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Mar 14

Consistency-diversity-realism Pareto fronts of conditional image generative models

Building world models that accurately and comprehensively represent the real world is the utmost aspiration for conditional image generative models as it would enable their use as world simulators. For these models to be successful world models, they should not only excel at image quality and prompt-image consistency but also ensure high representation diversity. However, current research in generative models mostly focuses on creative applications that are predominantly concerned with human preferences of image quality and aesthetics. We note that generative models have inference time mechanisms - or knobs - that allow the control of generation consistency, quality, and diversity. In this paper, we use state-of-the-art text-to-image and image-and-text-to-image models and their knobs to draw consistency-diversity-realism Pareto fronts that provide a holistic view on consistency-diversity-realism multi-objective. Our experiments suggest that realism and consistency can both be improved simultaneously; however there exists a clear tradeoff between realism/consistency and diversity. By looking at Pareto optimal points, we note that earlier models are better at representation diversity and worse in consistency/realism, and more recent models excel in consistency/realism while decreasing significantly the representation diversity. By computing Pareto fronts on a geodiverse dataset, we find that the first version of latent diffusion models tends to perform better than more recent models in all axes of evaluation, and there exist pronounced consistency-diversity-realism disparities between geographical regions. Overall, our analysis clearly shows that there is no best model and the choice of model should be determined by the downstream application. With this analysis, we invite the research community to consider Pareto fronts as an analytical tool to measure progress towards world models.

PromptTTS 2: Describing and Generating Voices with Text Prompt

Speech conveys more information than just text, as the same word can be uttered in various voices to convey diverse information. Compared to traditional text-to-speech (TTS) methods relying on speech prompts (reference speech) for voice variability, using text prompts (descriptions) is more user-friendly since speech prompts can be hard to find or may not exist at all. TTS approaches based on the text prompt face two challenges: 1) the one-to-many problem, where not all details about voice variability can be described in the text prompt, and 2) the limited availability of text prompt datasets, where vendors and large cost of data labeling are required to write text prompt for speech. In this work, we introduce PromptTTS 2 to address these challenges with a variation network to provide variability information of voice not captured by text prompts, and a prompt generation pipeline to utilize the large language models (LLM) to compose high quality text prompts. Specifically, the variation network predicts the representation extracted from the reference speech (which contains full information about voice) based on the text prompt representation. For the prompt generation pipeline, it generates text prompts for speech with a speech understanding model to recognize voice attributes (e.g., gender, speed) from speech and a large language model to formulate text prompt based on the recognition results. Experiments on a large-scale (44K hours) speech dataset demonstrate that compared to the previous works, PromptTTS 2 generates voices more consistent with text prompts and supports the sampling of diverse voice variability, thereby offering users more choices on voice generation. Additionally, the prompt generation pipeline produces high-quality prompts, eliminating the large labeling cost. The demo page of PromptTTS 2 is available onlinehttps://speechresearch.github.io/prompttts2.

The Trickle-down Impact of Reward (In-)consistency on RLHF

Standard practice within Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involves optimizing against a Reward Model (RM), which itself is trained to reflect human preferences for desirable generations. A notable subject that is understudied is the (in-)consistency of RMs -- whether they can recognize the semantic changes to different prompts and appropriately adapt their reward assignments -- and their impact on the downstream RLHF model. In this paper, we visit a series of research questions relevant to RM inconsistency: (1) How can we measure the consistency of reward models? (2) How consistent are the existing RMs and how can we improve them? (3) In what ways does reward inconsistency influence the chatbots resulting from the RLHF model training? We propose Contrast Instructions -- a benchmarking strategy for the consistency of RM. Each example in Contrast Instructions features a pair of lexically similar instructions with different ground truth responses. A consistent RM is expected to rank the corresponding instruction and response higher than other combinations. We observe that current RMs trained with the standard ranking objective fail miserably on Contrast Instructions compared to average humans. To show that RM consistency can be improved efficiently without using extra training budget, we propose two techniques ConvexDA and RewardFusion, which enhance reward consistency through extrapolation during the RM training and inference stage, respectively. We show that RLHF models trained with a more consistent RM yield more useful responses, suggesting that reward inconsistency exhibits a trickle-down effect on the downstream RLHF process.

Self-Consistency of the Internal Reward Models Improves Self-Rewarding Language Models

Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications. Recent advancements in Self-Rewarding Language Models suggest that an LLM can use its internal reward models (such as LLM-as-a-Judge) yuanself to generate preference data, improving alignment performance without costly human annotation. However, we find that different internal reward models within the same LLM often generate inconsistent preferences. This inconsistency raises concerns about the reliability of self-generated preference data, hinders overall alignment performance, and highlights the need for further research to ensure reliable and coherent alignment with human preferences. To address this limitation, we propose Self-Consistent Internal Rewards (SCIR), a novel framework designed to enhance consistency among internal reward models during training. In each training step, we collect preference predictions from multiple pre-defined internal reward models and enforce consistency and confidence through an inconsistency penalty mechanism, thereby improving the reliability of these internal reward models. We selectively use data with consistent predictions for preference optimization, ensuring the quality of the preference data. By employing self-consistent internal rewards, our method significantly improves the alignment performance and reward modeling capability of LLMs, outperforming baseline methods by a notable margin.

Diminished Diversity-of-Thought in a Standard Large Language Model

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Equality before the Law: Legal Judgment Consistency Analysis for Fairness

In a legal system, judgment consistency is regarded as one of the most important manifestations of fairness. However, due to the complexity of factual elements that impact sentencing in real-world scenarios, few works have been done on quantitatively measuring judgment consistency towards real-world data. In this paper, we propose an evaluation metric for judgment inconsistency, Legal Inconsistency Coefficient (LInCo), which aims to evaluate inconsistency between data groups divided by specific features (e.g., gender, region, race). We propose to simulate judges from different groups with legal judgment prediction (LJP) models and measure the judicial inconsistency with the disagreement of the judgment results given by LJP models trained on different groups. Experimental results on the synthetic data verify the effectiveness of LInCo. We further employ LInCo to explore the inconsistency in real cases and come to the following observations: (1) Both regional and gender inconsistency exist in the legal system, but gender inconsistency is much less than regional inconsistency; (2) The level of regional inconsistency varies little across different time periods; (3) In general, judicial inconsistency is negatively correlated with the severity of the criminal charges. Besides, we use LInCo to evaluate the performance of several de-bias methods, such as adversarial learning, and find that these mechanisms can effectively help LJP models to avoid suffering from data bias.

BARS: Towards Open Benchmarking for Recommender Systems

The past two decades have witnessed the rapid development of personalized recommendation techniques. Despite significant progress made in both research and practice of recommender systems, to date, there is a lack of a widely-recognized benchmarking standard in this field. Many existing studies perform model evaluations and comparisons in an ad-hoc manner, for example, by employing their own private data splits or using different experimental settings. Such conventions not only increase the difficulty in reproducing existing studies, but also lead to inconsistent experimental results among them. This largely limits the credibility and practical value of research results in this field. To tackle these issues, we present an initiative project (namely BARS) aiming for open benchmarking for recommender systems. In comparison to some earlier attempts towards this goal, we take a further step by setting up a standardized benchmarking pipeline for reproducible research, which integrates all the details about datasets, source code, hyper-parameter settings, running logs, and evaluation results. The benchmark is designed with comprehensiveness and sustainability in mind. It covers both matching and ranking tasks, and also enables researchers to easily follow and contribute to the research in this field. This project will not only reduce the redundant efforts of researchers to re-implement or re-run existing baselines, but also drive more solid and reproducible research on recommender systems. We would like to call upon everyone to use the BARS benchmark for future evaluation, and contribute to the project through the portal at: https://openbenchmark.github.io/BARS.

Multiple Choice Questions: Reasoning Makes Large Language Models (LLMs) More Self-Confident Even When They Are Wrong

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

DailyDilemmas: Revealing Value Preferences of LLMs with Quandaries of Daily Life

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Fair coins tend to land on the same side they started: Evidence from 350,757 flips

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. In a preregistered study we collected 350{,}757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery (DHM; 2007). The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started -- DHM estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51%. Our data lend strong support to this precise prediction: the coins landed on the same side more often than not, Pr(same side) = 0.508, 95% credible interval (CI) [0.506, 0.509], BF_{same-side bias} = 2359. Furthermore, the data revealed considerable between-people variation in the degree of this same-side bias. Our data also confirmed the generic prediction that when people flip an ordinary coin -- with the initial side-up randomly determined -- it is equally likely to land heads or tails: Pr(heads) = 0.500, 95% CI [0.498, 0.502], BF_{heads-tails bias} = 0.182. Furthermore, this lack of heads-tails bias does not appear to vary across coins. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that the within-people same-side bias decreased as more coins were flipped, an effect that is consistent with the possibility that practice makes people flip coins in a less wobbly fashion. Our data therefore provide strong evidence that when some (but not all) people flip a fair coin, it tends to land on the same side it started. Our data provide compelling statistical support for the DHM physics model of coin tossing.

Toward Stable and Consistent Evaluation Results: A New Methodology for Base Model Evaluation

This paper poses two critical issues in evaluating base models (without post-training): (1) Unstable evaluation during training: in the early stages of pre-training, the models lack the capability to answer questions as required, leading to unstable evaluation results. This instability makes it difficult to provide solid conclusions to guide the training, especially for key experiments such as data ablation and scaling law. (2) Inconsistency between base and instruct models: base models generally exhibit poorer evaluation performance compared to corresponding instruct models. This gap poses a challenge for assessing whether a base model with better evaluation can truly lead to a better instruct model. To address these issues, we propose Base model Oriented Systematic Evaluation (BOSE), a method specifically designed to optimize the evaluation of base models. Specifically, BOSE introduces two key innovations: In-Context Light-instruction Prompt (ICLiP) for open-ended tasks and Blank-ppl for multi-choice tasks with candidate options, which transforms the standard perplexity (ppl) metric into a fill-in-the-blank format to mitigate early-stage evaluation fluctuations. Furthermore, we are the first to propose Kendall's rank correlation to quantitatively measure the evaluation stability and consistency. Experimental results demonstrate that BOSE significantly enhances both the stability of evaluations during pre-training and the consistency between base and instruct models, thereby providing more reliable guidance for the LLMs' training.

Why Has Predicting Downstream Capabilities of Frontier AI Models with Scale Remained Elusive?

Predictable behavior from scaling advanced AI systems is an extremely desirable property. Although a well-established literature exists on how pretraining performance scales, the literature on how particular downstream capabilities scale is significantly muddier. In this work, we take a step back and ask: why has predicting specific downstream capabilities with scale remained elusive? While many factors are certainly responsible, we identify a new factor that makes modeling scaling behavior on widely used multiple-choice question-answering benchmarks challenging. Using five model families and twelve well-established multiple-choice benchmarks, we show that downstream performance is computed from negative log likelihoods via a sequence of transformations that progressively degrade the statistical relationship between performance and scale. We then reveal the mechanism causing this degradation: downstream metrics require comparing the correct choice against a small number of specific incorrect choices, meaning accurately predicting downstream capabilities requires predicting not just how probability mass concentrates on the correct choice with scale, but also how probability mass fluctuates on specific incorrect choices with scale. We empirically study how probability mass on the correct choice co-varies with probability mass on incorrect choices with increasing compute, suggesting that scaling laws for incorrect choices might be achievable. Our work also explains why pretraining scaling laws are commonly regarded as more predictable than downstream capabilities and contributes towards establishing scaling-predictable evaluations of frontier AI models.

Do Language Models Know When They're Hallucinating References?

State-of-the-art language models (LMs) are notoriously susceptible to generating hallucinated information. Such inaccurate outputs not only undermine the reliability of these models but also limit their use and raise serious concerns about misinformation and propaganda. In this work, we focus on hallucinated book and article references and present them as the "model organism" of language model hallucination research, due to their frequent and easy-to-discern nature. We posit that if a language model cites a particular reference in its output, then it should ideally possess sufficient information about its authors and content, among other relevant details. Using this basic insight, we illustrate that one can identify hallucinated references without ever consulting any external resources, by asking a set of direct or indirect queries to the language model about the references. These queries can be considered as "consistency checks." Our findings highlight that while LMs, including GPT-4, often produce inconsistent author lists for hallucinated references, they also often accurately recall the authors of real references. In this sense, the LM can be said to "know" when it is hallucinating references. Furthermore, these findings show how hallucinated references can be dissected to shed light on their nature. Replication code and results can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/hallucinated-references.

Transforming and Combining Rewards for Aligning Large Language Models

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

On the Existence of Simpler Machine Learning Models

It is almost always easier to find an accurate-but-complex model than an accurate-yet-simple model. Finding optimal, sparse, accurate models of various forms (linear models with integer coefficients, decision sets, rule lists, decision trees) is generally NP-hard. We often do not know whether the search for a simpler model will be worthwhile, and thus we do not go to the trouble of searching for one. In this work, we ask an important practical question: can accurate-yet-simple models be proven to exist, or shown likely to exist, before explicitly searching for them? We hypothesize that there is an important reason that simple-yet-accurate models often do exist. This hypothesis is that the size of the Rashomon set is often large, where the Rashomon set is the set of almost-equally-accurate models from a function class. If the Rashomon set is large, it contains numerous accurate models, and perhaps at least one of them is the simple model we desire. In this work, we formally present the Rashomon ratio as a new gauge of simplicity for a learning problem, depending on a function class and a data set. The Rashomon ratio is the ratio of the volume of the set of accurate models to the volume of the hypothesis space, and it is different from standard complexity measures from statistical learning theory. Insight from studying the Rashomon ratio provides an easy way to check whether a simpler model might exist for a problem before finding it, namely whether several different machine learning methods achieve similar performance on the data. In that sense, the Rashomon ratio is a powerful tool for understanding why and when an accurate-yet-simple model might exist. If, as we hypothesize in this work, many real-world data sets admit large Rashomon sets, the implications are vast: it means that simple or interpretable models may often be used for high-stakes decisions without losing accuracy.

The Many Dimensions of Truthfulness: Crowdsourcing Misinformation Assessments on a Multidimensional Scale

Recent work has demonstrated the viability of using crowdsourcing as a tool for evaluating the truthfulness of public statements. Under certain conditions such as: (1) having a balanced set of workers with different backgrounds and cognitive abilities; (2) using an adequate set of mechanisms to control the quality of the collected data; and (3) using a coarse grained assessment scale, the crowd can provide reliable identification of fake news. However, fake news are a subtle matter: statements can be just biased ("cherrypicked"), imprecise, wrong, etc. and the unidimensional truth scale used in existing work cannot account for such differences. In this paper we propose a multidimensional notion of truthfulness and we ask the crowd workers to assess seven different dimensions of truthfulness selected based on existing literature: Correctness, Neutrality, Comprehensibility, Precision, Completeness, Speaker's Trustworthiness, and Informativeness. We deploy a set of quality control mechanisms to ensure that the thousands of assessments collected on 180 publicly available fact-checked statements distributed over two datasets are of adequate quality, including a custom search engine used by the crowd workers to find web pages supporting their truthfulness assessments. A comprehensive analysis of crowdsourced judgments shows that: (1) the crowdsourced assessments are reliable when compared to an expert-provided gold standard; (2) the proposed dimensions of truthfulness capture independent pieces of information; (3) the crowdsourcing task can be easily learned by the workers; and (4) the resulting assessments provide a useful basis for a more complete estimation of statement truthfulness.

Preference Learning Algorithms Do Not Learn Preference Rankings

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

Beyond Preferences in AI Alignment

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Unintentional Unalignment: Likelihood Displacement in Direct Preference Optimization

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

Constraints on the variation of the fine-structure constant at 3<z<10 with JWST emission-line galaxies

We present constraints on the spacetime variation of the fine-structure constant alpha at redshifts 2.5le z<9.5 using JWST emission-line galaxies. The galaxy sample consists of 621 high-quality spectra with strong and narrow [O III] lambdalambda4959,5007 doublet emission lines from 578 galaxies, including 232 spectra at z>5. The [O III] doublet lines are arguably the best emission lines to probe the variation in alpha. We divide our sample into six subsamples based on redshift and calculate the relative variation Deltaalpha/alpha for the individual subsamples. The calculated Deltaalpha/alpha values are consistent with zero within 1sigma at all redshifts, suggesting no time variation in alpha above a level of (1-2) times10^{-4} (1sigma) in the past 13.2 billion years. When the whole sample is combined, the constraint is improved to be Deltaalpha/alpha = (0.2pm0.7) times10^{-4}. We further test the spatial variation in alpha using four subsamples of galaxies in four different directions on the sky. The measured Deltaalpha/alpha values are consistent with zero at a 1sigma level of sim 2times10^{-4}. While the constraints in this work are not as stringent as those from lower-redshift quasar absorption lines in previous studies, this work uses an independent tracer and provides the first constraints on Deltaalpha/alpha at the highest redshifts. With the growing number of emission-line galaxies from JWST, we expect to achieve stronger constraints in the future.

Disagreement as a way to study misinformation and its effects

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

CREAM: Consistency Regularized Self-Rewarding Language Models

Recent self-rewarding large language models (LLM) have successfully applied LLM-as-a-Judge to iteratively improve the alignment performance without the need of human annotations for preference data. These methods commonly utilize the same LLM to act as both the policy model (which generates responses) and the reward model (which scores and ranks those responses). The ranked responses are then used as preference pairs to train the LLM via direct alignment technologies (e.g. DPO). However, it is noteworthy that throughout this process, there is no guarantee of accuracy in the rewarding and ranking, which is critical for ensuring accurate rewards and high-quality preference data. Empirical results from relatively small LLMs (e.g., 7B parameters) also indicate that improvements from self-rewarding may diminish after several iterations in certain situations, which we hypothesize is due to accumulated bias in the reward system. This bias can lead to unreliable preference data for training the LLM. To address this issue, we first formulate and analyze the generalized iterative preference fine-tuning framework for self-rewarding language model. We then introduce the regularization to this generalized framework to mitigate the overconfident preference labeling in the self-rewarding process. Based on this theoretical insight, we propose a Consistency Regularized sElf-rewarding lAnguage Model (CREAM) that leverages the rewarding consistency across different iterations to regularize the self-rewarding training, helping the model to learn from more reliable preference data. With this explicit regularization, our empirical results demonstrate the superiority of CREAM in improving both reward consistency and alignment performance. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Raibows/CREAM.

Two Case Studies of Experience Prototyping Machine Learning Systems in the Wild

Throughout the course of my Ph.D., I have been designing the user experience (UX) of various machine learning (ML) systems. In this workshop, I share two projects as case studies in which people engage with ML in much more complicated and nuanced ways than the technical HCML work might assume. The first case study describes how cardiology teams in three hospitals used a clinical decision-support system that helps them decide whether and when to implant an artificial heart to a heart failure patient. I demonstrate that physicians cannot draw on their decision-making experience by seeing only patient data on paper. They are also confused by some fundamental premises upon which ML operates. For example, physicians asked: Are ML predictions made based on clinicians' best efforts? Is it ethical to make decisions based on previous patients' collective outcomes? In the second case study, my collaborators and I designed an intelligent text editor, with the goal of improving authors' writing experience with NLP (Natural Language Processing) technologies. We prototyped a number of generative functionalities where the system provides phrase-or-sentence-level writing suggestions upon user request. When writing with the prototype, however, authors shared that they need to "see where the sentence is going two paragraphs later" in order to decide whether the suggestion aligns with their writing; Some even considered adopting machine suggestions as plagiarism, therefore "is simply wrong". By sharing these unexpected and intriguing responses from these real-world ML users, I hope to start a discussion about such previously-unknown complexities and nuances of -- as the workshop proposal states -- "putting ML at the service of people in a way that is accessible, useful, and trustworthy to all".

What are human values, and how do we align AI to them?

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

Margin-aware Preference Optimization for Aligning Diffusion Models without Reference

Modern alignment techniques based on human preferences, such as RLHF and DPO, typically employ divergence regularization relative to the reference model to ensure training stability. However, this often limits the flexibility of models during alignment, especially when there is a clear distributional discrepancy between the preference data and the reference model. In this paper, we focus on the alignment of recent text-to-image diffusion models, such as Stable Diffusion XL (SDXL), and find that this "reference mismatch" is indeed a significant problem in aligning these models due to the unstructured nature of visual modalities: e.g., a preference for a particular stylistic aspect can easily induce such a discrepancy. Motivated by this observation, we propose a novel and memory-friendly preference alignment method for diffusion models that does not depend on any reference model, coined margin-aware preference optimization (MaPO). MaPO jointly maximizes the likelihood margin between the preferred and dispreferred image sets and the likelihood of the preferred sets, simultaneously learning general stylistic features and preferences. For evaluation, we introduce two new pairwise preference datasets, which comprise self-generated image pairs from SDXL, Pick-Style and Pick-Safety, simulating diverse scenarios of reference mismatch. Our experiments validate that MaPO can significantly improve alignment on Pick-Style and Pick-Safety and general preference alignment when used with Pick-a-Pic v2, surpassing the base SDXL and other existing methods. Our code, models, and datasets are publicly available via https://mapo-t2i.github.io

An Analysis of Approaches Taken in the ACM RecSys Challenge 2018 for Automatic Music Playlist Continuation

The ACM Recommender Systems Challenge 2018 focused on the task of automatic music playlist continuation, which is a form of the more general task of sequential recommendation. Given a playlist of arbitrary length with some additional meta-data, the task was to recommend up to 500 tracks that fit the target characteristics of the original playlist. For the RecSys Challenge, Spotify released a dataset of one million user-generated playlists. Participants could compete in two tracks, i.e., main and creative tracks. Participants in the main track were only allowed to use the provided training set, however, in the creative track, the use of external public sources was permitted. In total, 113 teams submitted 1,228 runs to the main track; 33 teams submitted 239 runs to the creative track. The highest performing team in the main track achieved an R-precision of 0.2241, an NDCG of 0.3946, and an average number of recommended songs clicks of 1.784. In the creative track, an R-precision of 0.2233, an NDCG of 0.3939, and a click rate of 1.785 was obtained by the best team. This article provides an overview of the challenge, including motivation, task definition, dataset description, and evaluation. We further report and analyze the results obtained by the top performing teams in each track and explore the approaches taken by the winners. We finally summarize our key findings, discuss generalizability of approaches and results to domains other than music, and list the open avenues and possible future directions in the area of automatic playlist continuation.

Secrets of RLHF in Large Language Models Part II: Reward Modeling

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

How Discriminative Are Your Qrels? How To Study the Statistical Significance of Document Adjudication Methods

Creating test collections for offline retrieval evaluation requires human effort to judge documents' relevance. This expensive activity motivated much work in developing methods for constructing benchmarks with fewer assessment costs. In this respect, adjudication methods actively decide both which documents and the order in which experts review them, in order to better exploit the assessment budget or to lower it. Researchers evaluate the quality of those methods by measuring the correlation between the known gold ranking of systems under the full collection and the observed ranking of systems under the lower-cost one. This traditional analysis ignores whether and how the low-cost judgements impact on the statistically significant differences among systems with respect to the full collection. We fill this void by proposing a novel methodology to evaluate how the low-cost adjudication methods preserve the pairwise significant differences between systems as the full collection. In other terms, while traditional approaches look for stability in answering the question "is system A better than system B?", our proposed approach looks for stability in answering the question "is system A significantly better than system B?", which is the ultimate questions researchers need to answer to guarantee the generalisability of their results. Among other results, we found that the best methods in terms of ranking of systems correlation do not always match those preserving statistical significance.