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per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | Petitioner George Porter is a veteran who was both wounded and decorated for his active participation in two major engagements during the Korean War; his combat service unfortunately left him a traumatized, changed man. His commanding officer's moving description of those two battles was only a fraction of the mitigating evidence that his counsel failed to discover or present during the penalty phase of his trial in 1988. In this federal postconviction proceeding, the District Court held that Porter's lawyer's failure to adduce that evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and granted his application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Porter was not prejudiced by any deficient performance by his counsel was a reasonable application of Like the District Court, we are persuaded that it was objectively unreasonable to conclude there was no reasonable probability the sentence would have been different if the sentencing judge and jury had heard the significant mitigation evidence that Porter's counsel neither uncovered nor presented. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari in part and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.[1] I Porter was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder for the shooting of his former girlfriend, Evelyn and her boyfriend Walter Burrows. He was sentenced to death on the first count but not the second. In July 1986, as his relationship with was ending, Porter threatened to kill her and then left town. When he returned to Florida three months later, he attempted to see but her mother told him that did not want to see him. He drove past ' house each of the two days prior to the shooting, and the night before the murder he visited who called the police. Porter then went to two cocktail lounges and spent the night with a friend, who testified Porter was quite drunk by 11 p.m. Early the next morning, Porter shot in her house. Burrows struggled with Porter and forced him outside where Porter shot him. Porter represented himself, with standby counsel, for most of the pretrial proceedings and during the beginning of his trial. Near the completion of the State's case in chief, Porter pleaded guilty. He thereafter changed his mind about representing himself, and his standby counsel was appointed as his counsel for the penalty phase. During the penalty phase, the State attempted to prove four aggravating factors: Porter had been "previously convicted" of another violent felony (i.e., in ' case, killing Burrows, and in his *449 |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | (i.e., in ' case, killing Burrows, and in his *449 case, killing );[2] the murder was committed during a burglary; the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner; and the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The defense put on only one witness, Porter's ex-wife, and read an excerpt from a deposition. The sum total of the mitigating evidence was inconsistent testimony about Porter's behavior when intoxicated and testimony that Porter had a good relationship with his son. Although his lawyer told the jury that Porter "has other handicaps that weren't apparent during the trial" and Porter was not "mentally healthy," he did not put on any evidence related to Porter's mental health. 3 Tr. 477-478 (Jan. 22, 1988). The jury recommended the death sentence for both murders. The trial court found that the State had proved all four aggravating circumstances for the murder of but that only the first two were established with respect to Burrows' murder. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances and imposed a death sentence for ' murder only. On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence over the dissent of two justices, but struck the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor. The court found the State had not carried its burden on that factor because the "record is consistent with the hypothesis that Porter's was a crime of passion, not a crime that was meant to be deliberately and extraordinarily painful." The two dissenting justices would have reversed the penalty because the evidence of drunkenness, "combined with evidence of Porter's emotionally charged, desperate, frustrated desire to meet with his former lover, is sufficient to render the death penalty disproportional punishment in this instance." In 1995, Porter filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court, claiming his penalty-phase counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The court conducted a 2-day evidentiary hearing, during which Porter presented extensive mitigating evidence, all of which was apparently unknown to his penalty-phase counsel. Unlike the evidence presented during Porter's penalty hearing, which left the jury knowing hardly anything about him other than the facts of his crimes, the new evidence described his abusive childhood, his heroic military service and the trauma he suffered because of it, his long-term substance abuse, and his impaired mental health and mental capacity. The depositions of his brother and sister described the abuse Porter suffered as a child. Porter routinely witnessed his father beat his mother, one time so severely that she had to go to the hospital and lost a child. Porter's father was violent |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | the hospital and lost a child. Porter's father was violent every weekend, and by his siblings' account, Porter was his father's favorite target, particularly when Porter tried to protect his mother. On one occasion, Porter's father shot at him for coming home late, but missed and just beat Porter instead. According to his brother, Porter attended classes for slow learners and left school when he was 12 or 13. To escape his horrible family life, Porter enlisted in the Army at age 17 and fought *450 in the Korean War. His company commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sherman Pratt, testified at Porter's postconviction hearing. Porter was with the 2d Division, which had advanced above the 38th parallel to Kunu-ri when it was attacked by Chinese forces. Porter suffered a gunshot wound to the leg during the advance but was with the unit for the battle at Kunuri. While the Eighth Army was withdrawing, the 2d Division was ordered to hold off the Chinese advance, enabling the bulk of the Eighth Army to live to fight another day. As Colonel Pratt described it, the unit "went into position there in bitter cold night, terribly worn out, terribly weary, almost like zombies because we had been in constant for five days we had been in constant contact with the enemy fighting our way to the rear, little or no sleep, little or no food, literally as I say zombies." 1 Tr. 138 (Jan. 4, 1996). The next morning, the unit engaged in a "fierce hand-to-hand fight with the Chinese" and later that day received permission to withdraw, making Porter's regiment the last unit of the Eighth Army to withdraw. Less than three months later, Porter fought in a second battle, at Chip'yong-ni. His regiment was cut off from the rest of the Eighth Army and defended itself for two days and two nights under constant fire. After the enemy broke through the perimeter and overtook defensive positions on high ground, Porter's company was charged with retaking those positions. In the charge up the hill, the soldiers "were under direct open fire of the enemy forces on top of the hill. They immediately came under mortar, artillery, machine gun, and every other kind of fire you can imagine and they were just dropping like flies as they went along." Porter's company lost all three of its platoon sergeants, and almost all of the officers were wounded. Porter was again wounded and his company sustained the heaviest losses of any troops in the battle, with more than 50% casualties. Colonel Pratt testified that these battles |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | more than 50% casualties. Colonel Pratt testified that these battles were "very trying, horrifying experiences," particularly for Porter's company at Chip'yong-ni. Porter's unit was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for the engagement at Chip'yong-ni, and Porter individually received two Purple Hearts and the Combat Infantryman Badge, along with other decorations. Colonel Pratt testified that Porter went absent without leave (AWOL) for two periods while in Korea. He explained that this was not uncommon, as soldiers sometimes became disoriented and separated from the unit, and that the commander had decided not to impose any punishment for the absences. In Colonel Pratt's experience, an "awful lot of [veterans] come back nervous wrecks. Our [veterans'] hospitals today are filled with people mentally trying to survive the perils and hardships [of]. the Korean War," particularly those who fought in the battles he described. When Porter returned to the United States, he went AWOL for an extended period of time.[3] He was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for that infraction, but he received an honorable discharge. After his discharge, he suffered dreadful nightmares and would attempt to climb his bedroom walls with knives at night.[4] Porter's *451 family eventually removed all of the knives from the house. According to Porter's brother, Porter developed a serious drinking problem and began drinking so heavily that he would get into fights and not remember them at all. In addition to this testimony regarding his life history, Porter presented an expert in neuropsychology, Dr. Dee, who had examined Porter and administered a number of psychological assessments. Dr. Dee concluded that Porter suffered from brain damage that could manifest in impulsive, violent behavior. At the time of the crime, Dr. Dee testified, Porter was substantially impaired in his ability to conform his conduct to the law and suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, two statutory mitigating circumstances, (6). Dr. Dee also testified that Porter had substantial difficulties with reading, writing, and memory, and that these cognitive defects were present when he was evaluated for competency to stand trial. 2 Tr. 227-228 (Jan. 5, 1996); see also Record 904-906. Although the State's experts reached different conclusions regarding the statutory mitigators,[5] each expert testified that he could not diagnose Porter or rule out a brain abnormality. 2 Tr. 345, 382 (Jan. 5, 1996); 3 The trial judge who conducted the state postconviction hearing, without determining counsel's deficiency, held that Porter had not been prejudiced by the failure to introduce any of that evidence. Record 1203, 1206. He found that Porter had failed to establish any statutory mitigating circumstances, and that |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | had failed to establish any statutory mitigating circumstances, and that the nonstatutory mitigating evidence would not have made a difference in the outcome of the case, He discounted the evidence of Porter's alcohol abuse because it was inconsistent and discounted the evidence of Porter's abusive childhood because he was 54 years old at the time of the trial. He also concluded that Porter's periods of being AWOL would have reduced the impact of Porter's military service to "inconsequential proportions." Finally, he held that even considering all three categories of evidence together, the "trial judge and jury still would have imposed death." The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. It first accepted the trial court's finding that Porter could not have established any statutory mitigating circumstances, based on the trial court's acceptance of the State's experts' conclusions in that regard. It then held the trial court was correct to find "the additional nonstatutory mitigation to be lacking in weight because of the specific facts presented." Like the postconviction court, the Florida Supreme Court reserved judgment regarding counsel's deficiency. Ibid.[6] Two justices dissented, reasoning *452 that counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence was "especially harmful" because of the divided vote affirming the sentence on direct appeal "even without the substantial mitigation that we now know existed"and because of the reversal of the heinous, atrocious, and cruel aggravating factor. Porter thereafter filed his federal habeas petition. The District Court held Porter's penalty-phase counsel had been ineffective. It first determined that counsel's performance had been deficient because "penalty-phase counsel did little, if any investigation and failed to effectively advocate on behalf of his client before the jury." It then determined that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, finding that the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established law in part because the state court failed to consider the entirety of the evidence when reweighing the evidence in mitigation, including the trial evidence suggesting that "this was a crime of passion, that [Porter] was drinking heavily just hours before the murders, or that [Porter] had a good relationship with his son." The Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held the District Court had failed to appropriately defer to the state court's factual findings with respect to Porter's alcohol abuse and his mental health. The Court of Appeals then separately considered each category of mitigating evidence and held it was not unreasonable for the state court to discount each category as it did. Porter petitioned for a writ of certiorari. We grant the petition and reverse with respect to the Court of Appeals' disposition of Porter's ineffective-assistance |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | respect to the Court of Appeals' disposition of Porter's ineffective-assistance claim. II To prevail under Porter must show that his counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. To establish deficiency, Porter must show his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." To establish prejudice, he "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Finally, Porter is entitled to relief only if the state court's rejection of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of ", or it rested "on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." (d). Because the state court did not decide whether Porter's counsel was deficient, we review this element of Porter's claim de novo. It is unquestioned that under the prevailing professional norms at the time of Porter's trial, counsel had an "obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background." The investigation conducted by Porter's counsel clearly did not satisfy those norms. Although Porter had initially elected to represent himself, his standby counsel became his counsel for the penalty phase a little over a month prior to the sentencing proceeding before the jury. It was the first time this lawyer had represented a defendant during a penalty-phase proceeding. At the postconviction hearing, he testified that he had only one short meeting with Porter regarding the penalty phase. He did not obtain any of Porter's school, medical, or military service records or interview any members of Porter's family. In we held counsel "fell short of professional standards" for not expanding their investigation beyond the presentence investigation report and one set of records they obtained, particularly "in light of what counsel actually discovered" in the records. Here, counsel did not even take the first step of interviewing witnesses or requesting records. Cf. ; ("[Counsel's] decision not to seek more character or psychological evidence than was already in hand was reasonable"). Beyond that, like the counsel in he ignored pertinent avenues for investigation of which he should have been aware. The court-ordered competency evaluations, for example, collectively reported Porter's very few years of regular school, his military service and wounds sustained in combat, and his father's "over-disciplin[e]." Record 902-906. As an explanation, counsel described Porter as fatalistic and uncooperative. But he acknowledged that although Porter instructed him not to speak with Porter's ex-wife or son, Porter did not give him any other instructions limiting the witnesses he could interview. Counsel thus failed to uncover |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | the witnesses he could interview. Counsel thus failed to uncover and present any evidence of Porter's mental health or mental impairment, his family background, or his military service. The decision not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional judgment. Porter may have been fatalistic or uncooperative, but that does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct some sort of mitigation investigation. See III Because we find Porter's counsel deficient, we must determine whether the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied in holding Porter was not prejudiced by that deficiency. Under a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S., In Florida, the sentencing judge makes the determination as to the existence and weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the punishment, (3), but he must give the jury verdict of life or death "great weight," (Fla.1975) Porter must show that but for his counsel's deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have received a different sentence. To assess that probability, we consider "the totality of the available mitigation evidenceboth that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding" *454 and "reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation." This is not a case in which the new evidence "would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge." The judge and jury at Porter's original sentencing heard almost nothing that would humanize Porter or allow them to accurately gauge his moral culpability. They learned about Porter's turbulent relationship with his crimes, and almost nothing else. Had Porter's counsel been effective, the judge and jury would have learned of the "kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a defendant's moral culpability." They would have heard about (1) Porter's heroic military service in two of the most criticaland horrificbattles of the Korean War, (2) his struggles to regain normality upon his return from war, (3) his childhood history of physical abuse, and (4) his brain abnormality, difficulty reading and writing, and limited schooling. See Instead, they heard absolutely none of that evidence, evidence which "might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of [Porter's] moral culpability." On the other side of the ledger, the weight of evidence in aggravation is not as substantial as the sentencing judge thought. As noted, the sentencing judge accepted the jury's recommendation of a death sentence for the murder of but rejected the jury's death-sentence recommendation for the murder of Burrows. The sentencing judge believed that |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | for the murder of Burrows. The sentencing judge believed that there were four aggravating circumstances related to the murder but only two for the Burrows murder. Accordingly, the judge must have reasoned that the two aggravating circumstances that were present in both cases were insufficient to warrant a death sentence but that the two additional aggravating circumstances present with respect to the murder were sufficient to tip the balance in favor of a death sentence. But the Florida Supreme Court rejected one of these additional aggravating circumstances, i.e., that ' murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, finding the murder "consistent with a crime of passion" even though premeditated to a heightened degree. 564 So.2d, -1064. Had the judge and jury been able to place Porter's life history "on the mitigating side of the scale," and appropriately reduced the ballast on the aggravating side of the scale, there is clearly a reasonable probability that the advisory juryand the sentencing judge"would have struck a different balance," and it is unreasonable to conclude otherwise. The Florida Supreme Court's decision that Porter was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to conduct a thoroughor even cursoryinvestigation is unreasonable. The Florida Supreme Court either did not consider or unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence adduced in the postconviction hearing. Under Florida law, mental health evidence that does not rise to the level of establishing a statutory mitigating circumstance may nonetheless be considered by the sentencing judge and jury as mitigating. See, e.g., Indeed, the Constitution *455 requires that "the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor." Yet neither the postconviction trial court nor the Florida Supreme Court gave any consideration for the purpose of nonstatutory mitigation to Dr. Dee's testimony regarding the existence of a brain abnormality and cognitive defects.[7] While the State's experts identified perceived problems with the tests that Dr. Dee used and the conclusions that he drew from them, it was not reasonable to discount entirely the effect that his testimony might have had on the jury or the sentencing judge. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court, following the state postconviction court, unreasonably discounted the evidence of Porter's childhood abuse and military service. It is unreasonable to discount to irrelevance the evidence of Porter's abusive childhood, especially when that kind of history may have particular salience for a jury evaluating Porter's behavior in his relationship with It is also unreasonable to conclude that Porter's military service would be reduced to "inconsequential proportions," 788 So.2d, simply because the jury would also have learned that Porter went AWOL on more |
per_curiam | 2,009 | 200 | per_curiam | Porter v. McCollum | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1756/porter-v-mccollum/ | would also have learned that Porter went AWOL on more than one occasion. Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those who fought on the front lines as Porter did.[8] Moreover, the relevance of Porter's extensive combat experience is not only that he served honorably under extreme hardship and gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took on Porter.[9] The evidence that he was AWOL is consistent with this theory of mitigation and does not impeach or diminish the evidence of his service. To conclude otherwise reflects a failure to engage with what Porter actually went through in Korea. As the two dissenting justices in the Florida Supreme Court reasoned, "there exists too much mitigating evidence that was not presented to now be ignored." Although the burden is on petitioner to show he was prejudiced by his counsel's deficiency, the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that Porter failed to meet this burden was an unreasonable application of our clearly established law. We do not require a defendant to show "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome" of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish "a probability sufficient to undermine *456 confidence in [that] outcome." -694, This Porter has done. The petition for certiorari is granted in part, and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. |
per_curiam | 1,970 | 200 | per_curiam | United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108209/united-states-v-maryland-savings-share-ins-corp/ | This is a direct appeal by the Uited States from a district court judgmet holdig ucostitutioal 501 (c) (14) (B) of the Iteral Reveue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. 501 (c) (14) (B) (1964 ed., Supp. V), o the groud that it arbitrarily discrimiates betwee Savigs-Share Isurace Corp. (MSSIC), the appellee, ad other similar oprofit, mutual isurers. MSSIC was established by the Legislature with the object of isurig the accouts of shareholders of member savigs ad loa associatios. Although first chartered i 1962, it seeks the beefit of 501 (c) (14) (B), which exempts from tax oprofit corporatios such as appellee but oly if orgaized before September 1, 1957.[1]*5 MSSIC's positio is that September 1, 1957, is a arbitrary ad ucostitutioal cutoff date which must be excised from the sectio, leavig the sectio applicable to all corporatios of the same ature as itself regardless of the date of their creatio. We do ot agree. Prior to 1951, all savigs ad loa associatios were exempt from taxatio of icome derived from their operatios. Also exempt were oprofit corporatios that isured the savigs istitutios. I 1951, the exemptio for savigs ad loa associatios was discotiued, o fidigs that the idustry had developed to a poit comparable to that of commercial baks. The exemptio for isurers, however, was cotiued, provided they were already i existece as of September 1, 1951. See Reveue Act of 1951, 313 (b), ; S. Rep. No. 781, 82d Cog., 1st Sess., 22-29; 2 U. S. Code Cog. & Ad. News 1969, 1991-1997 (1951). As of that date three private isurers fell withi the scope of the sectio two of them i Massachusetts ad oe i Coecticut. The, i 1956, a fourth such corporatio was orgaized i Ohio, ad four years later Cogress moved the cutoff date forward to September 1, 1957. Act of April 22, 1960, I 1963, a similar bill, H. R. 3297, 88th Cog., 1st Sess., which would have moved the cutoff date forward to Jauary 1, 1963, for the beefit of MSSIC, passed the House, but was ever reported out by the Seate Fiace Committee. Testimoy before the committee idicated *6 that cotiued forward movemet of the date might lead to proliferatio of state isurers that could hider the operatios ad threate the fiacial stability of the Federal Deposit Isurace Corporatio ad the Federal Savigs ad Loa Isurace Corporatio. See Hearig o H. R. 3297 before the Seate Committee o Fiace, 88th Cog., 2d Sess., 9-10 (1964). Agaist this backgroud, the District Court's ivalidatio of 501 (c) (14) (B) was error. The fact that |
per_curiam | 1,970 | 200 | per_curiam | United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108209/united-states-v-maryland-savings-share-ins-corp/ | of 501 (c) (14) (B) was error. The fact that Cogress eacts a statute cotaiig a "gradfather clause," which exempts from the geeral icome tax certai corporatios orgaized prior to a specified date, does ot of itself idicate that Cogress has made a arbitrary classificatio. Cf. ; Sperry & Hutchiso ; ; aff'd per curiam, Normally, a legislative classificatio will ot be set aside if ay state of facts ratioally justifyig it is demostrated to or perceived by the courts. ; ; Stadard Oil See also Here the legislative history of H. R. 3297 affirmatively discloses that Cogress had a ratioal basis for decliig i 1963 to broade the exemptio by extedig the cutoff date of 501 (c) (14) (B). Just as a State may provide that after a specified date ewly established commo carriers must obtai state approval before eterig ito busiess so as to prevet proliferatio of such carriers ad excessive use of the State's highways, see similarly Cogress does ot exceed its power to tax or does it violate the Fifth Amedmet whe it refuses to exempt from tax ewly *7 formed corporatios, the multiplicatio of which might burde otherwise valid federal programs.[2] Havig oted probable jurisdictio by order of October 12, 1970, we ow reverse the judgmet of the District Court. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, cosiderig that the issues i this case are deservig of pleary cosideratio, would set the case for argumet. |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | The question presented is whether the federal regulations governing the collection of blood plasma from paid donors pre-empt certain local ordinances. I Appellee Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., is a Florida corporation that operates, through subsidiaries, eight blood plasma centers in the United States. One of the centers, Tampa Plasma Corporation (TPC), is located in Hillsborough County, Florida. Appellee's plasma centers collect blood plasma from donors by employing a procedure called plasmapheresis. Under this procedure, whole blood removed from the donor is separated into plasma and other components, and "at least the red blood cells are returned to the donor," (e) Appellee sells the plasma to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Vendors of blood products, such as TPC, are subject to federal supervision. Under 351(a) of the Public Health Service Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 262(a), such vendors must be licensed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). Licenses are issued only on a showing that the vendor's establishment and blood products meet certain safety, purity, and potency standards established by the Secretary. 42 U.S. C. 262(d). HHS is authorized to inspect such establishments for compliance. 262(c). *710 Pursuant to 351 of the Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as the designee of the Secretary, has established standards for the collection of plasma. 21 CFR 640.60-640.76 The regulations require that a licensed physician determine the suitability of a donor before the first donation and thereafter at subsequent intervals of no longer than one year. 640.63(b)(1). A physician must also inform the donor of the hazards of the procedure and obtain the donor's consent, 640.61, and must be on the premises when the procedure is performed, 640.62. In addition, the regulations establish minimum standards for donor eligibility, 640.63(c)-(d), specify procedures that must be followed in performing plasmapheresis, 640.65, and impose labeling requirements, 640.70. In 1980, Hillsborough County adopted Ordinances 80-11 and 80-12. Ordinance 80-11 imposes a $225 license fee on plasmapheresis centers within the county. It also requires such centers to allow the County Health Department "reasonable and continuing access" to their premises for inspection purposes, and to furnish information deemed relevant by the Department. See App. 21-23. Ordinance 80-12 establishes a countywide identification system, which requires all potential donors to obtain from the County Health Department an identification card, valid for six months, that may be used only at the plasmapheresis center specified on the card. The ordinance incorporates by reference the FDA's blood plasma regulations, but also imposes donor testing and recordkeeping requirements beyond those contained in the federal regulations. Specifically, the ordinance requires that donors be tested for |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | regulations. Specifically, the ordinance requires that donors be tested for hepatitis prior to registration, that they donate at only one center, and that they be given a breath analysis for alcohol content before each plasma donation. See The county has promulgated regulations to implement Ordinance 80-12. The regulations set the fee for the issuance of an identification card to a blood donor at $2. They also *711 establish that plasma centers must pay the county a fee of $1 for each plasmapheresis procedure performed. See In December 1981, appellee filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances and their implementing regulations. Appellee argued primarily that the ordinances violated the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Appellee sought a declaration that the ordinances were unlawful and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. In November 1982, following a bench trial, the District Court upheld all portions of the local ordinances and regulations except the requirement that donors be subject to a breath-analysis test. The court rejected the Supremacy Clause challenge, discerning no evidence of federal intent to pre-empt the whole field of plasmapheresis regulation and finding no conflict between the Hillsborough County ordinances and the federal regulations. In addition, the District Court rejected the claim that the ordinances violate the Equal Protection Clause because they regulate only centers that pay donors for plasma, and not centers in which volunteers donate whole blood. The court identified a rational basis for the distinction: paid donors sell plasma more frequently than volunteers donate whole blood, and paid donors have a higher rate of hepatitis than do volunteer donors. Finally, the District Court found that, with one exception, the ordinances do not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. It concluded that the breath-analysis requirement would impose a large burden on plasma centers by forcing them to purchase fairly expensive testing equipment, and was not shown to achieve any purpose not adequately served by the subjective evaluations of sobriety already required by the federal regulations. *712 Automated Medical Laboratories appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals held that the FDA's blood plasma regulations pre-empt all provisions of the county's ordinances and regulations. The court acknowledged the absence of an express indication of congressional intent to pre-empt. Relying on the pervasiveness of the FDA's regulations and on the dominance of the federal interest in plasma regulation, however, it found an implicit intent to pre-empt state and local |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | it found an implicit intent to pre-empt state and local laws on that subject. In addition, the court found a serious danger of conflict between the FDA regulations and the Hillsborough County ordinances, reasoning that "[i]f the County scheme remains in effect, the national blood policy of promoting uniformity and guaranteeing a continued supply of healthy donors will be adversely affected." The Court of Appeals thus affirmed, albeit on other grounds, the District Court's invalidation of the breath-analysis requirement. It reversed the District Court's judgment upholding the remaining requirements of the Hillsborough County ordinances and regulations. In view of its decision, the court did not reach the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection challenges to the county's scheme. Hillsborough County and the County Health Department appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S. C. 1254(2).[1] We noted probable jurisdiction, and we now reverse. II It is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to," federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law may supersede state law in several different ways. First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms. In the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to preempt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation. Pre-emption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." ; see Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," See generally Capital Cities Cable, We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes. See, e. g., Capital Cities Cable, ; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan ; United Also, for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws. See, e. g., City of *714 III In |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | statewide laws. See, e. g., City of *714 III In arguing that the Hillsborough County ordinances and regulations are pre-empted, appellee faces an uphill battle. The first hurdle that appellee must overcome is the FDA's statement, when it promulgated the plasmapheresis regulations in 1973, that it did not intend its regulations to be exclusive. In response to comments expressing concern that the regulations governing the licensing of plasmapheresis facilities "would pre-empt State and local laws governing plasmapheresis," the FDA explained in a statement accompanying the regulations that "[t]hese regulations are not intended to usurp the powers of State or local authorities to regulate plasmapheresis procedures in their localities." The question whether the regulation of an entire field has been reserved by the Federal Government is, essentially, a question of ascertaining the intent underlying the federal scheme. See In this case, appellee concedes that neither Congress nor the FDA expressly pre-empted state and local regulation of plasmapheresis. Thus, if the county ordinances challenged here are to fail they must do so either because Congress or the FDA implicitly pre-empted the whole field of plasmapheresis regulation, or because particular provisions in the local ordinances conflict with the federal scheme. According to appellee, two separate factors support the inference of a federal intent to pre-empt the whole field: the pervasiveness of the FDA's regulations and the dominance of the federal interest in this area. Appellee also argues that the challenged ordinances reduce the number of plasma donors, and that this effect conflicts with the congressional goal of ensuring an adequate supply of plasma. The FDA's statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless either the agency's position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent, see Chevron U. S. A. or subsequent developments reveal a change in that position. Given appellee's first argument for implicit pre-emption that the comprehensiveness of the FDA's regulations evinces an intent to pre-empt any pre-emptive effect must result from the change since 1973 in the comprehensiveness of the federal regulations.[2] To prevail on its second argument for implicit pre-emption the dominance of the federal interest in plasmapheresis regulation appellee must show either that this interest became more compelling since 1973, or that, in 1973, the FDA seriously underestimated the federal interest in plasmapheresis regulation. The second obstacle in appellee's path is the presumption that state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under the Supremacy Clause. Through the challenged ordinances, Hillsborough County has attempted to protect the health of its plasma donors by preventing them |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | protect the health of its plasma donors by preventing them from donating too frequently. See Brief for Appellants 12. It also has attempted to ensure the quality of the plasma collected so as to protect, in turn, the recipients of such plasma. "Where the field that Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States `we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " 430 U. S., at (quoting 331 U. S., at ) (citations omitted). Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways ; (same); (same). Of course, the same principles apply where, as here, the field is said to have *716 been pre-empted by an agency, acting pursuant to congressional delegation. Appellee must thus present a showing of implicit pre-emption of the whole field, or of a conflict between a particular local provision and the federal scheme, that is strong enough to overcome the presumption that state and local regulation of health and safety matters can constitutionally coexist with federal regulation. IV Given the clear indication of the FDA's intention not to pre-empt and the deference with which we must review the challenged ordinances, we conclude that these ordinances are not pre-empted by the federal scheme. A We reject the argument that an intent to pre-empt may be inferred from the comprehensiveness of the FDA's regulations at issue here. As we have pointed out, given the FDA's 1973 statement, the relevant inquiry is whether a finding of pre-emption is justified by the increase, since 1973, in the comprehensiveness of the federal regulations. Admittedly, these regulations have been broadened over the years. When they were adopted in 1973, these regulations covered only plasma to be used in injections. In 1976, the regulations were expanded to cover also plasma to be used for the manufacture of "noninjectable" products. The original regulations also were amended to "clarify and strengthen the existing Source Plasma (Human) regulations in light of FDA inspectional and other regulatory experience." ; see also (1974) The FDA has not indicated that the new regulations affected its disavowal in 1973 of any intent to pre-empt state and local regulation, and the fact that the federal scheme was expanded to reach other uses of plasma does not cast doubt *717 on the continued validity of that disavowal.[3] Indeed, even in the absence of the 1973 statement, the comprehensiveness of the FDA's regulations would not justify pre-emption. In New York Dept. of Social the Court stated |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | pre-emption. In New York Dept. of Social the Court stated that "[t]he subjects of modern social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature require intricate and complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress necessarily intending its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem." There, in upholding state work-incentive provisions against a pre-emption challenge, the Court noted that the federal provisions "had to be sufficiently comprehensive to authorize and govern programs in States which had no requirements of their own as well as cooperatively in States with such requirements." But merely because the federal provisions were sufficiently comprehensive to meet the need identified by Congress did not mean that States and localities were barred from identifying additional needs or imposing further requirements in the field. See also De We are even more reluctant to infer pre-emption from the comprehensiveness of regulations than from the comprehensiveness of statutes. As a result of their specialized functions, agencies normally deal with problems in far more detail than does Congress. To infer pre-emption whenever an agency deals with a problem comprehensively is virtually tantamount to saying that whenever a federal agency decides to step into a field, its regulations will be exclusive. Such a rule, of course, would be inconsistent with the federal-state balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. See 430 U. S., at *718 Moreover, because agencies normally address problems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety of means, including regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments, we can expect that they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their regulations to be exclusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to the question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying that the mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the agency did in fact intend to pre-empt. Given the presumption that state and local regulation related to matters of health and safety can normally coexist with federal regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a field related to health and safety. Appellee also relies on the promulgation of the National Blood Policy by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), as an indication that the federal regulatory scheme is now comprehensive enough to justify complete pre-emption. See Brief for Appellee 25-26. Such reliance is misplaced. The National Blood Policy was established in 1974 as "a pluralistic and evolutionary approach to the solution of blood collection and distribution problems." (1974). The policy contains no regulations; instead, it is |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | problems." (1974). The policy contains no regulations; instead, it is a broad statement of goals and a call for cooperation between the Federal Government and the private sector: "These policies are intended to achieve certain goals but do not detail methods of implementation. In developing the most effective and suitable means of reaching these goals, the Secretary will involve, as appropriate, all relevant public and private sectors and Federal Government agencies in a cooperative effort to provide the best attainable blood services." The National Blood Policy indicates that federal regulation will be employed only as a last resort: "[I]f the private sector is unable to make satisfactory progress toward implementing *719 these policies, a legislative and/or regulatory approach would have to be considered." The adoption of this policy simply does not support the claim that the federal regulations have grown so comprehensive since 1973 as to justify the inference of complete pre-emption. B Appellee's second argument for pre-emption of the whole field of plasmapheresis regulation is that an intent to pre-empt can be inferred from the dominant federal interest in this field. We are unpersuaded by the argument. Undoubtedly, every subject that merits congressional legislation is, by definition, a subject of national concern. That cannot mean, however, that every federal statute ousts all related state law. Neither does the Supremacy Clause require us to rank congressional enactments in order of "importance" and hold that, for those at the top of the scale, federal regulation must be exclusive. Instead, we must look for special features warranting pre-emption. Our case law provides us with clear standards to guide our inquiry in this area. For example, in the seminal case of the Court inferred an intent to pre-empt from the dominance of the federal interest in foreign affairs because "the supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs is made clear by the Constitution," and the regulation of that field is "intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government," ; see also Needless to say, those factors are absent here. Rather, as we have stated, the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern. See 331 U. S., at[4] *720 There is also no merit in appellee's reliance on the National Blood Policy as an indication of the dominance of the federal interest in this area. Nothing in that policy takes plasma regulation out of the health-and-safety category and converts it into an area of overriding national concern. C Appellee's final argument is that even if the regulations are not |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | final argument is that even if the regulations are not comprehensive enough and the federal interest is not dominant enough to pre-empt the entire field of plasmapheresis regulation, the Hillsborough County ordinances must be struck down because they conflict with the federal scheme. Appellee argues principally that the challenged ordinances impose on plasma centers and donors requirements more stringent than those imposed by the federal regulations, and therefore that they present a serious obstacle to the federal goal of ensuring an "adequate supply of plasma." Tr. of Oral Arg. 24; see Brief for Appellee 30; (1972). We find this concern too speculative to support pre-emption. Appellee claims that "[t]he evidence at trial indicated that enforcement of the County ordinances would result in an increase in direct costs of plasma production by $1.50 per litre, and a total increase in production costs (including direct and indirect costs) of $7 per litre of plasma, an increase of approximately 15% in the total cost of production." Brief for Appellee 30. Appellee argues that these increased financial burdens would reduce the number of plasma centers. In addition, appellee claims, the county requirements would reduce the number of donors who only occasionally sell their plasma because such donors would be deterred by the identification-card requirement. On the basis of the record before it, the District Court rejected each of appellee's factual assertions. The District Court found that appellee's cost-of-compliance estimates "were clouded with speculation." App. 42. It also found that appellee had presented no facts to support its conclusion that "the vendor population would decrease by twenty-five *721 percent." These findings of fact can be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a); see and hence come to us with a strong presumption of validity. More importantly, even if the Hillsborough County ordinances had, in fact, reduced the supply of plasma in that county, it would not necessarily follow that they interfere with the federal goal of maintaining an adequate supply of plasma. Undoubtedly, overly restrictive local legislation could threaten the national plasma supply. Neither Congress nor the FDA, however, has struck a particular balance between safety and quantity; as we have noted, the regulations, which contemplated additional state and local requirements, merely establish minimum safety standards. See ; Moreover, the record in this case does not indicate what supply the Federal Government considers "adequate," and we have no reason to believe that any reduction in the quantity of plasma donated would make that supply "inadequate." Finally, the FDA possesses the authority to promulgate regulations pre-empting local legislation that imperils |
Justice Marshall | 1,985 | 15 | majority | Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111437/hillsborough-county-v-automated-medical-laboratories-inc/ | the authority to promulgate regulations pre-empting local legislation that imperils the supply of plasma and can do so with relative ease. See Moreover, the agency can be expected to monitor, on a continuing basis, the effects on the federal program of local requirements. Thus, since the agency has not suggested that the county ordinances interfere with federal goals, we are reluctant in the absence of strong evidence to find a threat to the federal goal of ensuring sufficient plasma. Our analysis would be somewhat different had Congress not delegated to the FDA the administration of the federal program. Congress, unlike an agency, normally does not follow, years after the enactment of federal legislation, the effects of external factors on the goals that the federal legislation sought to promote. Moreover, it is more difficult for Congress to make its intentions known for example by amending a statute than it is for an agency to amend its regulations or to otherwise indicate its position. *722 In summary, given the findings of the District Court, the lack of any evidence in the record of a threat to the "adequacy" of the plasma supply, and the significance that we attach to the lack of a statement by the FDA, we conclude that the Hillsborough County requirements do not imperil the federal goal of ensuring sufficient plasma.[5] Appellee also argues that the county ordinances conflict with the federal regulations because they prevent individuals with hepatitis from donating their plasma. See Such plasma is used for the production of hepatitis vaccines, and the federal regulations provide for its collection pursuant to special authorization and under carefully controlled conditions. 21 CFR 610.41 To the extent that the Hillsborough County ordinances preclude individuals with hepatitis from donating their plasma, the ordinances are said to stand in the way of the accomplishment of the federal goal of combating hepatitis. In order to collect plasma from individuals with hepatitis, however, a plasma center must obtain from the FDA, pursuant to 640.75, an exemption from the good-health requirements of 640.63(c). The record does not indicate that appellee has received the required exemption. As a result, appellee could not collect plasma from individuals with hepatitis even in the absence of the county ordinances. Thus, appellee lacks standing to challenge the ordinances on this ground.[6] *723 V We hold that Hillsborough County Ordinances 80-11 and 80-12, and their implementing regulations, are not pre-empted by the scheme for federal regulation of plasmapheresis. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118312/murphy-v-united-parcel-service-inc/ | Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), dismissed petitioner Vaughn L. Murphy from his job as a UPS mechanic because of his high blood pressure. Petitioner filed suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 42 U.S. C. 12101 et seq., in Federal District Court. The District Court granted summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly considered petitioner in his medicated state when it held that petitioner's impairment does *519 not "substantially limi[t]" one or more of his major life activities and whether it correctly determined that petitioner is not "regarded as disabled." See 12102(2). In light of our decision in ante, p. 471, we conclude that the Court of Appeals' resolution of both issues was correct. I Petitioner was first diagnosed with hypertension (high blood pressure) when he was 10 years old. Unmedicated, his blood pressure is approximately 250/160. With medication, however, petitioner's "hypertension does not significantly restrict his activities and in general he can function normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do." In August 1994, respondent hired petitioner as a mechanic, a position that required petitioner to drive commercial motor vehicles. Petitioner does not challenge the District Court's conclusion that driving a commercial motor vehicle is an essential function of the mechanic's job at UPS. To drive such vehicles, however, petitioner had to satisfy certain health requirements imposed by the Department of Transportation (DOT). 49 CFR 391.41(a) (1998) One such requirement is that the driver of a commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce have "no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle safely." 391.41(b)(6). At the time respondent hired him, petitioner's blood pressure was so high, measuring at 186/124, that he was not qualified for DOT health certification, see App. 98a-102a (Department of Transportation, Medical Regulatory Criteria for Evaluation Under Section 391.41(b)(6), attached as exhibit to *520 Affidavit and Testimony of John R. McMahon) (hereinafter Medical Regulatory Criteria). Nonetheless, petitioner was erroneously granted certification, and he commenced work. In September 1994, a UPS medical supervisor who was reviewing petitioner's medical files discovered the error and requested that petitioner have his blood pressure retested. Upon retesting, petitioner's blood pressure was measured at 160/102 and 164/104. See App. 48a (testimony of Vaughn Murphy). On October 5, 1994, respondent fired petitioner on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial motor vehicles. Petitioner brought suit under Title I |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118312/murphy-v-united-parcel-service-inc/ | of commercial motor vehicles. Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the ADA in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. It held that, to determine whether petitioner is disabled under the ADA, his "impairment should be evaluated in its medicated state." Noting that when petitioner is medicated he is inhibited only in lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions normally, the court held that petitioner is not "disabled" under the ADA. The court also rejected petitioner's claim that he was "regarded as" disabled, holding that respondent "did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT regulations." The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. Citing its decision in aff'd, ante, p. 471, that an individual claiming a disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any mitigating or corrective measures employed, the court held that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because his doctor had testified that when petitioner is medicated, he "`functions normally doing everyday activity that an everyday person does.' " App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The court also affirmed the District Court's determination that petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. It *521 explained that respondent did not terminate petitioner "on an unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a heart attack or stroke," but "because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles." at 5a. We granted certiorari, and we now affirm. II The first question presented in this case is whether the determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs. We have answered that question in Sutton in the affirmative. Given that holding, the result in this case is clear. The Court of Appeals concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life activity. Petitioner did not seek, and we did not grant, certiorari on whether this conclusion was correct. Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether, under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities should be made without consideration of mitigating measures. Consequently, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the grant of summary judgment in respondent's favor on the claim |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118312/murphy-v-united-parcel-service-inc/ | grant of summary judgment in respondent's favor on the claim that petitioner is substantially limited in one or more major life activities and thus disabled under the ADA. III The second issue presented is also largely resolved by our opinion in Sutton. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high blood pressure. As we held in Sutton, ante, at 489, a person is "regarded as" disabled within the *522 meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Here, petitioner alleges that his hypertension is regarded as substantially limiting him in the major life activity of working, when in fact it does not. To support this claim, he points to testimony from respondent's resource manager that respondent fired petitioner due to his hypertension, which he claims evidences respondent's belief that petitioner's hypertension and consequent inability to obtain DOT certificationsubstantially limits his ability to work. In response, respondent argues that it does not regard petitioner as substantially limited in the major life activity of working but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification. As a preliminary matter, we note that there remains some dispute as to whether petitioner meets the requirements for DOT certification. As discussed above, petitioner was incorrectly granted DOT certification at his first examination when he should have instead been found unqualified. See Upon retesting, although petitioner's blood pressure was not low enough to qualify him for the 1-year certification that he had incorrectly been issued, it was sufficient to qualify him for optional temporary DOT health certification. App. 98a-102a (Medical Regulatory Criteria). Had a physician examined petitioner and, in light of his medical history, declined to issue a temporary DOT certification, we would not second-guess that decision. Here, however, it appears that UPS determined that petitioner could not meet the DOT standards and did not allow him to attempt to obtain the optional temporary certification. at 84a-86a (testimony of Monica Sloan, UPS' company nurse); at 54a-55a (testimony and affidavit of Vaughn Murphy). We need not resolve the question whether petitioner could meet the standards for DOT health certification, however, as it goes only to whether petitioner is qualified *523 and whether respondent has a defense based on the DOT regulations, see Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, post, p. 555, issues not addressed by the court below or raised in the petition for certiorari. The only issue remaining |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118312/murphy-v-united-parcel-service-inc/ | raised in the petition for certiorari. The only issue remaining is whether the evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to obtain DOT certification (regardless of whether he can, in fact, obtain optional temporary certification) is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in one or more major life activities. As in Sutton, ante, at 491-492, we assume, arguendo, that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations regarding the disability determination are valid. When referring to the major life activity of working, the EEOC defines "substantially limits" as: "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 CFR 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998). The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts should consider when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, including "the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within [the] geographical area [reasonably accessible to the individual], from which the individual is also disqualified." 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). Thus, to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. See 1630.2(j)(3)(i) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working"). Again, assuming without deciding that these regulations are valid, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as disabled. Petitioner was fired from the position of UPS mechanic because he has a physical impairmenthypertensionthat *524 is regarded as preventing him from obtaining DOT health certification. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a (UPS terminated Murphy because "his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles"); 946 F. Supp., ; App. 125a, ¶ 18 (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) ("UPS considers driving commercial motor vehicles an essential function of plaintiff's job as mechanic"); at 103a (testimony of John R. McMahon) (stating that the reason why petitioner was fired was that he "did not meet the requirements of the Department of Transportation"). The evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded |
Justice O'Connor | 1,999 | 14 | majority | Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118312/murphy-v-united-parcel-service-inc/ | skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial motor vehiclea specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce. 49 CFR 390.5 (1998) Petitioner has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that petitioner is generally employable as a mechanic. Petitioner has "performed mechanic jobs that did not require DOT certification" for "over 22 years," and he secured another job as a mechanic shortly after leaving UPS. 946 F. Supp., at 876. Moreover, respondent presented uncontroverted evidence that petitioner could perform jobs such as diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine repairer, and gaswelding *525 equipment mechanic, all of which utilize petitioner's mechanical skills. See App. 115a (report of Lewis Vierling). Consequently, in light of petitioner's skills and the array of jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton, ante, at 492-493. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on petitioner's claim that he is regarded as disabled. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. It is so ordered. |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | In 1974 Congress amended the Judicial Code "to broaden and clarify the grounds for judicial disqualification." The first sentence of the amendment provides: *850 "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S. C. 455(a), as amended. In the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that a violation of 455(a) is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality, notwithstanding a finding that the judge was not actually conscious of those circumstances. Moreover, although the judgment in question had become final, the Court of Appeals determined that under the facts of this case, the appropriate remedy was to vacate the court's judgment. We granted certiorari to consider its construction of 455(a) as well as its remedial decision. We now affirm. I In November 1981, respondent Health Services Acquisition Corp. brought an action against petitioner John Liljeberg, Jr., seeking a declaration of ownership of a corporation known as St. Jude Hospital of Kenner, Louisiana (St. Jude). The case was tried by Judge Robert Collins, sitting without a jury. Judge Collins found for Liljeberg and, over a strong dissent, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Approximately 10 months later, respondent learned that Judge Collins had been a member of the Board of Trustees of Loyola University while Liljeberg was negotiating with Loyola to purchase a parcel of land on which to construct a hospital. The success and benefit to Loyola of these negotiations turned, in large part, on Liljeberg prevailing in the litigation before Judge Collins. Based on this information, respondent moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate the judgment on the ground that Judge Collins was disqualified under 455(a) at the time he heard the action and entered judgment *851 in favor of Liljeberg. Judge Collins denied the motion and respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals determined that resolution of the motion required factual findings concerning the extent and timing of Judge Collins' knowledge of Loyola's interest in the declaratory relief litigation. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded the matter to a different judge for such findings. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a. On remand, the District Court found that based on his attendance at Board meetings Judge Collins had actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in St. Jude in 1980 and 1981. The court further concluded, however, that Judge Collins had forgotten about Loyola's interest by the time the declaratory |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | had forgotten about Loyola's interest by the time the declaratory judgment suit came to trial in January 1982. On March 24, 1982, Judge Collins reviewed materials sent to him by the Board to prepare for an upcoming meeting. At that time just a few days after he had filed his opinion finding for Liljeberg and still within the 10-day period allowed for filing a motion for a new trial Judge Collins once again obtained actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in St. Jude. Finally, the District Court found that although Judge Collins thus lacked actual knowledge during trial and prior to the filing of his opinion, the evidence nonetheless gave rise to an appearance of impropriety. However, reading the Court of Appeals' mandate as limited to the issue of actual knowledge, the District Court concluded that it was compelled to deny respondent's Rule 60(b) motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The Court of Appeals again reversed. The court first noted that Judge Collins should have immediately disqualified himself when his actual knowledge of Loyola's interest was renewed.[1] The court also found that regardless of Judge Collins' actual knowledge, "a reasonable observer *852 would expect that Judge Collins would remember that Loyola had some dealings with Liljeberg and St. Jude and seek to ascertain the nature of these dealings." Such an appearance of impropriety, in the view of the Court of Appeals, was sufficient ground for disqualification under 455(a). Although recognizing that caution is required in determining whether a judgment should be vacated after becoming final, the court concluded that since the appearance of partiality was convincingly established and since the motion to vacate was filed as promptly as possible, the appropriate remedy was to vacate the declaratory relief judgment. Because the issues presented largely turn on the facts as they give rise to an appearance of impropriety, it is necessary to relate the sequence and substance of these events in some detail. II Petitioner, John Liljeberg, Jr., is a pharmacist, a promoter, and a half-owner of Axel Realty, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. In 1976, he became interested in a project to construct and operate a hospital in Kenner, Louisiana, a suburb of New Orleans. In addition to providing the community with needed health care facilities, he hoped to obtain a real estate commission for Axel Realty and the exclusive right to provide pharmaceutical services at the new hospital. The successful operation of such a hospital depended upon the acquisition of a "certificate of need" from the State of Louisiana; without such a certificate the hospital would |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | State of Louisiana; without such a certificate the hospital would not qualify for health care reimbursement payments under the federal medicare and medicaid programs.[2] Accordingly, in October 1979, Liljeberg formed St. Jude, intending to have the corporation apply for the certificate of need at an appropriate time. *853 During the next two years Liljeberg engaged in serious negotiations with at least two major parties. One set of negotiations involved a proposal to purchase a large tract of land from Loyola University for use as a hospital site, coupled with a plan to rezone adjoining University property. The proposed benefits to the University included not only the proceeds of the real estate sale itself, amounting to several million dollars, but also a substantial increase in the value to the University of the rezoned adjoining property. The progress of these negotiations was regularly reported to the University's Board of Trustees by its Real Estate Committee and discussed at Board meetings. The minutes of those meetings indicate that the University's interest in the project was dependent on the issuance of the certificate of need.[3] Liljeberg was also conducting serious negotiations with respondent's corporate predecessor, Hospital Affiliates International (HAI), a national health management company. In the summer of 1980, Liljeberg and HAI reached an agreement in principle, outlining their respective roles in developing *854 the hospital. The agreement contemplated that HAI would purchase a tract of land in Kenner (not owned by the University) and construct the hospital on that land; prepare and file the certificate of need; and retain Liljeberg as a consultant to the hospital in various capacities. In turn, it was understood that Liljeberg would transfer St. Jude to HAI. Pursuant to this preliminary agreement, various documents were executed, including an agreement by HAI to purchase the tract of land from its owner for $5 million and a further agreement by HAI to place $500,000 in escrow. In addition, it was agreed that Axel Realty, Inc., would receive a $250,000 commission for locating the property. Eventually, Liljeberg signed a "warranty and indemnity agreement," which HAI understood to transfer ownership of St. Jude to HAI. After the warranty and indemnity agreement was signed, HAI filed an application for the certificate of need. On August 26, 1981, the certificate of need was issued and delivered to Liljeberg. He promptly advised HAI,[4] and HAI paid the real estate commission to Axel Realty. A dispute arose, however, over whether the warranty and indemnity agreement did in fact transfer ownership of St. Jude to HAI. Liljeberg contended that the transfer of ownership of St. Jude |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | contended that the transfer of ownership of St. Jude and hence, the certificate of need was conditioned upon reaching a final agreement concerning his continued participation in the hospital project. This contention was not supported by any written instrument. HAI denied that there was any such unwritten understanding and insisted that, by virtue of the warranty and indemnity agreement, it had been sole owner of St. Jude for over a year. The dispute gave rise to this litigation. *855 Respondent filed its complaint for declaratory judgment on November 30, 1981. The case was tried by Judge Collins, sitting without a jury, on January 21 and 22, 1982. At the close of the evidence, he announced his intended ruling, and on March 16, 1982, he filed a judgment (dated March 12, 1982) and his findings of fact and conclusions of law. He credited Liljeberg's version of oral conversations that were disputed and of critical importance in his ruling.[5] During the period between November 30, 1981, and March 16, 1982, Judge Collins was a trustee of Loyola University, but was not conscious of the fact that the University and Liljeberg were then engaged in serious negotiations concerning *856 the Kenner hospital project, or of the further fact that the success of those negotiations depended upon his conclusion that Liljeberg controlled the certificate of need. To determine whether Judge Collins' impartiality in the Liljeberg litigation "might reasonably be questioned," it is appropriate to consider the state of his knowledge immediately before the lawsuit was filed, what happened while the case was pending before him, and what he did when he learned of the University's interest in the litigation. After the certificate of need was issued, and Liljeberg and HAI became embroiled in their dispute, Liljeberg reopened his negotiations with the University. On October 29, 1981, the Real Estate Committee sent a written report to each of the trustees, including Judge Collins, advising them of "a significant change" concerning the proposed hospital in Kenner and stating specifically that Loyola's property had "again become a prime location." App. 72. The Committee submitted a draft of a resolution authorizing a University vice president "to continue negotiations with the developers of the St. Jude Hospital." At the Board meeting on November 12, 1981, which Judge Collins attended, the trustees discussed the connection between the rezoning of Loyola's land in Kenner and the St. Jude project and adopted the Real Estate Committee's proposed resolution. Thus, Judge Collins had actual knowledge of the University's potential interest in the St. Jude hospital project in Kenner just a few |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | the St. Jude hospital project in Kenner just a few days before the complaint was filed. While the case was pending before Judge Collins, the University agreed to sell 80 acres of its land in Kenner to Liljeberg for $6,694,000. The progress of negotiations was discussed at a Board meeting on January 28, 1982. Judge Collins did not attend that meeting, but the Real Estate Committee advised the trustees that "the federal courts have determined that the certificate of need will be awarded to the St. Jude Corporation." Presumably this advice was based on Judge Collins' comment at the close of the hearing *857 a week earlier, when he announced his intended ruling because he thought "it would be unfair to keep the parties in doubt as to how I feel about the case." App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a. The formal agreement between Liljeberg and the University was apparently executed on March 19. App. 50-58. The agreement stated that it was not in any way conditioned on Liljeberg's prevailing in the litigation "pending in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. involving the obtaining by [Liljeberg] of a Certificate of Need," but it also gave the University the right to repurchase the property for the contract price if Liljeberg had not executed a satisfactory construction contract within one year and further provided for nullification of the contract in the event the rezoning of the University's adjoining land was not accomplished. Thus, the University continued to have an active interest in the outcome of the litigation because it was unlikely that Liljeberg could build the hospital if he lost control of the certificate of need; moreover, the rezoning was in turn dependent on the hospital project.[6] *858 The details of the transaction were discussed in three letters to the trustees dated March 12, 15, and 19, 1982, but Judge Collins did not examine any of those letter until shortly before the Board meeting on March 25, 1982. Thus, he acquired actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in the litigation on March 24, 1982. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, "Judge Collins should have recused himself when he obtained actual knowledge of that interest on March 24." In considering whether the Court of Appeals properly vacated the declaratory relief judgment, we are required to address two questions. We must first determine whether 455(a) can be violated based on an appearance of partiality, even though the judge was not conscious of the circumstances creating the appearance of impropriety, and second, whether relief is available under Rule 60(b) when |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | and second, whether relief is available under Rule 60(b) when such a violation is not discovered until after the judgment has become final. III Title 28 U.S. C. 455 provides in relevant part:[7] "(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. *859 "(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: "(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. "(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household." Scienter is not an element of a violation of 455(a). The judge's lack of knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance may bear on the question of remedy, but it does not eliminate the risk that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned" by other persons. To read 455(a) to provide that the judge must know of the disqualifying facts, requires not simply ignoring the language of the provision which makes no mention of knowledge but further requires concluding that the language in subsection (b)(4) which expressly provides that the judge must know of his or her interest is extraneous. A careful reading of the respective subsections makes clear that Congress intended to require knowledge under subsection (b)(4) and not to require knowledge under subsection (a).[8] Moreover, advancement of the purpose of the *860 provision to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process, see S. Rep. No. 93-419, p. 5 (1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, p. 5 (1974) does not depend upon whether or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might reasonably believe that he or she knew. As Chief Judge Clark of the Court of Appeals explained: "The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | because the judge actually has no interest in the case or because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible. The judge's forgetfulness, however, is not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the appearance of partiality. Under section 455(a), therefore, recusal is required even when a judge lacks actual knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or *861 bias in the case if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge." Contrary to petitioner's contentions, this reading of the statute does not call upon judges to perform the impossible to disqualify themselves based on facts they do not know. If, as petitioner argues, 455(a) should only be applied prospectively, then requiring disqualification based on facts the judge does not know would of course be absurd; a judge could never be expected to disqualify himself based on some fact he does not know, even though the fact is one that perhaps he should know or one that people might reasonably suspect that he does know. But to the extent the provision can also, in proper cases, be applied retroactively, the judge is not called upon to perform an impossible feat. Rather, he is called upon to rectify an oversight and to take the steps necessary to maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If he concludes that "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," then he should also find that the statute has been violated. This is certainly not an impossible task. No one questions that Judge Collins could have disqualified himself and vacated his judgment when he finally realized that Loyola had an interest in the litigation. The initial appeal was taken from his failure to disqualify himself and vacate the judgment after he became aware of the appearance of impropriety, not from his failure to disqualify himself when he first became involved in the litigation and lacked the requisite knowledge. In this case both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found an ample basis in the record for concluding that an objective observer would have questioned Judge Collins' impartiality. Accordingly, even though his failure to disqualify himself was the product of a temporary lapse of memory, it was nevertheless a plain violation of the terms of the statute. *862 A conclusion that a statutory violation occurred does not, however, end our inquiry. As in other areas of the law, there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance.[9] There need not be a draconian remedy for |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | disqualifying circumstance.[9] There need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of 455(a). It would be equally wrong, however, to adopt an absolute prohibition against any relief in cases involving forgetful judges. IV Although 455 defines the circumstances that mandate disqualification of federal judges, it neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty. Congress has wisely delegated to the judiciary the task of fashioning the remedies that will best serve the purpose of the legislation. In considering whether a remedy is appropriate, we do well to bear in mind that in many cases and this is such an example the Court of Appeals is in a better position to evaluate the significance of a violation than is this Court. Its judgment as to the proper remedy should thus be afforded our due consideration. A review of the facts demonstrates that the Court of Appeals' determination that a new trial is in order is well supported. *863 Section 455 does not, on its own, authorize the reopening of closed litigation. However, as respondent and the Court of Appeals recognized, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides a procedure whereby, in appropriate cases, a party may be relieved of a final judgment.[10] In particular, Rule 60(b)(6), upon which respondent relies, grants federal courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment "upon such terms as are just," provided that the motion is made within a reasonable time and is not premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).[11] The Rule does not particularize the factors that *864 justify relief, but we have previously noted that it provides courts with authority "adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice," while also cautioning that it should only be applied in "extraordinary circumstances," Rule 60(b)(6) relief is accordingly neither categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all 455(a) violations. We conclude that in determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of 455 (a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process. We must continuously bear in mind that "to perform its high function in the best way `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' " In re Murchison, Like the Court of Appeals, we accept the District Court's finding that while the case was actually being tried |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | Court's finding that while the case was actually being tried Judge Collins did not have actual knowledge of Loyola's interest in the dispute over the ownership of St. Jude and its precious certificate of need. When a busy federal judge concentrates his or her full attention on a pending case, personal concerns are easily forgotten. The problem, however, is that people who have not served on the bench are often all too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of *865 judges.[12] The very purpose of 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible. See S. Rep. No 93-419, at 5; H. R. Rep. No. 93-1453, at 5. Thus, it is critically important in a case of this kind to identify the facts that might reasonably cause an objective observer to question Judge Collins' impartiality. There are at least four such facts. First, it is remarkable that the judge, who had regularly attended the meetings of the Board of Trustees since 1977, completely forgot about the University's interest in having a hospital constructed on its property in Kenner. The importance of the project to the University is indicated by the fact that the 80-acre parcel, which represented only about 40% of the entire tract owned by the University, was sold for $6,694,000 and that the rezoning would substantially increase the value of the remaining 60%. The "negotiations with the developers of the St. Jude Hospital" were the subject of discussion and formal action by the trustees at a meeting attended by Judge Collins only a few days before the lawsuit was filed. App. 35. *866 Second, it is an unfortunate coincidence that although the judge regularly attended the meetings of the Board of Trustees, he was not present at the January 28, 1982, meeting, a week after the 2-day trial and while the case was still under advisement. The minutes of that meeting record that representatives of the University monitored the progress of the trial, but did not see fit to call to the judge's attention the obvious conflict of interest that resulted from having a University trustee preside over that trial. These minutes were mailed to Judge Collins on March 12, 1982. If the judge had opened that envelope when he received it on March 14 or 15, he would have been under a duty to recuse himself before he entered judgment on March 16.[13] Third, it is remarkable and quite inexcusable that Judge Collins failed to recuse himself on March 24, 1982. A full disclosure |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | to recuse himself on March 24, 1982. A full disclosure at that time would have completely removed any basis for questioning the judge's impartiality and would have made it possible for a different judge to decide whether the interests and appearance of justice would have been served by a retrial. Another 2-day evidentiary hearing would surely have been less burdensome and less embarrassing than the protracted proceedings that resulted from Judge Collins' nonrecusal and nondisclosure. Moreover, as the *867 Court of Appeals correctly noted, Judge Collins' failure to disqualify himself on March 24, 1982, also constituted a violation of 455(b)(4), which disqualifies a judge if he "knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding." This separate violation of 455 further compels the conclusion that vacatur was an appropriate remedy; by his silence, Judge Collins deprived respondent of a basis for making a timely motion for a new trial and also deprived it of an issue on direct appeal.[14] Fourth, when respondent filed its motion to vacate, Judge Collins gave three reasons for denying the motion,[15] but still did not acknowledge that he had known about the University's interest both shortly before and shortly after the trial. Nor did he indicate any awareness of a duty to recuse himself in March 1982. These facts create precisely the kind of appearance of impropriety that 455(a) was intended to prevent. The violation is neither insubstantial nor excusable. Although Judge Collins did not know of his fiduciary interest in the litigation, *868 he certainly should have known. In fact, his failure to stay informed of this fiduciary interest may well constitute a separate violation of 455. See 455(c). Moreover, providing relief in cases such as this will not produce injustice in other cases; to the contrary, the Court of Appeals' willingness to enforce 455 may prevent a substantive injustice in some future case by encouraging a judge or litigant to more carefully examine possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly disclose them when discovered. It is therefore appropriate to vacate the judgment unless it can be said that respondent did not make a timely request for relief, or that it would otherwise be unfair to deprive the prevailing party of its judgment. If we focus on fairness to the particular litigants, a careful study of Judge Rubin's analysis of the merits of the underlying litigation suggests that there is a |
Justice Stevens | 1,988 | 16 | majority | Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112106/liljeberg-v-health-services-acquisition-corp/ | merits of the underlying litigation suggests that there is a greater risk of unfairness in upholding the judgment in favor of Liljeberg than there is in allowing a new judge to take a fresh look at the issues.[16] Moreover, neither Liljeberg nor Loyola University *869 has made a showing of special hardship by reason of their reliance on the original judgment.[17] Finally, although a delay of 10 months after the affirmance by the Court of Appeals would normally foreclose relief based on a violation of 455(a), in this case the entire delay is attributable to Judge Collins' inexcusable failure to disqualify himself on March 24, 1982; had he recused himself on March 24, or even disclosed Loyola's interest in the case at that time, the motion could have been made less than 10 days after the entry of judgment. "The guiding consideration is that the administration *870 of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact." Public Utilities Comm'n of D. In sum, we conclude that Chief Judge Clark's opinion of the Court of Appeals reflects an eminently sound and wise disposition of this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Affirmed. |
Justice Ginsburg | 1,999 | 5 | concurring | Central State Univ. v. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Central State Univ. Chapter | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087701/central-state-univ-v-american-assn-of-univ-professors-central-state/ | I join the per curiam opinion recognizing, as the Court did in that for the mine run of economic regulations that do not trigger heightened scrutiny, it is appropriate to inquire whether the lawmaker's classification "rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United States Railroad Retirement the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the governmental decision maker, see and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. [432, 446 (1985)]." I also recognize that a summary disposition is not a fit occasion for elaborate discussion of our rational-basis standards of review. See Justice Stevens emphasizes that this case is of dominant importance to the state universities in Ohio, see post, at 131 (dissenting opinion); in that light, the Ohio Supreme Court is of course at liberty to resolve the matter under the Ohio Constitution. |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | This case concerns properties in the city of Sherrill, New York, purchased by the Oneida ndian Nation of New York (ON or Tribe) in 1997 and 1998. The separate parcels of land in question, once contained within the Oneidas' 300,000-acre reservation, were last possessed by the Oneidas as a tribal entity in 1805. For two centuries, governance of the area in which the properties are located has been provided by the State of New York and its county and municipal units. n County of this Court held that the Oneidas stated a triable claim for against the County of Oneida for wrongful possession of lands they conveyed to New York State in 17 in violation of federal law. n the instant action, ON resists the payment of property taxes to Sherrill on the ground that ON's acquisition of fee title to discrete parcels of historic reservation land revived the Oneidas' ancient sovereignty piecemeal over each parcel. Consequently, the Tribe maintains, regulatory authority over ON's newly purchased properties no longer resides in Sherrill. Our 1985 decision recognized that the Oneidas could maintain a federal common-law claim for for ancient wrongdoing in which both national and state governments were complicit. Today, we decline to project redress for the Tribe into the present and future, thereby disrupting the governance of central New York's counties and towns. Generations have passed during which non-ndians have owned and developed the area that once composed the Tribe's historic reservation. And at least since the middle years of the 19th century, most of the Oneidas have resided elsewhere. Given the longstanding, distinctly non-ndian character of the area and its inhabitants, the regulatory authority constantly exercised by New York State and its counties and towns, and the Oneidas' long delay in seeking judicial relief against parties other than the United States, we hold that *203 the Tribe cannot unilaterally revive its ancient sovereignty, in whole or in part, over the parcels at issue. The Oneidas long ago relinquished the reins of government and cannot regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders. A ON is a federally recognized ndian Tribe and a direct descendant of the Oneida ndian Nation (Oneida Nation), "one of the six nations of the roquois, the most powerful ndian Tribe in the Northeast at the time of the American Revolution." At the birth of the United States, the Oneida Nation's aboriginal homeland comprised some six million acres in what is now central New York. bid.; Oneida ndian Nation of N. n the years after the Revolutionary War, "the State of New York came under increasingly |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | Revolutionary War, "the State of New York came under increasingly heavy pressure to open the Oneidas' land for settlement." Oneida Reflective of that pressure, in 1788, New York State and the Oneida Nation entered into the Treaty of Fort Schuyler. For payments in money and kind, the Oneidas ceded to New York "all their lands." App. to Pet. for Cert. A136. Of the vast area conveyed, "[t]he Oneidas retained a reservation of about 300,000 acres," Oneida "for their own use and cultivation," App. to Pet. for Cert. A137 (internal quotation marks omitted).[1] ON does *204 not here contest the legitimacy of the Fort Schuyler conveyance or the boundaries of the reserved area. The Federal Government initially pursued a policy protective of the New York ndians, undertaking to secure the Tribes' rights to reserved lands. See Oneida -232; Oneida ; F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal ndian Law 418-419 (12 ed.); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal ndian Law 73-74 ( ed.) (hereinafter Handbook). n 1790, Congress passed the first ndian Trade and ntercourse Act, commonly known as the Nonintercourse Act. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, Periodically renewed, see Oneida -668, and n. 4, and remaining substantially in force today, see Rev. Stat. 2116, 25 U.S. C. 177, the Act bars sales of tribal land without the acquiescence of the Federal Government.[2] n 17, in further pursuit of its protective policy, the United States entered into the Treaty of Canandaigua with the Six (roquois) Nations. Act of Nov. 11, 17, That treaty both "acknowledge[d]" the Oneida Reservation as established by *205 the Treaty of Fort Schuyler and guaranteed the Oneidas' "free use and enjoyment" of the reserved territory. Art. The Oneidas in turn agreed they would "never claim any other lands within the boundaries of the United States." Art. V. New York State nonetheless continued to purchase reservation land from the Oneidas. The Washington administration objected to New York's 17 negotiations to buy 100,000 acres of the Oneidas' Reservation without federal Oneida 232. Later administrations, however, "[made not] even a pretense of interfer[ing] with [the] State's attempts to negotiate treaties [with the Oneidas] for land cessions." Oneida Nation of N. 43 nd. Cl. Comm'n 385 (1978); see also ; Campisi, The Oneida Treaty Period, 1783-1838, in The Oneida ndian : Two Perspectives 48, 59 (J. Campisi & L. Hauptman eds. 1988) (hereinafter Campisi). See generally Gunther 6 ("New York acquired much land from ndians through treaties perhaps as many as 200 not participated in, though apparently known and not objected to, by the national government." (footnote omitted)). The Federal |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | objected to, by the national government." (footnote omitted)). The Federal Government's policy soon veered away from protection of New York and other east coast reservations. n lieu of the commitment made in the Treaty of Canandaigua, the United States pursued a policy designed to open reservation lands to white settlers and to remove tribes westward. D. Getches, C. Wilkinson, & R. Williams, Cases and Materials on Federal ndian Law (After the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, federal policymakers "began to debate the tactics of inducing [eastern ndians] to exchange their remaining ancestral lands for a permanent territory in the West."). As recounted by the ndian Claims Commission in 1978, early 19th-century federal ndian agents in New York State did not simply fail to check New York's land purchases, they "took an active role in encouraging the removal of the Oneidas to the west." *206 Oneida Nation of N.Y., 43 nd. Cl. Comm'n, ; see Beginning in 1817, the Federal Government accelerated its efforts to remove ndian tribes from their east coast homelands. Handbook 78-79, and n. 142. Pressured by the removal policy to leave their ancestral lands in New York, some 150 Oneidas, by 1825, had moved to Wisconsin. Horsman, The Wisconsin Oneidas in the Preallotment Years, in The Oneida ndian n 1838, the Oneidas and the United States entered into the Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which envisioned removal of all remaining New York ndians, including the Oneidas, to Kansas. Act of Jan. 15, 1838, By this time, the Oneidas had sold all but 5,000 acres of their original reservation. Six hundred of their members resided in Wisconsin, while 620 remained in New York State. n Article 13 of the Buffalo Creek Treaty, the Oneidas agreed to remove to the Kansas lands the United States had set aside for them "as soon as they c[ould] make satisfactory arrangements" for New York State's "purchase of their lands at Oneida." As a condition of the treaty's ratification, the Senate directed that a federal commissioner "fully and fairly explai[n]" the terms to each signatory tribe and band. New York ndians v. United States, Commissioner Ransom H. Gillet, who had originally negotiated the treaty terms with the Oneidas, met with them again and assured them they would not be forced to move but could remain on "their lands where they reside," i. e., they could "if they ch[ose] to do so remain where they are forever." App. 146 (emphases added). The Oneidas who stayed on in New York after the proclamation of the Buffalo Creek Treaty continued to diminish in number and, during the 1840's, |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | Treaty continued to diminish in number and, during the 1840's, sold most of their remaining *207 lands to the State. New York ndians v. United States, A few hundred Oneidas moved to Canada in 1842, 8, and "by the mid-1840s, only about 200 Oneidas remained in New York State," ntroduction to Part The Oneida ndian Journey: From New York to Wisconsin, 1784-1860, pp. 9, 13 (L. Hauptman & L. McLester eds. 1999). By 1843, the New York Oneidas retained less than 1,000 acres in the State. Campisi 61. That acreage dwindled to 350 in 1890; ultimately, by 1920, only 32 acres continued to be held by the Oneidas. bid. The United States eventually abandoned its efforts to remove the New York ndians to Kansas. n 1860, the Federal Government restored the Kansas lands to the public domain, and sold them thereafter. New York ndians, 28-29, 31. B Early litigation concerning the Oneidas' land claims trained on monetary recompense from the United States for past deprivations. n 1893, the United States agreed to be sued for disposing of the Kansas lands to settlers, and the Oneidas in New York shared in the resulting award of See New York ndians, ; New York ndians, (identifying the Tribes qualified to share in the distribution of the sum recovered). Seeking further compensation from the United States a half century later, the New York and Wisconsin Oneidas initiated proceedings before the ndian Claims Commission in 11. Oneida ndian Nation of N. They sought redress for lands New York had acquired through 25 treaties of cession concluded between 17 and 1846. The Oneidas alleged, and the Claims Commission agreed, that under the Nonintercourse Act of 1790 and successor statutes, the Federal Government had a fiduciary duty to assure that the Oneidas received from New York "conscionable consideration" for the lands in question. Oneida Nation of N. *208 26 nd. Cl. Comm'n 138, 145 (1971). The Court of Claims affirmed the Commission's core determination, but held that the United States' duty extended only to land transactions of which the Government had knowledge. United Accordingly, the Court of Claims directed the Commission to determine whether the Government actually or constructively knew of the land transactions at issue. On remand, the Commission found that the Federal Government had actual or constructive knowledge of all of the treaties and would be liable if the Oneidas had not received conscionable consideration. Oneida Nation of N. Y., 43 nd. Cl. Comm'n, at 375, 406-407. The Commission anticipated further proceedings to determine the Federal Government's ultimate liability, but the Oneidas had by then |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | Federal Government's ultimate liability, but the Oneidas had by then decided to pursue a different course. On the Oneidas' request, the Court of Claims dismissed the proceedings. See Oneida Nation of N. n lieu of concentrating on recovery from the United States, the Oneidas pursued suits against local governments. n 1970, the Oneidas of New York and Wisconsin, asserting federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. 1331 or 1362, instituted a "test case" against the New York Counties of Oneida and Madison. They alleged that the cession of 100,000 acres to New York State in 17, see violated the Nonintercourse Act and thus did not terminate the Oneidas' right to possession under the applicable federal treaties and statutes. n this initial endeavor to gain compensation from governmental units other than the United States, the Oneidas confined their demand for relief. They sought only measured by the fair rental value, for the years 1968 and 1969, of 872 acres of their ancestral land owned and occupied by the two counties. The District Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed the Oneidas' *209 complaint for failure to state a claim arising under federal law. We reversed that determination, holding that federal jurisdiction was properly invoked. Oneida 682. n the next round, the Oneidas prevailed in the lower courts. On review in Oneida we rejected various defenses the counties presented that might have barred the action for -250, and held that the Oneidas could maintain their claim to be compensated "for violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law," While upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding the counties' liability under federal common law, we noted that "[t]he question whether equitable considerations should limit the relief available to the present day Oneida ndians was not addressed by the Court of Appeals or presented to this Court." Accordingly, "we express[ed] no opinion as to whether other considerations m[ight] be relevant to the final disposition of this case." bid. On remand, the District Court entered a final judgment which fixed the amount of payable by the counties. Allowing setoffs for the counties' good-faith improvements to the land, the court ordered recoveries of $15,9 from Oneida County and $18,970 from Madison County, plus prejudgment interest. Oneida ndian Nation of N. n 2000, litigation resumed in an action held in abeyance during the pendency of the test case. n that revitalized action, the Oneidas sought from Oneida and Madison Counties for a period spanning over 200 years. The amended complaint alleged that, through a series of agreements concluded during the years 17 to |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | a series of agreements concluded during the years 17 to 1846, approximately 250,000 acres of the Oneidas' ancestral land had been unlawfully conveyed to New York. Oneida ndian Nation of N. 199 F. R. D. 61, 66-68 (NDNY 2000). *210 The Oneidas further sought to enlarge the action by demanding recovery of land they had not occupied since the 17-1846 conveyances.[3] They attempted to join as defendants, inter alia, approximately 20,000 private landowners, and to obtain declaratory relief that would allow the Oneidas to eject these land[4] The District Court refused permission to join the landowners so late in the day, resting in part on the Oneidas' bad faith and undue delay. Further, the court found the proposed amendment "futile." n this regard, the court emphasized the "sharp distinction between the existence of a federal common law right to ndian homelands," a right this Court recognized in Oneida "and how to vindicate that right." 199 F. R. D., at 90. That distinction "must be drawn," the court stated, ib for in the two centuries since the alleged wrong, "development of every type imaginable *211 has been ongoing," Referring to the "practical concerns" that blocked restoration of ndians to their former lands, the court found it high time "to transcend the theoretical." bid. Cases of this genre, the court observed, "cr[ied] out for a pragmatic approach." bid. The District Court therefore excluded the imposition of any liability against private land This brings us to the present case, which concerns parcels of land in the city of Sherrill, located in Oneida County, New York. According to the 2000 census, over 99% of the population in the area is non-ndian: American ndians represent less than 1% of the city of Sherrill's population and less than 0.5% of Oneida County's population. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Population and Housing Characteristics: New York, 2000 PHC-1-34, Table 3, p. 124 available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/phc-1-34.pdf (as visited Mar. 24, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). ON owns approximately 17,000 acres of land scattered throughout the Counties of Oneida and Madison, representing less than 1.5% of the counties' total area. ON's predecessor, the Oneida Nation, had transferred the parcels at issue to one of its members in 1805, who sold the land to a non-ndian in 1807. The properties thereafter remained in non-ndian hands until ON's acquisitions in 1997 and 1998 in open-market transactions. See n. 3. ON now operates commercial enterprises on these parcels: a gasoline station, a convenience store, and a textile facility. Because the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | station, a convenience store, and a textile facility. Because the parcels lie within the boundaries of the reservation originally occupied by the Oneidas, ON maintained that the properties are exempt from taxation, and accordingly refused to pay the assessed property taxes. The city of Sherrill initiated eviction proceedings in state court, and ON sued Sherrill in federal court. n contrast to Oneida *212 and which involved demands for monetary compensation, ON sought equitable relief prohibiting, currently and in the future, the imposition of property taxes. ON also sued Madison County, seeking a declaration that the Tribe's properties in Madison are tax exempt. The litigation involved a welter of claims and counterclaims. Relevant here, the District Court concluded that parcels of land owned by the Tribe in Sherrill and Madison are not taxable. See A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed. Writing for the majority, Judge Parker ruled that the parcels qualify as "ndian country," as that term is defined in 18 U.S. C. 1151,[5] because they fall within the boundaries of a reservation set aside by the 17 Canandaigua Treaty for ndian use under federal -156; see The court further held that the Buffalo Creek Treaty did not demonstrate a clear congressional purpose to disestablish or diminish the Oneida 165; see Finally, the court found no legal requirement "that a federally recognized tribe demonstrate its continuous existence in order to assert a claim to its reservation land." n any case, the court held, the record demonstrated ON's continuous tribal existence. Judge Van Graafeiland dissented as to the majority's primary holding. n his view, the record raised a substantial question whether ON had "forfeited" its aboriginal rights to the land because it abandoned "its tribal existence for a discernable period of time." We granted the city of Sherrill's petition for a writ of certiorari, and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. *213 ON and the United States argue that because the Court in Oneida recognized the Oneidas' aboriginal title to their ancient reservation land and because the Tribe has now acquired the specific parcels involved in this suit in the open market, it has unified fee and aboriginal title and may now assert sovereign dominion over the parcels. Brief for Respondents 1, 12-19; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9-10. When the Oneidas came before this Court 20 years ago in Oneida they sought money ; see also The Court reserved for another day the question whether "equitable considerations" should limit the relief available to the present-day Oneidas. ;[6] "The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | present-day Oneidas. ;[6] "The substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant has any duty, and if so what it is, are very different questions from the remedial questions whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what the measure of the remedy is." D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies 1.2, p. 3 ; see also Navajo Tribe of ndians v. New Mexico, "[S]tandards of federal ndian law and federal equity practice" led the District Court, in the litigation revived after Oneida see to reject ON's plea for ejectment of 20,000 private land Oneida ndian Nation of N. Y., 199 F. R. D., at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted); ("[T]here is a sharp distinction between the existence of a federal common law right to ndian homelands and how to vindicate that right."). n this action, *214 ON seeks declaratory and injunctive relief recognizing its present and future sovereign immunity from local taxation on parcels of land the Tribe purchased in the open market, properties that had been subject to state and local taxation for generations.[7] We now reject the unification theory of ON and the United States and hold that "standards of federal ndian law and federal equity practice" preclude the Tribe from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.[8] The appropriateness of the relief ON here seeks must be evaluated in light of the long history of state sovereign control over the territory. From the early 1800's into the 1970's, the United States largely accepted, or was indifferent to, New York's governance of the land in question and the validity vel non of the Oneidas' sales to the State. See generally Gunther 23-25 (attributing much of the confusion and conflict in the history of New York ndian affairs to "Federal inattention and ambivalence"). n fact, the United States' policy and practice through much of the early 19th century was designed to dislodge east coast lands from ndian possession. *215 See -207. Moreover, the properties here involved have greatly increased in value since the Oneidas sold them 200 years ago. Notably, it was not until lately that the Oneidas sought to regain ancient sovereignty over land converted from wilderness to become part of cities like Sherrill. See ; Oneida -265 This Court has observed in the different, but related, context of the diminishment of an ndian reservation that "[t]he longstanding assumption of jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90% non-ndian, both in population and in land use," may create "justifiable expectations." Rosebud Sioux ; accord[9] Similar justifiable expectations, grounded in two centuries |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | Sioux ; accord[9] Similar justifiable expectations, grounded in two centuries of New York's exercise of regulatory *216 jurisdiction, until recently uncontested by ON, merit heavy weight here.[10] The wrongs of which ON complains in this action occurred during the early years of the Republic. For the past two centuries, New York and its county and municipal units have continuously governed the territory. The Oneidas did not seek to regain possession of their aboriginal lands by court decree until the 1970's. See And not until the 1990's did ON acquire the properties in question and assert its unification theory to ground its demand for exemption of the parcels from local[11] This long lapse of time, during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the attendant dramatic changes in the *217 character of the properties, preclude ON from gaining the disruptive remedy it now seeks. The principle that the passage of time can preclude relief has deep roots in our law, and this Court has recognized this prescription in various guises. t is well established that laches, a doctrine focused on one side's inaction and the other's legitimate reliance, may bar long-dormant claims for equitable relief. See, e.g., ("[C]ourts of equity act upon their own inherent doctrine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches in prosecuting the claim, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights." (internal quotation marks omitted)); ; 1 ("[The] doctrine of an equitable bar by lapse of time, so distinctly announced by the chancellors of England and reland, should now be regarded as settled law in this court."). This Court applied the doctrine of laches in to bar the heirs of an ndian from establishing a constructive trust over land their ndian ancestor had conveyed in violation of a statutory restriction. n the nearly three decades between the conveyance and the lawsuit, "[a] large part of the tract ha[d] been platted and recorded as an addition to the city of Omaha, and sold to purchasers." "[A]s the case stands at present," the Court observed, "justice requires only what the law would demand the repayment of the value of the [illegally conveyed] scrip." The Court also recognized the disproportion between the value of the scrip issued to the ndian ($150) and the value of the property the heirs sought to acquire (over $1 million). The sort of changes to the value and character of the land noted by the Court are present in even greater magnitude |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | noted by the Court are present in even greater magnitude in this suit. Cf. As between States, long acquiescence may have controlling effect on the exercise of dominion and sovereignty over territory. )); The acquiescence doctrine does not depend on the original validity of a boundary line; rather, it attaches legal consequences to acquiescence in the observance of the boundary. (No relationship need exist "between the origins of a boundary and the legal consequences of acquiescence in that boundary. Longstanding acquiescence by California and Nevada can give [the boundary lines] the force of law whether or not federal authorities had the power to draw them."). This Court's original-jurisdiction state-sovereignty cases do not dictate a result here, but they provide a helpful point of reference: When a party belatedly asserts a right to present and future sovereign control over territory,[12] longstanding observances and settled expectations are prime considerations. There is no dispute that it has been two centuries since the Oneidas last exercised regulatory control over the properties here or held them free from local *219 Parcel-by-parcel revival of their sovereign status, given the extraordinary passage of time, would dishonor "the historic wisdom in the value of repose." Oneida Finally, this Court has recognized the impracticability of returning to ndian control land that generations earlier passed into numerous private hands. See Yankton Sioux ("t is impossible to rescind the cession and restore the ndians to their former rights because the lands have been opened to settlement and large portions of them are now in the possession of innumerable innocent purchasers."); 145 U. S., (observing, in declining to award equitable relief, "[t]hat which was wild land thirty years ago is now intersected by streets, subdivided into blocks and lots, and largely occupied by persons who have bought upon the strength of Patrick's title, and have erected buildings of a permanent character"). The District Court, in the litigation dormant during the pendency of Oneida see rightly found these pragmatic concerns about restoring ndian sovereign control over land "magnified exponentially here, where development of every type imaginable has been ongoing for more than two centuries." Oneida ndian Nation of N. Y., 199 F. R. D., n this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the "impossibility" doctrine had no application because ON acquired the land in the open market and does not seek to uproot current property But the unilateral reestablishment of present and future ndian sovereign control, even over land purchased at the market price, would have disruptive practical consequences similar to those that led this Court in Yankton Sioux to initiate the |
Justice Ginsburg | 2,005 | 5 | majority | City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/142882/city-of-sherrill-v-oneida-indian-nation-of-ny/ | that led this Court in Yankton Sioux to initiate the impossibility doctrine. The city of Sherrill and Oneida County are today overwhelmingly populated by non-ndians. See A checkerboard of alternating state and tribal jurisdiction in New York State created unilaterally *220 at ON's behest would "seriously burde[n] the administration of state and local governments" and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the tribal patches. 510 U. S., at ). f ON may unilaterally reassert sovereign control and remove these parcels from the local tax rolls, little would prevent the Tribe from initiating a new generation of litigation to free the parcels from local zoning or other regulatory controls that protect all landowners in the area. See ("decree prayed for in this case, if granted, would offer a distinct encouragement to similar claims"); cf. (discussing tribal land-use controls); post, at 226, n. 6 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that "the balance of interests" supports continued state zoning jurisdiction).[13] Recognizing these practical concerns, Congress has provided a mechanism for the acquisition of lands for tribal communities that takes account of the interests of others with stakes in the area's governance and well-being. Title 25 U.S. C. 465 authorizes the Secretary of the nterior to acquire land in trust for ndians and provides that the land "shall be exempt from State and local " See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa ndians, The regulations implementing 465 are sensitive to the complex interjurisdictional concerns that arise when a tribe seeks to regain sovereign control over *221 territory. Before approving an acquisition, the Secretary must consider, among other things, the tribe's need for additional land; "[t]he purposes for which the land will be used"; "the impact on the State and its political subdivisions resulting from the removal of the land from the tax rolls"; and "[j]urisdictional problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise." 25 CFR 151.10(f) Section 465 provides the proper avenue for ON to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago. n sum, the question of for the Tribe's ancient dispossession is not at issue in this case, and we therefore do not disturb our holding in Oneida However, the distance from 1805 to the present day, the Oneidas' long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.[14] * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | dissenting | Commissioner v. Kowalski | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109748/commissioner-v-kowalski/ | More than a decade ago the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in United held that the $3-per-day subsistence allowance paid Minnesota state highway patrolmen was excludable from gross income under 119 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S. C. 119. It held, alternatively, that if the allowance were includable in gross income, it was deductible as an ordinary and necessary meal-cost trade or business expense under 162 (a) (2) of the Code, 26 U.S. C. 162 (a) (2). I sat as a Circuit Judge on that case. I was happy to join Chief Judge Vogel's opinion because I then felt, and still do, that it was correct on both grounds. Certainly, despite the usual persistent Government opposition in as many Courts of Appeals as were available, the ruling was in line with other authority at the appellate level at that time.[*]*97 Two cases, cert. denied, and were On December 11, 1967, however, this Court by a 5-3 vote decided United restricting to overnight trips the travel-expense deduction for meal costs under 162 (a) (2). That decision, of course, disapproved Morelan's alternative ground for decision. I am frank to say that had I been a Member of this Court at the time Correll was decided, I would have joined its for I fully agree with Mr. Justice Douglas' observation there, joined by Justices Black and Fortasan observation which, for me, is unanswerable and unansweredthat the Court, with a bow to the Government's argument for administrative convenience, and conceding an element of arbitrariness, read the word "overnight" into 162 (a) (2), a statute that speaks only in geographical terms. The taxpayer in the present case, faced with Correll, understandably does not press the 162 (a) (2) issue, but confines his defense to 61 and 119. I have no particular quarrel with the conclusion that the payments received by the New Jersey troopers constituted income to them under 61. I can accept that, but my stance in Morelan leads me to disagree with the Court's conclusion that the payments are not excludable under 119. The Court draws an in-cash or in-kind distinction. This has no appeal or persuasion for me because the statute does not speak specifically in such terms. It does no more than refer to "meals furnished on the business premises of the employer," and from those words the Court draws the in-kind consequence. I am not so sure. In any event. for me, as was the case in Morelan, the business premises of the State of *98 New Jersey, the trooper's employer, are wherever |
Justice Blackmun | 1,977 | 11 | dissenting | Commissioner v. Kowalski | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109748/commissioner-v-kowalski/ | State of *98 New Jersey, the trooper's employer, are wherever the trooper is on duty in that State. The employer's premises are statewide. The Court in its opinion makes only passing comment, with a general reference to fairness, on the ironical difference in tax treatment it now accords to the paramilitary New Jersey state trooper structure and the federal military. The distinction must be embarrassing to the Government in its position here, for the Internal Revenue Code draws no such distinction. The Commissioner is forced to find support for it support which the Court in its opinion in this case does not stretch to findonly from a regulation, Treas. Reg. 1.61-2 26 CFR 1.61-2 (1977), excluding subsistence allowances granted the military, and the general references in 37 U.S. C. 101 (25) (1970 ed., Supp. V), added by Pub. L. 93-419, 1, to "regular military compensation" and "Federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to Federal income tax." This, for me, is thin and weak support for recognizing a substantial benefit for the military and denying it for the New Jersey state trooper counterpart. I fear that state troopers the country over, not handsomely paid to begin with, will never understand today's decision. And I doubt that their reading of the Court's opinionif, indeed, a layman can be expected to understand its technical wordingwill convince them that the situation is as clear as the Court purports to find it. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | The population of our Nation's public schools, grades 7 through 12, numbers around 18 million. See U. S. Dept. of *667 Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 58 (Table 43). By the reasoning of today's decision, the millions of these students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search. In justifying this result, the Court dispenses with a requirement of individualized suspicion on considered policy grounds. First, it explains that precisely because every student athlete is being tested, there is no concern that school officials might act arbitrarily in choosing whom to test. Second, a broad-based search regime, the Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the search. In making these policy arguments, of course, the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing privacy concerns. Blanket searches, because they can involve "thousands or millions" of searches, "pos[e] a greater threat to liberty" than do suspicion-based ones, which "affec[t] one person at a time," Searches based on individualized suspicion also afford potential targets considerable control over whether they will, in fact, be searched because a person can avoid such a search by not acting in an objectively suspicious way. And given that the surest way to avoid acting suspiciously is to avoid the underlying wrongdoing, the costs of such a regime, one would think, are minimal. But whether a blanket search is "better," ante, at than a regime based on individualized suspicion is not a debate in which we should engage. In my view, it is not open to judges or government officials to decide on policy grounds which is better and which is worse. For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth And we have allowed exceptions *668 in recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicionbased regime would be ineffectual. Because that is not the case here, I dissent. I A In the Court explained that "[t]he Fourth does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are unreasonable." Applying this standard, the Court first held that a search of a car was not unreasonable merely because it was warrantless; because obtaining a warrant is impractical for an easily movable object such as a car, the Court explained, a warrant is not required. The Court also held, however, that a warrantless car search was unreasonable unless supported by some level of individualized suspicion, namely, probable cause. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | supported by some level of individualized suspicion, namely, probable cause. Significantly, the Court did not base its conclusion on the express probable cause requirement contained in the Warrant Clause, which, as just noted, the Court found inapplicable. Rather, the Court rested its views on "what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth ] was adopted" and "[what] will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." With respect to the "rights of individual citizens," the Court eventually offered the simple yet powerful intuition that "those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." More important for the purposes of this case, the Court clearly indicated that evenhanded treatment was no substitute for the individualized suspicion requirement: "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on *669 the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search." The Court's view that blanket searches are "intolerable and unreasonable" is well grounded in history. As recently confirmed in one of the most exhaustive analyses of the original meaning of the Fourth ever undertaken, see W. Cuddihy, The Fourth : Origins and Original Meaning (Ph.D. Dissertation at Claremont Graduate School) (hereinafter Cuddihy), what the Framers of the Fourth most strongly opposed, with limited exceptions wholly inapplicable here, were general searchesthat is, searches by general warrant, by writ of assistance, by broad statute, or by any other similar authority. See ; see also The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 483, 528 ; Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Is Worse Than the Disease, ; L. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 221-246 (1988). Although, ironically, such warrants, writs, and statutes typically required individualized suspicion, see, e. g., Cuddihy 1140 ("Typical of the American warrants of 1761-76 was Starke's `tobacco' warrant, which commanded its bearer to `enter any suspected Houses' ") such requirements were subjective and largely unenforceable. Accordingly, these various forms of authority led in practice to "virtually unrestrained," and hence "general," searches. J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 20 (1966). To be sure, the Fourth in the Warrant Clause, prohibits by name only searches by general warrants. But that was only |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | name only searches by general warrants. But that was only because the abuses of the general warrant were particularly vivid in the minds of the Framers' generation, Cuddihy 1554-1560, and not because the Framers viewed other kinds of general searches as any less unreasonable. "Prohibition of the general warrant was part of a *670 larger scheme to extinguish general searches categorically." 9. More important, there is no indication in the historical materials that the Framers' opposition to general searches stemmed solely from the fact that they allowed officials to single out individuals for arbitrary reasons, and thus that officials could render them reasonable simply by making sure to extend their search to every house in a given area or to every person in a given group. See (referring to this as the "`misery loves company' " theory of the Fourth ). On the contrary, although general searches were typically arbitrary, they were not invariably so. Some general searches, for example, were of the arguably evenhanded "door-to-door" kind. Cuddihy 1091; see also Indeed, Cuddihy's descriptions of a few blanket searches suggest they may have been considered more worrisome than the typical general search. See ; Perhaps most telling of all,as reflected in the text of the Warrant Clause, the particular way the Framers chose to curb the abuses of general warrantsand by implication, all general searcheswas not to impose a novel "evenhandedness" requirement; it was to retain the individualized suspicion requirement contained in the typical general warrant, but to make that requirement meaningful and enforceable, for instance, by raising the required level of individualized suspicion to objective probable cause. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. So, for example, when the same Congress that *671 proposed the Fourth authorized duty collectors to search for concealed goods subject to import duties, specific warrants were required for searches on land; but even for searches at sea, where warrants were impractical and thus not required, Congress nonetheless limited officials to searching only those ships and vessels "in which [a collector] shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed." The Collection Act of July 31, 1789, 24, ; see also Cuddihy 1490-1491 ("The Collection Act of 1789 was [the] most significant [of all early search statutes], for it identified the techniques of search and seizure that the framers of the amendment believed reasonable while they were framing it"). Not surprisingly, the Court relied on this statute and other subsequent ones like it in arriving at its views. See -151, 154; ("While the plain language of the does not |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | -151, 154; ("While the plain language of the does not mandate individualized suspicion as a necessary component of all searches and seizures, the historical record demonstrates that the framers believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of reasonable searches and seizures"). True, not all searches around the time the Fourth was adopted required individualized suspicionalthough most did. A search incident to arrest was an obvious example of one that did not, see Cuddihy 1518, but even those searches shared the essential characteristics that distinguish suspicion-based searches from abusive general searches: they only "affec[t] one person at a time," 480 U. S., at and they are generally avoidable by refraining from wrongdoing. See Protection of privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now the touchstone of the Fourth The view that mass, suspicionless searches, however evenhanded, are generally unreasonable remains inviolate in the criminal law enforcement context, see at least where the search is more than minimally intrusive, see Michigan Dept. of State It is worth noting in this regard that state-compelled, state-monitored collection and testing of urine, while perhaps not the most intrusive of searches, see, e. g., is still "particularly destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity." Treasury ; see also ante, at 658; We have not hesitated to treat monitored bowel movements as highly intrusive (even in the special border search context), compare United with United and it is not easy to draw a distinction. See Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L. J. 475, 487 (1968) ("[I]n our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy"). And certainly monitored urination combined with urine testing is more intrusive than some personal searches we have said trigger Fourth protections in the past. See, e. g., (characterizing the scraping of dirt from under a person's fingernails as a "`severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security' ") Finally, the collection and testing of urine is, of course, a search of a person, one of only four categories of suspect *673 searches the Constitution mentions by name. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 4 (listing "persons, houses, papers, and effects"); Cuddihy 835, 1518, 1552, n. 394 (indicating long history of outrage at personal searches before 1789). Thus, it remains the law that the police cannot, say, subject to drug testing every person entering or leaving a certain drug-ridden neighborhood in order to find evidence of crime. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 9.5(b), pp. 551-553 (hereinafter LaFave). And this is true even though it is hard to think of a more compelling government interest than the need to |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | of a more compelling government interest than the need to fight the scourge of drugs on our streets and in our neighborhoods. Nor could it be otherwise, for if being evenhanded were enough to justify evaluating a search regime under an open-ended balancing test, the Warrant Clause, which presupposes that there is some category of searches for which individualized suspicion is nonnegotiable, see 2 LaFave 4.1, at 118, would be a dead letter. Outside the criminal context, however, in response to the exigencies of modern life, our cases have upheld several evenhanded blanket searches, including some that are more than minimally intrusive, after balancing the invasion of privacy against the government's strong need. Most of these cases, of course, are distinguishable insofar as they involved searches either not of a personally intrusive nature, such as searches of closely regulated businesses, see, e. g., New ; Cuddihy 1501 ("Even the states with the strongest constitutional restrictions on general searches had long exposed commercial establishments to warrantless inspection"), or arising in unique contexts such as prisons, see, e. g., at ; Cuddihy 1516-1519, 1552-1553 (indicating that searches incident to arrest and prisoner searches were the only common personal searches at time of founding). This certainly explains why Justice Scalia, in his dissent in our recent Von decision, found it significant that "[u]ntil *674 today this Court had upheld a bodily search separate from arrest and without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing only with respect to prison inmates, relying upon the uniquely dangerous nature of that environment." Von at In any event, in many of the cases that can be distinguished on the grounds suggested above and, more important, in all of the cases that cannot, see, e. g., ; Von ; we upheld the suspicionless search only after first recognizing the Fourth 's longstanding preference for a suspicion-based search regime, and then pointing to sound reasons why such a regime would likely be ineffectual under the unusual circumstances presented. In for example, we stated outright that "`some quantum of individualized suspicion' " is "usually required" under the Fourth quoting and we built the requirement into the test we announced: "In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion," 489 U.S., The obvious negative implication of this reasoning is that, if such an individualized suspicion requirement would not place the government's objectives in jeopardy, the requirement should not |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | place the government's objectives in jeopardy, the requirement should not be forsaken. See also Von Accordingly, we upheld the suspicionless regime at issue in on the firm understanding that a requirement of individualized suspicion for testing train operators for drug or alcohol impairment following serious train accidents would be unworkable because "the scene of a serious rail *675 accident is chaotic." (Of course, it could be plausibly argued that the fact that testing occurred only after train operators were involved in serious train accidents amounted to an individualized suspicion requirement in all but name, in light of the record evidence of a strong link between serious train accidents and drug and alcohol use.) We have performed a similar inquiry in the other cases as well. See Von ; ; see also -560, n. 40 ; ; United (suspicion-based searches of airport passengers' carry-on luggage impractical because of the great number of plane travelers and "conceded inapplicability" of the profile method of detecting hijackers). Moreover, an individualized suspicion requirement was often impractical in these cases because they involved situations in which even one undetected instance of wrongdoing could have injurious consequences for a great number of people. See, e. g., ; ; Von ; at B The instant case stands in marked contrast. One searches today's majority opinion in vain for recognition that history and precedent establish that individualized suspicion is "usually required" under the Fourth (regardless of whether a warrant and probable cause are also required) and that, in the area of intrusive personal searches, the only recognized exception is for situations in which a suspicion-based scheme would be likely ineffectual. See at 674-675 and this page. Far from acknowledging anything special about individualized suspicion, the Court treats a suspicionbased regime as if it were just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternativethat is, an alternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intrusion, in their reasonable estimation, is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practicability. As an initial matter, I have serious doubts whether the Court is right that the District reasonably found that the lesser intrusion of a suspicion-based testing program outweighed its genuine concerns for the adversarial nature of such a program, and for its abuses. See ante, at 663-. For one thing, there are significant safeguards against abuses. The fear that a suspicion-based regime will lead to the testing of "troublesome but not drug-likely" students, *677 ante, at 663, for example, ignores that the required level of suspicion in the school context is objectively reasonable suspicion. In this respect, the facts of our decision in New should be |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | respect, the facts of our decision in New should be reassuring. There, we found reasonable suspicion to search a ninth-grade girl's purse for cigarettes after a teacher caught the girl smoking in the bathroom with a companion who admitted it. See Moreover, any distress arising from what turns out to be a false accusation can be minimized by keeping the entire process confidential. For another thing, the District's concern for the adversarial nature of a suspicion-based regime (which appears to extend even to those who are rightly accused) seems to ignore the fact that such a regime would not exist in a vacuum. Schools already have adversarial, disciplinary schemes that require teachers and administrators in many areas besides drug use to investigate student wrongdoing (often by means of accusatory searches); to make determinations about whether the wrongdoing occurred; and to impose punishment. To such a scheme, suspicion-based drug testing would be only a minor addition. The District's own elaborate disciplinary scheme is reflected in its handbook, which, among other things, lists the following disciplinary "problem areas" carrying serious sanctions: "DEFIANCE OF AUTHORITY," "DISORDERLY OR DISRUPTIVE CONDUCT INCLUDING FOUL LANGUAGE," "AUTOMOBILE USE OR MISUSE," "FORGERY OR LYING," "GAMBLING," "THEFT," "TOBACCO," "MISCHIEF," "VANDALISM," "RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING," "MENACING OR HARASSMENT," "ASSAULT," "FIGHTING," "WEAPONS," "EXTORTION," "EXPLOSIVE DEVICES," and "ARSON." Record, Exh. 2, p. 11; see also ; ("RESPONSIBILITIES OF SCHOOLS" include "To develop and distribute to parents and students reasonable rules *678 and regulations governing student behavior and attendance" and "To provide fair and reasonable standards of conduct and to enforce those standards through appropriate disciplinary action"). The high number of disciplinary referrals in the record in this case illustrates the District's robust scheme in action. In addition to overstating its concerns with a suspicionbased program, the District seems to have understated the extent to which such a program is less intrusive of students' privacy. By invading the privacy of a few students rather than many (nationwide, of thousands rather than millions), and by giving potential search targets substantial control over whether they will, in fact, be searched, a suspicionbased scheme is significantly less intrusive. In any event, whether the Court is right that the District reasonably weighed the lesser intrusion of a suspicion-based scheme against its policy concerns is beside the point. As stated, a suspicion-based search regime is not just any less intrusive alternative; the individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as the Fourth itself, and it may not be easily cast aside in the name of policy concerns. It may only be forsaken, our cases in the personal search |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | may only be forsaken, our cases in the personal search context have established, if a suspicion-based regime would likely be ineffectual. But having misconstrued the fundamental role of the individualized suspicion requirement in Fourth analysis, the Court never seriously engages the practicality of such a requirement in the instant case. And that failure is crucial because nowhere is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement would be ineffectual than in the school context. In most schools, the entire pool of potential search targetsstudentsis under constant supervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms. See T. L. *679 The record here indicates that the Vernonia schools are no exception. The great irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the evidence the District introduced to justify its suspicionless drug testing program consisted of first- or second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of inschool drug useand thus that would have justified a drugrelated search under our T. L. decision. See at 340 342 (warrant and probable cause not required for school searches; reasonable suspicion sufficient). Small groups of students, for example, were observed by a teacher "passing joints back and forth" across the street at a restaurant before school and during school hours. Tr. 67 Another group was caught skipping school and using drugs at one of the students' houses. See Several students actually admitted their drug use to school officials (some of them being caught with marijuana pipes). See One student presented himself to his teacher as "clearly obviously inebriated" and had to be sent home. Still another was observed dancing and singing at the top of his voice in the back of the classroom; when the teacher asked what was going on, he replied, "Well, I'm just high on life." 9-90. To take a final example, on a certain road trip, the school wrestling coach smelled marijuana smoke in a motel room occupied by four wrestlers, see an observation that (after some questioning) would probably have given him reasonable suspicion to test one or all of them. Cf. 4 LaFave 10.11(b), at 169 ("[I]n most instances the evidence of wrongdoing prompting teachers or principals to conduct searches is sufficiently detailed and specific to meet the traditional probable cause test"). In light of all this evidence of drug use by particular students, there is a substantial basis for concluding that a vigorous regime of suspicion-based testing (for which the District appears already to have rules in place, see Record, Exh. |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | appears already to have rules in place, see Record, Exh. 2, at 14, 17) would have gone a long way toward solving Vernonia's * school drug problem while preserving the Fourth rights of James Acton and others like him. And were there any doubt about such a conclusion, it is removed by indications in the record that suspicion-based testing could have been supplemented by an equally vigorous campaign to have Vernonia's parents encourage their children to submit to the District's voluntary drug testing program. See ; ante, at 665 (noting widespread parental support for drug testing). In these circumstances, the Fourth dictates that a mass, suspicionless search regime is categorically unreasonable. I recognize that a suspicion-based scheme, even where reasonably effective in controlling in-school drug use, may not be as effective as a mass, suspicionless testing regime. In one sense, that is obviously truejust as it is obviously true that suspicion-based law enforcement is not as effective as mass, suspicionless enforcement might be. "But there is nothing new in the realization" that Fourth protections come with a price. Indeed, the price we pay is higher in the criminal context, given that police do not closely observe the entire class of potential search targets (all citizens in the area) and must ordinarily adhere to the rigid requirements of a warrant and probable cause. The principal counterargument to all this, central to the Court's opinion, is that the Fourth is more lenient with respect to school searches. That is no doubt correct, for, as the Court explains, ante, at 655-656, schools have traditionally had special guardianlike responsibilities for children that necessitate a degree of constitutional leeway. This principle explains the considerable Fourth leeway we gave school officials in T. L. In that case, we held that children at school do not enjoy two of the Fourth 's traditional categorical protections against unreasonable searches and seizures: the warrant requirement *681 and the probable cause requirement. See T. L. -343. And this was true even though the same children enjoy such protections "in a nonschool setting." The instant case, however, asks whether the Fourth is even more lenient than that, i. e., whether it is so lenient that students may be deprived of the Fourth 's only remaining, and most basic, categorical protection: its strong preference for an individualized suspicion requirement, with its accompanying antipathy toward personally intrusive, blanket searches of mostly innocent people. It is not at all clear that people in prison lack this categorical protection, see 441 U. S., at ; but (indicating why suspicion requirement was impractical in ), and |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | but (indicating why suspicion requirement was impractical in ), and we have said "[w]e are not yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth" T. L. Thus, if we are to mean what we often proclaimthat students do not "shed their constitutional rights at the school house gate," the answer must plainly be no.[1] *682 For the contrary position, the Court relies on cases such as T. L. and See ante, at 655-656. But I find the Court's reliance on these cases ironic. If anything, they affirm that schools have substantial constitutional leeway in carrying out their traditional mission of responding to particularized wrongdoing. See T. L. ; ; By contrast, intrusive, blanket searches of schoolchildren, most of whom are innocent, for evidence of serious wrongdoing are not part of any traditional school function of which I am aware. Indeed, many schools, like many parents, prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do otherwise. As James Acton's father said on the witness stand, "[suspicionless testing] sends a message to children that are trying to be responsible citizens that they have to prove that they're innocent and I think that kind of sets a bad tone for citizenship." Tr. 9 I find unpersuasive the Court's reliance, ante, at 656-657, on the widespread practice of physical examinations and vaccinations, which are both blanket searches of a sort. Of course, for these practices to have any Fourth significance, the Court has to assume that these physical exams and vaccinations are typically "required" to a similar extent that urine testing and collection is required in the instant case, i. e., that they are required regardless of parental *683 objection and that some meaningful sanction attaches to the failure to submit. In any event, without forming any particular view of such searches, it is worth noting that a suspicion requirement for vaccinations is not merely impractical; it is nonsensical, for vaccinations are not searches for anything in particular and so there is nothing about which to be suspicious. Nor is this saying anything new; it is the same theory on which, in part, we have repeatedly upheld certain inventory searches. See, e. g., South As for physical examinations, the practicability of a suspicion requirement is highly doubtful because the conditions for which these physical exams ordinarily search, such as latent heart conditions, do not manifest themselves in observable behavior the way school drug use does. See at 679-. It might also be noted that physical exams (and of course vaccinations) are not searches |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | that physical exams (and of course vaccinations) are not searches for conditions that reflect wrongdoing on the part of the student, and so are wholly nonaccusatory and have no consequences that can be regarded as punitive. These facts may explain the absence of Fourth challenges to such searches. By contrast, although I agree with the Court that the accusatory nature of the District's testing program is diluted by making it a blanket one, any testing program that searches for conditions plainly reflecting serious wrongdoing can never be made wholly nonaccusatory from the student's perspective, the motives for the program notwithstanding; and for the same reason, the substantial consequences that can flow from a positive test, such as suspension from sports, are invariablyand quite reasonablyunderstood as punishment. The best proof that the District's testing program is to some extent accusatory can be found in James Acton's own explanation on the witness stand as to why he did not want to submit to drug testing: "Because I feel that they have no *684 reason to think I was taking drugs." Tr. 13 It is hard to think of a manner of explanation that resonates more intensely in our Fourth tradition than this. II I do not believe that suspicionless drug testing is justified on these facts. But even if I agreed that some such testing were reasonable here, I see two other Fourth flaws in the District's program.[2] First, and most serious, there is virtually no evidence in the record of a drug problem at the Washington Grade School, which includes the seventh and eighth grades, and which Acton attended when this litigation began. This is not surprising, given that, of the four witnesses who testified to drug-related incidents, three were teachers and/or coaches at the high school, see Tr. 65; 6; and the fourth, though the principal of the grade school at the time of the litigation, had been employed as principal of the high school during the years leading up to (and beyond) the implementation of the drug testing policy. See The only evidence of a grade school drug problem that my review of the record uncovered is a "guarantee" by the late-arriving grade school principal that "our problems we've had in `88 and `89 didn't start at the high school level. They started in the elementary school." But I would hope that a single assertion of this sort would not serve as an adequate basis on which to uphold mass, suspicionless drug testing of two entire grades of student athletesin Vernonia and, by the Court's reasoning, in other school |
Justice O'Connor | 1,995 | 14 | dissenting | Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117964/vernonia-school-dist-47j-v-acton/ | athletesin Vernonia and, by the Court's reasoning, in other school districts as well. Perhaps there is a drug problem at the grade school, but one would not know it from this *685 record. At the least, then, I would insist that the parties and the District Court address this issue on remand. Second, even as to the high school, I find unreasonable the school's choice of student athletes as the class to subject to suspicionless testinga choice that appears to have been driven more by a belief in what would pass constitutional muster, see than by a belief in what was required to meet the District's principal disciplinary concern. Reading the full record in this case, as well as the District Court's authoritative summary of it, it seems quite obvious that the true driving force behind the District's adoption of its drug testing program was the need to combat the rise in drug-related disorder and disruption in its classrooms and around campus. I mean no criticism of the strength of that interest. On the contrary, where the record demonstrates the existence of such a problem, that interest seems self-evidently compelling. "Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students." T. L. And the record in this case surely demonstrates there was a drug-related discipline problem in Vernonia of "`epidemic proportions.' " The evidence of a drug-related sports injury problem at Vernonia, by contrast, was considerably weaker. On this record, then, it seems to me that the far more reasonable choice would have been to focus on the class of students found to have violated published school rules against severe disruption in class and around campus, see Record, Exh. 2, at 9, 11disruption that had a strong nexus to drug use, as the District established at trial. Such a choice would share two of the virtues of a suspicion-based regime: testing dramatically fewer students, tens as against hundreds, and giving students control, through their behavior, *686 over the likelihood that they would be tested. Moreover, there would be a reduced concern for the accusatory nature of the search, because the Court's feared "badge of shame," ante, at 663, would already exist, due to the antecedent accusation and finding of severe disruption. In a lesser known aspect of we upheld an analogous testing scheme with little hesitation. See III It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis. But we must also stay mindful that not all government responses to such times are hysterical overreactions; some crises |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | We decide in this case the question reserved 10 years ago in namely, "the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest." I On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a pizza parlor in Rochester, N. Y., was killed during an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, Detective Anthony Fantigrossi of the *203 Rochester Police was told by another officer that an informant had supplied a possible lead implicating petitioner in the crime. Fantigrossi questioned the supposed source of the leada jail inmate awaiting trial for burglarybut learned nothing that supplied "enough information to get a warrant" for petitioner's arrest. App. 60.[1] Nevertheless, Fantigrossi ordered other detectives to "pick up" petitioner and "bring him in." Three detectives located petitioner at a neighbor's house on the morning of August 11. Petitioner was taken into custody; although he was not told he was under arrest, he would have been physically restrained if he had attempted to leave. Opinion in App. 116, 117. He was driven to police headquarters in a police car and placed in an interrogation room, where he was questioned by officers after being given the warnings required by Petitioner waived counsel and eventually made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the crime.[2] At petitioner's jury trial for attempted robbery and felony murder, his motions to suppress the statements and sketches were denied, and he was convicted. On appeal, both the *204 Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the conviction without opinion. aff'd, However, this Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court's supervening decision in The petitioner in Brown, like petitioner Dunaway, made inculpatory statements after receiving Miranda warnings during custodial interrogation following his seizurein that case a formal arreston less than probable cause. Brown's motion to suppress the statements was also denied and the statements were used to convict him. Although the Supreme Court recognized that Brown's arrest was unlawful, it affirmed the admission of the statements on the ground that the giving of Miranda warnings served to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the giving of the statements. This Court reversed, holding that the courts erred in adopting a per se rule that Miranda warnings in and of themselves sufficed to cure the Fourth Amendment violation; rather the Court held that in order to use such statements, the prosecution must show not only that the statements meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but also that |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | statements meet the Fifth Amendment voluntariness standard, but also that the causal connection between the statements and the illegal arrest is broken sufficiently to purge the primary taint of the illegal arrest in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment. In compliance with the remand, the New York Court of Appeals directed the Monroe County Court to make further factual findings as to whether there was a detention of petitioner, whether the police had probable cause, "and, in the event there was a detention and probable cause is not found for such detention, to determine the further question as to whether the making of the confessions was rendered infirm *205 by the illegal arrest which upheld a similar detention on the basis of information amounting to less than probable cause for arrestwas rejected on the grounds that the precedential value of Morales was questionable,[3] and that the controlling authority was the "strong language" in indicating "disdain for custodial questioning without probable cause to arrest."[4] The County Court further held that "the factual predicate in this case did not amount to probable cause sufficient to support the arrest of the defendant," that "the Miranda warnings by themselves did not purge the taint of the defendant's *206 illegal seizure[,] and [that] there was no claim or showing by the People of any attenuation of the defendant's illegal detention," App. 121. Accordingly petitioner's motion to suppress was granted. A divided Appellate Division reversed. Although agreeing that the police lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner, the majority relied on the Court of Appeals' reaffirmation, subsequent to the County Court's decision, that "[l]aw enforcement officials may detain an individual upon reasonable suspicion for questioning for a reasonable and brief period of time under carefully controlled conditions which are ample to protect the individual's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." quoting The Appellate Division also held that even if petitioner's detention were illegal, the taint of his illegal detention was sufficiently attenuated to allow the admission of his statements and sketches. The Appellate Division emphasized that petitioner was never threatened or abused by the police and purported to distinguish[5] The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's application for leave to appeal. App. 134. We granted certiorari, to clarify the Fourth Amendment's requirements as to the permissible grounds for custodial interrogation and to review the New York court's application of We reverse. II We first consider whether the Rochester police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without probable cause to arrest, they took petitioner into custody, transported *207 him to the police station, |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | petitioner into custody, transported *207 him to the police station, and detained him there for interrogation. The Fourth Amendment, applicable to the through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause" There can be little doubt that petitioner was "seized" in the Fourth Amendment sense when he was taken involuntarily to the police station.[6] And respondent State concedes that the police lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner before his incriminating statement during interrogation.[7] Nevertheless respondent contends that the seizure of petitioner did not amount to an arrest and was therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the police had a "reasonable suspicion" that petitioner possessed "intimate knowledge about a serious and unsolved crime." Brief for Respondent 10. We disagree. Before the Fourth *208 Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons was analyzed in terms of arrest, probable cause for arrest, and warrants based on such probable cause. The basic principles were relatively simple and straightforward: The term "arrest" was synonymous with those seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment. While warrants were not required in all circumstances,[8] the requirement of probable cause, as elaborated in numerous precedents,[9] was treated as absolute.[10] The "long-prevailing standards" of probable cause embodied "the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the] often opposing interests" in "safeguard[ing] citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy" and in "seek[ing] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." The standard of probable cause thus represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The standard applied to all arrests, without the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. Cf. Terry for the first time recognized an exception to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of persons must *209 be based on probable cause. That case involved a brief, on-the-spot stop on the street and a frisk for weapons, a situation that did not fit comfortably within the traditional concept of an "arrest." Nevertheless, the Court held that even this type of "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat" constituted a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment," 17, and therefore "must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." However, since the |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." However, since the intrusion involved in a "stop and frisk" was so much less severe than that involved in traditional "arrests," the Court declined to stretch the concept of "arrest"and the general rule requiring probable cause to make arrests "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendmentto cover such intrusions. Instead, the Court treated the stop-and-frisk intrusion as a sui generis "rubric of police conduct," And to determine the justification necessary to make this specially limited intrusion "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, the Court balanced the limited violation of individual privacy involved against the opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police officer's safety. As a consequence, the Court established "a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."[11] Thus, Terry departed from traditional Fourth Amendment in two respects. *210 First, it defined a special category of Fourth Amendment "seizures" so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment "seizures" reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. Second, the application of this balancing test led the Court to approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less rigorous than probable cause, but only for the purpose of a pat-down for weapons. Because Terry involved an exception to the general rule requiring probable cause, this Court has been careful to maintain its narrow scope. Terry itself involved a limited, on-the-street frisk for weapons.[12] Two subsequent cases which applied Terry also involved limited weapons frisks. See ; United applied Terry in the special context of roving border patrols stopping automobiles to check for illegal immigrants. The investigative stops usually consumed *211 less than a minute and involved "a brief question or two." The Court stated that "[b]ecause of the limited nature of the intrusion, stops of this sort may be justified on facts that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest." [13] See also United ; Respondent State now urges the Court to apply a balancing test, rather than the general rule, to custodial interrogations, and to hold that "seizures" such as that in this case may be justified by mere "reasonable suspicion."[]Terry and its *212 progeny clearly do not support such a result. The narrow intrusions involved in those cases were judged by a balancing test rather than by the general |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | judged by a balancing test rather than by the general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the "long-prevailing standards" of probable cause, 338 U. S., at only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest. Indeed, Brignoni-Ponce expressly refused to extend Terry in the manner respondent now urges. The Court there stated: "The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause." -882 Accord, United In contrast to the brief and narrowly circumscribed intrusions involved in those cases, the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room. He was never informed that he was "free to go"; indeed, he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody. The application of the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed an "arrest" under state law. The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was not "booked," and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruitless, while not insignificant for all purposes, see obviously do not make petitioner's *213 seizure even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny. Indeed, any "exception" that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are "reasonable" only if based on probable cause. The central importance of the probable-cause requirement to the protection of a citizen's privacy afforded by the Fourth Amendment's guarantees cannot be compromised in this fashion. "The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history." Henry v. United Hostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and decisions immediately after its adoption affirmed that "common rumor or report, suspicion, or even `strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for arrest." The familiar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth Amendment seizures reflects the benefit of extensive experience accommodating the factors relevant to the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and provides the |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary to the implementation of a workable rule. See at 175-. In effect, respondent urges us to adopt a multifactor balancing test of "reasonable police conduct under the circumstances" to cover all seizures that do not amount to technical arrests.[15] But the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first instance by police officers engaged in the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United A single, familiar standard is essential to *2 guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.[16] Indeed, our recognition of these dangers, and our consequent reluctance to depart from the proved protections afforded by the general rule, are reflected in the narrow limitations emphasized in the cases employing the balancing test. For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite "balancing" has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are "reasonable" only if supported by probable cause. Moreover, two important decisions since Terry confirm the conclusion that the treatment of petitioner, whether or not it is technically characterized as an arrest, must be supported by probable cause. decided the Term after Terry, considered whether fingerprints taken from a suspect detained without probable cause must be excluded from evidence. The State argued that the detention "was of a type which does not require probable cause," because it occurred during an investigative, rather than accusatory, stage, and because it was for the sole purpose of taking fingerprints. Rejecting the State's first argument, the Court warned: "[T]o argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our *215 citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed `arrests' or `investigatory detentions.'" The State's second argument in Davis was more substantial, largely because of the distinctions between taking fingerprints and interrogation: "Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and the `third degree.' Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time." In Davis, however, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the validity of a "narrowly circumscribed procedure for obtaining" the fingerprints of suspects without probable cause in part because, as the Court emphasized, "petitioner was not merely fingerprinted during the detention but also subjected to interrogation." The detention therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. similarly disapproved arrests made for "investigatory" purposes on less than probable cause. Although Brown's arrest had more of the trappings of a technical formal arrest than petitioner's, such differences in form must not be exalted over substance.[17]*216 Once in the police station, Brown was taken to an interrogation room, and his experience was indistinguishable from petitioner's. Our condemnation of the police conduct in Brown fits equally the police conduct in this case: "The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of the fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was `for investigation' or for `questioning.' The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up." See also These passages from Davis and Brown reflect the conclusion that detention for custodial interrogationregardless of its labelintrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest. We accordingly hold that the Rochester police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when, without probable cause, they seized petitioner and transported him to the police station for interrogation. III There remains the question whether the connection between this unconstitutional police conduct and the incriminating statements and sketches obtained during petitioner's illegal detention was nevertheless sufficiently attenuated to permit the use at trial of the statements and sketches. See Wong Sun v. United ; Nardone v. United ; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United U.S. 385 The New York courts have consistently held, and petitioner does not contest, that proper Miranda warnings were given and that his statements were "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. But settled that *217 "[t]he exclusionary rule, when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth," and held therefore that "Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation." "If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or `investigation,' would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings." Consequently, although a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,[18] this type of "voluntariness" is merely a "threshold requirement" for Fourth Amendment Indeed, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have to be reached. Beyond this threshold requirement, Brown articulated a test designed to vindicate the "distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment." Following Wong Sun, the Court eschewed any per se or "but for" rule, and identified the relevant inquiry as "whether Brown's statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of his arrest," ; see Wong Sun v. United Brown's focus on "the causal connection between the illegality and the confession," reflected the two policies behind the use of the exclusionary rule to effectuate *218 the Fourth Amendment. When there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, but use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts. Brown identified several factors to be considered "in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest[: t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct And the burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution."[19] Examining the case before it, the Court readily concluded that the State had failed to sustain its burden of showing the confession was admissible. In the "less than two hours" that elapsed between the arrest and the confession "there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever." Furthermore, the arrest without probable cause had a "quality of purposefulness" in that it was an "expedition for evidence" admittedly undertaken "in the hope that something might turn up." The situation |
Justice Brennan | 1,979 | 13 | majority | Dunaway v. New York | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110096/dunaway-v-new-york/ | "in the hope that something might turn up." The situation in this case is virtually a replica of the situation in Brown. Petitioner was also admittedly seized without probable cause in the hope that something might turn up, and confessed without any intervening event of significance.[20] Nevertheless, three members of the Appellate Division purported to distinguish Brown on the ground that the police did not threaten or abuse petitioner (presumably putting aside his illegal seizure and detention) and that the police *219 conduct was "highly protective of defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights." 402 N. Y. S. 2d, at 493. This betrays a lingering confusion between "voluntariness" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and the "causal connection" test established in Brown. Satisfying the Fifth Amendment is only the "threshold" condition of the Fourth Amendment required by Brown. No intervening events broke the connection between petitioner's illegal detention and his confession. To admit petitioner's confession in such a case would allow "law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the `procedural safeguards' of the Fifth."[21] Reversed. MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,992 | 11 | dissenting | Coleman v. Thompson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112735/coleman-v-thompson/ | Last Term the Court ruled that Roger Coleman could not present his arguments on the merits to the federal courts, simply because the person then acting as his attorney had made a trivial error in filing his notice of appeal three days late. While I dissented from that rulingand still believe it was erroneousI found some consolation in the Court's suggestion that matters might have been different had Coleman argued that he was actually innocent of the crime. See Coleman has now produced substantial evidence that he may be innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced to die. Yet the Court once again turns him away, this time permitting the Commonwealth of Virginia to execute him without a hearing at which his evidence could be fully presented. The Court's ruling is all the more troubling for me, in view of this Court's decision to hear argument next Term in a case in which the petitioner contends, just as Coleman does, that evidence of his innocence entitles him to a hearing on the merits. Herrera v. Collins, No. 91-7328, cert. granted, I have previously voted to stay an execution pending this Court's decision next Term in Herrera. See ; I *190 cannot believe that Coleman, who raises a substantially identical claim, should be denied all possibility of relief simply because his petition reached this Court later than did Leonel Herrera's. Accordingly, I would stay the execution. Justice Souter would grant the application for stay of execution |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | United States v. Van Leeuwen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108099/united-states-v-van-leeuwen/ | Respondent, at about 1:30 p. m. on Thursday, March 28, 1968, mailed two 12-pound packages at the post office in Mt. Vernon, Washington, a town some 60 miles from the Canadian border. One package was addressed to a post office box in Van Nuys, California, and the other to a post office box in Nashville, Tennessee. Respondent declared they contained coins. Each package *250 was to be sent airmail registered and each was insured for $10,000, a type of mailing that the parties agree was first class, making them not subject to discretionary inspection.[1] When the postal clerk told a policeman who happened to be present that he was suspicious of the packages, the policeman at once noticed that the return address on the packages was a vacant housing area of a nearby junior college, and that the license plates of respondent's car were British Columbia. The policeman called the Canadian police, who called customs in Seattle. At 3 o'clock that afternoon customs called Van Nuys and learned that the addressee of one package was under investigation in Van Nuys for trafficking in illegal coins. Due to the time differential, Seattle customs was unable to reach Nashville until the following morning, March 29, when Seattle was advised that the second addressee was also being investigated for the same crime. A customs official in Seattle thereupon filed an affidavit for a search warrant for both packages with a United States commissioner, who issued the search warrant at 4 p. m., and it was executed in Mt. Vernon at 6:30 p. m., 2 1/2 hours later. Thereupon the packages were opened, inspected, resealed, and promptly sent on their way. Other evidence showed that respondent had brought the two packages in from Canada without declaring them. He was tried for illegally importing gold coins in violation of 18 U.S. C. 545 and found guilty and sentenced and fined. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the coins were improperly admitted in evidence because a timely warrant had not been obtained. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari, We reverse. *251 It has long been held that first-class mail such as letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage as distinguished from newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matteris free from inspection by postal authorities, except in the manner provided by the Fourth Amendment. As stated in Ex parte Jackson, decided in 1878: "Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | United States v. Van Leeuwen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108099/united-states-v-van-leeuwen/ | from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment of the Constitution." The course of events since 1878 has underlined the relevance and importance of the Post Office to our constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Holmes in Milwaukee Pub. (dissenting opinion), said that "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues." We have emphasized over and over again that while Congress may classify the mail and fix the charges *252 for its carriage, it may not set up regimes of censorship over it, or encumber its flow by setting "administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail" to Yet even first-class mail is not beyond the reach of all inspection; and the sole question here is whether the conditions for its detention and inspection had been satisfied. We think they had been. The nature and weight of the packages, the fictitious return address, and the British Columbia license plates of respondent who made the mailings in this border town certainly justified detention, without a warrant, while an investigation was made. The "protective search for weapons" of a suspect which the Court approved in even when probable cause for an arrest did not exist, went further than we need go here. The only thing done here on the basis of suspicion was detention of the packages. There was at that point no possible invasion of the right "to be secure" in the "persons, houses, papers, and effects" protected by the Fourth Amendment against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Theoreticallyand it is theory only that respondent has on his sidedetention |
Justice Douglas | 1,970 | 10 | majority | United States v. Van Leeuwen | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108099/united-states-v-van-leeuwen/ | it is theory only that respondent has on his sidedetention of mail could at some point become an unreasonable seizure of "papers" or "effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Detention for 1 1/2 hoursfrom 1:30 p. m. to 3 p. m.for an investigation certainly was not excessive; and at the end of that time probable cause existed for believing that the California package was part of an illicit project. A warrant could have been obtained that *253 day for the one package; yet the mystery of the other package remained unsolved and federal officials in Tennessee could not be reached because of the time differential. The next morning they were reached and it was learned that the second package was also probably part of an illicit project. By 4 p. m.or 26 1/2 hours after the mailing in Mt. Vernona search warrant was obtained in Seattle and at 6:30 p. m., or 29 hours after the mailing, the search warrant reached Mt. Vernon, a speedy transmission considering the rush-hour time of day and the congested highway. No interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by forwarding the packages the following day rather than the day when they were deposited. The significant Fourth Amendment interest was in the privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy was not disturbed or invaded until the approval of the magistrate was obtained. The rule of our decisions certainly is not that first-class mail can be detained 29 hours after mailing in order to obtain the search warrant needed for its inspection. We only hold that on the facts of this case the nature of the mailings, their suspicious character, the fact that there were two packages going to separate destinations, the unavoidable delay in contacting the more distant of the two destinations, the distance between Mt. Vernon and Seattlea 29-hour delay between the mailings and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be "unreasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Detention for this limited time was, indeed, the prudent act rather than letting the packages enter the mails and then, in case the initial suspicions were confirmed, trying to locate them en route and enlisting the help of distant federal officials in serving the warrant. Reversed. |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared unconstitutional two sections of a licensing ordinance *85 governing coin-operated amusement establishments in the city of Mesquite, Texas.[1] Section 6 of Ordinance 1353, which directs the Chief of Police to consider whether a license applicant has any "connections with criminal elements,"[] was *86 held to be unconstitutionally vague. Section 5, which prohibits a licensee from allowing children under 17 years of age to operate the amusement devices unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian,[3] was held to be without a rational basis. The first holding rests solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals stated that its second holding rested on two provisions of the Texas Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Because Congress has limited our jurisdiction to review questions of state law, and because there is ambiguity in the Court of Appeals' second holding, we conclude that a remand for clarification of that holding is necessary. There is, however, no impediment to our review of the first holding. On April 5, 19, to accommodate the proposal of Aladdin's Castle, Inc. (Aladdin), to open an amusement center in a shopping mall, the city exempted from the prohibition against operation of amusement devices by unattended children certain amusement centers, the features of which were defined in terms of Aladdin's rules, as long as children under the age of seven were accompanied by an adult.[4] Thereafter, Aladdin entered into a long-term lease and made other arrangements to open a center in the mall. In August, however, *87 its application for a license was refused because the Chief of Police had concluded that Aladdin's parent corporation was connected with criminal elements. Aladdin then brought suit in a Texas state court and obtained an injunction requiring the city to issue it a license forthwith. The Texas court found that neither Aladdin nor its parent corporation had any connection with criminal elements and that the vagueness in the ordinance contravened both the Texas and the Federal Constitutions.[5] On February 7, 1977, less than a month after the city had complied with the state-court injunction by issuing the license to Aladdin, the city adopted a new ordinance repealing Aladdin's exemption, thereby reinstating the 17-year age requirement, and defining the term "connections with criminal elements" in some detail.[6] Aladdin then commenced this action *88 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, praying for an injunction against enforcement of the new ordinance. After a |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | an injunction against enforcement of the new ordinance. After a trial, the District Court held that the language "connections with criminal elements," even as defined, was unconstitutionally vague, but the District Court upheld the age restriction in the ordinance.[7] As already noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the former holding and reversed the latter. Invoking our appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S. C. 154(), the city now asks us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. After we noted probable jurisdiction, Aladdin advised us that the ordinance reviewed by the Court of Appeals had been further amended in December 1977 by eliminating the phrase "connections with criminal elements." The age restriction, however, was retained.[8] I A question of mootness is raised by the revision of the ordinance that became effective while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals. When that court decided that the term "connections with criminal elements" was unconstitutionally vague, that language was no longer a part of the ordinance. Arguably, if the court had been fully advised, it would have regarded the vagueness issue as moot.[9] It is clear to us, however, that it was under no duty to do so. *89 It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. Such abandonment is an important factor bearing on the question whether a court should exercise its power to enjoin the defendant from renewing the practice, but that is a matter relating to the exercise rather than the existence of judicial power.[10] In this case the city's repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated.[11] The city followed that course with respect to the age restriction, which was first reduced for Aladdin from 17 to 7 and then, in obvious response to the state court's judgment, the exemption was eliminated. There is no certainty that a similar course would not be pursued if its most recent amendment were effective to defeat federal jurisdiction. We therefore must confront the merits of the vagueness holding. "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." (emphasis *90 added).[1] We may assume that the definition of "connections with criminal elements" in the city's ordinance is so vague that a defendant could not be convicted of the offense of having such a connection; we may even assume, without deciding, that such a |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | connection; we may even assume, without deciding, that such a standard is also too vague to support the denial of an application for a license to operate an amusement center. These assumptions are not sufficient, however, to support a holding that this ordinance is invalid. After receiving recommendations from the Chief of Police, the Chief Building Inspector, and the City Planner, the City Manager decides whether to approve the application for a license; if he disapproves, he must note his reasons in writing. The applicant may appeal to the City Council. If the City Manager disapproved the application because of the Chief of Police's adverse recommendation as to the applicant's character, then the applicant must show to the City Council that "he or it is of good character as a law abiding citizen," which is defined in the ordinance to "mean substantially that standard employed by the Supreme Court of the State of Texas in the *91 licensing of attorneys as set forth in [the Texas statutes]." 9 of Ordinance 1353, App. to Juris. Statement 13. An applicant may further appeal to the state district court. It is clear from this summary[13] that the phrase "connections with criminal elements," as used in this ordinance, is not the standard for approval or disapproval of the application. The applicant's possible connection with criminal elements is merely a subject that the ordinance directs the Chief of Police to investigate before he makes a recommendation to the City Manager either to grant or to deny a pending application. The Federal Constitution does not preclude a city from giving vague or ambiguous directions to officials who are authorized to make investigations and recommendations. There would be no constitutional objection to an ordinance that merely required an administrative official to review "all relevant information" or "to make such investigation as he deems appropriate" before formulating a recommendation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was therefore incorrect insofar as it held that the directive to the Chief of Police is unconstitutionally vague. II The Court of Appeals stated that its conclusion that the age requirement in the ordinance is invalid rested on its interpretation of the Texas Constitution as well as the Federal Constitution: "We hold that the seventeen year old age requirement violates both the United States and Texas constitutional guarantees of due process of law, and that the application of this age requirement to coin-operated amusement centers violates the federal and Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law." *9 In the omitted footnotes the court quoted two provisions of the Texas Constitution |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | footnotes the court quoted two provisions of the Texas Constitution that are similar, but by no means identical, to parts of the Federal Constitution.[14] Because our jurisdiction of this appeal is based on 8 U.S. C. 154(), we are precluded from reviewing the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Texas Constitution. For the federal statute provides: "Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: "() By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, but such appeal shall preclude review by writ of certiorari at the instance of such appellant, and the review on appeal shall be restricted to the Federal questions presented" If the Texas Constitution provides an independent ground for the Court of Appeals' judgment, our possible disagreement with its exposition of federal law would not provide a sufficient basis for reversing its judgment. If that be so, we should simply dismiss the appeal insofar as the city seeks review of the invalidation of the age requirement. Cf. United[15] The city contends, however, that the Court of Appeals did not place independent reliance on Texas law but merely *93 treated the Texas constitutional protections as congruent with the corresponding federal provisions.[16] Under this reading of the Court of Appeals' opinion, our correction of any federal error automatically would result in a revision of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Texas Constitution. Instead of providing independent support for the judgment below, the Texas law, as understood by the Court of Appeals, would be dependent on our reading of federal law. Although the city's contention derives support from the Court of Appeals' greater reliance on federal precedents than on Texas cases, we nevertheless decline, for the reasons that follow, to decide the federal constitutional question now. It is first noteworthy that the language of the Texas constitutional provision is different from, and arguably significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding federal provisions. As a number of recent State Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, a state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly than this Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, and cases cited therein. Because learned members of the Texas Bar sit on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | sit on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and because that court confronts questions of Texas law in the regular course of its judicial business, that court is in a better position than are we to recognize any special nuances of state law. The fact that the Court of Appeals cited only four Texas cases is an insufficient *94 basis for concluding that it did not make an independent analysis of Texas law. Second, it is important to take note of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Texas "requirement of legislative rationality." That interpretation seems to adopt a standard requiring that a legislative classification rests " ` "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" ' "[17] This formulation is derived from this Court's opinion in F. S. Royster Guano But it is unclear whether this Court would apply the Royster Guano standard to the present case. See United States Railroad Retirement ; Therefore, it is surely not evident that the Texas standard and the federal standard are congruent. Finally, and of greater importance, is this Court's policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions. As we recently have noted, see this self-imposed limitation on the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction has an importance to the institution that transcends the significance of particular controversies. No reason for hasty decision of the constitutional question presented by this case has been advanced. If Texas law provides independent support *95 for the Court of Appeals' judgment, there is no need for decision of the federal issue.[18] On the other hand, if the city is correct in suggesting that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of state law is dependent on its federal analysis, that court can so advise us and we can then discharge our responsibilities free of concern that we may be unnecessarily reaching out to decide a novel constitutional question.[19] The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. *96 JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court's holding that Mesquite's ordinance directing the Chief of Police to consider whether a license applicant has any "connections with criminal elements" is not void for vagueness.[*] Like JUSTICE POWELL, however, I dissent from the Court's remand of the challenge to the age requirements in 5 of the Mesquite ordinance. The sentiment to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions is wise, but there is no reason in this case |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | is wise, but there is no reason in this case to suspect that the Fifth Circuit's standard for evaluating appellee's due process and equal protection claims under the Texas Constitution differed in any respect from federal constitutional standards. I agree with JUSTICE POWELL that "the inclusion of three cursory state-law citations in a full discussion of federal law by a federal court is neither a reference to nor an adoption of an independent state ground." Post, at 99-300 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I refrain from joining JUSTICE POWELL's detailed discussion in support of this position only because I would prefer not to engage in debate over the present health of "the Royster *97 Guano standard." As I understand it, and as expressed in the opinion of the Court, ante, at 9 and 94, the rationale for inquiring into the presence of independent and adequate state grounds is to avoid an unnecessary "abstract opinion," United (5), and to refrain from "unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions." Ante, at 94. This is the sole justification for remanding the case to the Court of Appeals. To justify that disposition, however, the Court finds it necessary to speculate as to whether a formulation of the rational-basis test initially stated in F. S. Royster Guano and reiterated in remains good law in light of more recent decisions. Ante, at 94. JUSTICE POWELL, in response, declares that "[t]his Court has never rejected either Royster Guano or" Post, at 301, n. 6. I fear that we have lost sight of the fact that our reason for pursuing this inquiry is to avoid rendering advisory opinions on federal constitutional law. It is ironic that in seeking to skirt a relatively narrow issue of whether the Mesquite age requirement is constitutional, an issue decided by the Court of Appeals and fully briefed, the Court has instead entered into highly abstract, totally advisory, speculation as to the continuing validity of one of our earlier statements on a matter of no small constitutional importance. If it is necessary to interpret a case twice removed and totally unrelated to the matter before us in order to justify a remand to the Court of Appeals, I would think it clear that no independent nonfederal basis for the decision is present. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in the Court's holding that Mesquite Ordinance 1353, 6, is not void for vagueness. I dissent, however, from the Court's remand of the challenge to 5. *98 I The jurisdictional basis for the Court's review of this case is |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | jurisdictional basis for the Court's review of this case is 8 U.S. C. 154(), which provides for mandatory Supreme Court review of federal appellate decisions overturning state statutes on federal constitutional grounds. Rather than exercising this jurisdiction, the Court remands the case to the Court of Appeals to clarify whether its decision is based on Texas law. In the past, the Court has not automatically required clarification when the record reveals that the lower court's decisional basis is federal law. In this case, the opinion of the Court of Appeals contains no analysis of state law independent of its clear application of federal law. In my view there is no justification for a remand. The city of Mesquite, Tex., adopted an ordinance stating that owners of coin-operated pinball machines should not allow their operation by youths under the age of 17 years. In the decision below, the Court of Appeals held that this ordinance violated equal protection and due process as well as First Amendment rights of free speech and association. The court's opinion referred to the Texas Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,[1] and quoted the relevant Texas constitutional provisions in the margin.[] The court then, at some length, applied the Fourteenth Amendment's rational-relationship test to the Mesquite ordinance, citing, quoting, and discussing a total of 18 federal cases in this analysis. In the two initial paragraphs defining the *99 broad principles applied in that analysis, the court cited two Texas cases and quoted briefly from another. These Texas cases do not suggest an adequate and independent state ground for overruling the Mesquite ordinance. In the quoted case, the Texas court was describing federal, not Texas, law. Texas Woman's ). Of the two other Texas cases cited, one involves an unsuccessful challenge to a zoning ordinance, and in it the Supreme Court of Texas applied the rule that a challenger to a zoning ordinance bears a heavy burden of showing that the exercise of police power is not lawful. City of University This case actually supports the validity of the Mesquite ordinance under Texas law. In the other case, Falfurrias Creamery S.W.d 351 the State had established an inspection program for dairies. One municipality then passed an ordinance under which milk could be sold within its borders only if inspected by a local inspector. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that this requirement was arbitrary, since the local inspector could easily determine whether other inspectors were "[making] inspect[ions] in accordance with the standard ordinance contemplated by the State law." This single case dealing with a dairy-inspection requirement |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | State law." This single case dealing with a dairy-inspection requirement designed to favor local dairies cannot be the basis for a serious allegation that Texas law would not allow Mesquite to exercise its police power by keeping youths out of pinball parlors. On the basis of an inference as weak as that afforded by Falfurrias Creamery, I would not remand to any court, state or federal. But even if the cited case law provided some support for appellee's challenge, the inclusion of three cursory state-law citations in a full discussion of federal law by a federal *300 court is neither a reference to nor an adoption of an independent state ground. The Court's view allows federal courts overruling state statutes to avoid appellate review here simply by adding citations to state cases when applying federal law. Nor is the Court's rigid approach today required by earlier decisions. In for example, California argued that the California Supreme Court's order dismissing the petitioner's prayer for relief was based on an independent and adequate state ground: the requirements of a state procedural rule. The Court nevertheless proceeded to the merits of the federal question without remanding for clarification of the dismissal order's basis. This Court found the proffered sources of the alleged state procedural rule unconvincing and "conclu[ded] that the constitutional issues are before us and we must consider them."[3] *301 II The Court gives three reasons for remanding. First, it observes that the language of the State Constitution, quoted in n. differs from that in the Federal Constitution and Texas may afford broader protection to individual rights than does the Federal Government. The relevant question is not, however, whether state law could be, or even is, different from federal law, but whether the Court of Appeals decided the case before it on state or federal grounds. In deciding this question, the citation of only three[4] state cases is not, of course, determinative. Here, however, the Court of Appeals failed to discuss, explain, describe, or even state Texas law despite extensive discussion of federal law and cases. The Court's second point is at least imaginative. It focuses on one sentence from 404 U. S., at quoted in the Texas case of Texas Woman's 530 S. W. d, at ante, at 94, and n. 17. That sentence reiterated a formulation of rational-basis analysis that was stated in F. S. Royster Guano The Court today then implies that "the Royster Guano standard" may no longer be good law, citing United States Railroad Retirement[5] From this implication,[6] the Court further *30 infers that "the Texas standard |
Justice Stevens | 1,982 | 16 | majority | City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110649/city-of-mesquite-v-aladdins-castle-inc/ | implication,[6] the Court further *30 infers that "the Texas standard and the federal standard" may not be congruent. The best answer to this speculative syllogism is found in the discussion of rational-basis analysis by the Court of Appeals. In an Appendix hereto I include the three paragraphs of the opinion that discuss the rational-relationship standard of review. It will be noted that nine United States Supreme Court cases were cited. Although three Texas cases were cited also, there is not the slightest indication that the Court of Appeals was distinguishing between federal and state law. Moreover, in the subsequent pages applying rational-relationship review, the court did not cite or discuss a single Texas case or any aspect of Texas law, though 11 federal cases were cited and discussed. -1040 Finally, the Court relies on our traditional reluctance to decide a constitutional question unnecessarily. But we noted jurisdiction to consider the validity of the Mesquite ordinance, and this question is squarely presented. As a general matter, the Court should avoid unnecessary remands; this is particularly true when the Court's mandatory jurisdiction has been invoked under 154(). Neither the Court of Appeals nor appellee has presented any substantial reason for thinking that the Mesquite ordinance is invalid under Texas law independently of federal law that clearly was the basis for the decision below. In these circumstances, we have a duty to decide the substantive questions presented. *303 APPENDIX TO OPINION OF JUSTICE POWELL[*] "1. Rational Basis "Assuming that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that no such rationality supports ordinance No. 1353. The test requires that legislative action be rationally related to the accomplishment of a legitimate state purpose. First, the challenged legislation must have a legitimate public purpose based on promotion of the public welfare, health or safety. See, e. g., ; Falfurrias Creamery S.W.d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. writ ref'd n.r.e.). Second, the act taken must bear a rational relation to the end it seeks to further. See e. g., Griswold v. -507 (WHITE, J., concurring); 353 U.S. 3, 39 ; City of University appeal dismissed "The requirement of legislative rationality in the service of legitimate purposes protects individuals and their liberties from official arbitrariness or unthinking prejudice. As one commentator noted, irrationality at least means `patently useless in the service of any goal apart from whim or favoritism.' Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review? 13 Creighton Law Review 487, 499 The test requires that legislation constitute a means that is `reasonable, not arbitrary and rests "upon some ground |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | concurring | United States v. Brignoni-Ponce | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109311/united-states-v-brignoni-ponce/ | I join in the opinion of the Court. I think it quite important to point out, however, that that opinion, which is joined by a somewhat different majority than that which comprised the Almeida-Sanchez Court, is both by its terms and by its reasoning concerned only with the type of stop involved in this case. I think that just as travelers entering the country may be stopped and searched without probable cause and without founded suspicion, because of "national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in," a strong case may be made for those charged with the enforcement of laws conditioning the right of vehicular use of a highway to likewise stop motorists using highways in order to determine whether they have met the qualifications prescribed by applicable law for such use. See ; United I regard these and similar situations, such *888 as agricultural inspections and highway roadblocks to apprehend known fugitives, as not in any way constitutionally suspect by reason of today's decision. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the judgment. I join in the affirmance of the judgment. The stopping of respondent's automobile solely because its occupants appeared to be of Mexican ancestry was a patent violation of the Fourth Amendment. I cannot agree, however, with the standard the Court adopts to measure the lawfulness of the officers' action. The Court extends the "suspicion" test of to the stop of a moving automobile. I dissented from the adoption of the suspicion test in Terry, believing it an unjustified weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protection of citizens from arbitrary interference by the police. I remarked then: "The infringement on personal liberty of any `seizure' of a person can only be `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess `probable cause' before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime." The fears I voiced in Terry about the weakening of the Fourth Amendment have regrettably been borne out by subsequent events. Hopes that the suspicion test might be employed only in the pursuit of violent crimea limitation endorsed by some of its proponents[*] have now been dashed, as it has been applied *889 in narcotics investigations, in apprehension of "illegal" aliens, and indeed has come to be |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,975 | 19 | concurring | United States v. Brignoni-Ponce | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109311/united-states-v-brignoni-ponce/ | apprehension of "illegal" aliens, and indeed has come to be viewed as a legal construct for the regulation of a general investigatory police power. The suspicion test has been warmly embraced by law enforcement forces and vigorously employed in the cause of crime detection. In criminal cases we see those for whom the initial intrusion led to the discovery of some wrongdoing. But the nature of the test permits the police to interfere as well with a multitude of law-abiding citizens, whose only transgression may be a nonconformist appearance or attitude. As one commentator has remarked: " `Police power exercised without probable cause is arbitrary. To say that the police may accost citizens at their whim and may detain them upon reasonable suspicion is to say, in reality, that the police may both accost and detain citizens at their whim.' " Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, The uses to which the suspicion test has been put are illustrated in some of the cases cited in the Court's opinion. In United for example, immigration officers stopped a station wagon near the border because there was a spare tire in the back seat. The court held that the officers reasonably suspected that the spare wheel well had been freed in order to facilitate the concealment of aliens. In United the Border Patrol officers encountered a man driving alone in a station wagon which was "riding low"; stopping the car was held reasonable because the officers suspected that aliens might have been hidden beneath the floorboards. The vacationer whose car is weighted down with luggage will find no comfort in these decisions; nor will the many law-abiding citizens *890 who drive older vehicles that ride low because their suspension systems are old or in disrepair. The suspicion test has indeed brought a state of affairs where the police may stop citizens on the highway on the flimsiest of justifications. The Court does, to be sure, disclaim approval of the particular decisions it cites applying the suspicion test. But by specifying factors to be considered without attempting to explain what combination is necessary to satisfy the test, the Court may actually induce the police to push its language beyond intended limits and to advance as a justification any of the enumerated factors even where its probative significance is negligible. Ultimately the degree to which the suspicion test actually restrains the police will depend more upon what the Court does henceforth than upon what it says today. If my Brethren mean to give the suspicion test a new bite, I applaud the intention. But |
Justice Stewart | 1,972 | 18 | dissenting | Milton v. Wainwright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108585/milton-v-wainwright/ | Under the guise of finding "harmless error," the Court today turns its back on a landmark constitutional precedent established 40 years ago. That precedent, which clearly controls this case, is I respectfully dissent. In 1958 a Florida grand jury indicted the petitioner, George Milton, for first-degree murder. This was an offense punishable by death under Florida law. After he had been indicted, Milton was remanded to the Dade County jail to await trial. He had retained a lawyer, who had advised him not to talk about his case with anyone. Some two weeks later the State directed a police officer named Langford to enter Milton's cell, posing as a fellow prisoner also under indictment for murder, in order to "seek information" from Milton. Langford entered the cell on a Friday evening. That night he "tried to open him [Milton] up," but Milton refused to talk about his case. The next day Langford devoted his efforts to gaining Milton's confidence. He shared his breakfast with Milton and gave him candy. He talked convincingly about his own purported crime. He tried to steer the conversation to the charge against Milton, but Milton repeatedly said he did not want to talk about it, and had been told not to talk about it by his lawyer. Finally, sometime between midnight and 3 a. m. on Sunday, after almost 36 hours of prodding *379 by his supposed fellow prisoner, Milton allegedly confessed the murder to Langford. At Milton's subsequent trial, Langford, over objection, was allowed to testify in detail to this alleged confession. Milton was convicted, and, upon the recommendation of the jury, he was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment. His appeals to the state appellate courts were unavailing, and he ultimately filed the present federal habeas corpus proceeding in the United District Court for the Southern District of Florida, claiming that his conviction was invalid because he had been deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel after the indictment. The District Judge denied the writ, apparently believing that the question before him was whether this Court's decision in was "retroactive": "This case was tried six years before the Supreme Court indicated in that confessions are involuntary per se if induced by officers or their agents from an accused after his indictment while he is without assistance of counsel. No Court has declared Massiah retroactive, and this Court will not be the first to do so. Counsel for Milton argues that Massiah was not declared retroactive because far from stating new principles of law, it merely restated principles derived |
Justice Stewart | 1,972 | 18 | dissenting | Milton v. Wainwright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108585/milton-v-wainwright/ | stating new principles of law, it merely restated principles derived from However, the Powell case dealt with the Sixth Amendment right to appointment of counsel in a capital case, a situation far different from this case. Milton knew what he was doing. He wasn't intimidated by the police, because he didn't even know his cellmate was a policeman. He had a lawyer who had told him not to make any statements concerning *380 his case, but he chose not to follow that advice." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed per curiam "on the basis of [the District Court's] opinion," and we granted certiorari, The District Court and the Court of Appeals were in error. They were mistaken, first, in thinking that the Massiah case had anything to do with the "voluntariness" of a confession. They were mistaken, second, in thinking that any real question of "retroactivity" was presented. They were mistaken, third, in thinking that dealt only with "appointment of counsel in a capital case." And they were mistaken, fourth, in thinking that was inapplicable to this case. decided almost 40 years ago, was one of the truly landmark constitutional decisions of this Court. It held that under the Fourteenth Amendment a man indicted for a capital offense in a state court has an absolute right, not "to appointment of," but to the assistance of counsel. And that constitutional right is not restricted to the trial. The Court reversed the convictions in Powell, because: "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself." In we found that *381 this constitutional right to counsel[1] was violated when, after indictment, a defendant who had a lawyer was surreptitiously interrogated alone by an agent of the police. "[U]nder our system of justice," we said, "the most elemental concepts of due process of law contemplate that an indictment be followed by a trial, `in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by all the procedural safe-guards of the law.' " "[A] Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding" "This view," we |
Justice Stewart | 1,972 | 18 | dissenting | Milton v. Wainwright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108585/milton-v-wainwright/ | the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding" "This view," we said, "no more than reflects a constitutional principle established as long ago as" -205. The "retroactivity" of the Massiah decision is a wholly spurious issue. For Massiah marked no new departure in the law. It upset no accepted prosecutorial practice. Its "retroactivity" would effect no wholesale jail deliveries. Cf. In no case before Massiah had this Court, at least since ever countenanced the kind of post-indictment police interrogation there involved, let alone ever specifically upheld the constitutionality of any such interrogation.[2] *382 For four decades this Court has recognized that when a State indicts a man for a capital offense, the most rudimentary constitutional principles require that he be afforded the full and effective assistance of counsel: "Let it be emphasized at the outset that this is not a case where the police were questioning a suspect in the course of investigating an unsolved crime "Under our system of justice an indictment is supposed to be followed by an arraignment and a trial. At every stage in those proceedings the accused has an absolute right to a lawyer's help if the case is one in which a death sentence may be imposed." (concurring opinion). So the question in this case is not whether Massiah is "retroactive,"[3] for the rule in that case has been settled law ever since I can find no basis for the Court's holding today that the admission of Officer Langford's testimony was harmless. In we said that an "error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant *383 cannot, under Fahy [v. Connecticut, ], be conceived of as harmless." -24. And on the question of whether a jury might possibly have been influenced, the State must "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals even suggested the possibility of harmless error in this case, and with very good reasons. The Court today relies on the fact that the challenged "confession" was only one of several introduced at the petitioner's trial. But it fails to mention that each of the previous statements was taken during an 18-day period after arrest but before indictment, when the petitioner was held in jail incommunicado and was questioned almost every day, often for hours at a time. For 10 days the petitioner denied that he had deliberately killed his wife. Finally, during a session in which two detectives working in tandem questioned him continuously for some eight |
Justice Stewart | 1,972 | 18 | dissenting | Milton v. Wainwright | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108585/milton-v-wainwright/ | detectives working in tandem questioned him continuously for some eight hours, the petitioner allegedly confessed. Other statements followed that one, but all were taken during the period of incommunicado detention. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Miami police chose to plant an officer in the petitioner's jail cell two weeks after indictment, in the hope of obtaining admissions less tainted by the indicia of unreliability that surrounded the previous statements. They succeeded in doing so, and the alleged confession thus obtained was truly devastating to the defense at the trial. Langford's testimony was the first evidence of any incriminating statements introduced by the State at the trial, and it was referred to repeatedly by the prosecutor in his final argument. The state courts determined that the petitioner's pre-indictment statements were voluntary, and that issue, as the Court notes, is not now before us. But the weight *384 given by a jury to any alleged confession is affected by the circumstances under which it was obtained, and the ability of the petitioner to discredit in the minds of the jury the evidence of his prior statements was undoubtedly destroyed by the strong corroboration and elaboration supplied by the testimony of Officer Langford, who had been unconstitutionally planted in the petitioner's jail cell. Surely there is at the least a reasonable doubt whether in these circumstances the introduction of Langford's testimony did not contribute to the verdict of first-degree murder returned by the jury, particularly where a conviction for a lesser degree of homicide was a distinct possibility on the evidence. To hold otherwise, in the absence of any finding of harmless error by any of the four courts that have previously ruled on the admissibility of Langford's testimony, is to violate the very principle that the Court restates today: "The writ of habeas corpus has limited scope; the federal courts do not sit to re-try state cases de novo but rather to review for violation of federal constitutional standards." Ante, at 377. Despite its admonition, the Court today refuses to rule on the constitutional question squarely presented in this case. That question is whether the great constitutional lesson of is to be ignored. I would not ignore it, but would honor its "fundamental postulate `that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.' " -72. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment before us. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | Last Term, in we recognized institutional limits on an appellate court's ability to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to death: "Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination, few can be gleaned from an appellate record. This inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant would be particularly devastating to any argument for consideration of what this Court has termed `[those] compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.' When we held that a defendant has a constitutional right to the consideration of such factors, we clearly envisioned that that consideration would occur among sentencers who were present to hear the evidence and arguments and see the witnesses." -331 That statement in is not an abstract disquisition on appellate courts generally. It concerns, in particular, the institutional limits of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in capital cases. Today, the Court ignores those recently stated limits and holds that the Mississippi Supreme Court may be competent to make, on a paper record, the findings required by that Crawford Bullock, Jr., killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill Mark Dickson, and thus deserves to die. The Court reaches that result by paying lipservice to the constitutional significance of while relegating findings to a position of judicial afterthought. The nature of the findings, however, dictates who must make them and at what point in the sentencing process they must be *395 made. The Eighth Amendment requires that findings be made at the trial court level before the sentencer condemns a defendant to death. The Court's misreading of threatens a retreat from the constitutional safeguards on the capital sentencing process that the Court has acknowledged in the decade since I Bullock testified both at his trial and at his sentencing proceeding. He explicitly denied that he killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill Dickson. See, e. g., Tr. 956, 983, 996, 1190. The jury's verdict and sentence are entirely consistent under Mississippi law with Bullock's testimony. As the Court recognizes, that law and the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to convict him and to sentence him to death without finding any particular degree of personal participation in the killing. Ante, at 383-38. The Court also recognizes that the Mississippi Supreme Court failed to make the required findings. That court affirmed Bullock's conviction and death sentence based on its view of Bullock's culpability under Mississippi's law of aiding and abetting, which establishes a threshold far below 's constitutional minimum. Ante, at 389-390. The Mississippi Supreme Court explicitly based its account of the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | The Mississippi Supreme Court explicitly based its account of the crime on Bullock's written confession, see in which Bullock stated only that Tucker killed Dickson, and that he, Bullock, had no intention of robbing Dickson. Tr. 387-390. That confession provides no evidence that Bullock killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill Dickson. Thus, the Court properly concludes that none of the required findings has been made. II The central message of is that the death penalty cannot constitutionally be imposed without an intensely individual *396 appraisal of the "personal responsibility and moral guilt" of the "The focus must be on his culpability, for we insist on `individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence,' which means that we must focus on `relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender.'" See also ; ; Put simply, establishes a constitutionally required factual predicate for the valid imposition of the death Cf. ante, at 390. Like the statutory aggravating circumstances discussed in the findings "circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death " Just as, absent the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, " `[a] case may not pass into that area in which the death penalty is authorized' " under law, quoting so too, absent a finding of one of the factors, a case may not pass into that area in which the death penalty is authorized by the Eighth Amendment. The Court agrees that it would be wrong for Mississippi to execute Bullock without first determining that he killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill Dickson. See, e. g., ante, at 378, 385, 386. But if that is so, then it was also wrong for the Mississippi jury to discharge "the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human," 02 U.S. 183, without first considering the fundamental issue of his personal culpability. By condemning Bullock to die, the jury announced *397 that he was not fit to live. This expression of the community's ultimate outrage, unaccompanied as it was by any finding that Bullock possessed the degree of culpability required by involved the kind of deprivation of human dignity which the Eighth Amendment forbids. Cf., e. g., -102 ; 217 U.S. 39, A The question of how to cure this constitutional violation remains. The Court holds that an adequate remedy for the absence of findings can be supplied by "any court that has the power to find the facts and vacate the sentence." Ante, at 386. I believe that, in this case, only a new sentencing proceeding before a jury |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | this case, only a new sentencing proceeding before a jury can guarantee the reliability which the Constitution demands. But the Court's decision today goes beyond a simple determination of how to cure an error that has already occurred. It tells the States, in effect, that it is no error for a jury or a trial judge to say that a defendant should die without first considering his personal responsibility and moral guilt, as requires. By turning the jury or trial court's determination into what can be viewed only as a preliminary stage in the capital-sentencing process, the Court's holding poses the threat of diffusing the sentencer's sense of responsibility in the manner condemned in The Court thus ignores both the proper institutional roles of trial and appellate courts and the pragmatic and constitutional concerns with reliability that underlie those roles. In short, the Court's holding rests on an improper equation of the wholly dissimilar functions of finding facts and of vacating a sentence because no facts have been found. established a clear constitutional imperative that a death sentence not be imposed by a sentencer who fails to make one of the findings. The Court confuses this imperative with the guarantee it purports to *398 make today that a death sentence will not be carried out before someone makes an finding. That this ignores a distinction with a constitutional difference is made clear by the Court's decisions in (198), and Presnell v. 39 U.S. 1 In Cole, the Court reversed a state appellate decision that had affirmed the defendants' sentences by finding they had violated a different statutory provision from the one with which they had been charged. It recognized that the Due Process Clause requires that defendants "have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court." In Presnell, the Court acknowledged that the "fundamental principles of procedural fairness" announced in Cole "apply with no less force at the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal trial." 39 U.S., at 16. It thus reversed a death sentence which the Supreme Court had affirmed on the basis of its own finding that evidence in the record would support a statutory aggravating circumstance that had not been found by the jury. Notably, in neither Cole nor Presnell did this Court consider whether the State Supreme Courts' evidentiary findings were correct; whether their findings were right was entirely irrelevant to the question whether the Due |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | right was entirely irrelevant to the question whether the Due Process Clause gave them the power to make such findings. The Court's decision today gives a state appellate court carte blanche to engage in factfinding concerning issues that no one at trial thought to be relevant. Here, as the Court recognizes, " `the entire case was essentially tried on the theory that it was not necessary, either for the felony murder conviction or for the sentence to death, to find that Bullock had either the intent to kill or any personal participation in the killing.' " Ante, at 38, quoting 73 F.2d 2, 28 *399 (CA5 198) ; see also, e. g., Tr. 1155. The critical issue was never determined in the trial court.[1] Far more than "[c]onsiderations of federalism and comity," ante, at 391, should prevent this Court, and other federal habeas courts, from examining trial transcripts and making findings themselves. Considerations of reliability provide a compelling reason for requiring state trial courts to address this issue in the first instance. And, with respect to the question of reliability, the Mississippi Supreme Court is in no better position than is this Court to determine Bullock's credibility. The Court's conclusion that we should allow the States to adopt capital punishment schemes that depend on appellate factfinding because "it is by no means apparent that appellate factfinding will always be inadequate," ante, at 388, n. 5 turns on its head the heightened concern with reliability that has informed our review of the death penalty over the past decade.[2] See, e. g., *00 72 U. S., at 328-329; 63 U.S. 992, ; 7 U.S. 625, ; 38 U. S., at 60 ; 30 U.S. 39, ; I believe that the Eighth Amendment not only requires that the sentencer make findings before it decides that a defendant must die, but also requires that the factfinder be present at the trial, to see and hear the witnesses. The Court long has recognized the special competence of trial courts which formed the basis for 's discussion of the "institutional limits on what an appellate court can do." In a variety of contexts, the Court has relied upon the New York Court of Appeals' explanation *01 in 252 N.Y. 22, 29, 63 : "Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth. How can we say the judge is wrong? We never |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | How can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses. To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal. His was the opportunity, the responsibility and the power to decide." See, e. g., 69 U.S. 12, 3 ; 59 U.S. 22, 3 Our precedents are not to the contrary. Although we held in 68 U.S. 7 (198), that neither the Sixth nor the Eighth Amendment required jury sentencing in capital cases, we made that determination in the face of a Florida statute which "plac[ed] responsibility on the trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case." at 65 In the relevant respects, a trial judge in a capital case is more like a jury than he is like an appellate court. Like the jury, he has seen the witnesses, and is well positioned to make those "determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province." 69 U. S., at 28.[3] *02 B The Court's discussion of "the nature of our ruling in" ante, at 38, reveals a reliance on three premises: first, "does not impose any particular form of procedure upon the States," ante, at 386 (emphasis omitted); second, " `does not affect the state's definition of any substantive offense, even a capital offense,' " ante, at 385, quoting (CA5), cert. denied, 69 U.S. 990 (198); and, third, is a "substantive limitation on sentencing" amenable to traditional proportionality review, ante, at 386. None of these propositions justifies the Court's holding today. That we have refused " `to say that there is any one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme,' " ante, at 387, quoting 68 U. S., at 6, does not mean that there are no wrong ways. As has been shown, a capital-sentencing scheme that permits an appellate court to *03 make findings sacrifices reliability needlessly to no discernible end, and cannot satisfy the Eighth Amendment. That does not restrict the State's power to define offenses is equally beside the point. A State's decision to define a crime as "capital" cannot "automatically dictate what should be the proper penalty," 38 U. S., at 602 and does not empower the State to execute a defendant who neither killed, nor attempted to kill, nor intended to kill. In Coker v. 33 U.S. 58 for example, 's definition of rape as a capital offense did not dispose of the Eighth Amendment issue. Both JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S dissent in and the Court of Appeals' opinion in Reddix the authorities upon which the |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | Appeals' opinion in Reddix the authorities upon which the Court relies recognize the distinction, which seems to elude the Court, between defining an offense and being entitled to execute a See 58 U. S., at 810, and n. 19 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) ( did not contest his conviction for felony murder; his "sole challenge is to the penalty imposed"); Reddix, 728 F. 2d, at cert. denied, 69 U.S. 873 (198)). A State remains free to define felony murder as it wishes; but it can execute a felony murderer who has been sentenced to death only by a sentencer who has determined that he possesses the degree of culpability discussed in The Court also would justify its holding by reference to the discussion of Eighth Amendment principles of proportionality in 63 U.S. 277 The Court's discussion mistakenly amalgamates review and essentially de novo factfinding. Certainly, the Court is correct that "the decision whether a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment in any particular case has long been viewed as one that a trial judge or an appellate *0 court is fully competent to make." Ante, at 386. But the Eighth Amendment demands more than that the reviewing court decide whether the sentencer has properly weighed the seriousness of the offense and the severity of the punishment. The Eighth Amendment binds the sentencer as well. The joint opinions in 28 U.S. 22 and 28 U.S. 262 all explicitly rested their approval of the capital-sentencing schemes before them on the combination of channeled factfinding by the sentencer and appellate In Gregg, an "important additional safeguard" was provided by the Supreme Court's review of "whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance," as well as by the exercise of comparative proportionality 28 U.S., at 198. In Proffitt, "meaningful appellate review" was provided because the appellate court had before it written findings justifying the imposition of the death 28 U.S., at 251. In Jurek, the jury had to make specific findings, which were then subject to appellate 28 U.S., at 269, 276. To permit States to collapse factfinding and review into one proceeding is to abandon one of the most critical protections afforded by every capital-sentencing scheme to which the Court previously has given its approval. "insist[ed] on `individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence,' " 58 U.S., quoting 38 U. S., at and not merely in reviewing the sentence imposed. The sentencer is not relieved of the duty to consider whether the severity of the defendant's crime justifies the death |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | whether the severity of the defendant's crime justifies the death penalty by the availability of proportionality places a substantive limitation on a process that precedes proportionality C This case demonstrates graphically why a trial-court sentencer must make the determination. Under *05 Mississippi law, "the jury is the sole player in the judicial process who may vote to send an accused to die." 9 So. 2d 756, (Miss. 198); see also 5 So. 2d 798, (Miss. 198), cert. denied, 69 U.S. 1117 To the extent that places a substantive limitation on sentencing, then, Bullock is entitled to insist that the sentencing jury heed its limits. suggests that to postpone Bullock's right to an determination is effectively to deprive him of that right because, in Mississippi, capital review is "conducted with a presumption of correctness." Wiley, 9 So. 2d, at ; see 72 U. S., at 331; see also The Mississippi Supreme Court examines the record solely to see whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that Bullock killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill, rather than whether Bullock in fact did any of those things. Saying that Bullock might have acted with the requisite culpability does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that Bullock actually have acted with that degree of blameworthiness. 7 U.S. 33 makes clear that the former inquiry is simply insufficient to satisfy due process. In Hicks, the Court vacated a sentence imposed, as Oklahoma law required, by a jury which had relied upon an invalid statutory provision despite the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed the sentence as within the permissible range. Hicks held that when a State vests the sentencing power in the trial jury, a defendant has "a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion." at 36. A state appeals court cannot reform a defendant's sentence, thus denying him the right actually to be sentenced by a jury "simply on the frail conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence equally as harsh as that [affirmed by the appellate court]. Such an arbitrary disregard of the petitioner's right *06 to liberty is a denial of due process of law." As for reliability, the Court buries in a footnote an acknowledgment that "the question whether the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill might in a given case turn on credibility determinations that could not be accurately made by an appellate court on the basis of a paper record, cf. |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | appellate court on the basis of a paper record, cf. 70 U.S. 56, ; 69 U.S. 12, 29" Ante, at 388, n. 5. The Court fails to notice that this is that "given case": Bullock took the stand, at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, to deny having killed, having attempted to kill, or having intended to kill Dickson. See Tr. 956, 983, 996, 1190. I have read the trial transcript. Although I think the evidence is consistent with Bullock's claim that the killing of Mark Dickson resulted from a drunken brawl between Tucker and Dickson that tragically got out of hand, cf. 73 F. 2d, at 28 I must concede that a jury or judge who saw Bullock testify might well think he lied. I fail, however, to see how an appellate court confidently could conclude, without any indication from anyone who actually saw him testify, that Bullock's account was so unworthy of belief that he was properly condemned to death. Moreover, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that this case is at all unusual in this respect.[] To permit the States *07 to construct capital-sentencing schemes that by their very nature will be inadequate in cases such as this strikes me as an abdication of our responsibility under the Eighth Amendment to ensure that the system of capital punishment, as well as the imposition of the penalty on individual defendants, meets the Constitution's requirements.[5] Here, Bullock had a legitimate expectation that the sentencing jury would consider his personal responsibility and moral guilt before deciding to send him to die. Under the only way to guarantee that such consideration has been given is to require the sentencer to determine that the defendant either killed, or attempted to kill, or intended to kill. That a jury might or could have made such a determination hardly provides a guarantee that this jury did. Because I believe every defendant is entitled to that guarantee, I would vacate the death sentence and remand the case with instructions to provide Bullock with a sentencing hearing before a jury. Inasmuch as the majority refuses to take this essential step, I dissent. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. The justification for executing the defendant depends on the degree of his culpability "what [his] intentions, expectations, *08 and actions were. American criminal law has long considered a defendant's intention and therefore his moral guilt to be critical to `the degree of [his] criminal culpability,' 21 U.S. 68, and the Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in |
Justice Blackmun | 1,986 | 11 | second_dissenting | Cabana v. Bullock | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111558/cabana-v-bullock/ | Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing." The Eighth Amendment therefore precludes the imposition of a death sentence upon a defendant whose "crime did not reflect `a consciousness materially more "depraved" than that of any person guilty of murder.' " at -801. Because the finding of moral culpability required by is but one part of a judgment that "is ultimately understood only as an expression of the community's outrage its sense that an individual has lost his moral entitlement to live,"[*] I believe that the decision whether a death sentence is the only adequate response to the defendant's moral culpability must be made by a single decisionmaker, be it the trial court or the jury. The State of Mississippi has wisely decided that the jury is the decisionmaker that is best able to "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death." As the Court points out, ante, at 383-38, a Mississippi jury has not found that respondent Bullock killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used. It follows, in my view, that a Mississippi jury has not determined that a death sentence is the only response that will satisfy the outrage of the community, and that a new sentencing hearing must be conducted if respondent is ultimately to be sentenced to die. In accordance with this reasoning, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Justice White | 1,986 | 6 | concurring | Batson v. Kentucky | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111662/batson-v-kentucky/ | The Court overturns the principal holding in that the Constitution does not require in any given case an inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons for using his peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the petit jury panel in the criminal trial of a black defendant and that in such a case it will be presumed that the prosecutor is acting for legitimate trial-related reasons. The Court now rules that such use of peremptory challenges in a given case may, but does not necessarily, raise an inference, which the prosecutor carries the burden of refuting, *101 that his strikes were based on the belief that no black citizen could be a satisfactory juror or fairly try a black defendant. I agree that, to this extent, Swain should be overruled. I do so because Swain itself indicated that the presumption of legitimacy with respect to the striking of black venire persons could be overcome by evidence that over a period of time the prosecution had consistently excluded blacks from petit juries.[*] This should have warned prosecutors that using peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption that no black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would violate the Equal Protection Clause. It appears, however, that the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so that I agree that an opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs. If the defendant objects, the judge, in whom the Court puts considerable trust, may determine that the prosecution must respond. If not persuaded otherwise, the judge may conclude that the challenges rest on the belief that blacks could not fairly try a black defendant. This, in effect, attributes to the prosecutor the view that all blacks should be eliminated from the entire venire. Hence, the Court's prior cases dealing with jury venires rather than petit juries are not without relevance in this case. The Court emphasizes that using peremptory challenges to strike blacks does not end the inquiry; it is not unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more blacks from the jury. The judge may not require the prosecutor to respond at all. If he does, the prosecutor, who in most cases has had a chance to voir dire the prospective jurors, will have an opportunity to give trial-related reasons for his strikes *102 some satisfactory ground other than the belief that black jurors should not be allowed to judge a black defendant. Much litigation will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's equal protection holding today, and the significant |
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