author_name
stringclasses 26
values | year
int64 1.97k
2.02k
| label
int64 0
200
| category
stringclasses 5
values | case_name
stringlengths 9
127
| url
stringlengths 55
120
| text
stringlengths 1k
3.91k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/902772/association-for-molecular-pathology-v-myriad-genetics-inc/ | has been identified.” 6 Myriad first identified groups of relatives with a history of breast cancer (some of whom also had developed ovarian cancer); because these individuals were related, scientists knew that it was more likely that their diseases were the result of genetic predisposition rather than other factors. Myriad compared sections of their chromosomes, looking for shared genetic abnormalities not found in the general population. It was that process which eventually enabled Myriad to determine where in the genetic sequence the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes reside. See, e.g., 763–775. Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 15 Opinion of the Court BRCA2 genes. If the patents depended upon the creation of a unique molecule, then a would-be infringer could arguably avoid at least Myriad’s patent claims on entire genes (such as claims 1 and 2 of the ’282 patent) by isolat- ing a DNA sequence that included both the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene and one additional nucleotide pair. Such a molecule would not be chemically identical to the molecule “invented” by Myriad. But Myriad obviously would resist that outcome because its claim is concerned primarily with the information contained in the genetic sequence, not with the specific chemical composition of a particular molecule. Finally, Myriad argues that the PTO’s past practice of awarding gene patents is entitled to deference, citing J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). See Brief for Respondents 35–39, 49–50. We disagree. J. E. M. held that new plant breeds were eligible for utility patents under notwithstanding separate statutes providing special protections for plants, see 7 U.S. C. et seq. (Plant Variety Protection Act); 35 U.S. C. (Plant Patent Act of 1930). After analyzing the text and structure of the relevant statutes, the Court mentioned that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences had determined that new plant breeds were patent eligible under and that Congress had recog- nized and endorsed that position in a subsequent Patent Act –145 and 35 U.S. C. In this case, however, Congress has not endorsed the views of the PTO in subsequent legislation. While Myriad relies on Judge Moore’s view that Congress endorsed the PTO’s position in a single sentence in the Consolidated Appro- priations Act of 2004, see Brief for Respondents 31, n. 8; that Act does not even mention genes, much less isolated DNA. (“None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this 16 ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v. MYRIAD GENETICS, INC. Opinion of the Court Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed to or encompassing |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/902772/association-for-molecular-pathology-v-myriad-genetics-inc/ | used to issue patents on claims directed to or encompassing a human organism”). Further undercutting the PTO’s practice, the United States argued in the Federal Circuit and in this Court that isolated DNA was not patent eligible under Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20–33, and that the PTO’s practice was not “a sufficient reason to hold that isolated DNA is patent-eligible.” See also at 28–29. These concessions weigh against deferring to the PTO’s determination.7 C cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentabil- ity as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments. As already explained, creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not natu- rally occurring.8 Petitioners concede that cDNA differs from natural DNA in that “the non-coding regions have —————— 7 Myriad also argues that we should uphold its patents so as not to disturb the reliance interests of patent holders like itself. Brief for Respondents 38–39. Concerns about reliance interests arising from PTO determinations, insofar as they are relevant, are better directed to Congress. See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. (slip op., at 22–24). 8 Some viruses rely on an enzyme called reverse transcriptase to re- produce by copying RNA into cDNA. In rare instances, a side effect of a viral infection of a cell can be the random incorporation of fragments of the resulting cDNA, known as a pseudogene, into the genome. Such pseudogenes serve no purpose; they are not expressed in protein creation because they lack genetic sequences to direct protein expres- sion. See J. Watson et al., Molecular Biology of the Gene 142, 144, fig. 7–5 (6th ed. 2008). Perhaps not surprisingly, given pseudogenes’ apparently random origins, petitioners “have failed to demonstrate that the pseudogene consists of the same sequence as the BRCA1 cDNA.” Association for Molecular The possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might randomly create a molecule similar to one created synthetically through human ingenuity does not render a composition of matter nonpatentable. Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 17 Opinion of the Court been removed.” Brief for Petitioners 49. They neverthe- less argue that cDNA is not patent eligible because “[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician.” That may be so, but the lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a “product of nature” and is patent eligible under except insofar as very |
Justice Thomas | 2,013 | 1 | majority | Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/902772/association-for-molecular-pathology-v-myriad-genetics-inc/ | nature” and is patent eligible under except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA.9 III It is important to note what is not implicated by this decision. First, there are no method claims before this Court. Had Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method pat- ent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well understood by geneticists at the time of Myriad’s patents “were well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach,” 702 F. Supp. 2d, at 202–203, and are not at issue in this case. Similarly, this case does not involve patents on new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that, “[a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged claims are —————— 9 We express no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory requirements of patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S. C. 103, and 112; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19, n. 5. 18 ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY v. MYRIAD GENETICS, INC. Opinion of the Court limited to such applications.” Nor do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has been altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of to such endeavors. We merely hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Federal Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part. It is so ordered. Cite as: 569 U. S. (2013) 1 SCALIA, J., concurring Opinion of SCALIA, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 12–398 ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT [June 13, 2013] JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join the judgment of the Court, and all of its opinion except Part I–A and some portions of the rest of the opin- ion |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | The definition of "disability" for purposes of the disability-insurance benefits program is set forth in 223(d) of the Social Security Act, codified, as amended, at 42 U.S. C. 423(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Paragraph (2)(A) of that section states: "An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work" The "severity regulation" promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for purposes of the program, however, explains to a claimant: "If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your age, education, and work experience." 20 CFR 404.1520(c) (1986) This regulation, on its very face, directly contradicts the statutory language requiring that a claimant's age, education, and work experience be considered in a case where the claimant cannot perform his past work. It is thus invalid. The legislative history of 423(d) confirms that the severity regulation exceeds the Secretary's statutory authority. Because the Court reverses the Court of Appeals' judgment that correctly invalidated that regulation, I dissent. I A In its opinion today, the Court analyzes the facial validity of the Secretary's severity regulation by interpreting 423(d) *160 in a manner that defeats the intent expressed through its language and structure. The Court isolates paragraph (1)(A) of 423(d) and finds that the severity regulation does not conflict with the 1954 statutory definition of disability contained therein. Disregarding the fact that this definition was later amended to include paragraph (2) of 423(d), the Court reaches a premature conclusion that the regulation "is not inconsistent with the statutory definition of disability." Ante, at 146. After thus reasoning that the "statutory definition of disability" is not a bar to the Secretary's severity regulation, the Court then characterizes paragraph (2)(A) as merely "limit[ing] the Secretary's authority to grant disability benefits, not to deny them."[1]Ante, at 148. This allows the Court to conclude that there is no reason for the Secretary to consider the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience listed in paragraph (2)(A) in cases where he already has determined that the claimant does not have a severe impairment. The critical error in the Court's analysis is readily apparent when one considers the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | the Court's analysis is readily apparent when one considers the language introducing paragraph (2) of 423(d). Although the Court purports to set forth 423(d) (2)(A) in its opinion, ante, at 140, it fails to quote the key language from the statute. The concurring opinion likewise *161 presents an abridged version of the statute. See ante, at 155. Neither places the language that it does quote within its proper context. Section 423(d) provides in relevant part: "(1) The term `disability' means "(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months; or "(B) in the case of an individual who has attained the age of 55 and is blind "(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) "(A) An individual (except a widow, surviving divorced wife, widower, or surviving divorced husband for purposes of section 402(e) or (f) of this title) shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), `work which exists in the national economy' means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country. "(B) A widow, surviving divorced wife, widower, or surviving divorced husband shall not be determined to be under a disability (for purposes of section 402(e) or (f) of this title) unless his or her physical or mental impairment or impairments are of a level of severity which under regulations prescribed by the Secretary is deemed *162 to be sufficient to preclude an individual from engaging in any gainful activity." 42 U.S. C. 423(d) (1982 ed. and Supp. III) By employing the phrase "for purposes of paragraph (1)(A)" to introduce paragraph (2), Congress made clear that paragraph (2) serves as an annotation to paragraph (1)(A), not as an independent requirement, as the Court implies. The language and structure of 423(d) plainly indicate that paragraph |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | The language and structure of 423(d) plainly indicate that paragraph (2) is relevant at the time the determination is made under paragraph (1)(A), not afterwards. Paragraph (2), in effect, explains how to determine whether a claimant is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity" within the meaning of paragraph (1)(A).[2] How the determination is to be made in most cases, including those brought by insured workers such as respondent Janet Yuckert, is set forth in paragraph (2)(A), whereas paragraph (2)(B) relates to the category of claims by surviving spouses of insured workers which is specifically excepted from paragraph (2)(A). Whether a claimant under (2)(A) has proved an "inability" to work "by reason of" a medical impairment *163 for purposes of (1)(A) depends upon whether the impairment limits the worker to such an extent that he is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any [other work]." A straightforward reading of 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A) indicates that the claimant must establish that he has an impairment, that it is medically determinable, that it meets the duration requirement, and that it is severe enough to be disabling within the terms of the statute so as to render him eligible for benefits. Paragraph (1)(A) does not indicate how the Secretary is to assess whether any established medical impairments meet the statutory severity standard. Paragraph (2)(A), however, provides that guidance. Under paragraph (2)(A), if the claimant is able to do his previous work, the Secretary, of course, need not consider his age, education, and work experience. In such a case, the medically determinable impairment is automatically deemed nonsevere within the meaning of the Act. If, however, the claimant cannot perform his past work, the Secretary then must inquire into the severity of the impairment or combination of impairments. He is to determine whether, in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience, the impairment is so severe that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful work. A comparison of this process to that set forth in paragraph (2)(B) leaves no doubt whatsoever that consideration of the vocational factors is a key feature of the process in evaluating claims under paragraph (2)(A). In paragraph (2)(B), Congress authorized the Secretary to deny benefit claims by surviving spouses based on medical evidence alone. That paragraph specifies that the Secretary may promulgate listed severity levels of impairments at which an individual cannot engage in any gainful activity, and may deny benefits in such *164 cases simply by comparison to this list.[3] If Congress had intended |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | simply by comparison to this list.[3] If Congress had intended to authorize the Secretary to deny benefits in that same manner in disability claims under paragraph (2)(A), without consideration of age, education, or work experience, it would have included the same language in paragraph (2)(A) that it used in paragraph (2)(B). B The 423(d)(2)(A) inquiry furthers the purpose of the disability-benefits program by ensuring an individualized assessment of alleged disability in cases of insured workers. The inquiry takes into account the fact that the same medically determinable impairment affects persons with different vocational characteristics differently. A relatively young, well-educated, and experienced individual who can no longer perform his past work due to a medical impairment may be able to transfer his skills to another job and perform substantial gainful work. That same medical impairment may have a much greater effect on a person's ability to perform substantial gainful work if the person is of advanced age and has minimal education and limited work experience. Thus, a particular medical impairment may not be disabling for the first individual while it could be for the second. Despite the clarity of the statutory language and the purpose of individualized disability determinations, the Secretary has promulgated as step two of his step-evaluation process the severity standard set forth in 20 CFR 404.1520(c) *165 (1986). Because that regulation prohibits agency adjudicators from considering a claimant's age,[4] education, and work experience in cases where the claimant cannot perform his past work, the regulation is invalid on its face.[5] *166 The reasoning upon which the Court relies to support its contrary conclusion is unconvincing. Rather than analyze the severity regulation's validity in light of the actual language and purpose of the statute, the Court relies, ante, at 146, on a description of the Act's definition of disability set forth in one of its own earlier opinions. See It is important to note, however, that the Court quotes only part of that description. Based on this abbreviated description, the Court views the statute as requiring a "functional approach to determining the effects of medical impairments," ante, at 146, and regards the regulation as adopting a similar approach. Merely because both the statute and the regulation require analysis of the effect of the medical impairments on the claimant's ability to work does not mean, however, that the two are consistent in all respects. Moreover, examination of the description of the statutory scheme, as set forth in reveals that the general declaration upon which the Court relies was supported with a discussion of the particulars of the statute that included |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | a discussion of the particulars of the statute that included both paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(A) of 423(d). By not including 423(d)(2)(A) at this step of its analysis, however, the Court avoids the impossible task of explaining how the statutory scheme described in Campbell and the regulatory scheme set forth in the severity regulation can represent "precisely" the same approach when *167 the statutory scheme includes consideration of vocational factors and the regulation does not. While still focusing on the comparison between the regulation and paragraph (1)(A) read in isolation, the Court states: "If the impairments are not severe enough to limit significantly the claimant's ability to perform most jobs [apparently referring to 20 CFR 404.1521 (1986)],[6] by definition the impairment does not prevent the claimant from engaging in any substantial gainful activity." Ante, at 146. Although I agree that a claimant who can perform most jobs is not disabled under the Act, I do not agree with the Court's implication that the statute authorizes the Secretary to review the medical evidence in a case and, solely on the basis of that information, to determine the claimant's ability to "perform most jobs." Under that interpretation of the statute, the agency adjudicators would decide whether a claimant covered by 423(d)(2)(A) could perform the listed basic-work activities, including responsiveness to supervision and adaptability to change in the workplace, without taking into account the claimant's age, education, and work experience. I simply cannot read the statutory language of 423(d)(1)(A) *168 and (2)(A) as authorizing the Secretary to permit that determination to be made in such a void. Even if a medical impairment affected different individuals' abilities to perform such functions to the same extent, regardless of age, education, and work experience, there is no guidance in the severity regulation as to what constitutes a "significant" limitation on the ability, for example, to use judgment or to adapt to changes in work conditions, or as to how the degree of limitation caused by a medical impairment on such functions is to be determined based solely on medical evidence. Nor does the regulation explain whether the claimant must be able to perform a few, most, or all of the 404.1521 "[e]xamples" of "basic work activities" in order to be found capable of performing "most jobs." The concurring opinion appears to assume that the Secretary can deny benefits at that stage only if a claimant can perform all the basic work activities listed without any significant limitations. Ante, at 155-156. Assuming this to be true, the regulation does not recognize that less than "significant" limitations on several |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | does not recognize that less than "significant" limitations on several of the activities in combination could equate with an overall significant limitation on the ability to perform most jobs. In sum, the regulation authorizes disability determinations to be made in a manner inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Congress clearly intended to prohibit these assessments from being made in a vacuum when it specified in 423(d)(2)(A) that a claimant's age, education, and work experience be taken into account in determining the effect of his medical impairment on his ability to work.[7] *169 There simply is no support in the language of the statute for the proposition that the Secretary can create his own definition of "severe impairment" for purposes of disability determinations in disabled-worker cases and exclude consideration of factors that Congress directed be considered. Whereas the Court perceives "no reason for the Secretary to consider the claimant's age, education, and work experience" in cases where a premature showing of nonseverity has been made, ante, at 148, there is one compelling reason for the Secretary to consider those factors the unambiguous language of the statute directs that he do so. II A An examination of the legislative history of 423(d) provides strong additional support for respondent's position. The disability definition in 423(d) has its roots in another statutory provision that was first enacted in 1952. In that year, Congress amended the Social Security Act in part to guarantee that the insured status of workers would not be adversely affected if they were permanently and totally disabled for periods of time prior to retirement. As part of this amendment, Congress added to the Act its 216(i), which contains the definition of "disability" and "period of disability" for purposes of that program. 42 U.S. C. 416(i) (1952 ed.). In 1954, Congress replaced those definitions with slightly different ones contained in a new 216(i). 42 U.S. C. 416(i) (1952 ed., Supp. IV). When Congress amended the Act in 1956, in part to establish a program to provide benefits for certain insured disabled individuals prior to retirement, it adopted the 216(i) definition for purposes of the new program. It added 223 to the Act which set forth the terms of the new program and included a definition of "disability" nearly identical to that set forth in *170 216(i).[8] In 1965, Congress amended that definition to specify that the impairment must be expected to last for not less than 12 months. The statutory definition of disability again was a focus of congressional attention in 1967, when the current structure of the definition was adopted. One |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | when the current structure of the definition was adopted. One of the express aims of the Social Security Act Amendments of that year was to provide a more detailed definition of "disability" for purposes of the disability-insurance benefits program. The definition was set forth in a new 223(d). The congressional Reports explain: "Paragraph (1) of the new section 223(d) states the basic definition of the term `disability' exactly as it [was] stated in existing law "Paragraph (2)(A) of the new section 223(d) provides that in applying the basic definition (except the special definition for the blind, and except for purposes of widow's or widower's insurance benefits on the basis of disability), an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairment or impairments are so severe that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the general area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." S. Rep. No. *171 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 263-264 (1967); H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 163 (1967).[9] Congress intended that this provision "clarify and amplify the definition of `disability' for purposes of the social security program." S. Rep. No. 744, at 263; H. R. Rep. No. 544, at 163. Congress felt the need to clarify the definition of disability because, in its view, the rising cost of the disability-insurance program was due in part to court decisions that had interpreted the definition too broadly. S. Rep. No. 744, at 46-47. In particular, Congress was concerned with decisions that had required agency adjudicators to focus on a narrow geographic area in determining whether a claimant could perform substantial gainful activity and to consider whether there existed specific job vacancies for which the claimant had a reasonable opportunity to be hired. See, e. g., ; Congress also noted that questions had arisen about what kind of medical evidence was necessary to "establish the existence and severity of an impairment," and about what current work performance constituted "substantial gainful activity." S. Rep. No. 744, at 48. The new language in 423(d)(2)(A) was aimed at answering these questions. Congress made it clear that medical factors, and not local job conditions, are the primary focus in disability cases. It tempered the new restrictiveness of the statute, however, by specifying that consideration of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | of the statute, however, by specifying that consideration of the vocational factors is a necessary component of the disability determination in all cases where a claimant is not working and the medical impairment is not of a level presumed to be disabling, except those expressly exempted from 423 *172 (d)(2)(A). Congress summarized its view of the disability determination process as follows: "In most cases the decision that an individual is disabled can be made solely on the basis of an impairment, or impairments, which are of a level of severity presumed (under administrative rules) to be sufficient so that, in the absence of an actual demonstration of ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, it may be presumed that the person is unable to so engage because of the impairment or impairments. The language which would be added by the bill specifies the requirements which must be met in order to establish inability to engage in substantial gainful activity for those people with impairments to which the presumption mentioned above does not apply" S. Rep. No. 744, at 49. Congress nowhere indicated an intention to authorize the Secretary to deny claims by insured workers not performing previous work based on medical factors alone. Congress' intention that the vocational factors be considered in claims by insured workers such as respondent is further illustrated by comparing Congress' own description of this process with its description of the simpler process it authorized in cases involving claims by disabled surviving spouses.[10] It was explained: "The bill would also provide benefits for certain disabled widows and disabled dependent widowers under a test of disability that is somewhat more restrictive than that for disabled workers and childhood disability beneficiaries. The determination of disability in the case of a widow or widower would be based solely on the level of severity of impairment. Determinations in disabled widow and widower cases would be made without *173 regard to nonmedical factors such as age, education, and work experience, which are considered in disabled worker cases" See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 52 (1967). Clearly, the nonmedical factors were considered by Congress to be a key ingredient in disability assessments under 423(d)(2)(A). Out of this legislative history surrounding the enactment and amendment of the current disability definition, the Court grasps at three straws. First, it quotes the legislative Reports that accompanied the 1954 amendment to 216(i) of the Act. Ante, at 147. The record is clear, however, that the 1967 Amendments to 223 of the Act represent a decision by Congress to set forth |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | the Act represent a decision by Congress to set forth new standards governing the severity assessment of medical impairments. Second, the Court relies upon language from the Senate Report that accompanied the 1967 Amendments. Once again, however, the context is incomplete, for the Court quotes only the remark concerning the "predominant importance of medical factors." Ante, at 148. There is no question that Congress intended to emphasize that a claimant must produce adequate medical evidence to support his showing of a severe medically determinable impairment. Such an intent, however, is not at odds with Congress' other clear aim of ensuring that an insured worker's age, education, and work experience remain relevant factors in the disability determination. Finally, the Court quotes the 1967 Senate Report's summary of the overall disability evaluation process which, as the Court points out, contemplated a sequential evaluation. Ante, at 148-149. Expressly included in that sequential evaluation, however, is the consideration of the vocational factors in cases where an insured worker cannot do his previous work.[11] *174 B To avoid the force of the legislative history contemporaneous with the enactment of 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A),[12] the Court seeks refuge in 4(b) of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, It claims that by this provision, Congress approved the validity of the severity regulation. Yet 4(b), on its face, says nothing of the severity level necessary to meet the eligibility requirements. See ante, at 149-151. According to that provision, in making a determination of the medical severity of a claimant's impairment or impairments, the Secretary cannot simply consider each impairment in isolation but rather must consider the combined effect of the impairments. There thus is no "approval of the severity regulation," as the Court would say, ante, at 150, in the language of that provision. The legislative history of the 1984 Act also does not stand as an endorsement of the severity regulation. Each of the three congressional Reports contains a brief description of the general disability-determination process. In each of these descriptions, the preliminary steps of the Secretary's step-evaluation process were characterized somewhat differently. The Senate Report, see ante, at 151, explained that the new provision requiring consideration of combined impairments would not authorize a departure from the sequential evaluation process. Omitted from the heart of the Court's quotation, however, is the Report's express incorporation by reference of the 1967 interpretation. The Report *175 explained: "As the Committee stated in its report on the 1967 amendments, an individual is to be considered eligible `only if it is shown that he has a severe medically determinable physical |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | is shown that he has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment or impairments.' " S. Rep. No. 98-466, p. 22 (1984) Reference back to the congressional views supporting the 1967 Amendments evinces an intent to adhere to a consistent interpretation of that provision. For the reasons discussed above, the 1967 view necessarily considered the vocational factors to be a critical part of a disability determination in cases where the insured worker cannot do his previous work. This view stands in contradiction to the Senate Report's apparent suggestion that the Secretary can deny benefits in such cases based on medical evidence alone. Hence, the Senate's discussion of the disability determination process is ambiguous at best. The House Report accompanying the 1984 Act reflects dissatisfaction with the step two severity regulation. According to the House Report, under that process, "a determination that a person is not disabled may be based on a judgment that the person has no impairment, or that the impairment or combination of impairments are slight enough to warrant a presumption that the person's work ability is not seriously affected." H. R. Rep. No. 98-618, p. 8 (1984). While stating that it did not wish to undermine the Secretary's entire step-evaluation process, the House Report nevertheless expressed reservations about the "slight impairment" approach as a threshold assessment at step two. It explained: "[T]he committee is concerned that the consideration of eligibility for disability benefits be conducted using criteria that clearly reflect the intent of Congress that all those who are unable to work receive benefits. It is of particular concern that the Social Security Administration has been criticized for basing terminations of benefits solely and erroneously on the judgment that the person's medical impairment is `slight,' according to very *176 strict criteria, and is therefore not disabling, without making any further evaluation of the person's ability to work." After stating that it did not wish to eliminate the sequential evaluation process, it continued: "However, the committee notes that the Secretary has already planned to re-evaluate the current criteria for non-severe impairments [i. e. step two], and urges that all due consideration be given to revising those criteria to reflect the real impact of impairments upon the ability to work" Hence, not only did the House Report read the current step-evaluation process as setting forth a "slight impairment" standard that was less onerous than the standard discussed in the Senate Report, but it also expressed concern that even that threshold step did not provide the necessary individualized consideration of a disability claim to determine the actual impact of |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | of a disability claim to determine the actual impact of the impairment on the individual's ability to work. The House thus indicated a desire not to upset the Secretary's step-evaluation process, but it did not approve the step two severity regulation. The Conference Report adopted the position set forth in the House Report. It referred to the Secretary's "plan to reevaluate the current criteria for nonsevere impairments" and to the expectation that the Secretary would apprise Congress of the results of that evaluation. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-1039, p. 30 (1984). Moreover, the description of the sequential evaluation process in the Conference Report is even more lenient than the House Report. The conferees approved of the flexibility and efficiency resulting from a threshold disability determination but indicated that "a determination that an individual is not disabled may be based on a judgment that an individual has no impairment, or that the medical severity of his impairment or combination of impairments is slight enough to warrant a *177 presumption, even without a full evaluation of vocational factors, that the individual's ability to perform [substantial gainful activity] is not seriously affected" The conferees stated that the current sequential evaluation process permitted that determination and they did not intend to eliminate the process. This characterization of the process as permitting less than a full evaluation of the vocational factors indicates that the appropriate standard would include an implicit or limited analysis of vocational factors. Because the agency's regulation states expressly that vocational factors will not be considered, however, the conferees' statement can serve only as a description of what they believed a valid threshold standard would be, rather than as a description of the current severity regulation. The ambiguity in the congressional references to step two is understandable due to the fact that Congress did not have before it the question of that regulation's validity. Examination of the totality of the legislative history of the 1984 Act reveals that Congress limited its focus to several major problems in the Social Security system. These problems included the standard of review for termination of disability benefits, for evaluating pain, for ensuring consideration of multiple impairments, and for evaluating the effect of mental impairments on ability to work. In sum, Congress acknowledged that the Secretary was in the midst of reevaluating the severity regulation and indicated its willingness to await the Secretary's results rather than to address the matter in the midst of the overwhelming legislative task it already faced regarding the matters properly before it. The brief remarks about the step-evaluation process simply cannot |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | it. The brief remarks about the step-evaluation process simply cannot be read as an endorsement of the facial validity of the severity regulation. These congressional comments in 1984 cannot outweigh the clear language of 423(d)(1)(A) and (2)(A) and the legislative history of those provisions. *178 III The Court makes much of the Secretary's broad authority to prescribe standards for applying the Social Security Act and the limited nature of our review in light of that authority. Ante, at 145. This Court has recognized, however, that "[c]ourts need not defer to an administrative construction of a statute where there are `compelling indications that it is wrong.' " quoting Red Lion Broadcasting When a regulation is facially inconsistent with the statute, the administrative construction of the statute is necessarily wrong and there is no need to consider further the position of the agency. The Secretary's interpretation of the statute as reflected in his regulation "cannot supersede the language chosen by Congress." Mohasco Unlike the situation presented recently in Congress unambiguously specified its intent when enacting 423(d) that the vocational factors be considered in determining disability eligibility in cases such as respondent's. The efficiency and reliability interests that the Court attributes to the Secretary,[13]ante, at 151-152, cannot outweigh clear congressional intent. The Secretary attempts to avoid the facial contradiction between his severity regulation and the statute by interpreting the regulation as representing only a de minimis threshold standard. The Secretary apparently has recognized finally what every Federal Court of Appeals has concluded application of a threshold severity regulation that is greater *179 than de minimis is invalid under the terms of the statute. See concurring opinion ante, at 156, and nn. 1 and 2. The Court explains that it has not considered the validity of the Secretary's application of the regulation, ante, at 150, n. 8, although it appears to adopt the "slight" impairment interpretation. See ante, at 153. In her concurring opinion, JUSTICE O'CONNOR expressly imposes on the severity regulation a narrowing interpretation that permits only a de minimis threshold standard. I cannot, however, join that approach in this case. I agree with respondent's position that, although a de minimis standard that implicitly draws the vocational factors into the disability determination may be permitted under the statute, this Court cannot resolve that question on the record in this case. Such a standard was not applied by the agency adjudicators who reviewed respondent's claim, and there is no record evidence as to the Secretary's application of a de minimis standard subsequent to the 1978 adoption of the sequential evaluation. Indeed, JUSTICE O'CONNOR |
Justice Blackmun | 1,987 | 11 | dissenting | Bowen v. Yuckert | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111907/bowen-v-yuckert/ | the 1978 adoption of the sequential evaluation. Indeed, JUSTICE O'CONNOR aptly demonstrates that even if the Secretary is currently attempting to readopt the pre-1978 slight impairment standard, that standard is entirely inconsistent with the interpretation in effect at the time respondent's claim was considered by the agency adjudicators. I agree with JUSTICE O'CONNOR that the evidence suggests that step two has been "applied systematically in a manner inconsistent with the statute." Ante, at 157; see also Little weight can be given to views of an agency when the views themselves are inconsistent. See United Housing Foundation, Whether a de minimis threshold standard is authorized under the statute is not before this Court. The regulation on its face simply does not describe a standard that incorporates into the threshold step an implicit consideration of the vocational factors. The language of step two does not represent *180 a standard that denies disability claims only if the medical impairment is so minimal that no set of vocational factors, even if fully considered, could result in a finding of disability. Yet, in order to be valid under the terms of the statute, any de minimis threshold step would have to adopt such a standard. It would have to ensure that it did not preclude an individual evaluation of vocational factors at a later stage[14] and a finding of disability if they affect the ultimate determination of that issue. I agree with the approach of the Court of Appeals in this case. Contrary to this Court's implication, ante, at 147, that Court did not address the question whether the statute authorizes a threshold showing of medical severity. The Court of Appeals addressed only the facial validity of the severity standard in step two of the sequential evaluation process. It expressly declined to consider whether other threshold severity standards, such as a de minimis standard, would be authorized under the statute. See Invalidating step two does not prohibit the adoption of a threshold screening standard *181 to eliminate frivolous claims at an early stage in the process if that standard takes into account vocational factors as required by the statute. Adoption of such a standard should take place through the administrative procedures required under the Act for the adoption of new regulations. See 42 U.S. C. 421(k)(2) (1982 ed., Supp. III). Further agency interpretations of the invalid regulation are of no value. They cannot alter the fact that the regulation is facially invalid. IV Because the Secretary's regulation directly conflicts with the statutory language set forth by Congress and because it plainly is inconsistent with the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | "[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane." The prohibition applies despite a prisoner's earlier competency to be held responsible for committing a crime and to be tried for *24 it. Prior findings of competency do not foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to be executed because of his present mental condition. Under once a prisoner makes the requisite preliminary showing that his current mental state would bar his execution, the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, entitles him to an adjudication to determine his condition. These determinations are governed by the substantive federal baseline for competency set down in Scott Louis Panetti, referred to here as petitioner, was convicted and sentenced to death in a Texas state court. After the state trial court set an execution date, petitioner made a substantial showing he was not competent to be executed. The state court rejected his claim of incompetency on the merits. Filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, petitioner claimed again that his mental condition barred his execution; that the Eighth Amendment set forth a substantive standard for competency different from the one advanced by the State; and that prior state-court proceedings on the issue were insufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements mandated by The State denied these assertions and argued, in addition, that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear petitioner's claims. We conclude we have statutory authority to adjudicate the claims petitioner raises in his habeas application; we find the state court failed to provide the procedures to which petitioner was entitled under the Constitution; and we determine that the federal appellate court employed an improperly restrictive test when it considered petitioner's claim of incompetency on the merits. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further consideration. I On a morning in 1992 petitioner awoke before dawn, dressed in camouflage, and drove to the home of his estranged wife's parents. Breaking the front-door lock, he entered the house and, in front of his wife and daughter, shot and killed his wife's mother and father. He took his wife and daughter hostage for the night before surrendering to police. Tried for capital murder in 1995, petitioner sought to represent himself. The court ordered a psychiatric evaluation, which indicated that petitioner suffered from a fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations. -14. The evaluation noted |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | a fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations. -14. The evaluation noted that petitioner had been hospitalized numerous times for these disorders. ; see Evidence later revealed that doctors had prescribed medication for petitioner's mental disorders that, in the opinion of one expert, would be difficult for a person not suffering from extreme psychosis even to tolerate. See Petitioner's wife described one psychotic episode in a petition she filed in seeking extraordinary relief from the Texas state courts. See She explained that petitioner had become convinced the devil had possessed their home and that, in an effort to cleanse their surroundings, petitioner had buried a number of valuables next to the house and engaged in other rituals. Petitioner nevertheless was found competent to be tried and to waive counsel. At trial he *249 claimed he was not guilty by reason of insanity. During his trial petitioner engaged in behavior later described by his standby counsel as "bizarre," "scary," and "trance-like." According to the attorney, petitioner's behavior both in private and in front of the jury made it evident that he was suffering from "mental incompetence," ; see and the net effect of this dynamic was to render the trial "truly a judicial farce, and a mockery of self-representation," There was evidence on the record, moreover, to indicate that petitioner had stopped taking his antipsychotic medication a few months before trial, see a rejection of medical advice that, it appears, petitioner has continued to this day with one brief exception, see Brief for Petitioner 16-17. According to expert testimony, failing to take this medication tends to exacerbate the underlying mental dysfunction. See ; see And it is uncontested that, less than two months after petitioner was sentenced to death, the state trial court found him incompetent to waive the appointment of state habeas counsel. See Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 10. It appears, therefore, that petitioner's condition has only worsened since the start of trial. The jury found petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence both on direct appeal and through state habeas proceedings. The Texas courts denied his requests for relief. See Panetti v. State, No. 72,230 (Crim. App., Dec. 3, 1997); Ex parte Panetti, No. 37,145-01 This Court twice denied a petition for certiorari. ; Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. His claims were again rejected, both by the District Court, Panetti v. Johnson, Cause No. A-99-CV-260-SS and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | No. A-99-CV-260-SS and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and we again denied a petition for certiorari, Among the issues petitioner raised in the course of these state and federal proceedings was his competency to stand trial and to waive counsel. Petitioner did not argue, however, that mental illness rendered him incompetent to be executed. On October 31, Judge Stephen B. Ables of the 216th Judicial District Court in Gillespie County, Texas, set petitioner's execution date for February 5, 2004. See First Order Setting Execution in Cause No. 3310; Order Setting Execution in Cause No. 3310. On December 10, counsel for petitioner filed with Judge Ables a motion under Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.05 Petitioner claimed, for the first time, that due to mental illness he was incompetent to be executed. The judge denied the motion without a hearing. When petitioner attempted to challenge the ruling, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, indicating it has authority to review an Art. 46.05 determination only when a trial court has determined a prisoner is incompetent. Ex parte Panetti, No. 74,6 (Jan. 2, 2004) Petitioner returned to federal court, where he filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 2254 and a motion for stay of execution. On February *250 4, 2004, the District Court stayed petitioner's execution to "allow the state court a reasonable period of time to consider the evidence of [petitioner's] current mental state." Order in Case No. A-04-CA-042-SS, -114, 116. The state court had before it, at that time, petitioner's Renewed Motion To Determine Competency To Be Executed (hereinafter Renewed Motion To Determine Competency). Attached to the motion were a letter and a declaration from two individuals, a psychologist and a law professor, who had interviewed petitioner while on death row on February 3, 2004. The new evidence, according to counsel, demonstrated that petitioner did not understand the reasons he was about to be executed. Due to the absence of a transcript, the state-court proceedings after this point are not altogether clear. The claims raised before this Court nevertheless make it necessary to recount the procedural history in some detail. Based on the docket entries and the parties' filings it appears the following occurred. The state trial court ordered the parties to participate in a telephone conference on February 9, 2004, to discuss the status of the case. There followed a court directive instructing counsel to submit, by February 20, the names of mental health experts the court should consider appointing pursuant to Art. 46.05(f). See The |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | court should consider appointing pursuant to Art. 46.05(f). See The court gave the parties until February 20 to submit any motions concerning the competency procedures and advised it would hold another status conference on that same date. Defendant's Motion To Reconsider in Cause No. 3310, pp. 1-2 (Mar. 4, 2004) (hereinafter Motion to Reconsider). On February 19, 2004, petitioner filed 10 motions related to the Art. 46.05 proceedings. They included requests for transcription of the proceedings, a competency hearing comporting with the procedural due process requirements set forth in and funds to hire a mental health expert. See Motion To Transcribe All Proceedings Related to Competency Determination Under Article 46.05 in Cause No. 3310; Motion To Ensure That The Article 46.05 "Final Competency Hearing" Comports With The Procedural Due Process Requirements of in Cause No. 3310 (hereinafter Motion to Ensure); Ex Parte Motion for Prepayment of Funds To Hire Mental Health Expert To Assist Defense in Article 46.05 Proceedings in Cause No. 3310. On February 20 the court failed to hold its scheduled status conference. Petitioner's counsel called the courthouse and was advised Judge Ables was out of the office for the day. Counsel then called the Gillespie County District Attorney, who explained that the judge had informed state attorneys earlier that week that he was cancelling the conference he had set and would appoint the mental health experts without input from the parties. Motion to Reconsider 2. On February 23, 2004, counsel for petitioner received an order, dated February 20, advising that the court was appointing two mental health experts pursuant to Art. 46.05(f). Order in Cause No. 3310, p. 1 (Feb. 26, 2004), On February 25, at an informal status conference, the court denied two of petitioner's motions, indicating it would consider the others when the court-appointed mental health experts completed their evaluations. Motion to Reconsider 3. On March 4, petitioner filed a motion explaining that a delayed *251 ruling would render a number of the motions moot. There is no indication the court responded to this motion. The court-appointed experts returned with their evaluation on April 2, 2004. Concluding that petitioner "knows that he is to be executed, and that his execution will result in his death," and, moreover, that he "has the ability to understand the reason he is to be executed," the experts alleged that petitioner's uncooperative and bizarre behavior was due to calculated design: "Mr. Panetti deliberately and persistently chose to control and manipulate our interview situation," they claimed. They maintained that petitioner "could answer questions about relevant legal issues if he were willing |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | answer questions about relevant legal issues if he were willing to do so." The judge sent a letter to counsel, including petitioner's attorney, Michael C. Gross, dated May 14, 2004. It said: "Dear Counsel: "It appears from the evaluations performed by [the court-appointed experts] that they are of the opinion that [petitioner] is competent to be executed in accordance with the standards set out in Art. 46.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. "Mr. Gross, if you have any other matters you wish to have considered, please file them in the case papers and get me copies by 5:00 p.m. on May 21, 2004." Petitioner responded with a filing entitled "Objections to Experts' Report, Renewed Motion for Funds To Hire Mental Health Expert and Investigator, Renewed Motion for Appointment of Counsel, and Motion for Competency Hearing" in Cause No. 3310 (May 24, 2004) (hereinafter Objections to Experts' Report). In this filing petitioner criticized the methodology and conclusions of the court-appointed experts; asserted his continued need for a mental health expert as his own criticisms of the report were "by necessity limited," ; again asked the court to rule on his outstanding motions for funds and appointment of counsel; and requested a competency hearing. Petitioner argued, as a more general matter, that the process he had received thus far failed to comply with Art. 46.05 and the procedural mandates set by The court, in response, closed the case. On May 26, it released a short order identifying the report submitted by the court-appointed experts and explaining that "[b]ased on the aforesaid doctors' reports, the Court finds that [petitioner] has failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is incompetent to be executed." Order Regarding Competency To Be Executed in Cause No. 3310, 9. The order made no mention of petitioner's motions or other filings. Petitioner did not appeal the ruling to the Court of Criminal Appeals, and he did not petition this Court for certiorari. This background leads to the matter now before us. Petitioner returned to federal court, seeking resolution of the 2254 petition he had filed on January 26. The District Court granted petitioner's motions to reconsider, to stay his execution, to appoint counsel, and to provide funds. The court, in addition, set the case for an evidentiary hearing, which included testimony by a psychiatrist, a professor, and two psychologists, all called by petitioner, as well as two psychologists and three correctional officers, called by respondent. See -135, 362-363; see 36-336. We describe the substance of the experts' testimony in more detail later in our opinion. |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | the experts' testimony in more detail later in our opinion. On September 29, 2004, the District Court denied petitioner's habeas application on the merits. It concluded that the *252 state trial court had failed to comply with Art. 46.05; found the state proceedings "constitutionally inadequate" in light of ; and reviewed petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim without deferring to the state court's finding of competency. (W.D.Tex.2004). The court nevertheless denied relief. It found petitioner had not shown incompetency as defined by Circuit precedent. "Ultimately," the court explained, "the Fifth Circuit test for competency to be executed requires the petitioner know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution." The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 549 U.S. II We first consider our jurisdiction. The habeas corpus application on review is the second one petitioner has filed in federal court. Under the gatekeeping provisions of 2 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2), "[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed" except under certain, narrow circumstances. See 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). The State maintains that, by direction of 2244, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate petitioner's 2254 application. Its argument is straightforward: "[Petitioner's] first federal habeas application, which was fully and finally adjudicated on the merits, failed to raise a claim," and, as a result, "[his] subsequent habeas application, which did raise a claim, was a `second or successive' application" under the terms of 2244(b)(2). Supplemental Brief for Respondent 1. The State contends, moreover, that any claim brought in an application governed by 2244's gatekeeping provisions must be dismissed. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 4-6 (citing 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)). The State acknowledges that -based incompetency claims, as a general matter, are not ripe until after the time has run to file a first federal habeas petition. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent 6. The State nevertheless maintains that its rule would not foreclose prisoners from raising claims. Under the State explains, a federal court is permitted to review a prisoner's claim once it becomes ripe if the prisoner preserved the claim by filing it in his first federal habeas application. Under the State's approach a prisoner contemplating a future claim could preserve it by this means. The State's argument has some force. The results it would produce, however, show its flaws. As in if the State's "interpretation of `second or successive' were correct, the implications for habeas practice would be far reaching and seemingly perverse." A prisoner would be faced with two options: forgo the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | A prisoner would be faced with two options: forgo the opportunity to raise a claim in federal court; or raise the claim in a first federal habeas application (which generally must be filed within one year of the relevant state-court ruling), even though it is premature. The dilemma would apply not only to prisoners with mental conditions indicative of incompetency but to those with no early sign of mental illness. All prisoners are at risk of deteriorations in their mental state. As a result, conscientious defense attorneys would be obliged to file unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) claims in each and every 2254 application. This counterintuitive approach would add to the *253 burden imposed on courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to any. We conclude there is another reasonable interpretation of 2244, one that does not produce these distortions and inefficiencies. The phrase "second or successive" is not self-defining. It takes its full meaning from our case law, including decisions predating the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of (AEDPA), See ; see The Court has declined to interpret "second or successive" as referring to all 2254 applications filed second or successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment already challenged in a prior 2254 application. See, e.g., (concluding that a second 2254 application was not "second or successive" after the petitioner's first application, which had challenged the same state-court judgment, had been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies); see at (indicating that "pre-AEDPA law govern[ed]" the case before it but implying that the Court would reach the same result under AEDPA); see Our interpretation of 2244 in is illustrative. There the prisoner filed his first habeas application before his execution date was set. In the first application he asserted, inter alia, that he was incompetent to be executed, citing The District Court, among other holdings, dismissed the claim as premature; and the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. When the State obtained a warrant for the execution, the prisoner filed, for the second time, a habeas application raising the same incompetency claim. The State argued that because the prisoner "already had one `fully-litigated habeas petition, the plain meaning of 2244(b) requires his new petition to be treated as successive.'" We rejected this contention. While the later filing "may have been the second time that [the prisoner] had asked the federal courts to provide relief on his claim," the Court declined to accept that there were, as a result, "two separate applications, [with] the second necessarily subject to |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | result, "two separate applications, [with] the second necessarily subject to 2244(b)." The Court instead held that, in light of the particular circumstances presented by a claim, it would treat the two filings as a single application. The petitioner "was entitled to an adjudication of all the claims presented in his earlier, undoubtedly reviewable, application for federal habeas relief." Our earlier holding does not resolve the jurisdictional question in the instant case. did not address the applicability of 2244(b) "where a prisoner raises a claim for the first time in a petition filed after the federal courts have already rejected the prisoner's initial habeas application." n. Yet the Court's willingness to look to the "implications for habeas practice" when interpreting 2244 informs the analysis here. We conclude, in accord with this precedent, that Congress did not intend the provisions of AEDPA addressing "second or successive" petitions to govern a filing in the unusual posture presented here: a 2254 application raising a -based incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is ripe. *254 Our conclusion is confirmed when we consider AEDPA's purposes. The statute's design is to "further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Cf. ("The AEDPA statute of limitation promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time" ). These purposes, and the practical effects of our holdings, should be considered when interpreting AEDPA. This is particularly so when petitioners "run the risk" under the proposed interpretation of "forever losing their opportunity for any federal review of their unexhausted claims." See In Rhines "[w]e recognize[d] the gravity of [the] problem" posed when petitioners file applications with only some claims exhausted, as well as "the difficulty [this problem has] posed for petitioners and federal district courts alike." 544 U.S., at 2, We sought to ensure our "solution to this problem [was] compatible with AEDPA's purposes." And in Castro we resisted an interpretation of the statute that would "produce troublesome results," "create procedural anomalies," and "close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any clear indication that such was Congress' intent." ; ; ; cf. An empty formality requiring prisoners to file unripe claims neither respects the limited legal resources available to the States nor encourages the exhaustion of state remedies. See 7, Instructing prisoners to file premature claims, particularly when many of these claims will not be colorable even at a later date, does not conserve judicial resources, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | even at a later date, does not conserve judicial resources, "reduc[e] piecemeal litigation," or "streamlin[e] federal habeas proceedings." AEDPA's concern for finality, moreover, is not implicated, for under none of the possible approaches would federal courts be able to resolve a prisoner's claim before execution is imminent. See -645 And last-minute filings that are frivolous and designed to delay executions can be dismissed in the regular course. The requirement of a threshold preliminary showing, for instance, will, as a general matter, be imposed before a stay is granted or the action is allowed to proceed. There is, in addition, no argument that petitioner's actions constituted an abuse of the writ, as that concept is explained in our cases. Cf. 51 U.S., at ("[AEDPA's] new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice `abuse *255 of the writ'"). To the contrary, we have confirmed that claims of incompetency to be executed remain unripe at early stages of the proceedings. See -645, ; see ; (remanding the case to the District Court to resolve 's incompetency claim, even though had brought that claim in a second federal habeas petition); See generally In the usual case, a petition filed second in time and not otherwise permitted by the terms of 2244 will not survive AEDPA's "second or successive" bar. There are, however, exceptions. We are hesitant to construe a statute, implemented to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism, in a manner that would require unripe (and, often, factually unsupported) claims to be raised as a mere formality, to the benefit of no party. The statutory bar on "second or successive" applications does not apply to a claim brought in an application filed when the claim is first ripe. Petitioner's habeas application was properly filed, and the District Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim. III A Petitioner claims that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, as elaborated by entitled him to certain procedures not provided in the state court; that the failure to provide these procedures constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law; and that under 2254(d) this misapplication of allows federal-court review of his incompetency claim without deference to the state court's decision. We agree with petitioner that no deference is due. The state court's failure to provide the procedures mandated by constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established law as determined by this Court. It is uncontested that petitioner made a substantial showing of incompetency. This showing entitled him to, among other |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | showing of incompetency. This showing entitled him to, among other things, an adequate means by which to submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence that had been solicited by the state court. And it is clear from the record that the state court reached its competency determination after failing to provide petitioner with this process, notwithstanding counsel's sustained effort, diligence, and compliance with court orders. As a result of this error, our review of petitioner's underlying incompetency claim is unencumbered by the deference AEDPA normally requires. identifies the measures a State must provide when a prisoner alleges incompetency to be executed. The four-Justice plurality in concluded as follows: "Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same presumptions accorded a defendant who has yet to be convicted or sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution altogether; if the Constitution renders the fact or timing of his execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact, then that fact must be determined *256 with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being. Thus, the ascertainment of a prisoner's sanity as a predicate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding." -412, Justice Powell's concurrence, which addressed the question of procedure, offered a more limited holding. When there is no majority opinion, the narrower holding controls. See Under this rule Justice Powell's opinion constitutes "clearly established" law for purposes of 2254 and sets the minimum procedures a State must provide to a prisoner raising a -based competency claim. Justice Powell's opinion states the relevant standard as follows. Once a prisoner seeking a stay of execution has made "a substantial threshold showing of insanity," the protection afforded by procedural due process includes a "fair hearing" in accord with fundamental fairness. 424, (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment) This protection means a prisoner must be accorded an "opportunity to be heard," though "a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal than a trial," As an example of why the state procedures on review in were deficient, Justice Powell explained, the determination of sanity "appear[ed] to have been made solely on the basis of the examinations performed by state-appointed psychiatrists." "Such a procedure invites arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from offering contrary medical evidence or even from explaining the inadequacies of the State's examinations." Justice Powell did not set forth "the precise limits that due process imposes in this area." He observed that |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | that due process imposes in this area." He observed that a State "should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake" once it has met the "basic requirements" required by due process. These basic requirements include an opportunity to submit "evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric examination." Petitioner was entitled to these protections once he had made a "substantial threshold showing of insanity." He made this showing when he filed his Renewed Motion To Determine Competencya fact disputed by no party, confirmed by the trial court's appointment of mental health experts pursuant to Article 46.05(f), and verified by our independent review of the record. The Renewed Motion included pointed observations made by two experts the day before petitioner's scheduled execution; and it incorporated, through petitioner's first Motion To Determine Competency, references to the extensive evidence of mental dysfunction considered in earlier legal proceedings. In light of this showing, the state court failed to provide petitioner with the minimum process required by The state court refused to transcribe its proceedings, notwithstanding the multiple motions petitioner filed requesting this process. To the extent a more complete record may have put some of the court's actions in a more favorable light, this only constitutes further evidence of the inadequacy of the proceedings. Based on the *257 materials available to this Court, it appears the state court on repeated occasions conveyed information to petitioner's counsel that turned out not to be true; provided at least one significant update to the State without providing the same notice to petitioner; and failed in general to keep petitioner informed as to the opportunity, if any, he would have to present his case. There is a strong argument the court violated state law by failing to provide a competency hearing. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.05(k). If this did, in fact, constitute a violation of the procedural framework Texas has mandated for the adjudication of incompetency claims, the violation undermines any reliance the State might now place on Justice Powell's assertion that "the States should have substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests at stake." See e.g., Brief for Respondent 16. What is more, the order issued by the state court implied that its determination of petitioner's competency was made solely on the basis of the examinations performed by the psychiatrists it had appointed precisely the sort of adjudication Justice Powell warned would "invit[e] arbitrariness and error," The state court made an additional error, |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | arbitrariness and error," The state court made an additional error, one that makes clear is impermissible under the Constitution: It failed to provide petitioner with an adequate opportunity to submit expert evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed experts. The court mailed the experts' report to both parties in the first week of May. The report, which rejected the factual basis for petitioner's claim, set forth new allegations suggesting that petitioner's bizarre behavior was due, at least in part, to deliberate design rather than mental illness. Petitioner's counsel reached the reasonable conclusion that these allegations warranted a response. See Objections to Experts' Report 13, and n. 1. On May 14 the court told petitioner's counsel, by letter, to file "any other matters you wish to have considered" within a week. Petitioner, in response, renewed his motions for an evidentiary hearing, funds to hire a mental health expert, and other relief. He did not submit at that time expert psychiatric evidence to challenge the court-appointed experts' report, a decision that in context made sense: The court had said it would rule on his outstanding motions, which included a request for funds to hire a mental-health expert and a request for an evidentiary hearing, once the court-appointed experts had completed their evaluation. Counsel was justified in relying on this representation by the court. Texas law, moreover, provides that a court's finding of incompetency will be made on the basis of, inter alia, a "final competency hearing." Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 46.05(k); see Ex parte Caldwell, (confirming that the "legislature codified the dictates of by enacting [the precursor to Art. 46.05]" and indicating that "[t]he determination of whether to appoint experts and conduct a hearing is within the discretion of the trial court" before a petitioner has made a substantial showing of incompetency). Had the court advised counsel it would resolve the case without first ruling on petitioner's motions and without holding a competency hearing, petitioner's counsel might have managed to procure the assistance of experts, as he had been able to do on a pro bono basis the day before petitioner's previously scheduled execution. It was, in any event, reasonable for counsel to refrain from procuring and submitting expert psychiatric evidence while waiting for the court to rule on the timely filed motions, *25 all in reliance on the court's assurances. But at this point the court simply ended the matter. The state court failed to provide petitioner with a constitutionally adequate opportunity to be heard. After a prisoner has made the requisite threshold showing, requires, at a |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | prisoner has made the requisite threshold showing, requires, at a minimum, that a court allow a prisoner's counsel the opportunity to make an adequate response to evidence solicited by the state court. See 477 U.S., 427, In petitioner's case this meant an opportunity to submit psychiatric evidence as a counterweight to the report filed by the court-appointed experts. Yet petitioner failed to receive even this rudimentary process. In light of this error we need not address whether other procedures, such as the opportunity for discovery or for the cross-examination of witnesses, would in some cases be required under the Due Process Clause. As makes clear, the procedural deficiencies already identified constituted a violation of petitioner's federal rights. B The state court's denial of certain of petitioner's motions rests on an implicit finding: that the procedures it provided were adequate to resolve the competency claim. In light of the procedural history we have described, however, this determination cannot be reconciled with any reasonable application of the controlling standard in That the standard is stated in general terms does not mean the application was reasonable. AEDPA does not "require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied." (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). Nor does AEDPA prohibit a federal court from finding an application of a principle unreasonable when it involves a set of facts "different from those of the case in which the principle was announced." The statute recognizes, to the contrary, that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner. See, e.g., ). These principles guide a reviewing court that is faced, as we are here, with a record that cannot, under any reasonable interpretation of the controlling legal standard, support a certain legal ruling. Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief, as relevant, only if the state court's "adjudication of [a] claim on the merits resulted in a decision that involved an unreasonable application" of the relevant law. When a state court's adjudication of a claim is dependent on an antecedent unreasonable application of federal law, the requirement set forth in 2254(d)(1) is satisfied. A federal court must then resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires. See ; (confirming that the state *259 court's ultimate decision to reject the prisoner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was based on the first prong and not the second). See 5-397, (indicating that 2254 does not preclude relief if either "the reasoning [or] the result of the state-court decision contradicts [our cases]"). Here, due to the state court's unreasonable |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | contradicts [our cases]"). Here, due to the state court's unreasonable application of the factfinding procedures upon which the court relied were "not adequate for reaching reasonably correct results" or, at a minimum, resulted in a process that appeared to be "seriously inadequate for the ascertainment of the truth." -424, (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) We therefore consider petitioner's claim on the merits and without deferring to the state court's finding of competency. IV A This brings us to the question petitioner asks the Court to resolve: whether the Eighth Amendment permits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness deprives him of "the mental capacity to understand that [he] is being executed as a punishment for a crime." Brief for Petitioner 31. A review of the expert testimony helps frame the issue. Four expert witnesses testified on petitioner's behalf in the District Court proceedings. One explained that petitioner's mental problems are indicative of "schizo-affective disorder," resulting in a "genuine delusion" involving his understanding of the reason for his execution, 57. According to the expert, this delusion has recast petitioner's execution as "part of spiritual warfare. between the demons and the forces of the darkness and God and the angels and the forces of light." 49. As a result, the expert explained, although petitioner claims to understand "that the state is saying that [it wishes] to execute him for [his] murder[s]," he believes in earnest that the stated reason is a "sham" and the State in truth wants to execute him "to stop him from preaching." Petitioner's other expert witnesses reached similar conclusions concerning the strength and sincerity of this "fixed delusion." ; see While the State's expert witnesses resisted the conclusion that petitioner's stated beliefs were necessarily indicative of incompetency, see particularly in light of his perceived ability to understand certain concepts and, at times, to be "clear and lucid," ; see they acknowledged evidence of mental problems, see at 239, 245, 30. Petitioner's rebuttal witness attempted to reconcile the experts' testimony: "Well, first, you have to understand that when somebody is schizophrenic, it doesn't diminish their cognitive ability. Instead, you have a situation whereand why we call schizophrenia thought disorder[]the logical integration and reality connection of their thoughts are disrupted, so the stimulus comes in, and instead of being analyzed and processed in a rational, logical, linear sort of way, it gets scrambled up and it comes out in a tangential, circumstantial, symbolic not really relevant kind of way. That's the essence of somebody being schizophrenic Now, it may be that if they're dealing with |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | schizophrenic Now, it may be that if they're dealing with someone who's more familiar [in] what may feel like a safer, more enclosed environment those sorts of interactions may be reasonably lucid *260 whereas a more extended conversation about more loaded material would reflect the severity of his mental illness." at 32-329. See There is, in short, much in the record to support the conclusion that petitioner suffers from severe delusions. See, e.g., 149, 202-203, 231-232, 32-329, 333; see generally 36-353. The legal inquiry concerns whether these delusions can be said to render him incompetent. The Court of Appeals held that they could not. That holding, we conclude, rests on a flawed interpretation of The Court of Appeals stated that competency is determined by whether a prisoner is aware "`that he [is] going to be executed and why he [is] going to be executed,'" 44 F.3d, at 19 (quoting 13 F.3d, at 77); see 44 F.3d, at 1 (discussing -422, (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). To this end, the Court of Appeals identified the relevant District Court findings as follows: first, petitioner is aware that he committed the murders; second, he is aware that he will be executed; and, third, he is aware that the reason the State has given for the execution is his commission of the crimes in question. 44 F.3d, at 17. Under Circuit precedent this ends the analysis as a matter of law; for the Court of Appeals regards these three factual findings as necessarily demonstrating that a prisoner is aware of the reason for his execution. The Court of Appeals concluded that its standard foreclosed petitioner from establishing incompetency by the means he now seeks to employ: a showing that his mental illness obstructs a rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution. at 17-1. As the court explained, "[b]ecause we hold that `awareness,' as that term is used in is not necessarily synonymous with `rational understanding,' as argued by [petitioner,] we conclude that the district court's findings are sufficient to establish that [petitioner] is competent to be executed." at 21. In our view the Court of Appeals' standard is too restrictive to afford a prisoner the protections granted by the Eighth Amendment. The opinions in it must be acknowledged, did not set forth a precise standard for competency. The four-Justice plurality discussed the substantive standard at a high level of generality; and Justice Powell wrote only for himself when he articulated more specific criteria. Yet in the portion of Justice Marshall's discussion constituting the opinion of the Court (the |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | Justice Marshall's discussion constituting the opinion of the Court (the portion Justice Powell joined) the majority did reach the express conclusion that the Constitution "places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life of an insane prisoner." The Court stated the foundation for this principle as follows: "[T]oday, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still vivid today. And the intuition that such an execution simply of-fends humanity is evidently shared across this Nation. Faced with such widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is compelled to conclude *261 that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane." at Writing for four Justices, Justice Marshall concluded by indicating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of "one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications." Justice Powell, in his separate opinion, asserted that the Eighth Amendment "forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it," The Court of Appeals' standard treats a prisoner's delusional belief system as irrelevant if the prisoner knows that the State has identified his crimes as the reason for his execution. See 401 F. Supp. 2d, (indicating that under Circuit precedent "a petitioner's delusional beliefseven those which may result in a fundamental failure to appreciate the connection between the petitioner's crime and his executiondo not bear on the question of whether the petitioner `knows the reason for his execution' for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment"); see -712. Yet the opinions nowhere indicate that delusions are irrelevant to "comprehen[sion]" or "aware[ness]" if they so impair the prisoner's concept of reality that he cannot reach a rational understanding of the reason for the execution. If anything, the majority suggests the opposite. Explaining the prohibition against executing a prisoner who has lost his sanity, Justice Marshall in the controlling portion of his opinion set forth various rationales, including recognition that "the execution of an insane person simply offends humanity," ; that it "provides no example to others," ; that "it is uncharitable to dispatch an offender into another world, when he is not of a capacity to fit |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | world, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it," ; that "madness is its own punishment," ; and that executing an insane person serves no retributive purpose, at 40. Considering the lastwhether retribution is servedit might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the community as a whole, including the surviving family and friends of the victim, to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed. The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense and the objective of community vindication are called in question, however, if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole. This problem is not necessarily overcome once the test set forth by the Court of Appeals is met. And under a similar logic the other rationales set forth by fail to align with the distinctions drawn by the Court of Appeals. Whether 's inquiry into competency is formulated as a question of the prisoner's ability to "comprehen[d] the reasons" for his punishment or as a determination into whether he is "unaware of why [he is] to suffer it," then, the approach taken by the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with The principles set forth in are put at risk by a rule that deems delusions relevant only with respect to the State's announced reason for a punishment or the fact of an imminent execution, see 44 F.3d, at 19, 21, as opposed to the real interests the State seeks to vindicate. *262 We likewise find no support elsewhere in including in its discussions of the common law and the state standards, for the proposition that a prisoner is automatically foreclosed from demonstrating incompetency once a court has found he can identify the stated reason for his execution. A prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it. does not foreclose inquiry into the latter. This is not to deny the fact that a concept like rational understanding is difficult to define. And we must not ignore the concern that some prisoners, whose cases are not implicated by this decision, will fail to understand why they are to be punished on account of reasons other than |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | are to be punished on account of reasons other than those stemming from a severe mental illness. The mental state requisite for competence to suffer capital punishment neither presumes nor requires a person who would be considered "normal," or even "rational," in a layperson's understanding of those terms. Someone who is condemned to death for an atrocious murder may be so callous as to be unrepentant; so self-centered and devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt; so adept in transferring blame to others as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be out of touch with reality. Those states of mind, even if extreme compared to the criminal population at large, are not what petitioner contends lie at the threshold of a competence inquiry. The beginning of doubt about competence in a case like petitioner's is not a misanthropic personality or an amoral character. It is a psychotic disorder. Petitioner's submission is that he suffers from a severe, documented mental illness that is the source of gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. This argument, we hold, should have been considered. The flaws of the Court of Appeals' test are pronounced in petitioner's case. Circuit precedent required the District Court to disregard evidence of psychological dysfunction that, in the words of the judge, may have resulted in petitioner's "fundamental failure to appreciate the connection between the petitioner's crime and his execution." 401 F. Supp. 2d, To refuse to consider evidence of this nature is to mistake 's holding and its logic. Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose. It is therefore error to derive from and the substantive standard for incompetency its opinions broadly identify, a strict test for competency that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the State has identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be inflicted. B Although we reject the standard followed by the Court of Appeals, we do not attempt to set down a rule governing all competency determinations. The record is not as informative as it might be, even on the narrower issue of how a mental illness of the sort alleged by petitioner might affect this analysis. In overseeing the development of the record and in making its factual findings, the District Court found itself bound to analyze |
Justice Kennedy | 2,007 | 4 | majority | Panetti v. Quarterman | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145700/panetti-v-quarterman/ | factual findings, the District Court found itself bound to analyze the question of competency in the terms set by Circuit precedent. It acknowledged, for example, the "difficult issue" posed by the delusions allegedly interfering with petitioner's understanding of the reason behind his execution, 401 F. Supp. 2d, but it refrained from making definitive findings of *263 fact with respect to these matters, see See (identifying testimony by Dr. Mark Cunningham indicating that petitioner "believes the State is in league with the forces of evil that have conspired against him" and, as a result, "does not even understand that the State of Texas is a lawfully constituted authority," but refraining from setting forth definitive findings of fact concerning whether this was an accurate characterization of petitioner's mindset). The District Court declined to consider the significance those findings might have on the ultimate question of competency under the Eighth Amendment. See And notwithstanding the numerous questions the District Court asked of the witnesses, see, e.g., -197, 216-21, 234-237, 321-323, it did not press the experts on the difficult issue it identified in its opinion, see The District Court, of course, was bound by Circuit precedent, and the record was developed pursuant to a standard we have found to be improper. As a result, we find it difficult to amplify our conclusions or to make them more precise. We are hesitant to decide a question of this complexity before the District Court and the Court of Appeals have addressed, in a more definitive manner and in light of the expert evidence found to be probative, the nature and severity of petitioner's alleged mental problems. The underpinnings of petitioner's claims should be explained and evaluated in further detail on remand. The conclusions of physicians, psychiatrists, and other experts in the field will bear upon the proper analysis. Expert evidence may clarify the extent to which severe delusions may render a subject's perception of reality so distorted that he should be deemed incompetent. Cf. Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 17-19 (discussing the ways in which mental health experts can inform competency determinations). And there is precedent to guide a court conducting Eighth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., 125 S. Ct. 113, ; ; -410, It is proper to allow the court charged with overseeing the development of the evidentiary record in this case the initial opportunity to resolve petitioner's constitutional claim. These issues may be resolved in the first instance by the District Court. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | concurring | Perry v. Sindermann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108609/perry-v-sindermann/ | [*] I concur in the Court's judgments and opinions in Sindermann and Roth, but there is one central point in both decisions that I would like to underscore since it may have been obscured in the comprehensive discussion of the cases. That point is that the relationship between a state institution and one of its teachers is essentially a matter of state concern and state law. The Court holds today only that a state-employed teacher who has a right to re-employment under state law, arising from either an express or implied contract, has, in turn, a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to some form of prior administrative or academic hearing on the cause *604 for nonrenewal of his contract. Thus, whether a particular teacher in a particular context has any right to such administrative hearing hinges on a question of state law. The Court's opinion makes this point very sharply: "Property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law" Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at 577. Because the availability of the Fourteenth Amendment right to a prior administrative hearing turns in each case on a question of state law, the issue of abstention will arise in future cases contesting whether a particular teacher is entitled to a hearing prior to non-renewal of his contract. If relevant state contract law is unclear, a federal court should, in my view, abstain from deciding whether he is constitutionally entitled to a prior hearing, and the teacher should be left to resort to state courts on the questions arising under state law. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting in No. 71-162, ante, p. 564, and dissenting in part in No. 70-36. Although I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion in No. 70-36, I also agree with my Brother MARSHALL that "respondent[s] [were] denied due process when [their] contract[s] [were] not renewed and [they were] not informed of the reasons and given an opportunity to respond." Ante, at 590. Since respondents were entitled to summary judgment on that issue, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 71-162, and, to the extent indicated by my Brother MARSHALL, I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 70-36. *605 MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting in part. Respondent was a teacher in the state college system of the State of Texas for a decade before the Board of Regents of Odessa Junior College decided not to renew his |
Justice Burger | 1,972 | 12 | concurring | Perry v. Sindermann | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108609/perry-v-sindermann/ | Regents of Odessa Junior College decided not to renew his contract. He brought this suit in Federal District Court claiming that the decision not to rehire him was in retaliation for his public criticism of the policies of the college administration in violation of the First Amendment, and that because the decision was made without giving him a statement of reasons and a hearing, it denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. This Court affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion holding that respondent has presented a bona fide First Amendment claim that should be considered fully by the District Court. But, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth, No. 71-162, ante, p. 587, I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to enter summary judgment for respondent entitling him to a statement of reasons why his contract was not renewed and a hearing on disputed issues of fact. |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111261/irving-independent-school-dist-v-tatro/ | We granted certiorari to determine whether the Education of the Handicapped Act or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires a school district to provide a handicapped child with clean intermittent catheterization during school hours. I Amber Tatro is an 8-year-old girl born with a defect known as spina bifida. As a result, she suffers from orthopedic and speech impairments and a neurogenic bladder, which prevents her from emptying her bladder voluntarily. Consequently, she must be catheterized every three or four hours to avoid injury to her kidneys. In accordance with accepted medical practice, clean intermittent catheterization (CIC), a procedure involving the insertion of a catheter into the urethra to drain the bladder, has been prescribed. The procedure is a simple one that may be performed in a few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour's training. Amber's parents, babysitter, and teenage brother are all qualified to administer CIC, and Amber soon will be able to perform this procedure herself. In petitioner Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber, who was then three and one-half years old. In consultation with her parents, who are respondents here, petitioner developed an individualized education program for Amber under the *886 requirements of the Education of the Handicapped Act, as amended significantly by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 0 U.S. C. 1401(19), 4(a)(5). The individualized education program provided that Amber would attend early childhood development classes and receive special services such as physical and occupational therapy. That program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. Respondents unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services for Amber during school hours.[1] In October respondents brought the present action in District Court against petitioner, the State Board of Education, and others. See 5(e)(). They sought an injunction ordering petitioner to provide Amber with CIC and sought damages and attorney's fees. First, respondents invoked the Education of the Handicapped Act. Because Texas received funding under that statute, petitioner was required to provide Amber with a "free appropriate public education," (1), 4(a)(1)(C)(ii), which is defined to include "related services," 1401(18). Respondents argued that CIC is one such "related service."[] Second, respondents invoked 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 9 U.S. C. 794, which forbids an individual, by reason of a handicap, to be "excluded from the *887 participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under" any program receiving federal aid. The District Court denied respondents' request for a preliminary injunction. That court concluded that CIC was not a "related |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111261/irving-independent-school-dist-v-tatro/ | injunction. That court concluded that CIC was not a "related service" under the Education of the Handicapped Act because it did not serve a need arising from the effort to educate. It also held that 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not require "the setting up of governmental health care for people seeking to participate" in federally funded programs. The Court of Appeals reversed. First, it held that CIC was a "related service" under the Education of the Handicapped Act, 0 U.S. C. 1401(17), because without the procedure Amber could not attend classes and benefit from special education. Second, it held that petitioner's refusal to provide CIC effectively excluded her from a federally funded educational program in violation of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court of Appeals remanded for the District Court to develop a factual record and apply these legal principles. On remand petitioner stressed the Education of the Handicapped Act's explicit provision that "medical services" could qualify as "related services" only when they served the purpose of diagnosis or evaluation. See n. The District Court held that under Texas law a nurse or other qualified person may administer CIC without engaging in the unauthorized practice of medicine, provided that a doctor prescribes and supervises the procedure. The District Court then held that, because a doctor was not needed to administer CIC, provision of the procedure was not a "medical service" for purposes of the Education of the Handicapped Act. Finding CIC to be a "related service" under that Act, the District Court ordered petitioner and the State Board of Education to modify Amber's individualized education program *888 to include provision of CIC during school hours. It also awarded compensatory damages against petitioner.[3] On the authority of Tatro I, the District Court then held that respondents had proved a violation of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Although the District Court did not rely on this holding to authorize any greater injunctive or compensatory relief, it did invoke the holding to award attorney's fees against petitioner and the State Board of Education.[4] ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a-63a. The Rehabilitation Act, unlike the Education of the Handicapped Act, authorizes prevailing parties to recover attorney's fees. See 9 U.S. C. 794a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 703 F.d 83 That court accepted the District Court's conclusion that state law permitted qualified persons to administer CIC without the physical presence of a doctor, and it affirmed the award of relief under the Education of the Handicapped Act. In affirming the award of attorney's fees based on a finding of liability |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111261/irving-independent-school-dist-v-tatro/ | award of attorney's fees based on a finding of liability under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court of Appeals held that no change of circumstances since Tatro I justified a different result. We granted certiorari, and we affirm in part and reverse in part. II This case poses two separate issues. The first is whether the Education of the Handicapped Act requires petitioner to *889 provide CIC services to Amber. The second is whether 504 of the Rehabilitation Act creates such an obligation. We first turn to the claim presented under the Education of the Handicapped Act. States receiving funds under the Act are obliged to satisfy certain conditions. A primary condition is that the state implement a policy "that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education." 0 U.S. C. (1). Each educational agency applying to a state for funding must provide assurances in turn that its program aims to provide "a free appropriate public education to all handicapped children." 4(a)(1)(C)(ii). A "free appropriate public education" is explicitly defined as "special education and related services." 1401(18).[5] The term "special education" means "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 1401(16). "Related services" are defined as "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from *890 special education, and includes the early identification and assessment of handicapping conditions in children." 1401(17) (emphasis added). The issue in this case is whether CIC is a "related service" that petitioner is obliged to provide to Amber. We must answer two questions: first, whether CIC is a "supportive servic[e] required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education"; and second, whether CIC is excluded from this definition as a "medical servic[e]" serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation. A The Court of Appeals was clearly correct in holding that CIC is a "supportive servic[e] required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education."[6] It is clear on this record that, without having CIC services available during the school day, Amber cannot attend school and thereby "benefit from special education." CIC services therefore fall squarely within the definition of a "supportive service."[7] *891 As we have stated before, "Congress sought |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111261/irving-independent-school-dist-v-tatro/ | "supportive service."[7] *891 As we have stated before, "Congress sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped children" and "to make such access meaningful." Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School 19 (198). A service that enables a handicapped child to remain at school during the day is an important means of providing the child with the meaningful access to education that Congress envisioned. The Act makes specific provision for services, like transportation, for example, that do no more than enable a child to be physically present in class, see 0 U.S. C. 1401(17); and the Act specifically authorizes grants for schools to alter buildings and equipment to make them accessible to the handicapped, 1406; see S. Rep. No. p. 38 (1975); 11 Cong. Rec. 19483-19484 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford). Services like CIC that permit a child to remain at school during the day are no less related to the effort to educate than are services that enable the child to reach, enter, or exit the school. We hold that CIC services in this case qualify as a "supportive servic[e] required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education."[8] B We also agree with the Court of Appeals that provision of CIC is not a "medical servic[e]," which a school is required to provide only for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. See 0 U.S. C. 1401(17). We begin with the regulations of the *89 Department of Education, which are entitled to deference.[9] See, e. g., 457 U.S. 13, (198). The regulations define "related services" for handicapped children to include "school health services," 34 CFR 300.13(a) which are defined in turn as "services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person," 300.13(b) (10). "Medical services" are defined as "services provided by a licensed physician." 300.13(b)(4).[10] Thus, the Secretary has determined that the services of a school nurse otherwise qualifying as a "related service" are not subject to exclusion as a "medical service," but that the services of a physician are excludable as such. This definition of "medical services" is a reasonable interpretation of congressional intent. Although Congress devoted little discussion to the "medical services" exclusion, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence.[11] From this understanding of *893 congressional purpose, the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that Congress intended to impose the obligation to provide school nursing services. Congress plainly required schools to hire various specially trained personnel to |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111261/irving-independent-school-dist-v-tatro/ | plainly required schools to hire various specially trained personnel to help handicapped children, such as "trained occupational therapists, speech therapists, psychologists, social workers and other appropriately trained personnel." S. Rep. No. School nurses have long been a part of the educational system, and the Secretary could therefore reasonably conclude that school nursing services are not the sort of burden that Congress intended to exclude as a "medical service." By limiting the "medical services" exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital, both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the provision. Petitioner's contrary interpretation of the "medical services" exclusion is unconvincing. In petitioner's view, CIC is a "medical service," even though it may be provided by a nurse or trained layperson; that conclusion rests on its reading of Texas law that confines CIC to uses in accordance with a physician's prescription and under a physician's ultimate supervision. Aside from conflicting with the Secretary's reasonable interpretation of congressional intent, however, such a rule would be anomalous. Nurses in petitioner School District are authorized to dispense oral medications and administer emergency injections in accordance with a physician's prescription. This kind of service for nonhandicapped children is difficult to distinguish from the provision of CIC to the handicapped.[1] It would be strange indeed if Congress, *894 in attempting to extend special services to handicapped children, were unwilling to guarantee them services of a kind that are routinely provided to the nonhandicapped. To keep in perspective the obligation to provide services that relate to both the health and educational needs of handicapped students, we note several limitations that should minimize the burden petitioner fears. First, to be entitled to related services, a child must be handicapped so as to require special education. See 0 U.S. C. 1401(1); 34 CFR 300.5 In the absence of a handicap that requires special education, the need for what otherwise might qualify as a related service does not create an obligation under the Act. See 34 CFR 300.14, Comment (1) Second, only those services necessary to aid a handicapped child to benefit from special education must be provided, regardless how easily a school nurse or layperson could furnish them. For example, if a particular medication or treatment may appropriately be administered to a handicapped child other than during the school day, a school is not required to provide nursing services to administer it. Third, the regulations state that school nursing services must be provided only if they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not if they must be performed by |
Justice Burger | 1,984 | 12 | majority | Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111261/irving-independent-school-dist-v-tatro/ | other qualified person, not if they must be performed by a physician. See 34 CFR 300.13(a), (b)(4), (b)(10) It bears mentioning that here not even the services of a nurse are required; as is conceded, a layperson with minimal training is qualified to provide CIC. See also, e. g., Department of Education of 77 F.d 809 *895 Finally, we note that respondents are not asking petitioner to provide equipment that Amber needs for CIC. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19. They seek only the services of a qualified person at the school. We conclude that provision of CIC to Amber is not subject to exclusion as a "medical service," and we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that CIC is a "related service" under the Education of the Handicapped Act.[13] III Respondents sought relief not only under the Education of the Handicapped Act but under 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well. After finding petitioner liable to provide CIC under the former, the District Court proceeded to hold that petitioner was similarly liable under 504 and that respondents were therefore entitled to attorney's fees under 505 of the Rehabilitation Act, 9 U.S. C. 794a. We hold today, in Smith v. Robinson, post, p. 99, that 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the Education of the Handicapped Act to remedy a denial of educational services. Respondents are therefore not entitled to relief under 504, and we reverse the Court of Appeals' holding that respondents *896 are entitled to recover attorney's fees. In all other respects, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join all but Part III of the Court's opinion. For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Smith v. Robinson, post, p. 99, I would affirm the award of attorney's fees to the respondents. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The petition for certiorari did not challenge the award of attorney's fees. It contested only the award of relief on the merits to respondents. Inasmuch as the judgment on the merits is supported by the Court's interpretation of the Education of the Handicapped Act, there is no need to express any opinion concerning the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.[*] Accordingly, while I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, I do not join Part III. |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities. See as amended, 42 U.S. C. 401 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. V) (Title II disability insurance benefits); 1381 et seq. (Title XVI supplemental security income). For both types of benefits the Act defines the key term "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. " 423(d)(1)(A) (1994 ed.) (Title II) (emphasis added); accord, 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (Title XVI). This case presents two questions about the Social Security Administration's interpretation of this definition. First, the Social Security Administration (which we shall call the Agency) reads the term "inability" as including a "12 month" requirement. In its view, the "inability" (to engage in any substantial gainful activity) must last, or must be expected *215 to last, for at least 12 months. Second, the Agency reads the term "expected to last" as applicable only when the "inability" has not yet lasted 12 months. In the case of a later Agency determinationwhere the "inability" did not last 12 monthsthe Agency will automatically assume that the claimant failed to meet the duration requirement. It will not look back to decide hypothetically whether, despite the claimant's actual return to work before 12 months expired, the "inability" nonetheless might have been expected to last that long. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held both these interpretations of the statute unlawful. We hold, to the contrary, that both fall within the Agency's lawful interpretive authority. See U. S. A. Consequently, we reverse. I In Cleveland Walton, the respondent, applied for both Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income. The Agency found that (1) by October 31, 1994, Walton had developed a serious mental illness involving both schizophrenia and associated depression; (2) the illness caused him then to lose his job as a full-time teacher; (3) by mid-1995 he began to work again part time as a cashier; and (4) by December 1995 he was working as a cashier full time. The Agency concluded that Walton's mental illness had prevented him from engaging in any significant work, i. e., from "engag[ing] in any substantial gainful activity," for 11 monthsfrom October 31, 1994 (when he lost his teaching job) until the end of September 1995 (when he earned income sufficient to |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | end of September 1995 (when he earned income sufficient to rise to the level of "substantial gainful activity"). See 20 CFR 404.1574, 416.974 And because the statute demanded an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" lasting 12, not 11, months, Walton was not entitled to benefits. *216 Walton sought court review. The District Court affirmed the Agency's decision, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The court said that the statute's 12-month duration requirement modifies the word "impairment," not the word "inability." It added that the statute's " leaves no doubt" that there is no similar "duration requirement" related to an "inability" (to engage in substantial gainful activity). It concluded that, because the statute's "speaks clearly" and is "unambiguous," Walton was entitled to receive benefits despite agency regulations restricting benefits to those unable to work for a 12-month period. The court went on to decide that, in any event, Walton qualified because, prior to Walton's return to work, one would have "expected" his "inability" to last 12 months. -190. It conceded that the Agency had made Walton's actual return to work determinative on this point. See 20 CFR 404.1520(b), 1592(d)(2) But it found unlawful the Agency regulations that gave the Agency the benefit of hindsighton the ground that they conflicted with the statute's clear For either reason, the Fourth Circuit concluded, Walton became "entitled" to Title II benefits no later than April 1995, five months after the onset of his illness. See 42 U.S. C. 423(a)(1)(D)(i), 423(a)(1)(D)(ii) (providing for a 5-month "waiting period" before a claimant is "entitled" to benefits), 423(c)(2)(A) (1994 ed.). It added that Walton's later work as a cashier was legally beside the point. That work simply counted as part of a 9-month "trial work period," which the statute grants to those "entitled" to Title II benefits, and which it permits them to perform without loss of benefits. 422(c). The Government sought certiorari. It pointed out that the Fourth Circuit's first holding conflicts with those of other Circuits, 235 F.3d, -190, with and It added that the Fourth Circuit's views were contrary to well-settled law and would create additional Social Security costs of $80 billion over 10 years. We granted the writ. We now reverse. II The statutory definition of "disability" has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind of "inability," namely, an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity." Second, it requires an "impairment," namely, a "physical or mental impairment," which provides "reason" for the "inability." The statute adds that the "impairment" must be one that "has lasted or |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | that the "impairment" must be one that "has lasted or can be expected to last not less than 12 months." But what about the "inability"? Must it also last (or be expected to last) for the same amount of time? The Agency has answered this question in the affirmative. Acting pursuant to statutory rulemaking authority, 42 U.S. C. 405(a) (Title II), 1383(d)(1) (Title XVI), it has promulgated formal regulations that state that a claimant is not disabled "regardless of [his] medical condition," if he is doing "substantial gainful activity." 20 CFR 404.1520(b) And the Agency has interpreted this regulation to mean that the claimant is not disabled if "within 12 months after the onset of an impairment the impairment no longer prevents substantial gainful activity." Courts grant an agency's interpretation of its own regulations considerable legal leeway. ; And no one here denies that the Agency has properly interpreted its own regulation. Consequently, the legal question before us is whether the Agency's interpretation of the statute is lawful. This Court has previously said that, if the statute speaks clearly "to the precise question at issue," we "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 467 *-843. If, however, the statute "is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," we must sustain the Agency's interpretation if it is "based on a permissible construction" of the Act. Hence we must decide (1) whether the statute unambiguously forbids the Agency's interpretation, and, if not, (2) whether the interpretation, for other reasons, exceeds the bounds of the permissible. ; see also United First, the statute does not unambiguously forbid the regulation. The Fourth Circuit believed the contrary primarily for a linguistic reason. It pointed out that, linguistically speaking, the statute's "12-month" phrase modifies only the word "impairment," not the word "inability." And to that extent we agree. After all, the statute, in parallel phrasing, uses the words "which can be expected to result in death." And that structurally parallel phrase makes sense in reference to an "impairment," but makes no sense in reference to the "inability." Nonetheless, this linguistic point is insufficient. It shows that the particular statutory provision says nothing explicitly about the "inability's" duration. But such silence, after all, normally creates ambiguity. It does not resolve it. Moreover, a nearby provision of the statute says that an "individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairment [is] of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S. C. 423(d)(2)(A) (Title II); accord, 1382c(a)(3)(B) (Title XVI). In other words, the statute, in the two provisions, specifies that the "impairment" must last 12 months and also be severe enough to prevent the claimant from engaging in virtually any "substantial gainful work." The statute, we concede, *219 nowhere explicitly says that the "impairment" must be that severe (i. e., severe enough to prevent "substantial gainful work") for 12 months. But that is a fair inference from the See Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae 13 (conceding that an impairment must remain of "disabling severity" for 12 months). At the very least the statute is ambiguous in that respect. And, if so, then it is an equally fair inference that the "inability" must last 12 months. That is because the latter statement (i. e., that the claimant must be unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity" for a year) is the virtual equivalent of the former statement (i. e., that the "impairment" must remain severe enough to prevent the claimant from engaging in "substantial gainful work" for a year). It simply rephrases the same point in a slightly different way. Second, the Agency's construction is "permissible." The interpretation makes considerable sense in terms of the statute's basic objectives. The statute demands some duration requirement. No one claims that the statute would permit an individual with a chronic illnesssay, high blood pressureto qualify for benefits if that illness, while itself lasting for a year, were to permit a claimant to return to work after only a week, or perhaps even a day, away from the job. The Agency's interpretation supplies a duration requirement, which the statute demands, while doing so in a way that consistently reconciles the statutory "impairment" and "inability" In addition, the Agency's regulations reflect the Agency's own longstanding interpretation. See Social Security Ruling 82-52, p. 106 ("In considering `duration,' it is the inability to engage in [substantial gainful activity] that must last the required 12-month period"); Disability Insurance State Manual 316 Government Lodging, Tab C, 316 ("Duration of impairment refers to that period of time during which an individual is continuously unable to engage in substantial gainful activity because *220 of" an impairment); OASI Disability Insurance Letter No. 39 (Jan. 22, 1957), Tab A, p. 1 (duration requirement refers to the "expected duration of the medical impairment " at a "level of severity sufficient to preclude" substantial gainful activity"). And this Court will normally accord particular deference to an agency |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | this Court will normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of "longstanding" duration. North Haven Bd. of Finally, Congress has frequently amended or reenacted the relevant provisions without change. E. g., Social Security Amendments of 1965, 303(a)(1), ; see also S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, pp. 98-99 ("[T]he committee's bill provide[s] for the payment of disability benefits for an insured worker who has been or can be expected to be totally disabled throughout a continuous period of 12 calendar months" (emphasis added)); ; H. R. Rep. No. 92-, p. 56 ("No benefit is payable, however, unless the disability is expected to last (or has lasted) at least 12 consecutive months" (emphasis added)); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 49 (1967) ("The committee also believes that an individual who does substantial gainful work despite an impairment or impairments that otherwise might be considered disabling is not disabled for purposes of establishing a period of disability"). These circumstances provide further evidenceif more is neededthat Congress intended the Agency's interpretation, or at least understood the interpretation as statutorily permissible. Commodity Futures Trading Walton points in reply to Title II stating that a claimant who is "under a disability shall be entitled to a benefit beginning with the first month after" a "waiting period" of "five consecutive calendar months throughout which" he "has been under a disability." *221 42 U.S. C. 423(a)(1)(D)(i), 423(c)(2)(A). He adds that this 5-month "waiting period" assures a lengthy period of time during which the applicant (who must be "under a disability" throughout) has been unable to work. And it thereby provides ironclad protection against the claimant who suffers a chronic, but only briefly disabling, disease, such as the claimant who suffers high blood pressure in our earlier example. See This claim does not help Walton, however, for it shows, at most, that the Agency might have chosen other reasonable time periodsa matter not disputed. Regardless, Walton's "waiting period" argument could work only in respect to Title II, not Title XVI. Title XVI has no waiting period, though it uses identical definitional And Walton does not explain why we should interpret the same statutory words differently in closely related contexts. See Department of Revenue of ). Walton also asks us to disregard the Agency's interpretation of its formal regulations on the ground that the Agency only recently enacted those regulations, perhaps in response to this litigation. We have previously rejected similar arguments. ; United Regardless, the Agency's interpretation is one of long standing. See And the fact that the Agency previously reached |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | standing. See And the fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means less formal than "notice and comment" rulemaking, see 5 U.S. C. 553, does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due. Cf. 467 U. S., )). If this Court's opinion in suggested an absolute rule to the contrary, our later opinion in United denied the suggestion. at 230- Indeed, Mead pointed to instances in which the Court has applied deference to agency interpretations that did not emerge out of notice-and-comment - ). It indicated that whether a court should give such deference depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used and the nature of the question at -. And it discussed at length why did not require deference in the circumstances there presenta discussion that would have been superfluous had the presence or absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking been 533 U.S., at -234. In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at See United cf. also 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise 1.7, 3.3 For these reasons, we find the Agency's interpretation lawful. III Walton's second claim is more complex. For purposes of making that claim, Walton assumes what we have just decided, namely, that the statute's "12 month" duration requirements *223 apply to both the "impairment" and the "inability" to work requirements. Walton also concedes that he returned to work after 11 months. But Walton claims that his work from month 11 to month 12 does not count against him because it is part of a "trial work" period that the statute grants to those "entitled" to Title II benefits. See 42 U.S. C. 422(c). And Walton adds, he was "entitle[d]" to benefits becauseeven though he returned to work after 11 monthshis "impairment" and his "inability" to work were nonetheless "expected to last" for at least "12 months" before he returned to work. To illustrate Walton's argument, we simplify the actual circumstances. We imagine: (1) On January 1, Year One, Walton developed (a) a severe impairment, which (b) made him unable to work; (2) Eleven (not twelve) months later, on December 1, Year One, Walton returned to work; (3) On July 1, Year Two, the Agency adjudicated, and denied, Walton's |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | July 1, Year Two, the Agency adjudicated, and denied, Walton's claim for benefits. Walton argues that, even though he returned to work after 11 months, had the Agency looked at the matter, not ex post, but as if it were looking prior to his return to work, the Agency would have had to conclude that both his "impairment" and his "inability" to work "can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 423(d)(1)(A). He consequently satisfied the 12month duration requirement and became "entitled" to benefits before he returned to work; he was in turn entitled to a "trial work" period; and his subsequent work as a cashier, being "trial work," should not count against him. The Agency's regulations plainly reject this view of the statute. They say, "You are not entitled to a trial work period" if "you perform work within 12 months of the onset of the impairment(s) and before the date of any notice of determination or decision finding you disabled. " 20 CFR 404.1592(d)(2) This regulation means that the Agency, deciding before the end of Year One, might have found that Walton's impairment (or inability to work) "can *224 be expected to last" for 12 months. But the Agency, deciding after Year One in which Walton in fact returned to work, would not ask whether his impairment (or inability to work) could have been expected to last 12 months. The legal question is whether this Agency regulation is consistent with the statute. The Court of Appeals, accepting Walton's view, concluded that it is not. It said that the Agency's rulespermitting the use of hindsight when reviewing claimsare inconsistent with the statute's plain And, here, other courts have agreed. See ; ; ; Nonetheless, we believe that Agency regulation is lawful. See The statute is ambiguous. It says nothing about how the Agency, when it adjudicates a matter after Year One, is to treat an earlier return to work. Its "can be expected to last" 12 months, 42 U.S. C. 423(d)(1)(A), simply does not say as of what time the law measures the "expectation." Indeed, from a linguistic perspective, the phrase "can be expected" foresees a decisionmaker who is looking into the future, not a decisionmaker who is in the future, looking back into the past in order to see what then "was," "could be," or "could have been" expected. And read in context, the purpose of the phrase "can be expected to last" might be one of permitting the Agency to award benefits before 12 months have expired, not one of |
Justice Breyer | 2,002 | 2 | majority | Barnhart v. Walton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118493/barnhart-v-walton/ | award benefits before 12 months have expired, not one of denying the Agency the benefit of hindsight. See ; cf. also S. Rep. No. 404, at 99. At the same time, the Agency's regulation seems a reasonable, hence permissible, interpretation of the statute. In effect it treats a pre-Agency-decision actual return to work, e. g., Walton's return in December Year One, as if it were determinative of the expectation question. With Year Two's hindsight, Walton's "inability" to work "can" not "be *225 expected to last 12 months." And use of that hindsight avoids the need for the Year Two decisionmaker in effect to answer a highly unwieldy question in what grammarians might call the pluperfect future tense. Of course, administrators and judges are capable of answering hypothetical questions of this kind. But here the question concerns what must be a contrary-to-fact speculation about the future. It is a speculation that, however often raised, would rarely prove easy to resolve. And the statute's purpose does not demand its resolution. Indeed, one might ask why, other things being equal, a claimant who returns to work too early ordinarily to qualify for benefits nonetheless should qualify if, but only if, that return was a kind of medical surprise. Of course, as Walton says, such a rule would help encourage (or at least not discourage) a claimant's early return to work. See generally S. Rep. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 15-16 (1960). But the statute does not demand that the Agency make of this desirable end an overriding interpretive principle. And the Agency has recognized and addressed the problem of work disincentives in other ways. See, e. g., 20 CFR 404.1574(c), 404.1575(d) The statute's complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration. See The interpretation at issue here is such a matter. The statute's is ambiguous. And the Agency's interpretation is reasonable. We conclude that the Agency's regulation is lawful. * * * The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is Reversed. *226 Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or Act) prohibits professional debt collectors from using “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt” and from “us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect” a debt. 15 U.S. C. 1692f. The Court today wrongfully holds that a debt collector that knowingly attempts to collect a time-barred debt in bankruptcy proceedings has violated neither of these prohibitions. Professional debt collectors have built a business out of buying stale debt, filing claims in bankruptcy proceedings to collect it, and hoping that no one notices that the debt is too old to be enforced by the courts. This practice is both “unfair” and “unconscionable.” I respectfully dissent from the Court’s conclusion to the contrary.1 I Americans owe trillions of dollars in consumer debt to creditors—credit card companies, schools, and car dealers, —————— 1 Because I believe the practice at issue here is “unfair” and “uncon scionable,” and thus violates 15 U.S. C. I do not address the Court’s conclusion that the practice is not “false, deceptive, or mislead ing” in violation of 2 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting among others. See Fed. Reserve Bank of N. Y., Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit 3 (2017). Most people will repay their debts, but some cannot do so. The debts they do not pay are increasingly likely to end up in the hands of professional debt collectors—companies whose business it is to collect debts that are owed to other companies. See Consumer Financial Protection Bur., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: Annual Report 2016, p. 8 (CFPB Report). Debt collection is a lucrative and growing industry. Last year, the Nation’s 6,000 debt collection agencies earned over $13 billion in revenue. Although many debt collectors are hired by creditors to work on a third-party basis, more and more collectors also operate as “debt buyers”—purchasing debts from creditors outright and attempting to collect what they can, with the profits going to their own accounts.2 See FTC, The Struc ture and Practices of the Debt Buying Industry 11–12 (FTC Report); CFPB Report 10. Debt buyers now hold hundreds of billions of dollars in consumer debt; indeed, a study conducted by the Federal Trade Commis sion (FTC) in 2009 found that nine of the leading debt buyers had purchased over $140 billion in debt just in the previous three years. FTC Report, at i–ii, T–3 (Table 3). Because creditors themselves have given up trying to collect the debts they sell to debt buyers, they sell those debts for pennies on the |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | debt buyers, they sell those debts for pennies on the dollar. The older the debt, the greater the discount: While debt buyers pay close to eight cents per dollar for debts under three years old, they pay as little as two cents per dollar for debts greater than six years old, and “effectively nothing” for debts greater than 15 years old. –24. These prices —————— 2Acase pending before this Court, Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 16–349, asks whether a certain kind of debt buyer is a “debt collector” under the FDCPA. Midland does not dispute that it is a debt collector under the Act. Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting reflect the basic fact that older debts are harder to collect. As time passes, consumers move or forget that they owe the debts; creditors have more trouble documenting the debts and proving their validity; and debts begin to fall within state statutes of limitations—time limits that “operate to bar a plaintiff ’s suit” once passed. CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U. S. (slip op., at 5). Because a creditor (or a debt collector) cannot enforce a time-barred debt in court, the debt is inherently worth very little indeed. But statutes of limitations have not deterred debt buy ers. For years, they have filed suit in state courts—often in small-claims courts, where formal rules of evidence do not apply—to collect even debts too old to be enforced by those courts.3 See The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small-Claims Court, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 259, 261 Importantly, the debt buyers’ only hope in these cases is that consumers will fail either to invoke the statute of limitations or to respond at all: In most States the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, meaning that a consumer must appear in court and raise it in order to dismiss the suit. See ante, at 4–5 (majority opinion). But consumers do fail to defend them selves in court—in fact, according to the FTC, over 90% fail to appear at all. FTC Report 45. The result is that debt buyers have won “billions of dollars in default judg ments” simply by filing suit and betting that consumers will lack the resources to respond. The FDCPA’s prohibitions on “misleading” and “unfair” conduct have largely beaten back this particular practice. Every court to have considered the question has held that —————— 3 Petitioner’s parent alone filed 245,000 lawsuits in 2009. See Silver- Greenberg, Boom in Debt Buying Fuels Another Boom—in Lawsuits, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2010, pp. |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | Another Boom—in Lawsuits, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2010, pp. A1, A16. Petitioner itself filed 110 lawsuits on just one date in a single state court. at A1. 4 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting a debt collector that knowingly files suit in court to collect a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA. See Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, ; 1487 (MD Ala. 1987); see also ante, at 5–6 (majority opin ion) (citing other cases). In 2015, petitioner and its parent company entered into a consent decree with the Govern ment prohibiting them from filing suit to collect time- barred debts and ordering them to pay $34 million in restitution. See Consent Order in In re Encore Capital Group, Inc., No. 2015–CFPB–0022 (Sept. 9, 2015), pp. 38, 46. And the leading trade association has now adopted a resolution barring the practice. See Brief for DBA Inter national, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 2–3. Stymied in state courts, the debt buyers have now turned to a new forum: bankruptcy courts. The same debt buyers that for years filed thousands of lawsuits in state courts across the country have begun to do the same thing in bankruptcy courts—specifically, in cases governed by Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows consum ers earning regular incomes to restructure their debts and repay as many as they can over a period of several years. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1300.01 (A. Resnick & H. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2016). As in ordinary civil cases, a debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding is entitled to have dismissed any claim filed against his estate that is barred by a statute of limitations. See 11 U.S. C. As in ordinary civil cases, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, one that must be raised by either the debtor or the trustee of his estate before it is honored. 558. And so—just as in ordinary civil cases—debt collectors may file claims in bankruptcy proceedings for stale debts and hope that no one notices that they are too old to be enforced. And that is exactly what the debt buyers have done. As a wide variety of courts and commentators have observed, Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 5 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting debt buyers have “deluge[d]” the bankruptcy courts with claims “on debts deemed unenforceable under state stat utes of limitations.” ; see also In re Jenkins, (noting a “plague of stale claims”); Brief for National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys et al. as Amici Curiae 9 (noting study describing “hundreds of thousands of proofs of claim |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | (noting study describing “hundreds of thousands of proofs of claim asserting hundreds of millions of dollars of con sumer indebtedness, all in a single year”). This practice has become so widespread that the Government sued one debt buyer last year “to address [its] systemic abuse of the bankruptcy process”—including a “business model” of “knowingly and strategically” filing thousands of claims for time-barred debt. Complaint in In re Freeman-Clay v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L. P., No. 14–41871 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo.), ¶¶1, 35 (Resurgent Complaint). This practice, the Government explained, “manipulates the bankruptcy process by systematically shifting the burden” to trustees and debtors to object even to “frivolous claims”—especially given that filing an objection is costly, time consuming, and easy to overlook. 43–44. II The FDCPA prohibits professional debt collectors from engaging in “unfair” and “unconscionable” practices. 15 U.S. C. Filing a claim in bankruptcy court for —————— 4 This Court has not had occasion to construe the terms “unfair” and “unconscionable” in The FDCPA’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended these terms as a backstop that would enable “courts, where appropriate, to proscribe other improper conduct not specifically addressed” by the statute. S. Rep. No. 95–382, p. 4 (1977). Courts have construed these terms, consistent with other federal and state statutes that employ them, to borrow from equitable and common- law traditions. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1200–1201 (CA11 2010) (per curiam); 6 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting debt that a collector knows to be time barred—like filing a lawsuit in a court to collect such a debt—is just such a practice. A Begin where the debt collectors themselves began: with their practice of filing suit in ordinary civil courts to collect debts that they know are time barred. Every court to have considered this practice holds that it violates the FDCPA. There is no sound reason to depart from this conclusion. Statutes of limitations “are not simply technicalities.” Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980). They reflect strong public-policy determinations that “it is unjust to fail to put [an] adver sary on notice to defend within a specified period of time.” United And they “promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Railroad Such concerns carry particular weight in the context of small- dollar consumer debt collection. As one thoughtful opinion explains: “Because few unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | explains: “Because few unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a statute of limitations could be used to defend against lawsuits based on stale debts, such consumers would unwittingly acquiesce to such law suits. And, even if the consumer realizes that she can use time as a defense, she will more than likely still give in rather than fight the lawsuit because she must still expend energy and resources and subject herself to the embarrassment of going into court to present the defense” Debt buyers’ efforts to pursue stale debt in ordinary civil Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 7 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting litigation may also entrap debtors into forfeiting their time defenses altogether. When a debt collector sues or threat ens to sue to collect a debt, many consumers respond by offering a small partial payment to forestall suit. In many States, a consumer who makes an offer like this has— unbeknownst to him—forever given up his ability to claim the debt is unenforceable. That is because in most States a consumer’s partial payment on a time-barred debt—or his promise to resume payments on such a debt—will restart the statute of limitations. FTC Report 47; see, e.g., 121 Cal. Rptr. 236, 237 (1975) (“ ‘The theory on which this is based is that the payment is an acknowledgement on the exist ence of the indebtedness which raises an implied promise to continue the obligation and to pay the balance’ ”). Debt collectors’ efforts to entrap consumers in this way have no place in honest business practice. B The same dynamics are present in bankruptcy proceed ings. A proof of claim filed in bankruptcy court represents the debt collector’s belief that it is entitled to payment, even though the debt should not be enforced as a matter of public policy. The debtor’s claim will be allowed, and will be incorporated in a debtor’s payment plan, unless the debtor or his trustee objects. But such objections require ordinary and unsophisticated people (and their over worked trustees) to be on guard not only against mistaken claims but also against claims that debt collectors know will fail under law if an objection is raised. Debt collectors do not file these claims in good faith; they file them hoping and expecting that the bankruptcy system will fail. Such a practice is “unfair” and “unconscionable” in violation of the FDCPA. The Court disagrees. But it does so on narrow grounds. To begin with, the Court does not hold that the Bankruptcy 8 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Code altogether displaces the FDCPA, leaving |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | JOHNSON SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Code altogether displaces the FDCPA, leaving it with no role to play in bankruptcy proceedings. Such a conclu sion would be wrong. Although the Code and the FDCPA “have different purposes and structural features,” ante, at 8, the Court has held that Congress, in passing the FDCPA’s predecessor, did so on the understanding that “the provisions and the purposes” of the two statutes were intended to “coexist.” 650 (1974). Although petitioner suggests that the FDCPA is best read “to have no application to [a] debt collector’s conduct” in a bankruptcy proceeding, Brief for Petitioner 41, the majority declines its invitation to adopt such a sweeping rule.5 Nor does the majority take a position on whether a debt collector violates the FDCPA by filing suit in an ordinary court to collect a debt it knows is time barred. Ante, at 6. Instead, the majority concludes, even assuming that such a practice would violate the FDCPA, a debt collector does —————— 5 Themajority does lean heavily on its fear that, were we to conclude that the FDCPA bars the practice at issue, we would be licensing “postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court” concerning mat ters best left to bankruptcy courts. Ante, at 9. But to do so would not, as the majority suggests, “upset [the] ‘delicate balance’ ” struck by the Code. (quoting ). For one, nothing requires a debtor to engage in satellite litigation in order to sue a debt collector under the FDCPA; a debtor can easily file an adversary proceeding asserting an FDCPA claim with the bankruptcy court itself, and in many cases will be better served by doing so. See, e.g., Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N. A., Nor is there any risk that finding the FDCPA applicable here will authorize bankruptcy courts (or, for that matter, civil courts) to engage in novel and unfet tered inquiries into “a creditor’s state of mind.” Ante, at 9. Both Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11 and its bankruptcy counterpart, Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 9011, authorize a court to impose sanctions on parties who willfully file meritless claims (a category that includes the debt buyers here, see In re Sekema, 654–655 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind. 2015)). So there is nothing new about the inquiry that courts would be required to undertake; it is no different than analyses they conduct every day. Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 9 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting not violate the Act by doing the same thing in bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy, the majority argues, is differ ent. True enough. But none of the distinctions |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | is differ ent. True enough. But none of the distinctions that the majority identifies bears the weight placed on it. First, the majority contends, structural features of the bankruptcy process reduce the risk that a stale debt will go unnoticed and thus be allowed. Ante, at 6–7. But there is virtually no evidence that the majority’s theory holds true in practice. The majority relies heavily on the pres ence of a bankruptcy trustee, appointed to act on the debtor’s behalf and empowered to (among other things) object to claims that he believes lack merit. See 11 U.S. C. 1302(b). In the majority’s view, the trustee’s gatekeeping role makes it “considerably more likely that an effort to collect upon a stale claim in bank ruptcy will be met with resistance, objection, and disal lowance.” Ante, at 7. The problem with the majority’s ipse dixit is that everyone with actual experience in the matter insists that it is false. The Government, which oversees bankruptcy trustees, tells us that trustees “cannot realis tically be expected to identify every time-barred claim filed in every bankruptcy.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25–26; see also Resurgent Complaint ¶43 (“Filing objections to all of [one collector]’s unenforceable claims would clog the docket of this Court and other courts with objections to frivolous claims”). The trustees them selves (appearing here as amici curiae) agree, describing the practice as “wasteful” and “exploit[ative].” Brief for National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees as Amicus Curiae 12. And courts across the country recog nize that Chapter 13 trustees are struggling under a “deluge” of stale debt. 758 F.3d, at Second, the other features of the bankruptcy process that the majority believes will serve as a backstop against frivolous claims are even less likely to do so in practice. The majority implies that a person who files for bankruptcy 10 MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC v. JOHNSON SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting is more sophisticated than the average consumer debtor because the initiation of bankruptcy is a choice made by a debtor. Ante, at 6. But a person who has filed for bank ruptcy will rarely be in such a superior position; he has, after all, just declared that he is unable to meet his finan cial obligations and in need of the assistance of the courts. It is odd to speculate that such a person is better situated to monitor court filings and lodge objections than an ordi nary consumer. The majority also suggests that the rules of bankruptcy help “guide the evaluation of claims.” But the rules of bankruptcy in fact facilitate the |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,017 | 24 | dissenting | Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4391109/midland-funding-llc-v-johnson/ | claims.” But the rules of bankruptcy in fact facilitate the allowance of claims: Claims are automatically allowed and made part of a plan unless an objection is made. See 11 U.S. C. A debtor is arguably more vulnerable in bank ruptcy—not less—to the oversights that the debt buyers know will occur. Finally, the majority suggests, in some cases a consumer will actually benefit if a claim for an untimely debt is filed. Ante, at 7–8. If such a claim is filed but disallowed, the majority explains, the debt will eventually be discharged, and the creditor will be barred from collecting it. See Here, too, practice refutes the majority’s rosy portrait of these proceedings. A debtor whose trustee does not spot and object to a stale debt will find no comfort in the knowledge that other consumers with more attentive trustees may have their debts disallowed and discharged. Moreover, given the high rate at which debtors are unable to fully pay off their debts in Chapter 13 proceedings, see Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 Texas L. Rev. 103, 111–112 most debtors who fail to object to a stale claim will end up worse off than had they never entered bankruptcy at all: They will make payments on the stale debts, thereby resuscitating them, see at 6–7, and may thus walk out of bankruptcy court owing more to their creditors than they did when they entered it. There is no benefit to Cite as: 581 U. S. (2017) 11 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting anyone in such a proceeding—except the debt collectors. * * * It does not take a sophisticated attorney to understand why the practice I have described in this opinion is unfair. It takes only the common sense to conclude that one should not be able to profit on the inadvertent inattention of others. It is said that the law should not be a trap for the unwary. Today’s decision sets just such a trap. I take comfort only in the knowledge that the Court’s decision today need not be the last word on the matter. If Congress wants to amend the FDCPA to make explicit what in my view is already implicit in the law, it need only say so. I respectfully dissent |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Brogan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118168/brogan-v-united-states/ | This case presents the question whether there is an exception to criminal liability under 18 U.S. C. 1001 for a false statement that consists of the mere denial of wrongdoing, the so-called "exculpatory no." I While acting as a union officer during 1987 and petitioner James Brogan accepted cash payments from JRD Management Corporation, a real estate company whose employees were represented by the union. On October 4, 1993, federal agents from the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service visited petitioner at his home. The agents identified themselves and explained that they were seeking petitioner's cooperation in an investigation of JRD and various individuals. They told petitioner that if he wished to cooperate, he should have an attorney contact the United States Attorney's Office, and that if he could not afford an attorney, one could be appointed for him. The agents then asked petitioner if he would answer some questions, and he agreed. One question was whether he had received any cash or gifts from JRD when he was a union officer. Petitioner's response was "no." At that point, the *400 agents disclosed that a search of JRD headquarters had produced company records showing the contrary. They also told petitioner that lying to federal agents in the course of an investigation was a crime. Petitioner did not modify his answers, and the interview ended shortly thereafter. Petitioner was indicted for accepting unlawful cash payments from an employer in violation of 29 U.S. C. 186(b)(1), (a)(2), and (d)(2), and making a false statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency in violation of 18 U.S. C. 1001. He was tried, along with several codefendants, before a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and was found guilty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions, We granted certiorari on the issue of the "exculpatory no." II At the time petitioner falsely replied "no" to the Government investigators' question, 18 U.S. C. 1001 ( ed.) provided: "Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." By its terms, 18 U.S. C. 1001 covers "any" false statementthat |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Brogan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118168/brogan-v-united-states/ | its terms, 18 U.S. C. 1001 covers "any" false statementthat is, a false statement "of whatever kind," United The word "no" in response to a question assuredly makes a "statement," see, e. g., Webster's New International Dictionary 2461 (2d ed. 190) (def. *401 2: "That which is stated; an embodiment in words of facts or opinions"), and petitioner does not contest that his utterance was false or that it was made "knowingly and willfully." In fact, petitioner concedes that under a "literal reading" of the statute he loses. Brief for Petitioner Petitioner asks us, however, to depart from the literal text that Congress has enacted, and to approve the doctrine adopted by many Circuits which excludes from the scope of 1001 the "exculpatory no." The central feature of this doctrine is that a simple denial of guilt does not come within the statute. See, e. g., ; United 80 ; United 81 F.2d 1222, ; United ; United ; United ; United 26 F.2d 178, -184 (CA1 197), cert. denied, 42 U.S. 93 There is considerable variation among the Circuits concerning, among other things, what degree of elaborated taletelling carries a statement beyond simple denial. See generally Annot., 102 A. L. R. Fed. 742 In the present case, however, the Second Circuit agreed with petitioner that his statement would constitute a "true `exculpatory n[o]' as recognized in other circuits," but aligned itself with the Fifth Circuit ) in categorically rejecting the doctrine, see United Petitioner's argument in support of the "exculpatory no" doctrine proceeds from the major premise that 1001 criminalizes only those statements to Government investigators that "pervert governmental functions"; to the minor premise that simple denials of guilt to Government investigators do not pervert governmental functions; to the conclusion that *402 1001 does not criminalize simple denials of guilt to Government investigators. Both premises seem to us mistaken. As to the minor: We cannot imagine how it could be true that falsely denying guilt in a Government investigation does not pervert a governmental function. Certainly the investigation of wrongdoing is a proper governmental function; and since it is the very purpose of an investigation to uncover the truth, any falsehood relating to the subject of the investigation perverts that function. It could be argued, perhaps, that a disbelieved falsehood does not pervert an investigation. But making the existence of this crime turn upon the credulousness of the federal investigator (or the persuasiveness of the liar) would be exceedingly strange; such a defense to the analogous crime of perjury is certainly unheard of.[1] Moreover, as we shall see, the |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Brogan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118168/brogan-v-united-states/ | is certainly unheard of.[1] Moreover, as we shall see, the only support for the "perversion of governmental functions" limitation is a statement of this Court referring to the possibility (as opposed to the certainty) of perversion of functiona possibility that exists whenever investigators are told a falsehood relevant to their task. In any event, we find no basis for the major premise that only those falsehoods that pervert governmental functions are covered by 1001. Petitioner derives this premise from a comment we made in United a case involving the predecessor to 1001. That earlier version of the statute subjected to criminal liability "`whoever shall knowingly and willfully make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, *403 or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States' " The defendant in Gilliland, relying on the interpretive canon ejusdem generis,[2] argued that the statute should be read to apply only to matters in which the Government has a financial or proprietary interest. In rejecting that argument, we noted that Congress had specifically amended the statute to cover "`any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States,' " thereby indicating "the congressional intent to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described." at 93. Petitioner would elevate this statement to a holding that 1001 does not apply where a perversion of governmental functions does not exist. But it is not, and cannot be, our practice to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedyeven assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something other than the text of the statute itself. The holding of Gilliland certainly does not exemplify such a practice, since it rejected the defendant's argument for a limitation that the text of the statute would not bear. And even the relied-upon dictum from Gilliland does not support restricting text to supposed purpose, but to the contrary acknowledges the reality that the reach of a statute often exceeds the precise evil to be eliminated. There is no inconsistency whatever between the proposition that Congress intended "to protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result" and the proposition *404 that the statute |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Brogan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118168/brogan-v-united-states/ | which might result" and the proposition *404 that the statute forbids all "the deceptive practices described." The second line of defense that petitioner invokes for the "exculpatory no" doctrine is inspired by the Fifth Amendment. He argues that a literal reading of 1001 violates the "spirit" of the Fifth Amendment because it places a "cornered suspect" in the "cruel trilemma" of admitting guilt, remaining silent, or falsely denying guilt. Brief for Petitioner 11. This "trilemma" is wholly of the guilty suspect's own making, of course. An innocent person will not find himself in a similar quandary ). And even the honest and contrite guilty person will not regard the third prong of the "trilemma" (the blatant lie) as an available option. The bon mot "cruel trilemma" first appeared in Justice Goldberg's opinion for the Court in 378 U.S. 2 where it was used to explain the importance of a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when subpoenaed to testify in an official inquiry. Without that right, the opinion said, he would be exposed "to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." at In order to validate the "exculpatory no," the elements of this "cruel trilemma" have now been alteredratcheted up, as it were, so that the right to remain silent, which was the liberation from the original trilemma, is now itself a cruelty. We are not disposed to write into our law this species of compassion inflation. Whether or not the predicament of the wrongdoer run to ground tugs at the heartstrings, neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment confers a privilege to lie. "[P]roper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness to remain silent, but not to swear falsely." United States v. Ap- *40 felbaum, 44 U.S. 11, See also United ; Petitioner contends that silence is an "illusory" option because a suspect may fear that his silence will be used against him later, or may not even know that silence is an available option. Brief for Petitioner 12 13. As to the former: It is well established that the fact that a person's silence can be used against himeither as substantive evidence of guilt or to impeach him if he takes the standdoes not exert a form of pressure that exonerates an otherwise unlawful lie. See United And as for the possibility that the person under investigation may be unaware of his right to remain silent: In the modern age of frequently dramatized "Miranda" warnings, that is implausible. Indeed, we found it implausible (or irrelevant) 30 years ago, |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Brogan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118168/brogan-v-united-states/ | Indeed, we found it implausible (or irrelevant) 30 years ago, unless the suspect was "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," 44 Petitioner repeats the argument made by many supporters of the "exculpatory no," that the doctrine is necessary to eliminate the grave risk that 1001 will become an instrument of prosecutorial abuse. The supposed danger is that overzealous prosecutors will use this provision as a means of "piling on" offensessometimes punishing the denial of wrongdoing more severely than the wrongdoing itself. The objectors' principal grievance on this score, however, lies not with the hypothetical prosecutors but with Congress itself, which has decreed the obstruction of a legitimate investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious one. It is not for us to revise that judgment. Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate, moreover, any history of prosecutorial excess, either before or after widespread judicial acceptance of the "exculpatory no." And finally, if there is a problem of supposed "overreaching" it is hard to see how the doctrine of the "exculpatory no" could solve it. It is easy enough for *406 an interrogator to press the liar from the initial simple denial to a more detailed fabrication that would not qualify for the exemption. III A brief word in response to the dissent's assertion that the Court may interpret a criminal statute more narrowly than it is written: Some of the cases it cites for that proposition represent instances in which the Court did not purport to be departing from a reasonable reading of the text, United 13 U.S. 64, ; 48 U.S. 279, In the others, the Court applied what it thought to be a background interpretive principle of general application. 11 U.S. 600, ; 287 U.S. 43, ; United Also into this last category falls the dissent's correct assertion that the present statute does not "mak[e] it a crime for an undercover narcotics agent to make a false statement to a drug peddler." Post, at 419 Criminal prohibitions do not generally apply to reasonable enforcement actions by officers of the law. See, e. g., 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses 142(a), p. 121 (1984) ("Every American jurisdiction recognizes some form of law enforcement authority justification"). It is one thing to acknowledge and accept such well defined (or even newly enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions. The problem with |
Justice Scalia | 1,998 | 9 | majority | Brogan v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118168/brogan-v-united-states/ | written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions. The problem with adopting such an expansive, user-friendly judicial rule is that there is no way of knowing when, or how, the rule is to be *407 invoked. As to the when: The only reason Justice Stevens adduces for invoking it here is that a felony conviction for this offense seems to him harsh. Which it may well be. But the instances in which courts may ignore harsh penalties are set forth in the Constitution, see Art. I, 9; Art. III, 3; Amdt. 8; Amdt. 14, 1; and to go beyond them will surely leave us at sea. And as to the how: There is no reason in principle why the dissent chooses to mitigate the harshness by saying that 1001 does not embrace the "exculpatory no," rather than by saying that 1001 has no application unless the defendant has been warned of the consequences of lying, or indeed unless the defendant has been put under oath. We are again at sea. To be sure, some of this uncertainty would be eliminated, at our stage of judging, if we wrenched out of its context the principle quoted by the dissent from Sir Edward Coke, that "communis opinio is of good authoritie in law,"[3] and if we applied that principle consistently to a consensus in the judgments of the courts of appeals. (Of course the courts of appeals themselves, and the district courts, would still be entirely at sea, until such time as a consensus would have developed.) But the dissent does not propose, and its author has not practiced, consistent application of the principle, see, e. g., 14 U.S. 69, (199) ("We think the text of 1001 forecloses any argument that we should simply ratify the body of cases adopting the judicial function exception"); 00 U.S. 43, (disagreeing with the unanimous conclusions of the Courts of Appeals that interpreted the criminal statute at *408 issue); thus it becomes yet another user-friendly judicial rule to be invoked ad libitum. * * * In sum, we find nothing to support the "exculpatory no" doctrine except the many Court of Appeals decisions that have embraced it. While communis error facit jus may be a sadly accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of this Court's jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be spread. Because the plain language of 1001 admits of no exception for an "exculpatory no," we affirm the judgment |
Justice Blackmun | 1,979 | 11 | concurring | Michigan v. DeFillippo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110127/michigan-v-defillippo/ | I join the Court's opinion, but add a few words about the concern so evident in MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissenting opinion that today's decision will allow States and municipalities to circumvent the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. There is some danger, I acknowledge, that the police will use a stop-and-identify ordinance to arrest persons for improper identification; that they will then conduct a search pursuant to the arrest; that if they discover contraband or other evidence of crime, the arrestee will be charged with some other offense; and that if they do not discover contraband or other evidence of crime, the arrestee will be released. In this manner, if the arrest for violation of the stop-and-identify *41 ordinance is not open to challenge, the ordinance itself could perpetually evade constitutional review. There is no evidence in this case, however, that the Detroit ordinance is being used in such a pretextual manner. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. If a defendant in a proper case showed that the police habitually arrest, but do not prosecute, under a stop-and-identify ordinance, then I think this would suffice to rebut any claim that the police were acting in reasonable, good-faith reliance on the constitutionality of the ordinance. The arrestee could then challenge the validity of the ordinance, and, if the court concluded it was unconstitutional, could have the evidence obtained in the search incident to the arrest suppressed. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,982 | 19 | dissenting | Johnson v. Board of Ed. of Chicago | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110732/johnson-v-board-of-ed-of-chicago/ | Title 28 U.S. C. 2106 provides that "[t]he Supreme Court may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review" Our practice over many years indicates that implicit in this grant of authority is a requirement that we specify our reasons for acting as we do. Here the Court departs from that implicit requirement. The ultimate disposition of the case is the vacation of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and a remand so that this case may be consolidated with another proceeding in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A reading of the Court's per curiam suggests that the Court is vaguely dissatisfied with the opinion of the Court of Appeals which it purportedly reviews, but no substantive judgment is made as to whether that opinion was correct or incorrect in whole or in part. Nothing in the record before us suggests to me any reason why we should assume a function more properly exercised by the Court of Appeals or by the District Court, and order consolidation of this case with another pending action in the District Court. But even if I were disposed to agree as to the propriety of the disposition now made by the Court, I would hope that something in the nature of an opinion explaining the reasons for the action would accompany the disposition. Since the Court's per curiam makes no effort at such an explanation, I dissent |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | Of the several remarkable aspects of the Court's opinion in this case, not the least is that, save for the docket number and the name of the case, it bears virtually no resemblance to the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which we granted certiorari to review. The question presented by the petition for certiorari, albeit in somewhat laborious form, is best captured in the first of the three questions: "Whether the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals erred in nullifying the clear and unambiguous mandatory imposition of costs under Rule 68?" Pet. for Cert. 2. The Court states that "[t]he narrow question presented by this case is whether the words `judgment obtained by the offeree' as used in that Rule should be construed to encompass a judgment against the offeree as well as a judgment in *367 favor of the offeree." Ante, at 348. After reciting the procedural history of the case in the lower courts, the Court criticizes the Court of Appeals for its failure to confront "the threshold question whether Rule 68 has any application to a case in which judgment is entered against the plaintiff-offeree and in favor of the defendant-offeror." Ante, at 350. The Court's resolution of the case turns on that threshold question and it finds that the answer "is dictated by the plain language, the purpose, and the history of Rule 68." Though the ultimate result reached by the Court is the same as that of the Court of Appeals, the difference in approach of the two opinions could not be more striking. The Court of Appeals began its opinion by stating that "[t]he issue presented in this appeal is whether the awarding of costs under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is mandatory or discretionary if the final judgment obtained by plaintiff is not more favorable than the defendant's offer." The Court of Appeals relied primarily on the ground that this was a private action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it was not willing "to permit a technical interpretation of a procedural rule to chill the pursuit of that high objective." The court explained that a $450 offer in a case such as this made the semantically mandatory language of Rule 68 discretionary and permitted, but did not require, the District Court to award costs when, "viewed as of the time of the offer along with consideration of the final outcome of the case, the offer can be seen to have been made in good faith and to have had |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | have been made in good faith and to have had some reasonable relationship in amount to the issues, litigation risks, and expenses anticipated and involved in the case." The Court of Appeals reasoned that this "liberal" not "technical" reading of Rule 68 is justified, at least in a Title VII case, and that it did not need to decide whether the same approach should be taken in other types of cases. *368 To the Court of Appeals, the mandatory language of Rule 68, at least in a Title VII case, is only discretionary where the offer is not "reasonable" and in "good faith" (neither of which qualifications are found in Rule 68). But to this Court, the Court of Appeals was entirely in error in even reaching that question because Rule 68 has no applicability to a case in which a judgment is entered against the plaintiff-offeree and in favor of the defendant-offeror. Totally ignoring the common-sense maxim that the greater includes the lesser, the Court concludes that its answer is "dictated by the plain language, the purpose, and the history of Rule 68." Two of the three reasons advanced by the Court of Appeals in support of its opinion permitting the District Court not to impose costs on respondent in this case are squarely negated by the reasoning of the Court's opinion. The "plain language" of the Rule refers neither to an exception for Title VII cases nor to a requirement that an offer be "reasonable" or made "in good faith." Although Title VII provides for elaborate conciliation machinery before suit, the plaintiff who receives a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC is simply authorized to sue the employer in the appropriate United States district court. There is no intimation in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Title VII that such lawsuit will not be conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules specifically provides that "[t]hese rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81." Rule 81 sets forth a list of exceptions including bankruptcy proceedings and proceedings in copyright brought under Title 17 of the United States Code, but proceedings brought under Title VII are not included. Presumably, the "plain language" of the Federal Rules and in particular Rule 68, as well as the "plain language" of the applicable provisions of Title VII, would bring the Court to |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | applicable provisions of Title VII, would bring the Court to *369 reject any special treatment with respect to costs for a Title VII lawsuit. In my view, there is also no basis for reading into Rule 68 any additional conditions for bringing the Rule into play other than those which are specifically contained in the provisions of the Rule itself. I assume that the Court would agree with this approach in view of its fondness for the "plain meaning" canon of statutory construction. Therefore, the best and shortest response to the Court of Appeals' suggestion that a Rule 68 offer must be "reasonable" and made in "good faith" is that Rule 68 simply does not incorporate any such requirement; it deprives a district court of its traditional discretion under Rule 54 to disallow costs to the prevailing party in the strongest verb of its type known to the English language"must": "If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68. (Emphasis added.) Over a half century ago the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit said "the word `must' is so imperative in its meaning that no case has been called to our attention where that word has been read `may.'" cert. denied, To import into the mandatory language of Rule 68 a requirement that the tender of judgment must be "reasonable" or made in "good faith" not only rewrites Rule 68, but also puts a district court in the impossible position of having to evaluate such uncertain and nebulous concepts in the context of an "offer of judgment" that in many cases may have been made years past. Since the Court relies on the "plain meaning" of Rule 68, it may be well to set that Rule out verbatim before analyzing its argument. Rule 68 provides in pertinent part: "At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, *370 a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer." (Emphasis added.) The Court asserts that the result reached by, if not the reasoning of, the Court of Appeals is correct because Rule 68, by its "plain language," applies only in cases in which a "judgment [is] finally obtained by the offeree." The Rule, therefore, does not apply in a case such as this where the defendant prevailedi. e., because no judgment was "obtained by the offeree." If Rule 68 does not apply, the determination regarding costs is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (d), which grants a district court the discretion to award the defendant costs as the "prevailing party," but does not require it to do so. The Court argues that the "plain language" of Rule 68, its "history," and "policy" reasons support this interpretation of the Rule. I read both the "plain language" of the Rule and its history quite differently than does the Court. According to it, a plaintiff"offeree" under the terms of Rule 68must win in the trial court in order to "obtain" a "judgment" within the meaning of that Rule. But we may call upon the various canons of statutory construction to pass before us in review as many times as we choose without being reduced to this anomalous conclusion. The term "judgment" is defined in Rule 54 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to mean a "decree and any *371 order from which an appeal lies." Unquestionably, respondent "obtained" an "order from which an appeal lies" when the District Court entered its judgment in this case. Certainly, respondent did not subscribe to the Court's reasoning because she immediately sought review in the Court of Appeals of the "judgment" which had been entered against her. Rule 68, when construed to include a traditional "take nothing" judgment, see, Appendix to Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Forms 31 and 32, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 530, as well as a judgment in favor of the plaintiff but less than the amount of the offer, thus fits with the remaining parts of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to judgments and orders in a manner in which the drafters of the Rule surely must have intended. To circumscribe Rule 68 in the manner in which the Court does is to virtually cut it adrift from the remaining related portions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a construction which could be justified only by the strongest |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | a construction which could be justified only by the strongest considerations of history and policy. Our cases do not support the proposition that such a construction will never be given to a rule or statute, but they do indicate that only the strongest support in the legislative history warrants such a result. Chemehuevi Tribe of I think my reading of this part of Rule 68 is entirely consistent with the Rule's history. When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, the pertinent part of Rule 68 read: "If the offer is not so accepted it shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible. If the adverse party fails to obtain a judgment more favorable than that offered, he shall not recover costs in the district court from the time of the offer but shall pay costs from that time." (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the event that "triggered" the operation of the original Rule 68 was the failure of the plaintiff to obtain *372 a judgment more favorable than that offered. Just as obviously, the plaintiff in this case did not meet her burden of obtaining a judgment more favorable than the $450 she was offered. The operation of Rule 68 was not intended to change when this part of the Rule was amended in 1948 to its present form. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1948 amendment explain the reasons for the amendmentnone of which give any indication that Congress decided to take away the benefits of the Rule to a defendant who made a Rule 68 offer but later prevailed on the merits.[1] As noted by the Court, the 1938 Advisory Committee Notes to the original version of the Rule cite to three state statutes as illustrations of the operation of the Rule. These three statutes, like the text of the original Rule 68, all mandated imposition of costs on a plaintiff who rejected an offer of judgment and then later failed to recover a judgment more favorable than the offer.[2] This is the identical situation *373 which the plaintiff here finds herself in. Moreover, in each of these three States, the general statutes providing for recovery of costs by prevailing defendants was, unlike Rule 54 (d), mandatory. See, e. g., 4 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 9787, 9788 (1935); 2 ; and N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law 1470-1475 (Thompson 1939). As a result, the state cases cited by the Court do not address the situation in which a defendant has prevailed on the merits *374 because in that situation the shifting of costs was mandatory |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | because in that situation the shifting of costs was mandatory under state law. It is, therefore, difficult for me to understand how it can be argued that Congress, seeking to pattern Rule 68 after the procedure used in these three States, could have possibly intended to immunize plaintiffs from the operation of the Rule and the concomitant costs it imposes simply because they lost their cases on the merits. It is also noteworthy that the lower court cases that have confronted the situation of a prevailing defendant seeking to recover its costs under Rule 68 have all concluded that such recovery is permissible. See Dual v. Cleland, 79 F. R. D. 696 (DC 1978); Mr. Hanger, Inc. v. Cut Rate Hangers, Inc., 63 F. R. D. 607 (EDNY 1974); Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 86 F. R. D. 500[3] Contrary to the view of the Court, I think that Rule 68 and Rule 54 (d) are entirely consistent with one another when read in a manner faithful to their actual language; indeed, the language of these Rules must be twisted virtually beyond recognition, and that of Rule 68 parsed virtually out of existence, to say that the latter Rule does not apply in a situation such as this simply because the petitioner prevailed. Rule 54 (d) itself contemplates the removal from the trial judge of the discretion of awarding costs when by its express terms it excepts situations where "express provision therefor is made in these rules." It cannot be doubted that the *375 mandatory language of Rule 68 is as clear as case of "express provision" as could be imagined. While I do not think it necessary to address the "policy" considerations relied upon by the Court when the intent of the drafters of the Rule is as plain as it is here, I do think it appropriate to note that no policy argument will convince me that a plaintiff who has refused an offer under Rule 68 and then has a "take nothing" judgment entered against her should be in a better position than a similar plaintiff who has refused an offer under Rule 68 but obtained a judgment in her favor, although in a lesser amount than that which was offered pursuant to Rule 68. The construction of Rule 68 urged by the Court would place in a better position a defendant who tendered $10,000 to a plaintiff under Rule 68 in a case where the plaintiff was awarded $5,000 than where the same tender was made and the plaintiff was awarded |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | the same tender was made and the plaintiff was awarded nothing. One final argument that has been pressed as a reason for affirmance of the Court of Appeals merits response. Rule 68 requires a party defending against a claim to serve upon the adverse party "an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued." A literal reading of the Rule appears to entitle a plaintiff to all costs accrued at the time of the offer. If the offer is accepted, the defendant must pay whatever costs the court determines were taxable at the time of the offer. Thus, a valid Rule 68 offer cannot be made if it limits or excludes any of the costs accrued on the date of the offer. It is argued that because "costs" are nowhere defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure it is necessary to look elsewhere to determine the types of costs which are assessable under Rule 68. Title VII does not contain a general definition of the term "costs," but it does specify that a court, in its discretion, shall allow the "prevailing party" a "reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" 42 U.S. C. 2000e-5 (k). This Court has interpreted this provision to *376 mean that a prevailing plaintiff shall receive her costs "except in unusual circumstances," and we held last Term that a claim to an attorney's fee is not defeated if the plaintiff prevails by "settlement rather than through litigation." Because a Rule 68 offer of judgment is a proposal which by definition stipulates that the plaintiff shall be treated as the prevailing party, as the argument runs, the cost component of Rule 68 in a Title VII case must include a component for plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees accrued as of the date of the offer. Petitioner's offer in this case under this theory did not technically comply with Rule 68 because it limited the amount of attorney's fees to be recovered by the respondent and thus did not provide for the recovery of all costs accrued at the date of the offer.[4] This argument, although superficially appealing, does not survive careful scrutiny. Our analysis must focus on the meaning of the word "costs" contained in Rule 68 and we are aided in this analysis by our decision only last Term in Roadway Express, There we were confronted with the question of whether the word "costs" contained in 28 U.S. C. 1927 included attorney's fees in the context of |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | U.S. C. 1927 included attorney's fees in the context of a civil rights lawsuit. Section 1927 provides that lawyers who multiply court proceedings vexatiously may be assessed the excess "costs" they create. However, 1927, like Rule 68, did not define the critical word "costs." A District Court had concluded that because the civil rights statutes allow a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees as part of the costs of litigation, it was authorized to award attorney's fees as part of the sanction it imposed *377 under We rejected this conclusion and in so doing we stated that in construing the term "costs" it was appropriate to look to the contemporaneous understanding of the term when the statute was enacted. We then assumed that Congress followed the recognized "American rule" that attorney's fees were not included within the definition of "costs" when it enacted Without any evidence that Congress wished to alter or amend the definition of "costs" by the passage of the civil rights fee-shifting statutes, 42 U.S. C. 1988 and 2000e-5 (k), we were unwilling to expand its historical definition. A conclusion similar to that reached in Roadway Express is equally sound here when determining whether "costs" as used in Rule 68 include attorney's fees in the context of a civil rights suit. Certainly, the "contemporaneous understanding" of "costs" when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938 did not include attorney's fees any more than it did in 1813 when the predecessor to 1927 was enacted. The legislative history of Rule 68 indicates no intent to deviate from the common meaning of costs and this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that when the authors of the Rules intended that attorney's fees be recovered, such fees were specifically mentioned. See, e. g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37, which allows "reasonable expenses including attorney's fees," as a sanction for discovery abuses. There is likewise no evidence of any congressional intent to alter the meaning of the word "costs" in Rule 68 by the passage of the civil rights statutes. Nothing in the fee-shifting provisions of these statutes or their legislative history has come to my attention which would suggest that Congress intended to amend Rule 68 by adding attorney's fees to otherwise taxable "costs" under that Rule. It is also worth noting that the logic that would include attorney's fees as recoverable costs under Rule 68 would also allow a similar recovery of attorney's fees in other litigation under statutes which permit the award of attorney's fees. *378 In 1975, this Court noted in Alyeska Pipeline that |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | *378 In 1975, this Court noted in Alyeska Pipeline that 29 statutes allow federal courts to award attorney's fees in certain suits. Some of these statutes define attorney's fees as an element of costs while others separate fees from other taxable costs. To construe Rule 68 to allow attorney's fees to be recoverable as costs would create a two-tier system of cost-shifting under Rule 68. Plaintiffs in cases brought under those statutes which award attorney's fees as costs and who are later confronted with a Rule 68 offer would find themselves in a much different and more difficult position than those plaintiffs who bring actions under statutes which do not have attorney's fees provisions. No persuasive justification exists for subjecting these plaintiffs to differing penalties for failure to accept a Rule 68 offer and no persuasive justification can be offered as to how such a reading of Rule 68 would in any way further the intent of the Rule which is to encourage settlement. Finally, if the term "costs" in Rule 68 includes attorney's fees, then Title VII plaintiffs who reject Rule 68 offers may find themselves in the unenviable position of having to absorb a defendant's attorney's fees if they fail to recover a judgment as favorable as the defendant's offer. This could seriously undermine the purposes behind the attorney's fees provisions of the Civil Rights Act, and yet there is no principled way to allow attorney's fees to be recovered as costs under Rule 68 in some Title VII situations while prohibiting such recovery in others. As we noted in Roadway Express in a similar context, to select on an ad hoc basis those features of 1988 and 2000e-5 (k) that should be read into Rule 68 would not only fundamentally alter the nature of Rule 68 but would also constitute standardless judicial law-making. Accordingly, in my view the offer made by the petitioner in this case fully complied with the terms of Rule 68 even though it attempted to place a limit on the ultimate amount of attorney's fees to be recovered. Because the *379 "costs" provision in Rule 68 does not encompass attorney's fees, those fees are just as susceptible to compromise and settlement as are other inchoate consequences of liability such as compensatory damages or backpay.[5] In sum, I would reject the "plain meaning" basis of the Court's opinion interpreting Rule 68 because, in my view, the Rule must be read not only contrary to its "plain meaning" but also woodenly and perversely in order to reach the conclusion that a prevailing defendant who had |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,981 | 19 | dissenting | Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110429/delta-air-lines-inc-v-august/ | to reach the conclusion that a prevailing defendant who had made an offer *380 pursuant to Rule 68 should be placed in a worse position than one who has lost to the plaintiff and had a judgment entered against him accordingly, but for an amount less than the amount tendered under Rule 68. This is "plain meaning" with a vengeance; a vengeance which neither the Rules Committee, this Court, nor Congress in their various roles in the adoption of the Rules could have contemplated. It may be said that to read the Rule according to its plain meaning as I see it will place barriers in the way of plaintiffs' suing defendants. The short answer to this argument is that any provisions such as Rule 68 designed to promote settlement, rather than litigation, of claims is bound to make a plaintiff take a look at his "hole card." By the same token, the availability of such a procedure is bound to make the defendant take a look at his "hole card" in order to make certain that he is using every means available to both avoid costly protracted litigation and possible loss of the case if it goes to trial. The Rule interpreted in accordance with its "plain meaning" offers a defendant a method for preventing further accrual of taxable costs in the case of inflated or "nuisance" lawsuits; if the plaintiff is of the opinion that the offer is too low to be worth acceptance or even serious consideration, he need not even respond to it and the case will, unless settled in some other manner, go to trial. By following such a course, a plaintiff who obtains a judgment in excess of the defendant's Rule 68 offer loses absolutely nothing; a plaintiff against whom a "take nothing" judgment is entered loses only the possibility that a district court might exercise its discretion and not award costs to the prevailing defendant. Although the vast increase in the amount of litigation in this Nation today is not a valid reason for twisting rules or statutes in order to reduce such volume, if the plain meaning of a rule may have a tendency to encourage settlement rather than trial, this is surely not an unfortunate mishap in our system of administering justice. |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Key v. Doyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109747/key-v-doyle/ | Sallye Lipscomb French died 20 days after executing a will leaving most of her estate to certain churches in the District of Columbia. Section 18-302 of the D. C. Code voids *60 religious devises and bequests made within 30 days of death.[1] Prevented by this statutory provision from carrying out the terms of the will, appellee Doyle as executor sought instructions in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Both that court and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held the statute unconstitutional.[2] The decedent's heirs and next of kin brought an appeal to this *61 Court under 28 U.S. C. 1257 (1), which provides for review by appeal in cases "where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity."[3] We postponed consideration of the question of our appellate jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits. Because we conclude that a law applicable only in the District of Columbia is not a "statute of the United States" for purposes of 28 U.S. C. 1257 (1), we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Before 1970 the judgments of the trial courts of the District of Columbia were appealable to the United States Court of Appeals.[4] Ultimate review in this Court was available under 28 U.S. C. 1254, which was applicable to all of the 11 *62 Federal Courts of Appeals.[5] A right of appeal to this Court from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit thus existed only where that court had *63 invalidated a state statute. All other cases, including those challenging the validity of local statutes of the District of Columbia, were reviewable here by writ of certiorari.[6] *64 The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970[7] substantially modified the structure and jurisdiction of the courts in the District, but there is no indication that Congress intended these changes to enlarge the right of appeal to this Court from the courts of that system. The aim of the Act was to establish "a Federal-State court system in the District of Columbia analogous to court systems in the several States." H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, p. 35 (1970). The Act provided that cases would no longer have to proceed from the local courts to the United States Court of Appeals, and then to this Court under 1254. Instead, the judgments of the newly created local Court of Appeals were made directly reviewable here, like the judgments of state courts.[8] |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Key v. Doyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109747/key-v-doyle/ | made directly reviewable here, like the judgments of state courts.[8] Accordingly, 1257, the jurisdictional provision concerning Supreme Court review of state-court decisions, was amended to include the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as "the highest court of a State."[9] In we recognized that the analogy between the local courts of the District and the courts of the States was not perfect. Although Congress had expressly classified the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as a state court, it had not indicated that D. C. Code provisions should be treated as state statutes. Thus, where the District of Columbia courts had upheld a *65 local statute against constitutional attack, we concluded that an appeal as of right would not lie to this Court under 1257 (2), which applies to state-court decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to state statutes. Underlying our decision was the long-established principle that counsels a narrow construction of jurisdictional provisions authorizing appeals as of right to this Court, in the absence of clear congressional intent to enlarge the Court's mandatory jurisdiction. The legislative history of the 1970 Act is as unenlightening about the applicability of 1257 (1) as it is about that of 1257 (2). In the Senate Committee hearings on an early version of the Act, there was one brief reference to 1257: "The Chairman [Senator Tydings]. On page 3, section 11-102 there is a provision relating to appeal: " `The highest court of the District of Columbia is the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. For purposes of appeal to the Supreme Court and other purposes of law, it shall be deemed the highest court of the state.' [Emphasis added.] "Now, my question to you is a question raised about that language. Is that sufficiently broad to allow the Supreme Court review by certiorari? "Mr. Kleindienst. We believe so. "The Chairman. As well as appeal pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 12750 [sic]? Because the language, you know, leaves out certiorari. Certiorari is an important vehicle to reach the Supreme Court. "Mr. Kleindienst. We believe the language covers certiorari but it would be easy to clarify."[10] *66 Although Senator Tydings seems to have assumed that both the appeal and certiorari provisions of 1257 would apply to the judgments of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, it is not clear whether he thought the appeal provision of 1257 (1) or that of 1257 (2) would govern. And if he had in mind 1257 (1), he made no reference to possible distinctions between federal statutes of solely local concern and those of broader scope. Nowhere in the legislative |
Justice Stewart | 1,978 | 18 | majority | Key v. Doyle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109747/key-v-doyle/ | concern and those of broader scope. Nowhere in the legislative history do we find further discussion of this point. The omission is understandable. The question had not arisen before the 1970 reorganization because 1257 then applied only to state courts, which seldom if ever confronted federal statutes of wholly local application. Although the courts of the District were accustomed to seeing such federal statutes, the jurisdictional provision that applied to them did not mention "statutes of the United States." Rather, 1254 divides cases from the courts of appeals into two categories those invalidating state statutes and all others. Although the precise question at issue in this case thus seems to have escaped the attention of Congress, it was clear that a general right of appeal from the District of Columbia courts to this Court on questions concerning the validity of local law did not exist at the time of the 1970 reorganization.[11] In the absence of an express provision so ordaining, it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to enlarge this Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction by simply shifting review of District of Columbia court judgments from 1254 to 1257.[12] *67 Indeed, the purposes of the 1970 Act strongly imply the contrary. As we noted in Palmore, Congress intended "to establish an entirely new court system with functions essentially similar to those of the local courts found in the 50 States of the Union with responsibility for trying and deciding those distinctively local controversies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction." This Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments under 1257 is reserved for cases threatening the supremacy of federal law. When state courts invalidate state statutes on federal grounds, uniformity of national law is not threatened and there is no automatic right of appeal to *68 this Court. From the analogy of the local D. C. courts to state courts drawn by Congress in the 1970 Act, it follows that no right of appeal should lie to this Court when a local court of the District invalidates a law of exclusively local application.[13] From such judgments and from similar state-court judgments, there is no appeal to this Court, but only review by writ of certiorari according to the terms of 1257 (3).[14] This construction of 1257 (1) neither enlarges nor reduces this Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction as a result of the 1970 Act. It gives litigants in the courts of the District the same right of review in this Court as is enjoyed by litigants in the courts of |
Justice Stevens | 1,993 | 16 | majority | Moreau v. Klevenhagen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112853/moreau-v-klevenhagen/ | The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act) generally requires employers to pay their employees for overtime work at a rate of 1 12 times the employees' regular wages.[1] In 1985, Congress amended the FLSA to provide a limited *24 exception to this rule for state and local governmental agencies. Under the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985 (1985 Amendments), public employers may compensate employees who work overtime with extra time off instead of overtime pay in certain circumstances.[2] The question in this case is whether a public employer in a State that prohibits public sector collective bargaining may take advantage of that exception when its employees have designated a union representative. Because the text of the 1985 Amendments provides the framework for our entire analysis, we quote the most relevant portion at the outset. Subsection 7(o)(2)(A) states: *25 "(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time [in lieu of overtime pay] only "(A) pursuant to "(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees; or "(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work" Petitioners are a group of employees who sought, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a collective FLSA compensatory time agreement by way of a designated representative. The narrow question dispositive here is whether petitioners are "employees not covered by subclause (i)" within the meaning of subclause (ii), so that their employer may provide compensatory time pursuant to individual agreements under the second subclause. I Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 to establish nationwide minimum wage and maximum hours standards. Section 7 of the Act encourages compliance with maximum hours standards by providing that employees generally must be paid on a time-and-one-half basis for all hours worked in excess of 40 per week.[3] Amendments to the Act in 1966[4] and 1974[5] extended its coverage to most public employers, and gave rise to a series of cases questioning the power of Congress to regulate the *26 compensation of state and local employees.[6] Following our decision in upholding that power, the Department of Labor (DOL) announced that it would hold public employers to the standards of the Act effective April 15, 1985.[7] In response to the Garcia decision and the DOL announcement, both Houses of Congress held hearings and considered legislation designed to ameliorate the burdens associated with necessary changes in public employment practices. The projected "financial costs of coming into compliance with the FLSAparticularly the overtime |
Justice Stevens | 1,993 | 16 | majority | Moreau v. Klevenhagen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112853/moreau-v-klevenhagen/ | costs of coming into compliance with the FLSAparticularly the overtime provisions"were specifically identified as a matter of grave concern to many States and localities. S. Rep. No. 99-159, p. 8 The statutory provision at issue in this case is the product of those deliberations. In its Report recommending enactment of the 1985 Amendments, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources explained that the new subsection 7(o) would allow public employers to compensate for overtime hours with compensatory time off, or "comp time," in lieu of overtime pay, so long as certain conditions were met: The provision of comp time must be at the premium rate of not less than 1 12 hours per hour of overtime work, and must be pursuant to an agreement reached prior to performance of the work. With respect to the nature of the necessary agreement, the issue raised in this case, the Committee stated: "Where employees have a recognized representative, the agreement or understanding must be between that representative and the employer, either through collective *27 bargaining or through a memorandum of understanding or other type of agreement." The House Committee on Education and Labor was in substantial agreement with the Senate Committee as to the conditions under which comp time could be made available. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-331, p. 20 On the question of subsection 7(o)'s agreement requirement, the House Committee expressed an understanding similar to the Senate Committee's: "Where employees have selected a representative, which need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent as long as it is a representative designated by the employees, the agreement or understanding must be between the representative and the employer" Where the Senate and House Committee Reports differ is in their description of the "representative" who, once designated, would require that compensatory time be provided only pursuant to an agreement between that representative and the employer. While the Senate Report refers to a "recognized" representative, the House Report states that the representative "need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent." this page. The Conference Report does not comment on this difference, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-357 and the 1985 Amendments as finally enacted do not adopt the precise language of either Committee Report. The issue is addressed, however, by the Secretary of Labor, in implementing regulations promulgated pursuant to express legislative direction under the 1985 Amendments.[8] The relevant DOL regulation seems to be patterned after the House Report, providing that "the representative need not be a formal or recognized bargaining agent."[9] At the *28 same time, in response |
Justice Stevens | 1,993 | 16 | majority | Moreau v. Klevenhagen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112853/moreau-v-klevenhagen/ | recognized bargaining agent."[9] At the *28 same time, in response to concerns expressed by the State of Missouri about the impact of the regulation in States where employee representatives have no authority to enter into enforceable agreements, the Secretary explained: "The Department believes that the proposed rule accurately reflects the statutory requirement that a CBA [collective bargaining agreement], memorandum of understanding or other agreement be reached between the public agency and the representative of the employees where the employees have designated a representative. Where the employees do not have a representative, the agreement must be between the employer and the individual employees. The Department recognizes that there is a wide variety of State law that may be pertinent in this area. It is the Department's intention that the question of whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA section 7(o) shall be determined in accordance with State or local law and practices. " 52 Fed. Reg. -2015 (1987) (emphasis added). II Petitioner Moreau is the president of the Harris County Deputy Sheriffs Union, representing approximately 400 deputy sheriffs in this action against the county and its sheriff, respondent Klevenhagen. For several years, the union has represented Harris County deputy sheriffs in various matters, such as processing grievances and handling workers' compensation claims, but it is prohibited by Texas law from *29 entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with the county.[10] Accordingly, the terms and conditions of petitioners' employment are included in individual form agreements signed by each employee. These agreements incorporate by reference the county's regulations providing that deputies shall receive 1 12 hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.[11] Petitioners filed this action in 1986, alleging, inter alia,[12] that the county violated the Act by paying for overtime work with comp time, rather than overtime pay, absent an agreement with their representative authorizing the substitution. Petitioners contended that they were "covered" by subclause (i) of subsection 7(o)(2)(A) by virtue of their union representation, *30 and that the county therefore was precluded from providing comp time pursuant to individual agreements (or pre-existing practice)[13] under subclause (ii). The District Court disagreed and entered summary judgment for the county. The court assumed that designation of a union representative normally would establish that employees are "covered" by subclause (i), and hence render subclause (ii) inapplicable, but went on to hold that subclause (i) cannot apply in States, like Texas, that prohibit collective bargaining in the public sector. Merritt v. Klevenhagen, Civ. Action No. 88-1298 p. 5, reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a20a. Reaching the same result by an |
Justice Stevens | 1,993 | 16 | majority | Moreau v. Klevenhagen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112853/moreau-v-klevenhagen/ | Pet. for Cert. 19a20a. Reaching the same result by an alternative route, the court also reasoned that petitioners were not "covered" by subclause (i) because their union was not "`recognized' " by the county, a requirement it grounded in the legislative history of the 1985 Amendments. reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but relied on slightly different reasoning. It seemed to agree with an Eleventh Circuit case, cert. denied, that the words "not covered" in subclause (ii) refer to the absence of an agreement rather than the absence of a representative. Under that theory, the fact that Texas law prohibits agreements between petitioners' union and the employer means that petitioners can never be "covered" by subclause *31 (i), making subclause (ii) available as an alternative vehicle for provision of comp time. Because there is conflict among the Circuits over the scope of subclause (i)'s coverage,[14] we granted certiorari. III Respondents find the language of the statute perfectly clear. In their view, subclause (ii) plainly authorizes individual agreements whenever public employees have not successfully negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement under subclause (i). Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that ambiguity in the statute itself justifies resort to its legislative history and the DOL regulations, and that these secondary sources unequivocally preclude individual comp time agreements with employees who have designated a representative. We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory text. At least one proposition is not in dispute. Subclause (ii) authorizes individual comp time agreements only "in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i)." Our task, therefore, is to identify the class of "employees" covered by subclause (i). This task is complicated by the fact that subclause *32 (i) does not purport to define a category of employees, as the reference in subclause (ii) suggests it would. Instead, it describes only a category of agreementsthose that (a) are bargained with an employee representative, and (b) authorize the use of comp time. Respondents read this shift in subject from "employees" in subclause (ii) to "agreement" in subclause (i) as susceptible of just one meaning: Employees are covered by subclause (i) only if they are bound by applicable provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement. Under this narrow construction, subclause (i) would not cover employees who designate a representative if that representative is unable to reach agreement with the employer, for whatever reason; such employees would remain "uncovered" and available for individual comp time agreements under subclause (ii). We find this reading unsatisfactory. First, while the language of subclauses (i) and (ii) will bear the interpretation |
Justice Stevens | 1,993 | 16 | majority | Moreau v. Klevenhagen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112853/moreau-v-klevenhagen/ | language of subclauses (i) and (ii) will bear the interpretation advanced by respondents, we cannot say that it will bear no other. Purely as a matter of grammar, subclause (ii)'s reference to "employees" remains unmodified by subclause (i)'s focus on "agreement," and "employees covered" might as easily comprehend employees with representatives as employees with agreements. See International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local Second, respondents' reading is difficult to reconcile with the general structure of subsection 7(o). Assuming designation of an employee representative, respondents' theory leaves it to the employer to choose whether it will proceed under subclause (i), and negotiate the terms of a collective comp time agreement with the representative, or instead proceed under subclause (ii), and deal directly with its employees on an individual basis. If the employer is free to choose the latter course (as most employers likely would), then it need only decline to negotiate with the employee representative to render subclause (i) inapplicable and authorize *33 individual comp time agreements under subclause (ii).[15] This permissive interpretation of subsection 7(o), however, is at odds with the limiting phrase of subclause (ii) at issue here. See Had Congress intended such an open-ended authorization of the use of comp time, it surely would have said so more simply, forgoing the elaborate subclause structure that purports to restrict use of individual agreements to a limited class of employees. Respondents' broad interpretation of the subsection 7(o) exception is also in some tension with the well-established rule that "exemptions from the [FLSA] are to be narrowly construed." See, e. g., At the same time, however, we find equally implausible a reading of the statutory text that would deem employees "covered" by subclause (i) whenever they select a representative, whether or not the representative has the ability to enter into the kind of agreement described in that subclause. If there is no possibility of reaching an agreement under subclause (i), then that subclause cannot logically be read as applicable. In other words, "employees covered by subclause (i)" must, at a minimum, be employees who conceivably could receive comp time pursuant to the agreement contemplated by that subclause. The most plausible reading of the phrase "employees covered by subclause (i)" is, in our view, neither of the extreme alternatives described above. Rather, the phrase is *34 most sensibly read as referring to employees who have designated a representative with the authority to negotiate and agree with their employer on "applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement" authorizing the use of comp time. This reading accords significance to both the focus on the word |
Justice Stevens | 1,993 | 16 | majority | Moreau v. Klevenhagen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112853/moreau-v-klevenhagen/ | reading accords significance to both the focus on the word "agreement" in subclause (i) and the focus on "employees" in subclause (ii). It is also true to the hierarchy embodied in subsection 7(o), which favors subclause (i) agreements over individual agreements by limiting use of the latter to cases in which the former are unavailable.[16] This intermediate reading of the statutory text is consistent also with the DOL regulations, interpreted most reasonably. It is true that (b), read in isolation, would support petitioners' view that selection of a representative by employeeseven a representative without lawful authority to bargain with the employeris sufficient to bring the employees within the scope of subclause (i) and preclude use of subclause (ii) individual agreements. See and n. 9. So interpreted, however, the regulation would prohibit entirely the use of comp time in a substantial portion of the public sector. It would also be inconsistent with the Secretary's statement that "the question whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA section 7(o) shall be determined in accordance with State or local law and practices." See This *35 clarification by the Secretary convinces us that when the regulations identify selection of a representative as the condition necessary for coverage under subclause (i), they refer only to those representatives with lawful authority to negotiate agreements.[17] Thus, under both the statute and the DOL regulations, employees are "covered" by subclause (i) when they designate a representative who lawfully may bargain collectively on their behalfunder the statute, because such authority is necessary to reach the kind of "agreement" described in subclause (i), and under the regulation, because such authority is a condition of "representative" status for subclause (i) purposes. Because we construe the statute and regulation in harmony, we need not comment further on petitioners' argument that the Secretary's interpretation of the 1985 Amendments is entitled to special deference. Petitioners in this case did not have a representative authorized by law to enter into an agreement with their employer providing for use of comp time under subclause (i). Accordingly, they were "not covered by subclause (i)," and subclause (ii) authorized the individual agreements challenged in this litigation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. So ordered. |
Justice Breyer | 1,998 | 2 | majority | Edwards v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118200/edwards-v-united-states/ | The statutes at issue in this case make it a crime to "conspir[e]" to "possess with intent todistribute a controlled substance." 21 U.S. C. 841 and 846. The Government charged petitioners with violating these statutes by conspiring "to possess with intent to distribute *513 mixtures containing" two controlled substances, namely, "cocaine and cocaine base" (i. e., "crack"). App. 6. The District Judge instructed the jury that "the government must prove that the conspiracy involved measurable amounts of cocaine or cocaine base." App. 16 (emphasis added). The jury returned a general verdict of guilty. And the judge imposed sentences based on his finding that each petitioner's illegal conduct had involved both cocaine and crack. Petitioners argued (for the first time) in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the judge's sentences were unlawful insofar as they were based upon crack. They said that the word "or" in the judge's instruction (permitting a guilty verdict if the conspiracy involved either cocaine or crack) meant that the judge must assume that the conspiracy involved only cocaine, which drug, they added, the Sentencing Guidelines treat more leniently than crack. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 1994) (drug table) (USSG). The Court of Appeals, however, held that the judge need not assume that only cocaine was involved. It pointed out that the Sentencing Guidelines require the sentencing judge, not the jury, to determine both the kind and the amount of the drugs at issue in a drug conspiracy. And it reasoned that the jury's belief about which drugs were involvedcocaine, crack, or bothwas therefore beside the point. In light of a potential conflict among the Circuits on this question, see, e. g., United ; United ; United we granted certiorari. We agree that in the circumstances of this case the judge was authorized to determine for sentencing purposes whether crack, as well as cocaine, was involved in the offense-related activities. The Sentencing Guidelines instruct the judge in a case like this one to determine both the *514 amount and the kind of "controlled substances" for which a defendant should be held accountableand then to impose a sentence that varies depending upon amount and kind. See United (judge may consider drug charge of which offender has been acquitted by jury in determining Guidelines sentence); Consequently, regardless of the jury's actual, or assumed, beliefs about the conspiracy, the Guidelines nonetheless require the judge to determine whether the "controlled substances" at issueand how much of those substancesconsisted of cocaine, crack, or both. And that is what the judge did in this case. Virtually |
Justice Breyer | 1,998 | 2 | majority | Edwards v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118200/edwards-v-united-states/ | that is what the judge did in this case. Virtually conceding this Guidelines-related point, petitioners argue that the drug statutes, as well as the Constitution, required the judge to assume that the jury convicted them of a conspiracy involving only cocaine. Petitioners misapprehend the significance of this contention, however, for even if they are correct, it would make no difference to their case. That is because the Guidelines instruct a sentencing judge to base a drug-conspiracy offender's sentence on the offender's "relevant conduct." USSG 1B1.3. And "relevant conduct," in a case like this, includes both conduct that constitutes the "offense of conviction," 1B1.3(a)(1), and conduct that is "part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction," 1B1.3(a)(2). Thus, the sentencing judge here would have had to determine the total amount of drugs, determine whether the drugs consisted of cocaine, crack, or both, and determine the total amount of eachregardless of whether the judge believed that petitioners' crack-related conduct was part of the "offense of conviction," or the judge believed that it was "part of the same course of conduct or common *515 scheme or plan." The Guidelines sentencing rangeon either beliefis identical. Of course, petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims would make a difference if it were possible to argue, say, that the sentences imposed exceeded the maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. That is because a maximum sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines. USSG 5G1.1. But, as the Government points out, the sentences imposed here were within the statutory limits applicable to a cocaine-only conspiracy, given the quantities of that drug attributed to each petitioner. Brief for United States 15-16, and nn. 6-7; see 21 U.S. C. 841(b)(1)(3); App. 42-47, 72-82, 107-112, 136-141, 163-169 (cocaine attributed to each petitioner). Cf. United Petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims also could have made a difference had it been possible to argue that their crack-related activities did not constitute part of the "same course of conduct or common scheme or plan." Then, of course, the crack (had it not been part of the "offense of conviction") would not have been part of the sentence-related "relevant conduct" at all. But petitioners have not made this argument, and, after reviewing the record (which shows a series of interrelated drug transactions involving both cocaine and crack), we do not see how any such claim could succeed. Instead, petitioners argue that the judge might have made different factual findings if only the judge had known that the law required him |
Justice Breyer | 1,998 | 2 | majority | Edwards v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118200/edwards-v-united-states/ | only the judge had known that the law required him to assume the jury had found a cocaine-only, not a cocaine-and-crack, conspiracy. It is sufficient for present purposes, however, to point out that petitioners did not make this particular argument in the District Court. Indeed, they seem to have raised their entire argument *516 for the first time in the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioners did not explain to the sentencing judge how their "jury-found-only-cocaine" assumption could have made a difference to the judge's own findings, nor did they explain how this assumption (given the judge's findings) should lead to greater leniency. Moreover, our own review of the record indicates that the judge's Guidelines-based factfinding, while resting upon the evidence before the jury, did not depend on any particular assumption about the type of conspiracy the jury found. Nor is there any indication that the assumption petitioners urge (a cocaine-only conspiracy) would likely have made a difference in respect to discretionary leniency. For these reasons, we need not, and we do not, consider the merits of petitioners' statutory and constitutional claims. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,981 | 11 | concurring | Schad v. Mount Ephraim | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110507/schad-v-mount-ephraim/ | I join the Court's opinion, but write separately to address two points that I believe are sources of some ambiguity in this still emerging area of the law. First, I would emphasize that the presumption of validity that traditionally attends a local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression protected under the First Amendment. In order for a reviewing court to determine whether a zoning restriction that impinges on free speech is "narrowly drawn [to] further a sufficiently substantial governmental interest," ante, at 68, the zoning authority must be prepared to articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant basis for its decision. This burden is by no means insurmountable, but neither should it be viewed as de minimis. In this case, Mount Ephraim evidently assumed that because the challenged ordinance was intended as a land-use regulation, it need survive only the minimal scrutiny of a rational relationship test, and that once rationality was established, appellants then carried the burden of proving the regulation invalid on First Amendment grounds. Brief for Appellee 11-12. After today's decision, it should be clear that where protected First Amendment interests are at stake, zoning regulations have no such "talismanic immunity from constitutional challenge." My other observation concerns the suggestion that a local *78 community should be free to eliminate a particular form of expression so long as that form is available in areas reasonably nearby. In Mini Theatres the Court dealt with locational restrictions imposed by a political subdivision, the city of Detroit, that preserved reasonable access to the regulated form of expression within the boundaries of that same subdivision. It would be a substantial step beyond Mini Theatres to conclude that a town or county may legislatively prevent its citizens from engaging in or having access to forms of protected expression that are incompatible with its majority's conception of the "decent life" solely because these activities are sufficiently available in other locales. I do not read the Court's opinion to reach, nor would I endorse, that conclusion.[*] Were I a resident of Mount Ephraim, I would not expect my right to attend the theater or to purchase a novel to be contingent upon the availability of such opportunities in "nearby" Philadelphia, a community in whose decisions I would have no political voice. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, (19) Similarly, I would not expect the citizens of Philadelphia to be under any obligation to provide me with access to theaters and bookstores simply because Mount Ephraim previously had acted to ban these forms of |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | Respondent Robyn Parks was sentenced to death for the murder of a gas station attendant. After his conviction became *496 final in 193, respondent brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 2 U.S. C. 2254 (192 ed.) challenging his conviction and death sentence. He alleged, inter alia, that an instruction given at the sentencing phase of his trial that told the jury to avoid "any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence," App. 13, deprived him of an individualized sentencing determination because a reasonable juror could have understood the instruction to bar consideration of relevant mitigating The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed and vacated respondent's death sentence. Today, the Court holds that respondent is not entitled to relief because his claim would require the application of a "new rule" that may not be applied retroactively on collateral review.[1] The Court displays undue eagerness to apply the new standard for retroactivity announced in Butler v. McKellar, ante, p. 407, at the expense of thoughtful legal analysis. I cannot countenance such carelessness when a life is at stake. I dissent. *497 I In the Court dramatically altered retroactivity doctrine as it applies to defendants challenging their confinement by the State through the collateral remedy of habeas corpus. The Court held that a habeas petitioner may not obtain relief from an unconstitutional conviction or sentence if his claim would require the recognition of a "new rule" of criminal procedure. ; Today, in Butler v. McKellar, ante, at 415, the Court defines a "new rule" as one that was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" under law prevailing at the time the habeas petitioner's conviction became final. As I argued in my dissent in Butler, the Court's novel "reasonableness" review of state court convictions is incompatible with the fundamental purposes of habeas corpus. See Butler, ante, at 424-430. The Court's decisions in the instant case and in Butler leave no doubt that the Court has limited drastically the scope of habeas corpus relief through the application of a virtually all-encompassing definition of "new rule." In this case, the Court concludes that respondent seeks a "new rule" because it determines that the few lower courts that have rejected similar challenges to an antisympathy instruction were not "unreasonable" for doing so. Ante, at 490 ("We thus cannot say that the large majority of federal and state courts that have rejected challenges to antisympathy instructions similar to that given at Park's trial have been unreasonable").[2] The majority's conclusion, however, is based on a *49 fundamental misreading of and |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | however, is based on a *49 fundamental misreading of and A Most of the majority opinion addresses the retroactivity of a claim not even raised by respondent. The majority mischaracterizes respondent's claim as one demanding that "jurors be allowed to base the sentencing decision upon the sympathy they feel for the defendant after hearing his mitigating evidence," ante, at 49, and holds that claim barred by See ante, at 4-494. But as counsel for respondent argued before this Court: "Mr. Parks asserts no constitutional right to a sympathetic or emotional jury. What he does assert under Woodson, and their progeny is the entirely familiar claim upheld consistently by this Court of a right to a sentencer who has not been precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's background, character or record in addition to the circumstances of his offense that he proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Tr. of Oral Arg. 19-20. Respondent concedes the State's contention that a decision to impose the death penalty must reflect a "reasoned moral response" to the defendant's culpability. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 9. What he argues is that his jury could have interpreted the antisympathy instruction as barring consideration *499 of mitigating More specifically, he claims that because much of the mitigating evidence relevant to his culpability also evoked sympathy, a juror who reacted sympathetically to the evidence would have believed that he was not entitled to consider that evidence at all not even for its "moral" weight.[3] See ("[A]n antisympathy charge by the court, exploited by the prosecutor's remarks, erected a barrier to full consideration of mitigating proof about [respondent's] background. Since these circumstances compromised respondent's chance to obtain a reasoned moral response from the jurors who held his life in the balance, his sentence is too unreliable to stand"). Respondent's actual claim, therefore, alleges nothing more than a violation of the rule recognized in and that a jury may not be prohibited from considering and giving effect *500 to all relevant mitigating evidence when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. It was on this claim that the Tenth Circuit granted respondent habeas corpus The court reasoned as follows: " `Mercy,' `humane' treatment, `compassion,' and consideration of the unique `humanity' of the defendant, which have all been affirmed as relevant considerations in the penalty phase of a capital case, all inevitably involve sympathy or are sufficiently intertwined with sympathy that they cannot be parsed without significant risk of confusion in the mind of a reasonable juror. Without placing an |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | in the mind of a reasonable juror. Without placing an undue technical emphasis on definitions, it seems to us that sympathy is likely to be perceived by a reasonable juror as an essential or important ingredient of, if not a synonym for, `mercy,' `humane' treatment, `compassion' and a full `individualized' consideration of the `humanity' of the defendant and his `character.' " In holding that the antisympathy instruction "undermined the jury's ability to consider fully [respondent's] mitigating evidence," the Tenth Circuit was careful to distinguish the claim at issue from the distorted version of respondent's claim that the Court revives today: "That argument misconstrues the issue. The issue is not whether unbridled sympathy itself is a proper mitigating factor. Rather, the issue is whether an absolute anti-sympathy instruction presents an impermissible danger of interfering with the jury's consideration of proper mitigating We hold that it does. The Supreme Court has made it clear that such a risk is `unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.' " (quoting ) (emphasis in original). *501 B Under respondent's claim must be decided according to the "prevailing law" at the time his conviction became final in 193 unless his claim falls within one of the two exceptions to the general nonretroactivity presumption. See By 193, this Court had unequivocally held that a sentencer may "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." ; see also -114 ; (when state law allows defendant to present any relevant mitigating evidence, " requires the sentencer to listen"). Despite the fact that respondent's conviction was final after both and were decided, the Court today holds that respondent is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because his claim requires the application of a "new rule" of criminal procedure. The majority states that although and may "inform, or even control or govern" such a claim, they do not "compel" the rule Parks seeks. Ante, at 491. The Court reasons that and answered only the question "what mitigating evidence the jury must be permitted to consider in making the sentencing decision" and not "how it must consider the mitigating " Ante, at 490 (emphasis in original); see Respondent does not, however, raise a claim challenging how the jury considered mitigating As explained *502 above, he argues that his jury could have believed it could not consider his mitigating evidence's bearing on moral culpability at all. Thus, his |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | mitigating evidence's bearing on moral culpability at all. Thus, his claim clearly falls within the holdings of and even under the majority's reading of those cases. The real question in this case is whether the rule of and was violated. Resolution of respondent's claim involves only the otherwise familiar inquiry into the sufficiency of the jury instructions, not the recognition of a new principle of law. See, e. g., ; The Court's conclusion that respondent seeks a "new rule" when he claims that the jury was "prevent[ed]. from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of [his] character and record and to circumstances of the offense proferred in mitigation," is disingenuous. Moreover, the majority's limited reading of and was rejected last Term in In that case, we held that did not bar a habeas petitioner from raising the claim that the Texas death penalty statute deprived him of an individualized sentencing determination by limiting the effect the jury could give to relevant mitigating We explained: "[I]t was clear from and that a State could not, consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, prevent the sentencer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense that mitigate against imposing the death penalty." argued that although a Texas jury was able to give some effect to the evidence of mental retardation, the evidence "ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the *503 scope of the special issues, and the jury was unable to express its `reasoned moral response' to that evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment."[4] In sustaining 's challenge, we expressly rejected the argument that although the State may not bar "consideration" of all relevant mitigating evidence, it may channel the "effect" the sentencer gives the We stated that " `the right to have the sentencer consider and weigh relevant mitigating evidence would be meaningless unless the sentencer was also permitted to give effect to its consideration' in imposing sentence." ).[5] See also at 327 *504 (" `In contrast to the carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer's discretion to impose the death sentence, the Constitution limits a State's ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence' ") ). The majority struggles mightily to distinguish rules that govern a jury's ability to "consider," "weigh," and "give effect to" mitigating evidence from rules relating to the "manner in which [the] mitigating evidence can be considered." Ante, at 491 This distinction is meaningless for a rule |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | Ante, at 491 This distinction is meaningless for a rule that limits the manner in which the jury considers mitigating evidence is unconstitutional if it limits the jury's ability to consider and give effect to that But under the majority's approach, a law requiring the jury to discount the weight of all, or of certain, mitigating factors would be consistent with so long as the majority could describe the statute as relating to the "manner" in which the jury considers the evidence despite such a statute's obvious preclusive effect. Cf. McKoy v. North Carolina, ante, at 465-466 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (requirement that jury unanimously agree that mitigating circumstance exists is not a restriction on the jury's ability to give effect to mitigating evidence, but only on the "manner in which it was allowed to do so viz., only unanimously") (citing ante, at 490). Indeed, the majority's language is strangely reminiscent of the argument trumpeted by JUSTICE SCALIA in JUSTICE SCALIA, writing for four Members of the Court, argued that "it could not be clearer that Jurek adopted the constitutional rule that the instructions had to render all mitigating circumstances relevant to the jury's verdict, but that the precise manner of their relevance the precise effect of their consideration could be channeled by law." The Court correctly rejected that position in and its failure to do so today creates considerable ambiguity *505 about which claims a federal court may hereafter consider on habeas corpus review. C Because the majority concludes that the claim respondent presses would constitute a "new rule," it must proceed to consider whether the claim fits within the second exception to the doctrine of nonretroactivity.[6] A plurality of the Court in concluded that only those new rules that amount to "bedrock procedural" rules "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished" should be applied retroactively. Today, a majority of the Court adopts this crabbed construction of the second exception and holds that the exception is limited to " `watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Ante, at 495 (quoting ); see also Butler, ante, at 416. Beyond such generalities, the majority offers no guidance despite its concession that the "precise contours of this exception may be difficult to discern." Ante, at 495. The determination with which the Court refuses to apply this exception to a capital sentencing error is most disturbing and is remarkably insensitive to the fundamental premise upon which our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is built. This Court has consistently "recognized that the |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | jurisprudence is built. This Court has consistently "recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination." If the irrevocable nature of the death penalty is not sufficient to counsel against application of Justice Harlan's doctrine of limited retroactivity for collateral review *506 altogether,[7] it should at least inform the determination of the proper scope of the second exception in capital cases.[] Moreover, the majority's insistence that a rule must enhance the accuracy of the factfinding process in order to fit within the second exception is difficult to justify in the context of capital sentencing. The decision whether to impose the death penalty represents a moral judgment about the defendant's culpability, not a factual finding. See ("[A] touchstone of factual innocence would provide little guidance in cases, such as those challenging the constitutionality of capital sentencing hearings"). Cf. Thus, the scope of the exception should be tailored to the unique nature of the sentencing decision. *507 The foremost concern of the Eighth Amendment is that the death sentence not be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. See, e. g., To comply with this command, a State must narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty and must also ensure that the decision to impose the death penalty is individualized. See The right to an individualized sentencing determination is perhaps the most fundamental right recognized at the capital sentencing hearing. See ("[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death") (citation omitted). "The nonavailability of corrective or modifying mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence." 43 U. S., ; see Blystone v. Pennsylvania, ante, at 307 ("The requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence"). Rules ensuring the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence guarantee that the jury acts with full information when formulating a moral judgment about the defendant's conduct. Because such rules are integral to the proper functioning of the capital sentencing hearing, they must apply retroactively under the second exception. Thus, even if respondent's claim constitutes a "new rule," it must fall within the second exception. I fear that the majority's failure to provide any principled analysis explaining why the second exception does |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | provide any principled analysis explaining why the second exception does not apply in this case reflects the Court's growing displeasure with the litigation of capital cases on collateral review. *50 II For the same reasons that and compel the conclusion that respondent does not seek a "new rule" under these cases also compel the conclusion that respondent was denied an individualized sentencing determination as required by the Eighth Amendment. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR has recognized, "one difficulty with attempts to remove emotion from capital sentencing through [antisympathy] instructions. is that juries may be misled into believing that mitigating evidence about a defendant's background or character also must be ignored." -546 (citing ). That is exactly what happened in this case: in all likelihood the jury interpreted the antisympathy instruction as a command to ignore the mitigating When reviewing the validity of particular jury instructions, the Court has consistently held that "[t]he question. is not what [this Court] declares the meaning of the charge to be, but rather what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning." Until this Term, there had been little disagreement with this standard. Today, however, a majority of the Court reformulates the appropriate inquiry as "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction" in an unconstitutional manner. Boyde v. California, ante, at 30.[9] Under *509 either the or Boyde approach, the antisympathy instruction given in this case was unconstitutional because it interfered with the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence presented by respondent. A "To determine how a reasonable juror could interpret an instruction, we `must focus initially on the specific language challenged.' If the specific instruction fails constitutional muster, we then review the instructions as a whole to see if the entire charge delivered a correct interpretation of the law." (quoting at ).[10] In this case, the jury was instructed to "avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence." App. 13 This instruction is distinguishable from the one upheld in In that case, the Court rejected the argument that a reasonable juror could have interpreted an instruction not to be "swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling" as a command not to consider mitigating The Court held instead that a reasonable juror would have understood "the instruction not to rely on `mere sympathy' as a directive to ignore only the sort of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase." *510 Because the jury in this case was told |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | phase." *510 Because the jury in this case was told not to consider any sympathy rather than "mere sympathy" it is more likely that the jury at respondent's trial understood that when making a moral judgment about respondent's culpability, it was forbidden to take into account any evidence that evoked a sympathetic response. The context of the sentencing proceedings bolsters this conclusion. The only mitigating evidence proffered by respondent was testimony about his deprived background from his father. Although this evidence was relevant to the sentencing decision because it bore on respondent's culpability, a juror's initial reaction to this evidence might have been to feel sympathy for respondent because of his hardship. A juror who conscientiously followed the instruction to avoid any sympathy would have believed that he was required to ignore the father's testimony altogether since only by excluding it completely from consideration could he eliminate all feelings of sympathy for respondent. Moreover, because the father's testimony did not fit within the mitigating circumstances listed by the judge, it was all the more likely that a juror believed that the father's testimony was irrelevant to the sentencing decision.[11] See *511 at 550 ("It is likely that jurors instructed not to rely on sympathy would conclude that the defendant had simply gone too far in his presentation, and that, as in other trial contexts, the jury must look to the judge for guidance as to that portion of the evidence that appropriately could be considered"). Indeed, the prosecutor's closing argument maintained that respondent's presentation at the sentencing phase constituted an illegitimate sympathy ploy and that the jury was required to ignore it.[12] After explaining that none of the minimum mitigating circumstances were supported by the evidence, the prosecutor argued: "[Defense counsel's] closing arguments are really a pitch to you for sympathy sympathy, or sentiment or prejudice; and you told me in voir dire you wouldn't do that. "Well it's just cold turkey. He either did it or he didn't. He either deserves the death penalty or he doesn't, you know. You leave the sympathy, and the sentiment and prejudice part out of it." App. 75. Given the sparse amount of evidence presented at the sentencing phase and the prosecutor's theme that the jury's deliberations *512 were to be purely mechanical,[13] there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed that the antisympathy instruction barred it from considering respondent's deprived background as a valid reason not to impose the death penalty. Nothing in the other instructions ensured that the antisympathy instruction would be correctly understood. The trial judge |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | the antisympathy instruction would be correctly understood. The trial judge did instruct the jury that it was required to consider a list of minimum mitigating circumstances and that it was free to consider any other factor it deemed mitigating,[14] but these instructions did not cure the infirmity of the anti-sympathy *513 instruction. Although the judge informed the jury in broad terms that it could consider all relevant mitigating evidence, he never defined the concept of mitigation for the jury. But the jury was told that it could not consider "sympathy" and nothing in the jury instructions explained that the command to avoid sympathy did not preclude the consideration of mitigating At best, then, the instructions sent contradictory messages. "Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict." 471 U. S., "Unless we can rule out the substantial possibility that the jury may have rested its verdict on the `improper' ground, we must remand for resentencing." B The majority suggests that and do not compel the invalidation of the antisympathy instruction because the instruction ensures that the decision to impose the death penalty is "a `reasoned moral response,' rather than an emotional one." Ante, at 493 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Although some recent cases have stated that the decision to impose the death penalty must be a moral decision, see ; ; those cases have not clearly defined the difference between a "reasoned moral response" and an "emotional" one. Indeed, our earlier cases recognized that "sympathy" is an important ingredient in the Eighth Amendment's requirement of an individualized sentencing determination. In a plurality of the Court held that "[a] process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances *514 of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind." at The description of "mitigating evidence" as "compassionate or mitigating factors" necessarily includes the concept of sympathy, because "sympathy" is fairly regarded as a synonym for "compassion." Webster's New International Dictionary 544 (2d ed. 1957); Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 541 (1952). We can debate whether sympathy is an emotional reaction that has no place in a decision to impose the death penalty or whether sympathy, although an emotion, plays an important role in forming the jury's moral response to |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Saffle v. Parks | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112390/saffle-v-parks/ | an important role in forming the jury's moral response to the defendant's actions. But this debate is an irrelevant academic exercise if in a particular case the jury is not informed of the distinction between the type of reaction to mitigating evidence that is an invalid emotional response and the type of reaction that is an acceptable "reasoned moral response." This Court's incantation of that talismanic phrase cannot hide the fact that the jury instructions in this case did not clearly inform the jurors that their decision whether to impose the death penalty the most severe sanction available to society should represent a moral judgment about the defendant's culpability in light of all the available I would think the Court would at least ensure that its views about the propriety of the death penalty were the ones actually transmitted to the jury. III The instructions at the sentencing phase of respondent's trial may well have misled the jury about its duty to consider the mitigating evidence respondent presented. Until today, the Court consistently has vacated a death sentence and remanded for resentencing when there was any ambiguity about whether the sentencer actually considered mitigating See *515 ("Woodson and require us to remove any legitimate basis for finding ambiguity concerning the factors actually considered by the [sentencer]"). See also ; at ; ; ; 43 U. S., at 60. The Court's failure to adhere to this fundamental Eighth Amendment principle is inexcusable. Distorting respondent's claim and our precedents in order to hide behind the smokescreen of a new standard of retroactivity is even more so. IV Even if I did not believe that the antisympathy instruction interfered with the jury's ability to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence, I would vacate respondent's death sentence. I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment. 42 U. S., at 227. |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.