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Browse files- index.html +6 -5
index.html
CHANGED
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
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if (!$(this).hasClass('selected')) {
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$('.formula').hide(200);
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$('.formula-list > a').removeClass('selected');
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$(this).addClass('selected');
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var target = $(this).attr('href');
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@@ -424,11 +425,11 @@
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the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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</div>
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</div>
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@@ -463,19 +464,19 @@
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<div class="columns is-centered">
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<div class="column">
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<p id="label-loss">
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Attackers can design adaptive attacks to try to bypass BEYOND when the attacker knows all the parameters of the model
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and the detection strategy. For an SSL model with a feature extractor $f$, a projector $h$, and a classification head $g$,
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the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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</p>
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<p id="representation-loss"
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where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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</p>
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<p id="total-loss"
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where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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</p>
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</div>
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if (!$(this).hasClass('selected')) {
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$('.formula').hide(200);
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+
$('.eq-des').hide(200);
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$('.formula-list > a').removeClass('selected');
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$(this).addClass('selected');
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var target = $(this).attr('href');
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the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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<!-- where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter. -->
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</div>
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</div>
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<div class="columns is-centered">
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<div class="column">
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<p id="label-loss" class="eq-des">
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Attackers can design adaptive attacks to try to bypass BEYOND when the attacker knows all the parameters of the model
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and the detection strategy. For an SSL model with a feature extractor $f$, a projector $h$, and a classification head $g$,
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the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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</p>
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+
<p id="representation-loss" class="eq-des" style="display: none">
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where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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</p>
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+
<p id="total-loss" class="eq-des" style="display: none;">
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where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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</p>
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</div>
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