Killed	O
In	O
Translation	O

	O
silascutler.com/2021/01/14/KilledInTranslation/	O

	O
January	O
15	O
,	O
2021	O


	O
2021	O
-	O
01	O
-	O
14	O

	O
Preface	O
:	O

	O
A	O
director	O
at	O
Google	O
once	O
told	O
me	O
that	O
the	O
larger	O
an	O
organization	O
,	O
the	O
less	O
subtlety	O
is	O
possible	O

	O
in	O
what	O
it	O
says	O
publicly	O
,	O
and	O
even	O
the	O
most	O
carefully	O
postulated	O
assessment	O
,	O
cushioned	O
with	O

	O
supporting	O
analytic	O
language	O
,	O
will	O
be	O
interpreted	O
as	O
fact	O
.	O

	O
Naming	O
of	O
threat	O
actor	O
groups	O
and	O
malware	O
is	O
a	O
critical	O
aspect	O
to	O
tracking	O
cyber	O
operations	O
.	O

	O
Armchair	O
Researchers	O
,	O
more	O
concerned	O
with	O
social	O
media	O
follower	O
counts	O
,	O
often	O
decry	O
these	O

	O
names	O
as	O
marketing	O
hooks	O
,	O
whereas	O
they	O
are	O
actually	O
complex	O
shibboleths	O
that	O
convey	O
the	O

	O
scope	O
of	O
a	O
set	O
of	O
activity	O
and	O
its	O
sourcing	O
.	O

	O
Since	O
roughly	O
2016	O
,	O
the	O
United	O
States	O
government	O
has	O
been	O
actively	O
working	O
to	O
collaborate	O

	O
with	O
non	O
-	O
government	O
agencies	O
.	O
The	O
National	O
Security	O
Agency	O
(	O
NSA	O
)	O
,	O
Cybersecurity	O
and	O

	O
Infrastructure	O
Security	O
Agency	O
(	O
CISA	O
)	O
,	O
and	O
the	O
Federal	O
Bureau	O
of	O
Investigation	O
(	O
FBI	O
)	O
have	O
all	O

	O
begun	O
publicly	O
sharing	O
tactical	O
reporting	O
containing	O
technical	O
details	O
,	O
indicators	O
,	O
and	O

	O
defensive	O
recommendations	O
.	O
These	O
reports	O
have	O
become	O
a	O
staple	O
of	O
any	O
major	O
cyber	O

	O
incident	O
because	O
they	O
provide	O
an	O
authoritative	O
situational	O
overview	O
and	O
an	O
initial	O
starting	O

	O
point	O
for	O
collaboration	O
.	O

	O
In	O
recent	O
reports[1][2	O
]	O
,	O
attribution	O
has	O
been	O
presented	O
at	O
the	O
forefront	O
of	O
the	O
report	O
and	O
used	O

	O
industry	O
cryptonyms	O
along	O
with	O
military	O
units	O
or	O
specific	O
government	O
entities	O
.	O
While	O
this	O
may	O

	O
be	O
intended	O
to	O
support	O
broader	O
usage	O
(	O
outside	O
of	O
technical	O
consumers	O
)	O
,	O
attribution	O
in	O
these	O

	O
reports	O
,	O
without	O
supporting	O
analysis	O
,	O
is	O
creating	O
a	O
dangerous	O
precedent	O
.	O

	O
Technical	O
analysis	O
is	O
fundamentally	O
rooted	O
in	O
scientific	O
methodology	O
.	O
When	O
research	O
is	O

	O
presented	O
,	O
a	O
basic	O
requirement	O
is	O
that	O
it	O
is	O
sufficiently	O
detailed	O
to	O
be	O
validated	O
by	O
reproducing	O

	O
the	O
analysis	O
.	O
Within	O
the	O
aforenoted	O
reports	O
,	O
attribution	O
is	O
presented	O
as	O
a	O
statement	O
of	O
fact	O
,	O

	O
similar	O
in	O
confidence	O
to	O
the	O
reported	O
dates	O
or	O
software	O
versions	O
,	O
instead	O
of	O
as	O
a	O
confidencestructured	O
assessment	O
.	O

	O
It	O
may	O
be	O
possible	O
the	O
authors	O
of	O
these	O
reports	O
have	O
a	O
Palantír[3	O
]	O
,	O
allowing	O
them	O
to	O
perfectly	O

	O
identify	O
the	O
hostile	O
authors	O
,	O
but	O
without	O
proper	O
confidence	O
language	O
and	O
presentation	O
,	O
these	O

	O
assessments	O
are	O
just	O
as	O
likely	O
to	O
have	O
been	O
made	O
by	O
a	O
roll	O
of	O
the	O
dice	O
.	O

	O
In	O
future	O
reports	O
,	O
providing	O
context	O
regarding	O
how	O
reported	O
activity	O
links	O
to	O
named	O
sets	O
will	O

	O
provide	O
critical	O
information	O
to	O
existing	O
understanding	O
of	O
these	O
groups	O
.	O
In	O
instances	O
where	O

	O
providing	O
this	O
information	O
may	O
risk	O
sources	O
and	O
methods	O
,	O
limiting	O
assessed	O
attribution	O
to	O
a	O

	O
1/2	O


	O
broad	O
geographic	O
estimate	O
or	O
omitting	O
it	O
entirely	O
may	O
provide	O
a	O
better	O
service	O
.	O

	O
[	O
1	O
]	O

	O
https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/28/2002306626/-1/-1/0/CSA%20Sandworm%20Actors	O

	O
%	O
20Exploiting%20Vulnerability%20in%20Exim%20Transfer%20Agent%2020200528.pdf	O

	O
[	O
2	O
]	O
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/16/2002457639/-1/-1/0/NCSC_APT29_ADVISORYQUAD-OFFICIAL-20200709-1810.PDF	O

	O
[	O
3	O
]	O
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palant%C3%ADr	O

	O
Older	O

	O
Backdooring	O
a	O
HID	O
Reader	O


	O
2/2	O