Daily Papers

Maintaining genetic diversity as a means to avoid premature convergence is critical in Genetic Programming. Several approaches have been proposed to achieve this, with some focusing on the mating phase from coupling dissimilar solutions to some form of self-adaptive selection mechanism. In nature, genetic diversity can be the consequence of many different factors, but when considering reproduction Sexual Selection can have an impact on promoting variety within a species. Specifically, Mate Choice often results in different selective pressures between sexes, which in turn may trigger evolutionary differences among them. Although some mechanisms of Sexual Selection have been applied to Genetic Programming in the past, the literature is scarce when it comes to mate choice. Recently, a way of modelling mating preferences by ideal mate representations was proposed, achieving good results when compared to a standard approach. These mating preferences evolve freely in a self-adaptive fashion, creating an evolutionary driving force of its own alongside fitness pressure. The inner mechanisms of this approach operate from personal choice, as each individual has its own representation of a perfect mate which affects the mate to be selected. In this paper, we compare this method against a random mate choice to assess whether there are advantages in evolving personal preferences. We conducted experiments using three symbolic regression problems and different mutation rates. The results show that self-adaptive mating preferences are able to create a more diverse set of solutions when compared to the traditional approach and a random mate approach (with statistically significant differences) and have a higher success rate in three of the six instances tested.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

In this research, we compare four different evaluation methods in coevolution on the Majority Function problem. The size of the problem is selected such that evaluation against all possible test cases is feasible. Two measures are used for the comparisons, i.e., the objective fitness derived from evaluating solutions against all test cases, and the objective fitness correlation (OFC), which is defined as the correlation coefficient between subjective and objective fitness. The results of our experiments suggest that a combination of average score and weighted informativeness may provide a more accurate evaluation in coevolution. In order to confirm this difference, a series of t-tests on the preference between each pair of the evaluation methods is performed. The resulting significance is affirmative, and the tests for two quality measures show similar preference on four evaluation methods. %This study is the first time OFC is actually computed on a real problem. Experiments on Majority Function problems with larger sizes and Parity problems are in progress, and their results will be added in the final version.

Evolvability is an important feature that impacts the ability of evolutionary processes to find interesting novel solutions and to deal with changing conditions of the problem to solve. The estimation of evolvability is not straightforward and is generally too expensive to be directly used as selective pressure in the evolutionary process. Indirectly promoting evolvability as a side effect of other easier and faster to compute selection pressures would thus be advantageous. In an unbounded behavior space, it has already been shown that evolvable individuals naturally appear and tend to be selected as they are more likely to invade empty behavior niches. Evolvability is thus a natural byproduct of the search in this context. However, practical agents and environments often impose limits on the reach-able behavior space. How do these boundaries impact evolvability? In this context, can evolvability still be promoted without explicitly rewarding it? We show that Novelty Search implicitly creates a pressure for high evolvability even in bounded behavior spaces, and explore the reasons for such a behavior. More precisely we show that, throughout the search, the dynamic evaluation of novelty rewards individuals which are very mobile in the behavior space, which in turn promotes evolvability.