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Justice Brennan | 1,970 | 13 | majority | In Re WINSHIP | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108111/in-re-winship/ | the argument that to afford juveniles the protection of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the juvenile process.[4] Use of the reasonable-doubt standard during the adjudicatory hearing will not disturb New York's policies that a finding that a child has violated a criminal law does not constitute a criminal conviction, that such a finding does not deprive the child of his civil rights, and that juvenile proceedings are confidential. Nor will there be any effect on the informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing at which the factfinding takes place. And the opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there will be no effect on the procedures *367 distinctive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing. The Court of Appeals observed that "a child's best interest is not necessarily, or even probably, promoted if he wins in the particular inquiry which may bring him to the juvenile court." It is true, of course, that the juvenile may be engaging in a general course of conduct inimical to his welfare that calls for judicial intervention. But that intervention cannot take the form of subjecting the child to the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law[5] and to the possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult. We conclude, as we concluded regarding the essential due process safeguards applied in that the observance of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "will not compel the to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Finally, we reject the Court of Appeals' suggestion that there is, in any event, only a "tenuous difference" between the reasonable-doubt and preponderance standards. The suggestion is singularly unpersuasive. In this very case, the trial judge's ability to distinguish between the two standards enabled him to make a finding of guilt that he conceded he might not have made under the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the trial judge's action evidences the accuracy of the observation of commentators that "the preponderance test is susceptible to the misinterpretation *368 that it calls on the trier of fact merely to perform an abstract weighing of the evidence in order to determine which side has produced the greater quantum, without regard to its effect in convincing his mind of the truth of the proposition asserted." Dorsen &[6] III In sum, the constitutional safeguard of proof beyond |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | This case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting 7 of the Endangered *558 Species Act of 1973 (ESA), as amended, 1 U.S. C. 3, in such fashion as to render it applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The preliminary issue, and the only one we reach, is whether respondents here, plaintiffs below, have standing to seek judicial review of the rule. I The ESA, as amended, 1 U.S. C. 31 et seq., seeks to protest species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. See generally The ESA instructs the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate by regulation a list of those species which are either endangered or threatened under enumerated criteria, and to define the critical habitat of these species. 1 U.S. C. 33, 3. Section 7(a)(2) of the Act then provides, in pertinent part: "Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical." 1 U.S. C. 3(a)(2). In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce respectively, promulgated a joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by 7(a)(2) extend to actions taken in foreign nations. The next year, however, the Interior Department began to reexamine its position. Letter from Leo Kuliz, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Aug. 8, 1979. A revised joint regulation, reinterpreting *559 7(a)(2) to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high seas, was proposed in 1983, and promulgated in 198, ; 50 CFR 402.01 Shortly thereafter, respondents, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes, filed this action against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation is in error as to the geographic scope of 7(a)(2) and an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring the initial interpretation. The District Court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. Defenders of The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed by a divided vote. Defenders of On |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | Eighth Circuit reversed by a divided vote. Defenders of On remand, the Secretary moved for summary judgment on the standing issue, and respondents moved for summary judgment on the merits. The District Court denied the Secretary's motion, on the ground that the Eighth Circuit had already determined the standing question in this case; it granted respondents' merits motion, and ordered the Secretary to publish a revised regulation. Defenders of Wildlife v.Hodel, The Eighth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari, II While the Constitution of the United States divides all power conferred upon the Federal Government into "legislative Powers," Art. I, 1, "[t]he executive Power," Art. II, 1, and "[t]he judicial Power," Art. III, 1, it does not attempt to define those terms. To be sure, it limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "Cases" and "Controversies," but an executive inquiry can bear the name "case" (the Hoffa case) and a legislative dispute can bear the name "controversy" (the Smoot-Hawley controversy). Obviously, then, the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers depends *50 largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts. In The Federalist No. 48, Madison expressed the view that "[i]t is not infrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies whether the operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere," whereas "the executive power [is] restrained within a narrower compass and more simple in its nature," and "the judiciary [is] described by landmarks still less uncertain." The Federalist No. 48, p. 25 One of those landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" and "Controversies" that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article III" serv[ing] to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process," is the doctrine of standing. Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. See, e. g., Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, see ; ; Sierra ;[1] and (b) "actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical,' " at ). Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained ofthe injury has to be "fairly. trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See FW/PBS, ; at Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. See ; ; ; and n. (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." National Wildlife Federation, In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such "mere allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence "specific facts," Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be "supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial." When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has *52 caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, as in this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inactionand perhaps on the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing "depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict," ASARCO ; see also at ; and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redress ability of injury. E. g., Thus, when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily "substantially more difficult" to establish. ; ; III We think the Court of Appeals failed to apply the foregoing principles in denying the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. Respondents had not made the requisite demonstration of (at least) injury and redressability. A Respondents' claim to injury is that the lack of consultation with respect to certain funded activities abroad "increas[es] the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species." Complaint ¶ 5, App. 13. Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of *53 standing. See, e. g., Sierra "But the `injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured." To survive the Secretary's summary judgment motion, respondents had to submit affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad, but also that one or more of respondents' members would thereby be "directly" affected apart from their "`special interest' in th[e] subject." See generally With respect to this aspect of the case, the Court of Appeals focused on the affidavits of two Defenders' members Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred. Ms. Kelly stated that she traveled to Egypt in 198 and "observed the traditional habitat of the endangered nile crocodile there and intend[s] to do so again, and hope[s] to observe the crocodile directly," and that she "will suffer harm in fact as the result of [the] American role in overseeing the rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile and [in] develop[ing] Egypt's. Master Water Plan." App. 101. Ms. Skilbred averred that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and "observed th[e] habitat" of "endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard" at what is now the site of the Mahaweli project funded by the Agency for International Development (AID), although she "was unable to see any of the endangered species"; "this development project," she continued, "will seriously reduce endangered, threatened, and endemic species habitat including areas that I visited [, which] may severely shorten the future of these species"; that threat, she concluded, harmed her |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | future of these species"; that threat, she concluded, harmed her because she "intend[s] to return to Sri Lanka in the future and hope[s] to be more fortunate in spotting at least the endangered elephant and leopard." When Ms. Skilbred was asked *54 at a subsequent deposition if and when she had any plans to return to Sri Lanka, she reiterated that "I intend to go back to Sri Lanka," but confessed that she had no current plans: "I don't know [when]. There is a civil war going on right now. I don't know. Not next year, I will say. In the future." We shall assume for the sake of argument that these affidavits contain facts showing that certain agency-funded projects threaten listed speciesthough that is questionable. They plainly contain no facts, however, showing how damage to the species will produce "imminent" injury to Mses. Kelly and Skilbred. That the women "had visited" the areas of the projects before the projects commenced proves nothing. As we have said in a related context, "`Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.' " 41 U. S., at ). And the affiants' profession of an "inten[t]" to return to the places they had visited beforewhere they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered speciesis simply not enough. Such "some day" intentionswithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will bedo not support a finding of the "actual or imminent" injury that our cases require. See[2] *55 Besides relying upon the Kelly and Skilbred affidavits, respondents propose a series of novel standing theories. The first, inelegantly styled "ecosystem nexus," proposes that any person who uses any part of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away. This approach, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed, is inconsistent with our opinion in National Wildlife Federation, which held that a plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage *5 must use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly "in the vicinity" of it. -889; see also Sierra It makes no difference that the general-purpose section of the ESA states that the Act was intended in part "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved," 1 U.S. C. 31(b). To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | 31(b). To say that the Act protects ecosystems is not to say that the Act creates (if it were possible) rights of action in persons who have not been injured in fact, that is, persons who use portions of an ecosystem not perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in question. Respondents' other theories are called, alas, the "animal nexus" approach, whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the "vocational nexus" approach, under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue. Under these theories, anyone who goes to see Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, and anyone who is a keeper of Asian elephants in the Bronx Zoo, has standing to sue because the Director of the Agency for International Development (AID) did not consult with the Secretary regarding the AID-funded project in Sri Lanka. This is beyond all reason. Standing is not "an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable," United but as we have said requires, at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of perceptible harm. It is clear that the person who observes or works with a particular animal threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since the very subject of his interest will no longer exist. It is even plausiblethough it goes to the outermost limit of plausibilityto think that a person who observes or works with animals of a particular species in the very area of the world where that species is threatened by a federal decision is facing such harm, since some animals that *57 might have been the subject of his interest will no longer exist, see Japan Whaling n. 4 It goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which he has no more specific connection.[3] *58 B Besides failing to show injury, respondents failed to demonstrate redressability. Instead of attacking the separate decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them harm, respondents chose to challenge a more generalized level of Government action (rules regarding consultation), the invalidation of which would affect all overseas projects. This programmatic approach has obvious practical advantages, but also obvious difficulties insofar as proof of causation or redressability is concerned. As we have said in another context, "suits challenging, not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations [are], even when premised on allegations of several instances of violations of law, rarely if ever appropriate for federalcourt adjudication." -70. The most obvious problem in the present case is redressability. Since the agencies funding the projects were not parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only against the Secretary: He could be ordered to revise his regulation to require consultation for foreign projects. But this would not remedy respondents' alleged injury unless the funding agencies were bound by the Secretary's regulation, which is very much an open question. Whereas in other contexts the ESA is quite explicit as to the Secretary's controlling authority, see, e. g., 1 U.S. C. 33(a)(1) ("The Secretary shall" promulgate regulations determining endangered species); 35(d)(1) ("The Secretary is authorized to provide financial assistance to any State"), with respect to consultation the initiative, and hence arguably the initial responsibility for determining statutory necessity, lies with *59 the agencies, see 3(a)(2) ("Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any" funded action is not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species) (emphasis added). When the Secretary promulgated the regulation at issue here, he thought it was binding on the agencies, see The Solicitor General, however, has repudiated that position here, and the agencies themselves apparently deny the Secretary's authority. (During the period when the Secretary took the view that 7(a)(2) did apply abroad, AID and FWS engaged in a running controversy over whether consultation was required with respect to the Mahaweli project, AID insisting that consultation applied only to domestic actions.) Respondents assert that this legal uncertainty did not affect redressability (and hence standing) because the District Court itself could resolve the issue of the Secretary's authority as a necessary part of its standing inquiry. Assuming that it is appropriate to resolve an issue of law such as this in connection with a threshold standing inquiry, resolution by the District Court would not have remedied respondents' alleged injury anyway, because it would not have been binding upon the agencies. They were not parties to the suit, and there is no reason they should be obliged to honor an incidental legal determination the suit produced.[4] The *570 Court of Appeals tried to finesse this problem by simply proclaiming that "[w]e are satisfied that an injunction requiring the Secretary to publish [respondents' desired] regulatio[n]. would result in consultation." Defenders of Wildlife, 851 F. 2d, at 1042, 1043-1044. We do not know what would justify that confidence, particularly |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | We do not know what would justify that confidence, particularly when the Justice Department (presumably after consultation with the agencies) has taken the position that the regulation is not binding.[5] The *571 short of the matter is that redress of the only injury in fact respondents complain of requires action (termination of funding until consultation) by the individual funding agencies; and any relief the District Court could have provided in this suit against the Secretary was not likely to produce that action. A further impediment to redressability is the fact that the agencies generally supply only a fraction of the funding for a foreign project. AID, for example, has provided less than 10% of the funding for the Mahaweli project. Respondents have produced nothing to indicate that the projects they have named will either be suspended, or do less harm to listed species, if that fraction is eliminated. As in -44, it is entirely conjectural whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents will be altered or affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve.[] There is no standing. IV The Court of Appeals found that respondents had standing for an additional reason: because they had suffered a "procedural injury." The so-called "citizen-suit" provision of the ESA provides, in pertinent part, that "any person may commence *572 a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter." 1 U.S. C. 40(g). The court held that, because 7(a)(2) requires interagency consultation, the citizen-suit provision creates a "procedural righ[t]" to consultation in all "persons"so that anyone can file suit in federal court to challenge the Secretary's (or presumably any other official's) failure to follow the assertedly correct consultative procedure, notwithstanding his or her inability to allege any discrete injury flowing from that failure. -122. To understand the remarkable nature of this holding one must be clear about what it does not rest upon: This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs (e. g., the procedural requirement for a hearing prior to denial of their license application, or the procedural requirement for an environmental impact statement before a federal facility is constructed next door to them).[7] Nor is it simply a case where concrete injury has been suffered by many persons, as in mass fraud or mass tort situations. Nor, finally, is it the *573 unusual case in which |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | Nor, finally, is it the *573 unusual case in which Congress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government's benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff. Rather, the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, selfcontained, noninstrumental "right" to have the Executive observe the procedures required by law. We reject this view.[8] We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about governmentclaiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that *574 no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at largedoes not state an Article III case or controversy. For example, in we dismissed a suit challenging the propriety of the process by which the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court: "[This is] not a case within the meaning of Article III Plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute in the federal courts a suit" In we dismissed for lack of Article III standing a taxpayer suit challenging the propriety of certain federal expenditures. We said: "The party who invokes the power [of judicial review] must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. Here the parties plaintiff have no such case. [T]heir complaint is merely that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess." In Ex parte Lévitt, we dismissed a suit contending that Justice Black's appointment to this Court violated the Ineligibility Clause, Art. I, cl. 2. *575 "It is an established principle," we said, "that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public." See also More recent cases are to the same effect. In United we dismissed for lack of standing a taxpayer suit challenging the Government's failure to disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency, in alleged violation of the constitutional requirement, Art. I, 9, cl. 7, that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." We held that such a suit rested upon an impermissible "generalized grievance," and was inconsistent with "the framework of Article III" because "the impact on [plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and `common to all members of the public.' " Richardson, And in we dismissed for the same reasons a citizen-taxpayer suit contending that it was a violation of the Incompatibility Clause, Art. I, cl. 2, for Members of Congress to hold commissions in the military Reserves. We said that the challenged action, "standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance. We reaffirm Lévitt in holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of th[is] kind" Schlesinger, Since Schlesinger we have on two occasions held that an injury amounting only to the alleged violation of a right to have the Government act in accordance with law was not judicially cognizable because *57 "`assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning.' " ; Valley Forge Christian And only two Terms ago, we rejected the notion that Article III permits a citizen suit to prevent a condemned criminal's execution on the basis of "`the public interest protections of the Eighth Amendment' "; once again, "[t]his allegation raise[d] only the `generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance' and [was] an inadequate basis on which to grant standing." To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically involved Government violation of procedures assertedly ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branchone of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches. "The province of the court," as Chief Justice Marshall said in "is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals." Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive. The question presented here is whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws (specifically, in agencies' observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure) can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and *577 that permits all citizens (or, for that matter, a subclass of citizens who suffer no distinctive concrete harm) to sue. If the concrete injury requirement has the separation-ofpowers significance we have always said, the answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," Art. II, 3. It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, "to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department," and to become "`virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.' " ). We have always rejected that vision of our role: "When Congress passes an Act empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers. This is very far from assuming that the courts are charged more than administrators or legislators with the protection of the rights of the people. Congress and the Executive supervise the acts of administrative agents. But under Article III, Congress established courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power." *578 "Individual rights," within the meaning of this passage, do not mean public rights that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual |
Justice Scalia | 1,992 | 9 | majority | Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112747/lujan-v-defenders-of-wildlife/ | that have been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms part of the public. See also Sierra 405 U. S., at Nothing in this contradicts the principle that "[t]he injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of `statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' " ). Both of the cases used by Linda R. S. as an illustration of that principle involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law and injury to a company's interest in marketing its product free from competition, see ). As we said in Sierra "[Statutory] broadening [of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury." Whether or not the principle set forth in can be extended beyond that distinction, it is clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must remain. * * * We hold that respondents lack standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. *579 Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Souter joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | The Tonnage Clause prohibits the States and their political subdivisions from charging ships for the privilege of using their ports. Because this case does not involve such a charge, I respectfully dissent. I The Tonnage Clause commands that “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Ton nage.” U. S. Const., Art. I, cl. 3. As the Court asserts, the purpose of the Clause is to prevent States with conven ient ports from abusing the privileges their natural posi tion affords. See ante, at 3–4. Thus, the pertinent inquiry in determining whether an exaction violates the Clause’s prohibitions is whether the charge is “ ‘in its essence a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving and departing from a port.’ ” Transportation ); see Clyde Mallory s v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265–266 (1935). In applying that principle, we have been cognizant of its limits. By its terms, the Tonnage Clause prohibits States from imposing a duty on ships based on their internal cubic capacity, see and it similarly prohibits charges 2 POLAR TANKERS, INC. v. CITY OF VALDEZ STEVENS, J., dissenting that “effect the same purpose” as a duty of tonnage—for instance, by imposing a duty based “on the number of masts, or of mariners, the size and power of the steam engine, or the number of passengers which she carries,” Passenger (opinion of Grier, J.). By contrast, charges levied for other purposes are outside the Clause’s reach. This Court has often ap proved charges for services rendered to ships to ensure their safe and convenient use of a port. See Clyde Mallory, –267. And the federal interest in protect ing access to the ports generally does not prevent States from charging shipowners those taxes and fees that the States are also authorized to levy on other property. See Wiggins 376 (1883) (upholding a “license tax” “laid upon the busi ness of keeping a ferry”); (up holding a property tax on ships). More than a century ago, we noted that it was “too well settled to admit of question that taxes levied by a State, upon ships or vessels owned by the citizens of the State, as property, based on a valuation of the same as property, to the extent of such ownership, are not within the prohibi tion of the Constitution.” Just as “[d]raymen may be compelled to pay a license tax on every dray owned by them, hackmen on every hack, [and] tavernkeepers on their taverns in proportion to the number of the rooms which they keep for |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | to the number of the rooms which they keep for the accommodation of guests,” so too can a State charge the operator of a ferry a “tax upon the boats which he employs.” Wiggins 107 U. S., at “[V]essels of all kinds are liable to taxation as property in the same manner as other personal property owned by citizens of the State.” ; State Tonnage Tax From and the State Tonnage Tax two principles emerge regarding the circumstances under which States may levy property taxes on ships. First, the Cite as: 557 U. S. (2009) 3 STEVENS, J., dissenting State seeking to levy the tax must show that the ship has sufficient contacts with the jurisdiction to establish a tax situs there. In our earlier cases, the existence of the situs was determined by the citizenship of the ship’s owner, see ; State Tonnage Tax 12 Wall., at 213, but a tax situs can also be created by a property’s substantial contacts with a jurisdiction.1 The requirement of a tax situs serves to distinguish property taxes from fees charged for the privilege of entering a port, which the Court has consistently found to violate the prohibition against duties of tonnage. See, e.g., Cannon, 20 Wall., at (holding unconstitutional “a tax upon every vessel which stops” in the city’s jurisdictional wa ters); Steamship (invalidating a tax imposed “upon every ship entering the port” and “collected upon every entry”). Our cases also require that property taxes on ships, as with other property, be calculated based on the ship’s —————— 1 Previously, courts followed the common-law “home port” doctrine, pursuant to which a ship could be taxed only by the State in which its owner was domiciled. See Pullman’s Palace Car That doctrine has since “yielded to a rule of fair apportionment among the States,” permitting any jurisdiction with which a ship has had sufficient contacts to establish a tax situs to levy a property tax on the ship in proportion to the ship’s contacts with the jurisdiction. See Japan Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 442–443 (1979); see also Standard Oil 383 (1952). We have roundly rejected the doctrine in cases involving ships moving in interstate operations along the inland waters. See And in the context of ocean-going ships, we have referred to the doctrine as “ ‘anachronistic’ ” and all but “ ‘abandoned,’ ” noting that “to rehabilitate the ‘home port doctrine’ as a tool of Commerce Clause analysis would be somewhat odd.” Japan In light of these developments, it is odd indeed that THE CHIEF JUSTICE endeavors |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | developments, it is odd indeed that THE CHIEF JUSTICE endeavors to distinguish Transportation Co. v. and the State Tonnage Tax as “apply[ing] only to taxation of property owned by citizens of the State.” See ante, at 2 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 4 POLAR TANKERS, INC. v. CITY OF VALDEZ STEVENS, J., dissenting value. When a State levies a property tax on ships, the prohibition of the Tonnage Clause comes into play only if the ships are “not taxed in the same manner as the other property of the citizens, or where the tax is imposed upon the vessel as an instrument of commerce, without refer ence to the value as property.” Although the meaning of ’s “same manner” lan guage is not immediately apparent, the remainder of the opinion emphasizes the importance of the method by which the tax on the petitioner’s ships was calculated— i.e., “based on a valuation of the same as property”— rather than the city’s taxation of other property in the jurisdiction. ; see Our decision in the State Tonnage Tax is to the same effect, as we held that taxes levied on ships “as property, based on a valuation of the same as property, are not within the prohibition of the Constitution,” but if States tax ships “by a tonnage duty, or indirectly by im posing the tax upon the master or crew, they assume a jurisdiction which they do not possess.” 214 (emphasis in original). Indeed, each of the taxes challenged in that case was invalidated because it was “levied on the steamboats wholly irrespective of the value of the vessels as property, and solely and exclusively on the basis of their cubical contents.” ; see at 224 (holding the tax unconstitutional because “the amount of the tax depends upon the carrying capacity of the steamboat and not upon her value as property”).2 Thus, in —————— 2 The Court seems to conflate these methods of calculating taxes on ships, as it asserts that “a tax on the value of such vessels is closely correlated with cargo capacity” and concludes that the tax in this case “depends on a factor related to tonnage.” Ante, at 7; see also ante, at 1 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). This is contrary to our longstanding recog nition that a ship’s capacity is not a proxy for its value: “[T]he experi ence of every one shows that a small steamer, new and well built, may be of much greater value than a large one, badly built or in need of Cite as: 557 U. S. |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | built or in need of Cite as: 557 U. S. (2009) 5 STEVENS, J., dissenting both and the State Tonnage Tax the method by which the challenged tax was calculated was essential to the Court’s determination of its validity. The tax in this case has both of the critical characteris tics of a legitimate property tax. It is undisputed that petitioner’s ships “are taxed based on their value, and only those [ships] that have acquired a taxable situs in Valdez are taxed.” Accord ingly, I would uphold the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision sustaining the tax against petitioner’s Tonnage Clause challenge. The plurality reaches the opposite conclusion because it reads ’s “same manner” language to impose a different limitation on the States’ power to tax ships. According to the plurality, “in order to fund services by taxing ships, a State must also impose similar taxes upon other businesses.” Ante, at 9. As discussed above, Wheel ing and the State Tonnage are better read to require that property taxes on ships be assessed based on the value of the ship rather than its tonnage. But even if the “same manner” requirement did not clearly refer to the method of calculating the tax, the phrase could not bear the weight the plurality places on it. And there is no other support in our cases or in the text of the Tonnage Clause for a rule that conditions a State’s exercise of its admitted authority to levy property taxes on ships upon its decision also to tax other property within its jurisdiction. Under the plurality’s reading, the same tax could be a “Duty of Tonnage” in one instance and not in another depending on taxing decisions wholly outside the Clause’s reach. Far from being compelled by our earlier cases, this rule is in tension with our decisions noting the substantial flexibility States must be afforded in making taxing deci sions and cautioning courts not to “subject the essential —————— extensive repairs.” State Tonnage Tax 6 POLAR TANKERS, INC. v. CITY OF VALDEZ STEVENS, J., dissenting taxing power of the State to an intolerable supervision.” Ohio Oil That tension is compounded by the inevitable difficulty States will have in navigating the new rule, as the plurality does not suggest at what point a State can be satisfied that it has taxed enough other property that it may also tax ships without violating the Clause’s prohibitions. In support of its understanding of the “same manner” requirement, the plurality asserts that the rule “helps to assure that a value-related property tax differs signifi cantly from a graduated |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | a value-related property tax differs signifi cantly from a graduated tax on a ship’s capacity and that the former is not simply a redesignation of the latter.” Ante, at 9. But our cases provide such assurance without resort to the plurality’s strained reading. Because States and their political subdivisions only have authority to tax property that has established a tax situs in the jurisdic tion, they cannot levy such taxes on ships merely for the privilege of entering or leaving the port; much more sub stantial contact with the jurisdiction is required. See Valdez Municipal Code ; Central R. Co. of And it is that contact, rather than entry into the port, that provides the basis for taxing the ships. The tax situs requirement thus ensures that a State cannot avoid the proscriptions of the Tonnage Clause by redesignating a duty charged for the privilege of entering the port as an ad valorem tax. The facts of this case illustrate the point. Most of peti tioner’s ships spend 40-to-50 days per year in the Port of Valdez. See App. 32–45. “[A]s a group the tankers form a continuous presence in the city.” The ships’ prolonged physical presence and extensive commer cial activities in the city have a substantial impact on the city’s resources. On average, the ships’ presence adds 550 people to the population of Valdez, increasing the city’s total population by 10%. Those people, as well as the Cite as: 557 U. S. (2009) 7 STEVENS, J., dissenting ships themselves, require numerous public services, in cluding harbor facilities, roads, bridges, water supply, and fire and police protection. As the Alaska Supreme Court concluded, the challenged tax is therefore a legiti mate property tax levied to support the ships’ use of the city’s services. See II Even if the Tonnage Clause were properly understood to permit a jurisdiction to levy a tax on ships only when other property in the jurisdiction is also taxed, I would uphold the challenged tax. Although the tax applies only to ships, see Valdez Municipal Code other property in the city is also subject to taxation. First, imposes a value-based property tax on trailers, mobile homes, and recreational vehicles that are affixed to a site and connected to utilities. The plurality makes much of the requirement that the property be “ ‘affixed’ ” to a particular site, concluding that “Valdez in fact taxes those vehicles only when they constitute a form, not of personal property, but of real property.” Ante, at 10. But the taxability of property pursuant to is determined in much the same |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | of property pursuant to is determined in much the same way as the taxability of ships. “A trailer or mobile home is conclusively presumed to be affixed to the land” and may therefore be taxed if “it has remained at a fixed site for more than ninety days.” (C). Similarly, a ship owner can establish a tax situs in Valdez and thus be subject to taxation if it is “kept or used within the city for any ninety days or more.” (2)(c).3 In both cases, the provision serves to impose a tax on property that has developed substantial contacts with the city. The plurality is thus wrong to —————— 3A ship can also establish a tax situs in Valdez if it is usually kept or used within the city, travels to or within the city along regular routes, or is necessary to the conduct of substantial business in the city. (2). 8 POLAR TANKERS, INC. v. CITY OF VALDEZ STEVENS, J., dissenting conclude that ships have been singled out for taxation. Valdez also “levie[s] a tax” on all property taxable under Alaska Statutes Chapter 43.56 at the same rate that applies to other property taxed by the city. Valdez Mu nicipal Code The tax is imposed on property used “primarily in the exploration for, production of, or pipeline transportation of gas or unrefined oil,” including machinery, equipment, pumping stations, powerplants, aircraft and motor vehicles, and docks and other port facilities. See 43.56.210(5)(A) For several reasons, this tax is more significant than the plurality acknowledges. First, contrary to the plurality’s view, the tax appears to be a municipal tax. Valdez Municipal Code states that the tax “is hereby levied” on “property taxable under Alaska Statutes Chapter 43.56,” which in turn states that “[a] municipality may levy” such taxes, The terms of these provisions indicate that the city has exercised its express authority to levy such taxes. Given the myriad types of property taxable under those provisions and the require ment of Valdez Municipal Code that the prop erty be taxed “at the rate of taxation that applies to other property taxed by the city,” it seems clear that petitioner’s ships are taxed in the “same manner” as other property even as the plurality uses that term. My view of the case would be the same even if the tax on property used in oil production were imposed by the State itself, as the plurality assumes. Whether the oil production tax and the challenged tax are levied by the same unit of government has no relevance to the question whether the latter |
Justice Stevens | 2,009 | 16 | dissenting | Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145862/polar-tankers-inc-v-city-of-valdez/ | government has no relevance to the question whether the latter violates the Constitution. The restric tion imposed by the Tonnage Clause is a command to the —————— 4 As the plurality notes, ante, at 10–11, Valdez did not raise this issue in state court, and the parties have provided only limited briefing on the issue. Cite as: 557 U. S. (2009) 9 STEVENS, J., dissenting States limiting their inherent taxing authority as sover eigns. The States’ political subdivisions have no such inherent power and can levy taxes only to the extent authorized by the State. See 16 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations pp. 19–24 (rev. 3d ed. 2003); see also Wiggins 107 U. S., at (noting “[t]he power of [a State] to authorize any city within her limits to impose a license tax” on ferries). Indeed, this aspect of the relationship between States and their politi cal subdivisions is reflected in (b), which authorizes municipalities to levy certain taxes and prevents them from exempting particular property from taxation. Because the city’s power to levy taxes derives from the State, whether the city or the State levies the tax on oil-production property is constitutionally irrelevant. Finally, it bears mention that the result in this particu lar case does nothing to further the interests the Tonnage Clause was intended to protect. As the Court acknowl edges, ante, at 4, the central purpose of the Clause is “to prevent the seaboard States, possessed of important ports of entry, from levying taxes on goods flowing through their ports to inland States,” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, (Frankfurter, J., dis senting in part). Port Valdez is at the southern terminus of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, which carries oil extracted from Alaska’s North Slope to Port Valdez where it is loaded onto oil tankers belonging to petitioner and others for transport to refineries in other States. Taxes imposed on ships exporting that oil have the same effect on commerce in oil as do taxes on oil-production property or the oil itself, and Alaska’s authority to impose taxes on oil and oil-production property is undisputed. From an economic or political point of view, there is no difference between Alaska’s geographical control over the area in which the oil is produced and the port from which it is exported. Accordingly, no federal interest is served by 10 POLAR TANKERS, INC. v. CITY OF VALDEZ STEVENS, J., dissenting prohibiting Alaska or its political subdivisions from taxing the oil-bearing ships that are continually present in the State’s ports. III The Tonnage Clause permits a State to |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | majority | Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108658/almota-farmers-elevator-whse-co-v-united-states/ | Since 1919 the petitioner, Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse has conducted grain elevator operations on land adjacent to the tracks of the Oregon-Washington *471 Railroad & Navigation in the State of Washington. It has occupied the land under a series of successive leases from the railroad. In 1967, the Government instituted this eminent domain proceeding to acquire the petitioner's property interest by condemnation. At that time there were extensive buildings and other improvements that had been erected on the land by the petitioner, and the then-current lease had 7 1/2 years to run. In the District Court the Government contended that just compensation for the leasehold interest, including the structures, should be "the fair market value of the legal rights possessed by the defendant by virtue of the lease as of the date of taking," and that no consideration should be given to any additional value based on the expectation that the lease might be renewed. The petitioner urged that, rather than this technical "legal rights theory," just compensation should be measured by what a willing buyer would pay in an open market for the petitioner's leasehold. As a practical matter, the controversy centered upon the valuation to be placed upon the structures and their appurtenances. The parties stipulated that the Government had no need for these improvements and that the petitioner had a right to remove them. But that stipulation afforded the petitioner only what scant salvage value the buildings might bring. The Government offered compensation for the loss of the use and occupancy of the buildings only over the remaining term of the lease. The petitioner contended that this limitation upon compensation for the use of the structures would fail to award what a willing buyer would have paid for the lease with the improvements, since such a buyer would expect to have the lease renewed and to continue to use the improvements in place. The value of the buildings, machinery, and equipment in place would be substantially greater than their salvage value at the end *472 of the lease term, and a purchaser in an open market would pay for the anticipated use of the buildings and for the savings he would realize from not having to construct new improvements himself. In sum, the dispute concerned whether Almota would have to be satisfied with its right to remove the structures with their consequent salvage value or whether it was entitled to an award reflecting the value of the improvements in place beyond the lease term. In a pretrial ruling, the District Court accepted the petitioner's theory and |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | majority | Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108658/almota-farmers-elevator-whse-co-v-united-states/ | pretrial ruling, the District Court accepted the petitioner's theory and held that Almota was to be compensated for the full market value of its leasehold "and building improvements thereon as of the date of taking the total value of said leasehold and improvements. to be what the interests of said company therein could have been then sold for upon the open market considering all elements and possibilities whatsoever found to then affect the market value of those interests including, but not exclusive of, the possibilities of renewal of the lease and of the landlord requiring the removal of the improvements in the event of there being no lease renewal." The court accordingly ruled that the petitioner was entitled to the full fair market value of the use of the land and of the buildings in place as they stood at the time of the taking, without limitation of such use to the remainder of the term of the existing lease. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ; it accepted the Government's theory that a tenant's expectancy in a lease renewal was not a compensable legal interest and could not be included in the valuation of structures that the tenant had built on the property. It rejected any award for the use of improvements beyond the lease term as "compensation for expectations disappointed by the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, expectations *473 not based upon any legally protected right, but based only upon `a speculation on a chance.' " The court explicitly refused to follow an en banc decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relied upon by the District Court, which had held that for condemnation purposes improvements made by a lessee are to be assessed at their value in place over their useful life without regard to the term of the lease. United In view of this conflict in the circuits, we granted certiorari, to decide an important question of eminent domain law: "Whether, upon condemnation of a leasehold, a lessee with no right of renewal is entitled to receive as compensation the market value of its improvements without regard to the remaining term of its lease, because of the expectancy that the lease would have been renewed."[1] We find that the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is in accord with established principles of just-compensation law under the Fifth Amendment, and therefore reverse the judgment before us and reinstate the judgment of the District Court. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | majority | Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108658/almota-farmers-elevator-whse-co-v-united-states/ | District Court. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without "just compensation." "And `just compensation' means the full monetary equivalent of the property taken. The owner is *474 to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken." United (footnotes omitted). See also United To determine such monetary equivalence, the Court early established the concept of "market value": the owner is entitled to the fair market value of his property at the time of the taking. New See also United at ; United And this value is normally to be ascertained from "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller." See United By failing to value the improvements in place over their useful lifetaking into account the possibility that the lease might be renewed as well as the possibility that it might notthe Court of Appeals in this case failed to recognize what a willing buyer would have paid for the improvements. If there had been no condemnation, Almota would have continued to use the improvements during a renewed lease term, or if it sold the improvements to the fee owner or to a new lessee at the end of the lease term, it would have been compensated for the buyer's ability to use the improvements in place over their useful life. As Judge Friendly wrote for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "Lessors do desire, after all, to keep their properties leased, and an existing tenant usually has the inside track to a renewal for all kinds of reasonsavoidance of costly alterations, saving of brokerage commissions, perhaps even ordinary decency on the part of landlords. Thus, even when the lease had expired, the condemnation will often force the tenant to remove or abandon the fixtures long before he would otherwise have had to, as well as deprive him *475 of the opportunity to deal with the landlord or a new tenantthe only two people for whom the fixtures would have a value unaffected by the heavy costs of disassembly and reassembly. The condemnor is not entitled to the benefit of assumptions, contrary to common experience, that the fixtures would be removed at the expiration of the stated term." United 388 F. 2d, at -602 (footnote omitted). It seems particularly likely in this case that Almota could have sold the leasehold at a price that would have reflected the continued ability of the buyer to use the improvements over their useful life. Almota had an unbroken succession |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | majority | Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108658/almota-farmers-elevator-whse-co-v-united-states/ | improvements over their useful life. Almota had an unbroken succession of leases since 1919, and it was in the interest of the railroad, as fee owner, to continue leasing the property, with its grain elevator facilities, in order to promote grain shipments over its lines. In a free market, Almota would hardly have sold the leasehold to a purchaser who paid only for the use of the facilities over the remainder of the lease term, with Almota retaining the right thereafter to remove the facilitiesin effect, the right of salvage. "Because these fixtures diminish in value upon removal, a measure of damages less than their fair market value for use in place would constitute a substantial taking without just compensation. `[I]t is intolerable that the state, after condemning a factory or warehouse, should surrender to the owner a stock of secondhand machinery and in so doing discharge the full measure of its duty.' " United[2] *476 United upon which the Government primarily relies, does not lead to a contrary result. The Court did indicate that the measure of damages for the condemnation of a leasehold is to be measured in terms of the value of its use and occupancy for the remainder of the lease term, and the Court refused to elevate an expectation of renewal into a compensable legal interest. But the Court was not dealing there with the fair market value of improvements. Unlike Petty Motor, there is no question here of creating a legally cognizable value where none existed, or of compensating a mere incorporeal expectation.[3] The petitioner here has constructed the improvements and seeks only their fair market value. Petty Motor should not be *477 read to allow the Government to escape paying what a willing buyer would pay for the same property. The Government argues that it would be unreasonable to compensate Almota for the value of the improvements measured over their useful life, since the Government could purchase the fee and wait until the expiration of the lease term to take possession of the land.[4] Once it has purchased the fee, the argument goes, there is no further expectancy that the improvements will be used during their useful life since the Government will assuredly require their removal at the end of the term. But the taking for the dam was one act requiring proceedings against owners of two interests.[5] At the time of that "taking" Almota had an expectancy of continued occupancy of its grain elevator facilities. The Government must pay just compensation for those interests "probably within the scope of the project from |
Justice Stewart | 1,973 | 18 | majority | Almota Farmers Elevator & Whse. Co. v. United States | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108658/almota-farmers-elevator-whse-co-v-united-states/ | those interests "probably within the scope of the project from the time the *478 Government was committed to it." United Cf. United 397 U. S., at -18. It may not take advantage of any depreciation in the property taken that is attributable to the project itself. at ; United -636. At the time of the taking in this case, there was an expectancy that the improvements would be used beyond the lease term. But the Government has sought to pay compensation on the theory that at that time there was no possibility that the lease would be renewed and the improvements used beyond the lease term. It has asked that the improvements be valued as though there were no possibility of continued use.[6] That is not how the market would have valued such improvements; it is not what a private buyer would have paid Almota. "The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness, United as it does from technical concepts of property law." United States v. Fuller, post, at 490. It is, of course, true that Almota should be in no better position than if it had sold its leasehold to a private buyer. But its position should surely be no worse. The judgment before us is reversed and the judgment of the District Court reinstated. *479 MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom MR. |
Justice Rehnquist | 1,977 | 19 | dissenting | National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109690/national-socialist-party-of-america-v-skokie/ | The Court treats an application filed here to stay a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County as a petition for certiorari to review the refusal of the Supreme Court of *45 Illinois to stay the injunction. It summarily reverses this refusal of a stay. I simply do not see how the refusal of the Supreme Court of Illinois to stay an injunction granted by an inferior court within the state system can be described as a "[f]inal judgmen[t] or decre[e] rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had," which is the limitation that Congress has imposed on our jurisdiction to review state-court judgments under 28 U.S. C. 1257. Cox Broadcasting relied upon by the Court, which surely took as liberal a view of this jurisdictional grant as can reasonably be taken, does not support the result reached by the Court here. In Cox there had been a final decision on the federal claim by the Supreme Court of Georgia, which was the highest court of that State in which such a decision could be had. Here all the Supreme Court of Illinois has done is, in the exercise of the discretion possessed by every appellate court, to deny a stay of a lower court ruling pending appeal. No Illinois appellate court has heard or decided the merits of applicants' federal claim. I do not disagree with the Court that the provisions of the injunction issued by the Circuit Court of Cook County are extremely broad, and I would expect that if the Illinois appellate courts follow cases such as and Nebraska Press relied upon by the Court, the injunction will be at least substantially modified by them. But I do not believe that in the long run respect for the Constitution or for the law is encouraged by actions of this Court which disregard the limitations placed on us by Congress in order to assure that an erroneous injunction issued by a state trial court does not wrongly interfere with the constitutional rights of those enjoined |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, the trustee in reorganization of Webb & Knapp, Inc., has standing under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C. 501 et seq., to assert, on behalf of persons holding debentures issued by Webb & Knapp, claims of misconduct by an indenture trustee. The United States District Court for the Southern District *417 of New York held that petitioner lacked the requisite standing, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed en banc, with two judges dissenting,[1] We granted certiorari, and we now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. I Webb & Knapp and its numerous subsidiaries were engaged in various real estate activities in both the United States and Canada. In 1954, the corporation executed an indenture with respondent, the Marine Midland Trust Company of New York (Marine), that provided for the issuance by Webb & Knapp of 5% debentures in the total amount of $8,607,600. A critical part of the indenture was the promise by Webb & Knapp that neither it nor any company affiliated with it[2] would incur or assume "any indebtedness resulting from money borrowed or from the purchase of real property or interests in real property or purchase any real property or interests in real property" unless the company's consolidated tangible assets, as defined in the indenture, equaled 200% of certain liabilities, after giving effect to the contemplated indebtedness or purchase.[3]*418 By requiring the company to maintain an asset-liability ratio of 2:1, the indenture sought to protect debenture purchasers by providing a cushion against any losses that the company might suffer in the ordinary course of business. In order to demonstrate continuing compliance with the requirements of the indenture, Webb & Knapp covenanted to file an annual certificate with Marine stating whether the corporation (debtor) had defaulted on any of its responsibilities under the indenture during the preceding year.[4] In its role as indenture trustee, Marine undertook "in case of default to exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it by [the] Indenture, and to use the same degree of care and skill in their exercise, as a prudent man would exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs."[5] This undertaking was qualified by language in the indenture that permitted the trustee to rely on the accuracy of certificates or reports of Webb & Knapp, in the absence of bad faith.[6] Commencing in 1959, Webb & Knapp sustained substantial financial losses in every year.[7] Finally, on May 7, 1965, Marine filed a |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | every year.[7] Finally, on May 7, 1965, Marine filed a petition in district court seeking the involuntary reorganization of Webb & Knapp under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. C. 501 et seq. Pursuant to 208 of Chapter X, 11 U.S. C. 608, the Securities and Exchange Commission intervened *419 on May 10, 1965.[8] Marine's petition was subsequently approved and petitioner was appointed trustee in reorganization on May 18, 1965. With the approval of the District Court, petitioner exercised the powers conferred upon him by 11 U.S. C. 567 and undertook an extensive investigation of the financial affairs of Webb & Knapp. His investigation showed that the company had total assets of $21,538,621 and total liabilities of $60,036,164, plus contingent tax liabilities of $29,400,000. Included among the liabilities were the 1954 debentures in the principal amount of $4,298,200 plus interest subsequent to the inception of the reorganization proceeding.[9] The investigation led petitioner to conclude that Marine had either willfully or negligently failed to fulfill its obligations under the indenture. Petitioner supported his conclusion with the following allegations: that from 1954 to 1964, Webb & Knapp's yearly certificates of compliance with the 2:1 asset-liability ratio mandated by the indenture were fraudulent, because they were based on grossly overvalued appraisals of real estate property; that from 1958 to 1964, Webb & Knapp did not have sufficient assets to comply with the terms of the indenture; that Marine should have known or did know of the inflated appraisals; and that because Marine permitted Webb & Knapp to violate the indenture by engaging in transactions that its impaired asset-liability *420 ratio forbade, Webb & Knapp suffered great financial losses.[10] Having obtained the approval of the District Court, petitioner filed an independent action on behalf of the debenture holders against Marine seeking to recover the principal amount of the outstanding debentures as damages for Marine's alleged bad-faith failure to compel compliance with the terms of the indenture by Webb & Knapp. Petitioner also filed a counterclaim in the same amount against Marine in the reorganization proceeding in which Marine had previously filed a claim for services rendered. In the reorganization proceeding, petitioner also filed an objection to the claim for services rendered, on the ground that even if petitioner could not obtain an affirmative recovery against Marine on behalf of the bondholders, he could at least raise Marine's improper conduct as a reason why the claim for services rendered should be denied.[11] Finally, petitioner moved to compel an accounting by Marine. Marine moved to dismiss the independent action and the counterclaim, moved to |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | to dismiss the independent action and the counterclaim, moved to strike the objection to the claim for services rendered, and opposed the motion to compel an accounting. The District Court found that petitioner had no standing in his capacity as a trustee in reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act to raise claims of misconduct by an indenture trustee on behalf of debenture holders and granted both of Marine's motions to dismiss. Viewing the motion to compel an accounting as merely a third vehicle to raise the same *421 claim on behalf of the debenture holders, the District Court denied that motion also. Only petitioner's objection to the claim for services rendered was left standing.[12] Petitioner appealed the dismissal of his claims and the denial of his motion for an accounting to the Court of Appeals. Marine filed a cross-appeal from the denial of its motion to strike petitioner's objection to the claim for services rendered. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court in its entirety. II The issue confronting us has never before been presented to this Court. It is an issue that has only rarely been presented to other courts, and on those rare occasions, it has caused even the most able jurists to disagree. The first time the issue arose was in Judge Augustus Hand wrote the opinion of the court holding that a trustee in reorganization did not have standing to sue a third party on behalf of bondholders. Judge Learned Hand disagreed and dissented. It is this decision that the lower courts found controlling in the instant case. The Clarke case is, in fact, the only other case in which the issue that is raised here was squarely presented.[13]*422 The issue is a difficult one, and, as we point out later, it is one that is capable of resolution by explicit congressional action. Lacking a specific legislative statement on this issue, we must resolve it as best we can by examining the nature of Chapter X proceedings, the role of the trustee in reorganization, and the way in which standing to sue on behalf of debenture holders would affect or change that role. Chapter X, enacted in 1938, stemmed from a comprehensive SEC study that disclosed widespread abuses under the then-existing provisions for business reorganizations. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees (1937-1940). This same study gave birth the following year to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S. C. 77aaa et seq., |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S. C. 77aaa et seq., which is discussed infra. In enacting Chapter X, Congress had protection of public investors primarily in mind. "The aims of Chapter X were to afford greater protection to creditors and stockholders by providing greater judicial control over the entire proceedings and impartial and expert administrative assistance in corporate reorganizations through appointment of a disinterested trustee and the active participation of the SEC." In *423 contradistinction to a bankruptcy proceeding where liquidation of a corporation and distribution of its assets is the goal, a Chapter X proceeding is for purposes of rehabilitating the corporation and reorganizing it. Chapter X proceedings are not limited to insolvent corporations but are open to those corporations that are solvent in the bankruptcy (asset-liability) sense but are unable to meet their obligations as they mature. United ; 11 U.S. C. 530 (1). The trustee in reorganization is the center of the statutory scheme. H. R. Rep. No. 09, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 43, 44. Title 11 U.S. C. 567 gives the trustee broad powers: "The trustee upon his appointment and qualification "(1) shall, if the judge shall so direct, with investigate the acts, conduct, property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of its business and the desirability of the continuance thereof, and any other matter relevant to the proceeding or to the formulation of a plan, and report thereon to the judge; "(2) may, if the judge shall so direct, examine the directors and officers of the debtor and any other witnesses concerning the foregoing matters or any of them; "(3) shall report to the judge any facts ascertained by him pertaining to fraud, misconduct, mismanagement and irregularities, and to any causes of action available to the estate; "(5) shall, at the earliest date practicable, prepare and submit a brief statement of his investigation of the property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of its business and *424 the desirability of the continuance thereof, in such form and manner as the judge may direct, to the creditors, stockholders, indenture trustees, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and such other persons as the judge may designate; and "(6) shall give notice to the creditors and stockholders that they may submit to him suggestions for the formulation of a plan, or proposals in the form of plans, within a time therein named." Title 11 U.S. C. 587 expands these powers: "Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, a trustee, upon his appointment and qualification, shall be vested with the same rights, |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | appointment and qualification, shall be vested with the same rights, be subject to the same duties, and exercise the same powers as a trustee appointed under section 72 of this title, and, if authorized by the judge, shall have and may exercise such additional rights and powers as a receiver in equity would have if appointed by a court of the United States for the property of the debtor." The powers given a trustee appointed under 72 are set in a footnote.[] *425 Petitioner argues that these powers are broad enough to encompass a suit on behalf of debenture holders against an indenture trustee who has acted in bad faith, and who has, therefore, violated the indenture and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S. C. 77aaa et seq. As pointed out above, the Trust Indenture Act was passed one year after Chapter X was enacted. Prior to its enactment, indenture trustees immunized themselves from any liability for either deliberate or negligent misconduct by writing exculpatory provisions into the indenture. Even in cases where misconduct by the indenture trustee was the proximate cause of injury to debenture holders, they found themselves impotent under the terms of most indentures to take action against the trustee. See generally 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 719-725 (2d ed. 1961). This problem and others are specifically mentioned in 15 U.S. C. 77bbb as establishing a necessity for regulation. The regulation provided by the Act takes many forms. 15 U.S. C. 77eee requires that whenever securities covered by the Trust Indenture Act are also covered by the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. C. 77a et seq., certain information about the indenture trustee and the terms of the indenture *426 must be included in the registration statement. Title 15 U.S. C. 77ggg provides that when securities are not registered under the 1933 Act but are covered by the Trust Indenture Act, the indenture must be "qualified" by the SEC before it is legal to sell the securities. Standards for eligibility and disqualification of a trustee are established by 15 U.S. C. 77jjj, and the duties and responsibilities of a trustee are enumerated in 15 U.S. C. 77ooo.[15] The indenture giving rise to this litigation was qualified by the SEC pursuant to the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. By alleging that the indenture trustee negligently or intentionally failed to prevent Webb & Knapp from violating the terms of the indenture, petitioner clearly alleges a violation of the 1939 legislation, 15 U.S. C. 77ooo.[16] But the question remains whether petitioner is a proper |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | 77ooo.[16] But the question remains whether petitioner is a proper party to take corrective action.[17] *427 Petitioner urges that the reorganization trustee is in a far better position than debt investors to discover and to prosecute claims based on the alleged failure of an indenture trustee to live up to the provisions of the indenture. He points to 11 U.S. C. 567, set and emphasizes that not only does the reorganization trustee have possession of the records of the debtor, but he also has a statutory duty to investigate the debtor's affairs and to "report to the judge any facts ascertained by him pertaining to fraud, misconduct, mismanagement and irregularities, and to any causes of action available to the estate." Reference is made, too, to 15 U.S. C. 77bbb (a) (1), which states that one of the problems Congress saw with respect to misconduct by indenture trustees was that "(A) individual action by investors for the purpose of protecting and enforcing their rights is rendered impracticable by reason of the disproportionate expense of taking such action, and (B) concerted action by such investors in their common interest through representatives of their own selection is impeded by reason of the wide dispersion of such investors through many States, and by reason of the fact that information as to the names and addresses of such investors generally is not available to such investors."[18] *428 Finally, petitioner asserts that to give him standing to sue on behalf of debenture holders will not encourage vexatious litigation or unduly deplete the resources of the debtor that he has been appointed to reorganize. He supports the first half of this proposition by noting that any action he takes is subject to the supervision of the District Court and to intervention by the SEC. The second half of the proposition finds support in the argument discussed above that petitioner already has a duty of investigation and that the minimal additional burden of prosecuting a lawsuit will not be great. At first blush, petitioner's theory, adopted in the opinion of the dissenters in the Court of Appeals, seems reasonable. But, there are three problems with petitioner's argument and these problems require that his position be rejected. First, Congress has established an elaborate system of controls with respect to indenture trustees and reorganization proceedings, and nowhere in the statutory scheme is there any suggestion that the trustee in reorganization is to assume the responsibility of suing third parties on behalf of debenture holders. The language, in fact, indicates that Congress had no such intent in mind. The statute, 11 |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | Congress had no such intent in mind. The statute, 11 U.S. C. 567 (3), gives the trustee the right, and indeed imposes the duty, to investigate fraud and misconduct and to report to the judge the potential causes of action "available to the estate." Even assuming that this section is read as if the quoted words were not present, and that it authorizes a trustee in reorganization to report whether he believes an indenture trustee has violated a duty to third-party debenture holders, there is nothing in the section that enables him to collect money not owed to the estate. Nor is there anything in 11 U.S. C. 110, set in relevant part in footnote that gives him this authority. His task is simply to "collect and reduce to *429 money the property of the estates for which [he is trustee]." 11 U.S. C. 75. The only support petitioner finds in the relevant statutes is in that portion of 11 U.S. C. 587 which gives reorganization trustees the additional rights that a "receiver in equity would have if appointed by a court of the United States for the property of the debtor." Petitioner relies on 296 U.S. 0 to support the proposition that a receiver in equity may sue third parties on behalf of bondholders. But, the opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Cardozo clearly emphasizes that the receiver in that case was suing on behalf of the corporation, not third parties; he was simply stating the same claim that the corporation could have made had it brought suit prior to entering receivership.[19] The debtor corporation makes no such claim in this case. See generally 2 R. Clark, Law and Practice of Receivers 362, at 619 (3d ed. 1959). This brings us to the second problem with petitioner's argument. Nowhere does petitioner argue that Webb & Knapp could make any claim against Marine. Indeed, the conspicuous silence on this point is a tacit admission that no such claim could be made.[20] Assuming that *430 petitioner's allegations of misconduct on the part of the indenture trustee are true, petitioner has at most described a situation where Webb & Knapp and Marine were in pari delicto. Whatever damage the debenture holders suffered, under petitioner's theory Webb & Knapp is as much at fault as Marine, if not more so. A question would arise, therefore, whether Marine would be entitled to be subrogated to the claims of the debenture holders. The Court of Appeals thought that subrogation would be required, If the Court of Appeals is correct, it is then difficult to |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | Court of Appeals is correct, it is then difficult to see what advantage there is in giving petitioner standing to sue, for as Chief Judge Friendly noted in his opinion for the court below: "It is necessary in the first instance to consider what effect a recovery by the Chapter X Trustee would have on the reorganization. On a superficial view this might seem substantialif, for example, the Chapter X Trustee were to achieve a complete recovery, the debenture holders would be paid off and it might seem there would be that much more for the other creditors and the stockholders. But this pleasant prospect speedily evaporates when the law of subrogation is brought into play. As a result of subrogation, Marine would simply be substituted for the debenture holders as the claimant. Cf. ALI, Restatement of Security 1 (1941). If the Chapter X Trustee recovered judgment in a lesser amount, the claim of the debenture holders would still be provable in full, with the division of the proceeds between them and Marine dependent upon the results of the reorganization, and other creditors or stockholders would not be affected." Even if the Court of Appeals is incorrect in its view of the propriety of subrogation under the facts of this case, *431 the fact remains that in every reorganization there is going to be a question of how much the trustee in reorganization should be permitted to recover on behalf of the debenture holders. The answer is, of course, whatever he cannot recoup from the corporation. Once this is recognized, the wisdom of Judge Augustus Hand in 137 F. 2d, at 800, becomes readily apparent: "Each creditor, including the debenture-holders, can prove the full amount of his claim, and only to the extent that a debenture-holder fails to satisfy it from the bankruptcy estate will he suffer a loss which he can assert against the defendant through its failure to enforce the negative covenants." In other words, debenture holders will not be able to recover damages from the indenture trustee until the reorganization is far enough along so that a reasonable approximation can be made as to the extent of their losses, if any. It is difficult to see precisely why it is at that point that the trustee in reorganization should represent the interests of the debenture holders, who are capable of deciding for themselves whether or not it is worthwhile to seek to recoup whatever losses they may have suffered by an action against the indenture trustee. Petitioner appears to concede that any suit by debenture holders would |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | appears to concede that any suit by debenture holders would not affect the interests of other parties to the reorganization, assuming that the Court of Appeals is correct on the subrogation point. It would seem, therefore, that the debenture holders, the persons truly affected by the suit against Marine, should make their own assessment of the respective advantages and disadvantages, not only of litigation, but of various theories of litigation. This brings us to the third problem with petitioner's argument: i. e., a suit by him on behalf of debenture holders may be inconsistent with any independent actions *432 that they might bring themselves. Petitioner and the SEC make very plain their position that a suit by the trustee in reorganization does not pre-empt suits by individual debenture holders. They maintain, however, that it would be unlikely that such suits would be brought since the debenture holders could reasonably expect that the trustee would vigorously prosecute the claims of all debt investors. But, independent actions are still likely because it is extremely doubtful that the trustee and all debenture holders would agree on the amount of damages to seek, or even on the theory on which to sue.[21] Moreover, if the indenture trustee wins the suit brought by the trustee in reorganization, unless the debenture holders are bound by that victory, the proliferation of litigation that petitioner seeks to avoid would then ensue. Finally, a question would arise as to who was bound by any settlement.[22] *433 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for class actions, avoids some of these difficulties. It is surely a powerful remedy and one that is available to all debenture holders.[23] Some of the factors that formerly deterred such actions have been changed by the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. Title 15 U.S. C. 77lll, for example, now requires that the debtor corporation maintain lists of debenture holders that it must turn over to the indenture trustees at regular intervals. Such lists are available to the individual debenture *434 holders upon request. Debenture holders would also be able to take advantage of any information obtained by the trustee in reorganization as a result of the investigation which the statute requires that he make. In addition, petitioner himself maintains that counsel fees would be recoverable if the action was successful. Brief for Petitioner 20; cf. 15 U.S. C. 77nnn. Thus, there is no showing whatever that by giving petitioner standing to sue on behalf of the debenture holders we would reduce litigation. On the contrary, there is every indication that litigation |
Justice Marshall | 1,972 | 15 | majority | Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108540/caplin-v-marine-midland-grace-trust-co/ | litigation. On the contrary, there is every indication that litigation would be increased, or at least complicated. III For the reasons discussed above we conclude that petitioner does not have standing to sue an indenture trustee on behalf of debenture holders. This does not mean that it would be unwise to confer such standing on trustees in reorganization. It simply signifies that Congress has not yet indicated even a scintilla of an intention to do so, and that such a policy decision must be left to Congress and not to the judiciary. Congress might well decide that reorganizations have not fared badly in the 34 years since Chapter X was enacted and that the status quo is preferable to inviting new problems by making changes in the system. Or, Congress could determine that the trustee in a reorganization was so well situated for bringing suits against indenture trustees that he should be permitted to do so. In this event, Congress might also determine that the trustee's action was exclusive, or that it should be brought as a class action on behalf of all debenture holders, or perhaps even that the debenture holders should have the option of suing on their own or having the trustee sue on their behalf. Any number of alternatives are available. Congress would also be able to answer questions regarding subrogation or timing of law suits before these questions *435 arise in the context of litigation. Whatever the decision, it is one that only Congress can make. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. |
Justice Kennedy | 1,993 | 4 | concurring | United States v. Olano | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/112848/united-states-v-olano/ | I join the Court's opinion and add this brief statement to express my own understanding of the Court's holding. When a court notices an error on its own initiative under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), see it may be awkward to say that the case is decided by burden of proof concepts, for by definition none of the parties have addressed the issue. But the Court's opinion is phrased with care to indicate that burden of proof concepts are the normal or usual mode of analysis of error under Rule 52, see ante, at 734-735, and so other rules may apply where the aggrieved party has not raised the issue. In most cases, however, *742 the party will have raised the alleged error on appeal. In that context, the analysis the Court adopts today is helpful, for it gives operative effect to the difference under Rule 52 between those cases where an objection has been preserved and those where it has not. That leads me to a final point, which is the independent force of the Rule against permitting alternates in the jury room during deliberations. As the Court is careful to note, this case was submitted on the assumption that it is error to follow this practice, and the Court does not question that premise. Indeed, there are good reasons to suppose that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) is the product of a judgment that our jury system should be given a stable and constant structure, one that cannot be varied by a court with or without the consent of the parties. See Reply Brief for United States 9, n. 4. In the course of a lengthy trial, defense counsel, who may have numerous requests for rulings pending before a district court, may acquiesce in a proposal from the bench concerning jury composition so that counsel can concentrate on matters they deem more pressing. In such a climate, the trial court ought not to put counsel in the position of having to object to a suggestion that compromises the Federal Rules. If there were a case in which a specific objection had been made and overruled, the systemic costs resulting from the Rule 24(c) violation would likely be significant, since it would seem to me most difficult for the Government to show the absence of prejudice, which would be required to avoid reversal of the conviction under Rule 52(a). Rule 24(c) is based on certain premises about group dynamics that make it difficult for us to know how the jury's deliberations may have been affected. Defendants seeking |
Justice Alito | 2,009 | 8 | concurring | Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145915/crawford-v-metropolitan-government-of-nashville-and-davidson-cty/ | The question in this case is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S. C. et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), prohibits retaliation against an employee who testifies in an inter nal investigation of alleged sexual harassment. I agree with the Court that the “opposition clause” of –3(a) (2000 ed.) prohibits retaliation for such conduct. I also agree with the Court’s primary reasoning, which is based on “the point argued by the Government and explained by an EEOC guideline: ‘When an employee communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in a form of employment discrimination, that communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.’ ” Ante, at 4. I write separately to emphasize my understanding that the Court’s holding does not and should not extend beyond employees who testify in internal investigations or engage in analogous purposive conduct. As the Court concludes, the term “oppose” does not denote conduct that necessarily rises to the level required by the Sixth Circuit—i.e., conduct that is “ ‘consistent’ ” and “instigated or initiated” by the employee. 211 Fed. 2 CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON CTY. ALITO, J., concurring in judgment Appx. 373, 376 The primary definitions of the term “oppose” do, however, require conduct that is active and purposive. See Webster’s New International Diction ary 1709–1710 (2d ed. 1953); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1010 (1966) (hereinafter Random Dict.); 10 Oxford English Dictionary 866–867 (2d ed. 1989). For example, the first three definitions of the term in the dictionary upon which the Court principally relies are as follows: “1. to act against or provide resistance to; combat. 2. to stand in the way of; hinder; obstruct. 3. to set as an opponent or adversary.” Random Dict. 1359 (2d ed. 1987). In accordance with these definitions, petitioner contends that the statutory term “oppose” means “taking action (including making a statement) to end, prevent, redress, or correct unlawful discrimination.” Brief for Petitioner 40. In order to decide the question that is before us, we have no need to adopt a definition of the term “oppose” that is broader than the definition that petitioner advances. But in dicta, the Court notes that the fourth listed definition in the Random House Dictionary of the English Language goes further, defining “oppose” to mean “ ‘to be hostile or adverse to, as in opinion.’ ” Ante, at 4 (emphasis added). Thus, this definition embraces silent opposition. While this is certainly an accepted usage of the term “oppose,” the term is not |
Justice Alito | 2,009 | 8 | concurring | Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145915/crawford-v-metropolitan-government-of-nashville-and-davidson-cty/ | accepted usage of the term “oppose,” the term is not always used in this sense, and it is questionable whether silent opposition is covered by the opposition clause of 42 U.S. C. –3(a). It is notewor thy that all of the other conduct protected by this provi sion—making a charge, testifying, or assisting or partici pating in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing— requires active and purposive conduct. “ ‘That several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of Cite as: 555 U. S. (2009) 3 ALITO, J., concurring in judgment interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well.’ ” S. D. Warren ). An interpretation of the opposition clause that protects conduct that is not active and purposive would have im portant practical implications. It would open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their employers. To be sure, in many cases, such employees would not be able to show that management was aware of their opposition and thus would not be able to show that their opposition caused the adverse actions at issue. But in other cases, such employ ees might well be able to create a genuine factual issue on the question of causation. Suppose, for example, that an employee alleges that he or she expressed opposition while informally chatting with a co-worker at the proverbial water cooler or in a workplace telephone conversation that was overheard by a co-worker. Or suppose that an em ployee alleges that such a conversation occurred after work at a restaurant or tavern frequented by co-workers or at a neighborhood picnic attended by a friend or relative of a supervisor. Some courts hold that an employee asserting a retalia tion claim can prove causation simply by showing that the adverse employment action occurred within a short time after the protected conduct. See, e.g., Clark County School (noting that some cases “accept mere temporal proximity between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case”); see also ; Conner v. Schnuk Markets, Inc., (CA10 1997); 4 CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON CTY. ALITO, J., concurring in judgment As a result, an employee claiming retaliation may be able to establish causation simply by showing that, within some time period prior to the adverse action, the employer, by some indirect means, became aware of the views that the employee had expressed. Where the pro tected conduct consisted of a private conversation, applica tion of this rule |
Justice Alito | 2,009 | 8 | concurring | Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Cty. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145915/crawford-v-metropolitan-government-of-nashville-and-davidson-cty/ | consisted of a private conversation, applica tion of this rule would be especially problematic because of uncertainty regarding the point in time when the em ployer became aware of the employee’s private expressions of disapproval. The number of retaliation claims filed with the EEOC has proliferated in recent years. See U. S. Equal Em ployment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2007, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ charges.html; Charge Statistics: FY 1992 Through FY 1996, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html (as visited Jan. 16, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (showing that retaliation charges filed with the EEOC doubled between 1992 and 2007). An expansive interpre tation of protected opposition conduct would likely cause this trend to accelerate. The question whether the opposition clause shields employees who do not communicate their views to their employers through purposive conduct is not before us in this case; the answer to that question is far from clear; and I do not understand the Court’s holding to reach that issue here. For present purposes, it is enough to hold that the opposition clause does protect an employee, like peti tioner, who testifies about unlawful conduct in an internal investigation |
per_curiam | 2,016 | 200 | per_curiam | Bosse v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4311283/bosse-v-oklahoma/ | In this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence” that does not “relate directly to the circumstances of the crime.” at 501–502, 507, n. 10. Four years later, in the Court granted certiorari to reconsider that ban on “ ‘victim impact’ evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim’s family.” The Court held that Booth was wrong to conclude that the Eighth Amendment re quired such a ban. That holding was expressly “limited to” this particular type of victim impact testimony. “Booth also held that the admission of a victim’s family members’ characteriza tions and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment,” but no such evidence was presented in so the Court had no occasion to reconsider that aspect of the decision. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “implicitly overruled that portion of Booth regard ing characterizations of the defendant and opinions of the sentence.” (emphasis added); see also v. State, 933 P.2d 880, 890–891 The decision below presents a straightforward application of that interpreta tion of A jury convicted petitioner Shaun Michael 2 BOSSE v. OKLAHOMA Per Curiam Bosse of three counts of first-degree murder for the 10 killing of Katrina Griffin and her two children. The State of Oklahoma sought the death penalty. Over Bosse’s objection, the State asked three of the victims’ relatives to recommend a sentence to the jury. All three recommended death, and the jury agreed. Bosse appealed, arguing that this testimony about the appropriate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment under Booth. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his sentence, concluding that there was “no error.” ¶¶ 57–58, 360 P.3d 13, 1226–1227. We grant certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and now vacate the judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. “[I]t is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.” United 567 (01) ; internal quotation marks omitted); see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap peals has recognized that “specifically acknowl edged its holding did not affect” Booth’s prohibition on opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appro priate punishment. –891. That should have ended its inquiry into whether the Eighth Amendment bars such testimony; the court was wrong to go further and conclude that implicitly overruled Booth in its entirety. “Our decisions remain binding prec edent until we see fit to |
per_curiam | 2,016 | 200 | per_curiam | Bosse v. Oklahoma | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4311283/bosse-v-oklahoma/ | decisions remain binding prec edent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality.” 252–253 (1998). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals remains bound by Booth’s prohibition on characterizations and opinions from a victim’s family members about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence unless this Court reconsiders that ban. The state court erred in con Cite as: 580 U. S. (16) 3 Per Curiam cluding otherwise. The State argued in opposing certiorari that, even if the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was wrong in its victim impact ruling, that error did not affect the jury’s sentencing determination, and the defendant’s rights were in any event protected by the mandatory sentencing re view in capital cases required under Oklahoma law. See Brief in Opposition 14–15. Those contentions may be addressed on remand to the extent the court below deems appropriate. The judgment of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap peals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 580 U. S. (16) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 15–9173 SHAUN MICHAEL BOSSE v. |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | These cases require us to interpret the definition of a "displaced person" set forth in the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 970 (Relocation Act), 42 U.S. C. 460 et seq. Section 0 (6) of the Act defines a "displaced person" as "any person who moves as a result of the acquisition of real property, or as the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency" 42 U.S. C. 460 (6).[] *43 Relocation benefits are available under the Act for individuals and businesses that satisfy either the "acquisition" or "written order" clause of this definition. Because the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits have adopted conflicting interpretations of the written order clause,[2] we granted certiorari. Both cases involve housing projects that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) acquired after the projects' sponsors defaulted on federally insured loans. We must determine whether the written order clause encompasses the tenants required to vacate those housing projects, even though HUD's orders to vacate were not motivated by a governmental acquisition of property to further a public program or project. I A Petitioners in No. 77-874 are 7 former tenants of the Riverhouse Tower Apartments, a low- and middle-income housing project in Indianapolis, Indiana. This complex was built in the late 960's by a private nonprofit corporation, Riverhouse Apartments, Inc., whose mortgage HUD insured and subsidized pursuant to 22 (d) (3) of the National Housing Act, as amended, 2 U.S. C. 75l (d) (3). Upon completion of the project, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) purchased the mortgage from *44 the private lender in accordance with 22 (d) (3) of the Housing Act. When Riverhouse Apartments, Inc., defaulted on the loan in July 970, GNMA assigned the mortgage to HUD in exchange for payment of the statutory mortgage benefits. Three years later, HUD initiated foreclosure proceedings, and a court-appointed receiver assumed operation of the project until HUD purchased the property at a foreclosure sale in August 974. HUD initially retained a management agent to continue operating the newly acquired project. However, the condition of the property had deteriorated so seriously during the period of default that HUD soon decided to close the apartment complex. Notices to quit were served on all remaining tenants in November 974, and by the following February, the buildings were vacant. HUD refused to provide relocation benefits for these dislocated tenants or to disclose its plans regarding the terminated project.[3] Petitioners then initiated this |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | its plans regarding the terminated project.[3] Petitioners then initiated this action in Federal District Court, claiming, inter alia, that they were "displaced persons" entitled to assistance under the Relocation Act.[4] Construing the written order clause of 0 (6) literally, the tenants argued that they had moved upon receiving written orders to vacate property acquired by a Government agency. The District Court rejected this statutory construction and granted summary judgment for HUD. Blades v. Dept. of HUD, Civ. No. IP 74-706-C (SD Ind., July 976). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In its view, 0 (6) encompasses only displacements for programs designed to benefit *45 the public as a whole or to fulfill a public need, not dislocations caused by the irretrievable failure of a public housing project.[5] B The tenants in No. 77-463 formerly occupied the Sky Tower apartment complex built in Washington, D. C., during the 950's. A nonprofit corporation purchased Sky Tower in 970, intending to convert a number of its small "garden" apartments into larger units for low- and moderate-income families. HUD agreed to assist in the rehabilitation by insuring the corporation's mortgage on the complex and subsidizing its interest payments, pursuant to 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended, 2 U.S. C. 75z-. Difficulties with two successive general contractors eventually prevented the corporate sponsor from making interest payments on its loan. As a result, the mortgagee declared the sponsor in default, foreclosed on the mortgage, and conveyed title to HUD in exchange for the statutory mortgage insurance benefits. See 2 U.S. C. 73 (g), (k). After acquiring title to Sky Tower in June 973, HUD hired a management agent to continue operating the partially rehabilitated complex. By September 974, however, HUD realized that Sky Tower's deteriorated condition would render any further efforts at rehabilitation futile. The agency therefore planned to demolish the buildings and sell the land to private developers for construction of single-family homes. *46 When the 72 families living in the complex were ordered to vacate, HUD declined to extend assistance under the Relocation Act.[6] A group of the Sky Tower tenants brought this suit in Federal District Court, challenging HUD's decision to raze the complex and its refusal to provide full relocation benefits. The District Court preliminarily enjoined HUD from completing the demolition, and subsequently granted summary judgment for the tenants on the benefits issue. Civ. Action No. 74-872 (DC, Sept. 2, 975).[7] A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that these tenants were "displaced persons" under the written order clause |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | these tenants were "displaced persons" under the written order clause of 0 (6). 87 U. S. App. D. C. 56, 6, In so ruling, the Court of Appeals rejected HUD's argument that 0 (6) reaches only persons dislocated by an agency's purposeful acquisition of property for use in certain types of government programs. The court instead considered the written order clause applicable whenever an agency orders persons to vacate so that property can be devoted to a federal program "`designed for the benefit of the public as a whole.'" 87 U. S. App. D. C., at 6, 57 *47 F. 2d, at In the court's view, HUD's demolition plan met this description. [8] Section 0 (6) of the Relocation Act, as previously indicated, provides that a "displaced person" is one who moves "as a result of the acquisition of real property, or as the result of the written order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property, for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency" 42 U.S. C. 460 (6). In neither case do the tenants claim coverage under the "acquisition" clause of 0 (6), which reaches persons dislocated by the actual procurement of property for a federal program or project. Brief for Respondents in No. 77-463, p. 5, and n. 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 0. Hence, these tenants' eligibility for relocation assistance turns on the meaning of the definition's written order clause. More precisely, their eligibility depends on the import of two critical phrases not specifically defined in the Act, "acquiring agency" and "for a program or project." The tenants contend that "acquiring agency" simply denotes a governmental body that has previously acquired property and that eventually orders persons to vacate. In contrast, HUD reads the phrase as a shorthand description of an agency currently engaged in the process of acquiring property. Under HUD's construction, the written order clause contains an implicit acquisition requirement. The clause thus construed does not apply unless an agency's proposed acquisition of property *48 directly causes issuance of the displacing order, whereas the tenants' interpretation demands no immediate causal connection between the procurement of property and the order to vacate. The parties also disagree about the proper referent for the phrase, "for a program or project."[9] HUD contends that this phrase modifies the acquisition requirement included in the written order clause. Consequently, "for a program or project" specifies the agency's original purpose in acquiring property, not just its purpose in issuing an order to vacate. Under this construction, the written order clause applies only if an agency issues its notice to |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | clause applies only if an agency issues its notice to vacate pursuant to an actual or proposed acquisition of property intended to further a federal program. Thus, tenants of a housing project acquired by the Government because of the owner's loan default would not be eligible for relocation assistance when the acquiring agency later adopts a program necessitating their displacement. The tenants, on the other hand, read "for a program or project" as referring solely to the written order. The phrase therefore identifies the agency's reason for ordering persons to vacate, but does not make eligibility depend on the agency's *49 original purpose in acquiring the property. According to this analysis, the written order clause covers any individual who receives a written order to vacate property that an agency has previously acquired, provided the displacement is "for" a federal program or project. Moreover, the tenants broadly construe "program or project" to include any governmental program designed to fulfill a public need. The statutory language is susceptible of either construction. However, an examination of Congress' purpose in adopting the Relocation Act, the legislative history of 0 (6), and the structure of the Act as a whole persuades us that HUD's interpretation more nearly reflects the intended scope of this assistance program. A Passage of the Relocation Act in 970 concluded nearly a decade of congressional effort to standardize federal legislation regarding relocation assistance. Prior to the 960's, Congress had enacted special provisions to assist persons displaced when particular federal agencies acquired property for designated public projects.[0] As a result, relocation benefits varied substantially from program to program. The House Public Works Committee responded to these variations in 96 by creating the Select Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition. In 964, this Subcommittee submitted a lengthy Report concerning the deficiencies of existing law, and its proposed "Fair Compensation Act" became the basis for most of the provisions ultimately codified in the Relocation Act.[] *50 The proposed Fair Compensation Act unambiguously reflects Congress' limited purpose in revising the special relocation legislation. The Act's declared purpose was to afford "persons affected by the acquisition of real property in Federal and federally assisted programs fair and equitable treatment on a basis as nearly uniform as practicable." Select Subcommittee Study 47 (emphasis added); see This statement of policy embodied Congress' recognition that existing law provided relocation benefits only to those persons dislocated by governmental acquisitions of property for use in public projects.[2] And in accord with its mandate, the Select Subcommittee drafted the replacement legislation to standardize and improve the assistance provided within that particular context.[3] Thus, |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | and improve the assistance provided within that particular context.[3] Thus, both the language and origins of the Relocation Act demonstrate that Congress initially intended to provide better relocation assistance when property is acquired for federal programs, not to extend assistance beyond that limited context to all persons somehow displaced by governmental programs.[4] *5 Congress' basic objective remained unchanged through succeeding legislative sessions as it considered a number of bills derived from the proposed Fair Compensation Act. During this period, the individual sponsors and the Senate Committee on Government Operations altered slightly the language used to declare Congress' purpose, but the meaning was unaffected.[5] Thus, the original "Declaration of Policy" in S. 9st Cong., st Sess., 20 (969), the bill finally enacted as the Relocation Act, stated that the legislation was designed "to establish a uniform policy for the fair and equitable treatment of owners, tenants, and other persons displaced by the acquisition of real property in Federal and federally assisted programs to the end that such persons shall not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole." (Emphasis added.) This language leaves little doubt that Congress' concern was *52 still with displacements caused by the acquisition of property for a Government program or project.[6] In arguing that Congress had a broader purpose, to provide relocation assistance outside the acquisition context, the tenants rely on language adopted by the House of Representatives after the Senate passed S. When the House Committee on Public Works reorganized and shortened the bill's provisions into their final form, it also streamlined the "Declaration of Policy" by deleting the references to acquisitions of property. Consequently, 20 of the Relocation Act simply refers to "persons displaced as a result of Federal and federally assisted programs,"[7] and the tenants suggest that all such persons are the intended beneficiaries of the statute. However, the tenants' interpretation of this language is plainly inconsistent with prior versions of the section, all of which expressly related to displacements caused by the acquisition of property for the programs specified in 20.[8] Nothing in the legislative materials suggests that this late revision in the Act's statement of purpose reflected any substantive departure from Congress' previous statutory design.[9] Indeed, the House Committee that shortened the Declaration of Policy stated in its Report that the bill "provides for relief of the economic *53 dislocation which occurs in the acquisition of real property for Federal and federally assisted programs." H. R. Rep. No. 9-656, p. 3 (970). Accordingly, the consistent purpose underlying this legislation persuades us that |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | Accordingly, the consistent purpose underlying this legislation persuades us that Congress intended the written order clause to apply only when an agency proposes acquiring property to further a federal program or project. B The legislative history specifically concerning the definition of a displaced person reinforces our conclusion. Prior versions of 0 (6) encompassed only persons dislocated by actual or proposed property acquisitions, and in particular, those acquisitions intended to further federal programs and projects. The legislative materials demonstrate that when Congress added the written order clause to this definition, its purpose was to delineate more precisely a subcategory of the originally intended beneficiaries, consisting of those who move in anticipation that a property acquisition for a federal program will necessitate their displacement. Viewed in context, the written order clause addresses a special situation related to unconsummated property acquisitions, not all displacements loosely connected with Government programs. The definition of a displaced person originated in the proposed Fair Compensation Act. Section 5 defined the term to include persons and businesses that move from real property "as a result of the acquisition or imminence of acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, by a Federal or State agency." Select Subcommittee Study 57-58. That this choice of language was deliberate can be seen from other provisions of the Act, which authorized relocation assistance only when the "head of any Federal agency acquires real property for public use."[20] *54 The version of the Fair Compensation Act introduced in the next Congress adopted the same definition of a displaced person.[2] However, witnesses during the Senate hearings criticized the phrase "or imminence of acquisition" as too ambiguous to provide guidance for agencies and potential displacees.[22] In response, the Senate Committee on Government Operations amended the phrase to read "or reasonable expectation of acquisition," thereby incorporating an objective standard of eligibility.[23] The limited scope of this amendment, *55 as well as the definition, is apparent from the Committee's explanation that the change was designed "to remove some of the ambiguities surrounding the meaning of `imminence' and to make it amply clear that this legislation applies to persons who move from property to be acquired in connection with a Federal or federally assisted program when or shortly after the proposed project is announced, and when the announcement is made substantially prior to the time the project is to be put into effect." S. Rep. No. 378, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (966). This passage and others in the Senate Committee Report[24] clearly indicate that Congress framed the definition to reach only persons displaced by actual |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | framed the definition to reach only persons displaced by actual or planned acquisitions of property. These materials also demonstrate that Congress restricted the definition even further by focusing exclusively on property acquisitions for use in federal programs and projects.[25] The Senate's amended definition of a displaced person was retained in the relocation bills proposed in succeeding legislative sessions, including the original version of the bill finally enacted as the Relocation Act, S. 9st Cong., st Sess., 05 (969).[26] The Senate passed this bill with only minor amendments and without significant debate.[27] But the House Committee on Public Works amended the definition of a *56 displaced person when reorganizing the bill's provisions into their final form.[28] This late amendment added the clause on which the tenants base their argument that relocation assistance was intended for all persons displaced by Government programs. The contemporaneous legislative materials, however, refute the tenants' interpretation of the written order clause. During the House hearings on the relocation bills, a number of witnesses criticized even the "reasonable expectation of acquisition" language as overly vague.[29] To remedy this problem, representatives of the United States Department of Transportation and HUD recommended relating the expectation of acquisition to a readily discernible official act, so that persons who justifiably relied on agency representations could still obtain reimbursement even if the agency later failed to complete the acquisition.[30] The House Committee accepted this suggestion and replaced "or reasonable expectation of acquisition" with "or as the result of the written order of the *57 acquiring agency to vacate real property."[3] Thus, the sole objective underlying the present written order clause was to delineate more precisely the persons eligible for assistance as a result of planned, but unconsummated, acquisitions of property for federal programs. The House Committee Report and floor debate also reflect this limited purpose. Based on the previously understood scope of this legislation and on testimony given during the House hearings,[32] the House Committee was well aware that *58 the unamended definition of a displaced person excluded those displaced by means other than property acquisitions for public projects. The Committee presumably would have articulated any intent to extend coverage beyond the acquisition context or to eliminate the requirement that an acquisition be for a federal program.[33] Instead, the House Report simply explained that under the new written order clause, "[i]f a person moves as the result of such a notice to vacate, it makes no difference whether or not the real property actually is acquired." H. R. Rep. No. 9-656, p. 4 (970) (emphasis added).[34] Similarly, the Report observed in reference to |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | (970) (emphasis added).[34] Similarly, the Report observed in reference to the entire definition of a displaced person, "[t]he controlling point is that the real property must be acquired for a Federal or Federal financially assisted program or project." [35] *59 Nor is there any evidence that the Senate perceived the written order clause as an expansion of the bill when it accepted the House Committee's changes without a conference and almost without debate. 6 Cong. Rec. 4063-4072 (970). The sole reference during the Senate deliberations to the amended definition of a "displaced person" appeared in a memorandum submitted on behalf of the administration, which stated: "The House bill would limit the status of displaced person to those who move as the result of the acquisition of, or written notice to vacate, real property. The Senate version would provide a broader definition which includes those who move as the result of acquisition or reasonable expectation of acquisition." This description of the amendment as a slight limitation, rather than a significant expansion of the statutory design, was accepted without dispute when the Senate approved the House version of this section as the final language for the Relocation Act. In sum, the legislative history of the written order clause reveals no congressional intent to extend relocation benefits beyond the acquisition context. Rather, this clause merely ensures that assistance is available for a distinct group of persons directed to move because of a contemplated acquisition, whether the agency ultimately acquires the property or not. The written order clause therefore preserves the original meaning of a displaced person, since it does not apply unless a proposed acquisition directly causes issuance of the notice to vacate and the property acquisition is intended to further a federal program or project. *60 C The structure of the Relocation Act confirms our conclusion that Congress did not expect to provide assistance for all persons somehow displaced by Government programs. The benefit provisions involved here are but one part of a comprehensive statute that also establishes the procedures agencies must follow when acquiring land for federal programs. See 42 U.S. C. 465-4655. This placement in itself suggests that Congress was concerned with burdens related to Government acquisitions of property, as opposed to a broader range of dislocation problems. But more importantly, the Act's other relocation sections, which specify the benefits available for displaced persons, manifest the limited scope of 0 (6) and the written order clause. Sections 202 and 205 of the Act require respectively that moving and related expenses be paid and relocation assistance advisory services be provided for |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | be paid and relocation assistance advisory services be provided for displaced persons only when an agency proposes acquiring property for a federal program. See n. Thus, 202 begins: "Whenever the acquisition of real property for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency in any State will result in the displacement of any person the head of such agency shall make a payment to any displaced person, upon proper application" 84 Stat. 895, 42 U.S. C. 4622. Identical language triggers application of 205. 84 Stat. 897, 42 U.S. C. 4625. If the tenants' broad construction of the written order clause were correct, certain individuals would qualify as displaced persons within the meaning of 0 (6), but the lack of an acquisition would preclude them from receiving benefits under 202 and 205. Absent any indication that Congress intended such an anomalous result, we believe all three provisions must be given similar scope.[36] *6 Sections 203 and 204 of the Act, which authorize replacement housing payments for dislocated homeowners and tenants, see n. also bear upon interpretation of the written order clause. These sections provide benefits only to displaced persons who occupied their dwelling for a prescribed length of time "prior to the initiation of negotiations for the acquisition of the property." 42 U.S. C. 4623 (a) ().[37] Congress drafted these occupancy requirements to exclude from coverage persons who otherwise might attempt to obtain substantial relocation benefits by moving onto property after the acquisition process has begun.[38] Yet according to the tenants' analysis of 0 (6), which requires only that an agency have procured the property at some point in the distant past, these occupancy strictures would exclude a much larger class of displaced persons than necessary to fulfill their objective. For example, tenants dislocated by the closing of a housing project that an agency had obtained 20 years earlier might satisfy the written order clause, but the failure of most to have lived in the project prior to the acquisition would prevent them from obtaining replacement housing payments under 204. Again, we doubt Congress intended the statute to operate in this manner. Rather, 203 and 204 demonstrate that the written order clause cannot be divorced from the acquisition context without distorting the statutory design. Finally, the special benefits provision in 27 of the Act *62 highlights the limited reach of 0 (6). Congress drafted 27 to preserve the one pre-existing relocation assistance program extending beyond the acquisition context.[39] This section provides: "A person who moves as a direct result of any project or program which receives Federal financial assistance under |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | any project or program which receives Federal financial assistance under title I of the Housing Act of 949, as amended, or as a result of carrying out a comprehensive city demonstration program under title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 966 shall be deemed to have been displaced as the result of the acquisition of real property." 84 Stat. 902, 42 U.S. C. 4637 (emphasis added). Inclusion of this special provision, to ensure that certain persons displaced by action other than an acquisition of property could still qualify for relocation benefits, reflects Congress' understanding that such persons would not be covered by the general definition of a "displaced person" set forth in 0 (6).[40] D Accordingly, we hold that the written order clause encompasses only those persons ordered to vacate in connection with the actual or proposed acquisition of property for a federal program. In essence, the clause embodies two causal requirements. First, the written order to vacate must result directly from an actual or contemplated property acquisition.[4] Second, *63 and more fundamentally, that acquisition must be "for," or intended to further, a federal program or project. In combination, these two causal requirements substantially limit applicability of the written order clause, so that persons directed to vacate property for a federal program cannot obtain relocation assistance unless the agency also intended at the time of acquisition to use the property for such a program or project. Thus, a program developed after the agency procures property will not suffice, even though it necessitates displacements, since that program could not have motivated the property acquisition.[42] It remains to be considered, however, whether the relationship between HUD's acquisitions and orders to vacate brings the tenants here within the purview of 0 (6). I The tenants in both cases contend that the acquisitions of Sky Tower and Riverhouse Apartments met these statutory requirements because HUD obtained the property in connection with its mortgage insurance programs. In support of this *64 contention, they point to Congress' explicit provision for occasional default acquisitions resulting from the mortgage insurance programs of the National Housing Act. Section 207 (k) of that Act expressly authorizes HUD to purchase insured properties at foreclosure sales, and 207 (l) grants HUD wide latitude to rehabilitate and operate property acquired upon default or to transfer the property and recoup the agency's investment. 2 U.S. C. 73 (k), (l). Pursuant to that mandate, HUD has prepared a Property Disposition Handbook Multi-family Properties, RHM 435. (97), revised and set forth at 24 CFR Pt. 290 which requires responsible officials to formulate |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | 24 CFR Pt. 290 which requires responsible officials to formulate a disposition program for newly acquired properties. However, the legislative history of the Relocation Act discussed in Part demonstrates that the mere anticipation and authorization of default acquisitions in the mortgage insurance programs cannot render these tenants eligible under 0 (6). By requiring that an acquisition be "for" a federal program or project, Congress intended that the acquisition must further or accomplish a program designed to benefit the public as a whole.[43] Even assuming that the National Housing Act mortgage insurance programs constitute federal "programs or projects,"[44] default acquisitions arising out of those programs *65 do not satisfy 0 (6)'s causality requirements. These acquisitions occur as a result of the mortgage insurance programs' predictable, though unfortunate failures, but the default acquisitions do not further the purpose of these particular programs.[45] If the written order clause were satisfied by acquisitions so tangentially related to a federal program or project, then, for example, persons who default on federally insured housing loans presumably could obtain relocation assistance whenever a Government agency acquires their homes at a foreclosure sale and thereby causes displacements. Absent any evidence that Congress intended to provide relocation benefits under such circumstances, we believe typical default acquisitions are not "for" a federal program within the meaning of 0 (6). For the same reasons, HUD's preparation of a Handbook governing the disposition of property acquired in this manner fails to qualify these tenants for relocation benefits. Like any purchaser, HUD must manage the property it acquires. But the mere adoption of a management plan cannot retroactively establish the requisite purpose for acquiring property in the first instance. Alternatively, the tenants in No. 77-463 contend that the particular disposition HUD planned for Sky Tower, pursuant to the Property Disposition Handbook, qualified them under the written order clause. After studying several options, HUD decided to demolish Sky Tower and sell the land to private developers who would build single-family homes, all in accordance with the District of Columbia government's master plan for improving the neighborhood. By its own admission in proceedings before the District Court, HUD proposed the demolition to "eliminate blight" in conformity with a plan to revitalize the area. 396 F. Supp. 235, 236 (DC 975). *66 These events convinced the Court of Appeals that the Sky Tower tenants had been ordered to vacate for a "program or project" within the meaning of 0 (6). 87 U. S. App. D. C., at 6, 57 F.2d, at The difficulty with this analysis is that even though HUD's demolition plan is the type |
Justice Marshall | 1,979 | 15 | majority | Alexander v. Department of Housing and Urban Development | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/110054/alexander-v-department-of-housing-and-urban-development/ | is that even though HUD's demolition plan is the type of program or project to which 0 (6) refers, HUD did not acquire Sky Tower for that purpose. The statute requires more than a causal connection between the order to vacate and the demolition program, which was all the Court of Appeals considered necessary. As explained in Part the program or project must also be the reason for acquiring the property. Yet the tenants have never contended that HUD initially acquired Sky Tower in order to eliminate blight or to further the District of Columbia government's master plan, nor did the Court of Appeals or the District Court reach such a conclusion. Without the requisite relationship between the demolition program and the acquisition, HUD's proposal for disposing of Sky Tower is no different than any other property management plan, insufficient by itself to confer eligibility under 0 (6) of the Relocation Act. We recognize, of course, that an agency's intent in acquiring property appears irrelevant to those displaced by federal order. From a tenant's perspective, the costs of dislocation are the same regardless of whether an agency anticipated causing displacements when it acquired property. Nonetheless, Congress chose to condition eligibility for relocation benefits on the agency's purpose in acquiring property, and our function is not to rewrite the statute. The increasing number of default acquisitions by Government agencies may well prompt Congress to expand the Relocation Act's coverage.[46] But until *67 Congress does so, the tenants in these cases are ineligible for relocation assistance under that Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 77-463 is reversed and the judgment in No. 77-874 is affirmed. It is so ordered. |
Justice Douglas | 1,974 | 10 | dissenting | Mississippi v. Arkansas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108972/mississippi-v-arkansas/ | Luna Bar is today an island in the Mississippi River. Arkansas on the west claims it is hers because the river as a result of an avulsion moved west. Mississippi claims it is hers because Luna Bar was created as a result of slow gradual accretion. The Special Master found for Mississippi and the case is here on exceptions to his Report. *5 No one has a historical recorded account of what happened. Mississippi made its case by use of experts who testified as to how the Mississippi River usually performs. They testified that the river at low water washes the concave side of a turn (this being the side that marks Luna Bar) but that during high water it scours the convex side (that being Arkansas). That testimony gives force to the argument that accretion formed Luna Bar, washing heavily Arkansas land to form the island. Favoring Mississippi was other testimony that at least in the Mississippi River avulsion would shorten the course of the river, while here the course was lengthened. Never did the experts know of an instance where avulsion had worked the way Arkansas claims. Opposed to these highly qualified experts were lay witnesses who knew Luna Bar. They had located great trees that once grew there, the age of the trees going back before 1800. Luna Bar therefore was not recently created nor was it created within the last 100 years. It had been there a long, long time. Moreover, the soil matched Arkansas' soil and the height of the land on Luna Bar was comparable to Arkansas' elevation. The Arkansas case was further bolstered by the theory that in the 1870's the avulsive action took place when the river returned to its old channel. The Special Master stated in his report: "I am aware that as Special Master it is not my function to render a decision. My duty is to make a report containing such review of the evidence as I consider justifies my findings of fact. I do not consider that to make the findings I do, it is necessary to totally destroy the validity of Arkansas' contentions. The burden of persuasion was upon Arkansas. Initially Arkansas conceded that Mississippi *6 had met its initial burden, aided as it was by the presumption that the change in the thalweg of the river was the product of accretion. The quite special character of the reasoning of Arkansas' witnesses leaves me unpersuaded that it has met its burden of proof. I make clear also that I would come to this conclusion even if the |
Justice Douglas | 1,974 | 10 | dissenting | Mississippi v. Arkansas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108972/mississippi-v-arkansas/ | that I would come to this conclusion even if the burden of proof was not on Arkansas, but was on plaintiff Mississippi." Report of Special Master 33. The case is close and if we were governed by the rule governing district court findings when an appeal is taken I would agree that the Special Master's findings are not "clearly erroneous." Heretofore the Court has not considered itself limited in its review of its Masters by the "clearly erroneous" test.[1] We said in United *7 that the "findings of the Master are justified by the evidence"; and in that the Master's judgment "accords with the conclusions we make from our own independent examination of the record." And see United It has at times been argued that original jurisdiction should not be taken, because of the waste of judicial time by this Court: "In an original suit, even when the case is first referred to a master, this Court has the duty of making an independent examination of the evidence, a time-consuming process which seriously interferes with the discharge of our ever-increasing appellate duties." (Stone, C. J., dissenting). The majority opinion did not dispute that claim but gave special reasons why original jurisdiction was necessary in that case. The findings of the Special Master are of course entitled to respect and their weight will be increased to the extent that credibility of witnesses is involved, as he saw them and heard them, while we have only a cold record. Credibility, however, seems to play no part here. The record *8 consists of maps and of testimony of witnesses. Those testifying for Mississippi qualified as eminent experts. Those testifying for Arkansas were in part experts and in part countrymen who for years knew Luna Bar, frequented it, and studied it. The experts of Mississippi state a plausible explanation that bolsters the theory of accretion. But the countrymen with their physical evidence convince me that the Mississippi River acted in an unprecedented way, found an old channel and in one convulsive operation invaded Arkansas, leaving Luna Bar an island carved out of Arkansas.[2] There is evidence taken from borings that the soil of the island is not compatible with the soil that would result from accretion. An expert, Dr. Clarence O. Durham, head of the Geoscience Department of Louisiana State University spent two days on the island. He concluded that prior to 1823, the date of the first Federal Land Office Survey, the river had flowed west of the island but that between 1823 and 1871 the channel at that point was not divided. |
Justice Douglas | 1,974 | 10 | dissenting | Mississippi v. Arkansas | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108972/mississippi-v-arkansas/ | and 1871 the channel at that point was not divided. He reached this conclusion from an 1872 map *9 which showed an abrupt shift of the Arkansas western bank into an abandoned prehistoric channel of the river. The island is the hard base of an ancient clay plug that dates prior to 1823. The ancient cypress stumps on the Arkansas mainland and those on the west side of the island are compelling evidence that the island and the mainland were connected for some centuries. To say that the island was formed by accretion is to use magic to make the ancient cypress stumps on the island disappear. Those trees are of the climax species; and the experts all agree that where climax trees appear the land mass on which they grow is at least 150 years old. The trees found on the high ground of the island were black walnut and red mulberry. Those trees were there prior to 1800 which would be impossible if Luna Bar was the product of accretion in modern times.[3] The hard core *300 of the island has an elevation between 133.2 feet and 133.5 feet; and the elevation on the adjacent Arkansas bank is between 132.2 feet and 139 feet.[4] Again there *301 is a compelling inference that while accretion may have added some soil to the island, the high hard core of the island was once connected with the mainland and severed from it by some abrupt and violent action of the river. |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | dissenting | Scarborough v. Principi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134738/scarborough-v-principi/ | Without deciding that the statutorily mandated 30-day deadline "even applies to the `not substantially justified' allegation requirement," ante, at 419, n. 6, the Court, nonetheless, applies the relation-back doctrine to cure the omitted no-substantial-justification allegation in petitioner's Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) fee application. The Court should have first addressed whether, as a textual matter, the no-substantial-justification allegation must be made within the 30-day deadline. I conclude that it must. The question then becomes whether the judicial application of the relation-back doctrine is appropriate in a case such as this where the statute defines the scope of the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity. Because there is no express allowance for relation back in EAJA, I conclude that the sovereign immunity canon applies to construe strictly the scope of the Government's waiver. The Court reaches its holding today by distorting the scope of and by eviscerating that case's doctrinal underpinnings. I In my view, the better reading of the text of the statute is that the 30-day deadline applies to the no-substantial-justification-allegation requirement. The first sentence of 28 U.S. C. 2412(d)(1)(B) states that "[a] party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees which shows": (1) the applicant's status as a prevailing party; (2) that the applicant is eligible to receive fees under 2412(d)(2)(B); and (3) the itemized amount sought. The second sentence of 2412(d)(1)(B) provides: "The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified." In stating that the applicant "shall also" make the no-substantial-justification allegation, the second sentence links the allegation requirement with the timing and other content requirements of the first sentence.[1] Indeed, there is only one deadline expressly contained in the provision. That 30-day deadline imposes a limitation on a set of requirements that petitioner must satisfy in order to receive an EAJA fee award. Immediately following the deadline is another sentence that requires the petitioner to make the no-substantial-justification allegation. Taking the provision as a whole, it is quite natural to read it as applying the 30-day deadline to all of its requirements.[2] And, this reading is *425 confirmed by numerous federal agency regulations,[3] which have interpreted a nearly identical EAJA provision allowing for fees in adversary adjudications conducted before federal agencies.[4] II Because I conclude that the no-substantial-justification allegation must be made within the 30-day deadline, the question *426 becomes whether the relation-back doctrine should apply here. The EAJA requirement for filing a timely fee application with the statutorily prescribed |
Justice Thomas | 2,004 | 1 | dissenting | Scarborough v. Principi | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/134738/scarborough-v-principi/ | for filing a timely fee application with the statutorily prescribed content is a condition on the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity in 2412(d)(1)(A). See As such, the scope of the waiver must be strictly construed. See, e. g., ; United ; Library of ; Since the relation-back doctrine relied upon by the Court is not present in the text of the statute, under a simple application of the sovereign immunity canon, petitioner is not entitled to "relate-back" his allegation beyond the 30-day deadline. The only way the Court avoids this straightforward conclusion is by applying Ante, at 420-422. Although does perhaps narrow the scope of the sovereign immunity canon, it does so only in limited circumstances. In particular, where the Government is made subject to suit to the same extent and in the same manner as private parties are, holds that the Government is subject to the rules that are "applicable to private suits." The Court in addressing equitable tolling, explained that "[t]ime requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to `equitable tolling,'" and that "[o]nce Congress has made a waiver [of sovereign immunity], making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening *427 of the congressional waiver." The Court determined that "[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation." Notwithstanding 's limited scope, the Court concludes: "'s reasoning would be diminished were it instructive only in situations with a readily identifiable private-litigation equivalent." Ante, at 422. The existence of this "private-litigation equivalent," however, formed the very basis for the Court's holding in I agree with the Government that there is "no analogue in private litigation," Brief for Respondent 39, for the EAJA fee awards at issue here. Section 2412(d) authorizes fee awards against the Government when there is no basis for recovery under the rules for private litigation.[5]'s analysis simply cannot apply to a proceeding against the Government when there is no analogue for it in private litigation. Accordingly, I would apply the sovereign immunity canon to construe strictly the scope of the Government's waiver and, therefore, against allowing an applicant to avoid the express statutory limitation through judicial application of the relation-back doctrine. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | The Gas Act divides responsibility over trade in natural gas between federal and state regulators. The Act and our cases interpreting it draw a firm line between national and local authority over this trade: If the Federal Government may regulate a subject, the States may not. Today the Court smudges this line. It holds that States may use their antitrust laws to regulate practices already regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission whenever “other considerations weigh against a find- ing of pre-emption.” Ante, at 16. The Court’s make-it-up- as-you-go-along approach to preemption has no basis in the Act, contradicts our cases, and will prove unworkable in practice. I Trade in natural gas consists of three parts. A drilling company collects gas from the earth; a pipeline company then carries the gas to its destination and sells it at wholesale to a local distributor; and the local distributor sells the gas at retail to industries and households. See ante, at 3. The Gas Act empowers the Commis- sion to regulate the middle of this three-leg journey— interstate transportation and wholesale sales. 15 U.S. C. 2 ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. SCALIA, J., dissenting et seq. But it does not empower the Commission to regulate the opening and closing phases—production at one end, retail sales at the other—thus leaving those matters to the States. (b). (Like the Court, I will for simplicity’s sake call the sales controlled by the Commis- sion wholesale sales, and the companies controlled by the Commission pipelines. See ante, at 4.) Over 70 years ago, the Court concluded that the Act confers “exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal regulatory agency.” Public Util. Comm’n of The Court thought it “clear” that the Act contemplates “a harmonious, dual system of regulation of the natural gas industry—federal and state regulatory bodies operating side by side, each active in its own sphere,” “without any confusion of func- tions.” The Court drew this inference from the law’s purpose and legislative history, though it could just as easily have relied on the law’s terms and structure. The Act grants the Commission a wide range of powers over wholesale sales and transportation, but qualifies only some of these powers with reservations of state authority over the same subject. See g(a) (concurrent authority over recordkeeping); h(a) (concurrent authority over depreciation and amortization rates). Congress’s decision to include express reservations of state power alongside these grants of authority, but to omit them alongside other grants of authority, suggests that the other grants are exclusive. Right or wrong, in any event, our inference of exclusivity is now settled beyond |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | any event, our inference of exclusivity is now settled beyond debate. United Fuel rejected a State’s regulation of wholesale rates. But our later holdings establish that the Act makes exclusive the Commission’s powers in general, not just its rate-setting power in particular. We have again and again set aside state laws—even those that do not purport to fix wholesale rates—for regulating a matter already subject to regulation by the Commission. Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 3 SCALIA, J., dissenting See, e.g., Northern Gas (state regulation of pipelines’ gas purchases preempted because it “in- vade[s] the exclusive jurisdiction which the Gas Act has conferred upon the [Commission]”); Corp. v. Eagerton, (state law prohibiting producers from passing on production taxes preempted because it “trespasse[s] upon FERC’s authority”); (1988) (state securities regulation directly affecting whole- sale rates and gas transportation facilities preempted because it regulates “matters that Congress intended FERC to regulate”). The test for preemption in this set- ting, the Court has confirmed, “ ‘is whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.’ ” Straightforward application of these precedents would make short work of the case at hand. The Gas Act empowers the Commission to regulate “practice[s] affecting [wholesale] rate[s].” d. Nothing in the Act suggests that the States share power to regulate these practices. The Commission has reasonably determined that this power allows it to regulate the behavior involved in this case, pipelines’ use of sham trades and false reports to manipulate gas price indices. Because the Commis- sion’s exclusive authority extends to the conduct chal- lenged here, state antitrust regulation of that conduct is preempted. II The Court agrees that the Commission may regulate index manipulation, but upholds state antitrust regulation of this practice anyway on account of “other considerations that weigh against a finding of pre-emption in this con- text.” Ante, at 16. That is an unprecedented decision. The Court does not identify a single case—not one—in 4 ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. SCALIA, J., dissenting which we have sustained state regulation of behavior already regulated by the Commission. The Court’s justifi- cations for its novel approach do not persuade. A The Court begins by considering “the target at which the state law aims.” Ante, at 11. It reasons that because this case involves a practice that affects both wholesale and retail rates, the Act tolerates state regulation that takes aim at the practice’s retail-stage effects. This analysis misunderstands how the Gas Act divides responsibilities between national and local regula- tors. The Act does not |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | between national and local regula- tors. The Act does not give the Commission the power to aim at particular effects; it gives it the power to regulate particular activities. When the Commission regulates those activities, it may consider their effects on all parts of the gas trade, not just on wholesale sales. It may, for example, set wholesale rates with the aim of encouraging producers to conserve gas supplies—even though produc- tion is a state-regulated activity. See Colorado Interstate Gas ; at 609– 6 (Jackson, J., concurring). Or it may regulate whole- sale sales with an eye toward blunting the sales’ anticom- petitive effects in the retail market—even though retail prices are controlled by the States. See The Court’s ad hoc partition of authority over index manipulation—leaving it to the Commission to control the practice’s consequences for wholesale sales, but allowing the States to target its consequences for retail sales—thus clashes with the de- sign of the Act. To justify its fixation on aims, the Court stresses that this case involves regulation of “background marketplace conditions” rather than regulation of wholesale rates or sales themselves. Ante, at 15. But the Gas Act empowers the Commission to regulate wholesale rates and Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 5 SCALIA, J., dissenting “background” practices affecting such rates. It grants both powers in the same clause: “Whenever the Commission find[s] that a [wholesale] rate, charge, or classification [or] any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust [or] unreason- able, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed.” d(a) Nothing in this provision, and for that matter nothing in the Act, suggests that federal authority over practices is a second-class power, somehow less ex- clusive than the authority over rates. The Court persists that the background conditions in this case affect both wholesale and retail sales. Ante, at 15. This observation adds atmosphere, but nothing more. The Court concedes that index manipulation’s dual effect does not weaken the Commission’s power to regulate it. Ante, at So too should the Court have seen that this simultaneous effect does not strengthen the claims of the States. It is not at all unusual for an activity controlled by the Commission to have effects in the States’ field; produc- tion, wholesale, and retail are after all interdependent stages of a single trade. We have never suggested that the rules of field preemption change in such situations. For example, producers’ ability to pass production taxes on to pipelines no doubt affects |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | to pass production taxes on to pipelines no doubt affects both producers and pipelines. Yet we had no trouble concluding that a state law restrict- ing producers’ ability to pass these taxes impermissibly attempted to manage “a matter within the sphere of FERC’s regulatory authority.” at –186. The Court’s approach makes a snarl of our precedents. In Northern the Court held that the Act preempts state regulations requiring pipelines to buy gas ratably from gas The regulations in that case shared each of the principal features emphasized by the Court today. They governed background market 6 ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. SCALIA, J., dissenting conditions, not wholesale prices. at 90–91. The back- ground conditions in question, pipelines’ purchases from gas wells, affected both the federal field of wholesale sales and the state field of gas production. –93. And the regulations took aim at the purchases’ effects on pro- duction; they sought to promote conservation of natural resources by limiting how much gas pipelines could take from each well. No matter; the Court still concluded that the regulations “invade[d] the federal agency’s exclusive domain.” The factors that made no difference in Northern should make no difference today. Contrast Northern with Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Comm’n of Kan., 4 U.S. 493 (19), which involved state regulations that restricted the times when producers could take gas from On this occasion the Court upheld the regula- tions—not because the law aimed at the objective of gas conservation, but because the State pursued this end by regulating “ ‘the physical ac[t] of drawing gas from the earth.’ ” Our precedents demand, in other words, that the Court focus in the present case upon what the State seeks to regulate (a pipeline practice that is subject to regulation by the Commission), not why the State seeks to regulate it (to curb the practice’s effects on retail rates). Trying to turn liabilities into assets, the Court bran- dishes statements from Northern and Northwest that (in its view) discuss where state law was “aimed” or “directed.” Ante, at 11. But read in context, these statements refer to the entity or activity that the state law regulates, not to which of the activity’s effects the law seeks to control by regulating it. See, e.g., North- ern (“[O]ur cases have consistently recognized a significant distinction between conserva- tion measures aimed directly at interstate purchasers and Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 7 SCALIA, J., dissenting wholesales and those aimed at producers and produc- tion”); Northwest (“[This regulation] is directed to the behavior of gas producers”). The law- suits |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | directed to the behavior of gas producers”). The law- suits at hand target pipelines (entities regulated by the Commission) for their manipulation of indices (behavior regulated by the Commission). That should have sufficed to establish preemption. B The Court also tallies several features of state antitrust law that, it believes, weigh against preemption. Ante, at 13–14. Once again the Court seems to have forgotten its precedents. We have said before that “ ‘Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction’ ” over the gas trade. Nantahala Power & Light (quot- ing 215– 216 (1964)). Our decisions have therefore “ ‘squarely rejected’ ” the theory, endorsed by the Court today, that the boundary between national and local authority turns on “ ‘a case-by-case analysis of the impact of state regula- tion upon the national interest.’ ” State antitrust law, the Court begins, applies to “all businesses in the marketplace” rather than just “natural- gas companies in particular.” Ante, at 13. So what? No principle of our natural-gas preemption jurisprudence distinguishes particularized state laws from state laws of general applicability. We have never suggested, for exam- ple, that a State may use general price-gouging laws to fix wholesale rates, or general laws about unfair trade prac- tices to control wholesale contracts, or general common- carrier laws to administer interstate pipelines. The Court in any event could not have chosen a worse setting in which to attempt a distinction between general and par- ticular laws. Like their federal counterpart, state anti- trust laws tend to use the rule of reason to judge the law- 8 ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. SCALIA, J., dissenting fulness of challenged practices. Legal Aspects of Buying and Selling (P. Zeidman ed. 2014–2015). This amorphous standard requires the reviewing court to con- sider “a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” State Oil (1997). Far from authorizing across-the-board application of a uniform requirement, therefore, the Court’s decision will invite state antitrust courts to engage in targeted regulation of the natural-gas industry. The Court also stresses the “ ‘long history’ ” of state antitrust regulation. Ante, at 14. Again, quite beside the point. States have long regulated public utilities, yet the Gas Act precludes them from using that estab- lished power to fix gas wholesale prices. United Fuel, 317 U.S., States also have long enacted laws to con- serve natural resources, yet the Act precludes them from deploying that power to control purchases made by |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | them from deploying that power to control purchases made by gas pipelines. Northern 372 U.S., –94. The Court’s invocation of the pedigree of state antitrust law rests on air. One need not launch this unbounded inquiry into the features of state law in order to preserve the States’ au- thority to apply “tax laws,” “disclosure laws,” and “blue sky laws” to natural-gas companies, ante, at 12. One need only stand by the principle that if the Commission has authority over a subject, the States lack authority over that subject. The Commission’s authority to regulate gas pipelines “in the public interest,” a, is a power to address matters that are traditionally the concern of utility regulators, not “a broad license to promote the general public welfare,” We have explained that the Commission does not, for example, have power to superintend “employment discrimination” or “unfair labor practices.” at 670– Cite as: 575 U. S. (2015) 9 SCALIA, J., dissenting 671. So the Act does not preempt state employment dis- crimination or labor laws. But the Commission does have power to consider, say, “conservation, environmental, and antitrust questions.” So the Act does preempt state antitrust laws. C At bottom, the Court’s decision turns on its perception that the Gas Act “ ‘was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power.’ ” Ante, at No doubt the Act protects state authority in a variety of ways. It gives the Commission authority over only some parts of the gas trade. (b). It establishes procedures under which the Commission may consult, collaborate, or share information with States. p. It even provides that the Commission may regulate practices affecting wholesale rates “upon its own motion or upon complaint of any State.” d(a) It should have gone without saying, however, that no law pursues its purposes at all costs. Nothing in the Act and nothing in our cases suggests that Congress protected state power in the way imagined by today’s decision: by licensing state sorties into the Commission’s domain whenever judges conclude that an incursion would not be too disruptive. The Court’s preoccupation with the purpose of preserv- ing state authority is all the more inexpiable because that is not the Act’s only purpose. The Act also has competing purposes, the most important of which is promoting “uni- formity of regulation.” Northern The Court’s decision impairs that objective. Before today, interstate pipelines knew that their practices relating to price indices had to comply with one set of regulations promulgated by the Commission. From now on, however, pipelines will have to ensure that their behavior conforms |
Justice Scalia | 2,015 | 9 | dissenting | Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2795279/oneok-inc-v-learjet-inc/ | however, pipelines will have to ensure that their behavior conforms to the discordant regulations of 50 States—or more accu- rately, to the discordant verdicts of untold state antitrust ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. SCALIA, J., dissenting juries. The Court’s reassurance that pipelines may still invoke conflict preemption, see ante, at 15–16, provides little comfort on this front. Conflict preemption will re- solve only discrepancies between state and federal regula- tions, not the discrepancies among differing state regula- tions to which today’s opinion subjects the industry. * * * “The Gas Act was designed to produce a harmonious and comprehensive regulation of the industry. Neither state nor federal regulatory body was to encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other.” (footnote omitted). Today, however, the Court allows the States to encroach. Worse still, it leaves pipelines guessing about when States will be allowed to encroach again. May States aim at retail rates under laws that share none of the features of antitrust law advertised today? Under laws that share only some of those features? May States apply their antitrust laws to pipelines without aiming at retail rates? But that is just the start. Who knows what other “considerations that weigh against a finding of pre- emption” remain to be unearthed in future cases? The Court’s all-things-considered test does not make for a stable background against which to carry on the natural gas trade. I would stand by the more principled and more workable line traced by our precedents. The Commission may regulate the practices alleged in this case; the States therefore may not. I respectfully dissent |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Hill v. McDonough | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145647/hill-v-mcdonough/ | Petitioner Clarence E. Hill challenges the constitutionality of a three-drug sequence the of Florida likely would use to execute him by lethal injection. Seeking to enjoin the procedure, he filed this action in the United s District Court for the Northern District of Florida, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. 1979, as amended, 42 U.S. C. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed the action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered it dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements for a second and successive petition. The question before us is whether Hill's claim must be brought by an action for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ, 28 U.S. C. 2254, or whether it may proceed as an action for relief under 42 U.S. C. This is not the first time we have found it necessary to discuss which of the two statutes governs an action brought by a prisoner alleging a constitutional violation. See, e. g., ; ; Hill's suit, we now determine, is comparable in its essentials to the action the Court allowed to proceed under 1983 in In accord with that precedent we now reverse. I In the year 1983, Hill was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. When his conviction and sentence became final some five years later, the method of execution then prescribed by Florida law was electrocution. Fla. Stat. *577 922.10 (1987). On January 14, 2000four days after the conclusion of Hill's first, unsuccessful round of federal habeas corpus litigationFlorida amended the controlling statute to provide: "A death sentence shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be executed by electrocution." 922.105(1) (2003). The now-controlling statute, which has not been changed in any relevant respect, does not specify a particular lethal injection procedure. Implementation is the responsibility of the Florida Department of Corrections. See ; The department has not issued rules establishing a specific lethal injection protocol, and its implementing policies and procedures appear exempt from Florida's Administrative Procedure Act. See 922.105(7). After the statute was amended to provide for lethal injection, the Florida Supreme Court heard a death row inmate's claim that the execution procedure violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. In Sims, the complainant, who had acquired detailed information about the procedure from the contended the planned three-drug sequence of injections would cause great pain if the drugs were not administered -668. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument as too |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Hill v. McDonough | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145647/hill-v-mcdonough/ | -668. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument as too speculative. On November 29, the Governor of Florida signed Hill's death warrant, which ordered him to be executed on January 24, Hill requested information about the lethal injection protocol, but the department provided none. App. 21, n. 3 (Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 15, n. 3 (hereinafter Complaint)). Hill then challenged, for the first time, the 's lethal injection procedure. On December 15, he filed a successive postconviction petition in state court, relying upon the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied Hill's request for an evidentiary *578 hearing and dismissed his claim as procedurally barred. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on January 17, Hill v. Three days laterand four days before his scheduled executionHill brought this action in District Court pursuant to 42 U.S. C. Assuming the would use the procedure discussed at length in the Sims decision, see App. 20-21, and n. 3 (Complaint ¶ 15, n. 3), Hill alleged that the first drug injected, sodium pentothal, would not be a sufficient anesthetic to render painless the administration of the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. There was an ensuing risk, Hill alleged, that he could remain conscious and suffer severe pain as the pancuronium paralyzed his lungs and body and the potassium chloride caused muscle cramping and a fatal heart attack. The complaint sought an injunction "barring defendants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they currently intend." The District Court found that under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent the 1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ). Because Hill had sought federal habeas corpus relief in an earlier action, the District Court deemed his petition successive and thus barred for failure to obtain leave to file from the Court of Appeals as required by 28 U.S. C. 2244(b). On the day of the scheduled execution the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Hill's action was a successive petition and that it would deny any application for leave to file a successive petition because 2244(b)(2) would not allow his claim to proceed. After issuing a temporary stay of execution, this Court granted Hill's petition for certiorari and continued the stay pending our resolution of the case. *579 II "Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S. C. 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. 1979, as amended, 42 U.S. C. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Hill v. McDonough | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145647/hill-v-mcdonough/ | U.S. C. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus." (citing ). An inmate's challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under 540 U.S., at In we addressed whether a challenge to a lethal injection procedure must proceed as a habeas corpus The complainant had severely compromised peripheral veins, and planned to apply an invasive procedure on his arm or leg to enable the injection. He sought to enjoin the procedure, alleging it would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court observed that the question whether a general challenge to a method of execution must proceed under habeas was a difficult one. The claim was not easily described as a challenge to the fact or duration of a sentence; yet in a where the legislature has established lethal injection as the method of execution, "a constitutional challenge seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself." did not decide this question. The lawsuit at issue, as the Court understood the case, did not require an injunction that would challenge the sentence itself. The invasive procedure in was not mandated by law, and the inmate appeared willing to concede the existence of an acceptable alternative procedure. Absent a finding that the challenged procedure was necessary to the lethal injection, the Court concluded, injunctive relief would not prevent the from implementing the sentence. Consequently, *580 the suit as presented would not be deemed a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself. See The decision in also observed that its holding was congruent with the Court's precedents addressing civil rights suits for damages that implicate habeas relief. Those cases provide that prisoners' suits for damages can be barred from proceeding under 1983 when a judgment in the prisoner's favor necessarily implies the invalidity of the prisoner's sentence. See, e. g., ; The action in however, was not analogous to a damages suit filed to circumvent the limits imposed by the habeas statute. The suit did not challenge an execution procedure required by law, so granting relief would not imply the unlawfulness of the lethal injection sentence. See In the case before us we conclude that Hill's 1983 action is controlled by the holding in Here, as in Hill's action if successful would not necessarily prevent the from executing him by lethal injection. The complaint does not challenge the lethal injection sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin respondents "from executing [Hill] in |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Hill v. McDonough | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145647/hill-v-mcdonough/ | seeks instead only to enjoin respondents "from executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend." App. 22 (Complaint ¶ 20). The specific objection is that the anticipated protocol allegedly causes "a foreseeable risk of gratuitous and unnecessary" pain. Hill concedes that "other methods of lethal injection the Department could choose to use would be constitutional," Brief for Petitioner 17, and respondents do not contend, at least to this point in the litigation, that granting Hill's injunction would leave the without any other practicable, legal method of executing Hill by lethal injection. Florida law, moreover, does not require the department of corrections to use the challenged procedure. See Fla. Stat. 922.105(1), (7) (prescribing lethal injection and leaving implementation to the department of corrections). Hill's challenge appears to leave the *581 free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure. Under these circumstances a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill's sentence. One difference between the present case and of course, is that Hill challenges the chemical injection sequence rather than a surgical procedure preliminary to the lethal injection. In however, the argued that the invasive procedure was not a medical operation separable from the lethal injection but rather a "necessary prerequisite to, and thus an indispensable part of, any lethal injection procedure." The Court reasoned that although venous access was necessary for lethal injection, it did not follow that the 's chosen means of access were necessary; "the gravamen of petitioner's entire claim" was that the procedure was "gratuitous." The same is true here. Although the injection of lethal chemicals is an obvious necessity for the execution, Hill alleges that the challenged procedure presents a risk of pain the can avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence ordering a lethal injection. One concern is that the foregoing analysis may be more theoretical than real based on the practicalities of the case. A procedure that avoids the harms Hill alleges, for instance, may be susceptible to attack for other purported risks of its own. Respondents and their supporting amici thus contend that the legal distinction between habeas corpus and 1983 actions must account for the practical reality of capital litigation tactics: Inmates file these actions intending to forestall execution, and 's emphasis on whether a suit challenges something "necessary" to the execution provides no endpoint to piecemeal litigation aimed at delaying the execution. Viewed in isolation, no single component of a given execution procedure may be strictly necessary, the argument goes, and a capital litigant may put off execution by challenging one aspect of |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Hill v. McDonough | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145647/hill-v-mcdonough/ | litigant may put off execution by challenging one aspect of a procedure after another. The amici s point to 's aftermath as a cautionary example, *582 contending that on remand the District Court allowed to amend his complaint and that litigation over the constitutionality of 's adopted alternativeone that had previously proposedcontinues to this day. See Brief for of et al. as Amici Curiae 7-14. Respondents and their supporting amici conclude that two different rules should follow from these practical considerations. The United s as amicus curiae contends that a capital litigant's 1983 action can proceed if, as in the prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution. A suit like Hill's that fails to do so, the United s maintains, is more like a claim challenging the imposition of any method of executionwhich is to say, the execution itselfbecause it shows the complainant is unable or unwilling to concede acceptable alternatives "[e]xcept in the abstract." Brief for United s 14. Although we agree courts should not tolerate abusive litigation tactics, see Part III, infra, even if the United s' proposed limitation were likely to be effective we could not accept it. It is true that the plaintiff's affirmative identification of an acceptable alternative supported our conclusion that the suit need not proceed as a habeas 541 U.S., (citing the inmate's complaint and affidavits). That fact, however, was not decisive. did not change the traditional pleading requirements for 1983 actions. If the relief sought would foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be proper. See 646. Cf. Imposition of heightened pleading requirements, however, is quite a different matter. Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 and 9; *583 Respondents and the s as amici frame their argument differently. While not asking the Court in explicit terms to overrule they contend a challenge to a procedure implicating the direct administration of an execution must proceed as a habeas Brief for Respondents 30-31; Brief for They rely on cases barring 1983 damages actions that, if successful, would imply the invalidation of an existing sentence or confinement. See, e. g., ; Those cases, they contend, demonstrate that the test of whether an action would undermine a sentence must "be applied functionally." Brief for By the same logic, it is said, a suit should be brought in habeas if it would frustrate the execution as a practical matter. This argument cannot be squared with 's observation |
Justice Kennedy | 2,006 | 4 | majority | Hill v. McDonough | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/145647/hill-v-mcdonough/ | practical matter. This argument cannot be squared with 's observation that its criterionwhether a grant of relief to the inmate would necessarily bar the executionis consistent with 's and 's approach to damages actions that implicate habeas relief. -647. In those cases the question is whether "the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity" of the confinement or sentence. As discussed above, and at this stage of the litigation, the injunction Hill seeks would not necessarily foreclose the from implementing the lethal injection sentence under present law, and thus it could not be said that the suit seeks to establish "unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence invalid." Any incidental delay caused by allowing Hill to file suit does not cast on his sentence the kind of negative legal implication that would require him to proceed in a habeas III Filing an action that can proceed under 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as *584 a matter of course. Both the and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence. Our conclusions today do not diminish that interest, nor do they deprive federal courts of the means to protect it. We state again, as we did in that a stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the 's strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal -650. See In re Blodgett, ; Thus, like other stay applicants, inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in which the plans to execute them must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant possibility of success on the merits. See See also (preliminary injunction not granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion). A court considering a stay must also apply "a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay." See also Gomez v. United s Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., (noting that the "last-minute nature of an application" or an applicant's "attempt at manipulation" of the judicial process may be grounds for denial of a stay). After a number of federal courts have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss suits they saw as speculative or filed too late in the day. |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act), 16 U.S. C. 1531 ( ed. and Supp. V), contains a variety of protections designed to save from extinction species that the Secretary of the Interior designates as endangered or threatened. Section 9of the Act makes it unlawful for any person to "take" any endangered or threatened species. The Secretary has promulgated a regulation that defines the statute's prohibition on takings to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." This case presents the question whether the Secretary exceeded his authority under the Act by promulgating that regulation. I Section 9(a)(1) of the Act provides the following protection for endangered species:[1] "Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to. *691 "(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States." 16 U.S. C. 1538(a)(1). Section 3(19)of the Act defines the statutory term "take": "The term `take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S. C. 1532(19). The Act does not further define the terms it uses to define "take." The Interior Department regulations that implement the statute, however, define the statutory term "harm": "Harm in the definition of `take' in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 CFR 17.3 This regulation has been in place since 1975.[2] A limitation on the 9 "take" prohibition appears in 10(a)(1)(B) of the Act, which Congress added by amendment in 1982. That section authorizes the Secretary to grant a permit for any taking otherwise prohibited by 9(a)(1)(B) "if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of,the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S. C. 1539(a)(1)(B). In addition to the prohibition on takings, the Act provides several other protections for endangered species. Section 4, 16 U.S. C. 1533, commands the Secretary to identify species of fish or wildlife that are in danger of extinction and to publish from time to time lists of all species he determines to *692 be endangered or threatened. Section 5, 16 U.S. C. 1534, authorizes the Secretary, in cooperation with the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | U.S. C. 1534, authorizes the Secretary, in cooperation with the States, see 1535, to acquire land to aid in preserving such species. Section 7 requires federal agencies to ensure that none of their activities,including the granting of licenses and permits, will jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species "or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary to be critical."16 U.S. C. 1536(a)(2). Respondents in this action are small landowners, logging companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their interests. They brought this declaratory judgment action against petitioners, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the statutory validity of the Secretary's regulation defining "harm," particularly the inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in the definition.[3] Respondents challenged the regulation on its face. Their complaint alleged that application of the "harm" regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species,[4] and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species,[5] had injured them economically. App. 17-23. *693 Respondents advanced three arguments to support their submission that Congress did not intend the word "take" in 9 to include habitat modification, as the Secretary's "harm" regulation provides. First, they correctly noted that language in the Senate's original version of the ESA would have defined "take" to include "destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish or wildlife,[6] but the Senate deleted that language from the bill before enacting it. Second, respondents argued that Congress intended the Act's express authorization for the Federal Government to buy private land in order to prevent habitat degradation in 5 to be the exclusive check against habitat modification on private property. Third, because the Senate added the term "harm" to the definition of "take" in a floor amendment without debate, respondents argued that the court should not interpret the term so expansively as to include habitat modification. The District Court considered and rejected each of respondents' arguments, finding "that Congress intended an expansive interpretation of the word `take,' an interpretation that encompasses habitat modification." The court noted that in 1982, when Congress was aware of a judicial decision that had applied the Secretary's regulation, see it amended the Act without using the opportunity to change the definition of "take." The court stated that, even had it found the ESA "`silent or ambiguous' " as to the authority for the Secretary's definition of "harm," it |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | to the authority for the Secretary's definition of "harm," it would nevertheless have upheld the regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute. at ). The District Court therefore entered summary judgment for petitioners and dismissed respondents' complaint. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals initially affirmed the judgment of the District Court. After granting a petition for rehearing, however, the panel reversed. Although acknowledging that "[t]he potential breadth of the word `harm' is indisputable," the majority concluded that the immediate statutory context in which "harm" appeared counseled against a broad reading; like the other words in the definition of "take," the word "harm" should be read as applying only to "the perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal taken The forbidden acts fit, in ordinary language, the basic model `A hit B.' " The majority based its reasoning on a canon of statutory construction called noscitur a sociis, which holds that a word is known by the company it keeps. See The majority claimed support for its construction from a decision of the Ninth Circuit that narrowly construed the word "harass" in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S. C. 1372(a)(2)(A), see United ; from the legislative history of the ESA;[7] from its view that Congress must not have intended the purportedly broad curtailment of private property rights that the Secretary's interpretation permitted; and from the ESA's land acquisition provision in 5 and restriction on federal agencies' activities regarding habitat in 7, both of which the court saw as evidence that Congress had not intended the 9 "take" prohibition to reach habitat modification. *695 Most prominently, the court performed a lengthy analysis of the 1982 amendment to 10 that provided for "incidental take permits" and concluded that the amendment did not change the meaning of the term "take" as defined in the 1973 statute.[8] Chief Judge Mikva, who had announced the panel's original decision, dissented. See In his view, a proper application of indicated that the Secretary had reasonably defined "harm," because respondents had failed to show that Congress unambiguously manifested its intent to exclude habitat modification from the ambit of "take." Chief Judge Mikva found the majority's reliance on noscitur a sociis inappropriate in light of the statutory language and unnecessary in light of the strong support in the legislative history for the Secretary's interpretation. He did not find the 1982 "incidental take permit" amendment alone sufficient to vindicate the Secretary's definition of "harm," but he believed the amendment provided additional support for that definition because it reflected Congress' view in 1982 that the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | definition because it reflected Congress' view in 1982 that the definition was reasonable. The Court of Appeals' decision created a square conflict with a decision of the Ninth Circuit that had upheld the Secretary's definition of "harm." See The Court of Appeals neither cited nor distinguished Palila II, despite the stark contrast between the Ninth Circuit's holding and its own. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. Our consideration of the text and structure of the Act, its legislative history, and the significance of the 1982 amendment persuades us that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be reversed. *696 II Because this case was decided on motions for summary judgment, we may appropriately make certain factual assumptions in order to frame the legal issue. First, we assume respondents have no desire to harm either the redcockaded woodpecker or the spotted owl; they merely wish to continue logging activities that would be entirely proper if not prohibited by the ESA. On the other hand, we must assume, arguendo, that those activities will have the effect, even though unintended, of detrimentally changing the natural habitat of both listed species and that, as a consequence, members of those species will be killed or injured. Under respondents' view of the law, the Secretary's only means of forestalling that grave resulteven when the actor knows it is certain to occur[9]is to use his 5 authority to purchase *697 the lands on which the survival of the species depends. The Secretary, on the other hand, submits that the 9 prohibition on takings, which Congress defined to include "harm," places on respondents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to 10. The text of the Act provides three reasons for concluding that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. First, an ordinary understanding of the word "harm" supports it. The dictionary definition of the verb form of "harm" is "to cause hurt or damage to: injure." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1034 (1966). In the context of the ESA, that definition naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened species. Respondents argue that the Secretary should have limited the purview of "harm" to direct applications of force against protected species, but the dictionary definition does not include the word "directly" or suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads to injury constitutes "harm."[10] Moreover, unless the statutory term "harm" encompasses *698 indirect as well as direct injuries, the word has no meaning that |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | well as direct injuries, the word has no meaning that does not duplicate the meaning of other words that 3 uses to define "take." A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage supports the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation. See, e. g.,[11] Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid. In we described the Act as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Whereas predecessor statutes enacted in 1966 and 1969 had not contained any sweeping prohibition against the taking of endangered species except on federal lands, see the 1973 Act applied to all land in the United States and to the Nation's territorial seas. As stated in 2 of the Act, among its central purposes is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved" 16 U.S. C. 1531(b). *699 In Hill, we construed 7 as precluding the completion of the Tellico Dam because of its predicted impact on the survival of the snail darter. See Both our holding and the language in our opinion stressed the importance of the statutory policy. "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute," we recognized, "was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Although the 9 "take" prohibition was not at issue in Hill, we took note of that prohibition, placing particular emphasis on the Secretary's inclusion of habitat modification in his definition of "harm."[12] In light of that provision for habitat protection, we could "not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without `harming' the snail darter." n. 30. Congress' intent to provide comprehensive protection for endangered and threatened species supports the permissibility of the Secretary's "harm" regulation. Respondents advance strong arguments that activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable harm will not violate the Act as construed in the "harm" regulation. Respondents, however, present a facial challenge to the regulation. Cf. ; Thus, they ask us to invalidate the Secretary's understanding of "harm" in every circumstance, even when an actor knows that an activity, such as draining a *700 pond, would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its habitat. Given Congress' clear expression of the ESA's broad purpose to protect endangered and threatened wildlife, the Secretary's definition of "harm" is reasonable.[13] Third, the |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | wildlife, the Secretary's definition of "harm" is reasonable.[13] Third, the fact that Congress in 1982 authorized the Secretary to issue permits for takings that 9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, "if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity," 16 U.S. C. 1539(a)(1)(B), strongly suggests that Congress understood 9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. Cf. The permit process requires the applicant to prepare a "conservation plan" that specifies how he intends to "minimize and mitigate" the "impact" of his activity on endangered and threatened species, 16 U.S. C. 1539(a)(2)(A), making clear that Congress had in mind foreseeable rather than merely accidental effects on listed species.[14] No one could seriously request an "incidental" take *701 permit to avert 9 liability for direct, deliberate action against a member of an endangered or threatened species, but respondents would read "harm" so narrowly that the permit procedure would have little more than that absurd purpose. "When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect." Congress' addition of the 10 permit provision supports the Secretary's conclusion that activities not intended to harm an endangered species, such as habitat modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the Secretary permits them. The Court of Appeals made three errors in asserting that "harm" must refer to a direct application of force because the words around it do.[15] First, the court's premise was flawed. Several of the words that accompany "harm" in the 3 definition of "take," especially "harass," "pursue," "wound," and "kill," refer to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force. Second, to the extent the court read a requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to define "take," it ignored 11's express provision that a "knowin[g]" *702 action is enough to violate the Act. Third, the court employed noscitur a sociis to give "harm" essentially the same function as other words in the definition, thereby denying it independent meaning. The canon, to the contrary, counsels that a word "gathers meaning from the words around it." The statutory context of "harm" suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with, but distinct from, the functions of the other verbs used to define "take." The Secretary's interpretation of "harm" to include indirectly injuring endangered animals through habitat modification permissibly interprets "harm" to have "a character of its own not to be submerged by its association." Russell Motor Car[16] Nor does the Act's inclusion |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | its association." Russell Motor Car[16] Nor does the Act's inclusion of the 5 land acquisition authority and the 7 directive to federal agencies to avoid destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat alter our conclusion. Respondents' argument that the Government lacks any incentive to purchase land under 5 when it can simply prohibit takings under 9 ignores the practical considerations that attend enforcement of the ESA. Purchasing habitat lands may well cost the Government less in many circumstances than pursuing civil or criminal penalties. In addition, the 5 procedure allows for protection of habitat before the seller's activity has harmed any endangered animal, *703 whereas the Government cannot enforce the 9 prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or injured. The Secretary may also find the 5 authority useful for preventing modification of land that is not yet but may in the future become habitat for an endangered or threatened species. The 7 directive applies only to the Federal Government, whereas the 9 prohibition applies to "any person." Section 7 imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifications that 9 does not replicate, and 7 does not limit its admonition to habitat modification that "actually kills or injures wildlife." Conversely, 7 contains limitations that 9 does not, applying only to actions "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species," 16 U.S. C. 1536(a)(2), and to modifications of habitat that has been designated "critical" pursuant to 4, 16 U.S. C. 1533(b)(2).[17] Any overlap that 5 or 7 may have with 9 in particular cases is unexceptional, see, e. g., and simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act set out in 2 and acknowledged in We need not decide whether the statutory definition of "take" compels the Secretary's interpretation of "harm," because our conclusions that Congress did not unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt respondents' view and that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case. See generally U. S. A. The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation. See *704 Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy,[18] III Our conclusion that the Secretary's definition of "harm" rests on a permissible construction of the ESA gains further support from the legislative history of the statute. The Committee Reports accompanying the bills that became the ESA do not specifically discuss the meaning of "harm," but they make clear that Congress intended "take" to |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | "harm," but they make clear that Congress intended "take" to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions. The Senate Report stressed that "`[t]ake' is defined in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can `take' or attempt to `take' any fish or wildlife." S. Rep. No. 93-, p. 7 (1973). The House Report stated that "the broadest possible terms" were used to define restrictions on takings. H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 15 (1973). The House Report underscored the breadth of the *705 "take" definition by noting that it included "harassment, whether intentional or not. " The Report explained that the definition "would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young." These comments, ignored in the dissent's welcome but selective foray into legislative history, see post, at 726-729, support the Secretary's interpretation that the term "take" in 9 reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters and trappers. Two endangered species bills, S. 1592 and S. 1983, were introduced in the Senate and referred to the Commerce Committee. Neither bill included the word "harm" in its definition of "take," although the definitions otherwise closely resembled the one that appeared in the bill as ultimately enacted. See Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7, 27 (1973) (hereinafter Hearings). Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate, subsequently introduced a floor amendment that added "harm" to the definition, noting that this and accompanying amendments would "help to achieve the purposes of the bill." 119 Cong. Rec. 25683 (1973). Respondents argue that the lack of debate about the amendment that added "harm" counsels in favor of a narrow interpretation. We disagree. An obviously broad word that the Senate went out of its way to add to an important statutory definition is precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful reading. The definition of "take" that originally appeared in S. 1983 differed from the definition as ultimately enacted in one other significant respect: It included "the destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish and wildlife. Hearings, at 27. Respondents make much of the fact that the Commerce Committee removed this phrase *706 from the "take" definition before S. 1983 went to the floor. See 119 Cong. Rec. 25663 (1973). We do not |
Justice Stevens | 1,995 | 16 | majority | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2462772/babbitt-v-sweet-home-chapter-communities-for-great-ore/ | floor. See 119 Cong. Rec. 25663 (1973). We do not find that fact especially significant. The legislative materials contain no indication why the habitat protection provision was deleted. That provision differed greatly from the regulation at issue today. Most notably, the habitat protection provision in S. 1983 would have applied far more broadly than the regulation does because it made adverse habitat modification a categorical violation of the "take" prohibition, unbounded by the regulation's limitation to habitat modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. The S. 1983 language also failed to qualify "modification" with the regulation's limiting adjective "significant." We do not believe the Senate's unelaborated disavowal of the provision in S. 1983 undermines the reasonableness of the more moderate habitat protection in the Secretary's "harm" regulation.[19] *707 The history of the 1982 amendment that gave the Secretary authority to grant permits for "incidental" takings provides further support for his reading of the Act. The House Report expressly states that "[b]y use of the word `incidental' the Committee intends to cover situations in which it is known that a taking will occur if the other activity is engaged in but such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity." H. R. Rep. No. 97-567, p. 31 (1982). This reference to the foreseeability of incidental takings undermines respondents' argument that the 1982 amendment covered only accidental killings of endangered and threatened animals that might occur in the course of hunting or trapping other animals. Indeed, Congress had habitat modification directly in mind: Both the Senate Report and the House Conference Report identified as the model for the permit process a cooperative state-federal response to a case in California where a development project threatened incidental harm to a species of endangered butterfly by modification of its habitat. See S. Rep. No. 97-418, p. 10 (1982); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, pp. 30-32 (1982). Thus, Congress in 1982 focused squarely on the aspect of the "harm" regulation at issue in this litigation. Congress' implementation of a permit program *708 is consistent with the Secretary's interpretation of the term "harm." IV When it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary. See 16 U.S. C. 1533, 1540(f). The task of defining and listing endangered and threatened species requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of Congress. Fashioning appropriate standards for issuing permits under 10 for takings that would otherwise violate 9 necessarily requires the exercise of broad discretion. The proper interpretation of a term such as "harm" involves a complex |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | Trans World Airlines, Inc. (TWA), a commercial airline, permits captains disqualified from serving in that capacity for reasons other than age to transfer automatically to the position of flight engineer. In this case, we must decide whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S. C. 621 et seq., requires the airline to afford this same "privilege of employment" to those captains disqualified by their age. We also must decide what constitutes a "willful" violation of the ADEA, entitling a plaintiff to "liquidated" or double I A TWA has approximately 3,000 employees who fill the three cockpit positions on most of its flights.[1] The "captain" is the pilot and controls the aircraft. He is responsible for all phases of its operation. The "first officer" is the copilot and assists the captain. The "flight engineer" usually monitors a side-facing instrument panel. He does not operate the flight controls unless the captain and the first officer become incapacitated. In 1977, TWA and the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, under which every employee in a cockpit position was required to retire when he reached the age of 60. This provision for mandatory retirement was lawful under the ADEA, as part of a "bona fide seniority system." See United Air Lines, On April 6, 1978, however, the Act was amended to prohibit the mandatory retirement of a protected individual because of his age.[2] TWA officials *115 became concerned that the company's retirement policy, at least as it applied to flight engineers, violated the amended ADEA.[3] On July 19, 1978, TWA announced that the amended ADEA prohibited the forced retirement of flight engineers at age 60. The company thus proposed a new policy, under which employees in all three cockpit positions, upon reaching age 60, would be allowed to continue working as flight engineers. TWA stated that it would not implement its new policy until it "had the benefit of [ALPA's] views."[4] ALPA's views were not long in coming. The Union contended that the collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the employment of a flight engineer after his 60th birthday and that the proposed change was not required by the recently amended ADEA. Despite opposition from the Union, TWA adopted a modified version of its proposal.[5] Under this plan, any employee in "flight engineer status" at age 60 is entitled to continue *116 working in that capacity. The new plan, unlike the initial proposal, does not give 60-year-old captains[6] the right automatically to begin training as flight engineers. Instead, a captain may remain with the airline only if he |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | a captain may remain with the airline only if he has been able to obtain "flight engineer status" through the bidding procedures outlined in the collective-bargaining agreement. These procedures require a captain, prior to his 60th birthday, to submit a "standing bid" for the position of flight engineer. When a vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior captain with a standing bid. If no vacancy occurs prior to his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid successfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain is retired.[7] Under the collective-bargaining agreement, a captain displaced for any reason besides age need not resort to the bidding procedures. For example, a captain unable to maintain the requisite first-class medical certificate, see 14 CFR 67.13 may displace automatically, or "bump," a less senior flight engineer.[8] The medically disabled captain's ability to bump does not depend upon the availability of a vacancy.[9] Similarly, a captain whose position is eliminated due to reduced manpower needs can "bump" a less senior *117 flight engineer.[10] Even if a captain is found to be incompetent to serve in that capacity, he is not discharged,[11] but is allowed to transfer to a position as flight engineer without resort to the bidding procedures.[12] Respondents Harold Thurston, Christopher J. Clark, and Clifton A. Parkhill, former captains for TWA, were retired upon reaching the age of 60. Each was denied an opportunity to "bump" a less senior flight engineer. Thurston was forced to retire on May 26, 1978, before the company adopted its new policy. Clark did not attempt to bid because TWA had advised him that bidding would not affect his chances of obtaining a transfer. These two captains thus effectively were denied an opportunity to become flight engineers through the bidding procedures. The third captain, Parkhill, did file a standing bid for the position of flight engineer. No vacancies occurred prior to Parkhill's 60th birthday, however, and he too was forced to retire. B Thurston, Clark, and Parkhill filed this action against TWA and ALPA in the United District Court for the Southern District of New York. They argued that the company's transfer policy violated ADEA 4(a)(1), *118 29 U.S. C. 623(a)(1). The airline allowed captains displaced for reasons other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers. Captains compelled to vacate their positions upon reaching age 60, they claimed, should be afforded this same "privilege of employment." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission intervened on behalf of 10 other age-disqualified captains who had been discharged as a result of their inability to displace less senior |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | as a result of their inability to displace less senior flight engineers.[13] The District Court entered a summary judgment in favor of defendants TWA and ALPA. Air Line Pilots The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas None could show that at the time of his transfer request a vacancy existed for the position of flight engineer. See Furthermore, the court found that two affirmative defenses justified the company's transfer policy. 29 U.S. C. 623(f)(1) and (f)(2). The United Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment. It found the McDonnell Douglas formula inapposite because the plaintiffs had adduced direct proof of age discrimination. Captains *119 disqualified for reasons other than age were allowed to "bump" less senior flight engineers. Therefore, the company was required by ADEA 4(a)(1), 29 U.S. C. 623(a)(1), to afford 60-year-old captains this same "privilege of employment." The Court of Appeals also held that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not justify the company's discriminatory transfer policy.[14] 713 F. 2d, at 949-951. TWA was held liable for "liquidated" or double damages because its violation of the ADEA was found to be "willful." According to the court, an employer's conduct is "willful" if it "knows or shows reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct is prohibited by the ADEA." Because "TWA was clearly aware of the 1978 ADEA amendments," the Court of Appeals found the respondents entitled to double -957. *120 TWA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in which it challenged the Court of Appeals' holding that the transfer policy violated the ADEA and that TWA's violation was "willful." The Union filed a cross-petition raising only the liability issue. We granted certiorari in both cases, and consolidated them for argument. We now affirm as to the violation of the ADEA, and reverse as to the claim for double II A The ADEA "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on age." Section 4(a)(1) of the Act proscribes differential treatment of older workers "with respect to [a] privileg[e] of employment." 29 U.S. C. 623(a). Under TWA's transfer policy, 60-year-old captains are denied a "privilege of employment" on the basis of age. Captains who become disqualified from serving in that position for reasons other than age automatically are able to displace less senior flight engineers. Captains disqualified because of age are not afforded this same "bumping" privilege. Instead, they are forced to resort to the bidding procedures set forth in the |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | to resort to the bidding procedures set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement. If there is no vacancy prior to a bidding captain's 60th birthday, he must retire.[15] The Act does not require TWA to grant transfer privileges to disqualified captains. Nevertheless, if TWA does grant *121 some disqualified captains the "privilege" of "bumping" less senior flight engineers, it may not deny this opportunity to others because of their age. In we held that "[a] benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free. not to provide the benefit at all." This interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. 2000(e) et seq., applies with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA "were derived in haec verba from Title VII."[16] TWA contends that the respondents failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell because at the time they were retired, no flight engineer vacancies existed. This argument fails, for the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. See The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the "plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence." In this case there is direct evidence that the method of transfer available to a disqualified captain depends upon his age. Since it allows captains who become disqualified for any reason other than age to "bump" less senior flight engineers, TWA's transfer policy is discriminatory on its face. Cf. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & B Although we find that TWA's transfer policy discriminates against disqualified captains on the basis of age, our inquiry cannot end here. Petitioners contend that the age-based transfer policy is justified by two of the ADEA's five affirmative defenses. Petitioners first argue that the discharge of respondents was lawful because age is a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) for the position of captain. 29 U.S. C. 623(f)(1). Furthermore, TWA claims that its retirement policy is part of a "bona fide seniority system," and thus exempt from the Act's coverage. 29 U.S. C. 623(f)(2). Section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA provides that an employer may take "any action otherwise prohibited" where age is a "bona fide occupational qualification." 29 U.S. C. 623(f)(1). In order to be permissible under 4(f)(1), however, the age-based discrimination must relate to a "particular business." Every court to consider the issue has assumed that the "particular |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | court to consider the issue has assumed that the "particular business" to which the statute refers is the job from which the protected individual is excluded. In for example, the court considered the Title VII claim of a female employee who, because of her sex, had not been allowed to transfer to the position of switchman. In deciding that the BFOQ defense was not available to the defendant, the court considered only the job of switchman. TWA's discriminatory transfer policy is not permissible under 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ for the "particular" position of flight engineer. It is necessary to recognize that the airline has two age-based policies: (i) captains are not allowed to serve in that capacity after reaching the age of 60; and (ii) age-disqualified captains are not given the transfer privileges afforded captains disqualified for other reasons. *123 The first policy, which precludes individuals from serving as captains, is not challenged by respondents.[17] The second practice does not operate to exclude protected individuals from the position of captain; rather it prevents qualified 60-year-olds from working as flight engineers. Thus, it is the "particular" job of flight engineer from which the respondents were excluded by the discriminatory transfer policy. Because age under 60 is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engineer,[18] the age-based discrimination at issue in this case cannot be justified by 4(f)(1). TWA nevertheless contends that its BFOQ argument is supported by the legislative history of the amendments to the ADEA. In 1978, Congress amended ADEA 4(f)(2), 29 U.S. C. 623(f)(2), to prohibit the involuntary retirement of protected individuals on the basis of age. Some Members of Congress were concerned that this amendment might be construed as limiting the employer's ability to terminate workers subject to a valid BFOQ. The Senate proposed an amendment to 4(f)(1) providing that an employer could establish a mandatory retirement age where age is a BFOQ. S. Rep. No. 95-493, pp. 11, 24 In the Conference Committee, however, the proposed amendment was withdrawn because "the [Senate] conferees agreed that [it] neither added to nor worked any change upon present law." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-950, p. 7 The House Committee Report also indicated that an individual could be compelled to retire from a position for which age was a BFOQ. H. R. Rep. No. 95-527, pt. 1, p. 12 *124 The legislative history of the 1978 Amendments does not support petitioners' position. The history shows only that the ADEA does not prohibit TWA from retiring all disqualified captains, including those who are incapacitated because of age. |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | disqualified captains, including those who are incapacitated because of age. This does not mean, however, that TWA can make dependent upon the age of the individual the availability of a transfer to a position for which age is not a BFOQ. Nothing in the legislative history cited by petitioners indicates a congressional intention to allow an employer to discriminate against an older worker seeking to transfer to another position, on the ground that age was a BFOQ for his former job. TWA also contends that its discriminatory transfer policy is lawful under the Act because it is part of a "bona fide seniority system." 29 U.S. C. 623(f)(2). The Court of Appeals held that the airline's retirement policy is not mandated by the negotiated seniority plan. We need not address this finding; any seniority system that includes the challenged practice is not "bona fide" under the statute. The Act provides that a seniority system may not "require or permit" the involuntary retirement of a protected individual because of his age. Although the FAA "age 60 rule" may have caused respondents' retirement, TWA's seniority plan certainly "permitted" it within the meaning of the ADEA. Moreover, because captains disqualified for reasons other than age are allowed to "bump" less senior flight engineers, the mandatory retirement was age-based. Therefore, the "bona fide seniority system" defense is unavailable to the petitioners. In summary, TWA's transfer policy discriminates against protected individuals on the basis of age, and thereby violates the Act. The two statutory defenses raised by petitioners do not support the argument that this discrimination is justified. The BFOQ defense is meritless because age is not a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of flight engineer, the job from which the respondents were excluded. Nor can TWA's policy be viewed as part of a bona *125 fide seniority system. A system that includes this discriminatory transfer policy permits the forced retirement of captains on the basis of age. III A Section 7(b) of the ADEA, 29 U.S. C. 626(b), provides that the rights created by the Act are to be "enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures" of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See But the remedial provisions of the two statutes are not identical. Congress declined to incorporate into the ADEA several FLSA sections. Moreover, 16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly qualified in ADEA 7(b) by a proviso that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to double damages "only in cases of willful violations." 29 U.S. C. 626(b). In this case, the Court |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | violations." 29 U.S. C. 626(b). In this case, the Court of Appeals held that TWA's violation of the ADEA was "willful," and that the respondents therefore were entitled to double We granted certiorari to review this holding. The legislative history of the ADEA indicates that Congress intended for liquidated damages to be punitive in nature. The original bill proposed by the administration incorporated 16(a) of the FLSA, which imposes criminal liability for a willful violation. See 113 Cong. Rec. 2199 (1967). Senator Javits found "certain serious defects" in the administration bill. He stated that "difficult problems of proof would arise under a criminal provision," and that the employer's invocation of the Fifth Amendment might impede investigation, conciliation, and enforcement. Therefore, he proposed that "the [FLSA's] criminal penalty in cases of willful violation [be] eliminated and a double damage liability substituted." Senator Javits argued that his proposed amendment would "furnish an effective deterrent to willful violations [of the ADEA]," ib *126 and it was incorporated into the ADEA with only minor modification, S. 788, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). This Court has recognized that in enacting the ADEA, "Congress exhibited a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial interpretation" The manner in which FLSA 16(a) has been interpreted therefore is relevant. In general, courts have found that an employer is subject to criminal penalties under the FLSA when he "wholly disregards the law without making any reasonable effort to determine whether the plan he is following would constitute a violation of the law." Nabob Oil (CA10), cert. denied, ; see also[19] This standard is substantially in accord with the interpretation of "willful" adopted by the Court of Appeals in interpreting the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. The court below stated that a violation of the Act was "willful" if "the employer. knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d, Given the legislative history of the liquidated damages provision, we think the "reckless disregard" standard is reasonable. The definition of "willful" adopted by the above cited courts is consistent with the manner in which this Court has interpreted the term in other criminal and civil statutes. In United the defendant was prosecuted under the Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, which made it a misdemeanor for a person "willfully" to *127 fail to pay the required tax. The Murdock Court stated that conduct was "willful" within the meaning of this criminal statute if it was "marked by careless disregard [for] whether or not one has the right so |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | disregard [for] whether or not one has the right so to act." In United the Court applied the Murdock definition of "willful" in a civil case. There, the defendant's failure to unload a cattle car was "willful," because it showed a disregard for the governing statute and an indifference to its -243.[20] The respondents argue that an employer's conduct is willful if he is "cognizant of an appreciable possibility that the employees involved were covered by the [ADEA]." In support of their position, the respondents cite 6 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA), 29 U.S. C. 255(a), which is incorporated in both the ADEA and the FLSA. Section 6 of the PPA provides for a 2-year statute of limitations period unless the violation is willful, in which case the limitations period is extended to three years. 29 U.S. C. 255(a). Several courts have held that a violation is willful within the meaning of 6 if the employer knew that the ADEA was "in the picture." See, e. g., cert. denied, ; Respondents contend that the term "willful" should be interpreted in a similar manner in applying the liquidated damages provision of the ADEA. We are unpersuaded by respondents' argument that a violation of the Act is "willful" if the employer simply knew of the potential applicability of the ADEA. Even if the "in *128 the picture" standard were appropriate for the statute of limitations, the same standard should not govern a provision dealing with liquidated [21] More importantly, the broad standard proposed by the respondents would result in an award of double damages in almost every case. As employers are required to post ADEA notices, it would be virtually impossible for an employer to show that he was unaware of the Act and its potential applicability. Both the legislative history and the structure of the statute show that Congress intended a two-tiered liability scheme. We decline to interpret the liquidated damages provision of ADEA 7(b) in a manner that frustrates this intent.[22] B As noted above, the Court of Appeals stated that a violation is "willful" if "the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 713 F.2d, Although we *129 hold that this is an acceptable way to articulate a definition of "willful," the court below misapplied this standard. TWA certainly did not "know" that its conduct violated the Act. Nor can it fairly be said that TWA adopted its transfer policy in "reckless disregard" of the Act's The record makes clear that TWA officials acted reasonably |
Justice Powell | 1,985 | 17 | majority | Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/111290/trans-world-airlines-inc-v-thurston/ | Act's The record makes clear that TWA officials acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their plan would violate the ADEA. See Nabob Oil Shortly after the ADEA was amended, TWA officials met with their lawyers to determine whether the mandatory retirement policy violated the Act. Concluding that the company's existing plan was inconsistent with the ADEA, David Crombie, the airline's Senior Vice President for Administration, proposed a new policy. Despite opposition from the Union, the company adopted a modified version of this initial proposal. Under the plan adopted on August 10, 1978, any pilot in "flight engineer status" on his 60th birthday could continue to work for the airline. On the day the plan was adopted, the Union filed suit against the airline claiming that the new retirement policy constituted a "major" change in the collective-bargaining agreement, and thus was barred by 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S. C. 156. Nevertheless, TWA adhered to its new policy. As evidence of "willfulness," respondents point to comments made by J. E. Frankum, the Vice President of Flight Operations. After Crombie was hospitalized in August 1978, Frankum assumed responsibility for bringing TWA's retirement policy into conformance with the ADEA. Despite legal advice to the contrary, Frankum initially believed that the company was not required to allow any pilot over 60 to work. Frankum later abandoned this position in favor of the plan approved on August 10, 1978. Frankum apparently had been concerned only about whether flight engineers could work after reaching the age of 60. There is no indication that TWA was ever advised by counsel that its new transfer policy discriminated against captains on the basis of age. *130 There simply is no evidence that TWA acted in "reckless disregard" of the requirements of the ADEA. The airline had obligations under the collective-bargaining agreement with the Airline Pilots Association. In an attempt to bring its retirement policy into compliance with the ADEA, while at the same time observing the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement, TWA sought legal advice and consulted with the Union. Despite opposition from the Union, a plan was adopted that permitted cockpit employees to work as "flight engineers" after reaching age 60. Apparently TWA officials and the airline's attorneys failed to focus specifically on the effect of each aspect of the new retirement policy for cockpit personnel. It is reasonable to believe that the parties involved, in focusing on the larger overall problem, simply overlooked the challenged aspect of the new plan.[23] We conclude that TWA's violation of the Act was not |
per_curiam | 1,973 | 200 | per_curiam | Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/108664/indiana-employment-security-div-v-burney/ | We noted probable jurisdiction in this case, to review the judgment of a three-judge district court, holding that Indiana's system of administering unemployment insurance was in conflict with 303 (a) (1) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S. C. 503 (a) (1).[1] Before the three-judge court entered its injunction, Indiana's practice was to discontinue unemployment benefits upon a determination of ineligibility, that determination taking place without the benefit of a full hearing for the erstwhile beneficiary. After several months of effort, however, the class representative in this litigation, Mrs. Burney, succeeded in obtaining a reversal of the initial determination of ineligibility.[2] She has now received full retroactive compensation. The full settlement of Mrs. Burney's financial claim raises the question whether there continues to be a case or controversy in this lawsuit. Though the appellee purports to represent a class of all present and future recipients *542 of unemployment insurance, there are no named representatives of the class except Mrs. Burney, who has been paid. Cf. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court to consider whether it has become moot. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | This is a direct appeal from a final judgment of a three-judge District Court, 28 U.S. C. 1253, 2101, invalidating an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ten applications of motor carriers to conduct general commodities operations between points in the Southwest and Southeast were consolidated in one proceeding. Three additional applicants were allowed to intervene. The hearing examiners, after extensive hearings, rejected each application. The Commission granted three of the applications of appellant carriers. Appellees, competing carriers, brought an action in the District Court, 28 U.S. C. 1336, to suspend, enjoin, and annul that portion of the order of the Commission that authorizes issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity to Red Ball, Bowman, and Johnson. The District Court refused to enforce the Commission's order because its findings and conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, and without rational basis within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S. C. 706, and likewise refused to remand the case believing that no useful purpose would be served,[1] *284 The Administrative Procedure Act in 5 U.S. C. 706 provides that: "The reviewing court shall (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be "(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law [or] "(E) unsupported by substantial evidence" These two provisions of 5 U.S. C. 706 (2) are part of six which are "separate standards." See Citizens to Preserve Overton The District Court properly concluded that, though an agency's finding may be supported by substantial evidence, based on the definition in Universal Camera[2] it may nonetheless reflect arbitrary and capricious action. There seems, however, to be agreement that the findings and conclusions of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. The question remains whether, as the District Court held, the Commission's action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" as provided in 5 U.S. C. 706 (2) (A). We disagree with the District Court and accordingly reverse its judgment and remand the cases for consideration of one issue not reached by the District Court or by this Court. I The Motor Carrier provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S. C. 307, empower the *285 Commission to grant an application for a certificate if it finds (1) that the applicant is "fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service proposed"; and (2) that the service proposed "is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity." The Commission made both findings, relying upon the applicants' general service record in support |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | findings, relying upon the applicants' general service record in support of a finding of fitness, and upon expressions of customer dissatisfaction with the existing service in support of its conclusion that the service proposed was consistent with the public convenience and necessity. The competing appellee carriers made presentations designed to show that their existing service was satisfactory and that the applicants would not offer measurably superior performance. The District Court concluded that the Commission had acted arbitrarily in its treatment of the presentations made by the protesting carriers. While the Commission had acknowledged the appellees' evidence, its reasons for refusing to credit it would not, in the District Court's view, withstand scrutiny, making its action tantamount to an arbitrary refusal to consider matters in the record. Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the scope of review is a narrow one. A reviewing court must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton The agency must articulate a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Burlington Truck While we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the *286 agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned. Colorado Interstate Gas Having summarized the appropriate scope of review, we proceed to consider the District Court's objections seriatim. A. Evidence as to Existing Service The applicant carriers presented exhibits showing the time in transit of selected shipments that had been consigned to appellee carriers by particular shippers during a designated study period. As the Commission acknowledged, the selection of particular shipments from those occurring during the study period had been made with an eye toward demonstrating service inadequacies.[3] These "worst case" studies figured in the Commission's finding that service would be improved by the entry of new carriers to the routes at issue. The appellee carriers offered studies of their own. These covered the same period and the same shippers as the applicants' presentations, but whereas the applicants had selected particular shipments to emphasize inadequacies, the appellee carriers included in their presentations all of the shipments consigned during the study period. These exhibits, argued the protesting carriers, placed the incidents cited by the applicants in perspective and demonstrated |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | the incidents cited by the applicants in perspective and demonstrated that the existing service was generally acceptable. The Commission acknowledged the appellees' presentations but concluded that they offered an inadequate rebuttal to the applicants' exhibits because *287 (1) they "relate to short periods of time or cover traffic handled for specified shippers"; and (2) the studies represented service provided by appellees after the Commission had designated the applications for hearing. Herrin Transportation 114 M. C. C. 571, 599 The District Court ruled that the Commission had applied inconsistent standards in reviewing the evidence of the parties, since the appellees' exhibits were based upon the same study periods and the same shippers as the applicants' -1260. We agree with the District Court that the first reason assigned by the Commissionthat the appellees' exhibits were based only upon short periods and particular shippers failed to distinguish the presentations of applicants and opponents. To counter the applicants' presentations, the protesting carriers chose the identical study periods and shippers but expanded the presentation to show all the shipments consigned. Since the protesters confined themselves to the periods and shippers the applicants had selected, there was no basis for an inference that the former had chosen so as to make the exhibits unrepresentative in their favor. The Commission's second reason, howeverthat the appellees' studies covered periods subsequent to a notice of hearingprovides support for the Commission's assessment of the evidence. The Commission recognized that protesting carriers might have been spurred to improve their service by the threat of competition raised by the designation of applicants for hearing. Therefore, reasoned the Commission, the protesting carriers' performance subsequent to the notice of hearing might be superior to the service they normally offered, and their exhibits, covering those periods, had to be read in light of that possibility. But the Commission was not precluded from relying upon the demonstrated shortcomings of the protesters' service during that period, for the incentive *288 effect the Commission identified would have, if anything, distorted the performance studies in the protesters' favor. The issue before the Commission was not whether the appellees' service met some absolute standard of performance but whether the "public convenience and necessity" would be served by the entry of new carriers into the markets served by appellees. United (7). Even if the Commission had accepted appellees' exhibits at face value, it could still have concluded that the deficiencies were sufficient to justify the admission of additional carriers. Certainly the Commission was entitled to regard the appellees' studies as possibly nonrepresentative of the usual service afforded,[4] to reason that the |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | nonrepresentative of the usual service afforded,[4] to reason that the shortcomings *2 were probably greater than these studies showed, and to conclude that service would be improved by granting the applications. B. Evidence of Applicants' Fitness The applicants supported their service proposals with exhibits showing transit times over comparable distances on other routes. The appellees once again pointed out that the applicants had been selective and offered transit times on different routes served by the applicants that were substantially longer than those applicants proposed to provide on the routes at issue. Appellees thus argued that the applicants could not reasonably be expected to live up to their service proposals. In addition, the appellees cited service restrictions that the applicants practiced on other routesrefusal to make scheduled pickup of merchandise, refusal to handle shipments less than a certain weight, refusal to transport goods to certain destinations, and the like. The Commission attributed little significance to the appellees' rebuttal. With respect to transit times, the Commission noted that different highway conditions might make transit times over identical distances totally incomparable. 114 M. C. C., at 611. The District Court held that the Commission had acted arbitrarily in so treating the evidence, for it had apparently relied on the applicants' transit-time evidence (id., at 586, 600) to support its finding of fitness. -1261. Similarly, the District Court viewed as *290 arbitrary the Commission's failure to mention in its opinion the service restrictions by applicants that appellees' had cited, since the Commission had relied upon identical restrictions practiced by appellees to support its finding that existing service was not satisfactory. 114 M. C. C., at 600. The Commission's treatment of the evidence of the applicants' performance on other routes is not a paragon of clarity. Had the Commission responded in a more considered manner to the evidence appellees presented, review would have been greatly facilitated, and further review by this Court perhaps avoided entirely. But we can discern in the Commission's opinion a rational basis for its treatment of the evidence, and the "arbitrary and capricious" test does not require more. The question before the Commission was whether service on the routes at issue would be enhanced by permitting new entry, and as to this the performance by prospective entrants on new routes was of limited relevance. The Commission noted with respect to transit times that different highway conditions might make experience there a poor indication of the times applicants could provide on the routes they sought to enter. More generally, the applicants' performance on other routes might, because of market conditions peculiar to |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | on other routes might, because of market conditions peculiar to that route (e. g., the nature of demand for service, or the number of competing carriers), offer an inaccurate basis for predicting what the applicants would do if admitted to the routes they sought in competition with the carriers already there. A carrier performing lethargically on a route where it was the sole provider of motor transportation, for example, could ill afford to continue the same practice where the situation was more competitive.[5] *291 The particular features of the applicants' performance elsewhere that the appellees cited were not shown by the Commission to be explainable by special market conditions on the routes where they occurred. It is said that the Commission could conclude that the evidence of performance elsewhere would be unlikely to prove dispositive, and that accordingly, absent some compelling demonstration by a proponent of a "performance elsewhere" study that it offered important predictive value, the Commission should disregard such evidence.[6] Of course, evidence of especially egregious performance elsewhere might have been viewed as an exception; a general assumption that competition would force new entrants to exceed the pre-existing quality of service in an effort to attract business might have to yield in the face of an applicant whose shortcomings elsewhere were many and flagrant. But no such evidence was offered here, and none of the applicants was so characterized. Indeed the examiners found *292 that "in the main the carriers participating in these proceedings are substantial and responsible carriers" (), and no party has disputed this finding. We do not find the Commission's treatment of the evidence arbitrary. II Having found that the admission of the applicant carriers to the routes they sought would produce benefits to the consumers served, the Commission proceeded to consider the effect of new entry upon the appellees. While the Commission acknowledged that competition from new entrants might cause at least short-run business losses for existing carriers, it found that, with the exception of one carrier, none would be "seriously adversely affected." Further, the Commission concluded that in any event, "the gains to be derived by the shipping public in general far outweigh any adverse effect this carrier or any other protestant may experience." 114 M. C. C., at 611. The District Court thought the Commission's treatment unsupportable, in view of the findings by the hearing examiners as to adverse impacts if the applications were granted. -1263. Insofar as the District Court's comments express the view that the Commission failed to consider the examiners' findings or the appellees' interests, the record shows otherwise. |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | examiners' findings or the appellees' interests, the record shows otherwise. The Commission stated in its opinion that "grants of authority will subject some of protestants' traffic to the possibility of diversion," but went on to make findings that there would be no "serious adverse impact." 114 M. C. C., at 610-611. The evidence that moved the examiners to a contrary view consisted of testimony by appellees' witnesses about the volume of shipments for which new entrants would compete if allowed to enter the market. The testimony thus presented the carriers' maximum potential exposure, *293 leaving considerable leeway for predicting what was likely if applications were granted. Cf. Market Street R. The examiners emphasized the magnitude of potential harm; the Commission took a more optimistic view. We see nothing arbitrary in this posture. That a carrier's entire business will be subject to competition hardly compels the conclusion that its operations will show no profit. It was rational for the Commission so to conclude that the new entrant may be expected not to swallow up existing carriers, especially if the latter make efforts to attract business. Moreover, the testimony offered by appellees' witnesses gave the carriers' exposure to competition if every new application sought by appellees were granted.[7] Thus, the examiners were reporting upon potential diversions of traffic under conditions that were never realized. Since the Commission granted only three of the 10 pending applications, much of the testimony on this matter had to be regarded with qualification, and some of it disregarded entirely.[8] The Commission's conclusion that consumer benefits outweighed any adverse impact upon the existing carriers reflects the kind of judgment that is entrusted to it, a power to weigh the competing interests and arrive at a balance that is deemed "the public convenience and necessity." United If the Commission has "drawn out and *294 crystallized these competing interests [and] attempted to judge them with as much delicacy as the prospective nature of the inquiry permits," (1), we can require no more. Here the Commission identified the competing interests. We cannot say that the balance it struck was arbitrary or contrary to law. III The District Court expressed concern about the considerable lapse of time between the conclusion of evidentiary hearings and the Commission's -1262. While it is unclear whether this was an independent ground for setting aside the Commission's order, we deem it advisable to deal directly with the suggestion that the record has grown too stale to support the order. Hearings on the applications in these cases began in 6 and concluded in 7. Thereafter, the parties prepared |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | in 6 and concluded in 7. Thereafter, the parties prepared extensive briefs for the examiners, who rendered their decision in November 9. The decision of the Commission was handed down on December 30, 1971. Thus, the evidentiary material pertained to service conditions which were dated by five years at the time the Commission rendered its We appreciate the difficulties that arise when the lapse between hearing and ultimate decision is so long. Undoubtedly economic changes dated the 6 studies that the parties, both applicants and appellees, had placed in the record. Nevertheless, we have always been loath to require that factfinding begin anew merely because of delay in proceedings of such magnitude and complexity. To repeat what was said in : "Administrative consideration of evidenceparticularly where the evidence is taken by an examiner, *295 his report submitted to the parties, and a hearing held on their exceptions to italways creates a gap between the time the record is closed and the time the administrative decision is promulgated. This is especially true if the issues are difficult, the evidence intricate, and the consideration of the case deliberate and careful. If upon the coming down of the order litigants might demand rehearings as a matter of law because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed, or some new fact discovered, there would be little hope that the administrative process could ever be consummated in an order that would not be subject to reopening. It has been almost a rule of necessity that rehearings were not matters of rights, but were pleas to discretion. And likewise it has been considered that the discretion to be invoked was that of the body making the order, and not that of a reviewing body." Only in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. did we remand a case for reopening of evidentiary proceedings; there the Commission's refusal to reopen in light of the economic metamorphosis brought on by the Great Depression led the Court to find an abuse of discretion. The same exceptional circumstances that compelled that disposition, however, have been found lacking in more recent cases. See United ; Illinois Commerce ; St. Joseph Stock Yards ; United Northern Merger Cases, Illinois Commerce is of particular relevance, for there the Court refused to compel the Interstate Commerce *296 Commission to reopen for the inclusion of new economic studies a record already closed for a comparable period. We believe appellees failed to meet the heavy burden thrust upon them by our cases.[9] The protracted character of the proceedings resulted, not from bureaucratic inertia, |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | protracted character of the proceedings resulted, not from bureaucratic inertia, but from the number and complexity of the issues and from the agency procedures that extended to the parties, in an effort to insure fairness in appearance as well as reality, and an opportunity to comment upon the proceedings at every stage. More than 900 witnesses testified in the original hearings, which consumed 150 days. At the conclusion the parties submitted briefs requiring seven months to prepare. The examiners' decision did not issue until nearly two years later. It is doubtful that the Commission could have made the record more current by judicial notice alone; while live testimony might not have been required, the Commission would at least have had to entertain evidence in affidavit form. Yet there would have been little assurance that at the conclusion of such a reopening, and the time required to digest the new material, the record would not again have become "stale." Accordingly, we conclude that there is sound basis for adhering to our practice of declining to require reopening of the record, except in the most extraordinary circumstances. *297 IV We conclude by addressing a concern voiced by the District Court, that the Commission's decision "indicates a predilection to grant these particular applications, followed by a strained attempt to marshal findings to support such conclusion." 364 F. Supp., at We disagree with the District Court insofar as its remarks charge the Commission with prejudging the issue and deciding without giving consideration to the evidence. But we think the approach adopted by the Commission does differ from that taken by the examiners in significant respects that are important to identify. The examiners viewed the evidence against a backdrop of assumptions about the relationship between consumer needs and carrier responsibilities. The examiners ruled, for example, that all shippers were not entitled to "single-line service" and that the shippers' difficulties were attributable, in part, to lack of diligence. The examiners put it that "[n]ormally existing carriers should have an opportunity. to transport all of the traffic they can handle adequately and efficiently in the territory they are authorized to serve without the competition of new operations." And to the extent that service inadequacies were demonstrated, the examiners viewed complaints to force compliance with certificates held by existing carriers as a preferred mode of relief. The Commission's approach, on the other hand, was more congenial to new entry and the resulting competition. This is the Commission's prerogative in carrying out its mandate to insure "safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service," National Transportation Policy, *298 preceding 49 U.S. |
Justice Douglas | 1,975 | 10 | majority | Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/109122/bowman-transp-inc-v-arkansas-best-freight-system-inc/ | and efficient service," National Transportation Policy, *298 preceding 49 U.S. C. 1. The Commission was not compelled to adopt the same approach as the examiners. It could conclude that the benefits of competitive service to consumers might outweigh the discomforts existing certificated carriers could feel as a result of new entry.[10] Our decisions have dispelled any notion that the Commission's primary obligation is the protection of firms holding existing certificates. disapproved the proposition that shippers must take their grievances through complaint procedures before improvement through new entry is And in United (7), we rejected the suggestion by a reviewing court that existing carriers have "a property right" to an opportunity to make amends before new certificates issue. A policy in favor of competition embodied in the laws has application in a variety of economic affairs. Even where Congress has chosen Government regulation as the primary device for protecting the public interest, a policy of facilitating competitive market structure and performance is entitled to consideration. McLean Trucking ; (8); Gulf Utilities ; Denver & R. G. W. R. (7). The Commission, of course, is entitled to conclude that preservation of a competitive structure in a given case is overridden by other interests, United v. Drum, 368 *, but where, as here, the Commission concludes that competition "aids in the attainment of the objectives of the national transportation policy," McLean Trucking we have no basis for disturbing the Commission's accommodation. V Our opinion disposes of appellees' objections to the Commission's order insofar as it granted the applications of Johnson and Red Ball.[11] As to appellant Bowman, however, an issue remains. In granting Bowman a certificate the Commission noted that the authority sought by Bowman exceeded that set forth in Bowman's application. The "excess" was granted, subject to a condition precedent of publication in the Federal Register of Bowman's request for the excess authority. Various appellees filed objections to the augmented authority sought by Bowman, which the Commission overruled. Appellees challenged the Commission's procedure in the District Court on a variety of grounds, and though the District Court indicated disapproval of the Commission's action, the court did not have to rule on the merits of appellees' objections since it set aside the Commission's approval of all the applications. While we have on occasion decided residual issues in the interest of an expeditious conclusion of protracted litigation, see (6), we believe that the issue of conformity of the Bowman certificate to its application is one for the District Court. The issue was not briefed or argued here, owing to the limitations set forth in |
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