Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advances in language generation and understanding but are also prone to exhibiting harmful social biases. While recognition of these behaviors has generated an abundance of bias mitigation techniques, most require modifications to the training data, model parameters, or decoding strategy, which may be infeasible without access to a trainable model. In this work, we leverage the zero-shot capabilities of LLMs to reduce stereotyping in a technique we introduce as zero-shot self-debiasing. With two approaches, self-debiasing via explanation and self-debiasing via reprompting, we show that self-debiasing can significantly reduce the degree of stereotyping across nine different social groups while relying only on the LLM itself and a simple prompt, with explanations correctly identifying invalid assumptions and reprompting delivering the greatest reductions in bias. We hope this work opens inquiry into other zero-shot techniques for bias mitigation.

When trained on large, unfiltered crawls from the internet, language models pick up and reproduce all kinds of undesirable biases that can be found in the data: they often generate racist, sexist, violent or otherwise toxic language. As large models require millions of training examples to achieve good performance, it is difficult to completely prevent them from being exposed to such content. In this paper, we first demonstrate a surprising finding: pretrained language models recognize, to a considerable degree, their undesirable biases and the toxicity of the content they produce. We refer to this capability as self-diagnosis. Based on this finding, we then propose a decoding algorithm that, given only a textual description of the undesired behavior, reduces the probability of a language model producing problematic text. We refer to this approach as self-debiasing. Self-debiasing does not rely on manually curated word lists, nor does it require any training data or changes to the model's parameters. While we by no means eliminate the issue of language models generating biased text, we believe our approach to be an important step in this direction.

Recent work has shown pre-trained language models capture social biases from the large amounts of text they are trained on. This has attracted attention to developing techniques that mitigate such biases. In this work, we perform an empirical survey of five recently proposed bias mitigation techniques: Counterfactual Data Augmentation (CDA), Dropout, Iterative Nullspace Projection, Self-Debias, and SentenceDebias. We quantify the effectiveness of each technique using three intrinsic bias benchmarks while also measuring the impact of these techniques on a model's language modeling ability, as well as its performance on downstream NLU tasks. We experimentally find that: (1) Self-Debias is the strongest debiasing technique, obtaining improved scores on all bias benchmarks; (2) Current debiasing techniques perform less consistently when mitigating non-gender biases; And (3) improvements on bias benchmarks such as StereoSet and CrowS-Pairs by using debiasing strategies are often accompanied by a decrease in language modeling ability, making it difficult to determine whether the bias mitigation was effective.

A prominent technique for self-supervised representation learning has been to contrast semantically similar and dissimilar pairs of samples. Without access to labels, dissimilar (negative) points are typically taken to be randomly sampled datapoints, implicitly accepting that these points may, in reality, actually have the same label. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we observe that sampling negative examples from truly different labels improves performance, in a synthetic setting where labels are available. Motivated by this observation, we develop a debiased contrastive objective that corrects for the sampling of same-label datapoints, even without knowledge of the true labels. Empirically, the proposed objective consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art for representation learning in vision, language, and reinforcement learning benchmarks. Theoretically, we establish generalization bounds for the downstream classification task.

Meta-gradient Reinforcement Learning (RL) allows agents to self-tune their hyper-parameters in an online fashion during training. In this paper, we identify a bias in the meta-gradient of current meta-gradient RL approaches. This bias comes from using the critic that is trained using the meta-learned discount factor for the advantage estimation in the outer objective which requires a different discount factor. Because the meta-learned discount factor is typically lower than the one used in the outer objective, the resulting bias can cause the meta-gradient to favor myopic policies. We propose a simple solution to this issue: we eliminate this bias by using an alternative, outer value function in the estimation of the outer loss. To obtain this outer value function we add a second head to the critic network and train it alongside the classic critic, using the outer loss discount factor. On an illustrative toy problem, we show that the bias can cause catastrophic failure of current meta-gradient RL approaches, and show that our proposed solution fixes it. We then apply our method to a more complex environment and demonstrate that fixing the meta-gradient bias can significantly improve performance.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perpetuate social biases, reflecting prejudices in their training data and reinforcing societal stereotypes and inequalities. Our work explores the potential of the Contact Hypothesis, a concept from social psychology for debiasing LLMs. We simulate various forms of social contact through LLM prompting to measure their influence on the model's biases, mirroring how intergroup interactions can reduce prejudices in social contexts. We create a dataset of 108,000 prompts following a principled approach replicating social contact to measure biases in three LLMs (LLaMA 2, Tulu, and NousHermes) across 13 social bias dimensions. We propose a unique debiasing technique, Social Contact Debiasing (SCD), that instruction-tunes these models with unbiased responses to prompts. Our research demonstrates that LLM responses exhibit social biases when subject to contact probing, but more importantly, these biases can be significantly reduced by up to 40% in 1 epoch of instruction tuning LLaMA 2 following our SCD strategy. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/chahatraj/breakingbias.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.