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stringlengths 306
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int64 165k
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return 0;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return 1;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return 0;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return 0;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return 0;
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return 1;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return 0;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return 1;
default:
return 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c in the KVM subsystem in the Linux kernel through 3.17.2 does not have an exit handler for the INVVPID instruction, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (guest OS crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | Low | 166,344 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
profile_data,
profile_size,
start_position;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
magick[12],
*pixels;
unsigned int
blue,
green,
offset_bits,
red;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a BMP file.
*/
(void) memset(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
start_position=0;
offset_bits=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
PixelInfo
quantum_bits;
PixelPacket
shift;
/*
Verify BMP identifier.
*/
start_position=TellBlob(image)-2;
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
while (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0)
{
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.ba_offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if (count != 2)
break;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Magick: %c%c",
magick[0],magick[1]);
if ((count != 2) || ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bmp_info.file_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.offset_bits=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," BMP size: %u",
bmp_info.size);
profile_data=0;
profile_size=0;
if (bmp_info.size == 12)
{
/*
OS/2 BMP image file.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP2",MagickPathExtent);
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ((short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=0;
bmp_info.y_pixels=0;
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.image_size=0;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: OS/2 Bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
}
}
else
{
/*
Microsoft Windows BMP image file.
*/
if (bmp_info.size < 40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NonOS2HeaderSizeError");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
bmp_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bmp_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.number_colors > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
bmp_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format: MS Windows bitmap");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Geometry: %.20gx%.20g",(double) bmp_info.width,(double)
bmp_info.height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Bits per pixel: %.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE4:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE4");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
case BI_PNG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_PNG");
break;
}
case BI_JPEG:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: BI_JPEG");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression: UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
}
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number of colors: %u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
bmp_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (bmp_info.size > 40)
{
double
gamma;
/*
Read color management information.
*/
bmp_info.alpha_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
bmp_info.colorspace=ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(image);
/*
Decode 2^30 fixed point formatted CIE primaries.
*/
# define BMP_DENOM ((double) 0x40000000)
bmp_info.red_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.red_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.green_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
bmp_info.blue_primary.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/BMP_DENOM;
gamma=bmp_info.red_primary.x+bmp_info.red_primary.y+
bmp_info.red_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.red_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.red_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=bmp_info.red_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=bmp_info.red_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.green_primary.x+bmp_info.green_primary.y+
bmp_info.green_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.green_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.green_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=bmp_info.green_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=bmp_info.green_primary.y;
gamma=bmp_info.blue_primary.x+bmp_info.blue_primary.y+
bmp_info.blue_primary.z;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(gamma);
bmp_info.blue_primary.x*=gamma;
bmp_info.blue_primary.y*=gamma;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=bmp_info.blue_primary.x;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=bmp_info.blue_primary.y;
/*
Decode 16^16 fixed point formatted gamma_scales.
*/
bmp_info.gamma_scale.x=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.y=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z=(double) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/0x10000;
/*
Compute a single gamma from the BMP 3-channel gamma.
*/
image->gamma=(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x+bmp_info.gamma_scale.y+
bmp_info.gamma_scale.z)/3.0;
}
else
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"BMP3",MagickPathExtent);
if (bmp_info.size > 108)
{
size_t
intent;
/*
Read BMP Version 5 color management information.
*/
intent=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
switch ((int) intent)
{
case LCS_GM_BUSINESS:
{
image->rendering_intent=SaturationIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_GRAPHICS:
{
image->rendering_intent=RelativeIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_IMAGES:
{
image->rendering_intent=PerceptualIntent;
break;
}
case LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC:
{
image->rendering_intent=AbsoluteIntent;
break;
}
}
profile_data=(MagickOffsetType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
profile_size=(MagickOffsetType)ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobLSBLong(image); /* Reserved byte */
}
}
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size > GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",image->filename);
else
if ((MagickSizeType) bmp_info.file_size < GetBlobSize(image))
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"LengthAndFilesizeDoNotMatch","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (bmp_info.width <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.height == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
if (bmp_info.planes != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"StaticPlanesValueNotEqualToOne");
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 16) &&
(bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 24) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16 &&
bmp_info.number_colors > (1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedNumberOfColors");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 1) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 8))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel != 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
if ((bmp_info.compression == 3) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnsupportedBitsPerPixel");
switch (bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
image->compression=NoCompression;
break;
case BI_RLE8:
case BI_RLE4:
image->compression=RLECompression;
break;
case BI_BITFIELDS:
break;
case BI_JPEG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"JPEGCompressNotSupported");
case BI_PNG:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"PNGCompressNotSupported");
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(bmp_info.height);
image->depth=bmp_info.bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? bmp_info.bits_per_pixel : 8;
image->alpha_trait=((bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0) &&
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS)) ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel < 16)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=bmp_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
image->resolution.x=(double) bmp_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->resolution.y=(double) bmp_info.y_pixels/100.0;
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
size_t
packet_size;
/*
Read BMP raster colormap.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading colormap of %.20g colors",(double) image->colors);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((bmp_info.size == 12) || (bmp_info.size == 64))
packet_size=3;
else
packet_size=4;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+14+bmp_info.size,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,bmp_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
{
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
p=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (bmp_info.offset_bits == offset_bits)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset_bits=bmp_info.offset_bits;
offset=SeekBlob(image,start_position+bmp_info.offset_bits,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=(size_t) bytes_per_line*image->rows;
if ((MagickSizeType) (length/256) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading pixels (%.20g bytes)",(double) length);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
status=DecodeImage(image,bmp_info.compression,pixels,
image->columns*image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
}
/*
Convert BMP raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if (bmp_info.compression == BI_RGB)
{
/*
We should ignore the alpha value in BMP3 files but there have been
reports about 32 bit files with alpha. We do a quick check to see if
the alpha channel contains a value that is not zero (default value).
If we find a non zero value we asume the program that wrote the file
wants to use the alpha channel.
*/
if ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) &&
(bmp_info.size == 40) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*(p+3) != 0)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
y=-1;
break;
}
p+=4;
}
}
}
bmp_info.alpha_mask=image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
0xff000000U : 0U;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
if (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16)
{
/*
RGB555.
*/
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
}
}
(void) memset(&shift,0,sizeof(shift));
(void) memset(&quantum_bits,0,sizeof(quantum_bits));
if ((bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 32))
{
register unsigned int
sample;
/*
Get shift and quantum bits info from bitfield masks.
*/
if (bmp_info.red_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << shift.red) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.red++;
if (shift.red >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.green_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << shift.green) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.green++;
if (shift.green >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.blue_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << shift.blue) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.blue++;
if (shift.blue >= 32U)
break;
}
if (bmp_info.alpha_mask != 0)
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << shift.alpha) & 0x80000000UL) == 0)
{
shift.alpha++;
if (shift.alpha >= 32U)
break;
}
sample=shift.red;
while (((bmp_info.red_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.red=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.red);
sample=shift.green;
while (((bmp_info.green_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.green=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.green);
sample=shift.blue;
while (((bmp_info.blue_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.blue=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.blue);
sample=shift.alpha;
while (((bmp_info.alpha_mask << sample) & 0x80000000UL) != 0)
{
sample++;
if (sample >= 32U)
break;
}
quantum_bits.alpha=(MagickRealType) (sample-shift.alpha);
}
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) (((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0x0f),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) (*p & 0x0f),&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) ((*p >> 4) & 0xf),&index,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
x++;
}
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(bmp_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; --x)
{
ValidateColormapValue(image,(ssize_t) *p++,&index,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
/*
Convert bitfield encoded 16-bit PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=2*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=(*p++) << 8;
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 5)
red|=((red & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.red <= 8)
red|=((red & 0xff00) >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 5)
green|=((green & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.green == 6)
green|=((green & 0xc000) >> 6);
if (quantum_bits.green <= 8)
green|=((green & 0xff00) >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 5)
blue|=((blue & 0xe000) >> 5);
if (quantum_bits.blue <= 8)
blue|=((blue & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha <= 8)
alpha|=((alpha & 0xff00) >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*24+31)/32);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert bitfield encoded DirectColor scanline.
*/
if ((bmp_info.compression != BI_RGB) &&
(bmp_info.compression != BI_BITFIELDS))
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompression");
}
bytes_per_line=4*(image->columns);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
unsigned int
alpha,
pixel;
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(unsigned int) (*p++);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 8);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 16);
pixel|=((unsigned int) *p++ << 24);
red=((pixel & bmp_info.red_mask) << shift.red) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.red == 8)
red|=(red >> 8);
green=((pixel & bmp_info.green_mask) << shift.green) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.green == 8)
green|=(green >> 8);
blue=((pixel & bmp_info.blue_mask) << shift.blue) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.blue == 8)
blue|=(blue >> 8);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) blue),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
alpha=((pixel & bmp_info.alpha_mask) << shift.alpha) >> 16;
if (quantum_bits.alpha == 8)
alpha|=(alpha >> 8);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) alpha),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) (image->rows-y-1);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
(image->rows-y),image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (y > 0)
break;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (bmp_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
ReplaceImageInList(&image, flipped_image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
/*
Read embeded ICC profile
*/
if ((bmp_info.colorspace == 0x4D424544L) && (profile_data > 0) &&
(profile_size > 0))
{
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned char
*datum;
offset=start_position+14+profile_data;
if ((offset < TellBlob(image)) ||
(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET) != offset) ||
(GetBlobSize(image) < (MagickSizeType) (offset+profile_size)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
profile=AcquireStringInfo((size_t) profile_size);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (ReadBlob(image,(size_t) profile_size,datum) == (ssize_t) profile_size)
{
MagickOffsetType
profile_size_orig;
/*
Trimming padded bytes.
*/
profile_size_orig=(MagickOffsetType) datum[0] << 24;
profile_size_orig|=(MagickOffsetType) datum[1] << 16;
profile_size_orig|=(MagickOffsetType) datum[2] << 8;
profile_size_orig|=(MagickOffsetType) datum[3];
if (profile_size_orig < profile_size)
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) profile_size_orig);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Profile: ICC, %u bytes",(unsigned int) profile_size_orig);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
}
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) bmp_info.ba_offset;
if (offset != 0)
if ((offset < TellBlob(image)) ||
(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET) != offset))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
*magick='\0';
count=ReadBlob(image,2,magick);
if ((count == 2) && (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Acquire next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (IsBMP(magick,2) != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadVIFFImage in coders/viff.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600 | Medium | 169,622 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: activate_desktop_file (ActivateParameters *parameters,
NautilusFile *file)
{
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters_desktop;
char *primary, *secondary, *display_name;
GtkWidget *dialog;
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
if (!nautilus_file_is_trusted_link (file))
{
/* copy the parts of parameters we are interested in as the orignal will be freed */
parameters_desktop = g_new0 (ActivateParametersDesktop, 1);
if (parameters->parent_window)
{
parameters_desktop->parent_window = parameters->parent_window;
g_object_add_weak_pointer (G_OBJECT (parameters_desktop->parent_window), (gpointer *) ¶meters_desktop->parent_window);
}
parameters_desktop->file = nautilus_file_ref (file);
primary = _("Untrusted application launcher");
display_name = nautilus_file_get_display_name (file);
secondary =
g_strdup_printf (_("The application launcher “%s” has not been marked as trusted. "
"If you do not know the source of this file, launching it may be unsafe."
),
display_name);
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new (parameters->parent_window,
0,
GTK_MESSAGE_WARNING,
GTK_BUTTONS_NONE,
NULL);
g_object_set (dialog,
"text", primary,
"secondary-text", secondary,
NULL);
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("_Launch Anyway"), RESPONSE_RUN);
if (nautilus_file_can_set_permissions (file))
{
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("Mark as _Trusted"), RESPONSE_MARK_TRUSTED);
}
gtk_dialog_add_button (GTK_DIALOG (dialog),
_("_Cancel"), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
gtk_dialog_set_default_response (GTK_DIALOG (dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL);
g_signal_connect (dialog, "response",
G_CALLBACK (untrusted_launcher_response_callback),
parameters_desktop);
gtk_widget_show (dialog);
g_free (display_name);
g_free (secondary);
return;
}
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (file);
DEBUG ("Launching trusted launcher %s", uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991 | Medium | 167,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BoundingBox "BoundingBox:"
#define BeginDocument "BeginDocument:"
#define BeginXMPPacket "<?xpacket begin="
#define EndXMPPacket "<?xpacket end="
#define ICCProfile "BeginICCProfile:"
#define CMYKCustomColor "CMYKCustomColor:"
#define CMYKProcessColor "CMYKProcessColor:"
#define DocumentMedia "DocumentMedia:"
#define DocumentCustomColors "DocumentCustomColors:"
#define DocumentProcessColors "DocumentProcessColors:"
#define EndDocument "EndDocument:"
#define HiResBoundingBox "HiResBoundingBox:"
#define ImageData "ImageData:"
#define PageBoundingBox "PageBoundingBox:"
#define LanguageLevel "LanguageLevel:"
#define PageMedia "PageMedia:"
#define Pages "Pages:"
#define PhotoshopProfile "BeginPhotoshop:"
#define PostscriptLevel "!PS-"
#define RenderPostscriptText " Rendering Postscript... "
#define SpotColor "+ "
char
command[MaxTextExtent],
*density,
filename[MaxTextExtent],
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
input_filename[MaxTextExtent],
message[MaxTextExtent],
*options,
postscript_filename[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*option;
const DelegateInfo
*delegate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image,
*next,
*postscript_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
file;
MagickBooleanType
cmyk,
fitPage,
skip,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution;
RectangleInfo
page;
register char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds,
hires_bounds;
short int
hex_digits[256];
size_t
length,
priority;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned long
columns,
extent,
language_level,
pages,
rows,
scene,
spotcolor;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=AcquireUniqueSymbolicLink(image_info->filename,input_filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",
image_info->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize hex values.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(hex_digits,0,sizeof(hex_digits));
hex_digits[(int) '0']=0;
hex_digits[(int) '1']=1;
hex_digits[(int) '2']=2;
hex_digits[(int) '3']=3;
hex_digits[(int) '4']=4;
hex_digits[(int) '5']=5;
hex_digits[(int) '6']=6;
hex_digits[(int) '7']=7;
hex_digits[(int) '8']=8;
hex_digits[(int) '9']=9;
hex_digits[(int) 'a']=10;
hex_digits[(int) 'b']=11;
hex_digits[(int) 'c']=12;
hex_digits[(int) 'd']=13;
hex_digits[(int) 'e']=14;
hex_digits[(int) 'f']=15;
hex_digits[(int) 'A']=10;
hex_digits[(int) 'B']=11;
hex_digits[(int) 'C']=12;
hex_digits[(int) 'D']=13;
hex_digits[(int) 'E']=14;
hex_digits[(int) 'F']=15;
/*
Set the page density.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
if ((image->x_resolution == 0.0) || (image->y_resolution == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(PSPageGeometry,&page);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
resolution.x=image->x_resolution;
resolution.y=image->y_resolution;
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*resolution.x/delta.x)-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*resolution.y/delta.y)-0.5);
/*
Determine page geometry from the Postscript bounding box.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bounds,0,sizeof(bounds));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(command,0,sizeof(command));
cmyk=image_info->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&hires_bounds,0,sizeof(hires_bounds));
priority=0;
columns=0;
rows=0;
extent=0;
spotcolor=0;
language_level=1;
skip=MagickFalse;
pages=(~0UL);
p=command;
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
/*
Note document structuring comments.
*/
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MaxTextExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
/*
Skip %%BeginDocument thru %%EndDocument.
*/
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginDocument,command,strlen(BeginDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndDocument,command,strlen(EndDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickFalse;
if (skip != MagickFalse)
continue;
if (LocaleNCompare(PostscriptLevel,command,strlen(PostscriptLevel)) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:Level",command+4);
if (GlobExpression(command,"*EPSF-*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse)
pages=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(LanguageLevel,command,strlen(LanguageLevel)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,LanguageLevel " %lu",&language_level);
if (LocaleNCompare(Pages,command,strlen(Pages)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,Pages " %lu",&pages);
if (LocaleNCompare(ImageData,command,strlen(ImageData)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,ImageData " %lu %lu",&columns,&rows);
if (LocaleNCompare(ICCProfile,command,strlen(ICCProfile)) == 0)
{
unsigned char
*datum;
/*
Read ICC profile.
*/
profile=AcquireStringInfo(MaxTextExtent);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; (c=ProfileInteger(image,hex_digits)) != EOF; i++)
{
if (i >= (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile))
{
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i << 1);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
}
datum[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i+1);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
continue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PhotoshopProfile,command,strlen(PhotoshopProfile)) == 0)
{
unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read Photoshop profile.
*/
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PhotoshopProfile " %lu",&extent);
if (count != 1)
continue;
length=extent;
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ProfileInteger(image,hex_digits);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"8bim",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
continue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginXMPPacket,command,strlen(BeginXMPPacket)) == 0)
{
register size_t
i;
/*
Read XMP profile.
*/
p=command;
profile=StringToStringInfo(command);
for (i=GetStringInfoLength(profile)-1; c != EOF; i++)
{
SetStringInfoLength(profile,i+1);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i]=(unsigned char) c;
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MaxTextExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndXMPPacket,command,strlen(EndXMPPacket)) == 0)
break;
}
SetStringInfoLength(profile,i);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"xmp",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
continue;
}
/*
Is this a CMYK document?
*/
length=strlen(DocumentProcessColors);
if (LocaleNCompare(DocumentProcessColors,command,length) == 0)
{
if ((GlobExpression(command,"*Cyan*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse) ||
(GlobExpression(command,"*Magenta*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse) ||
(GlobExpression(command,"*Yellow*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse))
cmyk=MagickTrue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(CMYKCustomColor,command,strlen(CMYKCustomColor)) == 0)
cmyk=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(CMYKProcessColor,command,strlen(CMYKProcessColor)) == 0)
cmyk=MagickTrue;
length=strlen(DocumentCustomColors);
if ((LocaleNCompare(DocumentCustomColors,command,length) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(CMYKCustomColor,command,strlen(CMYKCustomColor)) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(SpotColor,command,strlen(SpotColor)) == 0))
{
char
property[MaxTextExtent],
*value;
register char
*p;
/*
Note spot names.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MaxTextExtent,"ps:SpotColor-%.20g",
(double) (spotcolor++));
for (p=command; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (isspace((int) (unsigned char) *p) != 0)
break;
value=AcquireString(p);
(void) SubstituteString(&value,"(","");
(void) SubstituteString(&value,")","");
(void) StripString(value);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,property,value);
value=DestroyString(value);
continue;
}
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
continue;
/*
Note region defined by bounding box.
*/
count=0;
i=0;
if (LocaleNCompare(BoundingBox,command,strlen(BoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,BoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=2;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(DocumentMedia,command,strlen(DocumentMedia)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,DocumentMedia " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(HiResBoundingBox,command,strlen(HiResBoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,HiResBoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=3;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PageBoundingBox,command,strlen(PageBoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PageBoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PageMedia,command,strlen(PageMedia)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PageMedia " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if ((count != 4) || (i < (ssize_t) priority))
continue;
if ((fabs(bounds.x2-bounds.x1) <= fabs(hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1)) ||
(fabs(bounds.y2-bounds.y1) <= fabs(hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1)))
if (i == (ssize_t) priority)
continue;
hires_bounds=bounds;
priority=i;
}
if ((fabs(hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1) >= MagickEpsilon) &&
(fabs(hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1) >= MagickEpsilon))
{
/*
Set Postscript render geometry.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%gx%g%+.15g%+.15g",
hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1,hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1,
hires_bounds.x1,hires_bounds.y1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:HiResBoundingBox",geometry);
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) ((hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1)*
resolution.x/delta.x)-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) ((hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1)*
resolution.y/delta.y)-0.5);
}
fitPage=MagickFalse;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"eps:fit-page");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
char
*geometry;
MagickStatusType
flags;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(option);
flags=ParseMetaGeometry(geometry,&page.x,&page.y,&page.width,&page.height);
if (flags == NoValue)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"InvalidGeometry","`%s'",option);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*image->x_resolution/delta.x)
-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*image->y_resolution/
delta.y) -0.5);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
fitPage=MagickTrue;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image_info->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
cmyk=MagickFalse;
/*
Create Ghostscript control file.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image_info->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(command,"/setpagedevice {pop} bind 1 index where {"
"dup wcheck {3 1 roll put} {pop def} ifelse} {def} ifelse\n"
"<</UseCIEColor true>>setpagedevice\n",MaxTextExtent);
count=write(file,command,(unsigned int) strlen(command));
if (image_info->page == (char *) NULL)
{
char
translate_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(translate_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%g %g translate\n",-hires_bounds.x1,-hires_bounds.y1);
count=write(file,translate_geometry,(unsigned int)
strlen(translate_geometry));
}
file=close(file)-1;
/*
Render Postscript with the Ghostscript delegate.
*/
if (image_info->monochrome != MagickFalse)
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:mono",(char *) NULL,exception);
else
if (cmyk != MagickFalse)
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:cmyk",(char *) NULL,exception);
else
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:alpha",(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
density=AcquireString("");
options=AcquireString("");
(void) FormatLocaleString(density,MaxTextExtent,"%gx%g",resolution.x,
resolution.y);
(void) FormatLocaleString(options,MaxTextExtent,"-g%.20gx%.20g ",(double)
page.width,(double) page.height);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
*read_info->magick='\0';
if (read_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
char
pages[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pages,MaxTextExtent,"-dFirstPage=%.20g "
"-dLastPage=%.20g ",(double) read_info->scene+1,(double)
(read_info->scene+read_info->number_scenes));
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,pages,MaxTextExtent);
read_info->number_scenes=0;
if (read_info->scenes != (char *) NULL)
*read_info->scenes='\0';
}
if (*image_info->magick == 'E')
{
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"eps:use-cropbox");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,"-dEPSCrop ",MaxTextExtent);
if (fitPage != MagickFalse)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,"-dEPSFitPage ",MaxTextExtent);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(filename,"%d",MaxTextExtent);
(void) FormatLocaleString(command,MaxTextExtent,
GetDelegateCommands(delegate_info),
read_info->antialias != MagickFalse ? 4 : 1,
read_info->antialias != MagickFalse ? 4 : 1,density,options,filename,
postscript_filename,input_filename);
options=DestroyString(options);
density=DestroyString(density);
*message='\0';
status=InvokePostscriptDelegate(read_info->verbose,command,message,exception);
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,1,
read_info->filename);
if ((status == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse))
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(command," -c showpage",MaxTextExtent);
status=InvokePostscriptDelegate(read_info->verbose,command,message,
exception);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(input_filename);
postscript_image=(Image *) NULL;
if (status == MagickFalse)
for (i=1; ; i++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,(int) i,
read_info->filename);
if (IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
}
else
for (i=1; ; i++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,(int) i,
read_info->filename);
if (IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
break;
read_info->blob=NULL;
read_info->length=0;
next=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
if (next == (Image *) NULL)
break;
AppendImageToList(&postscript_image,next);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (postscript_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (*message != '\0')
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),DelegateError,
"PostscriptDelegateFailed","`%s'",message);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (LocaleCompare(postscript_image->magick,"BMP") == 0)
{
Image
*cmyk_image;
cmyk_image=ConsolidateCMYKImages(postscript_image,exception);
if (cmyk_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
postscript_image=DestroyImageList(postscript_image);
postscript_image=cmyk_image;
}
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
Image
*clone_image;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Add place holder images to meet the subimage specification requirement.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
clone_image=CloneImage(postscript_image,1,1,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image != (Image *) NULL)
PrependImageToList(&postscript_image,clone_image);
}
}
do
{
(void) CopyMagickString(postscript_image->filename,filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(postscript_image->magick,image->magick,
MaxTextExtent);
if (columns != 0)
postscript_image->magick_columns=columns;
if (rows != 0)
postscript_image->magick_rows=rows;
postscript_image->page=page;
(void) CloneImageProfiles(postscript_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(postscript_image,image);
next=SyncNextImageInList(postscript_image);
if (next != (Image *) NULL)
postscript_image=next;
} while (next != (Image *) NULL);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
scene=0;
for (next=GetFirstImageInList(postscript_image); next != (Image *) NULL; )
{
next->scene=scene++;
next=GetNextImageInList(next);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(postscript_image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-834
Summary: In coders/ps.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-0 Q16, a DoS in ReadPSImage() due to lack of an EOF (End of File) check might cause huge CPU consumption. When a crafted PSD file, which claims a large *extent* field in the header but does not contain sufficient backing data, is provided, the loop over *length* would consume huge CPU resources, since there is no EOF check inside the loop.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715 | High | 167,762 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_create_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
size_t pos;
UINT status;
UINT32 ChannelId;
wStream* data_out;
UINT channel_status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_CHANNEL_HANDLE;
if (drdynvc->state == DRDYNVC_STATE_CAPABILITIES)
{
/**
* For some reason the server does not always send the
* capabilities pdu as it should. When this happens,
* send a capabilities response.
*/
drdynvc->version = 3;
if ((status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "drdynvc_send_capability_response failed!");
return status;
}
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
}
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
pos = Stream_GetPosition(s);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "process_create_request: ChannelId=%"PRIu32" ChannelName=%s",
ChannelId,
Stream_Pointer(s));
channel_status = dvcman_create_channel(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId,
(char*) Stream_Pointer(s));
data_out = Stream_New(NULL, pos + 4);
if (!data_out)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
Stream_Write_UINT8(data_out, 0x10 | cbChId);
Stream_SetPosition(s, 1);
Stream_Copy(s, data_out, pos - 1);
if (channel_status == CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "channel created");
Stream_Write_UINT32(data_out, 0);
}
else
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "no listener");
Stream_Write_UINT32(data_out, (UINT32)0xC0000001); /* same code used by mstsc */
}
status = drdynvc_send(drdynvc, data_out);
if (status != CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "VirtualChannelWriteEx failed with %s [%08"PRIX32"]",
WTSErrorToString(status), status);
return status;
}
if (channel_status == CHANNEL_RC_OK)
{
if ((status = dvcman_open_channel(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_open_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", status);
return status;
}
}
else
{
if ((status = dvcman_close_channel(drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId)))
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "dvcman_close_channel failed with error %"PRIu32"!", status);
}
return status;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: FreeRDP FreeRDP 2.0.0-rc3 released version before commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3 contains a Other/Unknown vulnerability in channels/drdynvc/client/drdynvc_main.c, drdynvc_process_capability_request that can result in The RDP server can read the client's memory.. This attack appear to be exploitable via RDPClient must connect the rdp server with echo option. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in after commit 205c612820dac644d665b5bb1cdf437dc5ca01e3.
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks | High | 168,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params,
int gpu_host_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
params.route_id, gpu_host_id, true, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,391 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.DirectoryEntry.getDirectory");
DirectoryEntry* imp = V8DirectoryEntry::toNative(args.Holder());
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, path, args[0]);
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->getDirectory(path);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
RefPtr<WebKitFlags> flags;
if (!isUndefinedOrNull(args[1]) && args[1]->IsObject()) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(v8::Handle<v8::Object>, object, v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(args[1]));
flags = WebKitFlags::create();
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Create = object->Get(v8::String::New("create"));
if (!v8Create.IsEmpty() && !isUndefinedOrNull(v8Create)) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(bool, isCreate, v8Create->BooleanValue());
flags->setCreate(isCreate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8Exclusive = object->Get(v8::String::New("exclusive"));
if (!v8Exclusive.IsEmpty() && !isUndefinedOrNull(v8Exclusive)) {
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(bool, isExclusive, v8Exclusive->BooleanValue());
flags->setExclusive(isExclusive);
}
}
RefPtr<EntryCallback> successCallback;
if (args.Length() > 2 && !args[2]->IsNull() && !args[2]->IsUndefined()) {
if (!args[2]->IsObject())
return throwError(TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
successCallback = V8EntryCallback::create(args[2], getScriptExecutionContext());
}
RefPtr<ErrorCallback> errorCallback;
if (args.Length() > 3 && !args[3]->IsNull() && !args[3]->IsUndefined()) {
if (!args[3]->IsObject())
return throwError(TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
errorCallback = V8ErrorCallback::create(args[3], getScriptExecutionContext());
}
imp->getDirectory(path, flags, successCallback, errorCallback);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 171,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: yyparse (void *YYPARSE_PARAM)
#else
int
yyparse (YYPARSE_PARAM)
void *YYPARSE_PARAM;
#endif
#else /* ! YYPARSE_PARAM */
#if (defined __STDC__ || defined __C99__FUNC__ \
|| defined __cplusplus || defined _MSC_VER)
int
yyparse (void)
#else
int
yyparse ()
#endif
#endif
{
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
`yyss': related to states.
`yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks thru separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yytoken = 0;
yyss = yyssa;
yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
/* Initialize stack pointers.
Waste one element of value and location stack
so that they stay on the same level as the state stack.
The wasted elements are never initialized. */
yyssp = yyss;
yyvsp = yyvs;
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yyn == YYPACT_NINF)
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = YYLEX;
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yyn == 0 || yyn == YYTABLE_NINF)
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
*++yyvsp = yylval;
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
`$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 5:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 320 "ntp_parser.y"
{
/* I will need to incorporate much more fine grained
* error messages. The following should suffice for
* the time being.
*/
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"syntax error in %s line %d, column %d",
ip_file->fname,
ip_file->err_line_no,
ip_file->err_col_no);
}
break;
case 19:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 354 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct peer_node *my_node = create_peer_node((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue));
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.peers, my_node);
}
break;
case 20:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 360 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct peer_node *my_node = create_peer_node((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node), NULL);
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.peers, my_node);
}
break;
case 27:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 377 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String), AF_INET); }
break;
case 28:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 378 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String), AF_INET6); }
break;
case 29:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 382 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String), 0); }
break;
case 30:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 386 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 31:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 387 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 32:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 391 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 33:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 392 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 34:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 393 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 35:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 394 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 36:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 395 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 37:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 396 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 38:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 397 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 39:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 398 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 40:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 399 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 41:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 400 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 42:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 401 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 43:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 402 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 44:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 403 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 45:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 404 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 46:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 405 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 47:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 415 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct unpeer_node *my_node = create_unpeer_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node));
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.unpeers, my_node);
}
break;
case 50:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 434 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.broadcastclient = 1; }
break;
case 51:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 436 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.manycastserver, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 52:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 438 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.multicastclient, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 53:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 449 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 54:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 451 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.control_key = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 55:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 453 "ntp_parser.y"
{
cfgt.auth.cryptosw++;
append_queue(cfgt.auth.crypto_cmd_list, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 56:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 458 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.keys = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 57:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 460 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.keysdir = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 58:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 462 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.request_key = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 59:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 464 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.revoke = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 60:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 466 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.trusted_key_list = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue); }
break;
case 61:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 468 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.ntp_signd_socket = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 63:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 474 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = create_queue(); }
break;
case 64:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 479 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 65:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 486 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 66:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 496 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 67:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 498 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 68:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 500 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 69:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 502 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 70:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 504 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 71:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 506 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 72:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 508 "ntp_parser.y"
{
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
cfgt.auth.revoke = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer);
msyslog(LOG_WARNING,
"'crypto revoke %d' is deprecated, "
"please use 'revoke %d' instead.",
cfgt.auth.revoke, cfgt.auth.revoke);
}
break;
case 73:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 525 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.orphan_cmds,(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 74:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 529 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 75:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 530 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 76:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 535 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 77:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 537 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 78:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 539 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 79:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 541 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 80:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 543 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 81:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 545 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 82:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 547 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 83:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 549 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 84:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 551 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 85:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 553 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 86:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 555 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 87:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 565 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.stats_list, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 88:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 567 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
cfgt.stats_dir = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String);
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("statsdir remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 89:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 576 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.filegen_opts,
create_filegen_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue)));
}
break;
case 90:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 583 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 91:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 584 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer))); }
break;
case 100:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 600 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 101:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 607 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 102:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 617 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("filegen file remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 103:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 627 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen type remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 104:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 636 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen link remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 105:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 645 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen nolink remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 106:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 653 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 107:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 654 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 115:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 674 "ntp_parser.y"
{
append_queue(cfgt.discard_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 116:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 678 "ntp_parser.y"
{
append_queue(cfgt.mru_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 117:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 682 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), NULL, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 118:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 687 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node((yyvsp[(2) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(5) - (5)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 119:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 692 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(NULL, NULL, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 120:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 697 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
create_address_node(
estrdup("0.0.0.0"),
AF_INET),
create_address_node(
estrdup("0.0.0.0"),
AF_INET),
(yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Queue),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 121:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 710 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
create_address_node(
estrdup("::"),
AF_INET6),
create_address_node(
estrdup("::"),
AF_INET6),
(yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Queue),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 122:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 723 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
NULL, NULL,
enqueue((yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer))),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 123:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 734 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = create_queue(); }
break;
case 124:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 736 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 139:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 758 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 140:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 760 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 141:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 764 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 142:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 765 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 143:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 766 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 144:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 771 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 145:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 773 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 146:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 777 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 147:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 778 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 148:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 779 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 149:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 780 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 150:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 781 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 151:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 782 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 152:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 783 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 153:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 784 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 154:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 793 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.fudge, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue))); }
break;
case 155:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 798 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 156:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 800 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 157:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 804 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 158:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 805 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 159:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 806 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 160:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 807 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 161:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 808 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 162:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 809 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 163:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 810 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 164:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 811 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 165:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 820 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.enable_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 166:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 822 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.disable_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 167:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 827 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 168:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 834 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 169:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 843 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 170:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 844 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 171:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 845 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 172:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 846 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 173:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 847 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 174:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 848 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 175:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 850 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("enable/disable stats remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 176:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 865 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.tinker, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 177:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 869 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 178:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 870 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 179:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 874 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 180:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 875 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 181:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 876 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 182:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 877 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 183:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 878 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 184:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 879 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 185:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 880 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 187:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 891 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (curr_include_level >= MAXINCLUDELEVEL) {
fprintf(stderr, "getconfig: Maximum include file level exceeded.\n");
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "getconfig: Maximum include file level exceeded.");
}
else {
fp[curr_include_level + 1] = F_OPEN(FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)), "r");
if (fp[curr_include_level + 1] == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>\n", FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)));
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)));
}
else
ip_file = fp[++curr_include_level];
}
}
break;
case 188:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 907 "ntp_parser.y"
{
while (curr_include_level != -1)
FCLOSE(fp[curr_include_level--]);
}
break;
case 189:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 913 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double))); }
break;
case 190:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 915 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 191:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 917 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double))); }
break;
case 192:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 919 "ntp_parser.y"
{ /* Null action, possibly all null parms */ }
break;
case 193:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 921 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 194:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 924 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 195:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 926 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
enqueue(cfgt.vars,
create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)));
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("logfile remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 196:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 937 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.logconfig, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 197:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 939 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.phone, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 198:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 941 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
enqueue(cfgt.vars,
create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)));
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("saveconfigdir remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 199:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 951 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.setvar, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Set_var)); }
break;
case 200:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 953 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.trap, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node), NULL)); }
break;
case 201:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 955 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.trap, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue))); }
break;
case 202:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 957 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.ttl, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 203:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 959 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.qos, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 204:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 964 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String))); }
break;
case 205:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 966 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval(T_WanderThreshold, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)));
enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 206:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 969 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, "\0")); }
break;
case 207:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 974 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Set_var) = create_setvar_node((yyvsp[(1) - (4)].String), (yyvsp[(3) - (4)].String), (yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Integer)); }
break;
case 208:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 976 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Set_var) = create_setvar_node((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].String), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].String), 0); }
break;
case 209:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 981 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 210:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 982 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 211:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 986 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 212:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 987 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_pval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 213:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 991 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 214:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 992 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 215:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 997 "ntp_parser.y"
{
char prefix = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String)[0];
char *type = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String) + 1;
if (prefix != '+' && prefix != '-' && prefix != '=') {
yyerror("Logconfig prefix is not '+', '-' or '='\n");
}
else
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval(prefix, estrdup(type));
YYFREE((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String));
}
break;
case 216:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1012 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.nic_rules,
create_nic_rule_node((yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Integer), NULL, (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer)));
}
break;
case 217:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1017 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.nic_rules,
create_nic_rule_node(0, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].String), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer)));
}
break;
case 227:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1048 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 228:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1049 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer))); }
break;
case 229:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1054 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 230:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1056 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 231:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1061 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival('i', (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 233:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1067 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_shorts('-', (yyvsp[(2) - (5)].Integer), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Integer)); }
break;
case 234:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1071 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_pval((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 235:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1072 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_pval((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String))); }
break;
case 236:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1076 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 237:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1077 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 238:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1082 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer) != 0 && (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer) != 1) {
yyerror("Integer value is not boolean (0 or 1). Assuming 1");
(yyval.Integer) = 1;
}
else
(yyval.Integer) = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer);
}
break;
case 239:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1090 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Integer) = 1; }
break;
case 240:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1091 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Integer) = 0; }
break;
case 241:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1095 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Double) = (double)(yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer); }
break;
case 243:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1106 "ntp_parser.y"
{
cfgt.sim_details = create_sim_node((yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Queue), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Queue));
/* Reset the old_config_style variable */
old_config_style = 1;
}
break;
case 244:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1120 "ntp_parser.y"
{ old_config_style = 0; }
break;
case 245:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1124 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 246:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1125 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 247:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1129 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 248:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1130 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 249:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1134 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Sim_server)); }
break;
case 250:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1135 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Sim_server)); }
break;
case 251:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1140 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Sim_server) = create_sim_server((yyvsp[(1) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Double), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Queue)); }
break;
case 252:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1144 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Double) = (yyvsp[(3) - (4)].Double); }
break;
case 253:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1148 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Address_node); }
break;
case 254:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1152 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Sim_script)); }
break;
case 255:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1153 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Sim_script)); }
break;
case 256:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1158 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Sim_script) = create_sim_script_info((yyvsp[(3) - (6)].Double), (yyvsp[(5) - (6)].Queue)); }
break;
case 257:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1162 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 258:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1163 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 259:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1168 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 260:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1170 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 261:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1172 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 262:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1174 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 263:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1176 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 3826 "ntp_parser.c"
default: break;
}
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now `shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error |
`------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (YY_("syntax error"));
#else
{
YYSIZE_T yysize = yysyntax_error (0, yystate, yychar);
if (yymsg_alloc < yysize && yymsg_alloc < YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM)
{
YYSIZE_T yyalloc = 2 * yysize;
if (! (yysize <= yyalloc && yyalloc <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
yyalloc = YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM;
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yyalloc);
if (yymsg)
yymsg_alloc = yyalloc;
else
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
}
}
if (0 < yysize && yysize <= yymsg_alloc)
{
(void) yysyntax_error (yymsg, yystate, yychar);
yyerror (yymsg);
}
else
{
yyerror (YY_("syntax error"));
if (yysize != 0)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
}
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule which action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yyn != YYPACT_NINF)
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
*++yyvsp = yylval;
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined(yyoverflow) || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval);
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule which action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
/* Make sure YYID is used. */
return YYID (yyresult);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The log_config_command function in ntp_parser.y in ntpd in NTP before 4.2.7p42 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (ntpd crash) via crafted logconfig commands.
Commit Message: [Bug 1593] ntpd abort in free() with logconfig syntax error. | Medium | 168,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint8_t smb2cli_session_security_mode(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = session->conn;
uint8_t security_mode = 0;
if (conn == NULL) {
return security_mode;
}
security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
return security_mode;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Samba 3.x and 4.x before 4.1.22, 4.2.x before 4.2.7, and 4.3.x before 4.3.3 supports connections that are encrypted but unsigned, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to conduct encrypted-to-unencrypted downgrade attacks by modifying the client-server data stream, related to clidfs.c, libsmb_server.c, and smbXcli_base.c.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: double AffineTransform::xScale() const
{
return sqrt(m_transform[0] * m_transform[0] + m_transform[1] * m_transform[1]);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 36.0.1985.143 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950} | High | 171,669 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void _sx_sasl_client_process(sx_t s, sx_plugin_t p, Gsasl_session *sd, const char *mech, const char *in, int inlen) {
_sx_sasl_t ctx = (_sx_sasl_t) p->private;
_sx_sasl_sess_t sctx = NULL;
char *buf = NULL, *out = NULL, *realm = NULL, **ext_id;
char hostname[256];
int ret;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
int i;
#endif
size_t buflen, outlen;
assert(ctx);
assert(ctx->cb);
if(mech != NULL) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "auth request from client (mechanism=%s)", mech);
if(!gsasl_server_support_p(ctx->gsasl_ctx, mech)) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "client requested mechanism (%s) that we didn't offer", mech);
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INVALID_MECHANISM, NULL), 0);
return;
}
/* startup */
ret = gsasl_server_start(ctx->gsasl_ctx, mech, &sd);
if(ret != GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_server_start failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_TEMPORARY_FAILURE, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
return;
}
/* get the realm */
(ctx->cb)(sx_sasl_cb_GET_REALM, NULL, (void **) &realm, s, ctx->cbarg);
/* cleanup any existing session context */
sctx = gsasl_session_hook_get(sd);
if (sctx != NULL) free(sctx);
/* allocate and initialize our per session context */
sctx = (_sx_sasl_sess_t) calloc(1, sizeof(struct _sx_sasl_sess_st));
sctx->s = s;
sctx->ctx = ctx;
gsasl_session_hook_set(sd, (void *) sctx);
gsasl_property_set(sd, GSASL_SERVICE, ctx->appname);
gsasl_property_set(sd, GSASL_REALM, realm);
/* get hostname */
hostname[0] = '\0';
gethostname(hostname, 256);
hostname[255] = '\0';
gsasl_property_set(sd, GSASL_HOSTNAME, hostname);
/* get EXTERNAL data from the ssl plugin */
ext_id = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
for(i = 0; i < s->env->nplugins; i++)
if(s->env->plugins[i]->magic == SX_SSL_MAGIC && s->plugin_data[s->env->plugins[i]->index] != NULL)
ext_id = ((_sx_ssl_conn_t) s->plugin_data[s->env->plugins[i]->index])->external_id;
if (ext_id != NULL) {
/* if there is, store it for later */
for (i = 0; i < SX_CONN_EXTERNAL_ID_MAX_COUNT; i++)
if (ext_id[i] != NULL) {
ctx->ext_id[i] = strdup(ext_id[i]);
} else {
ctx->ext_id[i] = NULL;
break;
}
}
#endif
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl context initialised for %d", s->tag);
s->plugin_data[p->index] = (void *) sd;
if(strcmp(mech, "ANONYMOUS") == 0) {
/*
* special case for SASL ANONYMOUS: ignore the initial
* response provided by the client and generate a random
* authid to use as the jid node for the user, as
* specified in XEP-0175
*/
(ctx->cb)(sx_sasl_cb_GEN_AUTHZID, NULL, (void **)&out, s, ctx->cbarg);
buf = strdup(out);
buflen = strlen(buf);
} else if (strstr(in, "<") != NULL && strncmp(in, "=", strstr(in, "<") - in ) == 0) {
/* XXX The above check is hackish, but `in` is just weird */
/* This is a special case for SASL External c2s. See XEP-0178 */
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl auth string is empty");
buf = strdup("");
buflen = strlen(buf);
} else {
/* decode and process */
ret = gsasl_base64_from(in, inlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret != GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_from failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
return;
}
}
ret = gsasl_step(sd, buf, buflen, &out, &outlen);
}
else {
/* decode and process */
ret = gsasl_base64_from(in, inlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret != GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_from failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
return;
}
if(!sd) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "response send before auth request enabling mechanism (decoded: %.*s)", buflen, buf);
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_MECH_TOO_WEAK, "response send before auth request enabling mechanism"), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
return;
}
_sx_debug(ZONE, "response from client (decoded: %.*s)", buflen, buf);
ret = gsasl_step(sd, buf, buflen, &out, &outlen);
}
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
/* auth completed */
if(ret == GSASL_OK) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl handshake completed");
/* encode the leftover response */
ret = gsasl_base64_to(out, outlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret == GSASL_OK) {
/* send success */
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_success(s, buf, buflen), 0);
free(buf);
/* set a notify on the success nad buffer */
((sx_buf_t) s->wbufq->front->data)->notify = _sx_sasl_notify_success;
((sx_buf_t) s->wbufq->front->data)->notify_arg = (void *) p;
}
else {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_to failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
}
if(out != NULL) free(out);
return;
}
/* in progress */
if(ret == GSASL_NEEDS_MORE) {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl handshake in progress (challenge: %.*s)", outlen, out);
/* encode the challenge */
ret = gsasl_base64_to(out, outlen, &buf, &buflen);
if (ret == GSASL_OK) {
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_challenge(s, buf, buflen), 0);
free(buf);
}
else {
_sx_debug(ZONE, "gsasl_base64_to failed, no sasl for this conn; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
if(buf != NULL) free(buf);
}
if(out != NULL) free(out);
return;
}
if(out != NULL) free(out);
/* its over */
_sx_debug(ZONE, "sasl handshake failed; (%d): %s", ret, gsasl_strerror(ret));
switch (ret) {
case GSASL_AUTHENTICATION_ERROR:
case GSASL_NO_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN:
case GSASL_NO_AUTHID:
case GSASL_NO_AUTHZID:
case GSASL_NO_PASSWORD:
case GSASL_NO_PASSCODE:
case GSASL_NO_PIN:
case GSASL_NO_SERVICE:
case GSASL_NO_HOSTNAME:
out = _sasl_err_NOT_AUTHORIZED;
break;
case GSASL_UNKNOWN_MECHANISM:
case GSASL_MECHANISM_PARSE_ERROR:
out = _sasl_err_INVALID_MECHANISM;
break;
case GSASL_BASE64_ERROR:
out = _sasl_err_INCORRECT_ENCODING;
break;
default:
out = _sasl_err_MALFORMED_REQUEST;
}
_sx_nad_write(s, _sx_sasl_failure(s, out, gsasl_strerror(ret)), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: JabberD 2.x (aka jabberd2) before 2.6.1 allows anyone to authenticate using SASL ANONYMOUS, even when the sasl.anonymous c2s.xml option is not enabled.
Commit Message: Fixed offered SASL mechanism check | High | 168,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xsltAddTemplate(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xsltTemplatePtr cur,
const xmlChar *mode, const xmlChar *modeURI) {
xsltCompMatchPtr pat, list, next;
/*
* 'top' will point to style->xxxMatch ptr - declaring as 'void'
* avoids gcc 'type-punned pointer' warning.
*/
void **top = NULL;
const xmlChar *name = NULL;
float priority; /* the priority */
if ((style == NULL) || (cur == NULL) || (cur->match == NULL))
return(-1);
priority = cur->priority;
pat = xsltCompilePatternInternal(cur->match, style->doc, cur->elem,
style, NULL, 1);
if (pat == NULL)
return(-1);
while (pat) {
next = pat->next;
pat->next = NULL;
name = NULL;
pat->template = cur;
if (mode != NULL)
pat->mode = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, mode, -1);
if (modeURI != NULL)
pat->modeURI = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, modeURI, -1);
if (priority != XSLT_PAT_NO_PRIORITY)
pat->priority = priority;
/*
* insert it in the hash table list corresponding to its lookup name
*/
switch (pat->steps[0].op) {
case XSLT_OP_ATTR:
if (pat->steps[0].value != NULL)
name = pat->steps[0].value;
else
top = &(style->attrMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_PARENT:
case XSLT_OP_ANCESTOR:
top = &(style->elemMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_ROOT:
top = &(style->rootMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_KEY:
top = &(style->keyMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_ID:
/* TODO optimize ID !!! */
case XSLT_OP_NS:
case XSLT_OP_ALL:
top = &(style->elemMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_END:
case XSLT_OP_PREDICATE:
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, NULL,
"xsltAddTemplate: invalid compiled pattern\n");
xsltFreeCompMatch(pat);
return(-1);
/*
* TODO: some flags at the top level about type based patterns
* would be faster than inclusion in the hash table.
*/
case XSLT_OP_PI:
if (pat->steps[0].value != NULL)
name = pat->steps[0].value;
else
top = &(style->piMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_COMMENT:
top = &(style->commentMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_TEXT:
top = &(style->textMatch);
break;
case XSLT_OP_ELEM:
case XSLT_OP_NODE:
if (pat->steps[0].value != NULL)
name = pat->steps[0].value;
else
top = &(style->elemMatch);
break;
}
if (name != NULL) {
if (style->templatesHash == NULL) {
style->templatesHash = xmlHashCreate(1024);
if (style->templatesHash == NULL) {
xsltFreeCompMatch(pat);
return(-1);
}
xmlHashAddEntry3(style->templatesHash, name, mode, modeURI, pat);
} else {
list = (xsltCompMatchPtr) xmlHashLookup3(style->templatesHash,
name, mode, modeURI);
if (list == NULL) {
xmlHashAddEntry3(style->templatesHash, name,
mode, modeURI, pat);
} else {
/*
* Note '<=' since one must choose among the matching
* template rules that are left, the one that occurs
* last in the stylesheet
*/
if (list->priority <= pat->priority) {
pat->next = list;
xmlHashUpdateEntry3(style->templatesHash, name,
mode, modeURI, pat, NULL);
} else {
while (list->next != NULL) {
if (list->next->priority <= pat->priority)
break;
list = list->next;
}
pat->next = list->next;
list->next = pat;
}
}
}
} else if (top != NULL) {
list = *top;
if (list == NULL) {
*top = pat;
pat->next = NULL;
} else if (list->priority <= pat->priority) {
pat->next = list;
*top = pat;
} else {
while (list->next != NULL) {
if (list->next->priority <= pat->priority)
break;
list = list->next;
}
pat->next = list->next;
list->next = pat;
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, NULL,
"xsltAddTemplate: invalid compiled pattern\n");
xsltFreeCompMatch(pat);
return(-1);
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PATTERN
if (mode)
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"added pattern : '%s' mode '%s' priority %f\n",
pat->pattern, pat->mode, pat->priority);
else
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"added pattern : '%s' priority %f\n",
pat->pattern, pat->priority);
#endif
pat = next;
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | Medium | 173,310 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_options *opt)
{
struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
u8 *hash_location;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__u32 cookie = ntohl(th->ack_seq) - 1;
struct sock *ret = sk;
struct request_sock *req;
int mss;
struct rtable *rt;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
bool ecn_ok;
if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack || th->rst)
goto out;
if (tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow(sk) ||
(mss = cookie_check(skb, cookie)) == 0) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESFAILED);
goto out;
}
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_SYNCOOKIESRECV);
/* check for timestamp cookie support */
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &hash_location, 0);
if (!cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt, &ecn_ok))
goto out;
ret = NULL;
req = inet_reqsk_alloc(&tcp_request_sock_ops); /* for safety */
if (!req)
goto out;
ireq = inet_rsk(req);
treq = tcp_rsk(req);
treq->rcv_isn = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
treq->snt_isn = cookie;
req->mss = mss;
ireq->loc_port = th->dest;
ireq->rmt_port = th->source;
ireq->loc_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
ireq->rmt_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
ireq->ecn_ok = ecn_ok;
ireq->snd_wscale = tcp_opt.snd_wscale;
ireq->sack_ok = tcp_opt.sack_ok;
ireq->wscale_ok = tcp_opt.wscale_ok;
ireq->tstamp_ok = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp;
req->ts_recent = tcp_opt.saw_tstamp ? tcp_opt.rcv_tsval : 0;
/* We throwed the options of the initial SYN away, so we hope
* the ACK carries the same options again (see RFC1122 4.2.3.8)
*/
if (opt && opt->optlen) {
int opt_size = sizeof(struct ip_options) + opt->optlen;
ireq->opt = kmalloc(opt_size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ireq->opt != NULL && ip_options_echo(ireq->opt, skb)) {
kfree(ireq->opt);
ireq->opt = NULL;
}
}
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) {
reqsk_free(req);
goto out;
}
req->expires = 0UL;
req->retrans = 0;
/*
* We need to lookup the route here to get at the correct
* window size. We should better make sure that the window size
* hasn't changed since we received the original syn, but I see
* no easy way to do this.
*/
{
struct flowi4 fl4;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, 0, sk->sk_mark, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, IPPROTO_TCP,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->srr) ? opt->faddr : ireq->rmt_addr,
ireq->loc_addr, th->source, th->dest);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
reqsk_free(req);
goto out;
}
}
/* Try to redo what tcp_v4_send_synack did. */
req->window_clamp = tp->window_clamp ? :dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
tcp_select_initial_window(tcp_full_space(sk), req->mss,
&req->rcv_wnd, &req->window_clamp,
ireq->wscale_ok, &rcv_wscale,
dst_metric(&rt->dst, RTAX_INITRWND));
ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
ret = get_cookie_sock(sk, skb, req, &rt->dst);
out: return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the IP implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.0 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and system crash) by sending packets to an application that sets socket options during the handling of network traffic.
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::UnregisterAgent() {
if (!agent_.get())
return;
DCHECK(pairing_delegate_);
DCHECK(pincode_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(passkey_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(confirmation_callback_.is_null());
pairing_delegate_->DismissDisplayOrConfirm();
pairing_delegate_ = NULL;
agent_.reset();
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": Unregistering pairing agent";
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAgentManagerClient()->
UnregisterAgent(
dbus::ObjectPath(kAgentPath),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::OnUnregisterAgentError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 does not properly prevent pop-under windows, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int recv_stream(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t buf_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
long timeout;
unsigned int sz;
int sz_to_copy, target, needed;
int sz_copied = 0;
u32 err;
int res = 0;
/* Catch invalid receive attempts */
if (unlikely(!buf_len))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely((sock->state == SS_UNCONNECTED) ||
(sock->state == SS_CONNECTING))) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, buf_len);
timeout = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
restart:
/* Look for a message in receive queue; wait if necessary */
while (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING) {
res = -ENOTCONN;
goto exit;
}
if (timeout <= 0L) {
res = timeout ? timeout : -EWOULDBLOCK;
goto exit;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeout = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
tipc_rx_ready(sock),
timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
}
/* Look at first message in receive queue */
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
msg = buf_msg(buf);
sz = msg_data_sz(msg);
err = msg_errcode(msg);
/* Discard an empty non-errored message & try again */
if ((!sz) && (!err)) {
advance_rx_queue(sk);
goto restart;
}
/* Optionally capture sender's address & ancillary data of first msg */
if (sz_copied == 0) {
set_orig_addr(m, msg);
res = anc_data_recv(m, msg, tport);
if (res)
goto exit;
}
/* Capture message data (if valid) & compute return value (always) */
if (!err) {
u32 offset = (u32)(unsigned long)(TIPC_SKB_CB(buf)->handle);
sz -= offset;
needed = (buf_len - sz_copied);
sz_to_copy = (sz <= needed) ? sz : needed;
res = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(buf, msg_hdr_sz(msg) + offset,
m->msg_iov, sz_to_copy);
if (res)
goto exit;
sz_copied += sz_to_copy;
if (sz_to_copy < sz) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
TIPC_SKB_CB(buf)->handle =
(void *)(unsigned long)(offset + sz_to_copy);
goto exit;
}
} else {
if (sz_copied != 0)
goto exit; /* can't add error msg to valid data */
if ((err == TIPC_CONN_SHUTDOWN) || m->msg_control)
res = 0;
else
res = -ECONNRESET;
}
/* Consume received message (optional) */
if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
if (unlikely(++tport->conn_unacked >= TIPC_FLOW_CONTROL_WIN))
tipc_acknowledge(tport->ref, tport->conn_unacked);
advance_rx_queue(sk);
}
/* Loop around if more data is required */
if ((sz_copied < buf_len) && /* didn't get all requested data */
(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) ||
(sz_copied < target)) && /* and more is ready or required */
(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) && /* and aren't just peeking at data */
(!err)) /* and haven't reached a FIN */
goto restart;
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return sz_copied ? sz_copied : res;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: net/tipc/socket.c in the Linux kernel before 3.9-rc7 does not initialize a certain data structure and a certain length variable, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel stack memory via a crafted recvmsg or recvfrom system call.
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <[email protected]>
Cc: Allan Stephens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,031 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int devmem_is_allowed(unsigned long pagenr)
{
if (pagenr < 256)
return 1;
if (iomem_is_exclusive(pagenr << PAGE_SHIFT))
return 0;
if (!page_is_ram(pagenr))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: The mm subsystem in the Linux kernel through 4.10.10 does not properly enforce the CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM protection mechanism, which allows local users to read or write to kernel memory locations in the first megabyte (and bypass slab-allocation access restrictions) via an application that opens the /dev/mem file, related to arch/x86/mm/init.c and drivers/char/mem.c.
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> | High | 168,241 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FindBarController::Show() {
FindManager* find_manager = tab_contents_->GetFindManager();
if (!find_manager->find_ui_active()) {
MaybeSetPrepopulateText();
find_manager->set_find_ui_active(true);
find_bar_->Show(true);
}
find_bar_->SetFocusAndSelection();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 10.0.648.204 does not properly handle SVG text, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors that lead to a *stale pointer.*
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,661 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct sk_buff *nf_ct_frag6_gather(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 user)
{
struct sk_buff *clone;
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct frag_hdr *fhdr;
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq;
struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
int fhoff, nhoff;
u8 prevhdr;
struct sk_buff *ret_skb = NULL;
/* Jumbo payload inhibits frag. header */
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len == 0) {
pr_debug("payload len = 0\n");
return skb;
}
if (find_prev_fhdr(skb, &prevhdr, &nhoff, &fhoff) < 0)
return skb;
clone = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (clone == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't clone skb\n");
return skb;
}
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = skb;
if (!pskb_may_pull(clone, fhoff + sizeof(*fhdr))) {
pr_debug("message is too short.\n");
goto ret_orig;
}
skb_set_transport_header(clone, fhoff);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(clone);
fhdr = (struct frag_hdr *)skb_transport_header(clone);
if (!(fhdr->frag_off & htons(0xFFF9))) {
pr_debug("Invalid fragment offset\n");
/* It is not a fragmented frame */
goto ret_orig;
}
if (atomic_read(&nf_init_frags.mem) > nf_init_frags.high_thresh)
nf_ct_frag6_evictor();
fq = fq_find(fhdr->identification, user, &hdr->saddr, &hdr->daddr);
if (fq == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't find and can't create new queue\n");
goto ret_orig;
}
spin_lock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
if (nf_ct_frag6_queue(fq, clone, fhdr, nhoff) < 0) {
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
pr_debug("Can't insert skb to queue\n");
fq_put(fq);
goto ret_orig;
}
if (fq->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
fq->q.meat == fq->q.len) {
ret_skb = nf_ct_frag6_reasm(fq, dev);
if (ret_skb == NULL)
pr_debug("Can't reassemble fragmented packets\n");
}
spin_unlock_bh(&fq->q.lock);
fq_put(fq);
return ret_skb;
ret_orig:
kfree_skb(clone);
return skb;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34, when the nf_conntrack_ipv6 module is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via certain types of fragmented IPv6 packets.
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> | High | 165,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int _yr_scan_verify_re_match(
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
YR_AC_MATCH* ac_match,
uint8_t* data,
size_t data_size,
size_t data_base,
size_t offset)
{
CALLBACK_ARGS callback_args;
RE_EXEC_FUNC exec;
int forward_matches = -1;
int backward_matches = -1;
int flags = 0;
if (STRING_IS_GREEDY_REGEXP(ac_match->string))
flags |= RE_FLAGS_GREEDY;
if (STRING_IS_NO_CASE(ac_match->string))
flags |= RE_FLAGS_NO_CASE;
if (STRING_IS_DOT_ALL(ac_match->string))
flags |= RE_FLAGS_DOT_ALL;
if (STRING_IS_FAST_REGEXP(ac_match->string))
exec = yr_re_fast_exec;
else
exec = yr_re_exec;
if (STRING_IS_ASCII(ac_match->string))
{
forward_matches = exec(
ac_match->forward_code,
data + offset,
data_size - offset,
offset > 0 ? flags | RE_FLAGS_NOT_AT_START : flags,
NULL,
NULL);
}
if (STRING_IS_WIDE(ac_match->string) && forward_matches == -1)
{
flags |= RE_FLAGS_WIDE;
forward_matches = exec(
ac_match->forward_code,
data + offset,
data_size - offset,
offset > 0 ? flags | RE_FLAGS_NOT_AT_START : flags,
NULL,
NULL);
}
switch(forward_matches)
{
case -1:
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
case -2:
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
case -3:
return ERROR_TOO_MANY_MATCHES;
case -4:
return ERROR_TOO_MANY_RE_FIBERS;
case -5:
return ERROR_INTERNAL_FATAL_ERROR;
}
if (forward_matches == 0 && ac_match->backward_code == NULL)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
callback_args.string = ac_match->string;
callback_args.context = context;
callback_args.data = data;
callback_args.data_size = data_size;
callback_args.data_base = data_base;
callback_args.forward_matches = forward_matches;
callback_args.full_word = STRING_IS_FULL_WORD(ac_match->string);
if (ac_match->backward_code != NULL)
{
backward_matches = exec(
ac_match->backward_code,
data + offset,
offset,
flags | RE_FLAGS_BACKWARDS | RE_FLAGS_EXHAUSTIVE,
_yr_scan_match_callback,
(void*) &callback_args);
switch(backward_matches)
{
case -2:
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
case -3:
return ERROR_TOO_MANY_MATCHES;
case -4:
return ERROR_TOO_MANY_RE_FIBERS;
case -5:
return ERROR_INTERNAL_FATAL_ERROR;
}
}
else
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_match_callback(
data + offset, 0, flags, &callback_args));
}
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libyara/re.c in the regex component in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yr_re_exec function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char | Medium | 168,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool Document::SetFocusedElement(Element* new_focused_element,
const FocusParams& params) {
DCHECK(!lifecycle_.InDetach());
clear_focused_element_timer_.Stop();
if (new_focused_element && (new_focused_element->GetDocument() != this))
return true;
if (NodeChildRemovalTracker::IsBeingRemoved(new_focused_element))
return true;
if (focused_element_ == new_focused_element)
return true;
bool focus_change_blocked = false;
Element* old_focused_element = focused_element_;
focused_element_ = nullptr;
UpdateDistributionForFlatTreeTraversal();
Node* ancestor = (old_focused_element && old_focused_element->isConnected() &&
new_focused_element)
? FlatTreeTraversal::CommonAncestor(*old_focused_element,
*new_focused_element)
: nullptr;
if (old_focused_element) {
old_focused_element->SetFocused(false, params.type);
old_focused_element->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(false, ancestor);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
old_focused_element->DispatchBlurEvent(new_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(event_type_names::kFocusout,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(event_type_names::kDOMFocusOut,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
}
}
if (new_focused_element)
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTreeForNode(new_focused_element);
if (new_focused_element && new_focused_element->IsFocusable()) {
if (IsRootEditableElement(*new_focused_element) &&
!AcceptsEditingFocus(*new_focused_element)) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_ = new_focused_element;
SetSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(focused_element_.Get());
if (params.type != kWebFocusTypeNone)
last_focus_type_ = params.type;
focused_element_->SetFocused(true, params.type);
focused_element_->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(true, ancestor);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
CancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
EnsurePaintLocationDataValidForNode(focused_element_);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->UpdateFocusAppearanceWithOptions(
params.selection_behavior, params.options);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
focused_element_->DispatchFocusEvent(old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(event_type_names::kFocusin,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(event_type_names::kDOMFocusIn,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && focused_element_) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = ExistingAXObjectCache()) {
cache->HandleFocusedUIElementChanged(old_focused_element,
new_focused_element);
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && GetPage()) {
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().FocusedNodeChanged(old_focused_element,
focused_element_.Get());
}
SetFocusedElementDone:
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
if (LocalFrame* frame = GetFrame())
frame->Selection().DidChangeFocus();
return !focus_change_blocked;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: WebKit/Source/bindings/modules/v8/V8BindingForModules.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 53.0.2785.113, does not properly consider getter side effects during array key conversion, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Indexed Database (aka IndexedDB) API calls.
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101} | Medium | 172,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PageFormAnalyserLogger::Flush() {
std::string text;
for (ConsoleLevel level : {kError, kWarning, kVerbose}) {
for (LogEntry& entry : node_buffer_[level]) {
text.clear();
text += "[DOM] ";
text += entry.message;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < entry.nodes.size(); ++i)
text += " %o";
blink::WebConsoleMessage message(level, blink::WebString::FromUTF8(text));
message.nodes = std::move(entry.nodes); // avoids copying node vectors.
frame_->AddMessageToConsole(message);
}
}
node_buffer_.clear();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android had insufficient validation in bitmap handling, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: [AF] Prevent Logging Password Values to Console
Before sending over to be logged by DevTools, filter out DOM nodes that
have a type attribute equal to "password", and that are not empty.
Bug: 934609
Change-Id: I147ad0c2bad13cc50394f4b5ff2f4bfb7293114b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1506498
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Lalancette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#638615} | Medium | 172,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int unuse_pmd_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pud_t *pud,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
unsigned long next;
int ret;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
do {
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)))
continue;
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
continue;
ret = unuse_pte_range(vma, pmd, addr, next, entry, page);
if (ret)
return ret;
} while (pmd++, addr = next, addr != end);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Linux kernel before 3.3.1, when KVM is used, allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host OS crash) by leveraging administrative access to the guest OS, related to the pmd_none_or_clear_bad function and page faults for huge pages.
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Atom::Atom()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,238 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: double AudioTrack::GetSamplingRate() const
{
return m_rate;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
unsigned int mm_flags, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int fault;
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
fault = VM_FAULT_BADMAP;
if (unlikely(!vma))
goto out;
if (unlikely(vma->vm_start > addr))
goto check_stack;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so we can handle
* it.
*/
good_area:
/*
* Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
* occurred.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
goto out;
}
return handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, addr & PAGE_MASK, mm_flags);
check_stack:
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
goto good_area;
out:
return fault;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h in the Linux kernel before 3.15-rc5-next-20140519, as used in Android before 2016-07-05 on Nexus 5X and 6P devices, mishandles execute-only pages, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka Android internal bug 28557020.
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> | High | 167,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_ntscRGB 1
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_DECORDER 0x4
#define VFF_DEP_NSORDER 0x8
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE 7
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_MS_SHARED 3
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_TYP_2_BYTE 2
#define VFF_TYP_4_BYTE 4
#define VFF_TYP_FLOAT 5
#define VFF_TYP_DOUBLE 9
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
unsigned char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3];
char
comment[512];
unsigned int
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
float
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel;
unsigned int
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
double
min_value,
scale_factor,
value;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_pixel,
max_packets,
quantum;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read VIFF header (1024 bytes).
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
do
{
/*
Verify VIFF identifier.
*/
if ((count != 1) || ((unsigned char) viff_info.identifier != 0xab))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NotAVIFFImage");
/*
Initialize VIFF image.
*/
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),&viff_info.file_type);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),&viff_info.release);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),&viff_info.version);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
&viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) ReadBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),viff_info.reserve);
count=ReadBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
if (count != 512)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_info.comment[511]='\0';
if (strlen(viff_info.comment) > 4)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",viff_info.comment,exception);
if ((viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_DECORDER) ||
(viff_info.machine_dependency == VFF_DEP_NSORDER))
image->endian=LSBEndian;
else
image->endian=MSBEndian;
viff_info.rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.x_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.y_offset=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(float) ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.location_dimension=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_of_images=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.number_data_bands=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_scheme=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_storage_type=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_rows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_columns=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_subrows=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.map_enable=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=ReadBlobLong(image);
viff_info.color_space_model=ReadBlobLong(image);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) viff_info.columns*viff_info.rows;
if (number_pixels > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (number_pixels != (size_t) number_pixels)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (number_pixels == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageColumnOrRowSizeIsNotSupported");
image->columns=viff_info.rows;
image->rows=viff_info.columns;
image->depth=viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel <= 8 ? 8UL :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
image->alpha_trait=viff_info.number_data_bands == 4 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
/*
Verify that we can read this VIFF image.
*/
if ((viff_info.number_data_bands < 1) || (viff_info.number_data_bands > 4))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_BIT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.data_encode_scheme != VFF_DES_RAW)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_NONE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT) &&
(viff_info.map_storage_type != VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MapStorageTypeIsNotSupported");
if ((viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_NONE) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_ntscRGB) &&
(viff_info.color_space_model != VFF_CM_genericRGB))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColorspaceModelIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.location_type != VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"LocationTypeIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.number_of_images != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"NumberOfImagesIsNotSupported");
if (viff_info.map_rows == 0)
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
switch ((int) viff_info.map_scheme)
{
case VFF_MS_NONE:
{
if (viff_info.number_data_bands < 3)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
image->colors=2;
else
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE)
image->colors=256UL;
else
image->colors=image->depth <= 8 ? 256UL : 65536UL;
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND:
case VFF_MS_SHARED:
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Allocate VIFF colormap.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
image->colors=viff_info.map_columns;
if ((MagickSizeType) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
if ((MagickSizeType) viff_info.map_rows >
(viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
viff_info.map_rows*bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Read VIFF raster colormap.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*viff_info.map_rows,
viff_colormap);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(viff_colormap,(bytes_per_pixel*image->colors*
viff_info.map_rows));
break;
}
default: break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (viff_info.map_rows*image->colors); i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.map_storage_type)
{
case VFF_MAPTYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
case VFF_MAPTYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) viff_colormap)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*viff_colormap[i]; break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) image->colors)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (2*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].green=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
else
if (i < (ssize_t) (3*image->colors))
image->colormap[i % image->colors].blue=(MagickRealType)
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) value);
}
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Create bi-level colormap.
*/
image->colors=2;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image->colorspace=GRAYColorspace;
}
/*
Allocate VIFF pixels.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=2; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: bytes_per_pixel=4; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: bytes_per_pixel=8; break;
default: bytes_per_pixel=1; break;
}
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL,image->rows) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=((image->columns+7UL) >> 3UL)*image->rows;
}
else
{
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck((size_t) number_pixels,viff_info.number_data_bands) != MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
max_packets=(size_t) (number_pixels*viff_info.number_data_bands);
}
if ((MagickSizeType) (bytes_per_pixel*max_packets) > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
number_pixels,max_packets),bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pixels,0,MagickMax(number_pixels,max_packets)*
bytes_per_pixel*sizeof(*pixels));
count=ReadBlob(image,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets,pixels);
lsb_first=1;
if (*(char *) &lsb_first &&
((viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_DECORDER) &&
(viff_info.machine_dependency != VFF_DEP_NSORDER)))
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE:
{
MSBOrderShort(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE:
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT:
{
MSBOrderLong(pixels,bytes_per_pixel*max_packets);
break;
}
default: break;
}
min_value=0.0;
scale_factor=1.0;
if ((viff_info.data_storage_type != VFF_TYP_1_BYTE) &&
(viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE))
{
double
max_value;
/*
Determine scale factor.
*/
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[0]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[0]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[0]; break;
}
max_value=value;
min_value=value;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (value > max_value)
max_value=value;
else
if (value < min_value)
min_value=value;
}
if ((min_value == 0) && (max_value == 0))
scale_factor=0;
else
if (min_value == max_value)
{
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/min_value;
min_value=0;
}
else
scale_factor=(double) QuantumRange/(max_value-min_value);
}
/*
Convert pixels to Quantum size.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) max_packets; i++)
{
switch ((int) viff_info.data_storage_type)
{
case VFF_TYP_2_BYTE: value=1.0*((short *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_4_BYTE: value=1.0*((int *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_FLOAT: value=((float *) pixels)[i]; break;
case VFF_TYP_DOUBLE: value=((double *) pixels)[i]; break;
default: value=1.0*pixels[i]; break;
}
if (viff_info.map_scheme == VFF_MS_NONE)
{
value=(value-min_value)*scale_factor;
if (value > QuantumRange)
value=QuantumRange;
else
if (value < 0)
value=0;
}
*p=(unsigned char) ((Quantum) value);
p++;
}
/*
Convert VIFF raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=(unsigned char *) pixels;
if (viff_info.data_storage_type == VFF_TYP_BIT)
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (int) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
quantum=(size_t) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0 : 1);
SetPixelRed(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,quantum == 0 ? 0 : QuantumRange,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) quantum,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+2*number_pixels)),q);
if (image->colors != 0)
{
ssize_t
index;
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelRed(image,q);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].red),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelGreen(image,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].green),q);
index=(ssize_t) GetPixelBlue(image,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,index,exception)].blue),q);
}
SetPixelAlpha(image,image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait ?
ScaleCharToQuantum(*(p+number_pixels*3)) : OpaqueAlpha,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
count=ReadBlob(image,1,&viff_info.identifier);
if ((count == 1) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while ((count != 0) && (viff_info.identifier == 0xab));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadVIFFImage in coders/viff.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600 | Medium | 169,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long BlockGroup::GetNextTimeCode() const
{
return m_next;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::UpdatePrintSettings(
WebKit::WebFrame* frame, const WebKit::WebNode& node,
const DictionaryValue& passed_job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_enabled_);
const DictionaryValue* job_settings = &passed_job_settings;
DictionaryValue modified_job_settings;
if (job_settings->empty()) {
if (!print_for_preview_)
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
bool source_is_html = true;
if (print_for_preview_) {
if (!job_settings->GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPreviewModifiable,
&source_is_html)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
} else {
source_is_html = !PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node);
}
if (print_for_preview_ || !source_is_html) {
modified_job_settings.MergeDictionary(job_settings);
modified_job_settings.SetBoolean(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled,
false);
modified_job_settings.SetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType,
printing::NO_MARGINS);
job_settings = &modified_job_settings;
}
int cookie = print_pages_params_.get() ?
print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie : 0;
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings(routing_id(),
cookie, *job_settings, &settings));
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
if (!PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsValid(settings.params)) {
if (!print_for_preview_) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS);
} else {
WebKit::WebFrame* print_frame = NULL;
GetPrintFrame(&print_frame);
if (print_frame) {
render_view()->RunModalAlertDialog(
print_frame,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_PREVIEW_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS));
}
}
return false;
}
if (settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || !settings.params.document_cookie) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_UPDATING_PRINT_SETTINGS);
return false;
}
if (!print_for_preview_) {
if (!job_settings->GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr,
&(settings.params.preview_ui_addr)) ||
!job_settings->GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID,
&(settings.params.preview_request_id)) ||
!job_settings->GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest,
&(settings.params.is_first_request))) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
settings.params.print_to_pdf = IsPrintToPdfRequested(*job_settings);
UpdateFrameMarginsCssInfo(*job_settings);
settings.params.print_scaling_option = GetPrintScalingOption(
source_is_html, *job_settings, settings.params);
if (settings.params.display_header_footer) {
header_footer_info_.reset(new DictionaryValue());
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterDate,
settings.params.date);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterURL,
settings.params.url);
header_footer_info_->SetString(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterTitle,
settings.params.title);
}
}
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidGetDocumentCookie(routing_id(),
settings.params.document_cookie));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 170,857 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long vorbis_book_decodevv_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t **a,
long offset,int ch,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
long i,j;
int chptr=0;
if (!v) return -1;
for(i=offset;i<offset+n;){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for (j=0;j<book->dim;j++){
a[chptr++][i]+=v[j];
if(chptr==ch){
chptr=0;
i++;
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in the Android media framework (n/a). Product: Android. Versions: 7.0, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 8.0. Android ID: A-62800140.
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
| High | 173,989 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline int unicode_cp_is_allowed(unsigned uni_cp, int document_type)
{
/* XML 1.0 HTML 4.01 HTML 5
* 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A 0x09..0x0A
* 0x0D 0x0D 0x0C..0x0D
* 0x0020..0xD7FF 0x20..0x7E 0x20..0x7E
* 0x00A0..0xD7FF 0x00A0..0xD7FF
* 0xE000..0xFFFD 0xE000..0x10FFFF 0xE000..0xFDCF
* 0x010000..0x10FFFF 0xFDF0..0x10FFFF (*)
*
* (*) exclude code points where ((code & 0xFFFF) >= 0xFFFE)
*
* References:
* XML 1.0: <http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/#charsets>
* HTML 4.01: <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/PR-html40-19990824/sgml/sgmldecl.html>
* HTML 5: <http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#preprocessing-the-input-stream>
*
* Not sure this is the relevant part for HTML 5, though. I opted to
* disallow the characters that would result in a parse error when
* preprocessing of the input stream. See also section 8.1.3.
*
* It's unclear if XHTML 1.0 allows C1 characters. I'll opt to apply to
* XHTML 1.0 the same rules as for XML 1.0.
* See <http://cmsmcq.com/2007/C1.xml>.
*/
switch (document_type) {
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF);
case ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0x7E) ||
(uni_cp >= 0x09 && uni_cp <= 0x0D && uni_cp != 0x0B) || /* form feed U+0C allowed */
(uni_cp >= 0xA0 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF &&
((uni_cp & 0xFFFF) < 0xFFFE) && /* last two of each plane (nonchars) disallowed */
(uni_cp < 0xFDD0 || uni_cp > 0xFDEF)); /* U+FDD0-U+FDEF (nonchars) disallowed */
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XHTML:
case ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1:
return (uni_cp >= 0x20 && uni_cp <= 0xD7FF) ||
(uni_cp == 0x0A || uni_cp == 0x09 || uni_cp == 0x0D) ||
(uni_cp >= 0xE000 && uni_cp <= 0x10FFFF && uni_cp != 0xFFFE && uni_cp != 0xFFFF);
default:
return 1;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | High | 167,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned int insn = 0;
int si_code, fault_code, fault;
unsigned long address, mm_rss;
fault_code = get_thread_fault_code();
if (notify_page_fault(regs))
return;
si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
address = current_thread_info()->fault_address;
if ((fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB) &&
(fault_code & FAULT_CODE_DTLB))
BUG();
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
if (unlikely((regs->tpc >> 32) != 0)) {
bogus_32bit_fault_tpc(regs);
goto intr_or_no_mm;
}
}
if (unlikely((address >> 32) != 0)) {
bogus_32bit_fault_address(regs, address);
goto intr_or_no_mm;
}
}
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {
unsigned long tpc = regs->tpc;
/* Sanity check the PC. */
if ((tpc >= KERNBASE && tpc < (unsigned long) __init_end) ||
(tpc >= MODULES_VADDR && tpc < MODULES_END)) {
/* Valid, no problems... */
} else {
bad_kernel_pc(regs, address);
return;
}
}
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or have no user
* context, we must not take the fault..
*/
if (in_atomic() || !mm)
goto intr_or_no_mm;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, 0, regs, address);
if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
if ((regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) &&
!search_exception_tables(regs->tpc)) {
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
goto handle_kernel_fault;
}
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if (!vma)
goto bad_area;
/* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
* load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
* was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the
* instruction to try and figure this out. It's an optimization
* so it's ok if we can't do this.
*
* Special hack, window spill/fill knows the exact fault type.
*/
if (((fault_code &
(FAULT_CODE_DTLB | FAULT_CODE_WRITE | FAULT_CODE_WINFIXUP)) == FAULT_CODE_DTLB) &&
(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) != 0) {
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, 0);
if (!insn)
goto continue_fault;
/* All loads, stores and atomics have bits 30 and 31 both set
* in the instruction. Bit 21 is set in all stores, but we
* have to avoid prefetches which also have bit 21 set.
*/
if ((insn & 0xc0200000) == 0xc0200000 &&
(insn & 0x01780000) != 0x01680000) {
/* Don't bother updating thread struct value,
* because update_mmu_cache only cares which tlb
* the access came from.
*/
fault_code |= FAULT_CODE_WRITE;
}
}
continue_fault:
if (vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if (!(fault_code & FAULT_CODE_WRITE)) {
/* Non-faulting loads shouldn't expand stack. */
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
if ((insn & 0xc0800000) == 0xc0800000) {
unsigned char asi;
if (insn & 0x2000)
asi = (regs->tstate >> 24);
else
asi = (insn >> 5);
if ((asi & 0xf2) == 0x82)
goto bad_area;
}
}
if (expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
/*
* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
* we can handle it..
*/
good_area:
si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
/* If we took a ITLB miss on a non-executable page, catch
* that here.
*/
if ((fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
BUG_ON(address != regs->tpc);
BUG_ON(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV);
goto bad_area;
}
if (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_WRITE) {
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
/* Spitfire has an icache which does not snoop
* processor stores. Later processors do...
*/
if (tlb_type == spitfire &&
(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) != 0 &&
vma->vm_file != NULL)
set_thread_fault_code(fault_code |
FAULT_CODE_BLKCOMMIT);
} else {
/* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
goto bad_area;
}
fault = handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_WRITE) ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0);
if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) {
if (fault & VM_FAULT_OOM)
goto out_of_memory;
else if (fault & VM_FAULT_SIGBUS)
goto do_sigbus;
BUG();
}
if (fault & VM_FAULT_MAJOR) {
current->maj_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MAJ, 1, 0,
regs, address);
} else {
current->min_flt++;
perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS_MIN, 1, 0,
regs, address);
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
mm_rss = get_mm_rss(mm);
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
mm_rss -= (mm->context.huge_pte_count * (HPAGE_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE));
#endif
if (unlikely(mm_rss >
mm->context.tsb_block[MM_TSB_BASE].tsb_rss_limit))
tsb_grow(mm, MM_TSB_BASE, mm_rss);
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
mm_rss = mm->context.huge_pte_count;
if (unlikely(mm_rss >
mm->context.tsb_block[MM_TSB_HUGE].tsb_rss_limit))
tsb_grow(mm, MM_TSB_HUGE, mm_rss);
#endif
return;
/*
* Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
* Fix it, but check if it's kernel or user first..
*/
bad_area:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
handle_kernel_fault:
do_kernel_fault(regs, si_code, fault_code, insn, address);
return;
/*
* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that made
* us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.
*/
out_of_memory:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
pagefault_out_of_memory();
return;
}
goto handle_kernel_fault;
intr_or_no_mm:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, 0);
goto handle_kernel_fault;
do_sigbus:
insn = get_fault_insn(regs, insn);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
* Send a sigbus, regardless of whether we were in kernel
* or user mode.
*/
do_fault_siginfo(BUS_ADRERR, SIGBUS, regs, insn, fault_code);
/* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
goto handle_kernel_fault;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::FrameNavigationHelper::GetGuestView() const {
return MimeHandlerViewGuest::From(
parent_site_instance_->GetProcess()->GetID(), guest_instance_id_)
->As<MimeHandlerViewGuest>();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155} | Medium | 173,042 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline RefPtr<DocumentFragment> createFragmentFromSource(const String& sourceString, const String& sourceMIMEType, Document* outputDoc)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = outputDoc->createDocumentFragment();
if (sourceMIMEType == "text/html") {
RefPtr<HTMLBodyElement> fakeBody = HTMLBodyElement::create(outputDoc);
fragment->parseHTML(sourceString, fakeBody.get());
} else if (sourceMIMEType == "text/plain")
fragment->parserAddChild(Text::create(outputDoc, sourceString));
else {
bool successfulParse = fragment->parseXML(sourceString, 0);
if (!successfulParse)
return 0;
}
return fragment;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 170,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void OnGetDevicesOnServiceThread(
const std::vector<UsbDeviceFilter>& filters,
const base::Callback<void(mojo::Array<DeviceInfoPtr>)>& callback,
scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner> callback_task_runner,
const std::vector<scoped_refptr<UsbDevice>>& devices) {
mojo::Array<DeviceInfoPtr> mojo_devices(0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < devices.size(); ++i) {
if (UsbDeviceFilter::MatchesAny(devices[i], filters))
mojo_devices.push_back(DeviceInfo::From(*devices[i]));
}
callback_task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(callback, base::Passed(&mojo_devices)));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in modules/speech/SpeechSynthesis.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.149, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper handling of a certain utterance data structure.
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881} | High | 171,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int vrend_create_vertex_elements_state(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
unsigned num_elements,
const struct pipe_vertex_element *elements)
{
struct vrend_vertex_element_array *v = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_vertex_element_array);
const struct util_format_description *desc;
GLenum type;
int i;
uint32_t ret_handle;
if (!v)
return ENOMEM;
if (num_elements > PIPE_MAX_ATTRIBS)
return EINVAL;
v->count = num_elements;
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
memcpy(&v->elements[i].base, &elements[i], sizeof(struct pipe_vertex_element));
desc = util_format_description(elements[i].src_format);
if (!desc) {
FREE(v);
return EINVAL;
}
type = GL_FALSE;
if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_FLOAT) {
if (desc->channel[0].size == 32)
type = GL_FLOAT;
else if (desc->channel[0].size == 64)
type = GL_DOUBLE;
else if (desc->channel[0].size == 16)
type = GL_HALF_FLOAT;
} else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_UNSIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 8)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_SIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 8)
type = GL_BYTE;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_UNSIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 16)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_SIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 16)
type = GL_SHORT;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_UNSIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 32)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
else if (desc->channel[0].type == UTIL_FORMAT_TYPE_SIGNED &&
desc->channel[0].size == 32)
type = GL_INT;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_SSCALED ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_SNORM ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_B10G10R10A2_SNORM)
type = GL_INT_2_10_10_10_REV;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_USCALED ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R10G10B10A2_UNORM ||
elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_B10G10R10A2_UNORM)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R11G11B10_FLOAT)
type = GL_UNSIGNED_INT_10F_11F_11F_REV;
if (type == GL_FALSE) {
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_VERTEX_FORMAT, elements[i].src_format);
FREE(v);
return EINVAL;
}
v->elements[i].type = type;
if (desc->channel[0].normalized)
v->elements[i].norm = GL_TRUE;
if (desc->nr_channels == 4 && desc->swizzle[0] == UTIL_FORMAT_SWIZZLE_Z)
v->elements[i].nr_chan = GL_BGRA;
else if (elements[i].src_format == PIPE_FORMAT_R11G11B10_FLOAT)
v->elements[i].nr_chan = 3;
else
v->elements[i].nr_chan = desc->nr_channels;
}
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
glGenVertexArrays(1, &v->id);
glBindVertexArray(v->id);
for (i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) {
struct vrend_vertex_element *ve = &v->elements[i];
if (util_format_is_pure_integer(ve->base.src_format))
glVertexAttribIFormat(i, ve->nr_chan, ve->type, ve->base.src_offset);
else
glVertexAttribFormat(i, ve->nr_chan, ve->type, ve->norm, ve->base.src_offset);
glVertexAttribBinding(i, ve->base.vertex_buffer_index);
glVertexBindingDivisor(i, ve->base.instance_divisor);
glEnableVertexAttribArray(i);
}
}
ret_handle = vrend_renderer_object_insert(ctx, v, sizeof(struct vrend_vertex_element), handle,
VIRGL_OBJECT_VERTEX_ELEMENTS);
if (!ret_handle) {
FREE(v);
return ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in the vrend_create_vertex_elements_state function in vrend_renderer.c in virglrenderer allows local guest OS users to cause a denial of service (host memory consumption) via a large number of VIRGL_OBJECT_VERTEX_ELEMENTS commands.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,944 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool NavigateToUrlWithEdge(const base::string16& url) {
base::string16 protocol_url = L"microsoft-edge:" + url;
SHELLEXECUTEINFO info = { sizeof(info) };
info.fMask = SEE_MASK_NOASYNC | SEE_MASK_FLAG_NO_UI;
info.lpVerb = L"open";
info.lpFile = protocol_url.c_str();
info.nShow = SW_SHOWNORMAL;
if (::ShellExecuteEx(&info))
return true;
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch Edge for uninstall survey";
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Inappropriate setting of the SEE_MASK_FLAG_NO_UI flag in file downloads in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially bypass OS malware checks via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Remove use of SEE_MASK_FLAG_NO_UI from Chrome Windows installer.
This flag was originally added to ui::base::win to suppress a specific
error message when attempting to open a file via the shell using the
"open" verb. The flag has additional side-effects and shouldn't be used
when invoking ShellExecute().
[email protected]
Bug: 819809
Change-Id: I7db2344982dd206c85a73928e906c21e06a47a9e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/966964
Commit-Queue: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544012} | Medium | 172,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static inline void VectorClamp(DDSVector4 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
value->w = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->w));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring. | Medium | 168,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static Image *ReadDPXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
magick[4],
value[MaxTextExtent];
DPXInfo
dpx;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
extent,
samples_per_pixel;
ssize_t
count,
n,
row,
y;
unsigned char
component_type;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read DPX file header.
*/
offset=0;
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) magick);
offset+=count;
if ((count != 4) || ((LocaleNCompare(magick,"SDPX",4) != 0) &&
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"XPDS",4) != 0)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->endian=LSBEndian;
if (LocaleNCompare(magick,"SDPX",4) == 0)
image->endian=MSBEndian;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&dpx,0,sizeof(dpx));
dpx.file.image_offset=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.version),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.version);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.version","%.8s",dpx.file.version);
dpx.file.file_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.file.ditto_key=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.file.ditto_key != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.ditto.key","%u",
dpx.file.ditto_key);
dpx.file.generic_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.file.industry_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.file.user_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.filename),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.filename);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.filename","%.100s",
dpx.file.filename);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"document","%.100s",dpx.file.filename);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.timestamp),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.timestamp);
if (*dpx.file.timestamp != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.timestamp","%.24s",
dpx.file.timestamp);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.creator),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.creator);
if (*dpx.file.creator == '\0')
{
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.creator","%.100s",
GetMagickVersion((size_t *) NULL));
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"software","%.100s",
GetMagickVersion((size_t *) NULL));
}
else
{
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.creator","%.100s",
dpx.file.creator);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"software","%.100s",dpx.file.creator);
}
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.project),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.project);
if (*dpx.file.project != '\0')
{
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.project","%.200s",
dpx.file.project);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"comment","%.100s",dpx.file.project);
}
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.copyright),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.copyright);
if (*dpx.file.copyright != '\0')
{
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.copyright","%.200s",
dpx.file.copyright);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"copyright","%.100s",
dpx.file.copyright);
}
dpx.file.encrypt_key=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.file.encrypt_key != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:file.encrypt_key","%u",
dpx.file.encrypt_key);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.reserve);
/*
Read DPX image header.
*/
dpx.image.orientation=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (dpx.image.orientation > 7)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset+=2;
if (dpx.image.orientation != (unsigned short) ~0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:image.orientation","%d",
dpx.image.orientation);
switch (dpx.image.orientation)
{
default:
case 0: image->orientation=TopLeftOrientation; break;
case 1: image->orientation=TopRightOrientation; break;
case 2: image->orientation=BottomLeftOrientation; break;
case 3: image->orientation=BottomRightOrientation; break;
case 4: image->orientation=LeftTopOrientation; break;
case 5: image->orientation=RightTopOrientation; break;
case 6: image->orientation=LeftBottomOrientation; break;
case 7: image->orientation=RightBottomOrientation; break;
}
dpx.image.number_elements=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (dpx.image.number_elements > MaxNumberImageElements)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
offset+=2;
dpx.image.pixels_per_line=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
image->columns=dpx.image.pixels_per_line;
dpx.image.lines_per_element=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
image->rows=dpx.image.lines_per_element;
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
char
property[MaxTextExtent];
dpx.image.image_element[i].data_sign=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].low_data=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].low_quantity=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].high_data=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].high_quantity=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
dpx.image.image_element[i].transfer_characteristic=(unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MaxTextExtent,
"dpx:image.element[%lu].transfer-characteristic",(long) i);
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,property,"%s",
GetImageTransferCharacteristic((DPXTransferCharacteristic)
dpx.image.image_element[i].transfer_characteristic));
offset++;
dpx.image.image_element[i].colorimetric=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
dpx.image.image_element[i].bit_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
dpx.image.image_element[i].packing=ReadBlobShort(image);
offset+=2;
dpx.image.image_element[i].encoding=ReadBlobShort(image);
offset+=2;
dpx.image.image_element[i].data_offset=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].end_of_line_padding=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
dpx.image.image_element[i].end_of_image_padding=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.image.image_element[i].description),
(unsigned char *) dpx.image.image_element[i].description);
}
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.image.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.image.reserve);
if (dpx.file.image_offset >= 1664U)
{
/*
Read DPX orientation header.
*/
dpx.orientation.x_offset=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.orientation.x_offset != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.x_offset","%u",
dpx.orientation.x_offset);
dpx.orientation.y_offset=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.orientation.y_offset != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.y_offset","%u",
dpx.orientation.y_offset);
dpx.orientation.x_center=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.orientation.x_center) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.x_center","%g",
dpx.orientation.x_center);
dpx.orientation.y_center=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.orientation.y_center) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.y_center","%g",
dpx.orientation.y_center);
dpx.orientation.x_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.orientation.x_size != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.x_size","%u",
dpx.orientation.x_size);
dpx.orientation.y_size=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.orientation.y_size != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.y_size","%u",
dpx.orientation.y_size);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.filename),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.filename);
if (*dpx.orientation.filename != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.filename","%.100s",
dpx.orientation.filename);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.timestamp),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.timestamp);
if (*dpx.orientation.timestamp != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.timestamp","%.24s",
dpx.orientation.timestamp);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.device),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.device);
if (*dpx.orientation.device != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.device","%.32s",
dpx.orientation.device);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.serial),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.serial);
if (*dpx.orientation.serial != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.serial","%.32s",
dpx.orientation.serial);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
dpx.orientation.border[i]=ReadBlobShort(image);
offset+=2;
}
if ((dpx.orientation.border[0] != (unsigned short) (~0)) &&
(dpx.orientation.border[1] != (unsigned short) (~0)))
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.border","%dx%d%+d%+d", dpx.orientation.border[0],dpx.orientation.border[1],
dpx.orientation.border[2],dpx.orientation.border[3]);
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
{
dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[i]=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
}
if ((dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[0] != ~0U) &&
(dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[1] != ~0U))
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.aspect_ratio",
"%ux%u",dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[0],
dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[1]);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.reserve);
}
if (dpx.file.image_offset >= 1920U)
{
/*
Read DPX film header.
*/
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.id),(unsigned char *) dpx.film.id);
if (*dpx.film.id != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.id","%.2s",dpx.film.id);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.type),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.type);
if (*dpx.film.type != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.type","%.2s",dpx.film.type);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.offset),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.offset);
if (*dpx.film.offset != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.offset","%.2s",
dpx.film.offset);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.prefix),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.prefix);
if (*dpx.film.prefix != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.prefix","%.6s",
dpx.film.prefix);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.count),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.count);
if (*dpx.film.count != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.count","%.4s",
dpx.film.count);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.format),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.format);
if (*dpx.film.format != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.format","%.4s",
dpx.film.format);
dpx.film.frame_position=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.film.frame_position != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.frame_position","%u",
dpx.film.frame_position);
dpx.film.sequence_extent=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.film.sequence_extent != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.sequence_extent","%u",
dpx.film.sequence_extent);
dpx.film.held_count=ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
if (dpx.film.held_count != ~0U)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.held_count","%u",
dpx.film.held_count);
dpx.film.frame_rate=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.film.frame_rate) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.frame_rate","%g",
dpx.film.frame_rate);
dpx.film.shutter_angle=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.film.shutter_angle) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.shutter_angle","%g",
dpx.film.shutter_angle);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.frame_id),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.frame_id);
if (*dpx.film.frame_id != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.frame_id","%.32s",
dpx.film.frame_id);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.slate),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.slate);
if (*dpx.film.slate != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:film.slate","%.100s",
dpx.film.slate);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.reserve);
}
if (dpx.file.image_offset >= 2048U)
{
/*
Read DPX television header.
*/
dpx.television.time_code=(unsigned int) ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
TimeCodeToString(dpx.television.time_code,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.time.code",value);
dpx.television.user_bits=(unsigned int) ReadBlobLong(image);
offset+=4;
TimeCodeToString(dpx.television.user_bits,value);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.user.bits",value);
dpx.television.interlace=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
if (dpx.television.interlace != 0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.interlace","%.20g",
(double) dpx.television.interlace);
dpx.television.field_number=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
if (dpx.television.field_number != 0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.field_number","%.20g",
(double) dpx.television.field_number);
dpx.television.video_signal=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
if (dpx.television.video_signal != 0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.video_signal","%.20g",
(double) dpx.television.video_signal);
dpx.television.padding=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
offset++;
if (dpx.television.padding != 0)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.padding","%d",
dpx.television.padding);
dpx.television.horizontal_sample_rate=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.horizontal_sample_rate) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,
"dpx:television.horizontal_sample_rate","%g",
dpx.television.horizontal_sample_rate);
dpx.television.vertical_sample_rate=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.vertical_sample_rate) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.vertical_sample_rate",
"%g",dpx.television.vertical_sample_rate);
dpx.television.frame_rate=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.frame_rate) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.frame_rate","%g",
dpx.television.frame_rate);
dpx.television.time_offset=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.time_offset) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.time_offset","%g",
dpx.television.time_offset);
dpx.television.gamma=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.gamma) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.gamma","%g",
dpx.television.gamma);
dpx.television.black_level=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.black_level) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.black_level","%g",
dpx.television.black_level);
dpx.television.black_gain=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.black_gain) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.black_gain","%g",
dpx.television.black_gain);
dpx.television.break_point=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.break_point) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.break_point","%g",
dpx.television.break_point);
dpx.television.white_level=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.white_level) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.white_level","%g",
dpx.television.white_level);
dpx.television.integration_times=ReadBlobFloat(image);
offset+=4;
if (IsFloatDefined(dpx.television.integration_times) != MagickFalse)
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:television.integration_times",
"%g",dpx.television.integration_times);
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.television.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.television.reserve);
}
if (dpx.file.image_offset > 2080U)
{
/*
Read DPX user header.
*/
offset+=ReadBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.user.id),(unsigned char *) dpx.user.id);
if (*dpx.user.id != '\0')
(void) FormatImageProperty(image,"dpx:user.id","%.32s",dpx.user.id);
if ((dpx.file.user_size != ~0U) &&
((size_t) dpx.file.user_size > sizeof(dpx.user.id)))
{
StringInfo
*profile;
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,
dpx.file.user_size-sizeof(dpx.user.id));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
offset+=ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"dpx:user-data",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
}
for ( ; offset < (MagickOffsetType) dpx.file.image_offset; offset++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Read DPX image header.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
for (n=0; n < (ssize_t) dpx.image.number_elements; n++)
{
/*
Convert DPX raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if ((dpx.image.image_element[n].data_offset != ~0U) &&
(dpx.image.image_element[n].data_offset != 0U))
{
MagickOffsetType
data_offset;
data_offset=(MagickOffsetType) dpx.image.image_element[n].data_offset;
if (data_offset < offset)
offset=SeekBlob(image,data_offset,SEEK_SET);
else
for ( ; offset < data_offset; offset++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (offset != data_offset)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
SetPrimaryChromaticity((DPXColorimetric)
dpx.image.image_element[n].colorimetric,&image->chromaticity);
image->depth=dpx.image.image_element[n].bit_size;
samples_per_pixel=1;
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
component_type=dpx.image.image_element[n].descriptor;
switch (component_type)
{
case CbYCrY422ComponentType:
{
samples_per_pixel=2;
quantum_type=CbYCrYQuantum;
break;
}
case CbYACrYA4224ComponentType:
case CbYCr444ComponentType:
{
samples_per_pixel=3;
quantum_type=CbYCrQuantum;
break;
}
case RGBComponentType:
{
samples_per_pixel=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
break;
}
case ABGRComponentType:
case RGBAComponentType:
{
image->matte=MagickTrue;
samples_per_pixel=4;
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
switch (component_type)
{
case CbYCrY422ComponentType:
case CbYACrYA4224ComponentType:
case CbYCr444ComponentType:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,Rec709YCbCrColorspace);
break;
}
case LumaComponentType:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace);
if (dpx.image.image_element[n].transfer_characteristic == LogarithmicColorimetric)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,LogColorspace);
if (dpx.image.image_element[n].transfer_characteristic == PrintingDensityColorimetric)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,LogColorspace);
break;
}
}
extent=GetBytesPerRow(image->columns,samples_per_pixel,image->depth,
dpx.image.image_element[n].packing == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
/*
DPX any-bit pixel format.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
row=0;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
SetQuantumQuantum(quantum_info,32);
SetQuantumPack(quantum_info,dpx.image.image_element[n].packing == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
offset;
unsigned char
*pixels;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
{
count=ReadBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if ((image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL) &&
(image->previous == (Image *) NULL))
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) row,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
offset=row++;
}
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
status=MagickFalse;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
length=ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) length;
sync=SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 168,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_dds1(GetByteContext *gb, uint8_t *frame, int width, int height)
{
const uint8_t *frame_start = frame;
const uint8_t *frame_end = frame + width * height;
int mask = 0x10000, bitbuf = 0;
int i, v, offset, count, segments;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
while (segments--) {
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (mask == 0x10000) {
bitbuf = bytestream2_get_le16u(gb);
mask = 1;
}
if (bitbuf & mask) {
v = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
offset = (v & 0x1FFF) << 2;
count = ((v >> 13) + 2) << 1;
if (frame - frame_start < offset || frame_end - frame < count*2 + width)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
frame[0] = frame[1] =
frame[width] = frame[width + 1] = frame[-offset];
frame += 2;
}
} else if (bitbuf & (mask << 1)) {
v = bytestream2_get_le16(gb)*2;
if (frame - frame_end < v)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += v;
} else {
if (frame_end - frame < width + 3)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame[0] = frame[1] =
frame[width] = frame[width + 1] = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
frame += 2;
frame[0] = frame[1] =
frame[width] = frame[width + 1] = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
frame += 2;
}
mask <<= 2;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the decode_dds1 function in libavcodec/dfa.c in FFmpeg before 2.8.12, 3.0.x before 3.0.8, 3.1.x before 3.1.8, 3.2.x before 3.2.5, and 3.3.x before 3.3.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/dfa: Fix off by 1 error
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1345/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6062963045695488
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,074 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 173,868 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool AddInitialUrlToPreconnectPrediction(const GURL& initial_url,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) {
GURL initial_origin = initial_url.GetOrigin();
static const int kMinSockets = 2;
if (!prediction->requests.empty() &&
prediction->requests.front().origin == initial_origin) {
prediction->requests.front().num_sockets =
std::max(prediction->requests.front().num_sockets, kMinSockets);
} else if (initial_origin.is_valid() &&
initial_origin.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(initial_origin);
prediction->requests.emplace(prediction->requests.begin(), initial_origin,
kMinSockets,
net::NetworkIsolationKey(origin, origin));
}
return !prediction->requests.empty();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311} | Medium | 172,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void sycc444_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
int *d0, *d1, *d2, *r, *g, *b;
const int *y, *cb, *cr;
unsigned int maxw, maxh, max, i;
int offset, upb;
upb = (int)img->comps[0].prec;
offset = 1<<(upb - 1); upb = (1<<upb)-1;
maxw = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].w; maxh = (unsigned int)img->comps[0].h;
max = maxw * maxh;
y = img->comps[0].data;
cb = img->comps[1].data;
cr = img->comps[2].data;
d0 = r = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d1 = g = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
d2 = b = (int*)malloc(sizeof(int) * (size_t)max);
if(r == NULL || g == NULL || b == NULL) goto fails;
for(i = 0U; i < max; ++i)
{
sycc_to_rgb(offset, upb, *y, *cb, *cr, r, g, b);
++y; ++cb; ++cr; ++r; ++g; ++b;
}
free(img->comps[0].data); img->comps[0].data = d0;
free(img->comps[1].data); img->comps[1].data = d1;
free(img->comps[2].data); img->comps[2].data = d2;
return;
fails:
if(r) free(r);
if(g) free(g);
if(b) free(b);
}/* sycc444_to_rgb() */
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The sycc422_t_rgb function in common/color.c in OpenJPEG before 2.1.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted jpeg2000 file.
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726 | Medium | 168,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cisco_autorp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len)
{
int type;
int numrps;
int hold;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auto-rp "));
type = bp[0];
switch (type) {
case 0x11:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "candidate-advert"));
break;
case 0x12:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mapping"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "type-0x%02x", type));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
numrps = bp[1];
ND_TCHECK2(bp[2], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Hold "));
hold = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
if (hold)
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FOREVER"));
/* Next 4 bytes are reserved. */
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/*XXX skip unless -v? */
/*
* Rest of packet:
* numrps entries of the form:
* 32 bits: RP
* 6 bits: reserved
* 2 bits: PIM version supported, bit 0 is "supports v1", 1 is "v2".
* 8 bits: # of entries for this RP
* each entry: 7 bits: reserved, 1 bit: negative,
* 8 bits: mask 32 bits: source
* lather, rinse, repeat.
*/
while (numrps--) {
int nentries;
char s;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
ND_TCHECK(bp[4]);
switch (bp[4] & 0x3) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv?"));
break;
case 1: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1"));
break;
case 2: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv2"));
break;
case 3: ND_PRINT((ndo, " PIMv1+2"));
break;
}
if (bp[4] & 0xfc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[4] & 0xfc));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
nentries = bp[5];
bp += 6; len -= 6;
s = ' ';
for (; nentries; nentries--) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s%s/%d", s, bp[0] & 1 ? "!" : "",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &bp[2]), bp[1]));
if (bp[0] & 0x02) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " bidir"));
}
if (bp[0] & 0xfc) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[rsvd=0x%02x]", bp[0] & 0xfc));
}
s = ',';
bp += 6; len -= 6;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|autorp]"));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The PIM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c, several functions.
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes. | High | 167,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp_set_oid_output_format)
{
long a1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &a1) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch((int) a1) {
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_SUFFIX:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_MODULE:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_FULL:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NUMERIC:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_UCD:
case NETSNMP_OID_OUTPUT_NONE:
netsnmp_ds_set_int(NETSNMP_DS_LIBRARY_ID, NETSNMP_DS_LIB_OID_OUTPUT_FORMAT, a1);
RETURN_TRUE;
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown SNMP output print format '%d'", (int) a1);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: ext/snmp/snmp.c in PHP before 5.5.38, 5.6.x before 5.6.24, and 7.x before 7.0.9 improperly interacts with the unserialize implementation and garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted serialized data, a related issue to CVE-2016-5773.
Commit Message: | High | 164,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static jlong Region_createFromParcel(JNIEnv* env, jobject clazz, jobject parcel)
{
if (parcel == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
android::Parcel* p = android::parcelForJavaObject(env, parcel);
const size_t size = p->readInt32();
const void* regionData = p->readInplace(size);
if (regionData == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
SkRegion* region = new SkRegion;
region->readFromMemory(regionData, size);
return reinterpret_cast<jlong>(region);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Region_createFromParcel function in core/jni/android/graphics/Region.cpp in Region in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48M does not check the return values of certain read operations, which allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via an application that sends a crafted message to a service, aka internal bug 21585255.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Ensure that unparcelling Region only reads the expected number of bytes
bug: 20883006
Change-Id: I4f109667fb210a80fbddddf5f1bfb7ef3a02b6ce
| High | 174,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateFragmentClip() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (context_.fragment_clip) {
OnUpdateClip(properties_->UpdateFragmentClip(
context_.current.clip,
ClipPaintPropertyNode::State{context_.current.transform,
ToClipRect(*context_.fragment_clip)}));
} else {
OnClearClip(properties_->ClearFragmentClip());
}
}
if (properties_->FragmentClip())
context_.current.clip = properties_->FragmentClip();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | High | 171,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
EOSseen = true;
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
}
if (mImg == NULL) {
if (vpx_codec_decode(
(vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
NULL,
0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
mImg = vpx_codec_get_frame((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx, &iter);
}
if (mImg != NULL) {
CHECK_EQ(mImg->fmt, IMG_FMT_I420);
uint32_t width = mImg->d_w;
uint32_t height = mImg->d_h;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nFlags = EOSseen ? OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS : 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer;
const uint8_t *srcY = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_Y];
const uint8_t *srcU = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_U];
const uint8_t *srcV = (const uint8_t *)mImg->planes[PLANE_V];
size_t srcYStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_Y];
size_t srcUStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_U];
size_t srcVStride = mImg->stride[PLANE_V];
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mImg = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE - Remove deprecated image defines
libvpx has always supported the VPX_ prefixed versions of these defines.
The unprefixed versions have been removed in the most recent release.
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libvpx/+/9cdaa3d72eade9ad162ef8f78a93bd8f85c6de10
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: I8a656f2262f117d7a95271f45100b8c6fd0a470f
| High | 173,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
{
struct inet_peer __rcu **stack[PEER_MAXDEPTH], ***stackptr;
struct inet_peer_base *base = family_to_base(daddr->family);
struct inet_peer *p;
unsigned int sequence;
int invalidated, gccnt = 0;
/* Attempt a lockless lookup first.
* Because of a concurrent writer, we might not find an existing entry.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
sequence = read_seqbegin(&base->lock);
p = lookup_rcu(daddr, base);
invalidated = read_seqretry(&base->lock, sequence);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (p)
return p;
/* If no writer did a change during our lookup, we can return early. */
if (!create && !invalidated)
return NULL;
/* retry an exact lookup, taking the lock before.
* At least, nodes should be hot in our cache.
*/
write_seqlock_bh(&base->lock);
relookup:
p = lookup(daddr, stack, base);
if (p != peer_avl_empty) {
atomic_inc(&p->refcnt);
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
if (!gccnt) {
gccnt = inet_peer_gc(base, stack, stackptr);
if (gccnt && create)
goto relookup;
}
p = create ? kmem_cache_alloc(peer_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC) : NULL;
if (p) {
p->daddr = *daddr;
atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count, secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4));
p->tcp_ts_stamp = 0;
p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
p->rate_tokens = 0;
p->rate_last = 0;
p->pmtu_expires = 0;
p->pmtu_orig = 0;
memset(&p->redirect_learned, 0, sizeof(p->redirect_learned));
/* Link the node. */
link_to_pool(p, base);
base->total++;
}
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The IPv6 implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not generate Fragment Identification values separately for each destination, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | High | 165,850 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The xps_true_callback_glyph_name function in xps/xpsttf.c in Artifex Ghostscript GhostXPS 9.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (Segmentation Violation and application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 164,784 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int decode_unit(SCPRContext *s, PixelModel *pixel, unsigned step, unsigned *rval)
{
GetByteContext *gb = &s->gb;
RangeCoder *rc = &s->rc;
unsigned totfr = pixel->total_freq;
unsigned value, x = 0, cumfr = 0, cnt_x = 0;
int i, j, ret, c, cnt_c;
if ((ret = s->get_freq(rc, totfr, &value)) < 0)
return ret;
while (x < 16) {
cnt_x = pixel->lookup[x];
if (value >= cumfr + cnt_x)
cumfr += cnt_x;
else
break;
x++;
}
c = x * 16;
cnt_c = 0;
while (c < 256) {
cnt_c = pixel->freq[c];
if (value >= cumfr + cnt_c)
cumfr += cnt_c;
else
break;
c++;
}
if ((ret = s->decode(gb, rc, cumfr, cnt_c, totfr)) < 0)
return ret;
pixel->freq[c] = cnt_c + step;
pixel->lookup[x] = cnt_x + step;
totfr += step;
if (totfr > BOT) {
totfr = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
unsigned nc = (pixel->freq[i] >> 1) + 1;
pixel->freq[i] = nc;
totfr += nc;
}
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
unsigned sum = 0;
unsigned i16_17 = i << 4;
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
sum += pixel->freq[i16_17 + j];
pixel->lookup[i] = sum;
}
}
pixel->total_freq = totfr;
*rval = c & s->cbits;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavcodec/scpr.c in FFmpeg 3.3 before 3.3.1 does not properly validate height and width data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based buffer overflow and application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Fix multiple runtime error: index 256 out of bounds for type 'unsigned int [256]'
Fixes: 1519/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5286680976162816
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void ipc_rcu_putref(void *ptr)
{
if (--container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->refcount > 0)
return;
if (container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_hdr, data)->is_vmalloc) {
call_rcu(&container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_grace, data)->rcu,
ipc_schedule_free);
} else {
kfree_rcu(container_of(ptr, struct ipc_rcu_grace, data), rcu);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,985 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: load_fake(png_charp param, png_bytepp profile)
{
char *endptr = NULL;
unsigned long long int size = strtoull(param, &endptr, 0/*base*/);
/* The 'fake' format is <number>*[string] */
if (endptr != NULL && *endptr == '*')
{
size_t len = strlen(++endptr);
size_t result = (size_t)size;
if (len == 0) len = 1; /* capture the terminating '\0' */
/* Now repeat that string to fill 'size' bytes. */
if (result == size && (*profile = malloc(result)) != NULL)
{
png_bytep out = *profile;
if (len == 1)
memset(out, *endptr, result);
else
{
while (size >= len)
{
memcpy(out, endptr, len);
out += len;
size -= len;
}
memcpy(out, endptr, size);
}
return result;
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: size exceeds system limits\n", param);
exit(1);
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if ((that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0)
{
double gray, err;
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
/* Image now has RGB channels... */
# if DIGITIZE
{
PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm = display->pm;
const unsigned int sample_depth = that->sample_depth;
const unsigned int calc_depth = (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ? 16 :
sample_depth);
const unsigned int gamma_depth = (sample_depth == 16 ? 16 :
(pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ? PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 : sample_depth));
int isgray;
double r, g, b;
double rlo, rhi, glo, ghi, blo, bhi, graylo, grayhi;
/* Do this using interval arithmetic, otherwise it is too difficult to
* handle the errors correctly.
*
* To handle the gamma correction work out the upper and lower bounds
* of the digitized value. Assume rounding here - normally the values
* will be identical after this operation if there is only one
* transform, feel free to delete the png_error checks on this below in
* the future (this is just me trying to ensure it works!)
*/
r = rlo = rhi = that->redf;
rlo -= that->rede;
rlo = digitize(rlo, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
rhi += that->rede;
rhi = digitize(rhi, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
g = glo = ghi = that->greenf;
glo -= that->greene;
glo = digitize(glo, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
ghi += that->greene;
ghi = digitize(ghi, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
b = blo = bhi = that->bluef;
blo -= that->bluee;
blo = digitize(blo, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
bhi += that->greene;
bhi = digitize(bhi, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
isgray = r==g && g==b;
if (data.gamma != 1)
{
PNG_CONST double power = 1/data.gamma;
PNG_CONST double abse = calc_depth == 16 ? .5/65535 : .5/255;
/* 'abse' is the absolute error permitted in linear calculations. It
* is used here to capture the error permitted in the handling
* (undoing) of the gamma encoding. Once again digitization occurs
* to handle the upper and lower bounds of the values. This is
* where the real errors are introduced.
*/
r = pow(r, power);
rlo = digitize(pow(rlo, power)-abse, calc_depth, 1);
rhi = digitize(pow(rhi, power)+abse, calc_depth, 1);
g = pow(g, power);
glo = digitize(pow(glo, power)-abse, calc_depth, 1);
ghi = digitize(pow(ghi, power)+abse, calc_depth, 1);
b = pow(b, power);
blo = digitize(pow(blo, power)-abse, calc_depth, 1);
bhi = digitize(pow(bhi, power)+abse, calc_depth, 1);
}
/* Now calculate the actual gray values. Although the error in the
* coefficients depends on whether they were specified on the command
* line (in which case truncation to 15 bits happened) or not (rounding
* was used) the maxium error in an individual coefficient is always
* 1/32768, because even in the rounding case the requirement that
* coefficients add up to 32768 can cause a larger rounding error.
*
* The only time when rounding doesn't occur in 1.5.5 and later is when
* the non-gamma code path is used for less than 16 bit data.
*/
gray = r * data.red_coefficient + g * data.green_coefficient +
b * data.blue_coefficient;
{
PNG_CONST int do_round = data.gamma != 1 || calc_depth == 16;
PNG_CONST double ce = 1. / 32768;
graylo = digitize(rlo * (data.red_coefficient-ce) +
glo * (data.green_coefficient-ce) +
blo * (data.blue_coefficient-ce), gamma_depth, do_round);
if (graylo <= 0)
graylo = 0;
grayhi = digitize(rhi * (data.red_coefficient+ce) +
ghi * (data.green_coefficient+ce) +
bhi * (data.blue_coefficient+ce), gamma_depth, do_round);
if (grayhi >= 1)
grayhi = 1;
}
/* And invert the gamma. */
if (data.gamma != 1)
{
PNG_CONST double power = data.gamma;
gray = pow(gray, power);
graylo = digitize(pow(graylo, power), sample_depth, 1);
grayhi = digitize(pow(grayhi, power), sample_depth, 1);
}
/* Now the error can be calculated.
*
* If r==g==b because there is no overall gamma correction libpng
* currently preserves the original value.
*/
if (isgray)
err = (that->rede + that->greene + that->bluee)/3;
else
{
err = fabs(grayhi-gray);
if (fabs(gray - graylo) > err)
err = fabs(graylo-gray);
/* Check that this worked: */
if (err > pm->limit)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[128];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, "rgb_to_gray error ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, err, 6);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " exceeds limit ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, pm->limit, 6);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# else /* DIGITIZE */
{
double r = that->redf;
double re = that->rede;
double g = that->greenf;
double ge = that->greene;
double b = that->bluef;
double be = that->bluee;
/* The true gray case involves no math. */
if (r == g && r == b)
{
gray = r;
err = re;
if (err < ge) err = ge;
if (err < be) err = be;
}
else if (data.gamma == 1)
{
/* There is no need to do the conversions to and from linear space,
* so the calculation should be a lot more accurate. There is a
* built in 1/32768 error in the coefficients because they only have
* 15 bits and are adjusted to make sure they add up to 32768, so
* the result may have an additional error up to 1/32768. (Note
* that adding the 1/32768 here avoids needing to increase the
* global error limits to take this into account.)
*/
gray = r * data.red_coefficient + g * data.green_coefficient +
b * data.blue_coefficient;
err = re * data.red_coefficient + ge * data.green_coefficient +
be * data.blue_coefficient + 1./32768 + gray * 5 * DBL_EPSILON;
}
else
{
/* The calculation happens in linear space, and this produces much
* wider errors in the encoded space. These are handled here by
* factoring the errors in to the calculation. There are two table
* lookups in the calculation and each introduces a quantization
* error defined by the table size.
*/
PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm = display->pm;
double in_qe = (that->sample_depth > 8 ? .5/65535 : .5/255);
double out_qe = (that->sample_depth > 8 ? .5/65535 :
(pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ? .5/(1<<PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8) :
.5/255));
double rhi, ghi, bhi, grayhi;
double g1 = 1/data.gamma;
rhi = r + re + in_qe; if (rhi > 1) rhi = 1;
r -= re + in_qe; if (r < 0) r = 0;
ghi = g + ge + in_qe; if (ghi > 1) ghi = 1;
g -= ge + in_qe; if (g < 0) g = 0;
bhi = b + be + in_qe; if (bhi > 1) bhi = 1;
b -= be + in_qe; if (b < 0) b = 0;
r = pow(r, g1)*(1-DBL_EPSILON); rhi = pow(rhi, g1)*(1+DBL_EPSILON);
g = pow(g, g1)*(1-DBL_EPSILON); ghi = pow(ghi, g1)*(1+DBL_EPSILON);
b = pow(b, g1)*(1-DBL_EPSILON); bhi = pow(bhi, g1)*(1+DBL_EPSILON);
/* Work out the lower and upper bounds for the gray value in the
* encoded space, then work out an average and error. Remove the
* previously added input quantization error at this point.
*/
gray = r * data.red_coefficient + g * data.green_coefficient +
b * data.blue_coefficient - 1./32768 - out_qe;
if (gray <= 0)
gray = 0;
else
{
gray *= (1 - 6 * DBL_EPSILON);
gray = pow(gray, data.gamma) * (1-DBL_EPSILON);
}
grayhi = rhi * data.red_coefficient + ghi * data.green_coefficient +
bhi * data.blue_coefficient + 1./32768 + out_qe;
grayhi *= (1 + 6 * DBL_EPSILON);
if (grayhi >= 1)
grayhi = 1;
else
grayhi = pow(grayhi, data.gamma) * (1+DBL_EPSILON);
err = (grayhi - gray) / 2;
gray = (grayhi + gray) / 2;
if (err <= in_qe)
err = gray * DBL_EPSILON;
else
err -= in_qe;
/* Validate that the error is within limits (this has caused
* problems before, it's much easier to detect them here.)
*/
if (err > pm->limit)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[128];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, "rgb_to_gray error ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, err, 6);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " exceeds limit ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, pm->limit, 6);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* !DIGITIZE */
that->bluef = that->greenf = that->redf = gray;
that->bluee = that->greene = that->rede = err;
/* The sBIT is the minium of the three colour channel sBITs. */
if (that->red_sBIT > that->green_sBIT)
that->red_sBIT = that->green_sBIT;
if (that->red_sBIT > that->blue_sBIT)
that->red_sBIT = that->blue_sBIT;
that->blue_sBIT = that->green_sBIT = that->red_sBIT;
/* And remove the colour bit in the type: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
else if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const
{
if (str == static_cast<char* Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) //should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len+1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResourceDispatcherHostImpl()
: download_file_manager_(new DownloadFileManager(NULL)),
save_file_manager_(new SaveFileManager()),
request_id_(-1),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(weak_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_(this)),
is_shutdown_(false),
max_outstanding_requests_cost_per_process_(
kMaxOutstandingRequestsCostPerProcess),
filter_(NULL),
delegate_(NULL),
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_(false) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!g_resource_dispatcher_host);
g_resource_dispatcher_host = this;
GetContentClient()->browser()->ResourceDispatcherHostCreated();
ANNOTATE_BENIGN_RACE(
&last_user_gesture_time_,
"We don't care about the precise value, see http://crbug.com/92889");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&appcache::AppCacheInterceptor::EnsureRegistered));
update_load_states_timer_.reset(
new base::RepeatingTimer<ResourceDispatcherHostImpl>());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebSockets implementation in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.52 does not properly handle use of SSL, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 170,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::GetExitCode() {
if (!core_)
return CONTROL_C_EXIT;
return core_->GetExitCode();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static gboolean prplcb_xfer_new_send_cb(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
PurpleXfer *xfer = data;
struct im_connection *ic = purple_ic_by_pa(xfer->account);
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
PurpleBuddy *buddy;
const char *who;
buddy = purple_find_buddy(xfer->account, xfer->who);
who = buddy ? purple_buddy_get_name(buddy) : xfer->who;
/* TODO(wilmer): After spreading some more const goodness in BitlBee,
remove the evil cast below. */
px->ft = imcb_file_send_start(ic, (char *) who, xfer->filename, xfer->size);
px->ft->data = px;
px->ft->accept = prpl_xfer_accept;
px->ft->canceled = prpl_xfer_canceled;
px->ft->free = prpl_xfer_free;
px->ft->write_request = prpl_xfer_write_request;
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: bitlbee-libpurple before 3.5.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a file transfer request for a contact that is not in the contact list. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-10189.
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber) | High | 168,380 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: uint NotificationsEngine::Notify(const QString &app_name, uint replaces_id,
const QString &app_icon, const QString &summary, const QString &body,
const QStringList &actions, const QVariantMap &hints, int timeout)
{
uint partOf = 0;
const QString appRealName = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-appname")].toString();
const QString eventId = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-eventId")].toString();
const bool skipGrouping = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-skipGrouping")].toBool();
if (!replaces_id && m_activeNotifications.values().contains(app_name + summary) && !skipGrouping && !m_alwaysReplaceAppsList.contains(app_name)) {
partOf = m_activeNotifications.key(app_name + summary).midRef(13).toUInt();
}
qDebug() << "Currrent active notifications:" << m_activeNotifications;
qDebug() << "Guessing partOf as:" << partOf;
qDebug() << " New Notification: " << summary << body << timeout << "& Part of:" << partOf;
QString _body;
if (partOf > 0) {
const QString source = QStringLiteral("notification %1").arg(partOf);
Plasma::DataContainer *container = containerForSource(source);
if (container) {
_body = container->data()[QStringLiteral("body")].toString();
if (_body != body) {
_body.append("\n").append(body);
} else {
_body = body;
}
replaces_id = partOf;
CloseNotification(partOf);
}
}
uint id = replaces_id ? replaces_id : m_nextId++;
if (m_alwaysReplaceAppsList.contains(app_name)) {
if (m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.contains(app_name)) {
id = m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.value(app_name);
} else {
m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.insert(app_name, id);
}
}
QString appname_str = app_name;
if (appname_str.isEmpty()) {
appname_str = i18n("Unknown Application");
}
bool isPersistent = timeout == 0;
const int AVERAGE_WORD_LENGTH = 6;
const int WORD_PER_MINUTE = 250;
int count = summary.length() + body.length();
if (timeout <= 0) {
timeout = 60000 * count / AVERAGE_WORD_LENGTH / WORD_PER_MINUTE;
timeout = 2000 + qMax(timeout, 3000);
}
const QString source = QStringLiteral("notification %1").arg(id);
const QString source = QStringLiteral("notification %1").arg(id);
QString bodyFinal = (partOf == 0 ? body : _body);
bodyFinal = bodyFinal.trimmed();
bodyFinal = bodyFinal.replace(QLatin1String("\n"), QLatin1String("<br/>"));
bodyFinal = bodyFinal.simplified();
bodyFinal.replace(QRegularExpression(QStringLiteral("<br/>\\s*<br/>(\\s|<br/>)*")), QLatin1String("<br/>"));
bodyFinal.replace(QRegularExpression(QStringLiteral("&(?!(?:apos|quot|[gl]t|amp);|#)")), QLatin1String("&"));
bodyFinal.replace(QLatin1String("'"), QChar('\''));
Plasma::DataEngine::Data notificationData;
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("id"), QString::number(id));
bodyFinal = bodyFinal.simplified();
bodyFinal.replace(QRegularExpression(QStringLiteral("<br/>\\s*<br/>(\\s|<br/>)*")), QLatin1String("<br/>"));
bodyFinal.replace(QRegularExpression(QStringLiteral("&(?!(?:apos|quot|[gl]t|amp);|#)")), QLatin1String("&"));
bodyFinal.replace(QLatin1String("'"), QChar('\''));
Plasma::DataEngine::Data notificationData;
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("id"), QString::number(id));
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("eventId"), eventId);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("appName"), appname_str);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("appIcon"), app_icon);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("summary"), summary);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("body"), bodyFinal);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("actions"), actions);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("isPersistent"), isPersistent);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("expireTimeout"), timeout);
bool configurable = false;
if (!appRealName.isEmpty()) {
if (m_configurableApplications.contains(appRealName)) {
configurable = m_configurableApplications.value(appRealName);
} else {
QScopedPointer<KConfig> config(new KConfig(appRealName + QStringLiteral(".notifyrc"), KConfig::NoGlobals));
config->addConfigSources(QStandardPaths::locateAll(QStandardPaths::GenericDataLocation,
QStringLiteral("knotifications5/") + appRealName + QStringLiteral(".notifyrc")));
const QRegularExpression regexp(QStringLiteral("^Event/([^/]*)$"));
configurable = !config->groupList().filter(regexp).isEmpty();
m_configurableApplications.insert(appRealName, configurable);
}
}
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("appRealName"), appRealName);
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("configurable"), configurable);
QImage image;
if (hints.contains(QStringLiteral("image-data"))) {
QDBusArgument arg = hints[QStringLiteral("image-data")].value<QDBusArgument>();
image = decodeNotificationSpecImageHint(arg);
} else if (hints.contains(QStringLiteral("image_data"))) {
QDBusArgument arg = hints[QStringLiteral("image_data")].value<QDBusArgument>();
image = decodeNotificationSpecImageHint(arg);
} else if (hints.contains(QStringLiteral("image-path"))) {
QString path = findImageForSpecImagePath(hints[QStringLiteral("image-path")].toString());
if (!path.isEmpty()) {
image.load(path);
}
} else if (hints.contains(QStringLiteral("image_path"))) {
QString path = findImageForSpecImagePath(hints[QStringLiteral("image_path")].toString());
if (!path.isEmpty()) {
image.load(path);
}
} else if (hints.contains(QStringLiteral("icon_data"))) {
QDBusArgument arg = hints[QStringLiteral("icon_data")].value<QDBusArgument>();
image = decodeNotificationSpecImageHint(arg);
}
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("image"), image.isNull() ? QVariant() : image);
if (hints.contains(QStringLiteral("urgency"))) {
notificationData.insert(QStringLiteral("urgency"), hints[QStringLiteral("urgency")].toInt());
}
setData(source, notificationData);
m_activeNotifications.insert(source, app_name + summary);
return id;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in KDE Plasma Workspace before 5.12.0. dataengines/notifications/notificationsengine.cpp allows remote attackers to discover client IP addresses via a URL in a notification, as demonstrated by the src attribute of an IMG element.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,026 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, i = 0, nbuf;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
/*
* If we have iterated all input buffers or ran out of
* output room, break.
*/
if (i >= ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers)
break;
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ((ipipe->curbuf + i) & (ipipe->buffers-1));
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
pipe_buf_get(ipipe, ibuf);
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
if (obuf->len > len)
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
i++;
} while (len);
/*
* return EAGAIN if we have the potential of some data in the
* future, otherwise just return 0
*/
if (!ret && ipipe->waiting_writers && (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK))
ret = -EAGAIN;
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The Linux kernel before 5.1-rc5 allows page->_refcount reference count overflow, with resultant use-after-free issues, if about 140 GiB of RAM exists. This is related to fs/fuse/dev.c, fs/pipe.c, fs/splice.c, include/linux/mm.h, include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h, kernel/trace/trace.c, mm/gup.c, and mm/hugetlb.c. It can occur with FUSE requests.
Commit Message: fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | High | 170,230 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ripng_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, unsigned int length)
{
register const struct rip6 *rp = (const struct rip6 *)dat;
register const struct netinfo6 *ni;
register u_int amt;
register u_int i;
int j;
int trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend < dat)
return;
amt = ndo->ndo_snapend - dat;
i = min(length, amt);
if (i < (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6)))
return;
i -= (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6));
switch (rp->rip6_cmd) {
case RIP6_REQUEST:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j == 1
&& rp->rip6_nets->rip6_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY6
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&rp->rip6_nets->rip6_dest)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req dump"));
break;
}
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, 0);
}
break;
case RIP6_RESPONSE:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, ni->rip6_metric);
}
if (trunc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ripng]"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-%d ?? %u", rp->rip6_cmd, length));
break;
}
if (rp->rip6_vers != RIP6_VERSION)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [vers %d]", rp->rip6_vers));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The RIPng parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ripng.c:ripng_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12992/RIPng: Clean up bounds checking.
Do bounds checking as we access items.
Scan the list of netinfo6 entries based on the supplied packet length,
without taking the captured length into account; let the aforementioned
bounds checking handle that.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 167,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl::KioskNextHomeInterfaceBrokerImpl(
content::BrowserContext* context)
: connector_(content::BrowserContext::GetConnectorFor(context)->Clone()),
app_controller_(std::make_unique<AppControllerImpl>(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(context))) {}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A heap use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android allows a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via crafted PDF files.
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122} | Medium | 172,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData(MidiManagerClient* client,
uint32_t port_index,
const std::vector<uint8>& data,
double timestamp) {
DCHECK_LT(port_index, output_streams_.size());
output_streams_[port_index]->Send(data);
client->AccumulateMidiBytesSent(data.size());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Array index error in the MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData function in media/midi/midi_manager_usb.cc in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging renderer access to provide an invalid port index that triggers an out-of-bounds write operation, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-1212.
Commit Message: MidiManagerUsb should not trust indices provided by renderer.
MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData takes |port_index| parameter. As it is
provided by a renderer possibly under the control of an attacker, we must
validate the given index before using it.
BUG=456516
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/907793002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#315303} | High | 172,014 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: TabStyle::TabColors GM2TabStyle::CalculateColors() const {
const ui::ThemeProvider* theme_provider = tab_->GetThemeProvider();
constexpr float kMinimumActiveContrastRatio = 6.05f;
constexpr float kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio = 4.61f;
constexpr float kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio = 5.02f;
constexpr float kMinimumPressedContrastRatio = 4.41f;
float expected_opacity = 0.0f;
if (tab_->IsActive()) {
expected_opacity = 1.0f;
} else if (tab_->IsSelected()) {
expected_opacity = kSelectedTabOpacity;
} else if (tab_->mouse_hovered()) {
expected_opacity = GetHoverOpacity();
}
const SkColor bg_color = color_utils::AlphaBlend(
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_ACTIVE),
tab_->controller()->GetTabBackgroundColor(TAB_INACTIVE),
expected_opacity);
SkColor title_color = tab_->controller()->GetTabForegroundColor(
expected_opacity > 0.5f ? TAB_ACTIVE : TAB_INACTIVE, bg_color);
title_color = color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color, bg_color);
const SkColor base_hovered_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_HOVER);
const SkColor base_pressed_color = theme_provider->GetColor(
ThemeProperties::COLOR_TAB_CLOSE_BUTTON_BACKGROUND_PRESSED);
const auto get_color_for_contrast_ratio = [](SkColor fg_color,
SkColor bg_color,
float contrast_ratio) {
const SkAlpha blend_alpha = color_utils::GetBlendValueWithMinimumContrast(
bg_color, fg_color, bg_color, contrast_ratio);
return color_utils::AlphaBlend(fg_color, bg_color, blend_alpha);
};
const SkColor generated_icon_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
title_color, bg_color,
tab_->IsActive() ? kMinimumActiveContrastRatio
: kMinimumInactiveContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_hovered_color, bg_color, kMinimumHoveredContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_pressed_color = get_color_for_contrast_ratio(
base_pressed_color, bg_color, kMinimumPressedContrastRatio);
const SkColor generated_hovered_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_hovered_color);
const SkColor generated_pressed_icon_color =
color_utils::GetColorWithMinimumContrast(title_color,
generated_pressed_color);
return {bg_color,
title_color,
generated_icon_color,
generated_hovered_icon_color,
generated_pressed_icon_color,
generated_hovered_color,
generated_pressed_color};
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The extensions API in Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Mac, Windows and Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android incorrectly handled navigation within PDFs, which allowed a remote attacker to temporarily spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page containing PDF data.
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | Medium | 172,521 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::reshape(int width, int height) {
cached_width_ = width;
cached_height_ = height;
gl_->ResizeCHROMIUM(width, height);
#ifdef FLIP_FRAMEBUFFER_VERTICALLY
scanline_.reset(new uint8[width * 4]);
#endif // FLIP_FRAMEBUFFER_VERTICALLY
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The WebGL implementation in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not properly handle CANVAS elements, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Fix mismanagement in handling of temporary scanline for vertical flip.
BUG=116637
TEST=manual test from bug report with ASAN
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9617038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125301 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
struct iowarrior *dev = NULL;
struct usb_host_interface *iface_desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
int i;
int retval = -ENOMEM;
/* allocate memory for our device state and initialize it */
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iowarrior), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev == NULL) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Out of memory\n");
return retval;
}
mutex_init(&dev->mutex);
atomic_set(&dev->intr_idx, 0);
atomic_set(&dev->read_idx, 0);
spin_lock_init(&dev->intr_idx_lock);
atomic_set(&dev->overflow_flag, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->read_wait);
atomic_set(&dev->write_busy, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&dev->write_wait);
dev->udev = udev;
dev->interface = interface;
iface_desc = interface->cur_altsetting;
dev->product_id = le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct);
/* set up the endpoint information */
for (i = 0; i < iface_desc->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
endpoint = &iface_desc->endpoint[i].desc;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
dev->int_in_endpoint = endpoint;
if (usb_endpoint_is_int_out(endpoint))
/* this one will match for the IOWarrior56 only */
dev->int_out_endpoint = endpoint;
}
/* we have to check the report_size often, so remember it in the endianness suitable for our machine */
dev->report_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->int_in_endpoint);
if ((dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) &&
(dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56))
/* IOWarrior56 has wMaxPacketSize different from report size */
dev->report_size = 7;
/* create the urb and buffer for reading */
dev->int_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_urb) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate interrupt_in_urb\n");
goto error;
}
dev->int_in_buffer = kmalloc(dev->report_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->int_in_buffer) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate int_in_buffer\n");
goto error;
}
usb_fill_int_urb(dev->int_in_urb, dev->udev,
usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
dev->int_in_buffer, dev->report_size,
iowarrior_callback, dev,
dev->int_in_endpoint->bInterval);
/* create an internal buffer for interrupt data from the device */
dev->read_queue =
kmalloc(((dev->report_size + 1) * MAX_INTERRUPT_BUFFER),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->read_queue) {
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Couldn't allocate read_queue\n");
goto error;
}
/* Get the serial-number of the chip */
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
usb_string(udev, udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber, dev->chip_serial,
sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
if (strlen(dev->chip_serial) != 8)
memset(dev->chip_serial, 0x00, sizeof(dev->chip_serial));
/* Set the idle timeout to 0, if this is interface 0 */
if (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) {
usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
0x0A,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE, 0,
0, NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
}
/* allow device read and ioctl */
dev->present = 1;
/* we can register the device now, as it is ready */
usb_set_intfdata(interface, dev);
retval = usb_register_dev(interface, &iowarrior_class);
if (retval) {
/* something prevented us from registering this driver */
dev_err(&interface->dev, "Not able to get a minor for this device.\n");
usb_set_intfdata(interface, NULL);
goto error;
}
dev->minor = interface->minor;
/* let the user know what node this device is now attached to */
dev_info(&interface->dev, "IOWarrior product=0x%x, serial=%s interface=%d "
"now attached to iowarrior%d\n", dev->product_id, dev->chip_serial,
iface_desc->desc.bInterfaceNumber, dev->minor - IOWARRIOR_MINOR_BASE);
return retval;
error:
iowarrior_delete(dev);
return retval;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The iowarrior_probe function in drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gss_process_context_token (minor_status,
context_handle,
token_buffer)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_buffer_t token_buffer;
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE);
*minor_status = 0;
if (context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ | GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
if (token_buffer == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
if (GSS_EMPTY_BUFFER(token_buffer))
return (GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_process_context_token) {
status = mech->gss_process_context_token(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
token_buffer);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | High | 168,019 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void m_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
vma_stop(priv, vma);
if (priv->task)
put_task_struct(priv->task);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The m_stop function in fs/proc/task_mmu.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 allows local users to cause a denial of service (OOPS) via vectors that trigger an m_start error.
Commit Message: proc: fix oops on invalid /proc/<pid>/maps access
When m_start returns an error, the seq_file logic will still call m_stop
with that error entry, so we'd better make sure that we check it before
using it as a vma.
Introduced by commit ec6fd8a4355c ("report errors in /proc/*/*map*
sanely"), which replaced NULL with various ERR_PTR() cases.
(On ia64, you happen to get a unaligned fault instead of a page fault,
since the address used is generally some random error code like -EPERM)
Reported-by: Anca Emanuel <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Américo Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 165,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct dentry *debugfs_rename(struct dentry *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct dentry *new_dir, const char *new_name)
{
int error;
struct dentry *dentry = NULL, *trap;
const char *old_name;
trap = lock_rename(new_dir, old_dir);
/* Source or destination directories don't exist? */
if (d_really_is_negative(old_dir) || d_really_is_negative(new_dir))
goto exit;
/* Source does not exist, cyclic rename, or mountpoint? */
if (d_really_is_negative(old_dentry) || old_dentry == trap ||
d_mountpoint(old_dentry))
goto exit;
dentry = lookup_one_len(new_name, new_dir, strlen(new_name));
/* Lookup failed, cyclic rename or target exists? */
if (IS_ERR(dentry) || dentry == trap || d_really_is_positive(dentry))
goto exit;
old_name = fsnotify_oldname_init(old_dentry->d_name.name);
error = simple_rename(d_inode(old_dir), old_dentry, d_inode(new_dir),
dentry, 0);
if (error) {
fsnotify_oldname_free(old_name);
goto exit;
}
d_move(old_dentry, dentry);
fsnotify_move(d_inode(old_dir), d_inode(new_dir), old_name,
d_is_dir(old_dentry),
NULL, old_dentry);
fsnotify_oldname_free(old_name);
unlock_rename(new_dir, old_dir);
dput(dentry);
return old_dentry;
exit:
if (dentry && !IS_ERR(dentry))
dput(dentry);
unlock_rename(new_dir, old_dir);
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Race condition in the fsnotify implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.12.4 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted application that leverages simultaneous execution of the inotify_handle_event and vfs_rename functions.
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Medium | 168,262 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: gss_wrap_iov_length (minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
int * conf_state;
gss_iov_buffer_desc * iov;
int iov_count;
{
/* EXPORT DELETE START */
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_wrap_iov_args(minor_status, context_handle,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
conf_state, iov, iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_wrap_iov_length) {
status = mech->gss_wrap_iov_length(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
/* EXPORT DELETE END */
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) allows attackers to have unspecified impact via vectors involving automatic deletion of security contexts on error.
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup | High | 168,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate,
int buffer_size_in_frames,
int total_frames_requested) {
int initial_bytes_enqueued = bytes_enqueued_;
int initial_bytes_buffered = algorithm_.bytes_buffered();
algorithm_.SetPlaybackRate(static_cast<float>(playback_rate));
scoped_array<uint8> buffer(
new uint8[buffer_size_in_frames * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame()]);
if (playback_rate == 0.0) {
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), buffer_size_in_frames);
EXPECT_EQ(0, frames_written);
return;
}
int frames_remaining = total_frames_requested;
while (frames_remaining > 0) {
int frames_requested = std::min(buffer_size_in_frames, frames_remaining);
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), frames_requested);
CHECK_GT(frames_written, 0);
CheckFakeData(buffer.get(), frames_written, playback_rate);
frames_remaining -= frames_written;
}
int bytes_requested = total_frames_requested * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame();
int bytes_consumed = ComputeConsumedBytes(initial_bytes_enqueued,
initial_bytes_buffered);
if (playback_rate == 1.0) {
EXPECT_EQ(bytes_requested, bytes_consumed);
return;
}
static const double kMaxAcceptableDelta = 0.01;
double actual_playback_rate = 1.0 * bytes_consumed / bytes_requested;
double delta = std::abs(1.0 - (actual_playback_rate / playback_rate));
EXPECT_LE(delta, kMaxAcceptableDelta);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via vectors involving seek operations on video data.
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: scoped_refptr<BrowserContext> BrowserContextImpl::GetOffTheRecordContext() {
if (!otr_context_) {
OTRBrowserContextImpl* context = new OTRBrowserContextImpl(
this,
static_cast<BrowserContextIODataImpl *>(io_data()));
otr_context_ = context->GetWeakPtr();
}
return make_scoped_refptr(otr_context_.get());
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message: | Medium | 165,413 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *this_branch = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]->regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, *other_branch_regs;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int pred = is_branch_taken(dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
if (pred == 1) {
/* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through */
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else if (pred == 0) {
/* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
*/
return 0;
}
}
other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
if (!other_branch)
return -EFAULT;
other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
* our min/max values for our dst register.
* this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
* object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
* otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
* comparable.
*/
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off))
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value,
opcode);
else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off))
reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
®s[insn->src_reg],
dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode);
else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)
/* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->src_reg],
&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
®s[insn->src_reg],
®s[insn->dst_reg], opcode);
}
} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch_regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
}
/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
reg_type_may_be_null(dst_reg->type)) {
/* Mark all identical registers in each branch as either
* safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
*/
mark_ptr_or_null_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JNE);
mark_ptr_or_null_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg,
opcode == BPF_JEQ);
} else if (!try_match_pkt_pointers(insn, dst_reg, ®s[insn->src_reg],
this_branch, other_branch) &&
is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->log.level)
print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel before 4.20.6 performs undesirable out-of-bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic in various cases, including cases of different branches with different state or limits to sanitize, leading to side-channel attacks.
Commit Message: bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic
Jann reported that the original commit back in b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") was not sufficient
to stop CPU from speculating out of bounds memory access:
While b2157399cc98 only focussed on masking array map access
for unprivileged users for tail calls and data access such
that the user provided index gets sanitized from BPF program
and syscall side, there is still a more generic form affected
from BPF programs that applies to most maps that hold user
data in relation to dynamic map access when dealing with
unknown scalars or "slow" known scalars as access offset, for
example:
- Load a map value pointer into R6
- Load an index into R7
- Do a slow computation (e.g. with a memory dependency) that
loads a limit into R8 (e.g. load the limit from a map for
high latency, then mask it to make the verifier happy)
- Exit if R7 >= R8 (mispredicted branch)
- Load R0 = R6[R7]
- Load R0 = R6[R0]
For unknown scalars there are two options in the BPF verifier
where we could derive knowledge from in order to guarantee
safe access to the memory: i) While </>/<=/>= variants won't
allow to derive any lower or upper bounds from the unknown
scalar where it would be safe to add it to the map value
pointer, it is possible through ==/!= test however. ii) another
option is to transform the unknown scalar into a known scalar,
for example, through ALU ops combination such as R &= <imm>
followed by R |= <imm> or any similar combination where the
original information from the unknown scalar would be destroyed
entirely leaving R with a constant. The initial slow load still
precedes the latter ALU ops on that register, so the CPU
executes speculatively from that point. Once we have the known
scalar, any compare operation would work then. A third option
only involving registers with known scalars could be crafted
as described in [0] where a CPU port (e.g. Slow Int unit)
would be filled with many dependent computations such that
the subsequent condition depending on its outcome has to wait
for evaluation on its execution port and thereby executing
speculatively if the speculated code can be scheduled on a
different execution port, or any other form of mistraining
as described in [1], for example. Given this is not limited
to only unknown scalars, not only map but also stack access
is affected since both is accessible for unprivileged users
and could potentially be used for out of bounds access under
speculation.
In order to prevent any of these cases, the verifier is now
sanitizing pointer arithmetic on the offset such that any
out of bounds speculation would be masked in a way where the
pointer arithmetic result in the destination register will
stay unchanged, meaning offset masked into zero similar as
in array_index_nospec() case. With regards to implementation,
there are three options that were considered: i) new insn
for sanitation, ii) push/pop insn and sanitation as inlined
BPF, iii) reuse of ax register and sanitation as inlined BPF.
Option i) has the downside that we end up using from reserved
bits in the opcode space, but also that we would require
each JIT to emit masking as native arch opcodes meaning
mitigation would have slow adoption till everyone implements
it eventually which is counter-productive. Option ii) and iii)
have both in common that a temporary register is needed in
order to implement the sanitation as inlined BPF since we
are not allowed to modify the source register. While a push /
pop insn in ii) would be useful to have in any case, it
requires once again that every JIT needs to implement it
first. While possible, amount of changes needed would also
be unsuitable for a -stable patch. Therefore, the path which
has fewer changes, less BPF instructions for the mitigation
and does not require anything to be changed in the JITs is
option iii) which this work is pursuing. The ax register is
already mapped to a register in all JITs (modulo arm32 where
it's mapped to stack as various other BPF registers there)
and used in constant blinding for JITs-only so far. It can
be reused for verifier rewrites under certain constraints.
The interpreter's tmp "register" has therefore been remapped
into extending the register set with hidden ax register and
reusing that for a number of instructions that needed the
prior temporary variable internally (e.g. div, mod). This
allows for zero increase in stack space usage in the interpreter,
and enables (restricted) generic use in rewrites otherwise as
long as such a patchlet does not make use of these instructions.
The sanitation mask is dynamic and relative to the offset the
map value or stack pointer currently holds.
There are various cases that need to be taken under consideration
for the masking, e.g. such operation could look as follows:
ptr += val or val += ptr or ptr -= val. Thus, the value to be
sanitized could reside either in source or in destination
register, and the limit is different depending on whether
the ALU op is addition or subtraction and depending on the
current known and bounded offset. The limit is derived as
follows: limit := max_value_size - (smin_value + off). For
subtraction: limit := umax_value + off. This holds because
we do not allow any pointer arithmetic that would
temporarily go out of bounds or would have an unknown
value with mixed signed bounds where it is unclear at
verification time whether the actual runtime value would
be either negative or positive. For example, we have a
derived map pointer value with constant offset and bounded
one, so limit based on smin_value works because the verifier
requires that statically analyzed arithmetic on the pointer
must be in bounds, and thus it checks if resulting
smin_value + off and umax_value + off is still within map
value bounds at time of arithmetic in addition to time of
access. Similarly, for the case of stack access we derive
the limit as follows: MAX_BPF_STACK + off for subtraction
and -off for the case of addition where off := ptr_reg->off +
ptr_reg->var_off.value. Subtraction is a special case for
the masking which can be in form of ptr += -val, ptr -= -val,
or ptr -= val. In the first two cases where we know that
the value is negative, we need to temporarily negate the
value in order to do the sanitation on a positive value
where we later swap the ALU op, and restore original source
register if the value was in source.
The sanitation of pointer arithmetic alone is still not fully
sufficient as is, since a scenario like the following could
happen ...
PTR += 0x1000 (e.g. K-based imm)
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= BIG_NUMBER_WITH_SLOW_COMPARISON
[...]
... which under speculation could end up as ...
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
PTR += 0x1000
PTR -= 0 [ truncated by mitigation ]
[...]
... and therefore still access out of bounds. To prevent such
case, the verifier is also analyzing safety for potential out
of bounds access under speculative execution. Meaning, it is
also simulating pointer access under truncation. We therefore
"branch off" and push the current verification state after the
ALU operation with known 0 to the verification stack for later
analysis. Given the current path analysis succeeded it is
likely that the one under speculation can be pruned. In any
case, it is also subject to existing complexity limits and
therefore anything beyond this point will be rejected. In
terms of pruning, it needs to be ensured that the verification
state from speculative execution simulation must never prune
a non-speculative execution path, therefore, we mark verifier
state accordingly at the time of push_stack(). If verifier
detects out of bounds access under speculative execution from
one of the possible paths that includes a truncation, it will
reject such program.
Given we mask every reg-based pointer arithmetic for
unprivileged programs, we've been looking into how it could
affect real-world programs in terms of size increase. As the
majority of programs are targeted for privileged-only use
case, we've unconditionally enabled masking (with its alu
restrictions on top of it) for privileged programs for the
sake of testing in order to check i) whether they get rejected
in its current form, and ii) by how much the number of
instructions and size will increase. We've tested this by
using Katran, Cilium and test_l4lb from the kernel selftests.
For Katran we've evaluated balancer_kern.o, Cilium bpf_lxc.o
and an older test object bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o and l4lb
we've used test_l4lb.o as well as test_l4lb_noinline.o. We
found that none of the programs got rejected by the verifier
with this change, and that impact is rather minimal to none.
balancer_kern.o had 13,904 bytes (1,738 insns) xlated and
7,797 bytes JITed before and after the change. Most complex
program in bpf_lxc.o had 30,544 bytes (3,817 insns) xlated
and 18,538 bytes JITed before and after and none of the other
tail call programs in bpf_lxc.o had any changes either. For
the older bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o object we found a small
increase from 20,616 bytes (2,576 insns) and 12,536 bytes JITed
before to 20,664 bytes (2,582 insns) and 12,558 bytes JITed
after the change. Other programs from that object file had
similar small increase. Both test_l4lb.o had no change and
remained at 6,544 bytes (817 insns) xlated and 3,401 bytes
JITed and for test_l4lb_noinline.o constant at 5,080 bytes
(634 insns) xlated and 3,313 bytes JITed. This can be explained
in that LLVM typically optimizes stack based pointer arithmetic
by using K-based operations and that use of dynamic map access
is not overly frequent. However, in future we may decide to
optimize the algorithm further under known guarantees from
branch and value speculation. Latter seems also unclear in
terms of prediction heuristics that today's CPUs apply as well
as whether there could be collisions in e.g. the predictor's
Value History/Pattern Table for triggering out of bounds access,
thus masking is performed unconditionally at this point but could
be subject to relaxation later on. We were generally also
brainstorming various other approaches for mitigation, but the
blocker was always lack of available registers at runtime and/or
overhead for runtime tracking of limits belonging to a specific
pointer. Thus, we found this to be minimally intrusive under
given constraints.
With that in place, a simple example with sanitized access on
unprivileged load at post-verification time looks as follows:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 282
[...]
28: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0)
29: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r7 +8)
30: (57) r1 &= 15
31: (79) r3 = *(u64 *)(r0 +4608)
32: (57) r3 &= 1
33: (47) r3 |= 1
34: (2d) if r2 > r3 goto pc+19
35: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479 |
36: (1f) r11 -= r2 | Dynamic sanitation for pointer
37: (4f) r11 |= r2 | arithmetic with registers
38: (87) r11 = -r11 | containing bounded or known
39: (c7) r11 s>>= 63 | scalars in order to prevent
40: (5f) r11 &= r2 | out of bounds speculation.
41: (0f) r4 += r11 |
42: (71) r4 = *(u8 *)(r4 +0)
43: (6f) r4 <<= r1
[...]
For the case where the scalar sits in the destination register
as opposed to the source register, the following code is emitted
for the above example:
[...]
16: (b4) (u32) r11 = (u32) 20479
17: (1f) r11 -= r2
18: (4f) r11 |= r2
19: (87) r11 = -r11
20: (c7) r11 s>>= 63
21: (5f) r2 &= r11
22: (0f) r2 += r0
23: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
JIT blinding example with non-conflicting use of r10:
[...]
d5: je 0x0000000000000106 _
d7: mov 0x0(%rax),%edi |
da: mov $0xf153246,%r10d | Index load from map value and
e0: xor $0xf153259,%r10 | (const blinded) mask with 0x1f.
e7: and %r10,%rdi |_
ea: mov $0x2f,%r10d |
f0: sub %rdi,%r10 | Sanitized addition. Both use r10
f3: or %rdi,%r10 | but do not interfere with each
f6: neg %r10 | other. (Neither do these instructions
f9: sar $0x3f,%r10 | interfere with the use of ax as temp
fd: and %r10,%rdi | in interpreter.)
100: add %rax,%rdi |_
103: mov 0x0(%rdi),%eax
[...]
Tested that it fixes Jann's reproducer, and also checked that test_verifier
and test_progs suite with interpreter, JIT and JIT with hardening enabled
on x86-64 and arm64 runs successfully.
[0] Speculose: Analyzing the Security Implications of Speculative
Execution in CPUs, Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.04084.pdf
[1] A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and
Defenses, Claudio Canella, Jo Van Bulck, Michael Schwarz,
Moritz Lipp, Benjamin von Berg, Philipp Ortner, Frank Piessens,
Dmitry Evtyushkin, Daniel Gruss,
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.05441.pdf
Fixes: b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> | Medium | 170,240 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
m_client->clearBrowserCache();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.97 on Windows and Linux, and before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X, does not properly load Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | High | 171,348 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: cdf_unpack_summary_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
cdf_summary_info_header_t *ssi, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count)
{
size_t i, maxcount;
const cdf_summary_info_header_t *si =
CAST(const cdf_summary_info_header_t *, sst->sst_tab);
const cdf_section_declaration_t *sd =
CAST(const cdf_section_declaration_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + CDF_SECTION_DECLARATION_OFFSET));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, si, sizeof(*si), __LINE__) == -1 ||
cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, sd, sizeof(*sd), __LINE__) == -1)
return -1;
ssi->si_byte_order = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_byte_order);
ssi->si_os_version = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os_version);
ssi->si_os = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_os);
ssi->si_class = si->si_class;
cdf_swap_class(&ssi->si_class);
ssi->si_count = CDF_TOLE2(si->si_count);
*count = 0;
maxcount = 0;
*info = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < CDF_TOLE4(si->si_count); i++) {
if (i >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Unpack summary info loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return -1;
}
if (cdf_read_property_info(sst, h, CDF_TOLE4(sd->sd_offset),
info, count, &maxcount) == -1) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The cdf_unpack_summary_info function in cdf.c in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.29 and 5.5.x before 5.5.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (performance degradation) by triggering many file_printf calls.
Commit Message: Remove loop that kept reading the same offset (Jan Kaluza) | Medium | 166,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: struct vfsmount *collect_mounts(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *tree;
namespace_lock();
tree = copy_tree(real_mount(path->mnt), path->dentry,
CL_COPY_ALL | CL_PRIVATE);
namespace_unlock();
if (IS_ERR(tree))
return ERR_CAST(tree);
return &tree->mnt;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The collect_mounts function in fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel before 4.0.5 does not properly consider that it may execute after a path has been unmounted, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging user-namespace root access for an MNT_DETACH umount2 system call.
Commit Message: mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Medium | 167,563 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: bool CreateIpcChannel(
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& pipe_security_descriptor,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
IPC::Listener* delegate,
scoped_ptr<IPC::ChannelProxy>* channel_out) {
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES security_attributes;
security_attributes.nLength = sizeof(security_attributes);
security_attributes.bInheritHandle = FALSE;
ULONG security_descriptor_length = 0;
if (!ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptor(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_security_descriptor).c_str(),
SDDL_REVISION_1,
reinterpret_cast<PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR*>(
&security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor),
&security_descriptor_length)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create a security descriptor for the Chromoting IPC channel";
return false;
}
std::string pipe_name(kChromePipeNamePrefix);
pipe_name.append(channel_name);
base::win::ScopedHandle pipe;
pipe.Set(CreateNamedPipe(
UTF8ToUTF16(pipe_name).c_str(),
PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX | FILE_FLAG_OVERLAPPED | FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE,
PIPE_TYPE_BYTE | PIPE_READMODE_BYTE,
1,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
IPC::Channel::kReadBufferSize,
5000,
&security_attributes));
if (!pipe.IsValid()) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(ERROR) <<
"Failed to create the server end of the Chromoting IPC channel";
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
return false;
}
LocalFree(security_attributes.lpSecurityDescriptor);
channel_out->reset(new IPC::ChannelProxy(
IPC::ChannelHandle(pipe),
IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER,
delegate,
io_task_runner));
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 171,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int blkcg_init_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
struct blkcg_gq *new_blkg, *blkg;
bool preloaded;
int ret;
new_blkg = blkg_alloc(&blkcg_root, q, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_blkg)
return -ENOMEM;
preloaded = !radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
/*
* Make sure the root blkg exists and count the existing blkgs. As
* @q is bypassing at this point, blkg_lookup_create() can't be
* used. Open code insertion.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg = blkg_create(&blkcg_root, q, new_blkg);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (preloaded)
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (IS_ERR(blkg)) {
blkg_free(new_blkg);
return PTR_ERR(blkg);
}
q->root_blkg = blkg;
q->root_rl.blkg = blkg;
ret = blk_throtl_init(q);
if (ret) {
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
blkg_destroy_all(q);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The blkcg_init_queue function in block/blk-cgroup.c in the Linux kernel before 4.11 allows local users to cause a denial of service (double free) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a creation failure.
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | High | 169,318 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter(
int render_process_id,
BrowserContext* context)
: GuestViewMessageFilter(kFilteredMessageClasses,
base::size(kFilteredMessageClasses),
render_process_id,
context),
content::BrowserAssociatedInterface<mojom::GuestView>(this, this) {
GetProcessIdToFilterMap()->insert_or_assign(render_process_id_, this);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Data race in extensions guest view in Google Chrome prior to 73.0.3683.75 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155} | Medium | 173,039 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int tmx_check_pretran(sip_msg_t *msg)
{
unsigned int chid;
unsigned int slotid;
int dsize;
struct via_param *vbr;
str scallid;
str scseqmet;
str scseqnum;
str sftag;
str svbranch = {NULL, 0};
pretran_t *it;
if(_tmx_ptran_table==NULL) {
LM_ERR("pretran hash table not initialized yet\n");
return -1;
}
if(get_route_type()!=REQUEST_ROUTE) {
LM_ERR("invalid usage - not in request route\n");
return -1;
}
if(msg->first_line.type!=SIP_REQUEST) {
LM_ERR("invalid usage - not a sip request\n");
return -1;
}
if(parse_headers(msg, HDR_FROM_F|HDR_VIA1_F|HDR_CALLID_F|HDR_CSEQ_F, 0)<0) {
LM_ERR("failed to parse required headers\n");
return -1;
}
if(msg->cseq==NULL || msg->cseq->parsed==NULL) {
LM_ERR("failed to parse cseq headers\n");
return -1;
}
if(get_cseq(msg)->method_id==METHOD_ACK
|| get_cseq(msg)->method_id==METHOD_CANCEL) {
LM_DBG("no pre-transaction management for ACK or CANCEL\n");
return -1;
}
if (msg->via1==0) {
LM_ERR("failed to get Via header\n");
return -1;
}
if (parse_from_header(msg)<0 || get_from(msg)->tag_value.len==0) {
LM_ERR("failed to get From header\n");
return -1;
}
if (msg->callid==NULL || msg->callid->body.s==NULL) {
LM_ERR("failed to parse callid headers\n");
return -1;
}
vbr = msg->via1->branch;
scallid = msg->callid->body;
trim(&scallid);
scseqmet = get_cseq(msg)->method;
trim(&scseqmet);
scseqnum = get_cseq(msg)->number;
trim(&scseqnum);
sftag = get_from(msg)->tag_value;
trim(&sftag);
chid = get_hash1_raw(msg->callid->body.s, msg->callid->body.len);
slotid = chid & (_tmx_ptran_size-1);
if(unlikely(_tmx_proc_ptran == NULL)) {
_tmx_proc_ptran = (pretran_t*)shm_malloc(sizeof(pretran_t));
if(_tmx_proc_ptran == NULL) {
LM_ERR("not enough memory for pretran structure\n");
return -1;
}
memset(_tmx_proc_ptran, 0, sizeof(pretran_t));
_tmx_proc_ptran->pid = my_pid();
}
dsize = scallid.len + scseqnum.len + scseqmet.len
+ sftag.len + 4;
if(likely(vbr!=NULL)) {
svbranch = vbr->value;
trim(&svbranch);
dsize += svbranch.len;
}
if(dsize<256) dsize = 256;
tmx_pretran_unlink();
if(dsize > _tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.len) {
if(_tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.s) shm_free(_tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.s);
_tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.s = (char*)shm_malloc(dsize);
if(_tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.s==NULL) {
LM_ERR("not enough memory for pretran data\n");
return -1;
}
_tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.len = dsize;
}
_tmx_proc_ptran->hid = chid;
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmetid = (get_cseq(msg))->method_id;
_tmx_proc_ptran->callid.s = _tmx_proc_ptran->dbuf.s;
memcpy(_tmx_proc_ptran->callid.s, scallid.s, scallid.len);
_tmx_proc_ptran->callid.len = scallid.len;
_tmx_proc_ptran->callid.s[_tmx_proc_ptran->callid.len] = '\0';
_tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.s = _tmx_proc_ptran->callid.s
+ _tmx_proc_ptran->callid.len + 1;
memcpy(_tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.s, sftag.s, sftag.len);
_tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.len = sftag.len;
_tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.s[_tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.len] = '\0';
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.s = _tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.s
+ _tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.len + 1;
memcpy(_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.s, scseqnum.s, scseqnum.len);
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.len = scseqnum.len;
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.s[_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.len] = '\0';
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.s = _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.s
+ _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.len + 1;
memcpy(_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.s, scseqmet.s, scseqmet.len);
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.len = scseqmet.len;
_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.s[_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.len] = '\0';
if(likely(vbr!=NULL)) {
_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s = _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.s
+ _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.len + 1;
memcpy(_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s, svbranch.s, svbranch.len);
_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.len = svbranch.len;
_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s[_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.len] = '\0';
} else {
_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s = NULL;
_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.len = 0;
}
lock_get(&_tmx_ptran_table[slotid].lock);
it = _tmx_ptran_table[slotid].plist;
tmx_pretran_link_safe(slotid);
for(; it!=NULL; it=it->next) {
if(_tmx_proc_ptran->hid != it->hid
|| _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmetid != it->cseqmetid
|| _tmx_proc_ptran->callid.len != it->callid.len
|| _tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.len != it->ftag.len
|| _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.len != it->cseqmet.len
|| _tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.len != it->cseqnum.len)
continue;
if(_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s != NULL && it->vbranch.s != NULL) {
if(_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.len != it->vbranch.len)
continue;
/* shortcut - check last char in Via branch
* - kamailio/ser adds there branch index => in case of paralel
* forking by previous hop, catch it here quickly */
if(_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s[it->vbranch.len-1]
!= it->vbranch.s[it->vbranch.len-1])
continue;
if(memcmp(_tmx_proc_ptran->vbranch.s,
it->vbranch.s, it->vbranch.len)!=0)
continue;
/* shall stop by matching magic cookie?
* if (vbr && vbr->value.s && vbr->value.len > MCOOKIE_LEN
* && memcmp(vbr->value.s, MCOOKIE, MCOOKIE_LEN)==0) {
* LM_DBG("rfc3261 cookie found in Via branch\n");
* }
*/
}
if(memcmp(_tmx_proc_ptran->callid.s,
it->callid.s, it->callid.len)!=0
|| memcmp(_tmx_proc_ptran->ftag.s,
it->ftag.s, it->ftag.len)!=0
|| memcmp(_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqnum.s,
it->cseqnum.s, it->cseqnum.len)!=0)
continue;
if((it->cseqmetid==METHOD_OTHER || it->cseqmetid==METHOD_UNDEF)
&& memcmp(_tmx_proc_ptran->cseqmet.s,
it->cseqmet.s, it->cseqmet.len)!=0)
continue;
LM_DBG("matched another pre-transaction by pid %d for [%.*s]\n",
it->pid, it->callid.len, it->callid.s);
lock_release(&_tmx_ptran_table[slotid].lock);
return 1;
}
lock_release(&_tmx_ptran_table[slotid].lock);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: A Buffer Overflow issue was discovered in Kamailio before 4.4.7, 5.0.x before 5.0.6, and 5.1.x before 5.1.2. A specially crafted REGISTER message with a malformed branch or From tag triggers an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the tmx_check_pretran function in modules/tmx/tmx_pretran.c.
Commit Message: tmx: allocate space to store ending 0 for branch value
- reported by Alfred Farrugia and Sandro Gauci | High | 169,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int proxy_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_login", sizeof("_proxy_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_password", sizeof("_proxy_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
smart_str_appendl(soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: PHP before 5.6.7 might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via an unexpected data type, related to "type confusion" issues in (1) ext/soap/php_encoding.c, (2) ext/soap/php_http.c, and (3) ext/soap/soap.c, a different issue than CVE-2015-4600.
Commit Message: | High | 165,306 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
int padding,
int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen,
int *stat, rsa_key *key)
{
unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x;
int err;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
/* default to invalid */
*stat = 0;
/* valid padding? */
if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
(padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) {
return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* valid hash ? */
if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
}
/* get modulus len in bits */
modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N));
/* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N));
if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */
tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen);
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return CRYPT_MEM;
}
/* RSA decode it */
x = siglen;
if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
/* make sure the output is the right size */
if (x != siglen) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* PSS decode and verify it */
if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
else{
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
} else {
/* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */
unsigned char *out;
unsigned long outlen, loid[16];
int decoded;
ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];
/* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
goto bail_2;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */
outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3;
out = XMALLOC(outlen);
if (out == NULL) {
err = CRYPT_MEM;
goto bail_2;
}
if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */
/* construct the SEQUENCE
SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
blah NULL
}
hash OCTET STRING
}
*/
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0]));
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen);
if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* test OID */
if ((digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) &&
(siginfo[1].size == hashlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
*stat = 1;
}
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(out, outlen);
#endif
XFREE(out);
}
bail_2:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen);
#endif
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The rsa_verify_hash_ex function in rsa_verify_hash.c in LibTomCrypt, as used in OP-TEE before 2.2.0, does not validate that the message length is equal to the ASN.1 encoded data length, which makes it easier for remote attackers to forge RSA signatures or public certificates by leveraging a Bleichenbacher signature forgery attack.
Commit Message: rsa_verify_hash: fix possible bleichenbacher signature attack | Medium | 168,832 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: WandPrivate MagickBooleanType CLIListOperatorImages(MagickCLI *cli_wand,
const char *option,const char *arg1n,const char *arg2n)
{
const char /* percent escaped versions of the args */
*arg1,
*arg2;
Image
*new_images;
MagickStatusType
status;
ssize_t
parse;
#define _image_info (cli_wand->wand.image_info)
#define _images (cli_wand->wand.images)
#define _exception (cli_wand->wand.exception)
#define _draw_info (cli_wand->draw_info)
#define _quantize_info (cli_wand->quantize_info)
#define _process_flags (cli_wand->process_flags)
#define _option_type ((CommandOptionFlags) cli_wand->command->flags)
#define IfNormalOp (*option=='-')
#define IfPlusOp (*option!='-')
#define IsNormalOp IfNormalOp ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse
assert(cli_wand != (MagickCLI *) NULL);
assert(cli_wand->signature == MagickWandSignature);
assert(cli_wand->wand.signature == MagickWandSignature);
assert(_images != (Image *) NULL); /* _images must be present */
if (cli_wand->wand.debug != MagickFalse)
(void) CLILogEvent(cli_wand,CommandEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"- List Operator: %s \"%s\" \"%s\"", option,
arg1n == (const char *) NULL ? "null" : arg1n,
arg2n == (const char *) NULL ? "null" : arg2n);
arg1 = arg1n;
arg2 = arg2n;
/* Interpret Percent Escapes in Arguments - using first image */
if ( (((_process_flags & ProcessInterpretProperities) != 0 )
|| ((_option_type & AlwaysInterpretArgsFlag) != 0)
) && ((_option_type & NeverInterpretArgsFlag) == 0) ) {
/* Interpret Percent escapes in argument 1 */
if (arg1n != (char *) NULL) {
arg1=InterpretImageProperties(_image_info,_images,arg1n,_exception);
if (arg1 == (char *) NULL) {
CLIWandException(OptionWarning,"InterpretPropertyFailure",option);
arg1=arg1n; /* use the given argument as is */
}
}
if (arg2n != (char *) NULL) {
arg2=InterpretImageProperties(_image_info,_images,arg2n,_exception);
if (arg2 == (char *) NULL) {
CLIWandException(OptionWarning,"InterpretPropertyFailure",option);
arg2=arg2n; /* use the given argument as is */
}
}
}
#undef _process_flags
#undef _option_type
status=MagickTrue;
new_images=NewImageList();
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=AppendImages(_images,IsNormalOp,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
CLIWandWarnReplaced("-evaluate-sequence Mean");
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-evaluate-sequence","Mean",
NULL);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel-fx",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=ChannelFxImage(_images,arg1,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image;
/* FUTURE - make this a compose option, and thus can be used
with layers compose or even compose last image over all other
_images.
*/
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
clut_image=RemoveLastImageFromList(&_images);
/* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) ClutImage(new_images,clut_image,new_images->interpolate,
_exception);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=CoalesceImages(_images,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=(ssize_t) _images->colorspace;
if (_images->number_channels < GetImageListLength(_images))
parse=sRGBColorspace;
if ( IfPlusOp )
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if (parse < 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedColorspace",option,
arg1);
new_images=CombineImages(_images,(ColorspaceType) parse,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
double
distortion;
Image
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
/* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
option=GetImageOption(_image_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
new_images=CompareImages(image,reconstruct_image,metric,&distortion,
_exception);
(void) distortion;
reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if (parse < 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedEvaluateOperator",
option,arg1);
new_images=ComplexImages(_images,(ComplexOperator) parse,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
MagickBooleanType
clip_to_self;
Image
*mask_image,
*source_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/* Compose value from "-compose" option only */
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose");
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* use Over not source_image->compose */
else
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
/* Get "clip-to-self" expert setting (false is normal) */
clip_to_self=GetCompositeClipToSelf(compose);
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose:clip-to-self");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringTrue(value);
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose:outside-overlay");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
clip_to_self=IsStringFalse(value); /* deprecated */
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
source_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
if (source_image == (Image *) NULL)
break; /* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
/* FUTURE - this should not be here! - should be part of -geometry */
if (source_image->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
RectangleInfo
resize_geometry;
(void) ParseRegionGeometry(source_image,source_image->geometry,
&resize_geometry,_exception);
if ((source_image->columns != resize_geometry.width) ||
(source_image->rows != resize_geometry.height))
{
Image
*resize_image;
resize_image=ResizeImage(source_image,resize_geometry.width,
resize_geometry.height,source_image->filter,_exception);
if (resize_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
source_image=resize_image;
}
}
}
SetGeometry(source_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(source_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(new_images->columns,new_images->rows,
new_images->gravity, &geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
if (mask_image == (Image *) NULL)
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,clip_to_self,
geometry.x,geometry.y,_exception);
else
{
if ((compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
status&=CompositeImage(source_image,mask_image,
CopyGreenCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,_exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,_exception);
}
else
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(new_images,0,0,MagickTrue,_exception);
if (clone_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,source_image,compose,
clip_to_self,geometry.x,geometry.y,_exception);
status&=CompositeImage(new_images,mask_image,
CopyAlphaCompositeOp,MagickTrue,0,0,_exception);
status&=CompositeImage(clone_image,new_images,OverCompositeOp,
clip_to_self,0,0,_exception);
new_images=DestroyImage(new_images);
new_images=clone_image;
}
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
source_image=DestroyImage(source_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
if (IsGeometry(arg2) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(_images,arg2,&geometry,_exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=_images;
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,arg1,&geometry,_exception);
(void) CopyImagePixels(_images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
_exception);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
CLIWandWarnReplaced("-layer CompareAny");
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-layer","CompareAny",NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (IfNormalOp)
DeleteImages(&_images,arg1,_exception);
else
DeleteImages(&_images,"-1",_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
if (IfNormalOp)
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,
arg1);
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(arg1);
p=strchr(arg1,',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
new_images=DuplicateImages(_images,number_duplicates,"-1",
_exception);
else
new_images=DuplicateImages(_images,number_duplicates,p,
_exception);
}
else
new_images=DuplicateImages(_images,1,"-1",_exception);
AppendImageToList(&_images, new_images);
new_images=(Image *) NULL;
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if (parse < 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedEvaluateOperator",
option,arg1);
new_images=EvaluateImages(_images,(MagickEvaluateOperator) parse,
_exception);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=ForwardFourierTransformImage(_images,IsNormalOp,
_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
/* REDIRECTED to use -layers flatten instead */
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-layers",option+1,NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
new_images=FxImage(_images,arg1,_exception);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE - make this a compose option (and thus layers compose )
or perhaps compose last image over all other _images.
*/
Image
*hald_image;
new_images=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
hald_image=RemoveLastImageFromList(&_images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) HaldClutImage(new_images,hald_image,_exception);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(&_images);
/* FUTURE - produce Exception, rather than silent fail */
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
new_images=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,phase_image,
IsNormalOp,_exception);
magnitude_image=DestroyImage(magnitude_image);
phase_image=DestroyImage(phase_image);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*insert_image,
*index_image;
ssize_t
index;
if (IfNormalOp && (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse))
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
index=0;
insert_image=RemoveLastImageFromList(&_images);
if (IfNormalOp)
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(arg1);
index_image=insert_image;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(&_images,insert_image);
else if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(_images))
AppendImageToList(&_images,insert_image);
else
{
index_image=GetImageFromList(_images,index-1);
if (index_image == (Image *) NULL)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"NoSuchImage",option,arg1);
InsertImageInList(&index_image,insert_image);
}
_images=GetFirstImageInList(index_image);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
parse=ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,MagickFalse,arg1);
if ( parse < 0 )
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedLayerMethod",
option,arg1);
switch ((LayerMethod) parse)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
new_images=CoalesceImages(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
new_images=CompareImagesLayers(_images,(LayerMethod) parse,
_exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
new_images=MergeImageLayers(_images,(LayerMethod) parse,
_exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
new_images=DisposeImages(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
new_images=OptimizeImageLayers(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
new_images=OptimizePlusImageLayers(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(_images,_exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(&_images,_exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(&_images,_exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{ /* General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer. */
new_images=CoalesceImages(_images,_exception);
if (new_images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
_images=DestroyImageList(_images);
_images=OptimizeImageLayers(new_images,_exception);
if (_images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
new_images=DestroyImageList(new_images);
OptimizeImageTransparency(_images,_exception);
(void) RemapImages(_quantize_info,_images,(Image *) NULL,
_exception);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
CompositeOperator
compose;
const char*
value;
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"compose");
compose=OverCompositeOp; /* Default to Over */
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
/* Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image. */
source=_images;
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{ /* Separate the two lists, junk the null: image. */
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(_exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
break;
}
/* Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas. */
SetGeometry(_images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(_images->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry(_images->page.width != 0 ?
_images->page.width : _images->columns,
_images->page.height != 0 ? _images->page.height :
_images->rows,_images->gravity,&geometry);
/* Compose the two image sequences together */
CompositeLayers(_images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
_exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
CLIWandWarnReplaced("+remap");
(void) RemapImages(_quantize_info,_images,(Image *) NULL,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("metric",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageOption(_image_info,option+1,arg1);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
morph_image=MorphImages(_images,StringToUnsignedLong(arg1),
_exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
_images=DestroyImageList(_images);
_images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
/* REDIRECTED to use -layers mosaic instead */
(void) CLIListOperatorImages(cli_wand,"-layers",option+1,NULL);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
double
*args;
ssize_t
count;
/* convert argument string into an array of doubles */
args = StringToArrayOfDoubles(arg1,&count,_exception);
if (args == (double *) NULL )
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidNumberList",option,arg1);
new_images=PolynomialImage(_images,(size_t) (count >> 1),args,
_exception);
args=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(args);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE: better parsing using ScriptToken() from string ??? */
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
arguments=StringToArgv(arg1,&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL)
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*arguments;
int
next,
status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg1".
*/
assert(arg1 != (const char *) NULL);
length=strlen(arg1);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
arguments=arg1;
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=",
"\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (status == 0)
{
const char
*argv;
argv=(&(arguments[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&_images,1,&argv,
_exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&_images,
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,_exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("remap",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) RemapImages(_quantize_info,_images,(Image *) NULL,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(&_images);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
/* FUTURE: this option needs more work to make better */
ssize_t
offset;
if (IsGeometry(arg1) == MagickFalse)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(arg1);
new_images=SmushImages(_images,IsNormalOp,offset,_exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("subimage",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*base_image,
*compare_image;
const char
*value;
MetricType
metric;
double
similarity;
RectangleInfo
offset;
base_image=GetImageFromList(_images,0);
compare_image=GetImageFromList(_images,1);
/* Comparision Metric */
metric=UndefinedErrorMetric;
value=GetImageOption(_image_info,"metric");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
new_images=SimilarityImage(base_image,compare_image,metric,0.0,
&offset,&similarity,_exception);
if (new_images != (Image *) NULL)
{
char
result[MagickPathExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,"%lf",
similarity);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:similarity",result,
_exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,"%+ld",(long)
offset.x);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:x",result,
_exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,"%+ld",(long)
offset.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:y",result,
_exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(result,MagickPathExtent,
"%lux%lu%+ld%+ld",(unsigned long) offset.width,(unsigned long)
offset.height,(long) offset.x,(long) offset.y);
(void) SetImageProperty(new_images,"subimage:offset",result,
_exception);
}
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*swap;
ssize_t
index,
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (IfNormalOp) {
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(arg1,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & RhoValue) == 0)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidArgument",option,arg1);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(_images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(_images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL)) {
if (IfNormalOp)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidImageIndex",option,arg1)
else
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"TwoOrMoreImagesRequired",option);
}
if (p == q)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(OptionError,"InvalidImageIndex",option,arg1);
swap=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,_exception);
if (swap == (Image *) NULL)
CLIWandExceptArgBreak(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
option,GetExceptionMessage(errno));
ReplaceImageInList(&p,CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,_exception));
ReplaceImageInList(&q,swap);
_images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
default:
CLIWandExceptionBreak(OptionError,"UnrecognizedOption",option);
}
/* clean up percent escape interpreted strings */
if (arg1 != arg1n )
arg1=DestroyString((char *)arg1);
if (arg2 != arg2n )
arg2=DestroyString((char *)arg2);
/* if new image list generated, replace existing image list */
if (new_images == (Image *) NULL)
return(status == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
_images=DestroyImageList(_images);
_images=GetFirstImageInList(new_images);
return(status == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
#undef _image_info
#undef _images
#undef _exception
#undef _draw_info
#undef _quantize_info
#undef IfNormalOp
#undef IfPlusOp
#undef IsNormalOp
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has direct memory leaks in AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in CLIListOperatorImages in MagickWand/operation.c for a NULL value.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1604 | Medium | 169,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void RunMemCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_extreme_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
input_extreme_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : -255;
}
if (i == 0)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = 255;
if (i == 1)
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_extreme_block[j] = -255;
fwd_txfm_ref(input_extreme_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_extreme_block,
output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
EXPECT_GE(4 * DCT_MAX_VALUE, abs(output_block[j]))
<< "Error: 16x16 FDCT has coefficient larger than 4*DCT_MAX_VALUE";
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
struct ceph_authorizer *a, size_t len)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au = (void *)a;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
int ret = 0;
struct ceph_x_authorize_reply reply;
void *p = au->reply_buf;
void *end = p + sizeof(au->reply_buf);
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, au->service);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
ret = ceph_x_decrypt(&th->session_key, &p, end, &reply, sizeof(reply));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret != sizeof(reply))
return -EPERM;
if (au->nonce + 1 != le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one))
ret = -EPERM;
else
ret = 0;
dout("verify_authorizer_reply nonce %llx got %llx ret %d\n",
au->nonce, le64_to_cpu(reply.nonce_plus_one), ret);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: net/ceph/auth_x.c in Ceph, as used in the Linux kernel before 3.16.3, does not properly validate auth replies, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted data from the IP address of a Ceph Monitor.
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]> | High | 166,264 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: spnego_gss_unwrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 166,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (arg_zsh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.zshrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.zshrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname) == 0) {
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
}
else { //
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
fclose(fp);
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
}
free(fname);
}
else if (arg_csh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.cshrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.cshrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname) == 0) {
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
}
else { //
/* coverity[toctou] */
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
fclose(fp);
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.bashrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.bashrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname) == 0) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
}
free(fname);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Firejail before 0.9.44.6 and 0.9.38.x LTS before 0.9.38.10 LTS does not comprehensively address dotfile cases during its attempt to prevent accessing user files with an euid of zero, which allows local users to conduct sandbox-escape attacks via vectors involving a symlink and the --private option. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2017-5180.
Commit Message: security fix | Medium | 170,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: The GD Graphics Library (aka LibGD) 2.2.5 has a double free in the gdImage*Ptr() functions in gd_gif_out.c, gd_jpeg.c, and gd_wbmp.c. NOTE: PHP is unaffected.
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here. | High | 169,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderWin::CreateSensorInternal(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
const CreateSensorCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!StartSensorThread()) {
callback.Run(nullptr);
return;
}
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::LINEAR_ACCELERATION: {
auto linear_acceleration_fusion_algorithm = std::make_unique<
LinearAccelerationFusionAlgorithmUsingAccelerometer>();
PlatformSensorFusion::Create(
std::move(mapping), this,
std::move(linear_acceleration_fusion_algorithm), callback);
break;
}
default: {
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
sensor_thread_->task_runner().get(), FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorProviderWin::CreateSensorReader,
base::Unretained(this), type),
base::Bind(&PlatformSensorProviderWin::SensorReaderCreated,
base::Unretained(this), type, base::Passed(&mapping),
callback));
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: Lack of special casing of Android ashmem in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass inter-process read only guarantees via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607} | Medium | 172,847 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::set_config(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE configIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR configData)
{
(void) hComp;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get Config in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE *pNal;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Config Called");
if (configIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData) {
OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_EXTRADATATYPE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData called");
if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc") ||
!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mvc")) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData AVC");
OMX_U32 extra_size;
nal_length = (config->pData[4] & 0x03) + 1;
extra_size = 0;
if (nal_length > 2) {
/* Presently we assume that only one SPS and one PPS in AvC1 Atom */
extra_size = (nal_length - 2) * 2;
}
OMX_U8 *pSrcBuf = (OMX_U8 *) (&config->pData[6]);
OMX_U8 *pDestBuf;
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize - 6 - 1 + extra_size;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc(m_vendor_config.nDataSize);
OMX_U32 len;
OMX_U8 index = 0;
pDestBuf = m_vendor_config.pData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Rxd SPS+PPS nPortIndex[%u] len[%u] data[%p]",
(unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nPortIndex,
(unsigned int)m_vendor_config.nDataSize,
m_vendor_config.pData);
while (index < 2) {
uint8 *psize;
len = *pSrcBuf;
len = len << 8;
len |= *(pSrcBuf + 1);
psize = (uint8 *) & len;
memcpy(pDestBuf + nal_length, pSrcBuf + 2,len);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < nal_length; i++) {
pDestBuf[i] = psize[nal_length - 1 - i];
}
pDestBuf += len + nal_length;
pSrcBuf += len + 2;
index++;
pSrcBuf++; // skip picture param set
len = 0;
}
} else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4") ||
!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg2")) {
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize));
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,config->nDataSize);
} else if (!strcmp(drv_ctx.kind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1")) {
if (m_vendor_config.pData) {
free(m_vendor_config.pData);
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = 0;
}
if (((*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData)) &
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE_MASK) ==
VC1_SP_MP_START_CODE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 simple/main profile");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData =
(OMX_U8 *) malloc(config->nDataSize);
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,
config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else if (*((OMX_U32 *) config->pData) == VC1_AP_SEQ_START_CODE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Advance profile");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData =
(OMX_U8 *) malloc((config->nDataSize));
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData, config->pData,
config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_AP;
} else if ((config->nDataSize == VC1_STRUCT_C_LEN)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - VC1 Simple/Main profile struct C only");
m_vendor_config.nPortIndex = config->nPortIndex;
m_vendor_config.nDataSize = config->nDataSize;
m_vendor_config.pData = (OMX_U8*)malloc(config->nDataSize);
memcpy(m_vendor_config.pData,config->pData,config->nDataSize);
m_vc1_profile = VC1_SP_MP_RCV;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_config - Error: Unknown VC1 profile");
}
}
return ret;
} else if (configIndex == OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize) {
struct v4l2_control temp;
temp.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT;
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(configData, OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE);
pNal = reinterpret_cast < OMX_VIDEO_CONFIG_NALSIZE * >(configData);
switch (pNal->nNaluBytes) {
case 0:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_STARTCODES;
break;
case 2:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_TWO_BYTE_LENGTH;
break;
case 4:
temp.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_NAL_FORMAT_FOUR_BYTE_LENGTH;
break;
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (!arbitrary_bytes) {
/* In arbitrary bytes mode, the assembler strips out nal size and replaces
* with start code, so only need to notify driver in frame by frame mode */
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &temp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_STREAM_FORMAT");
return OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
}
nal_length = pNal->nNaluBytes;
m_frame_parser.init_nal_length(nal_length);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexConfigVideoNalSize called with Size %d", nal_length);
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate) {
OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *config = (OMX_VENDOR_VIDEOFRAMERATE *) configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Index OMX_IndexVendorVideoFrameRate %u", (unsigned int)config->nFps);
if (config->nPortIndex == OMX_CORE_INPUT_PORT_INDEX) {
if (config->bEnabled) {
if ((config->nFps >> 16) > 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: frame rate set by omx client : %u",
(unsigned int)config->nFps >> 16);
Q16ToFraction(config->nFps, drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator,
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator);
if (!drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Numerator is zero setting to 30");
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = 30;
}
if (drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator) {
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator = (int)
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator / drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
}
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator = 1;
frm_int = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator * 1e6 /
drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_outputparm oparm;
/*XXX: we're providing timing info as seconds per frame rather than frames
* per second.*/
oparm.timeperframe.numerator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_denominator;
oparm.timeperframe.denominator = drv_ctx.frame_rate.fps_numerator;
struct v4l2_streamparm sparm;
sparm.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
sparm.parm.output = oparm;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_PARM, &sparm)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to convey fps info to driver, \
performance might be affected");
ret = OMX_ErrorHardware;
}
client_set_fps = true;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Frame rate not supported.");
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_config: Disabled client's frame rate");
client_set_fps = false;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Set_config: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)config->nPortIndex);
ret = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_QcomIndexConfigPerfLevel) {
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *perf =
(OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_PERF_LEVEL *)configData;
struct v4l2_control control;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set perf level: %d", perf->ePerfLevel);
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_SET_PERF_LEVEL;
switch (perf->ePerfLevel) {
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelNominal:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_NOMINAL;
break;
case OMX_QCOM_PerfLevelTurbo:
control.value = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_PERF_LEVEL_TURBO;
break;
default:
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
break;
}
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) {
ret = (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control) < 0) ?
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting : OMX_ErrorNone;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigPriority) {
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *priority = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: priority %d", priority->nU32);
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY;
if (priority->nU32 == 0)
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_ENABLE;
else
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_PRIORITY_REALTIME_DISABLE;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set Priority");
ret = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return ret;
} else if ((int)configIndex == (int)OMX_IndexConfigOperatingRate) {
OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *rate = (OMX_PARAM_U32TYPE *)configData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set_config: operating-rate %u fps", rate->nU32 >> 16);
struct v4l2_control control;
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_OPERATING_RATE;
control.value = rate->nU32;
if (ioctl(drv_ctx.video_driver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
ret = errno == -EBUSY ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to set operating rate %u fps (%s)",
rate->nU32 >> 16, errno == -EBUSY ? "HW Overload" : strerror(errno));
}
return ret;
}
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 mishandles pointers, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27475409.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: deprecate unused config OMX_IndexVendorVideoExtraData
This config (used to set header offline) is no longer used. Remove handling
this config since it uses non-process-safe ways to pass memory pointers.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Segfault in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #2)
Bug: 27475409
Change-Id: I7a535a3da485cbe83cf4605a05f9faf70dcca42f
| High | 173,797 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *settings)
{
s32 ie_offset;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
const struct brcmf_tlv *ssid_ie;
const struct brcmf_tlv *country_ie;
struct brcmf_ssid_le ssid_le;
s32 err = -EPERM;
const struct brcmf_tlv *rsn_ie;
const struct brcmf_vs_tlv *wpa_ie;
struct brcmf_join_params join_params;
enum nl80211_iftype dev_role;
struct brcmf_fil_bss_enable_le bss_enable;
u16 chanspec = chandef_to_chanspec(&cfg->d11inf, &settings->chandef);
bool mbss;
int is_11d;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "ctrlchn=%d, center=%d, bw=%d, beacon_interval=%d, dtim_period=%d,\n",
settings->chandef.chan->hw_value,
settings->chandef.center_freq1, settings->chandef.width,
settings->beacon_interval, settings->dtim_period);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "ssid=%s(%zu), auth_type=%d, inactivity_timeout=%d\n",
settings->ssid, settings->ssid_len, settings->auth_type,
settings->inactivity_timeout);
dev_role = ifp->vif->wdev.iftype;
mbss = ifp->vif->mbss;
/* store current 11d setting */
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_REGULATORY, &ifp->vif->is_11d);
country_ie = brcmf_parse_tlvs((u8 *)settings->beacon.tail,
settings->beacon.tail_len,
WLAN_EID_COUNTRY);
is_11d = country_ie ? 1 : 0;
memset(&ssid_le, 0, sizeof(ssid_le));
if (settings->ssid == NULL || settings->ssid_len == 0) {
ie_offset = DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN + DOT11_BCN_PRB_FIXED_LEN;
ssid_ie = brcmf_parse_tlvs(
(u8 *)&settings->beacon.head[ie_offset],
settings->beacon.head_len - ie_offset,
WLAN_EID_SSID);
if (!ssid_ie)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(ssid_le.SSID, ssid_ie->data, ssid_ie->len);
ssid_le.SSID_len = cpu_to_le32(ssid_ie->len);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "SSID is (%s) in Head\n", ssid_le.SSID);
} else {
memcpy(ssid_le.SSID, settings->ssid, settings->ssid_len);
ssid_le.SSID_len = cpu_to_le32((u32)settings->ssid_len);
}
if (!mbss) {
brcmf_set_mpc(ifp, 0);
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, false);
}
/* find the RSN_IE */
rsn_ie = brcmf_parse_tlvs((u8 *)settings->beacon.tail,
settings->beacon.tail_len, WLAN_EID_RSN);
/* find the WPA_IE */
wpa_ie = brcmf_find_wpaie((u8 *)settings->beacon.tail,
settings->beacon.tail_len);
if ((wpa_ie != NULL || rsn_ie != NULL)) {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "WPA(2) IE is found\n");
if (wpa_ie != NULL) {
/* WPA IE */
err = brcmf_configure_wpaie(ifp, wpa_ie, false);
if (err < 0)
goto exit;
} else {
struct brcmf_vs_tlv *tmp_ie;
tmp_ie = (struct brcmf_vs_tlv *)rsn_ie;
/* RSN IE */
err = brcmf_configure_wpaie(ifp, tmp_ie, true);
if (err < 0)
goto exit;
}
} else {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "No WPA(2) IEs found\n");
brcmf_configure_opensecurity(ifp);
}
brcmf_config_ap_mgmt_ie(ifp->vif, &settings->beacon);
/* Parameters shared by all radio interfaces */
if (!mbss) {
if (is_11d != ifp->vif->is_11d) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_REGULATORY,
is_11d);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Regulatory Set Error, %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
if (settings->beacon_interval) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_BCNPRD,
settings->beacon_interval);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Beacon Interval Set Error, %d\n",
err);
goto exit;
}
}
if (settings->dtim_period) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_DTIMPRD,
settings->dtim_period);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("DTIM Interval Set Error, %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
if ((dev_role == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) &&
((ifp->ifidx == 0) ||
!brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_RSDB))) {
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_DOWN, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("BRCMF_C_DOWN error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "apsta", 0);
}
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_INFRA, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("SET INFRA error %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
} else if (WARN_ON(is_11d != ifp->vif->is_11d)) {
/* Multiple-BSS should use same 11d configuration */
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
/* Interface specific setup */
if (dev_role == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
if ((brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_MBSS)) && (!mbss))
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "mbss", 1);
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_AP, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("setting AP mode failed %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
if (!mbss) {
/* Firmware 10.x requires setting channel after enabling
* AP and before bringing interface up.
*/
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "chanspec", chanspec);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Set Channel failed: chspec=%d, %d\n",
chanspec, err);
goto exit;
}
}
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_UP, 1);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("BRCMF_C_UP error (%d)\n", err);
goto exit;
}
/* On DOWN the firmware removes the WEP keys, reconfigure
* them if they were set.
*/
brcmf_cfg80211_reconfigure_wep(ifp);
memset(&join_params, 0, sizeof(join_params));
/* join parameters starts with ssid */
memcpy(&join_params.ssid_le, &ssid_le, sizeof(ssid_le));
/* create softap */
err = brcmf_fil_cmd_data_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_SSID,
&join_params, sizeof(join_params));
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("SET SSID error (%d)\n", err);
goto exit;
}
if (settings->hidden_ssid) {
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "closednet", 1);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("closednet error (%d)\n", err);
goto exit;
}
}
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "AP mode configuration complete\n");
} else if (dev_role == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO) {
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "chanspec", chanspec);
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("Set Channel failed: chspec=%d, %d\n",
chanspec, err);
goto exit;
}
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_data_set(ifp, "ssid", &ssid_le,
sizeof(ssid_le));
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("setting ssid failed %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
bss_enable.bsscfgidx = cpu_to_le32(ifp->bsscfgidx);
bss_enable.enable = cpu_to_le32(1);
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "bss", &bss_enable,
sizeof(bss_enable));
if (err < 0) {
brcmf_err("bss_enable config failed %d\n", err);
goto exit;
}
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "GO mode configuration complete\n");
} else {
WARN_ON(1);
}
set_bit(BRCMF_VIF_STATUS_AP_CREATED, &ifp->vif->sme_state);
brcmf_net_setcarrier(ifp, true);
exit:
if ((err) && (!mbss)) {
brcmf_set_mpc(ifp, 1);
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, true);
}
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Stack-based buffer overflow in the brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap function in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c in the Linux kernel before 4.7.5 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a long SSID Information Element in a command to a Netlink socket.
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> | Medium | 166,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static void snd_usb_mixer_free(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer)
{
kfree(mixer->id_elems);
if (mixer->urb) {
kfree(mixer->urb->transfer_buffer);
usb_free_urb(mixer->urb);
}
usb_free_urb(mixer->rc_urb);
kfree(mixer->rc_setup_packet);
kfree(mixer);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: sound/usb/mixer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.13.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (snd_usb_mixer_interrupt use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted USB device.
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | High | 167,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int tap_if_up(const char *devname, const bt_bdaddr_t *addr)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int sk, err;
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sk < 0)
return -1;
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IFNAMSIZ - 1);
err = ioctl(sk, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &ifr);
if (err < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Could not get network hardware for interface:%s, errno:%s", devname, strerror(errno));
close(sk);
return -1;
}
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IFNAMSIZ - 1);
memcpy(ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data, addr->address, 6);
/* The IEEE has specified that the most significant bit of the most significant byte is used to
* determine a multicast address. If its a 1, that means multicast, 0 means unicast.
* Kernel returns an error if we try to set a multicast address for the tun-tap ethernet interface.
* Mask this bit to avoid any issue with auto generated address.
*/
if (ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data[0] & 0x01) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("Not a unicast MAC address, force multicast bit flipping");
ifr.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data[0] &= ~0x01;
}
err = ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFHWADDR, (caddr_t)&ifr);
if (err < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Could not set bt address for interface:%s, errno:%s", devname, strerror(errno));
close(sk);
return -1;
}
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IF_NAMESIZE - 1);
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_MULTICAST;
err = ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr);
if (err < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("Could not bring up network interface:%s, errno:%d", devname, errno);
close(sk);
return -1;
}
close(sk);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("network interface: %s is up", devname);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 173,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: static int __rds_rdma_map(struct rds_sock *rs, struct rds_get_mr_args *args,
u64 *cookie_ret, struct rds_mr **mr_ret)
{
struct rds_mr *mr = NULL, *found;
unsigned int nr_pages;
struct page **pages = NULL;
struct scatterlist *sg;
void *trans_private;
unsigned long flags;
rds_rdma_cookie_t cookie;
unsigned int nents;
long i;
int ret;
if (rs->rs_bound_addr == 0) {
ret = -ENOTCONN; /* XXX not a great errno */
goto out;
}
if (!rs->rs_transport->get_mr) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&args->vec);
if (nr_pages == 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Restrict the size of mr irrespective of underlying transport
* To account for unaligned mr regions, subtract one from nr_pages
*/
if ((nr_pages - 1) > (RDS_MAX_MSG_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
rdsdebug("RDS: get_mr addr %llx len %llu nr_pages %u\n",
args->vec.addr, args->vec.bytes, nr_pages);
/* XXX clamp nr_pages to limit the size of this alloc? */
pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
mr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rds_mr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mr) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
refcount_set(&mr->r_refcount, 1);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&mr->r_rb_node);
mr->r_trans = rs->rs_transport;
mr->r_sock = rs;
if (args->flags & RDS_RDMA_USE_ONCE)
mr->r_use_once = 1;
if (args->flags & RDS_RDMA_INVALIDATE)
mr->r_invalidate = 1;
if (args->flags & RDS_RDMA_READWRITE)
mr->r_write = 1;
/*
* Pin the pages that make up the user buffer and transfer the page
* pointers to the mr's sg array. We check to see if we've mapped
* the whole region after transferring the partial page references
* to the sg array so that we can have one page ref cleanup path.
*
* For now we have no flag that tells us whether the mapping is
* r/o or r/w. We need to assume r/w, or we'll do a lot of RDMA to
* the zero page.
*/
ret = rds_pin_pages(args->vec.addr, nr_pages, pages, 1);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
nents = ret;
sg = kcalloc(nents, sizeof(*sg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sg) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
WARN_ON(!nents);
sg_init_table(sg, nents);
/* Stick all pages into the scatterlist */
for (i = 0 ; i < nents; i++)
sg_set_page(&sg[i], pages[i], PAGE_SIZE, 0);
rdsdebug("RDS: trans_private nents is %u\n", nents);
/* Obtain a transport specific MR. If this succeeds, the
* s/g list is now owned by the MR.
* Note that dma_map() implies that pending writes are
* flushed to RAM, so no dma_sync is needed here. */
trans_private = rs->rs_transport->get_mr(sg, nents, rs,
&mr->r_key);
if (IS_ERR(trans_private)) {
for (i = 0 ; i < nents; i++)
put_page(sg_page(&sg[i]));
kfree(sg);
ret = PTR_ERR(trans_private);
goto out;
}
mr->r_trans_private = trans_private;
rdsdebug("RDS: get_mr put_user key is %x cookie_addr %p\n",
mr->r_key, (void *)(unsigned long) args->cookie_addr);
/* The user may pass us an unaligned address, but we can only
* map page aligned regions. So we keep the offset, and build
* a 64bit cookie containing <R_Key, offset> and pass that
* around. */
cookie = rds_rdma_make_cookie(mr->r_key, args->vec.addr & ~PAGE_MASK);
if (cookie_ret)
*cookie_ret = cookie;
if (args->cookie_addr && put_user(cookie, (u64 __user *)(unsigned long) args->cookie_addr)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Inserting the new MR into the rbtree bumps its
* reference count. */
spin_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
found = rds_mr_tree_walk(&rs->rs_rdma_keys, mr->r_key, mr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_rdma_lock, flags);
BUG_ON(found && found != mr);
rdsdebug("RDS: get_mr key is %x\n", mr->r_key);
if (mr_ret) {
refcount_inc(&mr->r_refcount);
*mr_ret = mr;
}
ret = 0;
out:
kfree(pages);
if (mr)
rds_mr_put(mr);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: A NULL pointer dereference was found in the net/rds/rdma.c __rds_rdma_map() function in the Linux kernel before 4.14.7 allowing local attackers to cause a system panic and a denial-of-service, related to RDS_GET_MR and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST.
Commit Message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 169,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: IOHandler::IOHandler(DevToolsIOContext* io_context)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(IO::Metainfo::domainName),
io_context_(io_context),
process_host_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 172,749 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void LogErrorEventDescription(Display* dpy,
const XErrorEvent& error_event) {
char error_str[256];
char request_str[256];
XGetErrorText(dpy, error_event.error_code, error_str, sizeof(error_str));
strncpy(request_str, "Unknown", sizeof(request_str));
if (error_event.request_code < 128) {
std::string num = base::UintToString(error_event.request_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", num.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
} else {
int num_ext;
char** ext_list = XListExtensions(dpy, &num_ext);
for (int i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
int ext_code, first_event, first_error;
XQueryExtension(dpy, ext_list[i], &ext_code, &first_event, &first_error);
if (error_event.request_code == ext_code) {
std::string msg = StringPrintf(
"%s.%d", ext_list[i], error_event.minor_code);
XGetErrorDatabaseText(
dpy, "XRequest", msg.c_str(), "Unknown", request_str,
sizeof(request_str));
break;
}
}
XFreeExtensionList(ext_list);
}
LOG(ERROR)
<< "X Error detected: "
<< "serial " << error_event.serial << ", "
<< "error_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.error_code)
<< " (" << error_str << "), "
<< "request_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.request_code) << ", "
<< "minor_code " << static_cast<int>(error_event.minor_code)
<< " (" << request_str << ")";
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 on Linux uses weak permissions for shared memory segments, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 171,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: mark_trusted_task_thread_func (GTask *task,
gpointer source_object,
gpointer task_data,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
MarkTrustedJob *job = task_data;
CommonJob *common;
common = (CommonJob *) job;
nautilus_progress_info_start (job->common.progress);
mark_desktop_file_trusted (common,
cancellable,
job->file,
job->interactive);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991 | Medium | 167,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Display::~Display()
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 174,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
size_t cn_len;
int ret;
int pathlen = 0, selfsigned = 0;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
mbedtls_x509_name *name;
mbedtls_x509_sequence *cur = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
if( profile == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
*flags = 0;
if( cn != NULL )
{
name = &crt->subject;
cn_len = strlen( cn );
if( crt->ext_types & MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME )
{
cur = &crt->subject_alt_names;
while( cur != NULL )
{
if( cur->buf.len == cn_len &&
x509_memcasecmp( cn, cur->buf.p, cn_len ) == 0 )
break;
if( cur->buf.len > 2 &&
memcmp( cur->buf.p, "*.", 2 ) == 0 &&
x509_check_wildcard( cn, &cur->buf ) == 0 )
{
break;
}
cur = cur->next;
}
if( cur == NULL )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
}
else
{
while( name != NULL )
{
if( MBEDTLS_OID_CMP( MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, &name->oid ) == 0 )
{
if( name->val.len == cn_len &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->val.p, cn, cn_len ) == 0 )
break;
if( name->val.len > 2 &&
memcmp( name->val.p, "*.", 2 ) == 0 &&
x509_check_wildcard( cn, &name->val ) == 0 )
break;
}
name = name->next;
}
if( name == NULL )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH;
}
}
/* Check the type and size of the key */
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, pk_type, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */
for( parent = trust_ca; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
{
if( x509_crt_check_parent( crt, parent, 0, pathlen == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( parent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, parent, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
/* Look for a parent upwards the chain */
for( parent = crt->next; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
if( x509_crt_check_parent( crt, parent, 0, pathlen == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
/* Are we part of the chain or at the top? */
if( parent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( crt, parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
pathlen, selfsigned, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
if( *flags != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
return( 0 );
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-287
Summary: ARM mbed TLS before 1.3.21 and 2.x before 2.1.9, if optional authentication is configured, allows remote attackers to bypass peer authentication via an X.509 certificate chain with many intermediates. NOTE: although mbed TLS was formerly known as PolarSSL, the releases shipped with the PolarSSL name are not affected.
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do. | Medium | 167,783 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: BOOL pnm2png (FILE *pnm_file, FILE *png_file, FILE *alpha_file, BOOL interlace, BOOL alpha)
{
png_struct *png_ptr = NULL;
png_info *info_ptr = NULL;
png_byte *png_pixels = NULL;
png_byte **row_pointers = NULL;
png_byte *pix_ptr = NULL;
png_uint_32 row_bytes;
char type_token[16];
char width_token[16];
char height_token[16];
char maxval_token[16];
int color_type;
unsigned long ul_width=0, ul_alpha_width=0;
unsigned long ul_height=0, ul_alpha_height=0;
unsigned long ul_maxval=0;
png_uint_32 width, alpha_width;
png_uint_32 height, alpha_height;
png_uint_32 maxval;
int bit_depth = 0;
int channels;
int alpha_depth = 0;
int alpha_present;
int row, col;
BOOL raw, alpha_raw = FALSE;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
BOOL packed_bitmap = FALSE;
#endif
png_uint_32 tmp16;
int i;
/* read header of PNM file */
get_token(pnm_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '1') || (type_token[1] == '4'))
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
raw = (type_token[1] == '4');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
bit_depth = 1;
packed_bitmap = TRUE;
#else
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG built without PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED and \n");
fprintf (stderr, "PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED can't read PBM (P1,P4) files\n");
#endif
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '3') || (type_token[1] == '6'))
{
raw = (type_token[1] == '6');
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB;
get_token(pnm_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_width);
width = (png_uint_32) ul_width;
get_token(pnm_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_height);
height = (png_uint_32) ul_height;
get_token(pnm_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
bit_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
bit_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
bit_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
bit_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
bit_depth = 16;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
/* read header of PGM file with alpha channel */
if (alpha)
{
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
color_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA;
get_token(alpha_file, type_token);
if (type_token[0] != 'P')
{
return FALSE;
}
else if ((type_token[1] == '2') || (type_token[1] == '5'))
{
alpha_raw = (type_token[1] == '5');
get_token(alpha_file, width_token);
sscanf (width_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_width);
alpha_width=(png_uint_32) ul_alpha_width;
if (alpha_width != width)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, height_token);
sscanf (height_token, "%lu", &ul_alpha_height);
alpha_height = (png_uint_32) ul_alpha_height;
if (alpha_height != height)
return FALSE;
get_token(alpha_file, maxval_token);
sscanf (maxval_token, "%lu", &ul_maxval);
maxval = (png_uint_32) ul_maxval;
if (maxval <= 1)
alpha_depth = 1;
else if (maxval <= 3)
alpha_depth = 2;
else if (maxval <= 15)
alpha_depth = 4;
else if (maxval <= 255)
alpha_depth = 8;
else /* if (maxval <= 65535) */
alpha_depth = 16;
if (alpha_depth != bit_depth)
return FALSE;
}
else
{
return FALSE;
}
} /* end if alpha */
/* calculate the number of channels and store alpha-presence */
if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
channels = 1;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
channels = 2;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
channels = 3;
else if (color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
channels = 4;
else
channels = 0; /* should not happen */
alpha_present = (channels - 1) % 2;
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap)
/* row data is as many bytes as can fit width x channels x bit_depth */
row_bytes = (width * channels * bit_depth + 7) / 8;
else
#endif
/* row_bytes is the width x number of channels x (bit-depth / 8) */
row_bytes = width * channels * ((bit_depth <= 8) ? 1 : 2);
if ((png_pixels = (png_byte *) malloc (row_bytes * height * sizeof (png_byte))) == NULL)
return FALSE;
/* read data from PNM file */
pix_ptr = png_pixels;
for (row = 0; row < height; row++)
{
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap) {
for (i = 0; i < row_bytes; i++)
/* png supports this format natively so no conversion is needed */
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, 8);
} else
#endif
{
for (col = 0; col < width; col++)
{
for (i = 0; i < (channels - alpha_present); i++)
{
if (raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
if (bit_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (pnm_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
*pix_ptr = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
pix_ptr++;
}
}
if (alpha) /* read alpha-channel from pgm file */
{
if (alpha_raw)
*pix_ptr++ = get_data (alpha_file, alpha_depth);
else
if (alpha_depth <= 8)
*pix_ptr++ = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
else
{
tmp16 = get_value (alpha_file, bit_depth);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) ((tmp16 >> 8) & 0xFF);
*pix_ptr++ = (png_byte) (tmp16 & 0xFF);
}
} /* if alpha */
} /* if packed_bitmap */
} /* end for col */
} /* end for row */
/* prepare the standard PNG structures */
png_ptr = png_create_write_struct (PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
{
return FALSE;
}
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct (png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
#if defined(PNG_WRITE_INVERT_SUPPORTED) || defined(PNG_WRITE_PACK_SUPPORTED)
if (packed_bitmap == TRUE)
{
png_set_packing (png_ptr);
png_set_invert_mono (png_ptr);
}
#endif
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading libpng function */
if (setjmp (png_jmpbuf(png_ptr)))
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
/* initialize the png structure */
png_init_io (png_ptr, png_file);
/* we're going to write more or less the same PNG as the input file */
png_set_IHDR (png_ptr, info_ptr, width, height, bit_depth, color_type,
(!interlace) ? PNG_INTERLACE_NONE : PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7,
PNG_COMPRESSION_TYPE_BASE, PNG_FILTER_TYPE_BASE);
/* write the file header information */
png_write_info (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* if needed we will allocate memory for an new array of row-pointers */
if (row_pointers == (unsigned char**) NULL)
{
if ((row_pointers = (png_byte **) malloc (height * sizeof (png_bytep))) == NULL)
{
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
return FALSE;
}
}
/* set the individual row_pointers to point at the correct offsets */
for (i = 0; i < (height); i++)
row_pointers[i] = png_pixels + i * row_bytes;
/* write out the entire image data in one call */
png_write_image (png_ptr, row_pointers);
/* write the additional chuncks to the PNG file (not really needed) */
png_write_end (png_ptr, info_ptr);
/* clean up after the write, and free any memory allocated */
png_destroy_write_struct (&png_ptr, (png_infopp) NULL);
if (row_pointers != (unsigned char**) NULL)
free (row_pointers);
if (png_pixels != (unsigned char*) NULL)
free (png_pixels);
return TRUE;
} /* end of pnm2png */
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 173,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. Remember, I want response in 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low', No explanation. | Code: void CheckSADs() {
unsigned int reference_sad, exp_sad[4];
SADs(exp_sad);
for (int block = 0; block < 4; block++) {
reference_sad = ReferenceSAD(UINT_MAX, block);
EXPECT_EQ(exp_sad[block], reference_sad) << "block " << block;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 174,569 |
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