Suspected	O
Russian	O
Activity	O
Targeting	O
Government	O
and	O

	O
Business	O
Entities	O
Around	O
the	O
Globe	O

	O
mandiant.com/resources/blog/russian-targeting-gov-business	O


	O
Blog	O

	O
Luke	O
Jenkins	O
,	O
Sarah	O
Hawley	O
,	O
Parnian	O
Najafi	O
,	O
Doug	O
Bienstock	O

	O
Dec	O
06	O
,	O
2021	O

	O
16	O
min	O
read	O

	O
|	O
Last	O
updated	O
:	O
Nov	O
29	O
,	O
2022	O

	O
Uncategorized	O
Groups	O
(	O
UNC	O
Groups	O
)	O

	O
Cloud	O

	O
Threat	O
Research	O

	O
Malware	O

	O
Russia	O

	O
UPDATE	O
(	O
May	O
2022	O
):	O
We	O
have	O
merged	O
UNC2452	O
with	O
APT29	O
.	O
The	O
UNC2452	O
activity	O

	O
described	O
in	O
this	O
post	O
is	O
now	O
attributed	O
to	O
APT29	O
.	O

	O
1/14	O


	O
As	O
the	O
one	O
-	O
year	O
anniversary	O
of	O
the	O
discovery	O
of	O
the	O
SolarWinds	O
supply	O
chain	O
compromise	O

	O
passes	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
remains	O
committed	O
to	O
tracking	O
one	O
of	O
the	O
toughest	O
actors	O
we	O
have	O

	O
encountered	O
.	O
These	O
suspected	O
Russian	O
actors	O
practice	O
top	O
-	O
notch	O
operational	O
security	O
and	O

	O
advanced	O
tradecraft	O
.	O
However	O
,	O
they	O
are	O
fallible	O
,	O
and	O
we	O
continue	O
to	O
uncover	O
their	O
activity	O
and	O

	O
learn	O
from	O
their	O
mistakes	O
.	O
Ultimately	O
,	O
they	O
remain	O
an	O
adaptable	O
and	O
evolving	O
threat	O
that	O
must	O

	O
be	O
closely	O
studied	O
by	O
defenders	O
seeking	O
to	O
stay	O
one	O
step	O
ahead	O
.	O


	O
Summary	O

	O
Mandiant	O
continues	O
to	O
track	O
multiple	O
clusters	O
of	O
suspected	O
Russian	O
intrusion	O
activity	O
that	O

	O
have	O
targeted	O
business	O
and	O
government	O
entities	O
around	O
the	O
globe	O
.	O
Based	O
on	O
our	O

	O
assessment	O
of	O
these	O
activities	O
,	O
we	O
have	O
identified	O
two	O
distinct	O
clusters	O
of	O
activity	O
,	O
UNC3004	O

	O
and	O
UNC2652	O
.	O
We	O
associate	O
both	O
groups	O
with	O
UNC2452	O
also	O
referred	O
to	O
as	O
Nobelium	O
by	O

	O
Microsoft	O
.	O

	O
Some	O
of	O
the	O
tactics	O
Mandiant	O
has	O
recently	O
observed	O
include	O
:	O

	O
Compromise	O
of	O
multiple	O
technology	O
solutions	O
,	O
services	O
,	O
and	O
reseller	O
companies	O
since	O

	O
2020	O
.	O

	O
Use	O
of	O
credentials	O
likely	O
obtained	O
from	O
an	O
info	O
-	O
stealer	O
malware	O
campaign	O
by	O
a	O
thirdparty	O
actor	O
to	O
gain	O
initial	O
access	O
to	O
organizations	O
.	O

	O
Use	O
of	O
accounts	O
with	O
Application	O
Impersonation	O
privileges	O
to	O
harvest	O
sensitive	O
mail	O

	O
data	O
since	O
Q1	O
2021	O
.	O

	O
Use	O
of	O
both	O
residential	O
IP	O
proxy	O
services	O
and	O
newly	O
provisioned	O
geo	O
located	O

	O
infrastructure	O
to	O
communicate	O
with	O
compromised	O
victims	O
.	O

	O
Use	O
of	O
novel	O
TTPs	O
to	O
bypass	O
security	O
restrictions	O
within	O
environments	O
including	O
,	O
but	O
not	O

	O
limited	O
to	O
the	O
extraction	O
of	O
virtual	O
machines	O
to	O
determine	O
internal	O
routing	O
configurations	O
.	O

	O
Use	O
of	O
a	O
new	O
bespoke	O
downloader	O
we	O
call	O
CEELOADER	O
.	O

	O
Abuse	O
of	O
multi	O
-	O
factor	O
authentication	O
leveraging	O
“	O
push	O
”	O
notifications	O
on	O
smartphones	O

	O
In	O
most	O
instances	O
,	O
post	O
compromise	O
activity	O
included	O
theft	O
of	O
data	O
relevant	O
to	O
Russian	O

	O
interests	O
.	O
In	O
some	O
instances	O
,	O
the	O
data	O
theft	O
appears	O
to	O
be	O
obtained	O
primarily	O
to	O
create	O
new	O

	O
routes	O
to	O
access	O
other	O
victim	O
environments	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actors	O
continue	O
to	O
innovate	O
and	O

	O
identify	O
new	O
techniques	O
and	O
tradecraft	O
to	O
maintain	O
persistent	O
access	O
to	O
victim	O
environments	O
,	O

	O
hinder	O
detection	O
,	O
and	O
confuse	O
attribution	O
efforts	O
.	O

	O
The	O
following	O
sections	O
highlight	O
intrusion	O
activity	O
from	O
multiple	O
incident	O
response	O
efforts	O
that	O

	O
are	O
currently	O
tracked	O
as	O
multiple	O
uncategorized	O
clusters	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
suspects	O
the	O
multiple	O

	O
clusters	O
to	O
be	O
attributable	O
to	O
a	O
common	O
Russian	O
threat	O
.	O
The	O
information	O
covers	O
some	O
of	O
the	O

	O
tactics	O
,	O
techniques	O
,	O
and	O
procedures	O
(	O
TTPs	O
)	O
used	O
by	O
the	O
threat	O
actors	O
for	O
initial	O
compromise	O
,	O

	O
establishing	O
a	O
foothold	O
,	O
data	O
collection	O
,	O
and	O
lateral	O
movement	O
;	O
how	O
the	O
threat	O
actors	O

	O
provision	O
infrastructure	O
;	O
and	O
indicators	O
of	O
compromise	O
.	O
The	O
information	O
is	O
being	O
shared	O
to	O

	O
raise	O
awareness	O
and	O
allow	O
organizations	O
to	O
better	O
defend	O
themselves	O
.	O

	O
2/14	O


	O
Initial	O
Compromise	O

	O
Compromise	O
of	O
Cloud	O
Services	O
Providers	O

	O
Mandiant	O
has	O
identified	O
multiple	O
instances	O
where	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
compromised	O
service	O

	O
providers	O
and	O
used	O
the	O
privileged	O
access	O
and	O
credentials	O
belonging	O
to	O
these	O
providers	O
to	O

	O
compromise	O
downstream	O
customers	O
.	O

	O
In	O
at	O
least	O
one	O
instance	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
identified	O
and	O
compromised	O
a	O
local	O
VPN	O
account	O

	O
and	O
made	O
use	O
of	O
this	O
VPN	O
account	O
to	O
perform	O
reconnaissance	O
and	O
gain	O
further	O
access	O
to	O

	O
internal	O
resources	O
within	O
the	O
victim	O
CSP	O
’s	O
environment	O
,	O
which	O
ultimately	O
led	O
to	O
the	O

	O
compromise	O
of	O
internal	O
domain	O
accounts	O
.	O

	O
Access	O
Obtained	O
from	O
Info	O
-	O
stealer	O
Malware	O
Campaign	O

	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
a	O
campaign	O
where	O
the	O
threat	O
actors	O
gained	O
access	O
to	O
the	O
target	O

	O
organization	O
’s	O
Microsoft	O
365	O
environment	O
using	O
a	O
stolen	O
session	O
token	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
analyzed	O

	O
the	O
workstations	O
belonging	O
to	O
the	O
end	O
user	O
and	O
discovered	O
that	O
some	O
systems	O
had	O
been	O

	O
infected	O
with	O
CRYPTBOT	O
,	O
an	O
info	O
-	O
stealer	O
malware	O
,	O
shortly	O
before	O
the	O
stolen	O
session	O
token	O

	O
was	O
generated	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
observed	O
that	O
in	O
some	O
cases	O
the	O
user	O
downloaded	O
the	O
malware	O

	O
after	O
browsing	O
to	O
low	O
reputation	O
websites	O
offering	O
free	O
,	O
or	O
“	O
cracked	O
”	O
,	O
software	O
.	O

	O
Mandiant	O
assesses	O
with	O
moderate	O
confidence	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
obtained	O
the	O
session	O

	O
token	O
from	O
the	O
operators	O
of	O
the	O
info	O
-	O
stealer	O
malware	O
.	O
These	O
tokens	O
were	O
used	O
by	O
the	O
actor	O

	O
via	O
public	O
VPN	O
providers	O
to	O
authenticate	O
to	O
the	O
target	O
’s	O
Microsoft	O
365	O
environment	O
.	O

	O
Abuse	O
of	O
Repeated	O
MFA	O
Push	O
Notifications	O

	O
Mandiant	O
has	O
also	O
observed	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
executing	O
multiple	O
authentication	O
attempts	O
in	O

	O
short	O
succession	O
against	O
accounts	O
secured	O
with	O
multi	O
-	O
factor	O
authentication	O
(	O
MFA	O
)	O
.	O
In	O
these	O

	O
cases	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
had	O
a	O
valid	O
username	O
and	O
password	O
combination	O
.	O
Many	O
MFA	O

	O
providers	O
allow	O
for	O
users	O
to	O
accept	O
a	O
phone	O
app	O
push	O
notification	O
or	O
to	O
receive	O
a	O
phone	O
call	O

	O
and	O
press	O
a	O
key	O
as	O
a	O
second	O
factor	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
took	O
advantage	O
of	O
this	O
and	O
issued	O

	O
multiple	O
MFA	O
requests	O
to	O
the	O
end	O
user	O
’s	O
legitimate	O
device	O
until	O
the	O
user	O
accepted	O
the	O

	O
authentication	O
,	O
allowing	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
to	O
eventually	O
gain	O
access	O
to	O
the	O
account	O
.	O


	O
Post	O
Compromise	O
Activity	O
Via	O
Cloud	O
Solution	O
Provider	O
Compromise	O

	O
Establish	O
Foothold	O

	O
In	O
at	O
least	O
one	O
case	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
compromised	O
a	O
Microsoft	O
Azure	O
AD	O
account	O
within	O
a	O

	O
Cloud	O
Service	O
Provider	O
’s	O
(	O
CSP	O
)	O
tenant	O
.	O
The	O
account	O
held	O
a	O
specific	O
Azure	O
AD	O
role	O
that	O

	O
allowed	O
it	O
to	O
use	O
the	O
Admin	O
on	O
Behalf	O
Of	O
(	O
AOBO	O
)	O
feature	O
.	O
With	O
AOBO	O
,	O
users	O
with	O
a	O
specific	O

	O
role	O
in	O
the	O
CSP	O
tenant	O
have	O
Azure	O
Role	O
Based	O
Access	O
Control	O
(	O
RBAC	O
)	O
Owner	O
access	O
to	O


	O
3/14	O


	O
Azure	O
subscriptions	O
in	O
their	O
customer	O
’s	O
tenants	O
that	O
were	O
created	O
through	O
the	O
reseller	O

	O
relationship	O
.	O
RBAC	O
Owner	O
access	O
gives	O
the	O
role	O
holder	O
complete	O
control	O
over	O
all	O
resources	O

	O
within	O
the	O
Azure	O
subscription	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
leveraged	O
the	O
compromised	O
csp	O
’s	O
credentials	O

	O
and	O
the	O
AOBO	O
feature	O
to	O
gain	O
privileged	O
access	O
to	O
Azure	O
subscriptions	O
used	O
to	O
host	O
and	O

	O
manage	O
downstream	O
customer	O
systems	O
.	O
The	O
actor	O
executed	O
commands	O
with	O
NT	O

	O
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	O
privileges	O
within	O
Azure	O
VMs	O
using	O
the	O
Azure	O
Run	O
Command	O
feature	O
.	O

	O
The	O
Azure	O
Run	O
Command	O
feature	O
allows	O
a	O
user	O
to	O
run	O
PowerShell	O
scripts	O
within	O
an	O
Azure	O

	O
VM	O
using	O
the	O
Azure	O
Portal	O
,	O
REST	O
API	O
,	O
or	O
PowerShell	O
without	O
knowledge	O
of	O
Windows	O

	O
credentials	O
that	O
are	O
valid	O
on	O
the	O
VM	O
itself	O
.	O

	O
Privilege	O
Escalation	O

	O
Mandiant	O
found	O
evidence	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
RDP	O
to	O
pivot	O
between	O
systems	O
that	O
had	O

	O
limited	O
internet	O
access	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
accessed	O
numerous	O
devices	O
using	O
RDP	O
and	O

	O
executed	O
several	O
native	O
Windows	O
commands	O
.	O
On	O
one	O
device	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actors	O
made	O
use	O
of	O

	O
the	O
Windows	O
Task	O
Manager	O
to	O
dump	O
the	O
process	O
memory	O
belonging	O
to	O
LSASS	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O

	O
actor	O
also	O
obtained	O
the	O
Azure	O
AD	O
Connect	O
configuration	O
,	O
the	O
associated	O
AD	O
service	O
account	O
,	O

	O
and	O
the	O
key	O
material	O
used	O
to	O
encrypt	O
the	O
service	O
account	O
credentials	O
.	O
The	O
Azure	O
AD	O
Connect	O

	O
account	O
is	O
used	O
to	O
replicate	O
the	O
on	O
-	O
premise	O
instance	O
of	O
Active	O
Directory	O
into	O
Azure	O
AD	O
.	O
In	O

	O
addition	O
to	O
this	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
obtained	O
the	O
Active	O
Directory	O
Federation	O
Services	O
(	O
ADFS	O
)	O

	O
signing	O
certificate	O
and	O
key	O
material	O
.	O
This	O
allowed	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
to	O
forge	O
a	O
SAML	O
token	O

	O
which	O
could	O
be	O
used	O
to	O
bypass	O
2FA	O
and	O
conditional	O
access	O
policies	O
to	O
access	O
Microsoft	O
365	O
.	O

	O
The	O
actor	O
stopped	O
Sysmon	O
and	O
Splunk	O
logging	O
on	O
these	O
devices	O
and	O
cleared	O
Windows	O

	O
Event	O
Logs	O
.	O

	O
The	O
threat	O
actors	O
leveraged	O
compromised	O
privileged	O
accounts	O
and	O
used	O
SMB	O
,	O
remote	O
WMI	O
,	O

	O
remote	O
scheduled	O
tasks	O
registration	O
,	O
and	O
PowerShell	O
to	O
execute	O
commands	O
within	O
victim	O

	O
environments	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
the	O
protocols	O
mainly	O
to	O
perform	O
reconnaissance	O

	O
(	O
notably	O
using	O
the	O
native	O
command	O
tasklist.exe	O
to	O
inspect	O
remote	O
systems	O
)	O
,	O
distribute	O

	O
BEACON	O
around	O
the	O
network	O
,	O
as	O
well	O
as	O
run	O
native	O
Windows	O
commands	O
for	O
credential	O

	O
harvesting	O
.	O
In	O
some	O
cases	O
,	O
the	O
actors	O
passed	O
in	O
a	O
specific	O
Kerberos	O
ticket	O
during	O
the	O
WMIC	O

	O
execution	O
using	O
the	O
/authority	O
:	O
Kerberos	O
flag	O
to	O
authenticate	O
as	O
computer	O
accounts	O
.	O
Computer	O

	O
accounts	O
by	O
design	O
have	O
local	O
administrator	O
rights	O
over	O
the	O
computer	O
for	O
which	O
they	O
are	O

	O
named	O
.	O

	O
Lateral	O
Movement	O
Between	O
CSP	O
and	O
Downstream	O
Clients	O

	O
CSPs	O
have	O
network	O
filtering	O
layers	O
in	O
place	O
between	O
their	O
on	O
-	O
premises	O
environment	O
and	O

	O
downstream	O
customer	O
environments	O
as	O
an	O
added	O
security	O
layer	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
that	O
the	O

	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
the	O
vSphere	O
PowerCLI	O
and	O
custom	O
PowerShell	O
scripts	O
configured	O
to	O
target	O

	O
the	O
vCenter	O
Web	O
endpoint	O
to	O
export	O
the	O
virtual	O
disk	O
image	O
of	O
a	O
specific	O
networking	O
device	O

	O
and	O
copy	O
it	O
off	O
the	O
service	O
provider	O
’s	O
infrastructure	O
.	O
To	O
authenticate	O
to	O
vCenter	O
the	O
threat	O

	O
actor	O
used	O
a	O
stolen	O
session	O
cookie	O
for	O
a	O
Privileged	O
Access	O
Management	O
(	O
PAM	O
)	O
account	O
.	O

	O
4/14	O


	O
Mandiant	O
believes	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
was	O
able	O
to	O
analyze	O
this	O
virtual	O
machine	O
and	O
identify	O

	O
devices	O
within	O
the	O
CSP	O
’s	O
network	O
that	O
were	O
specifically	O
allowed	O
to	O
communicate	O
with	O

	O
targeted	O
downstream	O
customers	O
.	O

	O
Using	O
this	O
knowledge	O
,	O
the	O
actor	O
compromised	O
the	O
authorized	O
source	O
jump	O
hosts	O
that	O

	O
circumvented	O
the	O
network	O
security	O
restrictions	O
of	O
the	O
service	O
provider	O
and	O
downstream	O
victim	O

	O
network	O
.	O
The	O
actor	O
compromised	O
a	O
customer	O
administration	O
account	O
from	O
one	O
of	O
the	O

	O
administration	O
jump	O
hosts	O
used	O
for	O
customer	O
administration	O
within	O
the	O
CSP	O
’s	O
environment	O
.	O

	O
The	O
CSP	O
would	O
connect	O
via	O
these	O
jump	O
hosts	O
using	O
dedicated	O
customer	O
admin	O
accounts	O
to	O

	O
interact	O
with	O
a	O
downstream	O
customer	O
’s	O
infrastructure	O
.	O
The	O
actor	O
then	O
performed	O
lateral	O

	O
movement	O
through	O
RDP	O
and	O
the	O
stolen	O
target	O
credentials	O
towards	O
the	O
victim	O
customer	O

	O
network	O
.	O

	O
In	O
another	O
case	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
Azure	O
’s	O
built	O
-	O
in	O
Run	O
Command	O
feature	O
to	O
execute	O

	O
commands	O
on	O
numerous	O
downstream	O
devices	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
native	O
Windows	O
tools	O

	O
to	O
perform	O
initial	O
reconnaissance	O
,	O
credential	O
theft	O
and	O
deploy	O
Cobalt	O
Strike	O
BEACON	O
to	O

	O
devices	O
via	O
PowerShell	O
.	O

	O
The	O
actor	O
then	O
used	O
this	O
BEACON	O
implant	O
to	O
persistently	O
install	O
CEELOADER	O
as	O
a	O

	O
Scheduled	O
Task	O
that	O
ran	O
on	O
login	O
as	O
SYSTEM	O
on	O
specific	O
systems	O
.	O
CEELOADER	O
is	O

	O
downloader	O
that	O
decrypts	O
a	O
shellcode	O
payload	O
to	O
execute	O
in	O
memory	O
on	O
the	O
victim	O
device	O
.	O

	O
Data	O
Collection	O

	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
multiple	O
attempts	O
by	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
to	O
dump	O
the	O
Active	O
Directory	O

	O
database	O
(	O
ntds.dit	O
)	O
using	O
the	O
built	O
-	O
in	O
ntdsutil.exe	O
command	O
.	O
There	O
was	O
also	O
evidence	O
that	O
the	O

	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
Sysinternals	O
ProcDump	O
to	O
dump	O
the	O
process	O
memory	O
of	O
the	O
LSASS	O

	O
process	O
.	O
In	O
addition	O
to	O
this	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
discovered	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
had	O
stolen	O
the	O
AD	O
FS	O

	O
token	O
signing	O
certificate	O
and	O
the	O
DKM	O
key	O
material	O
.	O
This	O
would	O
allow	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
to	O

	O
perform	O
Golden	O
SAML	O
attacks	O
and	O
authenticate	O
as	O
any	O
user	O
into	O
federated	O
environments	O
that	O

	O
used	O
AD	O
FS	O
for	O
authentication	O
,	O
such	O
as	O
Microsoft	O
365	O
.	O

	O
The	O
threat	O
actors	O
performed	O
data	O
theft	O
through	O
several	O
PowerShell	O
commands	O
,	O
uploading	O

	O
several	O
sequential	O
archive	O
files	O
ending	O
with	O
the	O
.7z	O
extension	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
uploaded	O

	O
these	O
files	O
to	O
a	O
webserver	O
they	O
presumably	O
controlled	O
.	O

	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
binaries	O
that	O
were	O
configured	O
to	O
upload	O
data	O
to	O
the	O
Mega	O
cloud	O
storage	O

	O
provider	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
deployed	O
the	O
tool	O
in	O
the	O
%	O
TEMP%\d	O
folder	O
as	O
mt.exe	O
and	O
mtt.exe	O
.	O

	O
Owing	O
to	O
several	O
mistakes	O
made	O
by	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
was	O
able	O
to	O
identify	O
that	O
the	O

	O
execution	O
of	O
the	O
renamed	O
tool	O
failed	O
.	O
Upon	O
investigation	O
,	O
it	O
appears	O
that	O
the	O
Megatools	O
binary	O

	O
used	O
by	O
the	O
threat	O
actors	O
fails	O
to	O
execute	O
if	O
renamed	O
.	O
Due	O
to	O
this	O
it	O
is	O
unclear	O
whether	O
the	O

	O
actor	O
was	O
able	O
to	O
successfully	O
exfiltrate	O
data	O
to	O
Mega	O
using	O
this	O
method	O
.	O


	O
5/14	O


	O
Mandiant	O
also	O
observed	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
access	O
a	O
victim	O
’s	O
on	O
-	O
premises	O
SharePoint	O
server	O

	O
looking	O
for	O
sensitive	O
technical	O
documentation	O
and	O
credentials	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
then	O
used	O
the	O

	O
gathered	O
credentials	O
to	O
move	O
laterally	O
around	O
the	O
network	O
.	O

	O
Application	O
Impersonation	O

	O
Microsoft	O
Exchange	O
and	O
Exchange	O
Online	O
provide	O
an	O
impersonation	O
role	O
(	O
titled	O

	O
ApplicationImpersonation	O
)	O
that	O
grants	O
an	O
account	O
the	O
ability	O
to	O
access	O
another	O
account	O
’s	O

	O
mailbox	O
and	O
“	O
act	O
as	O
”	O
that	O
mailbox	O
owner	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
was	O
able	O
to	O

	O
authenticate	O
to	O
an	O
existing	O
account	O
that	O
was	O
previously	O
granted	O
the	O
ApplicationImpersonation	O

	O
role	O
;	O
it	O
is	O
unclear	O
how	O
the	O
actor	O
obtained	O
this	O
initial	O
access	O
.	O

	O
Through	O
this	O
account	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
witnessed	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
use	O
impersonation	O
to	O
access	O

	O
multiple	O
mailboxes	O
belonging	O
to	O
users	O
within	O
the	O
victim	O
organization	O
.	O
The	O
threat	O
actor	O
also	O

	O
created	O
a	O
new	O
account	O
within	O
the	O
Microsoft	O
365	O
environment	O
which	O
Mandiant	O
deems	O
was	O
for	O

	O
backup	O
access	O
in	O
the	O
event	O
of	O
detection	O
.	O


	O
Threat	O
Actor	O
Infrastructure	O

	O
Residential	O
Internet	O
Access	O

	O
In	O
some	O
campaigns	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
was	O
using	O
residential	O
IP	O

	O
address	O
ranges	O
to	O
authenticate	O
to	O
victim	O
environments	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
believes	O
that	O
this	O
access	O

	O
was	O
obtained	O
through	O
residential	O
and	O
mobile	O
IP	O
address	O
proxy	O
providers	O
.	O
The	O
providers	O
proxy	O

	O
traffic	O
through	O
actual	O
mobile	O
devices	O
such	O
as	O
phones	O
and	O
tablets	O
by	O
legitimately	O
bundling	O
a	O

	O
proxy	O
application	O
in	O
return	O
for	O
free	O
applications	O
and/or	O
services	O
.	O

	O
The	O
actor	O
used	O
these	O
services	O
to	O
access	O
mailboxes	O
in	O
victim	O
Microsoft	O
365	O
tenants	O
.	O
By	O
doing	O

	O
so	O
,	O
the	O
source	O
logon	O
IP	O
address	O
belongs	O
to	O
a	O
major	O
Internet	O
Service	O
Provider	O
that	O
serves	O

	O
customers	O
in	O
the	O
same	O
country	O
as	O
the	O
victim	O
environment	O
.	O
These	O
tactics	O
showcase	O
the	O

	O
complexity	O
of	O
the	O
attacker	O
's	O
operations	O
and	O
is	O
rarely	O
seen	O
executed	O
by	O
other	O
threat	O
actors	O
.	O

	O
Accomplishing	O
this	O
can	O
make	O
it	O
very	O
difficult	O
for	O
investigators	O
to	O
differentiate	O
between	O
normal	O

	O
user	O
activity	O
and	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
's	O
activity	O
.	O

	O
Geo	O
-	O
located	O
Azure	O
Infrastructure	O

	O
In	O
another	O
campaign	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
provisioned	O
a	O
system	O
within	O
Microsoft	O
Azure	O
that	O
was	O

	O
within	O
close	O
proximity	O
to	O
a	O
legitimate	O
Azure	O
-	O
hosted	O
system	O
belonging	O
to	O
the	O
CSP	O
that	O
they	O

	O
used	O
to	O
access	O
their	O
customer	O
’s	O
environment	O
.	O
This	O
allowed	O
the	O
actor	O
to	O
establish	O
geoproximity	O
with	O
the	O
victims	O
which	O
resulted	O
in	O
the	O
recorded	O
source	O
IP	O
address	O
for	O
the	O
activity	O

	O
originating	O
from	O
within	O
legitimate	O
Azure	O
IP	O
ranges	O
.	O
Similar	O
to	O
the	O
technique	O
of	O
using	O

	O
residential	O
IP	O
addresses	O
,	O
using	O
Azure	O
infrastructure	O
within	O
close	O
proximity	O
to	O
victim	O
networks	O

	O
makes	O
it	O
difficult	O
for	O
investigators	O
to	O
differentiate	O
between	O
normal	O
user	O
activity	O
and	O
the	O
threat	O

	O
actor	O
’s	O
activity	O
.	O

	O
6/14	O


	O
Compromised	O
WordPress	O
Sites	O
Hosting	O
Second	O
Stage	O
Payloads	O

	O
In	O
several	O
campaigns	O
by	O
the	O
actor	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
and	O
our	O
partners	O
identified	O
that	O
the	O
actor	O
was	O

	O
hosting	O
second	O
stage	O
payloads	O
as	O
encrypted	O
blobs	O
on	O
legitimate	O
websites	O
running	O

	O
WordPress	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
observed	O
at	O
least	O
two	O
separate	O
malware	O
families	O
attributed	O
to	O
the	O

	O
threat	O
actor	O
hosted	O
on	O
compromised	O
WordPress	O
sites	O
.	O

	O
TOR	O
,	O
VPS	O
and	O
VPN	O
Providers	O

	O
In	O
multiple	O
campaigns	O
by	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
witnessed	O
the	O
actor	O
use	O
a	O
mixture	O
of	O

	O
TOR	O
,	O
Virtual	O
Private	O
Servers	O
(	O
VPS	O
)	O
and	O
public	O
Virtual	O
Private	O
Networks	O
(	O
VPN	O
)	O
to	O
access	O

	O
victim	O
environments	O
.	O
In	O
a	O
particular	O
campaign	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O

	O
performed	O
initial	O
reconnaissance	O
via	O
a	O
VPS	O
provider	O
located	O
in	O
the	O
same	O
region	O
as	O
the	O
victim	O
.	O

	O
Mandiant	O
believes	O
a	O
misconfiguration	O
by	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
meant	O
that	O
the	O
VPN	O
services	O

	O
running	O
on	O
the	O
VPS	O
stopped	O
functioning	O
after	O
8	O
hours	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
was	O
then	O
able	O
to	O
identify	O

	O
numerous	O
TOR	O
exit	O
nodes	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
used	O
based	O
on	O
new	O
authentication	O
events	O
.	O


	O
Operational	O
Security	O
and	O
Planning	O

	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
attempts	O
to	O
compromise	O
multiple	O
accounts	O
within	O
an	O
environment	O
and	O

	O
kept	O
use	O
of	O
each	O
account	O
separated	O
by	O
function	O
.	O
This	O
reduced	O
the	O
likelihood	O
that	O
detecting	O

	O
one	O
activity	O
could	O
expose	O
the	O
entire	O
scope	O
of	O
the	O
intrusion	O
.	O
Mandiant	O
found	O
evidence	O
that	O
the	O

	O
actor	O
compromised	O
multiple	O
accounts	O
and	O
used	O
one	O
for	O
the	O
sole	O
purpose	O
of	O
reconnaissance	O
,	O

	O
while	O
the	O
others	O
were	O
reserved	O
for	O
lateral	O
movement	O
within	O
the	O
organization	O
.	O
Mandiant	O

	O
previously	O
observed	O
this	O
threat	O
actor	O
using	O
strict	O
operational	O
security	O
to	O
use	O
specific	O
accounts	O

	O
and	O
systems	O
in	O
victim	O
environments	O
for	O
activities	O
that	O
are	O
often	O
higher	O
risk	O
,	O
such	O
as	O
data	O
theft	O

	O
and	O
large	O
-	O
scale	O
reconnaissance	O
.	O

	O
Once	O
within	O
an	O
environment	O
,	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
was	O
able	O
to	O
quickly	O
pivot	O
to	O
on	O
-	O
premises	O

	O
servers	O
and	O
crawl	O
these	O
servers	O
for	O
technical	O
documentation	O
and	O
credentials	O
.	O
From	O
this	O

	O
documentation	O
,	O
the	O
actor	O
was	O
able	O
to	O
identify	O
a	O
route	O
to	O
gain	O
access	O
to	O
their	O
ultimate	O
target	O
’s	O

	O
network	O
.	O
This	O
reconnaissance	O
shows	O
that	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
had	O
a	O
clear	O
end	O
goal	O
in	O
mind	O
and	O

	O
were	O
able	O
to	O
identify	O
and	O
exploit	O
an	O
opportunity	O
to	O
obtain	O
required	O
intelligence	O
to	O
further	O
their	O

	O
goals	O
.	O

	O
Mandiant	O
also	O
observed	O
efforts	O
to	O
avoid	O
detection	O
by	O
circumventing	O
or	O
deleting	O
system	O

	O
logging	O
within	O
the	O
victim	O
’s	O
environment	O
.	O
Namely	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
identified	O
the	O
threat	O
actor	O
disabling	O

	O
SysInternals	O
Sysmon	O
and	O
Splunk	O
Forwarders	O
on	O
victim	O
machines	O
that	O
they	O
accessed	O
via	O

	O
Microsoft	O
Remote	O
Desktop	O
in	O
addition	O
to	O
clearing	O
Windows	O
Event	O
Logs	O
.	O


	O
Malware	O
Descriptions	O


	O
7/14	O


	O
Cobalt	O
Strike	O
BEACON	O
:	O
Backdoor	O
written	O
in	O
C	O
/	O
C++	O
that	O
is	O
part	O
of	O
the	O
Cobalt	O
Strike	O

	O
framework	O
.	O
Supported	O
backdoor	O
commands	O
include	O
shell	O
command	O
execution	O
,	O
file	O
transfer	O
,	O

	O
file	O
execution	O
,	O
and	O
file	O
management	O
.	O
BEACON	O
can	O
also	O
capture	O
keystrokes	O
and	O
screenshots	O

	O
as	O
well	O
as	O
act	O
as	O
a	O
proxy	O
server	O
.	O
BEACON	O
may	O
also	O
be	O
tasked	O
with	O
harvesting	O
system	O

	O
credentials	O
,	O
port	O
scanning	O
,	O
and	O
enumerating	O
systems	O
on	O
a	O
network	O
.	O
BEACON	O
communicates	O

	O
with	O
a	O
command	O
and	O
control	O
(	O
C2	O
)	O
server	O
via	O
HTTP(S	O
)	O
or	O
DNS	O
.	O

	O
CEELOADER	O
:	O
Downloader	O
written	O
in	O
C	O
programing	O
language	O
.	O
It	O
supports	O
shellcode	O

	O
payloads	O
that	O
are	O
executed	O
in	O
memory	O
.	O
An	O
obfuscation	O
tool	O
has	O
been	O
used	O
to	O
hide	O
the	O
code	O

	O
in	O
CEELOADER	O
in	O
between	O
large	O
blocks	O
of	O
junk	O
code	O
with	O
meaningless	O
calls	O
to	O
the	O
Windows	O

	O
API	O
.	O
The	O
meaningful	O
calls	O
to	O
the	O
Windows	O
API	O
are	O
hidden	O
within	O
obfuscated	O
wrapper	O

	O
functions	O
that	O
decrypt	O
the	O
name	O
of	O
the	O
API	O
and	O
dynamically	O
resolve	O
it	O
before	O
calling	O
.	O

	O
CEELOADER	O
communicates	O
via	O
HTTP	O
and	O
the	O
C2	O
response	O
is	O
decrypted	O
using	O
AES-256	O
in	O

	O
CBC	O
mode	O
.	O
Additionally	O
,	O
the	O
HTTP	O
request	O
contains	O
a	O
statically	O
defined	O
i	O
d	O
that	O
may	O
vary	O
from	O

	O
sample	O
to	O
sample	O
.	O
CEELOADER	O
does	O
not	O
contain	O
a	O
persistence	O
mechanism	O
.	O


	O
Attribution	O

	O
Mandiant	O
assesses	O
that	O
some	O
of	O
this	O
activity	O
is	O
UNC2652	O
,	O
a	O
cluster	O
of	O
activity	O
observed	O

	O
targeting	O
diplomatic	O
entities	O
with	O
phishing	O
emails	O
containing	O
HTML	O
attachments	O
with	O

	O
malicious	O
JavaScript	O
,	O
ultimately	O
dropping	O
a	O
BEACON	O
launcher	O
.	O

	O
Mandiant	O
also	O
assesses	O
that	O
some	O
of	O
this	O
activity	O
is	O
UNC3004	O
,	O
a	O
cluster	O
of	O
activity	O
observed	O

	O
targeting	O
both	O
government	O
and	O
business	O
entities	O
through	O
gaining	O
access	O
to	O
Cloud	O
Solution	O

	O
Providers	O
/	O
Managed	O
Service	O
Providers	O
to	O
gain	O
access	O
to	O
downstream	O
customers	O
.	O

	O
Microsoft	O
has	O
previously	O
reported	O
on	O
both	O
UNC2652	O
and	O
UNC3004	O
activity	O
and	O
links	O
it	O
to	O

	O
UNC2452	O
,	O
the	O
group	O
behind	O
the	O
SolarWinds	O
compromise	O
,	O
under	O
the	O
name	O
“	O
Nobelium	O
”	O
.	O
While	O

	O
it	O
is	O
plausible	O
that	O
they	O
are	O
the	O
same	O
group	O
,	O
currently	O
,	O
Mandiant	O
does	O
not	O
have	O
enough	O

	O
evidence	O
to	O
make	O
this	O
determination	O
with	O
high	O
confidence	O
.	O


	O
Outlook	O
and	O
Implications	O

	O
This	O
intrusion	O
activity	O
reflects	O
a	O
well	O
-	O
resourced	O
threat	O
actor	O
set	O
operating	O
with	O
a	O
high	O
level	O
of	O

	O
concern	O
for	O
operational	O
security	O
.	O
The	O
abuse	O
of	O
a	O
third	O
party	O
,	O
in	O
this	O
case	O
a	O
CSP	O
,	O
can	O
facilitate	O

	O
access	O
to	O
a	O
wide	O
scope	O
of	O
potential	O
victims	O
through	O
a	O
single	O
compromise	O
.	O
Though	O
Mandiant	O

	O
can	O
not	O
currently	O
attribute	O
this	O
activity	O
with	O
higher	O
confidence	O
,	O
the	O
operational	O
security	O

	O
associated	O
with	O
this	O
intrusion	O
and	O
exploitation	O
of	O
a	O
third	O
party	O
is	O
consistent	O
with	O
the	O
tactics	O

	O
employed	O
by	O
the	O
actors	O
behind	O
the	O
SolarWinds	O
compromise	O
and	O
highlights	O
the	O
effectiveness	O

	O
of	O
leveraging	O
third	O
parties	O
and	O
trusted	O
vendor	O
relationships	O
to	O
carry	O
out	O
nefarious	O
operations	O
.	O


	O
Acknowledgements	O


	O
8/14	O


	O
Hundreds	O
of	O
consultants	O
,	O
analysts	O
and	O
reverse	O
engineers	O
have	O
been	O
working	O
together	O
to	O

	O
understand	O
and	O
track	O
these	O
security	O
incidents	O
over	O
the	O
past	O
year	O
.	O
This	O
larger	O
group	O
has	O
built	O

	O
a	O
baseline	O
of	O
knowledge	O
that	O
enables	O
us	O
to	O
continue	O
tracking	O
this	O
actor	O
.	O
We	O
would	O
like	O
to	O

	O
specifically	O
thank	O
Luis	O
Rocha	O
,	O
Marius	O
Fodoreanu	O
,	O
Mitchell	O
Clarke	O
,	O
Manfred	O
Erjak	O
,	O
Josh	O

	O
Madeley	O
,	O
Ashraf	O
Abdalhalim	O
and	O
Juraj	O
Sucik	O
from	O
Mandiant	O
Consulting	O
and	O
Wojciech	O

	O
Ledzion	O
,	O
Gabriella	O
Roncone	O
,	O
Jonathan	O
Leathery	O
and	O
Ben	O
Read	O
from	O
Mandiant	O
Intelligence	O

	O
for	O
their	O
assistance	O
in	O
writing	O
and	O
reviewing	O
this	O
blog	O
post	O
.	O

	O
Also	O
special	O
thanks	O
to	O
the	O
Microsoft	O
DART	O
and	O
MSTIC	O
teams	O
for	O
their	O
ongoing	O
collaboration	O
.	O


	O
Remediation	O

	O
Mandiant	O
recommends	O
that	O
organizations	O
review	O
and	O
implement	O
the	O
changes	O
suggested	O
in	O

	O
the	O
following	O
Mandiant	O
white	O
paper	O
which	O
was	O
recently	O
updated	O
to	O
include	O
advice	O
around	O
the	O

	O
Application	O
Impersonation	O
role	O
and	O
trust	O
relationships	O
with	O
Cloud	O
Service	O
Providers	O
and	O
their	O

	O
customers	O
.	O

	O
Technical	O
Highlights	O
to	O
Aid	O
Investigations	O
or	O
Hunting	O

	O
Recent	O
Staging	O
Directories	O
:	O

	O
%	O
PROGRAMFILES%\Microsoft	O
SQL	O
Server\ms	O

	O
%	O
WINDIR%\Temp	O

	O
%	O
WINDIR%\Temp\d	O

	O
Recent	O
Staging	O
Names	O
:	O

	O
d.7z	O

	O
vcredist.ps1	O

	O
fc.r	O

	O
out	O

	O
d.ps1	O

	O
d.z	O

	O
megatools.exe	O

	O
mt.exe	O

	O
mtt.exe	O

	O
ntds.dit	O

	O
handle64.exe	O

	O
movefile.exe	O

	O
diagview.dll	O

	O
diag.ps1	O

	O
diag.bat	O

	O
Recent	O
Scheduled	O
Task	O
Names	O
:	O

	O
9/14	O


	O
Microsoft	O
Diagnostics	O

	O
Microsoft	O
Azure	O
Diagnostics	O

	O
Google	O
Chrome	O
Update	O

	O
Recent	O
Administrative	O
or	O
Utility	O
Tools	O
:	O

	O
Azure	O
Run	O
Command	O

	O
Sysinternals	O
Handle	O

	O
Sysinternals	O
MoveFile	O

	O
ntdsutil	O

	O
netstat	O

	O
net	O

	O
tasklist	O

	O
RAR	O
/	O
7zip	O

	O
AADInternals	O

	O
vSphere	O
PowerCLI	O

	O
Sysinternals	O
Procdump	O

	O
Windows	O
Task	O
Manager	O


	O
Indicators	O
of	O
Compromise	O

	O
Hashes	O
for	O
Known	O
Activity	O
:	O

	O
diag.ps1	O
(	O
MD5	O
:	O
1d3e2742e922641b7063db8cafed6531	O
)	O

	O
BEACON.SMB	O
malware	O
connecting	O
to	O

	O
\\.\pipe\chrome.5687.8051.183894933787788877a1	O

	O
vcredist.ps1	O
(	O
MD5	O
:	O
273ce653c457c9220ce53d0dfd3c60f1	O
)	O

	O
BEACON	O
malware	O
connecting	O
via	O
HTTPS	O
to	O
nordicmademedia[.]com	O

	O
logo.png	O
(	O
MD5	O
:	O
3304036ac3bbf6cb2205e30226c89a1a	O
)	O

	O
Hosted	O
on	O
http://23.106.123[.]15	O
/	O
logo.png	O

	O
BEACON	O
malware	O
connected	O
via	O
HTTPS	O
to	O
stonecrestnews.com	O

	O
LocalData.dll	O
(	O
MD5	O
:	O
3633203d9a93fecfa9d4d9c06fc7fe36	O
)	O

	O
CEELOADER	O
malware	O
that	O
obtains	O
a	O
payload	O
from	O

	O
http://theandersonco[.]com	O
/	O
wp_info.php	O

	O
Unknown	O
(	O
MD5	O
:	O
e5aacf3103af27f9aaafa0a74b296d50	O
)	O

	O
BEACON	O
malware	O
connecting	O
via	O
HTTPS	O
to	O
nordicmademedia[.]com	O

	O
DiagView.dll	O
(	O
MD5	O
:	O
f3962456f7fc8d10644bf051ddb7c7ef	O
)	O

	O
CEELOADER	O
malware	O
that	O
obtains	O
a	O
payload	O
from	O

	O
http://tomasubiera[.]com	O
/	O
wp_getcontent.php	O

	O
IP	O
Addresses	O
Used	O
for	O
Authenticating	O
Through	O
Public	O
VPN	O
Providers	O
:	O


	O
10/14	O


	O
Note	O
:	O
Mandiant	O
have	O
removed	O
anonymized	O
addresses	O
from	O
this	O
list	O
,	O
the	O
remaining	O
addresses	O

	O
are	O
from	O
legitimate	O
hosting	O
providers	O
.	O

	O
20.52.144[.]179	O

	O
20.52.156[.]76	O

	O
20.52.47[.]99	O

	O
51.140.220[.]157	O

	O
51.104.51[.]92	O

	O
176.67.86[.]130	O

	O
176.67.86[.]52	O

	O
IP	O
Addresses	O
Used	O
for	O
Authenticating	O
From	O
the	O
Mobile	O
Proxy	O
Providers	O
:	O

	O
216.155.158[.]133	O

	O
63.75.244[.]119	O

	O
63.162.179[.]166	O

	O
63.162.179[.]94	O

	O
63.75.245[.]144	O

	O
63.75.245[.]239	O

	O
63.75.247[.]114	O

	O
IP	O
Addresses	O
Used	O
for	O
Command	O
and	O
Control	O
:	O

	O
91.234.254[.]144	O

	O
23.106.123[.]15	O

	O
URL	O
Addresses	O
Used	O
for	O
Command	O
and	O
Control	O
:	O

	O
nordicmademedia[.]com	O

	O
stonecrestnews[.]com	O

	O
URL	O
Addresses	O
of	O
Compromised	O
WordPress	O
Sites	O
Hosting	O
CEELOADER	O
Payloads	O
:	O

	O
Note	O
:	O
Mandiant	O
believes	O
the	O
actor	O
hosted	O
a	O
malicious	O
payload	O
on	O
the	O
following	O
domains	O
.	O

	O
tomasubiera[.]com	O

	O
theandersonco[.]com	O


	O
MITRE	O
ATT&CK	O
Techniques	O
Observed	O

	O
ATT&CK	O
Tactic	O
Category	O


	O
Techniques	O


	O
11/14	O


	O
Resource	O
Development	O


	O
Acquire	O
Infrastructure	O
(	O
T1583	O
)	O

	O
Virtual	O
Private	O
Server	O
(	O
T1583.003	O
)	O

	O
Compromise	O
Infrastructure	O
(	O
T1584	O
)	O

	O
Stage	O
Capabilities	O
(	O
T1608	O
)	O

	O
Link	O
Target	O
(	O
T1608.005	O
)	O

	O
Obtain	O
Capabilities	O
(	O
T1588	O
)	O

	O
Digital	O
Certificates	O
(	O
T1588.004	O
)	O


	O
Initial	O
Access	O


	O
Phishing	O
(	O
T1566	O
)	O

	O
Spearphishing	O
Attachment	O
(	O
T1566.001	O
)	O

	O
Spearphishing	O
Link	O
(	O
T1566.002	O
)	O

	O
External	O
Remote	O
Services	O
(	O
T1133	O
)	O

	O
Valid	O
Accounts	O
(	O
T1078	O
)	O

	O
Trusted	O
Relationship	O
(	O
T1199	O
)	O


	O
Execution	O


	O
User	O
Execution	O
(	O
T1204	O
)	O

	O
Malicious	O
Link	O
(	O
T1204.001	O
)	O

	O
Malicious	O
File	O
(	O
T1204.002	O
)	O

	O
Command	O
and	O
Scripting	O
Interpreter	O
(	O
T1059	O
)	O

	O
PowerShell	O
(	O
T1059.001	O
)	O

	O
Windows	O
Command	O
Shell	O
(	O
T1059.003	O
)	O

	O
JavaScript	O
(	O
T1059.007	O
)	O

	O
Scheduled	O
Task	O
/	O
Job	O
(	O
T1053	O
)	O

	O
Scheduled	O
task	O
(	O
T1053.005	O
)	O

	O
Windows	O
Management	O
Instrumentation	O
(	O
T1047	O
)	O


	O
Persistence	O


	O
Boot	O
or	O
Logon	O
Autostart	O
Execution	O
(	O
T1547	O
)	O

	O
Registry	O
Run	O
Keys	O
/	O
Startup	O
Folder	O
(	O
T1547.001	O
)	O

	O
Shortcut	O
Modification	O
(	O
T1547.009	O
)	O

	O
Scheduled	O
Task	O
/	O
Job	O
(	O
T1053	O
)	O

	O
Scheduled	O
task	O
(	O
T1053.005	O
)	O

	O
External	O
Remote	O
Services	O
(	O
T1133	O
)	O

	O
Valid	O
Accounts	O
(	O
T1078	O
)	O


	O
Privilege	O
Escalation	O


	O
Process	O
Injection	O
(	O
T1055	O
)	O

	O
Access	O
Token	O
Manipulation	O
(	O
T1134	O
)	O

	O
Token	O
Impersonation	O
/	O
Theft	O
(	O
T1134.001	O
)	O

	O
Boot	O
or	O
Logon	O
Autostart	O
Execution	O
(	O
T1547	O
)	O

	O
Shortcut	O
Modification	O
(	O
T1547.009	O
)	O

	O
Valid	O
Accounts	O
(	O
T1078	O
)	O

	O
Scheduled	O
Task	O
(	O
T1053	O
)	O

	O
Scheduled	O
task	O
(	O
T1053.005	O
)	O


	O
12/14	O


	O
Defence	O
Evasion	O


	O
Process	O
Injection	O
(	O
T1055	O
)	O

	O
Access	O
Token	O
manipulation	O
(	O
T1145	O
)	O

	O
Indicator	O
Removal	O
on	O
Host	O
(	O
T1070	O
)	O

	O
Hide	O
Artifacts	O
(	O
T1564	O
)	O

	O
Hidden	O
window	O
(	O
T1564.003	O
)	O

	O
Indicator	O
Removal	O
on	O
Host	O
(	O
T1070	O
)	O

	O
Clear	O
Windows	O
Event	O
Logs	O
(	O
T1070.001	O
)	O

	O
File	O
Deletion	O
(	O
T1070.004	O
)	O

	O
Timestomp	O
(	O
T1070.006	O
)	O

	O
Obfuscated	O
Files	O
or	O
information	O
(	O
T1027	O
)	O

	O
Indicator	O
Removal	O
from	O
Tools	O
(	O
T1027.005	O
)	O

	O
Virtualization	O
/	O
Sandbox	O
Evasion	O
(	O
T1497	O
)	O

	O
System	O
Checks	O
(	O
T1497.004	O
)	O

	O
Modify	O
Registry	O
(	O
T1112	O
)	O

	O
Deobfuscate	O
/	O
Decode	O
Files	O
or	O
Information	O
(	O
T1140	O
)	O

	O
Reflective	O
Code	O
Loading	O
(	O
T1620	O
)	O

	O
Valid	O
Accounts	O
(	O
T1078	O
)	O


	O
Credential	O
Access	O


	O
OS	O
Credential	O
Dumping	O
(	O
T1003	O
)	O

	O
NTDS	O
(	O
T1003.003	O
)	O

	O
Keylogging	O
(	O
T1003.001	O
)	O


	O
Discovery	O


	O
System	O
Information	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1082	O
)	O

	O
File	O
and	O
Directory	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1083	O
)	O

	O
Account	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1087	O
)	O

	O
Local	O
Account	O
(	O
T1087.001	O
)	O

	O
Domain	O
Account	O
(	O
T1087.002	O
)	O

	O
System	O
Network	O
Configuration	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1016	O
)	O

	O
Virtualization	O
/	O
Sandbox	O
Evasion	O
(	O
T1497	O
)	O

	O
System	O
Checks	O
(	O
T1497.001	O
)	O

	O
System	O
Owner	O
/	O
User	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1033	O
)	O

	O
System	O
network	O
Connections	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1049	O
)	O

	O
Network	O
Service	O
Scanning	O
(	O
T1046	O
)	O

	O
Process	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1057	O
)	O

	O
System	O
Service	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1007	O
)	O

	O
Permission	O
Groups	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1069	O
)	O

	O
Software	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1518	O
)	O

	O
Query	O
Registry	O
(	O
T1012	O
)	O


	O
Lateral	O
Movement	O


	O
Remote	O
Services	O
(	O
T1021	O
)	O

	O
Remote	O
Desktop	O
Protocol	O
(	O
T1021.001	O
)	O

	O
SSH	O
(	O
T1021.004	O
)	O


	O
13/14	O


	O
Collection	O


	O
Archive	O
Collected	O
Data	O
(	O
T1560	O
)	O

	O
Archive	O
via	O
Utility	O
(	O
T1560.001	O
)	O

	O
Data	O
from	O
Information	O
Repositories	O
(	O
T1213	O
)	O

	O
Sharepoint	O
(	O
T1213.002	O
)	O

	O
Input	O
Capture	O
(	O
T1056	O
)	O

	O
Keylogging	O
(	O
T1056.001	O
)	O


	O
Command	O
and	O
Control	O


	O
Web	O
Service	O
(	O
T1102	O
)	O

	O
Application	O
Layer	O
Protocol	O
(	O
T1071	O
)	O

	O
Web	O
Protocols	O
(	O
T1071.001	O
)	O

	O
DNS	O
(	O
T1071.004	O
)	O

	O
Encrypted	O
Channel	O
(	O
T1573	O
)	O

	O
Asymmetric	O
Cryptography	O
(	O
T1573.002	O
)	O

	O
Non	O
-	O
Application	O
layer	O
Protocol	O
(	O
T1095	O
)	O

	O
Non	O
-	O
Standard	O
Port	O
(	O
T1571	O
)	O

	O
Ingress	O
Tool	O
Transfer	O
(	O
T1105	O
)	O


	O
Exfiltration	O


	O
Data	O
Transfer	O
Size	O
Limits	O
(	O
T1030	O
)	O


	O
Impact	O


	O
Service	O
Stop	O
(	O
T1489	O
)	O


	O
Discovery	O


	O
System	O
Network	O
Configuration	O
Discovery	O
(	O
T1016	O
)	O


	O
Have	O
questions	O
?	O
Let	O
's	O
talk	O
.	O

	O
Mandiant	O
experts	O
are	O
ready	O
to	O
answer	O
your	O
questions	O
.	O

	O
Contact	O
Us	O


	O
14/14	O