|
Sophisticated O |
|
APT29 O |
|
Campaign O |
|
Abuses O |
|
Notion O |
|
API O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Target O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
|
|
O |
|
mrtiepolo.medium.com/sophisticated-apt29-campaign-abuses-notion-api-to-target-the-european-commission200188059f58 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Gianluca O |
|
Tiepolo O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
March O |
|
30 O |
|
, O |
|
2023 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Gianluca O |
|
Tiepolo O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
1/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Mar O |
|
9 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
· O |
|
|
|
O |
|
12 O |
|
min O |
|
read O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Research O |
|
by O |
|
Gianluca O |
|
Tiepolo O |
|
|
|
O |
|
A O |
|
map O |
|
of O |
|
Russia O |
|
, O |
|
as O |
|
imagined O |
|
by O |
|
DALL·E O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
highly O |
|
sophisticated O |
|
Advanced O |
|
Persistent O |
|
Threat O |
|
( O |
|
APT O |
|
) O |
|
group O |
|
that O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
|
|
O |
|
attributed O |
|
to O |
|
Russia O |
|
’s O |
|
Foreign O |
|
Intelligence O |
|
Service O |
|
( O |
|
SVR O |
|
) O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
active O |
|
|
|
O |
|
since O |
|
at O |
|
least O |
|
2008 O |
|
and O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
involved O |
|
in O |
|
a O |
|
wide O |
|
range O |
|
of O |
|
espionage O |
|
and O |
|
cyber O |
|
- O |
|
attack O |
|
|
|
O |
|
campaigns O |
|
targeting O |
|
governments O |
|
, O |
|
military O |
|
organizations O |
|
, O |
|
defense O |
|
contractors O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
|
|
O |
|
various O |
|
industries O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
United O |
|
States O |
|
, O |
|
Europe O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
Asia O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
is O |
|
also O |
|
known O |
|
as O |
|
NOBELIUM O |
|
( O |
|
Microsoft O |
|
) O |
|
, O |
|
Cozy O |
|
Bear O |
|
( O |
|
Crowdstrike O |
|
) O |
|
, O |
|
The O |
|
Dukes O |
|
|
|
O |
|
( O |
|
Kaspersky O |
|
) O |
|
, O |
|
JACKMACKEREL O |
|
( O |
|
iDefense O |
|
) O |
|
, O |
|
BlueBravo O |
|
( O |
|
Recorded O |
|
Future O |
|
) O |
|
and O |
|
UNC2452 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
( O |
|
FireEye O |
|
) O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
is O |
|
known O |
|
for O |
|
its O |
|
subtle O |
|
and O |
|
sophisticated O |
|
tradecraft O |
|
in O |
|
stealing O |
|
geopolitical O |
|
|
|
O |
|
intelligence O |
|
: O |
|
unlike O |
|
other O |
|
Russian O |
|
state O |
|
- O |
|
sponsored O |
|
groups O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
APT28 O |
|
or O |
|
Sandworm O |
|
, O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
has O |
|
not O |
|
been O |
|
linked O |
|
to O |
|
destructive O |
|
operations O |
|
and O |
|
operates O |
|
with O |
|
much O |
|
more O |
|
|
|
O |
|
discretion O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
attributed O |
|
to O |
|
a O |
|
number O |
|
of O |
|
high O |
|
- O |
|
profile O |
|
cyberattacks O |
|
, O |
|
including O |
|
: O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
was O |
|
one O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
two O |
|
Russian O |
|
groups O |
|
responsible O |
|
for O |
|
the O |
|
cyberattack O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
DNC O |
|
|
|
O |
|
during O |
|
the O |
|
2016 O |
|
U.S. O |
|
presidential O |
|
election O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
gained O |
|
access O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
DNC O |
|
’s O |
|
|
|
O |
|
email O |
|
system O |
|
and O |
|
stole O |
|
sensitive O |
|
information O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
was O |
|
subsequently O |
|
leaked O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
public O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
was O |
|
attributed O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
highly O |
|
sophisticated O |
|
supply O |
|
chain O |
|
attack O |
|
against O |
|
|
|
O |
|
SolarWinds O |
|
, O |
|
a O |
|
leading O |
|
IT O |
|
management O |
|
software O |
|
provider O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
attack O |
|
allowed O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
|
|
O |
|
to O |
|
gain O |
|
access O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
systems O |
|
of O |
|
several O |
|
U.S. O |
|
government O |
|
agencies O |
|
, O |
|
including O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Department O |
|
of O |
|
Justice O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
Department O |
|
of O |
|
State O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
the O |
|
Department O |
|
of O |
|
Homeland O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Security O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
May O |
|
2021 O |
|
, O |
|
it O |
|
was O |
|
revealed O |
|
that O |
|
APT29 O |
|
was O |
|
responsible O |
|
for O |
|
a O |
|
large O |
|
- O |
|
scale O |
|
cyberattack O |
|
on O |
|
|
|
O |
|
multiple O |
|
U.S. O |
|
government O |
|
agencies O |
|
and O |
|
private O |
|
companies O |
|
, O |
|
including O |
|
Microsoft O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
|
|
O |
|
used O |
|
a O |
|
compromised O |
|
email O |
|
marketing O |
|
system O |
|
to O |
|
send O |
|
spear O |
|
- O |
|
phishing O |
|
emails O |
|
to O |
|
over O |
|
3,000 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
individual O |
|
accounts O |
|
, O |
|
resulting O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
installation O |
|
of O |
|
a O |
|
backdoor O |
|
that O |
|
allowed O |
|
the O |
|
attackers O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
2/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
gain O |
|
access O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
victims O |
|
’ O |
|
networks O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
has O |
|
also O |
|
been O |
|
linked O |
|
to O |
|
other O |
|
significant O |
|
|
|
O |
|
cyberattacks O |
|
, O |
|
including O |
|
the O |
|
theft O |
|
of O |
|
COVID-19 O |
|
research O |
|
from O |
|
U.S.-based O |
|
pharmaceutical O |
|
|
|
O |
|
companies O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Overall O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
is O |
|
one O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
most O |
|
sophisticated O |
|
and O |
|
well O |
|
- O |
|
resourced O |
|
APT O |
|
groups O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
world O |
|
, O |
|
|
|
O |
|
and O |
|
its O |
|
TTPs O |
|
are O |
|
constantly O |
|
evolving O |
|
and O |
|
changing O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Tactics O |
|
, O |
|
Techniques O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
Procedures O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
is O |
|
known O |
|
for O |
|
its O |
|
patient O |
|
and O |
|
persistent O |
|
targeting O |
|
of O |
|
its O |
|
victims O |
|
, O |
|
often O |
|
using O |
|
multi O |
|
- O |
|
stage O |
|
|
|
O |
|
attacks O |
|
that O |
|
take O |
|
weeks O |
|
or O |
|
even O |
|
months O |
|
to O |
|
complete O |
|
. O |
|
Following O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
list O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
’s O |
|
most O |
|
|
|
O |
|
notable O |
|
TTPs O |
|
: O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
uses O |
|
highly O |
|
targeted O |
|
and O |
|
convincing O |
|
spear O |
|
- O |
|
phishing O |
|
emails O |
|
to O |
|
gain O |
|
access O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
O |
|
a O |
|
target O |
|
’s O |
|
system O |
|
. O |
|
These O |
|
emails O |
|
are O |
|
usually O |
|
tailored O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
recipient O |
|
’s O |
|
interests O |
|
and O |
|
|
|
O |
|
appear O |
|
to O |
|
come O |
|
from O |
|
a O |
|
trusted O |
|
source O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
has O |
|
also O |
|
been O |
|
known O |
|
to O |
|
use O |
|
watering O |
|
hole O |
|
attacks O |
|
, O |
|
where O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
|
|
O |
|
compromises O |
|
a O |
|
trusted O |
|
website O |
|
frequented O |
|
by O |
|
the O |
|
target O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
then O |
|
injects O |
|
malware O |
|
into O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
site O |
|
to O |
|
infect O |
|
visitors O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
uses O |
|
highly O |
|
customized O |
|
malware O |
|
, O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
“ O |
|
SeaDuke O |
|
” O |
|
and O |
|
“ O |
|
CosmicDuke O |
|
, O |
|
” O |
|
that O |
|
|
|
O |
|
are O |
|
designed O |
|
to O |
|
evade O |
|
detection O |
|
and O |
|
maintain O |
|
persistence O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
target O |
|
system O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
|
|
O |
|
group O |
|
is O |
|
also O |
|
known O |
|
to O |
|
use O |
|
well O |
|
- O |
|
known O |
|
tools O |
|
like O |
|
“ O |
|
Cobalt O |
|
Strike O |
|
” O |
|
and O |
|
“ O |
|
PowerShell O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Empire O |
|
” O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
is O |
|
known O |
|
for O |
|
its O |
|
use O |
|
of O |
|
zero O |
|
- O |
|
day O |
|
exploits O |
|
to O |
|
gain O |
|
access O |
|
to O |
|
target O |
|
systems O |
|
. O |
|
For O |
|
|
|
O |
|
example O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
known O |
|
to O |
|
use O |
|
exploits O |
|
for O |
|
popular O |
|
software O |
|
like O |
|
Microsoft O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Office O |
|
and O |
|
Adobe O |
|
Flash O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
often O |
|
uses O |
|
“ O |
|
” O |
|
tactics O |
|
, O |
|
where O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
uses O |
|
legitimate O |
|
tools O |
|
and O |
|
techniques O |
|
that O |
|
|
|
O |
|
are O |
|
already O |
|
present O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
target O |
|
system O |
|
to O |
|
evade O |
|
detection O |
|
. O |
|
This O |
|
can O |
|
include O |
|
tools O |
|
like O |
|
|
|
O |
|
, O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
this O |
|
particular O |
|
research O |
|
, O |
|
I O |
|
focused O |
|
on O |
|
analyzing O |
|
APT29 O |
|
’s O |
|
command O |
|
- O |
|
and O |
|
- O |
|
control O |
|
|
|
O |
|
capabilities O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Command O |
|
& O |
|
Control O |
|
|
|
O |
|
This O |
|
threat O |
|
group O |
|
has O |
|
a O |
|
history O |
|
of O |
|
using O |
|
trusted O |
|
and O |
|
legitimate O |
|
cloud O |
|
services O |
|
( O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
|
|
O |
|
social O |
|
media O |
|
services O |
|
and O |
|
Google O |
|
Drive O |
|
) O |
|
for O |
|
their O |
|
cyber O |
|
attacks O |
|
in O |
|
an O |
|
attempt O |
|
to O |
|
blend O |
|
into O |
|
|
|
O |
|
normal O |
|
network O |
|
traffic O |
|
and O |
|
evade O |
|
detection O |
|
. O |
|
Malware O |
|
distributed O |
|
by O |
|
APT29 O |
|
also O |
|
contains O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
ability O |
|
to O |
|
exfiltrate O |
|
data O |
|
over O |
|
those O |
|
same O |
|
C2 O |
|
channels O |
|
. O |
|
For O |
|
example O |
|
: O |
|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
’s O |
|
malware O |
|
searched O |
|
for O |
|
specific O |
|
that O |
|
contained O |
|
URLs O |
|
to O |
|
access O |
|
C2 O |
|
servers O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
’s O |
|
and O |
|
malware O |
|
also O |
|
have O |
|
the O |
|
ability O |
|
to O |
|
use O |
|
to O |
|
obtain O |
|
C2 O |
|
URLs O |
|
, O |
|
as O |
|
well O |
|
as O |
|
other O |
|
|
|
O |
|
social O |
|
media O |
|
services O |
|
like O |
|
and O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
3/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
’s O |
|
backdoor O |
|
uses O |
|
, O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
for O |
|
C2 O |
|
communication O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
has O |
|
also O |
|
utilized O |
|
custom O |
|
encryption O |
|
methods O |
|
, O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
those O |
|
found O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
’s O |
|
|
|
O |
|
SeaDuke O |
|
malware O |
|
where O |
|
a O |
|
unique O |
|
fingerprint O |
|
was O |
|
generated O |
|
for O |
|
the O |
|
infected O |
|
host O |
|
and O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Base64 O |
|
encoding O |
|
and O |
|
RC4 O |
|
/ O |
|
AES O |
|
encryption O |
|
was O |
|
used O |
|
to O |
|
layer O |
|
data O |
|
during O |
|
communications O |
|
|
|
O |
|
with O |
|
their O |
|
C2 O |
|
server O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
group O |
|
has O |
|
also O |
|
employed O |
|
techniques O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
“ O |
|
domain O |
|
fronting O |
|
” O |
|
and O |
|
|
|
O |
|
TOR O |
|
obfuscation O |
|
plugins O |
|
to O |
|
create O |
|
encrypted O |
|
network O |
|
tunnels O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Using O |
|
social O |
|
networks O |
|
for O |
|
C2 O |
|
communications O |
|
is O |
|
not O |
|
an O |
|
entirely O |
|
new O |
|
technique O |
|
: O |
|
other O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Russian O |
|
groups O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
Turla O |
|
( O |
|
Venomous O |
|
Bear O |
|
) O |
|
leveraged O |
|
comments O |
|
posted O |
|
to O |
|
Instagram O |
|
|
|
O |
|
to O |
|
obtain O |
|
the O |
|
address O |
|
of O |
|
its O |
|
command O |
|
and O |
|
control O |
|
servers O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Source O |
|
: O |
|
FireEye O |
|
, O |
|
Stealthy O |
|
Tactics O |
|
Define O |
|
a O |
|
Russian O |
|
Cyber O |
|
Threat O |
|
Group O |
|
, O |
|
2015 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
was O |
|
spotted O |
|
using O |
|
Twitter O |
|
to O |
|
control O |
|
infected O |
|
machines O |
|
as O |
|
early O |
|
as O |
|
2015 O |
|
: O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
HAMMERTOSS O |
|
campaign O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
was O |
|
able O |
|
to O |
|
receive O |
|
commands O |
|
and O |
|
send O |
|
stolen O |
|
data O |
|
|
|
O |
|
through O |
|
the O |
|
popular O |
|
social O |
|
network O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
allowed O |
|
them O |
|
to O |
|
evade O |
|
detection O |
|
by O |
|
security O |
|
|
|
O |
|
solutions O |
|
that O |
|
did O |
|
not O |
|
monitor O |
|
social O |
|
media O |
|
traffic O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
EnvyScout O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
a O |
|
more O |
|
recent O |
|
campaign O |
|
dating O |
|
back O |
|
to O |
|
June O |
|
2021 O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
targeted O |
|
Italy O |
|
diplomatic O |
|
|
|
O |
|
organizations O |
|
with O |
|
a O |
|
spear O |
|
phishing O |
|
campaign O |
|
that O |
|
distributed O |
|
the O |
|
EnvyScout O |
|
backdoor O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
C2 O |
|
communication O |
|
through O |
|
Slack O |
|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
backdoor O |
|
first O |
|
calls O |
|
a O |
|
function O |
|
to O |
|
create O |
|
a O |
|
custom O |
|
Slack O |
|
channel O |
|
, O |
|
adding O |
|
the O |
|
attacker O |
|
’s O |
|
|
|
O |
|
user O |
|
ID O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
newly O |
|
created O |
|
channel O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
backdoor O |
|
gets O |
|
the O |
|
user O |
|
name O |
|
and O |
|
hostname O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
victim O |
|
host O |
|
, O |
|
adds O |
|
4 O |
|
random O |
|
numbers O |
|
to O |
|
form O |
|
the O |
|
name O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
channel O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
sends O |
|
an O |
|
HTTP O |
|
|
|
O |
|
request O |
|
with O |
|
an O |
|
authorization O |
|
token O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
Slack O |
|
API O |
|
. O |
|
After O |
|
the O |
|
channel O |
|
is O |
|
established O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
backdoor O |
|
enters O |
|
an O |
|
infinite O |
|
loop O |
|
: O |
|
it O |
|
uses O |
|
the O |
|
“ O |
|
chat.postMessage O |
|
” O |
|
API O |
|
request O |
|
to O |
|
send O |
|
a O |
|
|
|
O |
|
beacon O |
|
message O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
newly O |
|
created O |
|
channel O |
|
and O |
|
it O |
|
receives O |
|
a O |
|
response O |
|
with O |
|
a O |
|
list O |
|
of O |
|
|
|
O |
|
additional O |
|
files O |
|
and O |
|
payloads O |
|
that O |
|
are O |
|
downloaded O |
|
and O |
|
executed O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
target O |
|
machine O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Beatdrop O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
mid O |
|
- O |
|
January O |
|
2022 O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
launched O |
|
yet O |
|
another O |
|
spear O |
|
phishing O |
|
campaign O |
|
targeting O |
|
a O |
|
|
|
O |
|
diplomatic O |
|
entity O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
was O |
|
detected O |
|
and O |
|
responded O |
|
to O |
|
by O |
|
Mandiant O |
|
. O |
|
During O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
investigation O |
|
, O |
|
Mandiant O |
|
discovered O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
malicious O |
|
emails O |
|
were O |
|
used O |
|
to O |
|
distribute O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
BEATDROP O |
|
and O |
|
BOOMMIC O |
|
downloaders O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
BEATDROP O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
downloader O |
|
written O |
|
in O |
|
C O |
|
that O |
|
leverages O |
|
Trello O |
|
for O |
|
Command O |
|
- O |
|
and O |
|
- O |
|
Control O |
|
|
|
O |
|
( O |
|
C2 O |
|
) O |
|
communication O |
|
. O |
|
Trello O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
web O |
|
- O |
|
based O |
|
project O |
|
management O |
|
application O |
|
that O |
|
allows O |
|
|
|
O |
|
users O |
|
to O |
|
organize O |
|
tasks O |
|
and O |
|
projects O |
|
using O |
|
customizable O |
|
boards O |
|
, O |
|
lists O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
cards O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
4/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
When O |
|
executed O |
|
, O |
|
BEATDROP O |
|
maps O |
|
its O |
|
own O |
|
copy O |
|
of O |
|
ntdll.dll O |
|
into O |
|
memory O |
|
to O |
|
execute O |
|
|
|
O |
|
shellcode O |
|
in O |
|
its O |
|
own O |
|
process O |
|
. O |
|
It O |
|
creates O |
|
a O |
|
suspended O |
|
thread O |
|
, O |
|
then O |
|
enumerates O |
|
the O |
|
system O |
|
for O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
username O |
|
, O |
|
computer O |
|
name O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
IP O |
|
address O |
|
to O |
|
create O |
|
a O |
|
victim O |
|
ID O |
|
. O |
|
This O |
|
victim O |
|
ID O |
|
is O |
|
used O |
|
|
|
O |
|
by O |
|
BEATDROP O |
|
to O |
|
store O |
|
and O |
|
retrieve O |
|
victim O |
|
payloads O |
|
from O |
|
its O |
|
C2 O |
|
. O |
|
Once O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
ID O |
|
is O |
|
|
|
O |
|
created O |
|
, O |
|
BEATDROP O |
|
sends O |
|
an O |
|
initial O |
|
request O |
|
to O |
|
Trello O |
|
to O |
|
determine O |
|
if O |
|
the O |
|
current O |
|
victim O |
|
has O |
|
|
|
O |
|
already O |
|
been O |
|
compromised O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
shellcode O |
|
payload O |
|
is O |
|
then O |
|
retrieved O |
|
from O |
|
Trello O |
|
and O |
|
is O |
|
|
|
O |
|
targeted O |
|
for O |
|
each O |
|
victim O |
|
. O |
|
Once O |
|
the O |
|
payload O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
retrieved O |
|
, O |
|
it O |
|
is O |
|
deleted O |
|
from O |
|
Trello O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Notion O |
|
for O |
|
C2 O |
|
Communication O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
October O |
|
2022 O |
|
, O |
|
ESET O |
|
Research O |
|
discovered O |
|
a O |
|
sample O |
|
uploaded O |
|
to O |
|
VirusTotal O |
|
that O |
|
closely O |
|
|
|
O |
|
resembled O |
|
what O |
|
APT29 O |
|
had O |
|
used O |
|
a O |
|
few O |
|
months O |
|
ago O |
|
, O |
|
with O |
|
the O |
|
key O |
|
difference O |
|
being O |
|
that O |
|
it O |
|
|
|
O |
|
used O |
|
Notion O |
|
, O |
|
a O |
|
cloud O |
|
- O |
|
based O |
|
note O |
|
- O |
|
taking O |
|
software O |
|
platform O |
|
, O |
|
for O |
|
Command O |
|
- O |
|
and O |
|
- O |
|
Control O |
|
|
|
O |
|
( O |
|
C&C O |
|
) O |
|
communications O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Notion O |
|
API O |
|
can O |
|
be O |
|
abused O |
|
for O |
|
C2 O |
|
communications O |
|
by O |
|
embedding O |
|
the O |
|
commands O |
|
into O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Notion O |
|
workspace O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
is O |
|
accessed O |
|
by O |
|
the O |
|
malware O |
|
as O |
|
if O |
|
it O |
|
were O |
|
a O |
|
legitimate O |
|
user O |
|
. O |
|
This O |
|
|
|
O |
|
misuse O |
|
of O |
|
Notion O |
|
allows O |
|
the O |
|
threat O |
|
actors O |
|
to O |
|
evade O |
|
detection O |
|
and O |
|
bypass O |
|
security O |
|
|
|
O |
|
controls O |
|
, O |
|
as O |
|
the O |
|
traffic O |
|
between O |
|
the O |
|
malware O |
|
and O |
|
the O |
|
Notion O |
|
server O |
|
is O |
|
likely O |
|
to O |
|
be O |
|
perceived O |
|
|
|
O |
|
as O |
|
legitimate O |
|
traffic O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
ESET O |
|
researchers O |
|
suspect O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
downloader O |
|
deployed O |
|
in O |
|
this O |
|
particular O |
|
campaign O |
|
was O |
|
|
|
O |
|
designed O |
|
to O |
|
gather O |
|
and O |
|
execute O |
|
additional O |
|
malicious O |
|
payloads O |
|
, O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
Cobalt O |
|
Strike O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
|
|
O |
|
campaign O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
analyzed O |
|
in O |
|
more O |
|
detail O |
|
by O |
|
researchers O |
|
at O |
|
Hive O |
|
Pro O |
|
and O |
|
Recorded O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Future O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
identify O |
|
the O |
|
sample O |
|
as O |
|
the O |
|
GraphicalNeutrino O |
|
malware O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
According O |
|
to O |
|
Recorded O |
|
Future O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
utilized O |
|
a O |
|
compromised O |
|
website O |
|
with O |
|
a O |
|
lure O |
|
text O |
|
of O |
|
|
|
O |
|
“ O |
|
Ambassador O |
|
’s O |
|
schedule O |
|
November O |
|
2022 O |
|
” O |
|
to O |
|
distribute O |
|
the O |
|
ZIP O |
|
file O |
|
“ O |
|
schedule.zip O |
|
” O |
|
, O |
|
suggesting O |
|
|
|
O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
targets O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
campaign O |
|
are O |
|
related O |
|
to O |
|
embassy O |
|
staff O |
|
or O |
|
an O |
|
ambassador O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
GraphicalNeutrino O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
malware O |
|
used O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
operation O |
|
, O |
|
serves O |
|
as O |
|
a O |
|
loader O |
|
with O |
|
basic O |
|
C2 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
capabilities O |
|
and O |
|
employs O |
|
various O |
|
anti O |
|
- O |
|
analysis O |
|
techniques O |
|
to O |
|
avoid O |
|
detection O |
|
, O |
|
including O |
|
API O |
|
|
|
O |
|
unhooking O |
|
and O |
|
sandbox O |
|
evasion O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
GraphicalNeutrino O |
|
artifact O |
|
— O |
|
140runtime.dll O |
|
|
|
O |
|
After O |
|
establishing O |
|
persistence O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
malware O |
|
decrypts O |
|
several O |
|
strings O |
|
, O |
|
including O |
|
a O |
|
Notion O |
|
API O |
|
|
|
O |
|
key O |
|
and O |
|
a O |
|
database O |
|
identifier O |
|
, O |
|
and O |
|
calculates O |
|
a O |
|
unique O |
|
ID O |
|
for O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
based O |
|
on O |
|
their O |
|
|
|
O |
|
username O |
|
and O |
|
hostname O |
|
. O |
|
It O |
|
then O |
|
uses O |
|
Notion O |
|
’s O |
|
API O |
|
for O |
|
C2 O |
|
communication O |
|
to O |
|
deliver O |
|
|
|
O |
|
additional O |
|
payloads O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
’s O |
|
machine O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
For O |
|
each O |
|
request O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
C2 O |
|
, O |
|
GraphicalNeutrino O |
|
parses O |
|
the O |
|
JSON O |
|
- O |
|
formatted O |
|
response O |
|
and O |
|
|
|
O |
|
searches O |
|
for O |
|
a O |
|
“ O |
|
file O |
|
” O |
|
array O |
|
; O |
|
if O |
|
the O |
|
array O |
|
is O |
|
not O |
|
empty O |
|
, O |
|
then O |
|
the O |
|
malware O |
|
will O |
|
parse O |
|
out O |
|
the O |
|
URL O |
|
|
|
O |
|
field O |
|
, O |
|
download O |
|
the O |
|
file O |
|
and O |
|
decrypt O |
|
it O |
|
using O |
|
a O |
|
custom O |
|
cipher O |
|
. O |
|
Once O |
|
the O |
|
shellcode O |
|
is O |
|
|
|
O |
|
decrypted O |
|
, O |
|
it O |
|
is O |
|
indirectly O |
|
spawned O |
|
in O |
|
a O |
|
new O |
|
thread O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
5/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
A O |
|
sample O |
|
response O |
|
from O |
|
Notion O |
|
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|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
use O |
|
of O |
|
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|
lures O |
|
during O |
|
times O |
|
of O |
|
heightened O |
|
geopolitical O |
|
tensions O |
|
, O |
|
such O |
|
as O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
ongoing O |
|
war O |
|
in O |
|
Ukraine O |
|
, O |
|
is O |
|
likely O |
|
to O |
|
be O |
|
effective O |
|
for O |
|
Russian O |
|
APT O |
|
groups O |
|
, O |
|
given O |
|
the O |
|
potential O |
|
|
|
O |
|
impact O |
|
of O |
|
information O |
|
gathered O |
|
from O |
|
compromised O |
|
entities O |
|
or O |
|
individuals O |
|
on O |
|
Russian O |
|
|
|
O |
|
foreign O |
|
policy O |
|
and O |
|
strategic O |
|
decision O |
|
- O |
|
making O |
|
processes O |
|
. O |
|
It O |
|
is O |
|
perhaps O |
|
for O |
|
this O |
|
reason O |
|
that O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
adopted O |
|
the O |
|
same O |
|
tactics O |
|
— O |
|
in O |
|
particular O |
|
the O |
|
stealthy O |
|
C2 O |
|
communication O |
|
through O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Notion O |
|
— O |
|
for O |
|
its O |
|
next O |
|
big O |
|
campaign O |
|
, O |
|
this O |
|
time O |
|
targeting O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Attack O |
|
against O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
this O |
|
final O |
|
section O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
blog O |
|
post O |
|
, O |
|
I O |
|
’m O |
|
dissecting O |
|
a O |
|
previously O |
|
undisclosed O |
|
campaign O |
|
|
|
O |
|
attributed O |
|
to O |
|
APT29 O |
|
which O |
|
targeted O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
previous O |
|
introduction O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
group O |
|
’s O |
|
TTPs O |
|
and O |
|
campaigns O |
|
will O |
|
hopefully O |
|
be O |
|
beneficial O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
reader O |
|
, O |
|
as O |
|
this O |
|
attack O |
|
|
|
O |
|
shares O |
|
quite O |
|
a O |
|
few O |
|
similarities O |
|
with O |
|
the O |
|
GraphicalNeutrino O |
|
campaign O |
|
that O |
|
was O |
|
exposed O |
|
by O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Recorded O |
|
Future O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Initial O |
|
Access O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Beginning O |
|
mid O |
|
- O |
|
February O |
|
2023 O |
|
, O |
|
a O |
|
spear O |
|
phishing O |
|
campaign O |
|
targeted O |
|
a O |
|
number O |
|
of O |
|
email O |
|
|
|
O |
|
addresses O |
|
related O |
|
to O |
|
members O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
attack O |
|
involved O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
distribution O |
|
of O |
|
a O |
|
malicious O |
|
.iso O |
|
image O |
|
that O |
|
contained O |
|
a O |
|
new O |
|
sample O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
|
|
O |
|
downloader O |
|
. O |
|
Once O |
|
executed O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
malware O |
|
was O |
|
observed O |
|
exploiting O |
|
the O |
|
Notion O |
|
API O |
|
to O |
|
deploy O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Cobalt O |
|
Strike O |
|
beacons O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Execution O |
|
flow O |
|
for O |
|
the O |
|
attack O |
|
targeting O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
first O |
|
phishing O |
|
email O |
|
, O |
|
sent O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
13th O |
|
February O |
|
2023 O |
|
, O |
|
masqueraded O |
|
as O |
|
an O |
|
administrative O |
|
|
|
O |
|
notice O |
|
related O |
|
to O |
|
documents O |
|
available O |
|
to O |
|
download O |
|
from O |
|
eTrustEx O |
|
, O |
|
a O |
|
web O |
|
based O |
|
exchange O |
|
|
|
O |
|
platform O |
|
that O |
|
ensures O |
|
secure O |
|
transmission O |
|
of O |
|
documents O |
|
between O |
|
members O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Commission O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
decoy O |
|
emails O |
|
are O |
|
written O |
|
in O |
|
English O |
|
and O |
|
were O |
|
delivered O |
|
to O |
|
an O |
|
extremely O |
|
|
|
O |
|
targeted O |
|
number O |
|
of O |
|
key O |
|
people O |
|
that O |
|
use O |
|
the O |
|
eTrustEx O |
|
platform O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Lure O |
|
email O |
|
delivered O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
European O |
|
Commission O |
|
|
|
O |
|
In O |
|
addition O |
|
, O |
|
I O |
|
noticed O |
|
that O |
|
in O |
|
different O |
|
samples O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
email O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
senders O |
|
are O |
|
probably O |
|
|
|
O |
|
compromised O |
|
email O |
|
accounts O |
|
belonging O |
|
to O |
|
legitimate O |
|
government O |
|
organizations O |
|
. O |
|
This O |
|
could O |
|
|
|
O |
|
lead O |
|
victims O |
|
to O |
|
believe O |
|
that O |
|
the O |
|
emails O |
|
came O |
|
from O |
|
reliable O |
|
partners O |
|
, O |
|
making O |
|
it O |
|
more O |
|
likely O |
|
for O |
|
|
|
O |
|
recipients O |
|
to O |
|
click O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
links O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
When O |
|
the O |
|
link O |
|
is O |
|
opened O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
is O |
|
redirected O |
|
to O |
|
a O |
|
malicious O |
|
HTML O |
|
page O |
|
hosted O |
|
at O |
|
|
|
O |
|
hxxps://literaturaelsalvador[.]com O |
|
/ O |
|
Instructions.html O |
|
which O |
|
makes O |
|
use O |
|
of O |
|
a O |
|
|
|
O |
|
technique O |
|
known O |
|
as O |
|
HTML O |
|
Smuggling O |
|
to O |
|
download O |
|
an O |
|
ISO O |
|
image O |
|
to O |
|
the O |
|
target O |
|
system O |
|
. O |
|
I O |
|
|
|
O |
|
believe O |
|
that O |
|
this O |
|
domain O |
|
is O |
|
not O |
|
actor O |
|
- O |
|
owned O |
|
but O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
compromised O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
aligns O |
|
with O |
|
|
|
O |
|
previous O |
|
APT29 O |
|
activity O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
6/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Lure O |
|
website O |
|
|
|
O |
|
The O |
|
ISO O |
|
file O |
|
is O |
|
set O |
|
to O |
|
auto O |
|
- O |
|
download O |
|
when O |
|
the O |
|
website O |
|
is O |
|
visited O |
|
by O |
|
the O |
|
victim O |
|
; O |
|
this O |
|
is O |
|
|
|
O |
|
achieved O |
|
through O |
|
the O |
|
following O |
|
JavaScript O |
|
code O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
contents O |
|
of O |
|
Instructions.iso O |
|
is O |
|
stored O |
|
|
|
O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
d O |
|
variable O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
JS O |
|
Code O |
|
which O |
|
downloads O |
|
the O |
|
first O |
|
- O |
|
stage O |
|
payload O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Execution O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Once O |
|
the O |
|
file O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
written O |
|
to O |
|
disk O |
|
, O |
|
when O |
|
a O |
|
user O |
|
double O |
|
- O |
|
clicks O |
|
on O |
|
it O |
|
in O |
|
Windows O |
|
10 O |
|
or O |
|
later O |
|
, O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
image O |
|
is O |
|
mounted O |
|
and O |
|
the O |
|
folder O |
|
contents O |
|
is O |
|
displayed O |
|
in O |
|
Windows O |
|
Explorer O |
|
. O |
|
The O |
|
ISO O |
|
|
|
O |
|
contains O |
|
two O |
|
files O |
|
— O |
|
a O |
|
Windows O |
|
shortcut O |
|
file O |
|
( O |
|
Instructions.lnk O |
|
) O |
|
and O |
|
a O |
|
malicious O |
|
DLL O |
|
|
|
O |
|
( O |
|
BugSplatRc64.dll O |
|
) O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
If O |
|
the O |
|
user O |
|
clicks O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
LNK O |
|
file O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
following O |
|
command O |
|
runs O |
|
, O |
|
unintentionally O |
|
triggering O |
|
the O |
|
|
|
O |
|
execution O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
malicious O |
|
DLL O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Execution O |
|
of O |
|
the O |
|
malicious O |
|
DLL O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Using O |
|
LNK O |
|
shortcuts O |
|
to O |
|
execute O |
|
malicious O |
|
DLLs O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
technique O |
|
that O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
associated O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APT29 O |
|
in O |
|
a O |
|
number O |
|
of O |
|
campaigns O |
|
. O |
|
In O |
|
this O |
|
particular O |
|
scenario O |
|
, O |
|
I O |
|
recognized O |
|
the O |
|
sample O |
|
as O |
|
|
|
O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
, O |
|
a O |
|
downloader O |
|
that O |
|
has O |
|
been O |
|
used O |
|
by O |
|
APT29 O |
|
since O |
|
2021 O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Persistence O |
|
|
|
O |
|
When O |
|
executed O |
|
with O |
|
the O |
|
InitiateDs O |
|
export O |
|
, O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
first O |
|
runs O |
|
a O |
|
few O |
|
reconnaissance O |
|
|
|
O |
|
commands O |
|
and O |
|
generates O |
|
a O |
|
host O |
|
- O |
|
id O |
|
by O |
|
hex O |
|
- O |
|
encoding O |
|
the O |
|
DNS O |
|
domain O |
|
and O |
|
username O |
|
. O |
|
Then O |
|
, O |
|
|
|
O |
|
it O |
|
creates O |
|
a O |
|
copy O |
|
of O |
|
itself O |
|
at O |
|
: O |
|
|
|
O |
|
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\DsDiBacks\BugSplatRc64.dll O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
creates O |
|
a O |
|
copy O |
|
of O |
|
itself O |
|
|
|
O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
then O |
|
establishes O |
|
persistence O |
|
on O |
|
the O |
|
compromised O |
|
system O |
|
by O |
|
creating O |
|
a O |
|
registry O |
|
|
|
O |
|
run O |
|
key O |
|
located O |
|
at O |
|
: O |
|
\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\DsDiBacks O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
establishes O |
|
persistence O |
|
through O |
|
a O |
|
registry O |
|
key O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Command O |
|
and O |
|
Control O |
|
|
|
O |
|
As O |
|
I O |
|
anticipated O |
|
at O |
|
the O |
|
start O |
|
of O |
|
this O |
|
post O |
|
, O |
|
the O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
sample O |
|
delivered O |
|
in O |
|
the O |
|
execution O |
|
|
|
O |
|
chain O |
|
leverages O |
|
its O |
|
command O |
|
- O |
|
and O |
|
- O |
|
control O |
|
by O |
|
communicating O |
|
over O |
|
HTTPS O |
|
using O |
|
Notion O |
|
|
|
O |
|
APIs O |
|
. O |
|
Notion O |
|
’s O |
|
database O |
|
feature O |
|
is O |
|
also O |
|
used O |
|
to O |
|
store O |
|
victim O |
|
information O |
|
and O |
|
stage O |
|
further O |
|
|
|
O |
|
payloads O |
|
for O |
|
download O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
PCAP O |
|
collected O |
|
during O |
|
C2 O |
|
communication O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
7/9 O |
|
|
|
|
|
O |
|
Based O |
|
on O |
|
my O |
|
observations O |
|
, O |
|
this O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
sample O |
|
periodically O |
|
executes O |
|
a O |
|
POST O |
|
request O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
O |
|
the O |
|
Notion O |
|
API O |
|
to O |
|
check O |
|
the O |
|
availability O |
|
of O |
|
a O |
|
second O |
|
- O |
|
stage O |
|
malware O |
|
payload O |
|
, O |
|
which O |
|
is O |
|
then O |
|
|
|
O |
|
retrieved O |
|
and O |
|
executed O |
|
in O |
|
memory O |
|
. O |
|
In O |
|
this O |
|
particular O |
|
campaign O |
|
, O |
|
APT29 O |
|
used O |
|
VaporRage O |
|
to O |
|
|
|
O |
|
distribute O |
|
Cobalt O |
|
Strike O |
|
beacons O |
|
to O |
|
further O |
|
establish O |
|
a O |
|
foothold O |
|
within O |
|
the O |
|
environment O |
|
. O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Following O |
|
is O |
|
a O |
|
sample O |
|
POST O |
|
request O |
|
towards O |
|
api.notion.com O |
|
( O |
|
104[.]18.42.99 O |
|
): O |
|
|
|
O |
|
POST O |
|
/v1 O |
|
/ O |
|
databases/37089abc0926463182bb5343bce252cc O |
|
/ O |
|
query O |
|
HTTP/1.1 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
content O |
|
- O |
|
type O |
|
: O |
|
application O |
|
/ O |
|
json O |
|
|
|
O |
|
accept O |
|
: O |
|
application O |
|
/ O |
|
json O |
|
|
|
O |
|
notion O |
|
- O |
|
version O |
|
: O |
|
2022 O |
|
- O |
|
06 O |
|
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28 O |
|
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authorization O |
|
: O |
|
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secret_X92sXCVWoTk63aPgGKlPBBmHVmuKXJ2geugKa7Ogj7s O |
|
|
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O |
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|
- O |
|
Agent O |
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
6.3 O |
|
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|
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|
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|
( O |
|
KHTML O |
|
, O |
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like O |
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|
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|
|
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|
Host O |
|
: O |
|
api.notion.com O |
|
|
|
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|
Content O |
|
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|
Length O |
|
: O |
|
79 O |
|
|
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|
Connection O |
|
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|
Keep O |
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no O |
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filter":{"property":"Name","rich_text":{"equals":"VKoMr3830"}},"page_size":1 O |
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attempts O |
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to O |
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keys O |
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certificates O |
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threat O |
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capabilities O |
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network O |
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security O |
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controls O |
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but O |
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also O |
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increases O |
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law O |
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tactics O |
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|
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gathering O |
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within O |
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targeted O |
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victim O |
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networks O |
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geopolitical O |
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impressive O |
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|
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actor O |
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definitely O |
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continue O |
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2023 O |
|
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|
|
|
|
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IOCs O |
|
|
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list O |
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|
campaign O |
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|
|
|
O |
|
Domains O |
|
hxxps://literaturaelsalvador[.]com O |
|
/ O |
|
instructions.html O |
|
|
|
O |
|
hxxps://api[.]notion[.]com O |
|
/ O |
|
v1 O |
|
/ O |
|
databases/37089abc0926463182bb5343bce252cc O |
|
/ O |
|
query O |
|
|
|
O |
|
IPs O |
|
|
|
O |
|
108[.]167.180.186 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
104[.]18.42.99 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
Files O |
|
— O |
|
SHA256 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
21a0b617431850a9ea2698515c277cbd95de4e59c493d0d8f194f3808eb16354 O |
|
|
|
O |
|
( O |
|
Instructions.iso O |
|
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|
|
|
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|
e957326b2167fa7ccd508cbf531779a28bfce75eb2635ab81826a522979aeb98 O |
|
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|
BugSplatRc64.dll O |
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|
|
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the O |
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|
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Gianluca O |
|
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|
|
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|
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|
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|
a O |
|
cybersecurity O |
|
researcher O |
|
who O |
|
specializes O |
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in O |
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|
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telecommunications O |
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|
|
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|
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