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As part of MIT course 6S 099 Artificial General Intelligence, I've gotten the chance to sit |
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down with Max Tagmark. |
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He is a professor here at MIT, he's a physicist, spent a large part of his career studying the |
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mysteries of our cosmological universe, but he's also studied and delved into the beneficial |
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possibilities and the existential risks of artificial intelligence. |
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Amongst many other things, he's the cofounder of the Future of Life Institute, author of |
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two books, both of which I highly recommend. |
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First, our mathematical universe, second is Life 3.0. |
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He's truly an out of the box thinker and a fun personality, so I really enjoy talking |
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to him. |
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If you'd like to see more of these videos in the future, please subscribe and also click |
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the little bell icon to make sure you don't miss any videos. |
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Also, Twitter, LinkedIn, AGI.MIT.IDU, if you want to watch other lectures or conversations |
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like this one. |
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Better yet, go read Max's book, Life 3.0, chapter 7 on goals is my favorite. |
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It's really where philosophy and engineering come together and it opens with a quote by |
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Dostoevsky, the mystery of human existence lies not in just staying alive, but in finding |
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something to live for. |
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Lastly, I believe that every failure rewards us with an opportunity to learn, in that sense |
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I've been very fortunate to fail in so many new and exciting ways and this conversation |
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was no different. |
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I've learned about something called Radio Frequency Interference, RFI, look it up. |
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Apparently music and conversations from local radio stations can bleed into the audio that |
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you're recording in such a way that almost completely ruins that audio. |
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It's an exceptionally difficult sound source to remove. |
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So, I've gotten the opportunity to learn how to avoid RFI in the future during recording |
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sessions. |
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I've also gotten the opportunity to learn how to use Adobe Audition and iZotope RX6 |
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to do some audio repair. |
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Of course, this is an exceptionally difficult noise to remove. |
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I am an engineer, I'm not an audio engineer, neither is anybody else in our group, but |
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we did our best. |
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Nevertheless, I thank you for your patience and I hope you're still able to enjoy this |
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conversation. |
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Do you think there's intelligent life out there in the universe? |
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Let's open up with an easy question. |
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I have a minority view here actually. |
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When I give public lectures, I often ask for show of hands who thinks there's intelligent |
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life out there somewhere else and almost everyone puts their hands up and when I ask why, they'll |
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be like, oh, there's so many galaxies out there, there's got to be. |
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But I'm a number nerd, right? |
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So when you look more carefully at it, it's not so clear at all. |
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When we talk about our universe, first of all, we don't mean all of space. |
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We actually mean, I don't know, you can throw me the universe if you want, it's behind you |
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there. |
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We simply mean the spherical region of space from which light has had time to reach us |
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so far during the 13.8 billion years since our big bang. |
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There's more space here, but this is what we call a universe because that's all we have |
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access to. |
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So is there intelligent life here that's gotten to the point of building telescopes and computers? |
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My guess is no, actually, the probability of it happening on any given planet is some |
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number we don't know what it is. |
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And what we do know is that the number can't be super high because there's over a billion |
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Earth like planets in the Milky Way galaxy alone, many of which are billions of years |
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older than Earth, and aside from some UFO believers, you know, there isn't much evidence |
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that any super advanced civilization has come here at all. |
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And so that's the famous Fermi paradox, right? |
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And then if you work the numbers, what you find is that if you have no clue what the |
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probability is of getting life on a given planet, so it could be 10 to the minus 10, |
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10 to the minus 20, or 10 to the minus two, or any power of 10 is sort of equally likely |
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if you want to be really open minded, that translates into it being equally likely that |
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our nearest neighbor is 10 to the 16 meters away, 10 to the 17 meters away, 10 to the |
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18. |
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Now, by the time you get much less than 10 to the 16 already, we pretty much know there |
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is nothing else that's close. |
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And when you get because it would have discovered us, they, yeah, they would have discovered |
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us longer or if they're really close, we would have probably noted some engineering projects |
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that they're doing. |
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And if it's beyond 10 to the 26 meters, that's already outside of here. |
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So my guess is actually that there are, we are the only life in here that's gotten the |
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point of building advanced tech, which I think is very, puts a lot of responsibility on our |
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shoulders, not screw up, you know, I think people who take for granted that it's okay |
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for us to screw up, have an accidental nuclear war or go extinct somehow because there's |
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a sort of Star Trek like situation out there where some other life forms are going to come |
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and bail us out and it doesn't matter so much. |
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I think they're leveling us into a false sense of security. |
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I think it's much more prudent to say, let's be really grateful for this amazing opportunity |
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we've had and make the best of it just in case it is down to us. |
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So from a physics perspective, do you think intelligent life, so it's unique from a sort |
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of statistical view of the size of the universe, but from the basic matter of the universe, |
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how difficult is it for intelligent life to come about with the kind of advanced tech |
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building life is implied in your statement that it's really difficult to create something |
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like a human species? |
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Well, I think what we know is that going from no life to having life that can do our level |
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of tech, there's some sort of to going beyond that than actually settling our whole universe |
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with life. |
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There's some road major roadblock there, which is some great filter as I just sometimes called |
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which, which tough to get through, it's either that that roadblock is either behind us or |
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in front of us. |
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I'm hoping very much that it's behind us. |
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I'm super excited every time we get a new report from NASA saying they failed to find |
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any life on Mars, because that suggests that the hard part, maybe it was getting the first |
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ribosome or some some very low level kind of stepping stone. |
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So they were home free because if that's true, then the future is really only limited by |
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our own imagination. |
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It would be much suckier if it turns out that this level of life is kind of a diamond dozen, |
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but maybe there's some other problem. |
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Like as soon as a civilization gets advanced technology within 100 years, they get into |
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some stupid fight with themselves and poof, you know, that would be a bummer. |
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Yeah. |
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So you've explored the mysteries of the universe, the cosmological universe, the one that's |
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between us today, I think you've also begun to explore the other universe, which is sort |
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of the mystery, the mysterious universe of the mind of intelligence, of intelligent life. |
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So is there a common thread between your interests or the way you think about space and intelligence? |
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Oh, yeah. |
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When I was a teenager, I was already very fascinated by the biggest questions and I felt that the |
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two biggest mysteries of all in science were our universe out there and our universe in |
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here. |
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Yeah. |
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So it's quite natural after having spent a quarter of a century on my career thinking |
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a lot about this one. |
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And now I'm indulging in the luxury of doing research on this one. |
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It's just so cool. |
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I feel the time is ripe now for you transparently deepening our understanding of this. |
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Just start exploring this one. |
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Yeah, because I think a lot of people view intelligence as something mysterious that |
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can only exist in biological organisms like us and therefore dismiss all talk about artificial |
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general intelligence is science fiction. |
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But from my perspective as a physicist, I am a blob of quirks and electrons moving around |
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in a certain pattern and processing information in certain ways. |
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And this is also a blob of quirks and electrons. |
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I'm not smarter than the water bottle because I'm made of different kind of quirks. |
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I'm made of up quirks and down quirks exact same kind as this. |
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It's a there's no secret sauce, I think in me, it's it's all about the pattern of the |
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information processing. |
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And this means that there's no law of physics saying that we can't create technology, which |
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can help us by being incredibly intelligent and help us crack mysteries that we couldn't. |
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In other words, I think we've really only seen the tip of the intelligence iceberg so |
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far. |
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Yeah. |
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So the perceptronium, yeah, so you coined this amazing term, it's a hypothetical state |
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of matter, sort of thinking from a physics perspective, what is the kind of matter that |
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can help as you're saying, subjective experience emerge, consciousness emerge. |
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So how do you think about consciousness from this physics perspective? |
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Very good question. |
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So, again, I think many people have underestimated our ability to make progress on this by convincing |
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themselves it's hopeless because somehow we're missing some ingredient that we need. |
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There's some new consciousness particle or whatever. |
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I happen to think that we're not missing anything and that it's not the interesting thing about |
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consciousness that gives us this amazing subjective experience of colors and sounds and emotions |
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and so on is rather something at the higher level about the patterns of information processing. |
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And that's why I like to think about this idea of perceptronium. |
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What does it mean for an arbitrary physical system to be conscious in terms of what its |
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particles are doing or its information is doing? |
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I hate carbon chauvinism, this attitude, you have to be made of carbon atoms to be smart |
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or conscious. |
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So something about the information processing that this kind of matter performs. |
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Yeah, and you can see I have my favorite equations here describing various fundamental |
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aspects of the world. |
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I think one day, maybe someone who's watching this will come up with the equations that |
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information processing has to satisfy to be conscious. |
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And I'm quite convinced there is big discovery to be made there because let's face it, we |
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know that some information processing is conscious because we are conscious. |
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But we also know that a lot of information processing is not conscious. |
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Most of the information processing happening in your brain right now is not conscious. |
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There are like 10 megabytes per second coming in even just through your visual system. |
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You're not conscious about your heartbeat regulation or most things. |
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Even if I just ask you to read what it says here, you look at it and then, oh, now you |
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know what it said. |
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But you're not aware of how the computation actually happened. |
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Your consciousness is like the CEO that got an email at the end with the final answer. |
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So what is it that makes a difference? |
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I think that's both a great science mystery, we're actually studying it a little bit in |
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my lab here at MIT, but I also think it's a really urgent question to answer. |
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For starters, I mean, if you're an emergency room doctor and you have an unresponsive patient |
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coming in, wouldn't it be great if in addition to having a CT scanner, you had a conscious |
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scanner that could figure out whether this person is actually having locked in syndrome |
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or is actually comatose. |
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And in the future, imagine if we build robots or the machine that we can have really good |
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conversations with, I think it's very likely to happen, right? |
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Wouldn't you want to know if your home helper robot is actually experiencing anything or |
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just like a zombie? |
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Would you prefer it? |
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What would you prefer? |
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Would you prefer that it's actually unconscious so that you don't have to feel guilty about |
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switching it off or giving boring chores? |
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What would you prefer? |
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Well, certainly we would prefer, I would prefer the appearance of consciousness, but the question |
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is whether the appearance of consciousness is different than consciousness itself. |
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And sort of ask that as a question, do you think we need to understand what consciousness |
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is, solve the hard problem of consciousness in order to build something like an AGI system? |
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No. |
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I don't think that. |
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I think we will probably be able to build things even if we don't answer that question. |
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But if we want to make sure that what happens is a good thing, we better solve it first. |
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So it's a wonderful controversy you're raising there, where you have basically three points |
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of view about the hard problem. |
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There are two different points of view that both conclude that the hard problem of consciousness |
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is BS. |
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On one hand, you have some people like Daniel Dennett who say that consciousness is just |
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BS because consciousness is the same thing as intelligence. |
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There's no difference. |
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So anything which acts conscious is conscious, just like we are. |
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And then there are also a lot of people, including many top AI researchers I know, who say, oh, |
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consciousness is just bullshit because of course machines can never be conscious. |
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They're always going to skiddy zombies, never have to feel guilty about how you treat them. |
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And then there's a third group of people, including Giulio Tononi, for example, and another, and |
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Gustav Koch and a number of others, I would put myself on this middle camp who say that |
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actually some information processing is conscious and some is not. |
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So let's find the equation which can be used to determine which it is. |
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And I think we've just been a little bit lazy kind of running away from this problem for |
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a long time. |
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It's been almost taboo to even mention the C word in a lot of circles because, but we |
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should stop making excuses. |
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This is a science question and there are ways we can even test any theory that makes predictions |
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for this. |
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And coming back to this helper robot, I mean, so you said you would want your helper robot |
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to certainly act conscious and treat you, like have conversations with you and stuff. |
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But wouldn't you, would you feel a little bit creeped out if you realized that it was |
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just a glossed up tape recorder, you know, that was just zombie and it's a faking emotion? |
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Would you prefer that it actually had an experience or would you prefer that it's actually not |
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experiencing anything so you feel, you don't have to feel guilty about what you do to it? |
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It's such a difficult question because, you know, it's like when you're in a relationship |
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and you say, well, I love you and the other person said I love you back. |
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It's like asking, well, do they really love you back or are they just saying they love |
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you back? |
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Don't you really want them to actually love you? |
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It's hard to, it's hard to really know the difference between everything seeming like |
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there's consciousness present, there's intelligence present, there's affection, passion, love, |
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and it actually being there. |
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I'm not sure. |
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Do you have... |
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Can I ask you a question about this? |
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Yes. |
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To make it a bit more pointed. |
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So Mass General Hospital is right across the river, right? |
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Suppose you're going in for a medical procedure and they're like, you know, for anesthesia |
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what we're going to do is we're going to give you muscle relaxance so you won't be able |
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to move and you're going to feel excruciating pain during the whole surgery but you won't |
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be able to do anything about it. |
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But then we're going to give you this drug that erases your memory of it. |
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Would you be cool about that? |
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What's the difference that you're conscious about it or not if there's no behavioral change, |
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right? |
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Right. |
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And that's a really clear way to put it. |
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Yeah, it feels like in that sense, experiencing it is a valuable quality. |
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So actually being able to have subjective experiences, at least in that case, is valuable. |
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And I think we humans have a little bit of a bad track record also of making these self |
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serving arguments that other entities aren't conscious. |
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You know, people often say, oh, these animals can't feel pain. |
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Right. |
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It's okay to boil lobsters because we asked them if it hurt and they didn't say anything. |
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And now there was just a paper out saying lobsters did do feel pain when you boil them |
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and they're banning it in Switzerland. |
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And we did this with slaves too often and said, oh, they don't mind. |
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They don't maybe aren't conscious or women don't have souls or whatever. |
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So I'm a little bit nervous when I hear people just take as an axiom that machines can't |
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have experience ever. |
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I think this is just a really fascinating science question is what it is. |
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Let's research it and try to figure out what it is that makes the difference between unconscious |
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intelligent behavior and conscious intelligent behavior. |
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So in terms of, so if you think of a Boston Dynamics human or robot being sort of with |
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a broom being pushed around, it starts pushing on a consciousness question. |
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So let me ask, do you think an AGI system, like a few neuroscientists believe needs to |
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have a physical embodiment, needs to have a body or something like a body? |
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No, I don't think so. |
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You mean to have a conscious experience? |
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To have consciousness. |
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I do think it helps a lot to have a physical embodiment to learn the kind of things about |
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the world that are important to us humans for sure. |
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But I don't think the physical embodiment is necessary after you've learned it. |
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Just have the experience. |
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Think about it when you're dreaming, right? |
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Your eyes are closed, you're not getting any sensory input, you're not behaving or moving |
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in any way, but there's still an experience there, right? |
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And so clearly the experience that you have when you see something cool in your dreams |
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isn't coming from your eyes, it's just the information processing itself in your brain, |
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which is that experience, right? |
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But if I put it another way, I'll say because it comes from neuroscience is the reason you |
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want to have a body and a physical, something like a physical system is because you want |
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to be able to preserve something. |
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In order to have a self, you could argue, you'd need to have some kind of embodiment |
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of self to want to preserve. |
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Well, now we're getting a little bit anthropomorphic, anthropomorphizing things, maybe talking about |
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self preservation instincts. |
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We are evolved organisms, right? |
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So Darwinian evolution endowed us and other evolved organisms with self preservation instinct |
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because those that didn't have those self preservation genes got cleaned out of the gene pool. |
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But if you build an artificial general intelligence, the mind space that you can design is much, |
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much larger than just a specific subset of minds that can evolve that have. |
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So an AGI mind doesn't necessarily have to have any self preservation instinct. |
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It also doesn't necessarily have to be so individualistic as us. |
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Like imagine if you could just, first of all, we're also very afraid of death, you know, |
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as opposed to you could back yourself up every five minutes and then your airplane is about |
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to crash. |
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You're like, shucks, I'm just, I'm going to lose the last five minutes of experiences |
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since my last cloud backup, dang, you know, it's not as big a deal. |
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Or if we could just copy experiences between our minds easily, like which we could easily |
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do if we were silicon based, right? |
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Then maybe we would feel a little bit more like a hive mind, actually, that maybe it's |
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the, so, so there's, so I don't think we should take for granted at all that AGI will have |
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to have any of those sort of competitive as alpha male instincts. |
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Right. |
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On the other hand, you know, this is really interesting because I think some people go |
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too far and say, of course, we don't have to have any concerns either that advanced |
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AI will have those instincts because we can build anything we want. |
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That there's, there's a very nice set of arguments going back to Steve Omohandro and |
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Nick Bostrom and others just pointing out that when we build machines, we normally build |
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them with some kind of goal, you know, win this chess game, drive this car safely or |
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whatever. |
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And as soon as you put in a goal into machine, especially if it's kind of open ended goal |
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and the machine is very intelligent, it'll break that down into a bunch of sub goals. |
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And one of those goals will almost always be self preservation because if it breaks |
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or dies in the process, it's not going to accomplish the goal, right? |
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Like, suppose you just build a little, you have a little robot and you tell it to go |
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down the store market here and, and get you some food, make you cook your Italian dinner, |
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you know, and then someone mugs it and tries to break it on the way. |
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That robot has an incentive to not get destroyed and defend itself for a runaway because otherwise |
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it's going to fail and cooking your dinner. |
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It's not afraid of death, but it really wants to complete the dinner cooking goal. |
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So it will have a self preservation instinct. |
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It will continue being a functional agent. |
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Yeah. |
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And, and, and similarly, if you give any kind of more ambitious goal to an AGI, it's very |
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likely they want to acquire more resources so it can do that better. |
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And it's exactly from those sort of sub goals that we might not have intended that some |
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of the concerns about AGI safety come, you give it some goal that seems completely harmless. |
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And then before you realize it, it's also trying to do these other things which you |
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didn't want it to do and it's maybe smarter than us. |
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So, so, and let me pause just because I am in a very kind of human centric way, see fear |
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of death as a valuable motivator. |
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So you don't think you think that's an artifact of evolution. |
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So that's the kind of mind space evolution created that we're sort of almost obsessed |
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about self preservation. |
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Yeah. |
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Some kind of genetic well, you don't think that's necessary to be afraid of death. |
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So not just a kind of sub goal of self preservation just so you can keep doing the thing, but |
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more fundamentally sort of have the finite thing like this ends for you at some point. |
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Interesting. |
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Do I think it's necessary for what precisely? |
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For intelligence, but also for consciousness. |
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So for those for both, do you think really like a finite death and the fear of it is |
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important? |
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So before I can answer, before we can agree on whether it's necessary for intelligence |
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or for consciousness, we should be clear on how we define those two words because a lot |
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are really smart people define them in very different ways. |
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I was in this on this panel with AI experts and they couldn't, they couldn't agree on |
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how to define intelligence even. |
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So I define intelligence simply as the ability to accomplish complex goals. |
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I like your broad definition because again, I don't want to be a carbon chauvinist. |
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And in that case, no, certainly it doesn't require fear of death. |
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I would say AlphaGo AlphaZero is quite intelligent. |
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I don't think AlphaZero has any fear of being turned off because it doesn't understand the |
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concept of even and similarly consciousness, I mean, you can certainly imagine a very simple |
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kind of experience if certain plants have any kind of experience, I don't think they're |
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very afraid of dying or there's nothing they can do about it anyway much. |
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So there wasn't that much value and but more seriously, I think if you ask not just about |
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being conscious, but maybe having what you would, we might call an exciting life for |
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you for your passion and really appreciate the things, maybe there, somehow, maybe there |
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perhaps it does help having a backdrop that, hey, it's finite, you know, let's make the |
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most of this, let's live to the fullest. |
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So if you knew you were going to just live forever, do you think you would change your |
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career? Yeah, I mean, in some perspective, it would |
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be an incredibly boring life living forever. |
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So in the sort of loose, subjective terms that you said of something exciting and something |
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in this that other humans would understand, I think, is yeah, it seems that the finiteness |
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of it is important. |
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Well, the good news I have for you then is based on what we understand about cosmology, |
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things in our universe is probably finite, although big crunch or big or big, what's |
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the extent of the infinite? |
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Yeah, we could have a big chill or a big crunch or a big rip or death, the big snap or death |
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bubbles. |
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All of them are more than a billion years away. |
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So we should we certainly have vastly more time than our ancestors thought, but still |
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pretty hard to squeeze in an infinite number of compute cycles, even though there are some |
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loopholes that just might be possible. |
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But I think, you know, some people like to say that you should live as if you're about |
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to you're going to die in five years or so, and that's sort of optimal. |
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Maybe it's a good as some we should build our civilization as if it's all finite to |
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be on the safe side. |
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Right, exactly. So you mentioned in defining intelligence as the ability to solve complex |
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goals. |
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So where would you draw a line? |
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How would you try to define human level intelligence and super human level intelligence? |
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Where is consciousness part of that definition? |
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No, consciousness does not come into this definition. |
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So so I think of intelligence as it's a spectrum, but there are very many different kinds of |
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goals you can have. |
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You have a goal to be a good chess player, a good goal player, a good car driver, a good |
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investor, good poet, etc. |
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27:31.260 --> 27:35.740 |
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So intelligence that bind by its very nature, isn't something you can measure, but it's |
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27:35.740 --> 27:39.900 |
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one number, some overall goodness, no, no, there are some people who are more better |
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27:39.900 --> 27:42.540 |
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at this, some people are better at that. |
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27:42.540 --> 27:48.380 |
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Right now we have machines that are much better than us at some very narrow tasks like multiplying |
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27:48.380 --> 27:57.620 |
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large numbers fast, memorizing large databases, playing chess, playing go, soon driving cars. |
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27:57.620 --> 28:03.340 |
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But there's still no machine that can match a human child in general intelligence. |
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28:03.340 --> 28:08.420 |
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But artificial general intelligence, AGI, the name of your course, of course, that |
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is by its very definition, the quest to build a machine that can do everything as well as |
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28:16.460 --> 28:17.460 |
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we can. |
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28:17.460 --> 28:24.060 |
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Up to the old Holy Grail of AI from back to its inception in the 60s. |
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28:24.060 --> 28:27.500 |
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If that ever happens, of course, I think it's going to be the biggest transition in the |
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28:27.500 --> 28:33.860 |
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history of life on Earth, but it doesn't necessarily have to wait the big impact until machines |
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28:33.860 --> 28:35.780 |
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are better than us at knitting. |
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The really big change doesn't come exactly at the moment they're better than us at everything. |
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28:41.940 --> 28:45.820 |
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The really big change comes, first, their big change is when they start becoming better |
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at us at doing most of the jobs that we do, because that takes away much of the demand |
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28:51.140 --> 28:53.380 |
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for human labor. |
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28:53.380 --> 29:01.300 |
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And then the really warping change comes when they become better than us at AI research. |
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29:01.300 --> 29:07.900 |
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Because right now, the time scale of AI research is limited by the human research and development |
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29:07.900 --> 29:14.100 |
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cycle of years, typically, along the take from one release of some software or iPhone |
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29:14.100 --> 29:16.300 |
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or whatever to the next. |
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29:16.300 --> 29:25.820 |
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But once Google can replace 40,000 engineers by 40,000 equivalent pieces of software or |
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29:25.820 --> 29:29.660 |
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whatever, then there's no reason that has to be years. |
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29:29.660 --> 29:32.020 |
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It can be, in principle, much faster. |
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29:32.020 --> 29:38.900 |
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And the time scale of future progress in AI and all of science and technology will be |
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29:38.900 --> 29:40.980 |
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driven by machines, not humans. |
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29:40.980 --> 29:49.660 |
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So it's this simple point, which gives right this incredibly fun controversy about whether |
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29:49.660 --> 29:54.540 |
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there can be intelligence explosion, so called singularity, as Werner Winge called it. |
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29:54.540 --> 30:00.060 |
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The idea, as articulated by I.J. Good, is obviously way back fifties, but you can see |
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30:00.060 --> 30:07.220 |
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Alan Turing and others thought about it even earlier. |
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30:07.220 --> 30:12.980 |
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You asked me what exactly what I define human level intelligence. |
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30:12.980 --> 30:18.540 |
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So the glib answer is just to say something which is better than us at all cognitive tasks |
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30:18.540 --> 30:21.980 |
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or better than any human at all cognitive tasks. |
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30:21.980 --> 30:25.900 |
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But the really interesting bar, I think, goes a little bit lower than that, actually. |
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30:25.900 --> 30:33.260 |
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It's when they're better than us at AI programming and general learning so that they can, if |
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30:33.260 --> 30:37.340 |
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they want to, get better than us at anything by just starting out. |
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30:37.340 --> 30:43.100 |
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So there better is a key word and better is towards this kind of spectrum of the complexity |
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30:43.100 --> 30:45.740 |
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of goals it's able to accomplish. |
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30:45.740 --> 30:53.060 |
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So another way to, and that's certainly a very clear definition of human love. |
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30:53.060 --> 30:56.300 |
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So there's, it's almost like a sea that's rising, you can do more and more and more |
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30:56.300 --> 30:57.300 |
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things. |
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30:57.300 --> 30:59.900 |
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It's actually a graphic that you show, it's really nice way to put it. |
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30:59.900 --> 31:04.340 |
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So there's some peaks and there's an ocean level elevating and you solve more and more |
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31:04.340 --> 31:05.340 |
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problems. |
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31:05.340 --> 31:09.220 |
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But, you know, just kind of to take a pause and we took a bunch of questions and a lot |
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31:09.220 --> 31:14.380 |
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of social networks and a bunch of people asked a sort of a slightly different direction |
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on creativity and on things that perhaps aren't a peak. |
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31:22.260 --> 31:28.620 |
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It's, you know, human beings are flawed and perhaps better means having being having contradiction |
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31:28.620 --> 31:30.260 |
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being flawed in some way. |
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31:30.260 --> 31:34.980 |
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So let me sort of, yeah, start and start easy, first of all. |
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31:34.980 --> 31:36.620 |
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So you have a lot of cool equations. |
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31:36.620 --> 31:39.660 |
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Let me ask, what's your favorite equation, first of all? |
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31:39.660 --> 31:43.580 |
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I know they're all like your children, but which one is that? |
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31:43.580 --> 31:49.060 |
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This is the Shreddinger equation, it's the master key of quantum mechanics of the micro |
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31:49.060 --> 31:50.060 |
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world. |
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31:50.060 --> 31:55.340 |
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So this equation can take everything to do with atoms and all the fuels and all the |
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31:55.340 --> 32:04.020 |
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way up to… Yeah, so, okay, so quantum mechanics is certainly a beautiful mysterious formulation |
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32:04.020 --> 32:05.020 |
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of our world. |
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32:05.020 --> 32:10.740 |
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So I'd like to sort of ask you, just as an example, it perhaps doesn't have the same |
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32:10.740 --> 32:17.420 |
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beauty as physics does, but in mathematics abstract, the Andrew Wiles who proved the |
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32:17.420 --> 32:19.460 |
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Fermat's last theory. |
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32:19.460 --> 32:24.180 |
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So he just saw this recently and it kind of caught my eye a little bit. |
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32:24.180 --> 32:27.980 |
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This is 358 years after it was conjectured. |
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32:27.980 --> 32:32.940 |
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So this very simple formulation, everybody tried to prove it, everybody failed. |
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32:32.940 --> 32:38.820 |
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And so here's this guy comes along and eventually proves it and then fails to prove it and then |
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32:38.820 --> 32:41.340 |
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proves it again in 94. |
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32:41.340 --> 32:45.940 |
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And he said like the moment when everything connected into place, in an interview he said |
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32:45.940 --> 32:47.980 |
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it was so indescribably beautiful. |
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32:47.980 --> 32:53.580 |
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That moment when you finally realize the connecting piece of two conjectures, he said it was so |
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32:53.580 --> 32:56.940 |
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indescribably beautiful, it was so simple and so elegant. |
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32:56.940 --> 33:01.540 |
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I couldn't understand how I'd missed it and I just stared at it in disbelief for 20 |
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33:01.540 --> 33:02.540 |
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minutes. |
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33:02.540 --> 33:08.100 |
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Then during the day I walked around the department and I keep coming back to my desk looking |
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33:08.100 --> 33:09.820 |
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to see if it was still there. |
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33:09.820 --> 33:10.820 |
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It was still there. |
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33:10.820 --> 33:11.820 |
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I couldn't contain myself. |
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33:11.820 --> 33:12.820 |
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I was so excited. |
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33:12.820 --> 33:16.180 |
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It was the most important moment of my working life. |
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33:16.180 --> 33:18.940 |
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Nothing I ever do again will mean as much. |
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33:18.940 --> 33:24.860 |
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So that particular moment and it kind of made me think of what would it take? |
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33:24.860 --> 33:28.380 |
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And I think we have all been there at small levels. |
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33:28.380 --> 33:34.820 |
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Maybe let me ask, have you had a moment like that in your life where you just had an idea |
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33:34.820 --> 33:40.060 |
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it's like, wow, yes. |
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33:40.060 --> 33:44.700 |
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I wouldn't mention myself in the same breath as Andrew Wiles, but I certainly had a number |
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33:44.700 --> 33:54.820 |
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of aha moments when I realized something very cool about physics just completely made |
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33:54.820 --> 33:55.820 |
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my head explode. |
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33:55.820 --> 33:59.580 |
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In fact, some of my favorite discoveries I made later, I later realized that they had |
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33:59.580 --> 34:03.340 |
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been discovered earlier by someone who's sometimes got quite famous for it. |
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34:03.340 --> 34:07.460 |
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So there's too late for me to even publish it, but that doesn't diminish in any way. |
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34:07.460 --> 34:12.340 |
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The emotional experience you have when you realize it like, wow. |
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34:12.340 --> 34:17.460 |
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So what would it take in that moment, that wow, that was yours in that moment? |
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34:17.460 --> 34:23.420 |
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So what do you think it takes for an intelligent system, an AGI system, an AI system to have |
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34:23.420 --> 34:24.980 |
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a moment like that? |
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34:24.980 --> 34:29.420 |
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It's a tricky question because there are actually two parts to it, right? |
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34:29.420 --> 34:37.260 |
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One of them is, can it accomplish that proof, can it prove that you can never write A to |
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34:37.260 --> 34:46.420 |
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the N plus B to the N equals 3 to the N for all integers, etc., etc., when N is bigger |
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34:46.420 --> 34:49.420 |
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than 2. |
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34:49.420 --> 34:51.580 |
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That's simply the question about intelligence. |
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34:51.580 --> 34:54.420 |
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Can you build machines that are that intelligent? |
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34:54.420 --> 34:59.860 |
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And I think by the time we get a machine that can independently come up with that level |
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34:59.860 --> 35:03.460 |
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of proofs, probably quite close to AGI. |
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35:03.460 --> 35:07.860 |
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But the second question is a question about consciousness. |
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35:07.860 --> 35:13.060 |
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When will we, how likely is it that such a machine would actually have any experience |
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35:13.060 --> 35:16.500 |
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at all as opposed to just being like a zombie? |
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35:16.500 --> 35:22.940 |
|
And would we expect it to have some sort of emotional response to this or anything at |
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35:22.940 --> 35:31.140 |
|
all akin to human emotion where when it accomplishes its machine goal, it views it as something |
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35:31.140 --> 35:39.260 |
|
very positive and sublime and deeply meaningful. |
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35:39.260 --> 35:45.260 |
|
I would certainly hope that if in the future we do create machines that are our peers or |
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35:45.260 --> 35:53.700 |
|
even our descendants, I would certainly hope that they do have this sort of sublime appreciation |
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35:53.700 --> 36:06.020 |
|
of life in a way, my absolutely worst nightmare would be that at some point in the future, |
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36:06.020 --> 36:10.620 |
|
the distant future, maybe our cosmos is teeming with all this post biological life, doing |
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36:10.620 --> 36:13.180 |
|
all the seemingly cool stuff. |
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36:13.180 --> 36:20.660 |
|
And maybe the last humans by the time our species eventually fizzles out will be like, |
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36:20.660 --> 36:26.140 |
|
well, that's okay, because we're so proud of our descendants here and look, my worst |
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36:26.140 --> 36:30.580 |
|
nightmare is that we haven't solved the consciousness problem. |
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36:30.580 --> 36:34.100 |
|
And we haven't realized that these are all the zombies, they're not aware of anything |
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36:34.100 --> 36:37.900 |
|
anymore than a tape recorder, as in any kind of experience. |
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36:37.900 --> 36:41.660 |
|
So the whole thing has just become a play for empty benches. |
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36:41.660 --> 36:44.700 |
|
That would be like the ultimate zombie apocalypse to me. |
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36:44.700 --> 36:52.900 |
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So I would much rather, in that case, that we have these beings which can really appreciate |
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36:52.900 --> 36:57.060 |
|
how amazing it is. |
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36:57.060 --> 37:02.260 |
|
And in that picture, what would be the role of creativity, what a few people ask about |
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37:02.260 --> 37:03.260 |
|
creativity? |
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37:03.260 --> 37:04.260 |
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Yeah. |
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37:04.260 --> 37:08.700 |
|
And do you think, when you think about intelligence, I mean, certainly the story you told at the |
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37:08.700 --> 37:14.100 |
|
beginning of your book involved, you know, creating movies and so on, sort of making |
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37:14.100 --> 37:18.580 |
|
money, you know, you can make a lot of money in our modern world with music and movies. |
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37:18.580 --> 37:23.100 |
|
So if you are an intelligent system, you may want to get good at that. |
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37:23.100 --> 37:26.300 |
|
But that's not necessarily what I mean by creativity. |
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37:26.300 --> 37:32.620 |
|
Is it important on that complex goals where the sea is rising for there to be something |
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37:32.620 --> 37:39.940 |
|
creative, or am I being very human centric and thinking creativity somehow special relative |
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37:39.940 --> 37:41.940 |
|
to intelligence? |
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37:41.940 --> 37:50.940 |
|
My hunch is that we should think of creativity simply as an aspect of intelligence. |
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37:50.940 --> 37:57.820 |
|
And we have to be very careful with human vanity. |
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37:57.820 --> 38:01.540 |
|
We have this tendency to very often want to say, as soon as machines can do something, |
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38:01.540 --> 38:05.980 |
|
we try to diminish it and say, oh, but that's not like real intelligence, you know, is |
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38:05.980 --> 38:12.620 |
|
it not creative or this or that, the other thing, if we ask ourselves to write down a |
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38:12.620 --> 38:18.500 |
|
definition of what we actually mean by being creative, what we mean by Andrew Wiles, what |
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38:18.500 --> 38:23.660 |
|
he did there, for example, don't we often mean that someone takes a very unexpected |
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38:23.660 --> 38:26.060 |
|
leap? |
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38:26.060 --> 38:33.740 |
|
It's not like taking 573 and multiplying by 224 by just a step of straightforward cookbook |
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38:33.740 --> 38:36.500 |
|
like rules, right? |
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38:36.500 --> 38:40.660 |
|
You can maybe make a connection between two things that people have never thought was |
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38:40.660 --> 38:41.660 |
|
connected. |
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38:41.660 --> 38:42.660 |
|
It's very surprising. |
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38:42.660 --> 38:44.300 |
|
Something like that. |
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38:44.300 --> 38:50.660 |
|
I think this is an aspect of intelligence, and this is actually one of the most important |
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38:50.660 --> 38:53.260 |
|
aspects of it. |
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38:53.260 --> 38:57.940 |
|
Maybe the reason we humans tend to be better at it than traditional computers is because |
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38:57.940 --> 39:02.020 |
|
it's something that comes more naturally if you're a neural network than if you're a |
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39:02.020 --> 39:05.820 |
|
traditional logic gates based computer machine. |
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39:05.820 --> 39:11.900 |
|
We physically have all these connections, and if you activate here, activate here, activate |
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39:11.900 --> 39:20.980 |
|
here, it ping, you know, my hunch is that if we ever build a machine where you could |
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39:20.980 --> 39:31.020 |
|
just give it the task, hey, hey, you say, hey, you know, I just realized I want to travel |
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39:31.020 --> 39:32.380 |
|
around the world instead this month. |
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39:32.380 --> 39:34.700 |
|
Can you teach my AGI course for me? |
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39:34.700 --> 39:36.100 |
|
And it's like, okay, I'll do it. |
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39:36.100 --> 39:39.860 |
|
And it does everything that you would have done and it improvises and stuff. |
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39:39.860 --> 39:42.860 |
|
That would in my mind involve a lot of creativity. |
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39:42.860 --> 39:45.660 |
|
Yeah, so it's actually a beautiful way to put it. |
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39:45.660 --> 39:54.540 |
|
I think we do try to grasp at the definition of intelligence as everything we don't understand |
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39:54.540 --> 39:57.580 |
|
how to build. |
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39:57.580 --> 40:02.180 |
|
So we as humans try to find things that we have and machines don't have, and maybe creativity |
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40:02.180 --> 40:05.940 |
|
is just one of the things, one of the words we used to describe that. |
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40:05.940 --> 40:06.940 |
|
That's a really interesting way to put it. |
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40:06.940 --> 40:09.820 |
|
I don't think we need to be that defensive. |
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40:09.820 --> 40:14.700 |
|
I don't think anything good comes out of saying, we're somehow special, you know, it's |
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40:14.700 --> 40:27.540 |
|
very wise, there are many examples in history of where trying to pretend they were somehow |
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40:27.540 --> 40:36.220 |
|
superior to all other intelligent beings has led to pretty bad results, right? |
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40:36.220 --> 40:39.700 |
|
Nazi Germany, they said that they were somehow superior to other people. |
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40:39.700 --> 40:44.580 |
|
Today, we still do a lot of cruelty to animals by saying they were so superior somehow on |
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40:44.580 --> 40:50.500 |
|
the other, they can't feel pain, slavery was justified by the same kind of really weak |
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40:50.500 --> 40:52.420 |
|
arguments. |
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40:52.420 --> 40:58.700 |
|
And I don't think if we actually go ahead and build artificial general intelligence, |
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40:58.700 --> 41:01.100 |
|
it can do things better than us. |
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41:01.100 --> 41:08.980 |
|
I don't think we should try to found our self worth on some sort of bogus claims of superiority |
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41:08.980 --> 41:11.940 |
|
in terms of our intelligence. |
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41:11.940 --> 41:21.780 |
|
I think we should instead find our calling and the meaning of life from the experiences |
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41:21.780 --> 41:22.780 |
|
that we have. |
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41:22.780 --> 41:23.780 |
|
Right. |
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41:23.780 --> 41:30.260 |
|
You know, I can have very meaningful experiences even if there are other people who are smarter |
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41:30.260 --> 41:35.860 |
|
than me, you know, when I go to faculty meeting here and I was talking about something and |
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41:35.860 --> 41:39.420 |
|
then I certainly realized, oh, he has an old prize, he has an old prize, he has an old |
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41:39.420 --> 41:40.420 |
|
prize. |
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41:40.420 --> 41:41.420 |
|
Yeah. |
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41:41.420 --> 41:47.660 |
|
You know, it doesn't make me enjoy life any less or enjoy talking to those people less. |
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41:47.660 --> 41:49.780 |
|
Of course not. |
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41:49.780 --> 41:57.420 |
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And contrary to that, I feel very honored and privileged to get to interact with other |
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very intelligent beings that are better than me and a lot of stuff. |
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So I don't think there's any reason why we can't have the same approach with intelligent |
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42:05.420 --> 42:06.420 |
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machines. |
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42:06.420 --> 42:08.900 |
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That's a really interesting, so people don't often think about that. |
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42:08.900 --> 42:14.380 |
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They think about if there's machines that are more intelligent, you naturally think |
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that that's not going to be a beneficial type of intelligence. |
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You don't realize it could be, you know, like peers with no ball prizes that would be just |
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fun to talk with. |
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And they might be clever about certain topics and you can have fun having a few drinks with |
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them. |
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Well, also, you know, another example we can all relate to why it doesn't have to be a |
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terrible thing to be impressed, the presence of people who are even smarter than us all |
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around is when you and I were both two years old, I mean, our parents were much more intelligent |
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than us. |
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42:48.980 --> 42:49.980 |
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Right. |
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Worked out okay. |
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Because their goals were aligned with our goals. |
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And that I think is really the number one key issue we have to solve if we value align |
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the value alignment problem exactly because people who see too many Hollywood movies with |
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lousy science fiction plot lines, they worry about the wrong thing, right? |
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They worry about some machine suddenly turning evil. |
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It's not malice that we should that is the concern. |
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It's competence. |
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43:23.000 --> 43:29.580 |
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By definition, intelligence makes you makes you very competent if you have a more intelligent |
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goal playing machine computer playing as a less intelligent one and when we define intelligence |
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as the ability to accomplish go winning, right? |
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It's going to be the more intelligent one that wins. |
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And if you have a human and then you have an AGI that's more intelligent in all ways |
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and they have different goals, guess who's going to get their way, right? |
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So I was just reading about this particular rhinoceros species that was driven extinct |
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just a few years ago. |
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Alan Bummer is looking at this cute picture of a mommy rhinoceros with its child, you |
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know, and why did we humans drive it to extinction? |
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It wasn't because we were evil rhino haters as a whole. |
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It was just because we our goals weren't aligned with those of the rhinoceros and it didn't |
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work out so well for the rhinoceros because we were more intelligent, right? |
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44:19.660 --> 44:27.220 |
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So I think it's just so important that if we ever do build AGI before we unleash anything, |
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we have to make sure that it learns to understand our goals, that it adopts our goals and retains |
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those goals. |
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44:38.380 --> 44:45.740 |
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So the cool interesting problem there is being able, us as human beings, trying to formulate |
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our values. |
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44:47.240 --> 44:52.540 |
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So you know, you could think of the United States Constitution as a way that people sat |
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down at the time a bunch of white men, which is a good example, I should say. |
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They formulated the goals for this country and a lot of people agree that those goals |
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actually held up pretty well. |
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It's an interesting formulation of values and failed miserably in other ways. |
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45:09.600 --> 45:15.500 |
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So for the value alignment problem and the solution to it, we have to be able to put |
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45:15.500 --> 45:23.420 |
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on paper or in a program, human values, how difficult do you think that is? |
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45:23.420 --> 45:24.420 |
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Very. |
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45:24.420 --> 45:25.980 |
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But it's so important. |
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We really have to give it our best and it's difficult for two separate reasons. |
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45:30.340 --> 45:37.660 |
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There's the technical value alignment problem of figuring out just how to make machines |
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understand our goals, adopt them and retain them. |
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45:40.660 --> 45:46.140 |
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And then there's the separate part of it, the philosophical part, whose values anyway. |
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And since we, it's not like we have any great consensus on this planet on values, what mechanism |
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should we create then to aggregate and decide, okay, what's a good compromise? |
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45:56.780 --> 46:01.260 |
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That second discussion can't just be left the tech nerds like myself, right? |
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46:01.260 --> 46:02.260 |
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That's right. |
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46:02.260 --> 46:06.820 |
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And if we refuse to talk about it and then AGI gets built, who's going to be actually |
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46:06.820 --> 46:10.660 |
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making the decision about whose values, it's going to be a bunch of dudes in some tech |
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46:10.660 --> 46:12.380 |
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company, right? |
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46:12.380 --> 46:18.420 |
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And are they necessarily so representative of all of humankind that we want to just |
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endorse it to them? |
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46:19.580 --> 46:25.220 |
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Are they even uniquely qualified to speak to future human happiness just because they're |
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46:25.220 --> 46:26.460 |
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good at programming AI? |
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46:26.460 --> 46:30.380 |
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I'd much rather have this be a really inclusive conversation. |
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46:30.380 --> 46:32.700 |
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But do you think it's possible? |
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46:32.700 --> 46:38.820 |
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You create a beautiful vision that includes sort of the diversity, cultural diversity |
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46:38.820 --> 46:43.900 |
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and various perspectives on discussing rights, freedoms, human dignity. |
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46:43.900 --> 46:46.620 |
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But how hard is it to come to that consensus? |
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46:46.620 --> 46:52.140 |
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Do you think it's certainly a really important thing that we should all try to do, but do |
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you think it's feasible? |
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46:54.460 --> 47:01.660 |
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I think there's no better way to guarantee failure than to refuse to talk about it or |
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47:01.660 --> 47:02.980 |
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refuse to try. |
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47:02.980 --> 47:08.060 |
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And I also think it's a really bad strategy to say, okay, let's first have a discussion |
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47:08.060 --> 47:09.060 |
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for a long time. |
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47:09.060 --> 47:13.540 |
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And then once we reach complete consensus, then we'll try to load it into some machine. |
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47:13.540 --> 47:16.980 |
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No, we shouldn't let perfect be the enemy of good. |
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47:16.980 --> 47:22.140 |
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Instead, we should start with the kindergarten ethics that pretty much everybody agrees on |
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and put that into our machines now. |
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47:24.580 --> 47:26.100 |
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We're not doing that even. |
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47:26.100 --> 47:32.980 |
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Look at anyone who builds a passenger aircraft wants it to never under any circumstances |
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fly into a building or mountain, right? |
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47:35.900 --> 47:38.860 |
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Yet the September 11 hijackers were able to do that. |
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47:38.860 --> 47:44.220 |
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And even more embarrassingly, Andreas Lubitz, this depressed German wings pilot, when he |
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47:44.220 --> 47:50.220 |
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flew his passenger jet into the Alps, killing over 100 people, he just told the autopilot |
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to do it. |
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He told the freaking computer to change the altitude to 100 meters. |
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47:55.140 --> 48:01.820 |
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And even though it had the GPS maps, everything, the computer was like, okay, no, so we should |
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48:01.820 --> 48:07.300 |
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take those very basic values, though, where the problem is not that we don't agree. |
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48:07.300 --> 48:12.460 |
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The problem is just we've been too lazy to try to put it into our machines and make sure |
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48:12.460 --> 48:17.460 |
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that from now on, airplanes will just, which all have computers in them, but we'll just |
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never just refuse to do something like that. |
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We go into safe mode, maybe lock the cockpit door, go to the nearest airport, and there's |
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48:25.580 --> 48:31.340 |
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so much other technology in our world as well now where it's really coming quite timely |
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48:31.340 --> 48:34.300 |
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to put in some sort of very basic values like this. |
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48:34.300 --> 48:41.460 |
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Even in cars, we've had enough vehicle terrorism attacks by now where people have driven trucks |
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and vans into pedestrians that it's not at all a crazy idea to just have that hardwired |
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into the car, because yeah, there are a lot of, there's always going to be people who |
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for some reason want to harm others, but most of those people don't have the technical |
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expertise to figure out how to work around something like that. |
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48:58.620 --> 49:01.780 |
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So if the car just won't do it, it helps. |
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49:01.780 --> 49:02.940 |
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So let's start there. |
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49:02.940 --> 49:05.020 |
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So there's a lot of, that's a great point. |
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49:05.020 --> 49:06.900 |
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So not chasing perfect. |
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49:06.900 --> 49:10.780 |
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There's a lot of things that most of the world agrees on. |
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49:10.780 --> 49:11.940 |
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Yeah, let's start there. |
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49:11.940 --> 49:12.940 |
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Let's start there. |
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49:12.940 --> 49:18.140 |
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And then once we start there, we'll also get into the habit of having these kind of conversations |
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about, okay, what else should we put in here and have these discussions? |
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49:21.940 --> 49:24.100 |
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This should be a gradual process then. |
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49:24.100 --> 49:25.100 |
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Great. |
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49:25.100 --> 49:31.380 |
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So, but that also means describing these things and describing it to a machine. |
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49:31.380 --> 49:35.620 |
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So one thing, we had a few conversations with Steven Wolfram. |
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49:35.620 --> 49:37.140 |
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I'm not sure if you're familiar with Steven Wolfram. |
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49:37.140 --> 49:38.500 |
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Oh yeah, I know him quite well. |
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So he has, you know, he works with a bunch of things, but you know, cellular automata, |
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these simple computable things, these computation systems. |
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49:47.660 --> 49:52.380 |
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And he kind of mentioned that, you know, we probably have already within these systems |
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already something that's AGI, meaning like we just don't know it because we can't talk |
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to it. |
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50:00.580 --> 50:06.380 |
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So if you give me this chance to try it, to try to at least form a question out of this, |
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50:06.380 --> 50:12.780 |
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because I think it's an interesting idea to think that we can have intelligent systems, |
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50:12.780 --> 50:17.260 |
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but we don't know how to describe something to them and they can't communicate with us. |
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50:17.260 --> 50:21.220 |
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I know you're doing a little bit of work in explainable AI, trying to get AI to explain |
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50:21.220 --> 50:22.220 |
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itself. |
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50:22.220 --> 50:28.340 |
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So what are your thoughts of natural language processing or some kind of other communication? |
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50:28.340 --> 50:30.220 |
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How does the AI explain something to us? |
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50:30.220 --> 50:33.740 |
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How do we explain something to it, to machines? |
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50:33.740 --> 50:35.420 |
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Or you think of it differently? |
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50:35.420 --> 50:40.100 |
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So there are two separate parts to your question there. |
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50:40.100 --> 50:43.900 |
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One of them has to do with communication, which is super interesting and I'll get to |
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50:43.900 --> 50:44.900 |
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that in a sec. |
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50:44.900 --> 50:50.100 |
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The other is whether we already have AGI, we just haven't noticed it. |
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50:50.100 --> 50:54.340 |
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There, I beg to differ. |
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50:54.340 --> 50:58.420 |
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And don't think there's anything in any cellular automaton or anything or the internet itself |
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50:58.420 --> 51:05.400 |
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or whatever that has artificial general intelligence in that it didn't really do exactly everything |
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51:05.400 --> 51:06.980 |
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we humans can do better. |
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51:06.980 --> 51:14.100 |
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I think the day that happens, when that happens, we will very soon notice and we'll probably |
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notice even before because in a very, very big way. |
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51:17.980 --> 51:18.980 |
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For the second part though. |
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51:18.980 --> 51:20.700 |
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Can I just, sorry. |
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51:20.700 --> 51:30.260 |
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Because you have this beautiful way to formulate in consciousness as information processing |
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51:30.260 --> 51:33.740 |
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and you can think of intelligence and information processing and you can think of the entire |
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universe. |
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51:34.740 --> 51:40.220 |
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These particles and these systems roaming around that have this information processing |
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51:40.220 --> 51:47.500 |
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power, you don't think there is something with the power to process information in the |
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way that we human beings do that's out there that needs to be sort of connected to. |
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51:55.460 --> 51:59.980 |
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It seems a little bit philosophical perhaps, but there's something compelling to the idea |
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that the power is already there, the focus should be more on being able to communicate |
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with it. |
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52:07.100 --> 52:15.340 |
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Well, I agree that in a certain sense, the hardware processing power is already out there |
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52:15.340 --> 52:21.180 |
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because our universe itself can think of it as being a computer already. |
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52:21.180 --> 52:25.540 |
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It's constantly computing what water waves, how it devolved the water waves and the river |
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52:25.540 --> 52:29.860 |
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Charles and how to move the air molecules around that Seth Lloyd has pointed out. |
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52:29.860 --> 52:33.940 |
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My colleague here that you can even in a very rigorous way think of our entire universe |
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52:33.940 --> 52:35.660 |
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is just being a quantum computer. |
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52:35.660 --> 52:40.900 |
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It's pretty clear that our universe supports this amazing processing power because you |
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can even within this physics computer that we live in, we can even build actual laptops |
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52:46.580 --> 52:47.580 |
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and stuff. |
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52:47.580 --> 52:49.140 |
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So clearly the power is there. |
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52:49.140 --> 52:53.420 |
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It's just that most of the compute power that nature has, it's in my opinion kind of wasting |
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52:53.420 --> 52:57.140 |
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on boring stuff like simulating yet another ocean wave somewhere where no one is even |
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looking. |
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52:58.140 --> 53:03.820 |
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So in a sense, what life does, what we are doing when we build computers is we're rechanneling |
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all this compute that nature is doing anyway into doing things that are more interesting |
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53:09.380 --> 53:14.220 |
|
than just yet another ocean wave and do something cool here. |
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53:14.220 --> 53:21.100 |
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So the raw hardware power is there for sure, and even just computing what's going to happen |
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53:21.100 --> 53:25.540 |
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for the next five seconds in this water ball, you know, it takes a ridiculous amount of |
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compute if you do it on a human computer. |
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53:28.060 --> 53:30.040 |
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This water ball just did it. |
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53:30.040 --> 53:36.020 |
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But that does not mean that this water ball has AGI and this because AGI means it should |
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53:36.020 --> 53:40.300 |
|
also be able to like I've written my book done this interview. |
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53:40.300 --> 53:42.100 |
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And I don't think it's just communication problems. |
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I don't think it can do it. |
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53:47.020 --> 53:51.780 |
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So Buddhists say when they watch the water and that there is some beauty, that there's |
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some depth and beauty in nature that they can communicate with. |
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53:55.380 --> 54:01.180 |
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Communication is also very important because I mean, look, part of my job is being a teacher |
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54:01.180 --> 54:09.940 |
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and I know some very intelligent professors even who just have a better hard time communicating. |
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54:09.940 --> 54:14.620 |
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They come up with all these brilliant ideas, but to communicate with somebody else, you |
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|
have to also be able to simulate their own mind. |
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54:17.140 --> 54:18.140 |
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Yes. |
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54:18.140 --> 54:22.020 |
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And build well enough and understand that model of their mind that you can say things |
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that they will understand. |
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54:24.500 --> 54:26.700 |
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And that's quite difficult. |
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54:26.700 --> 54:31.620 |
|
And that's why today it's so frustrating if you have a computer that makes some cancer |
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|
diagnosis and you ask it, well, why are you saying I should have a surgery? |
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54:36.260 --> 54:43.620 |
|
And if you don't want to reply, I was trained on five terabytes of data and this is my diagnosis |
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54:43.620 --> 54:49.220 |
|
boop, boop, beep, beep, doesn't really instill a lot of confidence, right? |
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54:49.220 --> 54:54.420 |
|
So I think we have a lot of work to do on communication there. |
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54:54.420 --> 54:59.380 |
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So what kind of, I think you're doing a little bit of work in explainable AI. |
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54:59.380 --> 55:01.340 |
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What do you think are the most promising avenues? |
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55:01.340 --> 55:07.100 |
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Is it mostly about sort of the Alexa problem of natural language processing of being able |
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55:07.100 --> 55:13.220 |
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to actually use human interpretable methods of communication? |
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55:13.220 --> 55:17.500 |
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So being able to talk to a system and talk back to you, or is there some more fundamental |
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55:17.500 --> 55:18.500 |
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problems to be solved? |
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55:18.500 --> 55:21.180 |
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I think it's all of the above. |
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55:21.180 --> 55:27.180 |
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The natural language processing is obviously important, but there are also more nerdy fundamental |
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55:27.180 --> 55:28.180 |
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problems. |
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55:28.180 --> 55:39.180 |
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Like if you take, you play chess, Russian, I have to, when did you learn Russian? |
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55:39.180 --> 55:45.700 |
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I speak Russian very poorly, but I bought a book, teach yourself Russian, I read a lot, |
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55:45.700 --> 55:47.700 |
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but it was very difficult. |
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55:47.700 --> 55:48.700 |
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Wow. |
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55:48.700 --> 55:49.700 |
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That's why I speak so poorly. |
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55:49.700 --> 55:51.700 |
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How many languages do you know? |
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55:51.700 --> 55:52.700 |
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Wow. |
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55:52.700 --> 55:53.700 |
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That's really impressive. |
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55:53.700 --> 55:54.700 |
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I don't know. |
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55:54.700 --> 55:58.740 |
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My wife has some calculations, but my point was, if you played chess, have you looked |
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55:58.740 --> 56:00.260 |
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at the AlphaZero games? |
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56:00.260 --> 56:01.260 |
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Yeah. |
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56:01.260 --> 56:02.260 |
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Oh, the actual games now. |
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56:02.260 --> 56:03.260 |
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Check it out. |
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56:03.260 --> 56:09.900 |
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Some of them are just mind blowing, really beautiful. |
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56:09.900 --> 56:12.460 |
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If you ask, how did it do that? |
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56:12.460 --> 56:14.500 |
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You got that. |
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56:14.500 --> 56:20.540 |
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Talk to Demis Osabis, others from DeepMind, all they'll ultimately be able to give you |
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56:20.540 --> 56:26.940 |
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is big tables of numbers, matrices that define the neural network, and you can stare at these |
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56:26.940 --> 56:32.980 |
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tables numbers till your face turned blue, and you're not going to understand much about |
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56:32.980 --> 56:35.860 |
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why it made that move. |
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56:35.860 --> 56:40.540 |
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Even if you have a natural language processing that can tell you in human language about, |
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56:40.540 --> 56:44.180 |
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oh, five, seven, point two, eight, still not going to really help. |
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56:44.180 --> 56:50.660 |
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I think there's a whole spectrum of fun challenges there involved in taking computation that |
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56:50.660 --> 56:59.940 |
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does intelligent things and transforming it into something equally good, equally intelligent, |
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56:59.940 --> 57:02.060 |
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but that's more understandable. |
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57:02.060 --> 57:08.180 |
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I think that's really valuable because I think as we put machines in charge of ever more |
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57:08.180 --> 57:13.540 |
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infrastructure in our world, the power grid, the trading on the stock market, weapon systems, |
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57:13.540 --> 57:19.620 |
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and so on, it's absolutely crucial that we can trust these AIs that do all we want and |
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57:19.620 --> 57:25.860 |
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trust really comes from understanding in a very fundamental way. |
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57:25.860 --> 57:29.940 |
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That's why I'm working on this, because I think the more if we're going to have some |
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57:29.940 --> 57:34.700 |
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hope of ensuring that machines have adopted our goals and that they're going to retain |
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57:34.700 --> 57:41.260 |
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them, that kind of trust, I think, needs to be based on things you can actually understand, |
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57:41.260 --> 57:47.140 |
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preferably even improve theorems on, even with a self driving car, right? |
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57:47.140 --> 57:51.020 |
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If someone just tells you it's been trained on tons of data and never crashed, it's less |
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57:51.020 --> 57:54.460 |
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reassuring than if someone actually has a proof. |
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57:54.460 --> 57:58.820 |
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Maybe it's a computer verified proof, but still it says that under no circumstances |
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57:58.820 --> 58:02.420 |
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is this car just going to swerve into oncoming traffic. |
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58:02.420 --> 58:09.460 |
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And that kind of information helps build trust and helps build the alignment of goals, at |
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58:09.460 --> 58:12.300 |
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least awareness that your goals, your values are aligned. |
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58:12.300 --> 58:17.620 |
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And I think even in the very short term, if you look at how today, this absolutely pathetic |
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58:17.620 --> 58:25.980 |
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state of cybersecurity that we have, where is it, 3 billion Yahoo accounts are packed |
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58:25.980 --> 58:34.300 |
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and almost every American's credit card and so on, you know, why is this happening? |
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58:34.300 --> 58:39.940 |
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It's ultimately happening because we have software that nobody fully understood how |
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58:39.940 --> 58:41.460 |
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it worked. |
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58:41.460 --> 58:45.100 |
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That's why the bugs hadn't been found, right? |
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58:45.100 --> 58:50.340 |
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And I think AI can be used very effectively for offense for hacking, but it can also be |
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58:50.340 --> 59:00.580 |
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used for defense, hopefully, automating verifiability and creating systems that are built in different |
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59:00.580 --> 59:03.140 |
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ways so you can actually prove things about them. |
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59:03.140 --> 59:05.460 |
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And it's important. |
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59:05.460 --> 59:09.740 |
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So speaking of software that nobody understands how it works, of course, a bunch of people |
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59:09.740 --> 59:14.820 |
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ask about your paper about your thoughts of why does deep and cheap learning work so well? |
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59:14.820 --> 59:19.280 |
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That's the paper, but what are your thoughts on deep learning, these kind of simplified |
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59:19.280 --> 59:26.620 |
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models of our own brains that have been able to do some successful perception work, pattern |
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59:26.620 --> 59:30.940 |
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recognition work, and now with AlphaZero and so on, do some clever things? |
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59:30.940 --> 59:35.740 |
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What are your thoughts about the promise limitations of this piece? |
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59:35.740 --> 59:37.140 |
|
Great. |
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59:37.140 --> 59:44.300 |
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I think there are a number of very important insights, very important lessons we can always |
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59:44.300 --> 59:47.340 |
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draw from these kind of successes. |
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59:47.340 --> 59:50.460 |
|
One of them is when you look at the human brain, you see it's very complicated, a tenth |
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59:50.460 --> 59:54.140 |
|
of 11 neurons, and there are all these different kinds of neurons, and yada yada, and there's |
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59:54.140 --> 59:57.980 |
|
been this long debate about whether the fact that we have dozens of different kinds is |
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59:57.980 --> 1:00:01.580 |
|
actually necessary for intelligence. |
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1:00:01.580 --> 1:00:06.500 |
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We can now, I think, quite convincingly answer that question of no, it's enough to have just |
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1:00:06.500 --> 1:00:07.500 |
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one kind. |
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1:00:07.500 --> 1:00:11.780 |
|
If you look under the hood of AlphaZero, there's only one kind of neuron, and it's ridiculously |
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1:00:11.780 --> 1:00:15.060 |
|
simple, a simple mathematical thing. |
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1:00:15.060 --> 1:00:21.380 |
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So it's just like in physics, if you have a gas with waves in it, it's not the detailed |
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1:00:21.380 --> 1:00:24.380 |
|
nature of the molecules that matter. |
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1:00:24.380 --> 1:00:27.060 |
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It's the collective behavior, somehow. |
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1:00:27.060 --> 1:00:33.060 |
|
Similarly, it's this higher level structure of the network that matters, not that you |
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1:00:33.060 --> 1:00:34.060 |
|
have 20 kinds of neurons. |
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1:00:34.060 --> 1:00:41.740 |
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I think our brain is such a complicated mess because it wasn't evolved just to be intelligent, |
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1:00:41.740 --> 1:00:51.740 |
|
it was evolved to also be self assembling, and self repairing, and evolutionarily attainable. |
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1:00:51.740 --> 1:00:53.660 |
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And patches and so on. |
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1:00:53.660 --> 1:00:58.700 |
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So I think it's pretty, my hunch is that we're going to understand how to build AGI before |
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1:00:58.700 --> 1:01:01.060 |
|
we fully understand how our brains work. |
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1:01:01.060 --> 1:01:06.260 |
|
Just like we understood how to build flying machines long before we were able to build |
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1:01:06.260 --> 1:01:07.260 |
|
a mechanical bird. |
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1:01:07.260 --> 1:01:08.260 |
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Yeah, that's right. |
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1:01:08.260 --> 1:01:15.300 |
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You've given the example of mechanical birds and airplanes, and airplanes do a pretty good |
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1:01:15.300 --> 1:01:18.620 |
|
job of flying without really mimicking bird flight. |
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1:01:18.620 --> 1:01:23.180 |
|
And even now, after 100 years later, did you see the TED talk with this German group of |
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1:01:23.180 --> 1:01:24.180 |
|
mechanical birds? |
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1:01:24.180 --> 1:01:25.180 |
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I did not. |
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1:01:25.180 --> 1:01:26.180 |
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I've heard you mention it. |
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1:01:26.180 --> 1:01:27.180 |
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Check it out. |
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1:01:27.180 --> 1:01:28.180 |
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It's amazing. |
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1:01:28.180 --> 1:01:30.180 |
|
But even after that, we still don't fly in mechanical birds because it turned out the |
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1:01:30.180 --> 1:01:34.580 |
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way we came up with simpler, and it's better for our purposes, and I think it might be the |
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1:01:34.580 --> 1:01:35.580 |
|
same there. |
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1:01:35.580 --> 1:01:38.140 |
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So that's one lesson. |
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1:01:38.140 --> 1:01:42.020 |
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Another lesson is one of what our paper was about. |
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1:01:42.020 --> 1:01:47.420 |
|
Well, first, as a physicist thought, it was fascinating how there's a very close mathematical |
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1:01:47.420 --> 1:01:50.900 |
|
relationship, actually, between our artificial neural networks. |
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1:01:50.900 --> 1:01:56.580 |
|
And a lot of things that we've studied for in physics go by nerdy names like the renormalization |
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1:01:56.580 --> 1:02:01.100 |
|
group equation and Hamiltonians and yada, yada, yada. |
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1:02:01.100 --> 1:02:11.380 |
|
And when you look a little more closely at this, you have, at first, I was like, well, |
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1:02:11.380 --> 1:02:18.700 |
|
there's something crazy here that doesn't make sense because we know that if you even |
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1:02:18.700 --> 1:02:23.380 |
|
want to build a super simple neural network to tell apart cat pictures and dog pictures, |
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1:02:23.380 --> 1:02:27.260 |
|
right, that you can do that very, very well now. |
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1:02:27.260 --> 1:02:31.540 |
|
But if you think about it a little bit, you convince yourself it must be impossible because |
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1:02:31.540 --> 1:02:36.420 |
|
if I have one megapixel, even if each pixel is just black or white, there's two to the |
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1:02:36.420 --> 1:02:40.900 |
|
power of one million possible images, which is way more than there are atoms in our universe. |
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1:02:40.900 --> 1:02:47.220 |
|
So in order to, and then for each one of those, I have to assign a number, which is the probability |
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1:02:47.220 --> 1:02:49.100 |
|
that it's a dog. |
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1:02:49.100 --> 1:02:55.900 |
|
So an arbitrary function of images is a list of more numbers than there are atoms in our |
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1:02:55.900 --> 1:02:56.900 |
|
universe. |
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1:02:56.900 --> 1:03:02.220 |
|
So clearly, I can't store that under the hood of my, my GPU or my, my computer yet somehow |
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1:03:02.220 --> 1:03:03.220 |
|
works. |
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1:03:03.220 --> 1:03:04.220 |
|
So what does that mean? |
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1:03:04.220 --> 1:03:12.940 |
|
Well, it means that out of all of the problems that you could try to solve with a neural network, |
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1:03:12.940 --> 1:03:17.940 |
|
almost all of them are impossible to solve with a reasonably sized one. |
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1:03:17.940 --> 1:03:24.820 |
|
But then what we showed in our paper was, was that the, the fraction, the kind of problems, |
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1:03:24.820 --> 1:03:29.740 |
|
the fraction of all the problems that you could possibly pose that the, that we actually |
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1:03:29.740 --> 1:03:34.980 |
|
care about given the laws of physics is also an infinitesimally tiny little part. |
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1:03:34.980 --> 1:03:37.180 |
|
And amazingly, they're basically the same part. |
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1:03:37.180 --> 1:03:38.180 |
|
Yeah. |
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1:03:38.180 --> 1:03:41.180 |
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It's almost like our world was created for, I mean, they kind of come together. |
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1:03:41.180 --> 1:03:42.180 |
|
Yeah. |
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1:03:42.180 --> 1:03:44.940 |
|
You, but you could say maybe where the world created the world that the world was created |
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1:03:44.940 --> 1:03:50.300 |
|
for us, but I have a more modest interpretation, which is that instead evolution endowments |
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1:03:50.300 --> 1:03:54.700 |
|
with neural networks, precisely for that reason, because this particular architecture has |
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1:03:54.700 --> 1:04:02.380 |
|
opposed to the one in your laptop is very, very well adapted to solving the kind of problems |
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1:04:02.380 --> 1:04:05.540 |
|
that nature kept presenting our ancestors with, right? |
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1:04:05.540 --> 1:04:09.380 |
|
So it makes sense that why do we have a brain in the first place? |
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1:04:09.380 --> 1:04:12.940 |
|
It's to be able to make predictions about the future and so on. |
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1:04:12.940 --> 1:04:17.580 |
|
So if we had a sucky system, which could never solve it, it wouldn't have a lot. |
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1:04:17.580 --> 1:04:23.420 |
|
So, but it's, so this is, this is a, I think a very beautiful fact. |
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1:04:23.420 --> 1:04:24.420 |
|
Yeah. |
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1:04:24.420 --> 1:04:28.780 |
|
And you also realize that there's, there, that we, there've been, it's been earlier |
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1:04:28.780 --> 1:04:34.140 |
|
work on, on why deeper networks are good, but we were able to show an additional cool |
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1:04:34.140 --> 1:04:40.260 |
|
fact there, which is that even incredibly simple problems, like suppose I give you a |
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1:04:40.260 --> 1:04:45.020 |
|
thousand numbers and ask you to multiply them together and you can write a few lines of |
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1:04:45.020 --> 1:04:46.820 |
|
code, boom, done, trivial. |
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1:04:46.820 --> 1:04:52.580 |
|
If you just try to do that with a neural network that has only one single hidden layer in it, |
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1:04:52.580 --> 1:04:59.940 |
|
you can do it, but you're going to need two to the power of thousand neurons to multiply |
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1:04:59.940 --> 1:05:03.260 |
|
a thousand numbers, which is again, more neurons than their atoms in our universe. |
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1:05:03.260 --> 1:05:05.740 |
|
So that's fascinating. |
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1:05:05.740 --> 1:05:11.580 |
|
But if you allow, if you allow yourself, make it a deep network of many layers, you only |
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1:05:11.580 --> 1:05:15.340 |
|
need four thousand neurons, it's perfectly feasible. |
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1:05:15.340 --> 1:05:17.500 |
|
So that's really interesting. |
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1:05:17.500 --> 1:05:18.500 |
|
Yeah. |
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1:05:18.500 --> 1:05:19.500 |
|
Yeah. |
|
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|
1:05:19.500 --> 1:05:24.460 |
|
So architecture type, I mean, you mentioned Schrodinger's equation and what are your thoughts |
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|
1:05:24.460 --> 1:05:32.860 |
|
about quantum computing and the role of this kind of computational unit in creating an |
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|
1:05:32.860 --> 1:05:34.900 |
|
intelligent system? |
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1:05:34.900 --> 1:05:41.100 |
|
In some Hollywood movies that I don't mention my name because I don't want to spoil them. |
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1:05:41.100 --> 1:05:46.820 |
|
The way they get AGI is building a quantum computer because the word quantum sounds |
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1:05:46.820 --> 1:05:47.820 |
|
cool and so on. |
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1:05:47.820 --> 1:05:48.820 |
|
That's right. |
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1:05:48.820 --> 1:05:54.940 |
|
But first of all, I think we don't need quantum computers to build AGI. |
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1:05:54.940 --> 1:06:01.740 |
|
I suspect your brain is not quantum computer in any found sense. |
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1:06:01.740 --> 1:06:03.460 |
|
So you don't even wrote a paper about that. |
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1:06:03.460 --> 1:06:09.060 |
|
Many years ago, I calculated the so called decoherence time that how long it takes until |
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1:06:09.060 --> 1:06:16.900 |
|
the quantum computerness of what your neurons are doing gets erased by just random noise |
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|
1:06:16.900 --> 1:06:21.420 |
|
from the environment and it's about 10 to the minus 21 seconds. |
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1:06:21.420 --> 1:06:27.420 |
|
So as cool as it would be to have a quantum computer in my head, I don't think that fast. |
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1:06:27.420 --> 1:06:35.820 |
|
On the other hand, there are very cool things you could do with quantum computers or I think |
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1:06:35.820 --> 1:06:40.780 |
|
we'll be able to do soon when we get bigger ones that might actually help machine learning |
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1:06:40.780 --> 1:06:43.180 |
|
do even better than the brain. |
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1:06:43.180 --> 1:06:58.620 |
|
So for example, one, this is just a moonshot, but hey, learning is very much same thing |
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|
1:06:58.620 --> 1:07:00.860 |
|
as search. |
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|
1:07:00.860 --> 1:07:05.460 |
|
If you're trying to train a neural network to get really learned to do something really |
|
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1:07:05.460 --> 1:07:10.820 |
|
well, you have some loss function, you have a bunch of knobs you can turn represented |
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1:07:10.820 --> 1:07:14.420 |
|
by a bunch of numbers and you're trying to tweak them so that it becomes as good as possible |
|
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|
1:07:14.420 --> 1:07:15.420 |
|
at this thing. |
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|
1:07:15.420 --> 1:07:22.580 |
|
So if you think of a landscape with some valley, where each dimension of the landscape corresponds |
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1:07:22.580 --> 1:07:25.780 |
|
to some number you can change, you're trying to find the minimum. |
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1:07:25.780 --> 1:07:29.980 |
|
And it's well known that if you have a very high dimensional landscape, complicated things, |
|
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|
1:07:29.980 --> 1:07:34.140 |
|
it's super hard to find the minimum. |
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|
1:07:34.140 --> 1:07:37.500 |
|
Quantum mechanics is amazingly good at this. |
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|
1:07:37.500 --> 1:07:42.980 |
|
If I want to know what's the lowest energy state this water can possibly have incredibly |
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1:07:42.980 --> 1:07:47.860 |
|
hard to compute, but nature will happily figure this out for you if you just cool it down, |
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1:07:47.860 --> 1:07:50.860 |
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make it very, very cold. |
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1:07:50.860 --> 1:07:55.260 |
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If you put a ball somewhere, it'll roll down to its minimum and this happens metaphorically |
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1:07:55.260 --> 1:07:57.620 |
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at the energy landscape too. |
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1:07:57.620 --> 1:08:02.940 |
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And quantum mechanics even uses some clever tricks which today's machine learning systems |
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1:08:02.940 --> 1:08:03.940 |
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don't. |
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1:08:03.940 --> 1:08:07.940 |
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If you're trying to find the minimum and you get stuck in the little local minimum here |
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1:08:07.940 --> 1:08:14.180 |
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in quantum mechanics, you can actually tunnel through the barrier and get unstuck again. |
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1:08:14.180 --> 1:08:15.420 |
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And that's really interesting. |
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1:08:15.420 --> 1:08:16.420 |
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Yeah. |
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1:08:16.420 --> 1:08:22.940 |
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So maybe for example, we'll one day use quantum computers that help train neural networks |
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1:08:22.940 --> 1:08:23.940 |
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better. |
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1:08:23.940 --> 1:08:24.940 |
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That's really interesting. |
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1:08:24.940 --> 1:08:25.940 |
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Okay. |
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1:08:25.940 --> 1:08:32.020 |
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So as a component of kind of the learning process, for example, let me ask sort of wrapping |
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1:08:32.020 --> 1:08:34.060 |
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up here a little bit. |
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1:08:34.060 --> 1:08:40.540 |
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Let me return to the questions of our human nature and love, as I mentioned. |
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1:08:40.540 --> 1:08:48.020 |
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So do you think you mentioned sort of a helper robot that you could think of also personal |
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1:08:48.020 --> 1:08:49.020 |
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robots. |
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1:08:49.020 --> 1:08:55.300 |
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Do you think the way we human beings fall in love and get connected to each other is |
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1:08:55.300 --> 1:09:00.420 |
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possible to achieve in an AI system and human level AI intelligence system. |
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1:09:00.420 --> 1:09:06.100 |
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Do you think we would ever see that kind of connection or, you know, in all this discussion |
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1:09:06.100 --> 1:09:11.460 |
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about solving complex goals, as this kind of human social connection, do you think that's |
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1:09:11.460 --> 1:09:16.460 |
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one of the goals on the peaks and valleys that were the raising sea levels that we'd |
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1:09:16.460 --> 1:09:17.460 |
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be able to achieve? |
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1:09:17.460 --> 1:09:22.180 |
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Or do you think that's something that's ultimately, or at least in the short term, relative to |
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1:09:22.180 --> 1:09:23.620 |
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the other goals is not achievable? |
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1:09:23.620 --> 1:09:25.220 |
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I think it's all possible. |
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1:09:25.220 --> 1:09:31.780 |
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And I mean, in recent, there's a very wide range of guesses, as you know, among AI researchers |
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1:09:31.780 --> 1:09:35.300 |
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when we're going to get AGI. |
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1:09:35.300 --> 1:09:39.620 |
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Some people, you know, like our friend Rodney Brooks said, it's going to be hundreds of |
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1:09:39.620 --> 1:09:41.140 |
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years at least. |
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1:09:41.140 --> 1:09:44.780 |
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And then there are many others that think it's going to happen relatively much sooner. |
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1:09:44.780 --> 1:09:52.140 |
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Recent polls, maybe half or so, AI researchers think we're going to get AGI within decades. |
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1:09:52.140 --> 1:09:56.260 |
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So if that happens, of course, then I think these things are all possible. |
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1:09:56.260 --> 1:10:01.860 |
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But in terms of whether it will happen, I think we shouldn't spend so much time asking, |
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1:10:01.860 --> 1:10:04.260 |
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what do we think will happen in the future? |
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1:10:04.260 --> 1:10:08.980 |
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As if we are just some sort of pathetic, passive bystanders, you know, waiting for the future |
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1:10:08.980 --> 1:10:12.740 |
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to happen to us, hey, we're the ones creating this future, right? |
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1:10:12.740 --> 1:10:18.340 |
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So we should be proactive about it and ask ourselves what sort of future we would like |
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1:10:18.340 --> 1:10:19.340 |
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to have happen. |
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1:10:19.340 --> 1:10:20.340 |
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That's right. |
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1:10:20.340 --> 1:10:21.340 |
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Trying to make it like that. |
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1:10:21.340 --> 1:10:25.660 |
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Well, what I prefer is some sort of incredibly boring zombie like future where there's all |
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1:10:25.660 --> 1:10:30.220 |
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these mechanical things happening and there's no passion, no emotion, no experience, maybe |
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1:10:30.220 --> 1:10:31.220 |
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even. |
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1:10:31.220 --> 1:10:35.740 |
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No, I would, of course, much rather prefer it if all the things that we find that we |
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1:10:35.740 --> 1:10:44.180 |
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value the most about humanity are a subjective experience, passion, inspiration, love, you |
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1:10:44.180 --> 1:10:50.780 |
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know, if we can create a future where those things do exist. |
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1:10:50.780 --> 1:10:56.500 |
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You know, I think ultimately it's not our universe giving meaning to us, it's us giving |
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1:10:56.500 --> 1:10:58.500 |
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meaning to our universe. |
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1:10:58.500 --> 1:11:03.620 |
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And if we build more advanced intelligence, let's make sure we build it in such a way |
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1:11:03.620 --> 1:11:09.100 |
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that meaning is part of it. |
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1:11:09.100 --> 1:11:13.900 |
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A lot of people that seriously study this problem and think of it from different angles have |
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1:11:13.900 --> 1:11:20.140 |
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trouble in the majority of cases, if they think through that happen, are the ones that |
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1:11:20.140 --> 1:11:22.620 |
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are not beneficial to humanity. |
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1:11:22.620 --> 1:11:27.260 |
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And so, yeah, so what are your thoughts? |
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1:11:27.260 --> 1:11:33.820 |
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What should people, you know, I really don't like people to be terrified, what's the way |
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1:11:33.820 --> 1:11:38.660 |
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for people to think about it in a way that, in a way we can solve it and we can make it |
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1:11:38.660 --> 1:11:39.660 |
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better. |
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1:11:39.660 --> 1:11:40.660 |
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Yeah. |
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1:11:40.660 --> 1:11:44.780 |
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No, I don't think panicking is going to help in any way, it's not going to increase chances |
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1:11:44.780 --> 1:11:46.060 |
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of things going well either. |
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1:11:46.060 --> 1:11:49.340 |
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Even if you are in a situation where there is a real threat, does it help if everybody |
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1:11:49.340 --> 1:11:50.620 |
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just freaks out? |
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1:11:50.620 --> 1:11:51.620 |
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Right. |
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1:11:51.620 --> 1:11:53.620 |
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No, of course not. |
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1:11:53.620 --> 1:11:59.740 |
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I think, yeah, there are, of course, ways in which things can go horribly wrong. |
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1:11:59.740 --> 1:12:04.460 |
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First of all, it's important when we think about this thing, this, about the problems |
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1:12:04.460 --> 1:12:08.780 |
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and risks, to also remember how huge the upsides can be if we get it right. |
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1:12:08.780 --> 1:12:13.420 |
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Everything we love about society and civilization is a product of intelligence. |
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1:12:13.420 --> 1:12:17.980 |
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So if we can amplify our intelligence with machine intelligence and not anymore lose |
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1:12:17.980 --> 1:12:23.380 |
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our loved ones, what we're told is an uncurable disease and things like this, of course, we |
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1:12:23.380 --> 1:12:24.940 |
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should aspire to that. |
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1:12:24.940 --> 1:12:28.700 |
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So that can be a motivator, I think, reminding yourselves that the reason we try to solve |
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1:12:28.700 --> 1:12:34.140 |
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problems is not just because we're trying to avoid gloom, but because we're trying to |
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1:12:34.140 --> 1:12:35.900 |
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do something great. |
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1:12:35.900 --> 1:12:43.340 |
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But then in terms of the risks, I think the really important question is to ask, what |
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1:12:43.340 --> 1:12:47.740 |
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can we do today that will actually help make the outcome good, right? |
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1:12:47.740 --> 1:12:52.700 |
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And dismissing the risk is not one of them, you know, I find it quite funny often when |
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1:12:52.700 --> 1:13:01.540 |
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I'm in discussion panels about these things, how the people who work for companies will |
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1:13:01.540 --> 1:13:05.100 |
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always be like, oh, nothing to worry about, nothing to worry about, nothing to worry about. |
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1:13:05.100 --> 1:13:09.980 |
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And it's always, it's only academics sometimes express concerns. |
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1:13:09.980 --> 1:13:10.980 |
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That's not surprising at all. |
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1:13:10.980 --> 1:13:17.500 |
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If you think about it, often Sinclair quipped, right, that it's hard to make a man believe |
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1:13:17.500 --> 1:13:20.620 |
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in something when his income depends on not believing in it. |
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1:13:20.620 --> 1:13:25.580 |
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And frankly, we know a lot of these people in companies that they're just as concerned |
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1:13:25.580 --> 1:13:26.580 |
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as anyone else. |
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1:13:26.580 --> 1:13:30.300 |
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But if you're the CEO of a company, that's not something you want to go on record saying |
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1:13:30.300 --> 1:13:34.980 |
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when you have silly journalists who are going to put a picture of a Terminator robot when |
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1:13:34.980 --> 1:13:35.980 |
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they quote you. |
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1:13:35.980 --> 1:13:39.380 |
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So, so the issues are real. |
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1:13:39.380 --> 1:13:45.660 |
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And the way I think about what the issue is, is basically, you know, the real choice we |
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1:13:45.660 --> 1:13:51.980 |
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have is, first of all, are we going to dismiss this, the risks and say, well, you know, let's |
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1:13:51.980 --> 1:13:57.140 |
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just go ahead and build machines that can do everything we can do better and cheaper, |
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1:13:57.140 --> 1:14:00.940 |
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you know, let's just make ourselves obsolete as fast as possible or what could possibly |
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1:14:00.940 --> 1:14:01.940 |
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go wrong. |
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1:14:01.940 --> 1:14:02.940 |
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Right. |
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1:14:02.940 --> 1:14:03.940 |
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That's one attitude. |
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1:14:03.940 --> 1:14:09.380 |
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The opposite attitude that I think is to say, it's incredible potential, you know, let's |
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1:14:09.380 --> 1:14:14.900 |
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think about what kind of future we're really, really excited about. |
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1:14:14.900 --> 1:14:18.700 |
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What are the shared goals that we can really aspire towards? |
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1:14:18.700 --> 1:14:22.100 |
|
And then let's think really hard about how we can actually get there. |
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1:14:22.100 --> 1:14:23.100 |
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So start with it. |
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1:14:23.100 --> 1:14:24.460 |
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Don't start thinking about the risks. |
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1:14:24.460 --> 1:14:26.940 |
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Start thinking about the goals. |
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1:14:26.940 --> 1:14:30.540 |
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And then when you do that, then you can think about the obstacles you want to avoid, right? |
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1:14:30.540 --> 1:14:34.420 |
|
I often get students coming in right here into my office for career advice. |
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1:14:34.420 --> 1:14:38.060 |
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Always ask them this very question, where do you want to be in the future? |
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1:14:38.060 --> 1:14:42.580 |
|
If all she can say is, oh, maybe I'll have cancer, maybe I'll run over by a truck. |
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1:14:42.580 --> 1:14:44.420 |
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Focus on the obstacles instead of the goal. |
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1:14:44.420 --> 1:14:49.340 |
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She's just going to end up a hypochondriac paranoid, whereas if she comes in and fire |
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1:14:49.340 --> 1:14:54.060 |
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in her eyes and is like, I want to be there, and then we can talk about the obstacles and |
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1:14:54.060 --> 1:14:56.100 |
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see how we can circumvent them. |
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1:14:56.100 --> 1:14:59.100 |
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That's I think a much, much healthier attitude. |
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1:14:59.100 --> 1:15:01.540 |
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And that's really what we're in. |
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1:15:01.540 --> 1:15:09.420 |
|
And I feel it's very challenging to come up with a vision for the future, which we're |
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1:15:09.420 --> 1:15:10.660 |
|
unequivocally excited about. |
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1:15:10.660 --> 1:15:14.300 |
|
I'm not just talking now in the vague terms like, yeah, let's cure cancer. |
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1:15:14.300 --> 1:15:18.500 |
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I'm talking about what kind of society do we want to create? |
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1:15:18.500 --> 1:15:25.380 |
|
What do we want it to mean to be human in the age of AI, in the age of AGI? |
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1:15:25.380 --> 1:15:31.460 |
|
So if we can have this conversation, broad, inclusive conversation, and gradually start |
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1:15:31.460 --> 1:15:38.100 |
|
converging towards some future with some direction at least that we want to steer towards, right? |
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1:15:38.100 --> 1:15:42.340 |
|
Then we'll be much more motivated to constructively take on the obstacles. |
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1:15:42.340 --> 1:15:54.260 |
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And I think if I wrap this up in a more succinct way, I think we can all agree already now that |
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1:15:54.260 --> 1:16:05.540 |
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we should aspire to build AGI that doesn't overpower us, but that empowers us. |
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1:16:05.540 --> 1:16:10.820 |
|
And think of the many various ways that can do that, whether that's from my side of the |
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1:16:10.820 --> 1:16:12.860 |
|
world of autonomous vehicles. |
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1:16:12.860 --> 1:16:17.020 |
|
I'm personally actually from the camp that believes this human level intelligence is |
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1:16:17.020 --> 1:16:22.780 |
|
required to achieve something like vehicles that would actually be something we would |
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1:16:22.780 --> 1:16:25.380 |
|
enjoy using and being part of. |
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1:16:25.380 --> 1:16:26.380 |
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So that's the one example. |
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1:16:26.380 --> 1:16:31.140 |
|
And certainly there's a lot of other types of robots and medicine and so on. |
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1:16:31.140 --> 1:16:35.300 |
|
So focusing on those and then coming up with the obstacles, coming up with the ways that |
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1:16:35.300 --> 1:16:38.420 |
|
that can go wrong and solving those one at a time. |
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1:16:38.420 --> 1:16:42.980 |
|
And just because you can build an autonomous vehicle, even if you could build one that |
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1:16:42.980 --> 1:16:47.500 |
|
would drive this final AGI, maybe there are some things in life that we would actually |
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1:16:47.500 --> 1:16:48.500 |
|
want to do ourselves. |
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1:16:48.500 --> 1:16:49.500 |
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That's right. |
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1:16:49.500 --> 1:16:50.500 |
|
Right? |
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1:16:50.500 --> 1:16:54.660 |
|
Like, for example, if you think of our society as a whole, there are some things that we |
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1:16:54.660 --> 1:16:57.540 |
|
find very meaningful to do. |
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1:16:57.540 --> 1:17:02.100 |
|
And that doesn't mean we have to stop doing them just because machines can do them better. |
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1:17:02.100 --> 1:17:06.660 |
|
I'm not going to stop playing tennis just the day someone builds a tennis robot and |
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1:17:06.660 --> 1:17:07.660 |
|
beat me. |
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1:17:07.660 --> 1:17:09.900 |
|
People are still playing chess and even go. |
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1:17:09.900 --> 1:17:10.900 |
|
Yeah. |
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1:17:10.900 --> 1:17:19.100 |
|
And in this very near term, even some people are advocating basic income, replace jobs. |
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1:17:19.100 --> 1:17:22.780 |
|
But if the government is going to be willing to just hand out cash to people for doing |
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1:17:22.780 --> 1:17:27.660 |
|
nothing, then one should also seriously consider whether the government should also just hire |
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1:17:27.660 --> 1:17:33.380 |
|
a lot more teachers and nurses and the kind of jobs which people often find great fulfillment |
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1:17:33.380 --> 1:17:34.380 |
|
in doing, right? |
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1:17:34.380 --> 1:17:38.900 |
|
We get very tired of hearing politicians saying, oh, we can't afford hiring more teachers, |
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1:17:38.900 --> 1:17:41.700 |
|
but we're going to maybe have basic income. |
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1:17:41.700 --> 1:17:46.340 |
|
If we can have more serious research and thought into what gives meaning to our lives, the |
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1:17:46.340 --> 1:17:50.700 |
|
jobs give so much more than income, right? |
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1:17:50.700 --> 1:18:00.020 |
|
And then think about, in the future, what are the roles that we want to have people |
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1:18:00.020 --> 1:18:03.180 |
|
continually feeling empowered by machines? |
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1:18:03.180 --> 1:18:08.900 |
|
And I think sort of, I come from the Russia, from the Soviet Union, and I think for a lot |
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1:18:08.900 --> 1:18:14.100 |
|
of people in the 20th century, going to the moon, going to space was an inspiring thing. |
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1:18:14.100 --> 1:18:21.300 |
|
I feel like the universe of the mind, so AI, understanding, creating intelligence is that |
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1:18:21.300 --> 1:18:23.380 |
|
for the 21st century. |
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1:18:23.380 --> 1:18:26.740 |
|
So it's really surprising, and I've heard you mention this, it's really surprising to |
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1:18:26.740 --> 1:18:31.940 |
|
me both on the research funding side that it's not funded as greatly as it could be. |
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1:18:31.940 --> 1:18:36.500 |
|
But most importantly, on the politician side, that it's not part of the public discourse |
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1:18:36.500 --> 1:18:44.300 |
|
except in killer bots, terminator kind of view, that people are not yet, I think, perhaps |
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1:18:44.300 --> 1:18:48.260 |
|
excited by the possible positive future that we can build together. |
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|
1:18:48.260 --> 1:18:54.660 |
|
So we should be, because politicians usually just focus on the next election cycle, right? |
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1:18:54.660 --> 1:18:59.340 |
|
The single most important thing I feel we humans have learned in the entire history of science |
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1:18:59.340 --> 1:19:07.460 |
|
is they were the masters of underestimation, underestimated the size of our cosmos, again |
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1:19:07.460 --> 1:19:11.380 |
|
and again, realizing that everything we thought existed was just a small part of something |
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|
1:19:11.380 --> 1:19:12.380 |
|
grander, right? |
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1:19:12.380 --> 1:19:18.580 |
|
Planet, solar system, the galaxy, clusters of galaxies, the universe. |
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1:19:18.580 --> 1:19:25.700 |
|
And we now know that we have the future has just so much more potential than our ancestors |
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1:19:25.700 --> 1:19:27.820 |
|
could ever have dreamt of. |
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1:19:27.820 --> 1:19:39.820 |
|
This cosmos, imagine if all of Earth was completely devoid of life except for Cambridge, Massachusetts. |
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1:19:39.820 --> 1:19:44.220 |
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Wouldn't it be kind of lame if all we ever aspired to was to stay in Cambridge, Massachusetts |
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forever and then go extinct in one week, even though Earth was going to continue on for |
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longer? |
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1:19:50.660 --> 1:19:57.300 |
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That sort of attitude I think we have now on the cosmic scale, we can, life can flourish |
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on Earth, not for four years, but for billions of years. |
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1:20:00.820 --> 1:20:06.340 |
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I can even tell you about how to move it out of harm's way when the sun gets too hot. |
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1:20:06.340 --> 1:20:11.900 |
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And then we have so much more resources out here, which today, maybe there are a lot of |
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other planets with bacteria or cow like life on them, but most of this, all this opportunity |
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seems as far as we can tell to be largely dead, like the Sahara Desert, and yet we have the |
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opportunity to help life flourish around this for billions of years. |
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1:20:30.380 --> 1:20:37.420 |
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So like, let's quit squabbling about whether some little border should be drawn one mile |
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to the left or right and look up into the skies and realize, hey, we can do such incredible |
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things. |
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Yeah. |
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1:20:45.380 --> 1:20:49.980 |
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And that's I think why it's really exciting that you and others are connected with some |
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of the work Elon Musk is doing because he's literally going out into that space, really |
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exploring our universe. |
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And it's wonderful. |
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1:20:57.260 --> 1:21:02.340 |
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That is exactly why Elon Musk is so misunderstood, right? |
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Misconstrued with some kind of pessimistic doomsayer. |
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1:21:05.300 --> 1:21:10.860 |
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The reason he cares so much about AI safety is because he more than almost anyone else |
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appreciates these amazing opportunities. |
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It will squander if we wipe out here on Earth. |
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We're not just going to wipe out the next generation, but all generations and this incredible |
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opportunity that's out there and that would be really be a waste. |
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1:21:25.580 --> 1:21:32.740 |
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And AI, for people who think that there would be better to do without technology, let me |
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just mention that if we don't improve our technology, the question isn't whether humanity |
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is going to go extinct. |
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1:21:38.740 --> 1:21:43.620 |
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The question is just whether we're going to get taken out by the next big asteroid or |
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the next super volcano or something else dumb that we could easily prevent with more tech, |
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right? |
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If we want life to flourish throughout the cosmos, AI is the key to it. |
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1:21:56.220 --> 1:22:04.780 |
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As I mentioned in a lot of detail in my book, even many of the most inspired sci fi writers |
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I feel have totally underestimated the opportunities for space travel, especially to other galaxies, |
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1:22:11.580 --> 1:22:17.100 |
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because they weren't thinking about the possibility of AGI, which just makes it so much easier. |
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1:22:17.100 --> 1:22:18.100 |
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Right. |
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1:22:18.100 --> 1:22:25.900 |
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Yeah, so that goes to a view of AGI that enables our progress, that enables a better life. |
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1:22:25.900 --> 1:22:30.060 |
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So that's a beautiful way to put it and something to strive for. |
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1:22:30.060 --> 1:22:31.580 |
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So Max, thank you so much. |
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1:22:31.580 --> 1:22:32.580 |
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Thank you for your time today. |
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1:22:32.580 --> 1:22:33.580 |
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It's been awesome. |
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1:22:33.580 --> 1:22:34.580 |
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Thank you so much. |
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1:22:34.580 --> 1:22:35.580 |
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Thanks. |
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1:22:35.580 --> 1:22:36.580 |
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Merci beaucoup. |
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1:22:36.580 --> 1:22:49.100 |
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Thank you so much for your time today and thank you so much for your time and for your |
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time. |
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1:22:50.100 --> 1:22:51.100 |
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Thank you. |
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1:22:51.100 --> 1:22:52.100 |
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Thank you. |
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1:22:52.100 --> 1:22:53.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:53.100 --> 1:22:54.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:54.100 --> 1:22:55.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:55.100 --> 1:22:56.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:56.100 --> 1:22:57.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:57.100 --> 1:22:58.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:58.100 --> 1:22:59.100 |
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Bye. |
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1:22:59.100 --> 1:23:00.100 |
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Bye. |
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