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/coordinate-embargoed-releases.txt
Content-type: text/asciidoc | |
Abstract: When a vulnerability is reported, we follow these guidelines to | |
assess the vulnerability, create and review a fix, and coordinate embargoed | |
security releases. | |
How we coordinate embargoed releases | |
------------------------------------ | |
To protect Git users from critical vulnerabilities, we do not just release | |
fixed versions like regular maintenance releases. Instead, we coordinate | |
releases with packagers, keeping the fixes under an embargo until the release | |
date. That way, users will have a chance to upgrade on that date, no matter | |
what Operating System or distribution they run. | |
The `git-security` mailing list | |
------------------------------- | |
Responsible disclosures of vulnerabilities, analysis, proposed fixes as | |
well as the orchestration of coordinated embargoed releases all happen on the | |
`git-security` mailing list at <[email protected]>. | |
In this context, the term "embargo" refers to the time period that information | |
about a vulnerability is kept under wraps and only shared on a need-to-know | |
basis. This is necessary to protect Git's users from bad actors who would | |
otherwise be made aware of attack vectors that could be exploited. "Lifting the | |
embargo" refers to publishing the version that fixes the vulnerabilities. | |
Audience of the `git-security` mailing list | |
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
Anybody may contact the `git-security` mailing list by sending an email | |
to <[email protected]>, though the archive is closed to the | |
public and only accessible to subscribed members. | |
There are a few dozen subscribed members: core Git developers who are trusted | |
with addressing vulnerabilities, and stakeholders (i.e. owners of products | |
affected by security vulnerabilities in Git). | |
Most of the discussions revolve around assessing the severity of the reported | |
issue (including the decision whether the report is security-relevant or can be | |
redirected to the public mailing list), how to remediate the issue, determining | |
the timeline of the disclosure as well as aligning priorities and | |
requirements. | |
Communications | |
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
If you are a stakeholder, it is a good idea to pay close attention to the | |
discussions, as pertinent information may be buried in the middle of a lively | |
conversation that might not look relevant to your interests. For example, the | |
tentative timeline might be agreed upon in the middle of discussing code | |
comment formatting in one of the patches and whether or not to combine fixes | |
for multiple, separate vulnerabilities into the same embargoed release. Most | |
mail threads are not usually structured specifically to communicate | |
agreements, assessments or timelines. | |
Typical timeline | |
---------------- | |
- A potential vulnerability is reported to the `git-security` mailing list. | |
- The members of the git-security list start a discussion to give an initial | |
assessment of the severity of the reported potential vulnerability. | |
We aspire to do so within a few days. | |
- After discussion, if consensus is reached that it is not critical enough | |
to warrant any embargo, the reporter is redirected to the public Git mailing | |
list. This ends the reporter's interaction with the `git-security` list. | |
- If it is deemed critical enough for an embargo, ideas are presented on how to | |
address the vulnerability. | |
- Usually around that time, the Git maintainer or their delegate(s) open a draft | |
security advisory in the `git/git` repository on GitHub (see below for more | |
details). | |
- Code review can take place in a variety of different locations, | |
depending on context. These are: patches sent inline on the git-security list, | |
a private fork on GitHub associated with the draft security advisory, or the | |
git/cabal repository. | |
- Contributors working on a fix should consider beginning by sending | |
patches to the git-security list (inline with the original thread), since they | |
are accessible to all subscribers, along with the original reporter. | |
- Once the review has settled and everyone involved in the review agrees that | |
the patches are nearing the finish line, the Git maintainer, and others | |
determine a release date as well as the release trains that are serviced. The | |
decision regarding which versions need a backported fix is based on input from | |
the reporter, the contributor who worked on the patches, and from | |
stakeholders. Operators of hosting sites who may want to analyze whether the | |
given issue is exploited via any of the repositories they host, and binary | |
packagers who want to make sure their product gets patched adequately against | |
the vulnerability, for example, may want to give their input at this stage. | |
- While the Git community does its best to accommodate the specific timeline | |
requests of the various binary packagers, the nature of the issue may preclude | |
a prolonged release schedule. For fixes deemed urgent, it may be in the best | |
interest of the Git users community to shorten the disclosure and release | |
timeline, and packagers may need to adapt accordingly. | |
- Subsequently, branches with the fixes are pushed to the git/cabal repository. | |
- The tags are created by the Git maintainer and pushed to the same repository. | |
- The Git for Windows, Git for macOS, BSD, Debian, etc. maintainers prepare the | |
corresponding release artifacts, based on the tags created that have been | |
prepared by the Git maintainer. | |
- The release artifacts prepared by various binary packagers can be | |
made available to stakeholders under embargo via a mail to the | |
`git-security` list. | |
- Less than a week before the release, a mail with the relevant information is | |
sent to <[email protected]> (see below), a list used to pre-announce | |
embargoed releases of open source projects to the stakeholders of all major | |
distributions of Linux as well as other OSes. | |
- Public communication is then prepared in advance of the release date. This | |
includes blog posts and mails to the Git and Git for Windows mailing lists. | |
- On the day of the release, at around 10am Pacific Time, the Git maintainer | |
pushes the tag and the `master` branch to the public repository, then sends | |
out an announcement mail. | |
- Once the tag is pushed, the Git for Windows maintainer publishes the | |
corresponding tag and creates a GitHub Release with the associated release | |
artifacts (Git for Windows installer, Portable Git, MinGit, etc). | |
- Git for Windows release is then announced via a mail to the public Git and | |
Git for Windows mailing lists as well as via a tweet. | |
- Ditto for distribution packagers for Linux and other platforms: | |
their releases are announced via their preferred channels. | |
- A mail to <[email protected]> (see below for details) is sent | |
as a follow-up to the <[email protected]> one, describing the | |
vulnerability in detail, often including a proof of concept of an exploit. | |
Note: The Git project makes no guarantees about timelines, but aims to keep | |
embargoes reasonably short in the interest of keeping Git's users safe. | |
Opening a Security Advisory draft | |
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
The first step is to https://github.com/git/git/security/advisories/new[open | |
an advisory]. Technically, this is not necessary. However, it is the most | |
convenient way to obtain the CVE number and it give us a private repository | |
associated with it that can be used to collaborate on a fix. | |
Notifying the Linux distributions | |
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
At most two weeks before release date, we need to send a notification to | |
<[email protected]>, preferably less than 7 days before the release date. | |
This will reach most (all?) Linux distributions. See an example below, and the | |
guidelines for this mailing list at | |
https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists[here]. | |
Once the version has been published, we send a note about that to oss-security. | |
As an example, see https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/12/13/1[the | |
v2.24.1 mail]; | |
https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/oss-security[Here] are | |
their guidelines. | |
The mail to oss-security should also describe the exploit, and give credit to | |
the reporter(s): security researchers still receive too little respect for the | |
invaluable service they provide, and public credit goes a long way to keep them | |
paid by their respective organizations. | |
Technically, describing any exploit can be delayed up to 7 days, but we usually | |
refrain from doing that, including it right away. | |
As a courtesy we typically attach a Git bundle (as `.tar.xz` because the list | |
will drop `.bundle` attachments) in the mail to distros@ so that the involved | |
parties can take care of integrating/backporting them. This bundle is typically | |
created using a command like this: | |
git bundle create cve-xxx.bundle ^origin/master vA.B.C vD.E.F | |
tar cJvf cve-xxx.bundle.tar.xz cve-xxx.bundle | |
Example mail to [email protected] | |
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
.... | |
To: [email protected] | |
Cc: [email protected], <other people involved in the report/fix> | |
Subject: [vs] Upcoming Git security fix release | |
Team, | |
The Git project will release new versions on <date> at 10am Pacific Time or | |
soon thereafter. I have attached a Git bundle (embedded in a `.tar.xz` to avoid | |
it being dropped) which you can fetch into a clone of | |
https://github.com/git/git via `git fetch --tags /path/to/cve-xxx.bundle`, | |
containing the tags for versions <versions>. | |
You can verify with `git tag -v <tag>` that the versions were signed by | |
the Git maintainer, using the same GPG key as e.g. v2.24.0. | |
Please use these tags to prepare `git` packages for your various | |
distributions, using the appropriate tagged versions. The added test cases | |
help verify the correctness. | |
The addressed issues are: | |
<list of CVEs with a short description, typically copy/pasted from Git's | |
release notes, usually demo exploit(s), too> | |
Credit for finding the vulnerability goes to <reporter>, credit for fixing | |
it goes to <developer>. | |
Thanks, | |
<name> | |
.... | |
Example mail to [email protected] | |
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | |
.... | |
To: [email protected] | |
Cc: [email protected], <other people involved in the report/fix> | |
Subject: git: <copy from security advisory> | |
Team, | |
The Git project released new versions on <date>, addressing <CVE>. | |
All supported platforms are affected in one way or another, and all Git | |
versions all the way back to <version> are affected. The fixed versions are: | |
<versions>. | |
Link to the announcement: <link to lore.kernel.org/git> | |
We highly recommend to upgrade. | |
The addressed issues are: | |
* <list of CVEs and their explanations, along with demo exploits> | |
Credit for finding the vulnerability goes to <reporter>, credit for fixing | |
it goes to <developer>. | |
Thanks, | |
<name> | |
.... |