text: 95,258,1402776533387776000,2724167859,Stephen McAleer,"We often choose to delegate our decisions to algorithms. What should a central mediator do when multiple people choose to delegate their actions to the same mediator? In our recent paper we propose a mediator which Pareto-improves delegating agents. <LINK> In the prisoner's dilemma, our Pareto Mediator creates a new game where both players delegating is a strong Nash equilibrium. When both players delegate, the mediator has them cooperate. <LINK> To see what this would look like on a restaurant-reservation platform, if delegating agents choose restaurants that are full, the mediator will simply reserve spots for them at open restaurants. <LINK> In sequential social dilemmas, the mediator will simply play a cooperative policy for both players if they choose to delegate. <LINK> Here's some more results on some random normal form games. <LINK> Joint work with @JB_Lanier, @MichaelD1729, Pierre Baldi, and @roydfox",https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.03927,"Machine learning algorithms often make decisions on behalf of agents with varied and sometimes conflicting interests. In domains where agents can choose to take their own action or delegate their action to a central mediator, an open question is how mediators should take actions on behalf of delegating agents. The main existing approach uses delegating agents to punish non-delegating agents in an attempt to get all agents to delegate, which tends to be costly for all. We introduce a Pareto Mediator which aims to improve outcomes for delegating agents without making any of them worse off. Our experiments in random normal form games, a restaurant recommendation game, and a reinforcement learning sequential social dilemma show that the Pareto Mediator greatly increases social welfare. Also, even when the Pareto Mediator is based on an incorrect model of agent utility, performance gracefully degrades to the pre-intervention level, due to the individual autonomy preserved by the voluntary mediator. ",Improving Social Welfare While Preserving Autonomy via a Pareto Mediator,6,"['We often choose to delegate our decisions to algorithms.  What should a central mediator do when multiple people choose to delegate their actions to the same mediator? In our recent paper we propose a mediator which Pareto-improves delegating agents.\n<LINK>', ""In the prisoner's dilemma, our Pareto Mediator creates a new game where both players delegating is a strong Nash equilibrium. When both players delegate, the mediator has them cooperate. https://t.co/nDnW3qmk7Y"", 'To see what this would look like on a restaurant-reservation platform, if delegating agents choose restaurants that are full, the mediator will simply reserve spots for them at open restaurants. https://t.co/RFV7JoO2iI', 'In sequential social dilemmas, the mediator will simply play a cooperative policy for both players if they choose to delegate. https://t.co/hsZjKyOTTp', ""Here's some more results on some random normal form games. https://t.co/2bhzFYnfGT"", 'Joint work with @JB_Lanier, @MichaelD1729, Pierre Baldi, and @roydfox']",21,06,922