Espionage	O
campaign	O
linked	O
to	O
Russian	O
intelligence	O
services	O

	O
gov.pl/web/baza-wiedzy/espionage-campaign-linked-to-russian-intelligence-services	O


	O
13.04.2023	O

	O
The	O
Military	O
Counterintelligence	O
Service	O
and	O
the	O
CERT	O
Polska	O
team	O
(	O
CERT.PL	O
)	O
observed	O
a	O
widespread	O
espionage	O

	O
campaign	O
linked	O
to	O
Russian	O
intelligence	O
services	O


	O
The	O
Military	O
Counterintelligence	O
Service	O
and	O
the	O
CERT	O
Polska	O
team	O
(	O
CERT.PL	O
)	O
observed	O
a	O
widespread	O
espionage	O

	O
campaign	O
linked	O
to	O
Russian	O
intelligence	O
services	O
,	O
aimed	O
at	O
collecting	O
information	O
from	O
foreign	O
ministries	O
and	O

	O
diplomatic	O
entities	O
.	O
Most	O
of	O
the	O
identified	O
targets	O
of	O
the	O
campaign	O
are	O
located	O
in	O
NATO	O
member	O
states	O
,	O
the	O

	O
European	O
Union	O
and	O
,	O
to	O
a	O
lesser	O
extent	O
,	O
in	O
Africa	O
.	O

	O
Many	O
elements	O
of	O
the	O
observed	O
campaign	O
–	O
the	O
infrastructure	O
,	O
the	O
techniques	O
used	O
and	O
the	O
tools	O
-	O
overlap	O
,	O
in	O
part	O

	O
or	O
in	O
full	O
,	O
with	O
activity	O
described	O
in	O
the	O
past	O
,	O
referred	O
to	O
by	O
Microsoft	O
as	O
“	O
NOBELIUM	O
”	O
and	O
by	O
Mandiant	O
as	O
“	O
APT29	O
”	O
.	O

	O
The	O
actor	O
behind	O
them	O
has	O
been	O
linked	O
to	O
,	O
among	O
other	O
things	O
,	O
a	O
campaign	O
called	O
“	O
SOLARWINDS”1	O
and	O
the	O
tools	O

	O
“	O
SUNBURST	O
”	O
,	O
“	O
ENVYSCOUT”2	O
.	O
3	O
.	O
and	O
“	O
BOOMBOX”4	O
,	O
as	O
well	O
as	O
numerous	O
other	O
espionage	O
campaigns5	O
.	O

	O
The	O
activities	O
described	O
here	O
differ	O
from	O
the	O
previous	O
ones	O
in	O
the	O
use	O
of	O
software	O
unique	O
to	O
this	O
campaign	O
and	O
not	O

	O
previously	O
described	O
publicly	O
.	O
New	O
tools6	O
were	O
used	O
at	O
the	O
same	O
time	O
and	O
independently	O
of	O
each	O
other	O
,	O
or	O
replacing	O

	O
those	O
whose	O
effectiveness	O
had	O
declined	O
,	O
allowing	O
the	O
actor	O
to	O
maintain	O
continues	O
,	O
high	O
operational	O
tempo	O
.	O

	O
At	O
the	O
time	O
of	O
publication	O
of	O
the	O
report	O
,	O
the	O
campaign	O
is	O
still	O
ongoing	O
and	O
in	O
development	O
.	O
The	O
Military	O

	O
Counterintelligence	O
Service	O
and	O
CERT.PL	O
recommend	O
all	O
entities	O
which	O
may	O
be	O
in	O
the	O
area	O
of	O
interest	O
of	O
the	O
actor	O

	O
to	O
implement	O
mechanisms	O
aimed	O
at	O
improving	O
the	O
security	O
of	O
IT	O
Security	O
systems	O
in	O
use	O
and	O
increasing	O
the	O

	O
detection	O
of	O
attacks	O
.	O
Examples	O
of	O
configuration	O
changes	O
and	O
detection	O
mechanisms	O
are	O
proposed	O
in	O
the	O

	O
recommendations	O
.	O

	O
The	O
aim	O
of	O
publishing	O
the	O
advisory	O
is	O
to	O
disrupt	O
the	O
ongoing	O
espionage	O
campaign	O
,	O
impose	O
additional	O
cost	O
of	O

	O
operations	O
against	O
allied	O
nations	O
and	O
enable	O
the	O
detection	O
,	O
analysis	O
and	O
tracking	O
of	O
the	O
activity	O
by	O
affected	O
parties	O

	O
and	O
the	O
wider	O
cyber	O
security	O
industry	O
.	O


	O
The	O
course	O
of	O
the	O
observed	O
campaigns	O


	O
1/7	O


	O
In	O
all	O
observed	O
cases	O
,	O
the	O
actor	O
utilised	O
spear	O
phishing	O
techniques	O
.	O
Emails	O
impersonating	O
embassies	O
of	O
European	O

	O
countries	O
were	O
sent	O
to	O
selected	O
personnel	O
at	O
diplomatic	O
posts	O
.	O
The	O
correspondence	O
contained	O
an	O
invitation	O
to	O
a	O

	O
meeting	O
or	O
to	O
work	O
together	O
on	O
documents	O
.	O
In	O
the	O
body	O
of	O
the	O
message	O
or	O
in	O
an	O
attached	O
PDF	O
document	O
,	O
a	O
link	O
was	O

	O
included	O
purportedly	O
directing	O
to	O
the	O
ambassador	O
's	O
calendar	O
,	O
meeting	O
details	O
or	O
a	O
downloadable	O
file	O
.	O


	O
Figure	O
1	O
.	O
Example	O
of	O
an	O
email	O
impersonating	O
the	O
Polish	O
embassy	O
and	O
urging	O
the	O
addressee	O
to	O
click	O
on	O
a	O
malicious	O

	O
link	O
.	O


	O
The	O
link	O
directed	O
to	O
a	O
compromised	O
website	O
that	O
contained	O
the	O
actor	O
's	O
signature	O
script	O
,	O
publicly	O
referred	O
to	O
as	O

	O
“	O
ENVYSCOUT	O
”	O
.	O
It	O
utilises	O
the	O
HTML	O
Smuggling	O
technique	O
–	O
whereby	O
a	O
malicious	O
file	O
placed	O
on	O
the	O
page	O
is	O

	O
decoded	O
using	O
JavaScript	O
when	O
the	O
page	O
is	O
opened	O
and	O
then	O
downloaded	O
on	O
the	O
victim	O
's	O
device	O
.	O
This	O
makes	O
the	O

	O
malicious	O
file	O
more	O
difficult	O
to	O
detect	O
on	O
the	O
server	O
side	O
where	O
it	O
is	O
stored	O
.	O
The	O
web	O
page	O
also	O
displayed	O
an	O

	O
information	O
intended	O
to	O
reassure	O
the	O
victim	O
that	O
they	O
had	O
downloaded	O
the	O
correct	O
attachment	O
.	O

	O
In	O
the	O
course	O
of	O
the	O
described	O
campaign	O
,	O
three	O
different	O
versions	O
of	O
the	O
ENVYSCOUT	O
tool	O
were	O
observed	O
,	O

	O
progressively	O
adding	O
new	O
mechanisms	O
to	O
hinder	O
analysis	O
.	O


	O
2/7	O


	O
Figure	O
2	O
.	O


	O
A	O
website	O
impersonating	O
the	O
Polish	O
embassy	O
suggesting	O
a	O
downloadable	O
calendar	O

	O
Campaigns	O
observed	O
in	O
the	O
past	O
linked	O
to	O
“	O
NOBELIUM	O
”	O
and	O
“	O
APT29	O
”	O
used	O
.ZIP	O
or	O
.ISO	O
files	O
to	O
deliver	O
the	O
malware	O
.	O

	O
During	O
the	O
campaign	O
described	O
above	O
,	O
.IMG	O
files	O
were	O
also	O
used	O
in	O
addition	O
to	O
the	O
aforementioned	O
file	O
formats	O
.	O
ISO	O

	O
and	O
IMG	O
disk	O
images	O
,	O
on	O
Windows	O
computers	O
,	O
are	O
automatically	O
mounted	O
in	O
the	O
file	O
system	O
when	O
opened	O
,	O
which	O

	O
causes	O
their	O
contents	O
to	O
be	O
displayed	O
in	O
Windows	O
Explorer	O
.	O
In	O
addition	O
,	O
they	O
do	O
not	O
carry	O
the	O
so	O
-	O
called	O
mark	O
-	O
of	O
-	O
theweb	O
,	O
i.e.	O
the	O
user	O
will	O
not	O
be	O
warned	O
that	O
the	O
files	O
were	O
downloaded	O
from	O
the	O
Internet	O
.	O

	O
The	O
actor	O
used	O
various	O
techniques	O
to	O
get	O
the	O
user	O
to	O
launch	O
the	O
malware	O
.	O
One	O
of	O
them	O
was	O
a	O
Windows	O
shortcut	O

	O
(	O
LNK	O
)	O
file	O
pretending	O
to	O
be	O
a	O
document	O
but	O
actually	O
running	O
a	O
hidden	O
DLL	O
library	O
with	O
the	O
actor	O
's	O
tools	O
.	O
The	O
DLL	O

	O
Sideloading	O
technique	O
was	O
also	O
observed	O
,	O
using	O
a	O
signed	O
executable	O
file	O
to	O
load	O
and	O
execute	O
code	O
contained	O
in	O
a	O

	O
hidden	O
DLL	O
library	O
by	O
placing	O
it	O
in	O
the	O
same	O
directory	O
,	O
under	O
a	O
name	O
chosen	O
according	O
to	O
the	O
entries	O
in	O
the	O
import	O

	O
table	O
.	O
At	O
a	O
later	O
stage	O
of	O
the	O
campaign	O
,	O
the	O
name	O
of	O
the	O
executable	O
file	O
contained	O
many	O
spaces	O
to	O
make	O
the	O
exe	O

	O
extension	O
difficult	O
to	O
spot	O
.	O


	O
Figure	O
3	O
.	O
View	O
after	O
the	O
victim	O
starts	O
-	O
up	O
an	O
image	O
file	O
with	O
the	O
default	O
Windows	O
Explorer	O
settings	O
.	O


	O
Tools	O
used	O
during	O
the	O
campaign	O


	O
3/7	O


	O
The	O
actor	O
used	O
various	O
tools	O
at	O
different	O
stages	O
of	O
the	O
described	O
campaign	O
.	O
All	O
those	O
listed	O
below	O
are	O
unique	O
to	O
the	O

	O
set	O
of	O
activities	O
described	O
.	O
A	O
detailed	O
technical	O
analysis	O
of	O
each	O
is	O
included	O
in	O
separate	O
documents	O
:	O

	O
1	O
.	O
SNOWYAMBER	O
–	O
a	O
tool	O
first	O
used	O
in	O
October	O
2022	O
,	O
abusing	O
the	O
Notion7	O
service	O
to	O
communicate	O
and	O

	O
download	O
further	O
malicious	O
files	O
.	O
Two	O
versions	O
of	O
this	O
tool	O
have	O
been	O
observed	O
.	O

	O
2	O
.	O
HALFRIG	O
–	O
used	O
for	O
the	O
first	O
time	O
in	O
February	O
2023	O
.	O
This	O
tool	O
is	O
distinguished	O
from	O
the	O
others	O
by	O
the	O

	O
embedded	O
code	O
that	O
runs	O
the	O
COBALT	O
STRIKE	O
tool	O
.	O

	O
3	O
.	O
QUARTERRIG	O
–	O
a	O
tool	O
first	O
used	O
in	O
March	O
2023	O
,	O
sharing	O
part	O
of	O
the	O
code	O
with	O
HALFRIG	O
.	O
Two	O
versions	O
of	O
this	O

	O
tool	O
were	O
observed	O
.	O

	O
The	O
first	O
version	O
of	O
the	O
SNOWYAMBER	O
tool	O
was	O
publicly	O
described	O
by	O
Recorded	O
Future	O
,	O
among	O
others8	O
.	O
A	O

	O
modified	O
version	O
of	O
the	O
SNOWYAMBER	O
tool	O
,	O
the	O
HALFRIG	O
tool	O
and	O
the	O
QUATERRIG	O
tool	O
have	O
not	O

	O
previously	O
been	O
described	O
publicly	O
.	O


	O
Figure	O
4	O
.	O
Timeline	O
illustrating	O
the	O
observed	O
actions	O
of	O
the	O
actor	O

	O
The	O
SNOWYAMBER	O
and	O
QUARTERRIG	O
tools	O
were	O
used	O
as	O
so	O
-	O
called	O
downloaders	O
.	O
Both	O
tools	O
sent	O
the	O
IP	O
address	O

	O
as	O
well	O
as	O
the	O
computer	O
and	O
user	O
name	O
to	O
the	O
actor	O
.	O
They	O
were	O
used	O
to	O
assess	O
whether	O
the	O
victim	O
was	O
of	O
interest	O

	O
to	O
the	O
actor	O
and	O
whether	O
it	O
was	O
a	O
malware	O
analysis	O
environment	O
.	O
If	O
the	O
infected	O
workstation	O
passed	O
manual	O

	O
verification	O
,	O
the	O
aforementioned	O
downloaders	O
were	O
used	O
to	O
deliver	O
and	O
start	O
-	O
up	O
the	O
commercial	O
tools	O
COBALT	O

	O
STRIKE	O
or	O
BRUTE	O
RATEL	O
.	O
HALFRIG	O
,	O
on	O
the	O
other	O
hand	O
,	O
works	O
as	O
a	O
so	O
-	O
called	O
loader	O
–	O
it	O
contains	O
the	O
COBALT	O

	O
STRIKE	O
payload	O
and	O
runs	O
it	O
automatically	O
.	O


	O
4/7	O


	O
Figure	O
5	O
.	O
Illustration	O
of	O
the	O
actor	O
's	O


	O
tool	O
delivery	O
course	O

	O
Despite	O
the	O
observed	O
changes	O
in	O
tools	O
,	O
many	O
of	O
the	O
elements	O
of	O
the	O
campaign	O
are	O
repeatable	O
.	O
These	O
include	O
:	O

	O
1	O
.	O
The	O
way	O
the	O
infrastructure	O
is	O
built	O
.	O
The	O
actor	O
behind	O
the	O
espionage	O
campaign	O
prefers	O
to	O
use	O
vulnerable	O

	O
websites	O
belonging	O
to	O
random	O
entities	O
.	O

	O
2	O
.	O
Email	O
theme	O
.	O
All	O
acquired	O
emails	O
used	O
in	O
the	O
campaigns	O
used	O
the	O
theme	O
of	O
correspondence	O
between	O

	O
diplomatic	O
entities	O
.	O


	O
5/7	O


	O
3	O
.	O
The	O
use	O
of	O
a	O
tool	O
publicly	O
referred	O
to	O
as	O
ENVYSCOUT	O
.	O
This	O
script	O
has	O
been	O
used	O
by	O
the	O
actor	O
since	O
at	O
least	O

	O
20219	O
.	O
Modifications	O
to	O
the	O
tool	O
's	O
code	O
were	O
observed	O
during	O
the	O
campaign	O
,	O
but	O
they	O
did	O
not	O
significantly	O

	O
affect	O
its	O
functionality	O
.	O

	O
4	O
.	O
A	O
link	O
to	O
the	O
ENVYSCOUT	O
tool	O
was	O
provided	O
to	O
the	O
victim	O
in	O
the	O
form	O
of	O
a	O
link	O
embedded	O
in	O
the	O
body	O
of	O
the	O

	O
email	O
or	O
in	O
the	O
body	O
of	O
an	O
attached	O
PDF	O
file	O
.	O

	O
5	O
.	O
Use	O
of	O
ISO	O
and	O
IMG	O
disc	O
images	O
.	O

	O
6	O
.	O
Use	O
of	O
a	O
technique	O
called	O
“	O
DLL	O
Sideloading	O
”	O
that	O
uses	O
a	O
non	O
-	O
malicious	O
,	O
digitally	O
signed	O
executable	O
file	O
to	O

	O
start	O
-	O
up	O
the	O
actor	O
’s	O
tools	O
.	O

	O
7	O
.	O
Use	O
of	O
commercial	O
tools	O
COBALT	O
STRIKE	O
and	O
BRUTE	O
RATEL	O
.	O


	O
Recommendations	O

	O
The	O
Military	O
Counterintelligence	O
Service	O
and	O
CERT.PL	O
strongly	O
recommend	O
that	O
all	O
entities	O
that	O
may	O
be	O
in	O
the	O

	O
actor	O
's	O
area	O
of	O
interest	O
implement	O
configuration	O
changes	O
to	O
disrupt	O
the	O
delivery	O
mechanism	O
that	O
was	O
used	O
in	O
the	O

	O
described	O
campaign	O
.	O
Sectors	O
that	O
should	O
particularly	O
consider	O
implementing	O
the	O
recommendations	O
are	O
:	O

	O
1	O
.	O
Government	O
entities	O
;	O

	O
2	O
.	O
Diplomatic	O
entities	O
,	O
foreign	O
ministries	O
,	O
embassies	O
,	O
diplomatic	O
staff	O
and	O
those	O
working	O
in	O
international	O
entities	O
;	O

	O
3	O
.	O
International	O
organisations	O
;	O

	O
4	O
.	O
Non	O
-	O
Governmental	O
organisations	O
.	O

	O
The	O
following	O
configuration	O
changes	O
can	O
be	O
used	O
to	O
disrupt	O
the	O
malware	O
delivery	O
mechanism	O
used	O
in	O
the	O
described	O

	O
campaign	O
:	O

	O
1	O
.	O
Blocking	O
the	O
ability	O
to	O
mount	O
disk	O
images	O
on	O
the	O
file	O
system	O
.	O
Most	O
users	O
doing	O
office	O
work	O
have	O
no	O
need	O
to	O

	O
download	O
and	O
use	O
ISO	O
or	O
IMG	O
files	O
.	O

	O
2	O
.	O
Monitoring	O
of	O
the	O
mounting	O
of	O
disk	O
image	O
files	O
by	O
users	O
with	O
administrator	O
roles	O
.	O

	O
3	O
.	O
Enabling	O
and	O
configuring	O
Attack	O
Surface	O
Reduction	O
Rules10	O
.	O

	O
4	O
.	O
Configuring	O
Software	O
Restriction	O
Policy	O
and	O
blocking	O
the	O
possibility	O
of	O
starting	O
-	O
up	O
executable	O
files	O
from	O

	O
unusual	O
locations	O
(	O
in	O
particular	O
:	O
temporary	O
directories	O
,	O
%	O
localappdata%	O
and	O
subdirectories	O
,	O
external	O
media11	O
)	O
.	O

	O
We	O
also	O
include	O
a	O
collection	O
of	O
all	O
observed	O
indicators	O
of	O
compromise	O
(	O
IoCs	O
)	O
related	O
to	O
the	O
campaign	O
described	O
,	O

	O
and	O
we	O
recommend	O
to	O
verify	O
the	O
system	O
and	O
network	O
logs	O
collected	O
for	O
their	O
occurrence	O
.	O


	O
Attachments	O

	O
1	O


	O
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc2452-merged-into-apt29	O

	O
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/	O
,	O

	O
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/	O

	O
3	O

	O
https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-apt29-phishing-campaigns	O

	O
4	O
Terminology	O
taken	O
from	O
the	O
Microsoft	O
MSTIC	O
team	O
's	O
publicly	O
available	O
analysis	O
:	O

	O
5	O
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/05/27/new-sophisticated-email-based-attack-from-nobelium/.	O

	O
2	O


	O
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF	O
,	O

	O
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Advisory%20Further%20TTPs%20associated%20with%20SVR%20cyber%20actors.pdf	O
,	O

	O
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russianintelligence-services	O
,	O

	O
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development	O

	O
6	O

	O
The	O
term	O
“	O
tools	O
”	O
is	O
used	O
in	O
a	O
broad	O
sense	O
and	O
includes	O
file	O
delivery	O
scripts	O
,	O
“	O
loader	O
”	O
,	O
“	O
stager	O
”	O
and	O
“	O
dropper	O
”	O

	O
software	O

	O
7	O

	O
https://www.notion.so/	O

	O
6/7	O


	O
8	O


	O
https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2023-0127.pdf	O

	O
https://microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/05/28/breaking-down-nobeliums-latest-early-stage-toolset/	O

	O
10	O

	O
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction	O

	O
11	O

	O
For	O
example	O
:	O

	O
C:\Windows\Temp\*.exe	O

	O
C:\Windows\Temp\*\*.exe	O

	O
%	O
USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\*.exe	O

	O
%	O
USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\*\*.exe	O

	O
%	O
USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\*.exe	O

	O
%	O
USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\*\*.exe	O

	O
9	O


	O
7/7	O