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opriate individuals and were documented in the files. Several of the cases demonstrated some of the concerns and issues we have raised in our prior work concerning audits of large corporations. For example, the complexity and vagueness of the tax code create legitimate differences in interpretation and administering the tax system creates a tension in seeking a proper balance between the tax administrator’s need for supporting documentation and the taxpayer’s burden in providing such information. IRS has ac
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knowledged problems related to the EEO climate in its Milwaukee, WI, area offices and over the last few years has moved to address them. After a finding of discrimination in 1995 in the case of one employee, a new district director initiated an internal review, and, afterwards, IRS appointed an outside review team to study the EEO situation. The internal study made 53 recommendations in broad categories related to creating a supportive work culture, understanding issues, preparing employees for promotion, a
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nd examining the promotion process. The outside study found no discriminatory hiring or promotion practices, but it did make recommendations related to hiring and promotions, among other things. Problems with the EEO climate in IRS’ Midwest District Office, which is headquartered in Milwaukee, date back several years. In 1995, Treasury agreed with an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative judge who found that a district employee was the victim of discrimination and retaliation. Also, Wiscons
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in congressional offices received EEO-related complaints from IRS employees, and internal and external groups were critical of district EEO matters. According to the District Director who arrived in early 1996, the district was perceived to run on “good-old-boy” connections. Also, the district, which was created in 1996 through the merger of three smaller districts, was facing possible layoffs, further contributing to tense labor-management relations. To try to better identify some of the underlying causes
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of the problems in IRS Milwaukee area offices, the District Director commissioned an IRS team in April 1996 to assess the EEO climate and make recommendations for corrective action. As part of its review, the team distributed a survey to all Milwaukee area district employees to gather EEO-related perceptions. On the basis of its review of the survey results and other data, in December 1997, the team reported that a lack of trust and goodwill pervaded the work environment. The survey revealed that people in
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all groups (e.g., males, females, nonminority whites, African Americans, and Hispanics) believed they were less likely than people in other groups to receive promotions, significant work assignments, training opportunities, and formal recognition or rewards. Specific problems cited in the report included little recent diversity training, a belief by certain minority employees that stereotypes negatively affected their treatment, difficulties in widely disseminating information, gaps in EEO communication, no
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formal mentoring program, and much dissatisfaction with how employees were selected for promotion. On the basis of its findings, the assessment team made 53 recommendations in 4 categories. The categories covered creating a supportive culture, creating a greater understanding of issues, preparing employees for promotion, and examining ways that employees were selected for promotion. In a 5th category—examining the representation of minorities in the district—the team made 21 more recommendations that were
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2,807 |
expected to be suspended pending an IRS analysis of the ramifications of certain court cases. The District Director who commissioned the climate assessment report praised it and the process that produced it. During his tenure, many actions were taken to address the district’s EEO problems. For example, (1) policy statements were issued tolerating no discriminatory behavior, (2) minority representation in the Director’s and EEO offices was increased, (3) the EEO office was given more privacy, (4) baselines w
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ere set to measure the impact of any improved hiring or promotion policies, (5) minorities were promoted to positions of authority, and (6) training was provided. Goals were also set to open communications with employees, employee and community groups, and the media; treat individual performance cases fairly; and not debate emotionally charged personnel issues in the press. In spite of the climate assessment team’s efforts and the various changes made or planned, the district’s EEO problems persisted. Conse
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quently, IRS and certain members of the Wisconsin congressional delegation agreed that another team should independently review the situation. To try to preserve its independence, the team purposefully had no representation from IRS. Also for this reason, it solicited no IRS comments on its draft report. The team interviewed more than 100 people and examined over 130 records and files, although it did not scientifically select interviewees or broadly survey all district employees. Team members told us they
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tried to ensure broad coverage by talking to many people and to all sides of general issues. Moreover, they relied on the climate assessment survey to summarize perceptions. They also, however, relied extensively on anecdotal information without determining its objectivity or accuracy. In August 1998, the team reported, among other things, that (1) many employees had no confidence in the EEO process and feared retaliation if they filed complaints or participated in a way considered adversarial to management
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, (2) separating EEO functions into outreach and traditional EEO/counseling components was not working effectively, (3) the counseling program was in disarray, and (4) confusion existed over the role of Treasury’s Regional Complaint Center in the formal EEO complaint process. Also, although anecdotes collected by the team did not support a sweeping indictment of Milwaukee IRS management practices, the report concluded that, intentionally or not, some practices perpetuated a work environment that was histori
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cally insensitive to the concerns of female and minority employees. On the basis of its review, the team made recommendations in different areas. For instance, many recommendations dealt with the team’s findings related to the district’s EEO process for resolving issues in a precomplaint stage and its relationship to Treasury’s formal complaint process. The team also made recommendations relating to hiring and promotions in spite of finding no discriminatory pattern or practice in promoting or hiring minori
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ties or women. The report noted that African Americans in IRS’ Milwaukee and Waukesha, WI, offices appeared underrepresented when compared to the Milwaukee civilian labor force. Although district managers and representatives of employee groups disagreed with many of the issues and assertions in the report, there was general agreement with many of the recommendations. For instance, the head of the diversity office at the time of the study informed us that he agreed with the substance of, had actually taken a
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ction related to, or would favor forwarding to Treasury many of the report’s recommendations. After the report was released, IRS initiated several significant actions to address problems identified. Chief among these was appointing a new District Director who arrived in the district in mid-November 1998 with a stated commitment to overcome past problems. In that regard, she described to us her intent to open communication channels and deal with disrespect, nastiness, and mean-spiritedness at all levels. She
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emphasized her themes of communication, responsibility, and accountability and told us that on her second day in the district she discussed these themes at an off-site meeting with top managers and union, EEO, and diversity officials. The new District Director also expressed to us her commitment to work with various interest groups. In addition, she combined the district’s EEO and diversity functions, made EEO positions permanent as opposed to rotational, and invited a union representative to be present fo
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r interviews for a new EEO officer. The new District Director stated that these actions were on the right track, but because of the long and contentious history of EEO problems in the district, improvements and success will take time. She also noted that better communication and cooperation among IRS and the various internal and external stakeholders will be extremely important in dealing with the district’s long-standing problems. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Commissioner of Internal Revenu
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e described IRS actions on the issues we noted. For instance, he shared our concern that IRS needed to improve how it managed executive misconduct cases. He noted that the recently created Commissioner’s Complaint Processing and Analysis Group, proposed as the Commissioner’s Review Group, will coordinate IRS’ efforts to improve complaint information, especially relating to alleged reprisal against whistleblowers, so that complaints will be promptly and fairly resolved. IRS will also share more information w
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ith employees and the public on responses to reprisals and other complaints to highlight a message that all employees will be held accountable for their actions. The full text of the Commissioner’s comments is reprinted in appendix IV. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Ranking Minority Member of the S
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enate Committee on Finance; the Honorable Charles O. Rossotti, Commissioner of Internal Revenue; other interested congressional committees; and other interested parties. This work was done under the direction of Joseph E. Jozefczyk, Assistant Director for Tax Policy and Administration Issues. Other major contributors are listed in appendix V. If you have questions, you may contact me on (202) 512-9110. We organized our work to bring together information bearing on the five issues contained in your May 21, 1
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998, request letter. Accordingly, our objectives were to (1) determine if senior Internal Revenue Service (IRS) managers received the same level of disciplinary action as line staff; (2) determine to what extent, if any, the IRS Deputy Commissioner might have delayed action on substantiated cases of employee misconduct until senior managers were eligible to retire; (3) ascertain the extent to which IRS employees might have retaliated against whistleblowers and against taxpayers or their representatives who
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were perceived as uncooperative; (4) determine the extent to which IRS employees might have zeroed out or reduced the additional tax recommended from examinations for reasons not related to the merits of the examinations; and (5) describe equal employment opportunity (EEO) issues in IRS offices in the Milwaukee metropolitan area. Our scope and methodology related to each of these objectives follow. To compare disciplinary experiences of Senior Executive Service (SES) and lower-level employees, we matched da
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ta accumulated by sampling senior executives’ misconduct cases against data for lower-level employees extracted from IRS’ broader disciplinary database, the Automated Labor and Employee Relations Tracking System (ALERTS). We compiled general statistics on how long senior executive cases took by collecting information from every second nontax SES case file in IRS’ Office of Executive Support (OES) that was active sometime between January 1, 1996, and June 30, 1998. Our sample included 70 cases. For each case
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in our sample, we extracted and recorded data from the relevant case file. These data included issues involved, processing dates, information on whether allegations were substantiated by investigators, disciplinary actions proposed and adopted, and information related to retirement. For lower-level employees, that is, general schedule (GS) employees, we obtained selected parts of the ALERTS database from IRS. We ran our statistical analyses on ALERTS cases that IRS’ Office of Labor Relations received betwe
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en January 1, 1996, and June 30, 1998, and on cases that were closed within that period. More specifically, we focused on administrative and IRS Inspection Service cases within ALERTS because they were the categories in which conduct matters were found. Although we did not audit ALERTS, IRS officials told us that this data system had over the years had flaws, but they also told us it was better than it used to be. Because ALERTS was the only source of information available on lower-level disciplinary action
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s, we used it to the extent that it had information comparable to what we collected on senior-level cases. We also reviewed recent internal IRS and independent studies of IRS’ disciplinary systems and interviewed IRS officials about their plans for revamping the systems. One IRS study we reviewed used the lower-level disciplinary database to assess the effect of IRS’ using a guide to determine appropriate disciplinary action. We also became familiar with the Douglas Factors, shown in appendix II, governing
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disciplinary actions imposed and asked IRS officials about the differences, if any, they perceived between SES and lower-level cases. We examined the question of alleged delays in dealing with cases of alleged misconduct by senior executives by taking several steps. First, we studied in depth the five specific cases mentioned in the April 1998 hearings. This involved examining investigative and personnel files as well as files maintained by OES. In addition, we interviewed various IRS officials, including t
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he Deputy Commissioner, about these cases. In addition, we used the 70-case sample of senior executive cases previously described to obtain more broad-based information about any possible delays. Although most of our analyses were based on this sample, to learn more about the cases that took the most time, we also examined every case file IRS could find that appeared on lists of cases awaiting action at OES for at least 90 days during the January 1, 1996, through June 30, 1998, period we were studying. We a
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lso examined cases that appeared on logs that IRS kept so we could better ensure we were not overlooking cases we did not otherwise encounter for the period. In all, we examined the 70 cases in our sample plus 43 more cases on lists and logs for a total of 113 cases. Because some individuals were involved in more than 1 case, the 113 cases we analyzed covered 83 senior executives. We extracted the same type of information from each of the case files that we extracted from the sampled case files. Examining l
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ists, logs, and files allowed us to see if recordkeeping practices might have contributed to any delays. To examine the relationship between case-processing and retirement dates, we analyzed where in the case-processing sequence the retirement dates provided us by OES fell. In instances in which OES was also able to readily provide retirement eligibility dates, we considered them in examining processing timeliness as well. To tabulate the number of whistleblowing reprisal cases, we obtained information from
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the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). We did this for the number of cases involving IRS employees, and for contextual purposes, for cases from throughout the federal government. For governmentwide data, we used either information already published or data generated specifically for us. For IRS data, the agencies did special searches of their databases. We did not audit the OSC or MSPB data systems. Because in the MSPB data system not all IRS cases could be isola
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ted, we examined actual case rulings that MSPB gathered for us or that we located on the Internet, looking for Department of the Treasury cases that were really IRS cases. For Treasury cases for which MSPB was not able to give us timely information and information was not on the Internet, we asked IRS to identify whether they involved IRS employees. In looking for information on IRS employees who might have retaliated against taxpayers or their representatives who were perceived to be uncooperative, we stud
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ied our reports on taxpayer abuse. In addition, we interviewed IRS officials and investigated entries under specific codes in various databases to see if relevant issues appeared. Finally, we discussed with IRS officials changes to the information systems that might be coming in the future. Concerning information on the improper zeroing out or reduction of additional tax recommended, we studied our and Inspection Service reports dealing with examination issues related to audit results. We specifically consi
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dered our and IRS information on the extent to which IRS audit recommendations were actually assessed and the factors that could explain the results. To describe EEO issues in the Milwaukee area, we examined the report of an outside team studying the program and the documents that the team accumulated in doing its work, including an IRS internal EEO climate assessment study. We also interviewed key study participants and affected parties in Washington, D.C., and Milwaukee to better understand what the EEO c
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limate in the area was, how the study report was done, and what had happened since the report was finished. In addition to addressing the concerns of the Senate Committee on Finance, we planned our work to respond to a mandate in the Conference Report on the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. The conferees intended for us to review the study team report. We did our work in Washington, D.C., and Milwaukee between June 1998 and March 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standa
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rds. The Douglas Factors are as follows: The nature and seriousness of the offense, and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibilities, including whether the offense was intentional or technical or inadvertent, or was committed maliciously or for gain, or was frequently repeated; the employee’s job level and type of employment, including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, and prominence of the position; the employee’s past disciplinary record; the employee’s past
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work record, including length of service, performance on the job, ability to get along with fellow workers, and dependability; the effect of the offense upon the employee’s ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect upon supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s ability to perform assigned duties; consistency of penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar offenses; consistency of the penalty with the applicable agency table of penalties; the notoriety of the offen
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se or its impact on the reputation of the agency; the clarity with which the employee was on notice of any rules that were violated in committing the offense, or had been warned about the conduct in question; potential for employee’s rehabilitation; mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense such as unusual job tensions, personality problems, mental impairment, harassment, or bad faith, malice or provocation on the part of others involved in the matter; and the adequacy and effectiveness of alternativ
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e sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or others. This appendix summarizes information about the five senior-level misconduct allegations cited in the April 1998 Senate Finance Committee hearings. The summaries include information about when the executives were eligible to retire and about whether their eligibility dates might have related to how their cases were processed. We refer to the executives in these five cases as Executives A through E. An IRS employee filed a complaint th
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at Executive A and two other IRS employees violated IRS ethics rules. The IRS employee also alleged that Executive A and the two other employees retaliated against her for reporting the ethics violations. The alleged violations included manipulating a rating system, giving an improper award, falsifying records, and not reporting time card fraud, although Executive A was only alleged to be involved in the last violation. Treasury’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) did not find that Executive A was culpable
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for ethics violations but found that the other two employees were culpable. IRS attorneys reviewing the case concluded that the information in the OIG report did not demonstrate misconduct on Executive A’s part. Executive A was not eligible for retirement when the allegation was made or when the OIG investigation was closed. This case started when the OIG received an anonymous allegation that Executive B abused travel authority. IRS officials reviewed the allegation and found that Executive B had authorized
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unjustified travel expenditures. Local management then counseled Executive B that all expenditures needed to be authorized according to IRS procedures. This counseling was confirmed in writing. However, contrary to IRS policy, the counseling took place before the Deputy Commissioner concurred with the proposed case resolution. Executive B was already eligible for retirement at the time the allegation was made. The OIG received an anonymous complaint that Executive C was abusing official travel. The OIG rep
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ort concluded that Executive C made personal use of some travel benefits earned on government travel. The offices considering the case disagreed among themselves over the facts, the adequacy of the investigation, and the steps to be taken next. The Director of IRS’ Human Resources Division, which was involved in executive misconduct cases earlier in the 1990s, advocated a reprimand, but the recommending official thought that significant circumstances mitigated any disciplinary action. OES prepared a stateme
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nt of differences and recommended a reprimand. A few months later, the recommending official, finding no abuse and unclear IRS guidance in the area, recommended closing the case without action but cautioning the executive. The next month, the OES official who previously recommended a reprimand sent the case to the Deputy Commissioner, this time agreeing with the recommending official’s position. A few months after that, the OIG reminded the Deputy Commissioner of the previous year’s report and requested app
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ropriate action. Later, OIG officials told OES that they disagreed with OES’ recommendation to close the case without action. Finally, OES wrote the Deputy Commissioner reaffirming the recommendation for closure without action but with cautioning. The Deputy Commissioner counseled the executive 5-½ years after the case began and 18 months after receiving the case. When we asked the Deputy Commissioner why the final stage of case processing took so long, he had no explanation. Executive C was not eligible fo
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r retirement at the time the allegation was made or at the time he was counseled. The IRS sexual harassment hotline received an anonymous allegation that Executive D might have harassed a staff member. During the Inspection Service investigation, Executive D refused to answer a question he believed was irrelevant. In its report, the Inspection Service summarized the facts of the investigation and did not conclude whether there was a violation of IRS ethical standards. OES and the recommending official disag
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reed in their analyses of the report and their resulting recommendations. OES concluded that a 15-day suspension was warranted for the refusal to answer a question even though IRS counsel was not sure a violation really occurred. OES also raised the possibility of reassigning Executive D. The recommending official believed that, in this case, refusal to answer a question did not violate ethics rules, but that counseling was warranted. About 39 months after OES prepared a statement of differences, an Inspect
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ion Service case-tracking entry indicated that IRS management planned no action on the case. The next year, OES closed the case “administratively” due to the employee’s retirement. The Deputy Commissioner told us that, several years before its administrative close, the case was “de facto closed” with Executive D’s transfer. He stated that the transfer was the appropriate disciplinary action because Executive D was too familiar with local employees. OES did not close the case until the individual retired sev
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eral years after the transfer. It did not realize that the Deputy Commissioner considered it closed earlier. Also, IRS officials we asked could not find the case file for at least a few months. Executive D was eligible for retirement at the time the allegation was made. The Inspection Service began an investigation after an anonymous caller reported to Internal Security that Executive E abused her authority. More than a year later, the investigation confirmed the allegation, and the Director of the Human Re
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sources Division recommended that a letter of reprimand be issued. More than 4 years after that, OES recommended sending a letter of reprimand or a letter confirming counseling. The Deputy Commissioner sent Executive E a letter of counseling 5-½ years after the original complaint and more than 4 years after receiving the case. The Deputy Commissioner explained to us that he had not been comfortable with the allegations’ correctness, but that he eventually agreed that the allegations had some merit. He added
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that the delay in closing the case occurred because he allowed the case to be lost in the system. He did not, he said, cover up for Executive E. Specifically, he stated that reduced OES staffing and a poor information system were contributing factors to the case being delayed without a disposition. Executive E was not eligible for retirement at the time the allegation was made or at the time the counseling letter was sent. Lawrence M. Korb, Evaluator-in-Charge, Tax Policy and Administration Leon H. Green,
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Senior Evaluator Deborah A. Knorr, Senior Evaluator Anthony P. Lofaro, Senior Evaluator Jacqueline M. Nowicki, Evaluator Patricia H. McGuire, Assistant Director MacDonald R. Phillips, Senior Computer Specialist James J. Ungvarsky, Senior Computer Specialist Eric B. Hall, Computer Technician The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, w
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hen necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202) 512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
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receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touch-tone phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
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In recent years, a number of factors have led to growing concern about the protection of privacy when personally identifiable information is collected and maintained by the federal government. Recent data breaches of personal information at government agencies, such as the data breach at the Department of Veterans Affairs, which exposed the personal information of 26.5 million veterans and active duty members of the military in May 2006, have raised concerns about identity theft. In addition, increasingly s
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ophisticated analytical techniques employed by federal agencies, such as data mining, also raise concerns about how personally identifiable information is used and what controls are placed on its use. Concerns such as these have focused attention on the structures agencies have instituted to ensure privacy protections are in place. The major requirements for privacy protection by federal agencies come from two laws, the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Gov Act of 2002. The Privacy Act places limitations on age
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ncies’ collection, disclosure, and use of personal information maintained in systems of records. The act describes a “record” as any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency and contains his or her name or another personal identifier. It also defines “system of records” as a group of records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by an individual identifier. The Privacy Act requires that whe
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n agencies maintain a system of records, they must notify the public by a system-of-records notice: that is, a notice in the Federal Register identifying, among other things, the type of data collected, the types of individuals about whom information is collected, the intended “routine” use of the data, and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct personal information. The act also requires agencies to define and limit their use of covered personal information. In addition, the act requires
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that to the greatest extent practicable, personal information should be collected directly from the subject individual when it may affect an individual’s rights or benefits under a federal program. The E-Gov Act of 2002 also assigns agencies significant responsibilities relating to privacy. The E-Gov Act strives to enhance protection for personal information in government information systems or information collections by requiring that agencies conduct PIAs. A PIA is an analysis of how personal information
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is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. Furthermore, according to OMB guidance, a PIA is an analysis of how information is handled. Specifically, a PIA is to (1) ensure that handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; (2) determine the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; and (3) examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes f
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or handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks. Agencies must conduct PIAs (1) before developing or procuring information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information that is in a personally identifiable form or (2) before initiating any new data collections involving personal information that will be collected, maintained, or disseminated using information technology if the same questions are asked of 10 or more people. To the extent that PIAs are made publicly available, t
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hey provide explanations to the public about such things as the information that will be collected, why it is being collected, how it is to be used, and how the system and data will be maintained and protected. OMB is tasked with providing guidance to agencies on how to implement the provisions of these two acts and has done so, beginning with guidance on the Privacy Act, issued in 1975. The guidance provides explanations for the various provisions of the law as well as detailed instructions on how to compl
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y. OMB’s guidance on implementing the privacy provisions of the E- Gov Act of 2002 identifies circumstances under which agencies must conduct PIAs and explains how to conduct them. We have previously reported on the role of senior privacy officials in the federal government. In 2006, we testified that the elevation of privacy officers to senior positions reflected the growing demands that these individuals faced in addressing privacy challenges on a day-to-day basis. The challenges we identified included en
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suring compliance with relevant privacy laws, such as the Privacy Act and the E-Gov Act, and controlling the collection and use of personal information obtained from commercial sources. Additionally, in 2007 we reported that the DHS Privacy Office had made significant progress in carrying out its statutory responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act and its related role in ensuring E-Gov Act compliance, but noted that more work remained to be accomplished. We recommended that DHS designate privacy offi
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cers at key DHS components, implement a department wide process for reviewing Privacy Act notices, establish a schedule for the timely issuance of privacy reports, and ensure that the Privacy Office’s annual reports to Congress contain a specific discussion of complaints of privacy violations. In response, DHS included a discussion of privacy complaints in its most recent annual report; however, the other recommendations have not yet been implemented. Laws and guidance set a variety of requirements for seni
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or privacy officials at federal agencies. For example, agencies have had a long standing requirement under the Paperwork Reduction Act to assign agency CIOs overall responsibility for privacy policy and compliance with the Privacy Act. In recent years, additional laws have been enacted that also address the roles and responsibilities of senior officials with regard to privacy. Despite much variation, all of these laws require agencies to assign overall responsibility for privacy protection and compliance to
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a senior agency official. In addition, OMB guidance has directed agencies to designate senior officials with overall responsibility for privacy. These laws and guidance set specific privacy responsibilities for these agency officials. These responsibilities can be grouped into six broad categories: (1) conducting PIAs; (2) Privacy Act compliance; (3) reviewing and evaluating the privacy implications of agency policies, regulations, and initiatives; (4) producing reports on the status of privacy protections
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; (5) ensuring that redress procedures are in place; and (6) ensuring that employees and contractors receive appropriate training. The laws and guidance vary in how they frame requirements in these categories and which agencies must adhere to them. Numerous laws assign privacy responsibility to senior agency officials. The earliest of these laws is the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, which, as amended, directs agency heads to assign a CIO with responsibility for carrying out the agency’s information resour
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ces management activities to improve agency productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness. The act directs agency CIOs to undertake responsibility for implementing and enforcing applicable privacy policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines, and to assume responsibility and accountability for compliance with and coordinated management of the Privacy Act of 1974 and related information management laws. As concerns about privacy have increased in recent years, Congress has enacted additional laws that inclu
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de provisions addressing the roles and responsibilities of senior officials with regard to privacy. Despite variations, a common thread among these laws, as well as relevant OMB guidance, is that they all require agencies to assign overall responsibility for privacy protection and compliance to a senior agency official. Relevant laws include the following: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directed the secretary of DHS to designate a senior official with primary responsibility for privacy policy. The Intell
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igence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Director of National Intelligence to appoint a Civil Liberties Protection Officer and assigned this individual specific privacy responsibilities. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 instructed the Attorney General to designate a senior official with primary responsibility for privacy policy. The Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies and General Government Appropriations Act of 2005 directed
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each agency whose appropriations were provided by the act, including the Departments of Transportation and Treasury, to designate a CPO with primary responsibility for privacy and data protection policy. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 instructed the heads of Defense, DHS, Justice, Treasury, Health and Human Services, and State, as well as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency to designate no less than one senior officer t
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o serve as a privacy and civil liberties officer. Specific privacy provisions of these laws are summarized in appendix II. A number of OMB memorandums have also addressed the roles and responsibilities of senior privacy officials. In 1999, OMB required agencies to designate a senior official to assume primary responsibility for privacy policy. OMB later reiterated this requirement in its guidance on compliance with the E-Gov Act, in which it directed agency heads to designate an appropriate senior official
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with responsibility for the coordination and implementation of OMB Web and privacy policy and to serve as the agency’s principal contact for privacy policies. Most recently, in 2005, OMB directed agencies to designate an SAOP with agency wide responsibility for information privacy issues and with responsibility for specific privacy functions, including ensuring agency compliance with all federal privacy laws, playing a central policy-making role in the development of policy proposals that implicate privacy
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issues, and ensuring that contractors and employees are provided with adequate privacy training. Beginning in 2005, OMB has also issued guidance significantly enhancing longstanding requirements for agencies to report on their compliance with privacy laws. OMB’s 2005 guidance directed agencies to add a new section addressing privacy to their annual reports under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). SAOPs were assigned responsibility for completion of this section, in which they were to r
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eport on such things as agency policies and procedures for the conduct of PIAs, agency policies for ensuring adequate privacy training, as well as their own involvement in agency regulatory and policy decisions. In 2006, OMB issued further guidance requiring agencies to include as part of their FISMA reports a section addressing measures for protecting personally identifiable information. This guidance also required that agencies provide OMB with quarterly privacy updates and report all incidents relating t
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2,876 |
o the loss of or unauthorized access to personally identifiable information. Most recently, OMB directed agencies in 2007 to include in their FISMA reports additional items, such as their breach notification policies, plans to eliminate unnecessary use of Social Security numbers, and plans for reviewing and reducing their holdings of personally identifiable information. These laws and guidance set a variety of requirements for senior officials to carry out specific privacy responsibilities. These responsibi
|
2,877 |
lities can be grouped into the following six key functions: Conduct of PIAs: A PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a federal system, and is required before developing or procuring information technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information that is in a personally identifiable form. Several laws assign privacy officials at covered agencies responsibilities that are met in part by performing PIAs on systems that collect, process, or stor
|
2,878 |
e personally identifiable information. This includes the requirements for several agencies to ensure that “technologies sustain and do not erode privacy protections.” Furthermore, OMB guidance requires agency SAOPs to ensure compliance with federal laws, regulations, and policies relating to information privacy, such as the E-Gov Act, which spells out agency PIA requirements. Privacy Act compliance: As previously discussed, the Privacy Act sets a variety of requirements for all federal agencies regarding pr
|
2,879 |
ivacy protection. For example, the act requires that when agencies establish or make changes to a system of records, they must notify the public by a notice in the Federal Register , identifying, among other things, the type of data collected, the types of individuals about whom information is collected, the intended “routine” use of the data, and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct personal information. Several other laws explicitly direct agency privacy officials to ensure that the p
|
2,880 |
ersonal information contained in their Privacy Act systems of records is handled in compliance with fair information practices as set out in the act. Further, OMB guidance assigns agency SAOPs with responsibility for ensuring Privacy Act compliance. Policy consultation: Relevant laws direct senior privacy officials to actively participate in the development and evaluation of privacy-sensitive agency policy decisions. Several specifically task the SAOP with evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals or
|
2,881 |
periodically reviewing agency actions affecting privacy. As agencies develop new policies, senior officials responsible for privacy issues play a key role in identifying and mitigating potential privacy risks prior to finalizing a particular policy decision. Moreover, OMB directed agency SAOPs to undertake a central role in the development of policy proposals that implicate privacy issues. Privacy reporting: Agency senior privacy officials are often required to prepare periodic reports to ensure transparenc
|
2,882 |
y about their activities and compliance with the law. Many laws reviewed required agencies to produce periodic privacy reports to agency stakeholders and Congress. OMB also requires agency SAOPs to report on their privacy activities as part of their annual FISMA reports, including such measures as their total numbers of systems of records, the number of written privacy complaints they have received, and whether a senior official has responsibility for all privacy-related activities. Redress: With regard to
|
2,883 |
federal agencies, the term “redress” generally refers to an agency’s complaint resolution process, whereby individuals may seek resolution of their concerns about an agency action. Specifically, in the privacy context, redress refers to processes for handling privacy inquiries and complaints as well as for allowing citizens who believe that agencies are storing and using incorrect information about them to gain access to and correct that information. The Privacy Act requires that all agencies, with certain
|
2,884 |
exceptions, allow individuals access to their records and the ability to have inaccurate information corrected. Several recent laws also direct senior privacy officials at specific agencies to provide redress by ensuring that they have adequate procedures for investigating and addressing privacy complaints by individuals. Several laws also provide for attention to privacy in a broader context of civil liberties protection. Privacy training: Privacy training is critical to ensuring that agency employees and
|
2,885 |
contractor personnel follow appropriate procedures and take proper precautions when handling personally identifiable information. For example, The Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies and General Appropriations Act of 2005 requires senior privacy officials at covered agencies to ensure that employees have adequate privacy training. OMB also requires agency SAOPs to ensure that employees and contractors receive privacy training. In addition to performing key privacy functions, requirements in laws
|
2,886 |
include responsibilities to ensure adequate security safeguards to protect against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, and destruction of sensitive personal information. Generally, this is provided through agency information security programs established under FISMA, and overseen by agency CIOs and chief information security officers (CISO). Moreover, OMB has issued guidance instructing agency heads to establish appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and conf
|
2,887 |
identiality of records. Figure 1 shows the extent to which laws have requirements that specifically address each privacy function and to which agencies these requirements apply. Agencies have varying organizational structures to address privacy responsibilities. For example, of the 12 agencies we reviewed, 2 had statutorily designated CPOs who also served as SAOPs, 5 designated their agency CIOs as their senior officials, and the others designated a variety of other officials, such as the general counsel or
|
2,888 |
assistant secretary for management. Further, not all of the agencies we reviewed had given their designated senior officials full oversight over all privacy-related functions. While 6 agencies had these officials overseeing all key privacy functions, 6 others relied on other organizational units not overseen by the designated senior official to perform certain key privacy functions. The fragmented way in which privacy functions have been assigned to organizational units in these agencies is at least partly
|
2,889 |
the result of evolving requirements in law and guidance. As requirements have evolved, organizational responsibilities have been established incrementally to meet them. However, without oversight and involvement in all key privacy functions, SAOPs may be unable to effectively serve as agency central focal points for privacy. Agencies have taken varied approaches to designating senior agency officials with privacy responsibilities. Two of the 12 agencies we reviewed had separate CPOs that were also designat
|
2,890 |
ed as the senior officials for privacy. Five agencies assigned their agency CIOs as SAOPs, and 1 agency assigned its CISO. Lastly, 4 agencies assigned another high-level official, such as a general counsel or assistant secretary for management, as the SAOP. In addition to varying in how they designated senior officials for privacy, agencies also varied in the way they assigned privacy responsibilities to organizational units. Four of the 12 agencies we reviewed (Transportation, DHS, State, and U.S. Agency f
|
2,891 |
or International Development) had one organization primarily responsible for all of the six key privacy functions outlined in the previous section. The remaining 8 agencies (Social Security Administration, Veterans Affairs, Defense, Commerce, Labor, Justice, Treasury, and Health and Human Services) relied on more than one organizational unit to perform privacy functions. Figure 2 summarizes the organizational structures in place at agencies to address the six key privacy functions, including the specific or
|
2,892 |
ganizational units responsible for carrying out each of the key privacy functions. Six of the agencies (DHS, State, Social Security Administration, Transportation, U.S. Agency for International Development, and Veterans Affairs) established privacy structures in which the SAOP oversaw all key privacy functions. For example, DHS’s Privacy Office performed these functions under the direction of the CPO, who was also the department’s SAOP. Similarly, U.S. Agency for International Development’s CISO (also the S
|
2,893 |
AOP) oversaw the agency’s privacy office, which was responsible for all key functions. While more than one organizational unit carried out privacy functions in two cases (Veterans Affairs and the Social Security Administration), all such units were overseen by the senior agency official for privacy. However, six other agencies (Commerce, Health and Human Services, Labor, Transportation, Defense, and Treasury) had privacy management structures in which the SAOP did not oversee all key privacy functions. For
|
2,894 |
two agencies—Justice and Treasury—the SAOP had oversight over all key functions except for redress, which was handled by individual component organizations. For the other four agencies, key functions were divided among two or more organizations, and the senior privacy official did not have oversight of all of them. For example, key privacy functions at Labor were being performed not only by the office of the CIO (who is also the SAOP) but also by the Office of the Solicitor, who is independent of the CIO. L
|
2,895 |
ikewise, the senior official at Commerce was responsible for overseeing conduct of PIAs, policy consultation, and privacy training, while a separate Privacy Act Officer was responsible for Privacy Act compliance. Without full oversight of key privacy functions, SAOPs may be limited in their ability to ensure that privacy protections are administered consistently across the organization. The fragmented way in which privacy functions have been assigned to organizational units in several agencies is at least p
|
2,896 |
artly the result of evolving requirements in law and guidance. As requirements have evolved, organizational responsibilities have been established incrementally to meet them. For example, although the Privacy Act does not specify organizational structures for carrying out its provisions, many agencies established Privacy Act officers to address the requirements of that act and have had such positions in place for many years. In some cases, agencies designated their general counsels to be in charge of ensuri
|
2,897 |
ng that the Privacy Act’s requirements were met. More recently, the responsibility to conduct PIAs under the E-Gov Act frequently has been given to another office, such as the Office of the CIO, because the E-Gov Act’s requirements apply to information technology, which is generally the purview of the CIO. If an SAOP was designated in such agencies without reassigning these responsibilities, that official may not have oversight and involvement in all key privacy activities. Uneven implementation of the Pape
|
2,898 |
rwork Reduction Act also may have contributed to fragmentation of privacy functions. As previously discussed, the Paperwork Reduction Act requires agency CIOs to take responsibility for privacy policy and compliance with the Privacy Act, and thus agencies could ensure they are in compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act by designating their CIOs as SAOPs. However, 7 out of the 12 agencies we reviewed did not designate their CIOs as SAOPs. Further, if CIOs were designated as agency SAOPs but did not have
|
2,899 |
responsibility for compliance with the Privacy Act—as was the case at Commerce, Labor, and Health and Human Services—the SAOPs would be left without full oversight of key privacy functions. Agencies that have more than one internal organization carrying out privacy functions run the risk that those organizations may not always provide the same protections for personal information if they are not overseen by a central authority. Thus, unless steps are taken to ensure that key privacy functions are under the
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