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Justice Ginsburg | 2,015 | 5 | majority | Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Comm'n | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2812589/arizona-state-legislature-v-arizona-independent-redistricting-commn/ | people. 404– 405 (1819). So comprehended, the Clause doubly empow ers the people. They may control the State’s lawmaking processes in the first instance, as Arizona voters have done, and they may seek Congress’ correction of regula tions prescribed by state legislatures. The people of Arizona turned to the initiative to curb the practice of gerrymandering and, thereby, to ensure that Members of Congress would have “an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.” The Federalist No. 57, at 350 (J. Madison). In so acting, Arizona voters sought to restore “the core principle of republican government,” namely, “that the voters should choose their representa tives, not the other way around.” Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 Texas L. Rev. 781 (05). The Elec tions Clause does not hinder that endeavor. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona is Affirmed. Cite as: 576 U. S. (15) 1 ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 13–1314 ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, APPELLANT v. ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL. |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | Laches is a doctrine that bars a plaintiff ’s claim when there has been unreasonable, prejudicial delay in com- mencing suit. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies p. 89 (2d ed. 1993). The question before us is whether a court can apply this doctrine in a patent infringement action for damages brought within the statute of limita- tions. The Court holds that a court cannot. Laches, it says, is a “gap-filling doctrine,” generally applicable where there is no statute of limitations. But the 1952 Patent Act contains a statute of limitations. Hence there is “no gap to fill.” Ante, at 5. In my view, however, the majority has ignored the fact that, despite the 1952 Act’s statute of limitations, there remains a “gap” to fill. See infra, at 2–3. Laches fills this gap. And for more than a century courts with virtual uimity have applied laches in patent damages cases. Congress, when it wrote the 1952 statute, was aware of and intended to codify that judicial practice. I fear that the majority, in ignoring this legal history, opens a new “gap” in the patent law, threatening harmful and unfair legal consequences. 2 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC BREYER, J., dissenting I Consider the relevant statutory language. Section 6 of the Patent Act says: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any infringement com- mitted more than six years prior to the filing of the com- plaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.” 35 U.S. C. (emphasis added). Section 2 says what the word “otherwise” means. It tells us that “unenforcea- bility” shall be a defense “in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent.” (emphasis added). Two features of this statutory language are important. First, the limitations provision, unlike those in many other statutes, does not set forth a period of time in which to sue, beginning when a claim accrues and then expiring some time later. (The False Claims Act, for example, gives a plaintiff six years from the date of the violation or three years from the date of discovery to file his suit, 31 U.S. C. Rather, it permits a patentee to sue at any time after an infringement takes place. It simply limits dam- ages to those caused within the preceding six years. That means that a patentee, after learning of a possible in- fringement in year 1, might wait until year 10 or year 15 or year 20 to bring a lawsuit. And if he wins, he can col- lect damages |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | lawsuit. And if he wins, he can col- lect damages for the preceding six years of infringement. This fact creates a gap. Why? Because a patentee might wait for a decade or more while the infringer (who perhaps does not know or believe he is an infringer) in- vests heavily in the development of the infringing product (of which the patentee’s invention could be only a small component), while evidence that the infringer might use to, say, show the patent is invalid disappears with time. Then, if the product is a success, the patentee can bring his lawsuit, hoping to collect a significant recovery. And if business-related circumstances make it difficult or impos- sible for the infringer to abandon its use of the patented Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 3 BREYER, J., dissenting invention (i.e., if the infringer is “locked in”), then the patentee can keep bringing lawsuits, say, in year 10 (col- lecting damages from years 4 through 10), in year 16 (collecting damages from years 10 through 16), and in year 20 (collecting any remaining damages). The possibility of this type of outcome reveals a “gap.” Laches works to fill the gap by barring recovery when the patentee unreason- ably and prejudicially delays suit. Second, the Patent Act’s language strongly suggests that Congress, when writing the statutory provisions before us, intended to permit courts to continue to use laches to fill this gap. The statute says that there are “except[ions]” to its 6-year damages limitation rule. It lists “unenforceability” as one of those exceptions. At common law, the word “unenforceability” had a meaning that encompassed laches. See, e.g., United (consider- ing whether an agreement “had become unenforceable by reason of inexcusable laches”). We often read statutes as incorporating common-law meanings. See And here there are good reasons for doing so. For one thing, the principal technical drafter of the Patent Act ) stated that §2 was meant to codify “equitable defenses such as laches.” P. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S. C. A. 1, 55 (West 1954). For another thing, there is a long history of prior case law that shows with crystal clarity that Congress intended the statute to keep laches as a defense. II The pre-1952 case law that I shall discuss is directly relevant because, as this Court has recognized, the 1952 Patent Act was primarily intended to codify existing law. 4 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC BREYER, J., dissenting See Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 579 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 4); accord, |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | Inc., 579 U. S. (2016) (slip op., at 4); accord, H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1952) (stating that the “main pur- pose” of the Patent Act was “codification and enactment” of existing law); 98 Cong. Rec. 9323 (1952) (drafter of the Act stating that it was generally intended to “codif[y] the present patent laws”). Now consider the existing law that the Patent Act’s drafters intended the Act to reflect. The decisions that find or say or hold that laches can bar monetary relief in patent infringement actions stretch in a virtually unbro- ken chain from the late 19th century through the Patent Act’s enactment in 1952. They number in the dozens and include every federal appeals court to have considered the matter. ; and Concord v. Norton, 16 F. 477 (CC Mass. 1883).) Here are the cases from the Federal Courts of Appeals alone: Lukens Steel Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 197 F.2d 939, 941 (CA2 1952); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., ; v. Hawley Prods. Co., ; 345–347 (CA5 1946); Rome Grader & Mach. ; France Mfg. 609–610 ; Universal Lock ; Union Shipbuild- ing (CA4 1938); 608– 610 ; Holman v. Oil Well Supply Co., 83 F.2d 538 (per curiam); Dock & Term. Eng. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., ; ; Westco-Chippewa Pump Co. v. Delaware Elec. & Supply Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 5 BREYER, J., dissenting Co., ; Window Glass Mach. 4 F. 645, 650– 651 ; Dwight & Sintering Co. v. Greenawalt, (CA2 19); George J. Meyer Mfg. 507–508 (CA7 19); Wolf Mineral Process ; Cummings v. Wilson & Willard Mfg. Co., ; ; Wolf, Sayer & Heller, Inc. v. United States Slicing Mach. Co., 261 F. 195, 197–198 ; A. R. Mosler & Co. v. Lurie, 209 F. 364, 371 (CA2 1913); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Consolidated Car Heating Co., (CA2 1909) (per curiam); Richardson v. D. M. Osborne & Co., 93 F. 8, 830–831 (CA2 1899); and Woodmanse & Hewitt Mfg. The majority replies that this list proves nothing. After all, it says, nearly all of these decisions come from courts of equity. Courts of equity ordinarily applied laches “ ‘to claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature ha[d] provided no fixed time limitation,’ ” ante, at 5 (quoting Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. (2014) (slip op., at 12)), not to requests for damages, “a quintessential legal remedy,” ante, at 3. Since “laches is a gap-filling doctrine,” the fact that it was applied to equit- able claims |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | the fact that it was applied to equit- able claims without statutes of limitations says little about whether it should apply to legal damages claims when “there is a statute of limitations,” and therefore “no gap to fill.” Ante, at 5. Good reply. But no cigar. Why not? (1) Because in 1897 Congress enacted a statute of limitations—very much like the one before us now—for patent claims brought in courts of equity. Ch. 391, (“[I]n any suit or action there shall be no recovery of profits or damages for any infringement committed more than six years be- fore” filing). Thus, after 1897, there was no statute of 6 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC BREYER, J., dissenting limitations gap for equity courts to fill, and yet they con- tinued to hold that laches applied. See, e.g., France Mfg., (“[N]otwithstanding the statute of limita- tions, relief may be denied on the ground of laches ”); Dwight & at (explaining how laches operates in conjunction with the statute of limit- ations to allow an infringer to “garne[r] the harvest of even the earliest of the 6 years to which recovery is in any event limited, with just confidence that he will not be disturbed”). (2) Because in 1870 Congress enacted a statute that gave courts of equity the power to award legal relief, namely, damages, in patent cases. Act of July 8, 1870, Congress did not give law courts an equivalent power to grant injunctive relief in patent suits. As a result, from the late 19th century until the merger of law and equity in 1938, nearly all patent litigation— including suits for damages—took place in courts of equity that were applying laches in conjunction with a statute of limitations. See Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid? (discussing the predomice of equity litigation). (3) Because Congress recognized that damages suits for patent infringement took place almost exclusively in equity courts, not law courts. Whenever Congress wished to modify patent damages law, it rewrote the statutory provisions governing damages in equity, not law. See, e.g., (modifying the equity damages statute to allow equity courts to award a “reasonable sum” even if a patentee had difficulty proving actual damages, but mak- ing no change to the legal damages provision). The 1952 Congress, seeking to understand whether, or how, laches applied in patent damages cases, would almost certainly have looked to equity practice. (4) Because, in any event, in those few pre-law/equity- merger cases in which courts of law considered whether Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 7 |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | law considered whether Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 7 BREYER, J., dissenting laches could bar a patent damages action, they, like their equity counterparts, held that it could. See Universal 104 F.2d, at ; 69 F.2d, at ; As the majority points out, these cases brought in law courts constitute “only a handful of decisions.” Ante, at 13. But that is simply because, as I just noted, almost all patent damages litigation took place in courts of equity. Regardless, before the merger of law and equity both law courts and equity courts recognized laches as a defense. And, after the merger of law and equity in 1938, federal courts still applied laches to patent damages claims. E.g., 182 F.2d, at (holding that “laches on the part of the plaintiff ” can “bar his right to recover damages”). This, of course, would make no sense if laches for patent damages was really an equity- only rule. Does the majority have any other good reason to ignore the mountain of authority recognizing laches as a defense? It refers to many general statements in opinions and treatises that say that laches is “no defense at law.” United But these statements are not about patent damages cases. They do not claim to encompass the problem at issue here. And they do not prevent Congress from enacting a statute that, recognizing patent litigation’s history, combines a statute of limitations with a laches defense. And that is what Congress has done in the Patent Act. The majority also tries to discredit the persuasiveness of the pre-Patent Act case law authority. It goes through the lengthy list of decisions, finding some judicial statements too vague, others just dicta, and still others having con- fused an equitable claim for “accounting” with a legal claim for “damages.” I agree that it has found weaknesses in the reasoning of some individual cases. But those weaknesses were not sufficient to prevent a treatise writer from concluding, on the basis of the great weight of 8 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC BREYER, J., dissenting authority, that in patent cases, “[l]aches may be inter- posed in an action at law.” 3 A. Deller, Walker on Patents 106 In any event, with all its efforts, the majority is unable to identify a single case—not one—from any court of ap- peals sitting in law or in equity before the merger, or sitting after the merger but before 1952, holding that laches could not bar a patent claim for damages. Fur- thermore, the majority concedes that it is unable to |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | Fur- thermore, the majority concedes that it is unable to distin- guish, by my count, at least six Court of Appeals cases directly holding that laches could bar a patent claim for damages. See Wolf, Sayer & Heller, ; Lurie, 209 F. 364; Universal ; Bren- Lukens, And that is the case law situation that Congress faced when it wrote a statute that, as we have said, sought primarily to codify existing patent law. See at 3–4. The majority tries to minimize the overall thrust of this case law by dividing the cases into subgroups and then concluding that the number of undistinguishable prece- dents in each subgroup is “too few to establish a settled, national consensus.” Ante, at 12. The problem with this approach is that, once we look at the body of case law as a whole, rather than in subgroups, we find what I have said and repeated, namely, that all the cases say the same thing: Laches applies. The majority’s insistence on subdi- vision makes it sound a little like a Phillies fan who an- nounces that a 9–0 loss to the Red Sox was a “close one.” Why close? Because, says the fan, the Phillies lost each inning by only one run. For the sake of completeness I add that, since 1952, every Federal Court of Appeals to consider the question has held that laches remains available for damages claims brought under the Patent Act. See A. C. Aukerman Co. v. R. L. Chaides Constr. Co., (CA Fed. 1992) (en banc). Yet, Congress has repeatedly reenacted Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 9 BREYER, J., dissenting 35 U.S. C. §2’s “unenforceability” language without material change. See, e.g., 20(g)(2)(B), 125 Stat. 3, 334. See also Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U. S. (2015) (slip op., at 14) (holding that congressional reenactment provides “convincing support for the conclu- sion that Congress accepted and ratified the uimous holdings of the Courts of Appeals”); Microsoft (when Congress has “often amended §2” while “le[aving] the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of §2 in place,” any further “recalibration” should be left to the Legislature). III The majority’s strongest argument is Petrella. There, the Court held that laches could not bar a damages claim brought within the Copyright Act’s limitations period. The present case holds roughly the same in respect to the Patent Act, providing a degree of consistency. There are relevant differences, however, between patent law and copyright law. For one thing, copyright law, unlike patent law, does not contain a century and a half |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | patent law, does not contain a century and a half of history during which courts held that laches and a statute of limitations could coexist. When Congress enacted the Patent Act in 1952, patent statutes had already contained a 6-year statute of limitations for 55 years (since 1897), during which time courts had continued to apply laches to patent damages cases. Copyright law, on the other hand, contained no federal statute of limitations until 1957. See Petrella, 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 3). For another thing, the Copyright Act, unlike the Patent Act, has express provisions that mitigate the unfairness of a copyright holder waiting for decades to bring his lawsuit. A copyright holder who tries to lie in wait to see if a de- fendant’s investment will prove successful will discover that the Copyright Act allows that defendant to “prove and 10 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC BREYER, J., dissenting offset against profits ‘deductible expenses’ incurred in generating those profits.” at (slip op., at 12) (quot- ing 17 U.S. C. Thus, if the defendant invests say $50 million in a film, a copyright holder who waits until year 15 (when the film begins to earn a profit) to bring a lawsuit may be limited to recovering the defendant’s profits less an apportioned amount of the defendant’s initial $50 million investment. But the Patent Act has no such deduction provision. Further, the Court, in Petrella, pointed out that the evidentiary loss that occurs while a copyright holder waits to bring suit is “at least as likely to affect plaintiffs as it is to disadvantage defendants.” 572 U. S., at (slip op., at 18). But that symmetry does not exist to the same degree in patent law. To win a copyright suit the copyright holder must show that the defendant copied his work. The death of witnesses and loss of documents from the time of the alleged infringement can therefore significantly impair the copyright holder’s ability to prove his case. There is no such requirement in a patent suit. Patent infringement is a strict-liability offense: There need not be any copying, only an end product (or process) that invades the area the patentee has carved out in his patent. At the same time, the passage of time may well harm patent defendants who wish to show a patent invalid by raising defenses of anticipation, obviousness, or insuffi- ciency. These kinds of defenses can depend upon contem- poraneous evidence that may be lost over time, and they arise far more frequently in patent cases than |
Justice Breyer | 2,017 | 2 | dissenting | SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4376984/sca-hygiene-products-aktiebolag-v-first-quality-baby-products-llc/ | and they arise far more frequently in patent cases than any of their counterparts do in copyright cases. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 23 (reporting that of all copyright cases pending as of January 2009, only 2.7% of judgment events resulted in a finding of a lack of ownership or validity of the copyright at issue); Allison, Lemley, & Schwartz, Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 Texas L. Rev. 1769, 1778, Cite as: 580 U. S. (2017) 11 BREYER, J., dissenting 1784–1785 (2014) (finding that 70% of summary judgment motions in patent cases filed in 2008–2009 related to anticipation or obviousness). The upshot is an absence here of the symmetrical effect of delay upon which the Court relied in Petrella. Finally, there is a “lock-in” problem that is likely to be more serious where patents are at issue. Once a business chooses to rely on a particular technology, it can become expensive to switch, even if it would have been cheap to do so earlier. See Lee & Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 409– 410 (2016). As a result, a patentee has considerable incen- tive to delay suit until the costs of switching—and accord- ingly the settlement value of a claim—are high. The practical consequences of such delay can be significant, as the facts of this case illustrate: First Quality invested hundreds of millions of dollars in its allegedly infringing technologies during the years that SCA waited to bring its suit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a–108a. And amici have provided numerous other examples that suggest this fact pattern is far from uncommon. See Brief for Dell et al. 11–19. I recognize the Majority’s suggestion that the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” might help alleviate some of these problems. See ante, at 15. I certainly hope so. But I would be more “cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing commu- nity.” Festo I add or confess that I believe that Petrella too was wrongly decided. Today’s case helps illustrate why I think that Petrella started this Court down the wrong track. I would stop, finding adequate grounds to distinguish Pet- rella. But the majority remains “determined to stay the course and continue on, travelling even further away,” Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. (2016) (ALITO, 12 SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS AKTIEBOLAG v. FIRST QUALITY BABY PRODUCTS, LLC BREYER, J., dissenting J., dissenting) (slip op., at 9), from Congress’ efforts, in the Patent Act, to promote the “Progress of Science and useful Arts,” U. S. Const., |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. the San Jacinto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108637/union-oil-co-of-cal-v-the-san-jacinto/ | While proceeding up the Columbia River, the oil tanker S. S. Santa Maria, bareboat chartered by petitioner, was struck by a barge owned by respondent Oliver J. Olson & Co. The barge was being towed by the tugboat San Jacinto, owned by respondent Star & Crescent Towboat Co. Both vessels were damaged. Petitioner commenced this admiralty action for damages to the Santa Maria, and respondent cross-libeled for damages to the barge. The District Court found the collision resulted solely from *141 negligence on the part of the crew of the San Jacinto, and dismissed the cross-libel. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that the San Jacinto had been negligent, but determined that the Santa Maria was also negligent in violating the "half-distance" rule, 33 U.S. C. 192. That court therefore reversed with directions that the District Court determine the amount of damage sustained by the barge and assess damages under the divided-damages rule. See The Schooner We granted certiorari, principally to consider petitioner's request that we abandon the divided-damages rule. The orderly disposition of the issues presented by the petition for certiorari, however, requires that we address ourselves to the issue of liability before reaching the question of damages. Since in so doing we conclude that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding the Santa Maria liable at all, we do not reach the issue of damages. I On the evening of December 24, 1967, the Santa Maria, loaded with 17,000 tons of petroleum products, was proceeding up the Columbia River toward Portland. The ship was steaming on the Oregon side of the channel, with clear visibility. At the same time, the San Jacinto was proceeding downriver, towing a 275-foot barge, fully loaded with lumber, by a 250-foot towline. Proceeding on the Washington side of the channel, it had encountered foggy weather conditions upriver. As the San Jacinto approached Cooper Point, the Santa Maria, steaming upstream, sighted the tug both visually and by radar. The two vessels were more than a mile apart and on opposite sides of the 500-foot-wide shipping channel. There was heavy fog, described as "tule fog," around Cooper Point, but the fog was localized on the Washington *142 side of the channel. Although there was haze and drizzle, there was no fog on the Oregon side of the channel; the visibility from the bridge of the Santa Maria upstream was between one and one-half and two miles. As the San Jacinto entered the fog on the Washington side off Cooper Point, the Santa Maria lost visual contact with the tug and barge. The Santa Maria's |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. the San Jacinto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108637/union-oil-co-of-cal-v-the-san-jacinto/ | visual contact with the tug and barge. The Santa Maria's pilot did not track the San Jacinto on radar, believing that the tug would remain on the Washington side of the channel and knowing that there was ample room for a port-to-port passage. At this time, the Santa Maria was proceeding at half-speed making approximately seven knots. The watch on the San Jacinto had not sighted the Santa Maria when the tug entered the heavy fog off Cooper Point. The tug's captain testified that, after entering the fog, he cut speed to three or three and one-half knots, and the visibility dead ahead was approximately 50 yards. The San Jacinto's navigators were "navigating by visual sight of the Washington coast," and the captain estimated that the tug passed between 50 and 75 yards off Cooper Point. At that point, the crew of the San Jacinto heard one blast of a ship's horn (later discovered to have been that of the Santa Maria), and responded with the fog signal for a tug with a barge in tow. No visual sighting of a ship was made, however. Shortly thereafter, the captain sighted range lights, which, he testified, he thought were 20 degrees off his starboard bow. To avoid what he anticipated to be a momentary collision, the captain swung the San Jacinto to porttowards the Oregon side of the channeland executed a U-turn, hoping to run upriver and thus avoid a collision. The San Jacinto started the U-turn while still in the heavy fog, and the execution of the turn brought the tug on a course directly across that of the Santa Maria. The Santa Maria sighted the San Jacinto emerging from the fog, at right angles to the Santa Maria, at a distance of *143 approximately 900 feet. Full astern was immediately ordered. The San Jacinto, quickly completing the turn, headed safely upriver. Before the Santa Maria could completely stop, however, the barge in tow sideslipped across the channel, crashing into the port bow of the Santa Maria; the force of that blow drove the tanker aground. The District Court found that the San Jacinto and the barge, and those in charge of navigation, were negligent in eight respects, including navigating at excessive speed, failing to maintain a proper lookout, and "acting hastily and without sufficient cause in pulling the tow across the channel when there was adequate clearance for the tug and barge to pass port to port." The court found that "the collision was proximately caused by the sole fault and negligence" of the San Jacinto and the barge, |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. the San Jacinto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108637/union-oil-co-of-cal-v-the-san-jacinto/ | fault and negligence" of the San Jacinto and the barge, and that the acts of negligence allegedly committed by the Santa Maria did not "proximately [contribute] to the collision and resulting damage." 522. The Ninth Circuit partially reversed, holding that the Santa Maria was proceeding at an immoderate speed in traveling at three to seven knots "while approaching the edge of the fog bank." That court reasoned that the San Jacinto was only 900 feet from the Santa Maria when the tug emerged from the fog bank, and the Santa Maria's speed was such that she could not stop within half that distance. The court, relying on The Silver (CA9), cert. denied sub nom. United deemed it immaterial that the visibility up the Oregon side of the channelthe direction in which the Santa Maria was headedwas almost two miles, because in its view the "relevant distance" for calculating the proper speed under the half-distance rule was the distance between the tanker and the fog bankto port of the Santa Maria. Finding *144 statutory fault, and ruling that petitioner had failed to prove that that fault could not have possibly contributed to the collision, see The Pennsylvania, the Court of Appeals held the Santa Maria liable for half the total damages. II The question of the liability of the Santa Maria turns on the application of Art. 16 of the Inland Rules of Navigation, 33 U.S. C. 192. That Rule provides in pertinent part: "Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circumstances and conditions." (Emphasis added.) Although the statutory test for determining the proper speed at which a vessel should proceed in a fog is phrased in general terms, our decisions have attached a well-recognized gloss to that phrase. This gloss on the statutory rule, variously referred to as the half-distance rule or the "rule of sight," is that, in a fog, "a moderate speed" is that "rate of speed as would enable [the vessel] to come to a standstill, by reversing her engines at full speed, before she should collide with a vessel which she should see through the fog." The See also The ; The As stated in The Chattahoochee, "[t]he principal reason for such reduction of speed is that it will give [both] vessels time to avoid a collision after coming in sight of each other." If two vessels, upon sighting each other, are proceeding at rates of speed such that *145 each can stop before it reaches the point at which |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. the San Jacinto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108637/union-oil-co-of-cal-v-the-san-jacinto/ | each can stop before it reaches the point at which the courses of the two intersect, collision is impossible. There can be no quarrel with the salutary purpose of this "rule of thumb." It is premised on the notion that when a ship is traveling under foggy weather conditions in waters in which other ships might be proceeding on intersecting courses, the speed of each ship must be such as to enable her to stop within half the distance separating the ships when they first sight each other. Implicit in the rule, however, is the assumption that vessels can reasonably be expected to be traveling on intersecting courses. If, on the facts of the case, it is totally unrealistic to anticipate the possibility that a vessel will travel on a particular heading that would intersect the course of another ship, the reason for the rule is rather clearly not present. Those cases in which this Court has upheld a finding of statutory fault because of a violation of the half-distance rule involved ships proceeding in fog on established coastal shipping lanes, The City of New York, ; The cf. The or ships traveling near or in a harbor, The cf. The Ludvig Holberg, We do not imply that because a vessel is running near fog, as opposed to running in it, the vessel is not required to proceed at "a moderate speed" in relation to the distance to the fog cover. That was, indeed, the circumstance in The Silver upon which the Ninth Circuit relied. But there a naval cruiser was traveling, with clear visibility ahead but with fog banks on each side, on the busy coastal shipping lane between San Francisco and Los Angeles. On such a course it is reasonable to expect that another ship might steam out of the fog at right angles to, and on a collision course with, the first vessel. *146 The rule of sight was applicable there precisely because of the reasonable possibility that such an event might occur. The facts of our case were significantly different. The Santa Maria and the San Jacinto were proceeding on opposite sides of a well-defined and relatively narrow channel. The Santa Maria had last sighted the tug only a mile ahead, proceeding along the Washington coast. Those in charge of the navigation of the tanker cannot be faulted for not anticipating the tug's totally unorthodox maneuver in darting across such a channel. The Victory & The Plymothian, The visibility in the direction in which the Santa Maria was headed was almost two miles. There is no |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,972 | 19 | majority | Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. the San Jacinto | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108637/union-oil-co-of-cal-v-the-san-jacinto/ | Maria was headed was almost two miles. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the speed of the tanker would have prevented her from coming to a complete halt within half the distance of sighting a vessel that was either proceeding on a remotely foreseeable intersecting course or else being overtaken by her. The tug emerged from a fog bank only 900 feet from the tanker on a course and for reasons that no seaman could, under the circumstances, have anticipated. The District Court's finding that any negligence on the part of the Santa Maria did not "proximately [contribute] to the collision" was but another way of saying that fault based on the half-distance rule must have some relationship to the dangers against which that rule was designed to protect. Here it did not. We believe that the District Court, and not the Court of Appeals, reached the correct result on the issue of liability. Since in our view respondents alone were at fault, there is no occasion to consider how damages should be apportioned were both vessels at fault. Reversed. *147 MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Mandel v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109696/mandel-v-bradley/ | Candidates for statewide or federal office in Maryland may obtain a place on the general election ballot by filing with the State Administrative Board of Election Laws a certificate of candidacy 70 days before a political party's primary election and then by winning the primary. Alternatively, under provisions of the Maryland Election Code, a candidate *174 for statewide or federal office may qualify for a position on the general election ballot as an independent by filing, 70 days before the date on which party primaries are held, nominating petitions signed by at least 3% of the State's registered voters and a certificate of candidacy. Md. Elec. Code Ann. 7-1 In Presidential election years this filing date occurs approximately 230 to 240 days before the general election. In other years it occurs about 120 days before the general election. 1-1 (a) (8), 5-2, 7-1. Appellee Bruce Bradley decided in the spring of to run as an independent candidate for the United States Senate in 1976, a Presidential election year. Starting in the fall of Bradley collected signatures on nominating petitions. The requisite number was 51, 155. On March 8, 1976, the deadline for filing, Bradley submitted 53,239 signatures and filed a certificate of candidacy for the Senate seat. However, on April 15, 1976, the State Administrative Board of Election Laws determined that only 42,049 of the signatures were valid and denied him a place on the ballot. Two weeks later, Bradley and the other appelleespetition signers and other voter supporters of Bradleyfiled the instant suit, alleging that the procedures mandated by 7-1 of the Md. Elec. Code constitute an unconstitutional infringement of their associational and voting rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They complained that Maryland's early filing date made it more difficult for Bradley to obtain the requisite number of signatures than for a party member to win a primary and sought, inter alia, an injunction against future enforcement of the offending provision of Maryland's election procedures. A three-judge District Court agreed with the appellees that the early filing deadline of 7-1 (i) was an unconstitutional burden on an independent candidate's access to the ballot and ordered the appellants to give Bradley 53 *175 days after the party primaries to gather the requisite number of signatures.[1] The court based its holding on our summary affirmance in aff'g In Salera, a three-judge court declared unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law setting the deadline for an independent candidate to gather signatures to obtain a place on the ballot 244 days before the general election in a Presidential election year. Under the Pennsylvania law, |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Mandel v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109696/mandel-v-bradley/ | election in a Presidential election year. Under the Pennsylvania law, independents had to submit signatures of only 2% of the largest vote cast for any candidate in the preceding statewide general election, but they had to gather the required signatures within a 21-day period prior to the filing deadline. In declaring the Pennsylvania statute invalid, the three-judge court relied, not on the short period for signature gathering ), but solely on the early deadline for submission of the necessary signatures. The court found that the deadline substantially burdened ballot access of independents by requiring them to obtain the necessary signatures at a time when the election issues were undefined and the voters were apathetic. It also rejected various countervailing state interests that had been urged. This Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the three-judge court in Salera. The three-judge court in this case viewed this Court's summary affirmance in Salera as controlling precedent for the proposition that early filing dates, such as that employed in Maryland, are unconstitutionally burdensome on the independent candidate's access to the ballot, and therefore decided in favor of the appellees. We noted probable jurisdiction, *176 The District Court erred in believing that our affirmance in Salera adopted the reasoning as well as the judgment of the three-judge court in that case and thus required the District Court to conclude that the early filing date is impermissibly burdensome. held that lower courts are bound by summary actions on the merits by this Court, but we noted that "[a]scertaining the reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real substance." at 345 n. 14. Because a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only, the rationale of the affirmance may not be gleaned solely from the opinion below. "When we summarily affirm, without opinion, we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument." (Footnote omitted.) Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions. After Salera, for example, other courts were not free to conclude that the Pennsylvania provision invalidated was nevertheless constitutional. Summary actions, however, including Salera, should not be understood as |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Mandel v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109696/mandel-v-bradley/ | Summary actions, however, including Salera, should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved. Here, the District Court ruled that legally "Salera decides the issue before us, and as the latest expression of the Supreme *177 Court, we are bound to follow it." App. to Jurisdictional Statement 12a. The precedential significance of the summary action in Salera, however, is to be assessed in the light of all of the facts in that case; and it is immediately apparent that those facts are very different from the facts of this case. There, in addition to the early filing date, signatures had to be gathered within a 21-day period. This limited time enormously increased the difficulty of obtaining the number of signatures necessary to qualify as an independent candidate.[2] This combination of an early filing deadline and the 21-day limitation on signature gathering is sufficient to distinguish Salera from the case now before us, where there is no limitation on the period within which such signatures must be gathered. In short, Salera did not mandate the result reached by the District Court in this case. Because of its preoccupation with Salera, the District Court failed to undertake an independent examination of the merits. The appropriate inquiry was set out in at 742: "[I]n the context of [Maryland] politics, could a reasonably diligent independent candidate be expected to satisfy the [ballot access] requirements, or will it be only rarely that the unaffiliated candidate will succeed in getting on the ballot? Past experience will be a helpful, if not always an unerring, guide: it will be one thing if independent candidates have qualified with some regularity and quite a different matter if they have not. We note here that the State mentions only one instance of *178 an independent candidate's qualifying but disclaims having made any comprehensive survey of the official records that would perhaps reveal the truth of the matter." In Storer itself, because the District Court had not applied these standards in adjudicating the constitutional issues before it, we remanded the case "to permit further findings with respect to the extent of the burden imposed on independent candidates." There is no reason here for doing any less. The District Court did not sift through the conflicting evidence and make findings of fact as to the difficulty of obtaining signatures in time to meet the early filing deadline. It did not consider the extent to which other features of the Maryland electoral systemsuch as the unlimited period during which signatures may |
per_curiam | 1,977 | 200 | per_curiam | Mandel v. Bradley | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109696/mandel-v-bradley/ | electoral systemsuch as the unlimited period during which signatures may be collected, or the unrestricted pool of potential petition signersmoderate whatever burden the deadline creates. See Developments in the Law Elections, It did not analyze what the past experience of independent candidates for statewide office might indicate about the burden imposed on those seeking ballot access. Instead, the District Court's assumption that the filing deadline by itself was per se illegal as well as the expedited basis upon which the case necessarily was decided[3]resulted in a failure to apply the constitutional standards announced in Storer to the statutory provisions here at issue.[4] *179 The application of those standards to the evidence in the record is, in the first instance, a task for the District Court. We therefore vacate the judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[5] It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S. C. et seq., citizens and lawful permanent residents (LPRs) of the United States may petition for certain fam- ily members—spouses, siblings, and children of various ages—to obtain immigrant visas. Such a sponsored indi- vidual is known as the petition’s principal beneficiary. In turn, any principal beneficiary’s minor child—meaning an unmarried child under the age of 2—qualifies as a deriv- ative beneficiary, “entitled to the same [immigration] status” and “order of consideration” as his parent. Accordingly, when a visa becomes available to the petition’s principal beneficiary, one also becomes available to her minor child. But what happens if, sometime after the relevant peti- tion was filed, a minor child (whether a principal or a derivative beneficiary) has turned 2—or, in immigration 2 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. lingo, has “aged out”? The immigration process may take years or even decades to complete, due in part to bureau- cratic delays associated with reviewing immigration doc- uments and in (still greater) part to long queues for the limited number of visas available each year. So someone who was a youngster at the start of the process may be an adult at the end, and no longer qualify for an immigration status given to minors. The Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), ensures that the time Government officials have spent processing immigration papers will not count against the beneficiary in assessing his status. See 8 U.S. C. But even with that provision, the beneficiary may age out solely because of the time he spent waiting in line for a visa to become available. The question presented in this case is whether the CSPA grants a remedy to all aliens who have thus out- paced the immigration process—that is, all aliens who counted as child beneficiaries when a sponsoring petition was filed, but no longer do so (even after excluding admin- istrative delays) by the time they reach the front of the visa queue. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) said no. It interpreted the CSPA as providing relief to only a subset of that group—specifically, those aged-out aliens who qualified or could have qualified as principal beneficiaries of a visa petition, rather than only as derivative beneficiaries piggy-backing on a parent. We now uphold the Board’s determination as a permissible construction of the statute. I A An alien needs an immigrant visa to enter and perma- nently reside in the United States. See To —————— An alien already in the United States—for example, on a student or temporary worker visa—must obtain |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | States—for example, on a student or temporary worker visa—must obtain “adjustment of status” rather than an immigrant visa to become a lawful permanent resident. See 8 Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 3 Opinion of KAGAN, J. obtain that highly sought-after document, the alien must fall within one of a limited number of immigration cate- gories. See The most favored is for the “immediate relatives” of U. S. citizens—their parents, spouses, and unmarried children under the age of 2. See 0(b)(). Five other categories— crucial to this case, and often denominated “preference” categories—are for “family-sponsored immigrants,” who include more distant or independent relatives of U. S. citizens, and certain close relatives of LPRs.2 Specifically, those family preference categories are: F: the unmarried, adult (2 or over) sons and daugh- ters of U. S. citizens; F2A: the spouses and unmarried, minor (under 2) children of LPRs; F2B: the unmarried, adult (2 or over) sons and daughters of LPRs; F3: the married sons and daughters of U. S. citizens; F4: the brothers and sisters of U. S. citizens. 53(a)()–(4).3 (A word to the wise: Dog-ear this page for easy reference, because these categories crop up regularly throughout this opinion.) —————— U. S. C. Because the criteria for securing adjustment of status and obtaining an immigrant visa are materially identical, we use the single term “immigrant visa” to refer to both. 2 The “family preference” label, as used by immigration officials, ap- plies only to these five classifications, and not to the category for “im- mediate relatives” of U. S. citizens. See Brief for Petitioners 3, n. 3 Immigrant visas can also go to aliens with special, marketable skills, see 53(b), or to aliens from countries with histori- cally low immigration to the United States, see 53(c). None of the respondents here sought visas under those “employment- based” or “diversity” categories. 4 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. The road to obtaining any family-based immigrant visa begins when a sponsoring U. S. citizen or LPR files a petition on behalf of a foreign relative, termed the princi- pal beneficiary. See (a)()(B)(i)(I), (b); 8 CFR (204). The sponsor (otherwise known as the petitioner—we use the words interchangeably) must provide U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) with evidence showing, among other things, that she has the necessary familial relationship with the beneficiary, see (d)(2), (g)(2), and that she has not committed any conduct disqualifying her from sponsoring an alien for a visa, see, e.g., 8 U.S. C. (barring an LPR from submitting a petition if she has committed certain offenses against |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | submitting a petition if she has committed certain offenses against minors). USCIS thereafter reviews the petition, and approves it if found to meet all requirements. See For a family preference beneficiary, that approval re- sults not in getting a visa then and there, but only in getting a place in line. (The case is different for “immedi- ate relatives” of U. S. citizens, who can apply for and receive a visa as soon as a sponsoring petition is ap- proved.) The law caps the number of visas issued each year in the five family preference categories, see 52, 53(a)()–(4), and demand regularly exceeds the supply. As a consequence, the principal bene- ficiary of an approved petition is placed in a queue with others in her category (F, F2A, or what have you) in order of “priority date”—that is, the date a petition was filed with USCIS. See (b); 22 CFR 42.53(a) (203). Every month, the Department of State sets a cut-off date for each family preference category, indicating that visas (sometimes referred to by “visa numbers”) are available for beneficiaries with priority dates earlier than the cut-off. See (g)(); 22 CFR The system is thus first-come, first-served Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 5 Opinion of KAGAN, J. within each preference category, with visas becoming available in order of priority date. Such a date may benefit not only the principal benefi- ciary of a family preference petition, but also her spouse and minor children. Those persons, labeled the petition’s “derivative beneficiar[ies],” are “entitled to the same sta- tus, and the same order of consideration” as the principal. 8 U.S. C. (h). Accordingly, when a visa be- comes available for the principal, one becomes available for her spouse and minor children too. And that is so even when (as is usually but not always the case) the spouse and children would not qualify for any family preference category on their own. For example, the child of an F4 petition’s principal beneficiary is the niece or nephew of a U. S. citizen, and federal immigration law does not recog- nize that relationship. Nonetheless, the child can piggy- back on his qualifying parent in seeking an immigrant visa—although, as will be further discussed, he may not immigrate without her. See (a)(2); infra, at 6, 20–2, 3–32. Once visas become available, the principal and any derivative beneficiaries must separately file visa applica- tions. See 8 U.S. C. Such an application re- quires an alien to demonstrate in various ways her ad- missibility to the United States. See, e.g., ()(A) (alien may not have serious |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | United States. See, e.g., ()(A) (alien may not have serious health problems); (2)(A) (alien may not have been convicted of cer- tain crimes); (3)(B) (alien may not have engaged in terrorist activity). Notably, one necessary showing involves the U. S. citizen or LPR who filed the initial petition: To mitigate any possibility of becoming a “public charge,” the visa applicant (whether a principal or de- rivative beneficiary) must append an “affidavit of sup- port” executed by that sponsoring individual. §(4)(C)(ii), 83a(a)(). Such an affidavit legally commits the sponsor to support the alien, usually for at 6 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. least 0 years, with an annual income “not less than 25% of the federal poverty line.” see After the beneficiaries have filed their applications, a consular official reviews the documents and, if everything is in order, schedules in-person interviews. See The interviews for a principal and her children (or spouse) usually occur back-to-back, although those for the children may also come later.4 The consular official will determine first whether the principal should receive a visa; if (but only if) the answer is yes, the official will then consider the derivatives’ applications. See (a)(2), 42.62, 42.8(a). Provided all goes well, everyone exits the consu- late with visas in hand—but that still does not make them LPRs. See 8 U.S. C. Each approved alien must then travel to the United States within a set time, undergo inspection, and confirm her admissibility. See 222, 225(a)–(b). Once again, a derivative’s fate is tied to the principal’s: If the principal cannot enter the country, neither can her children (or spouse). See 22 CFR When, but only when, an alien with an immi- grant visa is approved at the border does she finally be- come an LPR.5 —————— 4 See Dept. of State, The Immigrant Visa Process: Visa Applicant Interview, online at http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/ immigrate/immigrant-process/interview/applicant_interview.html (all Internet materials as visited June 5, 204, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). 5 The last part of the immigration process is streamlined for aliens already residing in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status. See n. The immigration officer interviewing such an alien, upon finding her visa-eligible, may declare her an LPR on the spot. See 8 U.S. C. §255(i)(2). But here too, the officer will not make a derivative beneficiary an LPR unless and until he approves that status for the principal. See (a)(2). Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 7 Opinion of KAGAN, J. B All of this takes time—and often a lot of it. At the front |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | takes time—and often a lot of it. At the front end, many months may go by before USCIS approves the initial sponsoring petition.6 On the back end, several additional months may elapse while a consular official considers the alien’s visa application and schedules an interview.7 And the middle is the worst. After a sponsor- ing petition is approved but before a visa application can be filed, a family-sponsored immigrant may stand in line for years—or even decades—just waiting for an immigrant visa to become available. See, e.g., Dept. of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, 9 Visa Bulletin, Immigrant Numbers for December 203 (Nov. 8, 203). And as the years tick by, young people grow up, and thereby endanger their immigration status. Remember that not all offspring, but only those under the age of 2 can qualify as an “immediate relative” of a U. S. citizen, or as the principal beneficiary of an LPR’s F2A petition, or (most crucially here) as the derivative beneficiary of any family preference petition. See So an alien eligible to immigrate at the start of the process (when a sponsor files a petition) might not be so at the end (when an immigration official reviews his documents for admis- sion). He may have “aged out” of his original immigration status by the simple passage of time. In 2002, Congress enacted the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), to address the treatment of those once-but-no-longer-minor aliens. One section of the Act neatly eliminates the “aging out” problem for the offspring of U. S. citizens seeking to immigrate as “imme- —————— 6 See USCIS, Processing Time Information, online at https:// egov.uscis.gov/cris/processingTimesDisplayInit.do. 7 See The Immigrant Visa Process: Interview, online at http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/immigrant-process/ interview.html. 8 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. diate relatives.” Under that provision, the “determination of whether [such] an alien satisfies the [immigration law’s] age requirement shall be made using [his] age” on the date the initial petition was filed. 8 U.S. C. §5(f )(). The section thus halts the flow of time for that group of would-be immigrants: If an alien was young when a U. S. citizen sponsored his entry, then Peter Pan-like, he re- mains young throughout the immigration process. A different scheme—and one not nearly so limpid— applies to the offspring of LPRs and aliens who initially qualified as either principal beneficiaries of F2A petitions or derivative beneficiaries of any kind of family preference petition. Section 3 of the CSPA, now codified at 8 U.S. C. §53(h), contains three interlinked paragraphs that mitigate the “aging out” problem for those prospective immigrants. |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | that mitigate the “aging out” problem for those prospective immigrants. The first two are complex but, with some perseverance, comprehensible. The third—the key provi- sion here—is through and through perplexing.8 —————— 8 The full text of these three paragraphs, for the masochists among this opinion’s readers, is as follows: “(h) Rules for determining whether certain aliens are children “() In general “For purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, a deter- mination of whether an alien satisfies the age requirement in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) of section 0(b)() of this title shall be made using— “(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien (or, in the case of subsection (d) of this section, the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien’s parent), but only if the alien has sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi- dence within one year of such availability; reduced by “(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition described in paragraph (2) was pending. “(2) Petitions described “The petition described in this paragraph is— “(A) with respect to a relationship described in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, a petition filed under section 54 of this title for classifi- Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 9 Opinion of KAGAN, J. The first paragraph, §53(h)(), contains a formula for calculating the age of an alien “[f]or purposes of subsec- tions (a)(2)(A) and (d)”—that is, for any alien seeking an immigrant visa directly under F2A or as a derivative beneficiary of any preference category. The “determina- tion of whether [such] an alien satisfies the [immigration law’s] age requirement”—that is, counts as under 2— “shall be made using— “(A) the age of the alien on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes available for such al- ien (or, in the case of [derivative beneficiaries], the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien’s parent) ; reduced by “(B) the number of days in the period during which the applicable petition described in paragraph (2) was pending.” The cross-referenced second paragraph, §53(h)(2), then explains that the “applicable petition” mentioned is the petition covering the given alien—so again, either an F2A petition filed on his own behalf or any petition extending to him as a derivative. Taken together, those two paragraphs prevent an alien from “aging out” because of—but only because of— bureaucratic delays: the time Government officials spend reviewing (or getting around to reviewing) |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | time Government officials spend reviewing (or getting around to reviewing) paperwork at —————— cation of an alien child under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section; or “(B) with respect to an alien child who is a derivative beneficiary under subsection (d) of this section, a petition filed under section 54 of this title for classification of the alien’s parent under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. “(3) Retention of priority date “If the age of an alien is determined under paragraph () to be 2 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” 8 U.S. C. §53(h). 0 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. what we have called the front and back ends of the immi- gration process. See at 6–7. The months that elapse before USCIS personnel approve a family prefer- ence petition (“the period during which the applicable petition described in paragraph (2) was pending”) do not count against an alien in determining his statutory “age.” Neither do the months a consular officer lets pass before adjudicating the alien’s own visa application (the period after “an immigrant visa number becomes available for such alien (or [his] parent)”). But the time in be- tween—the months or, more likely, years the alien spends simply waiting for a visa to become available—is not similarly excluded in calculating his age: Every day the alien stands in that line is a day he grows older, under the immigration laws no less than in life. And so derivative beneficiaries, as well as principal beneficiaries of F2A petitions, can still “age out”—in other words, turn 2, notwithstanding §53(h)()’s dual age adjustments— prior to receiving an opportunity to immigrate. What happens then (if anything) is the subject of §53(h)’s third paragraph—the provision at issue in this case. That paragraph states: “If the age of an alien is determined under para- graph () to be 2 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d) of this section, the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the origi- nal petition.” The provision thus first references the aged-out beneficiar- ies of family preference petitions, and then directs immi- gration officials to do something whose meaning this opinion will further consider—i.e., “automatically convert” an alien’s petition to an “appropriate category.” |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | consider—i.e., “automatically convert” an alien’s petition to an “appropriate category.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed the Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) Opinion of KAGAN, J. meaning of §53(h)(3) in Matter of 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (2009); its interpretation there is what we review in this case. was the principal beneficiary of an F4 petition that his sister, a U. S. citizen, filed in 992. At that time, ’s daughter was 0 years old, and thus qualified as a derivative beneficiary. But waited in line for a visa for more than a decade, and by the time his priority date finally came up, his daughter had turned 22 (even after applying §53(h)()’s age-reduction formula). thus obtained a visa for himself, boarded a plane alone, and entered the United States as an LPR. He then filed a new preference petition on his daughter’s behalf— this one under F2B, the category for LPRs’ adult sons and daughters. USCIS approved that petition, with a priority date corresponding to the date of ’s filing. contended that under §53(h)(3), his daughter was in- stead entitled to “retain the original priority date” given to his sister’s old F4 petition, because that petition could “automatically be converted” to the F2B category. The Board rejected that argument. It explained that “the language of [§53(h)(3)] does not expressly state which petitions qualify for automatic conversion and retention of priority dates.” Given that “ambi- guity,” the BIA looked to the “recognized meaning” of “the phrase ‘automatic conversion’ ” in immigration statutes and regulations—which it “presume[d]” Congress under- stood when enacting the CSPA. –35. “Historically,” the BIA showed, that language applied only when a petition could move seamlessly from one family preference category to another—not when a new sponsor was needed to fit a beneficiary into a different category. Some aged-out aliens’ petitions could accomplish that maneuver, because the alien had a qualifying relationship with the original sponsor, and continued to do so upon aging out; in that event, the Board held, §53(h)(3) en- sured that the alien would retain his original priority date. 2 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. See at 34–35. But the F4 petition filed by ’s sister could not “automatically be converted” in that way because ’s daughter never had a qualifying relation- ship with the sponsor: “[N]o category exists for the niece of a United States citizen.” –36. That is why himself had to file a new petition on his daughter’s behalf once she aged out and could no longer ride on his sibling status. The Board saw |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | no longer ride on his sibling status. The Board saw no evidence that Congress meant “to expand the use of the concept[ ] of automatic conver- sion” to reach such a case. And the Board thought such an expansion unwarranted because it would allow aliens like ’s daughter, who lacked any inde- pendent entitlement to a visa during the years her father spent standing on the F4 queue, to “cut[ ] in line ahead of others awaiting visas in other preference categories.” at 38. C The respondents in this case are similarly situated to and they seek the same relief. Each was once the principal beneficiary of either an F3 petition filed by a U. S. citizen parent or an F4 petition filed by a U. S. citi- zen sibling. Each also has a son or daughter who, on the date of filing, was under 2 and thus qualified as a deriva- tive beneficiary of the petition. But as was true of ’s daughter, the respondents’ offspring had all turned 2 (even accounting for §53(h)()’s age adjustments) by the time visas became available. Accordingly, the respondents immigrated to the United States alone and, as new LPRs, filed F2B petitions for their sons and daughters. Each argued that under §53(h)(3), those petitions should get the same priority date as the original F3 and F4 petitions once had. USCIS instead gave the new F2B petitions current priority dates, meaning that the sons and daugh- ters could not leapfrog over others in the F2B line. This case began as two separate suits, one joining many Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 3 Opinion of KAGAN, J. individual plaintiffs and the other certified as a class action. In each suit, the District Court deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of §53(h)(3) in and accord- ingly granted summary judgment to the Government. See 663 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99 (CD Cal. 2009); Costelo v. Chertoff, No. SA08–00688, 2009 WL 403056 (CD Cal., Nov. 0, 2009). After consolidating the two cases on appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed: Like the lower courts, it found §53(h)(3) ambiguous and acceded to the BIA’s construction. 965–966 (20). The Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc and reversed in a 6-to-5 decision. 695 F.3d 003 (202). The majority concluded that “the plain language of the CSPA unambiguously grants automatic conversion and priority date retention to [all] aged-out derivative benefi- ciaries,” and that the Board’s contrary conclusion “is not entitled to deference.” at 006. We granted certiorari, 570 U. S. (203), to resolve a Circuit split on the meaning of |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | (203), to resolve a Circuit split on the meaning of §53(h)(3),9 and we now reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision. II Principles of Chevron deference apply when the BIA interprets the immigration laws. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–844 (984); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 45, 424–425 (999). Indeed, “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immi- gration context,” where decisions about a complex statu- tory scheme often implicate foreign relations. (Those hardy readers who have made it this far will surely —————— 9 Compare 695 F.3d 003, 006 (CA9 202) (holding that §53(h)(3) extends relief to all aged-out derivative beneficiaries); (CA5 20) with Li v. Renaud, (CA2 20) (holding that §53(h)(3) not merely permits, but requires the Board’s contrary interpretation). 4 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. agree with the “complexity” point.) Under Chevron, the statute’s plain meaning controls, whatever the Board might have to say. See –843. But if the law does not speak clearly to the question at issue, a court must defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation, ra- ther than substitute its own reading. And §53(h)(3) does not speak unambiguously to the issue here—or more precisely put, it addresses that issue in divergent ways. We might call the provision Janus- faced. Its first half looks in one direction, toward the sweeping relief the respondents propose, which would reach every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition. But as the BIA recognized, and we will further explain, the section’s second half looks another way, to- ward a remedy that can apply to only a subset of those beneficiaries—and one not including the respondents’ offspring. The two faces of the statute do not easily cohere with each other: Read either most naturally, and the other appears to mean not what it says. That internal tension makes possible alternative reasonable constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another the section’s different parts. And when that is so, Chevron dictates that a court defer to the agency’s choice—here, to the Board’s expert judgment about which interpretation fits best with, and makes most sense of, the statutory scheme. Begin by reading the statute from the top—the part favoring the respondents. Section 53(h)(3)’s first clause—“If the age of an alien is determined under para- graph () to be 2 years of age or older for the purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d)”—states a condition that every aged-out beneficiary of a preference petition satis- fies. That is because all those beneficiaries have had their ages “determined |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | is because all those beneficiaries have had their ages “determined under paragraph ()” (and have come up wanting): Recall that the age formula of §53(h)() ap- plies to each alien child who originally qualified (under Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 5 Opinion of KAGAN, J. “subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d)”) as the principal beneficiary of an F2A petition or the derivative beneficiary of any family preference petition. On its own, then, §53(h)(3)’s opening clause encompasses the respondents’ sons and daughters, along with every other once-young beneficiary of a family preference petition now on the wrong side of 2. If the next phrase said something like “the alien shall be treated as though still a minor” (much as the CSPA did to ensure U. S. citizens’ children, qualifying as “immediate relatives,” would stay forever young, see at 7–8), all those aged-out beneficiaries would prevail in this case. But read on, because §53(h)(3)’s second clause instead prescribes a remedy containing its own limitation on the eligible class of recipients. “[T]he alien’s petition,” that part provides, “shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the origi- nal priority date.” That statement directs immigration officials to take the initial petition benefitting an alien child, and now that he has turned 2, “convert[ ]” that same petition from a category for children to an “appropri- ate category” for adults (while letting him keep the old priority date). The “conversion,” in other words, is merely from one category to another; it does not entail any change in the petition, including its sponsor, let alone any new filing. And more, that category shift is to be “automatic”— that is, one involving no additional decisions, contingen- cies, or delays. See, e.g., Random House Webster’s Una- bridged Dictionary 40 (2d ed. 200) (defining “automatic” as “having the capability of starting, operating, moving, etc., independently”); The American Heritage Dictionary 22 (4th ed. 2000) (“[a]cting or operating in a manner essentially independent of external influence”). The oper- ation described is, then, a mechanical cut-and-paste job— moving a petition, without any substantive alteration, from one (no-longer-appropriate, child-based) category to another (now-appropriate, adult) compartment. And so 6 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. the aliens who may benefit from §53(h)(3)’s back half are only those for whom that procedure is possible. The clause offers relief not to every aged-out beneficiary, but just to those covered by petitions that can roll over, seam- lessly and promptly, into a category for adult relatives. That understanding of §53(h)(3)’s “automatic conver- sion” language matches the exclusive way immigration law |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | “automatic conver- sion” language matches the exclusive way immigration law used the term when Congress enacted the CSPA. For many years before then (as today), a regulation entitled “Automatic conversion of preference classification” in- structed immigration officials to change the preference category of a petition’s principal beneficiary when either his or his sponsor’s status changed in specified ways. See (i)()–(3) (2002). For example, the regula- tion provided that when a U. S. citizen’s child aged out, his “immediate relative” petition converted to an F petition, with his original priority date left intact. See Similarly, when a U. S. citizen’s adult son married, his original petition migrated from F to F3, see ()(i); when, conversely, such a person divorced, his peti- tion converted from F3 to F, see ()(iii); and when a minor child’s LPR parent became a citizen, his F2A petition became an “immediate relative” petition, see (3)—all again with their original priority dates. Most notable here, what all of those authorized changes had in common was that they could occur without any change in the petitioner’s identity, or otherwise in the petition’s content. In each circumstance, the “automatic conversion” entailed nothing more than picking up the petition from one category and dropping it into another for which the alien now qualified.0 —————— 0 The dissent responds to this fact only with a pair of non-sequiturs. Post, at 8–9 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). First, the dissent cites a statutory provision that does not use the word “conversion” at all, so can hardly attest to its meaning. See 8 U.S. C. §54(a)()(D)(i)(III). And next, the dissent cites a regulation that post-dated the CSPA by Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 7 Opinion of KAGAN, J. Congress used the word “conversion” (even without the modifier “automatic”) in the identical way in two other sections of the CSPA. See Law v. Siegel, 57 U. S. (slip op., at 7) (204) (“[W]ords repeated in different parts of the same statute generally have the same meaning”). Section 2 refers to occasions on which, by virtue of the above-described regulation, a petition “converted” from F2A to the “immediate relative” category because of the sponsor parent’s naturalization, or from the F3 to the F box because of the beneficiary’s divorce. 8 U.S. C. §§5(f )(2), (3). Then, in Congress authorized an additional conversion of the same nature: It directed that when an LPR parent-sponsor naturalizes, the petition he has filed for his adult son or daughter “shall be converted,” unless the beneficiary objects, from the F2B to the F compartment—again with the original priority date un- changed. |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | the F compartment—again with the original priority date un- changed. 8 U.S. C. §§54(k)()–(3). (That opt-out mech- anism itself underscores the otherwise mechanical nature of the conversion.) Once again, in those cases, all that is involved is a recategorization—moving the same petition, filed by the same petitioner, from one preference classifi- cation to another, so as to reflect a change in either the alien’s or his sponsor’s status. In the rest of the CSPA, as in the prior immigration regulation, that is what “conver- sion” means. And if the term meant more than that in §53(h)(3), it would undermine the family preference system’s core —————— years, and thus is equally irrelevant to what Congress intended. See 7 Fed. Reg. 35732, 35749 (2006) (adding 8 CFR ()(iv)). More- over, both provisions relate to a sui generis circumstance in which a person can self-petition for a visa because her U. S. citizen or LPR relative either died or engaged in domestic abuse. In that situation, the alien’s eligibility rests throughout on her connection to the deceased or abusive relative; no new party must ever come in, as one has to in a case like to salvage a no-longer-effective petition. See infra, at 8 (addressing the problems that the substitution of a new petitioner raises). 8 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. premise: that each immigrant must have a qualified spon- sor. Consider the alternative addressed in —if “automatic conversion” were also to encompass the substi- tution of a new petitioner for the old one, to make sure the aged-out alien’s petition fits into a new preference category. In a case like recall, the original sponsor does not have a legally recognized relationship with the aged- out derivative beneficiary (they are aunt and niece); ac- cordingly, the derivative’s father—the old principal benefi- ciary—must be swapped in as the petitioner to enable his daughter to immigrate. But what if, at that point, the father is in no position to sponsor his daughter? Suppose he decided in the end not to immigrate, or failed to pass border inspection, or died in the meanwhile. Or suppose he entered the country, but cannot sponsor a relative’s visa because he lacks adequate proof of parentage or committed a disqualifying crime. See ; (d)(2); Or suppose he does not want to—or simply cannot—undertake the significant financial obligations that the law imposes on someone petitioning for an alien’s admission. See 8 U.S. C. §§83a(a)()(A), (f )()(D); Immigration offi- cials cannot assume away all those potential barriers to entry: That would run counter to the family preference system’s |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | entry: That would run counter to the family preference system’s insistence that a qualified and willing sponsor back every immigrant visa. See §§54(a)–(b). But nei- ther can they easily, or perhaps at all, figure out whether such a sponsor exists unless he files and USCIS approves a new petition—the very thing §53(h)(3) says is not required. Indeed, in cases like the problem is broader: Under the statute’s most natural reading, a new qualified sponsor will hardly ever exist at the moment the petition is to be “converted.” Section 53(h)(3), to be sure, does not explicitly identify that point in time. But §53(h)() specifies the date on which a derivative beneficiary is Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 9 Opinion of KAGAN, J. deemed to have either aged out or not: It is “the date on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien’s parent.” See §§53(h)()(A)–(B). Because that statutory aging out is the one and only thing that triggers automatic conversion for eligible aliens, the date of con- version is best viewed as the same. That reading, more- over, comports with the “automatic conversion” regulation on which Congress drew in enacting the CSPA, see at 6–7: The rule authorizes conversions “upon” or “as of the date” of the relevant change in the alien’s status (in- cluding turning 2))—regardless when USCIS may re- ceive notice of the change. 8 CFR ; but cf. post, at 4 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (wrongly stating that under that rule conversion occurs upon the agency’s re- ceipt of proof of the change). But on that date, no new petitioner will be ready to step into the old one’s shoes if such a substitution is needed to fit an aged-out beneficiary into a different category. The beneficiary’s parent, on the day a “visa number became available,” cannot yet be an LPR or citizen; by definition, she has just become eligible to apply for a visa, and faces a wait of at least several months before she can sponsor an alien herself. Nor, except in a trivial number of cases, is any hitherto uniden- tified person likely to have a legally recognized relation- ship to the alien. So if an aged-out beneficiary has lost his qualifying connection to the original petitioner, no conver- sion to an “appropriate category” can take place at the requisite time. As long as immigration law demands some valid sponsor, §53(h)(3) cannot give such an alien the designated relief. On the above account—in which conversion entails a simple reslotting of an original petition into a now- appropriate category—§53(h)(3)’s back half provides a |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | petition into a now- appropriate category—§53(h)(3)’s back half provides a remedy to two groups of aged-out beneficiaries. First, any child who was the principal beneficiary of an F2A petition (filed by an LPR parent on his behalf) can take advantage 20 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. of that clause after turning 2. He is, upon aging out, the adult son of the same LPR who sponsored him as a child; his petition can therefore be moved seamlessly—without the slightest alteration or delay—into the F2B category. Second, any child who was the derivative beneficiary of an F2A petition (filed by an LPR on his spouse’s behalf) can similarly claim relief, provided that under the statute, he is not just the spouse’s but also the petitioner’s child. Such an alien is identically situated to the aged-out prin- cipal beneficiary of an F2A petition; indeed, for the price of another filing fee, he could just as easily have been named a principal himself. He too is now the adult son of the original LPR petitioner, and his petition can also be in- stantly relabeled an F2B petition, without any need to substitute a new sponsor or make other revisions. In each case, the alien had a qualifying relationship before he was 2 and retains it afterward; all that must be changed is the label affixed to his petition.2 In contrast, as the Board held in the aged-out derivative beneficiaries of the other family preference categories—like the sons and daughters of the respond- ents here—cannot qualify for “automatic conversion.” Recall that the respondents themselves were principal beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions; their children, when under 2, counted as derivatives, but lacked any qualify- ing preference relationship of their own. The F3 deriva- tives were the petitioners’ grandsons and granddaughters; —————— Given the statute’s broad definition of “child,” the only F2A deriva- tive beneficiaries who fall outside that proviso are stepchildren who were over the age of 8 when the petitioner married the spousal benefi- ciary. See (b)()(B). The Government represents that thousands of children are designated as F2A derivatives every year. See Reply Brief 8, n. 3. 2 It is, therefore, impossible to understand the dissent’s statement that conversion of such a petition to an appropriate category requires “ ‘substantive alteration’ to [the] petition.” See post, at 9, n. 8 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 2 Opinion of KAGAN, J. the F4 derivatives their nephews and nieces; and none of those are relationships Congress has recognized as war- ranting a family preference. See 8 |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | has recognized as war- ranting a family preference. See 8 U.S. C. §§53(a)(3)– (4). Now that the respondents’ children have turned 2, and they can no longer ride on their parents’ coattails, that lack of independent eligibility makes a difference. For them, unlike for the F2A beneficiaries, it is impossible simply to slide the original petitions from a (no-longer- appropriate) child category to a (now-appropriate) adult one. To fit into a new category, those aged-out derivatives, like ’s daughter, must have new sponsors—and for all the reasons already stated, that need means they cannot benefit from “automatic conversion.” All that said, we hold only that §53(h)(3) permits—not that it requires—the Board’s decision to so distinguish among aged-out beneficiaries. That is because, as we explained earlier, the two halves of §53(h)(3) face in different directions. See Section 53(h)(3)’s first part—its conditional phrase—encompasses every aged-out beneficiary of a family preference petition, and thus points toward broad-based relief. But as just shown, §53(h)(3)’s second part—its remedial prescription— applies only to a narrower class of beneficiaries: those aliens who naturally qualify for (and so can be “automati- cally converted” to) a new preference classification when they age out. Were there an interpretation that gave each clause full effect, the Board would have been required to adopt it. But the ambiguity those ill-fitting clauses create instead left the Board with a choice—essentially of how to reconcile the statute’s different commands. The Board, recognizing the need to make that call, opted to abide by the inherent limits of §53(h)(3)’s remedial clause, rather than go beyond those limits so as to match the sweep of the section’s initial condition. On the Board’s reasoned view, the only beneficiaries entitled to statutory relief are those capable of obtaining the remedy designated. When 22 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. an agency thus resolves statutory tension, ordinary prin- ciples of administrative deference require us to defer. See National Assn. of Home 55 U.S. 644, (When a statutory scheme con- tains “a fundamental ambiguity” arising from “the differ- ing mandates” of two provisions, “it is appropriate to look to the implementing agency’s expert interpretation” to determine which “must give way”). III The respondents urge us to overturn the Board’s judg- ment for three independent reasons. First, and principally, they take issue with the Board’s—and now our—view of the limits associated with “automatic conversion”: They argue that every aged-out beneficiary’s petition can “au- tomatically be converted” to an “appropriate category,” and that the two halves of §53(h)(3) are thus reconcila- ble. Second, the respondents contend that even if “auto- |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | reconcila- ble. Second, the respondents contend that even if “auto- matic conversion” does not extend so far, §53(h)(3) separately entitles each such beneficiary to the benefit of his original petition’s priority date. And third, they claim that the Board’s way of resolving whatever ambiguity inheres in §53(h)(3) is arbitrary and capricious. The dissenting opinion reiterates the first two arguments, though with slight variation and in opposite order, while forgoing the third. See post, at 9–9 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (hereinafter the dissent). We find none of the contentions persuasive. A The respondents (and the dissent) initially aver that every aged-out beneficiary (including their own sons and daughters) can “automatically be converted” to an “appro- priate” immigration category, if only immigration officials try hard enough. The Government, in the respondents’ view, can accomplish that feat by substituting new spon- Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 23 Opinion of KAGAN, J. sors for old ones, and by “managing the timing” of every conversion to ensure such a new petitioner exists on the relevant date. Brief for Respondents 33. And because, the respondents say, it is thus possible to align the two halves of §53(h)(3)—even if through multiple administrative maneuvers—immigration officials are under an obligation to do so. We disagree, for reasons that should sound fa- miliar: Several are the same as those we have just given for upholding the Board’s interpretation. But still, we walk through the respondents’ argument step-by-step, to show how far it departs from any ordinary understanding of “automatic conversion.” The first (and necessary) premise of that argument does not augur well for the remainder: It is the view that the “automatic conversion” procedure permits a change in the petitioner’s identity. According to the respondents, the aged-out beneficiaries’ parents, upon becoming LPRs, can be subbed in for the original sponsors (i.e., the beneficiar- ies’ grandparents, aunts, and uncles), and the petitions then converted to the F2B category. But as we have shown, the “automatic conversion” language—as most naturally read and as long used throughout immigration law—contemplates merely moving a petition into a new and valid category, not changing its most essential fea- ture. See –7. That alone defeats the re- spondents’ position. And a further problem follows—this one concerning the date of automatic conversion. The respondents need that date to come at a time when the derivative beneficiaries’ parents (the substitute petitioners) are already living in the United States as LPRs; otherwise, the petitions could not qualify for the F2B box. In an attempt to make that possible, the respondents propose that conversion be viewed as taking place when |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | respondents propose that conversion be viewed as taking place when “the derivative beneficiary’s visa application is adjudicated.” Brief for Respondents 29. But as we have (again) demonstrated, the statute is 24 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. best read as establishing a different date: that “on which an immigrant visa number became available for the alien’s parent”—when, by definition, the parent is not yet an LPR. §53(h)(); see at 8–9. That is the mo- ment when a derivative ages out, which is the single change conversion reflects. By contrast, the respondents’ suggested date has no connection to that metamorphosis; the date of adjudication is merely when an immigration official later discovers that a child has turned 2. And that date is itself fortuitous, reflecting no more than when an immigration officer got around to reviewing a visa application: The possibility of conversion would thus depend on bureaucratic vagaries attending the visa pro- cess. So the respondents’ mistaken view of the timing of conversion is another off-ramp from their argument.3 —————— 3 Still, the respondents’ view of the timing of conversion is better than the dissent’s. As an initial matter, the dissent’s objection to assessing conversion as of the date a visa becomes available hinges on an imaginary difficulty. That approach, the dissent complains, cannot be right because that date always “occurs before the point at which the child is determined to have aged-out.” Post, Well, yes. The date a visa becomes available is, under the statute, the date an alien ages out (or not); and that status change of course occurs before an immigra- tion official, reviewing a visa application, finds that it has done so. But what of it? When an official determines that an alien was no longer a child on the date a visa became available, he also assesses whether automatic conversion was available to the alien as of that prior date. In other words, here as elsewhere in immigration law, conversion occurs (or not) upon the date of the relevant status change—and no other. See at 9. And once that is understood, the supposed difficulties the dissent throws up all melt away. At the time of the status change, F2A petitions can be converted without further contingencies, decisions, or delays, whereas no other petitions can. But cf. post, at 6, 7, n. 7 (countering, irrelevantly, that after an F2A petition is automatically converted, additional steps remain in the immigration process). And immigration officials later reviewing visa applications know that fact, and can treat the different classes of aged-out beneficiaries accordingly. Further, the dissent |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | the different classes of aged-out beneficiaries accordingly. Further, the dissent compounds its error by suggesting a baseless alternative date: “the moment when USCIS receives proof,” no matter Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 25 Opinion of KAGAN, J. Yet there is more—because even after substituting a new petitioner and delaying the conversion date in a way the statute does not contemplate, the respondents must propose yet further fixes to make “automatic” conversion work for their sons and daughters. The respondents’ next problem is that even on the conversion date they propose, most of them (and other derivatives’ parents) were not yet LPRs, and so could not possibly be sponsors. In the ordi- nary course, principal and derivative beneficiaries living abroad apply for their visas at the same time and go to the consulate together for back-to-back interviews. See at 6. And even if the parent is approved first, that alone does not make her an LPR; she still must come to this country, demonstrate her continued eligibility, and pass an inspection. See Thus, the respondents must recommend changes to the visa process to get the timing to work—essentially, administrative juggling to hold off the derivative beneficiary’s visa adjudication until his parent has become an LPR. In particular, they suggest that the consular official defer the derivative’s interview, or that the official nominally “reject the application” and then instruct the derivative to “reapply after the principal beneficiary immigrates.” Brief for Respondents 30. But the need for that choreography (which, in any event, few if any of the respondents conformed to) renders the conver- sion process only less “automatic,” because now it requires special intervention, purposeful delay, and deviation from —————— how far in the future, that a new petitioner stands ready and willing to sponsor an aged-out beneficiary. Post, Not even the respondents propose such a date, and for good reason. It has no grounding in the CSPA or in any regulatory practice, and it bears no connection to the timing of the status change (aging out) that triggers conversion (or even, as the respondents’ date does, to the later determination of that change). The only thing appearing to support the dissent’s date is a single-minded resolve, statutory text and administrative practice notwithstanding, to grant relief to every possible aged-out beneficiary. 26 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. standard administrative practice. Conversion has become not a machine that would go of itself, but a process pains- takingly managed. And after all this fancy footwork, the respondents’ scheme still cannot succeed, because however long a visa adjudication is postponed, |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | cannot succeed, because however long a visa adjudication is postponed, a derivative’s parent may never become able to sponsor a relative’s visa—and immigration officials cannot practicably tell whether a given parent has done so. We have noted before the potential impediments to serving as a petitioner—including that a parent may not immigrate, may not qualify as a sponsor, or may not be able to provide the requisite financial support. See at 7–8. The respondents offer no way to deal with those many contingencies. Require the parent to submit a new petition? But the entire point of automatic conversion (as the respondents themselves agree) is to obviate the need for such a document. See Brief for Re- spondents 30, 42. Investigate the parent’s eligibility in some other way? But even were that possible (which we doubt) such an inquiry would not square with the essen- tial idea of an automatic process. Disregard the possibility that no legal sponsor exists? But then visas would go, inevitably and not infrequently, to ineligible aliens. And so the workarounds have well and truly run out on the respondents’ argument.4 —————— 4 Nor does the dissent offer any serious aid to the respondents. The dissent initially acknowledges that automatic conversion cannot involve “additional decisions, contingencies, or delays.” Post, at 3. But no worries, the dissent continues: “[O]nce [an alien’s parent] provides confirmation of her eligibility to sponsor” the aged-out alien, the origi- nal petition “can automatically be converted to an F2B petition, with no additional decision or contingency” or (presumably) delay. Post, Think about that: Once every decision, contingency, and delay we have just described is over (and a parent has at long last turned out to be a viable sponsor), the dissent assures us that no further decisions, contingencies, and delays remain. Or, put differently, there are no contingencies after all the contingencies have been resolved; no deci- Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 27 Opinion of KAGAN, J. That leaves us with the same statutory inconsistency with which we began. Having followed each step of the respondents’ resourceful (if Rube Goldbergish) argument, we still see no way to apply the concept of automatic con- version to the respondents’ children and others like them. And that means we continue to face a statute whose halves do not correspond to each other—giving rise to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference. B The respondents, however, have another idea for recon- ciling §53(h)(3)’s front and back parts (and this back-up claim becomes the dissent’s principal argument). Recall that the section’s remedial clause instructs that “the alien’s petition |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | that the section’s remedial clause instructs that “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.” The respondents (and the dissent) ask us to read the italicized language as conferring a benefit wholly inde- pendent of automatic conversion. On that view, aged-out derivatives, even though ineligible for conversion, could “retain the[ir] original priority date[s]” if their parents file a new petition (as the respondents in fact did here “as a protective matter,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 55). And then, every- one encompassed in §53(h)(3)’s first clause would get at least some form of relief (even if not both forms) from the section’s second. For this argument, the respondents principally rely on the word “and”: “Where the word ‘and’ connects two” phrases as in §53(h)(3)’s back half, the respondents contend, those terms “operate independently.” —————— sions after all the decisions have been made; and no delay after all the delay has transpired. And as if that argument were not awkward enough, consider that it would make automatic conversion turn on the filing of a new document that shows the parent’s eligibility to sponsor her aged-out son or daughter—the very thing, as all parties agree, that conversion is supposed to render unnecessary. See at 8, 26. 28 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. Brief for Respondents 39; see post, at 9. But the conjunction “and” does not necessarily disjoin two phrases in the way the respondents say. In some sentences, no doubt, the respondents have a point. They use as their primary example: “[I]f the boat takes on wa- ter, then you shall operate the bilge pump and you shall distribute life jackets.” Brief for Respondents 39; see also post, at 0 (offering further examples). We agree that “you shall distribute life jackets” functions in that sentence as an independent command. But we can come up with many paired dictates in which the second is conditional on the first. “If the price is reasonable, buy two tickets and save a receipt.” “If you have time this summer, read this book and give me a report.” Or, shades of this case: “If your cell-phone contract expires, buy a new phone and keep the old number.”5 In each case, the second com- mand functions only once the first is accomplished. Whether “and” works in that way or in the respondents’ depends, like many questions of usage, on the context. See, e.g., Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. —————— 5 The dissent appears to think |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | Laboratories, Ltd. v. —————— 5 The dissent appears to think that something helpful to its view follows from repeating the word “shall” and changing the subject of the commands. See post, at 9–0. But that is not so, as some further examples show. “If you advance to the next round, my assistant shall schedule an interview and you shall come in to answer questions.” “If the plane is low on fuel, the tanks shall be refilled and the pilot shall fly the route as scheduled.” In these sentences, as in our prior ones, the second command is conditional on the first; all that differs is that these sentences are (much like statutes) more formal and stilted. And the dissent’s citation of United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (989), adds nothing to its argument. There, we construed the following provision: “[T]here shall be allowed to the holder of [a secured] claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.” at 24. We held that the phrase “provided for under the agreement” qualifies the words “any reasonable fees, costs, or charges,” but not the words “interest on such claim.” at 24–242. What relevance that interpretation bears to this case eludes us. Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 29 Opinion of KAGAN, J. Novo Nordisk A/S, 566 U. S. (202). Here, we think, context compels the Board’s view that the instructions work in tandem. The first phrase in- structs immigration officials to convert a petition (when an “appropriate category” exists); the next clarifies that such a converted petition will retain the original priority date, rather than receive a new one corresponding to the date of conversion. That reading comports with the way retention figures in other statutory and regulatory provisions re- specting “conversions”; there too, retention of a priority date is conditional on a conversion occurring. See 8 U.S. C. §§54(k)()–(3); 8 CFR ; at 6. The respondents wish to unhook the “retention” phrase from that mooring, and use it to explain what will attend a different event—that is, the filing of a new petition. But that is to make “retention” conditional on something the statute nowhere mentions—a highly improbable thing for Congress to have done. (If, once again, a teacher says to “read this book and give me a report,” no one would think he wants a report on some unidentified subject.) And indeed, the respondents’ and dissent’s own examples prove this point: In not a single one of their proffered sentences is the second |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | a single one of their proffered sentences is the second command contingent on the occurrence of some additional, unstated event, as it would have to be under the respondents’ construction of §53(h)(3); rather, each such command (e.g., “distribute life jackets”) flows directly from the stated condition (e.g., “if the boat takes on water”). So by far the more natural understanding of §53(h)(3)’s text is that retention follows conversion, and nothing else. The respondents’ contrary view would also engender unusual results, introducing uncertainty into the immi- gration system’s operation and thus interfering with statutory goals. Were their theory correct, an aged-out alien could hold on to a priority date for years or even decades while waiting for a relative to file a new petition. 30 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. Even if that filing happened, say, 20 years after the alien aged out, the alien could take out his priority-date token, and assert a right to spring to the front of any visa line. At that point, USCIS could well have a hard time confirm- ing the old priority date, in part because the names of derivative beneficiaries need not be listed on a visa peti- tion. And the possibility of such leap-frogging from many years past would impede USCIS’s publication of accurate waiting times. As far as we know, immigration law no- where else allows an alien to keep in his pocket a priority date untethered to any existing valid petition. Without some clearer statement, we cannot conclude Congress intended here to create such a free-floating, open-ended entitlement to a defunct petition’s priority date. See 25 I. & N. Dec.,6 —————— 6 The dissent claims that USCIS “administered priority date reten- tion in exactly this manner” before the CSPA’s enactment, post, at 0, but that confident assertion is just not so—or at least not in any way that assists the respondents. The dissent principally relies on 8 CFR which prior to the CSPA’s enactment permitted an aged- out F2A derivative beneficiary to retain his old priority date “if [a] subsequent petition is filed by the same petitioner” as filed the original. Far from authorizing an open-ended, free-floating entitlement, that now-superseded regulation allowed an alien to keep his priority date only if he (unlike the respondents’ offspring) had a qualifying relation- ship with the initial petitioner—that is, only if he fell within the group that the BIA in thought entitled to relief. See 25 I. & N. Dec., at 34–35. And the other provisions the dissent cites (which, unlike continue to operate) similarly fail to support the |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | (which, unlike continue to operate) similarly fail to support the dissent’s position, because they enable an alien to retain a priority date only if attached to an existing valid petition. See 8 U.S. C. §54(k)(3) (per- mitting an alien to retain a priority date associated with an ex- isting F2B petition); (e) (permitting an alien to retain a priority date associated with an existing employment-based peti- tion); §204.2(f)() (permitting an alien to retain a priority date associated with an existing employment-based petition for immigrating physicians). Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 3 Opinion of KAGAN, J. C Finally, the respondents contend that even if §53(h)(3) points at once in two directions—toward a broader scope in its first half and a narrower one in its second—the BIA acted unreasonably in choosing the more restrictive reading. In their view, the Board has offered no valid reason, consistent with “the purposes and con- cerns of the immigration laws,” to treat their own sons and daughters less favorably than aliens who were principal and derivative beneficiaries of F2A petitions. Brief for Respondents 47. Indeed, the respondents suggest that the BIA, “for its own unfathomable reasons, disapproves of Congress’s decision to allow any aged-out” aliens to get relief, and has thus “limited [§53(h)(3)] to as few deriva- tive beneficiaries as possible.” 5. We cannot agree. At the least, the Board’s interpreta- tion has administrative simplicity to recommend it. Un- der that view, immigration authorities need only perform the kind of straightforward (i.e., “automatic”) conversion they have done for decades—moving a petition from one box to another to reflect a given status change like aging out. See 25 I. & N. Dec., The respondents, as we have shown, would transform conversion into a managed, multi-stage process, requiring immigration and consular officials around the world to sequence and delay every aged-out alien’s visa adjudication until they are able to confirm that one of his parents had become a qualifying and willing F2B petitioner. And according to the Govern- ment’s (incomplete) statistics, that would have to happen in, at a minimum, tens of thousands of cases every year. See Reply Brief 8, n. 3. Still more important, the Board offered a cogent argu- ment, reflecting statutory purposes, for distinguishing between aged-out beneficiaries of F2A petitions and the respondents’ sons and daughters. See 35 I. & N. Dec., at 38. As earlier explained, the F2A beneficiaries 32 SCIALABBA v. CUELLAR DE OSORIO Opinion of KAGAN, J. have all had a qualifying relationship with an LPR for the entire period they have waited in line—i.e., since their original priority dates. |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | they have waited in line—i.e., since their original priority dates. See at 9–20. That means that when immigration authorities convert their petitions, they will enter the F2B line at the same place as others who have had a comparable relationship for an equal time. The conversion thus fits with the immigration law’s basic first-come-first-served rule. See 8 U.S. C. §53(e); By contrast, the derivative beneficiaries of F3 and F4 petitions, like the respondents’ sons and daughters, lacked any qualifying relationship with a citizen or LPR during the period they waited in line. See at 20–2. They were, instead, the grandchildren, nieces, or nephews of citizens, and those relationships did not independently entitle them to visas. If such aliens received relief under §53(h)(3), they would jump over thousands of others in the F2B line who had a qualifying relationship with an LPR for a far longer time. That displacement would, the Board reasonably found, scramble the priority order Con- gress prescribed. The argument to the contrary assumes that the re- spondents’ sons and daughters should “receive credit” for all the time the respondents themselves stood in line. Brief for Respondents 50. But first, the time the respond- ents spent waiting for a visa may diverge substantially from the time their children did. Suppose, for example, that one of the respondents had stood in the F4 queue for 5 years, and with just 4 years to go, married someone with a 7-year-old son. Under the respondents’ reading, that derivative beneficiary, after aging out, would get the full benefit of his new parent’s wait, and so displace many thousands of aliens who (unlike him) had stood in an immigration queue for nearly two decades. And second, even when the derivative qualified as such for all the time his parent stood in line, his status throughout that period hinged on his being that parent’s minor child. If his par- Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) 33 Opinion of KAGAN, J. ent had obtained a visa before he aged out, he would have been eligible for a visa too, because the law does not de- mand that a prospective immigrant abandon a minor child. But if the parent had died while waiting for a visa, or had been found ineligible, or had decided not to immi- grate after all, the derivative would have gotten nothing for the time spent in line. See –6. Similarly, the Board could reasonably conclude, he should not receive credit for his parent’s wait when he has become old enough to live independently. In the unavoidably zero- sum world of allocating |
Justice Kagan | 2,014 | 3 | majority | Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2678135/scialabba-v-cuellar-de-osorio/ | live independently. In the unavoidably zero- sum world of allocating a limited number of visas, the Board could decide that he belongs behind any alien who has had a lengthier stand-alone entitlement to immigrate. IV This is the kind of case Chevron was built for. What- ever Congress might have meant in enacting §53(h)(3), it failed to speak clearly. Confronted with a self- contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the Board chose a textually reasonable construc- tion consonant with its view of the purposes and policies underlying immigration law. Were we to overturn the Board in that circumstance, we would assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role. We decline that path, and defer to the Board. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Cite as: 573 U. S. (204) ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 2–930 LORI SCIALABBA, ACTING DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ROSA- LINA CUELLAR DE OSORIO ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 9, 204] CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | Under the Antiterrorim and Effective Death Penalty Act of (AEDPA), “a properly filed application for State pot-conviction or other collateral review re pect to the pertinent judgment or claim” toll the -year limitation period for filing a federal habea petition. 28 U.S. C. The quetion in thi cae i whether a motion to reduce entence under Rhode Iland law toll the limitation period, thereby rendering repondent Khalil Kholi’ federal habea petition timely. We hold that the phrae “collateral review” in mean judicial review of a judgment in a proceeding that i not part of direct review. Becaue the partie agree that a motion to reduce entence under Rhode Iland law i not part of the direct review proce, we hold that repondent’ motion tolled the AEDPA limitation period and that hi federal habea petition wa therefore timely. I A In 993, repondent wa convicted in Rhode Iland 2 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court Superior Court on 0 count of firt-degree exual aault, and he wa entenced to conecutive term of life im prionment. Repondent raied variou challenge to hi conviction on direct appeal, but the Supreme Court of Rhode Iland affirmed hi conviction. See The partie agree that repon dent’ conviction became final on direct review when hi time expired for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in thi Court. Brief for Petitioner 7, n. 4; Brief for Repon dent 3, n. ; ; ee generally (lip op., at 6). That date wa May 29, See thi Court’ Rule 3., 3.3, 30. In addition to taking a direct appeal, repondent filed two tate motion that are relevant to our deciion. The firt, filed on May 6, wa a motion to reduce en tence under Rule of the Rhode Iland Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure. In that motion, repondent aked the trial court to “reconider it prior determination” and “order that hi life entence run concurrently.” (order). Concluding that “the entence impoed wa ap —————— Thi Rule provide in relevant part: “The court may correct an illegal entence at any time. The court may correct a entence impoed in an illegal manner and it may reduce any entence when a motion i filed in one hundred and twenty (20) day after the entence i impoed, or in one hundred and twenty (20) day after receipt by the court of a mandate of the Supreme Court of Rhode Iland iued upon affirmance of the judgment or dimial of the appeal, or in one hundred and twenty (20) day after receipt by the court of a mandate or |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | day after receipt by the court of a mandate or order of the Supreme Court of the United State iued upon affirmance of the judgment, dimial of the appeal, or denial of a writ of certiorari. The court hall act on the motion in a reaonable time, provided that any delay by the court in ruling on the motion hall not prejudice the movant. The court may reduce a entence, the execution of which ha been upended, upon revocation of probation.” R. I. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. (a) (200) (emphai added). Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) 3 Opinion of the Court propriate,” the hearing jutice denied the Rule motion. On January 6, the State Supreme Court affirmed and oberved that the fact clearly jutified the entence. at 326–327. On May 23, 997, while the Rule motion wa pend ing, repondent alo filed an application for tate potcon viction relief, ee R. I. Gen. Law 0–9.– et eq. (Lexi 997) (titled “Pot Conviction Remedy”), which challenged hi conviction. The trial court denied thi motion a well, and the State Supreme Court affirmed that deciion on December 4, See 263– 264 B Repondent filed a federal habea petition in the Di trict of Rhode Iland on September 5, App. 3. By that time, hi conviction had been final for over year. AEDPA generally require a federal habea petition to be filed in one year of the date on which the judgment became final by the concluion of direct review. 28 U.S. C. But the -year limitation period i tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed application for State pot-conviction or other collateral review repect to the pertinent judgment or claim.” There i no dipute that repondent’ application for potconviction relief tolled the limitation period for over nine year—from May 23, 997, through December 4, Even after ubtracting that tretch of time from the -year period, however, the period between the concluion of direct review and the filing of the federal habea petition till exceed one year. Thu, in order for repondent’ petition to be timely, the Rule motion to reduce entence mut alo trigger the tolling proviion. Repondent’ federal habea petition wa referred to a Magitrate Judge for a report and recommendation, and 4 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court the Magitrate Judge concluded that the Rule motion wa not a “ ‘properly filed application for pot-conviction or other collateral review’ ” under becaue it wa “a ‘plea of leniency,’ and not a motion challenging the legal ufficiency of hi entence.” No. CA 07–346S, WL 6094, *4 The |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | of hi entence.” No. CA 07–346S, WL 6094, *4 The Ditrict Court adopted the Magitrate Judge’ report and recommendation and therefore dimied the federal habea petition a un timely. See On appeal, the Firt Circuit re vered. The Court of Appeal are divided over the quetion whether a motion to reduce entence toll the period of limitation under 2 We granted certiorari to anwer thi quetion repect to a motion to reduce entence under Rhode Iland law. 560 U. S. (200). II A AEDPA etablihe a -year period of limitation for a tate prioner to file a federal application for a writ of habea corpu. Thi period run “from the latet of” four pecified date, including “the date on which the judgment became final by the concluion of direct review or the expiration of the time for eeking uch re view.” ee alo at (lip op., at 6) (explaining when “the concluion of direct review occur”). The limitation period i tolled, however, during the pendency of “a properly filed application for State pot conviction or other collateral review repect to the —————— 2 Compare Alexander v. Secretary, Dept. of Correction, 523 F.3d 29, 297 (motion to reduce entence doe not toll limita tion period); ; (motion to reduce entence toll); Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) 5 Opinion of the Court pertinent judgment or claim.” The quetion in thi cae i whether a motion for reduction of entence under Rhode Iland’ Rule i an “application for State pot-conviction or other collateral review.” The partie agree that the anwer to thi quetion turn on the meaning of the phrae “collateral review,” ee Brief for Petitioner 9; Brief for Repondent 2–3, but they diagree about the definition of that term. Rhode Iland argue that “collateral review” include only “legal” chal lenge to a conviction or entence and thu exclude mo tion eeking a dicretionary entence reduction. Repon dent, on the other hand, maintain that “collateral review” i “review other than review of a judgment in the direct appeal proce” and thu include motion to reduce en tence. Brief for Repondent 7. We agree repon dent’ undertanding of “collateral review.” B “Collateral review” i not defined in AEDPA, and we have never provided a comprehenive definition of that term. See 75–78 We therefore begin by conidering the ordinary undertanding of the phrae “collateral review.” See (“We give the word of a tatute their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, abent an indication Congre intended them to bear ome different import” (internal quotation mark omitted)); ee alo (2002) (conidering the ordinary meaning of the word “pending” |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | alo (2002) (conidering the ordinary meaning of the word “pending” in ). The term “collateral,” in it “cutomary and preferred ene,” at mean “[l]ying aide from the main ubject, line of action, iue, purpoe, etc.; ubordinate, indirect,” 3 Oxford Englih Dictionary 473 (2d ed. 989) (hereinafter OED); ee alo Webter’ Third New International Dictionary 444 (993) (hereinafter 6 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court Webter’) (“accompanying a econdary,” “indirect,” or “ancillary”). By definition, omething that i “collateral” i “indirect,” not direct. 3 OED 473. Thi ugget that “collateral” review i review that i “[l]ying aide from the main” review, i.e., that i not part of direct review. See The definition of the related phrae “collateral attack” point in the ame direction. A “collateral attack” i “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal.” Black’ Law Dictionary 298 (em phai added); cf. (2) (defining “collateral attack” a “any form of potconviction relief other than a direct appeal”). Thi uage buttree the concluion that “collateral review” mean a form of review that i not part of the direct appeal proce. C Our prior uage of the term “collateral” alo upport thi undertanding. We have previouly decribed a vari ety of proceeding a “collateral,” and all of thee proceed ing hare the characteritic that we have identified, i.e., they tand apart from the proce of direct review. For example, our cae make it clear that habea corpu i a form of collateral review. We have ued the term habea corpu and “collateral review” interchangeably, ee, e.g., and it i well accepted that tate petition for habea corpu toll the limitation period, e.g., Rhine v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 272 (2005) (“[T]he -year tatute of limitation wa tolled while Rhine’ tate habea corpu petition wa pending”). We have alo decribed coram nobi a a mean of “col lateral attack,” ee, e.g., United State v. 346 U.S. 502, 50–5 (954) (internal quotation mark omit ted), and we have ued the term “collateral” to decribe proceeding under 28 U.S. C. and a prior verion of Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) 7 Opinion of the Court Rule of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. In United we ditin guihed between the proce of direct appeal and “a num ber of collateral remedie,” including Federal Rule motion, motion, and coram nobi. n. 4. Similarly, in (963) we drew a ditinction between a “[d]irect attack” on a criminal judgment and “collateral proceeding,” uch a Rule habea corpu, and proceeding. at 53–54. All of the proceeding identified in thee prior opinion a “collateral” |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | of the proceeding identified in thee prior opinion a “collateral” are eparate from the direct review proce, and thu our prior uage of the term “collateral” but tree the concluion that “collateral review” mean a form of review that i not direct. D Of coure, to trigger the tolling proviion, a “collateral” proceeding mut alo involve a form of “review,” but the meaning of that term eem clear. “Review” i bet under tood a an “act of inpecting or examining” or a “judicial reexamination.” Webter’ 944; ee alo Black’, at 434 (“[c]onideration, inpection, or reexamination of a ubject or thing”); 3 OED 83 (“[t]o ubmit (a decree, act, etc.) to examination or reviion”). We thu agree the Firt Circuit that “ ‘review’ commonly denote ‘a looking over or examination a view to amendment or im provement.’ ” (quoting Webter’ 944 (2002)). Viewed a a whole, then, “collateral review” of a judgment or claim mean a judicial reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outide of the direct review proce. III We now apply thi definition of “collateral review” to a Rule motion to reduce entence under Rhode Iland 8 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court law. A Rule of the Rhode Iland Rule of Criminal Procedure i much like the verion of Federal Rule of Criminal Pro cedure that wa in force prior to the enactment of the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 984 and the promulga tion of the Federal Sentencing Guideline. See State v. Byrne, ; Re porter’ Note following R. I. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. R. I. Court Rule Ann., p. 620 (Lexi 200). Under the Rhode Iland Rule, a Rule motion permit a court to provide relief from a entence in three way: A court “may” “correct an illegal entence,” “correct a entence impoed in an illegal manner,” and “reduce any entence.” R. I. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. (a); ee n. upra. In thi cae, repondent filed a motion to reduce hi entence, which permit a trial jutice to decide “ ‘ “on reflection or on the bai of changed circumtance that the entence originally impoed wa, for any reaon, unduly evere.” ’ ” (R. I. 200) ); ee alo Reporter’ Note following R. I. Super. Ct. Rule Crim. Proc. R. I. Court Rule Ann., at 620–62. Rhode Iland court have, at time, referred to uch a motion a a “ ‘plea for leniency.’ ” at (quoting Men, at 6). A Rule motion i made in the Superior Court, and it i generally heard by the ame trial jutice who entenced |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | i generally heard by the ame trial jutice who entenced the defendant. Byrne, The Rhode Iland Supreme Court ha explained that a motion to reduce entence i “ ‘addreed to the ound dicretion of the trial jutice’ ” and that appellate review of the trial jutice’ deciion i limited. at (quoting Men at 6). An appellate court may neverthe le diturb the trial jutice’ deciion “when the trial Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) 9 Opinion of the Court jutice ha impoed a entence that i out jutification and i groly diparate from other entence generally impoed for imilar offene.” at ; internal quotation mark omitted); ee alo u pra, at (aking whether trial jutice “abue[d] hi dicretion”). B With thee principle in mind, we conider whether Rhode Iland’ Rule motion to reduce entence i an application for “collateral review.” The firt—and the critical—quetion i whether a Rhode Iland Rule entence reduction proceeding i “collat eral.” Repondent and Rhode Iland agree that uch a motion i not part of the direct review proce. Moreover, we have previouly referred to a motion to reduce entence under old Rule of the Federal Rule of Criminal Proce dure a invoking a “collateral” remedy, ee Robinon, n. 4, and Rhode Iland’ Rule motion to reduce entence i “ubtantially imilar” to former Fed eral Rule Byrne, at Lower court have alo referred to Federal Rule entence reduction mo tion a “collateral.” See, e.g., v. United State, 94 F.2d 488, 492 (CA 99) (“ initiated a collateral attack on hi entence a Rule (b) motion to reduce hi entence” under the old Federal Rule). We thu have little difficulty concluding that a Rhode Iland entence reduction proceeding i “collateral.”3 —————— 3 We can imagine an argument that a Rhode Iland Rule proceed ing i in fact part of direct review under §2244(d)() becaue, according to the partie, defendant in Rhode Iland cannot raie any challenge to their entence on direct appeal; intead, they mut bring a Rule motion. See, e.g., (“It i well ettled in thi juridiction that a challenge to a criminal entence mut begin the filing of a [Rule ] motion [W]e will not conider the validity or legality of a entence on direct appeal unle 0 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court Not only i a motion to reduce entence under Rhode Iland law “collateral,” but it alo undoubtedly call for “review” of the entence. The deciion to reduce a en tence, while largely in the dicretion of the trial ju tice, involve judicial reexamination of the entence to determine whether a |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | involve judicial reexamination of the entence to determine whether a more lenient entence i proper.4 When ruling on uch a motion, a trial jutice i guided by everal factor, including “() the everity of the crime, (2) the defendant’ peronal, educational, and employment background, (3) the potential for rehabilitation, (4) the element of ocietal deterrence, and (5) the appropriatene of the punihment.” 746 A.2d 38 (internal quotation mark omit ted); ee alo at ; at 655. On appeal from a trial jutice’ deciion on a motion to reduce entence, the Supreme Court of Rhode Iland evaluate the trial jutice’ jutification in light of the relevant entencing factor to determine whether a en tence i “out jutification” and “groly diparate from other entence.” at (internal quota tion mark omitted).5 Thi proce urely qualifie a —————— extraordinary circumtance exit” (internal quotation mark omitted)); State v. McManu, 990 A.2d 229, 238 (R. I. 200) (refuing to con ider Eighth Amendment challenge on direct review becaue “[t]o challenge a criminal entence, the defendant mut firt file a motion to reduce in accordance Rule ”); ee alo (lip op., at 6–7). That iue ha not been briefed or argued by the partie, however, and we expre no opinion a to the merit of uch an argument. Even if we were to aume that a Rhode Iland Rule motion i part of direct review, our dipoition of thi cae would not change: Repondent’ habea petition till would be timely, becaue the limitation period would not have begun to run until after the Rule proceeding concluded. 4 A motion to reduce entence i unlike a motion for potconviction dicovery or a motion for appointment of counel, which generally are not direct requet for judicial review of a judgment and do not provide a tate court authority to order relief from a judgment. 5 E.g., (“Given thee Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) Opinion of the Court “review” of a entence in the meaning of We thu hold that a motion to reduce entence under Rhode Iland law i an application for “collateral review” that trigger AEDPA’ tolling proviion. IV In reiting thi interpretation, Rhode Iland advance everal argument that we find unperuaive. The firt of thee argument begin by oberving that, whenever our opinion have ued the precie phrae “col lateral review,” the proceeding in quetion wa one chal lenging the “lawfulne” of a prior judgment, Brief for Petitioner 2–22, uch a a or action, ee at 25. Rhode Iland argue that Congre, in enacting AEDPA, mut be preumed to have been aware of thi uage and |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | be preumed to have been aware of thi uage and mut have intended the phrae to carry thi narrow meaning. Thi argument read far too much into thee prior refer ence to “collateral review.” While our opinion have ued the phrae “collateral review” to refer to proceeding that challenge the lawfulne of a prior judgment, we have never uggeted that the phrae may properly be ued to decribe only proceeding of thi type. In addition, Rhode Iland overlook opinion decribing a motion to reduce entence a “collateral.” E.g., Robinon, 36 U.S., n. 4; at 492; ee alo D. Wilke, —————— factor, and the trial jutice’ exhautive explanation of her reaoning in entencing Mr. we hold it wa not an abue of her dicre tion to order Mr. to erve conecutive entence”); State v. Ferrara, 88 A.2d 642, (“[M]itigating circumtance clearly are not preent in thi cae”); State v. Roi, 77 A.2d 906, 908 (order) (“Baed upon [the court’] review of the record,” the entence “wa not exceive and wa jutified under the circumtance,” namely, “the abhorrent conduct of [the] defendant” and “the permiible penalty range” under the tatute); 746 A.2d 38 (“[T]he trial jutice wa aware of thee factor and applied them correctly”). 2 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court State Potconviction Remedie and Relief Handbook §§:2, :7, pp. 2, 5 (200) (characterizing a motion to reduce entence a a “collateral” or “potconviction” remedy). In a related argument, Rhode Iland note that everal other AEDPA proviion ue the term “collateral review” to refer to proceeding that involve a challenge to the lawfulne of a tate-court judgment, ee 28 U.S. C. (d)()(C), 2254(e)(2)(A)(i),6 and Rhode Iland reaon that the phrae “collateral review” in hould be limited to proceeding of thi nature. Thi argument ha the ame flaw a the argument jut dicued. Jut becaue the phrae “collateral review” encompae proceeding that challenge the lawfulne of a prior judgment, it doe not follow that other proceeding may not alo be decribed a involving “collateral review.” Finally, Rhode Iland contend that the purpoe of the tolling proviion i to allow a tate prioner to exhaut tate remedie and that thi purpoe i not erved when a prioner’ tate application merely eek entencing leni ency, a matter that cannot be raied in a federal habea petition. Thi argument i baed on an exceively narrow undertanding of ’ role. It i certainly true that a purpoe—and perhap the chief purpoe—of tolling under i to permit the exhaution of tate remedie, ee 533 U.S., at 78–79, but that i not ’ only role. The toll |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | 78–79, but that i not ’ only role. The toll ing proviion “provide a powerful incentive for litigant to exhaut all available tate remedie before proceeding in the lower federal court.” at 80 (emphai added). Tolling the limitation period for all “collateral review” motion provide both litigant and State an oppor tunity to reolve objection at the tate level, potentially obviating the need for a litigant to reort to federal court. —————— 6 All of thee proviion refer to a new rule of contitutional law made retroactively applicable by thi Court to “cae on collateral review.” Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) 3 Opinion of the Court If, for example, a litigant obtain relief on tate-law ground, there may be no need for federal habea. The ame dynamic may be preent to a degree repect to motion that do not challenge the lawfulne of a judg ment. If a defendant receive relief in tate court, the need for federal habea review may be narrowed or even obviated, and thi further principle of “comity, finality, and federalim.” Rhode Iland’ interpretation of would alo greatly complicate the work of federal habea court. Rhode Iland would require thoe court to eparate mo tion for a reduced entence into two categorie: thoe that challenge a entence on legal ground and thoe that merely ak for leniency. But thi taxonomy i problem atic. Even if a juridiction allow entencing judge to exercie a high degree of dicretion in electing a entence from in a precribed range, it doe not necearily follow that the judge’ choice i inulated from challenge on legal ground. “[D]icretionary choice are not left to a court’ ‘inclination, but to it judgment; and it judgment i to be guided by ound legal principle.’ ” Albemarle Paper 46 (975) (quoting United State v. Burr, 25 F. Ca. 30, (No. 4,692d) (CC Va. 807) (Marhall, C. J.)). If the law of a juridiction provide criteria to guide a trial judge’ exercie of en tencing dicretion, a motion to reduce entence may argue that a entence i inconitent thoe criteria. In that ene, the motion argue that the entence i contrary to entencing law. See, e.g., 5 A.3d, at (“A trial jutice conider a number of factor when determining a fair entence[,] including the defendant’ potential for rehabilitation. The defendant aert that the trial jutice did not conider defendant’ participation in rehabilitative program” (citation omitted)). We do not think that wa meant to require federal habea court to draw the ort of difficult ditinction that Rhode Iland’ 4 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | Rhode Iland’ 4 WALL v. KHOLI Opinion of the Court interpretation would demand. We alo reject the argument that the meaning of the phrae “collateral review” hould turn on whether the motion or application that trigger that review i cap tioned a a part of the criminal cae or a a eparate pro ceeding. See Thi interpretation of would produce confuion and inconitency. For one thing, ome “collateral” proceeding are often regarded a part of the criminal cae. We have aid, for example, that a writ of coram nobi “i a tep in the crimi nal cae and not a eparate cae and record, the begin ning of a eparate civil proceeding.” 346 U.S., at 505, n. 4; ee alo United State v. Denedo, 556 U. S. (lip op., at 8) (“[A]n application for the writ i properly viewed a a belated extenion of the original proceeding during which the error allegedly tranpired”). But we have nonethele uggeted that coram nobi i a mean of “collateral attack.” at 50–5 (internal quotation mark omitted); ee alo Robinon, 36 U.S., n. 4. Similarly, a motion under 28 U.S. C. ( ed., Supp. III) i entered on the docket of the original criminal cae and i typically referred to the judge who originally preided over the challenged proceeding, ee Rule 3(b), 4(a), but there i no dipute that proceeding are “collateral,” ee, e.g., Maaro v. United State, (decribing proceeding a “collateral”); Daniel v. United State, 532 U.S. 374, 3797 —————— 7 In other context not relevant here, there ha been ome confuion over whether proceeding are civil or criminal in nature. See, e.g., Potconviction Remedie p. 25 (200) (“[T]here i a dipute over whether the [] motion initiate an independent civil action or, intead, i merely a further tep in the criminal proecution”); 3 C. Wright & S. Welling, Federal Practice and Procedure (4th ed. 20). We expre no opinion on thi quetion. Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) 5 Opinion of the Court Moreover, the method of filing for potconviction or collateral review vary among the State. In the Ditrict of Columbia and fourteen State, the principal potconviction remedy i part of the original cae; in other State, it i not. Wilke, State Potconviction Remedie and Relief Handbook §:3, at 6–7. Given the State’ “different form of collateral review,” 533 U.S., at 77, the ap plication of AEDPA’ tolling proviion hould not turn on uch formalitie. See (“Congre may have re frained from excluive reliance on the term ‘pot-conviction’ o a to leave no doubt that the tolling proviion applie to all |
Justice Alito | 2,011 | 8 | majority | Wall v. Kholi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/206097/wall-v-kholi/ | leave no doubt that the tolling proviion applie to all type of tate collateral review available after a conviction”). We thu define “collateral review” according to it ordi nary meaning: It refer to judicial review that occur in a proceeding outide of the direct review proce. * * * For thee reaon, the judgment of the Court of Appeal i affirmed. It i o ordered. Cite a: 562 U. S. (20) SCALIA, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 09–868 ASHBEL T. WALL, II, DIRECTOR, RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PETI- TIONER v. KHALIL KHOLI ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT [March 7, 20] JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part. The Court hold that the term “collateral review” in 28 U.S. C. mean review that i not direct, ante, at 5, and that a motion under Rhode Iland’ Rule eek collateral review, ante, at 9. Becaue I agree thoe concluion, I cannot join footnote 3 of the Court’ opinion, ante, at 9, n. 3, which decline to decide whether a Rule motion eek direct review |
per_curiam | 1,970 | 200 | per_curiam | Craycroft v. Ferrall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108108/craycroft-v-ferrall/ | The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Upon consideration of the suggestion of the Solicitor General and upon an examination of the entire record, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is vacated and the case is remanded to that court. The Solicitor General concedes that the administrative remedies that the Court of Appeals held should first be exhausted by the petitioner, have either been exhausted or are nonexistent. The sole remaining question therefore seems to be whether petitioner's failure to seek relief in the Court of Military Appeals precludes consideration of petitioner's claims by the federal courts. While the Solicitor General concedes that resort to that judicial remedy does not preclude consideration of petitioner's claim by the federal courts, there is a conflict among the circuits. It is for consideration of that question, or alternatively the merits, that the case is remanded |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118087/regents-of-univ-of-cal-v-doe/ | The narrow question presented by this case is whether the fact that the Federal Government has agreed to indemnify a state instrumentality against the costs of litigation, including adverse judgments, divests the state agency of Eleventh Amendment immunity. We hold that it does not. I Respondent, a citizen of New York, brought suit against the Regents of the University of California and several individual defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Although he alleged other claims, we are concerned only with respondent's breach-ofcontract claim against the University. Doe contends that the University agreed to employ him as a mathematical physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which the University operates pursuant to a contract with the Federal Government. According to his complaint, the *427 University wrongfully refused to perform its agreement with Doe because it determined that he could not obtain the required security clearance from the Department of Energy (Department). Relying on Ninth Circuit cases holding that the University is "an arm of the state,"[1] the District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred respondent from maintaining his breach-of-contract action in federal court. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Assuming that in some, but not all, of its functions the University is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,[2] the court addressed the narrow question whether it is an arm of the State when "acting in a managerial capacity" for the Livermore Laboratory. Although the majority applied "a five-factor analysis,"[3] it emphasized that "liability *428 for money judgment is the single most important factor in determining whether an entity is an arm of the state." The majority opinion gave decisive weight to the terms of the University's agreement with the Department, which made it "clear that the Department, and not the State of California, is liable for any judgment rendered against the University in its performance of the Contract." The dissenting judge did not take issue with the majority's emphasis on the importance of the defendant's liability for a money judgment, but he reasoned that the proper analysis should focus on the primary legal liability rather than the ultimate economic impact of the judgment. Noting that it was undisputed that a judgment against the University "is a legal obligation of the State of California," he discounted the significance of the indemnitor's secondary, or indirect, liability. For his conclusion, he relied on Ninth Circuit precedent suggesting that a State may not confer Eleventh Amendment immunity on an entity or individual who would otherwise not enjoy that immunity simply by volunteering to satisfy judgments |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118087/regents-of-univ-of-cal-v-doe/ | not enjoy that immunity simply by volunteering to satisfy judgments against the entity, or by passing a statute indemnifying individual officers from liability, "The question is not who pays in the end; it is who is legally obligated to pay the judgment that is being sought." 65 F.3d, -778. Because other Courts of Appeals agree with the dissent's focus on legal rather than financial liability,[4] we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. *429 II The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." It has long been settled that the reference to actions "against one of the United States" encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities. ; In re Ayers, ; ; Ford Thus, "when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants." When deciding whether a state instrumentality may invoke the State's immunity, our cases have inquired into the relationship between the State and the entity in question. In making this inquiry, we have sometimes examined "the essential nature and effect of the proceeding," ibid.; see also Kennecott Copper and sometimes focused on the "nature of the entity created by state law"[5] to determine whether it should *430 "be treated as an arm of the State," Mt. Healthy City Bd. of[6] Of course, the question whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued. ; ; Ford 323 U. S., In Hess, we evaluated the relationship between an entity created by a bistate compact and the States that had joined to create that entity in order to determine whether that entity could properly be denominated as an "arm" of either of its founding States for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. In addition to considering the position of the bistate entity as a unique creature within the federal -42, and the nature of the claims at issue in the underlying proceeding, we focused particular attention on the fact that "both legally and practically" neither of |
Justice Stevens | 1,997 | 16 | majority | Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118087/regents-of-univ-of-cal-v-doe/ | on the fact that "both legally and practically" neither of the relevant States would have been obligated to pay a judgment obtained against the bistate entity, Respondent seeks to detach the importance of a State's *431 moorings as an indicator of the relationship between the State and its creation and to convert the inquiry into a formalistic question of ultimate financial liability. But none of the reasoning in our opinions lends support to the notion that the presence or absence of a third party's undertaking to indemnify the agency should determine whether it is the kind of entity that should be treated as an arm of the State. Just as with the arm-of-the-state inquiry, we agree with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals that with respect to the underlying Eleventh Amendment question, it is the entity's potential legal liability, rather than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge the liability in the first instance, that is relevant. Surely, if the sovereign State of California should buy insurance to protect itself against potential tort liability to pedestrians stumbling on the steps of the State Capitol, it would not cease to be "one of the United States." Accordingly, we reject respondent's principal contention that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to this litigation because any award of damages would be paid by the Department of Energy, and therefore have no impact upon the treasury of the State of California. The Eleventh Amendment protects the State from the risk of adverse judgments even though the State may be indemnified by a third party. III As an alternative ground for affirmance, respondent invites us to reexamine the validity of the Ninth Circuit cases holding that the University is an arm of the State. He argues that we should look beyond the potential impact of an adverse judgment on the state treasury, and examine the extent to which the elected state government exercises "real, immediate control and oversight" over the University, see as well as the character *432 of the function that gave rise to the litigation. Because the question we granted certiorari to address does not encompass this argument, we decline to address it. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110639/kaiser-steel-corp-v-mullins/ | The salient facts of this case are not sufficiently stressed in the Court's opinion, and thus bear repeating. Kaiser Steel Corporation and the United Mine Workers (UMW) entered into a collective-bargaining agreement in 1974. As a part of that agreement, Kaiser promised to make contributions to certain UMW-designated employee health and retirement plan funds, based in part upon the amount of coal purchased by Kaiser from non-UMW mines. This purchased-coal *90 clause obviously had value to Kaiser's UMW employees, because the agreement provided that if that clause were adjudged illegal, then the union could demand renegotiation of the contract in order to secure a quid pro quo for the invalidated clause. During the life of the contract, from 1974 to 1977, Kaiser's UMW employees fully performed their obligations under the contract. Kaiser, in contrast, did not pay a penny of the money that it had promised to pay under the purchased-coal clause. Instead, Kaiser failed to disclose the fact that it had purchased outside coal to which the clause applied, in plain violation of the reporting requirements of the 1974 agreement. In after Kaiser's UMW employees had lost their opportunity to renegotiate the 1974 agreement, and after they had fully performed their part of that bargain Kaiser for the first time interposed its claim of illegality as a defense to respondent trustees' suit to recover the moneys promised to their plan under the purchased-coal clause. " `It has been often stated in similar cases that the defence [of illegality] is a very dishonest one, and it lies ill in the mouth of the defendant to allege it.' " quoting This observation is peculiarly apt in the present case. The defense of illegality lies ill indeed in the mouth of the Kaiser Steel Corporation. In my view, this case exemplifies the very sort of abuse that Congress intended to stop with the enactment of 306(a) of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980.[1] *91 I Section 306(a) of the 1980 Amendments reads as follows: "DELINQUENT CONTRIBUTIONS "Every employer who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement." Stat. 1295. *92 The statutory language evinces an unmistakable congressional intention that obligatory payments shall be made, except when those payments are inconsistent with law. It is upon the construction of the phrase, "inconsistent with law," that the application of 306(a), |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110639/kaiser-steel-corp-v-mullins/ | the phrase, "inconsistent with law," that the application of 306(a), and the outcome of this case, obviously depend. The Court construes cases decided before the enactment of 306(a) as suggesting that courts would not enforce collectively bargained payment obligations tainted by "consequential" illegality payments that would "lead to" situations condemned by law, or that would allow a party to "reap the fruits" of illegal collective-bargaining provisions. Ante, at 81-83. Thus is read to require that an illegality defense should be entertained when "its rejection would be to enforce conduct that the antitrust laws forbid." Ante, at 82. In the Court's view, 306(a) constitutes no more than a statutory endorsement of these earlier cases, calling for a broad construction of the "inconsistent with law" phrase that would comport with those cases. The Court's view is plausible only if the legislative history of 306(a) is ignored. That history demonstrates beyond dispute that Congress was deeply concerned about the pre 1980 financial instability of employee benefit plans, and that this undesirable state of affairs was largely attributed to delinquent contributions by employers to those plans. The legislative history also demonstrates that Congress expressly intended 306(a) to simplify and expedite plan trustees' suits to recover contractually required but delinquent employers' contributions, and that Congress chose to do so by, inter alia, substantially narrowing the scope of illegality defenses available to employers sued by plan trustees for delinquent contributions. With the benefit of the legislative history, it is apparent that 306(a) was designed to allow an employer to be relieved of a plan contribution obligation only when the payment at issue is inherently illegal for example, when the payment is in the nature of a bribe. In sum, illegality defenses, once arguably available whenever the payment in *93 question could be connected with illegal activities or results, are now meant by Congress to be available only when the payment in question itself constitutes an illegal act. An examination of the legislative history of 306(a) makes this narrowing intention crystal clear. II The Court construes 306(a) as merely declaratory of pre-existing case law. This construction implicitly assumes that Congress was on the whole satisfied with the pre-1980 condition of employee benefit plan funds. But that assumption is clearly erroneous. Congress was seriously troubled by a perception that employee benefit plans were highly vulnerable to financial instability,[2] and it identified employers' delinquent contributions as a principal cause of that vulnerability. The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources concluded: "Recourse available under current law for collecting delinquent contributions is insufficient and unnecessarily *94 cumbersome and |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110639/kaiser-steel-corp-v-mullins/ | collecting delinquent contributions is insufficient and unnecessarily *94 cumbersome and costly. Some simple collection actions brought by plan trustees have been converted into lengthy, costly and complex litigation concerning claims and defenses unrelated to the employer's promise and the plans' entitlement to the contributions. This should not be the case. Federal pension law must permit trustees of plans to recover delinquent contributions efficaciously. Sound national pension policy demands that employers who enter into agreements providing for pension contributions not be permitted to repudiate their pension promises." Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (Comm. Print 1980) (emphasis added).[3] Thus Congress' paramount concern in enacting 306(a) was to expedite and simplify the collection of delinquent contributions by plan trustees in other words, to expedite and simplify the very kind of suit brought by respondents in the present case. To solve this problem, Congress decided, among other things, to narrow the legal defenses available to employers sued by plan trustees seeking to recover delinquent plan contributions. The comments of the sponsors of 306(a) in both the Senate and the House bear out this interpretation. In the House, Representative Thompson stated that "Federal pension law must permit trustees of plans to recover delinquent contributions efficaciously, and without regard to issues which might arise under labor-management relations *95 law other than 29 U.S. C. 186." 126 Cong. Rec. 23039 (1980) (emphasis added). Title 29 U.S. C. 186, entitled "Restrictions on financial transactions," essentially prohibits an employer from paying bribes to his employees, their representatives, or their union.[4] In sum, the comments of Representative Thompson evince a congressional intention that employers sued by plan trustees should be able to interpose an illegality defense only if the claimed illegality resided in the payment itself. In the Senate, Senator Williams stressed the same theme: "It is essential to the financial health of multiemployer plans that they and their actuaries be able to rely on an employer's contribution promises. [P]lan participants for whom the employer promises to make pension contributions to the plan in exchange for their labor are entitled to rely on their employer's promises. The bill clarifies the law in this regard by providing a direct ERISA cause of action against a delinquent employer without regard to extraneous claims or defenses." 126 Cong. Rec., at 20180 (emphasis added). *96 Senator Williams later restated his view of the defenses available to an employer under 306(a), and implicitly defined his understanding of the term, "extraneous," by using precisely the same words as Representative Thompson had. The sponsors of 306(a) thus intended |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110639/kaiser-steel-corp-v-mullins/ | as Representative Thompson had. The sponsors of 306(a) thus intended to cut off all illegality defenses that an employer might previously have interposed against a plan trustee, except those that claimed an illegality falling within the prohibition of 29 U.S. C. 186. Congress perceived that a plan trustee is merely a third-party beneficiary of the collective-bargaining agreement reached by an employer and its employees. Such a trustee does not take part in the negotiations that give rise to the employer's contribution obligation. Nor does that trustee have any influence over the performance of other aspects of the collective-bargaining agreement, which are as 306(a)'s sponsors put it "extraneous" or "unrelated to" the employer's promise to contribute to the plan. From the trustee's point of view, the employer's promise to make contributions to the designated plan is distinct and severable from all the other clauses of the collective-bargaining agreement, and failure of the agreement in any other respect is wholly irrelevant to the employer's contribution obligation. In order to achieve its goal of expediting and simplifying delinquent-contribution suits brought by plan trustees, Congress through 306(a) essentially adopted the trustee's point of view on this issue. To ensure the full funding of employee benefit plans, Congress provided that when an employer is sued for plan contributions due and owing under a collective-bargaining agreement, the only defenses that will be permitted are those, arising under 29 U.S. C. 186, involving a claim of illegality inherent in the payment itself. III The Court ignores this legislative prescription, thereby rendering 306(a) a nullity and frustrating Congress' desire *97 to protect the economic integrity of the retirement, health, and unemployment plans upon which so many working people rely. The majority devotes little time or effort to its analysis of 306(a), and its conclusion that that provision was intended merely to be declaratory of pre-existing law conflicts with the legislative history of 306(a) in significant respects. The Court does not explain why the modest, declaratory intention that it attributes to Congress is nowhere expressed in the legislative history of 306(a). Nor does the Court even begin to reconcile its view of the limited purpose of 306(a) with Congress' manifest concern for the financial vulnerability of employee benefit plans, or with Congress' express desire to simplify and expedite suits brought by plan trustees. The Court's position apparently is that Congress expected a mere statutory endorsement of existing case law to remedy the serious problems to which the 1980 Amendments were explicitly addressed. But simply to state this position is to expose its incredibility. The very fact that |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110639/kaiser-steel-corp-v-mullins/ | position is to expose its incredibility. The very fact that Congress perceived difficulties in the status quo, and sought to remedy them with 306(a), demonstrates that that provision was not intended merely to express satisfaction with existing law, but rather was designed to narrow substantially the scope of defenses available to employers. This conclusion naturally leads, to, and in turn explains, Senator Williams' and Representative Thompson's explicit limitation of the defenses available under the new provision to those arising under 29 U.S. C. 186. The Court, however, disregards these explicit limiting statements on the ground that "repeals by implication are disfavored," and that therefore "the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest." The Court's reasoning is not even superficially persuasive. It is obvious that the Sherman Act is not "repealed" by 306(a). The new provision merely channels the availability of the antitrust laws into employers' suits for declaratory and injunctive relief or for damages, the remedies normally afforded by those laws. See And with respect to 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act even if 306(a) is construed as a partial repealer, the record before us presents plenty of "clear and manifest" evidence that Congress intended to effect such a repeal: if the Court would only address that evidence. There is Congress' express dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs respecting employers' contributions to employee benefit plans; there is Congress' express intention to simplify and expedite trustees' suits to recover contractually required but delinquent employers' contributions; and there is explicit legislative history, offered by the sponsors of the legislation, disclosing the limiting device a cross-reference to 29 U.S. C. 186 actually chosen by Congress in order to effect its stated purpose. By demanding more evidence than this, the Court simply imposes its own view of the wisdom of 306(a) upon Congress and upon respondents, in the guise of judicial restraint. IV The legislative history of 306(a) makes it plain that the judgment of the Court of Appeals below, affirming the District Court's rejection of the illegality defenses proffered by petitioner Kaiser, should be affirmed by this Court. Kaiser's defenses do not attack the legality of the delinquent plan contributions themselves. Indeed, Kaiser does not even attempt to argue that the overdue payments sought by respondent trustees are inherently illegal. Rather, Kaiser contends that the making of those payments would "lead to" an illegal restraint of trade, or would allow the trustees to "reap the fruits" of an illegal "hot cargo" clause. Whatever the merits of these contentions of consequential illegality, 306(a) renders |
Justice Brennan | 1,982 | 13 | dissenting | Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110639/kaiser-steel-corp-v-mullins/ | the merits of these contentions of consequential illegality, 306(a) renders them quite irrelevant to Kaiser's obligation to make its promised contributions to the designated employee benefit plan funds. That was the very purpose of 306(a). *99 This conclusion does not impair Kaiser's rights vis-a-vis the UMW, nor does it undercut the important national policies embodied in the Sherman Act and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act. Kaiser can easily transform both of its illegality claims into causes of action brought directly against the union. "The employer may still have its claims adjudicated by bringing, in the proper forum, a timely suit against the union for rescission of the contract, antitrust damages, or a declaration that an unfair labor practice has been committed." Huge, at[5] Section 306(a) simply distinguishes Kaiser's rights against the union from its rights against respondents. In its effort to assure financial stability to employee benefit plans, 306(a) prescribes the insulation of plan trustees such as respondents from the potentially never-ending disputes between labor and management. Because I believe that 306(a) of the 1980 Amendments requires affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I dissent. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | concurring | Sackett v. Epa | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/625847/sackett-v-epa/ | Faced with an EPA administrative compliance order threatening tens of thousands of dollars in civil penalties per day, the Sacketts sued “to contest the jurisdictional bases for the order.” Brief for Petitioners 9. “As a logical prerequisite to the issuance of the challenged compliance order,” the Sacketts contend, “EPA had to determine that it has regulatory authority over [our] property.” at 54–55. The Court holds that the Sacketts may immediate- ly litigate their jurisdictional challenge in federal court. I agree, for the Agency has ruled definitively on that ques- tion. Whether the Sacketts could challenge not only the EPA’s authority to regulate their land under the Clean Water Act, but also, at this pre-enforcement stage, the terms and conditions of the compliance order, is a question today’s opinion does not reach out to resolve. Not raised by the Sacketts here, the question remains open for an- other day and case. On that understanding, I join the Court’s opinion. Cite as: 566 U. S. (2012) 1 ALITO, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–1062 CHANTELL SACKETT, ET VIR, PETITIONERS v. ENVI- RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL. |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | dissenting | Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118377/santa-fe-independent-school-dist-v-doe/ | The Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the school district's student-message program is invalid on its face under the Establishment Clause. But even more disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court's opinion; it bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life. Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is faithful to the meaning of the Establishment Clause, when it is recalled that George Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God." Presidential Proclamation, 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (J. Richardson ed. 1897). We do not learn until late in the Court's opinion that respondents in this case challenged the district's studentmessage program at football games before it had been put into practice. As the Court explained in United the fact that a policy might "operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid." See also While there is an exception to this principle in the First Amendment overbreadth context because of our concern that people may refrain from speech out of fear of prosecution, Los Angeles Police there is no similar justification for Establishment Clause cases. No speech will be "chilled" by the existence of a government policy that might unconstitutionally endorse religion over nonreligion. Therefore, the question is not whether the district's policy may be applied in violation of the Establishment Clause, but whether it inevitably will be. *319 The Court, venturing into the realm of prophecy, decides that it "need not wait for the inevitable" and invalidates the district's policy on its face. See ante, at 316. To do so, it applies the most rigid version of the oft-criticized test of[1] Lemon has had a checkered career in the decisional law of this Court. See, e. g., Lamb's (collecting opinions criticizing Lemon ); (stating that Lemon `s "three-part test represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Committee for Public Ed. and Religious (deriding "the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier described in Lemon "). We have even gone so far as to state that it has never been binding on us. Indeed, in an opinion upon which the Court relies heavily today, we mentioned, but |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | dissenting | Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118377/santa-fe-independent-school-dist-v-doe/ | upon which the Court relies heavily today, we mentioned, but did not feel compelled to apply, the Lemon test. See also ; Even if it were appropriate to apply the Lemon test here, the district's student-message policy should not be invalidated on its face. The Court applies Lemon and holds that the "policy is invalid on its face because it establishes an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school events." Ante, at 317. The Court's reliance on each of these conclusions misses the mark. First, the Court misconstrues the nature of the "majoritarian election" permitted by the policy as being an election on "prayer" and "religion."[2] See ante, at 314, 317. To the contrary, the election permitted by the policy is a two-fold process whereby students vote first on whether to have a student speaker before football games at all, and second, if the students vote to have such a speaker, on who that speaker will be. App. 104-105. It is conceivable that the election could become one in which student candidates campaign on platforms that focus on whether or not they will *321 pray if elected. It is also conceivable that the election could lead to a Christian prayer before 90 percent of the football games. If, upon implementation, the policy operated in this fashion, we would have a record before us to review whether the policy, as applied, violated the Establishment Clause or unduly suppressed minority viewpoints. But it is possible that the students might vote not to have a pregame speaker, in which case there would be no threat of a constitutional violation. It is also possible that the election would not focus on prayer, but on public speaking ability or social popularity. And if student campaigning did begin to focus on prayer, the school might decide to implement reasonable campaign restrictions.[3] But the Court ignores these possibilities by holding that merely granting the student body the power to elect a speaker that may choose to pray, "regardless of the students' ultimate use of it, is not acceptable." Ante, at 316. The Court so holds despite that any speech that may occur as a result of the election process here would be private, not government, speech. The elected student, not the government, would choose what to say. Support for the Court's holding cannot be found in any of our cases. And it essentially invalidates all student elections. A newly elected student body president, or even a newly elected |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | dissenting | Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118377/santa-fe-independent-school-dist-v-doe/ | newly elected student body president, or even a newly elected prom king or queen, could use opportunities for public speaking to say prayers. Under the Court's view, the mere grant of power *322 to the students to vote for such offices, in light of the fear that those elected might publicly pray, violates the Establishment Clause. Second, with respect to the policy's purpose, the Court holds that "the simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose and perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional violation." Ante, at 316. But the policy itself has plausible secular purposes: "[T]o solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate environment for the competition." App. 104-105. Where a governmental body "expresses a plausible secular purpose" for an enactment, "courts should generally defer to that stated intent." -75 ; see also The Court grants no deference toand appears openly hostile towardthe policy's stated purposes, and wastes no time in concluding that they are a sham. For example, the Court dismisses the secular purpose of solemnization by claiming that it "invites and encourages religious messages." Ante, at 306; Cf. (discussing the "legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions"). The Court so concludes based on its rather strange view that a "religious message is the most obvious means of solemnizing an event." Ante, at 306. But it is easy to think of solemn messages that are not religious in nature, for example urging that a game be fought fairly. And sporting events often begin with a solemn rendition of our national anthem, with its concluding verse "And this be our motto: `In God is our trust.' " Under the Court's logic, a public school that sponsors *323 the singing of the national anthem before football games violates the Establishment Clause. Although the Court apparently believes that solemnizing football games is an illegitimate purpose, the voters in the school district seem to disagree. Nothing in the Establishment Clause prevents them from making this choice.[4] The Court bases its conclusion that the true purpose of the policy is to endorse student prayer on its view of the school district's history of Establishment Clause violations and the context in which the policy was written, that is, as "the latest step in developing litigation brought as a challenge to institutional practices that unquestionably violated the Establishment Clause." Ante, at 308-309, 315. But the context attempted compliance with a District Court orderactually demonstrates that the school district was acting diligently to come within the governing constitutional law. The District Court ordered the school |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | dissenting | Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118377/santa-fe-independent-school-dist-v-doe/ | the governing constitutional law. The District Court ordered the school district to formulate a policy consistent with Fifth Circuit precedent, which permitted a school district to have a prayer-only policy. See But the school district went further than required by the District Court order and eventually settled on a policy that gave the student speaker a choice to deliver either an *324 invocation or a message. In so doing, the school district exhibited a willingness to comply with, and exceed, Establishment Clause restrictions. Thus, the policy cannot be viewed as having a sectarian purpose.[5] The Court also relies on our decision in to support its conclusion. In we concluded that the content of the speech at issue, a graduation prayer given by a rabbi, was "directed and controlled" by a school official. In other words, at issue in was government speech. Here, by contrast, the potential speech at issue, if the policy had been allowed to proceed, would be a message or invocation selected or created by a student. That is, if there were speech at issue here, it would be private speech. The "crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect," applies with particular force to the question of endorsement. Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. (emphasis in original). Had the policy been put into practice, the students may have chosen a speaker according to wholly secular criteria like good public speaking skills or social popularityand the student speaker may have chosen, on her own accord, to deliver a religious message. Such an application of the policy *325 would likely pass constitutional muster. See ("If the State had chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it would be harder to attribute an endorsement of religion to the State"). Finally, the Court seems to demand that a government policy be completely neutral as to content or be considered one that endorses religion. See ante, at 305. This is undoubtedly a new requirement, as our Establishment Clause jurisprudence simply does not mandate "content neutrality." That concept is found in our First Amendment speech cases and is used as a guide for determining when we apply strict scrutiny. For example, we look to "content neutrality" in reviewing loudness restrictions imposed on speech in public forums, see and regulations against picketing, see The Court seems to think that the fact that the |
Justice Rehnquist | 2,000 | 19 | dissenting | Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118377/santa-fe-independent-school-dist-v-doe/ | The Court seems to think that the fact that the policy is not content neutral somehow controls the Establishment Clause inquiry. See ante, at 305. But even our speech jurisprudence would not require that all public school actions with respect to student speech be content neutral. See, e. g., Bethel School Dist. No. Schools do not violate the First Amendment every time they restrict student speech to certain categories. But under the Court's view, a school policy under which the student body president is to solemnize the graduation ceremony by giving a favorable introduction to the guest speaker would be facially unconstitutional. Solemnization "invites and encourages" prayer and the policy's content limitations *326 prohibit the student body president from giving a solemn, yet nonreligious, message like "commentary on United States foreign policy." See ante, at 306. The policy at issue here may be applied in an unconstitutional manner, but it will be time enough to invalidate it if that is found to be the case. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Solem v. Stumes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111112/solem-v-stumes/ | The question in this case is whether should be applied I Respondent, Norman Stumes, was a suspect in the death of Joyce Hoff in Sioux Falls, S. D. On September 27, 1973, Stumes was arrested in Green Bay, Wis., on pending perjury and felony check charges. He had not yet been charged with Hoff's death. The following morning he spoke by phone with his attorney in Sioux Falls, who told him not to make any statements before returning to South Dakota. Three Sioux Falls police officers, Skadsen, Green, and Hendrick, went to Green Bay to bring Stumes back. They first spoke with him on the morning of October 1. After being read his Miranda rights, Stumes said that he understood them and did not object to speaking with police without his attorney present. After an hour and a half of conversation about the homicide, *640 Green asked Stumes if he would be willing to take a lie detector test. Stumes answered that "that is a question I'd rather not answer until I talk to [my attorney]." At that point the officers stopped questioning. The officers returned that afternoon and recommenced questioning without giving Miranda warnings. Stumes admitted he had been in Hoff's apartment the night of the killing and that they had had intercourse, but he denied having had anything to do with her death. When asked if the death had been intentional or accidental, Stumes said that it had been accidental. He then stated that "I would rather not talk about it any more at this time until I talk to my attorney, and after that I'll give you a full statement in regards to her death." Questioning thereupon ceased. The next morning Stumes and the three officers set out, by car, on the 600-mile trip to Sioux Falls. Stumes was given his Miranda warnings at the beginning of the trip, and was asked whether he would be willing to talk. He shrugged and nodded affirmatively, and there was then some further questioning. For most of the trip, the conversation was about unrelated matters, though occasionally the subject of Hoff's death came up. Late in the afternoon, after a 10- or 15-minute in the car, respondent had what he referred to as "a little conflict with my emotions" and "made the statement that I couldn't understand why anybody would want to kill Joyce and that the taking of a human life is so useless." Green told him he would feel better if he "got it off his chest." Stumes then recounted striking and strangling Hoff after she had said |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Solem v. Stumes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111112/solem-v-stumes/ | then recounted striking and strangling Hoff after she had said she would tell someone that she and Stumes had slept together. Green asked if Stumes would give the police a statement when they reached Sioux Falls, noting that his attorney would undoubtedly advise him not to. Stumes agreed to give a statement, stating: "I don't give a damn what he says. I'm doing anything I feel like, and I'll talk to anybody I want to." Stumes and the officers reached Sioux Falls at about 6:45 in the evening. Shortly after being *641 placed in a cell, Stumes called for Skadsen, asking him to "tell them that I didn't mean to kill her, that it was an accident that I'm not a vicious killer." Stumes was charged with murder; the trial court refused to suppress any of his statements to the police; and the jury found him guilty of first-degree manslaughter and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, the State Supreme Court remanded for a determination whether Stumes' statements had been voluntary. The trial court found that they had; the conviction was accordingly "automatically affirmed." 90 S. D. 382, Stumes then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United District Court for the District of South Dakota. The District Court denied the writ after an evidentiary hearing. It concluded that Stumes had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Miranda did not require that all questioning must cease forever once a suspect has requested counsel. Given the totality of the circumstances, the questioning during the trip to South Dakota was proper.[1] While Stumes' appeal was pending, we held that once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent conversation must be initiated by him. Applying Edwards to this case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the police had acted unconstitutionally in twice renewing interrogation after Stumes had invoked his right to counsel.[2] *642 Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari on three questions: whether the conduct of the police in this case violated Edwards, whether the District Court adequately deferred to the state court's factfinding, and whether Edwards should be applied We granted certiorari only as to the third. We therefore assume for present purposes that the conduct at issue here violated Edwards. We need not decide whether the police also violated Miranda v. a question not considered by the Court of Appeals. Because we conclude that the court erred in applying Edwards to this case, we reverse and remand for reconsideration under pre-Edwards law. II As |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Solem v. Stumes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111112/solem-v-stumes/ | reverse and remand for reconsideration under pre-Edwards law. II As a rule, judicial decisions apply "" Indeed, a legal system based on precedent has a built-in presumption of retroactivity. Nonetheless, retroactive application is not compelled, constitutionally or otherwise. Great Northern R. Since which held that applied only to defendants whose convictions were not yet final when Mapp was decided, we have recognized that "the interest of justice" and "the exigencies of the situation" may argue against imposing a new constitutional decision The basic principles of retroactivity in criminal cases were established in *643 and Under these cases, "[t]he criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity] question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."[3] Examining Edwards in light of these three factors, we conclude that it should not be applied A Complete retroactive effect is most appropriate where a new constitutional principle is designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal trials. See (citing cases). The Edwards rule has only a tangential relation to *644 truthfinding at trial. As we have noted in the past, "the question whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of degree." The application of the exclusionary rule pursuant to Edwards is perhaps not as entirely unrelated to the accuracy of the final result as it is in the Fourth Amendment context. See United ; Yet the Edwards rule cannot be said to be a sine qua non of fair and accurate interrogation. We faced a similar situation in where we held that the newly established rule that counsel had to be present during lineups was not to be applied There we noted that although excluding identifications made in the absence of counsel was "justified by the need to assure the integrity and reliability of our system of justice, [it] undoubtedly will affect cases in which no unfairness will be present." The same is true of the Edwards rule. The fact that a suspect has requested a lawyer does not mean that statements he makes in response to subsequent police questioning are likely to be inaccurate. Most important, in those situations where renewed interrogation raises significant doubt as to the voluntaries and reliability of the statement and, therefore, the accuracy of the outcome at trial, it is likely that suppression could be achieved without reliance on the |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Solem v. Stumes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111112/solem-v-stumes/ | likely that suppression could be achieved without reliance on the prophylactic rule adopted in Edwards.[4] We have frequently refused to give retroactive effect to decisions that bore at least as heavily on the truthfinding *645 function. The most notable of these is Miranda itself, which was held to apply only to trials taking place after it was decided. [5] See generally The Edwards rule is a far cry from the sort of decision that goes to the heart of the truthfinding function, which we have consistently held to be retroactive. E. g., ; ; Rather, it is a prophylactic rule, designed to implement pre-existing rights. This Court has not applied such decisions See ; Halliday v. United ; B In considering the reliance factor, this Court's cases have looked primarily to whether law enforcement authorities and *646 state courts have justifiably relied on a prior rule of law said to be different from that announced by the decision whose retroactivity is at issue. Unjustified "reliance' is no bar to retroactivity. This inquiry is often phrased in terms of whether the new decision was foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a "clear break with the past."[6] When the Court has explicitly overruled past precedent, disapproved a practice it has sanctioned in prior cases, or overturned a longstanding practice approved by near-unanimous lower-court authority, the reliance and effect factors in themselves "have virtually compelled a finding of nonretroactivity." United v. Johnson, See also We have been less inclined to limit the effect of a decision that has been "distinctly foreshadowed." At just what point of predictability local authorities should be expected to anticipate a future decision has been unclear, however. Edwards established a bright-line rule to safeguard pre-existing rights, not a new substantive requirement. Before and after Edwards a suspect had a right to the presence of a lawyer, and could waive that right. Edwards established a new test for when that waiver would be acceptable once the suspect had invoked his right to counsel: the suspect had to initiate subsequent communication. Prior to Edwards the *647 Court had "strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel," and had several times referred to an accused's right to be free from further questioning once he invoked his right to counsel, see Edwards did not overrule any prior decision or transform standard practice. Thus, it is not the sort of "clear break" case that is almost automatically nonretroactive. Edwards nonetheless did establish a new rule. We do not think that the police can be faulted if they did not |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Solem v. Stumes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111112/solem-v-stumes/ | that the police can be faulted if they did not anticipate its per se approach. Cf. Prior to Edwards, the emphasis in our cases had been on whether, as an individual, case-by-case matter, a waiver of the right to counsel had been knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See As we said in North relying on and treating the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as a fortiori, "[e]ven when a right so fundamental as that to counsel at trial is involved, the question of waiver must be determined on `the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " There we saw "no reason to discard that standard and replace it with an inflexible per se rule." See also The Miranda viewed the waiver question as controlled by and was taken to task for that view by one of the -514 See also Tague v. ;[7] It does not *648 in any way cast doubt on the legitimacy or necessity of Edwards to acknowledge that in some cases a waiver could be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent even though it occurred when the police recommenced questioning after an accused had invoked the right to counsel. The Court had several times refused to adopt per se rules governing the waiver of Miranda rights. ; North See also And, while Mosley did distinguish the right to counsel from the right to n. 10, much of the logic and language of the opinion could be applied to the invocation of the former. Edwards was not a necessary consequence of Miranda. Thus it could be justifiably believed that a waiver of the right to counsel following its invocation could be voluntary even if the police initiated the conversation. The state of the law in the lower courts prior to the Edwards decision bears out this reality. Cf. Before Edwards, the question whether the authorities could resume questioning after a defendant has asked for an attorney was acknowledged to be unsettled. See United v. Hernandez, ; United v. Herman, Some courts prohibited resumption of questioning unless initiated by the suspect. E. g., United v. Womack, ; United v. Priest, On the other hand, a number of courts allowed renewed interrogations after a request for counsel. E. g., ; vacated and remanded, 451 * ; United v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, (CA9) (en banc), cert. denied, ; See also United v. Clark,[8] In we declined to measure the prospectivity of Miranda from the date of because it had not been "fully anticipated" or "clearly foreshadowed" by that "The disagreements among other courts concerning the |
Justice White | 1,984 | 6 | majority | Solem v. Stumes | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111112/solem-v-stumes/ | foreshadowed" by that "The disagreements among other courts concerning the implications of Escobedo, however, have impelled us to lay down additional guidelines for situations not presented by that case. This we have done in Miranda and these guidelines are therefore available only to persons whose trials had not begun" when Miranda was decided. The same logic argues against retroactive application of Edwards, which, in light of the disagreements among lower courts, laid down additional guidelines for the implementation of Miranda. In short, it cannot be said that our decision in Edwards had been "clearly" or "distinctly" foreshadowed. See at Cf. 447 U. S., In these circumstances, we consider the reliance *650 interest compelling, even though Edwards did not overrule a specific C The retroactive application of Edwards would have a disruptive effect on the administration of justice. We can only guess at the number of cases where Edwards might make a difference in the admissibility of statements made to the police, but the number is surely significant. In all of those, some inquiry would be required to assess the substantiality of any Edwards claim. That investigation, and the possible retrial, would be hampered by problems of lost evidence, faulty memory, and missing witnesses. See D In sum, Edwards has little to do with the truthfinding function of the criminal trial, and the rights it is designed to protect may still be claimed by those whose convictions preceded the It would be unreasonable to expect law enforcement authorities to have conducted themselves in accordance with its bright-line rule prior to its announcement; and retroactive application would disrupt the administration of justice. Weighing these considerations, we conclude that Edwards should not be applied III At a minimum, nonretroactivity means that a decision is not to be applied in collateral review of final convictions. For purposes of this case, that is all we need decide about Edwards.[9] Our prior cases have drawn the nonretroactivity *651 line in a variety of places. Some decisions have been applied only to defendants whose convictions were not yet final when the new rule was established, United v. Johnson, ; some only to those defendants whose trials had not yet begun at that point, ; some only to those whose constitutional rights were violated after the law-changing decision was handed down, United ; ; and some only to those cases where the prosecution sought to introduce (newly) illegal evidence after the date of the nonretroactive decision, Just where the line should be drawn as to Edwards need not be decided today. IV The Court of Appeals erred by |
per_curiam | 1,979 | 200 | per_curiam | Pilson v. Bordenkircher | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110152/pilson-v-bordenkircher/ | The petitioner was convicted in a Kentucky court on a charge of first-degree manslaughter, and the judgment of conviction was sustained on direct appeal. The petitioner then filed a habeas corpus petition in a Federal District Court, alleging that the Kentucky conviction was supported by evidence insufficient to afford him due process of law. The federal court denied relief. Applying the "no evidence" test of the court concluded that "[a]lthough this was a close case on the evidence, we believe that the case was not devoid of an evidentiary basis for petitioner's conviction."[*] The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, also relying on the "no evidence" test, affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief. Thereafter, this Court in held that the Thompson "no evidence" test is constitutionally inadequate in a case such as this. An earlier decision had made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal conviction of any person except upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, The Court in Jackson held that this constitutional requirement can be effectuated only if a federal habeas corpus court, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a state-court conviction, inquires "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." It is thus beyond dispute that the District Court and Court of Appeals applied an incorrect and inadequate constitutional test in resolving the petitioner's due process claim that his state-court conviction rested on insufficient evidence. Although it is quite possible that the evidence against the petitioner will survive a challenge under the correct constitutional standard, he is entitled to have his application for habeas corpus considered under that standard. *3 The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky so that it may consider the petitioner's application for habeas corpus in the light of It is so ordered. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,018 | 4 | dissenting | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | When the District Court reduced petitioner Adaucto Chavez-Meza’s sentence, it entered its order on a terse “AO–247” form. An example of this form is attached as an Appendix, infra. On the form order, the District Court checked a box next to preprinted language stating that it had “considered” Chavez-Meza’s motion for a reduced sentence and that it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S. C. to the extent that they are applicable.” App. 106–107 (under seal). The District Court checked another box indicating that Chavez-Meza’s motion was granted, and the court stated that it was reducing his sentence to 114 months. But the District Court did not explain why it chose that particular sentence or why it had not sentenced Chavez- Meza to the bottom of his Guidelines range, as it had done at his original sentencing. Under these circumstances, in my view the District Court’s order was insufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review, a conclusion that requires this respectful dissent. My disagreement with the majority is based on a serious problem—the difficulty for prisoners and appellate courts in ascertaining a district court’s reasons for imposing a 2 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting sentence when the court fails to state those reasons on the record; yet, in the end, my disagreement turns on a small difference, for a remedy is simple and easily attained. Just a slight expansion of the AO–247 form would an- swer the concerns expressed in this dissent in most cases, and likely in the instant one. If the form were expanded to include just a few more categories covering the factors most often bearing on a trial court’s sentencing determina- tion, the objections petitioner raises likely would be met. The statute would be satisfied; district judges would have a helpful form that might well reduce the time for consid- eration of cases—and even if not would help ensure the full consideration which tends to result in uniformity and fairness; the Courts of Appeals, from the outset, would have far more assistance in determining whether appeals have merit; and this in turn would yield judicial efficien- cies that the sentencing system must have to be effective and that Courts of Appeals must have to ensure that the relevant statute can be administered and applied in an efficient, fair, and uniform way. The Court today, how- ever, gives its full approval to a conclusory Its result- ing holding is detrimental to the judicial system and to prisoners alike. The Sentencing Reform Act |
Justice Kennedy | 2,018 | 4 | dissenting | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | judicial system and to prisoners alike. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorizes a district court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence when he “has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentenc- ing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S. C. Con- gress specified that district courts may reduce a defend- ant’s sentence only “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” In United this Court addressed a statutory scheme that, like required district courts to consider specific Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 3 KENNEDY, J., dissenting statutory factors when they exercised their discretion. The Court held that “[w]here, as here, Congress has de- clared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, what- ever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review.” at –337. Here, the form order fails to provide sufficient infor- mation either to give adequate and efficient instruction to the trial court or to permit meaningful appellate review. The form order discloses no basis for determining why the District Court did not sentence Chavez-Meza to the bot- tom of his new Guidelines range, as it had when it im- posed his original sentence. The Court points out that there is no presumption in favor of a proportional reduction when a judge reduces a prisoner’s sentence pursuant to Ante, at 6–7. That is true, as far as it goes. The issue here, however, is not whether district courts must grant proportional reduc- tions; rather, the issue is what explanation should be required to permit meaningful review of a trial court’s resentencing The amount of necessary explanation might be different when a district court grants a proportional reduction—for example, when it sentences a defendant to the top or the bottom of his Guidelines range for both the initial and reduced sentence. In that circumstance, in most in- stances, an appellate court properly can infer that the dis- trict court’s reasons were the same as those it gave when it imposed the initial sentence. See Brief for National Asso- ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 6–11 (explaining that district courts typically grant pro- portional reductions and that the Sentencing Commission often assumes they will do so). Less explanation is neces- sary, not because proportional reductions are favored as a legal |
Justice Kennedy | 2,018 | 4 | dissenting | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | sary, not because proportional reductions are favored as a legal matter but because the initial sentencing proceeding 4 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting provides a record from which an appellate court can make prompt and reliable inferences as to the reasons that informed the trial court’s decision to resentence a defend- ant to the same relative point on his amended Guidelines range. Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, furthermore, one need not have an advanced degree in mathematics, much less a calculator, to draw this reasonable inference. District courts, as a matter of routine, regularly grant proportional reductions; and it seems unlikely that they conduct intricate logarithmic computations before doing so. In contrast to a proportional reduction in a prisoner’s sentence, a nonproportional reduction suggests that the district court’s reasons for choosing a particular sentence might be different from those it gave when it imposed the sentence in the first instance. Accordingly, a more specific explanation—but by no means an elaborate one—is neces- sary for an appellate court to determine why the district court chose a new point on the revised Guidelines range. The Court’s analogy to v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), fails as well. See ante, at 7–9. In the District Court imposed the defendant’s sentence at a hearing. The record made clear that “the sentencing judge listened to each argument,” “considered the supporting evidence,” and then determined that a 33-month sentence was “appropriate.” –358. But here there was no hearing when the District Court reduced Chavez- Meza’s sentence in light of the amended Guidelines. The District Court’s reasoning must be surmised from its terse, largely uninformative At Chavez-Meza’s initial sentencing there was a hearing similar to the one in But the fact that the District Court did not grant Chavez- Meza a proportional reduction when it later reconsidered his sentence limits the relevance of the initial sentencing proceeding. The District Court may well have had a legitimate Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 5 KENNEDY, J., dissenting reason for reducing Chavez-Meza’s sentence to 114 months instead of 108 months. And even a brief explana- tion stating that reason likely would have sufficed, for district courts need not write at length each time they rule upon a motion. The Court is quite correct to point out that a trial judge “need only ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’ ” Ante, at 3 (quoting ). It is likely that even a checkbox form would suffice |
Justice Kennedy | 2,018 | 4 | dissenting | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | It is likely that even a checkbox form would suffice in most cases, provided the form lists enough of the common rea- sons so that an appellate court, in most cases, can easily ascertain why the district court chose a particular sen- tence. Here, for example, the District Court simply could have added a sentence or two to the AO–247 form’s “Addi- tional Comments” box. Or, perhaps preferably, trial courts could use an expanded version of the AO–247 form that allows judges to indicate, even by checking a box, the reason or reasons for choosing a particular sentence. In this case, however, the District Court’s reasons re- main a mystery. The Court today speculates that the District Court sentenced Chavez-Meza to 114 months because he distributed a large quantity of methampheta- mine. Ante, at 8. For its part, the Court of Appeals specu- lated that the reason might have been “an incident of misconduct while in prison.” See (CA10 2017). But there is no basis for these assumptions in the District Court’s The sort of guesswork the Court relies upon in today’s decision is insufficient to provide meaningful appellate review of a district court’s exercise of its discretion under See Taylor, 487 U.S., at 342–343. According to the Court of Appeals, the relevant provi- sions of the Sentencing Reform Act must be read to allow a trial court not to give or state any reasons at all for a 6 CHAVEZ-MEZA v. UNITED STATES KENNEDY, J., dissenting resentencing This was error. The Court of Appeals reached its conclusion by comparing the provisions that relate to original sentencing— the provisions that pertain to the resen- tencing process— It reasoned that, because the former has an express requirement to state reasons while the latter does not, the statutory structure elimi- nates any requirement for reasons upon resentencing. The Court of Appeals’ analysis, however, ignores the scope of the statutory text in That section pertains to a procedure that is a full-scale adversary proceeding, where the defendant and counsel are present. As part of that procedure, the statute states: “The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” The statute does not require a full-scale adversary proceeding when resentencing is being considered after a Guidelines reduction. But it is incorrect to conclude that the absence of all those requirements forecloses the neces- sity to make a record that allows an appellate court to exercise meaningful review of the reasons for the resen- tencing This conclusion follows from this Court’s decision in |
Justice Kennedy | 2,018 | 4 | dissenting | Chavez-Meza v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4508139/chavez-meza-v-united-states/ | resen- tencing This conclusion follows from this Court’s decision in Taylor, holding that courts must “clearly artic- ulate” their reasoning “in order to permit meaningful appellate review,” even without any specific statutory 487 U.S., at –337. So the fact that Con- gress adopted a detailed explanatory requirement in another part of the statute does not displace Taylor’s background rule that district courts must provide enough reasoning for appellate courts to review their decisions when they exercise discretion under a statute like The Court quite correctly rejects the Government’s invitation to adopt the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. See ante, at 5–6. The Court’s ensuing analysis, however, is, in my respectful view, still incorrect. On the one hand, Cite as: 585 U. S. (2018) 7 KENNEDY, J., dissenting the Court holds that appellate courts may determine on a case-by-case basis whether a form order like the one here provides enough explanation. See ante, at 6, 9–10. Thus, any prisoner can appeal and argue that the order was insufficient in his case. On the other hand, the Court does not impose any serious requirement that a district court state its reasons on the front end—that is, before the appeal, when the district court rules on the motion. Thus, in cases like this one, appeals will often be based on speculation that requires the prisoner, the Gov- ernment, and the Court of Appeals to hypothesize the potential reasons for the prisoner’s sentence when a re- duction is weighed and considered. This is an unwise allocation of judicial resources. Dis- trict courts, to state the obvious, are best positioned to explain their reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Under the majority’s opinion, however, appellate courts will often lack clarity as to a district court’s reasoning and will be forced to either speculate (as the Court does today) based on their own view of the record, or remand the case for further explanation, likely followed by another appeal. What could have taken a sentence or two at the front end now can, and likely will, produce dozens of pages of briefs, bench memoranda, orders, and judicial opinions as the case makes its way first to the appellate court, then back down to the trial court and perhaps back to the appellate court again. A better, more efficient rule would require trial courts in cases like this one to provide their reasons in their initial decisions either by giving a short statement or checking additional boxes. We must be conscious of the fact that retroactive amendments to the Guidelines can result in thousands of resentencings. That is |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | Cory R. Maples is an Alabama capital prisoner sen- tenced to death in 1997 for the murder of two individuals. At trial, he was represented by two appointed lawyers, minimally paid and with scant experience in capital cases. Maples sought postconviction relief in state court, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and several other trial infirmities. His petition, filed in August was written by two New York attorneys serving pro bono, both associ- ated with the same New York-based large law firm. An Alabama attorney, designated as local counsel, moved the admission of the out-of-state counsel pro hac As understood by New York counsel, local counsel would facilitate their appearance, but would undertake no sub- stantive involvement in the case. In the summer of 2002, while Maples’ postconviction petition remained pending in the Alabama trial court, his New York attorneys left the law firm; their new employ- ment disabled them from continuing to represent Maples. They did not inform Maples of their departure and conse- 2 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court quent inability to serve as his counsel. Nor did they seek the Alabama trial court’s leave to withdraw. Neither they nor anyone else moved for the substitution of counsel able to handle Maples’ case. In May 2003, the Alabama trial court denied Maples’ petition. Notices of the court’s order were posted to the New York attorneys at the address of the law firm with which they had been associated. Those postings were re- turned, unopened, to the trial court clerk, who attempt- ed no further mailing. With no attorney of record in fact acting on Maples’ behalf, the time to appeal ran out. Thereafter, Maples petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court and, in turn, the Eleventh Circuit, rejected his petition, pointing to the procedural default in state court, i.e., Maples’ failure timely to appeal the Alabama trial court’s order denying him postconviction relief. Maples, it is uncontested, was blameless for the default. The sole question this Court has taken up for review is whether, on the extraordinary facts of Maples’ case, there is “cause” to excuse the default. Maples maintains that there is, for the lawyers he believed to be vigilantly repre- senting him had abandoned the case without leave of court, without informing Maples they could no longer represent him, and without securing any recorded substi- tution of counsel. We agree. Abandoned by counsel, Ma- ples was left unrepresented at a critical time for his state postconviction petition, and he lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | lacked a clue of any need to protect himself pro se. In these circumstances, no just system would lay the default at Maples’ death-cell door. Satisfied that the requisite cause has been shown, we reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment. I A Alabama sets low eligibility requirements for lawyers Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of the Court appointed to represent indigent capital defendants at trial. American Bar Association, Evaluating Fairness and Accu- racy in State Death Penalty Systems: The Alabama Death Penalty Assessment Report 117–120 (June 2006) (herein- after ABA Report); Brief for Alabama Appellate Court Justices et al. as Amici Curiae 7–8 (hereinafter Justices Brief). Appointed counsel need only be a member of the Alabama bar and have “five years’ prior experience in the active practice of criminal law.” Ala. Code (2006). Experience with capital cases is not required. Justices Brief 7–8. Nor does the State provide, or require appointed counsel to gain, any capital-case-specific profes- sional education or training. ABA Report 129–131; Jus- tices Brief 14–16. Appointed counsel in death penalty cases are also un- dercompensated. ABA Report 124–129; Justices Brief 12– 14. Until the State paid appointed capital defense attorneys just “$40.00 per hour for time expended in court and $20.00 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court in the preparation of [the defendant’s] case.” Ala. Code (1995). Although death penalty litiga- tion is plainly time intensive,1 the State capped at $1,000 fees recoverable by capital defense attorneys for out-of- court work. 2 Even today, court-appointed attorneys receive only $70 per hour. 2011 Ala. Acts no. 2011–678, pp. 1072–1073, —————— 1 One study of federal capital trials from 1990 to 1997 found that de- fense attorneys spent an average of 1,480 out-of-court hours prepar- ing a defendant’s case. Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases, Committee on Defender Services, Judicial Conference of the United States, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations Concerning the Cost and Quality of Defense Representation 14 (May 1998). 2 In the State removed the cap on fees for out-of-court work in capital cases. Ala. Code (2010 Cum. Supp.). Perhaps not coincidentally, 70% of the inmates on Alabama’s death row in 2006, including Maples, had been convicted when the $1,000 cap was in effect. ABA Report 126. 4 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court Nearly alone among the States, Alabama does not guar- antee representation to indigent capital defendants in postconviction proceedings. ABA Report 111–112, 158– 160; Justices Brief 33. The State has elected, instead, “to rely on the efforts of typically well-funded [out-of-state] volunteers.” Brief in Opposition in Barbour v. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | typically well-funded [out-of-state] volunteers.” Brief in Opposition in Barbour v. Allen, O. T. 2006, No. 06–10605, p. 23. Thus, as of 2006, 86% of the attorneys representing Alabama’s death row inmates in state collateral review proceedings “either worked for the Equal Justice Initiative (headed by NYU Law professor Bryan Stevenson), out-of-state public interest groups like the Innocence Project, or an out-of-state mega-firm.” Brief in Opposition 16, n. 4. On occasion, some prisoners sen- tenced to death receive no postconviction representation at all. See ABA Report 112 (“[A]s of April 2006, approxi- mately fifteen of Alabama’s death row inmates in the fi- nal rounds of state appeals had no lawyer to represent them.”). B This system was in place when, in 1997, Alabama charged Maples with two counts of capital murder; the victims, Stacy Alan Terry and Barry Dewayne Robinson II, were Maples’ friends who, on the night of the murders, had been out on the town with him. Maples pleaded not guilty, and his case proceeded to trial, where he was rep- resented by two court-appointed Alabama attorneys. Only one of them had earlier served in a capital case. See Tr. 3081. Neither counsel had previously tried the penalty phase of a capital case. Compensation for each lawyer was capped at $1,000 for time spent out-of-court preparing Maples’ case, and at $40 per hour for in-court services. See –12–21 (1995). Finding Maples guilty on both counts, the jury recom- mended that he be sentenced to death. The vote was 10 to 2, the minimum number Alabama requires for a death Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of the Court recommendation. See Ala. Code (1994) (“The decision of the jury to recommend a sentence of death must be based on a vote of at least 10 jurors.”). Accepting the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sen- tenced Maples to death. On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence. Ex parte Maples, ; Maples v. State, 758 So. 2d 1 We denied certiorari. Two out-of-state volunteers represented Maples in postconviction proceedings: Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, both associates at the New York offices of the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm. At the time, Alabama required out-of-state attorneys to associate local counsel when seeking admission to practice pro hac vice before an Alabama court, regardless of the nature of the proceeding. Rule Governing Admission to the Ala. State Bar (hereinafter Rule ).3 The Alabama Rule further pre- scribed that the local attorney’s name “appear on all no- tices, orders, pleadings, and |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | attorney’s name “appear on all no- tices, orders, pleadings, and other documents filed in the cause,” and that local counsel “accept joint and several responsibility with the foreign attorney to the client, to opposing parties and counsel, and to the court or adminis- trative agency in all matters [relating to the case].” Rule (C). Munanka and Ingen-Housz associated Huntsville, Ala- bama attorney John Butler as local counsel. Notwith- standing his obligations under Alabama law, Butler informed Munanka and Ingen-Housz, “at the outset,” that he would serve as local counsel only for the purpose of —————— 3 In 2006, Alabama revised Rule See Rule Governing Admission to the Ala. State Bar Under the new rule, the State allows out-of-state counsel to represent pro bono indigent criminal defendants in postconviction proceedings without involvement of local counsel. 6 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court allowing the two New York attorneys to appear pro hac vice on behalf of Maples. App. to Pet. for Cert. 255a. Given his lack of “resources, available time [and] experi- ence,” Butler told the Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers, he could not “deal with substantive issues in the case.” The Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys accepted Butler’s conditions. at 257a. This arrangement between out- of-state and local attorneys, it appears, was hardly atypi- cal. See Justices Brief 36 (“The fact is that local counsel for out-of-state attorneys in post-conviction litigation most often do nothing other than provide the mechanism for foreign attorneys to be admitted.”). With the aid of his pro bono counsel, Maples filed a petition for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.4 Among other claims, Maples asserted that his court-appointed attorneys provided con- stitutionally ineffective assistance during both guilt and penalty phases of his capital trial. App. 29–126. He alleged, in this regard, that his inexperienced and under- funded attorneys failed to develop and raise an obvious intoxication defense, did not object to several egregious instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and woefully un- derprepared for the penalty phase of his trial. The State responded by moving for summary dismissal of Maples’ petition. On December 27, the trial court denied the State’s motion. Some seven months later, in the summer of 2002, both Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell. App. to Pet. for Cert. 258a. Munanka gained a clerkship with a federal judge; Ingen-Housz accepted a position with the European Commission in Belgium. Neither attorney told Maples of their departure from Sullivan & Cromwell or of their resulting inability to continue to —————— 4 Originally filed in August the petition was resubmitted, with only minor alterations, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | in August the petition was resubmitted, with only minor alterations, in December See App. 22–24, 28–142. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of the Court represent him. In disregard of Alabama law, see Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.2, Comment, neither attorney sought the trial court’s leave to withdraw, App. to Pet. for Cert. 223a. Compounding Munanka’s and Ingen-Housz’s inaction, no other Sullivan & Cromwell lawyer entered an appearance on Maples’ behalf, moved to substitute counsel, or other- wise notified the court of any change in Maples’ represen- tation. Another nine months passed. During this time period, no Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys assigned to Maples’ case sought admission to the Alabama bar, entered ap- pearances on Maples’ behalf, or otherwise advised the Alabama court that Munanka and Ingen-Housz were no longer Maples’ attorneys. Thus, Munanka and Ingen- Housz (along with Butler) remained Maples’ listed, and only, “attorneys of record.” at 223a. There things stood when, in May 2003, the trial court, without holding a hearing, entered an order denying Maples’ Rule 32 petition. App. 146–225.5 The clerk of the Alabama trial court mailed copies of the order to Maples’ three attorneys of record. He sent Munanka’s and Ingen- Housz’s copies to Sullivan & Cromwell’s New York ad- dress, which the pair had provided upon entering their appearances. When those copies arrived at Sullivan & Cromwell, Munanka and Ingen-Housz had long since departed. The notices, however, were not forwarded to another Sullivan & Cromwell attorney. Instead, a mailroom employee sent the unopened envelopes back to the court. “Returned to Sender—Attempted, Unknown” was stamped on the enve- lope addressed to Munanka. App. to Reply to Brief in —————— 5 One of Maples’ attorneys observed, without contradiction, that the trial court’s order was a “word for word copy of the proposed Order that the State had submitted [with] its [December ] Motion to Dismiss.” 8 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court Opposition 8a. A similar stamp appeared on the envelope addressed to Ingen-Housz, along with the handwritten notation “Return to Sender—Left Firm.” at 7a. Upon receiving back the unopened envelopes he had mailed to Munanka and Ingen-Housz, the Alabama court clerk took no further action. In particular, the clerk did not contact Munanka or Ingen-Housz at the personal telephone numbers or home addresses they had provided in their pro hac vice applications. See Ingen-Housz Veri- fied Application for Admission to Practice Under Rule p. 1; and Munanka Verified Application for Admission to Practice Under Rule p. 1, in Maples v. State, No. CC– 95–842.60 (C. C. Morgan Cty., Ala.). Nor did |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | No. CC– 95–842.60 (C. C. Morgan Cty., Ala.). Nor did the clerk alert Sullivan & Cromwell or Butler. Butler received his copy of the order, but did not act on it. App. to Pet. for Cert. 256a. He assumed that Munanka and Ingen-Housz, who had been “CC’d” on the order, would take care of filing an appeal. Meanwhile, the clock ticked on Maples’ appeal. Under Alabama’s Rules of Appellate Procedure, Maples had 42 days to file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s May 22, 2003 order denying Maples’ petition for postconviction relief. Rule 4(a)(1) No appeal notice was filed, and the time allowed for filing expired on July 7, 2003. A little over a month later, on August 13, 2003, Ala- bama Assistant Attorney General Jon Hayden, the attor- ney representing the State in Maples’ collateral review proceedings, sent a letter directly to Maples. App. to Pet. for Cert. 253a–254a. Hayden’s letter informed Maples of the missed deadline for initiating an appeal within the State’s system, and notified him that four weeks remained during which he could file a federal habeas petition. Hayden mailed the letter to Maples only, using his prison address. No copy was sent to Maples’ attorneys of record, or to anyone else acting on Maples’ behalf. Upon receiving the State’s letter, Maples immediately Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of the Court contacted his mother. at 258a. She telephoned Sulli- van & Cromwell to inquire about her son’s case. Prompted by her call, Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys Marc De Leeuw, Felice Duffy, and Kathy Brewer submit- ted a motion, through Butler, asking the trial court to reissue its order denying Maples’ Rule 32 petition, thereby restarting the 42-day appeal period. at 222a. The trial court denied the motion, at 222a–225a, not- ing that Munanka and Ingen-Housz had not withdrawn from the case and, consequently, were “still attor- neys of record for the petitioner,” at 223a. Further- more, the court added, attorneys De Leeuw, Duffy, and Brewer had not “yet been admitted to practice in Ala- bama” or “entered appearances as attorneys of record.” “How,” the court asked, “can a Circuit Clerk in Decatur, Alabama know what is going on in a law firm in New York, New York?” at 223a–224a. Declining to blame the clerk for the missed notice of appeal deadline, the court said it was “unwilling to enter into subterfuge in order to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for the peti- tioner.” Maples next petitioned the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus, granting him leave |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus, granting him leave to file an out-of-time appeal. Rejecting Maples’ plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that, although the clerk had “assumed a duty to notify the parties of the resolution of Maples’s Rule 32 petition,” the clerk had satisfied that obligation by sending notices to the attorneys of record at the addresses those attorneys provided. at 234a–235a. Butler’s receipt of the order, the court observed, sufficed to notify all attorneys “in light of their apparent co-counsel status.” at 235a–236a ). The Alabama Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judg- ment, App. to Pet. for Cert. 237a, and this Court denied certiorari, 10 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court Having exhausted his state postconviction remedies, Maples sought federal habeas corpus relief. Addressing the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims Maples stated in his federal petition, the State urged that Maples had forever forfeited those claims. Maples did, indeed, present the claims in his state postconviction (Rule 32) petition, the State observed, but he did not timely appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition. That proce- dural default, the State maintained, precluded federal- court consideration of the claims.6 Maples replied that the default should be excused, because he missed the appeal deadline “through no fault of his own.” App. 262 (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court determined that Maples had default- ed his ineffective-assistance claims, and that he had not shown “cause” sufficient to overcome the default. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a–55a. The court understood Maples to argue that errors committed by his postconviction counsel, not any lapse on the part of the court clerk in Alabama, provided the requisite “cause” to excuse his failure to meet Alabama’s 42-days-to-appeal Rule. 5a. Such an argument was inadmissible, the court ruled, because this Court, in had held that the ineffectiveness of postconviction appellate counsel could not qualify as cause. App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a (citing ). A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Ma- In accord with the District Court, the Court of Appeals’ majority held that Maples defaulted his ineffective-assistance —————— 6 In opposing Maples’ request for an out-of-time appeal, the State argued to the Alabama Supreme Court that such an appeal was unwar- ranted. In that context, the State noted that Maples “may still present his postconviction claims to [the federal habeas] court.” 35 Record, Doc. No. 55, p. 22, n. 4. The State’s current position is in some tension with that observation. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court claims in state |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | S. (2012) 11 Opinion of the Court claims in state court by failing to file a timely notice of appeal, and that rendered Maples’ assertion of “cause” Judge Barkett dissented. 95–898. She conclud- ed that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals had acted “arbitrarily” in refusing to grant Maples’ request for an out-of-time appeal. In a case involving “indis- tinguishable facts,” Judge Barkett noted, the Alabama appellate court had allowed the petitioner to file a late appeal. ). Inconsistent application of the 42-days-to-appeal rule, Judge Barkett said, “render[ed] the rule an inadequate ground on which to bar federal review of Maples’s claims.” The inter- ests of justice, she added, required review of Maples’ claims in view of the exceptional circumstances and high stakes involved, and the absence of any fault on Maples’ part. We granted certiorari to decide whether the uncommon facts presented here establish cause adequate to excuse Maples’ procedural default. 562 U. S. (2011). II A As a rule, a state prisoner’s habeas claims may not be entertained by a federal court “when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address [those] claims because the pris- oner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. (2011) (slip op., at 7) (quoting –730). The bar to federal review may be lifted, however, if “the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the [procedural] default [in state court] and actual preju- dice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” at 750; see 84–85 12 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court (1977). Given the single issue on which we granted review, we will assume, for purposes of this decision, that the Ala- bama Court of Criminal Appeals’ refusal to consider Maples’ ineffective-assistance claims rested on an independ- ent and adequate state procedural ground: namely, Maples’ failure to satisfy Alabama’s Rule requiring a notice of appeal to be filed within 42 days from the trial court’s final order. Accordingly, we confine our considera- tion to the question whether Maples has shown cause to excuse the missed notice of appeal deadline. Cause for a procedural default exists where “something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,] ‘impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.’ ” 501 U.S., at 753 ; emphasis in original). Negligence on the part of a prison- er’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as “cause.” That is so, we reasoned in because the attorney is the prisoner’s agent, and under “well-settled |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | because the attorney is the prisoner’s agent, and under “well-settled principles of agency law,” the principal bears the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his agent. at 753–754. See also )). Thus, when a petitioner’s postconviction attorney misses a filing dead- line, the petitioner is bound by the oversight and cannot rely on it to establish cause. – 754. We do not disturb that general rule. A markedly different situation is presented, however, when an attorney abandons his client without notice, and there- by occasions the default. Having severed the principal- agent relationship, an attorney no longer acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative. See 1 Restatement Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 13 Opinion of the Court (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers Comment f (1998) (“Withdrawal, whether proper or improper, terminates the lawyer’s authority to act for the client.”). His acts or omissions therefore “cannot fairly be attributed to [the client].” See, e.g., Jamison v. Lockhart, (CA8 19) (attorney conduct may provide cause to excuse a state procedural default where, as a result of a conflict of interest, the attorney “ceased to be [petitioner’s] agent”); Porter v. State, (finding “good cause” for petitioner’s failure to file a timely habeas petition where the petitioner’s attorney terminated his representation without notifying petitioner and with- out taking “any formal steps to withdraw as the attorney of record”). Our recent decision in Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. (2010), is instructive. That case involved a missed one- year deadline, prescribed by 28 U.S. C. for filing a federal habeas petition. Holland presented two issues: first, whether the time limitation can be tolled for equitable reasons, and, second, whether an attorney’s unprofessional conduct can ever count as an “extraordi- nary circumstance” justifying equitable tolling. 560 U. S., at – (slip op., at 1, 16–17) (internal quotation marks omitted). We answered yes to both questions. On the second issue, the Court recognized that an at- torney’s negligence, for example, miscalculating a filing deadline, does not provide a basis for tolling a statutory time limit. at (slip op., at 19); at – (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., –6); see 336 (2007). The Holland petitioner, however, urged that attorney negligence was not the gravamen of his com- plaint. Rather, he asserted that his lawyer had detached himself from any trust relationship with his client: “[My lawyer] has abandoned me,” the petitioner complained to 14 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court the court. 560 U. S., at – (slip op., at 3–4) (brackets and internal quotation marks |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | – (slip op., at 3–4) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see (ordering a hearing on whether a client’s effective abandonment by his lawyer merited tolling of the one-year deadline for filing a federal habeas petition). In a concurring opinion in Holland, JUSTICE ALITO homed in on the essential difference between a claim of attorney error, however egregious, and a claim that an attorney had essentially abandoned his client. 560 U. S., at – (slip op., –7). Holland’s plea fit the latter category: He alleged abandonment “evidenced by counsel’s near-total failure to communicate with petitioner or to respond to petitioner’s many inquiries and requests over a period of several years.” at (slip op., at 6); see at –, (majority opinion) (slip op., at 3–4, 20). If true, JUSTICE ALITO explained, “petitioner’s allegations would suffice to establish extraordinary circumstances beyond his control[:] Common sense dictates that a liti- gant cannot be held constructively responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that word.” at (slip op., at 6).7 We agree that, under agency principles, a client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has abandoned him. Nor can a client be faulted for failing to act on his own behalf when he lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing him. We therefore inquire whether Maples has shown that his attorneys of record abandoned him, thereby supplying the —————— 7 Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. (2010), involved tolling of a federal time bar, while concerned cause for excusing a procedural default in state court. See Holland, 560 U. S., at (slip op., at 18). We see no reason, however, why the distinction between attorney negligence and attorney abandonment should not hold in both contexts. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 15 Opinion of the Court “extraordinary circumstances beyond his control,” ib necessary to lift the state procedural bar to his federal petition. B From the time he filed his initial Rule 32 petition until well after time ran out for appealing the trial court’s denial of that petition, Maples had only three attorneys of record: Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler. Unknown to Maples, not one of these lawyers was in fact serving as his attorney during the 42 days permitted for an appeal from the trial court’s order. 1 The State contends that Sullivan & Cromwell repre- sented Maples throughout his state postconviction pro- ceedings. Accordingly, the State urges, Maples cannot establish abandonment by counsel continuing through the six weeks |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | cannot establish abandonment by counsel continuing through the six weeks allowed for noticing an appeal from the trial court’s denial of his Rule 32 petition. We disagree. It is undisputed that Munanka and Ingen-Housz severed their agency relationship with Maples long before the default occurred. See Brief for Respondent 47 (conceding that the two attorneys erred in failing to file motions to withdraw from the case). Both Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell’s employ in the summer of 2002, at least nine months before the Alabama trial court entered its order denying Rule 32 relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 258a. Their new employment—Munanka as a law clerk for a federal judge, Ingen-Housz as an employee of the European Commission in Belgium—disabled them from continuing to represent Maples. See Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees, Canon 4(D)(3) (prohibiting judicial employees from participating in “litigation against federal, state or local government”); Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Commission, Tit. I, Art. 12b 16 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court (employees cannot perform outside work with- out first obtaining authorization from the Commission), available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_ en.pdf (as visited Jan. 13, 2012, and in Clerk of Court’s case file). Hornbook agency law establishes that the at- torneys’ departure from Sullivan & Cromwell and their commencement of employment that prevented them from representing Maples ended their agency relationship with him. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) (hereinafter Restatement (Second)) (“[T]he authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.”); 2 Comment a (“[T]he agent commits a breach of duty [of loyalty] to his principal by acting for another in an under- taking which has a substantial tendency to cause him to disregard his duty to serve his principal with only his principal’s purposes in mind.”). Furthermore, the two attorneys did not observe Ala- bama’s Rule requiring them to seek the trial court’s per- mission to withdraw. See Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 6.2, Comment. Cf. 1 Restatement (Second) Comment b (“[I]t is ordinarily inferred that a principal does not intend an agent to do an illegal act.”). By failing to seek permis- sion to withdraw, Munanka and Ingen-Housz allowed the court’s records to convey that they represented Maples. As listed attorneys of record, they, not Maples, would be the addressees of court orders Alabama law requires the clerk to furnish. See Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 34.5 (“Upon the entry of any order in a criminal proceeding made in response |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | of any order in a criminal proceeding made in response to a motion, the clerk shall, without undue delay, furnish all parties a copy thereof by mail or by other appropriate means.”) and 34.4 (“[W]here the defendant is represented by counsel, service shall be made upon the attorney of record.”). Although acknowledging that Munanka and Ingen- Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 17 Opinion of the Court Housz severed their agency relationship with Maples upon their departure from Sullivan & Cromwell, the State argues that, nonetheless, Maples was not abandoned. Other attorneys at the firm, the State asserts, continued to serve as Maples’ counsel. Regarding this assertion, we note, first, that the record is cloudy on the role other Sulli- van & Cromwell attorneys played. In an affidavit submit- ted to the Alabama trial court in support of Maples’ request that the court reissue its Rule 32 order, see at 9, partner Marc De Leeuw stated that he had been “in- volved in [Maples’] case since the summer of” App. to Pet. for Cert. 257a. After the trial court initially denied the State’s motion to dismiss in December De Leeuw informed the court, Sullivan & Cromwell “lawyers working on this case for Mr. Maples prepared for [an anticipated] evidentiary hearing.” at 258a. Another Sullivan & Cromwell attorney, Felice Duffy, stated, in an affidavit submitted to the Alabama trial court in September 2003, that she “ha[d] worked on [Maples’] case since October 14, 2002.” App. 231. But neither De Leeuw nor Duffy de- scribed what their “involve[ment]” or “wor[k] on [Maples’] case” entailed. And neither attorney named the lawyers, other than Munanka and Ingen-Housz engaged in preparation for the expected hearing. Nor did De Leeuw identify the specific work, if any, other lawyers performed on Maples’ case between Munanka’s and Ingen-Housz’s departures and the firm’s receipt of the telephone call from Maples’ mother.8 —————— 8 The unclear state of the record is perhaps not surprising, given Sul- livan & Cromwell’s representation of Maples after the default. As amici for Maples explain, a significant conflict of interest arose for the firm once the crucial deadline passed. Brief for Legal Ethics Professors et al. as Amici Curiae 23–27. Following the default, the firm’s interest in avoiding damage to its own reputation was at odds with Maples’ strongest argument—i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him, 18 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court The slim record on activity at Sullivan & Cromwell, however, does not warrant a remand to determine more precisely the work done by firm lawyers other than Mu- nanka and Ingen-Housz. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | done by firm lawyers other than Mu- nanka and Ingen-Housz. For the facts essential to our decision are not in doubt. At the time of the default, the Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys who later came forward— De Leeuw, Felice Duffy, and Kathy Brewer—had not been admitted to practice law in Alabama, had not entered their appearances on Maples’ behalf, and had done noth- ing to inform the Alabama court that they wished to sub- stitute for Munanka and Ingen-Housz. Thus, none of these attorneys had the legal authority to act on Maples’ behalf before his time to appeal expired. Cf. 1 Restate- ment (Second) (The “failure to acquire a qualification by the agent without which it is illegal to do an authorized act terminates the agent’s authority to act.”).9 What they did or did not do in their New York offices is therefore —————— therefore he had cause to be relieved from the default. Yet Sullivan & Cromwell did not cede Maples’ representation to a new attorney, who could have made Maples’ abandonment argument plain to the Court of Appeals. Instead, the firm represented Maples through briefing and oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit, where they attempted to cast responsibility for the mishap on the clerk of the Alabama trial court. Given Sullivan & Cromwell’s conflict of interest, Maples’ federal habeas petition, prepared and submitted by the firm, is not persuasive evi- dence that Maples, prior to the default, ever “viewed himself” as repre- sented by “the firm,” see post, at 4, rather than by his attorneys of record, Munanka and Ingen-Housz. 9 The dissent argues that the Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys had no basis “to infer that Maples no longer wanted them to represent him, simply because they had not yet qualified before the Alabama court.” Post, at 6–7. While that may be true, it is irrelevant. What the attor- neys could have inferred is that Maples would not have wanted them to file a notice of appeal on his behalf prior to their admission to practice in Alabama, for doing so would be “illegal,” post, at 7 (internal quota- tion marks omitted). See also 1 Restatement (Second) Comment b, For the critical purpose of filing a notice of appeal, then, the other Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys had no authority to act for Maples. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 19 Opinion of the Court beside the point. At the time critical to preserving Maples’ access to an appeal, they, like Munanka and Ingen-Housz, were not Maples’ authorized agents. 2 Maples’ only other attorney of record, local counsel Butler, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | 2 Maples’ only other attorney of record, local counsel Butler, also left him abandoned. Indeed, Butler did not even begin to represent Maples. Butler informed Munan- ka and Ingen-Housz that he would serve as local counsel only for the purpose of enabling the two out-of-state attor- neys to appear pro hac –6. Lacking the necessary “resources, available time [and] experience,” Butler told the two Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers, he would not “deal with substantive issues in the case.” That the minimal participation he undertook was incon- sistent with Alabama law, see Rule un- derscores the absurdity of holding Maples barred because Butler signed on as local counsel. In recognizing that Butler had no role in the case other than to allow Munanka and Ingen-Housz to appear pro hac vice, we need not rely solely on Butler’s and De Leeuw’s statements to that effect. App. to Pet. for Cert. 255a–258a. Other factors confirm that Butler did not “operat[e] as [Maples’] agent in any meaningful sense of that word.” Holland, 560 U. S., at (ALITO, J., concur- ring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 6). The first is Butler’s own conduct. Upon receiving a copy of the trial court’s Rule 32 order, Butler did not contact Sullivan & Cromwell to ensure that firm lawyers were taking appropriate action. Although Butler had reason to believe that Munanka and Ingen-Housz had received a copy of the court’s order, see App. 225 (indicating that Munanka and Ingen-Housz were CC’d on the order), But- ler’s failure even to place a phone call to the New York firm substantiates his disclaimer of any genuinely repre- sentative role in the case. 20 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court Notably, the State did not treat Butler as Maples’ actual representative. Assistant Attorney General Hayden ad- dressed the letter informing Maples of the default directly to Maples in prison. See Hayden sent no copy to, nor did he otherwise notify, any of the attorneys listed as counsel of record for Maples. Lawyers in Alabama have an ethical obligation to refrain from communicating direct- ly with an opposing party known to be represented by counsel. See Ala. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 ; Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 34.4 (requiring that the service of all documents “be made upon the attorney of record”). In writing directly and only to Maples, notwithstanding this ethical obligation, Assistant Attorney General Hayden must have believed that Maples was no longer represented by counsel, out-of-state or local.10 In sum, the record admits of only one reading: At no time before the missed deadline |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | only one reading: At no time before the missed deadline was Butler serving as Maples’ agent “in any meaningful sense of that word.” Holland, 560 U. S., at (opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 6). 3 Not only was Maples left without any functioning attor- ney of record, the very listing of Munanka, Ingen-Housz, and Butler as his representatives meant that he had no right personally to receive notice. See He in —————— 10 Itbears note, as well, that the State served its response to Maples’ Rule 32 petition only on Munanka at Sullivan & Cromwell’s New York address, not on Butler. App. 26. While the State may not be obligated to serve more than one attorney of record, its selection of New York rather than local counsel is some indication that, from the start, the State was cognizant of the limited role Butler would serve. Conforming the State’s Rule to common practice, in 2006, the Alabama Supreme Court amended the provision on appearances by out-of-state counsel to eliminate the requirement that such attorneys associate local counsel when representing indigent criminal defendants pro bono in postconvic- tion proceedings. See n. 3. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 21 Opinion of the Court fact received none or any other warning that he had better fend for himself. Had counsel of record or the State’s attorney informed Maples of his plight before the time to appeal ran out, he could have filed a notice of appeal himself11 or enlisted the aid of new volunteer attorneys.12 Given no reason to suspect that he lacked counsel able and willing to represent him, Maples surely was blocked from complying with the State’s procedural rule. C “The cause and prejudice requirement,” we have said, “shows due regard for States’ finality and comity interests while ensuring that ‘fundamental fairness [remains] the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus.’ ” Dretke v. Haley, ). In the unusual circumstances of this case, principles of agency law and fundamental fairness point to the same conclusion: There was indeed cause to excuse Maples’ procedural default. Through no fault of his own, Maples lacked the assistance of any authorized attorney during the 42 days Alabama allows for noticing an appeal from a trial court’s denial of postconviction relief. As just observed, he had no reason to suspect that, in reality, he had been reduced to pro se status. Maples was disarmed by extraordinary circum- stances quite beyond his control. He has shown ample cause, we hold, to excuse the procedural default into which —————— 11 The notice is a simple |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,012 | 5 | majority | Maples v. Thomas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/621045/maples-v-thomas/ | default into which —————— 11 The notice is a simple document. It need specify only: the party taking the appeal, the order or judgment appealed from, and the name of the court to which appeal is taken. Ala. Rule App. Proc. 3(c) 12 Alabama grants out-of-time appeals to prisoners proceeding pro se who were not timely served with copies of court orders. See Maples v. Allen, and Ex parte Robinson, ). Though Maples was not a pro se petitioner on the record, he was, in fact, without authorized counsel. 22 MAPLES v. THOMAS Opinion of the Court he was trapped when counsel of record abandoned him without a word of warning. III Having found no cause to excuse the failure to file a timely notice of appeal in state court, the District Court and the Eleventh Circuit did not reach the question of prejudice. See at 10–11. That issue, therefore, remains open for decision on remand. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 565 U. S. (2012) 1 ALITO, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–63 CORY R. MAPLES, PETITIONER v. KIM T. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | Toll v. Moreno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110770/toll-v-moreno/ | I join the Court's opinion. Its action today provides an eloquent and sufficient answer to JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissent: despite the vehemence with which his opinion is written, JUSTICE REHNQUIST has persuaded only one Justice to his position. But because the dissent attempts to plumb the Court's psyche, see post, at 41-42, n. 12,[1] I feel compelled to add comments addressed to JUSTICE REHNQUIST's ruminations on equal protection. In particular, I cannot leave un-challenged his suggestion that the Court's decisions holding resident aliens to be a "suspect class" no longer are good law. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's analysis on this point is based on a simple syllogism. Alienage classifications have been subjected to strict scrutiny, he suggests, because "aliens [are] *20 barred from asserting their interests in the governmental body responsible for imposing burdens upon them." Post, at 40. But "[m]ore recent decisions," he continues, have established that "the political powerlessness of aliens is itself the consequence of distinctions on the basis of alienage that are constitutionally permissible." This prompts JUSTICE REHNQUIST to pose what one supposes to be a rhetorical question: "whether political powerlessness is any longer a legitimate reason for treating aliens as a `suspect class' deserving of `heightened judicial solicitude.'" Post, at 41. The reader would infer from this analysis that JUSTICE REHNQUIST would uphold state enactments disadvantaging aliens unless those enactments are wholly irrational. With respect, in my view it is JUSTICE REHNQUIST's analysis that is wholly irrational; simply to state his proposition is to demonstrate its logical flaws. Most obviously, his exegesis of the Court's reasons for according aliens "suspect class" status is simplistic to the point of caricature. By labeling aliens a "`discrete and insular' minority," the Court did something more than provide a historical description of their political standing. That label also reflected the Court's considered conclusion that for most legislative purposes there simply are no meaningful differences between resident aliens and citizens, see so that aliens and citizens are "persons similarly circumstanced" who must "be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano At the same time, both common experience and the unhappy history reflected in our cases, see ; demonstrate that aliens often have been the victims of irrational discrimination. In combination, these factorsdisparate treatment accorded a class of "similarly circumstanced" persons who historically have been disabled by the prejudice of the majority *21 led the Court to conclude that alienage classifications "in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy," Personnel Administrator of and therefore demand close judicial scrutiny. This understanding, which is at the heart of the Court's modern alienage decisions, was unreservedly reaffirmed this |
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