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SOUTH AFRICA’S LOW- | |
EMISSION | |
DEVELOPMENT | |
STRATEGY 2050 | |
February 2020 | |
TABLE OF CONTENTS | |
ACRONYMS ..ccecssssssssessssscessseessneccanecesnecesnecesneeesnneesnneees | |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.. .. Vill | |
1 INTRODUCTION... | |
TA ‘The global:climate:Crisis scissinnscsennuinimmmcsncnon usin cionennesommunenimamn onan 1 | |
1:2 ‘he Paris Agreement tisrcssssccsmnnsresnnnnnermn cn 2 | |
1.3. The Science of 1.5°C and what it means for the Paris gOalS......... i eeeceeseeeeseesteeseesesteetessesneentenees 3 | |
1.4 Methodological elements for developing LEDS ...0.....c eee 4 | |
1.5 South Africa LEDS — a living COCUMENE.........c.eecescesceseestsseeseesesesteseeseenesueseseeesesiseesseeaeeneeeeneetentenseneeneeaes 6 | |
2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, EMISSIONS PROFILE AND POLICY LANDSCAPE .. .8 | |
21 -South:Aftica's Econom sscscscsnscarcconn mae 8 | |
2.1.1 — EMe@rgy SUPPLY... eseesceseeseesessesseseeseeseesesnesussnsaessesuesesensaeeaseneeueeeseesasensausaesaeseseeeensassnsensenseneeneaseesensaees 8 | |
2.1.2 Mining and the industrial S@CtOF 0... escseeseeseeseeseeeeseseeseeseeseenesnsseeaeeseseeeteetensenseseesetstenseneateaeeneeees 10 | |
2.1.3 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU)..00.. occ eeenesieaneeesnmenesieinanansenee 11 | |
214 Waste SOCIO «canneries neomncemimna ocean anmannamcemaramenaa 1 | |
21:5: Other sectors cna EER 11 | |
2.2 Greenhouse gas EMissions Profile 0... eee teseenesesteeeesnssnteeteeienneeniesiesenenssnsene 12 | |
2.3 Policy, legislation and strategies that inform SA-LEDS....0... cece eeeeeeeseseeteeieeeenneenesianeaneenee 14 | |
2.3.1 National Development Plan 2030 oo... eeeeeeesneeeesiesieneesesinesesnssmeetessennieaiesneeenananssne 15 | |
2.3.2 National Climate Change Response Policy . | |
2.3.9 Climate Change Bill ssssssisisesesenncanoreie sername | |
2.4 The role of sub-national government and the private SCCtOF wees testes 17 | |
2.4.1 Sub-national QOVErMMentt..........eccesceseesessessesseseeseeseeseeneseeeeeeesesuesnssessesseseeeteetsaseaseseneeneeeeeseneateeeeeeeees 17 | |
2.4.2 The contribution of the private SCCtOP...... ec eeceeeesesneetesteseeniesesineenesneeieateeenneeaieeiesenaneaneene 18 | |
2.5 Vulnerability and resilience ............cccceseeseesecesteseeseeseeseeseseeeeeeeeseeesssensseeaeeueensensaeeaseaseeeeeeeessenseneateaeeeeees 18 | |
3 VISION STATEMENT ....ssesssecsseesssesssecsneesnessnessneesnscsnscsnscsusesusesssesssessnecsusesnsssnsesusesusesusesnsceuesneessnesneeesneeseeeseeens 9 | |
A ‘GHG EMISSIGNS' MITIGATION MEASURES vevcosnmsscessnevarenensouemsemenrnenmserennnennrmenrnneT 21 | |
4.1 EMmergy SUPPLY... eeeeseeseeseeseseseseesesseesessesneeteaeeneenesecsessesucsusssseenesessasensaeeaesusensseeaeenssnesneaeenseeeeeeteatensenees 21 | |
4.1.1 Integrated Energy Plan... ccesceseeseeeceseseeseesecsesseseseesessesnssssnssesseeeesiseneseeaseeseseeeeneeeeeeseseneaneaeeeeaes 21 | |
4.1.2; ‘Integrated RESOUrCE PIAN esses ecweusccrerereeecmeerenercommreanseeeenucereneaeanner enna eenr iene 23 | |
41:3: Biofuelsopportunities vcesseorse sua sevemruneunner neem nra enema 26 | |
4.2 Energy: demand esseuswsverervemner rare nememmn nen nurmermres ancien momen ne eny esmureneer 27 | |
4.2.1 National Energy Efficiency Strategy... cece eeeeeesesesssesseseessessesseeseesuesnessiesnssesaseesesneeneeseeesease 27 | |
4.2.2 Support for uptake of Solar Water Heaters... ese eeeeeesseseestesteseeseesesntesesnesesaneesesneeneesieeneees 31 | |
4.2.3. National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act .......c..ceceeeccesesesteeeestestesteateateeeeeeees 31 | |
4.2.4 Promotion of Cleaner Mobility ...........cccccseeessessesteseesessesesesssessesseeeeneenseeeassissseeeeteeeseseseneeteneeeeaee 32 | |
AS INGUSUIY crvceresersys seen aerecenyrmameeurnrearerine | |
4.3.1 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). | |
4.3.2 Tax incentives for green project development ........... eesti | |
4.4 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU)...0.....ceeceeseeseseeesseseeseesssmetssssatseneesenneeneenieeneeee 36 | |
45 WaStC oneness iesienesesmeesesmenieeiesnienesnssenenssissnieaiesiinnnissussunenesessameaneesesnennieneenieen 37 | |
4.6 ChOSSeCUIIG MOBSUTES sere cc ct cceseccrwenen ean reunnrecere conten eenuneresieearcerereatevtnatect ra ventet ent vesroreniecotateeneaedeecereivers 39 | |
4.6.1 Carbon TaX sisisansusonanmpsoncnmmannennnnan ania nase ieonanaeY 39 | |
4.6.2 Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETS) sisicsnnmnnnmninnmmmnmininmnnmnmnemmmmnn 40 | |
4.6.3 Carbon Budgets... ccc eeesseseeseestsneseesisiesaesssemeiesssnmeaesisneenesssetaissnssnesaneesesneeanesieeneane 41 | |
4.6.4 Phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subSidieS/INCENtIVES occ es ceeeeseeseeseeseseseteetesneeneesteeneeee 41 | |
5 GOING FURTHER TO ACHIEVE THE PARIS GOALS ....escssescssecsssecesnesesneeesneeess 42 | |
5.1 Enhancing the vision for development ............cecsccccestesteseeseeeestestesteeeeeteeees | |
5.2 Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition... eects 44 | |
5.3 Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth ......... 46 | |
5.4 Providing broad access to fUNdS occ eeeeeeseeeeesieeieteeiesienesnsineissneenieeteeiesienssneenananeane 47 | |
5.4.1 Climate finance flows to date oo. eensieeeeeenesisieenenmeiessemeaieeeniennesnsenaneensenee 48 | |
5.4.2 Formalising climate finance Structures... csceeceseeseseeeesseseeseesesneeteseeieatessenneeniestesnteaneansenees 50 | |
54.3. Climate finance opportunities: cicmnnomnenumnimanemanmmnannamummamnmaiN 51 | |
5.5 — Driving innovation, research, and skills for future valUe CAPtUre ow... escent 54 | |
5.6 Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all... cece ieseenmeseieeiesesnieateeesnmenieaiesenaneansene 56 | |
5.7 Promoting sustainable development through education and culture................ 57 | |
5.8 Enhancing information and metrics .............0+ OT | |
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS: PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION .....essseeessee 58 | |
6.1 Detailed sectoral work to explore transformation pathwayS ......... cscs 58 | |
6.2 Creation of policy package roadmaps across three phases 00... cseeeeeesneseetesseeneentesneseeneeaneenee 59 | |
7 REFERENCES ..esessssecsssecsssssessscessncssnecesnscesnscesnsscssnsessnecesusecssscesnuscsunsesansessnseesnucessnecesuseesneeesusessuneeesneeenneeesneess 63 | |
LIST OF FIGURES | |
Figure 1: SA-LEDS in the context of prior climate-related work in South Africa... 7 | |
Figure 2: Key contributors to GDP ou... ..eeseeseesecesessestesesseesesnesussnsaeeseeneenseesseeaeeaseaseeeensesensesaneneeneeieeneanentensenseneeees 8 | |
Figure 3: Contribution of main emission categories and energy emission categories to national gross greenhouse | |
GAS EMISSIONS 2015 ess cescevercexcesss een ereceer cero ereceeneerann ne ceeenteerecen verre ener ee earermreneeeeenyee pene eeaner ea 13 | |
Figure 4: Total gross national GHG emissions by economic sector . we 14 | |
Figure 5: South Africa’s Peak, Plateau, Decline Trajectory Range...........c.sccsescesesessseeeseseeseeetsnssnseneeteeteeeeeeees 20 | |
Figure 6: Sectoral energy deMANd oo. ce eceeeseeseesneeeeseseeseeseseeeteeesneeateeteseesessussnseenesnesnieaneesenneeaeeneesneese 22 | |
Figure 7: Share of installed capacity in the 2019 IRP in MW... eee eesneeseeseeseeeeesesneenteeneeneenenneeniees 25 | |
Figuiré:8: Domestic climate finahice (2015 2017) veccicceceacwmnvecerareeneeerereaveranveerinneeeeveneeronminnveernavenveneneiertarns 49 | |
LIST OF TABLES | |
Table 1: Strategic interventions outlined in South Africa’s National Adaptation Strategy 0... 19 | |
Table 2: Energy efficiency targets outlined in the post-2015 NEES oo... eeesessneseeteeseseeeenesiniesneenee 28 | |
Table 3: Measures outlined in the post-2015 NEES .0.... cee seseeesieeessmansseneeniesisenniansenee 29 | |
Table 4: Current institutional arrangements to address climate change response actionS.............cceseeeeeeee 45 | |
Table 5: The three phases of the just transition ............ | |
ACRONYMS | |
ADP | |
AFOLU | |
BRT | |
CA | |
CO2 | |
CoP | |
CSIR | |
CTL | |
DAFF | |
DBSA | |
DEA | |
DoE | |
DSI | |
GDP | |
GHG | |
GJ | |
GTL | |
GTS | |
GWh | |
HySA | |
IDC | |
IEP | |
IGCCC | |
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action | |
Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use | |
Bus Rapid Transport | |
Conservation Agriculture | |
Carbon dioxide | |
Conference of the Parties | |
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research | |
Coal-to-Liquids | |
Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries | |
Development Bank of Southern Africa | |
Department of Environmental Affairs | |
Department of Energy | |
Department of Science and Innovation | |
Gross Domestic Product | |
Greenhouse Gas | |
Gigajoule | |
Gas-to-liquids (GTL) | |
Green Transport Strategy | |
Gigawatt hour | |
Hydrogen South Africa | |
Industrial Development Corporation | |
Integrated Energy Plan | |
Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change | |
IMCCC | |
IPAP | |
IPCC | |
IPP | |
IRP | |
Kfw | |
LEDS | |
LTAS | |
LTMS | |
MACC. | |
&E | |
MINMEC | |
MINTECH | |
MPA | |
MRF | |
t | |
t CO2-eq | |
W | |
ccc | |
NCCRP | |
NDC | |
NDP | |
EES | |
NEM:WA | |
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change | |
Industrial Policy Action Plan | |
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change | |
Independent Power Producer | |
Integrated Resource Plan | |
German KfW Development Bank | |
Low-Emission Development Strategy | |
Long Term Adaptation Scenarios | |
Long Term Mitigation Scenarios | |
Marginal Abatement Cost Curve | |
lonitoring and Evaluation | |
Ministers and Members of Executive Councils | |
Ministerial Technical Advisory Body | |
itigation Potential Analysis | |
Material Recovery Facility | |
Megatonne | |
legatonne Carbon Dioxide Equivalent | |
Megawatt | |
ational Committee on Climate Change | |
National Climate Change Response Policy | |
Nationally Determined Contribution | |
National Development Plan | |
ational Energy Efficiency Strategy | |
National Environmental Management: Waste Act | |
NERSA | |
NEVA | |
NIPF | |
NPC | |
NTCSA | |
NWMS | |
PAMs | |
PCCCC | |
PJ | |
PPD | |
RE | |
REIPPPP | |
REDD | |
SACCS | |
SANS | |
SA-LEDS | |
SDG | |
SET | |
SJRP | |
STEP | |
STI | |
SWH | |
UN | |
UNESCO | |
National Energy Regulator of South Africa | |
National Employment Vulnerability Assessment | |
National Industrial Policy Framework | |
National Planning Commission | |
National Terrestrial Carbon Sinks Assessment | |
National Waste Management Strategy | |
Policies and Measures | |
Presidential Climate Change Coordinating Commission | |
Petajoule | |
Peak, Plateau and Decline | |
Renewable Energy | |
Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme | |
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation | |
South African Centre for Capture and Storage | |
South African National Standard | |
South Africa Low-Emission Development Strategy | |
Sustainable Development Goal | |
Sectoral Emissions Target | |
Sector Jobs Resilience Plan | |
Subtropical Thicket Ecosystem Project | |
Science, Technology and Innovation | |
Solar Water Heater | |
United Nations | |
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization | |
vi | |
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change | |
WtE Waste-to-Energy | |
ZAR South African Rand | |
vii | |
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | |
INTRODUCTION | |
South Africa, like the rest of the world, is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In unmitigated greenhouse | |
gas (GHG) emissions scenarios, warming of up to 5 to 8°C is projected over the interior of the country by the end | |
of this century. Under a range of warming scenarios, drier conditions will be experienced in the west and south of | |
the country and wetter conditions in the east. Rainfall patterns will become more variable and unpredictable. | |
These changes will impact on water resources and food production, and increase the vulnerability of impoverished | |
communities, amongst others. The South African government thus regards climate change as a considerable | |
threat to the country and its socio-economic development. At the same time, if climate change is to be limited | |
through limiting the growth in global GHG emissions, with South Africa contributing its fair share to emission | |
reductions, there will be other implications for the country. As one of the top 20 global emitters, with a high | |
dependency on fossil fuels, substantial emission cuts will be required. The rapid transition that will be required | |
presents a potential risk to economic growth and sustainable development if not managed properly. | |
Through the Paris Agreement, Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change | |
(UNFCCC) have agreed to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre- | |
industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”. Article | |
4 of the Agreement sets out Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as the instrument countries must | |
develop to present their part of the global effort to “reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon | |
as possible... on the basis of equity and “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate | |
poverty”. To help ensure that the Parties’ national contributions can jointly achieve the collective goal, the Article | |
further states that “Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission | |
development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities | |
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances’. | |
This document has been prepared in response to that Article, and presents South Africa’s first Low Emission | |
Development Strategy (SA-LEDS). Through submitting this document to the UNFCCC our country reiterates its | |
commitment to achieving the Paris goals. Implementation of the Strategy will also contribute directly and indirectly | |
to the meeting of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). | |
SA-LEDS builds upon years of work on climate change in the country, which has contributed to the establishment | |
of an important set of policy documents. Building on existing plans offers numerous benefits, such as optimizing | |
vill | |
resources and ensuring buy-in of key stakeholders. Three key climate policy documents provide the foundation | |
on which SA-LEDS has been developed. These are: | |
e The National Development Plan (NDP): With an overarching objective of eliminating poverty and | |
reduce inequality by 2030, the NDP outlines a set of goals and actions to meet the country’s | |
environmental sustainability and resilience needs, and dedicates a full chapter to “Environmental | |
Sustainability - An equitable transition to a low-carbon economy”. | |
e The National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) represents government's comprehensive | |
policy framework for responding to climate change, including provisions for adaptation and mitigation. | |
e The Climate Change Bill (forthcoming) will form the legislative foundation for the climate change | |
adaptation and mitigation response. With respect to mitigation, the Bill provides for future review and | |
determination of the national greenhouse gas emissions trajectory; determination of sectoral emissions | |
targets for emitting sectors and subsectors; and allocation of carbon budgets. It also makes provision | |
for the development of plans to phase down or phase out the use of synthetic greenhouse gases - in | |
line with the Kigali Amendments to the Montreal Protocol. | |
Various other strategies, policies and sector plans have been developed for individual sectors of the economy, | |
which will all contribute to driving emission reductions. These are detailed in later sections of this document to | |
outline the set of discrete measures which serve as a starting point for implementation of the LEDS. At the same | |
time, many of these plans were developed prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and do not consider the | |
long-term, global goals in a coordinated manner and address a shorter timeframe than mid-century. Keeping SA- | |
LEDS as a dynamic and flexible document is important to ensure it keeps pace with domestic policy | |
developments, research, development and innovation, and declining costs of emissions mitigation technologies. | |
Notable here is a process being undertaken by the National Planning Commission (NPC) to develop a common | |
vision for the country in 2050. This vision will be instrumental in driving harmonisation of government plans and | |
policies and so it is important that the NPC process and vision takes into account the Paris goals. | |
In addition to policies and measures being implemented by national government, many sub-national (provincial | |
and local) government departments are undertaking activities that contribute to the national mitigation, adaptation | |
and resilience efforts. Sub-national activities have, however, not yet been aligned or coordinated, and different | |
geographical locations see different levels of activity. A diverse range of actions that contribute to GHG emissions | |
mitigation is also being seen across the private sector, with significant gains having been made in certain sectors | |
on both energy efficiency and emissions mitigation. | |
Although this strategy focuses primarily on greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, the vulnerability to climate | |
change impacts, as well as the need to build resilience to these impacts is noted, and will be further elaborated | |
in future iterations of SA-LEDS. South Africa has developed a National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy that | |
highlights nine key vulnerability areas for the country which acts as a complement to this document. | |
VISION STATEMENT | |
The stated vision for SA-LEDS is as follows: | |
South Africa follows a low-carbon growth trajectory while making a fair contribution to the | |
global effort to limit the average temperature increase, while ensuring a just transition and | |
building of the country’s resilience to climate change | |
In the absence of an agreed quantitative articulation of the vision, the Peak, Plateau, Decline Emissions Trajectory | |
Range, as reflected in the NCCRP and NDP, is used as the benchmark against which the performance of SA- | |
LEDS will be measured. The Climate Change Bill, described later, makes provision for regular updates of this | |
trajectory, through which it can be better placed within the context of the Paris Agreement. The outcomes of the | |
National Planning Commission process to develop a common vision for the country in 2050 will be used to update | |
SA-LEDS once released. In the development of the vision, South Africa will give due consideration to the IPCC | |
Special Report on 1.5°C, which represents the latest available science regarding this goal. | |
GHG EMISSIONS MITIGATION MEASURES | |
The strategy centres on measures currently being implemented by government to address mitigation across the | |
four key sectors of the economy, namely energy, industry, AFOLU and waste. It also presents planned cross- | |
sectoral measures that will contribute to driving mitigation action. As indicated previously, many of the measures | |
address only the short term, and are not considered transformational. South Africa puts these forward as a starting | |
point from which to ratchet up our future ambition towards more integrated, transformational strategy. | |
Energy supply | |
Decarbonisation of energy supply will largely be driven through the: | |
e Integrated Energy Plan, which analyses current energy supply and demand trends within the different | |
sectors of the economy, across all energy carriers. It then uses this information along with assumptions | |
about future demand and technology evolution to project the country’s future energy requirements under | |
a variety of different scenarios, including those with emissions limits and carbon prices. | |
Integrated Resource Plan, which guides the evolution of the South African electricity supply sector, in | |
that it identifies the preferred electricity generation technologies to be built to meet projected electricity | |
demand. It thus provides a mechanism for Government to drive the diversification of the country’s | |
electricity generation mix and promote the use of renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. | |
Biofuels Opportunities, offered through the Biofuels Industrial Strategy of 2007 (yet to be implemented) | |
and second and third generation biofuels technologies that could potentially increase the volumes of | |
biofuel that could be produced, without competing with food products for feedstocks. | |
Energy demand | |
SA-LEDS supports the implementation of a selection of measures to reduce energy demand, or limit growth in | |
energy demand, as the economy and population grows: | |
The National Energy Efficiency Strategy: In 2005, the Department of Energy launched the first National | |
Energy Efficiency Strategy (NEES). Building on this document, the Department of Minerals and Energy | |
is finalizing the post-2015 NEES, which outlines a set of goals for energy efficiency improvements across | |
the economy to 2030. The NEES also identifies a set of measures to be implemented in each sector to | |
achieve the stated targets. The Post-2015 NEES makes provision for a review every five years. | |
Support for increased uptake of Solar Water Heaters: Solar Water Heaters (SWH) partially offset use | |
of electricity for water heating in middle- and high-income households, and can service low-income | |
households that did not previously have ready access to hot water or used fuels other than electricity for | |
water heating. Since 2005 a number of goals have been set, and associated support programmes have | |
been established to drive uptake of SWH, with the NDP introducing a goal of five million SWHs by 2030. | |
The National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act: To further efforts to decrease | |
energy consumption and associated GHG emissions of new commercial and residential buildings, the | |
government has implemented energy efficiency and energy consumption standards under the National | |
Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act. The first of these is South African National Standard | |
(SANS) 204 - Energy Efficiency in Buildings. This standard “specifies the design requirements for energy | |
efficiency in buildings and of services in buildings with natural environmental control and artificial | |
ventilation or air conditioning systems.” The second, SANS 10400-XA — Energy Usage in Buildings, | |
includes the provisions of SANS 204 and others, providing a standard for energy efficient buildings. | |
xi | |
e Promotion of cleaner mobility: Emissions from energy supply in the transport sector are addressed | |
through a number of policy documents. The 2007 Public Transport Strategy sets out an action plan for | |
accelerated modal shifts and for the development of integrated rapid public transport networks. Since | |
then, the successful implementation of the bus rapid transport (BRT) system in Johannesburg has led to | |
it being adapted and implemented in other major South African cities, with further roll-outs being planned. | |
In 2018 the Green Transport Strategy (GTS) to 2050 was launched. The GTS provides the strategic | |
direction for the transport sector regarding the reduction of GHG emissions, the contribution of transport | |
to the green economy and the promotion of sustainable mobility. The Strategy aims to support reductions | |
in the contribution of the transport sector to national greenhouse gas emissions through interventions that | |
include local electric vehicle and battery production and roll out of solar powered charging stations; | |
continued use of fuel economy norms and standards for fuel efficiency and GHG emissions of vehicles; | |
and facilitating a shift of freight from road to rail. In September 2010 a COz tax was introduced on the | |
selling price of new motor vehicles that exceed a certain emissions limit. | |
Industry | |
Two sets of policies that directly and indirectly support emissions reductions in the industrial sector are identified, | |
beyond those that target energy efficiency. The Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), the implementation plan | |
for the National Industrial Policy Framework, is revised at various intervals. The most recent revision, which covers | |
the period 2018/19 to 2020/21, provides updates on key focus areas within the industrial sector, one of which is | |
green industry investment. The implementation of technologies with potential for contribution to emissions | |
reductions in the industrial sector is also supported by various tax incentives, contained in the Income Tax Act. | |
Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) | |
Mitigation actions identified in the AFOLU sector include Policies and Measures developed by line departments | |
including the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF)'. These include the draft Climate Change | |
Adaptation and Mitigation Plan for the South African Agricultural and Forestry sectors, the Conservation | |
Agriculture Policy and the Agroforestry Strategic Framework for South Africa. | |
1 Note that with a government restructure Forestry and Fisheries has now been combined with Environmental Affairs, while Agriculture | |
has been combined with agriculture and the department of rural development and land reform. The implications of this restructuring on | |
policy implementation has not yet been considered. | |
xii | |
Waste | |
Waste management activities are legislated through the National Environmental Management: Waste Act, with | |
further policy direction being provided through the National Waste Management Strategy (NWMS). The Strategy | |
adopts the waste management hierarchy of waste avoidance and reduction, re-use, recycling, recovery, treatment | |
and disposal, activities which potentially contribute to a reduction in emissions from material life cycles2. | |
Subsequent to the Waste Act and NWMS, twenty national waste management initiatives and annual targets have | |
been established through a process known as the Waste Phakisa. Of the initiatives, five are likely to have direct | |
and indirect impacts on the total national greenhouse gas emissions. The importance of circular economy thinking | |
in guiding the Waste Phakisa initiatives is recognised. | |
Cross-Cutting Measures | |
In addition to the measures specific to individual sectors described, four cross-cutting measures that will support | |
low carbon development are in various stages of being implemented. | |
e Carbon Tax: The Carbon Tax Act was brought into effect from 1 June 2019, which gives effect to the | |
“polluter pays principle” and aims to price carbon by internalising the negative costs of emitting GHGs. | |
The tax rate is set at R120 per tonne of COz-eq. To allow businesses time for transition, a basic tax-free | |
allowance of 60% will initially apply to all emissions, with further allowances depending on the activities. | |
The tax structure will be revised post-2021 to align with the proposed mandatory carbon budgets. | |
e Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs): The national emissions trajectory will be translated into Sectoral | |
Emission Targets or SETs, which are quantitative greenhouse gas emission targets allocated to an | |
emitting sector or sub-sector, over a defined time period. Individual national government departments will | |
be tasked with developing and implementing Policies and Measures (PAMs) to ensure emissions from | |
within a sector or sub-sector remain within SET limits. | |
e Carbon Budgets: Carbon Budgets set a maximum volume of emissions from certain activities that | |
individual entities are allowed to emit over three rolling five-year periods. By assigning a Carbon Budget | |
to an entity, a signal is provided as to the degree of GHG mitigation that is required within a specific time | |
period, with a penalty being imposed if the budget allocation is exceeded. Furthermore, by providing | |
entities with an understanding of how budgets are likely to be assigned in future phases to keep overall | |
2 Emissions savings achieved through actions in the waste sector will not all be reflected in that sector's inventory, however they may | |
contribute indirectly to national emissions savings. | |
xill | |
national emissions within the bounds of the national emissions trajectory, which will continue to be revised | |
downward in keeping with the Paris Agreement, they are sensitised to how mitigation requirements may | |
change in the future. The system thereby provides an opportunity for entities to plan ahead. | |
e Phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies/incentives: As a member of the G20, where countries | |
have committed to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, South Africa has indicated willingness to | |
identify and minimise their harmful impacts, taking cognisance of its developmental state. South Africa | |
should consider participating in a fossil fuel subsidy peer review within the G20 framework to facilitate | |
the sharing of experience and mutual learning among G20 members as the next step in identifying | |
inefficient fossil subsidies within the economy. | |
GOING FURTHER TO ACHIEVE THE PARIS GOALS | |
A set of stand-alone, sector-based policies and measures as well as a selection of cross-cutting interventions that | |
government is busy implementing has been presented above. However, a broad range of structural changes will | |
be necessary, in order to ensure the global economy achieves carbon neutrality within the second half of the | |
century. Changes will be required in terms of service demand, technology fleet, infrastructure, operating practice, | |
and energy sources, for all sectors of activity. As South Africa continues to strengthen its response to climate | |
change as part of a global effort, it will increase its focus on a range of strategic elements that will together promote | |
the change to low carbon growth, while continuing to align with the goals of the Paris Agreement. These relate | |
to: | |
e Enhancing the vision for development, including revising the emissions trajectory to reflect a fair | |
contribution to the global achievement of the Paris Agreement | |
e Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition | |
e Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth | |
e Providing broad access to funds | |
e Driving innovation, research, and skills for future value capture | |
e Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all | |
e Promoting sustainable development through education and culture | |
e Enhancing information and metrics | |
Each of these is elaborated upon in the main body of the document. | |
xiv | |
CONCLUDING REMARKS: PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION | |
SA-LEDS sets out a direction of travel for South Africa as we refine our low carbon emission development pathway | |
to meet our commitments to the international community and address our developmental agenda/priorities and | |
needs. We know that success will require decades of dedicated effort. Therefore, this Strategy is a living | |
document, the beginning of our journey towards ultimately reaching a net zero carbon economy by 2050. | |
The first step will thus be to ensure national targets are aligned with the Paris Agreement. Thereafter, planning | |
teams with analytical and sectoral expertise will engage in detailed scenario work to develop transformation | |
pathways towards achieving the national targets. Building a scenario is, however, not enough to plan for its | |
delivery. The work of translating such a plan to policy is a challenge which all Parties will have to grapple with | |
over the coming months and years. South Africa aims to inform rollout plans through the use of a dedicated | |
change framework. SA-LEDS will thus be reviewed at least every five years or earlier, should there be significant | |
changes in sectoral or national plans/programmes that can result in a big structural changes, growth or decay of | |
the economy and major global events that impact on its content or implementation. | |
Detailed sectoral work to explore transformation pathways | |
The Paris Agreement sets out the long-term climate change goals for the international community. While countries | |
establish their own goals in a nationally determined manner, sectoral details will have to be analyzed in significant | |
detail, laying out different scenarios to understand trajectories of investment, technology take-up, emissions | |
reduction, and market change. This work has already commenced in South Africa through a number of studies: | |
e The Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), the overall objective of which was to conduct an updated, | |
bottom-up assessment of mitigation potential in key economic sectors to identify a set of viable options | |
for reducing GHGs. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) for key sectors and subsectors were | |
constructed. The MACCs provide estimates of mitigation potential and marginal abatement costs for | |
broad mitigation measures. Estimates of national mitigation potential have been derived from the sectoral | |
MACCs and ranked in terms of level of implementability at national level for each of the technologies. | |
e The Pathways study to explore the impact of alternative economic growth trajectories on the country’s | |
emissions trajectory, looking at the implementation of structural changes rather than the implementation | |
of purely technical interventions. This study, which also used the single national emissions model, had | |
not been released at the time of writing of this document. | |
XV | |
e The Policies and Measures (PAMs) analysis, which explored the impact of existing PAMs, many of which | |
were identified previously, on the emissions trajectory. | |
Itis recognized that detailed forecasting is unlikely to accurately predict the evolution of markets. However, “failing | |
to plan is planning to fail’, which is why systematic planning is recommended for all sectors. Common | |
characteristics between scenarios that succeed and those that do not will help policymakers identify those | |
conditions which must be met in order for the transition to succeed, aligned with Paris in a manner consistent with | |
the latest science from the IPCC. Based on the sectoral pathways work, which will identify the requirements of | |
the different sectors, a cross-cutting analysis of such pathways will help identify common needs. An aggregate | |
understanding of the evolution over time of such critical factors such as levels of capital investment, consumer | |
prices of different energy options, and requirements for skilled workers in various industries (increasing and | |
decreasing), will set out the parameters for the cross-cutting strategies described previously. | |
Creation of policy package roadmaps across three phases | |
The likelihood of policy action leading to long-term transformation results would require the application of new | |
planning techniques. Pathway planning is an analytical tool that can inform national policy development over time | |
towards objectives that sit beyond a typical policy horizon. Pathways visualize the whole timespan between the | |
present and the time for which a target is set, seeking to establish what steps make sense now in the context of | |
reaching the long-term goal. When establishing potential pathways, the desired end-state should be linked to the | |
present, by “backcasting” rather than forecasting. This means that requirements for intermediate steps between | |
today and the long-term goal are deduced not on the basis of how compatible they may be with the current | |
context, but rather in terms of what is required for the end-state to be achieved. This leads policy-makers to | |
consider the question “what would have to be true” regarding short and medium-term checkpoints, deriving the | |
answer from the evolution to the goal. | |
Once pathways are clearly drawn out, regulatory, institutional, or other structural changes which are required for | |
the transformation can be identified, from which necessary changes can be deduced and used to suggest | |
concrete policy action. In this manner, a rigorous pathway analysis towards a long-term target can produce a | |
number of concrete actions which must be carried out by a certain time, to enable other actions. It can be helpful | |
to structure the time interval into three parts: short, medium and long-term, organising and communicating such | |
actions on a three-stage timeline. These stages are: | |
xvi | |
e Starting Right (to be completed prior to end of 2021 financial year) | |
e Turning the Corner (to begin in parallel with the Starting Right stage and continue to 2025) | |
e Massive Rollout (2025 to 2050) | |
“Starting Right’ will focus on actions relating to the current government administration, or perhaps also address | |
the initial years of the following one. The most important aspect of this stage is to ensure that a true transition is | |
kicked off. On the one hand, rapid implementation must begin in all areas where pathways to achieving the Paris | |
Goals are already clear while on the other, steps taken will need to enable future action at scale, as much as (or | |
perhaps more than) drive immediate emissions reductions. Clearly, “Starting Right” cannot be successfully | |
executed without a long-term pathways analysis to provide confidence on the Paris-compatibility of implemented | |
measures as well as the overall direction of travel. Indeed, the search for immediate emissions reductions in the | |
short-term can often lead to investments in technologies or business models which, while emitting less than | |
traditional options, are not on track to drive the large reductions demanded by the long-term transformation. | |
Avoiding decisions which will lead to emissions lock-in is thus a core priority of the “Starting Right” stage. | |
“Turning the Corner” would typically take five to seven years. This phase will begin to be implemented in parallel | |
with the “Starting Right” stage, where appropriate, and continue to 2025. This period is decisive, since within it | |
new decision and investment criteria are broadly applied, bringing about changes to the day-to-day operation of | |
many sectors of the economy at the same time. Resistance to change can become challenging if not well handled, | |
and must be anticipated and addressed with social acceptance and just transition actions. It is at this stage that | |
multiple policies will need to work in concert for the new technological options to make economic sense for | |
businesses and consumers. An overall understanding of the sectoral narratives of change and how they | |
collectively feed into the national vision will be core to the success of this stage. | |
“Massive rollout” is the final phase, in which low-emissions climate resilient options have become the new normal. | |
The constant application of transformative action will drive large volumes of investment towards transformational | |
change. Perseverance on the application of all aspects of change will be required to avoid imbalances or injustices | |
which will compromise the change, and sectors which achieve important milestones must not be allowed to | |
become complacent, but rather contribute to the broader change by supporting areas of natural synergy. | |
Examples of activities that might be taken during the three phases of implementation of the transition are shown | |
in the Table below. All along the way provision needs to be made for regular review of the Strategy and the | |
implementation plan, and M&E of implementation. | |
xvii | |
Table E1: The three phases of the just transition | |
Starting Right | |
(start immediately | |
and complete by | |
end of 2020/21 | |
financial year) | |
Start the process of developing long term plans for each sector, to avoid lock-in to emissions | |
intensive infrastructure and establish the basis for transformation at scale | |
Develop approaches for allocation of Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs) and carbon budgets to | |
high emitting entities | |
Develop Sector Jobs Resilience Plans (SJRPs) to support the transition to the low carbon | |
economy and climate resilient society in a Just manner | |
Identify the institutional, legislative, finance and other changes required to achieve the | |
transformation | |
Develop an understanding of the relevant government decisions which need to be taken to | |
achieve the long-term plans | |
Develop a monitoring plan | |
Turning the corner | |
(start immediately, | |
as _ appropriate, | |
and complete by | |
2025) | |
Develop and begin to implement detailed transformation plans for each sector, which is | |
supported by the implementation of the SETs, carbon budgets and SJRPs | |
Develop investment pathways to support the transformation | |
Implement foundational changes to drive down the national trajectory | |
Implement the institutional changes to accelerate the rate of transformation and remove barriers | |
Massive _ roll-out | |
(to 2050) | |
Roll-out the implementation plans for each sector along with measures to support changes until | |
they become the new reality | |
Refine strategies as required, to account for changes in technologies, society and markets | |
Successful rollout across the three stages will require policy action to be taken in a coordinated manner. It is | |
helpful to present policies not as stand-alone actions but rather as parts of policy packages, combinations of | |
measures which may include planning, regulatory, financial, and other instruments to collectively drive towards | |
the desired outcome, providing capabilities and overcoming barriers to change. Complementarity and sequencing | |
are both crucial to building effective policy packages. Proposed components of policy packages could include | |
those that focus on planning; institutional / regulatory considerations; project implementation; financing; | |
acceptance, skills and just transition; and avoiding lock-in. Policy packages should be built up in sequence over | |
time to ensure the full implementation of the pathway, in the form of a policy pathway which is required to | |
implement the low-carbon transition. | |
xviii | |
1 INTRODUCTION | |
1.1. The global climate crisis | |
Robust scientific evidence shows that the earth’s climate system is changing as a result of anthropogenic | |
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere have been rising steadily since | |
the industrial revolution (circa 1760), mainly as a result of the burning of fossil fuels, industrial processes, | |
deforestation and agricultural activities. An extensive global body of research from climate scientists has | |
confirmed the relationship between human-induced GHG emissions, higher global average surface temperatures | |
and changes to the earth’s climate system (IPCC, 2014; IPCC, 2018). | |
If current trends continue, global average temperatures are likely to increase by at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial | |
levels between 2030 and 2052. The impacts associated with such temperature increases are significant and far- | |
reaching; threatening people and ecosystems. The impacts, which become more severe the greater the | |
temperature increase, include sea level rise as a result of melting polar ice and glaciers, increases in the frequency | |
and severity of extreme weather events, changing ecosystems and desertification, ocean acidification, and loss | |
of biodiversity. The knock-on effects on human populations include health risks due to increasing temperatures | |
and heatwaves, water shortages, food insecurity, increased spread of diseases and pests as well as damage to | |
infrastructure due to extreme weather events. All of these impacts have economic repercussions (IPCC, 2014). | |
The severity of impacts is not only a function of the magnitude and rate of warming that is experienced, but also | |
geographic location and levels of development and vulnerability. Along with other developing nations, South Africa | |
is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In unmitigated GHG emissions scenarios, warming of | |
up to 5 to 8°C is projected over the interior of the country by the end of this century. Under a range of warming | |
scenarios, drier conditions will be experienced in the west and south of the country and wetter conditions in the | |
east. Rainfall patterns will become more variable and unpredictable. These changes will impact on water | |
resources and food production, and increase the vulnerability of impoverished communities, amongst others | |
(DEA, 2013). For this reason, the South African government regards climate change as a considerable threat to | |
the country and its socio-economic development, having the potential to undermine many of the advances made | |
in recent years. At the same time, if climate change is to be limited through limiting the growth in global GHG | |
emissions, with South Africa contributing its fair share to emission reductions, there will be other implications for | |
the country. As one of the top 20 emitters globally, with a high dependency on fossil fuels, substantial emission | |
cuts will be required. The rapid transition that will be required presents a potential risk to economic growth and | |
sustainable development if not managed properly. | |
1.2 The Paris Agreement | |
The international community has a long history of working to address the climate challenge. The United Nations | |
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1992 to "stabilize greenhouse gas | |
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the | |
Climate system". All 197 member states of the UN are parties to the Convention, and South Africa ratified the | |
Convention in August 1997. | |
Annual Conferences of the Parties (or COPs) have achieved different milestones since the first meeting in 1994. | |
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, set out the first concrete emissions reductions targets, which were adopted | |
by some Annex | (developed) countries. However, these reductions were insufficient to stop climate change. A | |
global deal, seeking to involve all countries, was pursued at COP 15 in 2009 but was not achieved, leaving many | |
Parties concerned about the complexity of agreeing such a deal. At COP 17, held in Durban, South Africa in 2011, | |
the “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (ADP) was established to "develop a | |
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all | |
Parties". The work of the ADP culminated in the drafting of the text which was negotiated and ultimately adopted | |
in 2015 by the Parties to the Convention, including South Africa, as the Paris Agreement. | |
In the Paris Agreement, Parties collectively agree to limit “the increase in the global average temperature to well | |
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre- | |
industrial levels”. Article 4 of the Agreement sets out Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) as the | |
instrument countries must develop to present their part of the global effort to “reach global peaking of greenhouse | |
gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and | |
to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance | |
between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of | |
this century, on the basis of equity and “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty” | |
(UNFCCC, 2015). | |
In order to help ensure that the Parties’ national contributions can jointly achieve the collective goal, the Article | |
further states that “Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission | |
development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities | |
and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances”. This document has been prepared in | |
response to that Article. | |
1.3 The Science of 1.5°C and what it means for the Paris goals | |
At the time of adoption of the Paris Agreement there was limited scientific literature available regarding the goal | |
of 1.5°C, making it difficult for Parties to gauge the effort required of their NDCs to achieve it. Parties therefore | |
invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to provide a special report on the impacts of global | |
warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, and the related global greenhouse gas emission pathways. This | |
Special Report, published in 2018, sets out the latest available science for countries to refer to when planning | |
their implementation of the Agreement (IPCC, 2018). | |
The Special Report makes clear the scale of the challenge facing all Parties in achieving the objectives of the | |
Paris Agreement. With regards to the temperature goal, it shows that every tenth of a degree centigrade in | |
warming makes a significant difference to the impacts on people and ecosystems, making 1.5°C of warming much | |
more closely aligned with the objective of the Convention, than 1.6°C, 1.6°C preferable to 1.7°C, and so on. | |
Furthermore, the Special Report shows that, to be consistent with 1.5°C, global CO2 emissions by 2030 must be | |
about 45% lower than those of 2010, reaching net zero emissions around 2050. Since global emissions have | |
continued to grow practically every year since the convention was signed, despite climate efforts to date, anumber | |
of important in-depth changes will have to take place very quickly around the world for this to be credible. The | |
IPCC describes these as “deep emissions reductions” in energy, industrial, urban, agricultural, and land | |
management systems, which will transform key aspects of the world economy (IPCC, 2018). For this to succeed, | |
the coming decade will be decisive. | |
The challenge of incorporating this rapid transformation into country plans must be resolved in a nationally | |
determined manner. Developed countries, which have committed to take the lead, must rapidly change the nature | |
of their investments both nationally and internationally to avoid locking in emissions. At the same time, the scale | |
of the reductions required means developing countries must also start to implement transformational changes. | |
For example, if a developing country were to commit to the target of 45% emissions reduction in double the time | |
recommended by the IPCC (which could be consistent with the IPCC global scenario provided developed | |
countries acted much earlier), and at the same time maintained a dynamic economic growth to reduce poverty, | |
that country’s emissions intensity per unit of GDP by the year 2042 would need to be under a quarter of its present | |
value. This has very clear implications: for developing as well as developed countries, before 2050 the core | |
technologies in operation must be fundamentally different from today’s. This is because there is no technological | |
scenario possible which achieves such a reduction while maintaining electric power primarily generated from coal, | |
oil or gas (without carbon capture), or in which passenger transport is provided primarily by petrol/diesel internal | |
combustion engine vehicles. Fossil fuel participation in power generation, where still present, will be only a minor | |
share of the total, and will continue to decline. Urban infrastructure and planning will have reduced the demand | |
for passenger kilometers travelled per person for a broad range of activities, and these will be provided far more | |
through shared platforms than today (be these traditional public transport, or new asset types serving through | |
innovative business models). The majority of these passenger kilometers will be provided by zero-emissions | |
vehicles/platforms, with energy supplied from renewable sources. | |
The availability of sustainable bioenergy and biomaterials will be limited by global constraints of forest coverage, | |
biodiversity, and food security. These products must be channeled to applications with limited alternatives (such | |
as long-haul aviation), reducing their potential availability as a drop-in substitute for fossil fuels in the bulk of | |
traditional power, energy, or transport applications. Industrial and commercial energy use will incentivise resource | |
efficiency at every turn, with service fulfilment models and product specification, design, and production processes | |
all re-engineered to practically eliminate emissions. | |
1.4 Methodological elements for developing LEDS | |
The broad scope of change required to achieve the Paris Agreement presents several important planning | |
challenges and opportunities. The LEDS planning process provides a space for Parties to use to reflect upon how | |
their national plans can achieve emissions pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement, within their common | |
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. While the timelines, targets and sectorial details of | |
the transformation will vary by country, the expectation is that all targets should follow a downward trajectory. To | |
achieve such a trajectory, transformational rather than incremental change is needed: while most national policies | |
aim to effect limited change within one area of national life over a timeframe of one to five years, the transformation | |
described in the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees will require planning over a 30-year timeframe to ensure | |
broad-based change across all sectors in a coordinated manner. | |
The decisive change of operating technologies requires a concerted, planned effort if it is to occur in an | |
economically rational manner over such a short timeframe. The timing dimension is crucial. While 2050 may seem | |
a long way off for citizens going about their daily life, or indeed in terms of changing government administrations, | |
the speed of technological change is determined by the lifetime of assets and their rate of replacement. If we | |
consider power generation plants which consume coal, many of these can operate 30 or 40 years after | |
commissioning, and while an internal combustion engine vehicle lifetime may extend to 15 years in the | |
industrialized world, vehicles of 25 years of age or more can be regularly seen on the streets of Africa. Investments | |
in city and transport infrastructure are also built with the expectation they should last for over 30 years. This means | |
that the investments made today and during the current NDC period will determine much of the activity, and | |
associated emissions, of 2050. | |
Creating a LEDS which aligns with the Paris Agreement thus requires new planning approaches and tools. Clear, | |
ambitious long-term targets must be set, consistent with the Paris goals. From these, policy makers must establish | |
what are the medium and short-term requirements needed to ensure the achievement of the long-term goals, to | |
inform actions taken on a much shorter timeframe so they can help rather than hinder success and avoid long- | |
term lock-in to emissions intensive options. | |
Transformation pathways, which show how changes must occur over time, must be developed, linking the desired | |
end-state with the current economic and technological structures. Enough is known about the direction of travel | |
required in all sectors to identify some key components of such trajectories in parallel to the process of agreeing | |
the long-term targets. | |
Specialist analytical work should feed into the transformation pathways across all sectors of activity, so the | |
credible projections of national emissions can be made, and to allow clear visibility of the trade-offs which will | |
emerge. Once the technology scenario options have been outlined, specific policies must be considered to guide | |
the transformation. Single policies will not be enough to effect such change, however: policy packages including | |
regulatory, financial, planning, project execution, social justice, and lock-in considerations must be built up so | |
their coordinated impact can achieve the transformation. In addition, Parties must identify the enablers of the | |
transition which are required but cannot be provided by the country alone, but rather by the international | |
community through collaboration. | |
The implementation of the policies and interventions can be thought of three stages. In the first stage, the in- | |
depth plans and changes which will be required in order for the transformation to take place will be identified, and | |
the most pressing lock-in threats avoided. The second is the inflection stage (beginning in parallel with the first | |
stage where appropriate) in which climate policies become an ongoing consideration in an ever-larger number of | |
decisions, changing the character of investments and policy decisions to leave behind development models which | |
imply GHG emissions. The final rollout stage follows during which climate-compatible modalities are fully adopted | |
in all sectors, and implemented continuously to achieve the transformation through ongoing technology | |
replacement. The benefits of economies of scale and the global transition will provide a positive feedback to the | |
rollout, making Paris-compatible options the most viable throughout this stage. | |
1.5 South Africa LEDS — a living document | |
This document presents South Africa’s first Low Emission Development Strategy (SA-LEDS) generated after the | |
adoption of the Paris Agreement. Through submitting this document to the UNFCCC our country reiterates its | |
commitment to achieving the Paris goals. It also highlights that implementation of the Strategy will contribute | |
directly and indirectly to the meeting of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). | |
SA-LEDS builds upon years of work on climate change in the country, which has culminated in the establishment | |
of an important set of policy documents (Figure 1). Building on existing plans, policies and aligned research, and | |
particularly the work that is supported by robust analytical and domestic engagement processes, offers numerous | |
benefits, such as optimizing resources and ensuring buy-in of key stakeholders. At the same time, many of these | |
plans were developed prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and therefore do not consider the long-term, | |
global goals embedded therein in the coordinated fashion that is required. Furthermore, most of these pre-existing | |
plans and policies address a shorter timeframe than mid-century. | |
The National Planning Commission (NPC) is currently undertaking a process to develop a common vision for the | |
country in 2050. This vision will be instrumental in driving harmonisation of government plans and policies and so | |
in order to make these more aligned with the methodological elements of developing a LEDS presented in Section | |
1.4, itis important that the NPC process and the vision it develops takes into account the Paris goals. | |
UNFCCC | |
Paris Agreement | |
Low Emissions | |
Development | |
Strategy (LEDS) | |
National Planning | |
aE alta cy | |
Mer me rE | |
Analytical Studies | |
ning and | |
National Development Plan (NDP) | |
NPC vision process (ongoing) | |
Ne een Cun ele re | |
National Policy (MPA) | |
(EIR realest) D | |
National Climate Change | |
Response Policy (2011) | |
Carbon tax | |
Climate Change Bill (forthcoming) | |
Other departments’ policies | |
UNFCCC: Has an objective to "stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with | |
the climate system" | |
Paris Agreement: Refers to post-2020 climate actions countries intend to take under the Agreement | |
Low Emissions Development Strategy (LEDS): Communication of mid-century long-term low GHG emissions development strategies, towards the goal of limiting | |
global warming to well below 2°C and to pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5°C | |
National Development Plan (NDP): Long-term development plan that aims to eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030. Recognises the need for a just low | |
carbon transition | |
NPC vision process (ongoing): Process to develop a low-carbon vision for the country to guide mitigation and adaptation action | |
National Climate Change Response Policy (2011): Framework for South Africa’s climate mitigation and adaptation response | |
Carbon Tax: Sets a price on greenhouse gas emissions from certain activities | |
Climate Change Bill (forthcoming): Establishes the legal framework for implementation instruments to drive mitigation and adaptation | |
Other departments’ policies: Other government policies across many departments either increase or decrease GHGs | |
Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA): Projections of National Greenhouse Gas emissions under “technically feasible” mitigation action | |
Pathways study: National emissions trajectories under alternative economic futures and enhanced/step change mitigation action | |
Policies and Measures (PAMs) study: Impact of existing PAMs on the national emissions trajectory | |
Figure 1: SA-LEDS in the context of prior climate-related work in South Africa | |
Despite being based largely on current knowledge and legislative context, SA-LEDS will be updated as new and | |
critical areas of work are completed by relevant government departments. Keeping SA-LEDS as a dynamic and | |
flexible document is important to ensure that it keeps pace with domestic policy developments, research, | |
development and innovation, and the declining costs of emissions mitigation technologies. | |
2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY, EMISSIONS PROFILE AND POLICY LANDSCAPE | |
An overview of the local economy, greenhouse gas emissions profile and relevant policy, legislation and strategies | |
is provided to set the context in which SA-LEDS has been developed. | |
2.1 South Africa’s Economy | |
South Africa has the second largest economy in Africa, after Nigeria, with a nominal 2019 GDP of US$ 371.298 | |
billion and nominal GDP per capita in that year of US$ 6,331 (IMF, 2019). Figure 2 shows the sectoral | |
contributions to GDP. At the same time, South Africa is amongst the most economically unequal countries in the | |
world, as reflected by the Gini Coefficient of 0.63 in 2014 (World Bank, 2019). | |
Agriculture, 3% Other, 3% | |
Construction, 4% | |
Finance, real estate and | |
business services, 22% | |
Trade, catering and | |
accommodation , 15% | |
Government services, | |
17% | |
Transport, 7% | |
Personal services, 8% | |
Mining , 8% | |
Manufacturing , 14% | |
Figure 2: Key contributors to GDP | |
Source: (Stats-SA, 2017a) | |
2.1.1. Energy supply | |
In 2016, the country’s total primary energy supply was approximately 5,880 Petajoules (PJ), with fossil-fuels (coal, | |
crude oil petroleum products and natural gas) supplying about 88% of the energy needs (IEA Bioenergy, 2018). | |
According to the 2018 Energy Sustainability Index, developed by the World Energy Council, South Africa is ranked | |
85! on the Energy Sustainability Index out of 125 countries. Low performance in environmental sustainability in | |
this index is due to the electricity sector's heavy reliance on coal, while increasing petroleum prices, coupled with | |
rising electricity tariffs, contributed to the low score on energy equity (WEC, 2014). While approximately 84% of | |
households in South Africa are electrified, energy poverty is still a significant challenge. As many as 2 million | |
South African households are still without access to electricity (Stats SA, 2017b). Universal access is a key priority | |
for the South African government. | |
More than 90% of the country’s electricity is generated from coal by the national utility, Eskom. In recent years, | |
a number of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) have entered the electricity market, predominately generating | |
renewable energy. The main driver of growth in IPPs is the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer | |
Procurement Programme (REIPPPP). The REIPPPP is a competitive tender process that is designed to | |
incentivise renewable energy project development. By the end of June 2019, the REIPPPP had achieved the | |
following (DoE, 201 9a): | |
e 6,422 MW of electricity had been procured from 112 Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers | |
(IPPs) in seven bid rounds; | |
e 3,976 MW ofelectricity generation capacity from 64 IPP projects has been connected to the national grid; | |
e 35,669 GWh of energy has been generated by renewable energy sources procured under the REIPPPP | |
since the first project became operational. | |
Eskom also has an active research programme which looks at renewable energy development amongst topics. | |
Eskom’s efforts in this regard have mainly been centred on the development of wind energy, pumped storage | |
and PV projects. The Ingula Pumped Storage Scheme is in commercial operation with four 333 MW generators. | |
Furthermore, Eskom’s Sere Wind Farm became fully commercially operational in 2015, with a capacity of 100 | |
MW (DoE, 2019b). | |
A number of South Africa’s existing coal-fired power stations will be retired between 2030 and 2050, and so large | |
investments in additional generation capacity will be needed in order to meet the projected electricity demand | |
and sustain economic growth. Across the country favourable conditions for wind power are found, and the high | |
levels of solar irradiation make it ideal for solar power. Biomass opportunities are available, many of which are | |
along the east coast which is tropical and characterised by large wood and sugar plantations. There is also some | |
potential for small and micro scale hydropower. | |
South Africa's liquid fuels requirements are met through local refining of imported crude oil, sourced mainly from | |
the Middle East and other African countries, through synthetic fuel produced from coal-to-liquids (CTL) and gas- | |
to-liquids (GTL) processes and through refined product imports. The six main liquid fuel producers are Sapref, | |
Enref, Natref and Chevref (refining crude oil) and Sasol and PetroSA (producing synthetic fuels from coal and | |
gas) (SAPIA, 2017). Apart from the production of liquid fuels, crude oil and coal are both used to produce a variety | |
of petrochemical products such as lubricants, bitumen and solvents. Being a net crude oil importer leaves South | |
Africa vulnerable to price fluctuations and volatility on global oil markets. | |
Natural gas plays a relatively minor role in the primary energy supply. Local production is mainly from the | |
Bredasdorp Basin, which lies offshore on the southern coastline. This basin supplies natural gas to PetroSA’s | |
Mossel Bay GTL facility. The bulk of the country’s natural gas demand is, however, met through imports from | |
Mozambique’s Temane and Pande gas fields. The gas is imported via a high-pressure pipeline and supplied to | |
Sasol and other industrial and commercial customers mainly within Gauteng Province. The finalisation of the Gas | |
Utilisation Master Plan, which has been under development for a number of years, will help to provide policy | |
certainty on the role that gas will play in the energy mix moving into the future. | |
2.1.2. Mining and the industrial sector | |
South Africa accounts for a substantial proportion of the world’s mineral resource reserves, with non-energy | |
minerals having an estimated value of approximately US$ 2.5 trillion (DMR, 2011). Key mineral outputs include | |
gold, coal, manganese, chrome, platinum and diamonds (dti, 2015). Domestically, coal provides over 70% of the | |
country’s primary energy supply (South African Government, 2012). South Africa is also major producer of non- | |
ferrous metals (aluminium, copper, brass, lead, zinc and tin). Non-ferrous metals and stainless steel accounts for | |
about a third of all the country’s manufactured products output. Minerals represent an important source of export | |
revenue. Having said that, coal prices and markets are demonstrating volatility due in part to global | |
decarbonisation efforts. This is likely to become even more relevant moving into the future. | |
The chemical industry is dominated by the emissions-intensive synthetic coal and natural gas-based liquid fuels | |
industry, as well as the petrochemicals industry. South Africa has the largest chemical industry in Africa and is | |
the world leader in coal-based synthetic fuel and gas-to-liquids (GTL) technologies. Other chemicals produced in | |
South Africa include ammonia, nitric acid, carbide, titanium oxide and carbon black. | |
South Africa also has an active manufacturing sector. However, liberalisation of the markets at the end of | |
apartheid resulted in manufacturing industries in South Africa struggling to remain competitive against more | |
diversified manufacturing industries in countries such as China, Vietnam and Bangladesh (Bhorat and Rooney, | |
2017). | |
2.1.3 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) | |
South Africa’s agricultural sector is diverse, with distinct farming regions that vary with climate, soil type and | |
farming practices. The sector includes field crops, horticulture and animal products. Animal products currently | |
generate the highest proportion of gross farm sector income, although the contribution from horticulture products | |
is growing (DAFF, 2017a). Commodities produced include maize, wheat, sugar, deciduous fruit and citrus, wine, | |
beef, dairy, lamb, pork, poultry and game. Livestock farming is the biggest contributor to the sector, and also the | |
largest contributor to AFOLU GHG emissions. Even though its contribution to total GDP is relatively small, and | |
has declined over the years due to the rise of other economic sectors, agriculture, forestry and fishing remains a | |
key provider of rural employment and export earnings (DAFF, 2017a). | |
2.1.4 Waste sector | |
As in many other countries, a growing population, a growing middle class and increased rates of urbanisation are | |
putting pressure on solid waste and waste water management facilities. Waste streams are also becoming | |
increasingly diverse in their composition, which affects the complexity of management processes. | |
The amount of waste landfilled in South Africa significantly exceeds the amount that is diverted, either through | |
reuse or recycling. The recently published Draft South African State of Waste Report shows that around 42 Mt of | |
general waste was generated in South Africa in 2017 (DEA, 2018a). Only about 11% of this was recycled, with | |
the remainder being disposed of to landfill. | |
Several landfills in the eight larger metropolitan areas are close to reaching their available air space or have | |
already reached their limits. Rapid urbanisation and high costs of building new engineered landfills has led to less | |
suitable landfill space being available. Moreover, the practice of landfilling is becoming less socially acceptable. | |
As such, government is pursuing initiatives to reduce waste generation and divert waste from landfill. These | |
initiatives are discussed further in Section 4.5 . | |
2.1.5 Other sectors | |
Tourism remains a priority growth area due to it being highly labour intensive, supports for small businesses and | |
generation of foreign direct investment (dti, 2015, South African Government, 2012). The trade sector is made up | |
of several divisions, including retail and wholesale, motor, accommodation and catering, food and beverages (dti, | |
2017). The remaining sectors contributing towards the economy are finance, real estate and business services, | |
government services, personal services and construction (dti, 2017). Finance real estate and business services | |
in particular continue to contribute positively to GDP growth. | |
2.2 Greenhouse gas emissions profile | |
The latest National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report (2015) shows that South Africa’s total gross GHG | |
emissions (excluding forestry and other land use) increased by 23% from 439 Mt CO2-eq in 2000 to 541 Mt CO2- | |
eq in 2015 (DEA, 2019a). Forestry and land use are a CO2 sink and reduced gross emissions by 5% in 2015. | |
South Africa’s net GHG emissions are 512 Mt COo-eq. | |
The Energy sector accounted for 79.5% of the total gross emissions for South Africa in 2015 (Figure 3), with the | |
percentage contribution of this sector to overall emissions growing by 25% between 2000 and 2015. Energy | |
industries (which includes electricity generation and liquid fuels production from both crude oil and coal) were the | |
main contributor, accounting for 60.4% of emissions from the energy sector and almost half of gross emissions. | |
This was followed by transport, other sectors, and manufacturing industries and construction. Fugitive emissions | |
from fuels contributed another 5% to overall emissions in 2015. Agriculture, Industrial Processes and Product | |
Use and Waste contributed 9.0%, 7.7% and 3.6% to gross national GHG emissions in 2015 respectively. | |
aisle) Melee toi) | |
AFOLU (excl. FOLU) | |
% | |
ae ENERGY | |
79% | |
Manufacturing Industires and | |
construction 7% | |
Bie-lasjecenam ley | |
Le) iT -TeeS Les oleh) | |
Fugitive emissions from fuels 5%. | |
Figure 3: Contribution of main emission categories and energy emission categories to national gross greenhouse gas emissions | |
in 2015 | |
If national emissions are expressed in terms of economic sectors rather than emission categories (see Figure 4), | |
electricity generation contributes 42% of gross national emissions. Industry accounts for 27% of national | |
emissions, with approximately a third of industry emissions associated with process emissions and the other two | |
thirds are as a result of energy use. Emissions from transport and agriculture contribute 10% each, with the | |
residential, commercial and waste sectors making up the remainder. Figure 4 also shows that 85% of greenhouse | |
gas emissions in 2015 are in the form of COz. Methane (CHa) contributes 9%, with over half of these emissions | |
being from agriculture. | |
13 | |
42% | |
__ Methane(CH, | |
Nitrous Oxide (N,Q) ~ | |
4) | |
’ HRstoy, | |
HFCs, PFCs | |
27% . Carbon dioxide (CO,) | |
10% 10% | |
5% | |
3% 4% | |
ii ZZ ian | |
Electricity Industry Transport Agriculture Commercial Residential Waste | |
generation | |
Figure 4: Total gross national GHG emissions by economic sector | |
The carbon intensity of the economy (tonnes CO2-eq per R1,000) and the energy intensity of the economy (tonnes | |
oil equivalent (toe) of energy per R1,000) have decreased between 2000 and 2015, by 18.7% and 12.4% | |
respectively. This is attributed to growth in the less energy intensive services and financial sectors together with | |
a decline in manufacturing and mining (DEA, 2019a). | |
2.3 Policy, legislation and strategies that inform SA-LEDS | |
Three key climate policy documents provide the foundation on which SA-LEDS has been developed. These are: | |
e The National Development Plan (NDP) | |
e The National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) | |
e The Climate Change Bill (forthcoming) | |
In addition to these three central documents, various strategies, policies and sector plans have been developed | |
for individual sectors of the economy, which will all contribute to driving emission reductions. These documents | |
are detailed in later sections to outline a set of discrete measures which serve as a starting point for | |
implementation of the LEDS. | |
2.3.1 National Development Plan 2030 | |
The overarching objective of the National Development Plan 2030 (NDP) is to eliminate poverty and reduce | |
inequality by 2030. Climate change impacts and mitigation are highlighted as critical issues throughout the | |
document. Chapter 5 is dedicated to “Environmental Sustainability - An equitable transition to a low-carbon | |
economy” and addresses both the use of natural resources and mineral deposits to support the transition of the | |
economy to a diverse, inclusive and low-carbon future, and tackling developmental challenges towards building | |
resilience to the impacts of climate change, particularly in poorer communities. In Chapter 3, economic | |
development and the key drivers of change are discussed — one of which relates to the need for a just transition | |
to a low carbon economy. Chapter 4 focuses on infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, noting the need | |
for diversification of energy supply and for cleaner coal technologies (South African Government, 2012). | |
The NDP outlines a set of goals and actions to meet the country’s environmental sustainability and resilience | |
needs. Those that contribute to climate mitigation include: | |
¢ Achieving the peak, plateau and decline trajectory for GHG emissions (See Section 3); | |
¢ Entrenching an economy-wide carbon price by 2030; | |
¢ Implementing zero emission building standards by 2030; and | |
¢ Achieving absolute reductions in the total volume of waste disposed to landfill each year. | |
The Plan also highlights co-benefits of mitigation action which include increasing energy security and enhancing | |
socio-economic and environmentally sustainable growth. | |
2.3.2 National Climate Change Response Policy | |
In 2011, the South African government published a National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP), which | |
represents government's comprehensive policy framework for responding to climate change (DEA, 2011)?. The | |
two key objectives of the NCCRP are: | |
3 Note that this document was published as a white paper but is now considered as a policy document | |
Effectively managing inevitable climate change impacts through interventions that build and sustain | |
South Africa’s social, economic and environmental resilience and emergency response capacity; and | |
Making a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the | |
atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, within | |
a timeframe that enables economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a sustainable | |
manner. | |
The Policy presents a vision for an effective climate change response and the long-term transition to a climate- | |
resilient, equitable and internationally competitive low carbon economy and society. This vision is premised on | |
government's commitment to sustainable development and a better life for all. | |
In support of achieving these objectives and achieving the vision, the Policy outlines a strategic approach to both | |
mitigation and adaptation. The mitigation components of the strategic approach were later captured in the Climate | |
Change Bill, as discussed in Section 2.3.3 below. | |
The four key principles that underpin the approach are that actions need to be: | |
Needs driven and customised: Employ a wide range of adaptation and mitigation approaches, policies, | |
measures, programmes interventions and actions, including those that meet the special needs and | |
circumstances of those most vulnerable; | |
Developmental: Prioritise climate change responses that have both mitigation and adaptation benefits | |
and that also have significant economic growth, job creation, public health, risk management and poverty | |
alleviation benefits; | |
Transformational, empowering and participatory: Include policies and measures to address climate | |
change at a scale that enables and supports the required level of innovation, sector and skills | |
development, finance and investment flows needed to realise the full benefit of a transition to a low | |
carbon, efficient, job-creating, equitable and competitive economy; dynamic and evidence-based; and | |
Balanced and cost effective: Incorporate a balanced approach to both climate change mitigation and | |
adaptation responses in terms of cost-benefit, prioritisation, focus, action and resource allocation; and | |
provide for the integration of sector-related climate change responses into the relevant sector planning | |
processes and their developmental policies and measures. | |
The Policy was the culmination of an iterative and participatory policy development process started in October | |
2005, that involved a wide range of stakeholders, including national departments, provincial and local | |
governments, parastatals, academia, research institutions, business, civil society and labour. | |
2.3.3 Climate Change Bill | |
The South African government is finalising its Climate Change Bill. Upon adoption, the Bill will form the legislative | |
foundation for the climate change adaptation and mitigation response. With respect to the mitigation response, | |
the Bill provides for future review and determination of the national greenhouse gas emissions trajectory; | |
determination of sectoral emissions targets for emitting sectors and subsectors; and allocation of carbon budgets. | |
Sectoral emissions targets and carbon budgets are discussed further in Section 4.6.3 and 4.6.4. The Bill also | |
makes provision for the development of plans to phase down or phase out the use of synthetic greenhouse gases | |
— in line with the Kigali Amendments to the Montreal Protocol. | |
2.4 The role of sub-national government and the private sector | |
In addition to the policies and measures being implemented by national government, sub-national government | |
and the private sector also have a role to play in achieving the vision of SA-LEDS. | |
2.4.1. Sub-national government | |
Many of the sub-national (provincial and local) government departments are already undertaking activities that | |
contribute to the national mitigation, adaptation and resilience efforts. Such activities include the development of | |
urban low emissions development strategies and broader climate change strategies, and the implementation of | |
a wide range of projects from embedded generation installations on their own buildings to implementing local | |
building codes that support energy efficiency to interventions in the waste sector. | |
Sub-national activities have, however, not yet been aligned or coordinated, and different geographical locations | |
see different levels of activity. The Climate Change Act will seek to address this consideration. In terms of the | |
Act, provincial and district municipality intergovernmental forums will be required to serve as Provincial Forums | |
on Climate Change. The Forums will be responsible for coordinating climate change response actions and | |
reporting in their jurisdictions. Furthermore, provinces and district and metropolitan municipalities are required to | |
prepare climate change needs and response assessments (which are updated every five years), and thereafter | |
develop and implement a climate change response implementation plan, which also requires five yearly updates. | |
A number of Cities are also members of global City movements relating to climate action and city networks that | |
contribute to the climate change agenda such as 100 Resilient Cities, ICLE! Local Governments for Sustainability, | |
and C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Many have internal (through their statutory planning documents) and | |
global carbon commitments and targets that apply to the functions of Transport planning, Urban development and | |
Spatial planning, Infrastructure investment and service delivery. Furthermore, there is increasing regional | |
coordination and horizontal integration of climate change responses as municipalities are sharing practice and | |
learning with one another, such as through the Kwazulu-Natal Climate Change Compact. | |
Some of South Africa’s metros are pioneering Net Zero Carbon Building policy and regulations. This requires that | |
buildings exceed the country’s energy efficiency and energy consumption standards, and that their remaining | |
energy demand is met by renewable energy. These initiatives are expected to scale the market for zero emission | |
buildings and support the national pathway to net zero carbon buildings. | |
2.4.2 The contribution of the private sector | |
A diverse range of actions that contribute to GHG emissions mitigation is being seen across the private sector in | |
South Africa, with significant gains having been made in certain sectors on both energy efficiency and emissions | |
mitigation. The private sector action is being driven by a growth in understanding of the business opportunities, | |
local and global market pressure and existing and forthcoming legislation. Actions range from adopting new | |
products and processes to new service offerings to retrofitting of existing operations to make them more energy | |
efficient and less emissions intensive. With suitable support this growth in action will continue. | |
2.5 Vulnerability and resilience | |
Although this strategy focuses primarily on greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, the vulnerability to climate | |
change impacts, as well as the need to build resilience to these impacts is noted, and will be further elaborated | |
in future iterations of SA-LEDS. South Africa has already developed a National Climate Change Adaptation | |
Strategy that highlights nine key vulnerability areas for the country (DEA, 201 9b): | |
e Unreliable and uncertain access to water; | |
e Risks to agricultural productivity and livestock; | |
e Human safety from climate related extreme events; | |
e Poor service delivery in human settlements; | |
e Vulnerable energy systems and other infrastructure; | |
e Diminished labour force productivity through exposure and health impacts; | |
e Risks to markets due to supply and demand volatility; | |
e Economic risks due to carbon intensity and dependence of the economy; and | |
e Impacts on ecosystems and challenges for conservation. | |
The National Adaptation Strategy also outlines a set of six strategic interventions that will contribute to the vision | |
of a climate resilient South Africa. The interventions and target outcomes are shown in Table 1. | |
Table 1: Strategic interventions outlined in South Africa’s National Adaptation Strategy | |
Intervention | |
Target outcome | |
Achieve an effective adaptation planning regime that | |
adequately responds to climate change threats | |
Achieve an effective adaptation planning regime that | |
covers at least 80% of the South African economy by | |
2025 | |
Define adaptation practice that integrates biophysical | |
and socio-economic aspects of vulnerability and | |
resilience | |
Define an adaptation vulnerability and resilience | |
framework implemented from 2020 across 100% of | |
key adaptation sectors | |
Establish effective governance & legislative processes | |
to integrate climate change in development planning | |
Define and legislate for adaptation governance | |
through the Climate Change Act by 2019 | |
National and sectoral implementation of adaptation | |
actions | |
Achieve a 100% coverage of climate change | |
considerations in sectoral operational plans by 2025 | |
Achieve adequate and predictable financial resourcing | |
of adaptation actions and needs, from a variety of | |
sources | |
Achieve 80% resourcing of national adaptation | |
needs, primarily from national fiscus, including | |
international sources | |
Develop an M&E system that tracks implementation of | |
adaptation actions and their effectiveness | |
Development of a national M&E system to track | |
vulnerability, resilience, implementation and resource | |
allocation by 2025 | |
3 VISION STATEMENT | |
SA-LEDS is grounded in South Africa’s climate change response as encapsulated in the documents described in | |
the previous section, while taking cognisance of the country’s international climate change commitments and | |
aspirations. The stated vision for SA-LEDS is as follows: | |
“South Africa follows a low-carbon growth trajectory while making a fair contribution to the global effort to | |
limit the average temperature increase, while ensuring a just transition and building of the country’s | |
resilience to climate change”. | |
In the absence of an agreed quantitative articulation of the vision, the national GHG emissions trajectory, as | |
reflected in the National Climate Change Response Policy (NCCRP) and the NDP, is used as the benchmark | |
against which the performance of SA-LEDS will be measured. The GHG trajectory, also referred to as the peak, | |
plateau and decline (PPD), shown in Figure 5 below, indicates that SA’s GHG emissions should peak in the period | |
2020 to 2025 in a range with a lower limit of 398 Mt CO2-eq and upper limits of 583 Mt CO2-eq and 614 Mt CO2- | |
eq for 2020 and 2025 respectively. Emissions will then plateau for up to ten years after the peak within the range | |
with a lower limit of 398 Mt CO2-eq and upper limit of 614 Mt CO2-eq. From 2036 onwards, emissions will decline | |
in absolute terms to a range with a lower limit of 212 Mt CO2-eq and an upper limit of 428 Mt CO2-eq by 2050. | |
The Climate Change Bill makes provision for regular updates of this trajectory, through which it can be better | |
placed within the context of the Paris Agreement. | |
MtCO,-eq | |
1000 | |
900 | |
800 | |
700 | |
2025,... 2035, 614 | |
2020, 583 | |
600 | |
2050, 428 | |
500 | |
400 | |
2025, 398 | |
300 2035, 398 | |
200 | |
2050, 212 | |
100 | |
0 | |
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 | |
Figure 5: South Africa’s Peak, Plateau, Decline Trajectory Range | |
20 | |
As indicated previously, a process is currently being undertaken by the National Planning Commission to develop | |
a common vision for the country in 2050. The vision will be used to update SA-LEDS once released. In the | |
development of this vision, South Africa will give due consideration to the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C, which | |
represents the latest available science regarding this goal. This report sheds new light on the global rate of | |
emissions reductions required to keep warming to 1.5°C with no or low overshoot. While it is agreed that | |
developed countries must take the lead in reducing emissions, in is also imperative that global totals not be | |
exceeded, because developing countries will suffer most from the negative impacts of such a collective failure to | |
limit global emissions. These challenges — which the IPCC Special Report has presented so clearly to the | |
international community — will play a key role in setting our national goals. We thus commit to ultimately moving | |
towards a goal of net zero carbon emissions by 2050, which will require various interventions to reduce | |
greenhouse gas emissions. This goal, how it will be achieved to ensure a just transition, and how the economic | |
advantages of the transition will be maximised, will be formally communicated in future iterations of this strategy. | |
4 GHG EMISSIONS MITIGATION MEASURES | |
This section describes measures currently being implemented by government to address GHG emissions | |
mitigation across the four key sectors of the economy, namely energy (supply and demand), industry, AFOLU | |
and waste. It also presents further planned cross-sectoral measures that will contribute to driving mitigation action. | |
It is recognised that many of the measures presented here address only the short term, and are not considered | |
to be transformational. South Africa puts these forward as a starting point from which we will be able to ratchet | |
up our future ambition towards more integrated, transformational strategy, through the approach described in | |
Section 5 and 6 of this document. | |
4.1 Energy supply | |
Energy supply is the mandate of the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy. Decarbonisation of energy | |
supply will largely be driven through the Integrated Energy Plan, the Integrated Resource Plan and the Industrial | |
Biofuels Strategy, issued by the Department of Energy, the predecessor of this Department. | |
4.1.1 Integrated Energy Plan | |
Energy planning is guided by the Integrated Energy Plan (IEP). The White Paper on Energy Policy of the | |
Republic of South Africa of 1998 identified the requirement for development of the IEP, with the National Energy | |
21 | |
Act of 2008 further defining the objectives thereof. The Energy Act also mandates the Minister of Energy to | |
develop, review and publish the IEP. | |
The IEP approach analyses current energy supply and demand trends within the different sectors of the economy, | |
across all energy carriers. It then uses this information along with assumptions about future demand and | |
technology evolution to project the country’s future energy requirements under a variety of different scenarios, | |
including those with emissions limits and different carbon prices. Based on an analysis of the scenario outcomes, | |
the IEP can define the future trajectories for electricity, liquid fuels and gas in the country. | |
The current IEP dates from 2003, and the Department of Energy has been working on updates thereof, with a | |
draft IEP outlining various energy scenarios having been issued in 2016 (DoE, 2016a). The draft IEP provides an | |
indication of the sectoral energy demand, as shown in Figure 6. This breakdown is relevant in this document in | |
that it helps to contextualise the mitigation measures presented below. The IEP update with a clear trajectory for | |
the energy sector is critical to guiding overall energy planning for the country, including in the context of this | |
document to support a just transition away from fossil fuels towards a low carbon future. | |
Transport | |
32% | |
Residential | |
14% | |
Mining | |
. 7% | |
Commerce Agriculture | |
7% 3% | |
Figure 6: Sectoral energy demand | |
Source: DoE, 2016a | |
22 | |
4.1.2 Integrated Resource Plan | |
The Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) guides the evolution of the South African electricity supply sector, in that it | |
identifies the preferred electricity generation technologies to be built to meet projected electricity demand. It thus | |
provides a mechanism for Government to drive the diversification of the country’s electricity generation mix and | |
promote the use of renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. | |
The 2019 IRP represents South Africa’s current policy position, an update on the 2010 IRP (DoE, 2019c). The | |
2019 update includes: | |
e Extension of the period of analysis to look at the period to 2050 (the IRP 2010 only looked to 2030), | |
however 2019 IRP only provides a build plan to 2030; | |
e Updated demand projections; and | |
e Updated technology costs. | |
By extending the coverage to 2050, the impact of decommissioning Eskom’s coal fired generation capacity on | |
the long-term requirements for new capacity is clearer. According to the IRP, the decommissioning schedule | |
shows that about 10,599 MW of Eskom’s coal generation capacity will be decommissioned by 2030, with the | |
figure increasing to 35,000 MW by 2050. For reference, the installed capacity in in 2018 was 37,149 MW. | |
The IRP is developed by first projecting the country’s long-term electricity demand, taking into account the impact | |
of both population growth and economic development, and the role that energy-efficiency and demand-side | |
interventions can play. It then presents a base case and a number of scenarios‘ which all provide an electricity | |
generation supply mix which can meet future electricity demand at least cost, taking into account the need for | |
ensuring security of supply. To explore how the build plan could contribute to a decline in South Africa’s GHG | |
4 Scenarios explored included those which have no cap on annual build on renewables, changes to gas prices and the application of a | |
carbon budget | |
23 | |
emissions in line with the current commitments, modelling of the base case included a carbon constraint to | |
account for the electricity sector's proportional contribution to meeting the PPD trajectory. A scenario was also | |
tested in the 2019 IRP where the emissions space available to the sector under the PPD (5,470 Mt COz) is divided | |
into three ten-year carbon budgets. | |
Drawing on the scenarios analysed in the IRP 2019, an “emerging long-term plan” to 2030 has been developed. | |
The IRP proposes a set of policy adjustments to ensure “a practical plan that will be flexible to accommodate | |
new, innovative technologies that are not currently cost competitive, the minimization of the impact of | |
decommissioning of coal power plants and the changing demand profile.” It is noted that although demand | |
projections and decommissioning profiles to 2050 are discussed, the 2019 IRP only provides an indicative | |
generation build plan to 2030. This is attributed to technology uncertainties beyond that time frame. | |
For the first time, a provision for embedded generation is included in the IRP. Embedded Generation (also referred | |
to as distributed generation) refers to electricity generation installations of capacities of between 1MW and 10MW | |
that are connected to the national grid. Embedded generation using renewable technologies is attracting | |
substantial investment and funding in both the private and public sector (with the latter typically being at sub- | |
national government level), and is set to grow exponentially. In recognition of this growth potential, a provision for | |
4,000 MW of other generation by 2030 is made, which includes embedded generation as well as co-generation, | |
biomass and landfill gas generation. Government, through the National Energy Regulator of South Africa | |
(NERSA) has been in the process of finalising the regulations governing embedded generation for an extended | |
period, an activity which requires urgent resolution. Although this has not yet been resolved at the national level, | |
number of individual municipalities have already put in place grid feed-in tariffs. | |
The IRP also proposes a set of research and analysis activities to be undertaken to support the low carbon | |
transition of the electricity supply sector. These include detailed studies on the impact of gas supply options on | |
electricity supply, the appropriate level of penetration of RE in the South African national grid, the cost and | |
economic benefits associated with other clean energy options as well as socio-economic impacts of communities | |
affected by the decommissioning of coal fired power stations. Such activities can help contribute to low emissions | |
transformation of the electricity sector in a manner that is informed, feasible and just. | |
24 | |
Transformation of the electricity supply sector | |
The IRP (2019) makes provision for renewables being added to the electricity supply mix, both to meet growing | |
demand and to replace power stations that will be decommissioned. Short-term additions to the mix include: | |
e 2,500 MW of new hydro capacity being built by 2030 | |
e 6,814 MW of new PV capacity being built between 2019 and 2030 | |
e 15,762 MW of new wind capacity being built between 2019 and 2030 | |
e 4,000 MW other generation being added to the grid between 2019 and 2030 | |
e 300 MW of Concentrated Solar Power to be built in 2019 | |
Provision is also made for 1,500 MW of new coal-fired power station capacity, beyond that which has already | |
been committed to. The resulting electricity supply mix in 2030 is shown in Figure 7. | |
8% | |
1% | |
Coal | |
a Hydro | |
Nuclear | |
44% Storage | |
a Pv | |
23% | |
B wind | |
csP | |
a Gas/diesel | |
7% 2% 3% | |
Figure 7: Share of installed capacity in the 2019 IRP in MW® | |
Through regular updates to the IRP, and making early commitments to deep transformation of the sector post | |
2030, ambition can be increased. However, including new coal-fired power stations in the build plan will result | |
in further lock-in to carbon intensive electricity supply, or the potential for stranded assets in the sector. | |
5 Note that the figure excludes embedded generation, due to a lack of information on how much has already been installed. | |
25 | |
The 2019 IRP is based on the current articulation of the PPD trajectory. Future updates to the IRP will need to | |
take into account any future modifications to the emissions trajectory. In this way electricity supply planning will | |
be aligned with the country’s increasing national ambition. | |
4.1.3 Biofuels opportunities | |
The Biofuels Industrial Strategy of the Republic of South Africa (DMR, 2007) outlines Government's approach to | |
the development of a biofuel sector in the country. The primary aim of the Strategy is to address poverty and | |
unemployment, although the role in climate change mitigation in the liquid fuels sector is recognised. The Strategy | |
proposed a 2% penetration of biofuels in the national liquid fuel supply (400 million litres per annum), within five | |
years of its publication. | |
In support of the strategy, the Regulations Regarding the Mandatory Blending of Biofuels with Petrol and Diesel | |
were published in the Government Gazette in August 2012. The Regulations describe the eligibility and process | |
for purchasing biofuels for blending and specify the type of records that need to be kept. The Regulations also | |
specify that (i) the minimum concentration to be allowed for biodiesel blending is 5% by volume; and (ii) the | |
permitted range for bio-ethanol blending is between 2 and 10% by volume. | |
Although the regulations were published in 2012, implementation has not yet begun. However, in 2019 the Energy | |
Minister signalled a commitment to implementing the biofuels regulatory framework to support a local biofuels | |
industry. Through inclusion in SA-LEDS the intention to support implementation of the Strategy is signalled. | |
Since the development of the Strategy, advancements have been made on second and third generation biofuels | |
technologies. These process routes could potentially increase the volumes of biofuel that could be produced in | |
South Africa, without competing with food products for feedstocks. | |
6 Second generation biofuels are made from lignocellulosic feedstocks, and thus do not compete with food crops for feedstocks. Third | |
generation biofuels are made from algae. | |
26 | |
4.2 Energy demand | |
SA-LEDS supports the implementation of a selection of measures to reduce energy demand, or limit growth in | |
energy demand, as the economy and population grows: | |
e The National Energy Efficiency Strategy; | |
e Support for increased uptake of Solar Water Heaters; | |
e The National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act; and | |
e Promotion of cleaner mobility. | |
These measures not only contribute to reductions in emissions associated with fossil fuels, but also to energy | |
security and energy access. | |
4.2.1 National Energy Efficiency Strategy | |
In 2005, the Department of Energy launched the first National Energy Efficiency Strategy (2005). Building on this | |
document, the Department of Minerals and Energy is finalizing the post-2015 National Energy Efficiency Strategy | |
(NEES), which outlines a set of goals for energy efficiency improvements across the economy to 2030 (DoE, | |
2016b). Table 2 captures the targets included in the NEES, with the explanation of how each of these targets was | |
established being provided in the NEES document. | |
27 | |
Table 2: Energy efficiency targets outlined in the post-2015 NEES | |
Sector/subsector | |
Goal | |
Public buildings sector | |
- 50% reduction in specific energy consumption (measured as GJ annual energy | |
consumption per m2 of occupied floor area), by 2030. | |
Municipal services | |
- 20% reduction in the energy intensity (measured as energy consumption per | |
capita of population served) of municipal service provision, by 2030. The | |
specific services included are street lighting, traffic lights, water supply and | |
waste water treatment. | |
- 30% reduction in the fossil fuel intensity of municipality vehicle fleets | |
(measured as total fossil fuel consumption by municipal vehicles per capita of | |
population served), by 2030. | |
Residential sector | |
- 33% reduction in the average specific energy consumption of new household | |
appliances purchased in South Africa, by 2030. | |
- 20% reduction in the average specific energy consumption of the residential | |
building stock, by 2030. | |
Commercial sector | |
- 37% reduction in the specific energy consumption (measured as GJ annual | |
energy consumption per m? of lettable/habitable floor area), by 2030. | |
Industry sector | |
- 16% reduction in the weighted mean specific energy consumption for the | |
manufacturing industry, by 2030 | |
- 40 PJ cumulative total annual energy saving from specific energy saving | |
interventions undertaken by in the mining subsector. | |
Agriculture sector | |
1 PJ verified electricity saving from officially supported projects, annually | |
Transport sector | |
20% reduction in the average vehicle energy intensity (measured in MJ/km) of | |
the South African road vehicle fleet, by 2030. | |
The NEES also identifies a set of measures to be implemented in each sector to achieve the stated targets. These | |
are shown in Table 3. | |
28 | |
Table 3: Measures outlined in the post-2015 NEES | |
Sector Measures fae | |
rame | |
Introduce mandatory Energy Performance Certificates in all rented properties and 2 | |
: : 7 years | |
publicly accessible buildings | |
Develop the public sector awareness raising campaign to facilitate the “leading by 5.Vears | |
example” approach y | |
Publie Introduce standards and labelling relevant for public sector appliances and | |
sector : 2 years | |
equipment | |
Announce a 15-year trajectory for the successive tightening of the energy B years | |
performance component of building standards and successively tighten standards y | |
Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data to the public sector 1 year | |
Municipal _| Develop municipal energy efficiency strategies 3 years | |
sector Support the implementation of energy savings measures 5 years | |
Announce a 15-year trajectory for the successive tightening of minimum energy | |
performance standards for household appliances and successively tighten | 5 years | |
standards | |
Develop a strongly branded energy performance certification mark for household | |
appliances (modelled on the “Energy Star“ brand), in addition to the planned | 5 years | |
energy efficiency labels. | |
Residential | Announce a 15-year trajectory for the successive tightening of the energy | |
sector performance component of building standards for residential buildings and | 5 years | |
successively tighten standards | |
Build on the existing awareness-raising activities targeting households and the 5 years | |
school curriculum y | |
Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data from the residential sector 1 year | |
Support technology innovation and dissemination of energy efficient cookstove 5 years | |
technologies y | |
Introduce mandatory Energy Performance Certificates in all rented properties and 2 | |
; 5 7 years | |
publicly accessible buildings | |
Commercial | Revise 12L to ensure it provides an incentive to commercial property owners 4 years | |
sector Introduce standards and labelling relevant for commercial sector appliances and 9 vests | |
equipment y | |
Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data from the commercial sector 1 year | |
Adjust the 12L tax incentive scheme 4 years | |
29 | |
Time | |
Sector Measures frame | |
Develop minimum energy performance standards for motors and motor-driven 4 | |
years | |
systems | |
Provide targeted support and advice on energy efficiency to enterprises 3 years | |
Incentivise enterprises to introduce Energy Management Systems and achieve errs | |
Industrial 1$050001 certification standards y | |
sector Roll-out the provision of energy and production data from the manufacturing sub- 4 year | |
sector y | |
Develop standardised tools for voluntary reporting of energy savings from 2 | |
eee th ts as years | |
initiatives in the mining sector | |
Create technology/ learning hubs for energy efficiency 2 years | |
Explore the potential for savings in agricultural vehicle use, and develop 2 Weare | |
appropriate awareness-raising material y | |
Agricultural | Develop targeted awareness-raising and training material on potential savings in 9 years | |
sector motor-driven systems y | |
Provide direct grants to small farmers / smallholders for all or part of the cost of 4 years | |
interventions | |
Develop fuel efficiency standards for light and heavy vehicles to improve the 5 years | |
Transport overall efficiency of the vehicle stock | |
sector Improve systems for ensuring road worthiness 5 years | |
Roll-out the provision of energy and activity data from the transport sector 1 year | |
Production | Develop the enabling framework for cogeneration and trigeneration 3 years | |
and | |
ost ibution | Expand intemal efficiency programmes for producers 3 years | |
sector | |
The Post-2015 NEES makes provision for a review every five years. | |
30 | |
4.2.2 Support for uptake of Solar Water Heaters | |
Solar Water Heaters (SWH) provide the opportunity to partially offset use of electricity for water heating in middle- | |
and high-income households, and to service low-income households that did not previously have ready access | |
to hot water or used fuels other than electricity for water heating. | |
Since 2005 a number of goals have been set, and associated support programmes have been established, to | |
drive the uptake of SWH in South Africa, with the National Development Plan introducing a goal of five million | |
SWHs by 2030. In 2015 Department of Energy (DoE) took over responsibility for the National SWH programme | |
from Eskom, making 5,000 subsidies available (further to those that had already been granted). The DoE aims to | |
roll out new, fully subsidised low-income installations as part of their Social Programme, and is seeking to drive | |
an increase in localised manufacture to have the positive co-benefit of local economic development. In addition | |
to government programmes that act as drivers, the uptake of SWH continues to be supported by rising energy | |
prices and electricity supply challenges. | |
4.2.3 National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act | |
To further efforts to decrease energy consumption and the associated GHG emissions of new commercial and | |
residential buildings, the South African government has implemented energy efficiency and energy consumption | |
standards under the National Building Regulations and Buildings Standards Act. Compliance with the Standards | |
is required in order to ensure compliance with the Act. | |
The first of the relevant standards is South African National Standard (SANS) 204 — Energy Efficiency in Buildings. | |
This standard “specifies the design requirements for energy efficiency in buildings and of services in buildings | |
with natural environmental control and artificial ventilation or air conditioning systems.” It includes provisions for | |
orientation, maximum energy demand and the maximum annual energy consumption for various kinds of buildings | |
31 | |
in various climate zones across the country, and design provisions for all parts of buildings’ construction. The | |
second standard, SANS 10400-XA — Energy Usage in Buildings includes the provisions of SANS 204 and other | |
standards, towards providing a standard for energy efficient buildings. | |
4.2.4 Promotion of Cleaner Mobility | |
Emissions from energy supply in the transport sector are addressed through a number of policy documents. The | |
Public Transport Strategy of 2007 set out an action plan for accelerated modal shifts and for the development of | |
integrated rapid public transport networks (DoT, 2007). Since then, the successful implementation of the bus rapid | |
transport (BRT) system in Johannesburg has led to it being adapted and implemented in other major South African | |
cities, including Cape Town, Rustenburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane, with further roll-outs being planned. | |
In 2018 the Green Transport Strategy (GTS) for 2018 to 2050 was launched (DoT, 2018). The GTS provides the | |
strategic direction for the transport sector regarding the reduction of GHG emissions, the contribution of transport | |
to the green economy and the promotion of sustainable mobility. The Strategy aims to support reductions in the | |
contribution of the transport sector to national greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% by 2050. | |
Some examples of the measures in the GTS that are relevant to SA-LEDS include: | |
e Exploring the potential for local electric vehicle and battery production, and growing the number of public | |
charging stations, powered by solar panels, by 40 stations per year’; | |
TItis recognised that for the full mitigation benefit of electric vehicles to be realised, concurrent electricity grid decarbonisation is required. | |
32 | |
e The continued use of fuel economy norms and standards for fuel efficiency and GHG emissions of | |
vehicles. Baseline studies on the adoption of more stringent fuel standards will help to provide a platform | |
for introducing cleaner fuel standards; and | |
e Facilitating a shift of freight from road to rail. This is in recognition that freight transport was previously | |
moved off rail onto road as a result of constraints in the country’s rail service, with road-based freight | |
transport currently accounting for around 75% of total freight moved. The road-to-rail shift will be | |
supported by the implementation of Transnet’s® Market Demand Strategy. The Market Demand Strategy | |
aims to create a more balanced and appropriate market between road and rail freight transport, thereby | |
reducing overloading of the road network and road infrastructure deterioration and contributing to a | |
reduction in GHGs associated with rail transport. | |
In September 2010 a COz tax was introduced on the selling price of new motor vehicles that exceed a certain | |
emissions limit, in order to increase the move towards lower emissions vehicles. The levy has grown incrementally | |
over time, and offers an established instrument that government could use for ratcheting up ambition in the | |
transport sector. | |
4.3 Industry | |
Two sets of policies that directly and indirectly support emissions reductions in the industrial sector are identified, | |
beyond those discussed in Section 4.2.1 that target energy efficiency. These are the Industrial Policy Action Plan | |
(IPAP) and tax rebates for green project development. | |
8 Transnet is the state-owned entity responsible for managing rail infrastructure and operation, ports and pipelines | |
33 | |
4.3.1 Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) | |
The National Industrial Policy Framework (NIPF) was adopted as a broad framework governing industrial policy | |
in South Africa, and thus articulates the overarching approach to industrial development (dti, 2007). The | |
implementation plan for the framework is contained in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP), which is revised | |
at various intervals. The most recent revision of the IPAP, which covers the period 2018/19 to 2020/21, provides | |
updates on key focus areas within the industrial sector, one of which is green industry investment. Some of the | |
green industry Action Programmes that will contribute to climate mitigation in the short term included in the IPAP | |
are: | |
e Developing a Policy Roadmap for Climate-Compatible Industrial Development; | |
e Systemised resource efficiency data collection and reporting; | |
e The Industrial Water Efficiency Project (which has a primary focus on water savings which is a resource | |
efficiency/adaptation focus, but will have a mitigation benefit through saving energy associated with water | |
supply); | |
e The Industrial Energy Efficiency Project; | |
e Resource-efficient and cleaner production skills development; and | |
e Specialist skills development in resource-efficiency and cleaner production. | |
The IPAP also supports fuel cell industry development. | |
34 | |
4.3.2 | |
Tax incentives for green project development | |
The implementation of technologies with potential for contribution to emissions reductions in the industrial sector | |
is supported by various tax incentives, contained in the Income Tax Act of South Africa: | |
Section 12B allows companies to deduct the cost incurred from investing in assets that are used directly | |
for the production of renewable energy from their taxable income; | |
Section 12I offers support for both capital investment and training related to Greenfield (new) and | |
Brownfield (expansions or upgrades) projects within South Africa’s manufacturing sector. A mandatory | |
requirement for qualification for this incentive is that projects demonstrate use of energy efficient | |
equipment (in the case of greenfield projects) or at least 15% energy improvement relative to a baseline | |
(brownfield projects) | |
Section 12K provides for tax exemptions on proceeds gained from the disposal of certified emission | |
reductions derived from activities registered with the Clean Development Mechanism. The tax window | |
runs up to 31 December 2020, in line with termination of the second commitment period of the Kyoto | |
Protocol; | |
Section 12L provides for a tax incentive to support implementation of energy savings. Since its inception | |
in 2013, major benefits have been realised in terms of energy savings of approximately 5.9 GWh, with | |
associated avoidance of GHG emissions, through a spend of ZAR 3 billion by government. Major | |
beneficiaries have been the mining and manufacturing subsectors. This incentive has been extended | |
until the end of the first phase of the carbon tax (31 December 2022) in line with requests from | |
stakeholders; and | |
Section 37B allows companies to deduct the costs, incurred due to expenditures on environmental | |
pollution control and monitoring equipment and/or disposal sites, from their taxable revenues. | |
35 | |
4.4 Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use (AFOLU) | |
South Africa’s land cover is dominated by open ecosystems in the form of shrublands (covering just under 40% | |
of the total land area), savanna woodlands (33%) and grasslands (27%). Both indigenous forests and exotic forest | |
plantations make up the remainder, with indigenous forests occupying less than 0.3% of South Africa’s land area | |
(GeoTerralmage, 2013) and forest plantations occupying 1% of the overall land area. | |
Changes in land use can result in the release of carbon stocks. The National Terrestrial Carbon Sinks Assessment | |
(NTCSA) (2015) indicated that transformation of land through land uses including crop agriculture can reduce soil | |
carbon by 40 to 60% from what existed in a natural grassland and savannah. Further, urban expansion and mining | |
reduces above and below ground carbon, as does degradation, which increases soil erosion. In terms of total | |
carbon sequestration, despite the small overall land coverage by forests, over 90% of CO2 absorbed in 2015 was | |
attributed to forest land, with the remainder being absorbed by grassland and savannah. | |
Mitigation actions identified in the AFOLU sector include Policies and Measures developed by line departments | |
including the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). These include the draft Climate Change | |
Adaptation and Mitigation Plan for the South African Agricultural and Forestry sectors, the Conservation | |
Agriculture Policy (DAFF, 2017b) and the Agroforestry Strategic Framework for South Africa (DAFF, 2017c). | |
In terms of the draft Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan, for mitigation in the agricultural sector it is | |
proposed that a strategic and integrated approach is taken that addresses sustainable agriculture more broadly | |
and “to build synergies and avoid conflicts between climate change mitigation and other policy objectives, and to | |
avoid offsetting mitigation efforts through intensification of production or land use change." In the forestry sector, | |
there is a specific objective to reduce GHG emissions through afforesting 100,000 hectares of land in the Eastern | |
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal as well as strengthening and expanding current initiatives including forest rehabilitation, | |
working for woodlands and the Subtropical Thicket Ecosystem Project (STEP). The implementation of the national | |
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) will lead to conservation of forest carbon | |
stocks, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of the forest carbon stocks. Protecting and | |
preserving existing carbon stocks in other ecosystems (those with high organic soil carbon, wetlands and some | |
grasslands) is also identified as a mitigation priority. | |
9 Note that with a government restructure Forestry and Fisheries has now been combined with Environmental Affairs, while Agriculture | |
has been combined with agriculture and the department of rural development and land reform. The implications of this restructuring on | |
policy implementation has not yet been considered. | |
36 | |
The DAFF Draft Conservation Agriculture Policy (DAFF, 2017b) provides a basis for national and sector policy | |
support for increasing the uptake of conservation agriculture (CA), including no-till, conservation till, precision | |
agriculture and meat production efficiency. GHG emission reduction occurs by reducing fuel consumption of farm | |
vehicles, increasing yields and reduced fertiliser use. Current CA adoption by grain growers is between 20 and | |
30% at a national scale. | |
Both the establishment of plantations and agroforestry could lead to the sequestration of atmospheric carbon in | |
soils and biomass. The DAFF Agroforestry Strategic Framework for South Africa (DAFF, 2017c) presents a broad | |
overview of the potential for agroforestry in a South African context by providing a set of principles and strategic | |
themes and goals. It recognises the carbon sequestration potential role of agroforestry. | |
4.5 Waste | |
Waste management activities in South Africa are legislated through the National Environmental Management: | |
Waste Act (NEM:WA) (DEA, 2009). To provide further policy direction in terms of establishing fully integrated | |
waste management practices in the country, the National Waste Management Strategy (NWMS) was developed | |
(DEA, 2012). The Strategy adopts the internationally accepted waste management hierarchy of waste avoidance | |
and reduction, re-use, recycling, recovery, treatment and disposal. Implementing activities in accordance with the | |
prioritisation afforded by the hierarchy potentially contributes to a reduction in emissions from material life cycles’? | |
as follows: | |
¢ Avoidance and reduction of waste avoids emissions with production and transport of the waste that | |
would have been ultimately sent to landfill; | |
10 Emissions savings achieved through actions in the waste sector will not all be reflected in that sector's inventory, however they may | |
contribute indirectly to national emissions savings. | |
37 | |
Reducing the quantity of recyclable waste sent to landfill, through the implementation of separation at | |
source programmes in metropolitan municipalities and through the establishment of material recovery | |
facilities (MRFs) for separation after the waste has been collected, avoids emissions with primary | |
material production in the case of inert materials and avoids generation of methane in landfill in the | |
case of organics; and | |
Recovery of value through waste-to-energy (WIE) facilities avoids generation of methane from organics | |
sent to landfill, and at the same time the electricity generated offsets electricity generation from fossil | |
fuels. It is noted that, although included in the 2012 Strategy, WIE is no longer considered to be a | |
preferred technology option, but is rather recognised to be a last resort for managing wastes for which | |
higher value cannot be recovered. | |
Subsequent to the Waste Act and National Waste Management Strategy, twenty national waste management | |
initiatives, with annual targets, have been established by the DEA through a process known as the Waste Phakisa. | |
Jointly, these initiatives aim to achieve landfill diversion of 20 million tonnes of waste per year (75% industrial and | |
50% municipal). Of the twenty initiatives, those that are likely to have direct and indirect impacts on the total | |
national greenhouse gas emissions include (GreenCape, 2018): | |
Achieving a minimum of 50% of households separating organics at source by 2023; | |
Introduction of Material Recovery Facilities (MRFs) and pelletising plants to increase plastic recycling | |
rates, and formalising packaging industry producer responsibility plans; | |
Developing capacity through a specialised programme which upskills agri-stakeholders to minimise food | |
loss, and running a consumer awareness campaign to use and consume “ugly” food, towards saving | |
245,000 tonnes of food waste to landfill per year; | |
Establishing refuse derived fuel plants across South Africa, towards diverting 120,000 tonnes of waste | |
from landfill; and | |
Establishing a refrigerant reclamation and reusable cylinder industry to reduce emissions of refrigerant | |
gases. | |
The importance of circular economy thinking in guiding the Waste Phakisa initiatives was noted. A circular | |
economy framing has positive benefits in terms of reducing greenhouse gases. | |
38 | |
4.6 Cross-Cutting Measures | |
In addition to the measures specific to individual sectors, four cross-cutting measures that will support low carbon | |
development are in various stages of being implemented. | |
4.6.1 Carbon Tax | |
The Carbon Tax Act was brought into effect from 1 June 2019. The Act gives effect to the “polluter pays principle” | |
and aims to price carbon by internalising the negative costs of emitting GHGs. The tax rate is set at R120 per | |
tonne of CO2-eq produced. To allow businesses time for transition, a basic tax-free allowance of 60% will initially | |
apply to all emissions, with a number of further allowances depending on the activities. These provide for | |
maximum tax-free allowances of between 60 and 95%. The allowances include those on fugitive emissions; for | |
trade exposure; for performance above the industry benchmark; for purchasing offsets; and for voluntarily being | |
allocated a (non-enforceable) carbon budget. The allowances bring the effective tax rate to between ZAR 6 and | |
ZAR 48 per tonne. | |
Post-2020, the carbon tax and the carbon budgeting system (discussed in Section 4.6.3 below) will be aligned. | |
This may include the option of imposing a higher tax rate as a penalty for emissions exceeding the carbon budget. | |
This interface option will help to ensure a credible price signal to drive mitigation and provide the required | |
regulatory policy certainty. At this stage some of the allowances are likely to be reduced, and the voluntary carbon | |
budget allowance will be completely removed. | |
39 | |
Emissions covered by the carbon tax are those that need to be reported in terms of the Department of | |
Environmental Affairs’ Mandatory Reporting Regulations, although the tax is administered by the South African | |
Revenue Services in the same way as other environmental levies. | |
The role of the carbon tax | |
e Through passing of the Carbon Tax Act, the government is providing a strong signal of an intention to | |
implement the “polluter pays principle”. | |
e At present, with the prescribed allowances, the tax rate is low. However, the ratcheting of this policy | |
intervention will be achieved through reducing the allowances and increasing the tax rate. | |
e Ahigher rate of tax on emissions exceeding the carbon budgets, as is being proposed once the carbon | |
budgets are mandatory, will further drive mitigation action. | |
4.6.2 Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs) | |
South Africa’s national emissions trajectory will be translated into Sectoral Emission Targets or SETs, which are | |
quantitative greenhouse gas emission targets allocated to an emitting sector or sub-sector, over a defined time | |
period. The sectors or sub-sectors to which SETs are allocated are still being defined, but will be aligned with the | |
IPCC (2006) emissions categories to facilitate alignment with other GHG reporting. Individual national government | |
departments will be tasked with developing and implementing Policies and Measures (PAMs) to ensure emissions | |
from within a sector or sub-sector remain within SET limits. The allocation of the SETs will be based on the socio- | |
economic benefits of introducing the Sectoral Emissions Targets; the best available science, evidence and | |
information; and the mitigation options available to the sector. SETs will be determined for three rolling five-year | |
periods. | |
Sectoral Emissions Targets | |
e Constraining the cumulative SETs applied across the sectors and sub-sectors within the GHG | |
emissions trajectory will ensure that, as the trajectory is revised towards meeting the requirements of | |
the Paris Agreement, a consistent message will be sent to all government departments about the | |
requirements for implementation of PAMs to drive down emissions. | |
40 | |
4.6.3 Carbon Budgets | |
Carbon Budgets set a maximum volume of emissions from certain activities that individual entities are allowed to | |
emit over three rolling five-year periods. By assigning a Carbon Budget to an entity, a signal is provided as to the | |
degree of GHG mitigation that is required within a specific time period, with a penalty being imposed if the budget | |
allocation is exceeded. Furthermore, by providing entities with an understanding of how the budgets are likely to | |
be assigned in future phases to keep overall national emissions within the bounds of the national emissions | |
trajectory, which will continue to be revised downward in keeping with the Paris Agreement, they are sensitised | |
to how mitigation requirements may change in the future. The system thereby provides an opportunity for entities | |
to plan ahead. | |
The first phase of the Carbon Budgets, which runs from 2016 to 2020, is currently being implemented, with the | |
allocation of company-level Carbon Budgets for a small group of companies. This phase is voluntary as there is | |
no legal basis to set emission limits for sectors or companies. The second and subsequent phases (i.e. the post- | |
2020 period) will become mandatory when the Climate Change Bill is formally approved by government. | |
4.6.4 Phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies/incentives | |
Fossil fuels are used across a number of the economic sectors in South Africa. As a member of the G20, where | |
countries have committed to phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, South Africa has indicated willingness to | |
identify and minimise their harmful impacts, taking cognisance of its developmental state. The subsidies | |
undermine the competitiveness of renewable energy, divert financial resources from development of priority | |
sectors and services such as education, health, and infrastructure; and encourage the extraction and | |
overconsumption of fossil fuels (as they are under-priced). Inefficient fossil fuel subsidies act as a negative fuel | |
tax or work as a negative price on carbon, and hence their phase-out entails removing market distortions which | |
would result in greater efficiencies in the economy, including restructuring taxes to reflect their environmental | |
impacts. An economy-wide carbon tax has been implemented from 1 June 2019 (as described above) and this | |
provides a price signal to nudge the economy towards low carbon development. South Africa should consider | |
participating in a fossil fuel subsidy peer review within the G20 framework to facilitate the sharing of experience | |
41 | |
and mutual learning among G20 members as the next step in identifying inefficient fossil subsidies within the | |
economy. | |
5 GOING FURTHER TO ACHIEVE THE PARIS GOALS | |
Section 4 focused on a set of stand-alone, sector-based policies and measures as well as a selection of cross- | |
cutting interventions that government is busy implementing. However, Section 1 highlighted that a broad range | |
of structural changes will be necessary across economic sectors, in order to ensure the global economy achieves | |
carbon neutrality within the second half of the century. Changes will be required in terms of service demand, | |
technology fleet, infrastructure, operating practice, and energy sources, for all sectors of activity. | |
Ensuring South Africa plays its role in the achievement of the Paris Agreement is the overarching purpose of this | |
strategy. Therefore, as the science of climate change evolves, and our understanding matures to permeate our | |
public awareness and policy processes, we will adjust our strategy accordingly. This is a living document, and | |
ongoing work will ensure adequate updates are brought forward at appropriate times. | |
As it continues to strengthen its response to climate change as part of a global effort, South Africa will increase | |
its focus on a range of strategic elements that will together promote the change to low carbon growth, while | |
continuing to align with the goals of the Paris Agreement. These are: | |
e Enhancing the vision for development | |
e Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition | |
e Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth | |
e Providing broad access to funds | |
e Driving innovation, research, and skills for future value capture | |
e Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all | |
42 | |
e Promoting sustainable development through education and culture | |
e Enhancing information and metrics | |
Each of these is elaborated upon in the sections that follow. | |
5.1 Enhancing the vision for development | |
The SA-LEDS vision described in Section 3 is guided by the peak-plateau-decline trajectory as defined in the | |
NCCRP and the NDC. The trajectory represents the contribution South Africa commits to the global response to | |
climate change at this time, aligned with its vision of development. | |
As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, South Africa subscribes to the view that a progression in climate ambition | |
will be necessary to achieve the global long-term goals, with all parties taking part in this progression in ambition | |
with regards to mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation, in accordance with the principles of the | |
Convention. As climate science continues to further our understanding of the challenges and potential solutions | |
to climate change, and economic reality broadens the range of options and global willingness to invest in them, | |
South Africa will continue to both strengthen its commitments and communicate in a compelling manner how they | |
represent our fair contribution to the global achievement of the Paris Agreement. | |
The IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C has provided significant new understanding | |
on the targets of the Paris Agreement, as briefly discussed in Section 1.2. Itis clear that Parties must find a way | |
to ensure that emissions over time decrease rapidly as part of a sustainable development pathway, consistent | |
with the goal of carbon neutrality in the second half of this century. Changes in all productive sectors, and | |
important enhancements of international cooperation, are required. All of these elements must be kept in mind as | |
we enhance our long-term development vision. | |
Determining a trajectory to carbon neutrality will require a number of processes. Sectoral scenario analyses will | |
be required to inform on the range of options. For these, traditional “incremental” modeling techniques will be | |
insufficient, so a transformational approach will be required. Uncertainties in speed of response and investments | |
required should not limit the scenario work, but rather become part of the output, to enable policymakers to | |
appreciate what conditions will be required to enable different trajectories. | |
Creating a national picture out of sectoral pathways will be essential to ensure balance between the sectors can | |
inform national deliberations. Stakeholders from all sectors will play a vital part, providing insights into | |
opportunities, challenges, trade-offs and requirements which will inform the national debate and also enrich our | |
43 | |
position with regards to the international community, be it as part of the UNFCCC negotiations or in discussions | |
with donors and investors. | |
The analyses will seek to determine requirements for enablers from other participants in the global community, | |
as appropriate. As South Africa play its part within a global effort, a range of technical pathways will be developed | |
for low carbon development. The strategy development process will evaluate the opportunities within a new model | |
of development, and the benefits of achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050, alongside the challenges to | |
the transition and the international enablers available. | |
National life, from local politics, business decisions, and mass media communications, will have to reflect these | |
ideas, preparing citizens and decision-makers for a new perspective on economic development. The climate | |
challenge will only be tackled under the paradigm of sustainable development. | |
5.2 Enhancing institutional capabilities and arrangements for the transition | |
Regardless of the details of the path followed towards a carbon-neutral world, in-depth sectorial transformation | |
plans will need to be developed over the coming years, with significant public and private sector collaboration, to | |
lay out the transformation pathways which will lead South Africa to achieve its goals. Such planning requires | |
political will, coordination, a participatory process, and specific analytical resources and expertise. | |
Thus, a critical area in which institutional capabilities and arrangements should be enhanced is for the planning | |
and policy-making processes themselves. These processes will have to develop targets across the whole | |
economy, plan detailed actions over several timescales, and ensure the right changes can take place in the right | |
way. The institutional capabilities required for these planning efforts and their implementation will require improved | |
capabilities, as well as closer links to the research community, civil society, and the business community. | |
As the sectoral pathways are fully identified, the required sequence of steps for their implementation should be | |
mapped onto the current institutional framework in order to establish where current coordination arrangements, | |
as shown in Table 4, are suitable, and where it would make sense to consider adjustments. It is important to recall | |
that these will be pathways of transformation, spanning 30 years and requiring multi-step processes which should | |
be mapped out in somewhat detailed sequence. Topics such as ministerial attributions, levels of government, | |
chains of command, and decision-making, as well as the scope for different institutions to access resources such | |
as finance, skills, or regulatory authorization, should all be taken into consideration, as they can make a significant | |
difference to the success of the transformation. | |
44 | |
Table 4: Current institutional arrangements to address climate change response actions | |
Structure | |
Function | |
Parliament and Portfolio Committees | |
Oversee and monitor the implementation of the | |
national climate change responses | |
Make laws to support climate change responses in | |
the country | |
Presidential Climate Change | |
Commission (PCCCC): (Yet to be established) | |
Coordinating | |
Coordinate and oversee the low carbon and just | |
transition, including how to maximise the | |
opportunities for jobs. | |
The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change | |
(IMCCC): Executive level committee. The Minister of | |
the Environment and Minister responsible for planning | |
monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency co-chair | |
meetings | |
Coordinate and align climate change response | |
efforts, including statutory and regulatory needs | |
Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change | |
(IGCCC): Consists of relevant national, provincial | |
departments and local government | |
Operationalise cooperative governance on the | |
climate change issues | |
Ministers and Members of Executive Councils | |
(MINMEC) and the Ministerial Technical Advisory | |
Body (MINTECH): Facilitate a high level of policy and | |
strategy coherence among the three spheres of | |
government - national, provincial and __ local | |
government | |
Guide climate change work across the three spheres | |
of government | |
National Committee on Climate Change (NCCC): | |
Multi-stakeholder Committee | |
Consult with stakeholders from key sectors that | |
impact on or are impacted by climate change - | |
academia, business, NGOs, labour, government and | |
civil society | |
Advise on matters relating to national responsibilities | |
Advise on the implementation of climate change- | |
related activities | |
In addition to the institutional arrangements, training and capacity building that will be required to support the | |
transition at the national government level, infrastructure and skills will need to be developed at the sub-national | |
45 | |
level. Many of the sub-national government structures are currently dysfunctional and lack the capacity to support | |
implementation of and manage funding for the actions required to support the low carbon transition. | |
5.3 Creating the right financial environment through aligning fiscal strategy with sustainable growth | |
The need for investment at scale and the change in purchasing choices of businesses and citizens over the | |
coming years makes the fiscal regime of a country a determining factor in its ability to achieve the structural | |
changes required by the joint objectives of achieving the Paris Agreement aims and eradicating poverty. The | |
correct incentives will accelerate positive change, while misalignment can hold back action. | |
Several considerations should inform fiscal adjustments over time. Overall tax revenue must be decoupled from | |
volumes of fossil fuel sales and exports in order to ensure that financial sustainability of the state does not become | |
a brake to the changes which are needed. Negative externalities should be considered for a greater share of | |
intake, supported by detailed analysis including market responses over time, which itself should inform the | |
pathway planning approach. | |
Capital investment should be encouraged in technology and implementation choices to support Paris-compatible | |
pathways. The incentives provided will have to be coherent with the long-term development pathway in order to | |
ensure short-term mitigation actions do not lead to emissions lock-in, nor a boost for assets which may become | |
stranded later. | |
Fossil fuels subsidies and incentives which have the effect of fostering inefficient management of resources such | |
as water, food, fertilizers, or public goods should be reviewed to support the transition to cleaner development. | |
While such a subsidy review may cause resistance in some sectors, it provides an opportunity to ensure the use | |
of state funds is progressive in terms of its distribution and enhances growth through the development of new | |
businesses and investments which align fully with national objectives. Support for renewable energy options must | |
be considered to accelerate their market acceptance, without building excessive distortions which may limit future | |
competitiveness or stagnate the transformation. | |
Significant work will be required to create an environment which is nurturing and inviting to new business models. | |
From shared ownership to provision of service/experience rather than goods/commodities, different ways of | |
satisfying demand — supported by ever more powerful and accessible digital platforms and networks — will | |
generate tremendous growth opportunities within a population increasing its per-capita income as poverty is | |
reduced. A forward-looking fiscal strategy, aware of the options and flexible to the evolution of new markets, will | |
46 | |
enhance such opportunities for South Africa, which will in turn bring export opportunities to Africa and the rest of | |
the world. | |
Additional opportunities for investment and growth will follow if the fiscal regime is inviting to new business which | |
seek to on-shore significant portions of the value chain of the industries which will lead the sustainable transition; | |
rather than zero-sum tariffs or restrictions, long-term policies which encourage investment, innovation, skills | |
development, and early leadership of local markets which are likely to evolve later in neighboring countries, will | |
all contribute to national wealth creation. | |
Carbon prices must evolve over time to effectively discourage fossil fuel and other emissions, while providing | |
clear market signals to investors in zero emission technologies that their investments will provide suitable returns | |
over their useful lifetimes. Visibility over future carbon prices, such as legislating for a ramp-up over several years, | |
provides clarity that carbon-intense investments will become uncompetitive and thus stranded, thereby informing | |
decisions which may lock the country into future emissions. | |
In summary, fiscal strategy over time must reconsider the balance of taxation, planning for falling sales of fossil | |
fuels and seeking to reduce negative externalities, while incentives will focus on both the emissions implications | |
of investments, favoring the route to net zero, and stimulating investments which take advantage of the | |
opportunities created by this transition, both in the short term (such as business creation) and in the medium to | |
long term, (such as by favoring skills development, innovation, and research). | |
The fiscal strategy must therefore form its own pathway to 2050, balancing the needs of the transformation, | |
economic and social development, with the viability of private sector companies and the state. | |
5.4 Providing broad access to funds | |
Access to funds in sufficient volume to meet the investment needs across a broad range of activities will be crucial | |
to the success of our efforts to tackle climate change. Significant work is already underway to illustrate this need | |
and help facilitate such access. | |
South Africa’s National Climate Change Response Policy emphasises the importance of mobilising a wide range | |
of financial and non-financial resources for both mitigation and adaptation. The Policy emphasises the need to | |
draw on all available sources of domestic and international financing (DEA, 2011). South Africa’s National | |
Determined Contribution goes further, and frames the ability to “catalyse, at an economy-wide scale, financing of | |
and investment in the transition to a low carbon and climate resilient economy and society” as a key challenge | |
for South Africa (DEA, 2015). Both these documents highlight the importance of international support given South | |
47 | |
Africa’s status as a developing country, and the magnitude of the challenge. Adaptation costs are difficult to | |
quantify, but it could cost South Africa more than US$ 30 billion per annum to adapt to climate change for the | |
period 2021-2030, and the incremental cost of mitigation action is estimated at more than US$ 1,350 billion in | |
total over the period 2020-2050, or roughly US$ 44 billion per year (DEA, 2015; DEA, 2019b). Furthermore, | |
Diffenbaugh and Burke (2019) find that the 1°C increase in global temperatures over the last century has already | |
reduced the size of the South African economy by between 10 and 20%." | |
Internationally, it is estimated that an additional US$ 13.5 trillion (in 2014 dollars) is required to remain below two | |
degrees of climate change from 2015 to 2030 (Meltzer, 2016; Bhattacharya et al, 2016). This additional | |
investment is, however, coupled with a reduction in investment in fossil fuel energy generation, transmission and | |
distribution of US$ 5.7 trillion and US$ 3.7 trillion in upstream oil, coal and gas investments. A further | |
US$ 5.1 trillion could also be saved in operating expenditure because of the reliance on low carbon technologies | |
like renewables. Meltzer (2016) points out that the challenge is thus how to deal with the high upfront cost of | |
these investments, since they are likely to more than pay for themselves over time. | |
5.4.1 Climate finance flows to date | |
Oliver et al (2018) find that US$ 472 billion of climate finance was deployed in 2015, US$ 455 billion in 2016 and | |
between US$ 510 billion and US$ 530 billion in 2017. Of the US$ 463 billion average annual flow over 2015 and | |
2016, an average of US$ 45 billion flowed from developed to developing countries, and only US$ 12 billion per | |
annum (including domestic resources) was deployed in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the US$ 463 billion average | |
annual value, more than 80% originated from domestic sources (US$ 162 billion from within OECD countries and | |
US$ 214 billion from within non-OECD countries). These numbers, however, cover all climate finance deployed, | |
and are not comparable to the pledge by developed countries, first made at COP15 in Copenhagen, to provide | |
US$ 100 billion of climate finance to developing countries by 2020. Timperley (2018) mentions that there is | |
disagreement about how close this pledge is to being met. According to the UNFCCC (2018), US$ 74.5 billion of | |
climate finance flowed to developing countries in 2016. International public climate finance flows to developing | |
countries, however, averaged US$ 58 billion for 2015 and 2016. Oxfam (2018) believes public climate finance | |
flows from developed to developing countries are much lower at between US$ 16 billion to US$ 21 billion. The | |
OECD (2019) estimated the value to be US$ 46.9 billion in 2016 and US$ 54.5 billion in 2017. Using project-level | |
11 According to the World Bank Development Indicators the size of the South African Economy was US$ 366 billion in 2018. | |
48 | |
data which doesn’t cover all climate finance flows, Timperley (2018), calculates a lower value for OECD climate | |
finance to developing countries of US$ 37 billion in 2016. | |
For 2015 to 2017, approximately US$ 160.7 million of bilateral and US$ 45.4 million of multilateral climate finance | |
flowed to South Africa. Over the same period, however, the South African government deployed almost | |
US$ 690 million of climate finance (DEA, 2019c).'2 The distribution of local public sector climate finance is shown | |
in Figure 8. Even though South African climate finance deployment was small by international standards, it is | |
nowhere near the levels that will be required from 2020 as discussed in the previous section. The percentage of | |
climate finance generated from domestic versus international sources is in line with international trends over this | |
period. | |
Energy Efficiency and Municipal Disaster 4 | |
Der a Municipal Disaster | |
Management funding _ 4.9% Recovery Grant | |
Loans program (EEDSM) ~ 4.1% — integrated National | |
~ Electrification | |
_— Programme (INEP) | |
0.1% | |
45.38 million | |
uso | |
an | |
Manufacturing | |
Competitiveness | |
Enhancement | |
programme (MCEP) | |
2.9% | |
National Expanded_—~ | |
Public Works | |
Programme: | |
Environmental | |
protection & | |
infrastructure All Grants | |
= Conditional Grants 8.7% | |
= Grants | |
@ Loans Domestic Finance | |
Figure 8: Domestic climate finance (2015 - 2017) | |
Source: DEA (2019c) | |
‘South Africa’s 3 Biennial Update Report (BUR-3) mentions that lags in reporting may lead to an underestimate of 2017 values. | |
Climate finance information for the periods 2000-2010 and 2010-2014 can be found in BUR-1 and BUR-2. | |
49 | |
Even without considering the contribution of domestic private sector financing for climate change-related activities, | |
which is likely to be significant given recent investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency in South | |
Africa, it is clear that international support contributes a relatively small proportion of climate finance being utilised | |
in South Africa. The contribution of domestic climate finance is also likely to increase further given the broad- | |
based carbon tax that was put in place during 2019. | |
International support is also highly concentrated in the form of one bilateral and one multilateral development | |
partner for the period under consideration. Germany contributed 55% of bilateral and 43% of total international | |
climate finance to South Africa, while the Global Environment Facility accounted for 93% of multilateral and 20% | |
of total international climate finance. The bulk of international climate finance was in the form of grants, with only | |
US$ 950,000 (0.5%) originating from multilateral loans (DEA, 2019c). | |
5.4.2 Formalising climate finance structures | |
While South Africa has made great strides in understanding its mitigation and adaptation challenge, and | |
particularly in understanding the availability and attractiveness of mitigation policies and measures and the ways | |
these will have to be combined to meet its international climate commitments, it has not been successful in | |
accessing climate finance on a transformational scale. The climate finance that has been accessed is | |
concentrated in two entities, and this creates risks in terms of the long-term certainty of flows and climate | |
governance and independence. | |
To address this shortcoming, South Africa is developing a comprehensive climate finance strategy. The strategy | |
will take a holistic view of climate finance activities and will cover all aspects of climate finance, including: the | |
quantum of climate finance required; identifying stakeholders and activities along the climate finance value-chain; | |
increasing climate finance flows from different types of finance providers (e.g. bilateral finance, multilateral | |
finance, domestic public finance and private sector finance), monitoring and evaluation, and climate finance | |
governance structures. The strategy will ensure that climate finance frameworks are compatible with local | |
conditions and ambition. Furthermore, in order to best contribute to the strategy development process, it should | |
seek to identify financing pathways commensurate with technology transformation pathways and economic | |
development pathways required by the transformation to a low-emissions economy (see remarks on planning for | |
implementation contained in Section 6). | |
South Africa has a framework for tracking climate finance in place, which is being operationalised as part of the | |
national integrated climate change monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. The climate change M&E system, | |
50 | |
however, is still under development and monitoring and reporting activities will only be automated during the final | |
phase of implementation (2021-2025) (DEA, 2017; DEA, 2019c). At present climate finance is therefore being | |
tracked on an ad hoc basis via informal engagements between the Department of Environmental Affairs and the | |
National Treasury. The national climate finance strategy will formalise local climate finance governance, | |
coordination and reporting structures. M&E will be a key focus area of the strategy, and it will seek to strengthen | |
the current climate finance M&E framework by extending monitoring and reporting to include all elements of the | |
climate finance value chain, including private sector finance. Furthermore, the strategy will consider the | |
development of mechanisms for evaluating the outcomes of climate finance to understand the extent to which it | |
is accelerating South Africa’s climate change mitigation and adaptation responses. In addition to supporting | |
climate change planning by the government, it will reassure the providers of finance that it is being effectively | |
deployed. It will also serve to illustrate the positive impact that climate finance can have in South Africa. | |
5.4.3 Climate finance opportunities | |
South Africa’s climate finance strategy will seek to quantify the financing requirements and identify areas where | |
climate finance should be targeted. This will complement significant research that has been undertaken to identify | |
sectors and activities that should be prioritised in terms of mitigation and adaptation actions. Research already | |
undertaken includes the Technology Needs Assessment (which is currently being updated) (DST, 2007), the Long | |
Term Adaptation Scenarios (LTAS), Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS), the latest GHG Inventory, the | |
Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), Climate Change Mitigation Technology Implementation Plan (DEA and DST, | |
2015), Global Change Research Plan and national government departmental plans (DEA, 2018b; DEA 2019c). | |
Explicitly linking climate finance requirements with mitigation and adaptation needs could also create the | |
opportunity to use climate finance to support technology development and transfer. Both the Green Climate Fund | |
and the Global Environment Facility, for example, provide support for the development of Technology Needs | |
Assessments and/or consider the results of these assessments in their lending programmes (Resende, 2019; | |
Kaung-Idba, 2019). | |
The climate finance strategy will also seek to understand why South Africa has not been successful in attracting | |
more climate finance, and will attempt to significantly increase the amount of climate finance flowing to South | |
Africa. As part of this process, a 5-year high-level climate finance implementation plan will be developed that will | |
include a pipeline of financeable projects. | |
51 | |
One area where South Africa has demonstrated that it has the capacity to effectively absorb large amounts of | |
climate finance, and where a scaling up of climate finance could have a positive mitigation impact relevant on a | |
global scale, is the electricity supply sector (as outlined in Section 4.1.2). South Africa’s electricity supply industry | |
is set for significant change in coming years as a result of an electricity supply crisis and reform of the current | |
poorly performing vertically integrated utility model. South Africa has one of the most carbon-intensive electricity | |
grids in the world, and recent research has shown that aggressive decarbonisation can have significant economic, | |
social and environment benefits (Wright, et al., 2017; Steyn, Burton, & Steenkamp, 2017; Bischof-Niemz & | |
Creamer, 2019). Significant decarbonisation of the electricity grid in the short term, however, is likely to incur | |
significant transition costs, and may not happen without significant international support. The current situation, | |
however, provides and unprecedented opportunity to avoid long-term carbon lock-in and significantly accelerate | |
a just transition to a low carbon and inclusive economy. | |
South Africa has a number of features that make it attractive as a destination for climate finance. The country has | |
a well-developed financial system and a history of developing and rolling out innovative instruments for raising | |
and deploying donor, public and private sector climate finance. The well-regarded Renewable Energy | |
Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), for example, managed to raise | |
US$ 15.83 billion of finance for utility-scale renewable energy projects, 80% of which originated from domestic | |
sources (IPPP Office, 2019).13 By the end of March 2019, the REIPPPP had procured 6,422 MW of capacity | |
(3,976 MW of which had been connected to the national grid). 35,669 GWh of renewable electricity had been | |
generated, saving 36.2 Mt of CO2 and 42.8 million kilolitres of water. 53,339 full-time equivalent (FTE)'4 jobs were | |
also created, 48,085 of which went to locals (DoE, 2019a). The economics of energy generation has changed in | |
South Africa, and a growing body of evidence shows that renewable energy is now the cheapest form of electricity | |
generation locally. Given the very carbon-intensive nature of South Africa’s national grid, and local energy | |
investment needs going forward, this creates an unprecedented opportunity for South Africa to absorb climate | |
finance. | |
South African banks have also started developing financing tools aimed at the smaller-scale renewables market | |
(GreenCape, 2019). Tools for aggregating and effectively deploying public sector climate finance also exist in the | |
form of, for example, the Green Fund managed by the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and the | |
13 Calculated at the annual average South Africa Rand-US dollar exchange rate for 2018 from the South African Reserve Bank. | |
14“ETE” means Full Time Employment Created. It refers to one person-year of employment. In the calculation of this number one person | |
year is equivalent to 230 person days of work. | |
52 | |
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), and the Energy Efficiency and Demand-side Management Fund | |
managed by the Department of Energy. | |
The REIPPPP is also an example of using green public procurement to raise climate finance. This is an approach | |
that is also being considered in other countries (see, for example, the UK Government’s Green Finance Strategy | |
(HM Government, 2019)) and could be expanded in South Africa. | |
Two municipal green bonds have been released in South Africa, by the City of Cape Town and the City of | |
Johannesburg, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange currently has three green bonds listed by financial | |
institutions with a total value of US$ 385 million (PWC, 2019; Khumalo, 2019) | |
South Africa has well capacitated development finance institutions, like the DBSA and the Industrial Development | |
Corporation (IDC) that routinely channel climate finance from multilateral and bilateral donors, and private sector | |
banks have also partnered with international donors to roll out innovative climate finance vehicles. An example of | |
this is the US$ 98 million FIRST fund that offers long term debt finance to local small renewable energy projects | |
(FIRST fund, undated). The fund is a collaboration between a local bank and the German KfW Development Bank | |
(KfW), and is underpinned by a first-loss debt facility and grant-type funding from KfW (Hawarden, undated). | |
Despite the sophistication and depth of South African financial markets, a number of barriers remain that restrict | |
the flow of funding to climate change projects. These are not unique to South Africa and include, amongst others, | |
a relatively high degree of risk aversion among local financial institutions, difficulty in accessing longer-term | |
financing, credibility of off-takers, high transaction costs for smaller projects, relatively long pay-back periods and | |
a lack of attractive large low carbon investment options, difficulty in raising financing for technologies that have | |
not been proven locally, a lack of concessionary wholesale finance, uncertainty about future electricity prices, | |
complexity and regulatory burden of environmental regulation, a lack of public sector capacity in key areas, and | |
an investment environment that is not conducive to investment due to policy uncertainty (Nicholls et al, 2015; | |
Cloete et al, 2016; Cloete et al, 2018). These barriers, coupled with the scale of funding that is required to address | |
mitigation and adaptation, means that there is a significant need for scaled-up international support to finance the | |
transition to a climate-resilient inclusive low-carbon economy in South Africa. | |
Positioning South Africa as an attractive destination for climate finance offers opportunities beyond enabling a | |
transition to a just, sustainable and prosperous low carbon economy as discussed below. It also creates the | |
opportunity to leverage its sophisticated and deep financial markets to serve as a gateway for climate finance to | |
the rest of the continent, which, as mentioned earlier, is struggling to access its fair share of climate finance. | |
Following the example of a country like the UK (see HM Government (2019)), South Africa should use its climate | |
53 | |
finance strategy to support the local financial sector to develop a competitive advantage in accessing and | |
channelling climate finance. To do this, however, the emphasis should be placed on greening the financial sector | |
as a whole, and not just developing a climate finance niche. | |
The reasons for this are multiple. Not only is the scale of the challenge such that countries cannot afford to | |
misallocate capital, particularly while domestic sources still make up the bulk of climate finance, but carbon lock- | |
in and a reluctance to allow stranded assets could jeopardise mitigation targets. Finance is a critical driver of the | |
low carbon transition, and without targeting finance effectively, climate goals will not be achieved. Equally | |
important, it is now well understood that neglecting to asses and price the risks inherent in climate change creates | |
systemic risk within financial systems (see, for example, TCFD (2017), Vermeulen et al (2018), Poloz et al (2019), | |
Giuzio et al (2019)). The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure has created a common language | |
for considering both physical and transition risk related to climate change. It is important that the | |
recommendations of the Task Force be mainstreamed into the South African financial sector to ensure that these | |
risks are understood and managed, to provide the information required to effectively deploy finance in a climate | |
compatible way (TCFD, 2017). Furthermore, as illustrated by the UK’s Green Finance Strategy, it is also important | |
that all local financial regulators recognise climate-related financial factors as part of their mandate and actively | |
monitor climate-related risk and exposure within the South African financial sector. | |
During the transition it is critical that the financial sector enables the redirection of funds from the high-carbon | |
activities that are no longer consistent with a just, sustainable and prosperous low carbon economy to the new | |
industries and activities that will underpin it. | |
5.5 Driving innovation, research, and skills for future value capture | |
Boosting innovation, research and skills is a crucial lever to increase South Africa’s international competitiveness, | |
and to ensure that higher-value economic activity spearheads future growth by becoming an ever-greater | |
proportion of GDP over time. The transitions required to support low-carbon development present clear | |
opportunities for the innovation, research, and skills agenda, particularly given that global compliance with Paris | |
implies a large, ongoing investment over decades. | |
South Africa’s existing research and industrial capabilities, as well as its natural resources, present a compelling | |
starting point for such an expansion. The national research agenda is largely guided by the priorities set by | |
national government and in particular the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI), as the national department | |
responsible for provision of leadership, an enabling environment and resources for science, technology and | |
54 | |
innovation. With 17% of funding for the South African climate change research and technology development | |
system coming from international sources, international research agendas also have some impact on the local | |
agenda. The White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) (DST, 2019) also emphasises the core | |
themes of inclusivity, transformation, and partnerships, and recognises the important role that STI would play in | |
mitigating and adapting to climate change impacts. The paper recognises the role of a circular economy in driving | |
the shift to a green economy by accelerating eco-innovation. | |
A range of existing research activities are already setting the basis for the low carbon transition. These include: | |
The Hydrogen South Africa (HySA) Research Programme, that aims to make South Africa a global player | |
in fuel cell technology, through prototyping, demonstration and commercialisation of fuel cell | |
technologies; | |
The Renewable Energy Hub and Spokes initiative aims to develop national technical capacity in wind, | |
solar photovoltaic and solar thermal power. Research capacity is built at various universities throughout | |
the country. Research focusses on specific individual components, as well as system design and | |
production. | |
The Lithium lon Battery Programme that was established to initiate the development of advanced energy | |
storage technologies which play an essential role regarding the integration of solar and wind power. | |
The South African Centre for Capture and Storage (SACCS) was established to drive the activities | |
required to realise commercial scale Carbon Capture and Storage in South Africa, towards sequestering | |
a portion of the emissions from coal-fired power plants, iron and steel, cement and coal gasification. | |
The Waste Research, Development and Innovation Roadmap implemented by the CSIR was developed | |
to assist DEA in realising the ambitions of the NWMS through research, science, technology and | |
innovation. If a recycling and circular economy is realised this will drastically reduce the volumes of waste | |
to landfill and mitigate GHG emissions. | |
Over time, the scale of the planning related to the low-carbon transition will increase, and further research and | |
innovation challenges will arise. Preliminary sectoral analyses have already suggested such specific research | |
and innovation challenge areas that will need to be addressed. Examples of future research direction include: | |
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, the IRP proposes a set of research and analysis activities to be undertaken | |
to support the low carbon transition of the electricity supply sector. These include detailed studies on the | |
impact of gas supply options, the appropriate level of penetration of RE in the South African national grid, | |
55 | |
the cost and economic benefits associated with other clean energy options as well as socio-economic | |
impacts of communities affected by the decommissioning of coal fired power stations. | |
e Developing robust data on the long-term implications of implementing mitigation policies and measures | |
across the sectors, where such information does not exist. Notable here are the transport, waste and | |
AFOLU sectors. | |
A rigorous analysis of South Africas competitiveness in the different commercial and industrial sectors which are | |
likely to present the greatest opportunities from the sustainable transformation should inform the specific support | |
provided to this agenda. This analysis should look across a spectrum of economic benefits, from value-chain | |
analysis of likely technology rollouts, to regional and global competitive advantages under different scenarios. | |
Key to the innovation, skills and value capture strategy is the idea of a 30-year transition. The planning approach | |
presented in Section 6 allows for a staged approach to building up the necessary policy environment, drive | |
investment, and train a diverse workforce while supporting entrepreneurial activity. Coupling this planning with | |
sectoral scenario analyses will help identify concrete areas of opportunity, for which additional work will be | |
required to fully flesh out plans. | |
5.6 Ensuring a just transition with jobs for all | |
South Africa’s transition to a low-carbon society and economy will have uneven socio-economic impacts. The | |
transition will bring about efficiencies, investment and growth, opening up many opportunities in new areas of | |
activity. However, activity will also reduce in areas linked with GHG emissions, leading to declining operations, | |
diminished returns for companies, and fewer jobs in specific sectors. Impacts will differ across scales, timeframes, | |
and locations. The South African government is committed to ensuring that the transition is just; that its negative | |
impacts are not disproportionally borne by the most vulnerable poor and working-class communities who are | |
simultaneously bearing the brunt of the physical impacts of climate change. | |
To ensure that government's commitment to a just transition is realised will require a clear vision around which | |
the various initiatives, policies, sectors, geographical areas and communities can organize. The vision being | |
developed by the National Planning Commission (NPC), through a consultative, bottom-up process, will help to | |
define such an end-state, together with pathways to achieve this in the key areas of land, water and energy. | |
Appropriate and sufficiently resourced plans and policies will be necessary. International examples exist of | |
initiatives to support workers and communities who currently depend on fossil fuel and other industries, on which | |
the South African government can draw. These include initiatives in training, re-tooling, relocation, early | |
56 | |
retirement, and other forms of support. A number of such initiatives are in the planning or pilot phase, led by | |
various stakeholders. A broader macro-economic view is also important. Two key policy instruments are being | |
developed to manage the just transition to a low carbon economy: the National Employment Vulnerability | |
Assessment (NEVA), and Sector Jobs Resilience Plans (SURPs). The NEVA will assess the employment | |
characteristics of key economic sectors in the context of the low carbon transition. The SJRPs will be tailored to | |
address the job losses in each sector, together with future opportunities. | |
All policy measures targeting the low carbon transition should be aligned with the fulfilment of the country’s | |
developmental objectives, which include alleviating poverty and reducing inequality, creating sustainable jobs and | |
increasing the provision of basic services to all South Africans. In addition, specific policies and interventions will | |
be required to support vulnerable communities in particular locations and scales, at particular times. | |
5.7 Promoting sustainable development through education and culture | |
Education can be a key factor in promoting sustainable development, by helping people develop knowledge, | |
skills, values and behaviors which enhance their understanding and appreciation of how sustainability means a | |
better life for them and their communities. Specific actions range vary the education curriculum, and must also | |
include cultural and citizen awareness campaigns. Significant work is already underway globally to promote | |
education surrounding climate change and sustainable development, and best practices are available, such as | |
through the “Education for Sustainable Development’ program of UNESCO.'5 The concepts of economic | |
transformation, pathways, and just transition must also be included into the educational and cultural work. | |
South Africa should see the opportunity to obtain support for education for sustainable development as a core | |
element of its overall strategy to improve education, and so should urgently set about developing a | |
comprehensive, integrated approach to realising this opportunity. | |
5.8 Enhancing information and metrics | |
Ensuring availability of data is central to tracking the low carbon transition, and monitoring that this transition is | |
being achieved in a way that is just to all. South Africa has already implemented mandatory reporting regulations | |
to support reporting by emitters falling within certain emissions categories. Furthermore, the Department of | |
Environmental Affairs is in the process of establishing the national M&E system, which will be used to monitor | |
15 See http:/Avww.unesco.org/new/en/harare/about-this-office/single- | |
view/news/southern_africa_celebrates_awarding_of_unesco_japan_esd_priz/ | |
57 | |
implementation of mitigation actions by stakeholders across the economy and ultimately to the implementation of | |
this and subsequent versions of SA-LEDS. | |
Future work needs to ensure that data is collected in a coherent, consistent and transparent manner, and that the | |
“tight” data to support decision making and planning is collected — including towards informing future updates of | |
this strategy. | |
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS: PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION | |
This strategy sets out a direction of travel for South Africa as we refine our low carbon emission development | |
pathway to meet our commitments to the international community and address our developmental | |
agenda/priorities and needs. We know that success will require decades of dedicated effort. Therefore, we | |
present this Strategy as a living document, the beginning of our journey towards ultimately reaching a net zero | |
carbon economy by 2050. | |
The first step will thus be to ensure national targets are aligned with the Paris Agreement, as stated in Section | |
5.1. Thereafter, planning teams with analytical and sectoral expertise will engage in detailed scenario work to | |
develop transformation pathways towards achieving the national targets (see discussion in Section 6.1 below). | |
Building a scenario is, however, not enough to plan for its delivery. The work of translating such a plan to policy | |
is a challenge which all Parties will have to grapple with over the coming months and years. South Africa aims to | |
inform rollout plans through the use of a dedicated change framework (Section 6.2). | |
SA-LEDS will thus be reviewed at least every five years or at an earlier date, should there be significant changes | |
in sectoral or national plans/programmes that can result in a big structural changes, growth or decay of the | |
economy and major global events that impact on its content or implementation. | |
6.1 Detailed sectoral work to explore transformation pathways | |
The Paris Agreement sets out the long-term climate change goals for the international community. While countries | |
establish their own goals in a nationally determined manner, sectoral details will have to be analyzed in significant | |
detail, laying out different scenarios to understand trajectories of investment, technology take-up, emissions | |
reduction, and market change. This work has already commenced in South Africa through a number of studies: | |
e The Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation Potential Analysis (MPA), the overall objective of which was | |
to conduct an updated, bottom-up assessment of mitigation potential in key economic sectors in order to | |
58 | |
identify a set of viable options for reducing GHGs. Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) for key | |
sectors and subsectors were constructed. The MACCs provide estimates of mitigation potential and | |
marginal abatement costs for broad mitigation measures. Estimates of national mitigation potential have | |
been derived from the sectoral MACCs and ranked in terms of level of implementability at national level | |
for each of the technologies. | |
e The Pathways study to explore the impact of alternative economic growth trajectories on the country’s | |
emissions trajectory, looking at the implementation of structural changes rather than the implementation | |
of purely technical interventions. This study, which also used the single national emissions model, had | |
not been released at the time of writing of this document. | |
e The Policies and Measures (PAMs) analysis, which explored the impact of existing PAMs, many of which | |
were included in Section 4 of this document, on the emissions trajectory. | |
Itis recognized that detailed forecasting is unlikely to accurately predict the evolution of markets. However, “failing | |
to plan is planning to fail’, which is why systematic planning is recommended for all sectors. Common | |
characteristics between scenarios that succeed and those that do not will help policymakers identify those | |
conditions which must be met in order for the transition to succeed, aligned with Paris in a manner consistent with | |
the latest science from the IPCC. | |
Based on the sectoral pathways work, which will identify the requirements of the different sectors, a cross-cutting | |
analysis of such pathways will help identify common needs. An aggregate understanding of the evolution over | |
time of such critical factors such as levels of capital investment, consumer prices of different energy options, and | |
requirements for skilled workers in various industries (increasing and decreasing), will set out the parameters for | |
the cross-cutting approaches detailed in Section 6.2. | |
6.2 Creation of policy package roadmaps across three phases | |
The likelihood of policy action leading to long-term transformation results would require the application of new | |
planning techniques. | |
Pathway planning has emerged as an analytical tool that can inform national policy development over time | |
towards objectives that sit beyond a typical policy horizon. Pathways aim to visualize the whole timespan between | |
the present and the time for which a target is set, seeking to establish what steps make sense now in the context | |
of reaching the long-term goal. When establishing potential pathways, the desired end-state should be linked to | |
the present, but by “backcasting” rather than forecasting. This means that requirements for intermediate steps | |
59 | |
between today and the long-term goal are deduced not on the basis of how compatible they may be with the | |
current context, but rather in terms of what is required for the end-state to be achieved. This leads policy-makers | |
to consider the question “what would have to be true” regarding short and medium-term checkpoints, deriving the | |
answer from the evolution to the goal. Since many actions have long lead times to achieve full effect, backcasting | |
can help identify by when core changes must take place. | |
Once pathways are clearly drawn out, regulatory, institutional, or other structural changes which are required for | |
the transformation can be identified, from which necessary changes can be deduced and used to suggest | |
concrete policy action. In this manner, a rigorous pathway analysis towards a long-term target can produce a | |
number of concrete actions which must be carried out by a certain time, to enable other actions. It can be helpful | |
to structure the time interval into three parts: short, medium and long-term, organising and communicating such | |
actions on a three-stage timeline. These stages are: | |
e Starting Right (to be completed prior to end of 2021 financial year) | |
e Turning the Corner (to begin in parallel with the Starting Right stage and continue to 2025) | |
e Massive Rollout (2025 to 2050) | |
The “Starting Right” stage will focus on actions relating to the current government administration, or perhaps also | |
address the initial years of the following one. The most important aspect of the “Starting Right” stage is to ensure | |
that a true transition is kicked off. On the one hand, rapid implementation must begin in all areas where pathways | |
to achieving the Paris Goals are already clear (such as investments in renewable energy power generation, solar | |
water heaters, etc) while on the other, steps taken will need to enable future action at scale, as much as (or | |
perhaps more than) drive immediate emissions reductions. Clearly, the “Starting Right” stage cannot be | |
successfully executed without a long-term pathways analysis to provide confidence on the Paris-compatibility of | |
implemented measures as well as the overall direction of travel. Indeed, the search for immediate emissions | |
reductions in the short-term can often lead to investments in technologies or business models which, while | |
emitting less than traditional options, are not on track to drive the large reductions demanded by the long-term | |
transformation. Because of this, avoiding decisions which will lead to emissions lock-in is a core priority of the | |
“Starting Right” stage. | |
The second stage, “Turning the Corner” would typically take five to seven years. This phase will begin to be | |
implemented in parallel with the “Starting Right” stage, where appropriate, and continue to 2025. This period is | |
decisive, since within it new decision and investment criteria are broadly applied, bringing about changes to the | |
day-to-day operation of many sectors of the economy at the same time. Resistance to change can become | |
60 | |
challenging if not well handled, and must be anticipated and addressed with social acceptance and just transition | |
actions. It is at this stage that multiple policies will need to work in concert for the new technological options to | |
make economic sense for businesses and consumers. An overall understanding of the sectoral narratives of | |
change and how they collectively feed into the national vision will be core to the success of this stage. | |
“Massive rollout” is the final phase, in which the low-emissions climate resilient options have become the new | |
normal. The constant application of transformative action will drive large volumes of investment towards | |
transformational change. Perseverance on the application of all aspects of change will be required to avoid | |
imbalances or injustices which will compromise the change, and sectors which achieve important milestones must | |
not be allowed to become complacent, but rather contribute to the broader change by supporting areas of natural | |
synergy. | |
Examples of activities that might be taken during the three phases of implementation of the transition are shown | |
in Table 5. All along the way provision needs to be made for regular review of the Strategy and the implementation | |
plan, and M&E of implementation. | |
Table 5: The three phases of the just transition | |
e Start the process of developing long term plans for each sector, to avoid lock-in to emissions | |
intensive infrastructure and establish the basis for transformation at scale | |
e Develop approaches for allocation of Sectoral Emissions Targets (SETs) and carbon budgets | |
Starting Right to high emitting entities | |
and complete by | |
end of 2020/21 | |
financial year) | |
(start immediately | ¢ | |
Develop Sector Jobs Resilience Plans (SJRPs) to support the transition to the low carbon | |
economy and climate resilient society in a Just manner | |
Identify the institutional, legislative, finance and other changes required to achieve the | |
transformation | |
Develop an understanding of the relevant government decisions which need to be taken to | |
achieve the long-term plans | |
Develop a monitoring plan | |
Turning the corner | |
(start immediately, | |
as _—_ appropriate, | |
and complete by | |
2025) | |
Develop and begin to implement detailed transformation plans for each sector, which is | |
supported by the implementation of the SETs, carbon budgets and SJRPs | |
Develop investment pathways to support the transformation | |
Implement foundational changes to drive down the national trajectory | |
Implement the institutional changes to accelerate the rate of transformation and remove | |
barriers | |
Massive __ roll-out | |
(to 2050) | |
Roll-out the implementation plans for each sector along with measures to support changes | |
until they become the new reality | |
Refine strategies as required, to account for changes in technologies, society and markets | |
61 | |
Successful rollout of the pathway across the three stages will thus require policy action to be taken in a | |
coordinated manner. It is helpful to present policies not as stand-alone actions but rather as parts of policy | |
packages, that is to say, combinations of measures which may include planning, regulatory, financial, and other | |
instruments to collectively drive towards the desired outcome, providing capabilities and overcoming barriers to | |
change. Complementarity and sequencing are both crucial to building effective policy packages. | |
Proposed components of policy packages could include those that focus on: | |
e Planning; | |
e Institutional / regulatory; | |
e Project implementation; | |
e Financing; | |
e Acceptance, skills and just transition; and | |
e Avoiding lock-in. | |
Policy packages should be built up in sequence over time to ensure the full implementation of the pathway, in the | |
form of a policy pathway which is required to implement the low-carbon transition. | |
62 | |
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