Daily Papers

Code generation models are not robust to small perturbations, which often lead to incorrect generations and significantly degrade the performance of these models. Although improving the robustness of code generation models is crucial to enhancing user experience in real-world applications, existing research efforts do not address this issue. To fill this gap, we propose CodeFort, a framework to improve the robustness of code generation models, generalizing a large variety of code perturbations to enrich the training data and enabling various robust training strategies, mixing data augmentation, batch augmentation, adversarial logits pairing, and contrastive learning, all carefully designed to support high-throughput training. Extensive evaluations show that we increase the average robust pass rates of baseline CodeGen models from 14.79 to 21.74. We notably decrease the robustness drop rate from 95.02% to 54.95% against code-syntax perturbations.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

This paper proposes a new loss function for adversarial training. Since adversarial training has difficulties, e.g., necessity of high model capacity, focusing on important data points by weighting cross-entropy loss has attracted much attention. However, they are vulnerable to sophisticated attacks, e.g., Auto-Attack. This paper experimentally reveals that the cause of their vulnerability is their small margins between logits for the true label and the other labels. Since neural networks classify the data points based on the logits, logit margins should be large enough to avoid flipping the largest logit by the attacks. Importance-aware methods do not increase logit margins of important samples but decrease those of less-important samples compared with cross-entropy loss. To increase logit margins of important samples, we propose switching one-vs-the-rest loss (SOVR), which switches from cross-entropy to one-vs-the-rest loss for important samples that have small logit margins. We prove that one-vs-the-rest loss increases logit margins two times larger than the weighted cross-entropy loss for a simple problem. We experimentally confirm that SOVR increases logit margins of important samples unlike existing methods and achieves better robustness against Auto-Attack than importance-aware methods.

Leveraging the models' outputs, specifically the logits, is a common approach to estimating the test accuracy of a pre-trained neural network on out-of-distribution (OOD) samples without requiring access to the corresponding ground truth labels. Despite their ease of implementation and computational efficiency, current logit-based methods are vulnerable to overconfidence issues, leading to prediction bias, especially under the natural shift. In this work, we first study the relationship between logits and generalization performance from the view of low-density separation assumption. Our findings motivate our proposed method MaNo which (1) applies a data-dependent normalization on the logits to reduce prediction bias, and (2) takes the L_p norm of the matrix of normalized logits as the estimation score. Our theoretical analysis highlights the connection between the provided score and the model's uncertainty. We conduct an extensive empirical study on common unsupervised accuracy estimation benchmarks and demonstrate that MaNo achieves state-of-the-art performance across various architectures in the presence of synthetic, natural, or subpopulation shifts.

As deep learning models are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, evaluating their vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations is essential for ensuring their reliability and trustworthiness. Over the past decade, a large number of white-box adversarial robustness evaluation methods (i.e., attacks) have been proposed, ranging from single-step to multi-step methods and from individual to ensemble methods. Despite these advances, challenges remain in conducting meaningful and comprehensive robustness evaluations, particularly when it comes to large-scale testing and ensuring evaluations reflect real-world adversarial risks. In this work, we focus on image classification models and propose a novel individual attack method, Probability Margin Attack (PMA), which defines the adversarial margin in the probability space rather than the logits space. We analyze the relationship between PMA and existing cross-entropy or logits-margin-based attacks, and show that PMA can outperform the current state-of-the-art individual methods. Building on PMA, we propose two types of ensemble attacks that balance effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, we create a million-scale dataset, CC1M, derived from the existing CC3M dataset, and use it to conduct the first million-scale white-box adversarial robustness evaluation of adversarially-trained ImageNet models. Our findings provide valuable insights into the robustness gaps between individual versus ensemble attacks and small-scale versus million-scale evaluations.

It is widely recognized that deep learning models lack robustness to adversarial examples. An intriguing property of adversarial examples is that they can transfer across different models, which enables black-box attacks without any knowledge of the victim model. An effective strategy to improve the transferability is attacking an ensemble of models. However, previous works simply average the outputs of different models, lacking an in-depth analysis on how and why model ensemble methods can strongly improve the transferability. In this paper, we rethink the ensemble in adversarial attacks and define the common weakness of model ensemble with two properties: 1) the flatness of loss landscape; and 2) the closeness to the local optimum of each model. We empirically and theoretically show that both properties are strongly correlated with the transferability and propose a Common Weakness Attack (CWA) to generate more transferable adversarial examples by promoting these two properties. Experimental results on both image classification and object detection tasks validate the effectiveness of our approach to improving the adversarial transferability, especially when attacking adversarially trained models. We also successfully apply our method to attack a black-box large vision-language model -- Google's Bard, showing the practical effectiveness. Code is available at https://github.com/huanranchen/AdversarialAttacks.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can bypass their safety guardrails. In many domains, adversarial training has proven to be one of the most promising methods to reliably improve robustness against such attacks. Yet, in the context of LLMs, current methods for adversarial training are hindered by the high computational costs required to perform discrete adversarial attacks at each training iteration. We address this problem by instead calculating adversarial attacks in the continuous embedding space of the LLM, which is orders of magnitudes more efficient. We propose a fast adversarial training algorithm (C-AdvUL) composed of two losses: the first makes the model robust on continuous embedding attacks computed on an adversarial behaviour dataset; the second ensures the usefulness of the final model by fine-tuning on utility data. Moreover, we introduce C-AdvIPO, an adversarial variant of IPO that does not require utility data for adversarially robust alignment. Our empirical evaluation on four models from different families (Gemma, Phi3, Mistral, Zephyr) and at different scales (2B, 3.8B, 7B) shows that both algorithms substantially enhance LLM robustness against discrete attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR), while maintaining utility. Our results demonstrate that robustness to continuous perturbations can extrapolate to discrete threat models. Thereby, we present a path toward scalable adversarial training algorithms for robustly aligning LLMs.

Adversarial robustness often comes at the cost of degraded accuracy, impeding the real-life application of robust classification models. Training-based solutions for better trade-offs are limited by incompatibilities with already-trained high-performance large models, necessitating the exploration of training-free ensemble approaches. Observing that robust models are more confident in correct predictions than in incorrect ones on clean and adversarial data alike, we speculate amplifying this "benign confidence property" can reconcile accuracy and robustness in an ensemble setting. To achieve so, we propose "MixedNUTS", a training-free method where the output logits of a robust classifier and a standard non-robust classifier are processed by nonlinear transformations with only three parameters, which are optimized through an efficient algorithm. MixedNUTS then converts the transformed logits into probabilities and mixes them as the overall output. On CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet datasets, experimental results with custom strong adaptive attacks demonstrate MixedNUTS's vastly improved accuracy and near-SOTA robustness -- it boosts CIFAR-100 clean accuracy by 7.86 points, sacrificing merely 0.87 points in robust accuracy.

In the presence of noisy labels, designing robust loss functions is critical for securing the generalization performance of deep neural networks. Cross Entropy (CE) loss has been shown to be not robust to noisy labels due to its unboundedness. To alleviate this issue, existing works typically design specialized robust losses with the symmetric condition, which usually lead to the underfitting issue. In this paper, our key idea is to induce a loss bound at the logit level, thus universally enhancing the noise robustness of existing losses. Specifically, we propose logit clipping (LogitClip), which clamps the norm of the logit vector to ensure that it is upper bounded by a constant. In this manner, CE loss equipped with our LogitClip method is effectively bounded, mitigating the overfitting to examples with noisy labels. Moreover, we present theoretical analyses to certify the noise-tolerant ability of LogitClip. Extensive experiments show that LogitClip not only significantly improves the noise robustness of CE loss, but also broadly enhances the generalization performance of popular robust losses.

Over-parameterized deep networks trained using gradient-based optimizers are a popular choice for solving classification and ranking problems. Without appropriately tuned ell_2 regularization or weight decay, such networks have the tendency to make output scores (logits) and network weights large, causing training loss to become too small and the network to lose its adaptivity (ability to move around) in the parameter space. Although regularization is typically understood from an overfitting perspective, we highlight its role in making the network more adaptive and enabling it to escape more easily from weights that generalize poorly. To provide such a capability, we propose a method called Logit Attenuating Weight Normalization (LAWN), that can be stacked onto any gradient-based optimizer. LAWN controls the logits by constraining the weight norms of layers in the final homogeneous sub-network. Empirically, we show that the resulting LAWN variant of the optimizer makes a deep network more adaptive to finding minimas with superior generalization performance on large-scale image classification and recommender systems. While LAWN is particularly impressive in improving Adam, it greatly improves all optimizers when used with large batch sizes

Instances-reweighted adversarial training (IRAT) can significantly boost the robustness of trained models, where data being less/more vulnerable to the given attack are assigned smaller/larger weights during training. However, when tested on attacks different from the given attack simulated in training, the robustness may drop significantly (e.g., even worse than no reweighting). In this paper, we study this problem and propose our solution--locally reweighted adversarial training (LRAT). The rationale behind IRAT is that we do not need to pay much attention to an instance that is already safe under the attack. We argue that the safeness should be attack-dependent, so that for the same instance, its weight can change given different attacks based on the same model. Thus, if the attack simulated in training is mis-specified, the weights of IRAT are misleading. To this end, LRAT pairs each instance with its adversarial variants and performs local reweighting inside each pair, while performing no global reweighting--the rationale is to fit the instance itself if it is immune to the attack, but not to skip the pair, in order to passively defend different attacks in future. Experiments show that LRAT works better than both IRAT (i.e., global reweighting) and the standard AT (i.e., no reweighting) when trained with an attack and tested on different attacks.

Reliable deployment of machine learning models such as neural networks continues to be challenging due to several limitations. Some of the main shortcomings are the lack of interpretability and the lack of robustness against adversarial examples or out-of-distribution inputs. In this exploratory review, we explore the possibilities and limits of adversarial attacks for explainable machine learning models. First, we extend the notion of adversarial examples to fit in explainable machine learning scenarios, in which the inputs, the output classifications and the explanations of the model's decisions are assessed by humans. Next, we propose a comprehensive framework to study whether (and how) adversarial examples can be generated for explainable models under human assessment, introducing and illustrating novel attack paradigms. In particular, our framework considers a wide range of relevant yet often ignored factors such as the type of problem, the user expertise or the objective of the explanations, in order to identify the attack strategies that should be adopted in each scenario to successfully deceive the model (and the human). The intention of these contributions is to serve as a basis for a more rigorous and realistic study of adversarial examples in the field of explainable machine learning.

Adversarial examples derived from deliberately crafted perturbations on visual inputs can easily harm decision process of deep neural networks. To prevent potential threats, various adversarial training-based defense methods have grown rapidly and become a de facto standard approach for robustness. Despite recent competitive achievements, we observe that adversarial vulnerability varies across targets and certain vulnerabilities remain prevalent. Intriguingly, such peculiar phenomenon cannot be relieved even with deeper architectures and advanced defense methods. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a causal approach called Adversarial Double Machine Learning (ADML), which allows us to quantify the degree of adversarial vulnerability for network predictions and capture the effect of treatments on outcome of interests. ADML can directly estimate causal parameter of adversarial perturbations per se and mitigate negative effects that can potentially damage robustness, bridging a causal perspective into the adversarial vulnerability. Through extensive experiments on various CNN and Transformer architectures, we corroborate that ADML improves adversarial robustness with large margins and relieve the empirical observation.

Responses generated by neural conversational models tend to lack informativeness and diversity. We present Adversarial Information Maximization (AIM), an adversarial learning strategy that addresses these two related but distinct problems. To foster response diversity, we leverage adversarial training that allows distributional matching of synthetic and real responses. To improve informativeness, our framework explicitly optimizes a variational lower bound on pairwise mutual information between query and response. Empirical results from automatic and human evaluations demonstrate that our methods significantly boost informativeness and diversity.

Recent studies have shown that robustness to adversarial attacks can be transferred across networks. In other words, we can make a weak model more robust with the help of a strong teacher model. We ask if instead of learning from a static teacher, can models "learn together" and "teach each other" to achieve better robustness? In this paper, we study how interactions among models affect robustness via knowledge distillation. We propose mutual adversarial training (MAT), in which multiple models are trained together and share the knowledge of adversarial examples to achieve improved robustness. MAT allows robust models to explore a larger space of adversarial samples, and find more robust feature spaces and decision boundaries. Through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we demonstrate that MAT can effectively improve model robustness and outperform state-of-the-art methods under white-box attacks, bringing sim8% accuracy gain to vanilla adversarial training (AT) under PGD-100 attacks. In addition, we show that MAT can also mitigate the robustness trade-off among different perturbation types, bringing as much as 13.1% accuracy gain to AT baselines against the union of l_infty, l_2 and l_1 attacks. These results show the superiority of the proposed method and demonstrate that collaborative learning is an effective strategy for designing robust models.

In this paper, we propose a feature affinity (FA) assisted knowledge distillation (KD) method to improve quantization-aware training of deep neural networks (DNN). The FA loss on intermediate feature maps of DNNs plays the role of teaching middle steps of a solution to a student instead of only giving final answers in the conventional KD where the loss acts on the network logits at the output level. Combining logit loss and FA loss, we found that the quantized student network receives stronger supervision than from the labeled ground-truth data. The resulting FAQD is capable of compressing model on label-free data, which brings immediate practical benefits as pre-trained teacher models are readily available and unlabeled data are abundant. In contrast, data labeling is often laborious and expensive. Finally, we propose a fast feature affinity (FFA) loss that accurately approximates FA loss with a lower order of computational complexity, which helps speed up training for high resolution image input.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Cross-entropy is a widely used loss function in applications. It coincides with the logistic loss applied to the outputs of a neural network, when the softmax is used. But, what guarantees can we rely on when using cross-entropy as a surrogate loss? We present a theoretical analysis of a broad family of loss functions, comp-sum losses, that includes cross-entropy (or logistic loss), generalized cross-entropy, the mean absolute error and other cross-entropy-like loss functions. We give the first H-consistency bounds for these loss functions. These are non-asymptotic guarantees that upper bound the zero-one loss estimation error in terms of the estimation error of a surrogate loss, for the specific hypothesis set H used. We further show that our bounds are tight. These bounds depend on quantities called minimizability gaps. To make them more explicit, we give a specific analysis of these gaps for comp-sum losses. We also introduce a new family of loss functions, smooth adversarial comp-sum losses, that are derived from their comp-sum counterparts by adding in a related smooth term. We show that these loss functions are beneficial in the adversarial setting by proving that they admit H-consistency bounds. This leads to new adversarial robustness algorithms that consist of minimizing a regularized smooth adversarial comp-sum loss. While our main purpose is a theoretical analysis, we also present an extensive empirical analysis comparing comp-sum losses. We further report the results of a series of experiments demonstrating that our adversarial robustness algorithms outperform the current state-of-the-art, while also achieving a superior non-adversarial accuracy.

Adversarial attacks expose important vulnerabilities of deep learning models, yet little attention has been paid to settings where data arrives as a stream. In this paper, we formalize the online adversarial attack problem, emphasizing two key elements found in real-world use-cases: attackers must operate under partial knowledge of the target model, and the decisions made by the attacker are irrevocable since they operate on a transient data stream. We first rigorously analyze a deterministic variant of the online threat model by drawing parallels to the well-studied k-secretary problem in theoretical computer science and propose Virtual+, a simple yet practical online algorithm. Our main theoretical result shows Virtual+ yields provably the best competitive ratio over all single-threshold algorithms for k<5 -- extending the previous analysis of the k-secretary problem. We also introduce the stochastic k-secretary -- effectively reducing online blackbox transfer attacks to a k-secretary problem under noise -- and prove theoretical bounds on the performance of Virtual+ adapted to this setting. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by conducting experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Imagenet classifiers, revealing the necessity of online algorithms in achieving near-optimal performance and also the rich interplay between attack strategies and online attack selection, enabling simple strategies like FGSM to outperform stronger adversaries.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Traditional knowledge distillation focuses on aligning the student's predicted probabilities with both ground-truth labels and the teacher's predicted probabilities. However, the transition to predicted probabilities from logits would obscure certain indispensable information. To address this issue, it is intuitive to additionally introduce a logit-level loss function as a supplement to the widely used probability-level loss function, for exploiting the latent information of logits. Unfortunately, we empirically find that the amalgamation of the newly introduced logit-level loss and the previous probability-level loss will lead to performance degeneration, even trailing behind the performance of employing either loss in isolation. We attribute this phenomenon to the collapse of the classification head, which is verified by our theoretical analysis based on the neural collapse theory. Specifically, the gradients of the two loss functions exhibit contradictions in the linear classifier yet display no such conflict within the backbone. Drawing from the theoretical analysis, we propose a novel method called dual-head knowledge distillation, which partitions the linear classifier into two classification heads responsible for different losses, thereby preserving the beneficial effects of both losses on the backbone while eliminating adverse influences on the classification head. Extensive experiments validate that our method can effectively exploit the information inside the logits and achieve superior performance against state-of-the-art counterparts.

Adversarial training, which is to enhance robustness against adversarial attacks, has received much attention because it is easy to generate human-imperceptible perturbations of data to deceive a given deep neural network. In this paper, we propose a new adversarial training algorithm that is theoretically well motivated and empirically superior to other existing algorithms. A novel feature of the proposed algorithm is to apply more regularization to data vulnerable to adversarial attacks than other existing regularization algorithms do. Theoretically, we show that our algorithm can be understood as an algorithm of minimizing the regularized empirical risk motivated from a newly derived upper bound of the robust risk. Numerical experiments illustrate that our proposed algorithm improves the generalization (accuracy on examples) and robustness (accuracy on adversarial attacks) simultaneously to achieve the state-of-the-art performance.

Recent works have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that find samples close to the original image but can make the model misclassify. Even with access only to the model's output, an attacker can employ black-box attacks to generate such adversarial examples. In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight defense against black-box attacks by adding random noise to hidden features at intermediate layers of the model at inference time. Our theoretical analysis confirms that this method effectively enhances the model's resilience against both score-based and decision-based black-box attacks. Importantly, our defense does not necessitate adversarial training and has minimal impact on accuracy, rendering it applicable to any pre-trained model. Our analysis also reveals the significance of selectively adding noise to different parts of the model based on the gradient of the adversarial objective function, which can be varied during the attack. We demonstrate the robustness of our defense against multiple black-box attacks through extensive empirical experiments involving diverse models with various architectures.

Recent work has developed optimization procedures to find token sequences, called adversarial triggers, which can elicit unsafe responses from aligned language models. These triggers are believed to be universally transferable, i.e., a trigger optimized on one model can jailbreak other models. In this paper, we concretely show that such adversarial triggers are not universal. We extensively investigate trigger transfer amongst 13 open models and observe inconsistent transfer. Our experiments further reveal a significant difference in robustness to adversarial triggers between models Aligned by Preference Optimization (APO) and models Aligned by Fine-Tuning (AFT). We find that APO models are extremely hard to jailbreak even when the trigger is optimized directly on the model. On the other hand, while AFT models may appear safe on the surface, exhibiting refusals to a range of unsafe instructions, we show that they are highly susceptible to adversarial triggers. Lastly, we observe that most triggers optimized on AFT models also generalize to new unsafe instructions from five diverse domains, further emphasizing their vulnerability. Overall, our work highlights the need for more comprehensive safety evaluations for aligned language models.

The use of deep neural networks in real-world applications require well-calibrated networks with confidence scores that accurately reflect the actual probability. However, it has been found that these networks often provide over-confident predictions, which leads to poor calibration. Recent efforts have sought to address this issue by focal loss to reduce over-confidence, but this approach can also lead to under-confident predictions. While different variants of focal loss have been explored, it is difficult to find a balance between over-confidence and under-confidence. In our work, we propose a new loss function by focusing on dual logits. Our method not only considers the ground truth logit, but also take into account the highest logit ranked after the ground truth logit. By maximizing the gap between these two logits, our proposed dual focal loss can achieve a better balance between over-confidence and under-confidence. We provide theoretical evidence to support our approach and demonstrate its effectiveness through evaluations on multiple models and datasets, where it achieves state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at https://github.com/Linwei94/DualFocalLoss

We study a family of adversarial multiclass classification problems and provide equivalent reformulations in terms of: 1) a family of generalized barycenter problems introduced in the paper and 2) a family of multimarginal optimal transport problems where the number of marginals is equal to the number of classes in the original classification problem. These new theoretical results reveal a rich geometric structure of adversarial learning problems in multiclass classification and extend recent results restricted to the binary classification setting. A direct computational implication of our results is that by solving either the barycenter problem and its dual, or the MOT problem and its dual, we can recover the optimal robust classification rule and the optimal adversarial strategy for the original adversarial problem. Examples with synthetic and real data illustrate our results.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

It is becoming increasingly clear that many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In attempting to explain the origin of adversarial examples, previous studies have typically focused on the fact that neural networks operate on high dimensional data, they overfit, or they are too linear. Here we argue that the origin of adversarial examples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neural networks have about their predictions. We show that the functional form of this uncertainty is independent of architecture, dataset, and training protocol; and depends only on the statistics of the logit differences of the network, which do not change significantly during training. This leads to adversarial error having a universal scaling, as a power-law, with respect to the size of the adversarial perturbation. We show that this universality holds for a broad range of datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet, and random data), models (including state-of-the-art deep networks, linear models, adversarially trained networks, and networks trained on randomly shuffled labels), and attacks (FGSM, step l.l., PGD). Motivated by these results, we study the effects of reducing prediction entropy on adversarial robustness. Finally, we study the effect of network architectures on adversarial sensitivity. To do this, we use neural architecture search with reinforcement learning to find adversarially robust architectures on CIFAR10. Our resulting architecture is more robust to white and black box attacks compared to previous attempts.

Deep learning models are susceptible to adversarial samples in white and black-box environments. Although previous studies have shown high attack success rates, coupling DNN models with interpretation models could offer a sense of security when a human expert is involved, who can identify whether a given sample is benign or malicious. However, in white-box environments, interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes) have been shown to be vulnerable to malicious manipulations. In black-box settings, as access to the components of IDLSes is limited, it becomes more challenging for the adversary to fool the system. In this work, we propose a Query-efficient Score-based black-box attack against IDLSes, QuScore, which requires no knowledge of the target model and its coupled interpretation model. QuScore is based on transfer-based and score-based methods by employing an effective microbial genetic algorithm. Our method is designed to reduce the number of queries necessary to carry out successful attacks, resulting in a more efficient process. By continuously refining the adversarial samples created based on feedback scores from the IDLS, our approach effectively navigates the search space to identify perturbations that can fool the system. We evaluate the attack's effectiveness on four CNN models (Inception, ResNet, VGG, DenseNet) and two interpretation models (CAM, Grad), using both ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our results show that the proposed approach is query-efficient with a high attack success rate that can reach between 95% and 100% and transferability with an average success rate of 69% in the ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our attack method generates adversarial examples with attribution maps that resemble benign samples. We have also demonstrated that our attack is resilient against various preprocessing defense techniques and can easily be transferred to different DNN models.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Discovering the existence of universal adversarial perturbations had large theoretical and practical impacts on the field of adversarial learning. In the text domain, most universal studies focused on adversarial prefixes which are added to all texts. However, unlike the vision domain, adding the same perturbation to different inputs results in noticeably unnatural inputs. Therefore, we introduce a new universal adversarial setup - a universal adversarial policy, which has many advantages of other universal attacks but also results in valid texts - thus making it relevant in practice. We achieve this by learning a single search policy over a predefined set of semantics preserving text alterations, on many texts. This formulation is universal in that the policy is successful in finding adversarial examples on new texts efficiently. Our approach uses text perturbations which were extensively shown to produce natural attacks in the non-universal setup (specific synonym replacements). We suggest a strong baseline approach for this formulation which uses reinforcement learning. It's ability to generalise (from as few as 500 training texts) shows that universal adversarial patterns exist in the text domain as well.

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Current attack methods are able to manipulate the network's prediction by adding specific but small amounts of noise to the input. In turn, adversarial training (AT) aims to achieve robustness against such attacks and ideally a better model generalization ability by including adversarial samples in the trainingset. However, an in-depth analysis of the resulting robust models beyond adversarial robustness is still pending. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions, even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences. Data & Project website: https://github.com/GeJulia/robustness_confidences_evaluation

Recent research finds CNN models for image classification demonstrate overlapped adversarial vulnerabilities: adversarial attacks can mislead CNN models with small perturbations, which can effectively transfer between different models trained on the same dataset. Adversarial training, as a general robustness improvement technique, eliminates the vulnerability in a single model by forcing it to learn robust features. The process is hard, often requires models with large capacity, and suffers from significant loss on clean data accuracy. Alternatively, ensemble methods are proposed to induce sub-models with diverse outputs against a transfer adversarial example, making the ensemble robust against transfer attacks even if each sub-model is individually non-robust. Only small clean accuracy drop is observed in the process. However, previous ensemble training methods are not efficacious in inducing such diversity and thus ineffective on reaching robust ensemble. We propose DVERGE, which isolates the adversarial vulnerability in each sub-model by distilling non-robust features, and diversifies the adversarial vulnerability to induce diverse outputs against a transfer attack. The novel diversity metric and training procedure enables DVERGE to achieve higher robustness against transfer attacks comparing to previous ensemble methods, and enables the improved robustness when more sub-models are added to the ensemble. The code of this work is available at https://github.com/zjysteven/DVERGE

Single-step adversarial training (SSAT) has demonstrated the potential to achieve both efficiency and robustness. However, SSAT suffers from catastrophic overfitting (CO), a phenomenon that leads to a severely distorted classifier, making it vulnerable to multi-step adversarial attacks. In this work, we observe that some adversarial examples generated on the SSAT-trained network exhibit anomalous behaviour, that is, although these training samples are generated by the inner maximization process, their associated loss decreases instead, which we named abnormal adversarial examples (AAEs). Upon further analysis, we discover a close relationship between AAEs and classifier distortion, as both the number and outputs of AAEs undergo a significant variation with the onset of CO. Given this observation, we re-examine the SSAT process and uncover that before the occurrence of CO, the classifier already displayed a slight distortion, indicated by the presence of few AAEs. Furthermore, the classifier directly optimizing these AAEs will accelerate its distortion, and correspondingly, the variation of AAEs will sharply increase as a result. In such a vicious circle, the classifier rapidly becomes highly distorted and manifests as CO within a few iterations. These observations motivate us to eliminate CO by hindering the generation of AAEs. Specifically, we design a novel method, termed Abnormal Adversarial Examples Regularization (AAER), which explicitly regularizes the variation of AAEs to hinder the classifier from becoming distorted. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can effectively eliminate CO and further boost adversarial robustness with negligible additional computational overhead.

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

We propose a new framework for estimating generative models via an adversarial process, in which we simultaneously train two models: a generative model G that captures the data distribution, and a discriminative model D that estimates the probability that a sample came from the training data rather than G. The training procedure for G is to maximize the probability of D making a mistake. This framework corresponds to a minimax two-player game. In the space of arbitrary functions G and D, a unique solution exists, with G recovering the training data distribution and D equal to 1/2 everywhere. In the case where G and D are defined by multilayer perceptrons, the entire system can be trained with backpropagation. There is no need for any Markov chains or unrolled approximate inference networks during either training or generation of samples. Experiments demonstrate the potential of the framework through qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the generated samples.

In this work, we leverage visual prompting (VP) to improve adversarial robustness of a fixed, pre-trained model at testing time. Compared to conventional adversarial defenses, VP allows us to design universal (i.e., data-agnostic) input prompting templates, which have plug-and-play capabilities at testing time to achieve desired model performance without introducing much computation overhead. Although VP has been successfully applied to improving model generalization, it remains elusive whether and how it can be used to defend against adversarial attacks. We investigate this problem and show that the vanilla VP approach is not effective in adversarial defense since a universal input prompt lacks the capacity for robust learning against sample-specific adversarial perturbations. To circumvent it, we propose a new VP method, termed Class-wise Adversarial Visual Prompting (C-AVP), to generate class-wise visual prompts so as to not only leverage the strengths of ensemble prompts but also optimize their interrelations to improve model robustness. Our experiments show that C-AVP outperforms the conventional VP method, with 2.1X standard accuracy gain and 2X robust accuracy gain. Compared to classical test-time defenses, C-AVP also yields a 42X inference time speedup.

It is not fully understood why adversarial examples can deceive neural networks and transfer between different networks. To elucidate this, several studies have hypothesized that adversarial perturbations, while appearing as noises, contain class features. This is supported by empirical evidence showing that networks trained on mislabeled adversarial examples can still generalize well to correctly labeled test samples. However, a theoretical understanding of how perturbations include class features and contribute to generalization is limited. In this study, we provide a theoretical framework for understanding learning from perturbations using a one-hidden-layer network trained on mutually orthogonal samples. Our results highlight that various adversarial perturbations, even perturbations of a few pixels, contain sufficient class features for generalization. Moreover, we reveal that the decision boundary when learning from perturbations matches that from standard samples except for specific regions under mild conditions. The code is available at https://github.com/s-kumano/learning-from-adversarial-perturbations.

We propose transferability from Large Geometric Vicinity (LGV), a new technique to increase the transferability of black-box adversarial attacks. LGV starts from a pretrained surrogate model and collects multiple weight sets from a few additional training epochs with a constant and high learning rate. LGV exploits two geometric properties that we relate to transferability. First, models that belong to a wider weight optimum are better surrogates. Second, we identify a subspace able to generate an effective surrogate ensemble among this wider optimum. Through extensive experiments, we show that LGV alone outperforms all (combinations of) four established test-time transformations by 1.8 to 59.9 percentage points. Our findings shed new light on the importance of the geometry of the weight space to explain the transferability of adversarial examples.

Several machine learning models, including neural networks, consistently misclassify adversarial examples---inputs formed by applying small but intentionally worst-case perturbations to examples from the dataset, such that the perturbed input results in the model outputting an incorrect answer with high confidence. Early attempts at explaining this phenomenon focused on nonlinearity and overfitting. We argue instead that the primary cause of neural networks' vulnerability to adversarial perturbation is their linear nature. This explanation is supported by new quantitative results while giving the first explanation of the most intriguing fact about them: their generalization across architectures and training sets. Moreover, this view yields a simple and fast method of generating adversarial examples. Using this approach to provide examples for adversarial training, we reduce the test set error of a maxout network on the MNIST dataset.

It is well known that natural language models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are mostly input-specific in nature. Recently, it has been shown that there also exist input-agnostic attacks in NLP models, called universal adversarial triggers. However, existing methods to craft universal triggers are data intensive. They require large amounts of data samples to generate adversarial triggers, which are typically inaccessible by attackers. For instance, previous works take 3000 data samples per class for the SNLI dataset to generate adversarial triggers. In this paper, we present a novel data-free approach, MINIMAL, to mine input-agnostic adversarial triggers from models. Using the triggers produced with our data-free algorithm, we reduce the accuracy of Stanford Sentiment Treebank's positive class from 93.6% to 9.6%. Similarly, for the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI), our single-word trigger reduces the accuracy of the entailment class from 90.95% to less than 0.6\%. Despite being completely data-free, we get equivalent accuracy drops as data-dependent methods.

Despite the improved accuracy of deep neural networks, the discovery of adversarial examples has raised serious safety concerns. Most existing approaches for crafting adversarial examples necessitate some knowledge (architecture, parameters, etc.) of the network at hand. In this paper, we focus on image classifiers and propose a feature-guided black-box approach to test the safety of deep neural networks that requires no such knowledge. Our algorithm employs object detection techniques such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) to extract features from an image. These features are converted into a mutable saliency distribution, where high probability is assigned to pixels that affect the composition of the image with respect to the human visual system. We formulate the crafting of adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based stochastic game, where the first player's objective is to minimise the distance to an adversarial example by manipulating the features, and the second player can be cooperative, adversarial, or random. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can con- verge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally minimal adversarial image. For Lipschitz networks, we also identify conditions that provide safety guarantees that no adversarial examples exist. Using Monte Carlo tree search we gradually explore the game state space to search for adversarial examples. Our experiments show that, despite the black-box setting, manipulations guided by a perception-based saliency distribution are competitive with state-of-the-art methods that rely on white-box saliency matrices or sophisticated optimization procedures. Finally, we show how our method can be used to evaluate robustness of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars.

One prominent approach toward resolving the adversarial vulnerability of deep neural networks is the two-player zero-sum paradigm of adversarial training, in which predictors are trained against adversarially chosen perturbations of data. Despite the promise of this approach, algorithms based on this paradigm have not engendered sufficient levels of robustness and suffer from pathological behavior like robust overfitting. To understand this shortcoming, we first show that the commonly used surrogate-based relaxation used in adversarial training algorithms voids all guarantees on the robustness of trained classifiers. The identification of this pitfall informs a novel non-zero-sum bilevel formulation of adversarial training, wherein each player optimizes a different objective function. Our formulation yields a simple algorithmic framework that matches and in some cases outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, attains comparable levels of robustness to standard adversarial training algorithms, and does not suffer from robust overfitting.

In order to train networks for verified adversarial robustness, it is common to over-approximate the worst-case loss over perturbation regions, resulting in networks that attain verifiability at the expense of standard performance. As shown in recent work, better trade-offs between accuracy and robustness can be obtained by carefully coupling adversarial training with over-approximations. We hypothesize that the expressivity of a loss function, which we formalize as the ability to span a range of trade-offs between lower and upper bounds to the worst-case loss through a single parameter (the over-approximation coefficient), is key to attaining state-of-the-art performance. To support our hypothesis, we show that trivial expressive losses, obtained via convex combinations between adversarial attacks and IBP bounds, yield state-of-the-art results across a variety of settings in spite of their conceptual simplicity. We provide a detailed analysis of the relationship between the over-approximation coefficient and performance profiles across different expressive losses, showing that, while expressivity is essential, better approximations of the worst-case loss are not necessarily linked to superior robustness-accuracy trade-offs.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent across many real-world applications, understanding and enhancing their robustness to user inputs is of paramount importance. Existing methods for identifying adversarial prompts tend to focus on specific domains, lack diversity, or require extensive human annotations. To address these limitations, we present Rainbow Teaming, a novel approach for producing a diverse collection of adversarial prompts. Rainbow Teaming casts adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity problem, and uses open-ended search to generate prompts that are both effective and diverse. It can uncover a model's vulnerabilities across a broad range of domains including, in this paper, safety, question answering, and cybersecurity. We also demonstrate that fine-tuning on synthetic data generated by Rainbow Teaming improves the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs without hurting their general capabilities and helpfulness, paving the path to open-ended self-improvement.

Neural text ranking models have witnessed significant advancement and are increasingly being deployed in practice. Unfortunately, they also inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural models, which have been detected but remain underexplored by prior studies. Moreover, the inherit adversarial vulnerabilities might be leveraged by blackhat SEO to defeat better-protected search engines. In this study, we propose an imitation adversarial attack on black-box neural passage ranking models. We first show that the target passage ranking model can be transparentized and imitated by enumerating critical queries/candidates and then train a ranking imitation model. Leveraging the ranking imitation model, we can elaborately manipulate the ranking results and transfer the manipulation attack to the target ranking model. For this purpose, we propose an innovative gradient-based attack method, empowered by the pairwise objective function, to generate adversarial triggers, which causes premeditated disorderliness with very few tokens. To equip the trigger camouflages, we add the next sentence prediction loss and the language model fluency constraint to the objective function. Experimental results on passage ranking demonstrate the effectiveness of the ranking imitation attack model and adversarial triggers against various SOTA neural ranking models. Furthermore, various mitigation analyses and human evaluation show the effectiveness of camouflages when facing potential mitigation approaches. To motivate other scholars to further investigate this novel and important problem, we make the experiment data and code publicly available.

In node classification using graph neural networks (GNNs), a typical model generates logits for different class labels at each node. A softmax layer often outputs a label prediction based on the largest logit. We demonstrate that it is possible to infer hidden graph structural information from the dataset using these logits. We introduce the key notion of label non-uniformity, which is derived from the Wasserstein distance between the softmax distribution of the logits and the uniform distribution. We demonstrate that nodes with small label non-uniformity are harder to classify correctly. We theoretically analyze how the label non-uniformity varies across the graph, which provides insights into boosting the model performance: increasing training samples with high non-uniformity or dropping edges to reduce the maximal cut size of the node set of small non-uniformity. These mechanisms can be easily added to a base GNN model. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves the performance of many benchmark base models.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models have shown vulnerability to adversarial examples in multimodal tasks. Furthermore, malicious adversaries can be deliberately transferred to attack other black-box models. However, existing work has mainly focused on investigating white-box attacks. In this paper, we present the first study to investigate the adversarial transferability of recent VLP models. We observe that existing methods exhibit much lower transferability, compared to the strong attack performance in white-box settings. The transferability degradation is partly caused by the under-utilization of cross-modal interactions. Particularly, unlike unimodal learning, VLP models rely heavily on cross-modal interactions and the multimodal alignments are many-to-many, e.g., an image can be described in various natural languages. To this end, we propose a highly transferable Set-level Guidance Attack (SGA) that thoroughly leverages modality interactions and incorporates alignment-preserving augmentation with cross-modal guidance. Experimental results demonstrate that SGA could generate adversarial examples that can strongly transfer across different VLP models on multiple downstream vision-language tasks. On image-text retrieval, SGA significantly enhances the attack success rate for transfer attacks from ALBEF to TCL by a large margin (at least 9.78% and up to 30.21%), compared to the state-of-the-art.

Adversarial examples pose a significant challenge to the robustness, reliability and alignment of deep neural networks. We propose a novel, easy-to-use approach to achieving high-quality representations that lead to adversarial robustness through the use of multi-resolution input representations and dynamic self-ensembling of intermediate layer predictions. We demonstrate that intermediate layer predictions exhibit inherent robustness to adversarial attacks crafted to fool the full classifier, and propose a robust aggregation mechanism based on Vickrey auction that we call CrossMax to dynamically ensemble them. By combining multi-resolution inputs and robust ensembling, we achieve significant adversarial robustness on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets without any adversarial training or extra data, reaching an adversarial accuracy of approx72% (CIFAR-10) and approx48% (CIFAR-100) on the RobustBench AutoAttack suite (L_infty=8/255) with a finetuned ImageNet-pretrained ResNet152. This represents a result comparable with the top three models on CIFAR-10 and a +5 % gain compared to the best current dedicated approach on CIFAR-100. Adding simple adversarial training on top, we get approx78% on CIFAR-10 and approx51% on CIFAR-100, improving SOTA by 5 % and 9 % respectively and seeing greater gains on the harder dataset. We validate our approach through extensive experiments and provide insights into the interplay between adversarial robustness, and the hierarchical nature of deep representations. We show that simple gradient-based attacks against our model lead to human-interpretable images of the target classes as well as interpretable image changes. As a byproduct, using our multi-resolution prior, we turn pre-trained classifiers and CLIP models into controllable image generators and develop successful transferable attacks on large vision language models.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have attracted considerable attention in information retrieval. Unfortunately, NRMs may inherit the adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural networks, which might be leveraged by black-hat search engine optimization practitioners. Recently, adversarial attacks against NRMs have been explored in the paired attack setting, generating an adversarial perturbation to a target document for a specific query. In this paper, we focus on a more general type of perturbation and introduce the topic-oriented adversarial ranking attack task against NRMs, which aims to find an imperceptible perturbation that can promote a target document in ranking for a group of queries with the same topic. We define both static and dynamic settings for the task and focus on decision-based black-box attacks. We propose a novel framework to improve topic-oriented attack performance based on a surrogate ranking model. The attack problem is formalized as a Markov decision process (MDP) and addressed using reinforcement learning. Specifically, a topic-oriented reward function guides the policy to find a successful adversarial example that can be promoted in rankings to as many queries as possible in a group. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework can significantly outperform existing attack strategies, and we conclude by re-iterating that there exist potential risks for applying NRMs in the real world.

Deep neural networks have been shown to suffer from a surprising weakness: their classification outputs can be changed by small, non-random perturbations of their inputs. This adversarial example phenomenon has been explained as originating from deep networks being "too linear" (Goodfellow et al., 2014). We show here that the linear explanation of adversarial examples presents a number of limitations: the formal argument is not convincing, linear classifiers do not always suffer from the phenomenon, and when they do their adversarial examples are different from the ones affecting deep networks. We propose a new perspective on the phenomenon. We argue that adversarial examples exist when the classification boundary lies close to the submanifold of sampled data, and present a mathematical analysis of this new perspective in the linear case. We define the notion of adversarial strength and show that it can be reduced to the deviation angle between the classifier considered and the nearest centroid classifier. Then, we show that the adversarial strength can be made arbitrarily high independently of the classification performance due to a mechanism that we call boundary tilting. This result leads us to defining a new taxonomy of adversarial examples. Finally, we show that the adversarial strength observed in practice is directly dependent on the level of regularisation used and the strongest adversarial examples, symptomatic of overfitting, can be avoided by using a proper level of regularisation.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs), designed to interpret and respond to human instructions, occasionally generate hallucinated or harmful content due to inappropriate instructions. This study uses linear probing to shed light on the hidden knowledge at the output layer of LVLMs. We demonstrate that the logit distributions of the first tokens contain sufficient information to determine whether to respond to the instructions, including recognizing unanswerable visual questions, defending against multi-modal jailbreaking attack, and identifying deceptive questions. Such hidden knowledge is gradually lost in logits of subsequent tokens during response generation. Then, we illustrate a simple decoding strategy at the generation of the first token, effectively improving the generated content. In experiments, we find a few interesting insights: First, the CLIP model already contains a strong signal for solving these tasks, indicating potential bias in the existing datasets. Second, we observe performance improvement by utilizing the first logit distributions on three additional tasks, including indicting uncertainty in math solving, mitigating hallucination, and image classification. Last, with the same training data, simply finetuning LVLMs improve models' performance but is still inferior to linear probing on these tasks.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

Convolutional Neural Networks have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are known to locate in subspaces close to where normal data lies but are not naturally occurring and of low probability. In this work, we investigate the potential effect defense techniques have on the geometry of the likelihood landscape - likelihood of the input images under the trained model. We first propose a way to visualize the likelihood landscape leveraging an energy-based model interpretation of discriminative classifiers. Then we introduce a measure to quantify the flatness of the likelihood landscape. We observe that a subset of adversarial defense techniques results in a similar effect of flattening the likelihood landscape. We further explore directly regularizing towards a flat landscape for adversarial robustness.

The phenomenon of adversarial examples illustrates one of the most basic vulnerabilities of deep neural networks. Among the variety of techniques introduced to surmount this inherent weakness, adversarial training has emerged as the most effective strategy for learning robust models. Typically, this is achieved by balancing robust and natural objectives. In this work, we aim to further optimize the trade-off between robust and standard accuracy by enforcing a domain-invariant feature representation. We present a new adversarial training method, Domain Invariant Adversarial Learning (DIAL), which learns a feature representation that is both robust and domain invariant. DIAL uses a variant of Domain Adversarial Neural Network (DANN) on the natural domain and its corresponding adversarial domain. In the case where the source domain consists of natural examples and the target domain is the adversarially perturbed examples, our method learns a feature representation constrained not to discriminate between the natural and adversarial examples, and can therefore achieve a more robust representation. DIAL is a generic and modular technique that can be easily incorporated into any adversarial training method. Our experiments indicate that incorporating DIAL in the adversarial training process improves both robustness and standard accuracy.

In today's era, where large language models (LLMs) are integrated into numerous real-world applications, ensuring their safety and robustness is crucial for responsible AI usage. Automated red-teaming methods play a key role in this process by generating adversarial attacks to identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities in these models. However, existing methods often struggle with slow performance, limited categorical diversity, and high resource demands. While Rainbow Teaming, a recent approach, addresses the diversity challenge by framing adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity search, it remains slow and requires a large fine-tuned mutator for optimal performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose Ferret, a novel approach that builds upon Rainbow Teaming by generating multiple adversarial prompt mutations per iteration and using a scoring function to rank and select the most effective adversarial prompt. We explore various scoring functions, including reward models, Llama Guard, and LLM-as-a-judge, to rank adversarial mutations based on their potential harm to improve the efficiency of the search for harmful mutations. Our results demonstrate that Ferret, utilizing a reward model as a scoring function, improves the overall attack success rate (ASR) to 95%, which is 46% higher than Rainbow Teaming. Additionally, Ferret reduces the time needed to achieve a 90% ASR by 15.2% compared to the baseline and generates adversarial prompts that are transferable i.e. effective on other LLMs of larger size. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/ferret.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

Large-scale pre-trained language models have achieved tremendous success across a wide range of natural language understanding (NLU) tasks, even surpassing human performance. However, recent studies reveal that the robustness of these models can be challenged by carefully crafted textual adversarial examples. While several individual datasets have been proposed to evaluate model robustness, a principled and comprehensive benchmark is still missing. In this paper, we present Adversarial GLUE (AdvGLUE), a new multi-task benchmark to quantitatively and thoroughly explore and evaluate the vulnerabilities of modern large-scale language models under various types of adversarial attacks. In particular, we systematically apply 14 textual adversarial attack methods to GLUE tasks to construct AdvGLUE, which is further validated by humans for reliable annotations. Our findings are summarized as follows. (i) Most existing adversarial attack algorithms are prone to generating invalid or ambiguous adversarial examples, with around 90% of them either changing the original semantic meanings or misleading human annotators as well. Therefore, we perform a careful filtering process to curate a high-quality benchmark. (ii) All the language models and robust training methods we tested perform poorly on AdvGLUE, with scores lagging far behind the benign accuracy. We hope our work will motivate the development of new adversarial attacks that are more stealthy and semantic-preserving, as well as new robust language models against sophisticated adversarial attacks. AdvGLUE is available at https://adversarialglue.github.io.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

In knowledge distillation literature, feature-based methods have dominated due to their ability to effectively tap into extensive teacher models. In contrast, logit-based approaches, which aim to distill `dark knowledge' from teachers, typically exhibit inferior performance compared to feature-based methods. To bridge this gap, we present LumiNet, a novel knowledge distillation algorithm designed to enhance logit-based distillation. We introduce the concept of 'perception', aiming to calibrate logits based on the model's representation capability. This concept addresses overconfidence issues in logit-based distillation method while also introducing a novel method to distill knowledge from the teacher. It reconstructs the logits of a sample/instances by considering relationships with other samples in the batch. LumiNet excels on benchmarks like CIFAR-100, ImageNet, and MSCOCO, outperforming leading feature-based methods, e.g., compared to KD with ResNet18 and MobileNetV2 on ImageNet, it shows improvements of 1.5% and 2.05%, respectively.

The origin of adversarial examples is still inexplicable in research fields, and it arouses arguments from various viewpoints, albeit comprehensive investigations. In this paper, we propose a way of delving into the unexpected vulnerability in adversarially trained networks from a causal perspective, namely adversarial instrumental variable (IV) regression. By deploying it, we estimate the causal relation of adversarial prediction under an unbiased environment dissociated from unknown confounders. Our approach aims to demystify inherent causal features on adversarial examples by leveraging a zero-sum optimization game between a casual feature estimator (i.e., hypothesis model) and worst-case counterfactuals (i.e., test function) disturbing to find causal features. Through extensive analyses, we demonstrate that the estimated causal features are highly related to the correct prediction for adversarial robustness, and the counterfactuals exhibit extreme features significantly deviating from the correct prediction. In addition, we present how to effectively inoculate CAusal FEatures (CAFE) into defense networks for improving adversarial robustness.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

While the transferability property of adversarial examples allows the adversary to perform black-box attacks (i.e., the attacker has no knowledge about the target model), the transfer-based adversarial attacks have gained great attention. Previous works mostly study gradient variation or image transformations to amplify the distortion on critical parts of inputs. These methods can work on transferring across models with limited differences, i.e., from CNNs to CNNs, but always fail in transferring across models with wide differences, such as from CNNs to ViTs. Alternatively, model ensemble adversarial attacks are proposed to fuse outputs from surrogate models with diverse architectures to get an ensemble loss, making the generated adversarial example more likely to transfer to other models as it can fool multiple models concurrently. However, existing ensemble attacks simply fuse the outputs of the surrogate models evenly, thus are not efficacious to capture and amplify the intrinsic transfer information of adversarial examples. In this paper, we propose an adaptive ensemble attack, dubbed AdaEA, to adaptively control the fusion of the outputs from each model, via monitoring the discrepancy ratio of their contributions towards the adversarial objective. Furthermore, an extra disparity-reduced filter is introduced to further synchronize the update direction. As a result, we achieve considerable improvement over the existing ensemble attacks on various datasets, and the proposed AdaEA can also boost existing transfer-based attacks, which further demonstrates its efficacy and versatility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at various tasks, including solving math word problems (MWPs), but struggle with real-world problems containing irrelevant information. To address this, we propose a prompting framework that generates adversarial variants of MWPs by adding irrelevant variables. We introduce a dataset, ProbleMATHIC, containing both adversarial and non-adversarial MWPs. Our experiments reveal that LLMs are susceptible to distraction by numerical noise, resulting in an average relative performance drop of ~26% on adversarial MWPs. To mitigate this, we fine-tune LLMs (Llama-2, Mistral) on the adversarial samples from our dataset. Fine-tuning on adversarial training instances improves performance on adversarial MWPs by ~8%, indicating increased robustness to noise and better ability to identify relevant data for reasoning. Finally, to assess the generalizability of our prompting framework, we introduce GSM-8K-Adv, an adversarial variant of the GSM-8K benchmark. LLMs continue to struggle when faced with adversarial information, reducing performance by up to ~6%.

In recent years, neural networks have become the default choice for image classification and many other learning tasks, even though they are vulnerable to so-called adversarial attacks. To increase their robustness against these attacks, there have emerged numerous detection mechanisms that aim to automatically determine if an input is adversarial. However, state-of-the-art detection mechanisms either rely on being tuned for each type of attack, or they do not generalize across different attack types. To alleviate these issues, we propose a novel technique for adversarial-image detection, RAID, that trains a secondary classifier to identify differences in neuron activation values between benign and adversarial inputs. Our technique is both more reliable and more effective than the state of the art when evaluated against six popular attacks. Moreover, a straightforward extension of RAID increases its robustness against detection-aware adversaries without affecting its effectiveness.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Adversarial training has been empirically proven to be one of the most effective and reliable defense methods against adversarial attacks. However, almost all existing studies about adversarial training are focused on balanced datasets, where each class has an equal amount of training examples. Research on adversarial training with imbalanced training datasets is rather limited. As the initial effort to investigate this problem, we reveal the facts that adversarially trained models present two distinguished behaviors from naturally trained models in imbalanced datasets: (1) Compared to natural training, adversarially trained models can suffer much worse performance on under-represented classes, when the training dataset is extremely imbalanced. (2) Traditional reweighting strategies may lose efficacy to deal with the imbalance issue for adversarial training. For example, upweighting the under-represented classes will drastically hurt the model's performance on well-represented classes, and as a result, finding an optimal reweighting value can be tremendously challenging. In this paper, to further understand our observations, we theoretically show that the poor data separability is one key reason causing this strong tension between under-represented and well-represented classes. Motivated by this finding, we propose Separable Reweighted Adversarial Training (SRAT) to facilitate adversarial training under imbalanced scenarios, by learning more separable features for different classes. Extensive experiments on various datasets verify the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

As industrial applications are increasingly automated by machine learning models, enforcing personal data ownership and intellectual property rights requires tracing training data back to their rightful owners. Membership inference algorithms approach this problem by using statistical techniques to discern whether a target sample was included in a model's training set. However, existing methods only utilize the unaltered target sample or simple augmentations of the target to compute statistics. Such a sparse sampling of the model's behavior carries little information, leading to poor inference capabilities. In this work, we use adversarial tools to directly optimize for queries that are discriminative and diverse. Our improvements achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing methods, especially in offline scenarios and in the low false-positive regime which is critical in legal settings. Code is available at https://github.com/YuxinWenRick/canary-in-a-coalmine.

We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial examples for deep learning models solely based on information limited to output label~(hard label) to a queried data input. We propose a simple and efficient Bayesian Optimization~(BO) based approach for developing black-box adversarial attacks. Issues with BO's performance in high dimensions are avoided by searching for adversarial examples in a structured low-dimensional subspace. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed attack method by evaluating both ell_infty and ell_2 norm constrained untargeted and targeted hard label black-box attacks on three standard datasets - MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Our proposed approach consistently achieves 2x to 10x higher attack success rate while requiring 10x to 20x fewer queries compared to the current state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attacks.

Post-hoc gradient-based interpretability methods [Simonyan et al., 2013, Smilkov et al., 2017] that provide instance-specific explanations of model predictions are often based on assumption (A): magnitude of input gradients -- gradients of logits with respect to input -- noisily highlight discriminative task-relevant features. In this work, we test the validity of assumption (A) using a three-pronged approach. First, we develop an evaluation framework, DiffROAR, to test assumption (A) on four image classification benchmarks. Our results suggest that (i) input gradients of standard models (i.e., trained on original data) may grossly violate (A), whereas (ii) input gradients of adversarially robust models satisfy (A). Second, we introduce BlockMNIST, an MNIST-based semi-real dataset, that by design encodes a priori knowledge of discriminative features. Our analysis on BlockMNIST leverages this information to validate as well as characterize differences between input gradient attributions of standard and robust models. Finally, we theoretically prove that our empirical findings hold on a simplified version of the BlockMNIST dataset. Specifically, we prove that input gradients of standard one-hidden-layer MLPs trained on this dataset do not highlight instance-specific signal coordinates, thus grossly violating assumption (A). Our findings motivate the need to formalize and test common assumptions in interpretability in a falsifiable manner [Leavitt and Morcos, 2020]. We believe that the DiffROAR evaluation framework and BlockMNIST-based datasets can serve as sanity checks to audit instance-specific interpretability methods; code and data available at https://github.com/harshays/inputgradients.

Recent work have demonstrated that robustness (to "corruption") can be at odds with generalization. Adversarial training, for instance, aims to reduce the problematic susceptibility of modern neural networks to small data perturbations. Surprisingly, overfitting is a major concern in adversarial training despite being mostly absent in standard training. We provide here theoretical evidence for this peculiar "robust overfitting" phenomenon. Subsequently, we advance a novel distributionally robust loss function bridging robustness and generalization. We demonstrate both theoretically as well as empirically the loss to enjoy a certified level of robustness against two common types of corruption--data evasion and poisoning attacks--while ensuring guaranteed generalization. We show through careful numerical experiments that our resulting holistic robust (HR) training procedure yields SOTA performance. Finally, we indicate that HR training can be interpreted as a direct extension of adversarial training and comes with a negligible additional computational burden. A ready-to-use python library implementing our algorithm is available at https://github.com/RyanLucas3/HR_Neural_Networks.

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and a thought-provoking paper by Bubeck and Sellke has analyzed this phenomenon through the lens of over-parameterization: interpolating smoothly the data requires significantly more parameters than simply memorizing it. However, this "universal" law provides only a necessary condition for robustness, and it is unable to discriminate between models. In this paper, we address these gaps by focusing on empirical risk minimization in two prototypical settings, namely, random features and the neural tangent kernel (NTK). We prove that, for random features, the model is not robust for any degree of over-parameterization, even when the necessary condition coming from the universal law of robustness is satisfied. In contrast, for even activations, the NTK model meets the universal lower bound, and it is robust as soon as the necessary condition on over-parameterization is fulfilled. This also addresses a conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. Our analysis decouples the effect of the kernel of the model from an "interaction matrix", which describes the interaction with the test data and captures the effect of the activation. Our theoretical results are corroborated by numerical evidence on both synthetic and standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10).

Mammalian brains handle complex reasoning tasks in a gestalt manner by integrating information from regions of the brain that are specialised to individual sensory modalities. This allows for improved robustness and better generalisation ability. In contrast, deep neural networks are usually designed to process one particular information stream and susceptible to various types of adversarial perturbations. While many methods exist for detecting and defending against adversarial attacks, they do not generalise across a range of attacks and negatively affect performance on clean, unperturbed data. We developed a fusion model using a combination of background and foreground features extracted in parallel from Places-CNN and Imagenet-CNN. We tested the benefits of the fusion approach on preserving adversarial robustness for human perceivable (e.g., Gaussian blur) and network perceivable (e.g., gradient-based) attacks for CIFAR-10 and MS COCO data sets. For gradient based attacks, our results show that fusion allows for significant improvements in classification without decreasing performance on unperturbed data and without need to perform adversarial retraining. Our fused model revealed improvements for Gaussian blur type perturbations as well. The increase in performance from fusion approach depended on the variability of the image contexts; larger increases were seen for classes of images with larger differences in their contexts. We also demonstrate the effect of regularization to bias the classifier decision in the presence of a known adversary. We propose that this biologically inspired approach to integrate information across multiple modalities provides a new way to improve adversarial robustness that can be complementary to current state of the art approaches.

While prior research has proposed a plethora of methods that build neural classifiers robust against adversarial robustness, practitioners are still reluctant to adopt them due to their unacceptably severe clean accuracy penalties. This paper significantly alleviates this accuracy-robustness trade-off by mixing the output probabilities of a standard classifier and a robust classifier, where the standard network is optimized for clean accuracy and is not robust in general. We show that the robust base classifier's confidence difference for correct and incorrect examples is the key to this improvement. In addition to providing intuitions and empirical evidence, we theoretically certify the robustness of the mixed classifier under realistic assumptions. Furthermore, we adapt an adversarial input detector into a mixing network that adaptively adjusts the mixture of the two base models, further reducing the accuracy penalty of achieving robustness. The proposed flexible method, termed "adaptive smoothing", can work in conjunction with existing or even future methods that improve clean accuracy, robustness, or adversary detection. Our empirical evaluation considers strong attack methods, including AutoAttack and adaptive attack. On the CIFAR-100 dataset, our method achieves an 85.21% clean accuracy while maintaining a 38.72% ell_infty-AutoAttacked (epsilon = 8/255) accuracy, becoming the second most robust method on the RobustBench CIFAR-100 benchmark as of submission, while improving the clean accuracy by ten percentage points compared with all listed models. The code that implements our method is available at https://github.com/Bai-YT/AdaptiveSmoothing.

Perceptual similarity metrics have progressively become more correlated with human judgments on perceptual similarity; however, despite recent advances, the addition of an imperceptible distortion can still compromise these metrics. In our study, we systematically examine the robustness of these metrics to imperceptible adversarial perturbations. Following the two-alternative forced-choice experimental design with two distorted images and one reference image, we perturb the distorted image closer to the reference via an adversarial attack until the metric flips its judgment. We first show that all metrics in our study are susceptible to perturbations generated via common adversarial attacks such as FGSM, PGD, and the One-pixel attack. Next, we attack the widely adopted LPIPS metric using spatial-transformation-based adversarial perturbations (stAdv) in a white-box setting to craft adversarial examples that can effectively transfer to other similarity metrics in a black-box setting. We also combine the spatial attack stAdv with PGD (ell_infty-bounded) attack to increase transferability and use these adversarial examples to benchmark the robustness of both traditional and recently developed metrics. Our benchmark provides a good starting point for discussion and further research on the robustness of metrics to imperceptible adversarial perturbations.

We introduce and study the problem of adversarial arithmetic, which provides a simple yet challenging testbed for language model alignment. This problem is comprised of arithmetic questions posed in natural language, with an arbitrary adversarial string inserted before the question is complete. Even in the simple setting of 1-digit addition problems, it is easy to find adversarial prompts that make all tested models (including PaLM2, GPT4, Claude2) misbehave, and even to steer models to a particular wrong answer. We additionally provide a simple algorithm for finding successful attacks by querying those same models, which we name "prompt inversion rejection sampling" (PIRS). We finally show that models can be partially hardened against these attacks via reinforcement learning and via agentic constitutional loops. However, we were not able to make a language model fully robust against adversarial arithmetic attacks.

Adversarial detection aims to determine whether a given sample is an adversarial one based on the discrepancy between natural and adversarial distributions. Unfortunately, estimating or comparing two data distributions is extremely difficult, especially in high-dimension spaces. Recently, the gradient of log probability density (a.k.a., score) w.r.t. the sample is used as an alternative statistic to compute. However, we find that the score is sensitive in identifying adversarial samples due to insufficient information with one sample only. In this paper, we propose a new statistic called expected perturbation score (EPS), which is essentially the expected score of a sample after various perturbations. Specifically, to obtain adequate information regarding one sample, we perturb it by adding various noises to capture its multi-view observations. We theoretically prove that EPS is a proper statistic to compute the discrepancy between two samples under mild conditions. In practice, we can use a pre-trained diffusion model to estimate EPS for each sample. Last, we propose an EPS-based adversarial detection (EPS-AD) method, in which we develop EPS-based maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) as a metric to measure the discrepancy between the test sample and natural samples. We also prove that the EPS-based MMD between natural and adversarial samples is larger than that among natural samples. Extensive experiments show the superior adversarial detection performance of our EPS-AD.

Recently, pre-trained vision-language models (e.g., CLIP) have shown great potential in few-shot learning and attracted a lot of research interest. Although efforts have been made to improve few-shot ability of CLIP, key factors on the effectiveness of existing methods have not been well studied, limiting further exploration of CLIP's potential in few-shot learning. In this paper, we first introduce a unified formulation to analyze CLIP-based few-shot learning methods from a perspective of logit bias, which encourages us to learn an effective logit bias for further improving performance of CLIP-based few-shot learning methods. To this end, we disassemble three key components involved in computation of logit bias (i.e., logit features, logit predictor, and logit fusion) and empirically analyze the effect on performance of few-shot classification. Based on analysis of key components, this paper proposes a novel AMU-Tuning method to learn effective logit bias for CLIP-based few-shot classification. Specifically, our AMU-Tuning predicts logit bias by exploiting the appropriate textbf{A}uxiliary features, which are fed into an efficient feature-initialized linear classifier with textbf{M}ulti-branch training. Finally, an textbf{U}ncertainty-based fusion is developed to incorporate logit bias into CLIP for few-shot classification. The experiments are conducted on several widely used benchmarks, and the results show AMU-Tuning clearly outperforms its counterparts while achieving state-of-the-art performance of CLIP-based few-shot learning without bells and whistles.

Domain generalization is the task of learning models that generalize to unseen target domains. We propose a simple yet effective method for domain generalization, named cross-domain ensemble distillation (XDED), that learns domain-invariant features while encouraging the model to converge to flat minima, which recently turned out to be a sufficient condition for domain generalization. To this end, our method generates an ensemble of the output logits from training data with the same label but from different domains and then penalizes each output for the mismatch with the ensemble. Also, we present a de-stylization technique that standardizes features to encourage the model to produce style-consistent predictions even in an arbitrary target domain. Our method greatly improves generalization capability in public benchmarks for cross-domain image classification, cross-dataset person re-ID, and cross-dataset semantic segmentation. Moreover, we show that models learned by our method are robust against adversarial attacks and image corruptions.

Numerous adversarial attack methods have been developed to generate imperceptible image perturbations that can cause erroneous predictions of state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) models, in particular, deep neural networks (DNNs). Despite intense research on adversarial attacks, little effort was made to uncover 'arcana' carried in adversarial attacks. In this work, we ask whether it is possible to infer data-agnostic victim model (VM) information (i.e., characteristics of the ML model or DNN used to generate adversarial attacks) from data-specific adversarial instances. We call this 'model parsing of adversarial attacks' - a task to uncover 'arcana' in terms of the concealed VM information in attacks. We approach model parsing via supervised learning, which correctly assigns classes of VM's model attributes (in terms of architecture type, kernel size, activation function, and weight sparsity) to an attack instance generated from this VM. We collect a dataset of adversarial attacks across 7 attack types generated from 135 victim models (configured by 5 architecture types, 3 kernel size setups, 3 activation function types, and 3 weight sparsity ratios). We show that a simple, supervised model parsing network (MPN) is able to infer VM attributes from unseen adversarial attacks if their attack settings are consistent with the training setting (i.e., in-distribution generalization assessment). We also provide extensive experiments to justify the feasibility of VM parsing from adversarial attacks, and the influence of training and evaluation factors in the parsing performance (e.g., generalization challenge raised in out-of-distribution evaluation). We further demonstrate how the proposed MPN can be used to uncover the source VM attributes from transfer attacks, and shed light on a potential connection between model parsing and attack transferability.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we take the role of investigators who want to trace the attack and identify the source, that is, the particular model which the adversarial examples are generated from. Techniques derived would aid forensic investigation of attack incidents and serve as deterrence to potential attacks. We consider the buyers-seller setting where a machine learning model is to be distributed to various buyers and each buyer receives a slightly different copy with same functionality. A malicious buyer generates adversarial examples from a particular copy M_i and uses them to attack other copies. From these adversarial examples, the investigator wants to identify the source M_i. To address this problem, we propose a two-stage separate-and-trace framework. The model separation stage generates multiple copies of a model for a same classification task. This process injects unique characteristics into each copy so that adversarial examples generated have distinct and traceable features. We give a parallel structure which embeds a ``tracer'' in each copy, and a noise-sensitive training loss to achieve this goal. The tracing stage takes in adversarial examples and a few candidate models, and identifies the likely source. Based on the unique features induced by the noise-sensitive loss function, we could effectively trace the potential adversarial copy by considering the output logits from each tracer. Empirical results show that it is possible to trace the origin of the adversarial example and the mechanism can be applied to a wide range of architectures and datasets.

Adversarial datasets should validate AI robustness by providing samples on which humans perform well, but models do not. However, as models evolve, datasets can become obsolete. Measuring whether a dataset remains adversarial is hindered by the lack of a standardized metric for measuring adversarialness. We propose AdvScore, a human-grounded evaluation metric that assesses a dataset's adversarialness by capturing models' and humans' varying abilities while also identifying poor examples. We then use AdvScore to motivate a new dataset creation pipeline for realistic and high-quality adversarial samples, enabling us to collect an adversarial question answering (QA) dataset, AdvQA. We apply AdvScore using 9,347 human responses and ten language models' predictions to track model improvement over five years, from 2020 to 2024. AdvScore thus provides guidance for achieving robustness comparable with human capabilities. Furthermore, it helps determine to what extent adversarial datasets continue to pose challenges, ensuring that, rather than reflecting outdated or overly artificial difficulties, they effectively test model capabilities.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

Existing frameworks for assessing robustness of large language models (LLMs) overly depend on specific benchmarks, increasing costs and failing to evaluate performance of LLMs in professional domains due to dataset limitations. This paper proposes a framework that systematically evaluates the robustness of LLMs under adversarial attack scenarios by leveraging knowledge graphs (KGs). Our framework generates original prompts from the triplets of knowledge graphs and creates adversarial prompts by poisoning, assessing the robustness of LLMs through the results of these adversarial attacks. We systematically evaluate the effectiveness of this framework and its modules. Experiments show that adversarial robustness of the ChatGPT family ranks as GPT-4-turbo > GPT-4o > GPT-3.5-turbo, and the robustness of large language models is influenced by the professional domains in which they operate.

The adversarial vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has been well-known and widely concerned, often under the context of learning top-1 attacks (e.g., fooling a DNN to classify a cat image as dog). This paper shows that the concern is much more serious by learning significantly more aggressive ordered top-K clear-box~ This is often referred to as white/black-box attacks in the literature. We choose to adopt neutral terminology, clear/opaque-box attacks in this paper, and omit the prefix clear-box for simplicity. targeted attacks proposed in Adversarial Distillation. We propose a novel and rigorous quadratic programming (QP) method of learning ordered top-K attacks with low computing cost, dubbed as QuadAttacK. Our QuadAttacK directly solves the QP to satisfy the attack constraint in the feature embedding space (i.e., the input space to the final linear classifier), which thus exploits the semantics of the feature embedding space (i.e., the principle of class coherence). With the optimized feature embedding vector perturbation, it then computes the adversarial perturbation in the data space via the vanilla one-step back-propagation. In experiments, the proposed QuadAttacK is tested in the ImageNet-1k classification using ResNet-50, DenseNet-121, and Vision Transformers (ViT-B and DEiT-S). It successfully pushes the boundary of successful ordered top-K attacks from K=10 up to K=20 at a cheap budget (1times 60) and further improves attack success rates for K=5 for all tested models, while retaining the performance for K=1.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

Assigning importance weights to adversarial data has achieved great success in training adversarially robust networks under limited model capacity. However, existing instance-reweighted adversarial training (AT) methods heavily depend on heuristics and/or geometric interpretations to determine those importance weights, making these algorithms lack rigorous theoretical justification/guarantee. Moreover, recent research has shown that adversarial training suffers from a severe non-uniform robust performance across the training distribution, e.g., data points belonging to some classes can be much more vulnerable to adversarial attacks than others. To address both issues, in this paper, we propose a novel doubly-robust instance reweighted AT framework, which allows to obtain the importance weights via exploring distributionally robust optimization (DRO) techniques, and at the same time boosts the robustness on the most vulnerable examples. In particular, our importance weights are obtained by optimizing the KL-divergence regularized loss function, which allows us to devise new algorithms with a theoretical convergence guarantee. Experiments on standard classification datasets demonstrate that our proposed approach outperforms related state-of-the-art baseline methods in terms of average robust performance, and at the same time improves the robustness against attacks on the weakest data points. Codes will be available soon.

We give the first efficient algorithm for learning halfspaces in the testable learning model recently defined by Rubinfeld and Vasilyan (2023). In this model, a learner certifies that the accuracy of its output hypothesis is near optimal whenever the training set passes an associated test, and training sets drawn from some target distribution -- e.g., the Gaussian -- must pass the test. This model is more challenging than distribution-specific agnostic or Massart noise models where the learner is allowed to fail arbitrarily if the distributional assumption does not hold. We consider the setting where the target distribution is Gaussian (or more generally any strongly log-concave distribution) in d dimensions and the noise model is either Massart or adversarial (agnostic). For Massart noise, our tester-learner runs in polynomial time and outputs a hypothesis with (information-theoretically optimal) error opt + epsilon for any strongly log-concave target distribution. For adversarial noise, our tester-learner obtains error O(opt) + epsilon in polynomial time when the target distribution is Gaussian; for strongly log-concave distributions, we obtain O(opt) + epsilon in quasipolynomial time. Prior work on testable learning ignores the labels in the training set and checks that the empirical moments of the covariates are close to the moments of the base distribution. Here we develop new tests of independent interest that make critical use of the labels and combine them with the moment-matching approach of Gollakota et al. (2023). This enables us to simulate a variant of the algorithm of Diakonikolas et al. (2020) for learning noisy halfspaces using nonconvex SGD but in the testable learning setting.

Adversarially robust classifiers possess a trait that non-robust models do not -- Perceptually Aligned Gradients (PAG). Their gradients with respect to the input align well with human perception. Several works have identified PAG as a byproduct of robust training, but none have considered it as a standalone phenomenon nor studied its own implications. In this work, we focus on this trait and test whether Perceptually Aligned Gradients imply Robustness. To this end, we develop a novel objective to directly promote PAG in training classifiers and examine whether models with such gradients are more robust to adversarial attacks. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets and architectures validate that models with aligned gradients exhibit significant robustness, exposing the surprising bidirectional connection between PAG and robustness. Lastly, we show that better gradient alignment leads to increased robustness and harness this observation to boost the robustness of existing adversarial training techniques.

The majority of methods for crafting adversarial attacks have focused on scenes with a single dominant object (e.g., images from ImageNet). On the other hand, natural scenes include multiple dominant objects that are semantically related. Thus, it is crucial to explore designing attack strategies that look beyond learning on single-object scenes or attack single-object victim classifiers. Due to their inherent property of strong transferability of perturbations to unknown models, this paper presents the first approach of using generative models for adversarial attacks on multi-object scenes. In order to represent the relationships between different objects in the input scene, we leverage upon the open-sourced pre-trained vision-language model CLIP (Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training), with the motivation to exploit the encoded semantics in the language space along with the visual space. We call this attack approach Generative Adversarial Multi-object scene Attacks (GAMA). GAMA demonstrates the utility of the CLIP model as an attacker's tool to train formidable perturbation generators for multi-object scenes. Using the joint image-text features to train the generator, we show that GAMA can craft potent transferable perturbations in order to fool victim classifiers in various attack settings. For example, GAMA triggers ~16% more misclassification than state-of-the-art generative approaches in black-box settings where both the classifier architecture and data distribution of the attacker are different from the victim. Our code is available here: https://abhishekaich27.github.io/gama.html

Efficient fine-tuning of large language models for task-specific applications is imperative, yet the vast number of parameters in these models makes their training increasingly challenging. Despite numerous proposals for effective methods, a substantial memory overhead remains for gradient computations during updates. Can we fine-tune a series of task-specific small models and transfer their knowledge directly to a much larger model without additional training? In this paper, we explore weak-to-strong specialization using logit arithmetic, facilitating a direct answer to this question. Existing weak-to-strong methods often employ a static knowledge transfer ratio and a single small model for transferring complex knowledge, which leads to suboptimal performance. % To address this, To surmount these limitations, we propose a dynamic logit fusion approach that works with a series of task-specific small models, each specialized in a different task. This method adaptively allocates weights among these models at each decoding step, learning the weights through Kullback-Leibler divergence constrained optimization problems. We conduct extensive experiments across various benchmarks in both single-task and multi-task settings, achieving leading results. By transferring expertise from the 7B model to the 13B model, our method closes the performance gap by 96.4\% in single-task scenarios and by 86.3\% in multi-task scenarios compared to full fine-tuning of the 13B model. Notably, we achieve surpassing performance on unseen tasks. Moreover, we further demonstrate that our method can effortlessly integrate in-context learning for single tasks and task arithmetic for multi-task scenarios. (Our implementation is available in https://github.com/Facico/Dynamic-Logit-Fusion.)

The dominant line of work in domain adaptation has focused on learning invariant representations using domain-adversarial training. In this paper, we interpret this approach from a game theoretical perspective. Defining optimal solutions in domain-adversarial training as a local Nash equilibrium, we show that gradient descent in domain-adversarial training can violate the asymptotic convergence guarantees of the optimizer, oftentimes hindering the transfer performance. Our analysis leads us to replace gradient descent with high-order ODE solvers (i.e., Runge-Kutta), for which we derive asymptotic convergence guarantees. This family of optimizers is significantly more stable and allows more aggressive learning rates, leading to high performance gains when used as a drop-in replacement over standard optimizers. Our experiments show that in conjunction with state-of-the-art domain-adversarial methods, we achieve up to 3.5% improvement with less than of half training iterations. Our optimizers are easy to implement, free of additional parameters, and can be plugged into any domain-adversarial framework.

Catastrophic overfitting (CO) in single-step adversarial training (AT) results in abrupt drops in the adversarial test accuracy (even down to 0%). For models trained with multi-step AT, it has been observed that the loss function behaves locally linearly with respect to the input, this is however lost in single-step AT. To address CO in single-step AT, several methods have been proposed to enforce local linearity of the loss via regularization. However, these regularization terms considerably slow down training due to Double Backpropagation. Instead, in this work, we introduce a regularization term, called ELLE, to mitigate CO effectively and efficiently in classical AT evaluations, as well as some more difficult regimes, e.g., large adversarial perturbations and long training schedules. Our regularization term can be theoretically linked to curvature of the loss function and is computationally cheaper than previous methods by avoiding Double Backpropagation. Our thorough experimental validation demonstrates that our work does not suffer from CO, even in challenging settings where previous works suffer from it. We also notice that adapting our regularization parameter during training (ELLE-A) greatly improves the performance, specially in large epsilon setups. Our implementation is available in https://github.com/LIONS-EPFL/ELLE .

A large-scale deep model pre-trained on massive labeled or unlabeled data transfers well to downstream tasks. Linear evaluation freezes parameters in the pre-trained model and trains a linear classifier separately, which is efficient and attractive for transfer. However, little work has investigated the classifier in linear evaluation except for the default logistic regression. Inspired by the statistical efficiency of naive Bayes, the paper revisits the classical topic on discriminative vs. generative classifiers. Theoretically, the paper considers the surrogate loss instead of the zero-one loss in analyses and generalizes the classical results from binary cases to multiclass ones. We show that, under mild assumptions, multiclass naive Bayes requires O(log n) samples to approach its asymptotic error while the corresponding multiclass logistic regression requires O(n) samples, where n is the feature dimension. To establish it, we present a multiclass H-consistency bound framework and an explicit bound for logistic loss, which are of independent interests. Simulation results on a mixture of Gaussian validate our theoretical findings. Experiments on various pre-trained deep vision models show that naive Bayes consistently converges faster as the number of data increases. Besides, naive Bayes shows promise in few-shot cases and we observe the "two regimes" phenomenon in pre-trained supervised models. Our code is available at https://github.com/ML-GSAI/Revisiting-Dis-vs-Gen-Classifiers.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

While it has long been empirically observed that adversarial robustness may be at odds with standard accuracy and may have further disparate impacts on different classes, it remains an open question to what extent such observations hold and how the class imbalance plays a role within. In this paper, we attempt to understand this question of accuracy disparity by taking a closer look at linear classifiers under a Gaussian mixture model. We decompose the impact of adversarial robustness into two parts: an inherent effect that will degrade the standard accuracy on all classes due to the robustness constraint, and the other caused by the class imbalance ratio, which will increase the accuracy disparity compared to standard training. Furthermore, we also show that such effects extend beyond the Gaussian mixture model, by generalizing our data model to the general family of stable distributions. More specifically, we demonstrate that while the constraint of adversarial robustness consistently degrades the standard accuracy in the balanced class setting, the class imbalance ratio plays a fundamentally different role in accuracy disparity compared to the Gaussian case, due to the heavy tail of the stable distribution. We additionally perform experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our empirical results also suggest that the implications may extend to nonlinear models over real-world datasets. Our code is publicly available on GitHub at https://github.com/Accuracy-Disparity/AT-on-AD.

Knowledge transferability, or transfer learning, has been widely adopted to allow a pre-trained model in the source domain to be effectively adapted to downstream tasks in the target domain. It is thus important to explore and understand the factors affecting knowledge transferability. In this paper, as the first work, we analyze and demonstrate the connections between knowledge transferability and another important phenomenon--adversarial transferability, i.e., adversarial examples generated against one model can be transferred to attack other models. Our theoretical studies show that adversarial transferability indicates knowledge transferability and vice versa. Moreover, based on the theoretical insights, we propose two practical adversarial transferability metrics to characterize this process, serving as bidirectional indicators between adversarial and knowledge transferability. We conduct extensive experiments for different scenarios on diverse datasets, showing a positive correlation between adversarial transferability and knowledge transferability. Our findings will shed light on future research about effective knowledge transfer learning and adversarial transferability analyses.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

Pre-trained models of code have achieved success in many important software engineering tasks. However, these powerful models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that slightly perturb model inputs to make a victim model produce wrong outputs. Current works mainly attack models of code with examples that preserve operational program semantics but ignore a fundamental requirement for adversarial example generation: perturbations should be natural to human judges, which we refer to as naturalness requirement. In this paper, we propose ALERT (nAturaLnEss AwaRe ATtack), a black-box attack that adversarially transforms inputs to make victim models produce wrong outputs. Different from prior works, this paper considers the natural semantic of generated examples at the same time as preserving the operational semantic of original inputs. Our user study demonstrates that human developers consistently consider that adversarial examples generated by ALERT are more natural than those generated by the state-of-the-art work by Zhang et al. that ignores the naturalness requirement. On attacking CodeBERT, our approach can achieve attack success rates of 53.62%, 27.79%, and 35.78% across three downstream tasks: vulnerability prediction, clone detection and code authorship attribution. On GraphCodeBERT, our approach can achieve average success rates of 76.95%, 7.96% and 61.47% on the three tasks. The above outperforms the baseline by 14.07% and 18.56% on the two pre-trained models on average. Finally, we investigated the value of the generated adversarial examples to harden victim models through an adversarial fine-tuning procedure and demonstrated the accuracy of CodeBERT and GraphCodeBERT against ALERT-generated adversarial examples increased by 87.59% and 92.32%, respectively.

Aligning generative models with human preference via RLHF typically suffers from overoptimization, where an imperfectly learned reward model can misguide the generative model to output undesired responses. We investigate this problem in a principled manner by identifying the source of the misalignment as a form of distributional shift and uncertainty in learning human preferences. To mitigate overoptimization, we first propose a theoretical algorithm that chooses the best policy for an adversarially chosen reward model; one that simultaneously minimizes the maximum likelihood estimation of the loss and a reward penalty term. Here, the reward penalty term is introduced to prevent the policy from choosing actions with spurious high proxy rewards, resulting in provable sample efficiency of the algorithm under a partial coverage style condition. Moving from theory to practice, the proposed algorithm further enjoys an equivalent but surprisingly easy-to-implement reformulation. Using the equivalence between reward models and the corresponding optimal policy, the algorithm features a simple objective that combines: (i) a preference optimization loss that directly aligns the policy with human preference, and (ii) a supervised learning loss that explicitly imitates the policy with a (suitable) baseline distribution. In the context of aligning large language models (LLM), this objective fuses the direct preference optimization (DPO) loss with the supervised fune-tuning (SFT) loss to help mitigate the overoptimization towards undesired responses, for which we name the algorithm Regularized Preference Optimization (RPO). Experiments of aligning LLMs demonstrate the improved performance of RPO compared with DPO baselines. Our work sheds light on the interplay between preference optimization and SFT in tuning LLMs with both theoretical guarantees and empirical evidence.

Most existing works focus on direct perturbations to the victim's state/action or the underlying transition dynamics to demonstrate the vulnerability of reinforcement learning agents to adversarial attacks. However, such direct manipulations may not be always realizable. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent setting where a well-trained victim agent nu is exploited by an attacker controlling another agent alpha with an adversarial policy. Previous models do not account for the possibility that the attacker may only have partial control over alpha or that the attack may produce easily detectable "abnormal" behaviors. Furthermore, there is a lack of provably efficient defenses against these adversarial policies. To address these limitations, we introduce a generalized attack framework that has the flexibility to model to what extent the adversary is able to control the agent, and allows the attacker to regulate the state distribution shift and produce stealthier adversarial policies. Moreover, we offer a provably efficient defense with polynomial convergence to the most robust victim policy through adversarial training with timescale separation. This stands in sharp contrast to supervised learning, where adversarial training typically provides only empirical defenses. Using the Robosumo competition experiments, we show that our generalized attack formulation results in much stealthier adversarial policies when maintaining the same winning rate as baselines. Additionally, our adversarial training approach yields stable learning dynamics and less exploitable victim policies.

Large vision-language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4 have achieved unprecedented performance in response generation, especially with visual inputs, enabling more creative and adaptable interaction than large language models such as ChatGPT. Nonetheless, multimodal generation exacerbates safety concerns, since adversaries may successfully evade the entire system by subtly manipulating the most vulnerable modality (e.g., vision). To this end, we propose evaluating the robustness of open-source large VLMs in the most realistic and high-risk setting, where adversaries have only black-box system access and seek to deceive the model into returning the targeted responses. In particular, we first craft targeted adversarial examples against pretrained models such as CLIP and BLIP, and then transfer these adversarial examples to other VLMs such as MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, UniDiffuser, BLIP-2, and Img2Prompt. In addition, we observe that black-box queries on these VLMs can further improve the effectiveness of targeted evasion, resulting in a surprisingly high success rate for generating targeted responses. Our findings provide a quantitative understanding regarding the adversarial vulnerability of large VLMs and call for a more thorough examination of their potential security flaws before deployment in practice. Code is at https://github.com/yunqing-me/AttackVLM.

Despite recent progress, state-of-the-art question answering models remain vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. While dynamic adversarial data collection, in which a human annotator tries to write examples that fool a model-in-the-loop, can improve model robustness, this process is expensive which limits the scale of the collected data. In this work, we are the first to use synthetic adversarial data generation to make question answering models more robust to human adversaries. We develop a data generation pipeline that selects source passages, identifies candidate answers, generates questions, then finally filters or re-labels them to improve quality. Using this approach, we amplify a smaller human-written adversarial dataset to a much larger set of synthetic question-answer pairs. By incorporating our synthetic data, we improve the state-of-the-art on the AdversarialQA dataset by 3.7F1 and improve model generalisation on nine of the twelve MRQA datasets. We further conduct a novel human-in-the-loop evaluation to show that our models are considerably more robust to new human-written adversarial examples: crowdworkers can fool our model only 8.8% of the time on average, compared to 17.6% for a model trained without synthetic data.

Adversarial examples, generated by carefully crafted perturbation, have attracted considerable attention in research fields. Recent works have argued that the existence of the robust and non-robust features is a primary cause of the adversarial examples, and investigated their internal interactions in the feature space. In this paper, we propose a way of explicitly distilling feature representation into the robust and non-robust features, using Information Bottleneck. Specifically, we inject noise variation to each feature unit and evaluate the information flow in the feature representation to dichotomize feature units either robust or non-robust, based on the noise variation magnitude. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that the distilled features are highly correlated with adversarial prediction, and they have human-perceptible semantic information by themselves. Furthermore, we present an attack mechanism intensifying the gradient of non-robust features that is directly related to the model prediction, and validate its effectiveness of breaking model robustness.

Adversarial training (AT) has been demonstrated as one of the most promising defense methods against various adversarial attacks. To our knowledge, existing AT-based methods usually train with the locally most adversarial perturbed points and treat all the perturbed points equally, which may lead to considerably weaker adversarial robust generalization on test data. In this work, we introduce a new adversarial training framework that considers the diversity as well as characteristics of the perturbed points in the vicinity of benign samples. To realize the framework, we propose a Regional Adversarial Training (RAT) defense method that first utilizes the attack path generated by the typical iterative attack method of projected gradient descent (PGD), and constructs an adversarial region based on the attack path. Then, RAT samples diverse perturbed training points efficiently inside this region, and utilizes a distance-aware label smoothing mechanism to capture our intuition that perturbed points at different locations should have different impact on the model performance. Extensive experiments on several benchmark datasets show that RAT consistently makes significant improvement on standard adversarial training (SAT), and exhibits better robust generalization.

Model attribution is a popular tool to explain the rationales behind model predictions. However, recent work suggests that the attributions are vulnerable to minute perturbations, which can be added to input samples to fool the attributions while maintaining the prediction outputs. Although empirical studies have shown positive performance via adversarial training, an effective certified defense method is eminently needed to understand the robustness of attributions. In this work, we propose to use uniform smoothing technique that augments the vanilla attributions by noises uniformly sampled from a certain space. It is proved that, for all perturbations within the attack region, the cosine similarity between uniformly smoothed attribution of perturbed sample and the unperturbed sample is guaranteed to be lower bounded. We also derive alternative formulations of the certification that is equivalent to the original one and provides the maximum size of perturbation or the minimum smoothing radius such that the attribution can not be perturbed. We evaluate the proposed method on three datasets and show that the proposed method can effectively protect the attributions from attacks, regardless of the architecture of networks, training schemes and the size of the datasets.

Despite excellent average-case performance of many image classifiers, their performance can substantially deteriorate on semantically coherent subgroups of the data that were under-represented in the training data. These systematic errors can impact both fairness for demographic minority groups as well as robustness and safety under domain shift. A major challenge is to identify such subgroups with subpar performance when the subgroups are not annotated and their occurrence is very rare. We leverage recent advances in text-to-image models and search in the space of textual descriptions of subgroups ("prompts") for subgroups where the target model has low performance on the prompt-conditioned synthesized data. To tackle the exponentially growing number of subgroups, we employ combinatorial testing. We denote this procedure as PromptAttack as it can be interpreted as an adversarial attack in a prompt space. We study subgroup coverage and identifiability with PromptAttack in a controlled setting and find that it identifies systematic errors with high accuracy. Thereupon, we apply PromptAttack to ImageNet classifiers and identify novel systematic errors on rare subgroups.

We study the problem of adversarial language games, in which multiple agents with conflicting goals compete with each other via natural language interactions. While adversarial language games are ubiquitous in human activities, little attention has been devoted to this field in natural language processing. In this work, we propose a challenging adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo as an example, in which an attacker and a defender compete around a target word. The attacker is tasked with inducing the defender to utter the target word invisible to the defender, while the defender is tasked with detecting the target word before being induced by the attacker. In Adversarial Taboo, a successful attacker must hide its intention and subtly induce the defender, while a competitive defender must be cautious with its utterances and infer the intention of the attacker. Such language abilities can facilitate many important downstream NLP tasks. To instantiate the game, we create a game environment and a competition platform. Comprehensive experiments and empirical studies on several baseline attack and defense strategies show promising and interesting results. Based on the analysis on the game and experiments, we discuss multiple promising directions for future research.

We study Pareto optimality in multi-objective multi-armed bandit by providing a formulation of adversarial multi-objective multi-armed bandit and defining its Pareto regrets that can be applied to both stochastic and adversarial settings. The regrets do not rely on any scalarization functions and reflect Pareto optimality compared to scalarized regrets. We also present new algorithms assuming both with and without prior information of the multi-objective multi-armed bandit setting. The algorithms are shown optimal in adversarial settings and nearly optimal up to a logarithmic factor in stochastic settings simultaneously by our established upper bounds and lower bounds on Pareto regrets. Moreover, the lower bound analyses show that the new regrets are consistent with the existing Pareto regret for stochastic settings and extend an adversarial attack mechanism from bandit to the multi-objective one.

Compositional Zero-shot Learning (CZSL) aims to identify novel compositions via known attribute-object pairs. The primary challenge in CZSL tasks lies in the significant discrepancies introduced by the complex interaction between the visual primitives of attribute and object, consequently decreasing the classification performance towards novel compositions. Previous remarkable works primarily addressed this issue by focusing on disentangling strategy or utilizing object-based conditional probabilities to constrain the selection space of attributes. Unfortunately, few studies have explored the problem from the perspective of modeling the mechanism of visual primitive interactions. Inspired by the success of vanilla adversarial learning in Cross-Domain Few-Shot Learning, we take a step further and devise a model-agnostic and Primitive-Based Adversarial training (PBadv) method to deal with this problem. Besides, the latest studies highlight the weakness of the perception of hard compositions even under data-balanced conditions. To this end, we propose a novel over-sampling strategy with object-similarity guidance to augment target compositional training data. We performed detailed quantitative analysis and retrieval experiments on well-established datasets, such as UT-Zappos50K, MIT-States, and C-GQA, to validate the effectiveness of our proposed method, and the state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance demonstrates the superiority of our approach. The code is available at https://github.com/lisuyi/PBadv_czsl.

Effective regularization techniques are highly desired in deep learning for alleviating overfitting and improving generalization. This work proposes a new regularization scheme, based on the understanding that the flat local minima of the empirical risk cause the model to generalize better. This scheme is referred to as adversarial model perturbation (AMP), where instead of directly minimizing the empirical risk, an alternative "AMP loss" is minimized via SGD. Specifically, the AMP loss is obtained from the empirical risk by applying the "worst" norm-bounded perturbation on each point in the parameter space. Comparing with most existing regularization schemes, AMP has strong theoretical justifications, in that minimizing the AMP loss can be shown theoretically to favour flat local minima of the empirical risk. Extensive experiments on various modern deep architectures establish AMP as a new state of the art among regularization schemes. Our code is available at https://github.com/hiyouga/AMP-Regularizer.

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to adversarial examples, which can easily fool DNNs into making incorrect predictions. To mitigate this deficiency, we propose a novel adversarial defense method called "Immunity" (Innovative MoE with MUtual information \& positioN stabilITY) based on a modified Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture in this work. The key enhancements to the standard MoE are two-fold: 1) integrating of Random Switch Gates (RSGs) to obtain diverse network structures via random permutation of RSG parameters at evaluation time, despite of RSGs being determined after one-time training; 2) devising innovative Mutual Information (MI)-based and Position Stability-based loss functions by capitalizing on Grad-CAM's explanatory power to increase the diversity and the causality of expert networks. Notably, our MI-based loss operates directly on the heatmaps, thereby inducing subtler negative impacts on the classification performance when compared to other losses of the same type, theoretically. Extensive evaluation validates the efficacy of the proposed approach in improving adversarial robustness against a wide range of attacks.

Conformal prediction is a powerful tool to generate uncertainty sets with guaranteed coverage using any predictive model, under the assumption that the training and test data are i.i.d.. Recently, it has been shown that adversarial examples are able to manipulate conformal methods to construct prediction sets with invalid coverage rates, as the i.i.d. assumption is violated. To address this issue, a recent work, Randomized Smoothed Conformal Prediction (RSCP), was first proposed to certify the robustness of conformal prediction methods to adversarial noise. However, RSCP has two major limitations: (i) its robustness guarantee is flawed when used in practice and (ii) it tends to produce large uncertainty sets. To address these limitations, we first propose a novel framework called RSCP+ to provide provable robustness guarantee in evaluation, which fixes the issues in the original RSCP method. Next, we propose two novel methods, Post-Training Transformation (PTT) and Robust Conformal Training (RCT), to effectively reduce prediction set size with little computation overhead. Experimental results in CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet suggest the baseline method only yields trivial predictions including full label set, while our methods could boost the efficiency by up to 4.36times, 5.46times, and 16.9times respectively and provide practical robustness guarantee. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Provably-Robust-Conformal-Prediction.

As machine learning models grow in complexity and increasingly rely on publicly sourced data, such as the human-annotated labels used in training large language models, they become more vulnerable to label poisoning attacks. These attacks, in which adversaries subtly alter the labels within a training dataset, can severely degrade model performance, posing significant risks in critical applications. In this paper, we propose FLORAL, a novel adversarial training defense strategy based on support vector machines (SVMs) to counter these threats. Utilizing a bilevel optimization framework, we cast the training process as a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game between an attacker, who strategically poisons critical training labels, and the model, which seeks to recover from such attacks. Our approach accommodates various model architectures and employs a projected gradient descent algorithm with kernel SVMs for adversarial training. We provide a theoretical analysis of our algorithm's convergence properties and empirically evaluate FLORAL's effectiveness across diverse classification tasks. Compared to robust baselines and foundation models such as RoBERTa, FLORAL consistently achieves higher robust accuracy under increasing attacker budgets. These results underscore the potential of FLORAL to enhance the resilience of machine learning models against label poisoning threats, thereby ensuring robust classification in adversarial settings.

Despite their tremendous success in modelling high-dimensional data manifolds, deep neural networks suffer from the threat of adversarial attacks - Existence of perceptually valid input-like samples obtained through careful perturbation that lead to degradation in the performance of the underlying model. Major concerns with existing defense mechanisms include non-generalizability across different attacks, models and large inference time. In this paper, we propose a generalized defense mechanism capitalizing on the expressive power of regularized latent space based generative models. We design an adversarial filter, devoid of access to classifier and adversaries, which makes it usable in tandem with any classifier. The basic idea is to learn a Lipschitz constrained mapping from the data manifold, incorporating adversarial perturbations, to a quantized latent space and re-map it to the true data manifold. Specifically, we simultaneously auto-encode the data manifold and its perturbations implicitly through the perturbations of the regularized and quantized generative latent space, realized using variational inference. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed formulation in providing resilience against multiple attack types (black and white box) and methods, while being almost real-time. Our experiments show that the proposed method surpasses the state-of-the-art techniques in several cases.

In this paper, we study the problem of generating obstinate (over-stability) adversarial examples by word substitution in NLP, where input text is meaningfully changed but the model's prediction does not, even though it should. Previous word substitution approaches have predominantly focused on manually designed antonym-based strategies for generating obstinate adversarial examples, which hinders its application as these strategies can only find a subset of obstinate adversarial examples and require human efforts. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a novel word substitution method named GradObstinate, a gradient-based approach that automatically generates obstinate adversarial examples without any constraints on the search space or the need for manual design principles. To empirically evaluate the efficacy of GradObstinate, we conduct comprehensive experiments on five representative models (Electra, ALBERT, Roberta, DistillBERT, and CLIP) finetuned on four NLP benchmarks (SST-2, MRPC, SNLI, and SQuAD) and a language-grounding benchmark (MSCOCO). Extensive experiments show that our proposed GradObstinate generates more powerful obstinate adversarial examples, exhibiting a higher attack success rate compared to antonym-based methods. Furthermore, to show the transferability of obstinate word substitutions found by GradObstinate, we replace the words in four representative NLP benchmarks with their obstinate substitutions. Notably, obstinate substitutions exhibit a high success rate when transferred to other models in black-box settings, including even GPT-3 and ChatGPT. Examples of obstinate adversarial examples found by GradObstinate are available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/anonauthors/SecretLanguage.

Recently, there is an emerging interest in adversarially training a classifier with a rejection option (also known as a selective classifier) for boosting adversarial robustness. While rejection can incur a cost in many applications, existing studies typically associate zero cost with rejecting perturbed inputs, which can result in the rejection of numerous slightly-perturbed inputs that could be correctly classified. In this work, we study adversarially-robust classification with rejection in the stratified rejection setting, where the rejection cost is modeled by rejection loss functions monotonically non-increasing in the perturbation magnitude. We theoretically analyze the stratified rejection setting and propose a novel defense method -- Adversarial Training with Consistent Prediction-based Rejection (CPR) -- for building a robust selective classifier. Experiments on image datasets demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms existing methods under strong adaptive attacks. For instance, on CIFAR-10, CPR reduces the total robust loss (for different rejection losses) by at least 7.3% under both seen and unseen attacks.

Adversarial training is well-known to produce high-quality neural network models that are empirically robust against adversarial perturbations. Nevertheless, once a model has been adversarially trained, one often desires a certification that the model is truly robust against all future attacks. Unfortunately, when faced with adversarially trained models, all existing approaches have significant trouble making certifications that are strong enough to be practically useful. Linear programming (LP) techniques in particular face a "convex relaxation barrier" that prevent them from making high-quality certifications, even after refinement with mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) and branch-and-bound (BnB) techniques. In this paper, we propose a nonconvex certification technique, based on a low-rank restriction of a semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation. The nonconvex relaxation makes strong certifications comparable to much more expensive SDP methods, while optimizing over dramatically fewer variables comparable to much weaker LP methods. Despite nonconvexity, we show how off-the-shelf local optimization algorithms can be used to achieve and to certify global optimality in polynomial time. Our experiments find that the nonconvex relaxation almost completely closes the gap towards exact certification of adversarially trained models.

Training deep networks requires various design decisions regarding for instance their architecture, data augmentation, or optimization. In this work, we find these training variations to result in networks learning unique feature sets from the data. Using public model libraries comprising thousands of models trained on canonical datasets like ImageNet, we observe that for arbitrary pairings of pretrained models, one model extracts significant data context unavailable in the other -- independent of overall performance. Given any arbitrary pairing of pretrained models and no external rankings (such as separate test sets, e.g. due to data privacy), we investigate if it is possible to transfer such "complementary" knowledge from one model to another without performance degradation -- a task made particularly difficult as additional knowledge can be contained in stronger, equiperformant or weaker models. Yet facilitating robust transfer in scenarios agnostic to pretrained model pairings would unlock auxiliary gains and knowledge fusion from any model repository without restrictions on model and problem specifics - including from weaker, lower-performance models. This work therefore provides an initial, in-depth exploration on the viability of such general-purpose knowledge transfer. Across large-scale experiments, we first reveal the shortcomings of standard knowledge distillation techniques, and then propose a much more general extension through data partitioning for successful transfer between nearly all pretrained models, which we show can also be done unsupervised. Finally, we assess both the scalability and impact of fundamental model properties on successful model-agnostic knowledge transfer.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful zero-shot assessors and are increasingly used in real-world situations such as for written exams or benchmarking systems. Despite this, no existing work has analyzed the vulnerability of judge-LLMs against adversaries attempting to manipulate outputs. This work presents the first study on the adversarial robustness of assessment LLMs, where we search for short universal phrases that when appended to texts can deceive LLMs to provide high assessment scores. Experiments on SummEval and TopicalChat demonstrate that both LLM-scoring and pairwise LLM-comparative assessment are vulnerable to simple concatenation attacks, where in particular LLM-scoring is very susceptible and can yield maximum assessment scores irrespective of the input text quality. Interestingly, such attacks are transferable and phrases learned on smaller open-source LLMs can be applied to larger closed-source models, such as GPT3.5. This highlights the pervasive nature of the adversarial vulnerabilities across different judge-LLM sizes, families and methods. Our findings raise significant concerns on the reliability of LLMs-as-a-judge methods, and underscore the importance of addressing vulnerabilities in LLM assessment methods before deployment in high-stakes real-world scenarios.

In the future, powerful AI systems may be deployed in high-stakes settings, where a single failure could be catastrophic. One technique for improving AI safety in high-stakes settings is adversarial training, which uses an adversary to generate examples to train on in order to achieve better worst-case performance. In this work, we used a safe language generation task (``avoid injuries'') as a testbed for achieving high reliability through adversarial training. We created a series of adversarial training techniques -- including a tool that assists human adversaries -- to find and eliminate failures in a classifier that filters text completions suggested by a generator. In our task, we determined that we can set very conservative classifier thresholds without significantly impacting the quality of the filtered outputs. We found that adversarial training increased robustness to the adversarial attacks that we trained on -- doubling the time for our contractors to find adversarial examples both with our tool (from 13 to 26 minutes) and without (from 20 to 44 minutes) -- without affecting in-distribution performance. We hope to see further work in the high-stakes reliability setting, including more powerful tools for enhancing human adversaries and better ways to measure high levels of reliability, until we can confidently rule out the possibility of catastrophic deployment-time failures of powerful models.

Ensembling is among the most popular tools in machine learning (ML) due to its effectiveness in minimizing variance and thus improving generalization. Most ensembling methods for black-box base learners fall under the umbrella of "stacked generalization," namely training an ML algorithm that takes the inferences from the base learners as input. While stacking has been widely applied in practice, its theoretical properties are poorly understood. In this paper, we prove a novel result, showing that choosing the best stacked generalization from a (finite or finite-dimensional) family of stacked generalizations based on cross-validated performance does not perform "much worse" than the oracle best. Our result strengthens and significantly extends the results in Van der Laan et al. (2007). Inspired by the theoretical analysis, we further propose a particular family of stacked generalizations in the context of probabilistic forecasting, each one with a different sensitivity for how much the ensemble weights are allowed to vary across items, timestamps in the forecast horizon, and quantiles. Experimental results demonstrate the performance gain of the proposed method.

We consider minimizing functions for which it is expensive to compute the (possibly stochastic) gradient. Such functions are prevalent in reinforcement learning, imitation learning and adversarial training. Our target optimization framework uses the (expensive) gradient computation to construct surrogate functions in a target space (e.g. the logits output by a linear model for classification) that can be minimized efficiently. This allows for multiple parameter updates to the model, amortizing the cost of gradient computation. In the full-batch setting, we prove that our surrogate is a global upper-bound on the loss, and can be (locally) minimized using a black-box optimization algorithm. We prove that the resulting majorization-minimization algorithm ensures convergence to a stationary point of the loss. Next, we instantiate our framework in the stochastic setting and propose the SSO algorithm, which can be viewed as projected stochastic gradient descent in the target space. This connection enables us to prove theoretical guarantees for SSO when minimizing convex functions. Our framework allows the use of standard stochastic optimization algorithms to construct surrogates which can be minimized by any deterministic optimization method. To evaluate our framework, we consider a suite of supervised learning and imitation learning problems. Our experiments indicate the benefits of target optimization and the effectiveness of SSO.

Adversarial examples cause neural networks to produce incorrect outputs with high confidence. Although adversarial training is one of the most effective forms of defense against adversarial examples, unfortunately, a large gap exists between test accuracy and training accuracy in adversarial training. In this paper, we identify Adversarial Feature Overfitting (AFO), which may cause poor adversarially robust generalization, and we show that adversarial training can overshoot the optimal point in terms of robust generalization, leading to AFO in our simple Gaussian model. Considering these theoretical results, we present soft labeling as a solution to the AFO problem. Furthermore, we propose Adversarial Vertex mixup (AVmixup), a soft-labeled data augmentation approach for improving adversarially robust generalization. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN, and Tiny ImageNet, and show that AVmixup significantly improves the robust generalization performance and that it reduces the trade-off between standard accuracy and adversarial robustness.

In recent years, NLP practitioners have converged on the following practice: (i) import an off-the-shelf pretrained (masked) language model; (ii) append a multilayer perceptron atop the CLS token's hidden representation (with randomly initialized weights); and (iii) fine-tune the entire model on a downstream task (MLP-FT). This procedure has produced massive gains on standard NLP benchmarks, but these models remain brittle, even to mild adversarial perturbations. In this work, we demonstrate surprising gains in adversarial robustness enjoyed by Model-tuning Via Prompts (MVP), an alternative method of adapting to downstream tasks. Rather than appending an MLP head to make output prediction, MVP appends a prompt template to the input, and makes prediction via text infilling/completion. Across 5 NLP datasets, 4 adversarial attacks, and 3 different models, MVP improves performance against adversarial substitutions by an average of 8% over standard methods and even outperforms adversarial training-based state-of-art defenses by 3.5%. By combining MVP with adversarial training, we achieve further improvements in adversarial robustness while maintaining performance on unperturbed examples. Finally, we conduct ablations to investigate the mechanism underlying these gains. Notably, we find that the main causes of vulnerability of MLP-FT can be attributed to the misalignment between pre-training and fine-tuning tasks, and the randomly initialized MLP parameters.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

Conformal prediction has shown spurring performance in constructing statistically rigorous prediction sets for arbitrary black-box machine learning models, assuming the data is exchangeable. However, even small adversarial perturbations during the inference can violate the exchangeability assumption, challenge the coverage guarantees, and result in a subsequent decline in empirical coverage. In this work, we propose a certifiably robust learning-reasoning conformal prediction framework (COLEP) via probabilistic circuits, which comprise a data-driven learning component that trains statistical models to learn different semantic concepts, and a reasoning component that encodes knowledge and characterizes the relationships among the trained models for logic reasoning. To achieve exact and efficient reasoning, we employ probabilistic circuits (PCs) within the reasoning component. Theoretically, we provide end-to-end certification of prediction coverage for COLEP in the presence of bounded adversarial perturbations. We also provide certified coverage considering the finite size of the calibration set. Furthermore, we prove that COLEP achieves higher prediction coverage and accuracy over a single model as long as the utilities of knowledge models are non-trivial. Empirically, we show the validity and tightness of our certified coverage, demonstrating the robust conformal prediction of COLEP on various datasets, including GTSRB, CIFAR10, and AwA2. We show that COLEP achieves up to 12% improvement in certified coverage on GTSRB, 9% on CIFAR-10, and 14% on AwA2.

The transferability of adversarial examples is a key issue in the security of deep neural networks. The possibility of an adversarial example crafted for a source model fooling another targeted model makes the threat of adversarial attacks more realistic. Measuring transferability is a crucial problem, but the Attack Success Rate alone does not provide a sound evaluation. This paper proposes a new methodology for evaluating transferability by putting distortion in a central position. This new tool shows that transferable attacks may perform far worse than a black box attack if the attacker randomly picks the source model. To address this issue, we propose a new selection mechanism, called FiT, which aims at choosing the best source model with only a few preliminary queries to the target. Our experimental results show that FiT is highly effective at selecting the best source model for multiple scenarios such as single-model attacks, ensemble-model attacks and multiple attacks (Code available at: https://github.com/t-maho/transferability_measure_fit).

We present a method for making neural network predictions robust to shifts from the training data distribution. The proposed method is based on making predictions via a diverse set of cues (called 'middle domains') and ensembling them into one strong prediction. The premise of the idea is that predictions made via different cues respond differently to a distribution shift, hence one should be able to merge them into one robust final prediction. We perform the merging in a straightforward but principled manner based on the uncertainty associated with each prediction. The evaluations are performed using multiple tasks and datasets (Taskonomy, Replica, ImageNet, CIFAR) under a wide range of adversarial and non-adversarial distribution shifts which demonstrate the proposed method is considerably more robust than its standard learning counterpart, conventional deep ensembles, and several other baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

To obtain, deterministic guarantees of adversarial robustness, specialized training methods are used. We propose, SABR, a novel such certified training method, based on the key insight that propagating interval bounds for a small but carefully selected subset of the adversarial input region is sufficient to approximate the worst-case loss over the whole region while significantly reducing approximation errors. We show in an extensive empirical evaluation that SABR outperforms existing certified defenses in terms of both standard and certifiable accuracies across perturbation magnitudes and datasets, pointing to a new class of certified training methods promising to alleviate the robustness-accuracy trade-off.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been widely applied to different tasks such as bioinformatics, drug design, and social networks. However, recent studies have shown that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks which aim to mislead the node or subgraph classification prediction by adding subtle perturbations. Detecting these attacks is challenging due to the small magnitude of perturbation and the discrete nature of graph data. In this paper, we propose a general adversarial edge detection pipeline EDoG without requiring knowledge of the attack strategies based on graph generation. Specifically, we propose a novel graph generation approach combined with link prediction to detect suspicious adversarial edges. To effectively train the graph generative model, we sample several sub-graphs from the given graph data. We show that since the number of adversarial edges is usually low in practice, with low probability the sampled sub-graphs will contain adversarial edges based on the union bound. In addition, considering the strong attacks which perturb a large number of edges, we propose a set of novel features to perform outlier detection as the preprocessing for our detection. Extensive experimental results on three real-world graph datasets including a private transaction rule dataset from a major company and two types of synthetic graphs with controlled properties show that EDoG can achieve above 0.8 AUC against four state-of-the-art unseen attack strategies without requiring any knowledge about the attack type; and around 0.85 with knowledge of the attack type. EDoG significantly outperforms traditional malicious edge detection baselines. We also show that an adaptive attack with full knowledge of our detection pipeline is difficult to bypass it.

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

The trade-off between robustness and accuracy has been widely studied in the adversarial literature. Although still controversial, the prevailing view is that this trade-off is inherent, either empirically or theoretically. Thus, we dig for the origin of this trade-off in adversarial training and find that it may stem from the improperly defined robust error, which imposes an inductive bias of local invariance -- an overcorrection towards smoothness. Given this, we advocate employing local equivariance to describe the ideal behavior of a robust model, leading to a self-consistent robust error named SCORE. By definition, SCORE facilitates the reconciliation between robustness and accuracy, while still handling the worst-case uncertainty via robust optimization. By simply substituting KL divergence with variants of distance metrics, SCORE can be efficiently minimized. Empirically, our models achieve top-rank performance on RobustBench under AutoAttack. Besides, SCORE provides instructive insights for explaining the overfitting phenomenon and semantic input gradients observed on robust models. Code is available at https://github.com/P2333/SCORE.

Adversarial robustness is a research area that has recently received a lot of attention in the quest for trustworthy artificial intelligence. However, recent works on adversarial robustness have focused on supervised learning where it is assumed that labeled data is plentiful. In this paper, we investigate semi-supervised adversarial training where labeled data is scarce. We derive two upper bounds for the robust risk and propose a regularization term for unlabeled data motivated by these two upper bounds. Then, we develop a semi-supervised adversarial training algorithm that combines the proposed regularization term with knowledge distillation using a semi-supervised teacher (i.e., a teacher model trained using a semi-supervised learning algorithm). Our experiments show that our proposed algorithm achieves state-of-the-art performance with significant margins compared to existing algorithms. In particular, compared to supervised learning algorithms, performance of our proposed algorithm is not much worse even when the amount of labeled data is very small. For example, our algorithm with only 8\% labeled data is comparable to supervised adversarial training algorithms that use all labeled data, both in terms of standard and robust accuracies on CIFAR-10.

Counterfactual explanations and adversarial attacks have a related goal: flipping output labels with minimal perturbations regardless of their characteristics. Yet, adversarial attacks cannot be used directly in a counterfactual explanation perspective, as such perturbations are perceived as noise and not as actionable and understandable image modifications. Building on the robust learning literature, this paper proposes an elegant method to turn adversarial attacks into semantically meaningful perturbations, without modifying the classifiers to explain. The proposed approach hypothesizes that Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models are excellent regularizers for avoiding high-frequency and out-of-distribution perturbations when generating adversarial attacks. The paper's key idea is to build attacks through a diffusion model to polish them. This allows studying the target model regardless of its robustification level. Extensive experimentation shows the advantages of our counterfactual explanation approach over current State-of-the-Art in multiple testbeds.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

We propose a new defense mechanism against adversarial attacks inspired by an optical co-processor, providing robustness without compromising natural accuracy in both white-box and black-box settings. This hardware co-processor performs a nonlinear fixed random transformation, where the parameters are unknown and impossible to retrieve with sufficient precision for large enough dimensions. In the white-box setting, our defense works by obfuscating the parameters of the random projection. Unlike other defenses relying on obfuscated gradients, we find we are unable to build a reliable backward differentiable approximation for obfuscated parameters. Moreover, while our model reaches a good natural accuracy with a hybrid backpropagation - synthetic gradient method, the same approach is suboptimal if employed to generate adversarial examples. We find the combination of a random projection and binarization in the optical system also improves robustness against various types of black-box attacks. Finally, our hybrid training method builds robust features against transfer attacks. We demonstrate our approach on a VGG-like architecture, placing the defense on top of the convolutional features, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Code is available at https://github.com/lightonai/adversarial-robustness-by-design.

Research on adversarial robustness is primarily focused on image and text data. Yet, many scenarios in which lack of robustness can result in serious risks, such as fraud detection, medical diagnosis, or recommender systems often do not rely on images or text but instead on tabular data. Adversarial robustness in tabular data poses two serious challenges. First, tabular datasets often contain categorical features, and therefore cannot be tackled directly with existing optimization procedures. Second, in the tabular domain, algorithms that are not based on deep networks are widely used and offer great performance, but algorithms to enhance robustness are tailored to neural networks (e.g. adversarial training). In this paper, we tackle both challenges. We present a method that allows us to train adversarially robust deep networks for tabular data and to transfer this robustness to other classifiers via universal robust embeddings tailored to categorical data. These embeddings, created using a bilevel alternating minimization framework, can be transferred to boosted trees or random forests making them robust without the need for adversarial training while preserving their high accuracy on tabular data. We show that our methods outperform existing techniques within a practical threat model suitable for tabular data.

The conventional wisdom behind learning deep classification models is to focus on bad-classified examples and ignore well-classified examples that are far from the decision boundary. For instance, when training with cross-entropy loss, examples with higher likelihoods (i.e., well-classified examples) contribute smaller gradients in back-propagation. However, we theoretically show that this common practice hinders representation learning, energy optimization, and margin growth. To counteract this deficiency, we propose to reward well-classified examples with additive bonuses to revive their contribution to the learning process. This counterexample theoretically addresses these three issues. We empirically support this claim by directly verifying the theoretical results or significant performance improvement with our counterexample on diverse tasks, including image classification, graph classification, and machine translation. Furthermore, this paper shows that we can deal with complex scenarios, such as imbalanced classification, OOD detection, and applications under adversarial attacks because our idea can solve these three issues. Code is available at: https://github.com/lancopku/well-classified-examples-are-underestimated.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are now commonly used in many domains. However, they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks: carefully crafted perturbations on data inputs that can fool a model into making incorrect predictions. Despite significant research on developing DNN attack and defense techniques, people still lack an understanding of how such attacks penetrate a model's internals. We present Bluff, an interactive system for visualizing, characterizing, and deciphering adversarial attacks on vision-based neural networks. Bluff allows people to flexibly visualize and compare the activation pathways for benign and attacked images, revealing mechanisms that adversarial attacks employ to inflict harm on a model. Bluff is open-sourced and runs in modern web browsers.

There has been a recent paradigm shift in robotics to data-driven learning for planning and control. Due to large number of experiences required for training, most of these approaches use a self-supervised paradigm: using sensors to measure success/failure. However, in most cases, these sensors provide weak supervision at best. In this work, we propose an adversarial learning framework that pits an adversary against the robot learning the task. In an effort to defeat the adversary, the original robot learns to perform the task with more robustness leading to overall improved performance. We show that this adversarial framework forces the the robot to learn a better grasping model in order to overcome the adversary. By grasping 82% of presented novel objects compared to 68% without an adversary, we demonstrate the utility of creating adversaries. We also demonstrate via experiments that having robots in adversarial setting might be a better learning strategy as compared to having collaborative multiple robots.

This paper addresses the challenges of aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values via preference learning (PL), with a focus on the issues of incomplete and corrupted data in preference datasets. We propose a novel method for robustly and completely recalibrating values within these datasets to enhance LLMs resilience against the issues. In particular, we devise a guaranteed polynomial time ranking algorithm that robustifies several existing models, such as the classic Bradley--Terry--Luce (BTL) (Bradley and Terry, 1952) model and certain generalizations of it. To the best of our knowledge, our present work is the first to propose an algorithm that provably recovers an {\epsilon}-optimal ranking with high probability while allowing as large as O(n) perturbed pairwise comparison results per model response. Furthermore, we show robust recovery results in the partially observed setting. Our experiments confirm that our algorithms handle adversarial noise and unobserved comparisons well in both general and LLM preference dataset settings. This work contributes to the development and scaling of more reliable and ethically aligned AI models by equipping the dataset curation pipeline with the ability to handle missing and maliciously manipulated inputs.

Adversarial examples provoke weak reliability and potential security issues in deep neural networks. Although adversarial training has been widely studied to improve adversarial robustness, it works in an over-parameterized regime and requires high computations and large memory budgets. To bridge adversarial robustness and model compression, we propose a novel adversarial pruning method, Masking Adversarial Damage (MAD) that employs second-order information of adversarial loss. By using it, we can accurately estimate adversarial saliency for model parameters and determine which parameters can be pruned without weakening adversarial robustness. Furthermore, we reveal that model parameters of initial layer are highly sensitive to the adversarial examples and show that compressed feature representation retains semantic information for the target objects. Through extensive experiments on three public datasets, we demonstrate that MAD effectively prunes adversarially trained networks without loosing adversarial robustness and shows better performance than previous adversarial pruning methods.

Evaluating the robustness of a defense model is a challenging task in adversarial robustness research. Obfuscated gradients have previously been found to exist in many defense methods and cause a false signal of robustness. In this paper, we identify a more subtle situation called Imbalanced Gradients that can also cause overestimated adversarial robustness. The phenomenon of imbalanced gradients occurs when the gradient of one term of the margin loss dominates and pushes the attack towards to a suboptimal direction. To exploit imbalanced gradients, we formulate a Margin Decomposition (MD) attack that decomposes a margin loss into individual terms and then explores the attackability of these terms separately via a two-stage process. We also propose a multi-targeted and ensemble version of our MD attack. By investigating 24 defense models proposed since 2018, we find that 11 models are susceptible to a certain degree of imbalanced gradients and our MD attack can decrease their robustness evaluated by the best standalone baseline attack by more than 1%. We also provide an in-depth investigation on the likely causes of imbalanced gradients and effective countermeasures. Our code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/MDAttack.

Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) to human preferences through preference optimization has been crucial but labor-intensive, necessitating for each prompt a comparison of both a chosen and a rejected text completion by evaluators. Recently, Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO) has demonstrated that LLMs can be aligned using merely binary "thumbs-up" or "thumbs-down" signals on each prompt-completion pair. In this paper, we present theoretical foundations to explain the successful alignment achieved through these binary signals. Our analysis uncovers a new perspective: optimizing a binary classifier, whose logit is a reward, implicitly induces minimizing the Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) loss. In the process of this discovery, we identified two techniques for effective alignment: reward shift and underlying distribution matching. Consequently, we propose a new algorithm, Binary Classifier Optimization, that integrates the techniques. We validate our methodology in two settings: first, on a paired preference dataset, where our method performs on par with DPO and KTO; and second, on binary signal datasets simulating real-world conditions with divergent underlying distributions between thumbs-up and thumbs-down data. Our model consistently demonstrates effective and robust alignment across two base LLMs and three different binary signal datasets, showcasing the strength of our approach to learning from binary feedback.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

Adversarial testing of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for their safe and responsible deployment. We introduce a novel approach for automated generation of adversarial evaluation datasets to test the safety of LLM generations on new downstream applications. We call it AI-assisted Red-Teaming (AART) - an automated alternative to current manual red-teaming efforts. AART offers a data generation and augmentation pipeline of reusable and customizable recipes that reduce human effort significantly and enable integration of adversarial testing earlier in new product development. AART generates evaluation datasets with high diversity of content characteristics critical for effective adversarial testing (e.g. sensitive and harmful concepts, specific to a wide range of cultural and geographic regions and application scenarios). The data generation is steered by AI-assisted recipes to define, scope and prioritize diversity within the application context. This feeds into a structured LLM-generation process that scales up evaluation priorities. Compared to some state-of-the-art tools, AART shows promising results in terms of concept coverage and data quality.

Recent work has shown that the training of a one-hidden-layer, scalar-output fully-connected ReLU neural network can be reformulated as a finite-dimensional convex program. Unfortunately, the scale of such a convex program grows exponentially in data size. In this work, we prove that a stochastic procedure with a linear complexity well approximates the exact formulation. Moreover, we derive a convex optimization approach to efficiently solve the "adversarial training" problem, which trains neural networks that are robust to adversarial input perturbations. Our method can be applied to binary classification and regression, and provides an alternative to the current adversarial training methods, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). We demonstrate in experiments that the proposed method achieves a noticeably better adversarial robustness and performance than the existing methods.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), which are further exacerbated by their multimodal nature. Existing defenses, including adversarial training, input transformations, and heuristic detection, are computationally expensive, architecture-dependent, and fragile against adaptive attacks. We introduce EigenShield, an inference-time defense leveraging Random Matrix Theory to quantify adversarial disruptions in high-dimensional VLM representations. Unlike prior methods that rely on empirical heuristics, EigenShield employs the spiked covariance model to detect structured spectral deviations. Using a Robustness-based Nonconformity Score (RbNS) and quantile-based thresholding, it separates causal eigenvectors, which encode semantic information, from correlational eigenvectors that are susceptible to adversarial artifacts. By projecting embeddings onto the causal subspace, EigenShield filters adversarial noise without modifying model parameters or requiring adversarial training. This architecture-independent, attack-agnostic approach significantly reduces the attack success rate, establishing spectral analysis as a principled alternative to conventional defenses. Our results demonstrate that EigenShield consistently outperforms all existing defenses, including adversarial training, UNIGUARD, and CIDER.

Recent years have witnessed remarkable progress made in large language models (LLMs). Such advancements, while garnering significant attention, have concurrently elicited various concerns. The potential of these models is undeniably vast; however, they may yield texts that are imprecise, misleading, or even detrimental. Consequently, it becomes paramount to employ alignment techniques to ensure these models to exhibit behaviors consistent with human values. This survey endeavors to furnish an extensive exploration of alignment methodologies designed for LLMs, in conjunction with the extant capability research in this domain. Adopting the lens of AI alignment, we categorize the prevailing methods and emergent proposals for the alignment of LLMs into outer and inner alignment. We also probe into salient issues including the models' interpretability, and potential vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. To assess LLM alignment, we present a wide variety of benchmarks and evaluation methodologies. After discussing the state of alignment research for LLMs, we finally cast a vision toward the future, contemplating the promising avenues of research that lie ahead. Our aspiration for this survey extends beyond merely spurring research interests in this realm. We also envision bridging the gap between the AI alignment research community and the researchers engrossed in the capability exploration of LLMs for both capable and safe LLMs.

Current studies on adversarial robustness mainly focus on aggregating local robustness results from a set of data samples to evaluate and rank different models. However, the local statistics may not well represent the true global robustness of the underlying unknown data distribution. To address this challenge, this paper makes the first attempt to present a new framework, called GREAT Score , for global robustness evaluation of adversarial perturbation using generative models. Formally, GREAT Score carries the physical meaning of a global statistic capturing a mean certified attack-proof perturbation level over all samples drawn from a generative model. For finite-sample evaluation, we also derive a probabilistic guarantee on the sample complexity and the difference between the sample mean and the true mean. GREAT Score has several advantages: (1) Robustness evaluations using GREAT Score are efficient and scalable to large models, by sparing the need of running adversarial attacks. In particular, we show high correlation and significantly reduced computation cost of GREAT Score when compared to the attack-based model ranking on RobustBench (Croce,et. al. 2021). (2) The use of generative models facilitates the approximation of the unknown data distribution. In our ablation study with different generative adversarial networks (GANs), we observe consistency between global robustness evaluation and the quality of GANs. (3) GREAT Score can be used for remote auditing of privacy-sensitive black-box models, as demonstrated by our robustness evaluation on several online facial recognition services.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that add malicious tokens to an input prompt to bypass the safety guardrails of an LLM and cause it to produce harmful content. In this work, we introduce erase-and-check, the first framework for defending against adversarial prompts with certifiable safety guarantees. Given a prompt, our procedure erases tokens individually and inspects the resulting subsequences using a safety filter. Our safety certificate guarantees that harmful prompts are not mislabeled as safe due to an adversarial attack up to a certain size. We implement the safety filter in two ways, using Llama 2 and DistilBERT, and compare the performance of erase-and-check for the two cases. We defend against three attack modes: i) adversarial suffix, where an adversarial sequence is appended at the end of a harmful prompt; ii) adversarial insertion, where the adversarial sequence is inserted anywhere in the middle of the prompt; and iii) adversarial infusion, where adversarial tokens are inserted at arbitrary positions in the prompt, not necessarily as a contiguous block. Our experimental results demonstrate that this procedure can obtain strong certified safety guarantees on harmful prompts while maintaining good empirical performance on safe prompts. Additionally, we propose three efficient empirical defenses: i) RandEC, a randomized subsampling version of erase-and-check; ii) GreedyEC, which greedily erases tokens that maximize the softmax score of the harmful class; and iii) GradEC, which uses gradient information to optimize tokens to erase. We demonstrate their effectiveness against adversarial prompts generated by the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack algorithm. The code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/aounon/certified-llm-safety.

Evasion attacks are a threat to machine learning models, where adversaries attempt to affect classifiers by injecting malicious samples. An alarming side-effect of evasion attacks is their ability to transfer among different models: this property is called transferability. Therefore, an attacker can produce adversarial samples on a custom model (surrogate) to conduct the attack on a victim's organization later. Although literature widely discusses how adversaries can transfer their attacks, their experimental settings are limited and far from reality. For instance, many experiments consider both attacker and defender sharing the same dataset, balance level (i.e., how the ground truth is distributed), and model architecture. In this work, we propose the DUMB attacker model. This framework allows analyzing if evasion attacks fail to transfer when the training conditions of surrogate and victim models differ. DUMB considers the following conditions: Dataset soUrces, Model architecture, and the Balance of the ground truth. We then propose a novel testbed to evaluate many state-of-the-art evasion attacks with DUMB; the testbed consists of three computer vision tasks with two distinct datasets each, four types of balance levels, and three model architectures. Our analysis, which generated 13K tests over 14 distinct attacks, led to numerous novel findings in the scope of transferable attacks with surrogate models. In particular, mismatches between attackers and victims in terms of dataset source, balance levels, and model architecture lead to non-negligible loss of attack performance.

This paper introduces FRACTURED-SORRY-Bench, a framework for evaluating the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) against multi-turn conversational attacks. Building upon the SORRY-Bench dataset, we propose a simple yet effective method for generating adversarial prompts by breaking down harmful queries into seemingly innocuous sub-questions. Our approach achieves a maximum increase of +46.22\% in Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-3.5-Turbo models compared to baseline methods. We demonstrate that this technique poses a challenge to current LLM safety measures and highlights the need for more robust defenses against subtle, multi-turn attacks.

It is well-known that the performance of well-trained deep neural networks may degrade significantly when they are applied to data with even slightly shifted distributions. Recent studies have shown that introducing certain perturbation on feature statistics (\eg, mean and standard deviation) during training can enhance the cross-domain generalization ability. Existing methods typically conduct such perturbation by utilizing the feature statistics within a mini-batch, limiting their representation capability. Inspired by the domain generalization objective, we introduce a novel Adversarial Style Augmentation (ASA) method, which explores broader style spaces by generating more effective statistics perturbation via adversarial training. Specifically, we first search for the most sensitive direction and intensity for statistics perturbation by maximizing the task loss. By updating the model against the adversarial statistics perturbation during training, we allow the model to explore the worst-case domain and hence improve its generalization performance. To facilitate the application of ASA, we design a simple yet effective module, namely AdvStyle, which instantiates the ASA method in a plug-and-play manner. We justify the efficacy of AdvStyle on tasks of cross-domain classification and instance retrieval. It achieves higher mean accuracy and lower performance fluctuation. Especially, our method significantly outperforms its competitors on the PACS dataset under the single source generalization setting, \eg, boosting the classification accuracy from 61.2\% to 67.1\% with a ResNet50 backbone. Our code will be available at https://github.com/YBZh/AdvStyle.

Alignment in large language models (LLMs) is used to enforce guidelines such as safety. Yet, alignment fails in the face of jailbreak attacks that modify inputs to induce unsafe outputs. In this paper, we present and evaluate a method to assess the robustness of LLM alignment. We observe that alignment embeds a safety classifier in the target model that is responsible for deciding between refusal and compliance. We seek to extract an approximation of this classifier, called a surrogate classifier, from the LLM. We develop an algorithm for identifying candidate classifiers from subsets of the LLM model. We evaluate the degree to which the candidate classifiers approximate the model's embedded classifier in benign (F1 score) and adversarial (using surrogates in a white-box attack) settings. Our evaluation shows that the best candidates achieve accurate agreement (an F1 score above 80%) using as little as 20% of the model architecture. Further, we find attacks mounted on the surrogate models can be transferred with high accuracy. For example, a surrogate using only 50% of the Llama 2 model achieved an attack success rate (ASR) of 70%, a substantial improvement over attacking the LLM directly, where we only observed a 22% ASR. These results show that extracting surrogate classifiers is a viable (and highly effective) means for modeling (and therein addressing) the vulnerability of aligned models to jailbreaking attacks.

Deploying large language models (LLMs) of several billion parameters can be impractical in most industrial use cases due to constraints such as cost, latency limitations, and hardware accessibility. Knowledge distillation (KD) offers a solution by compressing knowledge from resource-intensive large models to smaller ones. Various strategies exist, some relying on the text generated by the teacher model and optionally utilizing his logits to enhance learning. However, these methods based on logits often require both teacher and student models to share the same tokenizer, limiting their applicability across different LLM families. In this paper, we introduce Universal Logit Distillation (ULD) loss, grounded in optimal transport, to address this limitation. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of ULD loss in enabling distillation across models with different architectures and tokenizers, paving the way to a more widespread use of distillation techniques.

Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space attacks on reinforcement learning agents have a common weakness: while effective, their lack of temporal consistency makes them detectable using automated means or human inspection. Detectability is undesirable to adversaries as it may trigger security escalations. We introduce perfect illusory attacks, a novel form of adversarial attack on sequential decision-makers that is both effective and provably statistically undetectable. We then propose the more versatile R-attacks, which result in observation transitions that are consistent with the state-transition function of the adversary-free environment and can be learned end-to-end. Compared to existing attacks, we empirically find R-attacks to be significantly harder to detect with automated methods, and a small study with human subjects suggests they are similarly harder to detect for humans. We propose that undetectability should be a central concern in the study of adversarial attacks on mixed-autonomy settings.

The study of adversarial vulnerabilities of deep neural networks (DNNs) has progressed rapidly. Existing attacks require either internal access (to the architecture, parameters, or training set of the victim model) or external access (to query the model). However, both the access may be infeasible or expensive in many scenarios. We investigate no-box adversarial examples, where the attacker can neither access the model information or the training set nor query the model. Instead, the attacker can only gather a small number of examples from the same problem domain as that of the victim model. Such a stronger threat model greatly expands the applicability of adversarial attacks. We propose three mechanisms for training with a very small dataset (on the order of tens of examples) and find that prototypical reconstruction is the most effective. Our experiments show that adversarial examples crafted on prototypical auto-encoding models transfer well to a variety of image classification and face verification models. On a commercial celebrity recognition system held by clarifai.com, our approach significantly diminishes the average prediction accuracy of the system to only 15.40%, which is on par with the attack that transfers adversarial examples from a pre-trained Arcface model.

Recent work has demonstrated that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples---inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization. This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models. Code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with [email protected] as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

The conventional recipe for maximizing model accuracy is to (1) train multiple models with various hyperparameters and (2) pick the individual model which performs best on a held-out validation set, discarding the remainder. In this paper, we revisit the second step of this procedure in the context of fine-tuning large pre-trained models, where fine-tuned models often appear to lie in a single low error basin. We show that averaging the weights of multiple models fine-tuned with different hyperparameter configurations often improves accuracy and robustness. Unlike a conventional ensemble, we may average many models without incurring any additional inference or memory costs -- we call the results "model soups." When fine-tuning large pre-trained models such as CLIP, ALIGN, and a ViT-G pre-trained on JFT, our soup recipe provides significant improvements over the best model in a hyperparameter sweep on ImageNet. The resulting ViT-G model, which attains 90.94% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet, achieved a new state of the art. Furthermore, we show that the model soup approach extends to multiple image classification and natural language processing tasks, improves out-of-distribution performance, and improves zero-shot performance on new downstream tasks. Finally, we analytically relate the performance similarity of weight-averaging and logit-ensembling to flatness of the loss and confidence of the predictions, and validate this relation empirically. Code is available at https://github.com/mlfoundations/model-soups.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial training (AT) is an effective defense against adversarial examples. However, AT is prone to overfitting which degrades robustness substantially. Recently, data augmentation (DA) was shown to be effective in mitigating robust overfitting if appropriately designed and optimized for AT. This work proposes a new method to automatically learn online, instance-wise, DA policies to improve robust generalization for AT. A novel policy learning objective, consisting of Vulnerability, Affinity and Diversity, is proposed and shown to be sufficiently effective and efficient to be practical for automatic DA generation during AT. This allows our method to efficiently explore a large search space for a more effective DA policy and evolve the policy as training progresses. Empirically, our method is shown to outperform or match all competitive DA methods across various model architectures (CNNs and ViTs) and datasets (CIFAR10, SVHN and Imagenette). Our DA policy reinforced vanilla AT to surpass several state-of-the-art AT methods (with baseline DA) in terms of both accuracy and robustness. It can also be combined with those advanced AT methods to produce a further boost in robustness.

Although large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned, they remain vulnerable to jailbreaking through either carefully crafted prompts in natural language or, interestingly, gibberish adversarial suffixes. However, gibberish tokens have received relatively less attention despite their success in attacking aligned LLMs. Recent work, AmpleGCG~liao2024amplegcg, demonstrates that a generative model can quickly produce numerous customizable gibberish adversarial suffixes for any harmful query, exposing a range of alignment gaps in out-of-distribution (OOD) language spaces. To bring more attention to this area, we introduce AmpleGCG-Plus, an enhanced version that achieves better performance in fewer attempts. Through a series of exploratory experiments, we identify several training strategies to improve the learning of gibberish suffixes. Our results, verified under a strict evaluation setting, show that it outperforms AmpleGCG on both open-weight and closed-source models, achieving increases in attack success rate (ASR) of up to 17\% in the white-box setting against Llama-2-7B-chat, and more than tripling ASR in the black-box setting against GPT-4. Notably, AmpleGCG-Plus jailbreaks the newer GPT-4o series of models at similar rates to GPT-4, and, uncovers vulnerabilities against the recently proposed circuit breakers defense. We publicly release AmpleGCG-Plus along with our collected training datasets.

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Model attributions are important in deep neural networks as they aid practitioners in understanding the models, but recent studies reveal that attributions can be easily perturbed by adding imperceptible noise to the input. The non-differentiable Kendall's rank correlation is a key performance index for attribution protection. In this paper, we first show that the expected Kendall's rank correlation is positively correlated to cosine similarity and then indicate that the direction of attribution is the key to attribution robustness. Based on these findings, we explore the vector space of attribution to explain the shortcomings of attribution defense methods using ell_p norm and propose integrated gradient regularizer (IGR), which maximizes the cosine similarity between natural and perturbed attributions. Our analysis further exposes that IGR encourages neurons with the same activation states for natural samples and the corresponding perturbed samples, which is shown to induce robustness to gradient-based attribution methods. Our experiments on different models and datasets confirm our analysis on attribution protection and demonstrate a decent improvement in adversarial robustness.

Over the last decade, deep neural networks have achieved state of the art in computer vision tasks. These models, however, are susceptible to unusual inputs, known as adversarial examples, that cause them to misclassify or otherwise fail to detect objects. Here, we provide evidence that the increasing success of adversarial attacks is primarily due to increasing their size. We then demonstrate a method for generating the largest possible adversarial patch by building a adversarial pattern out of repeatable elements. This approach achieves a new state of the art in evading detection by YOLOv2 and YOLOv3. Finally, we present an experiment that fails to replicate the prior success of several attacks published in this field, and end with some comments on testing and reproducibility.