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Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | Toll v. Moreno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110770/toll-v-moreno/ | of the Court's modern alienage decisions, was unreservedly reaffirmed this Term in JUSTICE REHNQUIST nevertheless suggests that the Court's original understanding somehow has been undercut by "more recent decisions" recognizing that aliens may be excluded from the governmental process. For this proposition he cites and Again, with all due respect, JUSTICE REHNQUIST is simply wrong. The idea that aliens may be denied political rights is not a recently discovered concept or a newly molded principle that can be said to have eroded the prior understanding. To the contrary, the Court always has recognized that aliens may be denied use of the mechanisms of self-government, and all of the alienage cases have been decided against the backdrop of that principle. Indeed, this aspect of the alienage-equal protection doctrine was explored at length in the second of the Court's modern decisions in the area.[2] See -442 (citing ); Ambach v. *22 (citing ); -296 (citing ). Yet in cases contemporary with or postdating the Court has experienced no noticeable discomfort in applying strict scrutiny to alienage classifications that did not involve political interests. See In re Griffiths, ; Examining ; It is not surprising, then, that none of the "more recent decisions" relied on by JUSTICE REHNQUIST so much as suggested that the Court's earlier analysis had been undercut. Instead, those cases pointedly have declined to "retrea[t] from the position that restrictions on lawfully resident aliens that primarily affect economic interests are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny." See 441 U. S., at (that aliens may be denied political rights "is an exception to the general standard applicable to classifications based on alienage"); This reflects the Court's proper judgment that the alienage cases are not irreconcilable or inconsistent with one another. For while the Court has recognized, as the Constitution suggests, that alienage may be taken into account when it is relevantthat is, when classifications bearing on political interests are involved"[t]he distinction between citizens and aliens ordinarily [is] irrelevant to private activity," 441 U. S., at And it hardly need be demonstrated that governmental distinctions based on irrelevant characteristics cannot stand. If this dual aspect of alienage doctrine is unique, it is because aliens constitute a unique class.[3] *23 Finally, even were I to accept JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S view that powerlessness is the end-all of alienage-equal protection doctrine, I would find preposterous his further suggestion that, because States do not violate the Constitution when they exclude aliens from participation in the government of the community, the alien's powerlessness therefore is constitutionally irrelevant. From the moment the Court began constructing modern equal protection doctrine in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | Toll v. Moreno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110770/toll-v-moreno/ | moment the Court began constructing modern equal protection doctrine in United it never has been suggested that the reason for a discrete class' political powerlessness is significant; instead, the fact of powerlessness is crucial, for in combination with prejudice it is the minority group's inability to assert its political interests that "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." The very powerlessness of a discrete minority, then, is itself the factor that overcomes the usual presumption that "`even improvident decisions [affecting minorities] will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.'" Personnel Administrator of 442 U. S., at quoting If anything, the fact that aliens constitutionally may beand generally areformally and completely barred from participating in the process of self-government makes particularly profound the need for searching judicial review of classifications grounded on alienage. I might add that the Court explicitly has endorsed this seemingly self-evident proposition: in after noting that "[s]ome of [an alien's] disadvantages stem directly from the Constitution itself," the Court declared that "[t]he legitimacy of the delineation of the affected class [of aliens] buttresses the conclusion that it is `a "discrete and insular" minority' and, of course, is consistent with the premise that the class is one whose members suffer special *24 disabilities." I find JUSTICE REHNQUIST's attempt to stand this principle on its head perplexing, to say the least. One of the few assertions that can be made with complete confidence about the Court's alienage-equal protection decisions is that no opinion for the Court has ever so much as suggested that JUSTICE REHNQUIST's lone dissent in which espoused a view similar to the one he hints at todayexpressed the proper approach for deciding these cases. Of course, one cannot condemn another for sticking to his guns. Barring a radical change in the Court's reasoning in cases concerning alienage, however, one can expect that today's equal protection writing by JUSTICE REHNQUIST will join his opinion in to use his phrase, as "lifeless words on the pages of these Reports." Post, at 48. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court's opinion insofar as it holds that the State may not charge out-of-state tuition to nonimmigrant aliens who, under federal law, are exempt from both state and federal taxes, and who are domiciled in the State. Imposition of out-of-state tuition on such aliens conflicts with federal law exempting them from state taxes, since, after all, the University admits that it seeks to charge the higher tuition in order to recover costs that state income taxes |
Justice Blackmun | 1,982 | 11 | concurring | Toll v. Moreno | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110770/toll-v-moreno/ | tuition in order to recover costs that state income taxes normally would cover. I cannot join the remainder of the Court's opinion, however, for it wholly fails to address the criticisms leveled in JUSTICE REHNQUIST's dissenting opinion. As JUSTICE REHNQUIST makes clear, the class of G-4 aliens is not homogenous: some G-4 aliens are exempt under federal law from state taxes, while other G-4 aliens are not. Moreover, the legislative history of 4(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act, later reenacted as 893 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. 893, from which many G-4 *25 aliens derive their federal tax immunity, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to exempt such aliens from state taxes, choosing instead to leave the matter to the state and local authorities. Thus, I disagree with the Court when it states that the "State may not recoup indirectly from respondents' parents the taxes that the Federal Government has expressly barred the State from collecting," ante, at 16, for in fact Congress has not barred the State from collecting state taxes from many G-4 aliens. Accordingly, I conclude that the Supremacy Clause does not prohibit the University from charging out-of-state tuition to those G-4 aliens who are exempted by federal law from federal taxes only. |
Justice Burger | 1,981 | 12 | dissenting | Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110441/barrentine-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | The Court today movesrather blithely, so it seems to me, and unnecessarilyin a direction counter to the needs and interests of workers and employers and contrary to the interests of the judicial system. It does so on the theory that this result advances congressional policy, but careful analysis reveals that Congress, if anything, has mandated the contrary. With funds appropriated by Congress, the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, and the Judicial Branch have undertaken studies and pilot programs to remove just such routine and relatively modest-sized claims as this from the courts. Today, the Court moves in precisely the opposite direction, ignoring the objectives of Congress, the agreement of the parties, and the common sense of the situation. It moves toward making federal courts small claims courts contrary to the constitutional concept of these courts as having special and limited jurisdiction. I I agree, of course, that the congressionally created right of individual workers to a minimum wage under 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 206, may not be waived through a collective-bargaining agreement between an employer and the worker's union or through a direct agreement between an individual worker and the employer. Brooklyn Savings I also agree that the Act creates a private cause of action to vindicate the right to a minimum wage. Fair Labor Standards Act 16, 29 U.S. C. 216. But it is a differentindeed, a totally differentproposition to say that employees and employers may not agree to a means of enforcing the employees' *747 routine wage claims outside the costly, cumbersome judicial process of the federal courts and, specifically, that employees, acting through their union in an arm's-length negotiation with the employer, may not bind themselvesas the petitioners did hereto submit to final and binding arbitration "any controversy that might arise," App. 24, rather than resolve it through litigation in the federal courts. The existence of a right and the provision of a judicial forum do not necessarily make either nonwaivable; if that were so, all the holdings of this Court and countless decisions of federal and state courts that parties are bound by contracts to arbitrate are placed in doubt. "[T]he question of whether the statutory right may be waived depends upon the intention of Congress as manifested in the particular statute." Brooklyn Saving Unfortunately, neither the parties nor the United States as amicus curiae can point to a clear answer to this question in the legislative history of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is hornbook law, however, that there is a strong congressional policy favoring grievance |
Justice Burger | 1,981 | 12 | dissenting | Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110441/barrentine-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | however, that there is a strong congressional policy favoring grievance procedures and arbitration as a method of resolving labor disputes. See Labor Management Relations Act, 201 (b), 203 (d), 29 U.S. C. 171 (b), 173 (d); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 8, 29 U.S. C. 108. This Court has acknowledged that policy in the past. See, e. g., ; ; Textile The Court today pays lipservice to that congressional policy, ante, at 734-736, but thenparadoxicallyignores it. The reasons for favoring arbitration are as wise as they are obvious: litigation is costly and time consuming, and, more to the point in this case, judges are less adapted to the nuances of the disputes that typically arise in shops and factories than shop stewards, business agents, managerial supervisors, and the traditional ad hoc panels of factfinders. See, e. g., Steelworkers *748 v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation By bringing together persons actually involved in the workplace, often assisted by a neutral arbitrator experienced in such matters, disputes are resolved more swiftly and cheaply. This mechanism promotes industrial harmony and avoids strikes and conflicts; it provides a swift, fair, and inexpensive remedy. The policy of favoring extrajudicial methods of resolving disputes is reflected in other areas as well. With federal courts flooded by litigation increasing in volume, in length, and in a variety of novel forms,[1] the National Institute of Justice, under the leadership of Attorney General Griffin Bell, in 1979 launched a multimillion-dollar program of field studies to test whether mediation at a neighborhood level could resolve small disputes out of courts in a fashion satisfactory to the parties. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test: Final Evaluation Report 7-8 (1980). The results of this studyand other similar studies financed by private sources[2]confirmed what many had long suspected: small disputes may be resolved more swiftly and to the satisfaction of the parties without employing the cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive processes of litigation.[3] The National *749 Institute of Justice recommended further study and implementation of similar procedures. Neighborhood Justice Centers Field Test, Congress itself has recognized this problem and authorized such studies. Dispute Resolution Act, II By rejecting binding arbitration for resolution of this relatively simple wage claim arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court thereby rejects as well a policy Congress has followed for at least half a century throughout the field of labor relations and now being applied in other areas as well. To reach that strange result, the Court relies on our holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver But that case in no sense compels today's holding. The congressionally created right under Title VII of |
Justice Burger | 1,981 | 12 | dissenting | Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110441/barrentine-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | today's holding. The congressionally created right under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e et seq., was aimed at guaranteeing a workplace free from discrimination, racial and otherwise. That fundamental right is not and should not be subject to waiver by a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated by a union. But there obviously is a vast difference between resolving allegations of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act and settling a relatively typical and simple wage dispute such as we have here when the parties have expressly agreed to resolve such grievances by arbitration. The long history of union discrimination against minorities *750 and women, now happily receding,[4] led Congress to forbid discrimination by unions as well as employers. See 42 U.S. C. 2003e-2 (c). Against a background of union discrimination, Congress was aware that, in the context of claims under the Civil Rights Act, unions sometimes had been the adversary of workers. Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens. But this case is not a discrimination case. Even beyond the historical fact of union discrimination, we observed in Gardner-Denver that arbitrators are not likely to have the needed experience to deal with the special issues arising under the Civil Rights Act, a statute "whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts." Leaving resolution of discrimination claims to persons unfamiliar with the congressional policies behind that statute could have undermined enforcement of fundamental rights Congress intended to protect. But the "tension" seen by the Court in Gardner-Denver, ante, at 734, is simply not present here. A dispute over wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act arises in an entirely different historical and legal context. In that setting, the union and the employee are the traditional allies, united in enforcing wage claims of employees individually as well as collectively. The Court distorts the possibility that union leadership might fail to protect members' interests in a wage dispute. Ante, at 742. If this rare exception arose, protection of the employee is abundantly *751 available by way of the cause of action for breach of the union's duty of fair representation. See[5] Despite the Court's contrary view, ante, |
Justice Burger | 1,981 | 12 | dissenting | Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110441/barrentine-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | of fair representation. See[5] Despite the Court's contrary view, ante, at 743-744, whether the time spent in the driver's inspection of a vehicle before taking to the road, as required by federal law, and in transportation of the vehicle to a repair facility when necessary constituted "compensable time" under "Federal Wage Laws," App. 21 (petitioner Barrentine's grievance), is a factual question well suited for disposition by grievance processes and arbitration. The following factors are relevant: (a) the vehicle inspection was mandated, not by the employer, but by a federal regulation, 49 CFR 392.7 (1980); (b) the regulation places the responsibility to inspect the vehicle on the driver directly; (c) the inspection is intended primarily for the benefit of the public; (d) the petitioners' claim is one for wages; and (e) the bargaining over wages, which produced a rate well above the statutory minimum wage, presumably took into account the time spent by drivers in complying with federal requirements. This elementary wage dispute falls well within the scope of traditional arbitration as it exists under countless collective-bargaining agreements, which the Court now channels into the federal courts. For years the labor movement has developed panels of persons acceptable to both sides who are *752 familiar with "the law of the shop [and] the demands and norms of industrial relations." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver The Court's generalizations about the powers of arbitrators, ante, at 744-745, are irrelevant; arbitrators have whatever power the parties confer upon them. Here, that power extends to "any controversy that might arise." App. 24 (emphasis added). Surely a wage claim is covered. Allowing one party to such an elementary industrial dispute unilaterally to resort to the federal courts when an established, simplified, less costly procedure is availableand desired, as here, by the employer and the employee's union can only increase costs and consume judicial time unnecessarily. It makes neither good sense nor sound law to read the broad language of Gardner-Denverwritten in a civil rights discrimination caseto govern a routine wage dispute over a matter traditionally entrusted by the parties' arm's-length bargaining to binding arbitration. III The Court seems unaware that people's patience with the judicial process is wearing thin. Its holding runs counter to every study and every exhortation of the Judiciary, the Executive, and the Congress urging the establishment of reasonable mechanisms to keep matters of this kind out of the courts. See The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future passim (West Pub. 1979); American Bar Assn., Report on the National Conference on Minor Disputes Resolution passim (1978). The Federal Government, as I noted earlier, |
Justice Douglas | 1,971 | 10 | dissenting | Piccirillo v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108238/piccirillo-v-new-york/ | I do not approve dismissal of this writ as improvidently granted. Petitioner was indicted for assault committed by the use of tire irons. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced *550 to imprisonment. Shortly thereafter a grand jury was impaneled to investigate the assault on the victim and the conspiracies arising in connection with it. Petitioner, while still serving the sentence on the assault conviction, was called to testify before the grand jury. After refusing to testify, petitioner was granted immunity. He then testified to the assault which he had perpetrated by the use of tire irons. Four days later a police officer testified before the grand jury that after a chase, he had arrested petitioner and another, and thereupon had taken the tire irons from them. The officer also testified that following petitioner's arrest petitioner had offered the officer a bribe to change his testimony. Petitioner was subsequently indicted by the grand jury for bribery, and, following an unsuccessful motion to dismiss based on the grant of immunity, he pleaded guilty to attempted bribery. The New York Court of Appeals held four-to-three that the New York immunity statute only prohibited use of testimony and the fruits of the testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding and that the police officer's testimony was in no way derived from anything petitioner said. held that once immunity was granted, it protected the witness against prosecution not only for a crime that relates to the precise testimony given but also for the fruits of such testimony. But the Court went further: "In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." In which involved another federal prosecution, the immunity statute provided that the witness would be protected "on account of any transaction. concerning which he may testify." at *55 594. The Court held that the immunity offered was coterminous with the privilege and that the witness could therefore be compelled to testify. Thus, "transactional immunity" became part of the fabric of our federal constitutional law. See Now that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the States, the same immunity against state prosecutions must be granted by the States as the Federal Government must grant against federal prosecutions.[*] Subsequent to petitioner's case the New York Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that their statute provides transactional immunity. Nevertheless, that court also concluded that petitioner would not have benefited from the change of law because he gave no testimony which related to the offense for which he |
Justice Douglas | 1,971 | 10 | dissenting | Piccirillo v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108238/piccirillo-v-new-york/ | no testimony which related to the offense for which he was prosecuted. at 48 n. n. That approach to the problem is not in keeping with the generous interpretations which the Fifth Amendment has heretofore received by this Court. Petitioner had just testified to the grand jury concerning facts which provided the underlying basis for the bribery charge. The grand jury knew petitioner had assaulted a man with tire irons because petitioner himself told them so. The tire irons were the "evidence" which according to the police officer petitioner had tried to bribe him "to get rid of." They were the same tire irons used in the assault for which he was convicted and sentenced, not tire irons used to commit another assault. Moreover, *552 the bribery charge grew out of conversations which petitioner had with the police officer the day of his arraignment on the assault charge. It seems obvious that, if the transactional test is to be honored, this is one of the clearest instances in which to do so. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision below. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,990 | 11 | concurring | Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112459/michigan-dept-of-state-police-v-sitz/ | I concur only in the judgment. I fully agree with the Court's lamentations about the slaughter on our highways and about the dangers posed to almost everyone by the driver who is under the influence of alcohol or other drug. I add this comment only to remind the Court that it has been almost 20 years since, in in writing for three others (no longer on the Court) and myself, I noted that the "slaughter on the highways of this Nation exceeds the death toll of all our wars," and that I detected "little genuine public concern about what takes place in our very midst and on our daily travel routes." See also And in the Appendix to my writing in I set forth official figures to the effect that for the period from 1900 through 1969 motor-vehicle deaths in the United States exceeded the death toll of all our wars. I have little doubt that those figures, when supplemented for the two decades since 1969, would disclose an even more discouraging comparison. I am pleased, of course, that the Court is now stressing this tragic aspect of American life. See ante, at 451. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | This appeal concerns the constitutionality of a Missouri statute regulating the performance of abortions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down several provisions of the statute on the ground that they violated this Court's decision in and cases following it. We noted probable jurisdiction, and now reverse. *500 I In June 1986, the Governor of Missouri signed into law Missouri Senate Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1596 (hereinafter Act or statute), which amended existing state law concerning unborn children and abortions.[1]*501 The Act consisted of 20 provisions, 5 of which are now before the Court. The first provision, or preamble, contains "findings" by the state legislature that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and that "unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being." (1), (2) The Act further requires that all Missouri laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons, subject to the Federal Constitution and this Court's precedents. 1.205.2. Among its other provisions, the Act requires that, prior to performing an abortion on any woman whom a physician has reason to believe is 20 or more weeks pregnant, the physician ascertain whether the fetus is viable by performing "such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child." 188.029. The Act also prohibits the use of public employees and facilities to perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother's life, and it prohibits the use of public funds, employees, or facilities for the purpose of "encouraging or counseling" a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her 188.205, 188.210, 188.215. In July 1986, five health professionals employed by the State and two nonprofit corporations brought this class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri to challenge the constitutionality of the Missouri statute. Plaintiffs, appellees in this Court, sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that certain statutory provisions violated the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. App. A9. They asserted violations of various rights, including the "privacy *502 rights of pregnant women seeking abortions"; the "woman's right to an abortion"; the "righ[t] to privacy in the physician-patient relationship"; the physician's "righ[t] to practice medicine"; the pregnant woman's "right to life due to inherent risks involved in childbirth"; and the woman's right to "receive adequate medical advice and treatment" concerning abortions. at A17-A19. Plaintiffs filed this suit "on their own behalf and on |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | Plaintiffs filed this suit "on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire class consisting of facilities and Missouri licensed physicians or other health care professionals offering abortion services or pregnancy counseling and on behalf of the entire class of pregnant females seeking abortion services or pregnancy counseling within the State of Missouri." at A13. The two nonprofit corporations are Reproductive Health Services, which offers family planning and gynecological services to the public, including abortion services up to 22 weeks "gestational age,"[2] and Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, which provides abortion services up to 14 weeks gestational age. at A9-A10. The individual plaintiffs are three physicians, one nurse, and a social worker. All are "public employees" at "public facilities" in Missouri, and they are paid for their services with "public funds," as those terms are defined by 188.200. The individual plaintiffs, within the scope of their public employment, encourage and counsel pregnant women to have nontherapeutic abortions. Two of the physicians perform abortions. App. A54-A55. Several weeks after the complaint was filed, the District Court temporarily restrained enforcement of several provisions of the Act. Following a 3-day trial in December 1986, the District Court declared seven provisions of the Act unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement. These provisions included the preamble, 1.205; the "informed consent" provision, which required *503 physicians to inform the pregnant woman of certain facts before performing an abortion, 188.039; the requirement that post-16-week abortions be performed only in hospitals, 188.025; the mandated tests to determine viability, 188.029; and the prohibition on the use of public funds, employees, and facilities to perform or assist nontherapeutic abortions, and the restrictions on the use of public funds, employees, and facilities to encourage or counsel women to have such abortions, 188.205, 188.210, 188.215. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, with one exception not relevant to this appeal. The Court of Appeals determined that Missouri's declaration that life begins at conception was "simply an impermissible state adoption of a theory of when life begins to justify its abortion regulations." Relying on it further held that the requirement that physicians perform viability tests was an unconstitutional legislative intrusion on a matter of medical skill and -1075. The Court of Appeals invalidated Missouri's prohibition on the use of public facilities and employees to perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother's It distinguished our decisions in and on the ground that " `[t]here is a fundamental difference between providing direct funding to effect the abortion decision and allowing staff physicians to perform abortions at an existing publicly owned |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | staff physicians to perform abortions at an existing publicly owned hospital.' " quoting appeal dism'd, The Court of Appeals struck down the provision prohibiting the use of public funds for "encouraging or counseling" women to have nontherapeutic abortions, for the reason that this provision was both overly vague and inconsistent with the right to an abortion enunciated in 851 F. 2d, The court also invalidated the hospitalization *504 requirement for 16-week abortions, and the prohibition on the use of public employees and facilities for abortion counseling, but the State has not appealed those parts of the judgment below. See Juris. Statement I-II.[3] II Decision of this case requires us to address four sections of the Missouri Act: (a) the preamble; (b) the prohibition on the use of public facilities or employees to perform abortions; (c) the prohibition on public funding of abortion counseling; and (d) the requirement that physicians conduct viability tests prior to performing abortions. We address these seriatim. A The Act's preamble, as noted, sets forth "findings" by the Missouri Legislature that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being." (1), (2) The Act then mandates that state laws be interpreted to provide unborn children with "all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state," subject to the Constitution and this Court's precedents. 1.205.2.[4] In invalidating *505 the preamble, the Court of Appeals relied on this Court's dictum that " `a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions.' " -1076, quoting in turn citing -162. It rejected Missouri's claim that the preamble was "abortion-neutral," and "merely determine[d] when life begins in a nonabortion context, a traditional state prerogative." 851 F.2d, The court thought that "[t]he only plausible inference" from the fact that "every remaining section of the bill save one regulates the performance of abortions" was that "the state intended its abortion regulations to be understood against the backdrop of its theory of " [5] The State contends that the preamble itself is precatory and imposes no substantive restrictions on abortions, and that appellees therefore do not have standing to challenge it. Brief for Appellants 21-24. Appellees, on the other hand, insist that the preamble is an operative part of the Act intended to guide the interpretation of other provisions of the Act. Brief for Appellees 19-23. They maintain, for example, that the preamble's definition of life may prevent physicians *506 in public hospitals from dispensing certain forms of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | physicians *506 in public hospitals from dispensing certain forms of contraceptives, such as the intrauterine device. In our view, the Court of Appeals misconceived the meaning of the dictum, which was only that a State could not "justify" an abortion regulation otherwise invalid under on the ground that it embodied the State's view about when life begins. Certainly the preamble does not by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellees' medical practice. The Court has emphasized that "implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion." The preamble can be read simply to express that sort of value We think the extent to which the preamble's language might be used to interpret other state statutes or regulations is something that only the courts of Missouri can definitively decide. State law has offered protections to unborn children in tort and probate law, see and 1.205.2 can be interpreted to do no more than that. What we have, then, is much the same situation that the Court confronted in Alabama State Federation of As in that case: "We are thus invited to pass upon the constitutional validity of a state statute which has not yet been applied or threatened to be applied by the state courts to petitioners or others in the manner anticipated. Lacking any authoritative construction of the statute by the state courts, without which no constitutional question arises, and lacking the authority to give such a controlling construction ourselves, and with a record which presents no concrete set of facts to which the statute is to be applied, the case is plainly not one to be disposed of by the declaratory judgment procedure." It will be time enough for federal courts to address the meaning of the preamble should it be applied to restrict the activities of appellees in some concrete way. Until then, this *507 Court "is not empowered to decide abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it." See also Valley Forge Christian[6] We therefore need not pass on the constitutionality of the Act's preamble. B Section 188.210 provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any public employee within the scope of his employment to perform or assist an abortion, not necessary to save the life of the mother," while 188.215 makes it "unlawful for any public facility to be used for the purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | for the purpose of performing or assisting an abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother."[7] The Court of Appeals held that these provisions contravened this Court's abortion -1083. We take the contrary view. As we said earlier this Term in : "[O]ur cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." In the Court upheld a Connecticut welfare regulation under which Medicaid recipients received payments for medical services related *508 to childbirth, but not for nontherapeutic abortions. The Court rejected the claim that this unequal subsidization of childbirth and abortion was impermissible under As the Court put it: "The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult and in some cases, perhaps, impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation." Relying on the Court in held that the city of St. Louis committed "no constitutional violation in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services for nontherapeutic abortions." More recently, in the Court upheld "the most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment," which withheld from States federal funds under the Medicaid program to reimburse the costs of abortions, " `except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.' " (quoting Pub. L. 94-439, 209, ). As in and Poelker, the Court required only a showing that Congress' authorization of "reimbursement for medically necessary services generally, but not for certain medically necessary *509 abortions" was rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal of encouraging The Court of Appeals distinguished these cases on the ground that "[t]o prevent access to a public facility does more than demonstrate a political choice in favor of childbirth; it clearly narrows and in some |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | in favor of childbirth; it clearly narrows and in some cases forecloses the availability of abortion to women." The court reasoned that the ban on the use of public facilities "could prevent a woman's chosen doctor from performing an abortion because of his unprivileged status at other hospitals or because a private hospital adopted a similar anti-abortion stance." It also thought that "[s]uch a rule could increase the cost of obtaining an abortion and delay the timing of it as well." We think that this analysis is much like that which we rejected in Poelker, and McRae. As in those cases, the State's decision here to use public facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over abortion "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy." McRae, Just as Congress' refusal to fund abortions in McRae left "an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all," Missouri's refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals at all. The challenged provisions only restrict a woman's ability to obtain an abortion to the extent that she chooses to use a physician affiliated with a public hospital. This circumstance is more easily remedied, and thus considerably less burdensome, than indigency, which "may make it difficult and in some cases, perhaps, impossible for some women to have abortions" without public funding. Having held that the State's refusal to fund abortions does not violate it strains logic to reach a contrary result for the use *510 of public facilities and employees. If the State may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds," surely it may do so through the allocation of other public resources, such as hospitals and medical staff. The Court of Appeals sought to distinguish our cases on the additional ground that "[t]he evidence here showed that all of the public facility's costs in providing abortion services are recouped when the patient pays." Absent any expenditure of public funds, the court thought that Missouri was "expressing" more than "its preference for childbirth over abortions," but rather was creating an "obstacle to exercise of the right to choose an abortion [that could not] stand absent a compelling state interest." We disagree. "Constitutional concerns are |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | absent a compelling state interest." We disagree. "Constitutional concerns are greatest," we said in "when the State attempts to impose its will by the force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader." Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions. Nor, as appellees suggest, do private physicians and their patients have some kind of constitutional right of access to public facilities for the performance of abortions. Brief for Appellees 46-47. Indeed, if the State does recoup all of its costs in performing abortions, and no state subsidy, direct or indirect, is available, it is difficult to see how any procreational choice is burdened by the State's ban on the use of its facilities or employees for performing abortions.[8] *511 Poelker, and McRae all support the view that the State need not commit any resources to facilitating abortions, even if it can turn a profit by doing so. In Poelker, the suit was filed by an indigent who could not afford to pay for an abortion, but the ban on the performance of nontherapeutic abortions in city-owned hospitals applied whether or not the pregnant woman could pay. ;[9] The Court emphasized that the mayor's decision to prohibit abortions in city hospitals was "subject to public debate and approval or disapproval at the polls," and that "the Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth as St. Louis has done." at Thus we uphold the Act's restrictions on the use of public employees and facilities for the performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions. C The Missouri Act contains three provisions relating to "encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her " Section 188.205 states that no public funds can be used for this purpose; 188.210 states that public employees cannot, within the scope of their employment, engage in such speech; and 188.215 forbids such speech in public facilities. The Court of Appeals did not consider 188.205 separately from 188.210 and 188.215. It held that all three of these provisions were unconstitutionally vague, and that "the ban on using public funds, employees, and facilities to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion is an unacceptable infringement of the woman's fourteenth amendment right to choose an abortion after receiving *512 the medical information necessary to exercise the right knowingly and intelligently."[10] Missouri has chosen only to appeal the Court of Appeals' invalidation of the public |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | to appeal the Court of Appeals' invalidation of the public funding provision, 188.205. See Juris. Statement I-II. A threshold question is whether this provision reaches primary conduct, or whether it is simply an instruction to the State's fiscal officers not to allocate funds for abortion counseling. We accept, for purposes of decision, the State's claim that 188.205 "is not directed at the conduct of any physician or health care provider, private or public," but "is directed solely at those persons responsible for expending public funds." Brief for Appellants 43.[11] Appellees contend that they are not "adversely" affected under the State's interpretation of 188.205, and therefore that there is no longer a case or controversy before us on this question. Brief for Appellees 31-32. Plaintiffs are masters of their complaints and remain so at the appellate stage of a litigation. See Caterpillar A majority of the Court agrees with appellees that the controversy over 188.205 is now moot, because appellees' argument amounts to a decision to no longer seek a declaratory judgment that 188.205 is unconstitutional and accompanying declarative relief. See ; United We accordingly direct the Court of Appeals to vacate the judgment of the District Court *513 with instructions to dismiss the relevant part of the complaint. "Because this [dispute] was rendered moot in part by [appellees'] willingness permanently to withdraw their equitable claims from their federal action, a dismissal with prejudice is indicated." D Section 188.029 of the Missouri Act provides: "Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to believe is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gestational age, the physician shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful, and prudent physician engaged in similar practice under the same or similar conditions. In making this determination of viability, the physician shall perform or cause to be performed such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings and determination of viability in the medical record of the mother."[12] As with the preamble, the parties disagree over the meaning of this statutory provision. The State emphasizes the language of the first sentence, which speaks in terms of the physician's determination of viability being made by the standards of ordinary skill in the medical profession. Brief for Appellants 32-35. Appellees stress the language of the second sentence, which prescribes such "tests as are necessary" |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | the second sentence, which prescribes such "tests as are necessary" to make a finding of gestational age, fetal weight, and lung maturity. Brief for Appellees 26-30. *514 The Court of Appeals read 188.029 as requiring that after 20 weeks "doctors must perform tests to find gestational age, fetal weight and lung maturity." n. 5. The court indicated that the tests needed to determine fetal weight at 20 weeks are "unreliable and inaccurate" and would add $125 to $250 to the cost of an abortion. It also stated that "amniocentesis, the only method available to determine lung maturity, is contrary to accepted medical practice until 28-30 weeks of gestation, expensive, and imposes significant health risks for both the pregnant woman and the fetus." We must first determine the meaning of 188.029 under Missouri law. Our usual practice is to defer to the lower court's construction of a state statute, but we believe the Court of Appeals has "fallen into plain error" in this case. ; see " `In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.' " quoting United See Chemehuevi Tribe of ; The Court of Appeals' interpretation also runs "afoul of the well-established principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties." at We think the viability-testing provision makes sense only if the second sentence is read to require only those tests that are useful to making subsidiary findings as to viability. If we construe this provision to require a physician to perform those tests needed to make the three specified findings in all circumstances, including when the physician's reasonable professional judgment indicates that the tests would be irrelevant to determining viability or even dangerous to the mother and the fetus, the second sentence of 188.029 would *515 conflict with the first sentence's requirement that a physician apply his reasonable professional skill and It would also be incongruous to read this provision, especially the word "necessary,"[13] to require the performance of tests irrelevant to the expressed statutory purpose of determining viability. It thus seems clear to us that the Court of Appeals' construction of 188.029 violates well-accepted canons of statutory interpretation used in the Missouri courts, see State ex rel. Stern Brothers & (Mo. 0) ; which JUSTICE BLACKMUN ignores. Post, at 545-. The viability-testing provision of the Missouri Act is concerned with promoting the State's interest in potential human life rather than in maternal health. Section 188.029 creates what is essentially a presumption |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | maternal health. Section 188.029 creates what is essentially a presumption of viability at 20 weeks, which the physician must rebut with tests indicating that the fetus is not viable prior to performing an abortion. It also directs the physician's determination as to viability by specifying consideration, if feasible, of gestational age, fetal weight, and lung capacity. The District Court found that "the medical evidence is uncontradicted that a 20-week fetus is not viable," and that "23 1/2 to 24 weeks gestation is the earliest point in pregnancy where a reasonable possibility of viability *516 exists." But it also found that there may be a 4-week error in estimating gestational age, which supports testing at 20 weeks. In the Court recognized that the State has "important and legitimate" interests in protecting maternal health and in the potentiality of human During the second trimester, the State "may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health." After viability, when the State's interest in potential human life was held to become compelling, the State "may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."[14] In upon which appellees rely, the Court held that a Pennsylvania statute regulating the standard of care to be used by a physician performing an abortion of a possibly viable fetus was void for vagueness. But in the course of reaching that conclusion, the Court reaffirmed its earlier statement in Planned Parenthood of Central that " `the determination of whether a particular *517 fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.' " JUSTICE BLACKMUN, post, at 545, n. 6, ignores the statement in Colautti that "neither the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor as the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the life or health of the fetus." 439 U.S., at To the extent that 188.029 regulates the method for determining viability, it undoubtedly does superimpose state regulation on the medical determination whether a particular fetus is viable. The Court of Appeals and the District Court thought it unconstitutional for this -1075; To the extent that the viability tests increase the cost of what are in fact second-trimester abortions, their validity may also be questioned under -435, where the Court held that a requirement that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | under -435, where the Court held that a requirement that second-trimester abortions must be performed in hospitals was invalid because it substantially increased the expense of those procedures. We think that the doubt cast upon the Missouri statute by these cases is not so much a flaw in the statute as it is a reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in has resulted in subsequent cases like Colautti and making constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean bed. Statutes specifying elements of informed consent to be provided abortion patients, for example, were invalidated if they were thought to "structur[e] the dialogue between the woman and her physician." As the dissenters in Thornburgh pointed out, such a statute would have been sustained under any traditional standard of judicial review, or for any other surgical procedure except abortion. *518 Stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but it has less power in constitutional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments, this Court is the only body able to make needed changes. See United We have not refrained from reconsideration of a prior construction of the Constitution that has proved "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice." ; see U.S. 435, ; Erie R. 304 U.S. We think the trimester framework falls into that category. In the first place, the rigid framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general principles, as ours does. The key elements of the framework trimesters and viability are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle. Since the bounds of the inquiry are essentially indeterminate, the result has been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine.[15] As JUSTICE WHITE has put it, the trimester framework *519 has left this Court to serve as the country's "ex officio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States." Planned Parenthood of Central Cf. In the second place, we do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability. The dissenters in Thornburgh, writing in the context of the trimester analysis, would have recognized this |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | the context of the trimester analysis, would have recognized this fact by positing against the "fundamental right" recognized in the State's "compelling interest" in protecting potential human life throughout pregnancy. "[T]he State's interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability." Thornburgh, ; see ("State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist `throughout pregnancy' ") (citation omitted). The tests that 188.029 requires the physician to perform are designed to determine viability. The State here has chosen viability as the point at which its interest in potential human life must be safeguarded. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 188.030 It is true that the tests in question increase the expense of abortion, and regulate the discretion of the physician in determining the viability of the fetus. Since the tests will undoubtedly show in many cases that the fetus is not viable, the tests will have been performed for what were in fact second-trimester abortions. But we are satisfied that the requirement of these tests permissibly furthers *520 the State's interest in protecting potential human life, and we therefore believe 188.029 to be constitutional. JUSTICE BLACKMUN takes us to task for our failure to join in a "great issues" debate as to whether the Constitution includes an "unenumerated" general right to privacy as recognized in cases such as (5), and But unlike did not purport to adopt a whole framework, complete with detailed rules and distinctions, to govern the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would apply. As such, it was far different from the opinion, if not the holding, of which sought to establish a constitutional framework for judging state regulation of abortion during the entire term of pregnancy. That framework sought to deal with areas of medical practice traditionally subject to state regulation, and it sought to balance once and for all by reference only to the calendar the claims of the State to protect the fetus as a form of human life against the claims of a woman to decide for herself whether or not to abort a fetus she was carrying. The experience of the Court in applying in later cases, see suggests to us that there is wisdom in not unnecessarily attempting to elaborate the abstract differences between a "fundamental right" to abortion, as the Court described it in n. 1, a "limited fundamental constitutional right," which JUSTICE BLACKMUN today treats as having established, post, at 555, or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, which we believe it to be. The Missouri testing requirement |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,989 | 19 | majority | Webster v. Reproductive Health Services | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112330/webster-v-reproductive-health-services/ | which we believe it to be. The Missouri testing requirement here is reasonably designed to ensure that abortions are not performed where the fetus is viable an end which all concede is legitimate and that is sufficient to sustain its constitutionality. JUSTICE BLACKMUN also accuses us, inter alia, of cowardice and illegitimacy in dealing with "the most politically divisive domestic legal issue of our time." Post, at 559. There is * no doubt that our holding today will allow some governmental regulation of abortion that would have been prohibited under the language of cases such as and But the goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably "politically divisive" issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people through their elected representatives deal with matters of concern to them. The goal of constitutional adjudication is to hold true the balance between that which the Constitution puts beyond the reach of the democratic process and that which it does not. We think we have done that today. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S suggestion, post, at 538, 557-558, that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of our population is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion regulation reminiscent of the Dark Ages not only misreads our views but does scant justice to those who serve in such bodies and the people who elect them. III Both appellants and the United States as amicus curiae have urged that we overrule our decision in Brief for Appellants 12-18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8-24. The facts of the present case, however, differ from those at issue in Here, Missouri has determined that viability is the point at which its interest in potential human life must be safeguarded. In on the other hand, the Texas statute criminalized the performance of all abortions, except when the mother's life was at stake. -118. This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of which was that the Texas statute unconstitutionally infringed the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause, and we leave it undisturbed. To the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow and succeeding cases. *522A Because none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri Act properly before us conflict with the Constitution, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. *522B JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | Poelker v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109712/poelker-v-doe/ | The Court holds that St. Louis may constitutionally refuse to permit the performance of elective abortions in its city-owned hospitals while providing hospital services to women who carry their pregnancies to term. As stated by the Court of Appeals: "Stripped of all rhetoric, the city here, through its policy and staffing procedure, is simply telling indigent women, like Doe, that if they choose to carry their pregnancies to term, the city will provide physicians and medical facilities for full maternity care; but if they choose to exercise their constitutionally protected right to determine that they wish to terminate the pregnancy, the city will not provide physicians and facilities for the abortion procedure, even though it is probably safer than going through a full pregnancy and childbirth." The Court of Appeals held that St. Louis could not in this way "interfer[e] in her decision of whether to bear a child or have an abortion simply because she is indigent and unable to afford private treatment," ib because it was constitutionally impermissible that indigent women be "`subjected to State coercion to bear children which they do not wish to bear [while] no other women similarly situated are so coerced,'" *523 For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Maher v. Roe, ante, p. 482, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. Here the fundamental right of a woman freely to choose to terminate her pregnancy has been infringed by the city of St. Louis through a deliberate policy based on opposition to elective abortions on moral grounds by city officials. While it may still be possible for some indigent women to obtain abortions in clinics or private hospitals, it is clear that the city policy is a significant, and in some cases insurmountable, obstacle to indigent pregnant women who cannot pay for abortions in those private facilities. Nor is the closing of St. Louis' public hospitals an isolated instance with little practical significance. The importance of today's decision is greatly magnified by the fact that during and the first quarter of 1976 only about 18% of all public hospitals in the country provided abortion services, and in 10 States there were no public hospitals providing such services.[1] A number of difficulties lie beneath the surface of the Court's holding. Public hospitals that do not permit the performance of elective abortions will frequently have physicians on their staffs who would willingly perform them. This may operate in some communities significantly to reduce the number of physicians who are both willing and able to perform abortions in a hospital setting. It is not |
Justice Brennan | 1,977 | 13 | dissenting | Poelker v. Doe | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109712/poelker-v-doe/ | to perform abortions in a hospital setting. It is not a complete answer that many abortions may safely be performed in clinics, for some physicians will not be affiliated with those clinics, and some abortions may pose unacceptable risks if performed outside a hospital. Indeed, such an answer would be ironic, for if the result is to force some abortions to be performed in a clinic that properly should be performed in a hospital, the city policy will have operated to increase rather than reduce health risks associated with abortions; and in the Court permitted regulation by the State solely to protect maternal The Court's holding will also pose difficulties in small communities where the public hospital is the only nearby health care facility. If such a public hospital is closed to abortions, any womanrich or poorwill be seriously inconvenienced; and for some womenparticularly poor womenthe unavailability of abortions in the public hospital will be an insuperable obstacle. Indeed, a recent survey suggests that the decision in this case will be felt most strongly in rural areas, where the public hospital will in all likelihood be closed to elective abortions, and where there will not be sufficient demand to support a separate abortion clinic.[2] Because the city policy constitutes "coercion [of women] to bear children which they do not wish to bear," Roe v. Wade and the cases following it require that the city show a compelling state interest that justifies this infringement upon the fundamental right to choose to have an abortion. "[E]xpressing a preference for normal childbirth," ante, at 521, does not satisfy that standard. Roe explicitly held that during the first trimester no state interest in regulating abortions was compelling, and that during the second trimester the State's interest was compelling only insofar as it protected maternal -164. Under Roe, the State's "important and legitimate interest in potential life," at *525 which I take to be another way of referring to a State's "preference for normal childbirth"becomes compelling only at the end of the second trimester. Thus it is clear that St. Louis' policy preference is insufficient to justify its infringement on the right of women to choose to have abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy without interference by the State on the ground of moral opposition to abortions. St. Louis' policy therefore "unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion," I would affirm the Court of Appeals. |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | I agree with the majority that neither the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) nor the Equal Protection Clause prohibits Missouri's mandatory retirement provision as applied to petitioners, and I therefore concur in the judgment and in Parts I and III of the majority's opinion. I cannot agree, however, with the majority's reasoning in Part II of its opinion, which ignores several areas of well-established precedent and announces a rule that is likely to prove both unwise and infeasible. That the majority's analysis in Part II is completely unnecessary to the proper resolution of this case makes it all the more remarkable. I In addition to petitioners' equal protection claim, we granted certiorari to decide the following question: "Whether appointed Missouri state court judges are `appointee[s] on the policymaking level' within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (`ADEA'), 28 U.S. C. 621-34 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), and therefore exempted from the ADEA's general prohibition of mandatory retirement and thus subject to the mandatory retirement provision of Article V, Section 26 of the Missouri Constitution." Pet. for Cert. i. The majority, however, chooses not to resolve that issue of statutory construction. Instead, it holds that whether or not the ADEA can fairly be read to exclude state judges from its scope, "[w]e will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges are included." Ante, at 467 (emphasis in original). I cannot agree with this "plain statement" rule because it is unsupported by the decisions upon which the majority relies, contrary to our Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, and fundamentally unsound. *475 Among other things, the ADEA makes it "unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S. C. 623(a). In 1974, Congress amended the definition of "employer" in the ADEA to include "a State or political subdivision of a State." 630(b)(2). With that amendment, "there is no doubt what the intent of Congress was: to extend the application of the ADEA to the States." The dispute in this case therefore is not whether Congress has outlawed age discrimination by the States. It clearly has. The only question is whether petitioners fall within the definition of "employee" in the Act, 630(f), which contains exceptions for elected officials and certain appointed officials. If petitioners are "employee[s]," Missouri's mandatory retirement provision clearly conflicts with the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA. Indeed, |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | clearly conflicts with the antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA. Indeed, we have noted that the "policies and substantive provisions of the [ADEA] apply with especial force in the case of mandatory retirement provisions." Western Air Lines, Pre-emption therefore is automatic, since "state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." Pacific Gas & Elec. The majority's federalism concerns are irrelevant to such "actual conflict" pre-emption. "`The relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.'" Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan quoting While acknowledging this principle of federal legislative supremacy, see ante, at 460, the majority nevertheless imposes *476 upon Congress a "plain statement" requirement. The majority claims to derive this requirement from the plain statement approach developed in our Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., State and applied two Terms ago in The issue in those cases, however, was whether Congress intended a particular statute to extend to the States at all. In for example, the issue was whether States could be sued under 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S. C. 794. Similarly, the issue in Will was whether States could be sued under 42 U.S. C. In the present case, by contrast, Congress has expressly extended the coverage of the ADEA to the States and their employees. Its intention to regulate age discrimination by States is thus "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." See The only dispute is over the precise details of the statute's application. We have never extended the plain statement approach that far, and the majority offers no compelling reason for doing so. The majority also relies heavily on our cases addressing the constitutionality of state exclusion of aliens from public employment. See ante, at 461-463, 468-470. In those cases, we held that although restrictions based on alienage ordinarily are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, see 403 U.S. 3, the scrutiny will be less demanding for exclusion of aliens "from positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-government." This narrow "political-function" exception to the strict-scrutiny standard is based on the "State's historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its *477 democratic political institutions." It is difficult to see how the "political-function" exception supports the majority's plain statement rule. First, the exception merely reflects a determination of the scope of the rights of aliens under the Equal Protection Clause. Reduced scrutiny is appropriate for certain |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | the Equal Protection Clause. Reduced scrutiny is appropriate for certain political functions because "the right to govern is reserved to citizens." ; see also at -649. This conclusion in no way establishes a method for interpreting rights that are statutorily created by Congress, such as the protection from age discrimination in the ADEA. Second, it is one thing to limit judicially created scrutiny, and it is quite another to fashion a restraint on Congress' legislative authority, as does the majority; the latter is both counter-majoritarian and an intrusion on a coequal branch of the Federal Government. Finally, the majority does not explicitly restrict its rule to "functions that go to the heart of representative government," and may in fact be extending it much further to all "state governmental functions." See ante, at 470. The majority's plain statement rule is not only unprecedented, it directly contravenes our decisions in and South In those cases we made it clear "that States must find their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity." We also rejected as "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" any test for state immunity that requires a judicial determination of which state activities are "`traditional,'" "`integral,'" or "`necessary.'" The majority disregards those decisions in its attempt to carve out areas of state activity that will receive special protection from federal legislation. *478 The majority's approach is also unsound because it will serve only to confuse the law. First, the majority fails to explain the scope of its rule. Is the rule limited to federal regulation of the qualifications of state officials? See ante, at 464. Or does it apply more broadly to the regulation of any "state governmental functions"? See ante, at 470. Second, the majority does not explain its requirement that Congress' intent to regulate a particular state activity be "plain to anyone reading [the federal statute]." See ante, at 467. Does that mean that it is now improper to look to the purpose or history of a federal statute in determining the scope of the statute's limitations on state activities? If so, the majority's rule is completely inconsistent with our pre-emption jurisprudence. See, e. g., Hillsborough (emphasis added). The vagueness of the majority's rule undoubtedly will lead States to assert that various federal statutes no longer apply to a wide variety of state activities if Congress has not expressly referred to those activities in the statute. Congress, in turn, will be forced to draft long and detailed lists of which particular state functions it meant to |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | detailed lists of which particular state functions it meant to regulate. The imposition of such a burden on Congress is particularly out of place in the context of the ADEA. Congress already has stated that all "individual[s] employed by any employer" are protected by the ADEA unless they are expressly excluded by one of the exceptions in the definition of "employee." See 29 U.S. C. 630(f). The majority, however, turns the statute on its head, holding that state judges are not protected by the ADEA because "Congress has [not] made it clear that judges are included." Ante, at 467 (emphasis in original). Cf. where we held that state game wardens are covered by the ADEA, even though such employees are not expressly included within the ADEA's scope. *479 The majority asserts that its plain statement rule is helpful in avoiding a "potential constitutional problem." Ante, at 464. It is far from clear, however, why there would be a constitutional problem if the ADEA applied to state judges, in light of our decisions in and discussed above. As long as "the national political process did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated." There is no claim in this case that the political process by which the ADEA was extended to state employees was inadequate to protect the States from being "unduly burden[ed]" by the Federal Government. See In any event, as discussed below, a straightforward analysis of the ADEA's definition of "employee" reveals that the ADEA does not apply here. Thus, even if there were potential constitutional problems in extending the ADEA to state judges, the majority's proposed plain statement rule would not be necessary to avoid them in this case. Indeed, because this case can be decided purely on the basis of statutory interpretation, the majority's announcement of its plain statement rule, which purportedly is derived from constitutional principles, violates our general practice of avoiding the unnecessary resolution of constitutional issues. My disagreement with the majority does not end with its unwarranted announcement of the plain statement rule. Even more disturbing is its treatment of Congress' power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See ante, at 467-470. Section 5 provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Despite that sweeping constitutional delegation of authority to Congress, the majority holds that its plain statement rule will apply with full force to legislation enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority states: "In the face of ambiguity, we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its *480 Commerce Clause powers or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, at 470 (emphasis added).[1] The majority's failure to recognize the special status of legislation enacted pursuant to 5 ignores that, unlike Congress' Commerce Clause power, "[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority." Indeed, we have held that "principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments `by appropriate legislation.' Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty." City of ; see also at n. 18. The majority relies upon Pennhurst State School and see ante, at 469-470, but that case does not support its approach. There, the Court merely stated that "we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." In other words, the Pennhurst presumption was designed only to answer the question whether a particular piece of legislation *481 was enacted pursuant to 5. That is very different from the majority's apparent holding that even when Congress is acting pursuant to 5, it nevertheless must specify the precise details of its enactment. The majority's departures from established precedent are even more disturbing when it is realized, as discussed below, that this case can be affirmed based on simple statutory construction. II The statute at issue in this case is the ADEA's definition of "employee," which provides: "The term `employee' means an individual employed by any employer except that the term `employee' shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency, or political subdivision." 29 U.S. C. 630(f). A parsing of that definition reveals that it excludes from the definition of "employee" (and thus the coverage |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | excludes from the definition of "employee" (and thus the coverage of the ADEA) four types of (noncivil service) state and local employees: (1) persons elected to public office; (2) the personal staff of elected officials; (3) persons appointed by elected officials to be on the policymaking level; and (4) the immediate advisers of elected officials with respect to the constitutional or legal powers of the officials' offices. The question before us is whether petitioners fall within the third exception. Like the Court of Appeals, see I assume that petitioners, who were initially appointed to their positions by the Governor of *482 Missouri, are "appointed" rather than "elected" within the meaning of the ADEA. For the reasons below, I also conclude that petitioners are "on the policymaking level."[2] "Policy" is defined as "a definite course or method of action selected (as by a government, institution, group, or individual) from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and usu[ally] determine present and future decisions." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1754 Applying that definition, it is clear that the decisionmaking engaged in by common-law judges, such as petitioners, places them "on the policymaking level." In resolving disputes, although judges do not operate with unconstrained discretion, they do choose "from among alternatives" and elaborate their choices in order "to guide and determine present and future decisions." The quotation from Justice Holmes in the majority's opinion, see ante, at 466, is an eloquent description of the policymaking nature of the judicial function. Justice Cardozo also stated it well: "Each [common-law judge] indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. [W]ithin the confines of these open spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice moves with a freedom which stamps its action as creative. The law which is the resulting product is not found, but made." B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 113-115 (1921). *483 Moreover, it should be remembered that the statutory exception refers to appointees "on the policymaking level," not "policymaking employees." Thus, whether or not judges actually make policy, they certainly are on the same level as policymaking officials in other branches of government and therefore are covered by the exception. The degree of responsibility vested in judges, for example, is comparable to that of other officials that have been found by the lower courts to be on the policymaking level. See, e. g., ; Petitioners argue that the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | ; Petitioners argue that the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" exception should be construed to apply "only to persons who advise or work closely with the elected official that chose the appointee." Brief for Petitioners 18. In support of that claim, petitioners point out that the exception is "sandwiched" between the "personal staff" and "immediate adviser" exceptions in 630(f), and thus should be read as covering only similar employees. Petitioners' premise, however, does not prove their conclusion. It is true that the placement of the "appointee" exception between the "personal staff" and "immediate adviser" exceptions suggests a similarity among the three. But the most obvious similarity is simply that each of the three sets of employees are connected in some way with elected officials: The first and third sets have a certain working relationship with elected officials, while the second is appointed by elected officials. There is no textual support for concluding that the second set must also have a close working relationship with elected officials. Indeed, such a reading would tend to make the "appointee" exception superfluous since the "personal staff" and "immediate adviser" exceptions would seem to cover most appointees who are in a close working relationship with elected officials. *484 Petitioners seek to rely on legislative history, but it does not help their position. There is little legislative history discussing the definition of "employee" in the ADEA, so petitioners point to the legislative history of the identical definition in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000e(f). If anything, that history tends to confirm that the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" exception was designed to exclude from the coverage of the ADEA all high-level appointments throughout state government structures, including judicial appointments. For example, during the debates concerning the proposed extension of Title VII to the States, Senator Ervin repeatedly expressed his concern that the (unamended) definition of "employee" would be construed to reach those "persons who exercise the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the States and political subdivisions of the States." 118 Cong. Rec. 1838 (1972) (emphasis added). Indeed, he expressly complained that "[t]here is not even an exception in the [unamended] bill to the effect that the EEOC will not have jurisdiction over State judges, whether they are elected or appointed to office." Also relevant is Senator Taft's comment that, in order to respond to Senator Ervin's concerns, he was willing to agree to an exception not only for elected officials, but also for "those at the top decisionmaking levels in the executive and judicial branch as well." The |
Justice White | 1,991 | 6 | concurring | Gregory v. Ashcroft | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112632/gregory-v-ashcroft/ | levels in the executive and judicial branch as well." The definition of "employee" subsequently was modified to exclude the four categories of employees discussed above. The Conference Committee that added the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" exception made clear the separate nature of that exception: "It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected officials and members of their personal staffs, and persons appointed by such elected officials as advisors or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of the departments or agencies of State or local governments, such as *485 cabinet officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the local level." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-899, pp. 15-16 (1972) (emphasis added). The italicized "or" in that statement indicates, contrary to petitioners' argument, that appointed officials need not be advisers to be covered by the exception. Rather, it appears that "Congress intended two categories: policymakers, who need not be advisers; and advisers, who need not be policymakers." This reading is confirmed by a statement by one of the House Managers, Representative Erlenborn, who explained that "[i]n the conference, an additional qualification was added, exempting those people appointed by officials at the State and local level in policymaking positions." 118 Cong. Rec., at 77. In addition, the phrase "the highest levels" in the Conference Report suggests that Congress' intent was to limit the exception "down the chain of command, and not so much across agencies or departments." 858 F. 2d, at I also agree with the First Circuit's conclusion that even lower court judges fall within the exception because "each judge, as a separate and independent judicial officer, is at the very top of his particular `policymaking' chain of command, responding only to a higher appellate court." For these reasons, I would hold that petitioners are excluded from the coverage of the ADEA because they are "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" under 29 U.S. C. 630(f).[3] *486 I join Parts I and III of the Court's opinion and concur in its judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | In this tort action arising out of an automobile collision in California, a California court has entered a judgment against the State of Nevada that Nevada's own courts could not have entered. We granted certiorari to decide whether federal law prohibits the California courts from entering such a judgment or, indeed, from asserting any jurisdiction over another sovereign State. The respondents are California residents. They suffered severe injuries in an automoble collision on a California highway on May 13, 1968. The driver of the other vehicle, an employee of the University of Nevada, was killed in the collision. It is conceded that he was driving a car owned by the State, that he was engaged in official business, and that the University is an instrumentality of the State itself. Respondents filed this suit for damages in the Superior Court for the city of San Francisco, naming the administrator *412 of the driver's estate, the University, and the State of Nevada as defendants. Process was served on the State and the University pursuant to the provisions of the California Vehicle Code authorizing service of process on nonresident motorists.[1] The trial court granted a motion to quash service on the State, but its order was reversed on appeal. The California Supreme Court held, as a matter of California law, that the State of Nevada was amenable to suit in California courts and remanded the case for trial. We denied certiorari. On remand, Nevada filed a pretrial motion to limit the amount of damages that might be recovered. A Nevada statute places a limit of $25,000 on any award in a tort action against the State pursuant to its statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.[2] Nevada argued that the Full Faith and Credit *413 Clause of the United States Constitution[3] required the California courts to enforce that statute. Nevada's motion was denied, and the case went to trial. The jury concluded that the Nevada driver was negligent and awarded damages of $1,150,000.[4] The Superior Court entered judgment on the verdict and the Court of Appeal affirmed. After the California Supreme Court denied review, *414 the State of Nevada and its University successfully sought a writ of certiorari. Despite its importance, the question whether a State may claim immunity from suit in the courts of another State has never been addressed by this Court. The question is not expressly answered by any provision of the Constitution; Nevada argues that it is implicitly answered by reference to the common understanding that no sovereign is amenable to suit without its consentan understanding prevalent when the Constitution was |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | suit without its consentan understanding prevalent when the Constitution was framed and repeatedly reflected in this Court's opinions. In order to determine whether that understanding is embodied in the Constitution, as Nevada claims,[5] it is necessary to consider (1) the source and scope of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) the impact of the doctrine on the framing of the Constitution; (3) the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and (4) other aspects of the Constitution that qualify the sovereignty of the several States. I The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sovereign's own courts and the other to suits in the courts of another sovereign. The immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity. The doctrine, as it developed at common law, had its origins in the feudal system. Describing those origins, Pollock and Maitland noted that no lord could be sued by a vassal in his *415 own court, but each petty lord was subject to suit in the courts of a higher lord. Since the King was at the apex of the feudal pyramid, there was no higher court in which he could be sued.[6] The King's immunity rested primarily on the structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King could do no wrong.[7] We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by the colonists when they declared their independence from the Crown,[8] and the record in this case discloses an actual wrong committed by Nevada. But the notion that immunity from suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our cases. Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the "right to govern";[9] that kind of right would necessarily encompass the right to determine what suits may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. Thus, Mr. Justice Holmes explained sovereign *416 immunity as based "on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."[10] This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between the two sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of comity. This point was plainly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner which held that an American court could not assert jurisdiction over a vessel in which Napoleon, the reigning Emperor of France, claimed a sovereign right. In that case, the Chief Justice observed: "The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power. "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. "All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source." *417 After noting that the source of any immunity for the French vessel must be found in American law, the Chief Justice interpreted that law as recognizing the common usage among nations in which every sovereign was understood to have waived its exclusive territorial jurisdiction over visiting sovereigns, or their representatives, in certain classes of cases.[11] The opinion in The Schooner Exchange makes clear that if California and Nevada were independent and completely sovereign nations, Nevada's claim of immunity from suit in California's courts would be answered by reference to the law of California.[12] It is fair to infer that if the immunity defense Nevada asserts today had been raised in 1812 when The Schooner Exchange was decided, or earlier when the Constitution was being framed, the defense would have been sustained by the California courts.[13] By rejecting the defense in *418 this very case, however, the California courts have told us that whatever California law may have been in the past, it no longer extends immunity to Nevada as a matter of comity. Nevada quite rightly does not ask us to review the California courts' interpretation of California law. Rather, it argues that California is not free, as a sovereign, to apply its own law, but is bound instead by a federal rule of law implicit in the Constitution that requires all of the States to adhere to the sovereign-immunity doctrine |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | all of the States to adhere to the sovereign-immunity doctrine as it prevailed when the Constitution was adopted. Unless such a federal rule exists, we of course have no power to disturb the judgment of the California courts. II Unquestionably the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a matter of importance in the early days of independence.[14] Many of the States were heavily indebted as a result of the Revolutionary War. They were vitally interested in the question whether the creation of a new federal sovereign, with courts of its own, would automatically subject them, like lower English lords, to suits in the courts of the "higher" sovereign. But the question whether one State might be subject to suit in the courts of another State was apparently not a matter of concern when the new Constitution was being drafted *419 and ratified. Regardless of whether the Framers were correct in assuming, as presumably they did, that prevailing notions of comity would provide adequate protection against the unlikely prospect of an attempt by the courts of one State to assert jurisdiction over another, the need for constitutional protection against that contingency was not discussed. The debate about the suability of the States focused on the scope of the judicial power of the United States authorized by Art. III.[15] In The Federalist, Hamilton took the position that this authorization did not extend to suits brought by an individual against a nonconsenting State.[16] The contrary position was also advocated[17] and actually prevailed in this Court's decision in *420 The Chisholm decision led to the prompt adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.[18] That Amendment places explicit limits on the powers of federal courts to entertain suits against a State.[19] The language used by the Court in cases construing these limits, like the language used during the debates on ratification of the Constitution, emphasized the widespread acceptance of the view that a sovereign State is never amenable to suit without its consent.[20] But all of these cases, and all of the relevant debate, concerned questions of federal-court jurisdiction and the extent to which the States, by ratifying the Constitution and creating federal courts, had authorized suits *421 against themselves in those courts. These decisions do not answer the question whether the Constitution places any limit on the exercise of one's State's power to authorize its courts to assert jurisdiction over another State. Nor does anything in Art. III authorizing the judicial power of the United States, or in the Eleventh Amendment limitation on that power, provide any basis, explicit or implicit, for this Court to impose limits |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | basis, explicit or implicit, for this Court to impose limits on the powers of California exercised in this case. A mandate for federal-court enforcement of interstate comity must find its basis elsewhere in the Constitution. III Nevada claims that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution requires California to respect the limitations on Nevada's statutory waiver of its immunity from suit. That waiver only gives Nevada's consent to suits in its own courts. Moreover, even if the waiver is treated as a consent to be sued in California, California must honor the condition attached to that consent and limit respondents' recovery to $25,000, the maximum allowable in an action in Nevada's courts. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does require each State to give effect to official acts of other States. A judgment entered in one State must be respected in another provided that the first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Moreover, in certain limited situations, the courts of one State must apply the statutory law of another State. Thus, in Bradford Electric the Court held that a federal court sitting in New Hampshire was required by the Constitution to apply Vermont law in an action between a Vermont employee and a Vermont employer arising out of a contract made in Vermont.[21] But this Court's *422 decision in Pacific Insurance clearly establishes that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public policy.[22] The question in Pacific Insurance was whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause precluded California from applying its own workmen's compensation Act in the case of an injury suffered by a Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts employer while in California in the course of his employment. Even though the employer and employee had agreed to be bound by Massachusetts law, this Court held that California was not precluded from applying its own law imposing greater responsibilities on the employer. In doing so, the Court reasoned: "It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some limitations upon the extent to which a state may be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state in contravention of its own statutes or policy. And in the case of statutes, the extrastate effect of which Congress has not prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision, we think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | does not require one state to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of *423 the state of its enactment with respect to the same persons and events. Although Massachusetts has an interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massachusetts employees while temporarily abroad in the course of their employment, and may adopt that policy for itself, that could hardly be thought to support an application of the full faith and credit clause which would override the constitutional authority of another state to legislate for the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within it. Few matters could be deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more completely within its power." The Clapper case was distinguished on the ground that "there was nothing in the New Hampshire statute, the decisions of its courts, or in the circumstances of the case, to suggest that reliance on the provisions of the Vermont statute, as a defense to the New Hampshire suit, was obnoxious to the policy of New Hampshire."[23] In Pacific Insurance, on the other hand, California had its own scheme governing compensation for injuries in the State, and the California courts had found that the policy of that scheme would be frustrated were it denied enforcement. "Full faith and credit," this Court concluded, "does not here enable one state to legislate for the other or to project its laws across *424 state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it." A similar conclusion is appropriate in this case. The interest of California afforded such respect in the Pacific Insurance case was in providing for "the bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within it." In this case, California's interest is the closely related and equally substantial one of providing "full protection to those who are injured on its highways through the negligence of both residents and nonresidents." App. to Pet. for Cert. vii. To effectuate this interest, California has provided by statute for jurisdiction in its courts over residents and nonresidents alike to allow those injured on its highways through the negligence of others to secure full compensation for their injuries in the California courts. In further implementation of that policy, California has unequivocally waived its own immunity from liability for the torts committed by its own agents and authorized full recovery even against the sovereign. As the California courts have |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | recovery even against the sovereign. As the California courts have found, to require California either to surrender jurisdiction or to limit respondents' recovery to the $25,000 maximum of the Nevada statute would be obnoxious to its statutorily based policies of jurisdiction over nonresident motorists and full recovery. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require this result.[24] IV Even apart from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Nevada argues that the Constitution implicitly establishes a Union in which the States are not free to treat each other as unfriendly *425 sovereigns, but must respect the sovereignty of one another. While sovereign nations are free to levy discriminatory taxes on the goods of other nations or to bar their entry altogether, the States of the Union are not.[25] Nor are the States free to deny extradition of a fugitive when a proper demand is made by the executive of another State.[26] And the citizens in each State are entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.[27] Each of these provisions places a specific limitation on the sovereignty of the several States. Collectively they demonstrate that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent sovereigns. But these provisions do not imply that any one State's immunity from suit in the courts of another State is anything other than a matter of comity. Indeed, in view of the Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the States are reserved to the States or to the people,[28] the existence of express limitations on state sovereignty may equally imply that caution should be exercised before concluding that unstated limitations on state power were intended by the Framers. In the past, this Court has presumed that the States intended to adopt policies of broad comity toward one another. But this presumption reflected an understanding of state policy, rather than a constitutional command. As this Court stated in Bank of 590: "The intimate union of these states, as members of the same great political family; the deep and vital interests *426 which bind them so closely together; should lead us, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater degree of comity, and friendship, and kindness towards one another, than we should be authorized to presume between foreign nations. And when (as without doubt must occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any state requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare its will, and the legal presumption is at once at an end." In this case, California |
Justice Stevens | 1,979 | 16 | majority | Nevada v. Hall | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110034/nevada-v-hall/ | is at once at an end." In this case, California has "declared its will"; it has adopted as its policy full compensation in its courts for injuries on its highways resulting from the negligence of others, whether those others be residents or nonresidents, agents of the State, or private citizens. Nothing in the Federal Constitution authorizes or obligates this Court to frustrate that policy out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of Nevada.[29] In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the consent of the governed. The people of Nevada have consented to a system in which their State is subject only to limited liability in tort. But the people of California, who have had no voice in Nevada's decision, have adopted a different system. Each of these decisions is equally entitled to our respect. It may be wise policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations, for States to accord each other immunity or to respect any established limits on liability. They are free to do so. But if a federal court were to hold, by inference from the structure of our Constitution and nothing else, that California is not free in this case to enforce its policy of full compensation, that holding would constitute the real intrusion *427 on the sovereignty of the Statesand the power of the peoplein our Union. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Widmar v. Vincent | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110587/widmar-v-vincent/ | This case presents the question whether a state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities *265 of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion. I It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas City[1] to encourage the activities of student organizations. The University officially recognize over 100 student groups. It routinely provides University facilities for the meetings of registered organizations. Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester to help defray the costs to the University. From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meetings in University facilities.[2] In 1977, however, the University informed the group that it could no longer meet in University buildings. The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship of religious teaching."[3] *266 Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the regulation in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri.[4] They alleged that the University's discrimination against religious activity and discussion violated their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld the challenged regulation. It found the regulation not only justified, but required, by the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. Under the court reasoned, the State *267 could not provide facilities for religious use without giving prohibited support to an institution of -916. The District Court rejected the argument that the University could not discriminate against religious speech on the basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to less protection than other types of expression. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Rejecting the analysis of the District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no compelling justification. The court held that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and speakers of all kinds. According to the Court of Appeals, the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to advance religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of developing students' " `social and cultural awareness as well as [their] intellectual curiosity.' " (quoting from the University bulletin's description |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Widmar v. Vincent | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110587/widmar-v-vincent/ | [their] intellectual curiosity.' " (quoting from the University bulletin's description of the student activities program, reprinted in ). We granted certiorari. We now affirm. II Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms.[5] The Constitution *268 forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. See, e. g., Madison Joint School ; Southeastern Promotions, The University's institutional mission, which it describes as providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment *269 rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities. See, e. g., ; ; Here UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment. See, e. g., ; ;[6] In order to justify discriminatory *270 exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See[7] III In this case the University claims a compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives this interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the Federal and Missouri Constitutions. A The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to *271 other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States.[8] We agree that the interest of the University in complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not follow, however, that an "equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold that a policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the [policy] must not foster `an excessive government entanglement |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Widmar v. Vincent | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110587/widmar-v-vincent/ | finally, the [policy] must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with ' " See Committee for Public ; In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech,[9] would have a secular purpose[10] and would *272 avoid entanglement with [11] But the District Court concluded, and the University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the limited public forum would have the "primary effect" of advancing [12] *273 The University's argument misconceives the nature of this case. The question is not whether the creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its facilities for use by student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the content to their speech. See[13] In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely effects. It is possible perhaps even foreseeable that religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities. But this Court has explained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary advancement" of Committee for Public ; see, e. g., ; ; We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of our cases. Two factors are especially relevant. First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. As the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no more commit the University to religious goals" than it is "now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or any other group eligible to use its facilities. 635 F.2d,[14] Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e. g., ; Committee for Public and n. 38. If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments. *275 or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." ; quoted in Committee for Public n. 6.[15] At least in the absence of |
Justice Powell | 1,981 | 17 | majority | Widmar v. Vincent | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110587/widmar-v-vincent/ | for Public n. 6.[15] At least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary effect." B Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect state support for religion,[16] the University claims a compelling interest in complying with the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution.[17] The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to gather to engage in religious and nonreligious speech, would offend the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine how the Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause,[18] a state interest, derived from its own constitution, could ever outweigh free *276 speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We limit our holding to the case before us. On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its content. See, e. g., ; Police Dept. of On the other hand, the state interest asserted here in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State's interest as sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based discrimination against respondents' religious speech. IV Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.[19] Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." ; see University of California[20] Finally, *277 we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e. g., -189, that recognize a university's right to exclude even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education. The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | concurring | Black v. Romano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111433/black-v-romano/ | I I agree that revocation of probation need not be accompanied by an express demonstration on the record that alternatives to revocation were considered and found wanting before the decision to revoke was made.[1] Because I have argued on several occasions that written explanations for particular decisions are constitutionally required,[2] I write separately to explain my view as to why such explanations are not required in this setting. The Court has not attempted any systematic explanation of when due process requires contemporaneous reasons to be given for final decisions, or for steps in the decisionmaking process, that affect protected liberty or property interests. The Court has stated that the occasions when due process requires an explanation of the reasons for a decision "are the exception rather than the rule." At the same time, we have recognized several occasions in which such reasons must be provided, such as when public welfare benefits are terminated,[3] parole[4] or probation[5] is revoked, good-time credits *618 are taken away from prison inmates,[6] or inmates are transferred to mental institutions.[7] This requirement is not limited to explanations for substantive decisions on the merits, for record explanations must also be provided at stages of the hearing that are integral to assuring fair and accurate determinations on the merits. For example, counsel cannot be denied at parole or probation revocation hearings without a record explanation.[8] Similarly, the right of an inmate to present witnesses and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at hearings involving transfers to mental institutions may be limited only when supported by record findings of good cause.[9] In my view, the theme unifying these cases is that whether due process requires written reasons for a decision, or for a particular step in the decisionmaking process, is, like all due process questions, to be analyzed under the three-factor standard set forth in When written reasons would contribute significantly to the "fairness and reliability" of the process by which an individual is deprived of liberty or property, reasons must be given in this form unless the balance between the individual interest affected and the burden to the government tilts against the individual.[10] Whether *619 written reasons would make such a contribution in any particular case depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the decisionmaking tribunal,[11] the extent to which other procedural protections already assure adequately the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings,[12] and the nature of the question being decided.[13] Applying these principles here, I believe a factfinder need not on the record run through the litany of alternatives available before choosing incarceration. Most |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | concurring | Black v. Romano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111433/black-v-romano/ | through the litany of alternatives available before choosing incarceration. Most important, Gagnon already requires a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for concluding that revocation of probation is warranted.[14] That explanation will allow courts to determine whether revocation is substantively valid, or fundamentally unfair, even in the absence of record consideration of alternatives to revocation.[15] In addition, probation revocation bodies, be they judges or boards, are familiar enough with the possibility of alternatives to incarceration that such a requirement is not necessary to call their attention to the standards governing exercise of *620 their discretion.[16] Indeed, the only constitutional limitation on this discretion is that revocation be a rational response to the violation; revocation need not be the only available response to be permissible. See Part II. The breadth of this discretion significantly attenuates the value that written consideration of alternatives might otherwise play. Finally, a requirement that sentencers go through on the record an almost limitless variety of options other than revocation would significantly burden revocation hearings, for given the number of options available a statement of reasons rejecting each of them would amount to a lengthy document. On balance, then, due process does not require written reasons for rejecting nonincarceration alternatives to revocation. II That written reasons are not required for rejection of alternatives to revocation does not suggest that the Constitution allows probation to be revoked for any reason at all or for any probation violation. On the contrary, under as I read it, the decision to revoke probation must be based on a probation violation that logically undermines the State's initial determination that probation is the appropriate punishment for the particular defendant. Bearden held that probation cannot be revoked for failure to pay a fine and restitution, in the absence of a finding that the probationer has not made bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment do not exist. If a probationer cannot pay because he is poor, rather than because he has not tried to pay, his failure to make restitution or pay a fine signifies nothing about his continued rehabilitative prospects and cannot form the basis of a valid revocation decision. Revocation under these circumstances, the Court said, would be "fundamentally unfair." and n. 7, 673. *621 Although Bearden dealt with only one basis for revocation failure to pay a fine and restitution Bearden's holding can be understood only in light of more general principles about the nature of probation and the valid bases for revocation. First, the State has wide latitude in |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | concurring | Black v. Romano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111433/black-v-romano/ | bases for revocation. First, the State has wide latitude in deciding whether its penological interests will best be served by imprisonment, a fine, probation, or some other alternative. But in choosing probation, the State expresses a conclusion that its interests will be met by allowing an individual the freedom to prove that he can rehabilitate himself and live according to the norms required by life in a community. Bearden then recognizes that, once this decision is made, both the State and the probationer have an interest in assuring that the probationer is not deprived of this opportunity without reason. See also To the probationer, who is integrating himself into a community, it is fundamentally unfair to be promised freedom for turning square corners with the State but to have the State retract that promise when nothing he has done legitimately warrants such an about-face.[17] Similarly, it is irrational for the State to conclude that its interests are best served by probation, but then to conclude, in the absence of valid cause tracing to the probationer's conduct, that imprisonment is warranted. Thus, while the State can define the rules of punishment initially, choosing probation or imprisonment, the State cannot *622 change the rules in the middle of the game.[18] See A probation violation must therefore be such as to make it logical for the State to conclude that its initial decision to choose probation rather than imprisonment should now be abandoned. This principle establishes substantive limitations on probation revocation decisions beyond which revocation is fundamentally unfair. Although these limits are not stringent, it is important to note their existence. For example, a minor traffic violation, or other technical probation violation, may well not rationally justify a conclusion that the probationer is no longer a good rehabilitative risk.[19] Similarly, certain probation violations that might justify revocation if committed early in the probation term might not justify revocation if the probationer has completed cleanly 14 years, for example, of a *623 15-year term.[20] No doubt a violation may stir certain biases in judges who believe they have "taken a chance" on a probationer or in probation officers who feel personally at fault, but those biases do not authorize revocations that are solely vindictive or reflexive. Instead, given the nature of the liberty interest at stake, revocation must reflect a "considered judgment" that probation is no longer appropriate to satisfy the State's legitimate penological interests. To some extent, the rationality of the decision to revoke must be evaluated in light of alternative measures available for responding to the violation. One reason it was arbitrary |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | concurring | Black v. Romano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111433/black-v-romano/ | for responding to the violation. One reason it was arbitrary in Bearden to revoke probation for blameless failure to pay a fine was that the State's interest could be "served fully by alternative means."[21] The Court noted *624 that the time for making payments could be extended, the fine reduced, or the probationer ordered to perform some form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine. The State need not establish that revocation is the only means of realizing its penological interests once a probation violation has been committed, but alternative sanctions available to the State surely are a relevant consideration in evaluating whether revocation is logically related to the nature of the underlying violation. The "touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government." Probationers, possessed of the conditional liberty interest created by probation, are protected by this standard, and the decision to revoke probation must therefore be rationally justifiable in light of alternative sanctions available and the nature of the underlying violation. This is not a demanding standard given the breadth of reasons that can justify revocation, but it does impose substantive outer boundaries on revocation decisions. III There can be no doubt that the revocation decision here could have been based on a rational conclusion that respondent's probation violation demonstrated his unsuitability for continued probation. The probation judge found that respondent had committed the felony of leaving the scene of an accident, an accident in which an individual had been struck.[22] Although unrelated to the drug offenses for which respondent was initially sentenced, this violation demonstrates not only that Romano was a reckless driver, but also that he *625 either had some reason for seeking to cover up that fact or that he refuses to accept responsibility for his actions. The probation judge might have chosen some option other than revocation, but surely it was not irrational or illogical to conclude that Romano was no longer a good rehabilitative risk. Nor was the probation judge required to go through alternatives to revocation seriatim in the record. I therefore join the Court's opinion. |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | Some of our new rulings on the meaning of the United States Constitution apply retroactivelyto cases already concludedand some do not. This Court has held that the question whether a particular ruling is retroactive is itself a question of federal law. It is basic that when it comes to any such question of federal law, it is "the province and duty" of this Court "to say what the law is." State courts are the final arbiters of their own state law; this Court is the final arbiter of federal law. State courts are therefore bound by our rulings on whether our cases construing federal law are retroactive. The majority contravenes these bedrock propositions. The end result is startling: Of two criminal defendants, each of whom committed the same crime, at the same time, whose convictions became final on the same day, and each of whom raised an identical claim at the same time under the Federal Constitution, one may be executed while the other is set freethe first despite *1048 being correct on his claim, and the second because of it. That result is contrary to the Supremacy Clause and the Framers' decision to vest in "one supreme Court" the responsibility and authority to ensure the uniformity of federal law. Because the Constitution requires us to be more jealous of that responsibility and authority, I respectfully dissent. I One year after our leading modern precedent on retroactivityTeague's author explained: "The determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive. is a matter of federal law. When questions of state law are at issue, state courts generally have the authority to determine the retroactivity of their own decisions. The retroactive applicability of a constitutional decision of this Court, however, `is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied.'" American Assns., -178, ; citation omitted). For that reason, "we have consistently required that state courts adhere to our retroactivity decisions." and L. Ed. 2d 5 ). Even more recently, we held that the "Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law." Indeed, about the only point on which our retroactivity jurisprudence has been consistent is that the retroactivity of new federal rules is a question of federal law binding on States. The Court's contrary holding is based on a misreading of our precedent and a misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivity generally. A As the Court correctly points out, |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | of retroactivity generally. A As the Court correctly points out, before we took for granted the proposition that all federal constitutional rights, including rights that represented a break from earlier precedent, would be given full retroactive effect on both direct and collateral That all changed with In that case, a Louisiana prisoner brought a federal habeas petition arguing that illegally seized evidence was introduced against him at trial in violation of Mapp, however, had been decided after his conviction became final. We granted certiorari to decide whether the Mapp rule "operates retrospectively upon cases finally decided in the period prior to Mapp." -20, In answering this question, we broke from our past practice of assuming full retroactivity, holding that "we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying, a decision retrospectively." Our analysis turned entirely on the nature and scope of the particular constitutional right at issue: "[W]e must weigh the merits and demerits [of retroactive application] in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, *1049 and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Under this framework, we held that Mapp would apply only -40, The next year, we decided 8 S. Ct. 2, was a direct appeal from the New Jersey Supreme Court's denial of state collateral relief. The precise question in was whether the rules announced in and would apply to state prisoners whose convictions had become final before those cases were decided. In holding that Escobedo and Miranda should apply only 8 S. Ct. 2, we imported 's mode of retroactivity analysis into of state postconviction -727, 8 S. Ct. 2. Finally, in 87 S. Ct. we announced that, for purposes of retroactivity analysis, "no distinction is justified between convictions now final, as in the instant case, and convictions at various stages of trial and direct " 87 S. Ct. Thus, by the analysis was applied in of criminal convictions, whether final or not. No matter at what stage of this Court considered a retroactivity question, the issue was decided with reference to the purposes and practical impact of the precise federal right in question: "Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine [to decide the retroactivity issue] must inevitably vary with the [constitutional] dictate involved." 8 S. Ct. 2. Because the question of retroactivity was so tied up with the nature and purpose of the underlying federal constitutional |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | with the nature and purpose of the underlying federal constitutional right, it would have been surprising if any of our cases had suggested that States were free to apply new rules of federal constitutional law retroactively even when we would not. As one of the more thoughtful legal scholars put it in discussing the effect of the analysis on state collateral "[i]f a state gave relief in such a case on the exclusive authority of Mapp, under the rationale of the opinion it would presumably have been reversed." Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L.Rev. 5, 91, n. 1 Our precedents made clear that States could give greater substantive protection under their own laws than was available under federal law, and could give whatever retroactive effect to those laws they wished. As the Court explained in "[o]f course, States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision." 8 S. Ct. 2. The clear implication of this statement was that States could apply their own retroactivity rules only to new substantive rights "under their own law," not to new federal rules announced by this Court. Thus, contrary to the Court's view, our early retroactivity cases nowhere suggested that the retroactivity of new federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure was anything other than "a matter of federal law." It is no surprise, then, that *1050 when we held that a particular right would not apply retroactively, the language in our opinions did not indicate that our decisions were optional. See, e.g., L. Ed. 2d 2 "is to be applied only to trials in which the evidence is sought to be introduced after the date of [that] decision" ). And, of course, when we found that a state court erred in holding that a particular right should not apply retroactively, the state court was bound to comply. See, e.g., ; 89 S. Ct. L. Ed. 2d 2 ; L. Ed. 2d 5 Although nothing in our decisions suggested that state courts could determine the retroactivity of new federal rules according to their own lights, we had no opportunity to confront the issue head on until[1] In Payne, the defendant had argued before the Michigan Supreme Court that his resentencing violated the rule we had announced in North 23 L. Ed. 2d 5 (). In considering this question, the state court noted that this Court |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | considering this question, the state court noted that this Court had "not yet decided whether Pearce is to be applied retroactively." 38 Mich. 84, Nevertheless, without so much as citing any federal retroactivity precedent, the court decided that it would "apply Pearce in the present case in order to instruct our trial courts as to the Michigan interpretation of an ambiguous portion of Pearce, pending clarification by the United States Supreme Court." 191 N.W.2d, at We granted certiorari in Payne only on the question of retroactivity, and decided that Pearce should not apply retroactively. In reversing the contrary decision of the state court, our language was not equivocal: "Since the resentencing hearing in this case took place approximately two years before Pearce was decided, we hold that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in applying its proscriptions here." The majority argues that Payne did not preclude States from applying retroactivity rules different from those we announced; rather, the argument goes, the Michigan Supreme Court simply elected to follow the federal retroactivity rule, "pending clarification." See ante, at 1042-1044. That is certainly a possible reading of Payne, but not the most plausible one. The Michigan Supreme Court did not purport to rest its decision to apply Pearce retroactively on the federal analysis, and this Court's reversal is most reasonably read as requiring state courts to apply our federal retroactivity decisions. Notably, this is not the first time Members of this Court have debated the meaning of Payne, with Teague's author explaining that Payne supports the proposition that "we have consistently required that state courts adhere to our retroactivity decisions," American and the author of today's opinion disagreeing in dissent, see at 0, n. 4, (opinion of STEVENS, J.). But whichever way Payne is read, it either offers no support for the *1051 majority's position, because the state court simply applied federal retroactivity rules, or flatly rejects the majority's position, because the state court failed to apply federal retroactivity rules, and was told by this Court that it must. Meanwhile, Justice Harlan had begun dissenting in our retroactivity cases, pressing the view that new rules announced by the Court should be applied in all cases not yet final, without regard to the analysis set forth in See 25-29, (); 401 U.S. 7, 75-702, 91 S. Ct. 110, In 93 L. Ed. 2d 49 we abandoned as it applied to cases still on direct and adopted Justice Harlan's view in such cases. Noting that nonretroactivity on direct appeal "violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication" and that "selective application of new rules violates the principle |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | and that "selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same," 479 U.S., at 2, 3, we held that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct or not yet final," at 8, Just as in previous cases, Griffith by its terms bound state courts to apply our retroactivity decisions. Two years after Griffith was decided, we granted certiorari in 484 U.S. 1, 98 L. Ed. 2d 54 In that case, a South Carolina state habeas court had decided that our decision in 105 S. Ct. should not be applied retroactively. If the authority of state courts to apply their own retroactivity rules were well established under our precedentsas the majority would have it, see ante, at 1035-1039 this case should have been easily decided on the ground that whatever the federal retroactivity rule, the State could adopt its own rule on the retroactivity of newly announced federal constitutional standards. Instead, the State argued to this Court "that we should adopt Justice Harlan's theory that a newly announced constitutional rule should not be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral unless" the rule meets certain criteria the flip side of Justice Harlan's view about cases on direct that we had accepted in 484 U.S., at 5, Under that approach, the State argued, Francis would not be applied retroactively on collateral 484 U.S., at 5, In response, we discussed Justice Harlan's "distinction between direct and collateral " We found, however, that it was "not necessary to determine whether we should. adopt Justice Harlan's reasoning as to the retroactivity of cases announcing new constitutional rules to cases pending on collateral" at 5-, because Francis did not announce a new rule. This Court went on, however, to address South Carolina's alternative argument that it "has the authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus" which would allow it in the case before the Court "to refuse to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law retroactively in such a proceeding." 484 U.S., at 7, This argument should sound familiarwhatever the federal retroactivity rule, a State may establish its own retroactivity rule for its own collateral This Court rejected that proposition, not only because it did not regard Francis as a new rule, but also because the state court did not "plac[e] *1052 any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral" 484 U.S., at 8, As this Court explained, if the state court "consider[s] the merits of the |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | explained, if the state court "consider[s] the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires." Given all this, the present case should come out the way it does only if Teague changed the nature of retroactivity as a creature of federal law binding on the States, and adopted the argument rejected in that when it comes to retroactivity, a State "has the authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus" Teague did no such thing. B In Teague, we completed the project of conforming our view on the retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure to those of Justice Harlan. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion posed the problem by noting, with more than a bit of understatement, that the " retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results." In light of these concerns, and because of "`the important distinction between direct and collateral'" (quoting at 5, ), we generally adopted Justice Harlan's approach to retroactivity on collateral just as we had previously adopted his approach on direct in The approach to retroactivity was thus overruled in favor of the Harlan approach in two steps: Griffith and Teague. There is no dispute that Griffith is fully binding on States; a new rule "is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct or not yet final." 479 U.S., at 8, Teague is simply the other side of the coin, and it too should be binding in "all cases, state or federal." The fact that was overruled in two stages rather than one should not lead to a different result. Indeed, Teague did not purport to distinguish between federal and state collateral Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that "in we were asked to decide whether the rule announced in should be applied to a defendant on collateral at the time that case was decided," but that we were able to decide the case on alternative 489 U.S., (citations omitted). This citation of a state habeas casemakes clear that Teague contemplated no difference between retroactivity of new federal rules in state and federal collateral Thus, our unqualified holding that "[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced," is enough to decide this case. Moreover, the reasons the Teague Court provided for adopting Justice Harlan's view apply to state as well as federal collateral The majority is quite right that Teague invoked the interest in comity |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | is quite right that Teague invoked the interest in comity between the state and federal sovereigns. But contrary to the impression conveyed by the majority, there was more to Teague than that. Teague also relied on the interest in finality: "Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." The Court *1053 responds by flatly stating that "finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one." Ante, at 1040-1041. But while it is certainly true that finality of state convictions is a state interest, that does mean it is not also a federal one. After all, our decision in Griffith made finality the touchstone for retroactivity of new federal rules, and bound States to that judgment. See 479 U.S., at 8, (new rules are "to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct or not yet final" ). It is quite a radical proposition to assert that this Court has nothing to say about an interest "essential to the operation of our criminal justice system," without which "the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect," when the question is whether this interest is being undermined by the very rules of federal constitutional procedure that we are charged with expounding. A State alone may "evaluate, and weigh the importance of" finality interests, ante, at 1040-1041, when it decides which substantive rules of criminal procedure state law affords; it is quite a leap to hold, as the Court does, that they alone can do so in the name of the Federal Constitution. Teague was also based on the inequity of the approach to retroactivity. After noting that the disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants led us in Griffith to adopt Justice Harlan's view for cases on direct appeal, the Court then explained that the " standard also led to unfortunate disparity in the treatment of similarly situated defendants on collateral " See also at 31, (the Court's new approach to retroactivity "avoids the inequity resulting from the uneven application of new rules to similarly situated defendants"). This interest in reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disuniformity in the application of federal law is quite plainly a predominantly federal interest. Indeed, it was one of the main reasons we cited in Griffith for imposing a uniform rule of retroactivity upon state courts for cases on direct |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | rule of retroactivity upon state courts for cases on direct appeal. And, more to the point, it is the very interest that animates the Supremacy Clause and our role as the "one supreme Court" charged with enforcing it. Justice Story, writing for the Court, noted nearly two centuries ago that the Constitution requires "uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within [its] purview." (1). Indeed, the "fundamental principle" of our Constitution, as Justice O'Connor once put it, is "that a single sovereign's law should be applied equally to all." Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 1, 4 States are free to announce their own state-law rules of criminal procedure, and to apply them retroactively in whatever manner they like. That is fully consistent with the principle that "a single sovereign's law should be applied equally to all." But the Court's opinion invites just the sort of disuniformity in federal law that the Supremacy Clause was meant to prevent. The same determination of a federal constitutional violation at the same stage in the criminal process can result in freedom in one State and loss of liberty or life in a neighboring State.[2] The Court's opinion *1054 allows "a single sovereign's law"the Federal Constitution, as interpreted by this Courtto be applied differently in every one of the several States. Finally, from through to Teague, we have always emphasized that determining whether a new federal right is retroactive turns on the nature of the substantive federal rule at issue. See 3 U.S., (in deciding retroactivity, we "loo[k] to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation"); 384 U.S., 8 S. Ct. 2 ("Each constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine [to decide the retroactivity issue] must inevitably vary with the dictate involved"); Teague, (deciding whether rule is applicable to cases on collateral turns on whether the rule "places `certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" and whether the rule is an "absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness that is `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'"). That is how we determine retroactivity by carefully examining the underlying federal right. See, e.g., 11-1184, 17 L. Ed. 2d 1 ; ; ; 10 L. Ed. 2d 25 When this Court decides that a particular right shall not be applied retroactively, but |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | that a particular right shall not be applied retroactively, but a state court finds that it should, it is at least in part because of a different assessment by the state court of the nature of the underlying federal right something on which the Constitution gives this Court the final say. The nature and scope of the new rules we announce directly determines whether they will be applied retroactively on collateral Today's opinion stands for the unfounded proposition that while we alone have the final say in expounding the former, we have no control over the latter. II The Court's holding is not only based on a misreading of our retroactivity cases, but also on a misunderstanding of the nature of retroactivity generally. The majority's decision is grounded on the erroneous view that retroactivity is a remedial question. See ante, at 104-1047 ("It is important to keep in mind that our jurisprudence concerning the `retroactivity' of `new rules' of constitutional law is primarily concerned, *1055 not with the question whether a constitutional violation occurred, but with the availability or nonavailability of remedies"). But as explained in the lead opinion in American penned by the author of the lead opinion in Teagueit is an "error" to "equat[e] a decision not to apply a rule retroactively with the judicial choice of a remedy." 49 U.S., at 194, As Justice O'Connor went on to emphasize, "[n]or do this Court's retroactivity decisions, whether in the civil or criminal sphere, support the assertion that our retroactivity doctrine is a remedial principle." "While application of the principles of retroactivity may have remedial effects, they are not themselves remedial principles A decision defining the operative conduct or events that will be adjudicated under old law does not, in itself, specify an appropriate remedy." See also 93 S. Ct. 143, 3 L. Ed. 2d 151 (describing the question of retroactivity as "whether we will apply a new constitutional rule of criminal law in ing judgments of conviction obtained under a prior standard," and contrasting this with the question of the "appropriate scope of federal equitable remedies"). In other words, when we ask whether and to what extent a rule will be retroactively applied, we are asking what law new or oldwill apply. As we have expressly noted, "[t]he Teague doctrine does not involve a special `remedial' limitation on the principle of `retroactivity' as much as it reflects a limitation inherent in the principle itself." Reynoldsville Casket (5). The foregoing prompts a lengthy rejoinder from the Court, to the effect that it is wrong to view retroactivity as a |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | effect that it is wrong to view retroactivity as a federal choice-of-law question rather than a remedial one. That view, we are told, was rejected by five Justices in American and then by the Court in Ante, at 1043-104. But the proposition on which five Members of the Court agreed in American and that the Court adopted in was that the Griffith rule of retroactivitythat is, that newly announced constitutional decisions should apply to all cases on direct should apply to civil cases as well as criminal. See American 49 U.S., (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("I share Justice STEVENS' perception that prospective decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be"); at 2, ("Fundamental notions of fairness and legal process dictate that the same rules should be applied to all similar cases on direct "); ("When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct "). Neither Justice SCALIA's concurrence in American combined with the dissent, nor the Court's opinion in resolved that retroactivity was a remedial question. That is why, the year after American was decided, two of the Justices in today's majority could explain: "Since the question is whether the court should apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of law, `a choice between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.' Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. *105 358, 34, 77 L. Ed. 30 (19). Once a rule is found to apply `backward,' there may then be a further issue of remedies, i.e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one. Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, the remedial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least where the case originates in state court. See American Assns., 0, But the antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or otherwise. See at -178[, ]" James B. Beam Distilling 115 L. Ed. 2d 4 (1) (citation omitted; emphasis added). And certainly did not view the retroactivity of federal rules as a remedial question for state courts. Quite the contrary: held that the "Supremacy Clause does not allow |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | the contrary: held that the "Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law," 509 U.S., at and expressly treated retroactivity and remedy as separate questions, at -102, The majority explains that when we announce a new rule of law, we are not "`creating the law,'" but rather "`declaring what the law already is.'" Ante, at 1044 (quoting American (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment)). But this has nothing to do with the question before us. The point may lead to the conclusion that nonretroactivity of our decisions is improper the position the Court has adopted in both criminal and civil cases on direct but everyone agrees that full retroactivity is not required on collateral It necessarily follows that we must choose whether "new" or "old" law applies to a particular category of cases. Suppose, for example, that a defendant, whose conviction became final before we announced our decision in 541 U.S. 3, 158 L. Ed. 2d argues (correctly) on collateral that he was convicted in violation of both Crawford and 448 U.S. 5, S. Ct. 2531, 5 L. Ed. 2d 597 the case that Crawford overruled. Under our decision in 17 L. Ed. 2d 1 the "new" rule announced in Crawford would not apply retroactively to the defendant. But I take it to be uncontroversial that the defendant would nevertheless get the benefit of the "old" rule of Roberts, even under the view that the rule not only is but always has been an incorrect reading of the Constitution. See, e.g., 484 U.S., at 8, Thus, the question whether a particular federal rule will apply retroactively is, in a very real way, a choice between new and old law. The issue in this case is who should decide. The proposition that the question of retroactivitythat is, the choice between new or old law in a particular caseis distinct from the question of remedies has several important implications for this case. To begin with, whatever intuitive appeal may lie in the majority's statement that "the remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law," ante, at 1045, the statement misses the mark. The relevant inquiry is not about remedy; it is about choice of law new or old. There is no reason to believe, *1057 either legally or intuitively, that States should have any authority over this question when it comes to which federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure to apply.[3] Indeed, when |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | federal constitutional rules of criminal procedure to apply.[3] Indeed, when the question is what federal rule of decision from this Court should apply to a particular case, no Court but this onewhich has the ultimate authority "to say what the law is," 1 Cranch, at should have final say over the answer. See at ("Supremacy Clause does not allow federal retroactivity doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach to retroactivity under state law" ). This is enough to rebut the proposition that there is no "source of [our] authority" to bind state courts to follow our retroactivity decisions. Ante, at 104-1047. Retroactivity is a question of federal law, and our final authority to construe it cannot, at this point in the Nation's history, be reasonably doubted. Principles of federalism protect the prerogative of States to extend greater rights under their own laws than are available under federal law. The question here, however, is the availability of protection under the Federal Constitutionspecifically, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. It is no intrusion on the prerogatives of the States to recognize that it is for this Court to decide such a question of federal law, and that our decision is binding on the States under the Supremacy Clause. Consider the flip side of the question before us today: If a State interprets its own constitution to provide protection beyond that available under the Federal Constitution, and has ruled that this interpretation is not retroactive, no one would suppose that a federal court could hold otherwise, and grant relief under state law that a state court would refuse to grant. The result should be the same when a state court is asked to give retroactive effect to a right under the Federal Constitution that this Court has held is not retroactive. The distinction between retroactivity and available remedies highlights the fact that the majority's assertion "that Teague's general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court's power to interpret the federal habeas statute," ante, at 1039-1040even if correctis neither here nor there.[4] While Congress has substantial control over federal courts' ability to grant relief for violations of the Federal Constitution, the Constitution gives us the responsibility to decide what its provisions mean. And with that responsibility necessarily comes the authority to determine the scope of those provisionswhen they apply and when they do not. *1058 This propositionand the importance of the distinction between retroactivity and available remedieswere confirmed when we considered the availability of federal collateral of state convictions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act |
Justice Roberts | 2,008 | 0 | dissenting | Danforth v. Minnesota | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145832/danforth-v-minnesota/ | state convictions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of (AEDPA). See (d)(1). Whatever control Congress has over federal courts' ability to grant postconviction remedies, the availability or scope of those remedies has no bearing on our decisions about whether new or old law should apply in a particular case. That is why, after AEDPA's passage, we view the Teague inquiry as distinct from that under AEDPA. See 53 U.S. 2, 122 S. Ct. 47, ("While it is of course a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA standard of set forth in (d), none of our post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas corpus should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA standard, or that AEDPA relieves courts from the responsibility of addressing properly raised Teague arguments"). The majority today views the issue as simply one of what remedies a State chooses to apply; our cases confirm that the question whether a federal decision is retroactive is one of federal law distinct from the issue of available remedies. Lurking behind today's decision is of course the question of just how free state courts are to define the retroactivity of our decisions interpreting the Federal Constitution. I do not see any basis in the majority's logic for concluding that States are free to hold our decisions retroactive when we have held they are not, but not free to hold that they are not when we have held they are. Under the majority's reasoning, in either case the availability of relief in state court is a question for those courts to evaluate independently. The majority carefully reserves that question, see ante, at 1034, n. 4, confirming that the majority regards it as open. Nor is there anything in today's decision suggesting that States could not adopt more nuanced approaches to retroactivity. For example, suppose we hold that the Sixth Amendment right to be represented by particular counsel of choice, recently announced in United 12 S. Ct. 2557, 15 L. Ed. 2d 409 (200), is a new rule that does not apply retroactively. Under the majority's rationale, a state court could decide that it nonetheless will apply Gonzalez-Lopez retroactively, but only if the defendant could prove prejudice, or some other criterion we had rejected as irrelevant in defining the substantive right. Under the majority's logic, that would not be a misapplication of our decision in Gonzalez-Lopezwhich specifically rejected any required showing of prejudice, 12 S. Ct. 2557but simply a state decision on the scope of available remedies in state court. The possible permutationsfrom |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | In we held that a defendant who requests a jury instruction on a lesser offense under Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must demonstrate that "the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense." This case requires us to apply this elements test to the offenses described by 18 U.S. C. 2113(a) and (b) *259 ( ed. and Supp. IV). The former punishes "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes from the person or presence of another any thing of value belonging to, or in the possession of, any bank" The latter, which entails less severe penalties, punishes, inter alia, "[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the possession of, any bank" We hold that 2113(b) requires an element not required by 2113(a)three in factand therefore is not a lesser included offense of 2113(a). Petitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction on the offense described by 2113(b). I On September 9, petitioner Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank in Hamilton Township, New Jersey. Carter confronted a customer who was exiting the bank and pushed her back inside. She screamed, startling others in the bank. Undeterred, Carter ran into the bank and leaped over the customer service counter and through one of the teller windows. One of the tellers rushed into the manager's office. Meanwhile, Carter opened several teller drawers and emptied the money into a bag. After having removed almost $16,000 in currency, Carter jumped back over the counter and fled from the scene. Later that day, the police apprehended him. A grand jury indicted Carter, charging him with violating 2113(a). While not contesting the basic facts of the episode, Carter pleaded not guilty on the theory that he had not taken the bank's money "by force and violence, or by intimidation," as 2113(a) requires. Before trial, Carter moved that the court instruct the jury on the offense described by 2113(b) as a lesser included offense of the offense described by 2113(a). The District Court, relying *260 on United[1] denied the motion in a preliminary ruling. At the close of the Government's case, the District Court denied Carter's motion for a judgment of acquittal and indicated that the preliminary ruling denying the lesser included offense instruction would stand. The jury, instructed on 2113(a) alone, returned a guilty verdict, and the District Court entered judgment pursuant to that |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | verdict, and the District Court entered judgment pursuant to that verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion, relying on its earlier decision in Mosley. Judgment order reported at While the Ninth Circuit agrees with the Third that a lesser offense instruction is precluded in this context, see United other Circuits have held to the contrary, see United ; United We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, and now affirm. II In we were called upon to interpret Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c)'s provision that "[t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged." We held that this provision requires application of an elements test, under which "one offense is not `necessarily included' in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense." 489 U.S.,[2] The *261 elements test requires "a textual comparison of criminal statutes," an approach that, we explained, lends itself to "certain and predictable" outcomes.[3] Applying the test, we held that the offense of tampering with an odometer, 15 U.S. C. 1984 and 1990c(a) (1982 ed.), is not a lesser included offense of mail fraud, 18 U.S. C. 1341. We explained that mail fraud requires two elements(1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts). The lesser offense of odometer tampering, however, requires the element of knowingly and willfully causing an odometer to be altered, an element that is absent from the offense of mail fraud. Accordingly, the elements of odometer tampering are not a subset of the elements of mail fraud, and a defendant charged with the latter is not entitled to an instruction on the former under Rule 31(c). Turning to the instant case, the Government contends that three elements required by 2113(b)'s first paragraph are not required by 2113(a): (1) specific intent to steal; (2) asportation; and (3) valuation exceeding $1,000. The statute provides: " 2113. Bank robbery and incidental crimes "(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, *262 management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association "Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | "Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. "(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or "Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." A "textual comparison" of the elements of these offenses suggests that the Government is correct. First, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant act "with intent to steal or purloin," subsection (a) contains no similar requirement. Second, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant "tak[e] and carr[y] away" the property, subsection (a) only requires that the defendant "tak[e]" the property. Third, whereas the first paragraph of subsection (b) requires that the property have a "value exceeding $1,000," subsection (a) contains no valuation requirement. These extra clauses in subsection (b) "cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; [they] mea[n] something." Carter urges that the foregoing application of `s elements test is too rigid and submits that ordinary principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to the inquiry. We do not dispute the latter proposition. The *263 test, after all, requires an exercise in statutory interpretation before the comparison of elements may be made, and it is only sensible that normal principles of statutory construction apply. We disagree, however, with petitioner's conclusion that such principles counsel a departure in this case from what is indicated by a straightforward reading of the text. III We begin with the arguments pertinent to the general relationship between 2113(a) and (b). Carter first contends that the structure of 2113 supports the view that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). He points to subsection (c) of 2113, which imposes criminal liability on a person who knowingly "receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any property or money or other thing of value which has been taken or stolen from a bank in violation of subsection (b). " (Emphasis added.) It would be anomalous, posits Carter, for subsection (c) to applyas its text plainly providesonly |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | Carter, for subsection (c) to applyas its text plainly providesonly to the fence who receives property from a violator of subsection (b) but not to the fence who receives property from a violator of subsection (a). The anomaly disappears, he concludes, only if subsection (b) is always violated when subsection (a) is violatedi. e., only if subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). But Carter's anomalyeven if it truly existsis only an anomaly. Petitioner does not claim, and we tend to doubt, that it rises to the level of absurdity. Cf. ; For example, it may be that violators of subsection (a) generally act alone, while violators of subsection (b) are commonly assisted by fences. In such a state of affairs, a sensible Congress may have thought it necessary to punish only the fences of property taken in violation of subsection (b). Or Congress may have thought that a defendant who violates subsection (a) *264 usuallyif not inevitablyalso violates subsection (b), so that the fence may be punished by reference to that latter violation. In any event, nothing in subsection (c) purports to redefine the elements required by the text of subsections (a) and (b). Carter's second argument is more substantial. He submits that, insofar as subsections (a) and (b) are similar to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny, we must assume that subsections (a) and (b) require the same elements as their common-law predecessors, at least absent Congress' affirmative indication (whether in text or legislative history) of an intent to displace the common-law scheme. While we (and the Government) agree that the statutory crimes at issue here bear a close resemblance to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny, see Brief for United States 29 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *229, *232); accord, post, at 278-, that observation is beside the point. The canon on imputing common-law meaning applies only when Congress makes use of a statutory term with established meaning at common law, and Carter does not point to any such term in the text of the statute. This limited scope of the canon on imputing common-law meaning has long been understood. In for example, we articulated the canon in this way: "[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them." *265 In other words, a "cluster of ideas" from the common law should be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-law term, and not when, as here, Congress simply describes an offense analogous to a commonlaw crime without using common-law terms. We made this clear in United At issue was whether 18 U.S. C. 1014which punishes a person who "knowingly makes any false statement or report for the purpose of influencing in any way the action" of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured bank "upon any application, advance, commitment, or loan"requires proof of the materiality of the "false statement." The defendants contended that since materiality was a required element of "false statement"-type offenses at common law, it must also be required by 1014. Although Justice Stevens in dissent thought the argument to be meritorious, we rejected it: "[F]undamentally, we disagree with our colleague's apparent view that any term that is an element of a common-law crime carries with it every other aspect of that common-law crime when the term is used in a statute. Justice Stevens seems to assume that because `false statement' is an element of perjury, and perjury criminalizes only material statements, a statute criminalizing `false statements' covers only material statements. By a parity of reasoning, because common-law perjury involved statements under oath, a statute criminalizing a false statement would reach only statements under oath. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended to impose such restrictions sub silentio, however, and so our rule on imputing common-law mean- ing to statutory terms does not sweep so broadly. " n. 10[4] *266 Similarly, in United we declined to look to the analogous common-law crime because the statutory term at issue"stolen"had no meaning at common law. See By contrast, we have not hesitated to turn to the common law for guidance when the relevant statutory text does contain a term with an established meaning at common law. In for example, we addressed whether materiality is required by federal statutes punishing a "scheme or artifice to defraud." and 20-21, nn. 3-4 (citing 18 U.S. C. 1341, 1343, 1344). Unlike the statute in Wells, which contained no commonlaw term, these statutes did include a common-law term "defraud." Because common-law fraud required proof of materiality, we applied the canon to hold that these federal statutes implicitly contain a materiality requirement as well. Similarly, in we observed that "extortion" in 18 U.S. |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | well. Similarly, in we observed that "extortion" in 18 U.S. C. 1951 was a common-law term, and proceeded to interpret this term by reference to its meaning at common law. Here, it is undisputed that "robbery" and "larceny" are terms with established meanings at common law. But neither *267 term appears in the text of 2113(a) or 2113(b).[5] While the term "robbery" does appear in 2113's title, the title of a statute "`[is]of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase' " in the statute itself. Pennsylvania Dept. of And Carter does not claim that this title illuminates any such ambiguous language. Accordingly, the canon on imputing common-law meaning has no bearing on this case. IV We turn now to Carter's more specific arguments concerning the "extra" elements of 2113(b). While conceding the absence of three of 2113(b)'s requirements from the text of 2113(a)(1) "intent to steal or purloin"; (2) "takes and carries away, " i. e., asportation; and (3) "value exceeding $1,000" (first paragraph)Carter claims that the first two should be deemed implicit in 2113(a), and that the third is not an element at all. A As to "intent to steal or purloin," it will be recalled that the text of subsection (b) requires a specific "intent to steal or purloin," whereas subsection (a) contains no explicit mens rea requirement of any kind. Carter nevertheless argues that such a specific intent requirement must be deemed implicitly present in 2113(a) by virtue of "our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms *268 does not contain them." United[6] Properly applied to 2113, however, the presumption in favor of scienter demands only that we read subsection (a) as requiring proof of general intent that is, that the defendant possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime (here, the taking of property of another by force and violence or intimidation). Before explaining why this is so under our cases, an example, United cert. denied, will help to make the distinction between "general" and "specific" intent less esoteric. In Lewis, a person entered a bank and took money from a teller at gunpoint, but deliberately failed to make a quick getaway from the bank in the hope of being arrested so that he would be returned to prison and treated for alcoholism. Though this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of using force and taking money (satisfying "general intent"), he did not intend permanently to deprive the bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy "specific intent").[7] See generally 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal *269 Law 3.5, p. 315 (1986) (distinguishing general from specific intent). The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from "otherwise innocent conduct." X-Citement In for example, to avoid criminalizing the innocent activity of gun ownership, we interpreted a federal firearms statute to require proof that the defendant knew that the weapon he possessed had the characteristics bringing it within the scope of the statute. See also, e. g., ; 342 U. S., at 2-271. By contrast, some situations may call for implying a specific intent requirement into statutory text. Suppose, for example, a statute identical to 2113(b) but without the words "intent to steal or purloin." Such a statute would run the risk of punishing seemingly innocent conduct in the case of a defendant who peaceably takes money believing it to be his. Reading the statute to require that the defendant possess general intent with respect to the actus reusi. e., that he know that he is physically taking the moneywould fail to protect the innocent actor. The statute therefore would need to be read to require not only general intent, but also specific intenti. e., that the defendant take the money with "intent to steal or purloin." In this case, as in Staples, a general intent requirement suffices to separate wrongful from "otherwise innocent" conduct. Section 2113(a) certainly should not be interpreted to apply to the hypothetical person who engages in forceful taking of money while sleepwalking (innocent, if aberrant activity), but this result is accomplished simply by requiring, as Staples did, general intenti. e., proof of knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime. And once this mental state and actus reus are shown, the concerns underlying the presumption in favor of scienter are fully satisfied, *2 for a forceful takingeven by a defendant who takes under a good-faith claim of rightfalls outside the realm of the "otherwise innocent." Thus, the presumption in favor of scienter does not justify reading a specific intent requirement"intent to steal or purloin"into 2113(a).[8] Independent of his reliance upon the presumption in favor of scienter, Carter argues that the legislative history of 2113 supports the notion that an "intent to steal" requirement should be read into 2113(a). Carter points out that, in 1934, Congress enacted what is now 2113(a), but with the adverb "feloniously" (which all agree is equivalent to "intent |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | the adverb "feloniously" (which all agree is equivalent to "intent to steal") modifying the verb "takes." Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, 2(a), In 1937, Congress added what is now 2113(b). Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, Finally, in 1948, Congress made two changes to 2113, deleting "feloniously" from what is now 2113(a) and dividing the "robbery" and "larceny" offenses into their own separate subsections. Carter concludes that the 1948 deletion of "feloniously" was merely a stylistic change, and that Congress had no intention, in deleting that word, to drop the requirement that the defendant "feloniously" take the propertythat is, with intent to steal.[9] Such reasoning, however, misunderstands *271 our approach to statutory interpretation. In analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text, see, e. g., Estate of not by "psychoanalyzing those who enacted it," Bank One Chicago, N. While "feloniously" no doubt would be sufficient to convey a specific intent requirement akin to the one spelled out in subsection (b), the word simply does not appear in subsection (a). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, post, at 283-284, this reading is not a fanciful one. The absence of a specific intent requirement from subsection (a), for example, permits the statute to reach cases like Lewis, see where an ex-convict robs a bank because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison. (The Government represents that indictments on this same fact pattern (which invariably plead out and hence do not result in reported decisions) are brought "as often as every year," Brief for United States 22, n. 13.) It can hardly be said, therefore, that it would have been absurd to delete "feloniously" in order to reach such defendants. And once we have made that determination, our inquiry into legislative motivation is at an end. Cf. Bock Laundry Machine -511.[10] *272 B Turning to the second element in dispute, it will be recalled that, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant "tak[e] and carr[y] away the property," subsection (a) requires only that the defendant "tak[e]" the property. Carter contends that the "takes" in subsection (a) is equivalent to "takes and carries away" in subsection (b). While Carter seems to acknowledge that the argument is at war with the text of the statute, he urges that text should not be dispositive here because nothing in the evolution of 2113(a) suggests that Congress sought to discard the asportation requirement from that subsection. But, again, our inquiry focuses on an analysis of the textual product of Congress' efforts, not on speculation as to the internal thought processes of its Members. |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | speculation as to the internal thought processes of its Members. Congress is certainly free to outlaw bank theft that does not involve asportation, and it hardly would have been absurd for Congress to do so, since the taking-without-asportation scenario is no imagined hypothetical. See, e. g., 9 S.W.2d 835, Indeed, a leading treatise applauds the deletion of the asportation requirement from the elements of robbery. See 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 8.11, at 439. No doubt the common law's decision to require asportation also has its virtues. But Congress adopted a different view in 2113(a), and it is not for us to question that choice. C There remains the requirement in 2113(b)'s first paragraph that the property taken have a "value exceeding $1,000"a requirement notably absent from 2113(a). Carter, shifting gears from his previous arguments, concedes the textual point but claims that the valuation requirement *273 does not affect the elements analysis because it is a sentencing factor, not an element. We disagree. The structure of subsection (b) strongly suggests that its two paragraphsthe first of which requires that the property taken have "value exceeding $1,000," the second of which refers to property of "value not exceeding $1,000"describe distinct offenses. Each begins with the word "[w]hoever," proceeds to describe identically (apart from the differing valuation requirements) the elements of the offense, and concludes by stating the prescribed punishment. That these provisions "stand on their own grammatical feet" strongly suggests that Congress intended the valuation requirement to be an element of each paragraph's offense, rather than a sentencing factor of some base 2113(b) offense. Even aside from the statute's structure, the "steeply higher penalties"an enhancement from a 1-year to a 10-year maximum penalty on proof of valuation exceeding $1,000leads us to conclude that the valuation requirement is an element of the first paragraph of subsection (b). See Castillo v. United States, ante, at 127; 526 U. S., 3. Finally, the constitutional questions that would be raised by interpreting the valuation requirement to be a sentencing factor persuade us to adopt the view that the valuation requirement is an element. See 9-252. The dissent agrees that the valuation requirement of subsection (b)'s first paragraph is an element, but nonetheless would hold that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). Post, at 287-289. The dissent reasons that the "value not exceeding $1,000" component of 2113(b)'s second paragraph is not an element of the offense described in that paragraph. Hence, the matter of value does not prevent 2113(b)'s second paragraph from being a lesser included offense of 2113(a). And |
Justice Thomas | 2,000 | 1 | majority | Carter v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118376/carter-v-united-states/ | paragraph from being a lesser included offense of 2113(a). And if a defendant wishes to receive an instruction on the first paragraph of 2113(b)which entails more severe penalties than the second *274 paragraph, but is a more realistic option from the jury's standpoint in a case such as this one where the value of the property clearly exceeds $1,000the dissent sees no reason to bar him from making that election, even though the "value exceeding $1,000" element of 2113(b)'s first paragraph is clearly absent from 2113(a). This novel maneuver creates a problem, however. Since subsection (a) contains no valuation requirement, a defendant indicted for violating that subsection who requests an instruction under subsection (b)'s first paragraph would effectively "waive his [Fifth Amendment] right to notice by indictment of the `value exceeding $1,000' element." Post, at 289. But this same course would not be available to the prosecutor who seeks the insurance policy of a lesser included offense instruction under that same paragraph after determining that his case may have fallen short of proving the elements of subsection (a). For, whatever authority defense counsel may possess to waive a defendant's constitutional rights, see generally New a prosecutor has no such power. Thus, the prosecutor would be disabled from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction under Rule 31(c), a result plainly contrary to in which we explicitly rejected an interpretive approach to the Rule that would have permitted "the defendant, by in effect waiving his right to notice, [to] obtain a lesser [included] offense instruction in circumstances where the constitutional restraint of notice to the defendant would prevent the prosecutor from seeking an identical instruction," * * * We hold that 2113(b) is not a lesser included offense of 2113(a), and therefore that petitioner is not entitled to a jury instruction on 2113(b). The judgment of the Third Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (1989 ver sion) requires, among other things, that auto manufactur ers install seatbelts on the rear seats of passenger vehi cles. They must install lap-and-shoulder belts on seats next to a vehicle’s doors or frames. But they have a choice about what to install on rear inner seats (say, middle seats or those next to a minivan’s aisle). There they can install either (1) simple lap belts or (2) lap-and-shoulder belts. 54 Fed. Reg. 46257–46258 (1989); (1993), promulgated pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 15 U.S. C. et seq. (1988 ed.) (recodified without substantive change 9 U.S. C. et seq. (2006 ed.)). The question presented here is whether this federal regulation pre-empts a state tort suit that, if successful, would deny manufacturers a choice of belts for rear inner seats by imposing tort liability upon those who choose to install a simple lap belt. We conclude that providing manufacturers with this seatbelt choice is not a significant objective of the federal regulation. Consequently, the 2 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court regulation does not pre-empt the state tort suit. I In 2002, the Williamson family, riding in their 1993 Mazda minivan, was struck head on by another vehicle. Thanh Williamson was sitting in a rear aisle seat, wearing a lap belt; she died in the accident. Delbert and Alexa Williamson were wearing lap-and-shoulder belts; they survived. They, along with Thanh’s estate, subsequently brought this California tort suit against Mazda. They claimed that Mazda should have installed lap-and shoulder belts on rear aisle seats, and that Thanh died because Mazda equipped her seat with a lap belt instead. The California trial court dismissed this tort claim on the basis of the pleadings. And the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The appeals court noted that in v. American Honda Motor Co., this Court considered whether a different portion of (an older version of) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (FMVSS 208)—a portion that required installation of passive restraint devices—pre-empted a state tort suit that sought to hold an auto manufacturer liable for failure to install a particular kind of passive restraint, namely, airbags. We found that the federal regulation intended to assure manufacturers that they would retain a choice of installing any of several different passive restraint de vices. And the regulation sought to assure them that they would not have to exercise this choice in favor of airbags. For that reason we thought that the federal regulation pre-empted a state tort suit that, |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | that the federal regulation pre-empted a state tort suit that, by premising tort liabil ity on a failure to install airbags, would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice that the federal regulation had assured them. –875. The court saw considerable similarity between this case and The federal regulation at issue here gives manufacturers a choice among two different kinds of Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 3 Opinion of the Court seatbelts for rear inner seats. And a state lawsuit that premises tort liability on a failure to install a particular kind of seatbelt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, would in effect deprive the manufacturer of that The court concluded that, as in the federal regulation pre empts the state tort suit. 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (2008). The Williamsons sought certiorari. And we granted certiorari in light of the fact that several courts have interpreted as indicating that FMVSS 208 pre-empts state tort suits claiming that manufacturers should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts, not lap belts, on rear inner seats. Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227 (CA5 2007); Roland v. General Motors Corp., 881 N.E. 2d 722 (Ind. App. 2008); II In we considered a portion of an earlier (1984) version of FMVSS 208. That regulation required manu facturers to equip their vehicles with passive restraint systems, thereby providing occupants with automatic accident protection. (1984). But that regulation also gave manufacturers a choice among sev eral different passive restraint systems, including airbags and automatic seatbelts. The question before the Court was whether the Act, together with the regulation, pre-empted a state tort suit that would have held a manufacturer liable for not installing airbags. 529 U.S., at 865. By requiring manufacturers to install air bags (in order to avoid tort liability) the tort suit would have deprived the manufacturers of the choice among passive restraint systems that the federal regulation gave them. See Hillsborough (“[S]tate laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by 4 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court federal statutes”). We divided this basic pre-emption question into three subsidiary First, we asked whether the statute’s express pre-emption provision pre empted the state tort suit. That statutory clause says that “no State” may “establish, or continue in effect any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of perform ance” of a motor vehicle or item of equipment “which is not identical to the Federal standard.” 15 U.S. C. (1988 ed.) (emphasis added). We had previously held that a word somewhat similar to “standard,” namely, “require ments” (found in a similar |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | similar to “standard,” namely, “require ments” (found in a similar statute) included within its scope state “common-law duties,” such as duties created by state tort Medtronic, 502– 503 (1996) (plurality opinion); at 503–505 (BREYER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); at 509–512 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But we nonetheless held that the state tort suit in question fell outside the scope of this particular pre emption clause. That is primarily because the statute also contains a saving clause, which says that “[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under common ” 15 U.S. C. (emphasis added). Since tort law is ordinarily “common law,” we held that “the presence of the saving clause,” makes clear that Congress intended state tort suits to fall outside the scope of the express pre-emption clause. Second, we asked the converse question: The saving clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the express pre-emption clause. But does it do more? Does it foreclose or limit “the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those principles instruct us to read” federal statutes as pre-empting state laws (including state common-law standards) that “actually conflict” with the federal statutes (or related regulations)? Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 5 Opinion of the Court We concluded that the saving clause does not foreclose or limit the op eration of “ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent.” These two holdings apply directly to the case before us. We here consider (1) the same statute, 15 U.S. C. et seq.; (2) a later version of the same regulation, FMVSS 208; and (3) a somewhat similar claim that a state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation. In light of the statute’s express pre-emption clause cannot pre empt the common-law tort action; but neither can the statute’s saving clause foreclose or limit the operation of ordinary conflict pre-emption principles. We consequently turn our attention to ’s third subsidiary question, whether, in fact, the state tort action conflicts with the federal regulation. III Under ordinary conflict pre-emption principles a state law that “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of a federal law is pre-empted. (1941). See (federal statute can pre-empt a state statute); (1992) (federal statute can pre-empt a state tort suit); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (federal regulation can pre-empt a state stat ute); (federal regulation can pre-empt a state tort suit). In we found that the state |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | a state tort suit). In we found that the state law stood as an “ ‘obstacle’ to the accomplishment” of a significant federal regulatory objective, namely, the maintenance of manufac turer We must decide whether the same is true here. A At the heart of lies our determination that giving 6 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court auto manufacturers a choice among different kinds of passive restraint devices was a significant objective of the federal regulation. We reached this conclusion on the basis of our examination of the regulation, including its history, the promulgating agency’s contemporaneous explanation of its objectives, and the agency’s current views of the regulation’s pre-emptive effect. The history showed that the Department of Transporta tion (DOT) had long thought it important to leave manu facturers with a In 19 DOT required manufac turers to install manual seat belts. ; 2415 (19). Because many car occu pants did not “buckle up,” DOT began to require passive protection, such as airbags or automatic seatbelts, but without “favor[ing] or “expect[ing]” the use of airbags. ; 35 Fed. Reg. 16927 (1970). DOT subsequently approved the use of ignition interlocks, which froze the ignition until the occupant buckled the belt, as a substitute for passive restraints. ; (1972). But the interlock devices were unpopular with the public, and Congress soon forbade the agency to make them a means of compliance. ; Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1482 (previously codified at 15 U.S. C. (1988 ed.)). DOT then temporarily switched to the use of dem onstration projects, but later it returned to mandating passive restraints, again leaving manufacturers with a choice of systems. –877; see 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984). DOT’s contemporaneous explanation of its 1984 regula tion made clear that manufacturer choice was an impor tant means for achieving its basic objectives. The 1984 regulation gradually phased in passive restraint require ments, initially requiring manufacturers to equip only 10% of their new fleets with passive restraints. DOT Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 7 Opinion of the Court explained that it intended its phasing period partly to give manufacturers time to improve airbag technology and to develop “other, better” passive restraint systems. DOT further explained that it had rejected an “ ‘all airbag’ ” system. It was worried that requiring airbags in most or all vehicles would cause a public backlash, like the backlash against interlock devices. DOT also had concerns about the safety of airbags, for they could injure out-of-place occupants, par ticularly children. at 877–878. And, given the cost |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | occupants, par ticularly children. at 877–878. And, given the cost of airbags, vehicle owners might not replace them when necessary, leaving occupants without passive protection. The regulation therefore “deliberately sought vari ety—a mix of several different passive restraint systems.” DOT hoped that this mix would lead to better information about the devices’ comparative effectiveness and to the eventual development of “alternative, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems.” Finally, the Solicitor General told us that a tort suit that insisted upon use of airbags, as opposed to other federally permissible passive restraint systems, would “stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of these objectives.” (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in v. American Honda Motor Co., O. T. 1999, No. 98–1811, pp. 25–26 (hereinafter United States Brief in ) ). And we gave weight to the Solicitor General’s view in light of the fact that it “ ‘embodie[d] the Secretary’s policy judg ment that safety would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alternative protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car.’ ” 529 U.S., at 881 (quoting United States Brief in 25–26). Taken together, this history, the agency’s contempora neous explanation, and the Government’s current under standing of the regulation convinced us that manufacturer choice was an important regulatory objective. And since 8 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court the tort suit stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of that objective, we found the tort suit pre-empted. B We turn now to the present case. Like the regulation in the regulation here leaves the manufacturer with a And, like the tort suit in the tort suit here would restrict that But unlike we do not believe here that choice is a significant regulatory objec tive. We concede that the history of the regulation before us resembles the history of airbags to some degree. In 1984, DOT rejected a regulation that would have required the use of lap-and-shoulder belts in rear seats. 49 Fed. Reg. 15241. Nonetheless, by 1989 when DOT promulgated the present regulation, it had “concluded that several factors had changed.” DOT then required manufacturers to install a particular kind of belt, namely, lap-and-shoulder belts, for rear outer seats. In respect to rear inner seats, it retained manufac turer choice as to which kind of belt to install. But its 1989 reasons for retaining that choice differed considera bly from its 1984 reasons for permitting manufacturers a choice in respect to airbags. DOT here was not concerned about consumer acceptance; it was convinced that lap-and |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | not concerned about consumer acceptance; it was convinced that lap-and shoulder belts would increase safety; it did not fear addi tional safety risks arising from use of those belts; it had no interest in assuring a mix of devices; and, though it was concerned about additional costs, that concern was diminishing. In respect to consumer acceptance, DOT wrote that if “people who are familiar with and in the habit of wearing lap/shoulder belts in the front seat find lap/shoulder belts in the rear seat, it stands to reason that they would be more likely to wear those belts when riding in the rear seat.” Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 9 Opinion of the Court (1988). In respect to safety, DOT wrote that, because an in creasing number of rear seat passengers wore seatbelts, rear seat lap-and-shoulder belts would have “progressively greater actual safety benefits.” It added: “[s]tudies of occupant protection from 1968 forward show that the lap-only safety belts installed in rear seating positions are effective in reducing the risk of death and injury. However, the agency believes that rear-seat lap/shoulder safety belts would be even more effective.” Five years earlier, DOT had expressed concern that lap and-shoulder belts might negatively impact child safety by interfering with the use of certain child car seats that relied upon a tether. But by 1989, DOT found that car seat designs “had shifted away” from tethers. 53 Fed. Reg. 47983. And rear lap-and-shoulder belts could therefore offer safety benefits for children old enough to use them without diminishing the safety of smaller children in car seats. 7988–47989 (“[T]he agency believes that this proposal for rear seat lap/shoulder belts would offer benefits for children riding in some types of booster seats, would have no positive or negative effects on children riding in most designs of car seats and children that are too small to use shoulder belts, and would offer older children the same incremental safety protection [as adults]”). Nor did DOT seek to use its regulation to spur the development of alternative kinds of rear aisle or mid dle seat safety devices. See Why then did DOT not require lap-and-shoulder belts in these seats? We have found some indication that it thought use of lap-and-shoulder belts in rear aisle seats could cause “entry and exit problems for occupants of seating positions to the rear” by “stretch[ing] the shoulder 10 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court belt across the aisleway,” However, DOT encouraged manufacturers to address this issue through innovation: “[I]n those cases where manufacturers are able to |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | through innovation: “[I]n those cases where manufacturers are able to de sign and install lap/shoulder belts at seating positions adjacent to aisleways without interfering with the aisleway’s purpose of allowing access to more rear ward seating positions[, the agency] encourages the manufacturers to do so.” And there is little indication that DOT considered this matter a significant safety concern. Cf. Letter from Philip R. Recht, Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., to Roger Matoba (Dec. 28, 1994), App. to Reply Brief for Petitioners 2 (“With respect to your concerns about the safety of shoulder safety belts which cross an aisle, I note that such belts do not in fact prevent rear ward passengers from exiting the vehicle. Such passen gers may g[o] under or over the belt. They may also move the belt aside”). The more important reason why DOT did not require lap-and-shoulder belts for rear inner seats was that it thought that this requirement would not be cost-effective. The agency explained that it would be significantly more expensive for manufacturers to install lap-and-shoulder belts in rear middle and aisle seats than in seats next to the car doors. But that fact—the fact that DOT made a negative judgment about cost effectiveness— cannot by itself show that DOT sought to forbid common law tort suits in which a judge or jury might reach a different conclusion. For one thing, DOT did not believe that costs would remain frozen. Rather it pointed out that costs were falling as manufacturers were “voluntarily equipping more and more of their vehicles with rear seat lap/shoulder belts.” For another thing, many, perhaps most, Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 11 Opinion of the Court federal safety regulations embody some kind of cost effectiveness judgment. While an agency could base a decision to pre-empt on its cost-effectiveness judgment, we are satisfied that the rulemaking record at issue here discloses no such pre-emptive intent. And to infer from the mere existence of such a cost-effectiveness judgment that the federal agency intends to bar States from impos ing stricter standards would treat all such federal stan dards as if they were maximum standards, eliminating the possibility that the federal agency seeks only to set forth a minimum standard potentially supplemented through state tort We cannot reconcile this consequence with a statutory saving clause that foresees the likelihood of a continued meaningful role for state tort Finally, the Solicitor General tells us that DOT’s regula tion does not pre-empt this tort suit. As in “the agency’s own views should make a difference.” 529 U.S., “Congress has delegated |
Justice Breyer | 2,011 | 2 | majority | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/205315/williamson-v-mazda-motor-of-america-inc/ | views should make a difference.” 529 U.S., “Congress has delegated to DOT authority to imple ment the statute; the subject matter is technical; and the relevant history and background are complex and extensive. The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.” There is “no reason to suspect that the Solicitor General’s representation of DOT’s views reflects anything other than ‘the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the mat ter.’ ” (quoting 462 (1997)). Neither has DOT expressed inconsistent views on this subject. In the Solicitor General pointed out that “state tort law does not conflict with a federal ‘minimum standard’ merely because state law imposes a more strin gent requirement.” United States Brief in 21 (cita 12 WILLIAMSON v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. Opinion of the Court tion omitted). And the Solicitor General explained that a standard giving manufacturers “multiple options for the design of” a device would not pre-empt a suit claiming that a manufacturer should have chosen one particular option, where “the Secretary did not determine that the availabil ity of options was necessary to promote safety.” ; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Wood v. General Motors Corp., O. T. 1989, No. 89–46, p. 15. This last statement describes the present case. In then, the regulation’s history, the agency’s contemporaneous explanation, and its consistently held interpretive views indicated that the regulation sought to maintain manufacturer choice in order to further signifi cant regulatory objectives. Here, these same considera tions indicate the contrary. We consequently conclude that, even though the state tort suit may restrict the manufacturer’s choice, it does not “stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objec tives” of federal 312 U.S., at Thus, the regulation does not pre-empt this tort action. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is re versed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Cite as: 562 U. S. (2011) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–1314 DELBERT WILLIAMSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL. |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Beckwith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109430/beckwith-v-united-states/ | The important issue presented in this case is whether a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service, investigating potential criminal income tax violations, must, in *342 an interview with a taxpayer, not in custody, give the warnings called for by this Court's decision in We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the holding of the Court of Appeals in this case, which is consistent with the weight of authority on the issue,[1] and the position adopted by the United Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.[2] The District Court conducted a thorough inquiry into the facts surrounding the interview of petitioner before ruling on his motion to suppress the statements at issue. After a considerable amount of investigation, two special agents of the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service met with petitioner in a private home where petitioner occasionally stayed. The senior agent testified that they went to see petitioner at this private residence at 8 a. m. in order to spare petitioner the possible embarrassment of being interviewed at his place of employment which opened at 10 a. m. Upon their arrival, they identified themselves to the person answering the door and asked to speak to petitioner. The agents were invited into the house and, when petitioner entered the room where they were waiting, they introduced themselves *343 and, according to the testimony of the senior agent, Beckwith then excused himself for a period in excess of five minutes, to finish dressing.[3] Petitioner then sat down at the dining room table with the agents; they presented their credentials and stated they were attached to the Intelligence Division and that one of their functions was to investigate the possibility of criminal tax fraud. They then informed petitioner that they were assigned to investigate his federal income tax liability for the years 1966 through 1971. The senior agent then read to petitioner from a printed card the following: "As a special agent, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue laws, and related offenses. "Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers or information might tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything which you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding." App. 65-66. Petitioner acknowledged that |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Beckwith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109430/beckwith-v-united-states/ | of an attorney before responding." App. 65-66. Petitioner acknowledged that he understood his rights. The agents then interviewed him until about 11 o'clock. The agents described the conversation as "friendly" and "relaxed." The petitioner noted that the agents did not "press" him on any question he could not or chose not to answer. Prior to the conclusion of the interview, the senior agent requested that petitioner permit the agents to *344 inspect certain records. Petitioner indicated that they were at his place of employment. The agents asked if they could meet him there later. Having traveled separately from petitioner, the agents met petitioner approximately 45 minutes later and the senior agent advised the petitioner that he was not required to furnish any books or records; petitioner, however, supplied the books to the agents. Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress all statements he made to the agents or evidence derived from those statements on the ground that petitioner had not been given the warnings mandated by The District Court ruled that he was entitled to such warnings "when the court finds as a fact that there were custodial circumstances." The District Judge went on to find that "on this record there is no evidence whatsoever of any such situation." The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. 166 U. S. App. D. C. 361, It noted that the reasoning of was based "in crucial part" on whether the suspect "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way," citing ; and agreed with the District Court that "Beckwith was neither arrested nor detained against his will." 166 U. S. App. D. C., We agree with the analysis of the Court of Appeals[4] and, therefore, affirm its judgment. Petitioner contends that the "entire starting point" for the criminal prosecution brought against him was secured from his own statements and disclosures during the interview with the Internal Revenue agents from the *345 Intelligence Division. He correctly points out that cases are assigned to the Intelligence Division only when there is some indication of criminal fraud and that, especially since tax offenses rarely result in pretrial custody, the taxpayer is clearly the "focus" of a criminal investigation when a matter is assigned to the Intelligence Division. Given the complexity of the tax structure and the confusion on the part of taxpayers between the civil and criminal function of the Internal Revenue Service, such a confrontation, argues petitioner, places the taxpayer under "psychological restraints" which are the functional, and, therefore, the legal, equivalent of custody. In short |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Beckwith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109430/beckwith-v-united-states/ | functional, and, therefore, the legal, equivalent of custody. In short we agree with Chief Judge Bazelon, speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeals, that "[t]he major thrust of Beckwith's argument is that the principle of and Mathis[[5]] should be extended to cover interrogation in non-custodial circumstances after a police investigation has focused on the suspect." With the Court of Appeals, we "are not impressed with this argument in the abstract nor as applied to the particular facts of Beckwith's interrogation." It goes far beyond the reasons for that holding and such an extension of the requirements would cut this Court's holding in that case completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale. The narrow issue before the Court in was presented very precisely in the opening paragraph of that opinion"the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation."[6] (Emphasis supplied.) The Court concluded *346 that compulsion is "inherent in custodial surroundings,"[7] at 458, and, consequently, that special safeguards were required in the case of "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights." In subsequent decisions, the Court specifically stressed that it was the custodial nature of the interrogation which triggered the necessity for adherence to the specific requirements of its holding. ; See generally Petitioner's argument that he was placed in the functional, and, therefore, legal, equivalent of the situation asks us now to ignore completely that was grounded squarely in the Court's explicit and detailed assessment of the peculiar "nature and setting of in-custody interrogation," 384 U.S., That Courts of Appeals have so read is suggested by Chief Judge Lumbard in United : " `It was the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, which led the court to impose the *347 requirements with regard to custodial questioning.' " directly supports this conclusion in holding that the requirements are applicable to interviews with Internal Revenue agents concerning tax liability, when the subject is in custody; the Court thus squarely grounded its holding on the custodial aspects of the situation, not the subject matter of the interview.[8] An interview with Government agents in a situation such as the one shown by this record simply does not present the elements which the Court found so inherently coercive as to require its holding. Although the "focus" of an investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was his tax liability which |
Justice Burger | 1,976 | 12 | majority | Beckwith v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109430/beckwith-v-united-states/ | in the sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself in the custodial situation described by the Court as the basis for its holding. implicitly defined "focus," for its purposes, as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (Emphasis supplied.) It may well be true, as petitioner contends, that the "starting point" for the criminal prosecution was the information obtained from petitioner and the records exhibited by him. But this amounts to no more than saying that a tax return signed by a taxpayer can be the "starting point" for a prosecution. We recognize, of course, that noncustodial interrogation might possibly in some situations, by virtue of some *348 special circumstances, be characterized as one where "the behavior of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined." When such a claim is raised, it is the duty of an appellate court, including this Court, "to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness." Proof that some kind of warnings were given or that none were given would be relevant evidence only on the issue of whether the questioning was in fact coercive. ; In the present case, however, as Chief Judge Bazelon noted, "[t]he entire interview was free of coercion," 166 U. S. App. D. C., at Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | The words "transportation in interstate or foreign commerce" appear in a host of federal criminal statutes.[1] These statutes prohibit the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, forged checks, prostitutes, explosives, obscene materials, kidnap victims, counterfeit phonograph records, and numerous other items. In all of these statutes the predicate for federal jurisdiction might reasonably be identified in either of two ways: first, as I read the statutory language, it might require that the subject be transported *660 across a state line; second, as the Court reads this language, it may merely require that the subject be transported during an interstate journey. In this case the evidence indicates that petitioner transported stolen checks from Ohio into Pennsylvania. We must assume, because of insufficient contrary evidence, that petitioner did not forge the checks until he was on the Pennsylvania side of his interstate journey. The Court holds that this evidence proves a violation of 18 U.S. C. 2314, which in pertinent part proscribes the transportation in interstate commerce of forged checks.[2] According to the Court, a forged check is transported in interstate commerce as long as the check was in a forged condition at some point during the defendant's journey from one State to another. Consistent with this rationale, it was not even necessary that the Government proved that the checks crossed state lines.[3] Under the Court's analysis, petitioner would have violated 2314 if he had left his home in Ohio, picked up a forged check in Pittsburgh, and negotiated it in Beaver Falls.[4] If the Court's reading of this language is consistently applied to all of the statutes in which the same jurisdictional predicate appears, this is an extremely important case. If the Court's holding is limited to the situation in which a check has been carried across a state line and then forged in the *661 destination State, the holding is not very significant. Although it would be illogical to limit the holding in that way, a review of the relevant legislative history will demonstrate that the holding should not be extended to its logical conclusion. That review also demonstrates, I believe, that today's holding does not faithfully reflect the intent of Congress. I "[T]he issue in the present case is the meaning that Congress ascribed to the phrase `interstate commerce' in 2314." Ante, at 647, n. 9. More specifically, the question is "whether the statutory phrase `interstate commerce' comprehends movement of a forged security [wholly] within the destination State," ante, at 648, or whether petitioner is correct that Congress intended "to limit the reach of that provision to those persons |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | "to limit the reach of that provision to those persons who transport forged securities across state lines," ante, at 647. For the answer to this question, the Court correctly looks to the legislative history of 3 of the Dyer Act, the precursor of 2314. The interstate commerce language that was enacted as 3 of the Dyer Act in 1919 has been retained in 2314; for our purposes, the subsequent enactments in 1934 and 1939 merely expanded the coverage of 3 to other types of stolen property and to forged securities, respectively. Section 3 of the Dyer Act proscribes, in accurate paraphrase, the transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles. See The phrase, standing alone, admittedly is ambiguous. It is clarified by 2(b) of the same statute, which provides that "[t]he term `interstate. commerce' as used in this Act shall include transportation from one State to another State." Any lingering ambiguity is dispelled by the legislative history. The problem that gave rise to the legislation, the House Judiciary Committee reported, was that "[t]hieves steal automobiles and take them from one State to another and oft-times *662 have associates in this crime who receive and sell the stolen machines." H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1919) (hereafter H. R. Rep. No. 312). In a discussion of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the Committee manifested its intention to proscribe only this problem: "The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State can not be questioned," ; "[n]o good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another," In introducing the bill to the House, Representative Dyer opened his remarks by stating that "this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment for those stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one State to another State." 58 Cong. Rec. 5470 (1919). He described 3 and 4 of the Act, the precursors of 18 U.S. C. 2314 and 2315, as follows: "It provides, gentlemen, for only two things. Section 3 provides for the punishment of a thief stealing a car and transporting it from one State to another. Section 4 provides for the receipt of the stolen car by thieves in another State for the purpose of selling and disposing of it." 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919). Representative Igoe stated that "[t]he |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | 58 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1919). Representative Igoe stated that "[t]he offense sought to be reached in the act is the transportation, the taking it across the line, taking it from one State to another." Senator Cummins, in introducing the House bill to the Senate, described its purpose to be "to punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce." He explained: "I want Senators to know what the bill is. The favorite place for such thefts is near a State line, where vehicles are carried quickly across the State line, and there is *663 very great difficulty in securing the punishment of the offender. The bill is for the purpose of giving the Federal courts jurisdiction for the punishment of such an offender." [5] Representative Bee, like Representative Reavis, objected to the bill because it "single[d] out automobiles" for special treatment. Representative Reavis stated that he would "be very glad indeed to vote for a bill making it a felony to transport stolen property of any kind from one State to another." The Court's expansive interpretation of the interstate commerce phrase in 3 of the Dyer Act is far broader than any that was expressed by the Committees and the Members of the 66th Congress. The Court offers several reasons for its reading of the statute, but none withstands analysis. A The Court first reasons that, by using the phrase "transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles" in the statute, Congress must have intended to proscribe more than the "transportation across state lines of stolen motor vehicles" or the "interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles." The Court's reasoning from the text, however, is flawed in two respects. First, the House Report and the Members of Congress who described the Dyer Act proscription as the "interstate *664 transportation of stolen motor vehicles," or some such phrase focusing on state lines, used these phrases interchangeably with the phrase "transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles," which was the formulation included in the proposed and enacted bill. The point is illustrated by Representative Dyer's descriptions of the interstate commerce element of the bill. For example, the final paragraph of the House Report that he submitted begins with the sentence, "The purpose of the proposed law is to suppress crime in interstate commerce." H. R. Rep. No. 312, Two sentences later, however, the Report urges that Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, should "provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another." Representative Dyer opened his remarks |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | from one State to another." Representative Dyer opened his remarks to the House with the statement that "this bill is for the purpose of providing punishment for those stealing automobiles and automobile trucks and taking them from one State to another State." 58 Cong. Rec. 5470 (1919). It is inconceivable that Representative Dyer or any of the other legislators who used interchangeably the various phrases[6] nevertheless intended the statutory formulation "transportation in interstate commerce of stolen motor vehicles" to mean any more than "interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles" or "transportation across state lines of stolen motor vehicles" or "transportation of stolen motor vehicles from one State to another." The second flaw in the Court's textual analysis is its reference to 18 U.S. C. 10 for the definition of "interstate commerce." See ante, at 648-649. Section 10 provides that "[t]he term `interstate commerce', as used in this title, includes commerce between one State and another State." It merits reiteration, however, that "interstate commerce" is defined much more narrowly in the Dyer Act and the National *665 Stolen Property Act of 1934. Section 2(b) of the Dyer Act provides that the term "shall include transportation from one State to another State." Section 2(a) of the 1934 enactment provides that the term "shall mean transportation from one State to another State." When Congress revised the Federal Criminal Code in 1948, it consolidated several definitions of "interstate commerce" into 10. The Reviser's Notes state only that, "[i]n addition to slight improvements in style, the word `commerce' was substituted for `transportation' in order to avoid the narrower connotation of the word `transportation' since `commerce' obviously includes more than `transportation.' " Notes following 18 U.S. C. 10. For purposes of divining the intent of Congress in enacting the Dyer Act in 1919, the National Stolen Property Act in 1934, and the amendments thereto in 1939, we must refer to the definition by which those Congresses understood the reach of those criminal statutes. B There is a logical explanation albeit an unarticulated one for Congress' use of the arguably broader formulation in the statute when its intent was so clearly less ambitious. This explanation is derived from the part of the legislative history in which the constitutionality of the proposed Dyer Act was justified by reference to this Court's expositions of the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The Court infers from one such part of the legislative history that "Congress intended the statutory phrase to be as broad as this Court had used the phrase in Commerce Clause decisions before 1919." |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | had used the phrase in Commerce Clause decisions before 1919." Ante, at 653. If the legislative history is examined through 1919 lenses instead of from a distance of six decades, however, the only supportable conclusion is that Congress used the phrase "interstate commerce" merely to indicate the source of its authority to proscribe *666 conduct that had previously been regulated solely by the States. In the Court's words, the House Report "justif[ied] Congress' authority to enact the Dyer Act by reference to this Court's decisions holding that Congress has plenary power under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce." Ante, at 652. From this discussion in the House Report, the Court draws the conclusion that Congress meant to adopt as the definition of the statutory term this Court's construction of the constitutional term "interstate commerce." That conclusion does not logically follow from its premise and is without any support in the legislative history. The part of the House Report cited by the Court begins with this paragraph: "The power of the Congress to enact this law and to punish the theft of automobiles in one State and the removing of them into another State can not be questioned, in view of laws of similar nature heretofore enacted by Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States touching same." H. R. Rep. No. 312, This statement establishes that (1) the objective of the statute was to proscribe the transportation of a stolen automobile from one State to another, and (2) the House Judiciary Committee was confident that this objective could be accomplished under the Commerce Clause, as interpreted by this Court. The Report's discussion of this Court's decisions justifies the Committee's confidence in the constitutionality of the Act. Indeed, the penultimate paragraph of the Report explains just how far Congress can act under the Commerce Clause;[7] in the paragraph's closing sentence, which the *667 Court quotes, ante, at 650, the Report states that even "[l]arceny of goods from railroad cars being transported in interstate commerce has been declared a crime by act of Congress." H. R. Rep. No. 312, But the Committee had a much more limited objective in proposing the Dyer Act. In the closing paragraph of the Report, it expressly linked its discussion of this Court's Commerce clause cases with the statutory objective: "No good reason exists why Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, should not provide that such commerce should not be polluted by the carrying of stolen property from one State to another." The Committee's confidence in |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | property from one State to another." The Committee's confidence in the constitutionality of the Act was not shared by all Members of Congress. Representative Newton described in detail the practice of automobile thieves of stealing cars and driving them across state lines where they could not be pursued by the police of the first State. See 58 Cong. Rec. 5474-5475 (1919). After summarizing the need for federal legislation,[8] he turned to the question of its constitutionality: *668 "But it has been seriously argued by Members of this House that Congress has no power to pass such a law; that such legislation is an invasion of the rights of the States. But if you will study the laws upon kindred subjects heretofore enacted by Congress and will read the decisions of the courts sustaining such laws I do not believe that a doubt will remain in the mind of even the most ardent States-rights advocate as to the powers of Congress upon this subject." Representative Newton discussed a number of court decisions and repeatedly compared the federal laws therein upheld with the bill Congress was considering: "In the face of the decisions which I have just read, can there be any question but what an automobile which is stolen in one State and transported across a State line into another State for the purpose of yielding a profit to the person transporting the same constitutes `interstate commerce'? "Thus it will be observed that no particular vehicle of transportation is necessary in order to make the article transported interstate commerce, nor is it necessary that the article should be transported for any specific purpose. All that is necessary for it to become interstate commerce is that it shall be transported from one State to another, even though it be live stock driven on foot. "If the driving of diseased cattle from one State to another is interstate commerce, as held in the decision just cited, and as held by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of ), then the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another certainly falls within the meaning of that term. *669 "If the transportation of a woman from one State to another, by means of an automobile, for prostitution, constitutes interstate commerce, then how can it be argued, with any show of color, that the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another for profit is not interstate commerce?" -5476. Given these statements in the legislative history and the absence of any indication that any legislator intended the Dyer |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | absence of any indication that any legislator intended the Dyer Act to proscribe more than the transportation of stolen automobiles from one State into another, it is manifest that Congress used the term "interstate commerce" and referred to this Court's decisions construing the Commerce Clause simply to articulate the source of its authority to proscribe the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles. The Court's suggestion that Congress incorporated into the statute the constitutional definition of "interstate commerce" is quite implausible. C The final leg of the Court's analysis of the legislative history is the following colloquy between Representatives Anderson and Dyer: "Mr. ANDERSON. I will ask the gentleman whether the committee meant the same thing in its definition of interstate commerce in section 2 as it meant in section 4? "Mr. DYER. I think so. If the gentleman will point out wherein it differs, I shall be glad. "Mr. ANDERSON. In the definition under section 2 interstate commerce means transportation from one State to another, while if you refer to section 4 you find there you have a vehicle or motor car constituting interstate or foreign commerce, and you scarcely have a sensible section. "Mr. DYER. I will say to the gentleman that if there is any difference there, which I do not see, the matter *670 would be construed by the Supreme Court, which has passed many times upon what is meant by interstate and foreign commerce. I think it really is not necessary to put the definition in this bill. It was done at the request of some of the members of the committee. The Supreme Court has decided many times what is interstate commerce. I do not think myself that any definition is necessary." Since the Court places so much reliance upon Representative Dyer's answer, see ante, at 650-652, a careful parsing is necessary. Section 2(b) of the bill provided that "[t]he term `interstate commerce,' as used in this Act, shall include transportation from one State to another State." Section 4 of the bill proscribed the receipt, concealment, storage, bartering, sale, or disposition of any stolen motor vehicle "moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate commerce." Representative Anderson's confusion is understandable: 2 defined interstate commerce in terms of interstate transportation; 4, however, seemed to indicate that the automobile itself constituted interstate commerce, apart from the transportation of it.[9] Representative Dyer obviously did not understand the confusion because he perceived no difference between the two sections insofar as the meaning of "interstate commerce" was concerned. He had no doubt that this Court knew what |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | concerned. He had no doubt that this Court knew what the term meant and that 4 would be construed correctly; indeed, he saw no need for the statutory definition of "interstate commerce." Even if it could be said that Representative Dyer was willing to defer to this Court for the definition of the interstate commerce element of 4, that is not what Congress did. The Dyer Act as proposed and as enacted included *671 the definition of "interstate commerce" as transportation from one State to another. Moreover, 4, which contained the confusing reference to interstate commerce, is the precursor of 2315, not the section the Court interprets today. The precursor of 2314 is 3 of the Dyer Act, which has nothing to do with Representative Anderson's confusion and Representative Dyer's answer. Interestingly, another colloquy, this one between Representatives Hastings and Saunders, also indicates the confusion about the meaning of 4 of the bill: "Mr. HASTINGS. I want to direct the gentleman's attention to section 4. Suppose an automobile is stolen, say, in the State of Virginia at some one point and is transported to some other point in the State of Virginia and sold to some one there who knows that property to have been stolen, would that be a Federal offense under section 4? "Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. I think not. How would it be? Up to that point what has been done has not reached the dignity of a Federal offense. The Federal offense begins when there is a movement in interstate commerce. "Mr. HASTINGS. Section 4 provides that anyone receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, and it does not require it to have gone across State lines, as you will perceive if you read section 4 closely. "Mr. SAUNDERS of Virginia. The gentleman did not read the language in line 10, which says: Moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce. "And that answers the difficulty of the gentleman from Oklahoma." 58 Cong. Rec. 5477 (1919). Immediately after this colloquy, Representative Dyer asked for a vote, and the House passed the bill. If we were construing 2315, which is the successor to 4 of the Dyer Act, *672 then this colloquy would seem to indicate that 4 requires the automobile to have crossed state lines, notwithstanding the confusing reference to "interstate commerce" in that section and Representative Dyer's answer to Representative Anderson's observation. In any event, we are not construing 2315, but 2314, and the definition of "interstate commerce" included in the Dyer Act, as well as |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | "interstate commerce" included in the Dyer Act, as well as the statute's legislative history, clearly indicates that 3, the precursor of 2314, proscribed only the transportation across state lines of stolen automobiles. II The National Stolen Property Act, enacted in 1934, merely extended the Dyer Act to the transportation in interstate commerce of other types of stolen property.[10] The Act was passed with little debate, but its legislative history confirms the points made above. As they did in 1919, the Committees and Members of Congress used the phrase "transportation in interstate commerce of stolen property" interchangeably with such phrases as "interstate transportation of stolen property" or "transportation across state lines of stolen property." The Senate Judiciary Committee Report described the Dyer Act as "concerned [with] interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles." S. Rep. No. 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934). The House Judiciary Committee Report stated that "[t]his bill is designed to punish interstate transportation of stolen property, securities, or money." H. R. Rep. No. 73d Cong, 2d Sess., 2 (1934). It also noted *673 that "[p]revious Congresses have considered bills providing punishment for interstate shipment of stolen property." Senator Ashurst told the Senate: "Gangsters who now convey stolen property, except vehicles, across the State line, with that immemorial gesture of derision, thumb their nose at the officers. This bill extends the provisions of the [Dyer Act] to other stolen property described in the bill." 78 Cong. Rec. 6981 (1934). Also like the legislative history of the Dyer Act, the Reports in 1934 substantiated the constitutionality of the enactment, this time by reference to the decisions upholding the Dyer Act. See S. Rep. No. ; H. R. Rep. No. The Reports made an additional point that merits consideration. The Department of Justice, in a memorandum reprinted in the Senate Report, explained the troubles that previous attempts at extending the Dyer Act to other stolen property had faced: "The explanation for the opposition to federalizing such crimes was in the concern which had developed at that time over the burdening of the Federal machinery for administering criminal justice. It was for this reason also that the Senate failed to pass a similar bill in 1930. The heavy burden placed on the Federal Government by the Dyer Act, which concerned interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, had then become apparent." S. Rep. No. The Senate bill therefore limited federal jurisdiction to cases involving stolen property worth $1,000 or more. The House increased the limit to $5,000, with this explanation: "It is believed that it would place too great a burden on the |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | dissenting | McElroy v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110671/mcelroy-v-united-states/ | that it would place too great a burden on the Department of Justice to ask it to undertake to apprehend and prosecute every person violating the substantive provisions of such a law without regard to the amount of property involved. The minimum valuations *674 fixed in the bill required to give the Federal Government jurisdiction are the figures asked and recommended by the Attorney General." H. R. Rep. No. The Senate acceded to the increase. The point to be made is that Congress recognized that federal law enforcement authorities had limited resources. This recognition makes it all the more likely that Congress did not intend in 1934 to extend its proscription beyond the interstate transportation of stolen property. III Quoting from United the Court declares that "in [enacting] 2314 Congress `contemplated coming to the aid of the states in detecting and punishing criminals whose offenses are complete under state law, but who utilize the channels of interstate commerce to make a successful getaway and thus make the state's detecting and punitive processes impotent.' " Ante, at 654. Ironically, this quote actually refutes the Court's position. The Court assumes, as it must, that the state offense committed by petitioner forging a check was committed in Pennsylvania rather than in Ohio, from which petitioner commenced his interstate journey. This is not a case, therefore, in which the defendant's offense was complete under state law before he crossed state lines to make his getaway. Rather, this is a case in which the defendant crossed state lines and then committed the underlying state offense.[11] It is even more ironic that, although the issue of the meaning of the interstate commerce phrase of 2314 was not before the Court in Sheridan, the Court thrice referred to that element as the "interstate transportation" of forged securities. See 329 U.S., 84, 385, 387. Remarkably, the Court today places so much significance upon the statutory formulation of the interstate *675 commerce element of 2314 even though in referring to that element the Committees and Members of the 1919 and 1934 Congresses, as well this Court in Sheridan, repeatedly used the formulation that the Court rejects today as too narrow. IV The petitioner's argument that he was prosecuted and convicted under the wrong statute may generate little sympathy.[12] Our primary concern, however, is not with the fate of this defendant. Rather, our concern is to identify the scope of the Federal Government's responsibility for law enforcement. That scope is a matter for Congress to determine. In this case, it is clear to me that the Court has |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | dissenting | Georgia v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112764/georgia-v-mccollum/ | The Court reaches the remarkable conclusion that criminal defendants being prosecuted by the State act on behalf of their adversary when they exercise peremptory challenges during jury selection. The Court purports merely to follow *63 precedents, but our cases do not compel this perverse result. To the contrary, our decisions specifically establish that criminal defendants and their lawyers are not government actors when they perform traditional trial functions. I It is well and properly settled that the Constitution's equal protection guarantee forbids prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion. See ; The Constitution, however, affords no similar protection against private action. "Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendmen[t] and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be." National Collegiate Athletic This distinction appears on the face of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1 The critical but straightforward question this case presents is whether criminal defendants and their lawyers, when exercising peremptory challenges as part of a defense, are state actors. In the Court developed a two-step approach to identifying state action in cases such as this. First, the Court will ask "whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority." Next, it will decide whether, on the particular facts at issue, the parties who allegedly caused the deprivation of a federal right can "appropriately" and "in all fairness" be characterized as state actors. ; The *64 Court's determination in this case that the peremptory challenge is a creation of state authority, ante, at 51, breaks no new ground. See at -621. But disposing of this threshold matter leaves the Court with the task of showing that criminal defendants who exercise peremptories should be deemed governmental actors. What our cases require, and what the Court neglects, is a realistic appraisal of the relationship between defendants and the government that has brought them to trial. We discussed that relationship in Polk which held that a public defender does not act "under color of state law" for purposes of 42 U.S. C. 1983 "when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." We began our analysis by explaining that a public defender's obligations toward her client are no different than the obligations of any other defense attorney. These obligations |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | dissenting | Georgia v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112764/georgia-v-mccollum/ | than the obligations of any other defense attorney. These obligations preclude attributing the acts of defense lawyers to the State: "[T]he duties of a defense lawyer are those of a personal counselor and advocate. It is often said that lawyers are `officers of the court.' But the Courts of Appeals are agreed that a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor" We went on to stress the inconsistency between our adversarial system of justice and theories that would make defense lawyers state actors. "In our system," we said, "a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State." This adversarial posture rests on the assumption that a defense lawyer best serves the public "not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advancing `the undivided interests of his client.' " -319 ). Moreover, we pointed out that the independence of defense attorneys from state control has a constitutional dimension. "established the right of state criminal defendants to the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against [them]." Implicit in this right "is the assumption that counsel will be free of state control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an effective and independent advocate." Thus, the defense's freedom from state authority is not just empirically true, but is a constitutionally mandated attribute of our adversarial system. Because this Court deems the "under color of state law" requirement that was not satisfied in identical to the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement, see the holding of simply cannot be squared with today's decision. In particular, cannot be explained away as a case concerned exclusively with the employment status of public defenders. See ante, at 54. The Court reasoned that public defenders performing traditional defense functions are not state actors because they occupy the same position as other defense attorneys in relevant -325. This reasoning followed on the heels of a critical determination: Defending an accused "is essentially a private function," not state action. The Court's refusal to acknowledge `s initial holding, on which the entire opinion turned, will not make that holding go away. The Court also seeks to evade `s logic by spinning out a theory that defendants and their lawyers transmogrify from government adversaries into state actors when they exercise a peremptory challenge, and then change back to perform other defense functions. See ante, at 54. however, established that even though public defenders might act under color of state law when carrying |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | dissenting | Georgia v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112764/georgia-v-mccollum/ | defenders might act under color of state law when carrying out administrative or investigative functions outside a courtroom, they are not vested with state authority "when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a *66 criminal proceeding." Since making peremptory challenges plainly qualifies as a "traditional function" of criminal defense lawyers, see ; forecloses the Court's functional analysis. Even aside from our prior rejection of it, the Court's functional theory fails. "[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement. that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Thus, a private party's exercise of choice allowed by state law does not amount to state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as "the initiative comes from [the private party] and not from the State." See Flagg Bros., The government in no way influences the defense's decision to use a peremptory challenge to strike a particular juror. Our adversarial system of criminal justice and the traditions of the peremptory challenge vest the decision to strike a juror entirely with the accused. A defendant "may, if he chooses, peremptorily challenge `on his own dislike, without showing any cause;' he may exercise that right without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously." "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." See ; at 378. Certainly, did not render and its realistic approach to the state action inquiry dead letters. The Court distinguished *67 by saying: "In the ordinary context of civil litigation in which the government is not a party, an adversarial relation does not exist between the government and a private litigant. In the jury selection process, the government and private litigants work for the same end." While the nonpartisan administrative interests of the State and the partisan interests of private litigants may not be at odds during civil jury selection, the same cannot be said of the partisan interests of the State and the defendant during jury selection in a criminal trial. A private civil litigant opposes a private counterpart, but a criminal defendant is by design in an adversarial relationship with the government. Simply put, the defendant seeks to strike jurors predisposed to convict, while the State seeks to strike jurors predisposed to acquit. The Court clearly recognized this point when it limited the statement that "an adversarial relation does not exist between |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | dissenting | Georgia v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112764/georgia-v-mccollum/ | the statement that "an adversarial relation does not exist between the government and a private litigant" to "the ordinary context of civil litigation in which the government is not a party. " From arrest, to trial, to possible sentencing and punishment, the antagonistic relationship between government and the accused is clear for all to see. Rather than squarely facing this fact, the Court, as in rests its finding of governmental action on the points that defendants exercise peremptory challenges in a courtroom and judges alter the composition of the jury in response to defendants' choices. I found this approach wanting in the context of civil controversies between private litigants, for reasons that need not be repeated here. See But even if I thought was correctly decided, I could not accept today's simplistic extension of it. makes clear that the unique relationship between criminal defendants and the State precludes attributing defendants' actions to the State, whatever is the case in civil trials. How could it be otherwise when the underlying question is *68 whether the accused "c[an] be described in all fairness as a state actor"? 500 U.S., at As accords with our state action jurisprudence and with common sense, I would honor it. II What really seems to bother the Court is the prospect that leaving criminal defendants and their attorneys free to make racially motivated peremptory challenges will undermine the ideal of nondiscriminatory jury selection we espoused in -. The concept that the government alone must honor constitutional dictates, however, is a fundamental tenet of our legal order, not an obstacle to be circumvented. This is particularly so in the context of criminal trials, where we have held the prosecution to uniquely high standards of conduct. See ; Considered in purely pragmatic terms, moreover, the Court's holding may fail to advance nondiscriminatory criminal justice. It is by now clear that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or innocence. See Developments in the Race and the Criminal Process, ; Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, Using peremptory challenges to secure minority representation on the jury may help to overcome such racial bias, for there is substantial reason to believe that the distorting influence of race is minimized on a racially mixed jury. See ; Developments in *69 the at As amicus NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund explained in this case: "The ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority |
Justice O'Connor | 1,992 | 14 | dissenting | Georgia v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112764/georgia-v-mccollum/ | case: "The ability to use peremptory challenges to exclude majority race jurors may be crucial to empaneling a fair jury. In many cases an African American, or other minority defendant, may be faced with a jury array in which his racial group is underrepresented to some degree, but not sufficiently to permit challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. The only possible chance the defendant may have of having any minority jurors on the jury that actually tries him will be if he uses his peremptories to strike members of the majority race." Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 9-10 See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense yers as Amicus Curiae 56-57; In a world where the outcome of a minority defendant's trial may turn on the misconceptions or biases of white jurors, there is cause to question the implications of this Court's good intentions. That the Constitution does not give federal judges the reach to wipe all marks of racism from every courtroom in the land is frustrating, to be sure. But such limitations are the necessary and intended consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment's state action requirement. Because I cannot accept the Court's conclusion that government is responsible for decisions criminal defendants make while fighting state prosecution, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,979 | 19 | majority | Chrysler Corp. v. Brown | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110062/chrysler-corp-v-brown/ | The expanding range of federal regulatory activity and growth in the Government sector of the economy have increased federal agencies' demands for information about the activities of private individuals and corporations. These developments have paralleled a related concern about secrecy in Government and abuse of power. The Freedom of Information Act (hereinafter FOIA) was a response to this concern, but it has also had a largely unforeseen tendency to exacerbate the uneasiness of those who comply with governmental demands for information. For under the FOIA third parties have been able to obtain Government files containing information submitted by corporations and individuals who thought that the information would be held in confidence. This case belongs to a class that has been popularly denominated "reverse-FOIA" suits. The Chrysler (hereinafter Chrysler) seeks to enjoin agency disclosure on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the FOIA and 18 U.S. C. 15, a criminal statute with origins in the 19th century that proscribes disclosure of certain classes of business and personal information. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that the FOIA is purely a disclosure statute and affords Chrysler no private right of action to enjoin agency disclosure. But we cannot agree with that court's conclusion that this disclosure is "authorized by law" within the meaning of 15. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand so that it can consider *286 whether the documents at issue in this case fall within the terms of 15. I As a party to numerous Government contracts, Chrysler is required to comply with Executive Orders 11246 and 11375, which charge the Secretary of Labor's with ensuring that corporations that benefit from Government contracts provide equal employment opportunity regardless of race or sex.[1] The United States Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has promulgated regulations which require Government contractors to furnish reports and other information about their affirmative-action programs and the general composition of their work forces.[2] The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (formerly the Defense Supply Agency) of the Department of Defense is the designated compliance agency responsible for monitoring Chrysler's employment practices.[3] OFCCP regulations require that Chrysler make available to this agency written affirmative-action programs (AAP's) and annually submit Employer Information Reports, known as EEO-1 Reports. The agency may also conduct "compliance reviews" and "complaint investigations," which culminate in Compliance Review Reports (CRR's) and Complaint Investigation Reports (CIR's), respectively.[4] *287 Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor provide for public disclosure of information from records of the OFCCP and its compliance agencies. Those regulations state that |
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