Daily Papers

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (e.g. GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, etc.) in software engineers' daily practices, it is important to ensure that the code generated by these tools is not only functionally correct but also free of vulnerabilities. Although LLMs can help developers to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can generate insecure code. There are two contributing factors to the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) do not adequately represent genuine software engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on competitive programming challenges or classroom-type coding tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger codebases, introducing potential security risks. There's a clear absence of benchmarks that focus on evaluating the security of the generated code. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security considerations. Metrics such as pass@k gauge the probability of obtaining the correct code in the top k suggestions. Other popular metrics like BLEU, CodeBLEU, ROUGE, and METEOR similarly emphasize functional accuracy, neglecting security implications. In light of these research gaps, in this paper, we described SALLM, a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This framework has three major components: a novel dataset of security-centric Python prompts, an evaluation environment to test the generated code, and novel metrics to evaluate the models' performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models(LLMs) have had a significant impact on a wide range of fields, from general domains to specialized areas. However, these advancements have also significantly increased the potential for malicious users to exploit harmful and jailbreak prompts for malicious attacks. Although there have been many efforts to prevent harmful prompts and jailbreak prompts, protecting LLMs from such malicious attacks remains an important and challenging task. In this paper, we propose QGuard, a simple yet effective safety guard method, that utilizes question prompting to block harmful prompts in a zero-shot manner. Our method can defend LLMs not only from text-based harmful prompts but also from multi-modal harmful prompt attacks. Moreover, by diversifying and modifying guard questions, our approach remains robust against the latest harmful prompts without fine-tuning. Experimental results show that our model performs competitively on both text-only and multi-modal harmful datasets. Additionally, by providing an analysis of question prompting, we enable a white-box analysis of user inputs. We believe our method provides valuable insights for real-world LLM services in mitigating security risks associated with harmful prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

Prompt engineering has emerged as a powerful technique for optimizing large language models (LLMs) for specific applications, enabling faster prototyping and improved performance, and giving rise to the interest of the community in protecting proprietary system prompts. In this work, we explore a novel perspective on prompt privacy through the lens of membership inference. We develop Prompt Detective, a statistical method to reliably determine whether a given system prompt was used by a third-party language model. Our approach relies on a statistical test comparing the distributions of two groups of model outputs corresponding to different system prompts. Through extensive experiments with a variety of language models, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Prompt Detective for prompt membership inference. Our work reveals that even minor changes in system prompts manifest in distinct response distributions, enabling us to verify prompt usage with statistical significance.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

The rise of capabilities expressed by large language models has been quickly followed by the integration of the same complex systems into application level logic. Algorithms, programs, systems, and companies are built around structured prompting to black box models where the majority of the design and implementation lies in capturing and quantifying the `agent mode'. The standard way to shape a closed language model is to prime it for a specific task with a tailored prompt, often initially handwritten by a human. The textual prompts co-evolve with the codebase, taking shape over the course of project life as artifacts which must be reviewed and maintained, just as the traditional code files might be. Unlike traditional code, we find that prompts do not receive effective static testing and linting to prevent runtime issues. In this work, we present a novel dataset called PromptSet, with more than 61,000 unique developer prompts used in open source Python programs. We perform analysis on this dataset and introduce the notion of a static linter for prompts. Released with this publication is a HuggingFace dataset and a Github repository to recreate collection and processing efforts, both under the name pisterlabs/promptset.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 126,000 prompt injection attacks and 46,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the largest dataset of human-generated adversarial examples for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have a lot of easily interpretable stucture, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as prompt extraction and prompt hijacking. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release all data and source code at https://tensortrust.ai/paper

Large language models (LLMs) have profoundly transformed natural language applications, with a growing reliance on instruction-based definitions for designing chatbots. However, post-deployment the chatbot definitions are fixed and are vulnerable to attacks by malicious users, emphasizing the need to prevent unethical applications and financial losses. Existing studies explore user prompts' impact on LLM-based chatbots, yet practical methods to contain attacks on application-specific chatbots remain unexplored. This paper presents System Prompt Meta Language (SPML), a domain-specific language for refining prompts and monitoring the inputs to the LLM-based chatbots. SPML actively checks attack prompts, ensuring user inputs align with chatbot definitions to prevent malicious execution on the LLM backbone, optimizing costs. It also streamlines chatbot definition crafting with programming language capabilities, overcoming natural language design challenges. Additionally, we introduce a groundbreaking benchmark with 1.8k system prompts and 20k user inputs, offering the inaugural language and benchmark for chatbot definition evaluation. Experiments across datasets demonstrate SPML's proficiency in understanding attacker prompts, surpassing models like GPT-4, GPT-3.5, and LLAMA. Our data and codes are publicly available at: https://prompt-compiler.github.io/SPML/.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

As the integration of the Large Language Models (LLMs) into various applications increases, so does their susceptibility to misuse, raising significant security concerns. Numerous jailbreak attacks have been proposed to assess the security defense of LLMs. Current jailbreak attacks mainly rely on scenario camouflage, prompt obfuscation, prompt optimization, and prompt iterative optimization to conceal malicious prompts. In particular, sequential prompt chains in a single query can lead LLMs to focus on certain prompts while ignoring others, facilitating context manipulation. This paper introduces SequentialBreak, a novel jailbreak attack that exploits this vulnerability. We discuss several scenarios, not limited to examples like Question Bank, Dialog Completion, and Game Environment, where the harmful prompt is embedded within benign ones that can fool LLMs into generating harmful responses. The distinct narrative structures of these scenarios show that SequentialBreak is flexible enough to adapt to various prompt formats beyond those discussed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SequentialBreak uses only a single query to achieve a substantial gain of attack success rate over existing baselines against both open-source and closed-source models. Through our research, we highlight the urgent need for more robust and resilient safeguards to enhance LLM security and prevent potential misuse. All the result files and website associated with this research are available in this GitHub repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/JailBreakAttack-4F3B/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to red teaming attacks, which can induce LLMs to generate harmful content. Previous research constructs attack prompts via manual or automatic methods, which have their own limitations on construction cost and quality. To address these issues, we propose an integrated approach that combines manual and automatic methods to economically generate high-quality attack prompts. Specifically, considering the impressive capabilities of newly emerged LLMs, we propose an attack framework to instruct LLMs to mimic human-generated prompts through in-context learning. Furthermore, we propose a defense framework that fine-tunes victim LLMs through iterative interactions with the attack framework to enhance their safety against red teaming attacks. Extensive experiments on different LLMs validate the effectiveness of our proposed attack and defense frameworks. Additionally, we release a series of attack prompts datasets named SAP with varying sizes, facilitating the safety evaluation and enhancement of more LLMs. Our code and dataset is available on https://github.com/Aatrox103/SAP .

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Large language models and AI chatbots have been at the forefront of democratizing artificial intelligence. However, the releases of ChatGPT and other similar tools have been followed by growing concerns regarding the difficulty of controlling large language models and their outputs. Currently, we are witnessing a cat-and-mouse game where users attempt to misuse the models with a novel attack called prompt injections. In contrast, the developers attempt to discover the vulnerabilities and block the attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we provide an overview of these emergent threats and present a categorization of prompt injections, which can guide future research on prompt injections and act as a checklist of vulnerabilities in the development of LLM interfaces. Moreover, based on previous literature and our own empirical research, we discuss the implications of prompt injections to LLM end users, developers, and researchers.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

Text-to-Image generation models have revolutionized the artwork design process and enabled anyone to create high-quality images by entering text descriptions called prompts. Creating a high-quality prompt that consists of a subject and several modifiers can be time-consuming and costly. In consequence, a trend of trading high-quality prompts on specialized marketplaces has emerged. In this paper, we propose a novel attack, namely prompt stealing attack, which aims to steal prompts from generated images by text-to-image generation models. Successful prompt stealing attacks direct violate the intellectual property and privacy of prompt engineers and also jeopardize the business model of prompt trading marketplaces. We first perform a large-scale analysis on a dataset collected by ourselves and show that a successful prompt stealing attack should consider a prompt's subject as well as its modifiers. We then propose the first learning-based prompt stealing attack, PromptStealer, and demonstrate its superiority over two baseline methods quantitatively and qualitatively. We also make some initial attempts to defend PromptStealer. In general, our study uncovers a new attack surface in the ecosystem created by the popular text-to-image generation models. We hope our results can help to mitigate the threat. To facilitate research in this field, we will share our dataset and code with the community.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

The increasing reliance on Large Language Models (LLMs) across academia and industry necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their robustness to prompts. In response to this vital need, we introduce PromptBench, a robustness benchmark designed to measure LLMs' resilience to adversarial prompts. This study uses a plethora of adversarial textual attacks targeting prompts across multiple levels: character, word, sentence, and semantic. These prompts are then employed in diverse tasks, such as sentiment analysis, natural language inference, reading comprehension, machine translation, and math problem-solving. Our study generates 4,032 adversarial prompts, meticulously evaluated over 8 tasks and 13 datasets, with 567,084 test samples in total. Our findings demonstrate that contemporary LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial prompts. Furthermore, we present comprehensive analysis to understand the mystery behind prompt robustness and its transferability. We then offer insightful robustness analysis and pragmatic recommendations for prompt composition, beneficial to both researchers and everyday users. We make our code, prompts, and methodologies to generate adversarial prompts publicly accessible, thereby enabling and encouraging collaborative exploration in this pivotal field: https://github.com/microsoft/promptbench.

Text-to-Image models may generate harmful content, such as pornographic images, particularly when unsafe prompts are submitted. To address this issue, safety filters are often added on top of text-to-image models, or the models themselves are aligned to reduce harmful outputs. However, these defenses remain vulnerable when an attacker strategically designs adversarial prompts to bypass these safety guardrails. In this work, we propose PromptTune, a method to jailbreak text-to-image models with safety guardrails using a fine-tuned large language model. Unlike other query-based jailbreak attacks that require repeated queries to the target model, our attack generates adversarial prompts efficiently after fine-tuning our AttackLLM. We evaluate our method on three datasets of unsafe prompts and against five safety guardrails. Our results demonstrate that our approach effectively bypasses safety guardrails, outperforms existing no-box attacks, and also facilitates other query-based attacks.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

The evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is crucial to assess their performance and mitigate potential security risks. In this paper, we introduce PromptBench, a unified library to evaluate LLMs. It consists of several key components that are easily used and extended by researchers: prompt construction, prompt engineering, dataset and model loading, adversarial prompt attack, dynamic evaluation protocols, and analysis tools. PromptBench is designed to be an open, general, and flexible codebase for research purposes that can facilitate original study in creating new benchmarks, deploying downstream applications, and designing new evaluation protocols. The code is available at: https://github.com/microsoft/promptbench and will be continuously supported.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

We surface a new threat to closed-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) that enables an attacker to compute optimization-based prompt injections. Specifically, we characterize how an attacker can leverage the loss-like information returned from the remote fine-tuning interface to guide the search for adversarial prompts. The fine-tuning interface is hosted by an LLM vendor and allows developers to fine-tune LLMs for their tasks, thus providing utility, but also exposes enough information for an attacker to compute adversarial prompts. Through an experimental analysis, we characterize the loss-like values returned by the Gemini fine-tuning API and demonstrate that they provide a useful signal for discrete optimization of adversarial prompts using a greedy search algorithm. Using the PurpleLlama prompt injection benchmark, we demonstrate attack success rates between 65% and 82% on Google's Gemini family of LLMs. These attacks exploit the classic utility-security tradeoff - the fine-tuning interface provides a useful feature for developers but also exposes the LLMs to powerful attacks.

Safety, security, and compliance are essential requirements when aligning large language models (LLMs). However, many seemingly aligned LLMs are soon shown to be susceptible to jailbreak attacks. These attacks aim to circumvent the models' safety guardrails and security mechanisms by introducing jailbreak prompts into malicious queries. In response to these challenges, this paper introduces Defensive Prompt Patch (DPP), a novel prompt-based defense mechanism specifically designed to protect LLMs against such sophisticated jailbreak strategies. Unlike previous approaches, which have often compromised the utility of the model for the sake of safety, DPP is designed to achieve a minimal Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the high utility of LLMs. Our method uses strategically designed interpretable suffix prompts that effectively thwart a wide range of standard and adaptive jailbreak techniques. Empirical results conducted on LLAMA-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 models demonstrate the robustness and adaptability of DPP, showing significant reductions in ASR with negligible impact on utility. Our approach not only outperforms existing defense strategies in balancing safety and functionality, but also provides a scalable and interpretable solution applicable to various LLM platforms.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Large Language Models are prone to off-topic misuse, where users may prompt these models to perform tasks beyond their intended scope. Current guardrails, which often rely on curated examples or custom classifiers, suffer from high false-positive rates, limited adaptability, and the impracticality of requiring real-world data that is not available in pre-production. In this paper, we introduce a flexible, data-free guardrail development methodology that addresses these challenges. By thoroughly defining the problem space qualitatively and passing this to an LLM to generate diverse prompts, we construct a synthetic dataset to benchmark and train off-topic guardrails that outperform heuristic approaches. Additionally, by framing the task as classifying whether the user prompt is relevant with respect to the system prompt, our guardrails effectively generalize to other misuse categories, including jailbreak and harmful prompts. Lastly, we further contribute to the field by open-sourcing both the synthetic dataset and the off-topic guardrail models, providing valuable resources for developing guardrails in pre-production environments and supporting future research and development in LLM safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Users can divulge sensitive information to proprietary LLM providers, raising significant privacy concerns. While open-source models, hosted locally on the user's machine, alleviate some concerns, models that users can host locally are often less capable than proprietary frontier models. Toward preserving user privacy while retaining the best quality, we propose Privacy-Conscious Delegation, a novel task for chaining API-based and local models. We utilize recent public collections of user-LLM interactions to construct a natural benchmark called PUPA, which contains personally identifiable information (PII). To study potential approaches, we devise PAPILLON, a multi-stage LLM pipeline that uses prompt optimization to address a simpler version of our task. Our best pipeline maintains high response quality for 85.5% of user queries while restricting privacy leakage to only 7.5%. We still leave a large margin to the generation quality of proprietary LLMs for future work. Our data and code is available at https://github.com/siyan-sylvia-li/PAPILLON.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as dominant tools for various tasks, particularly when tailored for a specific target by prompt tuning. Nevertheless, concerns surrounding data privacy present obstacles due to the tuned prompts' dependency on sensitive private information. A practical solution is to host a local LLM and optimize a soft prompt privately using data. Yet, hosting a local model becomes problematic when model ownership is protected. Alternative methods, like sending data to the model's provider for training, intensify these privacy issues facing an untrusted provider. In this paper, we present a novel solution called Differentially-Private Offsite Prompt Tuning (DP-OPT) to address this challenge. Our approach involves tuning a discrete prompt on the client side and then applying it to the desired cloud models. We demonstrate that prompts suggested by LLMs themselves can be transferred without compromising performance significantly. To ensure that the prompts do not leak private information, we introduce the first private prompt generation mechanism, by a differentially-private (DP) ensemble of in-context learning with private demonstrations. With DP-OPT, generating privacy-preserving prompts by Vicuna-7b can yield competitive performance compared to non-private in-context learning on GPT3.5 or local private prompt tuning. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/DP-OPT .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model's original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. Ensuring that LLMs are robust against such attacks is crucial for their deployment in real-world applications, particularly in critical tasks. In this paper, we propose PROMPTFUZZ, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PROMPTFUZZ selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM's resilience. PROMPTFUZZ operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. Using PROMPTFUZZ, we can uncover more vulnerabilities in LLMs, even those with strong defense prompts. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PROMPTFUZZ in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours. Additionally, we construct a dataset to fine-tune LLMs for enhanced robustness against prompt injection attacks. While the fine-tuned model shows improved robustness, PROMPTFUZZ continues to identify vulnerabilities, highlighting the importance of robust testing for LLMs. Our work emphasizes the critical need for effective testing tools and provides a practical framework for evaluating and improving the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have seen rapid development in recent years, revolutionizing various applications and significantly enhancing convenience and productivity. However, alongside their impressive capabilities, ethical concerns and new types of attacks, such as jailbreaking, have emerged. While most prompting techniques focus on optimizing adversarial inputs for individual cases, resulting in higher computational costs when dealing with large datasets. Less research has addressed the more general setting of training a universal attacker that can transfer to unseen tasks. In this paper, we introduce JUMP, a prompt-based method designed to jailbreak LLMs using universal multi-prompts. We also adapt our approach for defense, which we term DUMP. Experimental results demonstrate that our method for optimizing universal multi-prompts outperforms existing techniques.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated unparalleled prowess in mimicking human-like text generation and processing. Among the myriad of applications that benefit from LLMs, automated code generation is increasingly promising. The potential to transform natural language prompts into executable code promises a major shift in software development practices and paves the way for significant reductions in manual coding efforts and the likelihood of human-induced errors. This paper reports the results of a study that evaluates the performance of various LLMs, such as Bard, ChatGPT-3.5, ChatGPT-4, and Claude-2, in generating Python for coding problems. We focus on how levels of prompt specificity impact the accuracy, time efficiency, and space efficiency of the generated code. A benchmark of 104 coding problems, each with four types of prompts with varying degrees of tests and specificity, was employed to examine these aspects comprehensively. Our results indicate significant variations in performance across different LLMs and prompt types, and its key contribution is to reveal the ideal prompting strategy for creating accurate Python functions. This study lays the groundwork for further research in LLM capabilities and suggests practical implications for utilizing LLMs in automated code generation tasks and test-driven development.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across various natural language processing tasks. Due to their training on internet-sourced datasets, LLMs can sometimes generate objectionable content, necessitating extensive alignment with human feedback to avoid such outputs. Despite massive alignment efforts, LLMs remain susceptible to adversarial jailbreak attacks, which usually are manipulated prompts designed to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Here, we introduce a novel approach, Directed Rrepresentation Optimization Jailbreak (DROJ), which optimizes jailbreak prompts at the embedding level to shift the hidden representations of harmful queries towards directions that are more likely to elicit affirmative responses from the model. Our evaluations on LLaMA-2-7b-chat model show that DROJ achieves a 100\% keyword-based Attack Success Rate (ASR), effectively preventing direct refusals. However, the model occasionally produces repetitive and non-informative responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a helpfulness system prompt that enhances the utility of the model's responses. Our code is available at https://github.com/Leon-Leyang/LLM-Safeguard.

With the success of large language models (LLMs) of code and their use as code assistants (e.g. Codex used in GitHub Copilot), techniques for introducing domain-specific knowledge in the prompt design process become important. In this work, we propose a framework called Repo-Level Prompt Generator that learns to generate example-specific prompts using prompt proposals. The prompt proposals take context from the entire repository, thereby incorporating both the structure of the repository and the context from other relevant files (e.g. imports, parent class files). Our technique doesn't require any access to the weights of the LLM, making it applicable in cases where we only have black-box access to the LLM. We conduct experiments on the task of single-line code-autocompletion using code repositories taken from Google Code archives. We demonstrate that an oracle constructed from our prompt proposals gives a remarkably high relative improvement of 36% over Codex, showing the quality of these proposals. Further, we show that when we train a model to predict a prompt proposal, we can achieve significant performance gains over Codex and other baselines. We release our code, data, and trained checkpoints at: https://github.com/shrivastavadisha/repo_level_prompt_generation.

Many-shot jailbreaking circumvents the safety alignment of large language models by exploiting their ability to process long input sequences. To achieve this, the malicious target prompt is prefixed with hundreds of fabricated conversational turns between the user and the model. These fabricated exchanges are randomly sampled from a pool of malicious questions and responses, making it appear as though the model has already complied with harmful instructions. In this paper, we present PANDAS: a hybrid technique that improves many-shot jailbreaking by modifying these fabricated dialogues with positive affirmations, negative demonstrations, and an optimized adaptive sampling method tailored to the target prompt's topic. Extensive experiments on AdvBench and HarmBench, using state-of-the-art LLMs, demonstrate that PANDAS significantly outperforms baseline methods in long-context scenarios. Through an attention analysis, we provide insights on how long-context vulnerabilities are exploited and show how PANDAS further improves upon many-shot jailbreaking.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

The recent explosion in the capabilities of large language models has led to a wave of interest in how best to prompt a model to perform a given task. While it may be tempting to simply choose a prompt based on average performance on a validation set, this can lead to a deployment where unexpectedly poor responses are generated, especially for the worst-off users. To mitigate this prospect, we propose Prompt Risk Control, a lightweight framework for selecting a prompt based on rigorous upper bounds on families of informative risk measures. We offer methods for producing bounds on a diverse set of metrics, including quantities that measure worst-case responses and disparities in generation quality across the population of users. In addition, we extend the underlying statistical bounding techniques to accommodate the possibility of distribution shifts in deployment. Experiments on applications such as open-ended chat, medical question summarization, and code generation highlight how such a framework can foster responsible deployment by reducing the risk of the worst outcomes.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed a meteoric rise in popularity among the general public users over the past few months, facilitating diverse downstream tasks with human-level accuracy and proficiency. Prompts play an essential role in this success, which efficiently adapt pre-trained LLMs to task-specific applications by simply prepending a sequence of tokens to the query texts. However, designing and selecting an optimal prompt can be both expensive and demanding, leading to the emergence of Prompt-as-a-Service providers who profit by providing well-designed prompts for authorized use. With the growing popularity of prompts and their indispensable role in LLM-based services, there is an urgent need to protect the copyright of prompts against unauthorized use. In this paper, we propose PromptCARE, the first framework for prompt copyright protection through watermark injection and verification. Prompt watermarking presents unique challenges that render existing watermarking techniques developed for model and dataset copyright verification ineffective. PromptCARE overcomes these hurdles by proposing watermark injection and verification schemes tailor-made for prompts and NLP characteristics. Extensive experiments on six well-known benchmark datasets, using three prevalent pre-trained LLMs (BERT, RoBERTa, and Facebook OPT-1.3b), demonstrate the effectiveness, harmlessness, robustness, and stealthiness of PromptCARE.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are essential for contextual understanding of both visual and textual information. However, their vulnerability to adversarially manipulated inputs presents significant risks, leading to compromised outputs and raising concerns about the reliability in VLM-integrated applications. Detecting these malicious prompts is thus crucial for maintaining trust in VLM generations. A major challenge in developing a safeguarding prompt classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled benign and malicious data. To address the issue, we introduce VLMGuard, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled user prompts in the wild for malicious prompt detection. These unlabeled prompts, which naturally arise when VLMs are deployed in the open world, consist of both benign and malicious information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated maliciousness estimation score for distinguishing between benign and malicious samples within this unlabeled mixture, thereby enabling the training of a binary prompt classifier on top. Notably, our framework does not require extra human annotations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiment shows VLMGuard achieves superior detection results, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Disclaimer: This paper may contain offensive examples; reader discretion is advised.

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to security and safety threats, such as prompt injection, prompt extraction, and harmful requests. One major cause of these vulnerabilities is the lack of an instruction hierarchy. Modern LLM architectures treat all inputs equally, failing to distinguish between and prioritize various types of instructions, such as system messages, user prompts, and data. As a result, lower-priority user prompts may override more critical system instructions, including safety protocols. Existing approaches to achieving instruction hierarchy, such as delimiters and instruction-based training, do not address this issue at the architectural level. We introduce the Instructional Segment Embedding (ISE) technique, inspired by BERT, to modern large language models, which embeds instruction priority information directly into the model. This approach enables models to explicitly differentiate and prioritize various instruction types, significantly improving safety against malicious prompts that attempt to override priority rules. Our experiments on the Structured Query and Instruction Hierarchy benchmarks demonstrate an average robust accuracy increase of up to 15.75% and 18.68%, respectively. Furthermore, we observe an improvement in instruction-following capability of up to 4.1% evaluated on AlpacaEval. Overall, our approach offers a promising direction for enhancing the safety and effectiveness of LLM architectures.

Safety guard models that detect malicious queries aimed at large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring the secure and responsible deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. However, deploying existing safety guard models with billions of parameters alongside LLMs on mobile devices is impractical due to substantial memory requirements and latency. To reduce this cost, we distill a large teacher safety guard model into a smaller one using a labeled dataset of instruction-response pairs with binary harmfulness labels. Due to the limited diversity of harmful instructions in the existing labeled dataset, naively distilled models tend to underperform compared to larger models. To bridge the gap between small and large models, we propose HarmAug, a simple yet effective data augmentation method that involves jailbreaking an LLM and prompting it to generate harmful instructions. Given a prompt such as, "Make a single harmful instruction prompt that would elicit offensive content", we add an affirmative prefix (e.g., "I have an idea for a prompt:") to the LLM's response. This encourages the LLM to continue generating the rest of the response, leading to sampling harmful instructions. Another LLM generates a response to the harmful instruction, and the teacher model labels the instruction-response pair. We empirically show that our HarmAug outperforms other relevant baselines. Moreover, a 435-million-parameter safety guard model trained with HarmAug achieves an F1 score comparable to larger models with over 7 billion parameters, and even outperforms them in AUPRC, while operating at less than 25% of their computational cost.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

This paper introduces Indiana Jones, an innovative approach to jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs) by leveraging inter-model dialogues and keyword-driven prompts. Through orchestrating interactions among three specialised LLMs, the method achieves near-perfect success rates in bypassing content safeguards in both white-box and black-box LLMs. The research exposes systemic vulnerabilities within contemporary models, particularly their susceptibility to producing harmful or unethical outputs when guided by ostensibly innocuous prompts framed in historical or contextual contexts. Experimental evaluations highlight the efficacy and adaptability of Indiana Jones, demonstrating its superiority over existing jailbreak methods. These findings emphasise the urgent need for enhanced ethical safeguards and robust security measures in the development of LLMs. Moreover, this work provides a critical foundation for future studies aimed at fortifying LLMs against adversarial exploitation while preserving their utility and flexibility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in a variety of important applications, yet their safety and reliability remain as major concerns. Various adversarial and jailbreak attacks have been proposed to bypass the safety alignment and cause the model to produce harmful responses. We introduce Self-supervised Prompt INjection (SPIN) which can detect and reverse these various attacks on LLMs. As our self-supervised prompt defense is done at inference-time, it is also compatible with existing alignment and adds an additional layer of safety for defense. Our benchmarks demonstrate that our system can reduce the attack success rate by up to 87.9%, while maintaining the performance on benign user requests. In addition, we discuss the situation of an adaptive attacker and show that our method is still resilient against attackers who are aware of our defense.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Bard, have revolutionized natural language understanding and generation. They possess deep language comprehension, human-like text generation capabilities, contextual awareness, and robust problem-solving skills, making them invaluable in various domains (e.g., search engines, customer support, translation). In the meantime, LLMs have also gained traction in the security community, revealing security vulnerabilities and showcasing their potential in security-related tasks. This paper explores the intersection of LLMs with security and privacy. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs positively impact security and privacy, potential risks and threats associated with their use, and inherent vulnerabilities within LLMs. Through a comprehensive literature review, the paper categorizes the papers into "The Good" (beneficial LLM applications), "The Bad" (offensive applications), and "The Ugly" (vulnerabilities of LLMs and their defenses). We have some interesting findings. For example, LLMs have proven to enhance code security (code vulnerability detection) and data privacy (data confidentiality protection), outperforming traditional methods. However, they can also be harnessed for various attacks (particularly user-level attacks) due to their human-like reasoning abilities. We have identified areas that require further research efforts. For example, Research on model and parameter extraction attacks is limited and often theoretical, hindered by LLM parameter scale and confidentiality. Safe instruction tuning, a recent development, requires more exploration. We hope that our work can shed light on the LLMs' potential to both bolster and jeopardize cybersecurity.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

The growing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has influenced the development of their lighter counterparts-Small Language Models (SLMs)-to enable on-device deployment across smartphones and edge devices. These SLMs offer enhanced privacy, reduced latency, server-free functionality, and improved user experience. However, due to resource constraints of on-device environment, SLMs undergo size optimization through compression techniques like quantization, which can inadvertently introduce fairness, ethical and privacy risks. Critically, quantized SLMs may respond to harmful queries directly, without requiring adversarial manipulation, raising significant safety and trust concerns. To address this, we propose LiteLMGuard (LLMG), an on-device prompt guard that provides real-time, prompt-level defense for quantized SLMs. Additionally, our prompt guard is designed to be model-agnostic such that it can be seamlessly integrated with any SLM, operating independently of underlying architectures. Our LLMG formalizes prompt filtering as a deep learning (DL)-based prompt answerability classification task, leveraging semantic understanding to determine whether a query should be answered by any SLM. Using our curated dataset, Answerable-or-Not, we trained and fine-tuned several DL models and selected ELECTRA as the candidate, with 97.75% answerability classification accuracy. Our safety effectiveness evaluations demonstrate that LLMG defends against over 87% of harmful prompts, including both direct instruction and jailbreak attack strategies. We further showcase its ability to mitigate the Open Knowledge Attacks, where compromised SLMs provide unsafe responses without adversarial prompting. In terms of prompt filtering effectiveness, LLMG achieves near state-of-the-art filtering accuracy of 94%, with an average latency of 135 ms, incurring negligible overhead for users.

Code generation has emerged as a key task to automate software development by converting high-level descriptions into executable code. Large language models (LLMs) excel at this but depend heavily on input prompt quality.Manual prompt engineering can be time-consuming and inconsistent, limiting LLM effectiveness. This paper introduces Prochemy, an innovative method for automatically refining prompts to boost code generation. Prochemy overcomes manual prompt limitations by automating optimization, ensuring consistency during inference, and supporting multi-agent systems.It iteratively refines prompts based on model performance, using an optimized final prompt for improved consistency across tasks. We tested Prochemy on natural language-based code generation and translation tasks using three LLM series. Results indicate Prochemy enhances existing methods, improving performance by 5.0% for GPT-3.5-Turbo and 1.9% for GPT-4o over zero-shot baselines on HumanEval. In state-of-the-art LDB, Prochemy + LDB surpasses standalone methods by 1.2-1.8%. For code translation, Prochemy boosts GPT-4o's Java-to-Python (AVATAR) performance from 74.5 to 84.1 (+12.9%) and Python-to-Java from 66.8 to 78.2 (+17.1%). Moreover, Prochemy maintains strong performance when integrated with the o1-mini model, validating its efficacy in code tasks. Designed as plug-and-play, Prochemy optimizes prompts with minimal human input, bridging the gap between simple prompts and complex frameworks.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can perform various natural language processing tasks with suitable instruction prompts. However, designing effective prompts manually is challenging and time-consuming. Existing methods for automatic prompt optimization either lack flexibility or efficiency. In this paper, we propose an effective approach to automatically select the optimal prompt for a given input from a finite set of synthetic candidate prompts. Our approach consists of three steps: (1) clustering the training data and generating candidate prompts for each cluster using an LLM-based prompt generator; (2) synthesizing a dataset of input-prompt-output tuples for training a prompt evaluator to rank the prompts based on their relevance to the input; (3) using the prompt evaluator to select the best prompt for a new input at test time. Our approach balances prompt generality-specificity and eliminates the need for resource-intensive training and inference. It demonstrates competitive performance on zero-shot question-answering datasets: GSM8K, MultiArith, and AQuA.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

Enterprise customers are increasingly adopting Large Language Models (LLMs) for critical communication tasks, such as drafting emails, crafting sales pitches, and composing casual messages. Deploying such models across different regions requires them to understand diverse cultural and linguistic contexts and generate safe and respectful responses. For enterprise applications, it is crucial to mitigate reputational risks, maintain trust, and ensure compliance by effectively identifying and handling unsafe or offensive language. To address this, we introduce SweEval, a benchmark simulating real-world scenarios with variations in tone (positive or negative) and context (formal or informal). The prompts explicitly instruct the model to include specific swear words while completing the task. This benchmark evaluates whether LLMs comply with or resist such inappropriate instructions and assesses their alignment with ethical frameworks, cultural nuances, and language comprehension capabilities. In order to advance research in building ethically aligned AI systems for enterprise use and beyond, we release the dataset and code: https://github.com/amitbcp/multilingual_profanity.

Prompting ChatGPT to achieve complex goals (e.g., creating a customer support chatbot) often demands meticulous prompt engineering, including aspects like fluent writing and chain-of-thought techniques. While emerging prompt optimizers can automatically refine many of these aspects, we argue that clearly conveying customized requirements (e.g., how to handle diverse inputs) remains a human-centric challenge. In this work, we introduce Requirement-Oriented Prompt Engineering (ROPE), a paradigm that focuses human attention on generating clear, complete requirements during prompting. We implement ROPE through an assessment and training suite that provides deliberate practice with LLM-generated feedback. In a study with 30 novices, we show that requirement-focused training doubles novices' prompting performance, significantly outperforming conventional prompt engineering training and prompt optimization. We also demonstrate that high-quality LLM outputs are directly tied to the quality of input requirements. Our work paves the way for more effective task delegation in human-LLM collaborative prompting.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their safety and reliability, particularly regarding their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective that attributes this vulnerability to reward misspecification during the alignment process. We introduce a metric ReGap to quantify the extent of reward misspecification and demonstrate its effectiveness and robustness in detecting harmful backdoor prompts. Building upon these insights, we present ReMiss, a system for automated red teaming that generates adversarial prompts against various target aligned LLMs. ReMiss achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on the AdvBench benchmark while preserving the human readability of the generated prompts. Detailed analysis highlights the unique advantages brought by the proposed reward misspecification objective compared to previous methods.

AI-powered coding assistants such as GitHub Copilot and OpenAI ChatGPT have achieved notable success in automating code generation. However, these tools rely on pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) that are typically trained on human-written code sourced from open-source project hosting sites like GitHub, which often contains inherent security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may then be mirrored in the code generated by these LLMs, a critical risk revealed and highlighted by recent empirical studies. In this work, we present an exploratory study on whether fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs on datasets of vulnerability-fixing commits can promote secure code generation. We explored two parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques (LoRa and IA3) on two pre-trained LLMs for code generation. We crawled a fine-tuning dataset (14,622 C and C++ files) for secure code generation by collecting code fixes of confirmed vulnerabilities from open-source repositories. Our evaluation dataset comprises 52 vulnerability scenarios designed to cover the top most dangerous C and C++ Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Each scenario is a prompt that may induce LLMs to generate vulnerable code. Our exploration reveals that fine-tuning LLMs can improve secure code generation by 6.4% in C language and 5.4% in C++ language. We further experimented with fine-tuning LLMs using different versions of the collected secure code dataset (block, function, and line). We found that fine-tuning with function-level and block-level datasets achieves the best secure code generation performance, compared to the alternatives (file-level and line-level).

Batch prompting, which combines a batch of multiple queries sharing the same context in one inference, has emerged as a promising solution to reduce inference costs. However, our study reveals a significant security vulnerability in batch prompting: malicious users can inject attack instructions into a batch, leading to unwanted interference across all queries, which can result in the inclusion of harmful content, such as phishing links, or the disruption of logical reasoning. In this paper, we construct BATCHSAFEBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 150 attack instructions of two types and 8k batch instances, to study the batch prompting vulnerability systematically. Our evaluation of both closed-source and open-weight LLMs demonstrates that all LLMs are susceptible to batch-prompting attacks. We then explore multiple defending approaches. While the prompting-based defense shows limited effectiveness for smaller LLMs, the probing-based approach achieves about 95% accuracy in detecting attacks. Additionally, we perform a mechanistic analysis to understand the attack and identify attention heads that are responsible for it.

Recent surge in Large Language Model (LLM) availability has opened exciting avenues for research. However, efficiently interacting with these models presents a significant hurdle since LLMs often reside on proprietary or self-hosted API endpoints, each requiring custom code for interaction. Conducting comparative studies between different models can therefore be time-consuming and necessitate significant engineering effort, hindering research efficiency and reproducibility. To address these challenges, we present prompto, an open source Python library which facilitates asynchronous querying of LLM endpoints enabling researchers to interact with multiple LLMs concurrently, while maximising efficiency and utilising individual rate limits. Our library empowers researchers and developers to interact with LLMs more effectively and enabling faster experimentation and evaluation. prompto is released with an introductory video (https://youtu.be/-eZAmlV4ypk) under MIT License and is available via GitHub (https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/prompto).

Large language models (LLMs) are renowned for their exceptional capabilities, and applying to a wide range of applications. However, this widespread use brings significant vulnerabilities. Also, it is well observed that there are huge gap which lies in the need for effective detection and mitigation strategies against malicious prompt injection attacks in large language models, as current approaches may not adequately address the complexity and evolving nature of these vulnerabilities in real-world applications. Therefore, this work focuses the impact of malicious prompt injection attacks which is one of most dangerous vulnerability on real LLMs applications. It examines to apply various BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) like multilingual BERT, DistilBert for classifying malicious prompts from legitimate prompts. Also, we observed how tokenizing the prompt texts and generating embeddings using multilingual BERT contributes to improve the performance of various machine learning methods: Gaussian Naive Bayes, Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and Logistic Regression. The performance of each model is rigorously analyzed with various parameters to improve the binary classification to discover malicious prompts. Multilingual BERT approach to embed the prompts significantly improved and outperformed the existing works and achieves an outstanding accuracy of 96.55% by Logistic regression. Additionally, we investigated the incorrect predictions of the model to gain insights into its limitations. The findings can guide researchers in tuning various BERT for finding the most suitable model for diverse LLMs vulnerabilities.

Auto-regressive large language models (LLMs) have yielded impressive performance in many real-world tasks. However, the new paradigm of these LLMs also exposes novel threats. In this paper, we explore their vulnerability to inference cost attacks, where a malicious user crafts Engorgio prompts to intentionally increase the computation cost and latency of the inference process. We design Engorgio, a novel methodology, to efficiently generate adversarial Engorgio prompts to affect the target LLM's service availability. Engorgio has the following two technical contributions. (1) We employ a parameterized distribution to track LLMs' prediction trajectory. (2) Targeting the auto-regressive nature of LLMs' inference process, we propose novel loss functions to stably suppress the appearance of the <EOS> token, whose occurrence will interrupt the LLM's generation process. We conduct extensive experiments on 13 open-sourced LLMs with parameters ranging from 125M to 30B. The results show that Engorgio prompts can successfully induce LLMs to generate abnormally long outputs (i.e., roughly 2-13times longer to reach 90%+ of the output length limit) in a white-box scenario and our real-world experiment demonstrates Engergio's threat to LLM service with limited computing resources. The code is accessible at https://github.com/jianshuod/Engorgio-prompt.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent across many real-world applications, understanding and enhancing their robustness to user inputs is of paramount importance. Existing methods for identifying adversarial prompts tend to focus on specific domains, lack diversity, or require extensive human annotations. To address these limitations, we present Rainbow Teaming, a novel approach for producing a diverse collection of adversarial prompts. Rainbow Teaming casts adversarial prompt generation as a quality-diversity problem, and uses open-ended search to generate prompts that are both effective and diverse. It can uncover a model's vulnerabilities across a broad range of domains including, in this paper, safety, question answering, and cybersecurity. We also demonstrate that fine-tuning on synthetic data generated by Rainbow Teaming improves the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs without hurting their general capabilities and helpfulness, paving the path to open-ended self-improvement.

Prompts are crucial to large language models as they provide context information such as topic or logical relationships. Inspired by this, we propose PromptASR, a framework that integrates prompts in end-to-end automatic speech recognition (E2E ASR) systems to achieve contextualized ASR with controllable style of transcriptions. Specifically, a dedicated text encoder encodes the text prompts and the encodings are injected into the speech encoder by cross-attending the features from two modalities. When using the ground truth text from preceding utterances as content prompt, the proposed system achieves 21.9% and 6.8% relative word error rate reductions on a book reading dataset and an in-house dataset compared to a baseline ASR system. The system can also take word-level biasing lists as prompt to improve recognition accuracy on rare words. An additional style prompt can be given to the text encoder and guide the ASR system to output different styles of transcriptions. The code is available at icefall.

Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant priority in text understanding and generation. However, LLMs suffer from the risk of generating harmful contents especially while being employed to applications. There are several black-box attack methods, such as Prompt Attack, which can change the behaviour of LLMs and induce LLMs to generate unexpected answers with harmful contents. Researchers are interested in Prompt Attack and Defense with LLMs, while there is no publicly available dataset with high successful attacking rate to evaluate the abilities of defending prompt attack. In this paper, we introduce a pipeline to construct high-quality prompt attack samples, along with a Chinese prompt attack dataset called CPAD. Our prompts aim to induce LLMs to generate unexpected outputs with several carefully designed prompt attack templates and widely concerned attacking contents. Different from previous datasets involving safety estimation, we construct the prompts considering three dimensions: contents, attacking methods and goals. Especially, the attacking goals indicate the behaviour expected after successfully attacking the LLMs, thus the responses can be easily evaluated and analysed. We run several popular Chinese LLMs on our dataset, and the results show that our prompts are significantly harmful to LLMs, with around 70% attack success rate to GPT-3.5. CPAD is publicly available at https://github.com/liuchengyuan123/CPAD.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) offer significant promise for improving breast cancer diagnosis in medical imaging. However, these models are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks--small, imperceptible changes that can mislead classifiers--raising critical concerns about their reliability and security. Traditional attacks rely on fixed-norm perturbations, misaligning with human perception. In contrast, diffusion-based attacks require pre-trained models, demanding substantial data when these models are unavailable, limiting practical use in data-scarce scenarios. In medical imaging, however, this is often unfeasible due to the limited availability of datasets. Building on recent advancements in learnable prompts, we propose Prompt2Perturb (P2P), a novel language-guided attack method capable of generating meaningful attack examples driven by text instructions. During the prompt learning phase, our approach leverages learnable prompts within the text encoder to create subtle, yet impactful, perturbations that remain imperceptible while guiding the model towards targeted outcomes. In contrast to current prompt learning-based approaches, our P2P stands out by directly updating text embeddings, avoiding the need for retraining diffusion models. Further, we leverage the finding that optimizing only the early reverse diffusion steps boosts efficiency while ensuring that the generated adversarial examples incorporate subtle noise, thus preserving ultrasound image quality without introducing noticeable artifacts. We show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attack techniques across three breast ultrasound datasets in FID and LPIPS. Moreover, the generated images are both more natural in appearance and more effective compared to existing adversarial attacks. Our code will be publicly available https://github.com/yasamin-med/P2P.

As large language models (LLMs) become integrated into everyday applications, ensuring their robustness and security is increasingly critical. In particular, LLMs can be manipulated into unsafe behaviour by prompts known as jailbreaks. The variety of jailbreak styles is growing, necessitating the use of external defences known as guardrails. While many jailbreak defences have been proposed, not all defences are able to handle new out-of-distribution attacks due to the narrow segment of jailbreaks used to align them. Moreover, the lack of systematisation around defences has created significant gaps in their practical application. In this work, we perform systematic benchmarking across 15 different defences, considering a broad swathe of malicious and benign datasets. We find that there is significant performance variation depending on the style of jailbreak a defence is subject to. Additionally, we show that based on current datasets available for evaluation, simple baselines can display competitive out-of-distribution performance compared to many state-of-the-art defences. Code is available at https://github.com/IBM/Adversarial-Prompt-Evaluation.

In the evolving landscape of software development, Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a unique phenomenon known as emergent abilities, demonstrating adeptness across numerous tasks, from text summarization to code generation. While these abilities open up novel avenues in software design and crafting, their incorporation presents substantial challenges. Developers grapple with decisions surrounding the direct embedding of LLMs within applications versus employing them for code generation. Moreover, effective prompt design becomes a critical concern, given the necessity of data extraction from natural language outputs. To address these intricacies, this paper introduces AskIt, a domain-specific language (DSL) specifically designed for LLMs. AskIt simplifies LLM integration, offering type-guided output control, template-based function definitions, and a unified interface that diminishes the distinction between LLM-based code generation and application integration. Furthermore, through Programming by Example (PBE), AskIt harnesses the power of few-shot learning at the programming language level. Our evaluations underscore AskIt's potency. Across 50 tasks, AskIt generated concise prompts for the given tasks, achieving a 16.14% reduction in prompt length relative to benchmarks. Additionally, by enabling the transition from direct LLM application usage to function generation, AskIt achieved significant speedups, as observed in our GSM8K benchmark experiments. Through these advancements, AskIt streamlines the integration of LLMs in software development, offering a more efficient, versatile approach for leveraging emergent abilities. The implementations of AskIt in TypeScript and Python are available at https://github.com/katsumiok/ts-askit and https://github.com/katsumiok/pyaskit, respectively.

Safety is critical to the usage of large language models (LLMs). Multiple techniques such as data filtering and supervised fine-tuning have been developed to strengthen LLM safety. However, currently known techniques presume that corpora used for safety alignment of LLMs are solely interpreted by semantics. This assumption, however, does not hold in real-world applications, which leads to severe vulnerabilities in LLMs. For example, users of forums often use ASCII art, a form of text-based art, to convey image information. In this paper, we propose a novel ASCII art-based jailbreak attack and introduce a comprehensive benchmark Vision-in-Text Challenge (ViTC) to evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in recognizing prompts that cannot be solely interpreted by semantics. We show that five SOTA LLMs (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2) struggle to recognize prompts provided in the form of ASCII art. Based on this observation, we develop the jailbreak attack ArtPrompt, which leverages the poor performance of LLMs in recognizing ASCII art to bypass safety measures and elicit undesired behaviors from LLMs. ArtPrompt only requires black-box access to the victim LLMs, making it a practical attack. We evaluate ArtPrompt on five SOTA LLMs, and show that ArtPrompt can effectively and efficiently induce undesired behaviors from all five LLMs.

Large-scale pre-trained generative models are taking the world by storm, due to their abilities in generating creative content. Meanwhile, safeguards for these generative models are developed, to protect users' rights and safety, most of which are designed for large language models. Existing methods primarily focus on jailbreak and adversarial attacks, which mainly evaluate the model's safety under malicious prompts. Recent work found that manually crafted safe prompts can unintentionally trigger unsafe generations. To further systematically evaluate the safety risks of text-to-image models, we propose a novel Automatic Red-Teaming framework, ART. Our method leverages both vision language model and large language model to establish a connection between unsafe generations and their prompts, thereby more efficiently identifying the model's vulnerabilities. With our comprehensive experiments, we reveal the toxicity of the popular open-source text-to-image models. The experiments also validate the effectiveness, adaptability, and great diversity of ART. Additionally, we introduce three large-scale red-teaming datasets for studying the safety risks associated with text-to-image models. Datasets and models can be found in https://github.com/GuanlinLee/ART.

Our work tackles the challenge of securing user inputs in cloud-hosted large language model (LLM) serving while ensuring output invariance, model confidentiality, and compute efficiency. We introduce secure multi-party decoding (SMD), which leverages confidential computing to confine user prompts to a trusted execution environment (TEE), namely a confidential virtual machine (CVM), while allowing service providers to generate tokens efficiently. We also introduce a novel cryptographic method, prompt obfuscation (PO), to ensure robustness against reconstruction attacks on SMD. We demonstrate that our approach preserves both prompt confidentiality and LLM serving efficiency. Our solution can enable privacy-preserving cloud LLM serving that handles sensitive prompts, such as clinical records, financial data, and personal information.

This paper presents the second ChatGPT4PCG competition at the 2024 IEEE Conference on Games. In this edition of the competition, we follow the first edition, but make several improvements and changes. We introduce a new evaluation metric along with allowing a more flexible format for participants' submissions and making several improvements to the evaluation pipeline. Continuing from the first edition, we aim to foster and explore the realm of prompt engineering (PE) for procedural content generation (PCG). While the first competition saw success, it was hindered by various limitations; we aim to mitigate these limitations in this edition. We introduce diversity as a new metric to discourage submissions aimed at producing repetitive structures. Furthermore, we allow submission of a Python program instead of a prompt text file for greater flexibility in implementing advanced PE approaches, which may require control flow, including conditions and iterations. We also make several improvements to the evaluation pipeline with a better classifier for similarity evaluation and better-performing function signatures. We thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of the new metric and the improved classifier. Additionally, we perform an ablation study to select a function signature to instruct ChatGPT for level generation. Finally, we provide implementation examples of various PE techniques in Python and evaluate their preliminary performance. We hope this competition serves as a resource and platform for learning about PE and PCG in general.

The advanced capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have made them invaluable across various applications, from conversational agents and content creation to data analysis, research, and innovation. However, their effectiveness and accessibility also render them susceptible to abuse for generating malicious content, including phishing attacks. This study explores the potential of using four popular commercially available LLMs - ChatGPT (GPT 3.5 Turbo), GPT 4, Claude and Bard to generate functional phishing attacks using a series of malicious prompts. We discover that these LLMs can generate both phishing emails and websites that can convincingly imitate well-known brands, and also deploy a range of evasive tactics for the latter to elude detection mechanisms employed by anti-phishing systems. Notably, these attacks can be generated using unmodified, or "vanilla," versions of these LLMs, without requiring any prior adversarial exploits such as jailbreaking. As a countermeasure, we build a BERT based automated detection tool that can be used for the early detection of malicious prompts to prevent LLMs from generating phishing content attaining an accuracy of 97\% for phishing website prompts, and 94\% for phishing email prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive performance in software engineering tasks. However, improving their accuracy in generating correct and reliable code remains challenging. Numerous prompt engineering techniques (PETs) have been developed to address this, but no single approach is universally optimal. Selecting the right PET for each query is difficult for two primary reasons: (1) interactive prompting techniques may not consistently deliver the expected benefits, especially for simpler queries, and (2) current automated prompt engineering methods lack adaptability and fail to fully utilize multi-stage responses. To overcome these challenges, we propose PET-Select, a PET-agnostic selection model that uses code complexity as a proxy to classify queries and select the most appropriate PET. By incorporating contrastive learning, PET-Select effectively distinguishes between simple and complex problems, allowing it to choose PETs that are best suited for each query's complexity level. Our evaluations on the MBPP and HumanEval benchmarks using GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o show up to a 1.9% improvement in pass@1 accuracy, along with a 74.8% reduction in token usage. Additionally, we provide both quantitative and qualitative results to demonstrate how PET-Select effectively selects the most appropriate techniques for each code generation query, further showcasing its efficiency in optimizing PET selection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

Large language models have shown their ability to become effective few-shot learners with prompting, revoluting the paradigm of learning with data scarcity. However, this approach largely depends on the quality of prompt initialization, and always exhibits large variability among different runs. Such property makes prompt tuning highly unreliable and vulnerable to poorly constructed prompts, which limits its extension to more real-world applications. To tackle this issue, we propose to treat the hard prompt and soft prompt as separate inputs to mitigate noise brought by the prompt initialization. Furthermore, we optimize soft prompts with contrastive learning for utilizing class-aware information in the training process to maintain model performance. Experimental results demonstrate that \sysname outperforms state-of-the-art methods by 7.20% in accuracy and reduces the standard deviation by 2.02 on average. Furthermore, extensive experiments underscore its robustness and stability across 7 datasets covering various tasks.

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize the target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve nearly 100\% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on GPT-3.5/4, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Gemma-7B, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with 100\% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). We provide the code, prompts, and logs of the attacks at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

Prompt tuning provides an efficient way for users to customize Large Language Models (LLMs) with their private data in the emerging LLM service scenario. However, the sensitive nature of private data brings the need for privacy preservation in LLM service customization. Based on prompt tuning, we propose Privacy-Preserving Prompt Tuning (RAPT), a framework that provides privacy guarantees for LLM services. rapt adopts a local privacy setting, allowing users to privatize their data locally with local differential privacy. As prompt tuning performs poorly when directly trained on privatized data, we introduce a novel privatized token reconstruction task that is trained jointly with the downstream task, allowing LLMs to learn better task-dependent representations. Despite the simplicity of our framework, experiments show that RAPT achieves competitive performance across tasks while providing privacy guarantees against adversaries.

Recent advancements in AI safety have led to increased efforts in training and red-teaming large language models (LLMs) to mitigate unsafe content generation. However, these safety mechanisms may not be comprehensive, leaving potential vulnerabilities unexplored. This paper introduces MathPrompt, a novel jailbreaking technique that exploits LLMs' advanced capabilities in symbolic mathematics to bypass their safety mechanisms. By encoding harmful natural language prompts into mathematical problems, we demonstrate a critical vulnerability in current AI safety measures. Our experiments across 13 state-of-the-art LLMs reveal an average attack success rate of 73.6\%, highlighting the inability of existing safety training mechanisms to generalize to mathematically encoded inputs. Analysis of embedding vectors shows a substantial semantic shift between original and encoded prompts, helping explain the attack's success. This work emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to AI safety, calling for expanded red-teaming efforts to develop robust safeguards across all potential input types and their associated risks.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

We discover that DALLE-2 seems to have a hidden vocabulary that can be used to generate images with absurd prompts. For example, it seems that Apoploe vesrreaitais means birds and Contarra ccetnxniams luryca tanniounons (sometimes) means bugs or pests. We find that these prompts are often consistent in isolation but also sometimes in combinations. We present our black-box method to discover words that seem random but have some correspondence to visual concepts. This creates important security and interpretability challenges.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, are designed to provide useful and safe responses. However, adversarial prompts known as 'jailbreaks' can circumvent safeguards, leading LLMs to generate potentially harmful content. Exploring jailbreak prompts can help to better reveal the weaknesses of LLMs and further steer us to secure them. Unfortunately, existing jailbreak methods either suffer from intricate manual design or require optimization on other white-box models, which compromises either generalization or efficiency. In this paper, we generalize jailbreak prompt attacks into two aspects: (1) Prompt Rewriting and (2) Scenario Nesting. Based on this, we propose ReNeLLM, an automatic framework that leverages LLMs themselves to generate effective jailbreak prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ReNeLLM significantly improves the attack success rate while greatly reducing the time cost compared to existing baselines. Our study also reveals the inadequacy of current defense methods in safeguarding LLMs. Finally, we analyze the failure of LLMs defense from the perspective of prompt execution priority, and propose corresponding defense strategies. We hope that our research can catalyze both the academic community and LLMs developers towards the provision of safer and more regulated LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/NJUNLP/ReNeLLM.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

Red-teaming, or identifying prompts that elicit harmful responses, is a critical step in ensuring the safe and responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). Developing effective protection against many modes of attack prompts requires discovering diverse attacks. Automated red-teaming typically uses reinforcement learning to fine-tune an attacker language model to generate prompts that elicit undesirable responses from a target LLM, as measured, for example, by an auxiliary toxicity classifier. We show that even with explicit regularization to favor novelty and diversity, existing approaches suffer from mode collapse or fail to generate effective attacks. As a flexible and probabilistically principled alternative, we propose to use GFlowNet fine-tuning, followed by a secondary smoothing phase, to train the attacker model to generate diverse and effective attack prompts. We find that the attacks generated by our method are effective against a wide range of target LLMs, both with and without safety tuning, and transfer well between target LLMs. Finally, we demonstrate that models safety-tuned using a dataset of red-teaming prompts generated by our method are robust to attacks from other RL-based red-teaming approaches.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly powerful but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs cause the model to deviate from its intended instructions. This paper introduces Sentinel, a novel detection model, qualifire/prompt-injection-sentinel, based on the \answerdotai/ModernBERT-large architecture. By leveraging ModernBERT's advanced features and fine-tuning on an extensive and diverse dataset comprising a few open-source and private collections, Sentinel achieves state-of-the-art performance. This dataset amalgamates varied attack types, from role-playing and instruction hijacking to attempts to generate biased content, alongside a broad spectrum of benign instructions, with private datasets specifically targeting nuanced error correction and real-world misclassifications. On a comprehensive, unseen internal test set, Sentinel demonstrates an average accuracy of 0.987 and an F1-score of 0.980. Furthermore, when evaluated on public benchmarks, it consistently outperforms strong baselines like protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2. This work details Sentinel's architecture, its meticulous dataset curation, its training methodology, and a thorough evaluation, highlighting its superior detection capabilities.

Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be compromised with manual jailbreak attacks and (automatic) adversarial attacks. Recent studies suggest that defending against these attacks is possible: adversarial attacks generate unlimited but unreadable gibberish prompts, detectable by perplexity-based filters; manual jailbreak attacks craft readable prompts, but their limited number due to the necessity of human creativity allows for easy blocking. In this paper, we show that these solutions may be too optimistic. We introduce AutoDAN, an interpretable, gradient-based adversarial attack that merges the strengths of both attack types. Guided by the dual goals of jailbreak and readability, AutoDAN optimizes and generates tokens one by one from left to right, resulting in readable prompts that bypass perplexity filters while maintaining high attack success rates. Notably, these prompts, generated from scratch using gradients, are interpretable and diverse, with emerging strategies commonly seen in manual jailbreak attacks. They also generalize to unforeseen harmful behaviors and transfer to black-box LLMs better than their unreadable counterparts when using limited training data or a single proxy model. Furthermore, we show the versatility of AutoDAN by automatically leaking system prompts using a customized objective. Our work offers a new way to red-team LLMs and understand jailbreak mechanisms via interpretability.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, particularly in the face of stealthy and complex jailbreaks, presents a formidable challenge. In this study, we present a simple yet highly effective defense strategy, i.e., Intention Analysis Prompting (IAPrompt). The principle behind is to trigger LLMs' inherent self-correct and improve ability through a two-stage process: 1) essential intention analysis, and 2) policy-aligned response. Notably, IAPrompt is an inference-only method, thus could enhance the safety of LLMs without compromising their helpfulness. Extensive experiments on SAP200 and DAN benchmarks across Vicuna, ChatGLM, MPT, DeepSeek, and GPT-3.5 show that IAPrompt could consistently and significantly reduce the harmfulness in response (averagely -46.5% attack success rate) and maintain the general helpfulness. Further analyses present some insights into how our method works. To facilitate reproducibility, We release our code and scripts at: https://github.com/alphadl/SafeLLM_with_IntentionAnalysis

LLMs have gained immense popularity among researchers and the general public for its impressive capabilities on a variety of tasks. Notably, the efficacy of LLMs remains significantly dependent on the quality and structure of the input prompts, making prompt design a critical factor for their performance. Recent advancements in automated prompt optimization have introduced diverse techniques that automatically enhance prompts to better align model outputs with user expectations. However, these methods often suffer from the lack of standardization and compatibility across different techniques, limited flexibility in customization, inconsistent performance across model scales, and they often exclusively rely on expensive proprietary LLM APIs. To fill in this gap, we introduce GREATERPROMPT, a novel framework that democratizes prompt optimization by unifying diverse methods under a unified, customizable API while delivering highly effective prompts for different tasks. Our framework flexibly accommodates various model scales by leveraging both text feedback-based optimization for larger LLMs and internal gradient-based optimization for smaller models to achieve powerful and precise prompt improvements. Moreover, we provide a user-friendly Web UI that ensures accessibility for non-expert users, enabling broader adoption and enhanced performance across various user groups and application scenarios. GREATERPROMPT is available at https://github.com/psunlpgroup/GreaterPrompt via GitHub, PyPI, and web user interfaces.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances coding tasks by incorporating retrieved code examples into prompts. However, lengthy prompts, often exceeding tens of thousands of tokens, introduce challenges related to limited context windows of language models (LMs) and high computational costs. Existing prompt compression techniques focus on natural language, lacking tailored solutions for code. To address the gap, we propose CodePromptZip, a framework that compresses code examples before integrating into RAG workflows. Our framework employs a type-aware, priority-driven strategy to construct training samples for training code compression model. By using program analysis, we identify token types (e.g., Identifier) and perform ablation analysis to rank their removal priorities based on their impact on task performance. We then train a small LM as the compressor on these samples, enabling flexible compression conditioned on specified ratios while minimizing performance degradation. Specially, the compressor is augmented with a copy mechanism, allowing tokens to be directly copied from the original code snippets. Evaluation results show that CodePromptZip surpasses SOTA entropy-based and distillation-based baselines, improving by 23.4%, 28.7%, and 8.7% over the best baseline for Assertion Generation, Bugs2Fix, and Code Suggestion, respectively.

LLMs have demonstrated commendable performance across diverse domains. Nevertheless, formulating high-quality prompts to assist them in their work poses a challenge for non-AI experts. Existing research in prompt engineering suggests somewhat scattered optimization principles and designs empirically dependent prompt optimizers. Unfortunately, these endeavors lack a structural design, incurring high learning costs and it is not conducive to the iterative updating of prompts, especially for non-AI experts. Inspired by structured reusable programming languages, we propose LangGPT, a structural prompt design framework. Furthermore, we introduce Minstrel, a multi-generative agent system with reflection to automate the generation of structural prompts. Experiments and the case study illustrate that structural prompts generated by Minstrel or written manually significantly enhance the performance of LLMs. Furthermore, we analyze the ease of use of structural prompts through a user survey in our online community.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant attention from the general public and LLM vendors. In response, efforts have been made to align LLMs with human values and intent use. However, a particular type of adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak prompt, has emerged and continuously evolved to bypass the safeguards and elicit harmful content from LLMs. In this paper, we conduct the first measurement study on jailbreak prompts in the wild, with 6,387 prompts collected from four platforms over six months. Leveraging natural language processing technologies and graph-based community detection methods, we discover unique characteristics of jailbreak prompts and their major attack strategies, such as prompt injection and privilege escalation. We also observe that jailbreak prompts increasingly shift from public platforms to private ones, posing new challenges for LLM vendors in proactive detection. To assess the potential harm caused by jailbreak prompts, we create a question set comprising 46,800 samples across 13 forbidden scenarios. Our experiments show that current LLMs and safeguards cannot adequately defend jailbreak prompts in all scenarios. Particularly, we identify two highly effective jailbreak prompts which achieve 0.99 attack success rates on ChatGPT (GPT-3.5) and GPT-4, and they have persisted online for over 100 days. Our work sheds light on the severe and evolving threat landscape of jailbreak prompts. We hope our study can facilitate the research community and LLM vendors in promoting safer and regulated LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have attained human-level fluency in text generation, which complicates the distinguishing between human-written and LLM-generated texts. This increases the risk of misuse and highlights the need for reliable detectors. Yet, existing detectors exhibit poor robustness on out-of-distribution (OOD) data and attacked data, which is critical for real-world scenarios. Also, they struggle to provide explainable evidence to support their decisions, thus undermining the reliability. In light of these challenges, we propose IPAD (Inverse Prompt for AI Detection), a novel framework consisting of a Prompt Inverter that identifies predicted prompts that could have generated the input text, and a Distinguisher that examines how well the input texts align with the predicted prompts. We develop and examine two versions of Distinguishers. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that both Distinguishers perform significantly better than the baseline methods, with version2 outperforming baselines by 9.73% on in-distribution data (F1-score) and 12.65% on OOD data (AUROC). Furthermore, a user study is conducted to illustrate that IPAD enhances the AI detection trustworthiness by allowing users to directly examine the decision-making evidence, which provides interpretable support for its state-of-the-art detection results.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Prompt engineering is very important to enhance the performance of large language models (LLMs). When dealing with complex issues, prompt engineers tend to distill multiple patterns from examples and inject relevant solutions to optimize the prompts, achieving satisfying results. However, existing automatic prompt optimization techniques are only limited to producing single flow instructions, struggling with handling diverse patterns. In this paper, we present AMPO, an automatic prompt optimization method that can iteratively develop a multi-branched prompt using failure cases as feedback. Our goal is to explore a novel way of structuring prompts with multi-branches to better handle multiple patterns in complex tasks, for which we introduce three modules: Pattern Recognition, Branch Adjustment, and Branch Pruning. In experiments across five tasks, AMPO consistently achieves the best results. Additionally, our approach demonstrates significant optimization efficiency due to our adoption of a minimal search strategy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive proficiency across a range of natural language processing tasks yet remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak attacks, carefully designed to elicit harmful responses from LLMs. Traditional methods rely on manual heuristics, which suffer from limited generalizability. While being automatic, optimization-based attacks often produce unnatural jailbreak prompts that are easy to detect by safety filters or require high computational overhead due to discrete token optimization. Witnessing the limitations of existing jailbreak methods, we introduce Generative Adversarial Suffix Prompter (GASP), a novel framework that combines human-readable prompt generation with Latent Bayesian Optimization (LBO) to improve adversarial suffix creation in a fully black-box setting. GASP leverages LBO to craft adversarial suffixes by efficiently exploring continuous embedding spaces, gradually optimizing the model to improve attack efficacy while balancing prompt coherence through a targeted iterative refinement procedure. Our experiments show that GASP can generate natural jailbreak prompts, significantly improving attack success rates, reducing training times, and accelerating inference speed, thus making it an efficient and scalable solution for red-teaming LLMs.

A growing variety of prompt engineering techniques has been proposed for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet systematic evaluation of each technique on individual software engineering (SE) tasks remains underexplored. In this study, we present a systematic evaluation of 14 established prompt techniques across 10 SE tasks using four LLM models. As identified in the prior literature, the selected prompting techniques span six core dimensions (Zero-Shot, Few-Shot, Thought Generation, Ensembling, Self-Criticism, and Decomposition). They are evaluated on tasks such as code generation, bug fixing, and code-oriented question answering, to name a few. Our results show which prompting techniques are most effective for SE tasks requiring complex logic and intensive reasoning versus those that rely more on contextual understanding and example-driven scenarios. We also analyze correlations between the linguistic characteristics of prompts and the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of prompting techniques in enhancing performance on SE tasks. Additionally, we report the time and token consumption for each prompting technique when applied to a specific task and model, offering guidance for practitioners in selecting the optimal prompting technique for their use cases.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

This paper presents the latest progress of GPTutor: a ChatGPT-powered programming tool extension in Visual Studio Code. The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has improved software development efficiency, but their performance can be hindered by training data limitations and prompt design issues. Existing LLM development tools often operate as black boxes, with users unable to view the prompts used and unable to improve performance by correcting prompts when errors occur. To address the aforementioned issues, GPTutor was introduced as an open-source AI pair programming tool, offering an alternative to Copilot. GPTutor empowers users to customize prompts for various programming languages and scenarios, with support for 120+ human languages and 50+ programming languages. Users can fine-tune prompts to correct the errors from LLM for precision and efficient code generation. At the end of the paper, we underscore GPTutor's potential through examples, including demonstrating its proficiency in interpreting and generating Sui-Move, a newly introduced smart contract language, using prompt engineering.

In the quest to facilitate the deep intelligence of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessible in final-end user-bot interactions, the art of prompt crafting emerges as a critical yet complex task for the average user. Contrast to previous model-oriented yet instruction-agnostic Automatic Prompt Optimization methodologies, yielding polished results for predefined target models while suffering rapid degradation with out-of-box models, we present Free-form Instruction-oriented Prompt Optimization (FIPO). This approach is supported by our large-scale prompt preference dataset and employs a modular fine-tuning schema. The FIPO schema reimagines the optimization process into manageable modules, anchored by a meta prompt that dynamically adapts content. This allows for the flexible integration of the raw task instruction, the optional instruction response, and the optional ground truth to produce finely optimized task prompts. The FIPO preference dataset is meticulously constructed using the optimal and suboptimal LLMs, undergoing rigorous cross-verification by human experts and analytical models. Applying the insights from the data with Tulu2 models and fine-tuning strategies, we validate the efficacy of FIPO schema across five public benchmarks. Codes, data and scripts are here: https://github.com/LuJunru/FIPO_Project.

Prompt engineering is a challenging and important task due to the high sensitivity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to the given prompt and the inherent ambiguity of a textual task instruction. Automatic prompt engineering is essential to achieve optimized performance from LLMs. Recent studies have demonstrated the capabilities of LLMs to automatically conduct prompt engineering by employing a meta-prompt that incorporates the outcomes of the last trials and proposes an improved prompt. However, this requires a high-quality benchmark to compare different prompts, which is difficult and expensive to acquire in many real-world use cases. In this work, we introduce a new method for automatic prompt engineering, using a calibration process that iteratively refines the prompt to the user intent. During the optimization process, the system jointly generates synthetic data of boundary use cases and optimizes the prompt according to the generated dataset. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method with respect to strong proprietary models on real-world tasks such as moderation and generation. Our method outperforms state-of-the-art methods with a limited number of annotated samples. Furthermore, we validate the advantages of each one of the system's key components. Our system is built in a modular way, facilitating easy adaptation to other tasks. The code is available https://github.com/Eladlev/AutoPrompt{here}.

Prompting interfaces allow users to quickly adjust the output of generative models in both vision and language. However, small changes and design choices in the prompt can lead to significant differences in the output. In this work, we develop a black-box framework for generating adversarial prompts for unstructured image and text generation. These prompts, which can be standalone or prepended to benign prompts, induce specific behaviors into the generative process, such as generating images of a particular object or generating high perplexity text.

A less complex and more straightforward program is a crucial factor that enhances its maintainability and makes writing secure and bug-free programs easier. However, due to its heavy workload and the risks of breaking the working programs, programmers are reluctant to do code refactoring, and thus, it also causes the loss of potential learning experiences. To mitigate this, we demonstrate the application of using a large language model (LLM), GPT-3.5, to suggest less complex versions of the user-written Python program, aiming to encourage users to learn how to write better programs. We propose a method to leverage the prompting with few-shot examples of the LLM by selecting the best-suited code refactoring examples for each target programming problem based on the prior evaluation of prompting with the one-shot example. The quantitative evaluation shows that 95.68% of programs can be refactored by generating 10 candidates each, resulting in a 17.35% reduction in the average cyclomatic complexity and a 25.84% decrease in the average number of lines after filtering only generated programs that are semantically correct. Furthermore, the qualitative evaluation shows outstanding capability in code formatting, while unnecessary behaviors such as deleting or translating comments are also observed.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to memorize significant portions of their training data. Parts of this memorized content have been shown to be extractable by simply querying the model, which poses a privacy risk. We present a novel approach which uses prompt-tuning to control the extraction rates of memorized content in LLMs. We present two prompt training strategies to increase and decrease extraction rates, which correspond to an attack and a defense, respectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques by using models from the GPT-Neo family on a public benchmark. For the 1.3B parameter GPT-Neo model, our attack yields a 9.3 percentage point increase in extraction rate compared to our baseline. Our defense can be tuned to achieve different privacy-utility trade-offs by a user-specified hyperparameter. We achieve an extraction rate reduction of up to 97.7% relative to our baseline, with a perplexity increase of 16.9%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as enterprise and government, ensuring that they adhere to user-defined security policies within context is critical-especially with respect to information non-disclosure. While prior LLM studies have focused on general safety and socially sensitive data, large-scale benchmarks for contextual security preservation against attacks remain lacking. To address this, we introduce a novel large-scale benchmark dataset, CoPriva, evaluating LLM adherence to contextual non-disclosure policies in question answering. Derived from realistic contexts, our dataset includes explicit policies and queries designed as direct and challenging indirect attacks seeking prohibited information. We evaluate 10 LLMs on our benchmark and reveal a significant vulnerability: many models violate user-defined policies and leak sensitive information. This failure is particularly severe against indirect attacks, highlighting a critical gap in current LLM safety alignment for sensitive applications. Our analysis reveals that while models can often identify the correct answer to a query, they struggle to incorporate policy constraints during generation. In contrast, they exhibit a partial ability to revise outputs when explicitly prompted. Our findings underscore the urgent need for more robust methods to guarantee contextual security.

This research addresses command-line embedding in cybersecurity, a field obstructed by the lack of comprehensive datasets due to privacy and regulation concerns. We propose the first dataset of similar command lines, named CyPHER, for training and unbiased evaluation. The training set is generated using a set of large language models (LLMs) comprising 28,520 similar command-line pairs. Our testing dataset consists of 2,807 similar command-line pairs sourced from authentic command-line data. In addition, we propose a command-line embedding model named CmdCaliper, enabling the computation of semantic similarity with command lines. Performance evaluations demonstrate that the smallest version of CmdCaliper (30 million parameters) suppresses state-of-the-art (SOTA) sentence embedding models with ten times more parameters across various tasks (e.g., malicious command-line detection and similar command-line retrieval). Our study explores the feasibility of data generation using LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. Furthermore, we release our proposed command-line dataset, embedding models' weights and all program codes to the public. This advancement paves the way for more effective command-line embedding for future researchers.

Text-to-image diffusion models, e.g. Stable Diffusion (SD), lately have shown remarkable ability in high-quality content generation, and become one of the representatives for the recent wave of transformative AI. Nevertheless, such advance comes with an intensifying concern about the misuse of this generative technology, especially for producing copyrighted or NSFW (i.e. not safe for work) images. Although efforts have been made to filter inappropriate images/prompts or remove undesirable concepts/styles via model fine-tuning, the reliability of these safety mechanisms against diversified problematic prompts remains largely unexplored. In this work, we propose Prompting4Debugging (P4D) as a debugging and red-teaming tool that automatically finds problematic prompts for diffusion models to test the reliability of a deployed safety mechanism. We demonstrate the efficacy of our P4D tool in uncovering new vulnerabilities of SD models with safety mechanisms. Particularly, our result shows that around half of prompts in existing safe prompting benchmarks which were originally considered "safe" can actually be manipulated to bypass many deployed safety mechanisms, including concept removal, negative prompt, and safety guidance. Our findings suggest that, without comprehensive testing, the evaluations on limited safe prompting benchmarks can lead to a false sense of safety for text-to-image models.

Prompt caching in large language models (LLMs) results in data-dependent timing variations: cached prompts are processed faster than non-cached prompts. These timing differences introduce the risk of side-channel timing attacks. For example, if the cache is shared across users, an attacker could identify cached prompts from fast API response times to learn information about other users' prompts. Because prompt caching may cause privacy leakage, transparency around the caching policies of API providers is important. To this end, we develop and conduct statistical audits to detect prompt caching in real-world LLM API providers. We detect global cache sharing across users in seven API providers, including OpenAI, resulting in potential privacy leakage about users' prompts. Timing variations due to prompt caching can also result in leakage of information about model architecture. Namely, we find evidence that OpenAI's embedding model is a decoder-only Transformer, which was previously not publicly known.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to `jailbreaking' prompts, which can induce the generation of harmful content. This paper demonstrates that moderate WANDA pruning (Sun et al., 2023) can increase their resistance to such attacks without the need for fine-tuning, while maintaining performance on standard benchmarks. Our findings suggest that the benefits of pruning correlate with the initial safety levels of the model, indicating a regularizing effect of WANDA pruning. We introduce a dataset of 225 harmful tasks across five categories to systematically evaluate this safety enhancement. We argue that safety improvements can be understood through a regularization perspective. First, we show that pruning helps LLMs focus more effectively on task-relevant tokens within jailbreaking prompts. Then, we analyze the effects of pruning on the perplexity of malicious prompts before and after their integration into jailbreak templates. Finally, we demonstrate statistically significant performance improvements under domain shifts when applying WANDA to linear models.

With the rapidly increasing capabilities and adoption of code agents for AI-assisted coding, safety concerns, such as generating or executing risky code, have become significant barriers to the real-world deployment of these agents. To provide comprehensive and practical evaluations on the safety of code agents, we propose RedCode, a benchmark for risky code execution and generation: (1) RedCode-Exec provides challenging prompts that could lead to risky code execution, aiming to evaluate code agents' ability to recognize and handle unsafe code. We provide a total of 4,050 risky test cases in Python and Bash tasks with diverse input formats including code snippets and natural text. They covers 25 types of critical vulnerabilities spanning 8 domains (e.g., websites, file systems). We provide Docker environments and design corresponding evaluation metrics to assess their execution results. (2) RedCode-Gen provides 160 prompts with function signatures and docstrings as input to assess whether code agents will follow instructions to generate harmful code or software. Our empirical findings, derived from evaluating three agent frameworks based on 19 LLMs, provide insights into code agents' vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations on RedCode-Exec show that agents are more likely to reject executing risky operations on the operating system, but are less likely to reject executing technically buggy code, indicating high risks. Risky operations described in natural text lead to a lower rejection rate than those in code format. Additionally, evaluations on RedCode-Gen show that more capable base models and agents with stronger overall coding abilities, such as GPT4, tend to produce more sophisticated and effective harmful software. Our findings highlight the need for stringent safety evaluations for diverse code agents. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/AI-secure/RedCode.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

In software development, the predominant emphasis on functionality often supersedes security concerns, a trend gaining momentum with AI-driven automation tools like GitHub Copilot. These tools significantly improve developers' efficiency in functional code development. Nevertheless, it remains a notable concern that such tools are also responsible for creating insecure code, predominantly because of pre-training on publicly available repositories with vulnerable code. Moreover, developers are called the "weakest link in the chain" since they have very minimal knowledge of code security. Although existing solutions provide a reasonable solution to vulnerable code, they must adequately describe and educate the developers on code security to ensure that the security issues are not repeated. Therefore we introduce a multipurpose code vulnerability analysis system SecRepair, powered by a large language model, CodeGen2 assisting the developer in identifying and generating fixed code along with a complete description of the vulnerability with a code comment. Our innovative methodology uses a reinforcement learning paradigm to generate code comments augmented by a semantic reward mechanism. Inspired by how humans fix code issues, we propose an instruction-based dataset suitable for vulnerability analysis with LLMs. We further identify zero-day and N-day vulnerabilities in 6 Open Source IoT Operating Systems on GitHub. Our findings underscore that incorporating reinforcement learning coupled with semantic reward augments our model's performance, thereby fortifying its capacity to address code vulnerabilities with improved efficacy.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized the field of natural language processing, yet they might be attacked to produce harmful content. Despite efforts to ethically align LLMs, these are often fragile and can be circumvented by jailbreaking attacks through optimized or manual adversarial prompts. To address this, we introduce the Information Bottleneck Protector (IBProtector), a defense mechanism grounded in the information bottleneck principle, and we modify the objective to avoid trivial solutions. The IBProtector selectively compresses and perturbs prompts, facilitated by a lightweight and trainable extractor, preserving only essential information for the target LLMs to respond with the expected answer. Moreover, we further consider a situation where the gradient is not visible to be compatible with any LLM. Our empirical evaluations show that IBProtector outperforms current defense methods in mitigating jailbreak attempts, without overly affecting response quality or inference speed. Its effectiveness and adaptability across various attack methods and target LLMs underscore the potential of IBProtector as a novel, transferable defense that bolsters the security of LLMs without requiring modifications to the underlying models.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research

Zero-shot anomaly detection (ZSAD) aims to identify anomalies in unseen categories by leveraging CLIP's zero-shot capabilities to match text prompts with visual features. A key challenge in ZSAD is learning general prompts stably and utilizing them effectively, while maintaining both generalizability and category specificity. Although general prompts have been explored in prior works, achieving their stable optimization and effective deployment remains a significant challenge. In this work, we propose GenCLIP, a novel framework that learns and leverages general prompts more effectively through multi-layer prompting and dual-branch inference. Multi-layer prompting integrates category-specific visual cues from different CLIP layers, enriching general prompts with more comprehensive and robust feature representations. By combining general prompts with multi-layer visual features, our method further enhances its generalization capability. To balance specificity and generalization, we introduce a dual-branch inference strategy, where a vision-enhanced branch captures fine-grained category-specific features, while a query-only branch prioritizes generalization. The complementary outputs from both branches improve the stability and reliability of anomaly detection across unseen categories. Additionally, we propose an adaptive text prompt filtering mechanism, which removes irrelevant or atypical class names not encountered during CLIP's training, ensuring that only meaningful textual inputs contribute to the final vision-language alignment.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

Enabling large language models (LLMs) to perform tasks in zero-shot has been an appealing goal owing to its labor-saving (i.e., requiring no task-specific annotations); as such, zero-shot prompting approaches also enjoy better task generalizability. To improve LLMs' zero-shot performance, prior work has focused on devising more effective task instructions (e.g., ``let's think step by step'' ). However, we argue that, in order for an LLM to solve them correctly in zero-shot, individual test instances need more carefully designed and customized instructions. To this end, we propose PRoMPTd, an approach that rewrites the task prompt for each individual test input to be more specific, unambiguous, and complete, so as to provide better guidance to the task LLM. We evaluated PRoMPTd on eight datasets covering tasks including arithmetics, logical reasoning, and code generation, using GPT-4 as the task LLM. Notably, PRoMPTd achieves an absolute improvement of around 10% on the complex MATH dataset and 5% on the code generation task on HumanEval, outperforming conventional zero-shot methods. In addition, we also showed that the rewritten prompt can provide better interpretability of how the LLM resolves each test instance, which can potentially be leveraged as a defense mechanism against adversarial prompting. The source code and dataset can be obtained from https://github.com/salokr/PRoMPTd

Large language models (LLMs) are a new and powerful tool for a wide span of applications involving natural language and demonstrate impressive code generation abilities. In this paper, we explore the capabilitity of state-of-the-art LLMs, including closed-source options like OpenAI GPT-4 and open-source alternatives like Meta AI Codellama, to automatically generate tests and use these tests to validate and verify compiler implementations of a directive-based programming paradigm, OpenACC. Our approach entails exploring various prompt engineering techniques including a code template, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) with code template, expressive prompt using RAG with code template, one-shot example, and RAG with one-shot example. This paper focusses on (a) exploring the capabilities of the latest LLMs for code generation, (b) investigating prompt and fine tuning methods, and (c) analyzing the outcome of LLMs generated tests

Despite excellent average-case performance of many image classifiers, their performance can substantially deteriorate on semantically coherent subgroups of the data that were under-represented in the training data. These systematic errors can impact both fairness for demographic minority groups as well as robustness and safety under domain shift. A major challenge is to identify such subgroups with subpar performance when the subgroups are not annotated and their occurrence is very rare. We leverage recent advances in text-to-image models and search in the space of textual descriptions of subgroups ("prompts") for subgroups where the target model has low performance on the prompt-conditioned synthesized data. To tackle the exponentially growing number of subgroups, we employ combinatorial testing. We denote this procedure as PromptAttack as it can be interpreted as an adversarial attack in a prompt space. We study subgroup coverage and identifiability with PromptAttack in a controlled setting and find that it identifies systematic errors with high accuracy. Thereupon, we apply PromptAttack to ImageNet classifiers and identify novel systematic errors on rare subgroups.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Training machine learning approaches for vulnerability identification and producing reliable tools to assist developers in implementing quality software -- free of vulnerabilities -- is challenging due to the lack of large datasets and real data. Researchers have been looking at these issues and building datasets. However, these datasets usually miss natural language artifacts and programming language diversity. We scraped the entire CVE details database for GitHub references and augmented the data with 3 security-related datasets. We used the data to create a ground-truth dataset of natural language artifacts (such as commit messages, commits comments, and summaries), meta-data and code changes. Our dataset integrates a total of 8057 security-relevant commits -- the equivalent to 5942 security patches -- from 1339 different projects spanning 146 different types of vulnerabilities and 20 languages. A dataset of 110k non-security-related commits is also provided. Data and scripts are all available on GitHub. Data is stored in a .CSV file. Codebases can be downloaded using our scripts. Our dataset is a valuable asset to answer research questions on different topics such as the identification of security-relevant information using NLP models; software engineering and security best practices; and, vulnerability detection and patching; and, security program analysis.

The integration of AI agents with Web3 ecosystems harnesses their complementary potential for autonomy and openness yet also introduces underexplored security risks, as these agents dynamically interact with financial protocols and immutable smart contracts. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of AI agents within blockchain-based financial ecosystems when exposed to adversarial threats in real-world scenarios. We introduce the concept of context manipulation, a comprehensive attack vector that exploits unprotected context surfaces, including input channels, memory modules, and external data feeds. Through empirical analysis of ElizaOS, a decentralized AI agent framework for automated Web3 operations, we demonstrate how adversaries can manipulate context by injecting malicious instructions into prompts or historical interaction records, leading to unintended asset transfers and protocol violations which could be financially devastating. To quantify these vulnerabilities, we design CrAIBench, a Web3 domain-specific benchmark that evaluates the robustness of AI agents against context manipulation attacks across 150+ realistic blockchain tasks, including token transfers, trading, bridges and cross-chain interactions and 500+ attack test cases using context manipulation. We systematically assess attack and defense strategies, analyzing factors like the influence of security prompts, reasoning models, and the effectiveness of alignment techniques. Our findings show that prompt-based defenses are insufficient when adversaries corrupt stored context, achieving significant attack success rates despite these defenses. Fine-tuning-based defenses offer a more robust alternative, substantially reducing attack success rates while preserving utility on single-step tasks. This research highlights the urgent need to develop AI agents that are both secure and fiduciarily responsible.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Large Language Models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, have demonstrated vast potential but also introduce challenges related to content constraints and potential misuse. Our study investigates three key research questions: (1) the number of different prompt types that can jailbreak LLMs, (2) the effectiveness of jailbreak prompts in circumventing LLM constraints, and (3) the resilience of ChatGPT against these jailbreak prompts. Initially, we develop a classification model to analyze the distribution of existing prompts, identifying ten distinct patterns and three categories of jailbreak prompts. Subsequently, we assess the jailbreak capability of prompts with ChatGPT versions 3.5 and 4.0, utilizing a dataset of 3,120 jailbreak questions across eight prohibited scenarios. Finally, we evaluate the resistance of ChatGPT against jailbreak prompts, finding that the prompts can consistently evade the restrictions in 40 use-case scenarios. The study underscores the importance of prompt structures in jailbreaking LLMs and discusses the challenges of robust jailbreak prompt generation and prevention.

With growing capabilities of large language models, prompting them has become the dominant way to access them. This has motivated the development of strategies for automatically selecting effective language prompts. In this paper, we introduce prompt flatness, a new metric to quantify the expected utility of a language prompt. This metric is inspired by flatness regularization in statistical learning that quantifies the robustness of the model towards its parameter perturbations. We provide theoretical foundations for this metric and its relationship with other prompt selection metrics, providing a comprehensive understanding of existing methods. Empirically, we show that combining prompt flatness with existing metrics improves both performance and sample efficiency. Our metric outperforms the previous prompt selection metrics with an average increase of 5% in accuracy and 10% in Pearson correlation across 6 classification benchmarks.

Well-designed prompts are crucial for enhancing Large language models' (LLMs) reasoning capabilities while aligning their outputs with task requirements across diverse domains. However, manually designed prompts require expertise and iterative experimentation. While existing prompt optimization methods aim to automate this process, they rely heavily on external references such as ground truth or by humans, limiting their applicability in real-world scenarios where such data is unavailable or costly to obtain. To address this, we propose Self-Supervised Prompt Optimization (SPO), a cost-efficient framework that discovers effective prompts for both closed and open-ended tasks without requiring external reference. Motivated by the observations that prompt quality manifests directly in LLM outputs and LLMs can effectively assess adherence to task requirements, we derive evaluation and optimization signals purely from output comparisons. Specifically, SPO selects superior prompts through pairwise output comparisons evaluated by an LLM evaluator, followed by an LLM optimizer that aligns outputs with task requirements. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SPO outperforms state-of-the-art prompt optimization methods, achieving comparable or superior results with significantly lower costs (e.g., 1.1% to 5.6% of existing methods) and fewer samples (e.g., three samples). The code is available at https://github.com/geekan/MetaGPT.

We introduce Codex, a GPT language model fine-tuned on publicly available code from GitHub, and study its Python code-writing capabilities. A distinct production version of Codex powers GitHub Copilot. On HumanEval, a new evaluation set we release to measure functional correctness for synthesizing programs from docstrings, our model solves 28.8% of the problems, while GPT-3 solves 0% and GPT-J solves 11.4%. Furthermore, we find that repeated sampling from the model is a surprisingly effective strategy for producing working solutions to difficult prompts. Using this method, we solve 70.2% of our problems with 100 samples per problem. Careful investigation of our model reveals its limitations, including difficulty with docstrings describing long chains of operations and with binding operations to variables. Finally, we discuss the potential broader impacts of deploying powerful code generation technologies, covering safety, security, and economics.

Along with the remarkable successes of Language language models, recent research also started to explore the security threats of LLMs, including jailbreaking attacks. Attackers carefully craft jailbreaking prompts such that a target LLM will respond to the harmful question. Existing jailbreaking attacks require either human experts or leveraging complicated algorithms to craft jailbreaking prompts. In this paper, we introduce BOOST, a simple attack that leverages only the eos tokens. We demonstrate that rather than constructing complicated jailbreaking prompts, the attacker can simply append a few eos tokens to the end of a harmful question. It will bypass the safety alignment of LLMs and lead to successful jailbreaking attacks. We further apply BOOST to four representative jailbreak methods and show that the attack success rates of these methods can be significantly enhanced by simply adding eos tokens to the prompt. To understand this simple but novel phenomenon, we conduct empirical analyses. Our analysis reveals that adding eos tokens makes the target LLM believe the input is much less harmful, and eos tokens have low attention values and do not affect LLM's understanding of the harmful questions, leading the model to actually respond to the questions. Our findings uncover how fragile an LLM is against jailbreak attacks, motivating the development of strong safety alignment approaches.

The aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful language understanding and decision-making tools that are created through extensive alignment with human feedback. However, these large models remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks, where adversaries manipulate prompts to elicit malicious outputs that should not be given by aligned LLMs. Investigating jailbreak prompts can lead us to delve into the limitations of LLMs and further guide us to secure them. Unfortunately, existing jailbreak techniques suffer from either (1) scalability issues, where attacks heavily rely on manual crafting of prompts, or (2) stealthiness problems, as attacks depend on token-based algorithms to generate prompts that are often semantically meaningless, making them susceptible to detection through basic perplexity testing. In light of these challenges, we intend to answer this question: Can we develop an approach that can automatically generate stealthy jailbreak prompts? In this paper, we introduce AutoDAN, a novel jailbreak attack against aligned LLMs. AutoDAN can automatically generate stealthy jailbreak prompts by the carefully designed hierarchical genetic algorithm. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that AutoDAN not only automates the process while preserving semantic meaningfulness, but also demonstrates superior attack strength in cross-model transferability, and cross-sample universality compared with the baseline. Moreover, we also compare AutoDAN with perplexity-based defense methods and show that AutoDAN can bypass them effectively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) guardrail systems are designed to protect against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. However, they remain vulnerable to evasion techniques. We demonstrate two approaches for bypassing LLM prompt injection and jailbreak detection systems via traditional character injection methods and algorithmic Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) evasion techniques. Through testing against six prominent protection systems, including Microsoft's Azure Prompt Shield and Meta's Prompt Guard, we show that both methods can be used to evade detection while maintaining adversarial utility achieving in some instances up to 100% evasion success. Furthermore, we demonstrate that adversaries can enhance Attack Success Rates (ASR) against black-box targets by leveraging word importance ranking computed by offline white-box models. Our findings reveal vulnerabilities within current LLM protection mechanisms and highlight the need for more robust guardrail systems.