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" According to Hassan et al. (2008), around 59.4% of Fur are carriers of the E1b1b paternal haplogroup. Of these, 68.4% bear the V32 subclade. Approximately 6.3% also belong to the haplogroup J1. This points to significant patrilineal gene flow from neighbouring Afro-Asiatic-speaking populations. The remaining Fur individuals are primarily carriers of the A3b2 lineage (31.3%), which is instead common among Nilotes.
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" Maternally, the Fur entirely belong to African-based derivatives of the macrohaplogroup L according to Hassan (2010). Of these mtDNA clades, the L0a1 (15.3%) and L1c (11.5%) lineages are most frequent. This altogether suggests that the genetic introgression into the Fur's ancestral population was asymmetrical, occurring primarily through Afro-Asiatic-speaking males rather than females.
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"= = = Andy Clark = = =
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" Andrew Clark, (born 1957) is a professor of philosophy and Chair in Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. Before this, he was director of the Cognitive Science Program at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana and previously taught at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri and the University of Sussex in England. Clark is one of the founding members of the CONTACT collaborative research project whose aim is to investigate the role environment plays in shaping the nature of conscious experience. Clark's papers and books deal with the philosophy of mind and he is considered a leading scientist in mind extension. He has also written extensively on connectionism, robotics and the role and nature of mental representation.
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" Clark's work explores a number of disparate but interrelated themes. Many of these themes run against established wisdom in cognitive processing and representation. According to traditional computational accounts, the function of the mind is understood as the process of creating, storing and updating internal representations of the world, on the basis of which other processes and actions may take place. Representations are updated to correspond with an environment in accordance with the function, goal-state, or desire of the system in question at any given time. Thus, for example, learning a new route through a maze-like building would be mirrored in a change in the representation of that building. Action, on this view, is the outcome of a process which determines the best way to achieve the goal-state or desire, based on current representations. Such a determinative process may be the purview of a Cartesian ""central executive"" or a distributed process like homuncular decomposition.
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" In contrast to traditional models of cognition, which often posit the one-way flow of sensory information from the periphery towards more remote areas of the brain, Clark has suggested a two-way ""cascade of cortical processing"" underlying perception, action, and learning. The concept of predictive processing lies at the heart of this view, wherein top-down predictions attempt to correctly guess or ""explain away"" bottom-up sensory information in an iterative, hierarchical manner. Discrepancies between the expected signal and actual signal, in essence the ""prediction error,"" travel upward to help refine the accuracy of future predictions. Interactions between forward flow of error (conveyed by ""error units"") and backward flow of prediction are dynamic, with attention playing a key role in weighting the relative influence of either at each level of the cascade (dopamine is mentioned as ""one possible mechanism for encoding precision"" with regard to error units). Action (or action-oriented predictive processing) also plays an important role in Clark's account as another means by which the brain can reduce prediction error by directly influencing the environment. To this, he adds that ""personal, affective, and hedonic"" factors would be implicated along with the minimization of prediction error, creating a more nuanced model for the relationship between action and perception.
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" According to Clark, the computational model, which forms the philosophical foundation of artificial intelligence, engenders several intractable problems. One of the more salient is an information bottleneck: if, in order to determine appropriate actions, it is the job of the mind to construct detailed inner representations of the external world, then, as the world is constantly changing, the demands on the mental system will almost certainly preclude any action taking place. For Clark, we need relatively little information about the world before we may act effectively upon it. We tend to be susceptible to ""grand illusion"", where our impressions of a richly detailed world obscures a reality of minimal environmental information and quick action. We needn't try to reconstruct the detail of this world, as it is able to serve as its own best model from which to extract information ""just in time"".
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" Clark's writings also focus on the concept of transhumanism, most prevalent in his work, ""Natural-Born Cyborgs"" which explores the progressing incorporation of human biology and technological implants. Through a series of contemporary technological studies and an evaluation of the cyborg figure in pop-culture, Clark maps out a perception of the cyborg as a reality. This is not necessarily to show what humanity is to become from biologically implanted technology, but rather to explore where humanity is now with said technology. In his own words, humans are ""creatures whose minds are special precisely because they are tailor-made for multiple mergers and coalitions."" He elaborates this as he describes his body as an ""electronic virgin"" untouched by technology, but gradually over time technology will become intertwined with his biology. Whether that incorporation will be as mundane as the use of eyeglasses or something more advanced such as a new auditory prosthesis, he believes the merger of technology and biology is inevitable and present.
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" Clark is perhaps most well known for his defense of the extended mind hypothesis.
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" According to Clark, the dynamic loops through which mind and world interact are not merely instrumental; the cycle of activity that runs from brain through body and world and back again is what constitutes cognition. The mind, on this account, is not restricted to the biological organism but extends into that organism's environment. An example is carrying out a mathematical task. One person may complete the task solely in their head, while another completes the task with the assistance of paper and pencil. By Clark's parity principle, there is no reason to count these means as different so long as the results are the same. The process of cognition in the second case involves paper and pencil, so the conception of mind appropriate to the person involved must include these items.
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" Clark concedes that, in practice, the criterion of ""equal efficiency"" required by the parity principle is seldom met. He nonetheless proposes that the boundary of ""skin and skull"" is arbitrary and cognitively meaningless. If, in the example above, the paper and pencil used by the second person becomes a virtual paper-and-pencil visible on a monitor and controlled by a silicon chip implanted in the head, the similarity between the two situations becomes clearer.
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" Clark foresees the development of cognitive prosthetics, or ""electronic brain enhancements"" (""EBEs""), as only the next logical step in the human mind's natural integration with technology. Clark's research interests also include wetwiring and other human-electronic integration experiments, as well as technological advances in immediate human communication and their utilization in society.
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" To further illustrate extended cognition, Clark uses two anecdotal examples: Inga and Otto, the latter being a patient of Alzheimer's disease. Both desire to visit a museum and must remember the address. For Inga, this is a matter of simple memory recall and accessing her belief in where she remembers the given location of the museum. Due to his condition, Otto relies on the use of written records in a notebook in order to recall his memory, as the disease makes it difficult for him to have a finite belief on the museum's location without it. This notebook in a way becomes his livelihood, functioning as a memory bank to accommodate his condition. As Clark puts it, ""his notebook plays the role usually played by a biological memory"" effectively becoming a part of his extended mind. The goal of describing the thought processes of Inga and Otto is to show multiple variations of extended cognition and how it functions differently among individuals depending on their mental biology. Clark claims the key aspect that unites the cognitive process of the two individuals is that each has the initial belief on where the museum is located. Although the way the verification of belief differs in practice between the two, they are still able to come up with a solution on the museum's location despite one using a source of external storage. In a later work, Clark addresses any potential criticism on the process of Otto's system of belief by stating that Otto's impulse to consult his notebook is a similar process to that of Inga consulting her recalled memory. Clark also elaborates on the importance of environment when using extended cognition. He believes that the way one formalizes ""beliefs"" is, ""constituted partly by features of the environment"" if they are playing the desired role of ""driving cognitive processes.” This summarizes his belief that the mind, in fact, can extend to the surrounding environment.
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" Although the comparisons between Otto and Inga may seem distant when judging the power of extended cognition, Clark attempts to gap a more similar comparison between the two by claiming that if Otto were to lose his notebook it would be the same as Inga losing a thought from her consciousness. He also suggests the concept of Otto's notebook being an extension of himself, having it take on a more material role suggesting that it may be equal to the way one treats a physical appendage to their body. The notebook in a way becomes a ""fragile biological limb or organ"" one that Otto may feel to protect from harm's way.
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" Supporters of extended cognition have used Clark's comparison between Inga and Otto as a champion analogy to support the theory of the internal mind extending into the environment. In an article on the argument of extended cognition, Erik Myin makes note of this group, ""a close causal coupling between persons and environments,"" such as Otto and his notebook, ""can license the conclusion that the mind spreads into the environment."" His also writes that some followers use Clark's argument of, ""external elements"" playing a role that could be seen as, ""cognitive if played by something internal to a person."" A good reference to this would be how Otto's notebook is used for cognitive verification.
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" ""The Extended Mind"" has been met with criticism from scholars challenging extended cognition. The claim is that Clark's theories lack a differentiation of biological memory and external storage of thought. This is mainly addressed to the cognitive comparison between Otto and Inga, and how their thought processes are viewed as equal an engagement of extended thought given Otto's condition. When he uses his notepad, it is necessary reliance, as these records will help him to remember his thoughts. However, there is an argument questioning if this follows Clark's description of extended cognition as it requires a running cycle of cognitive connectivity that returns to the body.
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" In a critique of Clark's ""Supersizing the Mind"", Lawrence Shapiro and Shannon Spaulding, of The University of Wisconsin-Madison, touch upon this criticism from scholars who challenge extended cognition. They describe the argument against Clark being that ""...cognitive routines involving biological memory and those involving external stores of information are importantly different."" Essentially they are claiming that the way someone stores memory externally is separate from their biological cognition. For example, if Inga were to use a notepad, it would function as an extension of her compression as her thought process would follow Clark's description of dynamic loops that return to the mind in a cycle. However, when Otto uses the notepad has a way to retain his memory, whatever thoughts he records will not follow back and will become disconnected from his biological mind. In this respect, parts of Otto's mind would essentially ""exist outside his brain,"" meaning that the comparison between Inga and Otto may not be reliant as they appear to function differently in Clark's own theory.
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" This criticism of Otto and Inga is addressed by Clark himself in ""Supersizing the Mind"":“[the] claim was not that the processes in Otto and Inga are identical, or even similar, in terms of their detailed implementation. It is simply that, with respect to the role that the long-term encodings play in guiding current response, both modes of storage can be seen as supporting dispositional beliefs. It is the way the information is poised to guide reasoning … and behavior that counts. (p. 96)”He argues that extended cognition was never meant to be a universal ""fine-grained similarity"" between all minds. He believes that such a ""fine-grained similarity"" is not necessary when analyzing extended consciousness, suggesting it differs depending on an individual's behavior and their given environment.
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" Clark lives in Edinburgh, Scotland with his partner, Alexa Morcom, a cognitive neuroscientist. He has a tattoo of a comic book styled, undersea theme.
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" Books by Andy Clark:
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" Clark is also on the editorial boards of the following journals:
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"= = = Don Craig Wiley = = =
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" Don Craig Wiley (October 21, 1944 – November 2001) was an American structural biologist.
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" Wiley received his doctoral degree in biophysics in 1971 from Harvard University, where he worked under the direction of the subsequent 1976 chemistry Nobel Prize winner William N. Lipscomb, Jr.
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" There, Wiley did early work on the structure of aspartate carbamoyltransferase, the largest molecular structure determined at that time. Noteworthy in this effort was that Wiley managed to grow crystals of aspartate carbamoyltransferase suitable for obtaining its X-ray structure, a particularly difficult task in the case of this molecular complex.
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" Wiley was world-renowned for finding new ways to help the human immune system battle such viral scourges as smallpox, influenza, HIV/AIDS and herpes simplex.
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" Famous quote: ""I'm sorry, but I just don't understand anything in biology unless I know what it looks like.""
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" In 1990, he was awarded the Louisa Gross Horwitz Prize from Columbia University. His research was honored with the 1993 Cancer Research Institute William B. Coley Award. Harvard called Wiley ""one of the most influential biologists of his generation."" In 1999, Wiley and another Harvard professor, Jack L. Strominger, won the Japan Prize for their discoveries of how the immune system protects humans from infections.
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" Wiley owned a British racing green-colored Aston Martin.
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" Don Wiley disappeared on November 15, 2001; his body was found in the Mississippi River a month later and his death was ruled to be an accident.
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"= = = Snooker world rankings 1983/1984 = = =
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" Snooker world rankings 1983/1984: The professional world rankings for the top 32 snooker players in the 1983/1984 season are listed below.
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"= = = Hematoma = = =
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" A hematoma (US spelling) or haematoma (UK spelling) is a localized bleeding outside of blood vessels, due to either disease or trauma including injury or surgery and may involve blood continuing to seep from broken capillaries. A hematoma is benign and is initially in liquid form spread among the tissues including in sacs between tissues where it may coagulate and solidify before blood is reabsorbed into blood vessels. An ecchymosis is a hematoma of the skin larger than 10mm.
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" They may occur among/within many areas such as skin and other organs, connective tissues, bone, joints and muscle.
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" A collection of blood (or even a hemorrhage) may be aggravated by anticoagulant medication (blood thinner). Blood seepage and collection of blood may occur if heparin is given via an intramuscular route; to avoid this, heparin must be given intravenously or subcutaneously.
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" It is not to be confused with hemangioma, which is an abnormal buildup/growth of blood vessels in the skin or internal organs.
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" Some hematomas are visible under the surface of the skin (commonly called bruises) or possibly felt as masses/lumps. Lumps may be caused by the limitation of the blood to a sac, subcutaneous or intramuscular tissue space isolated by fascial planes. This is a key anatomical feature that helps prevent injuries from causing massive blood loss. In most cases the hematoma such as a sac of blood eventually dissolves; however, in some cases they may continue to grow such as due to blood seepage or show no change. If the sac of blood does not disappear, then it may need to be surgically cleaned out/repaired.
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" The slow process of reabsorption of hematomas can allow the broken down blood cells and hemoglobin pigment to move in the connective tissue. For example, a patient who injures the base of his thumb might cause a hematoma, which will slowly move all through the finger within a week. Gravity is the main determinant of this process.
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" Hematomas on articulations can reduce mobility of a member and present roughly the same symptoms as a fracture.
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" In most cases, movement and exercise of the affected muscle is the best way to introduce the collection back into the blood stream.
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" A misdiagnosis of a hematoma in the vertebra can sometimes occur; this is correctly called a hemangioma (buildup of cells) or a benign tumor.
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