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tech2proc

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Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes.
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
Siloscape uses Tor to communicate with C2.
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
StrongPity can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
Traffic traversing the Tor network will be forwarded to multiple nodes before exiting the Tor network and continuing on to its intended destination.
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
Uroburos can use implants on multiple compromised machines to proxy communications through its worldwide P2P network.
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
Ursnif has used Tor for C2.
Proxy:Multi-hop Proxy
WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic.
Proxy:Domain Fronting
It has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic.
Proxy:Domain Fronting
Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.
Proxy:Domain Fronting
meek uses Domain Fronting to disguise the destination of network traffic as another server that is hosted in the same Content Delivery Network (CDN) as the intended destination.
Proxy:Domain Fronting
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.
Proxy:Domain Fronting
SMOKEDHAM has used a fronted domain to obfuscate its hard-coded C2 server domain.
Remote Access Software
During C0015, the threat actors installed the AnyDesk remote desktop application onto the compromised network.
Remote Access Software
During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.
Remote Access Software
During C0027, It directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.
Remote Access Software
It has a plugin for VNC and Ammyy Admin Tool.
Remote Access Software
It used legitimate programs such as AmmyyAdmin and Team Viewer for remote interactive C2 to target systems.
Remote Access Software
It used the Ammyy Admin tool as well as TeamViewer for remote access, including to preserve remote access if a Cobalt Strike module was lost.
Remote Access Software
It used DameWare Mini Remote Control for lateral movement.
Remote Access Software
Dridex contains a module for VNC.
Remote Access Software
Egregor has checked for the LogMein event log in an attempt to encrypt files in remote machines.
Remote Access Software
EVILNUM has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to run a legitimate TeamViewer application to connect to compromrised machines.
Remote Access Software
It has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system.
Remote Access Software
It has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy REvil.
Remote Access Software
Hildegard has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.
Remote Access Software
It has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.
Remote Access Software
It has used a legitimate application, ScreenConnect, to manage systems remotely and move laterally.
Remote Access Software
It has installed TeamViewer on targeted systems.
Remote Access Software
During Night Dragon, threat actors used several remote administration tools as persistent infiltration channels.
Remote Access Software
It has the capability to download a VNC module from command and control (C2).
Remote Access Software
It has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access.
Remote Access Software
It has used remote administration tools or remote industrial control system client software for execution and to maliciously release electricity breakers.
Remote Access Software
It has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.
Remote Access Software
It used a cloud-based remote access software called LogMeIn for their attacks.
Remote Access Software
TrickBot uses vncDll module to remote control the victim machine.
Traffic Signaling
Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.
Traffic Signaling
Kobalos is triggered by an incoming TCP connection to a legitimate service from a specific source port.
Traffic Signaling
Pandora can identify if incoming HTTP traffic contains a token and if so it will intercept the traffic and process the received command.
Traffic Signaling
Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.
Traffic Signaling
Ryuk has used Wake-on-Lan to power on turned off systems for lateral movement.
Traffic Signaling
SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.
Traffic Signaling
Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet.
Traffic Signaling
Uroburos can intercept the first client to server packet in the 3-way TCP handshake to determine if the packet contains the correct unique value for a specific Uroburos implant. If the value does not match, the packet and the rest of the TCP session are passed to the legitimate listening application.
Traffic Signaling
Winnti for Linux has used a passive listener, capable of identifying a specific magic value before executing tasking, as a secondary command and control (C2) mechanism.
Traffic Signaling:Port Knocking
Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.
Traffic Signaling:Port Knocking
metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.
Traffic Signaling:Port Knocking
It has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.
Traffic Signaling:Socket Filters
Penquin installs a TCP and UDP filter on the eth0 interface.
Web Service
It has used Dropbox, Amazon S3, and Google Drive to host malicious downloads.
Web Service
BADHATCH can be utilized to abuse sslip.io, a free IP to domain mapping service, as part of actor-controlled C2 channels.
Web Service
Bazar downloads have been hosted on Google Docs.
Web Service
BoomBox can download files from Dropbox using a hardcoded access token.
Web Service
Brute Ratel C4 can use legitimate websites for external C2 channels including Slack, Discord, and MS Teams.
Web Service
Bumblebee has been downloaded to victim's machines from OneDrive.
Web Service
During C0017, It used the Cloudflare services for C2 communications.
Web Service
During C0027, It downloaded tools from sites including file.io, GitHub, and paste.ee.
Web Service
Carbon can use Pastebin to receive C2 commands.
Web Service
CharmPower can download additional modules from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets.
Web Service
DarkTortilla can retrieve its primary payload from public sites such as Pastebin and Textbin.
Web Service
Doki has used the dogechain.info API to generate a C2 address.
Web Service
DropBook can communicate with its operators by exploiting the Simplenote, DropBox, and the social media platform, Facebook, where it can create fake accounts to control the backdoor and receive instructions.
Web Service
It has used Discord's content delivery network (CDN) to deliver malware and malicious scripts to a compromised host.
Web Service
It has used file-sharing services including WeTransfer, TransferNow, and OneDrive to deliver payloads.
Web Service
It has used Pastebin and Google Storage to host content for their operations.
Web Service
It has used sslip.io, a free IP to domain mapping service that also makes SSL certificate generation easier for traffic encryption, as part of their command and control.
Web Service
It has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.
Web Service
It has used GitHub repositories for downloaders which will be obtained by the group's .NET executable on the compromised system.
Web Service
GuLoader has the ability to download malware from Google Drive.
Web Service
Hildegard has downloaded scripts from GitHub.
Web Service
It has incorporated at least five different cloud service providers into their C2 infrastructure including CloudMe.
Web Service
It has used GitHub to host its payloads to operate spam campaigns.
Web Service
It has used DropBox URLs to deliver variants of PlugX.
Web Service
NETWIRE has used web services including Paste.ee to host payloads.
Web Service
ngrok has been used by threat actors to proxy C2 connections to ngrok service subdomains.
Web Service
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.
Web Service
It has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control.
Web Service
SharpStage has used a legitimate web service for evading detection.
Web Service
Sibot has used a legitimate compromised website to download DLLs to the victim's machine.
Web Service
SMOKEDHAM has used Google Drive and Dropbox to host files downloaded by victims via malicious links.
Web Service
Snip3 can download additional payloads from web services including Pastebin and top4top.
Web Service
It has leveraged iplogger.org to send collected data back to C2.
Web Service
It has used legitimate web services including Pastebin, Dropbox, and GitHub for C2 communications.
Web Service
WhisperGate can download additional payloads hosted on a Discord channel.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
It used legitimate websites for C2 through dead drop resolvers (DDR), including GitHub, Pastebin, and Microsoft TechNet.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
Astaroth can store C2 information on cloud hosting services such as AWS and CloudFlare and websites like YouTube and Facebook.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
BADNEWS collects C2 information via a dead drop resolver.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
BLACKCOFFEE uses Microsoft’s TechNet Web portal to obtain a dead drop resolver containing an encoded tag with the IP address of a command and control server.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
It's MSGET downloader uses a dead drop resolver to access malicious payloads.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
During C0017, It used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably It updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
CharmPower can retrieve C2 domain information from actor-controlled S3 buckets.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
Grandoreiro can obtain C2 information from Google Docs.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
Javali can read C2 information from Google Documents and YouTube.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
The KEYPLUG Windows variant has retrieved C2 addresses from encoded data in posts on tech community forums.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
Metamorfo has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
Some MiniDuke components use Twitter to initially obtain the address of a C2 server or as a backup if no hard-coded C2 server responds.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
It hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
PlugX uses Pastebin to store C2 addresses.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
PolyglotDuke can use Twitter, Reddit, Imgur and other websites to get a C2 URL.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
It has used Pastebin to check the version of beaconing malware and redirect to another Pastebin hosting updated malware.
Web Service:Dead Drop Resolver
It has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names. It has also hidden Pony C2 server IP addresses within transactions on the Bitcoin and Namecoin blockchain.