[
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Read naturally in the present context, the phrase \u201cappropriate and necessary\u201d requires at least some attention to cost. One would not say that it is even rational, never mind \u201cappropriate,\u201d to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. In addition, \u201ccost\u201d includes more than the expense of complying with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost. EPA\u2019s interpretation precludes the Agency from considering any type of cost\u2014including, for instance, harms that regulation might do to human health or the environment. The Government concedes that if the Agency were to find that emissions from power plants do damage to human health, but that the technologies needed to eliminate these emissions do even more damage to human health, it would still deem regulation appropriate. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 70. No regulation is \u201cappropriate\u201d if it does significantly more harm than good.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Using costs in the Transport Rule calculus, we agree with EPA, also makes good sense. Eliminating those amounts that can cost-effectively be reduced is an efficient and equitable solution to the allocation problem the Good Neighbor Provision requires the Agency to address. Efficient because EPA can achieve the levels of attainment, i.e., of emission reductions, the proportional approach aims to achieve, but at a much lower overall cost. Equitable because, by imposing uniform cost thresholds on regulated States, EPA\u2019s rule subjects to stricter regulation those States that have done relatively less in the past to control their pollution. Upwind States that have not yet implemented pollution controls of the same stringency as their neighbors will be stopped from free riding on their neighbors\u2019 efforts to reduce pollution. They will have to bring down their emissions by installing devices of the kind in which neighboring States have already invested.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Respondents and the dissent argue that the mere fact that \u00a71326(b) does not expressly authorize cost-benefit analysis for the BTA test, though it does so for two of the other tests, displays an intent to forbid its use. This surely proves too much. For while it is true that two of the other tests authorize cost-benefit analysis, it is also true that all four of the other tests expressly authorize some consideration of costs. Thus, if respondents\u2019 and the dissent\u2019s conclusion regarding the import of \u00a71326(b)\u2019s silence is correct, it is a fortiori true that the BTA test permits no consideration of cost whatsoever, not even the \u201ccost-effectiveness\u201d and \u201cfeasibility\u201d analysis that the Second Circuit approved, see supra, at 6, that the dissent would approve, post, at 1\u20132, and that respondents acknowledge. The inference that respondents and the dissent would draw from the silence is, in any event, implausible, as \u00a71326(b) is silent not only with respect to cost-benefit analysis but with respect to all potentially relevant factors. If silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA could not consider any factors in implementing \u00a71326(b)\u2014an obvious logical impossibility. It is eminently reasonable to conclude that \u00a71326(b)\u2019s silence is meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency\u2019s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to what degree.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Each time a species becomes extinct, the pool of wild species diminishes. This, in turn, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce by diminishing a natural resource that could otherwise be used for present and future commercial purposes. Unlike most other natural resources, however, the full value of the variety of plant and animal life that currently exists is uncertain. Plants and animals that are lost through extinction undoubtedly have economic uses that are, in some cases, as yet unknown but which could prove vitally important in the future. A species whose worth is still unmeasured has what economists call an 'option value' \u2014 the value of the possibility that a future discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought of as useless. See Bryan Nolan, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits of Quantification in Valuing Biodiveristy, in Biodiversity 200, 202 (Edward O. Wilson ed., 1988). To allow even a single species whose value is not currently apparent to become extinct therefore deprives the economy of the option value of that species. Because our current knowledge of each species and its possible uses is limited, it is impossible to calculate the exact impact that the loss of the option value of a single species might have on interstate commerce. See Alan Randall, What Mainstream Economists Have to Say about the Value of Biodiversity, in Biodiversity, supra, at 217. In the aggregate, however, we can be certain that the extinction of species and the attendant decline  in biodiversity will have a real and predictable effect on interstate commerce.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Much of the EPA's analysis is correct, and the EPA's basic decision to use TSCA as a comprehensive statute designed to fight a multi-industry problem was a proper one that we uphold today on review. What concerns us, however, is the manner in which the EPA conducted some of its analysis. TSCA requires the EPA to consider, along with the effects of toxic substances on human health and the environment, \u201cthe benefits of such substance[s] or mixture[s] for various uses and the availability of substitutes for such uses,\u201d as well as \u201cthe reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration for the effect on the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and public health.\u201d ",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "The plain meaning of the word 'feasible' supports respondents' interpretation of the statute. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 831 (1976), 'feasible' means 'capable of being done, executed, or effected.' Accord, the Oxford English Dictionary 116 (1933) ('Capable of being done, accomplished or carried out'); Funk & Wagnalls New 'Standard' Dictionary of the English Language 903 (1957) ('That may be done, performed or effected'). Thus, \u00a7 6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to issue the standard that 'most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health,' limited only by the extent to which this is 'capable of being done.' In effect, then, as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits by placing the 'benefit' of worker health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this 'benefit' unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in \u00a7 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute, because feasibility analysis is. ",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "To evaluate whether use of a pesticide poses an \u201cunreasonable risk to man or the environment,\u201d the Administrator engages in a cost-benefit analysis that takes \u201cinto account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.\u201d 7 U.S.C. s 136(bb). We have previously recognized that in the \u201cpreliminary assessment of probabilities\u201d involved in a suspension proceeding, \u201cit is not necessary to have evidence on . . . a specific use or area in order to be able to conclude on the basis of substantial evidence that the use of (a pesticide) in general is hazardous.\u201d EDF v. EPA, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 130, 489 F.2d at 1254, quoted in EDF v. EPA (Shell Chemical Co.), 167 U.S.App.D.C. at 80, 510 F.2d at 1301. \u201cReliance on general data, consideration of laboratory experiments on animals, etc.\u201d has been held a sufficient basis for an order cancelling or suspending the registration of a pesticide. Id. Once risk is shown, the responsibility to demonstrate that the benefits outweigh the risks is upon the proponents of continued registration. Conversely, the statute places a \u201cheavy burden\u201d18 of explanation on an Administrator who decides to permit the continued use of a chemical known to produce cancer in experimental animals. Applying these principles to the evidence adduced in this case, we conclude that the Administrator's decision to suspend most uses of heptachlor and chlordane and not to suspend others is supported by substantial evidence and is a rational exercise of his authority under FIFRA.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Other provisions in the Clean Water Act also suggest the Agency's interpretation. When Congress wished to mandate the greatest feasible reduction in water pollution, it did so in plain language: The provision governing the discharge of toxic pollutants into the Nation's waters requires the EPA to set \u201ceffluent limitations [which] shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds ... that such elimination is technologically and economically achievable,\u201d \u00a7 1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). See also \u00a7 1316(a)(1) (mandating \u201cwhere practicable, a standard [for new point sources] permitting no discharge of pollutants\u201d (emphasis added)). Section 1326(b)'s use of the less ambitious goal of \u201cminimizing adverse environmental impact\u201d suggests, we think, that the agency retains some discretion to determine the extent of reduction that is warranted under the circumstances. That determination could plausibly involve a consideration of the benefits derived from reductions and the costs of achieving them. Cf. 40 CFR \u00a7 125.83 (defining \u201cminimize\u201d for purposes of the Phase I regulations as \u201creduc[ing] to the smallest amount, extent, or degree reasonably possible\u201d). It seems to us, therefore, that the phrase \u201cbest technology available,\u201d even with the added specification \u201cfor minimizing adverse environmental impact,\u201d does not unambiguously preclude cost-benefit analysis.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Suppose, for example, that the industries of upwind State A have expended considerable resources installing modern pollution-control devices on their plants. Factories in upwind State B, by contrast, continue to run old, dirty plants. *520 Yet, perhaps because State A is more populous and therefore generates a larger sum of pollution overall, the two States' emissions have equal effects on downwind attainment. If State A and State B are required to eliminate emissions proportionally (i.e., equally), sources in State A will be compelled to spend far more per ton of reductions because they have already utilized lower cost pollution controls. State A's sources will also have to achieve greater reductions than would have been required had they not made the cost-effective reductions in the first place. State A, in other words, will be tolled for having done more to reduce pollution in the past.20 EPA'S COST-BASED ALLocation avoids these anomalies.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "In the Phase II requirements challenged here the EPA sought only to avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits. The agency limited variances from the Phase II \u201cnational performance standards\u201d to circumstances where the costs are \u201csignificantly greater than the benefits\u201d of compliance. 40 CFR \u00a7 125.94(a)(5)(ii). In defining the \u201cnational performance standards\u201d themselves the EPA assumed the application of technologies whose benefits \u201capproach those estimated\u201d for closed-cycle cooling systems at a fraction of the cost: $389 million per year, 69 Fed.Reg. 41666, as compared with (1) at least $3.5 billion per year to operate compliant closed-cycle cooling systems, id., at 41605 (or $1 billion per year to impose similar requirements on a subset of Phase II facilities, id., at 41606), and (2) significant reduction in the energy output of the altered facilities, id., at 41605. And finally, the EPA's assessment of the relatively meager financial benefits of the Phase II regulations that it adopted\u2014reduced impingement and entrainment of 1.4 billion aquatic organisms, id., at 41661, Exh. XII\u20136, with annualized use benefits of $83 million, id., at 41662, and nonuse benefits of indeterminate value, id., at 41660\u201341661\u2014when compared to annual costs of $389 million, demonstrates quite clearly that the agency did not select the Phase II regulatory requirements because their benefits equaled their costs.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "In sum, we hold that the CAA does not command that States be given a second **1610 opportunity to file a SIP after EPA has quantified the State's interstate pollution obligations. We further conclude that the Good Neighbor Provision does not require EPA to disregard costs and consider exclusively each upwind State's physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem. EPA's cost-effective allocation of emission reductions among upwind States, we hold, is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Statutory context reinforces the relevance of cost. The procedures governing power plants that we consider today appear in \u00a7 7412(n)(1), which bears the caption \u201cElectric utility steam generating units.\u201d In subparagraph (A), the part of the law that has occupied our attention so far, Congress required EPA to study the hazards to public health posed by power plants and to determine whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. But in subparagraphs (B) and (C), Congress called for two additional studies. One of them, a study into mercury emissions from power plants and other sources, must consider \u201cthe health and environmental effects of such emissions, technologies which are available to control such emissions, and the costs of such technologies.\u201d \u00a7 7412(n)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This directive to EPA to study cost is a further indication of the relevance of cost to the decision to regulate.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Our reasoning so far establishes that it was unreasonable for EPA to read \u00a7 7412(n)(1)(A) to mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants. The Agency must consider cost\u2014including, most importantly, cost of compliance\u2014before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law unambiguously required the Agency, when making this preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value. It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation) how to account for cost.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Again on this issue as with the first, we need not decide whether EPA's reading is the only reading of this provision. Even if the statute does not compel EPA's approach, and even if EPA's reading is not the better reading, we conclude that it is still at least a reasonable reading given the various potential meanings of \u201ccost\u201d in this context. Therefore, we reject petitioners' argument that EPA was required to exclude consideration of cost-effectiveness and to set a beyond-the-floor standard of 0.04 lb/ton of clinker.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Upon an initial showing of product danger, the proper course for the EPA to follow is to consider each regulatory option, beginning with the least burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under each option. The EPA cannot simply skip several rungs, as it did in this case, for in doing so, it may skip a less-burdensome alternative mandated by TSCA. Here, although the EPA mentions the problems posed by intermediate levels of regulation, it takes no steps to calculate the costs and benefits of these intermediate levels. See 54 Fed.Reg. at 29,462, 29,474. Without doing this it is impossible, both for the EPA and for this court on review, to know that none of these alternatives was less burdensome than the ban in fact chosen by the agency.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Of more concern to us is the failure of the EPA to compute the costs and benefits of its proposed rule past the year 2000, and its double-counting of the costs of asbestos use. In performing its calculus, the EPA only included the number of lives saved over the next thirteen years, and counted any additional lives saved as simply \u201cunquantified benefits.\u201d 54 Fed.Reg. at 29,486. The EPA and intervenors now seek to use these unquantified lives saved to justify calculations as to which the benefits seem far outweighed by the astronomical costs. For example, the EPA plans to save about three lives with its ban of asbestos pipe, at a cost of $128\u2013227 million (i.e., approximately $43\u201376 million per life saved). Although the EPA admits that the price tag is high, it claims that the lives saved past the year 2000 justify the price. See generally id. at 29,473 (explaining use of unquantified benefits). Such calculations not only lessen the value of the EPA's cost analysis, but also make any meaningful judicial review impossible. While TSCA contemplates a useful place for unquantified benefits beyond the EPA's calculation, unquantified benefits never were intended as a trump card allowing the EPA to justify any cost calculus, no matter how high.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "The realities of interstate air pollution, however, are not so simple. Most upwind States contribute pollution to multiple downwind States in varying amounts. See 76 Fed.Reg. 48239\u201348246. See also Brief for Respondent Calpine Corp. et al. in Support of Petitioners 48\u201349 (offering examples). Suppose then that States X and Y also contribute pollutants to a second downwind State (State B), this time in a ratio of seven to one. Though State Y contributed a relatively larger share of pollution to State A, with respect to State B, State X is the greater offender. Following the proportionality approach with respect to State B would demand that State X reduce its emissions by seven times as much as State Y. Recall, however, that State Y, as just hypothesized, had to effect five times as large a reduction with respect to State A. The Court of Appeals' proportionality edict with respect to both State A and State B appears to work neither mathematically nor in practical application. Proportionality as to one downwind State will not achieve proportionality as to others. Quite the opposite. And where, as is generally true, upwind States contribute pollution to more than two downwind receptors, proportionality becomes all the more elusive.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "1",
        "input": "Other provisions explicitly permitted or required economic costs to be taken into account in implementing the air quality standards. Section 111(b)(1)(B), for example, commanded the Administrator to set \u201cstandards of performance\u201d for certain new sources of emissions that as specified in \u00a7 111(a)(1) were to \u201creflec[t] the degree of emission limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.\u201d Section 202(a)(2) prescribed that emissions standards for automobiles could take effect only \u201cafter such period as the Administrator finds necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite technology, giving appropriate consideration to the cost of compliance within such period.\u201d 84 Stat. 1690. See also \u00a7 202(b)(5)(C) (similar limitation for interim standards); \u00a7 211(c)(2) (similar limitation for fuel additives); \u00a7 231(b) (similar limitation for implementation of aircraft emission standards). Subsequent amendments to the CAA have added many more provisions directing, in explicit language, that the Administrator consider costs in performing various duties. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 7545(k)(1) (reformulate gasoline to \u201crequire the greatest reduction in emissions ... taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emissions reductions\u201d); \u00a7 7547(a)(3) (emission reduction for nonroad vehicles to be set \u201cgiving appropriate consideration to the cost\u201d of the standards). We have therefore refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "0",
        "input": "The common law of finds generally assigns ownership of the abandoned property without regard to where the property is found. Two exceptions to the rule are recognized: First, when the abandoned property is embedded in the soil, it belongs to the owner of the soil; Second, when the owner of the land where the property is found (whether on or embedded in the soil) has constructive possession of the property such that the property is not \u2018lost,\u2019 it belongs to the owner of the land.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "0",
        "input": "We need not decide whether Chevron deference should attach. Riverkeeper contends it should not, given the informality of the agency's action. Namely, it points out that the Corps did not engage in notice and comment rulemaking when it invoked Section 404(t), but acted on the basis of a Memorandum of Record. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (holding 'the want of' notice and comment procedures often compels in favor of not deferring to the agency). We need not settle this debate. At the least, Skidmore deference is due, and is sufficient to support the Corps' action.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "0",
        "input": "We disagree with the district court\u2019s conclusions regarding the APA claim. Because the Keeper has independent authority to determine the eligibility of properties and to add them to the National Register, the annulment of the state listing did not automatically void the national listing. Therefore, we reverse and remand-for entry of judgment for defendant-appellant.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "0",
        "input": "It is far from clear, moreover, that appellants' argument regarding the need for further proceedings before the Planning Board is correct even as a matter of Massachusetts law. The Supreme Judicial Court has noted that when a zoning board of appeals is shown to have erroneously interpreted applicable zoning law, and that error leads to the wrongful denial of a special permit, \u201cthe issuance of a permit is a matter of duty, not discretion, and relief in the form of an order that a permit issue is appropriate.\u201d Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 382 Mass. 283, 415 N.E.2d 840, 848-49 (1981).",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    },
    {
        "output": "0",
        "input": "We recognize that there is evidence to suggest that the Boyd Theater is not as architecturally significant as the Designation Committee presented. There is also evidence from which a jury could infer that the Historical Commission was predisposed to designate the theater. This argument, however, focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence to support the designation based upon criteria other than the potential cultural value of the Boyd if converted to a live performance space. This is not the appropriate inquiry here.",
        "instruction": "The following paragraph is drawn from a judicial opinion. Please determine if economic reasoning is involved by listing 1(if it is present) or 0(if not present). Economic reasoning is defined as when considerations such balancing costs and benefits, analysis of costs, or use of cost-benefit analysis influence the opinion."
    }
]