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Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112478/cruzan-v-director-mo-dept-of-health/ | the need for such arrangements however makes this a tool which will all too often go unused by those who might desire it." When a person tells family or close friends that she does not want her life sustained artificially, she is "express[ing] her wishes in the only terms familiar to her, and as clearly as a lay person should be asked to express them. To require more is unrealistic, and for all practical purposes, it precludes the right of patients to forego life-sustaining treatment." In re O'Connor,[22] When Missouri enacted a living will statute, it specifically provided that the absence of a living will does not warrant a presumption that a patient wishes continued medical treatment. See n. *325 Thus, apparently not even Missouri's own legislature believes that a person who does not execute a living will fails to do so because he wishes continuous medical treatment under all circumstances. The testimony of close friends and family members, on the other hand, may often be the best evidence available of what the patient's choice would be. It is they with whom the patient most likely will have discussed such questions and they who know the patient best. "Family members have a unique knowledge of the patient which is vital to any decision on his or her behalf." Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically and Terminally Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y. L. S. Human Rights Annual 35, 46 The Missouri court's decision to ignore this whole category of testimony is also at odds with the practices of other States. See, e. g., In re Peter, 108 N. J. 365, ; ; In re Severns, 425 A.2d 6 The Missouri court's disdain for Nancy's statements in serious conversations not long before her accident, for the opinions of Nancy's family and friends as to her values, beliefs and certain choice, and even for the opinion of an outside objective factfinder appointed by the State evinces a disdain for Nancy Cruzan's own right to choose. The rules by which an incompetent person's wishes are determined must represent every effort to determine those wishes. The rule that the Missouri court adopted and that this Court upholds, however, skews the result away from a determination that as accurately as possible reflects the individual's own preferences and beliefs. It is a rule that transforms human beings into passive subjects of medical technology. "[M]edical care decisions must be guided by the individual patient's interests and values. Allowing persons to determine their own medical treatment is an important way in |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112478/cruzan-v-director-mo-dept-of-health/ | determine their own medical treatment is an important way in which society respects persons as individuals. *326 Moreover, the respect due to persons as individuals does not diminish simply because they have become incapable of participating in treatment decisions. [I]t is still possible for others to make a decision that reflects [the patient's] interests more closely than would a purely technological decision to do whatever is possible. Lacking the ability to decide, [a patient] has a right to a decision that takes his interests into account." Conservatorship of Drabick, C I do not suggest that States must sit by helplessly if the choices of incompetent patients are in danger of being ignored. See ante, at 281. Even if the Court had ruled that Missouri's rule of decision is unconstitutional, as I believe it should have, States would nevertheless remain free to fashion procedural protections to safeguard the interests of incompetents under these circumstances. The Constitution provides merely a framework here: Protections must be genuinely aimed at ensuring decisions commensurate with the will of the patient, and must be reliable as instruments to that end. Of the many States which have instituted such protections, Missouri is virtually the only one to have fashioned a rule that lessens the likelihood of accurate determinations. In contrast, nothing in the Constitution prevents States from reviewing the advisability of a family decision, by requiring a court proceeding or by appointing an impartial guardian ad litem. There are various approaches to determining an incompetent patient's treatment choice in use by the several States today, and there may be advantages and disadvantages to each and other approaches not yet envisioned. The choice, in largest part, is and should be left to the States, so long as each State is seeking, in a reliable manner, to discover what the patient would want. But with such momentous interests in the balance, States must avoid procedures that will prejudice *327 the decision. "To err either wayto keep a person alive under circumstances under which he would rather have been allowed to die, or to allow that person to die when he would have chosen to cling to lifewould be deeply unfortunate." In re Conroy, 98 N. J., at D Finally, I cannot agree with the majority that where it is not possible to determine what choice an incompetent patient would make, a State's role as parens patriae permits the State automatically to make that choice itself. See ante, at 286 (explaining that the Due Process Clause does not require a State to confide the decision to "anyone but the patient |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112478/cruzan-v-director-mo-dept-of-health/ | State to confide the decision to "anyone but the patient herself"). Under fair rules of evidence, it is improbable that a court could not determine what the patient's choice would be. Under the rule of decision adopted by Missouri and upheld today by this Court, such occasions might be numerous. But in neither case does it follow that it is constitutionally acceptable for the State invariably to assume the role of deciding for the patient. A State's legitimate interest in safeguarding a patient's choice cannot be furthered by simply appropriating it. The majority justifies its position by arguing that, while close family members may have a strong feeling about the question, "there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospect of her situation while competent." I cannot quarrel with this observation. But it leads only to another question: Is there any reason to suppose that a State is more likely to make the choice that the patient would have made than someone who knew the patient intimately? To ask this is to answer it. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed: "Family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the patient's approach to life, but also *328 because of their special bonds with him or her. It is they who treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause." In re Jobes, 108 N. J. 394, 416, 529 A.2d The State, in contrast, is a stranger to the patient. A State's inability to discern an incompetent patient's choice still need not mean that a State is rendered powerless to protect that choice. But I would find that the Due Process Clause prohibits a State from doing more than that. A State may ensure that the person who makes the decision on the patient's behalf is the one whom the patient himself would have selected to make that choice for him. And a State may exclude from consideration anyone having improper motives. But a State generally must either repose the choice with the person whom the patient himself would most likely have chosen as proxy or leave the decision to the patient's family.[23] IV As many as 10,000 patients are being maintained in persistent vegetative states in the United States, and the number is expected to increase significantly in the near future. See at 27, 31. Medical technology, developed over the past 20 or |
Justice Brennan | 1,990 | 13 | dissenting | Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112478/cruzan-v-director-mo-dept-of-health/ | 27, 31. Medical technology, developed over the past 20 or so years, is often capable of resuscitating people after they have stopped breathing or their hearts have stopped beating. Some of those people are brought fully back to life. Two decades ago, those who were not and could not swallow and digest food, died. Intravenous solutions could not provide sufficient calories to maintain people for more than a short time. Today, various forms of artificial feeding have been developed that are able to keep people metabolically alive for years, even decades. See Spencer & Palmisano, Specialized Nutritional Support of *329 Patients A Hospital's Legal Duty?, 11 Quality Rev. Bull. 160, 160-161 In addition, in this century, chronic or degenerative ailments have replaced communicable diseases as the primary causes of death. See R. Weir, Abating Treatment with Critically Ill Patients 12-13 (1989); President's Commission -16. The 80% of Americans who die in hospitals are "likely to meet their end `in a sedated or comatose state; betubed nasally, abdominally and intravenously; and far more like manipulated objects than like moral subjects.'"[24] A fifth of all adults surviving to age 80 will suffer a progressive dementing disorder prior to death. See Cohen & Eisdorfer, Dementing Disorders, in The Practice of Geriatrics 194 "[L]aw, equity and justice must not themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modern technological marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought of." In re Quinlan, 70 N. J. 10, 44, The new medical technology can reclaim those who would have been irretrievably lost a few decades ago and restore them to active lives. For Nancy Cruzan, it failed, and for others with wasting incurable disease, it may be doomed to failure. In these unfortunate situations, the bodies and preferences and memories of the victims do not escheat to the State; nor does our Constitution permit the State or any other government to commandeer them. No singularity of feeling exists upon which such a government might confidently rely as parens patriae. The President's Commission, after years of research, concluded: "In few areas of health care are people's evaluations of their experiences so varied and uniquely personal as in their assessments of the nature and value of the processes associated with dying. For some, every moment of life is of inestimable value; for others, life without *330 some desired level of mental or physical ability is worthless or burdensome. A moderate degree of suffering may be an important means of personal growth and religious experience to one person, but only frightening or despicable to another." President's Commission 276. Yet Missouri and |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | Today the majority holds that an Article III court erred when it allowed plaintiffs who prevailed on appeal to collect on a supersede as bond in the face of an injunction issued by a non-Article III judge. Because, in my view, the majority *314 attaches insufficient weight to the fact that the challenged injunction was issued by a non-Article III judge, I respectfully dissent. I The outlines of the problems I perceive are best drawn by starting with an examination of the injunctions and opinions issued by the Bankruptcy Judge in this case. As the majority notes, Bennie and Joann Edwards (the Edwards) won a tort judgment against Celotex Corporation for damages Bennie Edwards suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos. To stay the judgment pending appeal, Celotex arranged for Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Northbrook) to post a supersede as bond to cover the full amount of the judgment. On October 12, before Celotex filed its voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Edwards' judgment against Celotex. It is undisputed that, when the Edwards' judgment was affirmed, any property interest that Celotex retained in the supersede as bond was extinguished. The filing of Celotex's bankruptcy petition on October 12, triggered the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S. C. 32(a). On October 17, the Bankruptcy Judge, acting pursuant to 11 U.S. C. 105(a),[1] supplemented the automatic stay provisions with an emergency order staying, inter alia, all proceedings "involving any of the Debtors [i. e., Celotex]." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-28. The supersede as bond filed in the Edwards' case, however, evidences an independent obligation on the part of * Northbrook. For that reason, neither the automatic stay of proceedings against the debtor pursuant to 32(a) of the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Judge's October 17, 105(a) stay restrained the Edwards from proceeding against Northbrook to enforce Northbrook's obligations under the bond. As the Court of Appeals correctly held, the October 17 order enjoined the prosecution of proceedings involving "the Debtors," but did not expressly enjoin the Edwards from proceeding against Northbrook. See On May 3, the Edwards commenced their proceeding against Northbrook by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure[2] to enforce the supersedeas bond. Several weeks lateron June 13, the Bankruptcy Court entered a new three-paragraph order enjoining all of Celotex's judgment creditors from collecting on their supersedeas bonds. Paragraph 1 of the order addressed creditors whose appellate process had not yet concluded. |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | order addressed creditors whose appellate process had not yet concluded. Paragraph 2 addressed creditors whose appellate process concluded only after Celotex had filed for bankruptcy. Paragraph 3 applied to judgment creditors, such as the Edwards, whose appeals had concluded before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Paragraph 3 expressly precluded those creditors from proceeding against any bond "without first seeking to vacate the Section 105 stay entered by this Court." In re Celotex Corp., *31 The opinion supporting that order explained that Paragraphs 1 and 2 rested in part on the theory that the debtor retains a property interest in the supersedeas bonds until the appellate process was complete, and any attempt to collect on those bonds was therefore covered in the first instance by 32(a)'s automatic stay provisions. The opinion recognized that that rationale did not cover supersedeas bonds posted in litigation with judgment creditors, such as the Edwards, whose appellate process was complete. The Bankruptcy Judge concluded, however, that 105(a) gave him the power to stay the collection efforts of such bonded judgment creditors. The Bankruptcy Judge contended that other courts had utilized the 105(a) stay "to preclude actions which may `impede the reorganization process,' " at 483, quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., (CA2), cert. denied, or "`which will have an adverse impact on the Debtor's ability to formulate a Chapter 11 plan,' " quoting A. H. Robins (CA4), cert. denied, But cf. n. 12, infra. Apparently viewing his own authority as virtually limitless, the Bankruptcy Judge described a general bankruptcy power "to stop ongoing litigation and to prevent peripheral court decisions from dealing with issues without first allowing the bankruptcy court to have an opportunity to review the potential effect on the debtor." He concluded that in "mega" cases in which "potential conflicts with other judicial determinations" might arise, "the powers of the bankruptcy court under Section 105 must in the initial stage be absolute." Ib I do not agree that the powers of a bankruptcy judge, a non-Article III judge, "must be absolute" at the initial stage or indeed at any stage. Instead, the jurisdiction and the power of bankruptcy judges are cabined by specific and important statutory and constitutional constraints that operate at every phase of a bankruptcy. In my view, those constraints *317 require that the judgment of the Court of Appeals be affirmed. The majority concludes that the Court of Appeals must be reversed because the Bankruptcy Judge had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and because the injunction had more than a "`frivolous pretense to validity.' " Ante, at 312. Even applying the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | pretense to validity.' " Ante, at 312. Even applying the majority's framework, I would affirm the Court of Appeals. As I will demonstrate, the constraints on the jurisdiction and authority of the Bankruptcy Judge compel the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue the challenged injunction, and that the injunction has only a "`frivolous pretense to validity.' " I will explain, however, why the majority's deferential approach seems particularly inappropriate as applied to this particular injunction, now in its fifth year of preventing enforcement of supersedeas bonds lodged in an Article III court. II In my view, the Bankruptcy Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction that prevents an Article III court from allowing a judgment creditor to collect on a supersedeas bond posted in that court by a nondebtor. In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority relies primarily on the Bankruptcy Judge's "related to" jurisdiction, and thus I will address that basis of jurisdiction first. The majority properly observes that, under 28 U.S. C. 1334(b), the district court has broad bankruptcy jurisdiction, extending to "all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11."[3] The majority notes correctly *318 that the Edwards' action to enforce the supersedeas bond is within the district court's "related to" jurisdiction,[4] because allowing creditors such as the Edwards "to execute immediately on the bonds would have a direct and substantial adverse effect on Celotex's ability to undergo a successful reorganization." Ante, at 310.[5] The majority then observes *319 that, under 28 U.S. C. 157(a), the district court may "refe[r]" to the bankruptcy judge "any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11."[] Thus, the majority concludes that, because the Edwards' action to enforce the *320 supersedeas bond was within the District Court's "related to" jurisdiction and because the District Court referred all matters to the Bankruptcy Judge, the Bankruptcy Judge had jurisdiction over the Edwards' action. In my view, the majority's approach pays insufficient attention to the remaining provisions of 157, and, more importantly, to the decision of this Court that gave rise to their creation. The current jurisdictional structure of the Bankruptcy Code reflects this Court's decision in Northern Constr. which in turn addressed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, The 1978 Act significantly restructured the Bankruptcy Code. The Act created "bankruptcy courts" and vested in them "jurisdiction over all `civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases under title 11.' " Northern quoting 28 U.S. C. 1471(b) (197 ed., Supp. IV). As the plurality opinion in Northern observed, "[t]his jurisdictional grant empowers bankruptcy courts to entertain a wide variety of cases," involving "claims based on state law as well as those based on federal law." The Act bestowed upon the judges of the bankruptcy courts broad powers to accompany this expanded jurisdiction. See n. Northern The Act did not, however, make the newly empowered bankruptcy judges Article III judges. In particular, it denied bankruptcy judges the life tenure and salary protection that the Constitution requires for Article III judges. See U. S. Const., Art. III, 1. In Northern this Court held that the Act was unconstitutional, at least insofar as it allowed a non-Article III court to "entertain and decide" a purely state-law ; see at 8 (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion distinguished the revamped bankruptcy courts from prior *321 district court "adjuncts" which the Court had found did not violate Article III. The plurality noted that, in contrast to the narrow, specialized jurisdiction exercised by these prior adjuncts, "the subject-matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts encompasses not only traditional matters of bankruptcy, but `all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11.' " at 85. In addition, prior adjuncts "engaged in statutorily channeled factfinding functions," while the bankruptcy courts "exercise `all of the jurisdiction' conferred by the Act on the district courts."[7]Ib In response to Northern Congress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (1984 amendments), Section 157 was passed as part of the 1984 amendments. Section 157 establishes two broad categories of proceedings: "core proceedings" and "[n]on-core proceedings." For "all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under [ 157(a)]," 157(b)(1) permits bankruptcy judges to "hear and determine" the proceedings and to "enter appropriate orders and judgments." For noncore proceedings "otherwise related to a case under title 11," 157(c)(1) permits the bankruptcy court only to "hear" the proceedings and to "submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court." See 1 Collier ¶ 3.01[1][c][iv], at 3-28 ("[C]ivil proceedings `related to cases under title 11' " are "excluded from being treated as `core proceedings' by 28 U.S. C. 157(b)(1), and are the subject of special procedures contained in section[s] 157(c)(1) and (c)(2)"). For these "related proceedings," 1 Collier ¶ 3.01[1][c][iv], at 3-28, only the *322 district court has the power to enter "any |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | the *322 district court has the power to enter "any final order or judgment."[8] In my view, the distinction between the jurisdiction to "hear and determine" core proceedings on the one hand and the jurisdiction only to "hear" related proceedings on the other hand is critical, if not dispositive. I believe that the jurisdiction to hear (and yet not to determine) a case under 157(c)(1) provides insufficient jurisdiction to a bankruptcy judge to permit him to issue a binding injunction that prevents an Article III court from exercising its conceded jurisdiction over the case.[9] The unambiguous text of 157(c)(1) *323 requires that the bankruptcy judge's participation in related proceedings be merely advisory rather than adjudicative. In my view, having jurisdiction to grant injunctions over cases that one may not decide is inconsistent with such an advisory role. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy whose impact on private rights may be just as onerous as a final determination. The constitutional concerns that animate the current jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and that deny non-Article III tribunals the power to determine private controversies apply with equal force to the entry of an injunction interfering with the exercise of the admitted jurisdiction of an Article III tribunal.[10] In sum, my view on the sufficiency of "related to" jurisdiction to sustain the injunction in this case can be stated quite simply: If a bankruptcy judge lacks jurisdiction to "determine" a question, the judge lacks jurisdiction to issue an injunction that prevents an Article III court, which concededly does have jurisdiction, from determining that question.[11]*324 Any conclusion to the contrary would trivialize the constitutional imperatives that shaped the Bankruptcy Code's jurisdictional provisions.[12] III Petitioner and the majority rely primarily on "related to" jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court's holding appears to rest almost entirely on the view that a bankruptcy judge has jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in Article III courts whenever those proceedings are "related to" a pending Title 11 case. See ante, at 307-311. Two footnotes in the Court's opinion, however, might be read as suggesting alternative bases of *325 jurisdiction. See ante, at 304-305, n. 4, 311, n. 8. Those two footnotes require a brief response. In footnote 4 of its opinion, the Court refers to two different claims advanced by Celotex in the bankruptcy proceedings: a claim that "the bonded judgment creditors should not be able to execute on their bonds because, by virtue of the collateralization of the bonds, the bonded judgment creditors are beneficiaries of Celotex asset transfers that are voidable as preferences and fraudulent transfers"; and a claim that "the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | as preferences and fraudulent transfers"; and a claim that "the punitive damages portions of the judgments can be voided or subordinated." There is little doubt that those claims are properly characterized as ones "arising under" Title 11 within the meaning of 28 U.S. C. 1334(b);[13] however, it does not necessarily follow from that characterization that the Bankruptcy Judge had jurisdiction to issue the injunction in support of the prosecution of those claims. Celotex's complaint was not filed until months after the Bankruptcy Judge's injunction issued. The claims raised in that complaint cannot retroactively provide a jurisdictional basis for the Bankruptcy Judge's injunction. Moreover, Celotex's attempts to set aside the Edwards' supersedeas bond are patently meritless. It strains credulity, *32 to suggest that a supersedeas bond, posted almost a year and a half before the bankruptcy petition was filed, could be set aside as a preference or as a fraudulent transfer for the benefit of Celotex's adversaries in bitterly contested litigation. Conceivably, Celotex's provision of security to Northbrook might be voidable, but that possibility could not impair the rights of the judgment creditors to enforce the bond against Northbrook even though they might be unwitting beneficiaries of the fraud. That possibility, at most, would be relevant to the respective claims of Northbrook and Celotex to the pledged collateral. Similarly, the fact that the Edwards' judgment included punitive as well as compensatory damages does not provide even an arguable basis for reducing Northbrook's obligations under the supersedeas bond. Even if there is a basis for subordinating a portion of Northbrook's eventual claim against Celotex on "bankruptcy law grounds," that has nothing to do with the Edwards' claim against Northbrook. It thus seems obvious that, at least with respect to the Edwards, Celotex has raised frivolous claims in an attempt to manufacture bankruptcy jurisdiction and thereby to justify a bankruptcy judge's injunction that had been issued over one year earlier. Cf. In its footnote 8, the Court appears to suggest that the injunction prohibiting the Edwards from proceeding against Northbrook (described in the footnote as the "stay proceeding") may "aris[e] under" Title 11 or may "arise in" the Title 11 case. Perhaps this is accurate in a literal sense: The injunction did, of course, "arise under" Title 11 because 11 U.S. C. 105(a) created whatever power the Bankruptcy Judge had to issue the injunction. Similarly, the injunction "arises in" the Title 11 case because that is where it originated. It cannot be the law, however, that a bankruptcy *327 judge has jurisdiction to enter any conceivable order that a party might request simply |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | enter any conceivable order that a party might request simply because 105(a) authorizes some injunctions or because the request was first made in a pending Title 11 case. Cf. 2 Collier ¶ 105.01[1], at 105-3 (Section 105 "is not an independent source of jurisdiction, but rather it grants the courts flexibility to issue orders which preserve and protect their jurisdiction"). The mere filing of a motion for a 105 injunction to enjoin a proceeding in another forum cannot be a jurisdictional bootstrap enabling a bankruptcy judge to exercise jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist. IV Even if I believed that the Bankruptcy Judge had jurisdiction to issue his injunction, I would still affirm the Court of Appeals because in my view the Bankruptcy Judge's injunction has only a "frivolous pretense to validity." In 1898, Congress codified the bankruptcy laws. Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, most bankruptcy proceedings were conducted by "referees" who resolved controversies involving property in the actual or constructive possession of the court, as well as certain disputes involving property in the possession of third parties. In 2(a)(15) of the 1898 Act, Congress vested in bankruptcy courts the power to: "[M]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act." Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 54. In 18, Congress clarified both the powers and the limitations on the injunctive authority of referees in bankruptcy by adding to the end of 2(a)(15), "Provided, however, That an injunction to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only." In 1978, through the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress significantly revised the Bankruptcy Code and the role of *328 bankruptcy referees.[14] Though stopping short of making bankruptcy referees Article III judges, Congress significantly increased the status, the duties, and the powers of those referees. For example, as we noted in Northern the expanded powers under the new Act included "the power to hold jury trials, to issue declaratory judgments, [and] to issue writs of habeas corpus under certain circumstances." In addition, Congress again provided for broad injunctive powers. Thus, for example, in the place of 2(a)(15), Congress added 11 U.S. C. 105, which provided in relevant part: "The [bankruptcy court] may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." See Once again, however, along with both this marked expansion of the power of bankruptcy judges and the broad delegation of injunctive authority, Congress indicated its intent to limit the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | of injunctive authority, Congress indicated its intent to limit the power of those judges to enjoin other courts: Although Congress provided that "[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty," it provided that bankruptcy courts "may not enjoin another court." 28 U.S. C. 1481 (1982 ed.).[15] Thus, for well over 50 years prior to the adoption of the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, it was clear that Congress intended to deny bankruptcy judges the power to enjoin other courts. *329 The 1984 amendments, inter alia, repealed 1481 (and its express limitation on injunctive authority), leaving 105 as the only source of the bankruptcy judge's injunctive authority.[1] Given that Northern required a contraction in the authority of bankruptcy judges,[17] and given that the 1984 amendments regarding the powers of the bankruptcy courts were passed to comply with Northern[18] it would be perverseand in my view "frivolous"to contend that Congress intended the repeal of 1481 to operate as an authorization for those judges to enjoin proceedings in other courts, thus significantly expanding the powers of bankruptcy judges. My view of the consequence of the 1984 amendments is reinforced by the structure of 1481. When Congress placed restrictions on the injunctive power of the bankruptcy courts, it did so in 1481, right after the clause granting those courts "the powers of a court of equity, law, and admiralty." In my view, this suggests that Congress saw 1481and not 105(a)as the source of any power to enjoin other courts. Thus, the removal of 1481 by the 1984 amendments is properly viewed as eliminating the sole source of congressionally granted authority to enjoin other courts. Cf. In re Hipp, 1515-151 (concluding on similar reasoning that 1481, not 105(a), was the source of the bankruptcy court's power to punish criminal contempt under the 1978 Act). *330 Nor does anything in the 198 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code alter my analysis.[19] The primary effect of those amendments was to give the bankruptcy judges the power to issue orders sua sponte.[20] The 198 amendments, therefore, do not reflect any expansion of the power of Bankruptcy Judges to enjoin other courts. The Bankruptcy Judge's error with respect to this injunction thus seems clear, and the injunction falls, therefore, within the exception recognized by the majority for injunctions with only a "frivolous pretense to validity." I recognize, of course, that one may legitimately question the "frivolousness" of the injunction in light of the Fourth Circuit's upholding the very injunction at issue in this case, see 978 F.2d 14 cert. denied, and the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | this case, see 978 F.2d 14 cert. denied, and the disagreement of a substantial number of my colleagues. In my view, however, the Bankruptcy Judge's error is sufficiently plain that the Court of Appeals was justified in allowing the Edwards to collect on their bond.[21] *331 V The Court's holding today rests largely on its view that the Edwards' proper remedy is to appeal the Bankruptcy Judge's injunction, first to the District Court and then to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Court concedes, however, that the Edwards need not do so if the Bankruptcy Judge exceeded his jurisdiction, or if the injunction is supported by nothing more than "a frivolous pretense to validity." Ante, at 312. For the reasons already stated, I think both of those conditions are satisfied in this case. The non-Article III Bankruptcy Judge simply lacked both jurisdiction and authority to prevent an Article III court from exercising its unquestioned jurisdiction to decide a matter that is related only indirectly to the bankruptcy proceeding. I think it important, however, to add a few brief words explaining why I find this injunction especially troubling and why the injunction should be viewed with a particularly critical eye. First, the justification offered by the Bankruptcy Judge should give the Court pause. As originally articulated, the justification for this injunction was that emergency relief was required lest the reorganization of Celotex become impossible and liquidation follow. Apart from the fact that the "emergency" rationale is plainly insufficient to support an otherwise improper injunction that has now lasted for more than four years, the judge's reasoning reveals reliance on the misguided notion that a good end is a sufficient justification for the existence and exercise of power. His reference to the need to exercise "absolute" power to override "potential conflicts with other judicial determinations" that might have a "potential impact on the debtor" should invite far *332 more exacting scrutiny of his order than the Court deems appropriate. Second, that the subject of the injunction was a supersedeas bond makes the injunction suspect. A supersedeas bond may be viewed as putting the integrity of the court in which it is lodged on the line. As the Court of Appeals noted, the Edwards were "promised by the court" that the supersedeas bond would be available if they prevailed on F.3d, at 320. For that reason, in my opinion, questions relating to the enforceability of a supersedeas bond should generally be answered in the forum in which the bond is posted. Moreover, whenever possible, such questions should be resolved before |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | dissenting | Celotex Corp. v. Edwards | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/117920/celotex-corp-v-edwards/ | posted. Moreover, whenever possible, such questions should be resolved before the court accepts the bond as security for collection of the judgment being appealed. After a debtor has benefited from the postponement of collection of an adverse judgment, both that debtor and its successors in interest should normally be estopped from asserting that the judgment creditors who relied to their detriment on the validity of the bond had no right to do so. The very purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect judgment creditors from the risk that insolvency of the debtor may impair their ability to enforce the judgment promptly. When the bond has served the purpose of forestalling immediate levies on the judgment debtor's assetslevies that might have precipitated an earlier bankruptcyit is inequitable to postpone payment merely because the risk against which the bond was intended to provide protection has actually occurred. See at 319 ("It is manifestly unfair to force the judgment creditor to delay the right to collect with a promise to protect the judgment only to later refuse to allow that successful plaintiff to execute the bond because the debtor has sought protection under the laws of bankruptcy"); In re Southmark, ("The principal risk against which such bonds are intended as a protection is insolvency. To hold *333 that the very contingency against which they guard shall, if it happens, discharge them, seems to us bad law and worse logic"). The inequity that the Court today condones does not, of course, demonstrate that its legal analysis is incorrect. It does, however, persuade me that the Court should not review this case as though it presented an ordinary collateral attack on an injunction entered by an Article III court.[22] Instead, the Court should, I believe, more carefully consider which of the two competing tribunals is guilty of trespassing in the other's domain. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Stewart | 1,975 | 18 | concurring | Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v. Robertson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109293/administrator-federal-aviation-administration-v-robertson/ | Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S. C. 552 (b) (3), provides for nondisclosure of "matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." Section 1104 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S. C. 1504, specifically provides that when "[a]ny person" objects to the public disclosure of certain information, "the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public." The Court today rules that information may be withheld under 1104 by reason of Exemption 3. Legislation of unusually broad scope often reflects reconciliation of conflicting values and policies. On occasion, therefore, particular provisions of such legislation may seem at odds with its basic purpose. But when the statutory language is relatively clear and the legislative history casts no serious doubt, the only appropriate judicial course is to give effect to the evident legislative intent. So it is here. The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in order to impose objective and easily applicable statutory disclosure standards in place of relatively amorphous standards such as the "public interest," behind which the most self-serving motives for nondisclosure of information could be concealed. ; and see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 813, *269 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965). But it seems equally clear that Congress intended to leave largely undisturbed existing statutes dealing with the disclosure of information by specific agencies. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1966). Simply stated, the respondents' position is that to allow administrative discretion under a general "public interest" standard to determine whether information shall be disclosed to the public is inconsistent with the general thrust of the Freedom of Information Act. For this Court to accept that position, it must accept its inevitable corollary: that by enacting the Freedom of Information Act, Congress intended to repeal, by implication alone, those statutes that make disclosure a matter of agency discretion.[1] It simply is impossible fairly to discern any such intention on the part of Congress. There is no evidence of such an intention in either the statutory language or the legislative history, and there are strong intimations to the contrary. See ante, at 263-265. Our role is to interpret statutory language, not to revise it. As matters now stand, when an agency asserts a right to withhold information based on a specific *270 statute of the kind described in Exemption 3, the only question "to be |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | n the defendant in a criminal case was found guilty on 5 of 11 counts on which the jury was instructed. The verdict was a general one and one 6-year sentence was imposed. On writ of error, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, saying that the first "count an the verdict of guilty returned upon it being sufficient to support the judgment and sentence, the question of the sufficiency of the other counts need not be considered." Similarly, in a defendant was convicted on each of five counts, and a general sentence was imposed. The Court said, : "Since this sentence was less than the maximum punishment authorized by the statute for conviction under any one Count, the judgment below must be upheld if the conviction upon any of the Counts is sustainable" ; ; ; and were similar holdings. t is therefore clear that in cases such as Claassen and Barenblatt, there is no Stromberg, Thomas, or problem. *892 Here, the jury imposing the sentence found three aggravating circumstances and based on all the evidence imposed the death sentence. One of the aggravating circumstance was found invalid on an intervening appeal in another case, and the claim is that under Stromberg, Thomas, and the death sentence must be set aside. agree with the Court that there is no such problem since the evidence supporting the invalid aggravating circumstances was properly before the jury. The Court, however, suggests that if the evidence had been inadmissible under the Federal Constitution, there might be a Stromberg, Thomas, or problem. The Court says, ante, at 88: "The jury's imposition of the death sentence after finding more than one aggravating circumstance is also not precisely the same as the imposition of a single sentence of imprisonment after guilty verdicts on each of several separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, because the qualitatively different sentence of death is imposed only after a channeled sentencing procedure" The Court thus suggests that the Claassen-Barenblatt line of cases may not be applicable to sentencing proceedings in capital punishment cases. fail to grasp the distinction, however, between those cases and the sentencing procedures involved here. n Claassen and Barenblatt, there was only one sentence on several counts and one could be no surer there than here that the sentence did or did not rest on any one of the counts. Those cases, however, would sustain the sentence if it was authorized under any of the valid counts. Stromberg, Thomas, and should no more invalidate the single sentence in this case. Thus in may view there would be no |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | this case. Thus in may view there would be no Stromberg-Thomas- problem, as such, if the invalid count had rested on constitutionally inadmissible evidence. But since the jury is instructed to take into account all the evidence, there would remain the question whether the inadmissible evidence invalidates the sentence. Perhaps it would, but at least there *89 would be room for the application of the harmless-error rule, which would not be the case, it seems to me, under the per se rule of Stromberg, and Thomas. Except for the foregoing, join the Court's opinion and its judgment as well. JUSTCE REHNQUST, concurring in the judgment. While agreeing with the Court's judgment, write separately to make clear my understanding of the application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the capital sentencing procedures and used in this case. agree with the Court's treatment of the factual and procedural background of the case, and with its characterization of the question presented for review. n brief, we must decide whether the procedure by which Georgia imposed the death sentence comports with the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments; whether, in this case, imposition of the death sentence violates the rule of ; and whether the erroneous presentation to a jury of an invalid aggravating circumstance requires vacating the death sentence imposed by that jury. The Georgia death sentencing procedure is comprehensively detailed in the statutes of the State, decisions of the Georgia courts, the opinion issued by the Georgia Supreme Court in response to the questioned certified by this Court, and the jury instructions in this case. As these materials reveal, two separate proceedings are necessary to imposition of the death sentence in Georgia. The first stage is simply a traditional criminal trial on the question of guilt or innocence. f the defendant is found guilty of a capital offense, a separate sentencing proceedings is then conducted. At this second proceeding, the State and the defendant are permitted to introduce a wide range of evidence in "extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment." Ga. Code *89 27-250 The Sentencing body is then directed to make two separate decisions. First, it decides whether any of a number of specific, statutorily defined aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a reasonably doubt. Ga. Code 27-25.1(b). n addition, the jury is instructed that, if it finds one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, it is to make the further judgment whether the defendant deserves the death sentence. n making this second decision, statutory aggravating circumstances found by the sentence are considered together with all the other evidence in mitigation |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | are considered together with all the other evidence in mitigation and aggravation. The sentencer is not, however, instructed to formally "weigh" the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. f a death sentence is imposed, then the case receives both conventional appellate consideration and expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Respondent challenges the Georgia death sentencing system as violative of the Eight Amendment, on the grounds that it fails adequately to channel the discretion of the sentencing body. n particular, respondent urges that the absence of an instruction that the sentence must balance statutory aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances before imposing the death sentence render the scheme unconstitutional under the reasoning in Respondent's claim is, in my opinion, completely foreclosed by this Court's precedents. Except in minor detail, Georgia's current system is identical to the sentencing procedure we held constitutional in ; The joint opinion in Gregg fully recognized that the Georgia scheme did not direct the sentencing body that statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances were to be weighed against each other in any formal sense. This is evident from its careful description of the Georgia scheme, and its treatment of the *895 Model Penal Code's proposed system, where the fact that the sentencing body is formally instructed to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances was specifically noted. Notwithstanding the lack of an explicit "balancing" directive, the joint opinion upheld the statutory scheme, since, taken as a whole, it provided the sentencing authority with sufficient guidance to prevent the "freakish" imposition of death barred in Furman. Likewise, in JUSTCE WHTE's concurrence, the role of aggravating circumstances was squarely discussed, and approved. To accept respondent's contention that the sentencing body must be specifically instructed to balance statutory aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances would require rejecting the judgment in Gregg that the Georgia statute provided the sentencing body with adequate guidance to permit it to impose death.[1] Respondent next contends that requires that his death sentence be set aside. Respondent's argument rests on the fact that one of the three aggravating circumstances specified by the jury in *896 his case was later found invalid under a state-court decision holding the statutory definition of the circumstance impermissibly vague under the United States Constitution.[2] Respondent reasons that Stromberg establishes a rule requiring that any general verdict returned by a factfinder be set aside if it is based, even in part, upon "an invalid factor." Supplemental Brief for Respondent 8. According to respondent, because one of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury was invalid, the general verdict of death returned by the jury |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | invalid, the general verdict of death returned by the jury fails the Stromberg test. Careful examination of Stromberg, cases following that decision, and the role of aggravating circumstances in a jury's imposition of the death penalty compels rejection of respondent's claim. Stromberg presented a straightforward case. The defendant was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting the display of a red flag for any of three separate purposes. At trial the jury was instructed that the defendant should be convicted if he acted with any one of the proscribed purposes; it returned a general verdict of guilty without indicating which purpose it believed motivated the defendant. This Court concluded that the first of the clauses of the statute detailing impermissible purposes was unconstitutional, and held that it was unnecessary to decide the validity of the remaining two clauses. The Court observed that the prosecutor had "emphatically urged upon the jury that they could convict the appellant under the first clause alone, without regard to the other clauses." t concludes that it was "impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained," ib and that, given this complete uncertainty, the conviction could not stand. See also Williams v. North Carolina, 17 U. S. *897 287, 292 (192); ; ; Of course, if the jury does indicate which statutory elements supported its verdict, and if these are valid, then Stromberg is inapplicable. As the Court points out, the Stromberg doctrine subsequently was extended albeit without lengthy analysis. n the Court vacated a conviction based on a single-count indictment, for casting contempt on the United States flag. The statute under which petitioner was convicted criminalized casting contempt upon the flag by "words or act." The information filed against petitioner alleged that he violated this statue because he both burned the flag and shouted derogatory statement about it. Likewise, the State introduced evidence at the bench trial of both the petitioners act and his speech. The Court concluded that petitioners constitutional rights would have been violated had he been punished for his speech. t thought, moreover, that the trial judge might have rested his finding solely on petitioners speech, which presented a situation similar to that in Stromberg. n addition, however, the Court believed that, on the record of the case, there was an "unacceptable danger that the trier of fact regarded the two acts as `intertwined' and rested the conviction on both together." n short, when an element of a crime is defined to included constitutionally projected actions, and when the States alleges, argues, and offer proof that |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | and when the States alleges, argues, and offer proof that the defendant's protected conduct satisfied the element, then a general verdict of guilty must be set aside, even if the State also alleged and proved another course of conduct that could have satisfied the element. As in Stromberg, however, the Court also noted that when the record indicates that he jury's verdict did not rest on an "intertwined" combination of protected and *898 unprotected conduct, but instead rested sufficiently on unprotected conduct, then the verdict would stand. Neither the Stromberg line of case nor provides respondent with appreciable support. agree with the Court that the Stromberg rule is plainly distinguished since the jury explicated returned two concededly valid aggravation circumstances, thereby conclusively negating the inference that it rested solely on the invalid circumstances. Likewise, conclude that the analysis in is inapposite.[] t is helpful in explaining why this is the case to discuss separately the two decision made by the sentencing body during the Georgia death penalty proceedings. initially consider the applicability of to the jury's first decision that is the finding of statutory aggravating circumstances. As indicated above, explicitly stated that its rule regarding the treatment of aggravating circumstance is inapplicable "when the indictment or information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on finding of guilt on certain of those counts, for in such instances there is positive evidence that the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits and separately from the others." This exception to the rule extends to the jury's determination in this case that certain specified aggravating circumstances existed. The jury received separate instructions as to each of several aggravating circumstances, and returned a verdict from separately listing three circumstances. The fact that one of these subsequently proved to be invalid does not affect the validity of the remaining two jury findings, just as the reversal on appeal of one of several convictions returned to separate *899 counts does not affect the remaining convictions. There was "positive evidence" that Stephens' jury considered each aggravating circumstance "on its own merits and separately from the others." Because of this, provides no basis for questioning the jury's first decision, which, if supported, permitted it to go further and consider whether Stephens deserved the death sentence. 's logic is even less applicable to a Georgia death jury's second decision, namely, that the defendant deserved the death sentence. Under the respondent's theory, the jury's verdict of death was based in part on an aggravating circumstances that later proved invalid, and which, according |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | an aggravating circumstances that later proved invalid, and which, according to respondent must thus fall under the rule of Whatever its proper application elsewhere, 's rule cannot fairly be extended to the sentencing context. As discussed below, the significant difference between the role of aggravating circumstances in the jury's decision to imposed the death sentence and role played by instructions or allegations in a jury's determination of guilt preclude applying to the sentencing context. The rule relied upon by respondent was developed in a situation where a factfinder returns a verdict of guilty on a specific criminal charge. n returning this verdict, the jury decides whether the defendant committed a specific set of defined acts with a particular mental state. These elements each of which is necessary to the verdict of guilty, are specifically and carefully enumerated and defined in the indictment or information and the instructions to the jury. Only evidence relevant to the particular elements alleged by the State is admissible, even then, subject to exclusion of prejudicial evidence which might distract the jury from the specific factfinding task it performs. Based on this evidence the jury decides whether each of the elements constituting the offense was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court's observation in accurately captures the character of the procedure *900 leading to a criminal conviction: "n a trial before verdict the issue is whether a defendant is guilty of having engaged in certain criminal conduct of which he has been specifically accused. Rules of evidence have been fashioned for criminal trials narrowly confin[ing] the trial contest" The decision by a Georgia death jury at the final stage of its deliberations to impose death is a significantly different decision from the model just described. A wide range of evidence is admissible on literally countless subjects: "We have long recognized that `[f]or the determination of sentence, justice generally requires that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." Gregg, The role of aggravating circumstances in making this judgment is substantially more limited than the role played by jury instructions or allegations in an indictment in an ordinary trial. n Georgia, aggravating circumstances serve principally to restrict the class of defendants subject to the death sentence; once a single aggravating circumstances is specified, the jury then considers all the evidence in aggravation-mitigation in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, see Part An aggravating circumstance in this latter stage is simply one of the countless considerations weighed by the jury in seeking to judge the punishment |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | weighed by the jury in seeking to judge the punishment appropriate to the individual defendant. f an aggravating circumstance is revealed to be invalid, the probable effect of this fact alone on the jury's second decision whether the death sentence is appropriate is minimal. f one of the few theories of guilt presented to the jury *901 in the trial judge's instructions, or the indictment, proves invalid, there is substantial risk that the jury may have based its verdict on an improper theory. This follows from the necessarily limited number of theories presented to the jury, and from the fact that the jury's decisionmaking is carefully routed along paths specifically set out in the instructions. When an aggravating circumstance proves invalid, however, the effect ordinarily is only to diminish the probative value of one of literally countless factors that the jury considered. The inference that this diminution would alter the result reached by the jury is all but nonexistent. Given this, the rule developed in simply cannot be applied sensibly to sentencing decisions resulting from proceedings involving aggravating circumstances. nstead, as developed in the following Part, a difference analysis has been applied to the question whether to set aside sentencing decisions based in part upon invalid factors. Respondent contends next that, even if is inapplicable the erroneous submission to the jury of an instruction which we are bound to regard as unconstitutionally vague, see n. must have had sufficient effect on the jury's deliberations to require vacating its verdict. Although our prior decisions are not completely consistent regarding the effect of constitutional error in sentencing proceedings on the sentence imposed on the defendant, in general sentencing decisions are accorded far greater finality than convictions. Ordinarily, a sentence within statutory limits is beyond appellate review. 57 U.S. 86, 9 n 9 U. S., at 588, n. 9, we cited approval to several of a long line of sentencing decisions. n ; ; and defendants were convicted on several separate counts and received "general sentence," *902 not linked to any one or combination of the counts. The defendants than challenged all their conviction on writ of error or appeal. The Court, following a well-settled rule, stated in Barenblatt: "Since this sentence was less than the maximum punishment authorized by the statute for conviction under any one Count, the judgment below must be upheld if the conviction upon any of the Counts is sustainable." n Claassen we said: "[]t is settled law in this court, and in this country generally, that in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only." 12 U.S., -17. The practical basis for the rules articulated in Gore and the Claassen line of cases is clear. As indicated above, sentencing decisions rest on a far-reaching inquiry into countless facts and circumstances and not on the type of proof of particular elements that returning a conviction does. The fact that one of the countless considerations that the sentencer would have taken into account was erroneous, misleading, or otherwise improperly before him, ordinarily can be assumed not to have been a necessary basis for his decision. Nonetheless in limited cases, non capital sentencing decisions are vacated for resentencing. n United 0 U.S. two uncounseled and therefore unconstitutionally obtained convictions were introduced against the defendant in the sentencing proceeding. The Court observed that the sentencing judge gave "explicit" and specific" attention, to these convictions. Moreover, it noted that the defendant would have "appeared in a dramatically different light" had the true character of the unconstitutional convictions been known: the judge would have been dealing with a *90 man unconstitutionally imprisoned, beginning at age 17, for more than 10 years, including 5 1/2 years on a chain gang. Finally, the Court reemphasized the unconstitutional character of the respondent's prior convictions, and opined that to permit his sentence to stand would "erode" the rule in 72 U.S. 5 (196). Given all this, respondent's sentence was held improper, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Similarly, in U.S. 76 an uncounseled defendant was sentenced following a proceeding in which the trial judge explicitly an repeatedly relied upon the incorrect assumption that the defendant had been convicted of several crimes. The Court observed that "[i]t is not the duration of severity of this sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false, which the prisoner had no opportunity to correct by the services which counsel would provide, that renders the proceedings lacking in due process." The approach taken in Townsend, and the Claassen line of cases begins with the presumption that, since the sentencer's judgment rested on countless variables, an error made in one portion of the sentencing proceeding ordinarily should not affect the sentence. |
Justice White | 1,983 | 6 | concurring | Zant v. Stephens | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110984/zant-v-stephens/ | of the sentencing proceeding ordinarily should not affect the sentence. This presumption is most plainly revealed by the Claassen line of cases, where a sentence will stand even if it turns out that the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced had not all been committed. Nonetheless, the defendant may adduce evidence that the sentencing body likely would have acted differently had the error not occurred. n order to prevail on such a claim, however, we have required a convincing showing that the introduction of specific constitutionally infirm evidence had an ascertainable and "dramatic" impact on the sentencing authority. See United Of course, a more careful application of this standard is appropriate in capital cases. *90 n the present case, however, the erroneous submission to the jury of an invalid aggravating circumstance simply cannot satisfy whatever standard may plausibly be based on the cases discussed above. As the Court points out, the only real impact resulting from the error was the evidence properly before the jury was capable of being fit within a category that the judge's instructions labeled "aggravating." The evidence in question respondent's prior convictions plainly was an aggravating factor, which, as we held in Gregg, the jury was free to consider. The fact that the instruction gave added weight to this no doubt played some role in the deliberations of some jurors. Yet, the Georgia Supreme Court was plainly right in saying that the "mere fact that some of the aggravating circumstances presented were improperly designated `statutory;" had "an inconsequential impact on the jury's decision regarding the death penalty." The plurality recognized in U. S., at 605, that there can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death." Whatever a defendant must show to set aside a death sentence, the present case involved only a remote possibility that the error had any effect on the jury's judgment; the Eighth Amendment did not therefore require that the defendant's sentence be vacated. |
Justice Brennan | 1,973 | 13 | second_dissenting | Barnes v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108830/barnes-v-united-states/ | Petitioner was charged in two counts of a six-count indictment with possession of United States Treasury *853 checks stolen from the mails, knowing them to be stolen. The essential elements of such an offense are (1) that the defendant was in possession of the checks, (2) that the checks were stolen from the mails, and (3) that the defendant knew that the checks were stolen. The Government proved that petitioner had been in possession of the checks and that the checks had been stolen from the mails; and, in addition, the Government introduced some evidence intended to show that petitioner knew or should have known that the checks were stolen. But rather than leaving the jury to determine the element of "knowledge" on the basis of that evidence, the trial court instructed it that it was free to infer the essential element of "knowledge" from petitioner's unexplained possession of the checks. In my view, that instruction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it permitted the jury to convict even though the actual evidence bearing on "knowledge" may have been insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore dissent. We held in In re Winship, that the Due Process Clause requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime" Thus, in we approved the inference of "knowledge" from the fact of possessing smuggled heroin because " `[c]ommon sense' tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal in is smuggled" (Emphasis added.) The basis of that "common sense" judgment was, of course, the indisputable fact that all or virtually all heroin in this country is necessarily smuggled. Here, however, it cannot be said that all or virtually all endorsed United States Treasury checks have been stolen. Indeed, it is neither unlawful nor unusual *854 for people to use such checks as direct payment for goods and services. Thus, unlike Turner, "common sense" simply will not permit the inference that the possessor of stolen Treasury checks "inevitably" knew that the checks were stolen. Cf. In short, the practical effect of the challenged instruction was to permit the jury to convict petitioner even if it found insufficient or disbelieved all of the Government's evidence bearing directly on the issue of "knowledge." By authorizing the jury to rely exclusively on the inference in determining the element of "knowledge," the instruction relieved the Government of the burden of proving that element beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction thereby violated the principle of Winship that every essential |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | concurring | Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/ | Today the Court upholds the withdrawal liability provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA) against a facial challenge to their validity based on the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I join the Court's opinion and agree with its reasoning and its result, but I write separately to emphasize some of the issues the Court does not decide today. Specifically, the Court does not decide today, and has left open in previous cases, whether the imposition of withdrawal liability under the MPPAA and of plan termination liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) may in some circumstances be so arbitrary and irrational as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Pension Benefit Guaranty ; Nachman The Court also has no occasion to decide whether the MPPAA may violate the Taking Clause as applied in particular cases, or whether the pension plan in this case is a defined benefit plan rather than a defined contribution plan within the meaning of ERISA. As the Court indicates, the mere fact that "legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another," ante, at 223, will not establish either a violation of the Taking Clause or the Due Process Clause. With regard to the latter provision, it is settled that in the field of economic legislation "the burden is on one complaining of a due *229 process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way." Nonetheless, the Court has never intimated that Congress possesses unlimited power to "readjus[t] rights and burdens [and] upse[t] otherwise settled expectations." Turner Our recent cases leave open the possibility that the imposition of retroactive liability on employers for the benefit of employees may be arbitrary and irrational in the absence of any connection between the employer's conduct and some detriment to the employee. See Turner ; Pension Benefit Guaranty ). Insofar as the application of the provisions of the MPPAA and of ERISA to pension benefits that accrue in the future is concerned, there can be little doubt of Congress' power to override contractual provisions limiting employer liability for unfunded benefits promised to employees under the plan. But both statutes impose liability under certain circumstances on contributing employers for unfunded benefits that accrued in the past under a pension plan whether or not the employers had agreed to ensure that benefits would be fully funded. In my view, imposition of this type of retroactive liability on employers, to be constitutional, must rest on some basis in |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | concurring | Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/ | employers, to be constitutional, must rest on some basis in the employer's conduct that would make it rational to treat the employees' expectations of benefits under the plan as the employer's responsibility. In enacting ERISA, Congress distinguished between two types of employee retirement benefit plans: "defined benefit plan[s]" and "defined contribution plan[s]," also known as "individual account plan[s]." See 29 U.S. C. 1002(34), (35). An employer is subject to plan termination liability under ERISA only if the employee benefit plan to which the employer has contributed is covered by ERISA's plan termination insurance program, which applies to defined benefit *230 plans but not to defined contribution plans. 29 U.S. C. 1321(b)(1). See Nachman Congress exempted defined contribution plans from ERISA's termination insurance program because a defined contribution plan does not specify benefits to be paid, but instead establishes an individual account for each participant to which employer contributions are made. 29 U.S. C. 1002(34). "[U]nder such plans, by definition, there can never be an insufficiency of funds in the plan to cover promised benefits." Nachman By contrast, whenever a plan defines the benefits payable thereunder, the possibility exists that at a given time plan assets will fall short of the present value of vested plan benefits. Congress therefore subjected defined benefit plans to ERISA's plan termination insurance program, and did so by broadly defining a defined benefit plan as "a pension plan other than an individual account plan." 29 U.S. C. 1002(35). We have no occasion today to decide whether this definition sweeps in all plans in which the benefits to be received by employees are fixed by the terms of the plan, even if the plan also provides that the employer's contributions shall be fixed and shall not be adjusted to whatever level would be required to provide those benefits. Indeed, this litigation began in part as a challenge by the Trustees of the Operating Engineers Pension Plan to a determination by the Pension Benefit Guaranty (hereinafter PBGC) that the Pension Plan is a defined benefit plan. See ante, at 219. That challenge was resolved against the Trustees and is not presented here. ERISA's broad definition of defined benefit plan may well mean that Congress imposed contingent liability on contributing employers without regard to the extent of a particular employer's actual responsibility for the existence of a plan's promise of fixed benefits to employees and without regard to the extent to which any such promise was conditioned and *231 understood by employees to be conditioned by plan provisions limiting the employer's obligations to make contributions to the |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | concurring | Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/ | provisions limiting the employer's obligations to make contributions to the plan. If so, the application of ERISA may in some circumstances raise constitutional doubts under the Taking Clause or the Due Process Clause. The same doubts arise with respect to the imposition of withdrawal liability under the MPPAA, which is properly seen as a prophylactic extension of the liability initially imposed by ERISA. Withdrawal liability is intended to ensure that " `an employer withdrawing from a multiemployer plan w[ill] complete funding its fair share of the plan's unfunded liabilities,' " R. A. Gray & n. 3 and thus presupposes that employers can be made liable for those unfunded liabilities in the first instance. Although the MPPAA substitutes liability to the plan for liability to PBGC, the withdrawal liability it imposes on employers who contribute to multiemployer plans reflects the same apparent determination to treat all definite benefits as promises for which the employer can be held liable that underlies termination liability under ERISA. PBGC coverage of a multiemployer plan continues to turn on whether it is a defined benefit plan, and the MPPAA defines the withdrawing employer's liability to the plan in terms of "unfunded vested benefits," 29 U.S. C. 1391, thereby making withdrawal liability turn on the presence of fixed benefits. The MPPAA's termination liability provisions are complex, but their overall effect is also to hold employers liable for underfunding of vested fixed benefits. See 29 U.S. C. 1341a. Thus, it is evident that the MPPAA expands on Congress' decision in ERISA to exempt only defined contribution plans, narrowly defined, from PBGC coverage and employer liability. Whether the employer's liability is to *232 PBGC or to the plan, the thrust of both statutes is to enforce the plan's promise of fixed benefits against the employer with respect to benefits already accrued. The degree to which an employer can be said to be responsible for the promise of benefits made by a plan varies dramatically across the spectrum of plans. Where a single employer has unilaterally adopted and maintained a pension plan for its employees, the employer's responsibility for the presence of a promise to pay defined benefits is direct and substantial. The employer can nominate all the plan's trustees and enjoys wide discretion in designing the plan and determining the level of benefits. Where such a plan holds out to employees a promise of definite benefits, and where employees have rendered the years of service required for benefits to accrue and vest, it seems entirely rational to hold the employer liable for any shortfall in the plan's assets, even |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | concurring | Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/ | employer liable for any shortfall in the plan's assets, even if the plan's provisions purport to limit the employer's liability in the event of underfunding upon plan termination. Where a pension plan is established through collective bargaining between one or more employers and a union, matters may be different. Such plans, commonly known as "Taft-Hartley" plans, were authorized by 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 7, codified, as amended, at 29 U.S. C. 186(c)(5). Taft-Hartley plans are the product of joint negotiation between employers and a union representing employees and are administered by trustees nominated in equal numbers by employers and the union. Unlike typical defined benefit plans, which call for variable employer contributions and provide for fixed benefits, most Taft-Hartley plans "possess the characteristics of both fixed contributions and fixed benefits." J. Melone, Collectively Bargained Multi-Employer Pension Plans 20 (1963) (hereinafter Melone). As PBGC has explained: "Employers participating in multiemployer plans are generally required to contribute at a fixed rate, specified *233 in the collective bargaining agreement. Traditionally, the multiemployer plan or the bargaining agreement have limited the employer's contractual obligation to contribute at the fixed rate, whether or not the contributions were sufficient to provide the benefits established by the joint board or the collectively bargained agreement." Pension Benefit Guaranty Multiemployer Study Required by P. L. 95-214, p. 22 (1978) (hereinafter Multiemployer Study). See also Melone 50; Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and Pension Plans, Under these hybrid Taft-Hartley plans it is the plans' trustees, not the employers and the union, who are "usually responsible for determining the types of benefits to be provided. and the level of benefits, although in some cases these are set in the collective bargaining agreement." Multiemployer Study 22 (footnote omitted). See also GAO/ HRD-85-58, Comptroller General's Report to the Congress, Effects of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act on Plan Participants' Benefits, 37, App. I, Table 3 (June 14, 1985) (95% of 139 multiemployer plans surveyed provided that trustees set benefits) (hereinafter Report to the Congress). This delegation of responsibility to the trustees may well stem from an understanding on the part of employers and unions that under the fixed-contribution approach the plan rather than the employers would bear the risks of adverse experience and the benefits of favorable experience in the first instance. See Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining: A Reference Guide for Trade Unions 64 (American Federation of Labor 1953). If the actuary's earnings assumptions proved too conservative, the plan would have excess assets that could be used to support an increase in |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | concurring | Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/ | assets that could be used to support an increase in benefits by the trustees, and if assets growth was lower than anticipated, benefits could be reduced. It now appears that Taft-Hartley plan employers will be liable for such experience *234 losses in many cases, even where withdrawal occurs as a result of events over which an employer has no control, and even though experience gains can still ordinarily be used to increase benefits. It is also noteworthy that, as this Court held in NLRB v. Amax Coal "the duty of the management-appointed trustee of an employee benefit fund under 302(c)(5) is directly antithetical to that of an agent of the appointing party." ERISA conclusively established that "an employee benefit fund trustee is a fiduciary whose duty to the trust beneficiaries must overcome any loyalty to the interest of the party that appointed him." In light of these fiduciary duties, it seems remarkable to impute responsibility to employers for the level of benefits promised by the plan and set by the joint board of trustees, notwithstanding the express limits on employer liability contained in the plan and agreed to in collective bargaining. Yet that would appear to be what Congress may have done to the extent a Taft-Hartley plan such as the pension plan in this case is treated as a pure defined benefit plan in which the employer promised to make contributions to the extent necessary to fund the fixed benefits provided in the plan. As Representative Erlenborn put it in the hearings on the MPPAA: "[W]e have taken something that neither looked like a duck, or walked like a duck, or quacked like a duck, and we passed a law [ERISA] and said, `It is a duck.' If it is that easy, I suppose we can repeal the law of gravity and solve our energy problem. It is treating the multiemployer plans where you negotiate a contribution as having put a legal obligation on the employer to reach a level of benefits that has caused the problem." Hearings on The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1979 before the Task Force on Welfare and Pension Plans of the Subcommittee on Labor-Management *235 Relations of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 391 (emphasis added). The foregoing observations suggest to me that whatever promises a collectively bargained plan makes with respect to benefits may not always be rationally traceable to the employer's conduct and that it may sometimes be quite fictitious to speak of such plans as "promising" benefits at a specified level, since to do so ignores |
Justice O'Connor | 1,986 | 14 | concurring | Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111605/connolly-v-pension-benefit-guaranty-corporation/ | benefits at a specified level, since to do so ignores express and bargained-for conditions on those promises. Where the plan's fixed-contribution aspects were agreed to by employees through their exclusive bargaining representatives, and where employers had no control over the level of benefits promised, employer responsibility for the benefits specified by the plan is very much attenuated, and employee expectations that those benefits will in all events be paid, in the face of plan language to the contrary, are not easily traceable to the employer's conduct. The possible arbitrariness of imposing termination and withdrawal liability on some employers contributing to fixed-cost Taft-Hartley plans may be heightened in particular cases. For example, an employer who agrees to participate in a multiemployer plan long after the plan's benefit structure has been determined may have had no say whatever in establishing critical features of the plan that determine the level of benefits and the value of those benefits. Similarly, if a plan had regularly undergone increases and reductions in accrued benefits prior to ERISA, any contention that employers caused employees to rely on a promise of fixed benefits might carry even less weight. Beyond that, the withdrawal provisions of the MPPAA are structured in a manner that may lead to extremely harsh results. For example, it appears that even if the trustees raised benefits for both retired and current employees during the period immediately prior to an employer's withdrawal, the withdrawing employer can be held liable for the resulting underfunding. Such benefit increases are not uncommon. *236 See Report to the Congress 43, App. I, Table 17 (68% of multiemployer plans surveyed increased benefits for working participants during 33 months prior to enactment of the MPPAA); Table 18 (46% of these plans increased retirees' benefits during the same period). In addition, the presumptive method for calculating employer withdrawal liability is based on the employer's proportionate share of the contributions made to the plan during the years in which the employer participated. 29 U.S. C. 1391(b). As a result, because fixed-contribution plans typically do not set each employer's contributions on the basis of the value of the benefits accrued by that employer's employees, it seems entirely possible that an employer may be liable to the plan for substantial sums even though that employer's contributions plus its allocable share of plan earnings exceed the present value of all benefits accrued by its employees. To be sure, the Court does not address these questions today. Since this case involves only a facial challenge under the Taking Clause to the MPPAA's withdrawal liability provisions, the Court properly |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | The Court holds that the Constitution prevents millions of pension from enforcing their rights to prudent and loyal management of their retirement trusts. Indeed, the Court determines that pension may not bring a federal lawsuit to stop or cure retirement-plan mismanagement until their pensions are on the verge of default. This con- clusion conflicts with common sense and longstanding prec- edent. I A ERISA1 protects “the interests of participants in em- ployee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.” 9 U.S. C. Chief among these safeguards is that “all assets of an employee benefit plan” must “be held in trust by one or more trustees” for “the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries.” (c)(1). A retirement plan’s assets “shall never in- ure to the benefit of any employer.” ecause ERISA requires that retirement-plan assets be —————— 1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 9 U.S. C. et seq. THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting held in trust, it imposes on the trustees and other plan man- ag “ ‘strict standards’ ” of conduct “ ‘derived from the com- mon law of trusts.’ ” Fifth Third ). These “fiduciary duties” obligate the trustees and manag to act prudently and loyally, looking out solely for the best interest of the plan’s partici- pants and beneficiaries—typically, the employees who sac- rifice wages today to secure their retirements tomorrow. 1106. Not surprisingly, ERISA fiduciaries owe du- ties not only to the plan they manage, but also “to the ben- eficiaries” and participants for whom they manage it. Har- ris and Sav. ank v. Salomon Smith arney Inc., 530 U.S. 38, 41–4, 50 (000). If a fiduciary flouts these stringent standards, ERISA provides a cause of action and makes the fiduciary pon- ally liable. 1. The United States Secretary of Labor, a plan participant or beneficiary, or another fiduci- ary may sue for “appropriate relief under section 1109.” see also (permitting participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries to bring suit “to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan”). Section 1109’s remedies include restoration of lost assets, disgorgement of ill-gained profits, and removal of the offending fiduciaries. Petition allege that, as of 007, respondents breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by investing pension-plan as- sets in respondents’ own mutual funds and by paying them- selves excessive management fees. (Petition further contend that this self-dealing pists today.) According to the complaint, the fiduciaries also made imprudent invest- ments that allowed them to manipulate accounting rules, boost |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | invest- ments that allowed them to manipulate accounting rules, boost their reported incomes, inflate their stock prices, and Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting exercise lucrative stock options to their own (and their sharehold’) benefit. Then came the Great Recession. In 008, the retirement plan lost $1.1 billion, allegedly $748 million more than a properly managed plan would have lost. So some of the plan’s participants sued under 9 U.S. C. for the relief Congress contemplated: restoration of losses, dis- gorgement of respondents’ ill-gotten profits and fees, re- moval of the disloyal fiduciaries, and an injunction to stop the ongoing breaches. Faced with this lawsuit, respondents returned to the plan about $311 million (less than half of what the plan had lost) and none of the profits respond- ents had unlawfully gained. See 630–631 (CA8 018). II In the Court’s words, the question here is whether peti- tion have alleged a “concrete” injury to support their con- stitutional standing to sue. Ante, at 3. They have for at least three independent reasons. A First, petition have an interest in their retirement plan’s financial integrity, exactly like private trust benefi- ciaries have in protecting their trust. y alleging a $750 million injury to that interest, petition have established their standing. 1 This Court typically recognizes an “injury in fact” where the alleged harm “has a close relationship to” one “that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a law- suit in English or American courts.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. (016) (slip op., at 9). Thus, the Court acknowledges that “private trust” beneficiaries have stand- ing to protect the assets in which they have an “equitable” interest. Ante, at 3–4. The critical question, then, is 4 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting whether petition have an equitable interest in their re- tirement plan’s assets even though their pension payments are fixed. They do. ERISA expressly required the creation of a trust in which petition are the beneficiaries: “[A]ll assets” of the plan “shall be held in trust” for petition’ “exclusive” benefit. 9 U.S. C. (c)(1); see also These requirements exist regardless whether the employer establishes a defined-benefit or defined-contribution Similarly, the Plan Document governing petition- ’ defined-benefit plan states that, at “ ‘all times,’ ” all plan assets “ ‘shall’ ” be in a “ ‘trust fund’ ” managed for the par- ticipants’ and beneficiaries’ “ ‘exclusive benefit.’ ” App. 60– 61. The Plan Document also gives petition a residual interest in the trust fund’s assets: It instructs that, |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | residual interest in the trust fund’s assets: It instructs that, “[u]pon termination of the Plan, each Participant [and] eneficiary” shall look to “the assets of the [trust f]und” to “provide the benefits otherwise apparently promised in this Plan.” Rec- ord in No. –cv–687 (D Minn.), Doc. 107–1, p. 75. This arrangement conf on the “participants [and] beneficiar- ies” of a defined-benefit plan an equitable stake, or a “com- mon interest,” in “the financial integrity of the ” Mas- sachusetts Mut. Life Ins. n. 9 Petition’ equitable interest finds ample support in tra- ditional trust law. “The creation of a trust,” like the one here, provides beneficiaries “an equitable interest in the subject matter of the trust.” Restatement (Second) of —————— Generally, “a trust is created when one pon (a ‘settlor’ or ‘grantor’) transf property to a third party (a ‘trustee’) to administer for the ben- efit of another (a ‘beneficiary’).” North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kim- berley Rice Kaestner 199 Family 588 U. S. (019) (slip op., at ); see also Restatement (Second) of s (1957). Neither the Court nor respondents dispute that petition’ pension fund meets these elements. Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 5 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting s Comment a, p. 19 (1957); see Courts have long recognized that this equitable interest gives beneficiaries a basis to “have a breach of trust enjoined and redress[ed].” ; see also Spokeo, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 9). That is, a beneficiary’s equitable interest allows her to “maintain a suit” to “compel the trustee to perform his duties,” to “enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust,” to “compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust,” and to “remove the trustee.” Restatement (Second) of s see also 05 (beneficiary may require a trustee to restore “any loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate” and “any profit made by [the trustee] through the breach of trust”).3 So too here. ecause respondents’ alleged mismanage- ment lost the pension fund hundreds of millions of dollars, petition have stated an injury to their equitable property interest in that trust. The Court, by contrast, holds that participants and bene- ficiaries in a defined-benefit plan have no stake in their plan’s assets. Ante, at 4. In other words, the Court treats beneficiaries as mere bystand to their own pensions. That is wrong on several scores. For start, it creates a paradox: In one breath, the Court determines that peti- tion have “no equitable or property interest” in their plan’s assets, ante, at 4; in another, the Court concedes that petition |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | ante, at 4; in another, the Court concedes that petition have an enforceable interest in receiving their “monthly pension benefits,” ante, at enefits paid from where? The plan’s assets, obviously. Precisely because pe- tition have an interest in payments from their trust —————— 3 Even contingent and discretionary beneficiaries (those who might not ever receive any assets from the trust) can sue to protect the trust absent a ponal financial loss (or an imminent risk of loss). See A. Hess, G. ogert, & G. ogert, Law of s and ees (June 019 up- date) (ogert & ogert) (listing cases). 6 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting fund, they have an interest in the integrity of the assets from which those payments come. See U.S., at n. 9. The Court’s contrary conclusion is unrecognizable in the fundamental trust law that both ERISA and the Plan Doc- ument expressly incorporated. If the participants and beneficiaries in a defined-benefit plan did not have equita- ble title to the plan’s assets, then no one would. Yet that would mean that no “trust” exists, contrary to the plain terms of both ERISA and the Plan Document. See 9 U.S. C. App. 60; see also n. lair, 300 U.S., at ; ogert & ogert Restatement (Second) of s Comment a, at 19. Recognizing this problem, the Court asserts that, despite our case law, ERISA’s text, and petition’ Plan Document, trust law is not relevant at all. The Court announces that all “plaintiffs who allege mismanagement of a defined-ben- efit plan,” regardless of their plan terms, cannot invoke a “trust-law analogy” to “support Article III standing.” Ante, at 4. That categorical conclusion has no basis in logic or law. Logically, the Court’s reasoning relies on tautology. To dis- tinguish an ERISA trust fund from a private trust fund, the Court observes that petition’ payments have not “fluctu- ate[d] with the value of the plan or because of the plan fi- duciaries’ good or bad investment decisions” in the past, ante, at 1, so petition will necessarily continue to receive full payments “for the rest of their lives,” no matter the out- come of this suit, ante, at 3. ut that is circular: Petition will receive benefits indefinitely because they receive bene- fits now? The Court does not explain how the pension could satisfy its monthly obligation if, as petition allege, the plan fiduciaries drain the pool from which petition’ fixed income streams flow. Legally, the Court’s analysis lists distinctions without a difference. First, the Court writes that a trust promising Cite as: 590 |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | the Court writes that a trust promising Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 7 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting fixed payments is not a trust because the promise “will not change, regardless of how well or poorly the [trust] is man- aged.” Ante, at 4. That does not follow (a promise of pay- ment diff from an actual payment) and it does not dis- prove a trust. s vary in their terms, to be sure. See ogert & ogert (“The settlor has great freedom in the selection of the beneficiaries and their interests”). ut re- gardless whether a trust creates a “present interest” in “im- mediate enjoyment” of the trust property or “a future inter- est” in “receiv[ing] trust assets or benefits at a later time,” the beneficiary “always” has an “equitable” stake. Second, the Court states that “the employer, not plan par- ticipants, receives any surplus left over after all of the ben- efits are paid” and “the employer, not plan participants, is on the hook for plan shortfalls.” Ante, at 4; see also ante, at 7 (noting that “the federal Pension enefit Guaranty Corporation is required by law to pay” some benefits if a plan fails). ut that does not distinguish ERISA from standard trust law, either. It does not matter that other parties besides beneficiaries may have a residual stake in trust assets; a beneficiary with a life-estate interest in pay- ments from a trust still has an equitable interest. See ogert & ogert Even life-beneficiaries may “re- quir[e]” the trustee “to pay the trust the amount necessary to place the trust account in the position in which it would have been, had the [trustee’s fiduciary] duty been per- formed.” If anything, petition’ equitable interests are stronger than those of their common-law counterparts; the Plan Document provides petition a residual interest in the pension fund’s assets even after the trust terminates. See Record in No. –cv–687, Doc. 107–1, at 75. Nor is it relevant whether additional parties (including an insurance carrier) are “on the hook” for plan shortfalls after a loss occurs. Cf. ante, at 4, 6, 7, 8, n. The Court appears to conclude that insurance (or other protections to 8 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting remedy trust losses) would deprive beneficiaries of their eq- uitable interests in their trusts. See ut the Court cites nothing supporting that proposition. To the contrary, it is well settled that beneficiaries retain equitable interests in trust assets even when those assets are insured or re- plenished. See ogert & ogert Some States and trusts require that |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | See ogert & ogert Some States and trusts require that the “property of a trust be insured” or similarly protected; indeed, some jurisdictions impose on trustees a fiduciary “duty to insure.” (collecting au- thorities). None of those authorities suggests that benefi- ciaries lose their equitable interests as a result, and none suggests that the law excuses a fiduciary’s malfeasance simply because other sources may help provide relief. The Court’s opposing view—that employer liability and insur- ance pardon a trustee’s wrongdoing from a beneficiary’s suit—has no support in law. Third, the Court draws a line between a trust and a con- tract, ante, at 4, but this too is insignificant here. The Court declares that petition’ pension plan “is more in the na- ture of a contract,” ¸ but then overlooks that the so- called contract creates a trust. The Plan Document ex- pressly requires that petition’ pension funds be held in a “trust” exclusively for petition’ benefit. App. 60–61. The Court’s statement that “the employer, not plan partici- pants, receives any surplus left over after all of the benefits are paid,” cf. ante, at 4, actually proves that a trust exists. The reason the employer does not receive any residual until “after all of the benefits are paid,” ib is because the Plan Document provides petition an enforceable residual in- terest, Record in No. –cv–687, Doc. 107–1, at 75. It is telling that the Court does not cite, let alone analyze, the “contract” governing petition’ trust fund. Last, the Court cites inapposite case law. It asserts that “this Court has stated” that “plan participants possess no equitable or property interest in the ” Ante, at 4 and Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 9 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 55 U.S. 48 (008)). ut precedent has said no such thing. Quite the opposite: explained that defined-benefit-plan bene- ficiaries have a “common interest” in the “financial integ- rity” of their defined-benefit U.S., at n. 9. Neither Hughes nor suggests otherwise. Hughes explained that a defined-benefit-plan beneficiary does not have “a claim to any particular asset that composes a part of the plan’s general asset pool.” 55 U.S., at 440. ut that statement concerned whether the beneficiaries had a legal right to extra payments after the plan’s assets grew. at 436–437. Whether a beneficiary has a legal claim to pay- ment when a plan gains money says nothing about whether a beneficiary has an equitable interest to restore assets when a plan loses money. Hughes, in fact, invited a suit like petition’: The Court suggested that the plaintiffs could have prevailed had they “allege[d] |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | suggested that the plaintiffs could have prevailed had they “allege[d] that [the employer] used any of the assets for a purpose other than to pay its obligations to the Plan’s beneficiaries.” at 44–443. Equally telling is that Hughes resolved the beneficiaries’ breach-of-fiduciary claims on the merits without doubting whether the plaintiffs had standing to assert them. See at 443–446; Steel 53 U.S. 83, (explaining this Court’s inde- pendent duty to assure itself of Article III standing). is even less helpful to today’s Court. That case involved a defined-contribution plan, not a defined-benefit 55 U.S., at 50. It was about remedies, not rights. See at 56. And it stated that although “individual in- juries” may occur from ERISA plan mismanagement, the statutory provision at issue required that the remedy go to the (discussing 9 U.S. C. ()). said nothing about standing and nothing about ERISA’s 10 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting other statutory remedies.4 In fact, confirmed that ERISA beneficiaries like petition may sue fiduciaries for “ ‘any profit which would have accrued to the [plan] if there had been no breach of trust,’ ” 55 U.S., at 54, n. 4, or where “fiduciary breaches impair the value of plan as- sets,” at 56. ecause petition bring those kinds of claims, supports their standing. Second, petition have standing because a breach of fiduciary duty is a cognizable injury, regardless whether that breach caused financial harm or increased a risk of nonpayment. 1 A beneficiary has a concrete interest in a fiduciary’s loy- alty and prudence. For over a century, trust law has pro- vided that breach of “a fiduciary or trust relation” makes the trustee “suable in equity.” Clews v. Jamieson, 18 U.S. 461, 480–481 (1901). That is because beneficiaries have an enforceable “right that the trustee shall perform the trust in accordance with the directions of the trust instrument and the rules of equity.” ogert & ogert see also Restatement (Second) of s (trust beneficiary may “maintain a suit” for breach of fiduciary duty). That interest is concrete regardless whether the benefi- ciary suff ponal financial loss. A beneficiary may sue a trustee for restitution or disgorgement, remedies that rec- ognize the relevant harm as the trustee’s wrongful gain. Through restitution law, trustees are “subject to liability” if they are unjustly enriched by a “ ‘violation of [a benefi- ciary]’s legally protected rights,’ ” like a breach of fiduciary —————— 4 The Court expressly declined to address other relief like that provided under see 55 U.S., at 5, a provision that petition- invoke here. Cite |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | U.S., at 5, a provision that petition- invoke here. Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 11 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting duty. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust En- richment and Comment a, p. 3 (010). Similarly, dis- gorgement allows a beneficiary to “stri[p]” the trustee of “a wrongful gain.” Comment a, at Our Court drew on these principles almost 00 years ago when it stated that a trustee’s breach of loyalty supports a cause of action “without any further inquiry” into gain or loss to a trust or its beneficiaries. ; see also, e.g., at 556– (noting this rule’s roots in “English courts of chancery from an early day”); see also 35 U.S. 106, 10 (under “the principles governing the duty of a trustee,” it “makes no dif- ference that the [trust] estate was not a loser in the trans- action”); ogert & ogert (similar). Put another way, “traditional remedies” like “unjust enrichment are not contingent on a plaintiff ’s allegation of damages beyond the violation of his private legal right.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at – (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at –3). Nor does it matter whether the beneficiaries receive the remedy themselves. A beneficiary may require a trustee to “restore” assets directly “to the trust fund.” ogert & ogert see also Restatement (Second) of s 05. In fact, because fiduciary duties are so paramount, the rem- edy need not involve money at all. A beneficiary may sue to “enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust” and to “remove the trustee.” Congress built on this tradition by making plan fiduciar- ies expressly liable to restore to the plan wrongful profits and any losses their breach caused, and by providing for in- junctive relief to stop the misconduct and remove the wrongdo. See 9 U.S. C. 1(a)(), (3). In do- ing so, Congress rejected the Court’s statement that a “trust-law analogy does not” apply to “plaintiffs who al- lege mismanagement of a defined-benefit ” Cf. ante, at 4. To the contrary, ERISA imposes “trust-like fiduciary standards,” Varity 1 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting to “[r]espon[d] to deficiencies in prior law regulating [retire- ment] plan fiduciaries” and to provide even greater protec- tions for defined-benefit-plan beneficiaries, Harris 530 U.S., at 41–4; see also Spokeo, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 9) (historical and congressionally recognized injuries often support standing). Given all that history and ERISA’s text, this Court itself has noted, in the defined-benefit-plan context, “that when a trustee” breaches “his fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries,” the “beneficiaries may then maintain an action |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | to the beneficiaries,” the “beneficiaries may then maintain an action for restitu- tion or disgorgement.” Harris 530 U.S., at 50. Harris confirms that ERISA incorporated “[t]he com- mon law of trusts” to allow defined-benefit-plan beneficiar- ies to seek relief from fiduciary breaches. ; see also at 41–4 (noting that certain ERISA provisions “supple- men[t] the fiduciary’s general duty of loyalty to the plan’s beneficiaries”).5 The Court off no reply to all the historical and statu- tory evidence showing petition’ concrete interest in pru- dent and loyal fiduciaries. Instead, the Court insists again that “participants in a defined-benefit plan are not similarly situated to the bene- ficiaries of a private trust,” ante, at 4, and that the “com- plaint did not plausibly and clearly claim that the alleged mismanagement of the plan substantially increased the —————— 5 Curiously, today’s Court suggests that ERISA’s efforts to bolster trust-law fiduciary duties actually degraded them instead. See ante, at 4 (justifying a narrow construction of ERISA protections because “trust law informs but does not control interpretation of ERISA”). Yet the case the Court cites, Varity relied on trust law to establish the minimum obligations ERISA imposes on plan fidu- ciaries. See (confirming that the “ERISA fiduciary duty in- cludes [the] common law duty of loyalty”). Today’s Court mistakes the floor for the ceiling. See ; see also Harris 530 U.S., at 41– 4. Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting risk that the plan and the employer would fail and be una- ble to pay the plaintiffs’ future pension benefits,” ante, at 7. The first observation is incorrect for the reasons stated above. ut even were the Court correct that petition’ rights do not sound in trust law, petition would still have standing. The Court reasons that petition have an en- forceable right to “monthly payments for the rest of their lives” because their plan conf a “contractua[l] enti- tle[ment].” Ante, at Under that view, the plan also con- f contractual rights to loyal and prudent plan manage- ment. See App. 60–61; 9 U.S. C. 1109. Thus, for the same reason petition could bring suit if they did not receive payments from their plan, they could bring suit if they did not receive loyalty and prudence from their fiduciaries. After all, it is well settled that breach of “a contract to act diligently and skil[l]fully” provides a “groun[d] of action” in federal court. 4 Pet. 17, 181–18 It is also undisputed that “[a] breach of contract always creates a right of action,” even when no financial “harm was caused.” Restatement (First) of |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | even when no financial “harm was caused.” Restatement (First) of Contracts §38, and Comment a, pp. 50–503 (193); see also Spokeo, 578 U. S., at – (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at –3) (“[C]ourts historically pre- sumed that the plaintiff suffered a de facto injury merely from having his ponal, legal rights invaded” even with- out any “allegation of damages”). Petition would thus have standing even were they to accept the Court’s flawed premise. The Court’s second statement, that petition have not alleged a substantial risk of missed payments, ante, at 7, is orthogonal to the issues at hand. A breach-of-fiduciary- duty claim exists regardless of the beneficiary’s ponal gain, loss, or recovery. In rejecting petition’ standing and maintaining that “this suit would not change [petition- ’] monthly pension benefits,” ante, at 8, the Court fails to 14 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting distinguish the different rights on which pension-plan ben- eficiaries may sue. They have a right not just to their pen- sion benefits, but also to loyal and prudent fiduciaries. See 4 U.S. 490, (the standing in- quiry “turns on the nature and source of the claim as- serted”). Petition seek relief tailored to the second cate- gory, including restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive remedies. Cf. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. 534 U.S. 04, 15–16 (00) (explaining the various historical bases for ERISA’s remedies). The Court does not even try to explain ERISA’s (or the Plan Document’s) text imposing fiduciary duties, let alone this Court’s decision in Harris supporting petition’ standing. And even though the Court briefly mentions that petition seek “in- junctive relief, including replacement of the plan’s fiduciar- ies,” ante, at it off no analysis on that issue. Put dif- ferently, the Court denies petition standing to sue without analyzing all their claims to relief. With its focus on fiscal harm, the Court seems to suggest that pecuniary injury is the sine qua non of standing. The Court emphasizes that petition themselves have not “sustained any monetary injury” apart from their trust fund’s losses. Ante, at ; see also ante, at 4. ut injury to a plaintiff ’s wallet is not, and has never been, a prerequisite for standing. The Constitution permits federal courts to hear disputes over nonfinancial injuries like the harms alleged here. Spokeo, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 9); see also, e.g., at – (THOMAS, J., concur- ring) (slip op., at –3); Tennessee Elec. Power 7–86 In Heckler v. Mathews, 465 —————— 6 This Court has found standing in myriad cases involving noneco- nomic injuries. Examples include |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | standing in myriad cases involving noneco- nomic injuries. Examples include the denial or threatened impairment of: equal treatment, Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 00, 11 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of ; “truthful information Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 15 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting U. S. 78 (1984), for instance, this Court recognized a plain- tiff ’s standing to assert a “noneconomic” injury for discrim- inatory distribution of his Social Security benefits, even though he did not have “a substantive right to any particu- lar amount of benefits.” Petition’ stand- ing here is even sturdier: They assert a noneconomic injury for unlawful management of their retirement plan and, un- like the plaintiff in Heckler, petition do have a substan- tive right to a particular amount of benefits. Cf. ante, at (acknowledging that petition’ benefits are “vested” and that payments are “legally and contractually” required). None of this is disputed. In fact, the Court seems to con- cede all this reasoning in a footnote. See ante, at 6, n. 1. The Court appears to acknowledge that an ERISA benefi- ciary’s noneconomic right to information from the fiduciar- ies would support standing. See (citing 9 U.S. C. (1)(A)). Yet the Court off no reason to think that a beneficiary’s noneconomic right to loyalty and prudence from the fiduciaries is meaningfully different. For its part, the concurrence attempts to fill the Court’s gaps by adding that “[t]he fiduciary duties created by ERISA are owed to the plan, not petition.” Ante, at (opinion of THOMAS, J.). ut this Court has already rejected —————— concerning the availability of housing,” Havens Realty (198); esthetic and recreational interests, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 58 U.S. 167, 181–18 (000); “information which must be publicly disclosed pur- suant to a statute,” Federal Election 54 U.S. 11, 1 ; one’s “ponal, political, and professional reputation,” Meese v. Keene, ; and the right to speak, Spokeo, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 9) (citing Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (009)). This Court has even said that a for-profit business has standing to assert religious injuries. See 573 U.S. 68, and n. 6 Today’s Court does not recon- cile these cases with its novel financial-harm requirement; nor does the Court explain why a breach of fiduciary duty is less concrete than the injuries listed above. 16 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting that view. Compare Varity (“This argument fails”), with Nor is that argument puasive on its own terms. The concurrence relies on a compound prepositional phrase |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | own terms. The concurrence relies on a compound prepositional phrase taken out of context, collecting ERISA provisions saying that a fiduciary acts “with respect to” a See ante, at (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Of course a plan fiduciary per- forms her duties “with respect to a ” 9 U.S. C. After all, she manages the §110(a). ut she does so “solely in the interest” and “for the exclusive purposes” of the plan’s “participants and beneficiaries.” (c)(1), 1104(a)(1). In short, the concurrence gets it backwards. Congress did not enact ERISA to protect plans as artificial entities. It enacted ERISA (and required trusts in the first place) to protect the plan “participants” and “their beneficiaries.” Thus, ERISA fiduciary duties run where the stat- ute says: to the participants and their beneficiaries. C Last, petition have standing to sue on their retirement plan’s behalf. 1 Even if petition had no suable interest in their plan’s financial integrity or its competent supervision, the plan it- self would. There is no disputing at this stage that respond- ents’ “mismanagement” caused the plan “approximately $750 million in losses” still not fully reimbursed. Ante, at (majority opinion). And even under the concurrence’s view, respondents’ fiduciary duties “are owed to the ” Ante, at (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The plan thus would have standing to sue under either theory discussed above. The problem is that the plan is a legal fiction: Although ERISA provides that a retirement plan “may sue as an entity,” 9 U.S. C. §1(d)(1), someone must still do so on Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 17 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting the plan’s behalf. Typically that is the fiduciary’s job. See §110(a)(1) (fiduciaries have “authority to control and man- age the operation and administration of the plan”). ut im- agine a case like this one, where the fiduciaries refuse to sue because they would be the defendants. Does the Con- stitution compel a pension plan to let a fox guard the hen- house? Of course not. This Court’s representational standing doctrine permits petition to sue on their plan’s behalf. See Food and Commercial This doctrine “rests on the prem- ise that in certain circumstances, particular relationships (recognized either by common-law tradition or by statute) are sufficient to rebut the background presumption that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties.” This is especially so where, as here, there is “some sort of impediment” to the other party’s “effective assertion of their own rights.” R. Fallon, J. Man- ning, D. Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Fed- eral Courts and the Federal System |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | & Wechsler’s The Fed- eral Courts and the Federal System 158 (6th ed. 009); see also The common law has long regarded a beneficiary’s repre- sentational suit as a proper “basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” Spokeo, 578 U. S., at (slip op., at 9). When “the trustee cannot or will not” sue, a beneficiary may do so “as a temporary representative of the trust.” ogert & ogert The common law also allows “the terms of a trust” to “confer upon oth the power to enforce the trust,” giving that pon “standing” to “bring suit against the trustee.” Restatement (Third) of s Comment d(1), at 7. ERISA embraces this tradition. Sections 1(a)() and (a)(3) authorize participants and beneficiaries to sue “in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole,” U.S., at n. 9, so that any “recovery” aris- ing from the action “inures to the benefit of the plan as a 18 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting whole,” Perhaps for this reason, and adding to the incongruity in today’s outcome, some Memb of this Court have insisted that lawsuits to enforce ERISA’s fidu- ciary duties “must” be brought “in a representative capac- ity.” Varity 516 U.S., (THOMAS, J., dissent- ing) (internal quotation marks omitted). Permitting beneficiaries to enforce their plan’s rights finds plenty of support in our constitutional case law. Take associational standing: An association may file suit “to re- dress its memb’ injuries, even without a showing of in- jury to the association itself.” Food and Commercial Work- 517 U.S., at 55. All Article III requires is that a member “ ‘would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right’ ” and that “ ‘the interests [the association] seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose.’ ” at Petition’ suit here is the other side of the same coin: The plan would have standing to sue in its own right, and petition’ interest is to disgorge wrongful profits and reimburse the trust for losses, thereby preserving trust as- sets held for their exclusive benefit. Next-friend standing is another apt analog. Long “ac- cepted [as a] basis for jurisdiction,” this doctrine allows a party to “appear in [federal] court on behalf of detained prison who are unable to seek relief themselves.” 16 (tracing the doctrine’s roots to the 17th century). Here, of course, petition’ plan cannot access the courts itself because the parties the Court thinks should file suit (the fiduciaries) are the defendants. Like a “next friend,” moreover, petition are “dedicated to the best interests” of |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | friend,” moreover, petition are “dedicated to the best interests” of the party they seek to protect, because the plan’s interests are peti- tion’ interests.7 —————— 7 Other examples include guardians ad litem and, of course, trustees. E.g., Communications 554 U.S. 69, Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 19 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Congress was on well-established ground when it allowed pension participants and beneficiaries to sue on their retire- ment plan’s behalf. The Court’s conflicting conclusion starts with inapposite cases. It invokes U.S. 693, (0), reasoning that “to claim ‘the interests of oth, the litigants themselves still must have suffered an injury in fact.’ ” Ante, at 4. Perry, a case about a California ballot initiative, is a far cry from this one. Perry found that “pri- vate parties” with no stake in the litigation “distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen” were not proper representatives of the U.S., at 707, 710. If an- ything, Perry supports petition here: This Court found “readily distinguishable” other representational-standing cases by undcoring their sound traditions. (distinguishing assignee and next-friend standing).8 A tra- ditional beneficiary-vus-trustee claim like petition’ is exactly such a suit. Next, the Court maintains that petition “have not been legally or contractually assigned” or “appointed” to —————— 87 (008) (noting in the Article III standing context that “federal courts routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit,” such as when “[t]rustees bring suits to benefit their trusts”); see also at 304–305, n. (ROERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“ees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like make up a settled, continuous practice ‘of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process’ ”). 8 The Court cites two more cases: and 49 U.S. 190 ut both endorsed ex- pansive views of standing. See 501 U.S., at 15–17 (allowing indirect own of a corporation to sue under federal securities laws); 49 U.S., at 194–195 (holding that a plaintiff had representa- tional standing to assert an equal protection claim on a business patron’s behalf ). To the extent the Court suggests that a financial loss is neces- sary (or that a breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient) for standing, that is incorrect. See Part II–, 0 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting represent the Ante, at 5. Although a formal assign- ment or appointment suffices for standing, it is not neces- sary. See, e.g., Food and Commercial Work, 517 U.S., at 55; 495 U.S., at 16. Regardless, Congress ex- pressly and thereby legally assigned pension-plan partici- pants and beneficiaries the |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | and thereby legally assigned pension-plan partici- pants and beneficiaries the right to represent their plan, in- cluding in lawsuits where the other would-be representative is the defendant. 9 U.S. C. §(), (3); see also, e.g., Restatement (Third) of s Com- ment d(1), at 7 (trust terms may confer standing to sue the trustee). ERISA was “primarily concerned with the possi- ble misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire ” U.S., at ; see also –, nn. 8–9.9 Far from “ ‘automatically’ ” con- ferring petition standing to sue or creating an injury from whole cloth, cf. ante, at 5, ERISA assigns the right to sue on the plan’s unquestionably cognizable harm: here, fi- duciary breaches causing wrongful gains and hundreds of millions of dollars in losses. So even under the Court’s framing, it does not matter whether petition “sustained any monetary injury,” ante, at because their pension plan did. To support standing, a statute may (but need not) legally designate a party to sue on another’s behalf. e- cause ERISA does so here, petition should be permitted to sue for their pension plan’s sake. —————— 9 Neither 554 U.S. 69, nor Vermont of Natural Re- 59 U.S. 765 (000), is to the contrary. Cf. ante, at 5. oth decisions undermine today’s result. See 554 U.S., at 80, 87 (noting in the Article III context that “ ‘na- ked legal title’ ” has long permitted suit and that “federal courts routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not them- selves directly bringing suit,” such as when “[t]rustees bring suits to ben- efit their trusts”); Vermont 59 U.S., at 774 (showing that even a partial statutory assignment grants constitutional standing to sue on another’s behalf ). Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting III The Court also notes that “[e]ven if a defined-benefit plan is mismanaged into plan termination, the federal [Pension enefit Guaranty Corporation] by law acts as a backstop and cov the vested pension benefits up to a certain amount and often in full.” Ante, at 8, n. The Court then suggests that the only way beneficiaries of a mismanaged plan could sue is if their benefits were not “guaranteed in full by the PGC.” Those statements undcore the problem in today’s de- cision. Whereas ERISA and petition’ Plan Document ex- plicitly mandate that all plan assets be handled prudently and loyally for petition’ exclusive benefit, the Court sug- gests that beneficiaries should endure disloyalty, impru- dence, and plan mismanagement so long as the Federal Government is |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | and plan mismanagement so long as the Federal Government is there to pick up the bill when “the plan and the employer” “fail.” ut the purpose of ERISA and fiduciary duties is to pre- vent retirement-plan failure in the first place. 9 U.S. C. In barely more than a decade, the country (indeed the world) has experienced two unexpected financial crises that have rocked the existence and stability of many em- ploy once thought incapable of failing. ERISA deliber- ately provides protection regardless whether an employer is on sound financial footing one day because it may not be so stable the next. See 10 The Court’s references to Government insurance also overlook sobering truths about the PGC. The Government Accountability Office recently relisted the PGC as one of the “High Risk” Government programs most likely to be- come insolvent. See GAO, Report to Congressional Com- mittees, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed To —————— 10 This also explains why a material risk of loss is not a prerequisite for standing, least of all for retirees relying on their retirement plan for in- come. Cf. ante, at 7–8. THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas (GAO–19– 157SP, 019) (GAO High-Risk Report). Noting the insol- vency of defined-benefit plans that the PGC insures and the “significant financial risk and governance challenges that the PGC faces,” the GAO High-Risk Report warns that “the retirement benefits of millions of American work- and retirees could be at risk of dramatic reductions” within four years. at 56–57. At last count, the PGC’s “net accumulated financial deficit” was “over $51 billion” and its “exposure to potential future losses for underfunded plans” was “nearly $185 billion.” at 67. Notably, the GAO had issued these warnings before the current financial crisis struck. Exchanging ERISA’s fiduciary duties for Gov- ernment insurance would only add to the PGC’s plight and require taxpay to bail out pension plans. IV It is hard to ovtate the harmful consequences of the Court’s conclusion. With ERISA, “the crucible of congres- sional concern was misuse and mismanagement of plan as- sets by plan administrators.” U.S., at 141, n. 8. In imposing fiduciary duties and providing a private right of action, Congress “designed” the statute “to prevent these abuses in the future.” Yet today’s outcome en- courages the very mischief ERISA meant to end. After today’s decision, about 35 million people with de- fined-benefit plans11 will be vulnerable to fiduciary miscon- duct. The Court’s reasoning allows fiduciaries to misuse pension funds so long as the employer has a strong |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | pension funds so long as the employer has a strong enough balance sheet during (or, as alleged here, because of ) the misbehavior. Indeed, the Court holds that the Constitution —————— 11 See Dept. of Labor, Private Pension Plan ulletin Historical Tables and Graphs, 1975–017 (Sept. 019) (Table E4), https: / /www.dol.gov / sites / dolgov / files / ESA / research / statistics / retirement - bulletins / private - pension - plan - bulletin - historical - tables - and - graphs.pdf. Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 3 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting forbids retirees to remedy or prevent fiduciary breaches in federal court until their retirement plan or employer is on the brink of financial ruin. See ante, at 7–8. This is a re- markable result, and not only because this case is bookended by two financial crises. There is no denying that the Great Recession contributed to the plan’s massive losses and statutory underfunding, or that the present pandemic punctuates the perils of imprudent and disloyal financial management. Today’s result also disrupts the purpose of ERISA and the trust funds it requires. s have trustees and fiduciary duties to protect the assets and the beneficiaries from the vicissitudes of fortune. Fiduciary duties, especially loyalty, are potent prophylactic rules that restrain trustees “tempted to exploit [a] trust.” ogert & ogert Con- gress thus recognized that one of the best ways to protect retirement plans was to codify the same fiduciary duties and beneficiary-enforcement pow that have existed for centuries. E.g., 9 U.S. C. §(b), 1109, 1. Along those lines, courts once held fiduciaries to a higher stand- ard: “Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” 49 N.Y. 458, (198) Not so today. Nor can petition take comfort in the so-called “regu- latory phalanx” guarding defined-benefit plans from mis- management. Ante, at 7. Having divested ERISA of en- forceable fiduciary duties and beneficiaries of their right to sue, the Court lists “employ and their sharehold,” other fiduciaries, and the “Department of Labor” as parties on whom retirees should rely. Ante, at 6–7. ut there are serious holes in the Court’s proffered line of defense. The Court’s proposed solutions offer nothing in a case like this one. The employer, its sharehold, and the plan’s co- fiduciaries here have no reason to bring suit because they either committed or profited from the misconduct. Recall 4 THOLE v. U. S. ANK N. A. SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting the allegations: Respondents misused a pension plan’s as- sets to invest in their own mutual funds, pay themselves excessive fees, and |
Justice Sotomayor | 2,020 | 24 | dissenting | Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4757654/thole-v-u-s-bank-n-a/ | in their own mutual funds, pay themselves excessive fees, and swell the employer’s income and stock prices. Nor is the Court’s suggestion workable in the mine run of cases. The reason the Court gives for trusting em- ploy and sharehold to look out for beneficiaries—“be- cause the employ are entitled to the plan surplus and are often on the hook for plan shortfalls,” ante, at 6—is what commentators call a conflict of interest.1 Neither is the Federal Government’s enforcement power a palliative. “ERISA makes clear that Congress did not in- tend for Government enforcement pow to lessen the re- sponsibilities of plan fiduciaries.” Central States, 47 U.S., at 578. The Secretary of Labor, moreover, signed a brief (in support of petition) verifying that the Federal Govern- ment cannot “monitor every [ERISA] plan in the country.” rief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6. Even when the Government can sue (in a representational capacity, of course), it cannot seek all the relief that a participant or beneficiary could. Compare 9 U.S. C. () with At bottom, the Court rejects ERISA’s private- enforcement scheme and suggests a preference that taxpay- fund the monitoring (and perhaps the bailing out) of pension plans. See ante, at 6–8, and n. Finally, in justifying today’s outcome, the Court discusses attorney’s fees. Twice the Court underlines that attorneys have a “$31 million” “stake” in this case. Ante, at 3. ut no one in this litigation has suggested attorney’s fees as a —————— 1 E.g., Fischel & Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive enefit Rule, 111 This con- flict exists because, contrary to the Court’s assertion, the employer and its sharehold are not “entitled to the plan surplus” until after the plan terminates and after all vested benefits have been paid from the trust fund’s assets. Compare ante, at 6, with 9 U.S. C. (ERISA plan assets “shall never inure to the benefit of any employer” while the trust exists); see also App. 61; Record in No. –cv–687 (D Minn.), Doc. 107–1, p. 75. Cite as: 590 U. S. (00) 5 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting basis for standing. As the Court appears to admit, its focus on fees is about optics, not law. See ante, at 3 (acknowledg- ing that attorney’s fees do not advance the standing in- quiry). The Court’s aside about attorneys is not only misplaced, it is also mistaken. Missing from the Court’s opinion is any recognition that Congress found private enforcement suits and fiduciary duties critical to policing retirement plans; that it was after this litigation was initiated that respond- ents restored $311 million to |
Justice Breyer | 2,006 | 2 | concurring | Woodford v. Ngo | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145635/woodford-v-ngo/ | I agree with the Court that, in enacting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S. C. Congress intended the term “exhausted” to “mean what the term means in administrative law, where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.” Ante, at 11. I do not believe that Congress desired a system in which prisoners could elect to bypass prison grievance systems without conse quences. Administrative law, however, contains well established exceptions to exhaustion. See (BREYER, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., dissenting) (constitu tional claims); ; ; McCarthy v. Madigan, (inadequate or unavailable administrative remedies); see generally II R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise (4th ed. 2002). Moreover, habeas corpus law, which contains an exhaustion requirement that is “substantively similar” to administra tive law’s and which informs the Court’s opinion, ante, at 9 10, also permits a number of exceptions. See post, at 5, n. 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that habeas corpus law permits “petitioners to overcome procedural defaults if they can show that the procedural rule is not firmly established 2 WOODFORD v. NGO BREYER, J., concurring in judgment and regularly followed, if they can demonstrate cause and prejudice to overcome a procedural default, or if enforcing the procedural default rule would result in a miscarriage of justice” (citations omitted)). At least two Circuits that have interpreted the statute in a manner similar to that which the Court today adopts have concluded that the PLRA’s proper exhaustion re quirement is not absolute. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (CA3 2004); (CA2 2004). In my view, on remand, the lower court should similarly consider any challenges that petitioner may have concerning whether his case falls into a tradi tional exception that the statute implicitly incorporates. Cite as: 548 U. S. (2006) 1 STEVENS, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 05–416 JEANNE S. WOODFORD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | We have once again a case that presents "the perennial problem of the validity of a state tax for the privilege of carrying on, within a state, certain activities" related to a corporation's operation of an interstate business. Memphis Gas[1] The issue is whether Louisiana, consistent with the Commerce Clause, Art. 8, cl. 3, may impose a fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory corporation franchise tax on appellant, Colonial Pipeline Co., a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate business, upon the "incident" of its "qualification to carry on or do business in this state or the actual doing of business within this state in a corporate form." No question is raised as to the reasonableness of the apportionment of appellant's capital deemed to have been employed in Louisiana, and it is not claimed that the tax is discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained the validity of the tax. We noted probable jurisdiction, We affirm. Appellant is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Atlanta, Ga. t is a common carrier of liquefied petroleum products and owns and operates a pipeline system extending from Houston, Tex., to the New York City area. This 3,400-mile pipeline links the oil refining complexes of Texas and Louisiana with the population centers of the Southeast and *10 Northeast. Appellant daily delivers more than one million gallons of petroleum products to 14 States and the District of Columbia. Approximately 58 miles of the pipeline are located in Louisiana. Over this distance within Louisiana, appellant owns and operates several pumping stations which keep the petroleum products flowing at a sustained rate, and various tank storage facilities used to inject or withdraw petroleum products into or from the line. A work force of 5 to 30 employees mechanics, electricians, and other workersinspect and maintain the line within the State. During the tax years in question, and 1971, appellant maintained no administrative offices or personnel in Louisiana, although it had once maintained a division office in Baton Rouge. Appellant does no intrastate business in petroleum products in Louisiana. On May 9, 196, appellant voluntarily qualified to do business in Louisiana, although it could have carried on its interstate business without doing so. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1:30 H ; see n. 8, infra. Tupon, the Collector of Revenue imposed the Louisiana franchise tax on appellant's activities in the State during 196. At that time La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 47:601, the Louisiana Franchise Tax Act, expressly provided: "The tax levied in is due and payable for the privilege of carrying on or doing business, the exercising of its charter |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | carrying on or doing business, the exercising of its charter or the continuance of its charter within this state, or owning or using any part or all of its capital or plant in this state."[] (Emphasis supplied.) *103 Appellant paid the tax and sued for a refund. The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, held that, in that form, 601 was unconstitutional as applied to appellant because, being imposed directly upon "the privilege of carrying on or doing [interstate] business," it violated the Commerce Clause, Art. 8, cl. 3. Colonial Pipeline The Supreme Court of Louisiana refused review.[3] Following this decision, the Louisiana Legislature amended La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 47:601 by Act 35 of The amendment excised from 601 the words: "The tax levied in is due and payable for the privilege of carrying on or doing business," and substituted: "The qualification to carry on or do business in this state or the actual doing of business within this state in a corporate form," as one of three "alternative incidents" upon which the tax might be imposed. The other two "incidents" the exercise of the corporate charter in the State, and the employment t of its capital, plant, or other property *104 were carried forward from the earlier version of the statute.[4] See n. The Collector of Revenue then renewed his efforts to impose a tax on appellant, this time for doing business "in a corporate form" during and 1971. Again, appellant paid the tax and sued for a refund. The Louisiana District Court and the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, concluded that the amendment made no substantive *105 change in 601, which it construed as still imposing the tax directly upon the privilege of carrying on or doing an interstate business, and held that amended 601 was tfore unconstitutional as applied to appellant. 75 So. d 834 The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed. The court recognized that "[t]he pertinent Constitutional question is whether, as applied to a corporation whose exclusive business carried on within the State is interstate, this statute violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." 89 So. d, But the court attached controlling significance to the omission from the amended statute of the "primary operating incident [of the former version], i. e., `the privilege of carrying on or doing business,' " and the substitution for that incident of doing business in the corporate form. The court held: "The thrust of the [amended] statute is to tax not the interstate business done in Louisiana by a foreign corporation, but the doing of business in Louisiana in |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | foreign corporation, but the doing of business in Louisiana in a corporate form, including `each and every act, power, right, privilege or immunity exercised or enjoyed in this state, as an incident to or by virtue of the powers and privileges acquired by the nature of such organizations' " Accordingly, the court concluded that amended 601 applied the franchise tax to foreign corporations doing only an interstate business in Louisiana not as a tax upon "the general privilege of doing interstate business but simply [as a tax upon] the corporation's privilege of enjoying in a corporate capacity the ownership or use of its capital, plant or other property in this state, the corporation's privilege of exercising and continuing its corporate character in the State of Louisiana, and the corporation's use of its corporate form to do business in the State." Upon that premise, the court validated the levy as a *106 constitutional exaction for privileges enjoyed by corporations in Louisiana and for benefits furnished by the State to enterprises carrying on business, interstate or local, in the corporate form, whether as domestic or foreign corporations. The court reasoned: "The corporation, including the foreign corporation doing only interstate business in Louisiana, enjoys under our laws many privileges separate and apart from simply doing business, such for instance as the legal status to sue and be sued in the Courts of our State, continuity of business without interruption by death or dissolution, transfer of property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, advantages of business controlled and managed by corporate directors, and the general absence of individual liability, among others. "The fact that the corporate form of doing business is inextricably interwoven in a foreign corporation's doing interstate business in the State, does not in our view detract from the fact that the local incident taxed is the form of doing business rather than the business done by that corporation. And it is our view that the local incident is real and sufficiently distinguishable, so that taxation tof does not, under the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, violate the Commerce Clause. "The statute does not discriminate between foreign and local corporations, being applicable, as it is, to both. Nor do we believe that the State's exercise of its power by this taxing statute is out of proportion to Colonial's activities within the state and their consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protection which the state has afforded them. "Furthermore we believe that the State has given *107 something for which it can ask return. The return, tax levy |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | for which it can ask return. The return, tax levy in this case, is an exaction which the State of Louisiana requires as a recompense for its protection of lawful activities carried on in this state by Colonial, activities which are incidental to the powers and privileges possessed by it by the nature of its organization, the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise in manning the facilities of their pipeline system throughout the 58 miles of its pipeline in the State of Louisiana." -101.[5] This Court is, of course, not bound by the state court's determination that the challenged tax is not a tax on interstate commerce. "The State may determine for *108 itself the operating incidence of its tax. But it is for this Court to determine whether the tax, as construed by the highest court of the State, is or is not `a tax on interstate commerce.' " Memphis Steam 34 U.S. 389, 39 (195). We tfore turn to the question whether the tax imposed upon appellant under amended 601, as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is or is not a tax on interstate commerce. t is a truism that the mere act of carrying on business in interstate commerce does not exempt a corporation from state taxation. "t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business." Western Live 303 U.S. 50, 54 Accordingly, decisions of this Court, particularly during recent decades, have sustained nondiscriminatory, properly apportioned state corporate taxes upon foreign corporations doing an exclusively interstate business when the tax is related to a corporation's local activities and the State has provided benefits and protections for those activities for which it is justified in asking a fair and reasonable return.[6]General Motors ; Memphis Gas Cf. Motor 340 U.S. 60 General Motors states the controlling test: "[T]he validity of the tax rests upon whether the *109 State is exacting a constitutionally fair demand for that aspect of interstate commerce to which it bears a special relation. For our purposes the decisive issue turns on the operating incidence of the tax. n other words, the question is whether the State has exerted its power in proper proportion to appellant's activities within the State and to appellant's consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the State has afforded. As was said in `[t]he simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.' |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | state has given anything for which it can ask return.' " -441. Amended 601 as applied to appellant satisfies this test. First, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the operating incidences of the franchise tax are the three localized alternative incidences provided in 601: (1) doing business in Louisiana in the corporate form; () the exercise of a corporation's charter or the continuance of its charter within the State; and (3) the owning or using any part of its capital, plant, or other property in Louisiana in a corporate capacity. We necessarily accept this construction of amended 601 by Louisiana's highest 89 So. d, Second, the court found that the powers, privileges, and benefits Louisiana bestows incident to these activities were sufficient to support a tax on doing business in the corporate form in that State. We perceive no basis upon which we can say that this is not in fact the case. Our pertinent precedents tfore require affirmance of the State Supreme Court's judgment. Memphis Gas sustained a similar franchise tax imposed by Mississippi on a foreign pipeline corporation engaged exclusively in an interstate business even though the company had not qualified in Mississippi. *110 Memphis Natural Gas Co., a Delaware corporation, owned and operated a natural gas pipeline extending from Louisiana, through Arkansas and Mississippi, to Memphis and other parts of Tennessee. Approximately 135 miles of the pipeline were located in Mississippi, and two of the corporation's compressing stations were located in that State. The corporation engaged in no intrastate commerce in Mississippi, and had only one customer t. t had not qualified under the corporation laws of Mississippi. t had neither an agent for the service of process nor an office in that State, and its only employees t were those necessary for the maintenance of the pipeline. The corporation paid all ad valorem taxes assessed against its property in Mississippi. n addition to these taxes, however, Mississippi imposed a "franchise or excise tax" upon all corporations "doing business" within the State. The statute defined "doing business" in terms that suggest it may have been the model for 601, that is, "[to] mean and [to] include each and every act, power or privilege exercised or enjoyed in this State, as an incident to, or by virtue of the powers and privileges acquired by the nature of such organization." 335 U.S., at 8.[7] The Supreme Court of Mississippi held, as did the Supreme Court of Louisiana 89 So. d, at 101, that the tax was " `an exaction as a recompense for protection of the local activities |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | exaction as a recompense for protection of the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and otherwise manning the facilities of the system throughout the 135 miles of its line in this State.' " * n affirming the judgment of that court, Mr. Justice Reed, in a plurality opinion, said: "We think that the state is within its constitutional rights in exacting compensation under this statute for the protection it affords the activities within its borders. Of course, the interstate commerce could not be conducted without these local activities. But that fact is not conclusive. These are events apart from the flow of commerce. This is a tax on activities for which the state, not the United States, gives protection and the state is entitled to compensation when its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate business." This conclusion is even more compelled in the instant case since appellant voluntarily qualified under Louisiana law and tfore enjoys the same rights and privileges as a domestic corporation. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1:306 () (Supp. 1975).[8] The Louisiana Supreme Court defined *11 appellant's powers and privileges as including "the legal status to sue and be sued in the Courts of our State, continuity of business without interruption by death or dissolution, transfer of property interests by the disposition of shares of stock, advantages of business controlled and managed by corporate directors, and the general absence of individual liability" 89 So. d, These privileges obviously enhance the value to appellant of its activities within Louisiana. See Southern Gas v. Alabama, ; v. nterstate Natural Gas Co., 103 F.d 544 (CA5), aff'd, 308 U.S. 5 Cf. Railway Express Nevertheless, appellant contends that Motor 340 U.S. 60 and Railway Express require the conclusion that 601 is unconstitutional as applied to appellant. The argument is without merit. held invalid under the Commerce Clause a Connecticut tax based expressly "upon [the corporation's] franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing business within the state" Similarly, Railway Express invalidated Virginia's "annual license tax" imposed on express companies expressly "for the privilege of doing business" in the State. Thus both taxes, as express imposts upon the privilege of carrying on an exclusively interstate business, contained the same fatal constitutional flaw that led the Louisiana Court of Appeal to strike down the levy against appellant *113 under 601 before its amendment in "A tax is [an unconstitutional] direct burden, if laid upon the operation or act of interstate commerce." Ozark Pipe 66 U.S. 555, (195) The amendment however repealed that unconstitutional |
Justice Brennan | 1,975 | 13 | majority | Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109239/colonial-pipeline-co-v-traigle/ | 66 U.S. 555, (195) The amendment however repealed that unconstitutional basis for the tax, and made 601 constitutional by limiting its application to operating incidences of activities within Louisiana for which the State affords privileges and protections that constitutionally entitle Louisiana to exact a fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory tax. expressly recognized: "The incidence of the tax provides the answer. The State is not precluded from imposing taxes upon other activities or aspects of this business which, unlike the privilege of doing interstate business, are subject to the sovereign power of the State." -609.[9] Of course, an otherwise unconstitutional tax is not made the less so by masking it in words cloaking its actual thrust. Railway Express ; Railway Express ; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. 10 U.S. 17, 7 "t is not a matter of labels." Here, however, the Louisiana Legislature amended 601 purposefully to remove any basis of a levy upon the privilege of carrying on an interstate business and narrowly to confine *114 the impost to one related to appellant's activities within the State in the corporate form. Since appellant, a foreign corporation qualified to carry on its business in corporate form, and doing business in Louisiana in the corporate form, tby gained benefits and protections from Louisiana of value and importance to its business, the application of that State's fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory levy to appellant does not offend the Commerce Clause. The tax cannot be said to be imposed upon appellant merely or solely for the privilege of doing interstate business in Louisiana. t is, rather, a fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory means of requiring appellant to pay its just share of the cost of state government upon which appellant necessarily relies and by which it is furnished protection and benefits. Affirmed. MR. JUSTCE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTCE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTCE REHNQUST joins, concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | In this case, we decide whether precludes an expert witness from testifying in a manner that has long been allowed under the law of evidence. Specifically, does bar an expert from expressing an opinion based on facts about a case that have been made known to the expert but about which the expert is not competent to testify? We also decide whether substantially impedes the ability of prosecutors to introduce DNA evidence and thus may effectively relegate the prosecution in some cases to reli- ance on older, less reliable forms of proof. In petitioner’s bench trial for rape, the prosecution called an expert who testified that a DNA profile produced by an outside laboratory, Cellmark, matched a profile produced by the state police lab using a sample of peti- tioner’s blood. On direct examination, the expert testified that Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and that Cellmark provided the police with a DNA profile. The expert also explained the notations on documents admit- 2 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. ted as business records, stating that, according to the records, vaginal swabs taken from the victim were sent to and received back from Cellmark. The expert made no other statement that was offered for the purpose of identi- fying the sample of biological material used in deriving the profile or for the purpose of establishing how Cellmark handled or tested the sample. Nor did the expert vouch for the accuracy of the profile that Cellmark produced. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that the expert’s testi- mony violated the Confrontation Clause as interpreted in Petitioner’s main argument is that the expert went astray when she referred to the DNA profile provided by Cellmark as having been produced from semen found on the victim’s vaginal swabs. But both the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court found that this statement was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, and it is settled that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the admission of such statements. See at 59–60, n. 9 (citing (1985)). For more than 200 years, the law of evidence has permitted the sort of testimony that was given by the ex- pert in this case. Under settled evidence law, an expert may express an opinion that is based on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to be true. It is then up to the party who calls the expert to introduce other evidence establishing the facts assumed by the expert. While it was once the practice for an expert who based an opinion on assumed facts to |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | an expert who based an opinion on assumed facts to testify in the form of an an- swer to a hypothetical question, modern practice does not demand this formality and, in appropriate cases, permits an expert to explain the facts on which his or her opinion is based without testifying to the truth of those facts. See Fed. Rule Evid. 703. That is precisely what occurred in this case, and we should not lightly “swee[p] away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evi- Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 3 Opinion of ALITO, J. dence.” 330 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). We now conclude that this form of expert testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause because that provi- sion has no application to out-of-court statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. When an expert testifies for the prosecution in a criminal case, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the expert about any statements that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court statements that are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the assump- tions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Applying this rule to the present case, we con- clude that the expert’s testimony did not violate the Sixth Amendment. As a second, independent basis for our decision, we also conclude that even if the report produced by Cellmark had been admitted into evidence, there would have been no Confrontation Clause violation. The Cellmark report is very different from the sort of extrajudicial statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and con- fessions, that the Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach. The report was produced before any suspect was identified. The report was sought not for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even under suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on the loose. And the profile that Cellmark provided was not inherently inculpatory. On the contrary, a DNA profile is evidence that tends to exculpate all but one of the more than 7 billion people in the world today. The use of DNA evi- dence to exonerate persons who have been wrongfully accused or convicted is well known. If DNA profiles could not be introduced without calling the technicians who participated in the preparation of the profile, economic 4 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. pressures would encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely instead on older |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely instead on older forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification, that are less reliable. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U. S. (2012). The Con- frontation Clause does not mandate such an undesirable development. This conclusion will not prejudice any de- fendant who really wishes to probe the reliability of the DNA testing done in a particular case because those who participated in the testing may always be subpoenaed by the defense and questioned at trial. I A On February 10, 2000, in Chicago, Illinois, a young woman, L. J., was abducted while she was walking home from work. The perpetrator forced her into his car and raped her, then robbed her of her money and other per- sonal items and pushed her out into the street. L. J. ran home and reported the attack to her mother, who called the police. An ambulance took L. J. to the hospital, where doctors treated her wounds and took a blood sample and vaginal swabs for a sexual-assault kit. A Chicago Police detective collected the kit, labeled it with an inventory number, and sent it under seal to the Illinois State Police (ISP) lab. At the ISP lab, a forensic scientist received the sealed kit. He conducted a chemical test that confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs, and he then resealed the kit and placed it in a secure evidence freezer. During the period in question, the ISP lab often sent biological samples to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory in Germantown, Maryland, for DNA testing. There was evidence that the ISP lab sent L. J.’s vaginal swabs to Cellmark for testing and that Cellmark sent back a report containing a male DNA profile produced from semen taken from those swabs. At this time, petitioner was not under Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 5 Opinion of ALITO, J. suspicion for L. J.’s rape. Sandra Lambatos, a forensic specialist at the ISP lab, conducted a computer search to see if the Cellmark profile matched any of the entries in the state DNA database. The computer showed a match to a profile produced by the lab from a sample of petitioner’s blood that had been taken after he was arrested on unrelated charges on August 3, 2000. On April 17, 2001, the police conducted a lineup at which L. J. identified petitioner as her assailant. Peti- tioner was then indicted for aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnaping, and aggravated robbery. In lieu of a jury trial, petitioner chose to be tried before a state judge. B |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | petitioner chose to be tried before a state judge. B Petitioner’s bench trial began in April 2006. In open court, L. J. again identified petitioner as her attacker. The State also offered three expert forensic witnesses to link petitioner to the crime through his DNA. First, Brian Hapack, an ISP forensic scientist, testified that he had confirmed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs taken from L. J. by performing an acid phosphatase test. After performing this test, he testified, he resealed the evidence and left it in a secure freezer at the ISP lab. Second, Karen Abbinanti, a state forensic analyst, testi- fied that she had used Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Short Tandem Repeat (STR) techniques to develop a DNA profile from a blood sample that had been drawn from petitioner after he was arrested in August 2000. She also stated that she had entered petitioner’s DNA profile into the state forensic database. Third, the State offered Sandra Lambatos as an expert witness in forensic biology and forensic DNA analysis. On direct examination, Lambatos testified about the general process of using the PCR and STR techniques to generate 6 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. DNA profiles from forensic samples such as blood and semen. She then described how these DNA profiles could be matched to an individual based on the individual’s unique genetic code. In making a comparison between two DNA profiles, Lambatos stated, it is a “commonly accepted” practice within the scientific community for “one DNA expert to rely on the records of another DNA expert.” App. 51. Lambatos also testified that Cellmark was an “accred- ited crime lab” and that, in her experience, the ISP lab routinely sent evidence samples via Federal Express to Cellmark for DNA testing in order to expedite the testing process and to “reduce [the lab’s] backlog.” at 49–. To keep track of evidence samples and preserve the chain of custody, Lambatos stated, she and other analysts relied on sealed shipping containers and labeled shipping mani- fests, and she added that experts in her field regularly relied on such protocols. at –51. Lambatos was shown shipping manifests that were admitted into evidence as business records, and she ex- plained what they indicated, namely, that the ISP lab had sent L. J.’s vaginal swabs to Cellmark, and that Cellmark had sent them back, along with a deduced male DNA profile. at 52–55. The prosecutor asked Lambatos whether there was “a computer match” between “the male DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs of [L. J.]” and “[the] male |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | from the vaginal swabs of [L. J.]” and “[the] male DNA profile that had been identi- fied” from petitioner’s blood sample. The defense attorney objected to this question for “lack of foundation,” arguing that the prosecution had offered “no evidence with regard to any testing that’s been done to generate a DNA profile by another lab to be testified to by this witness.” The prosecutor responded: “I‘m not getting at what another lab did.” Rather, she said, she was simply asking Lambatos about “her own testing based on [DNA] information” that she had received from Cellmark. Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 7 Opinion of ALITO, J. The trial judge agreed, noting, “If she says she didn’t do her own testing and she relied on a test of another lab and she’s testifying to that, we will see what she’s going to say.” The prosecutor then proceeded, asking Lambatos, “Did you compare the semen that had been identified by Brian Hapack from the vaginal swabs of [L. J.] to the male DNA profile that had been identified by Karen [Abbinanti] from the blood of [petitioner]?” Lambatos answered “Yes.” Defense counsel lodged an objection “to the form of the question,” but the trial judge overruled it. Lambatos then testified that, based on her own comparison of the two DNA pro- files, she “concluded that [petitioner] cannot be excluded as a possible source of the semen identified in the vaginal swabs,” and that the probability of the profile’s appearing in the general population was “1 in 8.7 quadrillion black, 1 in 390 quadrillion white, or 1 in 109 quadrillion Hispanic unrelated individuals.” Asked whether she would “call this a match to [petitioner],” Lambatos an- swered yes, again over defense counsel’s objection. at 58. The Cellmark report itself was neither admitted into evidence nor shown to the factfinder. Lambatos did not quote or read from the report; nor did she identify it as the source of any of the opinions she expressed. On cross-examination, Lambatos confirmed that she did not conduct or observe any of the testing on the vaginal swabs, and that her testimony relied on the DNA profile produced by Cellmark. She stated that she trusted Cellmark to do reliable work because it was an accredited lab, but she admitted she had not seen any of the calibrations or work that Cellmark had done in deduc- ing a male DNA profile from the vaginal swabs. at 59–62. Asked whether the DNA sample might have been de- 8 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. graded before Cellmark analyzed it, Lambatos answered |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | of ALITO, J. graded before Cellmark analyzed it, Lambatos answered that, while degradation was technically possible, she strongly doubted it had occurred in this case. She gave two reasons. First, the ISP lab likely would have noticed the degradation before sending the evidence off to Cell- mark. Second, and more important, Lambatos also noted that the data making up the DNA profile would ex- hibit certain telltale signs if it had been deduced from a degraded sample: The visual representation of the DNA sequence would exhibit “specific patterns” of degradation, and she “didn’t see any evidence” of that from looking at the profile that Cellmark produced. at 81–82. When Lambatos finished testifying, the defense moved to exclude her testimony “with regards to testing done by [Cellmark]” based on the Confrontation Clause. Defense counsel argued that there was “no evidence with regards to any work done by [Cellmark] to justify testimony coming into this case with regard to their anal- ysis.” Thus, while defense counsel objected to and sought the exclusion of Lambatos’ testimony insofar as it implicated events at the Cellmark lab, defense counsel did not object to or move for the exclusion of any other portion of Lambatos’ testimony, including statements regarding the contents of the shipment sent to or received back from Cellmark. See 56, 90. See also 385 Ill. App. 3d 359, 367–, (chain-of- custody argument based on shipping manifests waived). The prosecution responded that petitioner’s Confronta- tion Clause rights were satisfied because he had the op- portunity to cross-examine the expert who had testified that there was a match between the DNA profiles pro- duced by Cellmark and Abbinanti. App. 91. Invoking Illinois Rule of Evidence 703,1 the prosecutor argued that —————— 1 Consistent with the Federal Rules, Illinois Rule of Evidence 703 provides as follows: Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 9 Opinion of ALITO, J. an expert is allowed to disclose the facts on which the expert’s opinion is based even if the expert is not compe- tent to testify to those underlying facts. She further ar- gued that any deficiency in the foundation for the expert’s opinion “[d]oesn’t go to the admissibility of [that] testi- mony,” but instead “goes to the weight of the testimony.” App. 91. The trial judge agreed with the prosecution and stated that “the issue is what weight do you give the test, not do you exclude it.” Accordingly, the judge stated that he would not exclude Lambatos’ testimony, which was “based on her own independent testing of the data received from [Cellmark].” –95 (alteration in original). The trial |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | data received from [Cellmark].” –95 (alteration in original). The trial court found petitioner guilty of the charges against him. The state court of appeals affirmed in rele- vant part, concluding that Lambatos’ testimony did not violate petitioner’s confrontation rights because the Cell- mark report was not offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter it asserted. See –970 (“Cellmark’s report was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered to provide a basis for Lambatos’ opinion”) The Supreme Court of Illinois also affirmed. Under state law, the court noted, the Cellmark report could not be used as substantive evidence. When Lambatos referenced the report during her direct examination, she did so “for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for [her expert opinion],” not for the purpose of showing “the truth of the matter asserted” by —————— “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.” 10 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. the report. at 1, Thus, the report was not used to establish its truth, but only “to show the underlying facts and data Lambatos used before rendering an expert opinion.” 939 N.E. 2d, at 279. We granted certiorari. 564 U.S. (2011). II A The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the wit- nesses against him.” Before this Court took the view that the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admis- sion of an out-of-court statement that fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, see but in the Court adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confronta- tion right, holding that “[t]estimonial statements of wit- nesses absent from trial [can be] admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” 541 U. S., has resulted in a steady stream of new cases in this Court. See v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. (2011); Michigan v. 562 U.S. (2011); ; Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 ; ; Two of these decisions involved scientific reports. In the defendant was arrested and charged with distributing and trafficking in cocaine. At trial, the prosecution introduced bags of a white powdery |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | At trial, the prosecution introduced bags of a white powdery substance that had been found in the defendant’s possession. The trial court also admitted into evidence three “certificates of analysis” from the state forensic laboratory stating that the bags had been “examined with the following results: Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 11 Opinion of ALITO, J. The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.” 557 U. S., at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the admission of these certificates, which were executed under oath before a notary, violated the Sixth Amendment. They were created for “the sole purpose of providing evidence against a defendant,” at 323, and were “ ‘quite plainly affidavits,’ ” (THOMAS, J., concurring). The Court emphasized that the introduction of the report to prove the nature of the sub- stance found in the defendant’s possession was tanta- mount to “live, in-court testimony” on that critical fact and that the certificates did “precisely what a witness does on direct examination.” (internal quotation marks omitted). There was no doubt that the certificates were used to prove the truth of the matter they asserted. Un- der state law, “the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance.” (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis deleted). On these facts, the Court said, it was clear that the certif- icates were “testimonial statements” that could not be introduced unless their authors were subjected to the “ ‘cru- cible of cross-examination.’ ” 317 (quoting ). In we held that another scientific report could not be used as substantive evidence against the de- fendant unless the analyst who prepared and certified the report was subject to confrontation. The defendant in that case had been convicted of driving while intoxicated. At trial, the court admitted into evidence a forensic report certifying that a sample of the defendant’s blood had an alcohol concentration of 0.21 grams per hundred milli- liters, well above the legal limit. Instead of calling the analyst who signed and certified the forensic report, the prosecution called another analyst who had not performed or observed the actual analysis, but was only familiar with 12 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. the general testing procedures of the laboratory. The Court declined to accept this surrogate testimony, despite the fact that the testifying analyst was a “knowledgeable representative of the laboratory” who could “explain the lab’s processes and the details of the report.” 564 U. S., at (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). The Court stated |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1). The Court stated simply: “The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification.” at (slip op., at 2). Just as in the forensic report that was “introduce[d]” in “contain[ed] a testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial.” 564 U. S., at – (slip op., at 7–8). The report was signed by the nontestifying analyst who had authored it, stating, “I certify that I followed the procedures set out on the reverse of this report, and the statements in this block are correct. The concentration of alcohol in this sample is based on the grams of alcohol in one hundred milliliters of blood.” App. in O. T. No. 09–10876, p. 62. Critically, the report was introduced at trial for the substantive purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted by its out-of-court author—namely, that the defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.21. This was the central fact in question at the defendant’s trial, and it was dispositive of his guilt. In concurrence, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR highlighted the im- portance of the fact that the forensic report had been admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter it asserted. She emphasized that “this [was] not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves admitted into evidence.” 564 U. S., at (slip op., at 6) (opinion concurring in part) (citing Fed. Rule Evid. 703). “We would face a different question,” she observed, “if asked to determine the consti- tutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 13 Opinion of ALITO, J. testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.” at (slip op., at 6). We now confront that question. B It has long been accepted that an expert witness may voice an opinion based on facts concerning the events at issue in a particular case even if the expert lacks first- hand knowledge of those facts. At common law, courts developed two ways to deal with this situation. An expert could rely on facts that had already been established in the record. But because it was not always possible to proceed in this manner, and be- cause record evidence was often disputed, courts devel- oped the alternative practice of allowing an expert to testify in the form of a “hypothetical question.” Under this approach, the expert would be asked to assume the truth of certain factual |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | would be asked to assume the truth of certain factual predicates, and was then asked to offer an opinion based on those assumptions. See 1 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence p. 87 ; 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence p. 1084 (2d ed. 1923) (“If the witness is skilled enough, his opinion may be adequately obtained upon hypothetical data alone; and it is immate- rial whether he has ever seen the person, place or thing in question” (citation omitted)). The truth of the premises could then be established through independent evidence, and the factfinder would regard the expert’s testimony to be only as credible as the premises on which it was based. An early example of this approach comes from the Eng- lish case of Beckwith v. Sydebotham, 1 Camp. 116, 170 Eng. Rep. 897 (K. B. 17), where a party sought to prove the seaworthiness of a ship, the Earl of Wycombe, by calling as witnesses “several eminent surveyors of ships who had never seen the ‘Earl of Wycombe.’ ” The opposing party objected to the testimony because it relied 14 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. on facts that were not known to be true, but the judge disagreed. Because the experts were “peculiarly ac- quainted” with “a matter of skill or science,” the judge said, the “jury might be assisted” by their hypothetical opinion based on certain assumed facts. 170 Eng. Rep., at 897. The judge acknowledged the danger of the jury’s being unduly prejudiced by wrongly assuming the truth of the hypothetical facts, but the judge noted that the experts could be asked on cross-examination what their opinion of the ship’s seaworthiness would be if differ- ent hypothetical facts were assumed. If the party that had called the experts could not independently prove the truth of the premises they posited, then the experts’ “opinion might not go for much; but still it was admissible evi- dence.” There is a long tradition of the use of hypothetical ques- tions in American courts. In 1887, for example, this Court indicated its approval of the following jury instruction: “As to the questions, you must understand that they are not evidence; they are mere statements to these witnesses and, upon the hypothesis or assumption of these questions the witnesses are asked to give their [opinion]. You must readily see that the value of the answers to these questions depends largely, if not wholly, upon the fact whether the statements made in these questions are sustained by the proof. If the statements in these questions are not supported by the proof, then |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | in these questions are not supported by the proof, then the answers to the questions are enti- tled to no weight, because based upon false assump- tions or statements of facts.” Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 (internal quotation marks omitted). Modern rules of evidence continue to permit experts to express opinions based on facts about which they lack personal knowledge, but these rules dispense with the need for hypothetical questions. Under both the Illinois Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 15 Opinion of ALITO, J. and the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may base an opinion on facts that are “made known to the expert at or before the hearing,” but such reliance does not constitute admissible evidence of this underlying information. Ill. Rule Evid. 703; Fed. Rule Evid. 703. Accordingly, in jury trials, both Illinois and federal law generally bar an expert from disclosing such inadmissible evidence.2 In bench trials, however, both the Illinois and the Federal Rules place no restriction on the revelation of such information to the factfinder. When the judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that the judge will understand the limited reason for the disclosure of the underlying inadmissible information and will not rely on that information for any improper purpose. As we have noted, “[i]n bench trials, judges routinely hear inadmissible evidence that they are presumed to ignore when making decisions.” Harris v. Rivera, There is a “well-established presumption” that “the judge [has] ad- hered to basic rules of procedure,” when the judge is acting as a factfinder. at –347 (emphasis added). See also 1 U.S. 1030, (1991) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). This feature of Illinois and federal law is important because while departing from prior Confronta- tion Clause precedent in other respects, took pains to reaffirm the proposition that the Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes —————— 2 But disclosure of these facts or data to the jury is permitted if the value of disclosure “substantially outweighs [any] prejudicial effect,” Fed. Rule Evid. 703, or “the probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.” 604 N.E.2d 294, 333 When this disclosure occurs, “the underlying facts” are revealed to the jury “for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for [the expert’s] opinion” and not “for the truth of the matter asserted.” 604 N.E. 2d, 16 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” 541 U. S., –60, n. 9 (citing ). In Street, the defendant claimed that the police had coerced him |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | Street, the defendant claimed that the police had coerced him into adopting the confession of his alleged accomplice. The prosecution sought to rebut this claim by showing that the defendant’s confession differed significantly from the accomplice’s. Although the accom- plice’s confession was clearly a testimonial statement, the Court held that the jurors could hear it as long as they were instructed to consider that confession not for its truth, but only for the “distinctive and limited purpose” of comparing it to the defendant’s confession, to see whether the two were identical. III A In order to assess petitioner’s Confrontation Clause argument, it is helpful to inventory exactly what Lamba- tos said on the stand about Cellmark. She testified to the truth of the following matters: Cellmark was an accredited lab, App. 49; the ISP occasionally sent forensic samples to Cellmark for DNA testing, ibid.; according to shipping manifests admitted into evidence, the ISP lab sent vaginal swabs taken from the victim to Cellmark and later re- ceived those swabs back from Cellmark, at 52–55; and, finally, the Cellmark DNA profile matched a profile pro- duced by the ISP lab from a sample of petitioner’s blood, –56. Lambatos had personal knowledge of all of these matters, and therefore none of this testimony in- fringed petitioner’s confrontation right. Lambatos did not testify to the truth of any other matter concerning Cellmark. She made no other reference to the Cellmark report, which was not admitted into evidence and was not seen by the trier of fact. Nor did she testify to anything that was done at the Cellmark lab, and she did not vouch for the quality of Cellmark’s work. Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 17 Opinion of ALITO, J. B The principal argument advanced to show a Confronta- tion Clause violation concerns the phrase that Lambatos used when she referred to the DNA profile that the ISP lab received from Cellmark. This argument is developed most fully in the dissenting opinion, and therefore we refer to the dissent’s discussion of this issue. In the view of the dissent, the following is the critical portion of Lambatos’ testimony, with the particular words that the dissent finds objectionable italicized: “Q Was there a computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been identified as hav- ing originated from Sandy Williams? “A Yes, there was.” Post, at 7 (opinion of KAGAN, J.) (quoting App. 56; emphasis added). According to the dissent, the italicized phrase violated petitioner’s confrontation right |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | to the dissent, the italicized phrase violated petitioner’s confrontation right because Lambatos lacked personal knowledge that the profile produced by Cellmark was based on the vaginal swabs taken from the victim, L. J. As the dissent acknowledges, there would have been “nothing wrong with Lambatos’s testifying that two DNA profiles—the one shown in the Cellmark report and the one derived from Williams’s blood—matched each other; that was a straightforward application of Lambatos’s expertise.” Post, at 12. Thus, if Lambatos’ testimony had been slightly modified as follows, the dissent would see no problem: “Q Was there a computer match generated of the male DNA profile produced by 18 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. Cellmark found in semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been identified as having originated from Sandy Williams? “A Yes, there was.”3 The defect in this argument is that under Illinois law (like federal law) it is clear that the putatively offending phrase in Lambatos’ testimony was not admissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that the matching DNA profile was “found in semen from the vaginal swabs.” Rather, that fact was a mere premise of the prosecutor’s question, and Lambatos simply as- sumed that premise to be true when she gave her answer indicating that there was a match between the two DNA profiles. There is no reason to think that the trier of fact took Lambatos’ answer as substantive evidence to estab- lish where the DNA profiles came from. The dissent’s argument would have force if petitioner had elected to have a jury trial. In that event, there would have been a danger of the jury’s taking Lambatos’ testi- mony as proof that the Cellmark profile was derived from the sample obtained from the victim’s vaginal swabs. Absent an evaluation of the risk of juror confusion and careful jury instructions, the testimony could not have —————— 3 The small difference between what Lambatos actually said on the stand and the slightly revised version that the dissent would find un- objectionable shows that, despite the dissent’s rhetoric, its narrow argument would have little practical effect in future cases. Prosecutors would be allowed to do exactly what the prosecution did in this case so long as their testifying experts’ testimony was slightly modified along the lines shown above. Following that course presumably would not constitute a “prosecutorial dodge,” “subterfuge,” “indirection,” the “neat trick” of “sneak[ing]” in evidence, or the countenancing of constitutional violations with “a wink and a nod.” See post, at 3, 16, |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | “a wink and a nod.” See post, at 3, 16, 17, 12 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 19 Opinion of ALITO, J. gone to the jury. This case, however, involves a bench trial and we must assume that the trial judge understood that the portion of Lambatos’ testimony to which the dissent objects was not admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted.4 The dissent, on the other hand, reaches the truly remarkable conclusion that the wording of Lambatos’ testimony con- fused the trial judge. Were it not for that wording, the argument goes, the judge might have found that the pros- ecution failed to introduce sufficient admissible evidence to show that the Cellmark profile was derived from the sample taken from the victim, and the judge might have disregarded the DNA evidence. This argument reflects a profound lack of respect for the acumen of the trial judge.5 To begin, the dissent’s argument finds no support in the trial record. After defense counsel objected to Lambatos’ testimony, the prosecutor made clear that she was asking Lambatos only about “her own testing based on [DNA] information” that she had received from Cellmark. App. 56. Recognizing that Lambatos’ testimony would carry weight only if the underlying premises could be estab- lished, the judge noted that “the issue is what weight do you give the test [performed by Lambatos], not do you exclude it.” This echoes the old statement in Beckwith that an expert’s opinion based on disputed prem- ises “might not go for much; but still it [is] admissible evidence.” 1 Camp., 170 Eng. Rep., at 897. Both —————— 4 We do not suggest that the Confrontation Clause applies differently depending on the identity of the factfinder. Cf. post, at 14–15 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Instead, our point is that the identity of the factfinder makes a big difference in evaluating the likelihood that the factfinder mistakenly based its decision on inadmissible evidence. 5 See post, at 14 (opinion of KAGAN, J.) (“I do not doubt that a judge typically will do better than a jury in excluding such inadmissible evidence from his decisionmaking process. Perhaps the judge did so here” (emphasis added)). 20 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court viewed the record in this way, and we see no ground for disagreement.6 Second, it is extraordinarily unlikely that any trial judge would be confused in the way that the dissent posits. That Lambatos was not competent to testify to the chain of custody of the |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | competent to testify to the chain of custody of the sample taken from the victim was a point that any trial judge or attorney would immediately under- stand. Lambatos, after all, had absolutely nothing to do with the collection of the sample from the victim, its sub- sequent handling or preservation by the police in Illinois, or its shipment to and receipt by Cellmark. No trial judge would take Lambatos’ testimony as furnishing “the miss- ing link” in the State’s evidence regarding the identity of the sample that Cellmark tested. See post, at 6 (opinion of KAGAN, J.). Third, the admissible evidence left little room for argu- ment that the sample tested by Cellmark came from any source other than the victim’s vaginal swabs.7 This is so —————— 6 The dissent finds evidence of the trial judge’s confusion in his statement that petitioner is “ ‘the guy whose DNA, according to the evidence from the experts, is in the semen recovered from the victim’s vagina.’ ” Post, at 14 (emphasis added). The dissent interprets the phrase “according to the evidence from the experts” as a reference to what one expert, Lambatos, said about the origin of the sample that Cellmark tested. In context, however, the judge’s statement is best understood as attributing to Lambatos nothing more than the conclu- sion that there was a match between the two DNA profiles that were compared. The foundational facts, that one of the profiles came from the defendant and that the other came from “ ‘the semen recovered from the victim’s vagina,’ ” were established not by expert testimony but by ordinary chain-of-custody evidence. 7 Our point is not that admissible evidence regarding the identity of the sample that Cellmark tested excuses the admission of testimonial hearsay on this matter. Compare post, at 5–6 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment), with post, at 14 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). Rather, our point is that, because there was substantial (albeit circumstantial) evidence on this matter, there is no reason to infer that the trier of fact must Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 21 Opinion of ALITO, J. because there is simply no plausible explanation for how Cellmark could have produced a DNA profile that matched Williams’ if Cellmark had tested any sample other than the one taken from the victim. If any other items that might have contained Williams’ DNA had been sent to Cellmark or were otherwise in Cellmark’s possession, there would have been a chance of a mix-up or of cross- contamination. See District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial (ALITO, J., concurring). But there |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial (ALITO, J., concurring). But there is absolutely nothing to suggest that Cellmark had any such items. Thus, the fact that the Cellmark profile matched Williams—the very man whom the victim identified in a lineup and at trial as her at- tacker—was itself striking confirmation that the sample that Cellmark tested was the sample taken from the victim’s vaginal swabs. For these reasons, it is fanciful to suggest that the trial judge took Lambatos’ testimony as providing critical chain-of-custody evidence. C Other than the phrase that Lambatos used in referring to the Cellmark profile, no specific passage in the trial record has been identified as violating the Confrontation Clause, but it is nevertheless suggested that the State somehow introduced “the substance of Cellmark’s report into evidence.” Post, at 8 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). The main impetus for this argument appears to be the (errone- ous) view that unless the substance of the report was sneaked in, there would be insufficient evidence in the record on two critical points: first, that the Cellmark profile was based on the semen in the victim’s vaginal swabs and, second, that Cellmark’s procedures were reli- able. This argument is both legally irrelevant for present purposes and factually incorrect. —————— have taken Lambatos’ statement as providing “the missing link.” 22 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. As to legal relevance, the question before us is whether petitioner’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right was violated, not whether the State offered sufficient founda- tional evidence to support the admission of Lambatos’ opinion about the DNA match. In order to prove these underlying facts, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, and the Illinois courts found that this evidence was sufficient to satisfy state-law requirements regarding proof of foundational facts. See 385 Ill. App. 3d, at 3– –; 939 N.E. 2d, at 275. We cannot review that interpretation and application of Illinois law. Thus, even if the record did not contain any evidence that could rationally support a find- ing that Cellmark produced a scientifically reliable DNA profile based on L. J.’s vaginal swab, that would not estab- lish a Confrontation Clause violation. If there were no proof that Cellmark produced an accurate profile based on that sample, Lambatos’ testimony regarding the match would be irrelevant, but the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in does not bar the admission of irrelevant evidence, only testimonial statements by de- clarants who are not subject to cross-examination.8 It is not correct, however, that the trial record lacks admissible evidence with respect to the source of the sam- ple that Cellmark tested |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | to the source of the sam- ple that Cellmark tested or the reliability of the Cell- mark profile. As to the source of the sample, the State offered conventional chain-of-custody evidence, namely, the testimony of the physician who obtained the vaginal swabs, the testimony of the police employees who handled and kept custody of that evidence until it was sent to —————— 8 Applying the Due Process Clause, we have held that a federal court may determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of all the elements needed for conviction for a state offense. but petitioner has not raised a due process claim. And in any event, L. J.’s identification of petitioner as her assailant would be sufficient to defeat any such claim. Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 23 Opinion of ALITO, J. Cellmark, and the shipping manifests, which provided evidence that the swabs were sent to Cellmark and then returned to the ISP lab. In addition, as already discussed, the match between the Cellmark profile and petitioner’s profile was itself telling confirmation that the Cellmark profile was deduced from the semen on the vaginal swabs. This match also provided strong circumstantial evidence regarding the reliability of Cellmark’s work. Assuming (for the reasons discussed above) that the Cellmark profile was based on the semen on the vaginal swabs, how could shoddy or dishonest work in the Cellmark lab9 have re- sulted in the production of a DNA profile that just so happened to match petitioner’s? If the semen found on the vaginal swabs was not petitioner’s and thus had an en- tirely different DNA profile, how could sloppy work in the Cellmark lab have transformed that entirely different profile into one that matched petitioner’s? And without access to any other sample of petitioner’s DNA (and recall that petitioner was not even under suspicion at this time), how could a dishonest lab technician have substituted pe- titioner’s DNA profile? Under the circumstances of this case, it was surely permissible for the trier of fact to infer that the odds of any of this were exceedingly low. This analysis reveals that much of the dissent’s argu- ment rests on a very clear error. The dissent argues that Lambatos’ testimony could be “true” only if the predicate facts asserted in the Cellmark report were true, and there- fore Lambatos’ reference to the report must have been used for the purpose of proving the truth of those facts. See post, at 10–11. But the truth of Lambatos’ testimony, properly understood, was not dependent on the truth of any |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | properly understood, was not dependent on the truth of any predicate facts. Lambatos testified that two DNA profiles matched. The correctness of this expert opinion, which the defense was able to test on cross-examination, —————— 9 See post, at 18 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). 24 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. was not in any way dependent on the origin of the samples from which the profiles were derived. Of course, Lamba- tos’ opinion would have lacked probative value if the pros- ecution had not introduced other evidence to establish the provenance of the profiles, but that has nothing to do with the truth of her testimony. The dissent is similarly mistaken in its contention that the Cellmark report “was offered for its truth because that is all such ‘basis evidence’ can be offered for.” Post, at 13; see also post, at 3 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (“[S]tatements introduced to explain the basis of an expert’s opinion are not introduced for a plausible nonhearsay purpose”). This view is directly contrary to the current version of Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which this Court approved and sent to Congress in 2000. Under that Rule, “basis evidence” that is not admissible for its truth may be disclosed even in a jury trial under appropriate circumstances. The purpose for allowing this disclosure is that it may “assis[t] the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion.” Advisory Committee’s 2000 Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 703, 28 U.S. C. App., p. 361. The Rule 703 approach, which was controversial when adopted,10 is based on the idea that the disclosure of basis evidence can help the factfinder understand the expert’s thought pro- cess and determine what weight to give to the expert’s opinion. For example, if the factfinder were to suspect that the expert relied on factual premises with no support in the record, or that the expert drew an unwarranted inference from the premises on which the expert relied, then the probativeness or credibility of the expert’s opin- ion would be seriously undermined. The purpose of dis- closing the facts on which the expert relied is to allay these fears—to show that the expert’s reasoning was not illogical, and that the weight of the expert’s opinion does —————— 10 See Advisory Committee’s 2000 Notes on Rule 703, at 361. Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 25 Opinion of ALITO, J. not depend on factual premises unsupported by other evidence in the record—not to prove the truth of the un- derlying facts. Perhaps because it cannot seriously dispute the legit- imate nonhearsay purpose |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | because it cannot seriously dispute the legit- imate nonhearsay purpose of illuminating the expert’s thought process, the dissent resorts to the last-ditch ar- gument that, after all, it really does not matter whether Lambatos’ statement regarding the source of the Cellmark report was admitted for its truth. The dissent concedes that “the trial judge might have ignored Lambatos’s statement about the Cellmark report,” but nonetheless maintains that “the admission of that statement violated the Confrontation Clause even if the judge ultimately put it aside.” Post, at 15, n. 2. But in a bench trial, it is not necessary for the judge to stop and make a formal state- ment on the record regarding the limited reason for which the testimony is admitted. If the judge does not consider the testimony for its truth, the effect is precisely the same. Thus, if the trial judge in this case did not rely on the statement in question for its truth, there is simply no way around the proviso in that the Confrontation Clause applies only to out-of-court statements that are “use[d]” to “establis[h] the truth of the matter asserted.” 541 U. S., –60, n. 9 (citing Street, ). For all these reasons, we conclude that petitioner’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right was not violated. D This conclusion is entirely consistent with and In those cases, the forensic reports were introduced into evidence, and there is no question that this was done for the purpose of proving the truth of what they asserted: in that the defendant’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit and in Melendez- Diaz that the substance in question contained cocaine. Nothing comparable happened here. In this case, the 26 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. Cellmark report was not introduced into evidence. An expert witness referred to the report not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the report, i.e., that the report contained an accurate profile of the perpetrator’s DNA, but only to establish that the report contained a DNA profile that matched the DNA profile deduced from peti- tioner’s blood. Thus, just as in Street, the report was not to be considered for its truth but only for the “distinctive and limited purpose” of seeing whether it matched something 471 U. S., The relevance of the match was then established by independent circumstantial evidence showing that the Cellmark report was based on a forensic sample taken from the scene of the crime. Our conclusion will not open the door for the kind of abuses suggested by some of petitioner’s amici and the dissent. See |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | suggested by some of petitioner’s amici and the dissent. See post, at 10–11; Brief for Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae 20–21. In the hypothetical situations posited, an expert expresses an opinion based on factual premises not supported by any admissible evidence, and may also reveal the out-of-court statements on which the expert relied.11 There are at least four safeguards to —————— 11 Both JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE KAGAN quote statements in D. Kaye, D. Bernstein, & J. The New Wigmore: Expert Evidence pp. 196–197 (2d ed. 2011) (hereinafter New Wigmore), that are critical of the theory that an expert, without violating the Confronta- tion Clause, may express an opinion that is based on testimonial hearsay and may, in some circumstances, disclose that testimonial hearsay to the trier of fact. The principal basis for this criticism seems to be the fear that juries, even if given limiting instructions, will view the disclosed hearsay as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. See (referring reader to the more detailed discussion in Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After Craw- ford v. Washington, 15 Johns. L. & Pol’y 791 (2007)); New Wigmore 197, and n. 39 (citing jury cases); at 2–4, 811–813. This argument plainly has no application in a case like this one, in which a judge sits as the trier of fact. In the 2012 Supplement of The New Wigmore, the authors discuss the present case and criticize the reasoning of the Illinois courts as follows: Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 27 Opinion of ALITO, J. prevent such abuses. First, trial courts can screen out experts who would act as mere conduits for hearsay by strictly enforcing the requirement that experts display some genuine “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed. Rule Evid. 702(a). Second, experts are generally precluded from disclosing inadmissible evidence to a jury. See Fed. Rule Evid. 703; 175–, Third, if such evidence is disclosed, the trial judges may and, under most circum- stances, must, instruct the jury that out-of-court state- ments cannot be accepted for their truth, and that an expert’s opinion is only as good as the independent evi- dence that establishes its underlying premises. See Fed. Rules Evid. 105, 703; 527– 528, And fourth, if the prosecution cannot muster any independent admissible evidence to prove the foundational facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert’s testimony, then the ex- pert’s testimony cannot be given any weight by the trier of fact.12 —————— |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | be given any weight by the trier of fact.12 —————— “The problem with [the not-for-the-truth-of-the-matter argument accepted by the Illinois courts] is that Lambatos had to rely on the truth of the statements in the Cellmark report to reach her own con- clusion. The claim that evidence that the jury must credit in order to credit the conclusion of the expert is introduced for something other than its truth is sheer fiction.” New Wigmore at 24 (2012 Supp.) (emphasis added). This discussion is flawed. It overlooks the fact that there was no jury in this case, and as we have explained, the trier of fact did not have to rely on any testimonial hearsay in order to find that Lambatos’ testi- mony about the DNA match was supported by adequate foundational evidence and was thus probative. 12 Our discussion of the first ground for our decision cannot conclude without commenting on the Kocak case, which dramatically appears at the beginning of the dissent. In that case, a Cellmark lab analyst 28 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. IV A Even if the Cellmark report had been introduced for its truth, we would nevertheless conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation. The Confrontation Clause refers to testimony by “witnesses against” an accused. Both the noted evidence scholar James Henry Wigmore and Justice Harlan interpreted the Clause in a strictly literal sense as referring solely to persons who testify in court, but we have not adopted this narrow view. It has been said that “[t]he difficulty with the Wigmore-Harlan view in its purest form is its tension with much of the apparent history surrounding the evolution of the right of confrontation at common law.” White v. Illinois, 2 U.S. 360 (THOMAS, J., concurring). “[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed,” the Court concluded in “was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” 541 U. S., at “[I]n England, pretrial examinations of suspects —————— realized while testifying at a pretrial hearing that there was an error in the lab’s report and that the DNA profile attributed to the accused was actually that of the victim. The lesson of this cautionary tale is nothing more than the truism that it is possible for an apparently incriminating DNA profile to be mistakenly attributed to an accused. But requiring that the lab analyst or analysts who produced the DNA profile be called as prosecution witnesses is neither sufficient nor necessary to prevent such errors. Since samples may be mixed |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | necessary to prevent such errors. Since samples may be mixed up or contaminated at many points along the way from a crime scene to the lab, calling one or more lab analysts will not necessarily catch all such mistakes. For example, a mistake might be made by a clerical employee responsible for receiv- ing shipments of samples and then providing them to the lab’s techni- cians. What is needed is for the trier of fact to make sure that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, rules out the possibility of such mistakes at every step along the way. And in the usual course of authentication, defense counsel will have access to sufficient infor- mation to inquire into, question, or challenge the procedures used by a laboratory if this seems to be a prudent and productive strategy. Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 29 Opinion of ALITO, J. and witnesses by government officials ‘were sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony.’ ” 562 U. S., at (slip op., at 6) (quoting ). The Court has thus interpreted the Confrontation Clause as prohibiting modern-day practices that are tantamount to the abuses that gave rise to the recognition of the confron- tation right. But any further expansion would strain the constitutional text. The abuses that the Court has identified as prompting the adoption of the Confrontation Clause shared the fol- lowing two characteristics: (a) they involved out-of-court statements having the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct and (b) they involved formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. In all but one of the post- cases13 in which a Confrontation Clause violation has been found, both of these characteris- tics were present. See (slip op., at 3–4) (certified lab report having purpose of showing that defendant’s blood-alcohol level exceeded legal limit); (certified lab report having purpose of showing that substance connected to defendant contained cocaine); (custodial statement made after Miranda warnings that shifted blame from declarant to accused).14 The one excep- tion occurred in 829– 832 which was decided together with v. Washington, but in Hammon and every other post- case in which the Court has found a violation of —————— 13 Experience might yet show that the holdings in those cases should be reconsidered for the reasons, among others, expressed in the dis- sents the decisions produced. Those decisions are not challenged in this case and are to be deemed binding precedents, but they can and should be distinguished on the facts here. 14 With respect to see (THOMAS, J., concurring in |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | here. 14 With respect to see (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 30 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. the confrontation right, the statement at issue had the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. B In Hammon, the one case in which an informal state- ment was held to violate the Confrontation Clause, we considered statements elicited in the course of police in- terrogation. We held that a statement does not fall within the ambit of the Clause when it is made “under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” In another police-interrogation case, we explained that a person who makes a statement to resolve an ongo- ing emergency is not acting like a trial witness because the declarant’s purpose is not to provide a solemn declara- tion for use at trial, but to bring an end to an ongoing threat. See 562 U. S., at (slip op., at 11, 14). We noted that “the prospect of fabrication is presumably significantly diminished” when a statement is made under such circumstances, at (slip op., at 14) and that reliability is a salient characteristic of a statement that falls outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause, at – (slip op., at 14–15). We emphasized that if a statement is not made for “the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,” its admissi- bility “is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.” at – (slip op., at 11–12). In and the Court held that the particular forensic reports at issue qualified as testi- monial statements, but the Court did not hold that all forensic reports fall into the same category. Introduction of the reports in those cases ran afoul of the Confrontation Clause because they were the equivalent of affidavits made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a particular Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 31 Opinion of ALITO, J. criminal defendant at trial. There was nothing resembling an ongoing emergency, as the suspects in both cases had already been captured, and the tests in question were relatively simple and can generally be performed by a single analyst. In addition, the technicians who prepared the reports must have realized that their contents (which reported an elevated blood-alcohol level and the presence of an illegal drug) would be incriminating. C The Cellmark report is very different. It plainly was not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. In identifying the |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. In identifying the primary purpose of an out- of-court statement, we apply an objective test. 562 U. S., at (slip op., at 13). We look for the primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the statement, taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances. Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to accuse petitioner or to cre- ate evidence for use at trial. When the ISP lab sent the sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that time. Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate petitioner—or for that matter, anyone else whose DNA profile was in a law enforcement database. Under these circumstances, there was no “prospect of fabrication” and no incentive to produce anything other than a scientifi- cally sound and reliable profile. at (slip op., at 14). The situation in which the Cellmark technicians found themselves was by no means unique. When lab techni- cians are asked to work on the production of a DNA pro- file, they often have no idea what the consequences of 32 WILLIAMS v. ILLINOIS Opinion of ALITO, J. their work will be. In some cases, a DNA profile may provide powerful incriminating evidence against a person who is identified either before or after the profile is com- pleted. But in others, the primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect who has been charged or is under investigation. The technicians who prepare a DNA profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will turn out to be incriminating or exonerating—or both. It is also significant that in many labs, numerous tech- nicians work on each DNA profile. See Brief for New York County District Attorney’s Office et al. as Amici Curiae 6 (New York lab uses at least 12 technicians for each case); 906 N.E.2d 70, 79 (“[A]pproximately 10 Cellmark analysts were involved in the laboratory work in this case”). When the work of a lab is divided up in such a way, it is likely that the sole purpose of each technician is simply to perform his or her task in accordance with accepted procedures. Finally, the knowledge that defects in a DNA profile may often be detected from the profile itself provides a further safeguard. In this case, for example, Lambatos testified |
Justice Alito | 2,012 | 8 | majority | Williams v. Illinois | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/802772/williams-v-illinois/ | a further safeguard. In this case, for example, Lambatos testified that she would have been able to tell from the profile if the sample used by Cellmark had been degraded prior to testing. As noted above, moreover, there is no real chance that “sample contamination, sample switching, mislabeling, [or] fraud” could have led Cellmark to pro- duce a DNA profile that falsely matched petitioner. Post, at 21 (KAGAN, J., dissenting). At the time of the testing, petitioner had not yet been identified as a suspect, and there is no suggestion that anyone at Cellmark had a sample of his DNA to swap in by malice or mistake. And given the complexity of the DNA molecule, it is inconceiv- able that shoddy lab work would somehow produce a DNA profile that just so happened to have the precise genetic makeup of petitioner, who just so happened to be picked out of a lineup by the victim. The prospect is beyond Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 33 Opinion of ALITO, J. fanciful. In short, the use at trial of a DNA report prepared by a modern, accredited laboratory “bears little if any resem- blance to the historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate.” at (slip op., at 2) (THOMAS, J., concurring). * * * For the two independent reasons explained above, we conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is Affirmed. Cite as: 567 U. S. (2012) 1 BREYER, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 10–85 SANDY WILLIAMS, PETITIONER v. |
Justice Douglas | 1,972 | 10 | dissenting | Flood v. Kuhn | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108580/flood-v-kuhn/ | This Court's decision in Federal Baseball made in 1922, is a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its creator, should remove. Only a romantic view[1] of a rather dismal business account over the last 50 years would keep that derelict in midstream. In 1922 the Court had a narrow, parochial view of commerce. With the demise of the old landmarks of that era, particularly United and the whole concept of commerce has changed. Under the modern decisions such as Mandeville Island ; United ; ; United the power of Congress was recognized as broad enough to reach all phases of the vast operations of our national industrial system. *287 An industry so dependent on radio and television as is baseball and gleaning vast interstate revenues (see H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4, 5 (1952)) would be hard put today to say with the Court in the Federal Baseball Club case that baseball was only a local exhibition, not trade or commerce. Baseball is today big business that is packaged with beer, with broadcasting, and with other industries. The beneficiaries of the Federal Baseball Club decision are not the Babe Ruths, Ty Cobbs, and Lou Gehrigs. The owners, whose records many say reveal a proclivity for predatory practices, do not come to us with equities. The equities are with the victims of the reserve clause. I use the word "victims" in the Sherman Act sense, since a contract which forbids anyone to practice his calling is commonly called an unreasonable restraint of (CA2). And see (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers). If congressional inaction is our guide, we should rely upon the fact that Congress has refused to enact bills broadly exempting professional sports from antitrust regulation.[3] H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. *288 (1952). The only statutory exemption granted by Congress to professional sports concerns broadcasting rights. 15 U.S. C. 1291-1295. I would not ascribe a broader exemption through inaction than Congress has seen fit to grant explicitly. There can be no doubt "that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate"[4] we would hold it to be subject to federal antitrust regulation. The unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us from correcting our own mistakes. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | dissenting | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | The Court's seminal decision in establishes the principle that the *187 States may not exercise their sovereign powers so as to control those instrumentalities of the United States which have been judged necessary and proper to carry into effect federal laws and policies. Although the narrow issue in that case involved only the assertion by the State of Maryland of its power to tax a federal bank, the Court laid down a more general construction of the Supremacy Clause that has proved to be enduring in its force of reason. As the Court stated: "The attempt to use [state sovereign power] on the means employed by the government of the Union, in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give." The contrary principle would be "capable of arresting all the measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people have declared their constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would transfer the supremacy, in fact, to the States." "The result," the Court concluded, "is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." Although, again, the narrow issue in McCulloch concerned only the power to tax, which as the Court noted "involves the power to destroy," the passages quoted above demonstrate that the decision was formulated, explicitly, with sufficient breadth to apply to other measures a State might impose that would "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control" the operations of federal instrumentalities. And, clearly, the power to regulate also involves "the power to destroy" if the regulatory web is spun too tightly around its object. More commonly, however, the additional and perhaps conflicting regulations imposed by a *188 State would simply burden the federal instrumentality, interfere with its operations, and frustrate the federal objectives it is designed to achieve. Nonetheless, the law has long been settled that such regulation cannot be imposed on federal instrumentalities by the States, under the Supremacy Clause, unless the Federal Government directly indicates that it finds such impositions to be consistent with the proper pursuit of its powers under federal law. ; In this case the State of Ohio seeks to require a federal nuclear facility, which all concede to be the equivalent of any other federal instrumentality,[1] to |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | dissenting | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | to be the equivalent of any other federal instrumentality,[1] to make a "bonus" money payment to workers who are injured when the injury results from the facility's failure to comply with "any specific [state] requirement for the protection of the lives, health or safety of employees." Ohio Const., Art. II, 35. Although the Court declines to decide whether this provision of state law is tantamount to a regulation of the facility or to some similarly impermissible imposition upon it, ante, at 182, I believe that no other view is tenable on the facts before us. Initially, the proper focus under the Supremacy Clause is not the avowed purpose for which the State adopts a given provision but the actual effect of the provision on the operation of a federal instrumentality and on its ability to achieve the objectives of federal law and policy for which it has been created. The Court has held that even the general framework of state workers' compensation laws may not be applied at places that lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government. And *189 yet the provision of Ohio law at issue in this case is much more specific in its application, and in its regulatory effect upon this federal facility, than is the general framework of such laws. The basic feature of the state statutory regimes for the compensation of workers is that the common law governing the relationship between employer and employee, whose doctrines had become so disadvantageous to employees, is replaced by an automatic entitlement of the employee to certain benefits when injured in the course of employment. See 1 A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation 1.10-3.40 Unlike this basic scheme, however, which does not pressure the federal facility to alter its operations in any specific respect to comply with particular state regulations, the Ohio law exposes the facility to a special penalty if it does not comply with "any specific [state] requirement for the protection of the lives, health or safety of employees." Ohio Const., Art. II, 35. The specificity of these requirements is much more intrusive on the management of the federal facility than even a state workers' compensation law that would preserve the employee's right to sue the employer for willful misconduct or for intentional injury, as do the laws of several States. In terms of the regulatory impact on the federal instrumentality, it is one thing for the facility to know that it should manage its operations so as to minimize the risk of injuries to its employees; it is quite another to expose it to |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | dissenting | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | its employees; it is quite another to expose it to money penalties for failing to comply with the whole panoply of specific state regulations that dictate precise rules to govern very detailed aspects of employee health and safety. It is quite obvious that an attempt by the State of Ohio to impose these same kinds of specific regulations on the federal facility, directly, by obliging the facility to satisfy them all or else to suspend operations, would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. The rule at issue here has a similar effect. Appellees claim that the federal facility violated a provision in the code of safety requirements, which the State of Ohio has *190 adopted by administrative rule. The provision sets out specific restrictions on mobile work platforms and rolling platforms, and says that "[e]xposed surfaces shall be free from sharp edges, burrs or other projecting parts." Ohio Admin. Code 4121:1-5-03(D)(2) (1987). There are thousands of such requirements in the administrative rules adopted by the Ohio Industrial Commission's Division of Safety and Hygiene, which in their current version run to well over 200 double-columned pages of meticulous prescriptions, illustrated in minute detail with diagrams, graphs, and charts, see Ohio Admin. Code, ch. 4121:1 (1987), and there are countless other specific requirements in the State's other laws and regulations. It will not do to say that the State of Ohio has not attempted to regulate this facility directly, but simply has exposed it to possible money payments for failure to comply with these specific requirements, since such requirements are often enforced by fines rather than by enjoining specific conduct, and in any event the apparent means of enforcing all of these rules is through the workers' compensation awards permitted under state law. Nor does it make sense to say that the State of Ohio is not fining the facility, but is only penalizing it in the form of additional compensation to injured workers. It cannot matter that the extra payment is made only in the event of an actual injury; one might just as well argue that a regulatory fine would not be a burden if it were imposed not every day but only on the less frequent occasions when inspections are held. Even more to the point, if the amount of the money penalty were very large, the direct compulsion that would be brought to bear upon the federal facility to knuckle under and scrutinize its operations for compliance with every jot and title of the state administrative rules is apparent. The case is no different because the amount of |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | dissenting | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | apparent. The case is no different because the amount of the extra "bonus" award in any given instance may be small. In the contested provision involved nothing *191 more than whether the person in charge of an eating house at a federal home for disabled veterans was required under state law to put out a small printed sign that would read "oleomargarine sold and used here" when he served oleomargarine to the inmates. The state law was found to be invalid as applied to the federal facility, under the Supremacy Clause, without regard to the plain fact that the contested imposition was such a slight one, for the principle remains the same in such a case.[2] The mechanics of the Ohio provision, as interpreted by the Ohio courts, reinforce both the obvious regulatory effect of this state law and the important differences between such a provision and a basic workers' compensation scheme. First, unlike workers' compensation, which provides an award to every employee who is injured on the job regardless of how the injury occurred, the additional payment here is only available when the facility fails to comply with a state regulatory "requirement." Even the regulatory provisions embodied in federal laws and rules have been held not to activate the extra money penalty afforded by state law. See, e. g., State ex rel. ; State ex rel. Second, the necessity that the state requirement be "specific" in its dictates has been strictly construed. It "does not comprehend a general course of conduct or general duties or obligations flowing from the relation of employer and employee, but embraces such lawful, specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct as are prescribed by statute or by orders of the Industrial Commission." State ex rel. The question whether a particular safety requirement is sufficiently "specific" to support an extra money penalty has often been litigated in the Ohio courts, and such awards are invalidated unless the claimant is able to demonstrate that the specific requirement "demands that some particular and definite act or thing be done." State ex rel. See also State ex rel. ; State ex rel. Jack Conie & Sons In order to secure the penalty award, the employee must show that the regulatory requirement is "definite" in the sense that it leaves no discretion to the employer does not make it at all "a matter of his own choosing" how to comply with the specific requirement. State ex rel. Fast & Since this provision of Ohio law exacts a monetary penalty only for failure to comply with state |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | dissenting | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | a monetary penalty only for failure to comply with state laws and regulations, and indeed only for failure to comply with those state regulations which are so specific that they dictate precisely what steps the employer must take to avoid this increased financial exposure, the principal effect of this provision can only be to induce the employer to adhere to each of the various health and safety regulations that the State has adopted. And therefore the impact of such a provision on a federal instrumentality presents a very different problem, for purposes of analysis under the Supremacy Clause, from that posed by the mere application of a state workers' compensation scheme. The Court today skirts these difficulties and rests its disposition on the view that, no matter how extensive the actual regulatory effect of this state law may be, Congress has sanctioned its application to federal instrumentalities by enacting 40 U.S. C. 290. The Court finds in this statute the "unambiguous" *193 and "clear congressional mandate" approving such state regulation that we have required in past cases. Kern-Limerick, ; I disagree. Section 290 authorizes each State to apply its "workmen's compensation laws" to all "property belonging to the United States of America, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State, in the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State." The crux of the matter is whether Congress intended by this provision to open up all federal instrumentalities to the kind of potentially onerous regulation of their operations that is imposed by the Ohio provision for money penalties. I do not believe that in authorizing the States to apply these compensation laws to federal instrumentalities "in the same way and to the same extent" as they apply to other employers, Congress had any purpose to expose federal establishments to coercive financial pressure to comply with a slew of detailed state regulations about how to carry on their operations. Nothing in the statute or its background suggests that Congress had such an intent, and certainly nothing at all suggests that any such position was "clearly" or "unambiguously" approved by Congress. I am unimpressed by the fact that a small fraction of the States permitted such additional awards at the time 290 was passed; if the "clear congressional mandate" approving such state regulations cannot be found in the federal statute itself, then the obscure practices of a few States at the time of enactment will not suffice to create one. Congress need not explicitly disapprove every contrary aspect of the |
Justice White | 1,988 | 6 | dissenting | Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112075/goodyear-atomic-corp-v-miller/ | Congress need not explicitly disapprove every contrary aspect of the workers' compensation laws of the several States in order to refrain from giving them its "unambiguous" blessing. Section 290 was enacted in response to the Court's decision in which had held that state workers' compensation laws may not be applied *194 at all in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The purpose of the bill as stated was simply the humanitarian one of "correcting this situation," in which workers employed on federal projects were deprived of the benefits of coverage purely because of an oddity of location. S. Rep. No. 2294, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1936); H. R. Rep. No. 2656, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1936). As the Senate Report explained at greater length: "The purpose of the amended bill is to fill a conspicuous gap in the workmen's compensation field by furnishing protection against death or disability to laborers and mechanics employed by contractors or other persons on Federal property." S. Rep. No. 2294, at 1. That Congress intended nothing more than to provide much-needed coverage to these workers is shown by the single revealing item in the scanty legislative history of the statute. The House version of the bill not only would have extended coverage to these workers, but also would have subjected federal property to state safety and insurance regulations and would have authorized state officers to enter upon federal premises in furtherance of these aims. The Senate struck out these latter provisions at the request of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, noting expressly that they "would not only produce conflicts of authority between State and Federal officers but would also mark a wide departure from the well-established principle that Federal officers should have complete charge of any regulations pertaining to Federal property." S. Rep. No. 2294, at 2. As no such departure from normal practice was intended by Congress, the Senate version of the bill was enacted. This background to the enactment of 290 shows that Congress did not intend to expose federal instrumentalities to the kind of detailed and mandatory regulation that is provided by the Ohio law at issue in this case. The Court's response on this point is simply to assert that "[t]he effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal projects are significantly *195 more intrusive than the incidental regulatory effects of such an additional award provision." Ante, at 185. In some instances the Court may be correct that the effects of direct regulation could be more intrusive than a provision for penalty awards, |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Moore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109552/moore-v-united-states/ | John David Moore, Jr., was convicted in a bench trial of possession of heroin with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S. C. 841 (a) (1). In an unpublished order, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the judgment of conviction. In early January 1975, police officers received a tip from an informant that Moore and others were in possession of heroin at "Moore's apartment." The police obtained a search warrant and entered the apartment, where they found Moore lying face down near a coffee table in the living room. Also present in the apartment was a woman who was sitting on a couch in the same room. Bags containing heroin were found both on top of and beneath the coffee table, and they were seized along with various narcotics paraphernalia. At a consolidated hearing on Moore's motion to suppress evidence and on the merits, the prosecution adduced no admissible evidence showing that Moore was in possession of the heroin in the apartment in which he and the woman were found other than his proximity to the narcotics at the time the warrant was executed. Indeed, one police officer *21 testified that he did not find "any indications of ownership of the apartment." In his closing argument on the merits, however, the prosecutor placed substantial emphasis on the out-of-court declaration of the unidentified informant: "[A] confidential informant came to Detective Uribe and said, `I have information or I havethrough personal observation, know that John David Moore resides at a certain apartment here in El Paso, Texas, and he is in possession of a certain amount of heroin.' " In adjudging Moore guilty, the trial court found that he had been in close proximity to the seized heroin, that he was the tenant of the apartment in question, and that he had, therefore, been in possession of the contraband. In making these findings, the court expressly relied on the hearsay declaration of the informant: "Information revealed by the confidential informant and relied upon in the preparation of the Affidavit disclosed that John David Moore was the occupant of Apartment # 60, Building # 7, Hill Country Apartments, 213 Argonaut, El Paso, Texas." Defense counsel objected to the court's reliance upon hearsay evidence, but the judge refused to amend this finding except to add the phrase "at the time of the seizure" to the end of the sentence. There can be no doubt that the informant's out-of-court declaration that the apartment in question was "Moore's apartment," either as related in the search warrant affidavit or as reiterated in live testimony by |
per_curiam | 1,976 | 200 | per_curiam | Moore v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109552/moore-v-united-states/ | search warrant affidavit or as reiterated in live testimony by the police officers, was hearsay and thus inadmissible in evidence on the issue of Moore's guilt. Introduction of this testimony deprived Moore of the opportunity to cross-examine the informant as to exactly what he meant by "Moore's apartment," and what factual basis, if any, there was for believing that Moore was a tenant or regular resident there. Moore was similarly *22 deprived of the chance to show that the witness' recollection was erroneous or that he was not credible.[1] The informant's declaration falls within no exception to the hearsay rule recognized in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and reliance on this hearsay statement in determining petitioner's guilt or innocence was error.[2] Although the only competent evidence of Moore's possession of the narcotics was his proximity to them in an apartment in which another person was also present and of which he was not shown to be the tenant or even a regular resident, the Solicitor General now argues that the error in admitting the hearsay evidence was harmless. That is far from clear. Whether or not the evidence of proximity alone, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could suffice to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore was in possession of the heroin, the fact is that the trial court did not find Moore guilty on that evidence alone. The Government suggests that Moore's failure to testify or to adduce any evidence showing "that his presence in the apartment was unrelated to the heroin" highlights the alleged harmlessness of the error, but this suggestion can carry no weight in view of the elementary proposition that the prosecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. Equally unpersuasive is the Government's argument that the error was probably harmless because Moore was convicted in a bench trial; whatever the merits of that argument as a general proposition, it has a hollow ring in a case where the trial judge expressly relied upon the inadmissible evidence in finding the defendant guilty. *23 The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court so it may determine whether the wrongful admission of the hearsay evidence was harmless error.[3] It is so ordered. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST dissent from summary reversal and would set the case for oral argument. |
Justice Stewart | 1,970 | 18 | majority | Ashe v. Swenson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108114/ashe-v-swenson/ | In the Court held that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The question in this case is whether the State of Missouri violated that guarantee when it prosecuted the petitioner a second time for armed robbery in the circumstances here presented.[1] Sometime in the early hours of the morning of January 10, 1960, six men were engaged in a poker game in the basement of the home of John Gladson at Lee's Summit, Missouri. Suddenly three or four masked men, armed with a shotgun and pistols, broke into the basement and robbed each of the poker players of money and various articles of personal property. The robbers and it has never been clear whether there were three or four of themthen fled in a car belonging to one of the victims of the robbery. Shortly thereafter the stolen car was discovered in a field, and later that morning three men were arrested by a state trooper while they were walking on a highway not far from where the abandoned car had been found. The petitioner was arrested by another officer some distance away. *438 The four were subsequently charged with seven separate offensesthe armed robbery of each of the six poker players and the theft of the car. In May 1960 the petitioner went to trial on the charge of robbing Donald Knight, one of the participants in the poker game. At the trial the State called Knight and three of his fellow poker players as prosecution witnesses. Each of them described the circumstances of the holdup and itemized his own individual losses. The proof that an armed robbery had occurred and that personal property had been taken from Knight as well as from each of the others was unassailable. The testimony of the four victims in this regard was consistent both internally and with that of the others. But the State's evidence that the petitioner had been one of the robbers was weak. Two of the witnesses thought that there had been only three robbers altogether, and could not identify the petitioner as one of them. Another of the victims, who was the petitioner's uncle by marriage, said that at the "patrol station" he had positively identified each of the other three men accused of the holdup, but could say only that the petitioner's voice "sounded very much like" that of one of the robbers. The fourth participant in the poker game did identify the petitioner, but only by his "size and height, and his actions." The cross-examination of |
Justice Stewart | 1,970 | 18 | majority | Ashe v. Swenson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108114/ashe-v-swenson/ | his "size and height, and his actions." The cross-examination of these witnesses was brief, and it was aimed primarily at exposing the weakness of their identification testimony. Defense counsel made no attempt to question their testimony regarding the holdup itself or their claims as to their losses. Knight testified without contradiction that the robbers had stolen from him his watch, $250 in cash, and about $500 in checks. His billfold, which had been found by the police in the possession of one of the three other men accused of the robbery, was admitted in evidence. The defense offered no testimony and waived final argument. *439 The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found that the petitioner was one of the participants in the armed robbery, the theft of "any money" from Knight would sustain a conviction.[2] He also instructed the jury that if the petitioner was one of the robbers, he was guilty under the law even if he had not personally robbed Knight.[3] The jurythough not instructed to elaborate upon its verdictfound the petitioner "not guilty due to insufficient evidence." Six weeks later the petitioner was brought to trial again, this time for the robbery of another participant in the poker game, a man named Roberts. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, based on his previous acquittal. The motion was overruled, and the second trial began. The witnesses were for the most part the *440 same, though this time their testimony was substantially stronger on the issue of the petitioner's identity. For example, two witnesses who at the first trial had been wholly unable to identify the petitioner as one of the robbers, now testified that his features, size, and mannerisms matched those of one of their assailants. Another witness who before had identified the petitioner only by his size and actions now also remembered him by the unusual sound of his voice. The State further refined its case at the second trial by declining to call one of the participants in the poker game whose identification testimony at the first trial had been conspicuously negative. The case went to the jury on instructions virtually identical to those given at the first trial. This time the jury found the petitioner guilty, and he was sentenced to a 35-year term in the state penitentiary. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, holding that the "plea of former jeopardy must be denied." A collateral attack upon the conviction in the state courts five years later was also unsuccessful. The petitioner then brought the present habeas corpus proceeding |
Justice Stewart | 1,970 | 18 | majority | Ashe v. Swenson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108114/ashe-v-swenson/ | unsuccessful. The petitioner then brought the present habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, claiming that the second prosecution had violated his right not to be twice put in jeopardy. Considering itself bound by this court's decision in the District Court denied the writ, although apparently finding merit in the petitioner's claim.[4] The Court *441 of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, also upon the authority of [5] We granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional question this case presents. As the District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the operative facts here are virtually identical to those of In that case the defendant was tried for the armed robbery of three men who, along with others, had been held up in a tavern. The proof of the robbery was clear, but the evidence identifying the defendant as one of the robbers was weak, and the defendant interposed an alibi defense. The jury brought in a verdict of not guilty. The defendant was then brought to trial again, on an indictment charging the robbery of a fourth victim of the tavern holdup. This time the jury found him guilty. After appeals in the state courts proved unsuccessful, Hoag brought his case here. Viewing the question presented solely in terms of Fourteenth Amendment due processwhether the course that New had pursued had "led to fundamental unfairness," this Court declined to reverse the judgment of conviction, because "in the circumstances shown by this record, we cannot say that *442 petitioner's later prosecution and conviction violated due process."[6] The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether "collateral estoppel"the principle that bars relitigation between the same parties of issues actually determined at a previous trialis a due process requirement in a state criminal trial, since it accepted New 's determination that the petitioner's previous acquittal did not in any event give rise to such an estoppel. And in the view the Court took of the issues presented, it did not, of course, even approach consideration of whether collateral estoppel is an ingredient of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. The doctrine of puts the issues in the present case in a perspective quite different from that in which the issues were perceived in The question is no longer whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. And if collateral estoppel is embodied in that guarantee, then its applicability in a particular case is no longer a matter to |
Justice Stewart | 1,970 | 18 | majority | Ashe v. Swenson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108114/ashe-v-swenson/ | in a particular case is no longer a matter to be left for state court determination within the broad *443 bounds of "fundamental fairness," but a matter of constitutional fact we must decide through an examination of the entire record. Cf. New York Times ; ; ; ; "Collateral estoppel" is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel has been an established rule of federal criminal law at least since this Court's decision more than 50 years ago in United As Mr. Justice Holmes put the matter in that case, "It cannot be that the safeguards of the person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than those that protect from a liability in debt."[7] As a rule of federal law, therefore, "[i]t is much too late to suggest that this principle is not fully applicable to a former judgment in a criminal case, either because of lack of `mutuality' or because the judgment may reflect only a belief that the Government had not met the higher burden of proof exacted in such cases for the Government's evidence as a whole although not necessarily as to every link in the chain." United *444 The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality. Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to "examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration."[8] The inquiry "must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings." Any test more technically restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of acquittal.[9] *445 Straightforward application of the federal rule to the present case can lead to but one conclusion. For |
Justice Stewart | 1,970 | 18 | majority | Ashe v. Swenson | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108114/ashe-v-swenson/ | the present case can lead to but one conclusion. For the record is utterly devoid of any indication that the first jury could rationally have found that an armed robbery had not occurred, or that Knight had not been a victim of that robbery. The single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not. The federal rule of law, therefore, would make a second prosecution for the robbery of Roberts wholly impressible. The ultimate question to be determined, then, in the light of is whether this established rule of federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. We do not hesitate to hold that it is.[10] For whatever else that *446 constitutional guarantee may embrace, North it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to "run the gantlet" a second time. The question is not whether Missouri could validly charge the petitioner with six separate offenses for the robbery of the six poker players. It is not whether he could have received a total of six punishments if he had been convicted in a single trial of robbing the six victims. It is simply whether, after a jury determined by its verdict that the petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State could constitutionally hale him before a new jury to litigate that issue again. After the first jury had acquitted the petitioner of robbing Knight, Missouri could certainly not have brought him to trial again upon that charge. Once a jury had determined upon conflicting testimony that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the petitioner was one of the robbers, the State could not present the same or different identification evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery of Knight in the hope that a different jury might find that evidence more convincing. The situation is constitutionally no different here, even though the second trial related to another victim of the same robbery. For the name of the victim, in the circumstances of this case, had no bearing whatever upon the issue of whether the petitioner was one of the robbers. *447 In this case the State in its brief has frankly conceded that following the petitioner's acquittal, it treated the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution: "No doubt the prosecutor felt the state had a provable case on the first charge and, when he lost, he did what every good |
Justice Brennan | 1,970 | 13 | majority | In Re WINSHIP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108111/in-re-winship/ | Constitutional questions decided by this Court concerning the juvenile process have centered on the adjudicatory stage at "which a determination is made as to *359 whether a juvenile is a `delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution." In re decided that, although the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the hearing at this stage conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative proceeding the Due Process Clause does require application during the adjudicatory hearing of " `the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' " This case presents the single, narrow question whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.[1] Section 712 of the New York Family Court Act defines a juvenile delinquent as "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing, conducted pursuant to 742 of the Act, a judge in New York Family Court *360 found that appellant, then a 12-year-old boy, had entered a locker and stolen $112 from a woman's pocketbook. The petition which charged appellant with delinquency alleged that his act, "if done by an adult, would constitute the crime or crimes of Larceny." The judge acknowledged that the proof might not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rejected appellant's contention that such proof was required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judge relied instead on 744 (b) of the New York Family Court Act which provides that "[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence."[2] During a subsequent dispositional hearing, appellant was ordered placed in a training school for an initial period of 18 months, subject to annual extensions of his commitment until his 18th birthdaysix years in appellant's case. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed without opinion, The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed by a four-to-three vote, expressly sustaining the constitutionality of 744(b),[3]*361 We noted probable jurisdiction, We reverse. I The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The "demand for a higher |
Justice Brennan | 1,970 | 13 | majority | In Re WINSHIP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108111/in-re-winship/ | early years as a Nation. The "demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula `beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt." C. McCormick, Evidence 321, pp. 681-682 ; see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence 2497 (3d ed. 1940). Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does "reflect a profound judgment about the *362 way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required. See, for example, ; ; ; ; ; ; 8 ; 357 U.S. 5, Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that "[i]t is the duty of the Government to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notionbasic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free societyis a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of `due process.' " In a similar vein, the Court said in at that "[g]uilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property." at stated that the requirement is implicit in "constitutions. [which] recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and liberty." In Davis a murder conviction was *363 reversed because the trial judge instructed the jury that it was their duty to convict when the evidence was equally balanced regarding the sanity of the accused. This Court said: "On the contrary, he is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime. No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them is sufficient to show beyond |
Justice Brennan | 1,970 | 13 | majority | In Re WINSHIP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108111/in-re-winship/ | that the evidence before them is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocencethat bedrock "axiomatic and elementary" principle whose "enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." As the dissenters in the New York Court of Appeals observed, and we agree, "a person accused of a crime would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case." The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society *364 that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. As we said in at : "There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending valueas a criminal defendant his libertythis margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt." To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it "impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue." Dorsen & In Re and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent |
Justice Brennan | 1,970 | 13 | majority | In Re WINSHIP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108111/in-re-winship/ | standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. *365 II We turn to the question whether juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt when they are charged with violation of a criminal law. The same considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child. We do not find convincing the contrary arguments of the New York Court of Appeals. rendered untenable much of the reasoning relied upon by that court to sustain the constitutionality of 744 (b). The Court of Appeals indicated that a delinquency adjudication "is not a `conviction' ( 781); that it affects no right or privilege, including the right to hold public office or to obtain a license ( 782); and a cloak of protective confidentiality is thrown around all the proceedings ( 783-784)." -256. The court said further: "The delinquency status is not made a crime; and the proceedings are not criminal. There is, hence, no deprivation of due process in the statutory provision [challenged by appellant]" In effect the Court of Appeals distinguished the proceedings in question here from a criminal prosecution by use of what called the " `civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings." But expressly rejected that distinction as a reason for holding the Due Process Clause inapplicable to a juvenile -51. The Court of Appeals also attempted to justify the preponderance standard on the related ground that juvenile proceedings are designed "not to punish, but to save the child." Again, however, expressly rejected this We made clear in that decision that civil labels and good *366 intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be `delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." Nor do we perceive any merit in the argument that to afford juveniles the protection of proof |
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