allenhzy commited on
Commit
710289e
·
1 Parent(s): dcaee4d
Files changed (1) hide show
  1. index.html +6 -5
index.html CHANGED
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
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  if (!$(this).hasClass('selected')) {
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  $('.formula').hide(200);
 
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  $('.formula-list > a').removeClass('selected');
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  $(this).addClass('selected');
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  var target = $(this).attr('href');
@@ -424,11 +425,11 @@
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  the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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  To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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- where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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  and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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  Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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- where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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  </div>
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  </div>
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@@ -463,19 +464,19 @@
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  <div class="columns is-centered">
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  <div class="column">
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- <p id="label-loss">
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  Attackers can design adaptive attacks to try to bypass BEYOND when the attacker knows all the parameters of the model
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  and the detection strategy. For an SSL model with a feature extractor $f$, a projector $h$, and a classification head $g$,
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  the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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  To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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  </p>
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- <p id="representation-loss", style="display: none">
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  where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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  and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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  Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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  </p>
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- <p id="total-loss", style="display: none;">
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  where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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  </p>
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  </div>
 
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  if (!$(this).hasClass('selected')) {
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  $('.formula').hide(200);
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+ $('.eq-des').hide(200);
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  $('.formula-list > a').removeClass('selected');
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  $(this).addClass('selected');
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  var target = $(this).attr('href');
 
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  the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
426
  To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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+ <!-- where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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  and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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  Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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+ where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter. -->
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  </div>
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  </div>
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  <div class="columns is-centered">
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  <div class="column">
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+ <p id="label-loss" class="eq-des">
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  Attackers can design adaptive attacks to try to bypass BEYOND when the attacker knows all the parameters of the model
469
  and the detection strategy. For an SSL model with a feature extractor $f$, a projector $h$, and a classification head $g$,
470
  the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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  To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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  </p>
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+ <p id="representation-loss" class="eq-des" style="display: none">
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  where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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  and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
476
  Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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  </p>
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+ <p id="total-loss" class="eq-des" style="display: none;">
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  where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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  </p>
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  </div>