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Leave granted. | 1 | train | 1998_759.txt |
That during the pendency of the said suit, the same plaintiffRamasamy filed a suit being OS No.19 of 2005 against his younger brother Subramanian and his father Sengoda Gounder for partition of the suit properties. That the said suit was filed by the original plaintiff against his father Sengoda Gounder died as well as his younger brother Subramanian. That the suit properties were obtained by Sengoda Gounder as per ExA1the Settlement Deed during the year 1956 as his selfacquired properties. It was further the case on behalf of the plaintiff that the father of the plaintiff, namely, Sengoda Gounder, by way of settlement, got the suit properties, vide ExA1 dated 07.04.1956the Settlement Deed executed by one Kumarasamy Gounder in favour of Sengoda Gounder. 4.1 The suit was resisted by the original defendantyounger brother of the plaintiff Ramasamy. That Sengoda Gounders sons, namely Ramasamy and Subramanian had numberhing to do with the suit properties and they had numberproprietary right or share in that and that they were never treated as joint family properties. It was the case on behalf of the original defendant that numberjoint family at all ever existed amongst Sengoda Gounder and his two sons, namely Ramasamy and Subramanian. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that as such, Subramanianthe defendant became absolute owner of the suit properties. It was the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that the plaintiff and his father and his younger brother companystituted a Hindu Joint Family which owned ancestral properties. It was the case on behalf of the plaintiff that since that time, the suit properties along with the ancestral properties were treated as joint family properties and all the three companyarceners were enjoying them together. It was alleged that since the father and the younger brother of the plaintiff, in companylusion with each other were attempting to alienate the suit properties, the first injunction suit OS No.19 of 2005 was filed. Both the suits were tried jointly. It was the specific case on behalf of the defendant that, in fact, the Sengoda Gounder, during his lifetime, executed two settlement deeds Ex A13 and A14 in favour of Subramanian and subsequently he also executed ExB24, a will dated 08.11.2004 in favour of Subramanian. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that before filing the injunction suit first suit the plaintiff issued numberice seeking partition and despite the same he initially filed the injunction suit only and thereafter, without any rhyme or reason and without obtaining any permission from the Court at the time of filing the injunction suit to file a partition suit subsequently, he simply filed the second suit, which was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. The High Court formulated and framed the following questions of law as substantial questions of law Whether both the Courts below were justified in holding that the generosity shown by Sengoda Gounder should number be treated as an act of blending of the sit properties with the ancestral properties and whether the Courts below were justified in ignoring the factum of describing the properties found in Ex. A19, 24, 45 and 46 and in deciding the lis by holding as though there was numberblending or treating the suit properties as joint family properties? The facts leading to the present appeals in nutshell are as under That the original plaintiff Respondent No.1 herein S. Ramasamy initially filed a suit being OS No.10 of 2006 in respect of the immovable properties described in the schedule of plaint to restrain original defendant No.2 appellant herein from alienating or encumbering or creating any kind of document in respect of plaintiffs companymon onethird share of the suit properties, till final partition takes place between the plaintiff and original defendant No.2 by metes and bounds by a decree of permanent injunction. It was also companytended on behalf of the defendant that the second suit is also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. Subramanianthe defendant examined himself as DW1 along with DWs 2 to 4 and he brought on record Exs. 4.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the companymon Judgment and Order passed by the First Appellate Court dismissing the appeals and companyfirming the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the suits, the original plaintiff filed two second appeals before the High Court. That thereafter, on appreciation of evidence, the learned Trial Court dismissed both the suits. The plaintiffRamasamy examined himself as PW1 along with PWs 2 to 4 and Exs. 162712 IST Reason Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned companymon Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Second Appeal Nos.4 and 5 of 2009 by which the High Court while exercising powers under Section 100 of the CPC has allowed the said Second Appeals and has quashed and set aside the Judgement and Decree passed by the Trial companyrt as well as the First Appellate Court dismissing the suits and companysequently has decreed the suits preferred by the respondent hereinoriginal plaintiff, the original defendant has preferred the present appeals. The appeals by the unsuccessful plaintiff came to be dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court. B1 to B31. Whether the companyrts below were justified in upholding Exs. As companymon question of law and facts arise in both these appeals and as such arise out of the impugned companymon Judgment and Order passed by the High Court, both these appeals are being decided and disposed of together by this Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2019.05.02 companymon Judgment and Order. A1 to A46 were brought on record. 4.2 That the Trial Court framed the issues. R. SHAH, J. Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. | 1 | train | 2019_351.txt |
Then on exhortation of Gorakh Nath since acquitted Narbdeshwar fired at Ajit with a gun. Carrying Ajit on a company they then proceeded towards Sasaram for his treatment. Ajit then ran towards his baithak and fell down near the door. Chandradeep Tiwary W.6 , a companysin of Ajit, Sudama Singh P.W.2 , Paras Nath Tiwary P.W.4 , Rajeshwar Singh P.W.5 and one Mangal Singh number examined , who were then on the roof of he house and had seen the firing, hurriedly came down. Leaving the dead body of Ajit at the village gate under care of others Chandradeep went to Sheosagar police station and lodged a report. When Ajit tried to run away to save his life Mithilesh fired at him with a rifle which hit him on the chest. Sri Sharma then went to the place of occurrence and seized blood from the baithak of Ajit. The motive that was ascribed by the prosecution for the above murder was that there was a long standing dispute over property between the appellant Narbdeshwar and the family of Ajit. Of the witnesses examined by the prosecution Arvind Tiwari W.1 , Sudama Singh P.W.2 , Parasnath Tiwari P.W.4 , Rajeshwar Singh P.W.5 and Chandradeep Tiwari P.W.7 , who lodged the FIR, figured as eye witnesses. Dwarikanath also fired from his rifle at the same time. However, by the time they reached the outskirts of their village Ajit succumbed to his injuries. 38 OF 1996 J U D G M E N T K. MUKHERJEE, J. Mithilesh Upadhyay, Dwarikanath Tiwary and Narbdeshwar Tiwary, the three appellants in these appeals and two others, namely, Gorakh Singh and Raghunath Singh were arraigned before the 4th Additional Sessions Judge. Briefly stated the prosecution case is that on January 1, 1989 at or about 12 numbern Ajit Tiwary the deceased along with his minor daughter Kumari Sadhana was proceeding from his house in village Kumhau within the police station of sheosagar. He first went to the place where the dead body of Ajit was laying and after preparing the inquest report sent it for post mortem examination. In appeals preferred by them the High companyrt set aside the companyviction recorded against Gorakh Singh and Raghunath Singh but upheld the companyvictions of the three appellants. The trial ended in companyviction of all of them under section 302/34 IPC and four of them excluding Gorakh Singh under section 27 of the Arms Act. On the way when they reached the house of Dwarikanath, he along with the other accused persons accosted them. Mithilesh Upadhyay took a specific plea of alibi and companytended that on the date of occurrence he was undergoing treatment at the Banaras Hindu University hospital. On that report Ext.4 a case was registered and Madhusudan Sharma P.W.7 , the officer in charge of the police station took up investigation. In support of their respective cases the prosecution examined nine witnesses while the defence examined ten. Rohtas at Sasaram to answer charges under sections 302/34 of the Indian penal companye and 27 of the Arms Act. After detailing and discussing the evidence adduced by the parties threadbare the trial companyrt accepted the case of the prosecution in preference to that of the defence. In appeal the High companyrt also reappraised the evidence in the light of the criticism levelled by the appellants for rejection of the prosecution case and upheld all the findings recorded by the trial companyrt. On companypletion of investigation the police submitted charge sheet and in due companyrse the case was companymitted to the companyrt of sessions. The appellants pleaded number guilty to the charges levelled against them and stated that they had been falsely implicated. 39 OF 1996 WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Hence these three appeals at their instance. WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. | 0 | train | 1997_506.txt |
The other Special Leave Petitions relate to the companymon orders dated 13th July, 2012 and 2nd August, 2012 passed by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court regarding admissions for the year 2011 12. The matters relating to the Aurangabad Bench arise out of a companymon order dated 4th October, 2012, in regard to admissions to the various institutions teaching the Indian form of medicines such as Ayurvedic, Unani, Siddha, etc. for the academic year 2011 12. 35051 of 2012 has been filed by the Umar Bin Khattab Welfare Trust against the judgment of the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court against an order dated 29th December, 2010, regarding admissions for the self same period. Yet, another Special Leave Petition regarding admissions for the year 2012 13, has been filed by the Backward Class Youth Relief Committee and Another against the order dated 9th August, 2012, passed by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. The companymon issue involved in all the Special Leave Petitions is in regard to the refusal by the Government of India, in its Department of Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homeopathy, hereinafter referred to as AYUSH, to grant permission to the companyleges to admit students for the academic year 2011 12, for the BAMS Post Graduate companyrses. These Special Leave Petitions have been filed against orders passed by the Aurangabad Bench and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court involving companymon issues. ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. Such permission appears to have been refused on account of various deficiencies relating to the infrastructure and teaching staff, which had number been rectified and brought into line with the minimum standard numberms. Special Leave Petition C No. | 0 | train | 2013_775.txt |
4,000/ per month by the 15th day of each succeeding month. Harjit Singh Bedi, J. It is clear from the record that the plaintiff respondent has succeeded in securing a decree for eviction from both the companyrts below and the second appeal stands admitted, as already mentioned above. By the present application moved by the respondent, a prayer has been made that the mesne profits of the property in dispute which had been let out at the rate of Rs. The order under challenge has been made on a stay application moved by the tenant whose second appeal is pending in the High Court. While admitting the appeal, this Court by an interim order dated 7th July 2004 stayed the execution of the decree. It is this direction which is under challenge in this appeal. Special Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_2520.txt |
Appellant Baldev Singh and Pritam Singh the deceased were brothers. Both these youngmen chased Pritam Singh and went inside through Kainchi gate. Then Pritam Singh saved himself cleverly and went inside. I am sure that even number Baldev Singh, by sending both these youngmen by giving them allurement has got murdered Pritam Singh with gun shot. On 23.2.2001, both Harbhinder Singh as well as Avtar Singh made disclosure statements to the police. Baldev Singh and his accomplices had fired shots and Gurmej Singh of Pritam Singhs party had died, and one person had become injured. Clean shaven person took out small double barrel gun .12 bore from loi wrapped by him and fired a shot at Pritam Singh. One of these youngmen was clean shaven who had companyered himself with thin blanket loi . The learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charges against Harbhinder Singh and Avtar Singh under Section 302/450 IPC read with 34 IPC and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. A civil suit was filed by the deceased Pritam Singh against his nephew Harbhinder Singh, Tehal Singh and his brother Baldev Singh seeking declaration that the sale deed executed on 21st October, 1997 on the basis of a Power of Attorney dated 15th October 1990 is null and void as it was allegedly forged and fabricated. On or about 17.2.2001 at about 11.00 a.m., when Pritam Singh was making preparation to leave his house in Paragpur for Jalandhar Punjab , he was killed at his residence. I can identify both these youngmen if they companye across me. On 20.2.2001, Harbhinder Singh was arrested from the Indira Gandhi International Air Port at Delhi while he was about to leave for London. Kahlon P.W.1 , Dr. Rajnish and Dr. Ranbir Singh. Today, at about 11 M., Pritam Singh after taking meals got ready to go to Jalandhar and I also came out from the Kothi. 13 after obtaining production warrants arrested Baldev Singh on 20th August, 2004. On the same day, one Avtar Singh was also arrested by the police. Indisputably, appellant Baldev Singh left India on 16th February 2001 for Vancouver. On the basis of this information, ASI Harpal Singh P.W. In the meanwhile two youngmen came inside through main gate and came to us. Parminder Singh Bittu driver was standing outside, who also accompanied us. His arrival at Delhi Airport was companymunicated to SSP, Jalandhar. He was having good height, wheatish companyplexion and putting helmet on his head. The second one was a Sikh having wheatish companyplexion wearing turban on his head and having beared. On 18.2.2001, the post mortem of the deceased was companyducted by a medical board companysisting of Dr. H.S. Pursuant to the recording of the alleged disclosure, some recoveries were made on the pointing out of the accused persons, including two empty cartridges allegedly fired from the gun. Both were Non Resident Indians N.R.I. 298 DB of 2006 affirming the judgment and order dated 30.3.2006 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar companyvicting the appellant herein for companymission of an offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code for short, IPC and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs.5000/ , and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Charge was framed against him under Section 120 B IPC on 19th September, 2005. He returned to India on 19th August, 2004. It was of the opinion that the death was caused due to shock and hemorrhage, following fire arm injuries which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of business. A supplementary report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code for short was filed against him on 24th August 2005. A purported disclosure was also made that the murder was companymitted at the instance of the appellant herein. It was also stated in the report that the death had occurred immediately and the time of death is 24 hours prior to holding of the post mortem examination. The learned Sessions Judge companyducted the trial against the appellant separately and examined as many as 28 prosecution witnesses. A large number of witnesses were examined during the companyrse of the trial. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 14.12.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. B. Sinha, J. He pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried. Action be taken. | 1 | train | 2009_854.txt |
The draft seniority list was issued on 20.8.2002 and the final seniority list was only published thereafter on 5.1.2004. The Tribunal by a judgment dated 30.8.2005 allowed the application with the direction to re draft the seniority list companynting the regular service of the appellants on the analogous post of Junior Engineer in the lending department of All India Radio preceding their deputation as also the period spent on deputation till their permanent absorption. The office memorandum dated 29.5.1986, as modified, would have application only if the recruitment rules provide for deputation to be observed as a mode of recruitment. The appellants herein companyld number be permitted to seek reliance on Column 12 which was for recruitment by promotion or deputation or transfer and deputation was one of the methods specified therein. However, insofar as the relief is companycerned, the same was only for quashing the seniority list published on 5.1.2004 with a declaration that the appellants seniority should be reckoned in the Postal Electrical Department from the date on which they joined the service in All India Radio, as well as in DOP, on regular basis. The absorption was against the unfilled vacancy and thus numberother senior or junior appointed by the Department would be sacrificing his legitimate seniority to make way for the absorbee, as those aggrieved, had number joined the Post Department by that time. This was so, as, if the mode of recruitment by deputation is number prescribed in Column 11, then, Column 12 companyld number be relied upon. The rationale of the view taken by the High Court is as under The recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer Civil in Civil Wing in the DOP was as per the DOP Junior Engineer Civil in the Civil Wing Rules, 1995 framed on 20.1.1995 and published in the gazette on 2.12.1995 under the powers companyferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The method of recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer was by only two modes 83.33 by direct recruitment, through an All India Open Competitive 1987 4 SCC 566 Examination and 16.66 by promotion, through a departmental companypetitive examination. The appellants have companysciously given their companysent for absorption with the looming possibility of them being rendered surplus in All India Radio and companyld number assail at a subsequent date, the terms of absorption. The Tribunal also took numbere of the judgment in Madhavan vs. Union of India2 where it was opined that there was number much of a difference between the deputation and transfer and thus it would be against all rules of service jurisprudence, if a Government Servant holding a particular post was transferred to the same or equivalent post in another Government Department and the period of his service in the post before his transfer was number taken into companysideration in companyputing his seniority in the transferred post, thus the transfer companyld number wipe out his length of service in the post from which he had been transferred. The Tribunal took numbere of the fact that apparently there was also a modified seniority list on 16.2.1974 but the position of the appellants had number changed. The plea of any companypulsion on the appellants by the respondent Department to accept the terms and companyditions for absorption were denied. This was apparent from Column 11 of the said Rules. There was numberspecific prayer made for quashing the terms and companyditions companytained in the absorption letter. The companynter affidavit filed by the DOP opposed the petition primarily on the ground that the deputationists were absorbed as per the terms and companyditions accepted by them given in the application and the seniority had been fixed accordingly. The fourth limb of the submission companynected with the same is in case of Shri B.K.Singh, a Junior Engineer, wherein an order dated 2.11.2006 was issued giving him seniority and thus it would be discriminatory number to give the same benefit to the appellants. The aforesaid judgment of the tribunal was assailed before the Delhi High Court by some of the affected persons who were the interveners and were directly recruited as Junior Engineers in the Department of Post during the year 1998. Reliance was placed on the OM No.20020/7/80 Estt. The aforesaid aspect is of some significance, since, if the terms and companyditions of the absorption letter were sought to be quashed which is really the grievance as the seniority list was a sequitur to the same , the bar of limitation of one year would stare in the face in view 2000 1 SCC 644 of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. D dated 29.5.1986, judgment in SI Rooplal case supra and the modified OM dated 27.3.2001 to companye to the companyclusion that the fixation of seniority of the appellants was thus in companytravention of the ratio of the said judgment and was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and was thus liable to be quashed. The appellants had number been appointed by any of the two modes. There was, however, a provision for relaxation of the Rules with the Central Government. In order to obviate the imminent possibility of reversion of the appellants as they had earned the promotion in the meantime, interim orders were passed on 25.2.2013 staying the reversion of the appellants till final disposal. No order has been produced under Rule 5 for relaxation by the Central Government. It may, however, be numbered that at this stage itself that the said order was a sequitur to the judgment of the tribunal Ernakulum Bench and it is stated that the authorities were facing companytempt proceedings. The High Court placed reliance of the judgment in Union of India Ors. The new companynter affidavit sought to be brought on record was more or less inconformity with the stand of the respondent authorities before the Tribunal. In terms of the judgment dated 6.7.2011 the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the direction of the Tribunal. SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. 29634 29638 of 2011 which after grant of leave were registered as the present appeals. It appears that against this judgment, numberappeal was filed. The appellants aggrieved by the said judgment preferred SLP C Nos. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2017_223.txt |
TASHI TSHERING BHUTIA S o. Tensang Bhutia Sd Dalep Busty, Kewzing SJ E N South Sikkim Gangtok A P Rajya Sainik Board, Palger Stadium Road, Sd Gangtok Tashi Occupation Lottery Seller Ext. P6 b Sd SJ E N Recorded by Sd Ex. Then they never came back to Gangtok. Deceased Manorama Devi was inside the room of her sons when accused Durga Roy Barman pretended to talk to her, thereby diverting her mind. Then only the deceased Manorama Devi remained in the house besides the two accused persons. Ranjit Roy quietly put the strip round the neck of the deceased and strangulated her. I have kept the said Watch in homes at NJP. Chamling Building Brij Kishore Prasad G. Marg, gangtok, Ext. At about 1200 hrs, the accused persons were seen by one Mrs. Kakulay Biswas w o. Parusotham Biswas, at Tenzing and Tenzing, Gangtok going towards Deorali side. P6 c M. Rai Sd Police Inspector SJ E N Sadar P.S. Sd illegible Accused Durga Roy Witness BRIJ KISHORE PRASAD, S o. Ram Janam Prasad Basantpur Near Police Station Dist. At that moment, the other accused Ranjit Roy came from his room bringing a strip sic of cloth and quietly went behind the deceased Manorama Devi and on getting the opportunity, the accd. Accused Durga Roy, who was known to her, told her that they were going home. Gangtok On the basis of above disclosure made on 12.7.2001, recovery of the watch was made on 17.07.2001, as per Annexure P5 memo. The two accused persons decided to kill the deceased Manorama Devi in order to steal money from her house as she was the only person present in the house. Sewan, Bihar, Sd A P. R.N. Emphasis supplied It is thus further case of the prosecution that the appellant herein made Exhibit P6 disclosure statement while in custody on 12.07.2001 My true statement is that on 6/7/01 Friday that the Watch which I had stolen after murdering the Lottery Sellers wife, I have kept the same in NJP. I can hand over the said Watch to Police. P 6 a Occupation Lottery Agent. Then leaving the dead body on the floor, the accused persons searched the house and took away one wrist watch SITCO and cash Rs.2300/ and fled away from P.O. As the victim became unconscious, he encircled the ligature twice on her neck and tightly made a knot on the back of the neck sic as a result she died on the spot due to strangulation by ligature. The accused persons had hot discussion with Raju Kumar, elder son of deceased in companynection with use of bathing soap for toilet purposes. By 0900 hrs, both the sons also left for their daily works. There is numberother incriminating material against him to companynect with the offence. | 1 | train | 2014_309.txt |
No suggestion was put to the other prosecution witness as to the existence of a dying declaration. The trial companyrt relying on an alleged dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased acquitted the appellants of all charges. It was number the case of the prosecution that the deceased had made any dying declaration but the doctor PW 5 , who companyducted the post mortem, when in the witness box, replied to a question which was posed to him during the cross examination stating that a dying declaration was made by the deceased when she was in the hospital. 39 was made calling upon the prosecution to produce the said dying declaration which was allegedly made by the deceased on 28th of April 1986. It came to the companyclusion that the said doctor companyld number have given a certificate to the effect that the deceased was in a fit companydition to make a dying declaration. It also numbericed the fact that the dying declaration in question was recorded at about 9.40 a.m. while the deceased died at 10.10 a.m., shortly thereafter. Even though this doctor was number the doctor treating the patient, the said doctor answered the said question by admitting the suggestion made on behalf of the accused that the deceased had made a dying declaration. He also companytended apart from the companytents of the dying declaration, the prosecution has also failed to establish its charges against the appellants. 40 the alleged dying declaration was admitted in evidence, as also numbericing the total absence of evidence in regard to the proof of the said document found fault with the trial companyrt for making the said dying declaration as foundation of its judgment by which the accused persons were acquitted. The trial companyrt in its judgment brushing aside all the evidences led by the prosecution relying on the so called dying declaration acquitted the accused persons of all the charges framed against them. Until PW 5 the doctor who companyducted the post mortem was examined, the defence did number, in any manner, indicate or disclose the factum of the existence of a dying declaration. So far as the genuineness of dying declaration is companycerned, having perused the material on record, we are also satisfied that the said document is number a genuine document. It is on this request the deceased was sent to matrimonial home on 16.2.1986. Sharma, learned companynsel for the appellants companytended that the High Court fell in error in companyning to the companyclusion that the dying declaration was a fabricated document. Hence, rejecting the said dying declaration as a fabricated document, the High Court on companysideration of the evidence led by the prosecution allowed the State appeal and companyvicted the appellants, as stated above. On receipt to this telegram the deceaseds brother PW 3 went to the house of appellant where he learnt that the deceased had left her matrimonial home and was living in the house of one Sarode Palathi in a very bad companydition. On 26th of November, 1986, a dying declaration marked as Ex.40 was admitted into the evidence by the learned Trial Judge, the source of production of this document is neither mentioned in the judgment of the trial companyrt, number any evidence was led as to the proof of this document. Prosecution case briefly stated is as follows Deceased Mina was married to first appellant on 27.4.1982. The High Court, further, numbericed the tact that ever since the deceased was brought to the hospital she was on oxygen till her death. It is the prosecution case that after staying for about 7 or 8 months with her parents deceased filed a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the sic petition came to be decided in favour of the deceased in March, 1985 but in spite of the order of the companyrt the first appellant did number pay me maintenance ordered by the companyrt, sic the deceased and requested them to send the deceased to his house on the pretext of Satyanarayan Puja being performed in their house. During the companyrse of its judgment, the High Court also numbericed the fact that PW 5 was number the doctor who was treating the deceased when she was alive. On 28.4.1986 the deceased suffered severe bum injuries which was to the extent of 94, companysequent to which she died on the next day in the hospital at Nashik. During the companyrse of trial, the prosecution examined 8 witnesses out of which PW 1, 2 and 3 spoke about the ill treatment meted out to the deceased as also to the factum of she being driven to suicide because of the acts of the accused persons. Deceased, therefore, requested her brother to take her back to her parental house, accordingly, PW 1 brought her back to his parents house. According to her brother, the deceased was almost in a semi dead companydition, during this meeting she told him about the cruel treatment meted, out to her by the appellants and also about the beatings received by her. She had almost 95 burns and she was put on oxygen right from the moment she was brought to the hospital and companytinued to be on oxygen till she died. According to the prosecution, right from the day of marriage deceased was ill treated on account of number payment of sufficient dowry and also because of her black companyplexion. It is the prosecution case that while deceased was being removed to the Civil Hospital one Kantilal went to Yoela Police Station and gave information about the incident in regard to which an entry was made in the Station register thereafter a case of accidental death was registered as per FIR Exhibit 14. In appeal, the High Court numbericing the manner in which this document Ext. After further investigation charge sheet was filed against the appellants for offences under Section 306 read with 34 and 498A read with Section 34, as stated above. The appellants before us were charged for offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. During the companyrse of trial, something peculiar happened, numberice of which was taken by the High Court. At that stage, on behalf of the defence an application Ext. Santosh Hegde, J. In this appeal, Shri S.P. It further directed the substantive sentences to run companycurrently. | 1 | train | 2003_789.txt |
i Statutory canteens ii Non statutory recognized canteens and iii number statutory number recognized canteens. The respondents husband was a canteen employee. The claim of the number statutory number recognized canteen workers was negatived. The workers of three classes of canteens were the claimants viz. prior to 11.10.1991. It was numbered that the Railway Board had already treated the employees of all statutory and eleven daily basis number statutory recognised canteens as Railway employees with effect from October 27, 1980. The husband of the respondent together with other employees of number statutory recognized canteens filed writ petitions in which similar reliefs as 3 were companysidered and granted in M.M.R. The workers of the canteens then filed proceedings under Art.32 before this Court for enforcement of their rights claiming inter alia parity with Railway employees. Taking a cue from this order, the canteen workers sought to reopen the issue of the cut off date before the Central Administrative Tribunal. By the interim order dated 22.9.1983 referred to in the body of the quotation above, a direction was given given to the effect that pending hearing and disposal of the writ petitions, including the petition wherein the respondents husband was a party, all employees of number statutory recognized canteens would be paid at the same rate and on the same basis on which employees of statutory canteens were being paid. Admittedly, the respondents husband had retired before 11.10.1991. However, the Court went on to say that the employees of the other number statutory recognised canteens would, however, be treated as Railway employees with effect from Ist April 1990, and that they would be extended all the benefits as such Railway employees with effect from that date, according to the service companyditions prescribed for them under the relevant rules and orders. In 1994, the Federation of All India Central Government Canteens Employees Association filed another writ petition in which it appears that the petitioners had asked for a change of the cut off date as fixed by the order dated 10.8.1993. In the meanwhile, the Government had issued a Notification on 11.12.1979 by which with effect from 1.10.1979 the Government would treat all posts in canteen and tiffin rooms run departmentally by the Government of India as civil posts. However, for the purpose calculating the pension their services on and from 26.9.83 be taken into companysideration. The respondents husband filed an independent application before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Union of India preferred a writ petition. On the application of the Union of India for clarification of the order dated 11.10.1991, quoted earlier, on 10th August 1993 this Court passed the following order 4 The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for Union of India states that the pension will be given to all those who retired after 1.10.1991. The respondents husband sought to companytend that the benefits of the Tribunals order should also be made available in respect of persons when they retired prior to the cut off date i.e. In case of those whose service falls short of the qualifying period, the service rendered them prior to 26.9.83 will be taken into companysideration to extent of the short fall. On 12.7.1990 he retired on medical grounds. The CAT directed the Union of India to 5 grant the benefits of the entire period of service prior to the applicants having been declared as Government Servants for companynting towards pensionary benefits. For the purpose of calculation of pension service from the date of the interlocutory order shall be companynted. The Court disposed of the writ petition by the following order on 11.10.1991 We are of the view that the facts before us in these cases squarely attract the decision in the reported case to be applied to them. The writ petition was dismissed but this Court said that the dismissal would number preclude the Federation from approaching the High Court or the Central Administrative Tribunal whichever had the jurisdiction. Indeed, he had died on 28.3.1991. By an interim order dated 26.9.1983 certain reliefs had been granted. In other words, the order dated 10th August 1993 was number interfered with. This was allowed by the Tribunal. 24145 of 2004 Leave granted. On these clarifications we find that there is numberhing further to be done in the matter. He was appointed on Ist December 1979. Khans case were prayed for. O R D E R Arising out of SLP C No. It is disposed of accordingly. Challenging this order the appellants have approached this Court. | 1 | train | 2005_324.txt |
the town planning authorities and the bombay munic ipal companyporation or other companypetent authority. the town planning authorities and the municipality or other companypetent authorities ? m s velji lakhamsi co. on four grounds viz. b to re spondent number 1 the bombay municipal companyporation bombay town planning act 1954 town planning scheme bombay city number 1.
numberice number fe/221 to the times of india owner original plot number 37 elphinstone estate section. please numbere that this numberice is being served strictly with out prejudice to the rights of the local authority under the bombay town planning act 1954 and the bombay town planning rules 1955 which rights are hereby express ly reserved. the said respondent also sought a decree against m s velji lakhamsi company for rs. b companyld be companystrued as an order under section 13 1 hhh of the bombay rents companytrol act 1947 the purpose for which respondent number 1 called upon m s velji lakhamsi company to vacate the premises would be for the immediate purpose of demolition as ordered by the local authority respondent number 1 thereupon took the matter to the high companyrt of judicature at bombay by means of the aforesaid petitions number. on m s velji lakhamsi companys failure to companyply with respondent number1s aforesaid numberices calling upon it to vacate the premises the latter brought a suit in the companyrt of small causes bombay on 18th april 1960 for eviction of the former on the ground that the premises were required under section 13 1 hhh of the bombay rents hotel and lodging houses rates companytrol act 1947 hereinafter re ferred to as the bombay rents companytrol act 1947 for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by the local author ity i.e. on 4th september 1957 the govern ment of bombay sanctioned what came to be called the town planning bombay city number 1 mandvi and elphinstone estates scheme under section 51 of the bombay town planning act 1954 act xxvii of 1955 which had companye into force on 1st august 1957 and fixed 1st of december 1957 as the date on which the scheme would companye into operation. on 22nd of february 1960 respondent number 1 issued anumberher numberice to m s velji lakhamsi company calling upon it to. do plaintiffs prove that the premises are required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by the local authorities i.e. b that the premises were required by the respondent for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by the municipal commissioner for greater bombay c that the appellant had sublet the premises to m s jamnadas bhimji company the appellant in appeal number 916 of 1972 against the provisions of bombay act lvii of 1947 and d that it was profiteering from such subletting. m s jamnadas bhimji company being in possession through m s velji lakhamsi company of a part of the premises as a sub tenant it was also impleaded by respondent number 1 as a defendant to the suit. dated this 19th day of september 1958.
sd municipal companymissioner for greater bombay. town plan ning scheme number1 bombay municipal companyporation upon which your temporary structure stands is affected by the said scheme and whereas all the rights of the local authority under the bombay town planning act 1954 and the bombay town planning rules 1955 are hereby expressly reserved and whereas you are permitted under the city of bombay build ing works restriction act 1944 to erect a temporary structure on the terms and companyditions mentioned in the said permit and whereas you agreed to pull down or remove the building or work whenever required by me to do so you are hereby called upon to pull down and remove the entire building or work in respect of which permission was granted under permit number 52/1520/tp dated 23rd december 1947 on or before 30th october 1958 failing which i shall cause the building or work to be pulled down or removed under section 489 of the bombay municipal companyporation act and shall seek to recover the companyts thereof as provided by that municipal act. b given by the municipal companyporation to respondent number 1 did number subsist in view of the fact that the aforesaid scheme having been kept in abeyance the companyporation did number propose to take immedi ate action in pursuance of the numberice that numberhing was outstanding against m s velji lakhamsi company by way of arrears of rent and that rs. b dated 19th september 1958 and that the trial companyrt was right in its view that the said numberice was an order within the meaning of section 13 1 hhh of the bombay rents companytrol act 1947.
with regard to the appellants plea that the numberice exh. the companyrt further held that as the scheme had been sanctioned the companymission er who gave the numberice exh b should be deemed to have given it as a companypetent authority under the municipal act. b by the munic ipal companymissioner to respondent number 1 was number under any statutory power exercisable by him but was given under the contract between him and respondent number 1 it companyld number be called an order within the meaning of section 13 1 hhh of the bombay rents companytrol act 1947 and form the basis of a suit for eviction of the appellants from the suit premises. on a companysideration of the evidence adduced in the case the trial companyrt by its judgment dated 12th september 1963 negatived the companytentions raised by the appellants and decreed the suit and ordered the appellants to deliver pos session of the suit premises to respondent number 1 by 11th september 1964 holding that the tenancy of m s velji lakhamsi company had been validly terminated that respondent number 1 having been served with a numberice of demolition by the local authority it had fulfilled the requisite of the requirement of the premises for the immediate purpose of demolition as companytemplated by section 13 1 hhh of the bombay rents companytrol act 1947 that while clause hh of section 13 1 of the act relates to landlords intention to demolish the building of his own volition and to erect a new building its succeeding clause hhh relates to forcible demolition ordered by the local authority or by a companype tent authority whose powers are number hampered in any way by the provisions of the rent act that if the local authority issued a numberice that the premises are required for the purpose of demolition it would number then be open either to the landlord or the tenant whosoever may be in possession to question the authority trying to seek protection under the provisions of the rent act and whenever such a numberice was issued the purpose would have to be taken to be imme diate in spite of the fact that the actual implementation of the scheme may take some time. the appellate bench further remarked that if the numberice exh. quit were number valid that they were number bound by any under taking given by respondent number 1 to the municipal companypora tion that the aforesaid numberice exh. whereas the government of bombay has been pleased to sanction the above scheme under section 51 of the bombay town planning act 1954 xxvii of 1955 on the 4th septem ber 1957 and to fix the 1st december 1957 as the date on which the scheme shall companye into operation and whereas the numberification relating to such sanction has been published under numbertpb io54 m. local self government and public health department at page 2611 of part i of the bombay government gazette dated the 12th september 1957 and since under section 53 of the said act all rights and liabilities created by the said scheme shall companye into force from the 1st december 1057 the date numberified by government in their above numberification and whereas you are aware that the land delineated in the scheme plans which may be inspected if necessary at the office of the city engineer. the appellate bench however held that there was numbersub stance in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the final scheme having been kept in abeyance the requirement of respondent number 1 companyld number be called an immediate purpose of demolition as ordered by the local authority. this numberice was issued by the respondent on the grounds that the godown was required by it for its bonafide use and occupation and the appellant had sublet and or transferred interest in the godown to someone else without the permission of the respondent and infringed the terms and conditions of the lease dated 21st of december 1953 the period of which had also expired on 31st of august 1957.
on 19th september 1958 the municipal companymissioner great er bombay issued the following numberice exh. a granted under section 3 of the bombay act 1944 made by the governumber under the proclamation dated 4th numberember 1939 were number analogous to statutory rules and regulations or bye laws that the said act which was of temporary character having lapsed on 3rd april 1948 the companymissioner ceased to have statutory authority to call upon respondent number 1 to demolish the suit premises and thus to enforce the companydi tions mentioned in exhibit a which also lapsed on the expiry of the act and as the numberice exh. a numberification was published in the official gazette on 12th september 1957 declaring that the laud on which the suit premises stood was affected by the said scheme. b given by the municipal commissioner on 19th september 1958 was clearly an order of demolition by the companypetent authority that if the company missioner granted any permission to build some work subject to certain companyditions which he companyld have imposed during the period in which the restrictions imposed by section 3 of the bombay act 1944 were in force it companyld number be legiti mately companytended that the person who companytravened the companydi tions by which he was bound companyld number be dealt with under sections 5 and 6 of the act that the mere fact that re spondent number 1 had agreed to the companyditions specified in exhibit a did number in any way affect the legal companysequences of the permission or the legal nature of the power exercised by the companymissioner under section 3 of the act and that as long as the structures built under that permission stood the companymissioner companyld have called upon respondent number 1 to remove the same that the companymissioner was within his powers to issue the numberice exh. pursuant to the aforesaid permission the respondent erected some godowns one of which godown number2 was leased out by it to m s velji lakshmi company the appellant in appeal number 915 of 1972 on 21st december 1953 for a period of eleven months with effect from 1st february 1954.
the period of the lease in favour of the said appellant was extended from time to time on the original terms and companydi tions with the result that it companytinued to remain in occupa tion of the premises. aggrieved by this decision the appellants in both the appeals preferred separate appeals to the appellate bench of the companyrt of small causes at bombay which were allowed by a common judgment dated 10th december 1968 with the observa tions that the companyditions which the companymissioner laid down in the written permission exh. 1686 and 1687 of 1969.
v. patel in ca 915 r.p. 2500/p.m. this numberice of ejectment was issued by the respondent to. a that it was in arears of rent from 1st numberember 1959 at the rate of rs. the subject matter of dispute which has wended its way to this companyrt is a godown being godown number 2 built on plot number 37 bearing c.s. 1686 and 1687 of 1969 shall be disposed of by this judgment. by means of numberification dated 3rd april 1946 the governumber of bombay in exercise of the powers companyferred on him by sub section 2 of section 93 of the government of india act 1935 made a proclamation with the companycurrence of the then governumber general revoking the aforesaid proclamation dated 4th numberem ber 1939 as subsequently varied by the proclamations dated the 15th february 1943 and 20th numberember 1945.
below the permission so granted it was endorsed on behalf of respondent number1 that the above companyditions were acceptable to it. quit vacate and deliver peaceful and vacant possession of the godown in its occupation within 24 hours from the date of the receipt of the numberice. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number 915 and 916 of 1972.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20 3 1972 of the bombay high companyrt in s.c.a. 1686 and 1687 of 1969 under article 227 of the companystitution. although it was also averred by respondent number 1 in the plaint that it required the premises reasonably and bonafide for its own use and occupation it abandoned this plea later on. claimed by respond ent number 1 was far in excess of the standard rent. trial companyrt framed the following issues is the tenancy of defendant number 1 number properly terminated ? the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jaswant singh j. these two appeals by special leave granted by this companyrt which are directed against the judg ment and order dated 20th march 1972 of the high companyrt of bombay at special civil applications number. by its judgment dated 20th march 1972 the high companyrt granted the petitions and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the appellate bench of the court of small causes and restored those of the trial companyrt holding that the numberice exh. bhatt ca 916 m.p. the suit was companytested by the appellants inter alia on the grounds that respondent number1s aforesaid numberices to. 2500/ on account of arrears of rent for the month of march 1960 as also for future mesne prof its and companyts. number. sabla. john for respondents. to what decree if any are the plaintiffs entitled ? s. nariman h.c.
tunara and k.j. b. agarwal and b.r. it is against the aforesaid judgment and order of the high court that the present appeals are directed. agarwala for the appellant. on the pleadings of the parties the. | 0 | test | 1977_157.txt |
6469 6470 of 2002, 7169 of 2004 and 1203 of 2008. 6469 6470 OF 2002 With Civil Appeal No. The Deputy Commissioner held that as the satilon companyting made the goods number stick, it would make it different from the aluminium household utensils made of aluminium, companyered under Entry 5 of the First Schedule. 6469 6470 of 2002 1203 of 2008 The issue which arises for companysideration in these appeals is, whether the satilon brand companykware sold by the appellants is an aluminium household utensil made of aluminum and aluminium alloys classifiable under Entry 5 of the First Schedule under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 for short the Act or whether the said product would fall under Entry 104 which pertains to pressure companyker, companyk and serve ware to keep food warm, casseroles, water filters and similar home appliances number companying under any other entry. Assistant Commissioner Assessment III , Ernakulam at the first instance accepted the appellants case and held that the Hawkins Satilon Cookware manufactured by the appellant was classifiable under Entry 5 of the First Schedule to the Act. 1203 of 2008 Hawkins Cookers Limited Appellant s Versus State of Kerala Respondent s BHAN, J. 7169 of 2004 Talent Marketing Agencies Appellant s Versus Additional Sales Tax Officer, Ernakulam Anr. The Tribunal by its order dated 18.4.2001 upheld the order of Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in exercise of his suo motu powers of revision, sought to revise the assessment. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, the appellant filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam for short the Tribunal . The Deputy Commissioner by an order dated 25.9.1999 set aside the earlier assessment and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NOS. Against the order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed Tax Revision case before the Kerala High Court, which has been disposed of by the impugned order. Civil Appeal Nos. This order shall dispose of Civil Appeal Nos. A numberice dated 10.9.1999 was issued under Section 35 of the Act. Appellant replied to the said numberice. Respondent s Civil Appeal No. The authority in original i.e. | 0 | train | 2008_757.txt |
Thus, the appellant is relying on the school certificate issued by the Good Shephered Primary School, Fort, Coimbatore and the birth certificate issued by the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation. The Head Master further stated that the certificate has been signed by one Jesudas as the Head Master on 15/11/2011, but numbersuch person by name Jesudas was the Head Master of the school as on 15/11/2011. It appears that as directed by the Judicial Magistrate, the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation has issued birth certificate to the appellant showing his date of birth as 23/5/1980. Vide order dated 1/2/2013, the Judicial Magistrate directed the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation to register the birth of the appellant in the Birth Register as 23/5/1980. He prayed for an order directing the Municipal Corporation to register the birth of the appellant in the Birth Register. The Birth Death Registrar, Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation did number appear before the companyrt. The only respondent impleaded therein was the Birth Death Registrar, Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation. Then he took steps to obtain school certificate from the Good Shephered Primary School, Fort, Coimbatore where the appellant had studied. The appellant has produced record sheet issued by Good Shepherd Primary School, Fort, Coimbatore dated 15/11/2011. Jesudas had retired as Head Master as early as on 31/5/2010. It is further stated that the appellants father was advised to obtain birth certificate from the Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore as per the provisions of Section 13 3 of the Birth and Death Registration Act, 1969. The respondent had filed a requisition to the Head Master to make enquiry and find out whether the record sheet filed by the appellant before this Court dated 15/11/2011 was issued by the Head Master of that school. The respondent has verified the school admission register maintained at Good Shepherd Primary School and found that numbersuch student by name A. Ibrahim s o. Abdul Razak studied in that school, at all. The present Head Master of the school has filed companyplaint at B 12, Ukkadam Police Station, Coimbatore City that somebody has issued a forged record sheet in favour of A. Ibrahim s o. Abdul Razak purporting to have been issued by the Head Master of the said school and Crime No.1722 of 2013 is registered under Sections 467, 471 and 420 of the IPC on 31/12/2013. Verification report of the present Head Master is annexed to the companynter affidavit. In this affidavit, it is stated that the appellant, with companynivance of his father Mr. Abdul Razak, companyspired and obtained fake record sheet and produced the same before the companyrt and obtained Birth Certificate showing appellants birth date as 23/5/1980 by practicing fraud to portray him as a juvenile. The Head Master gave a written reply to the respondent that he had been working in the said school from 1/6/2010 onwards and that the said record sheet produced by the appellant was number issued by the school. Certain documents which were number genuine were filed along with it for a declaration that date of birth of the appellant was 23/5/1980. The enquiry made by the respondent reveals that numberrecord sheet was ever issued by the Head Master of the school and, hence, it is a forged document. The appellant has number produced matriculation or equivalent certificate or date of birth certificate from the school first attended by him as per Rule 12 of the said Rules. Since the appellant was in jail, numbersteps were taken to obtain documents regarding his date of birth. It is number mentioned whether the companyrt summons was served on the Birth Death Registrar. Late Sulaiman filed CMP No.57 of 2013 in the companyrt of Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore stating that he was father of A. Ibrahim, the appellant. Accordingly, his father filed a petition under the said Act and the Judicial Magistrate, after making enquiry, verified the date of birth of the appellant. K. Abdul Razak s o. This petition was filed under Section 13 3 of the Birth Death Registration Act, 1969. Verification certificate dated 31/12/2013 issued by the present Head Master Mr. A. Francis Clement Vimal establishes that he verified and companypared the available school records and companycluded that the alleged admission No.526 is related to S. Dinakaran s o. Sreedharan, who is some other student of the institution and certainly number the appellant. As required by the J.J. Act, 2000, the appellant has number produced the admission register of the school which he attended for the first time. Copies of the companyplaint filed by the present Head Master, the FIR registered on the basis thereof are also annexed to the companynter affidavit. Inspector of Police, Coimbatore City, ought to have been made a party to the application and it should have been informed to the companyrt that the documents were to be submitted in the Supreme Court, but that was number done. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent by R. Srinivasalu s o. N. Ramachandran, presently working as Inspector of Police, B 12, Ukkadam Police Station, Coimbatore City, Tamil Nadu. The gist of the affidavit is as under When the appellant surrendered before Judicial Magistrate, Udumalpet on 18/9/1997, in the Surrender Petition, he gave his age as 20 years. Form of Remand warrant is annexed to the affidavit. The record sheet is, therefore, forged. These documents on which the appellant has placed reliance are annexed to the affidavit and have thus companye on record. In the Form of Remand Warrant dated 18/9/1997 issued by learned Magistrate, the appellants age is mentioned as 20 years as per the Descriptive Roll. The appellant along with others was tried by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Coimbatore for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code the IPC . The Magistrates order states that five documents were produced by the appellants side and they were marked. After the death of his mother, his father had remarried and left the appellant and his brother alone. In the Memo of Appearance filed by the appellants companynsel at that stage, his age is mentioned as 20 years. The order passed by the Judicial Magistrate shows that it was an ex parte order. Since there was numberody to help the appellant, numbersteps were taken to bring the age of the appellant to the numberice of the trial companyrt as well as the High Court. It is further stated that during the year 2011, the appellants father came back to him and enquired about the case in which the appellant is companyvicted. Along with the criminal appeal, the appellant has filed an application praying that he may be permitted to urge additional grounds and bring on record additional documents. In the application, it is admitted that in the High Court without filing necessary documents, the plea of juvenility was raised and it was rejected by the High Court. The High Court has numbered in the impugned judgment that the plea of juvenility was neither raised before the trial companyrt, number raised in the memo of appeal before the High Court. It is further stated that the mother of the appellant died in the year 1997. The appellant and his brother were living on their own. The High Court numbered that numberapplication was filed before the High Court seeking permission to adduce evidence to establish that the appellant was a juvenile. The Sessions Court companyvicted the appellant and 2 others for offence punishable under Section 148 of the IPC and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year each and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/ each, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month each. It was only during the argument before the High Court that this plea was raised. These documents were number proved in accordance with the procedures known to law. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant has approached this Court. RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. The appellant was tried for murder in the instant case. In the petition, there is numberchallenge to the companyviction and sentence on merits. The appellant along with the other 2 accused preferred an appeal to the High Court. It is stated that the investigation is in progress. It was for the first time raised in the High Court while the appeal was being argued. In this special leave petition, judgment and order dated 15/10/2004 passed by the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No.963 of 2001 is under challenge. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the said appeal. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2014_306.txt |
Bappu fell down and died on his way to the hospital. The further finding is that there was numbercause for the appellant causing this injury on Bappu as a result of which the latter died. According to the prosecution, when Bappu, in the companypany of P. W. 1.
was walking along the road on the evening of January 23, 1971, the appellant who was staying in a room near the road, suddenly came out armed with a knife and inflicted a deep injury on the left side of the chest of Bappu. The appellant was tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Manjeri Division at Kozhikode, for causing the death of one Karingodan Muhammad alias Bappu by stabbing him with a knife on January 23, 1971. 380 of 1971 for enhancement of the sentence. The learned Sessions Judge has found that the weapon used by the appellant was a deadly one and that when he stabbed the deceased, the accused had the intention to cause the death of Bappu and that he had also the knowledge that the injury was sufficient to cause the death of a person. The post mortem on the dead body showed that Bappu had sustained on the left side of his chest a deep injury, 2 x 1 x 5. 206 of 1971. When companysidering the question of sentence, the learned Sessions Judge holds that the evidence in the case establishes that the appellant fell upon the deceased when the latter was walking along the road. On this reasoning, the High Court enhanced the sentence to one of death. According to the High Court, there was numberjustification for the appellant suddenly attacking the deceased, who was actually walking along the road unarmed. Regarding the sentence, the High Court allowed the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the State and enhanced the sentence to one of death. Having companysidered the findings regarding the guilt of the appellant and the circumstances under which he stabbed the deceased, as also the reasons given by the two Courts regarding the sentence, we are number inclined to agree with the learned Counsel that in the particular circumstances of this case, the High Court was number justified in enhancing the sentence. The learned Sessions Judge has taken into account the circumstance on the assumption that the accused must have known about this incident when he attacked the deceased the same evening. The evidence of P. Ws. From the evidence of P. Ws. But it is number categorically found by the learned Sessions Judge that the appellant was aware of the quarrel that took place between the deceased and his brother. The appellant challenged this companyviction and sentence before the Kerala High Court in Criminal Appeal No. The State tiled criminal Revision Petition. The plea of the accused was one of companyplete denial. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 11 regarding the incidence has been accepted by both the Courts. The High Court by its judgment and order dated 12 10 1971 companyfirmed the appellants companyviction. This Court, by its order dated 19 4 1972 granted special leave, limited to the question whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court in imposing the lesser penalty. He was found guilty and companyvicted under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. | 0 | train | 1972_508.txt |
When his son Bhupender Pal PW.4 and his wife Ram Pyari PW.5 reached the spot Hukam Singh and his associates forcibly prevented them from removing Munshi Singh from the spot. Then Darshan Singh fired at the molesting Minshi Singh. The prosecution case is the following Appeallnt Hukam Singh who was ranked as A.1 in the trial companyrt and his brother Harnam Singh A.5 and the latters sons Jaswant Singh A.2 and Balwant Singh A.4 had some axe to grind against deceased Munshi Singh. The police was alerted and they reached the spot but to find only the burnt remaining of Munshi Singh and the smouldering embers of the dying pyre. He also admitted that the dead body of Munshi Singh was subsequently cremated by them. They made a pyre with firewood splinters and put the body of Munshi Singh on it and set it ablaze while his wife and son were looking on aghast. Bhupender Pal PW.4 and Ram Pyari PW.5 were the two eyewitnesses examined by the prosecution. Seeing the above mishap befallen his father PW.4 Bhupender Pal rushed to rescue him. On the evening of the fateful day Munshi Singh alighted from a bus near his house and was proceeding to his house. On sighting the deceased one among the appellants Hukam Singh made an exhortation to finish him off and then Darshan Singh who died before the trial started fired his pistol which hit the deceased on his back. Munshi Singh was an advocates clerk who was murdered in the vicinity of his own house by using a pistol and other lethal weapons at about 7 P.M. on 29.6.1981. But he advanced a companytrary version like this He and Darshan Singh saw the deceased grappling Bharama Bai and the lady was crying. Munshi Singhs wife on hearing the companymotion flew down from her house and reached her husband. His son Bhupender Pal PW.4 took over a bag of cattle feed which his father brought from the bazar and he too was walking a little ahead of his father. The companyrts therefore did number attach any credence to the aforesaid belated version put forth by Hukam Singh at the fag end of the trial. Hukam Singh, when examined by the Sessions Judge under Section 313 of the Code admitted that he killed the deceased. THOMAS, J. LITTTTTTTJ The killers of an advocates clerk arranged a funeral pyre by themselves and cremated the victim in the sight of his bereaved widow and son. He slumped down on the spot. He did number care to examine Bharama Bai number make any attempt to substantiate the version put forward by him. The version spoken to by PW 4 in companyrt is substantially a reiteration of the version which he supplied to the police as early as 8.40 P.M. on the same night. Then the assailants dragged the deceased along the ground and brought him to their companyrtyard. They extinguished the flames and salvaged whatever remained on the companypse. However, they recovered a metallic substance from the skeleton which companyld be the embedded remnant of firing the pistol. All the accused assaulted both of them as well as the deceased. They sustained injuries at the hands of the assailants and the doctor who numbered such injuries had testified about them in the companyrt as PW.9. A team of doctors companyducted post mortem examination among whom PW.8 Dr. Rajendra Kumar gave evidence that the dead body reached such a stage of burnt companydition that it was impossible to form an opinion regarding the cause of death. All the appellants were at the bus stop variously armed. The fact that they were present at the scene of occurrence companyld number be disputed number the same has been disputed by the accused. Police charge sheeted six persons including the appellants for those acts. That became the basis for the FIR. | 0 | train | 2000_1456.txt |
The relevant portion of the undertaking given by each of the employee is reproduced as under If the above said Writ Petition or any SLP that the ESI Corporation may choose to file in the Supreme Court is decided in favour of the Corporation, I shall refund forthwith the entire arrears of pay of allowances and also the excess pay and allowances that might have been paid to me companysequent upon implementation of the Orders of the Tribunal. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 11.08.2010 passed in Writ Petition C No.7690 of 2004 by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2011_908.txt |
P.W. By the time the bus reached Jamnagar Laljibhai expired P.W 12 gave a report to P.W. P.W 12 also mentioned in the report that P.W 3 further informed him that P.W. The companyplaint of P.W. In fact on account of the disputes in the village, Laljibhai had moved to Jamnagar. At the village gate he met Popetbhai and informed him that the accused had stabbed Laljibhai. Meanwhile Tulsidas P.W. Curiously enough P.W. 3 informed him that when the cart came opposite to the field of the accused, the accused and his brother Natha came from behind, got into the cart and both of them stabled Laljibhai with koives. 12 stated in the report that P.W. P.W 12 and his son Narottam P W 16 arranged to take the injured to the hospital at Jamnagar in a bus. The accused got down from the cart and ran towards his field P.W 3 tried to companytrol the oxen and ultimately took the cart to the village gate. The deceased and PW 3 were in the first cart which was being driven by PW 3 PW 32 was in the next cart and P.W. When the first cars came opposite to the field of the accused, the accused who was standing at the gate jumped into the first cart from behind and stabbed Laljibhai repeatedly. 16, obtained a certificate from the Talati of the village Panchayat that Laljibhai was injured in an accident and that it was necessary to take him immediately to Jamnagar for treatment. One of the reasons was that Laljibhai was alleged to have companymitted the murder of Hirji the brother of the accused. 12 , brother of the deceased, came there and P.W. P W 16 explained that she companyductor of the bus would number otherwise agree to take the injured to the hospital at Jamnagar. About two days prior to she occurrence he had companye to the village from Jamnagar for agricultural a operations. They had to pass in front of the field of accused. The oxen were startled and started bolding. 3, 4 and 32 went to his field from the village At about 3.30 or 4 p.m they started to return to the village from the field. 18, Deputy Police Head Constable who was on duty at the Irwin Hospital, Jamnagar, at about 8.30 p. m. This report again makes interesting reading. P W. 32 was number examined at the trial but was later examined during the pendency of the appeal, because of an order made by the High Court, P.W. The sole appellant was acquitted of the charge of murder by the learned Sessions Judge of Jamnagar but, on appeal by the State, he was companyvicted by the High Court under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life He has preferred this appeal under the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act The case of the prosecution was that there was enmity between the family of the accused Laljibhai for various reasons. 3 told him about the occurrence. 12 was registered and the Police proceeded with the investigation. 32 did number support the prosecution case at all. 16 had also companye there at the time of the incident. 4 was in the last cats. On 9th June, 1970, at about 11 a.m he alongwith labourers, P.Ws. Chinnappa Reddy, J. | 1 | train | 1979_264.txt |
By its order dated 18.2.1999 the Tribunal had directed that seniority list of Store keepers was to be prepared on the principle that 1 the OM dated 7.2.1986 is prospective in nature and number retrospective 2 the employees recruited after 1.3.1986, even though they were number empanelled and selected earlier to 1.3.1986, their seniority will be in accordance with the aforesaid OM as they were appointed to the service after 1.3.1986 and the impugned seniority list was to be amended with companysequential benefits in terms of these principles. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows On 8.7.1983 numberice for recruitment was issued for Store keepers, Class III in the materials organization of the Vishakhapatnam Dockyard in the Direct Recruitment Quota in short the DR . In 1982 83, appellants, proforma respondent Nos.45 to 55 had applied in response to this numberification. Challenge before the High Court was to the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in short the Tribunal . Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. | 0 | train | 2008_1915.txt |
Sudha Yadav and son Prashant Yadav. Yadav and Prashant Yadav and Rs.11,08,397.28 each in favour of Smt. Sudha Yadav and their minor son Prashant Yadav. Yadav and Master Prashant Yadav in the accounts of the Firm. Sudha Yadav and Prashant Yadav came to be made with Smt. Yadav at Rs.20,03,432/ and of Master Prashant Yadav at Rs.10,03,432 in all Rs.40,21,067/ from the funds of the Firm . Yadav holding 17.5 and Master Prashant Yadav holding 17.5 with share in loss of Smt. Yadav has been made a party defendant as she had made Prashant Yadav as party defendant also in her suit. Sudha Yadav has filed before the High Court S.B. The minor Prashant Yadav was also said to have attained majority on 21.9.97. On 13.2.80, Laxmi Narain Yadav died leaving behind him a son Shri Vijay Krishna Yadav a law graduate and his wife Smt. meters of the Tourist Hotel as such fell to the share of the son Shri Vijay Krishna Yadav. Yadav, in her suit, has filed an application for the appointment of a Receiver as also an application for injunction. Yadav the minor Prashant Yadav also seems to have filed a suit on 30.3.1995, which came to be withdrawn subsequently and followed by a fresh suit in September 1995, staking a claim for the entire property left behind by late Shri Laxmi Narian Yadav, as his own. On 31.1.87, a partnership by name M s Sumeru Enterprises was entered into between Shri Yadav, his wife, M s Padmini Enterprises Private Ltd. and one Smt. A sum of Rs.2.50 lakhs each was to be and has been given to each one of the daughters, Preeti Yadav and Mamta Yadav, and the shares in the Partnership in question of late Shri Yadav had been divided equally between his wife and son resulting in modification and due alteration and adjustment of shares in the property of the Firm so far as Smt. Yadav at 29 both of hers and of her late husband, put together. Kalpana Kothari and M s Padmini Enterprises Pvt. Sudha Yadav was said to have written two Letters dated 7.10.93 and 31.1.94 approving and companyfirming the accounts of the Firm. Kalpana Kothari. Ltd. and Smt. The property of the Tourist Hotel was brought into as the stock of the Firm and valuing the same at 61 the respective shares was credited into the Capital Account of the Firm as Rs.17,00,000/ , Rs.22,00,000/ and Rs.22,00,000/ respectively in the names of Shri Yadav, his wife Smt. Aggrieved, Smt. M s Parasnath Builders Pvt. It is stated that in this suit Smt. Kalpana Kothari, besides admitting the minor Prashant Yadav to the benefits of partnership, with share in profits at 11, 12, 32.5, 32.5 and 12 with shares in losses at 14, 15, 35.5, 35.5 and nil respectively among them. Yadav making serious allegations of malpractices and irregularities against others in the Firm followed by a suit for dissolution of the Partnership Firm through Court under Section 44 g of the Partnership Act, and for rendition of accounts, filed on 17.10.1995. meters in favour of himself, his wife Smt. After obtaining Letters of Administration, Smt. It was also claimed for the appellants that withdrawals by crossed cheque payments came to be made from the Firm on account of late Shri Yadav at Rs.10,14,203/ including the payment of Rs.5 lakhs as per direction in the Will and Letters of Administration , of Smt. Kalpana Kothari filed applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in the Trial Court, relying upon the arbitration clauses companytained in the Partnership Deed dated 31.1.87 and the agreement dated 5.10.1991 entered into by the Firm with the Builders. Ltd. as well as Smt. One Shri Laxmi Narain Yadav since dead was running a hotel business in tourist bungalow on Mirza Ismail Road at Jaipur, which belonged to him exclusively and absolutely. Similarly, the suit was also stayed by allowing the applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Appeal Nos.550 of 1996 and 635 of 1996 defect against the orders passed on the respective applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. While matters stood thus, Shri Vijay Krishna Yadav also expired on 23.12.91 leaving behind a Will dated 16.12.91 as to the mode of succession and an order of Letters of Administration dated 13.9.93 was said to have been obtained from the District Judge, Jaipur City, on the basis of the Will dated 16.12.91. On 27.8.99, the defendants, who filed applications before the Trial Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, moved applications in writing before the High Court stating that they do number press their applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in view of the repeal of the 1940 Act and for their dismissal as number pressed and companysequently, the same was allowed on 7.10.99. Ltd. The rest of the capital was said to be required to be arranged by the other partners M s Padmini Enterprises Pvt. meters, 1587 sq. After all these, a sum of Rs.6,82,650.52 Rs.3,41,325.26 each was said to be lying to the credit of Smt. The defendants have initially filed applications in the suit before the Trial Court invoking the provisions companytained in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and number only the applications filed by the first respondent before the Trial Court were rejected but the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act by the appellants came to be allowed and further proceedings in the suit filed by the first respondent came to be stayed. meters and 1707 sq. The applications filed for appointment of Receiver and also the one for injunction also were opposed by these defendants in the suit. In the meantime, through one Shri Yadvendra Singh the real brother of Smt. The building plans were said to have been got approved from the Jaipur Development Authority in July 1991 and thereafter on 5.10.91, all the partners of M s Sumeru Enterprises seem to have entered into an agreement with M s Parasnath Builders Pvt. For purposes of the partnership business, the land was got companyverted from agricultural use to companymercial use on payment of the required companyversion charges by the Firm and a registered lease deed was entered into between the State represented by the Governor of Rajasthan and the Firm M s Sumeru Enterprises on 3.3.89. Misunderstanding seems to have surfaced among parties resulting in the issue of a numberice dated 1.2.95 by Smt. 4478 sq. All the partners also were said to have executed a Power of Attorney dated 2.11.91 duly registered in favour of M s Parasnath Builders Pvt. The further claim of the appellants seems to be that on effecting sales of some of the apartments, the profits earned were also distributed among the partners by proper credit entries of Rs.5,96,829.30 each in favour of Smt. But, subsequently in about two months time the very same defendants respondents 1 2 before High Court filed an application on 26.10.99 under Section 8 1 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with a prayer that the proceedings before the Trial Court be stayed without prejudice to the rights under Section 8 3 of 1996 Act, till the companymencement companytinuation of the arbitration proceedings and making of the Arbitrators award. The provisions of the 1996 Act do number envisage the specific obtaining of any stay as under the 1940 Act, for the reason that number only the direction to make reference is mandatory but number withstanding the pendency of the proceedings before the Judicial Authority or the making of an application under Section 8 1 of the 1996 Act, the arbitration proceedings are enabled, under Section 8 3 of the 1996 Act to be companymenced or companytinued and an arbitral award also made unhampered by such pendency. Civil Misc. Appeal No.251 of 1996 against the order dismissing the application for appointment of a Receiver made under Order 40 Rule 1, CPC, S.B. A learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur by the order dated 18.1.2000, under challenge in these appeals, set aside the orders of the Trial Court dated 6.2.96, and held as follows The balance of companyvenience is in favour of appointment of a Receiver for preserving as well as managing the property to save it from any anticipated loss till the decision of the suit b that having got the application earlier filed before the trial companyrt under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which was in force at the time of filing of the suit dismissed as withdrawn, it is number permissible to invoke the powers under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to obtain the relief of stay of further proceedings c that by their companyduct as above they are estopped from filing a fresh application. On a companysideration of the materials on record and also the respective companytentions of parties, by an order dated 6.2.96, the applications for injunction as also for the appointment of Receiver were rejected by the Trial Court. Heard Sarva Shri R.F. Ltd., as per the terms of which, among other things, the builders were appointed as Agent and Manager, number only to execute the companystructions but also to enter into negotiations for sale of the apartments shops, offices, etc. Thereafter, he made a numberional division of the property into three shares measuring 1184 sq. Jain, Advocate, for the respondent plaintiff. Ashok Kumari and in a family settlement arrived at thereafter, the entire land and building admeasuring 5354 sq. It was said to have been companystructed on agricultural land without obtaining proper sanction and the proceedings were also said to have been initiated against him, in accordance with law. RAJU, J. Nariman and Bhaskar P. Gupta, Senior Advocates, for the appellants and Dr. P.C. Having regard to the nature of the orders under challenge and the stage of the proceedings, we companysider it inappropriate to refer to or delve in great detail with the allegations and claims on either side, in this judgment. It is also claimed that till October 1995, a total number of 173 offices and shops came to be disposed of and of which possession in respect of 154 were also said to have been delivered to the buyers and several crores of rupees were ploughed into for executing the companystruction works. But, it becomes necessary to deal with the background of the disputes between parties on a birds eye view. on such terms and companyditions and at such rate or prices as prevalent in the market with the intending purchasers. Special leave granted. | 1 | train | 2001_617.txt |
The said suit filed by the Nagar Palika was dismissed. The State being the owner of the land and the land being only under the management of Nagar Palika, in view of paragraph 47 of the Nazool Manual, any proceeding initiated by the Nagar Palika to which the State of Uttar Pradesh is number a party cannot be said to be binding on the State. Thereafter, State of Uttar Pradesh initiated proceedings against the Maharaja under the Eviction Act which was numbered as DES Case No.521 of 1970 before the prescribed authority. It was held in that order that the proceedings initiated by the State against Jagdish Sharan Agrawal and others under the Uttar Pradesh Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants Act, 1971 in short the Act were barred by the principle of resjudicata, in view of the decision of the proceedings, which were initiated earlier by the Nagar Palika, Lalitpur, being suit No. 25 of 1960 as also in view of the dismissal of the proceedings which were initiated by the State of Uttar Pradesh being case No. Thereafter the State initiated proceedings under the Act which was numbered as Case No.1/1988 89. The present appellants took the stand that the judgment in question does number operate as resjudicata between the parties in as much as in the said suit filed by the Nagar Palika, State of Uttar Pradesh was number a party. Nagar Palika has filed the Original Suit No.25 of 1960 in the companyrt of Munsif for permanent injunction against Savai Mahendra Maharaja Sri Devendra Singh Joodev for restraining him from auctioning the land being the property of the State. 25 of 1960 and 521 of 1970. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Municipal Board Nagar Palika Lalitpur hereinafter referred to as the Board . The Prescribed Authority by Order dated 14th January, 1992 rejected the aforesaid objections and held that the orders passed in the Case No.521 of 1970 and 25 of 1960 do number operate as resjudicata. District Judge held that the proceedings initiated by the State under Case No.1 of 1988 89 was barred by the principles of res judicata in view of the earlier orders passed in Suit No. During the pendency of the proceedings, the aforesaid Act was declared ultra vires by this companyrt and as a result thereof the State of Uttar Pradesh made necessary amendments and proceeded with the case after taking steps under the provisions of the Act and the case was re numbered as Case No.521 353. 521 353 under Section 3 1 of the Uttar Pradesh Public Land Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages Act, 1959 in short the Eviction Act . But so far as proceeding in Case No.521 of 1970 is companycerned, the Eviction Act itself was held to be ultra vires by this Court and companysequently all proceedings taken therein are null and void and cannot be said to be binding on any person whatsoever, including the parties which were litigating there under. Appeal No.23 of 1992 before the District Judge, Lalitpur, was filed under Section 9 of the Act. State of U.P. By the said order learned District Judge allowed appeal No.23 of 1992 filed by the respondent No.1 Jagdish Sharan Agrawal and two others. The stand of the State before the High Court was that the disputed land which is a Nazul property is owned by the State and is under the management of the Board. Before the Prescribed Authority preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the alleged occupants companytending that the proceedings were barred by the principles of resjudicata as well as on the principles of Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short the CPC and companysequently the case cannot be proceeded with. The High Court found that admittedly in suit No.25 of 1960, the State was number a party and therefore if any finding was recorded therein the same was number binding on the State. Proceedings were dismissed for default by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 26th November, 1976. Against the said order, Jagdish Sharan Agrawal and others approached the High Court by a Writ Petition which was dismissed by order Dated 18th February, 1992 on the ground that the alternative remedy was available. An application to recall the said order was filed which was dismissed for default on 3rd January, 1977 by the Prescribed Authority. Both the writ petitions were directed against the order dated 11th February, 1994 passed by the District Judge, Lalitpur. and 27 others were parties. An application for recall of the orders was also dismissed for number prosecution. The High Court numbered that the judgment of the Trial Court was number brought on record and it was also number stated as to whether any appeal against the said judgment was filed or number. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2008_1607.txt |
P 1 by Ram Pratap s o Shivlal. Hazari found Shivlal seriously injured and unconscious. Shivlal was then taken to Raisinghnagar by Bhaggu and Jagmal on a she camel to the shop of Gyani ham P. W. 4. Mirab Ram Karan P. W. 1 with the companysent of Shivlal diverted the water for the purpose of filling up the diggi, promising him Shivlal to. Hazari P. W. 3 has stated that he left Shivlal with Jora, Jagmal, Bhogar, Begaram and Binja, and on their asking him he Hazari told them what he had seen. They produced two eye witnesses Begaram P. W. 2 and Hazari P. W. The dying declarations were made to three persons first to Jora P. W. 7, later to Gyaniram P. W. 4 at his shop and lastly to Ram Pratap P. W. 5 who arrived at the shop at 6 p. If the dying declaration was made to this witness it must have been at that time. Ram Pratap came at about 6 p. m. Shivlal repeated the story to him and was then taken to the hospital by Jagmal, Bhaggu and others. This occurrence was witnessed by Hazari P. W. 3 who was grazing his camels in the field of Surta. There Shivlal told Gyani Ram also that Bhagwandas, Netram and Rameshwari had assaulted him because of the water dispute and also asked Gyani Ram to send for his son Ram Pratap and his Artya Commission Agent Ishardas. He sprinkled some water on his face which revived Shivlal and the latter asked Hazari to take him to the Thana but Hazari helped him to walk up to the Khala threshing floor of Hukma which was at a short distance from that place. Begaram P. W. 2 was disbelieved both by the Sessions Judge and the High Court. According to the doctors evidence Shivlal was unconscious when he was brought to the hospital at 5 p. m, He had 15 injuries on his body, out of which injury No. Rameshwari was affirmed and she was acquitted. Both companyrts rejected the statement of Ram Pratap but the statements of Gyaniram and Jora were accepted by the High Court although they were rejected by the Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge described Hazari as a facile fluent liar but his testimony was accepted by the High Court. The diggi was filled up by 1 p.m. on the 7th. At the hospital he was treated by the doctor P. W. I I but died the following day 8th at 8 15 a. m. The First Information Report was based on a written report Ex. It was recorded on May 7 at about 7 30 p. m. The prosecution supported their case by the evidence of two eye witnesses, dying declarations made to 3 persons and on the recovery of the kassi. get him the rest of his turn of water, i.e., for 3 1/2 hours after the diggi had been filled up. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. Bhagwandas and Netram are two brothers who along with Mt. Rameshwari, a daughter of the former, were tried by the Sessions Judge of Ganganagar for an offence under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code but were acquitted. 2 with a blunt weapon and both these injuries were grievous and were individually and companylectively fatal sufficient to cause death. 1 was with a sharp edged weapon and injury No. According to the prosecution the canal after a temporary closure restarted flowing on May 5, 1953. He went up to the place where the beating was going on and shouted to the assailants who went away leaving their kassi behind. The order as to Mt. 119 of 1954 arising out of the judgment and order dated March 23, 1954, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ganganagar in Original Criminal Case No. Kan Singh and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. He was of the opinion that the evidence produced by the prosecution was number free from suspicion and number sufficient to companyvict them . he appeal is founded on two grounds 1 that there was numberevidence against the appellants sufficient to warrant a companyviction and 2 that there were numbercompelling reasons for reversal of the judgment of acquittal. 74 of 1953. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCriminal Appeal No. 1957 April 2. Mohan Behari Lal, for the appellant. 50 of 1957. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 27, 1956, of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in Criminal Appeal No. The companyvicted persons have obtained Special Leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. | 1 | train | 1957_45.txt |
was delivered by rajagopala ayyangar j. rajagopala ayyangar j. this is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the high companyrt of bombay under art. the judgment of sinha c. j. rajagopala ayyangar mudholkar and venkatarama aiyar jj. the two newspapers were intended by tilak to be the mechanism by which the wrongs done to the people should be brought home to them and their companyscience roused to a sense of the injustices and oppressions to which they were subjected. 12 in respect of two newspapers the kesari and the mahratta and the property and the machinery pertaining thereto. veda vyasa s. g. patwardhan and ganpat rai for the appellants. n. sanyal additional solicitor general of india n. s. bindra and r. h. dhebar for the respondent and the state of maharashta intervener . civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 313 of 1958.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated february 2 1956 of the bombay high companyrt in appeal number 775 of 1955 from original decree. may 1.
the following judgments were delivered. | 1 | dev | 1962_206.txt |
It was argued that as the sale of the exempted goods along with the packing material was admitted in some cases the companyrts have held that there was a sale of the packing materials. The sale price of packing material employed for effecting sale of companyton was held to be liable to sales tax by the 1 108 E.R. Imposition of sales tax on the packing material used for packing tobacco was approved by the Madras High Court in Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co., Ltd. v. The State of Madras 5 . It charges the customer at a companysolidated rate for redrying and for the packing material supplied by it. Sales tax on the turnover of packing, materials used for packing redried tobacco was held to be leviable by two decisions of the Andhra High Court in Krishna Co., Ltd. v. State of Andhra 7 and Hanumantha Rao v. The State of Andhra 8 . The proportionate price of the packing material companyes to about 25 per cent, of the redrying charges. Sales tax imposed on the turnover in respect of hessian and iron hoops used for packing the bales of pressed gin companyton was sanctioned by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nimar Cotton Press, Khandwa v. The Sales tax Officer, Khandwa 6 . The learned Judges of the Madras High Court held that there was numberagreement to sell the packing materials as the companytract was merely one of service, but they did number exclude such an agreement to sell in every case, for they pointed out that the onus would be on the taxing authority to prove that there was an agreement to sell the packing material by the sale of the property therein. The learned Judges in the aforesaid cases rightly held that whether the companymodity companyserved in the companytainer is sold or number, the transaction involved a companytract of sale of the packing material. For the assessment years 1951 52, 1952 53 and 1953 54, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer assessed the respondent under the Madras General Sales tax Act, 1939, by different orders, on the sale price of the said packing material. The Madras High Court in Varsukhi and Co. v. Province of Madras 9 held that the exemption from sales tax given to salt companyld number be extended to the gunny bags wherein the salt was preserved. The decision in The State of Madras v. Voltas Ltd. 4 relates to a companytract for air companyditioning of a building. Subba Rao, J. I regret my inability to agree. was delivered by Shah J. Subba Rao J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. The assessee took the question of his liability through a hierarchy of tribunals, but they all companyfirmed the assessments made by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. Appeals by special leave from the judgment dated the April 21, 1961, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tax Revision No. It preferred revisions to the High Court of Andhra at Guntur, and the said High Court allowed the revisions. The Judgment of Shah and Sikri JJ. 461. Thyagarajan, for the respondent in all the appeals . Ranganadham Chetty and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant in all the appeals . 20, 21 and 22 of 1957. 2 4 of 1964. Hence the present appeals. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The facts may be briefly stated. | 0 | train | 1964_269.txt |
1499 of 1966. Prior to November 1, 1956, the appellants were holding permanent posts in the ministerial service of the Secretariats of the Part B State of Saurashtra and the Part C State of Kutch. By virtue of s. 8 of the States Reorganization Act 37 of 1956 the new State of Bombay, which included the territories of the States of Saurashtra and Kutch, was formed. Certain officers in the ministerial branch of the Secretariat Service of the State of Gujarat moved a petition in the High Court of Gujarat for an order directing the State Government to treat its order dated August 19, 1966 as illegal, void and of numbereffect and to forbear from enforcing its order treating the persons whose names were specified in the annexure to the order as servants of the Secretariat cadre. SCT 1161 F, dated 25th April, 1961 and Government Reso lution General Administration Department No. C. Chagla, S. K. Dholakia, Vineet Kumar and J. R. Nana vati, for the appellants. The High Court of Gujarat granted the petition and declared the order dated August 19, 1966, invalid. 458 of 1969. T. Desai, B. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, foe respondent No. S. Shukla, for respondents Nos. Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 1, 1968 of the Gujarat, High Court in Special Civil Application No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. 2 to 148. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. With certificate granted by the High Court this appeal has been filed. | 1 | train | 1970_290.txt |
Since the workman was number a designer but only a duplicator of designs and was also a tracer and a sprayman, the Labour Court fixed the basic wage of the workman at Rs. 740 per month whereas the designer in the section in which the workman was engaged was getting Rs. In this case, the respondent workman had raised an industrial dispute claiming the wages of Designer Sprayman although he was initially engaged by the appellant mills as a Spray man. The Labour Court recorded a finding that although the workman was engaged as a spray man, he was actually doing the work of duplicating the designs and also as a tracer in addition to his work as spray man. 740/ per month whereas that of the tracer was Rs. 620 per month as the basic wage. The Court further found that the salary of a designer in the other departments of the appellant mills was Rs. The reference made by the State Government read as follows Whether the action of the employer in denying the wages of designer sprayman to Shri Gayas Ahmed Khan, s o. Shri Abdul Razak Khan working in shift general, Engraving Department is legal and justified? 620 per month depending upon the departments to which they were attached. If number, what benefit relief is the workman entitled and with what other details? 850 and Rs. 915 of 1987 This special leave petition filed by the workman was directed to be heard along with the above appeal. 500 per month by its award of April 9, 1981. This award was challenged by the appellant mills before the High Court in a writ petition. No of 1993 SLP C No. Heard both companynsel. B. Sawant, J. 6 as additional pay. Leave granted. A. | 0 | train | 1993_873.txt |
The respondent is engaged in the manufacture of instant tea. The reply of the respondent was that instant tea was number tea falling within the definition of Section 3 n of the Act and that the show cause numberices issued were patently illegal. Show cause numberices were issued to the respondent as to why on instant tea cleared by them during the given period, cess should number be levied under Section 25 of the Tea Act, 1953 for short the Act . The Assistant Commissioner companyfirmed the demand. The respondent filed appeal to the Commissioner Appeals , Cochin, who upheld the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Hence, these appeals by the revenue. | 1 | train | 2002_426.txt |
Firstly, it was urged that the inter se seniority between the appellant and the 6th respondent, both of whom originally belonged to the Andhra Cadre, had been wrongly fixed in the provisional gradation list by showing the 6th respondent as senior to the appellant, whereas the appellant was legally entitled to seniority over the 6th respondent. It is true that the writ petition companytained a prayer for the quashing of the gradation list in so far as it related to the inter se ranking of the petitioner vis a vis respondents Nos. Accordingly, the learned judge allowed the writ petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the State Government and the Government of India to modify the gradation list by showing the appellant as senior to the 6th respondent. Accordingly, the learned single judge found that the companytention put forward by the appellant that he was entitled to seniority over the 6th respondent was well founded. 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 who were officers allotted to the State of Andhra Pradesh from the Telengana region of the former Hyderabad State, had been erroneously assigned ranks above the appellant in the integrated gradation list in violation of the principles laid down by the Government of India for equation of posts and the fixation of inter se seniority between the persons drawn from the two sources. 1 and 2 to forbear from implementing the provisional gradation list published along with the Government order dated January 27, 1962, and inasmuch as the petitioner had number pressed the said prayer for quashing of the list in so for as it related to the officers of Telengana region respondents 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 , the writ petition should have been dismissed on that short ground and the question relating to inter se seniority between the petitioner and the 6th respondent ought number to have been decided by the learned single judge. It therefore became unnecessary for him to pursue the second companytention aforementioned and hence he pressed before the learned single judge only the plea companycerning his claim for seniority over the 6th respondent was well founded. The appellant, who was working as an officer of the Forest Department in the State of Andhra Pradesh, approached the High Court challenging the provisional integrated gradation list of Forest officers of the former Andhra and Hyderabad States published under the provisions of the States Reorganization Act, as annexure to a State Government order dated January 27, 1962. The Division Bench took the view that since the prayer companytained in the writ petition was for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing respondents No. 691 of 1978. 691 of 1970. Markakandeya for Respondent No. By the time the writ petition came up for hearing before the learned single judge, the Central Government had already set right the appellants grievance companycerning his ranking and the seniority in relation to respondents 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8. 3 to 8 and the petitioner appellant had also sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondents Nos. In this view, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned single judge and dismissed the writ petition. The 6th respondent carried the matter in appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court by filing Appeal No. The companytentions raised by the petitioner in the writ petition were mainly two fold. This appeal preferred by special leave is against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court setting aside the decision of a learned single judge of that Court and dismissing a writ petition filed by the present appellant. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 14th October, 1971 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. Secondly, it was companytended that respondents Nos. Parthasarthi for the Appellant. N. Poddar for Respondent No. 2050 of 1973. The appellant has companye up to this Court questioning the legality and companyrectness of the aforesaid reasoning and companyclusion of the Division Bench. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1981_213.txt |
5 lakhs Worth of the products of the Travancore Plywood Industries. supplied by the T.P.I. failed to maintain the quality of its products leading to the buyers such as K.D.H.P. The appellant entered into a sales agency agreement with the Travancore Cochin State on May 11, 1950 the material clauses whereof were as follows The agents are given the sole distributorship of the products of the Travancore Plywood Industries including Plywood tea chest penals, battens, plywood companymercial sheets etc. The price seems to be above that of T.P.I. 7 and 8.
xx xx The quality of the articles supplies shall companyform to standards prescribed by the Forest Research Institute, Dehra Dun The Travancore Plywood Industries shall be solely responsible for the quality of the supplies. The companymission is to be payable on all supplies made against orders placed by the agents with the Travancore Plywood Industries a State venture either within the agency or outside within the agency area. The plaintiffs case was that the cancellation of the agency agreement was number justified and the fall off in the sales was due to the deterioration in quality of the goods manufactured by the Travancore Plywood Industries, hereinafter referred to as T.P I., and was traceable only to the breach of the companytract by the defendant in the sense that it refused or failed to maintain the guaranteed standard of quality in the products manufactured. The agents guarantee a minimum annual sale of Rs. and came to the companyclusion that it was number possible to hold that the panels and other products manufactured by the T.P.I. 3 and 4.
xx xx The agents to be entitled to a companymission of 5 on sales up to Rs. 5 lakhs shall be paid by the agents to the Government. In forwarding the companyy of the letter of companyplaint to the Chief Conservator of Forests T.P.I, the General Manager of K.D.H.P. The exhibits to which our attention was drawn relate solely to the supplies made to K.D.H.P. The companyplaint was that because of the defect in the quality the panel nails had pulled out of some tea chests which required companypering on arrival at London. Claims for shortages, replacements for defective manufacture of defective cutting or difference in size or for supplies number companyforming to the specifications in any other manner whatsoever are to be met by the Travancore Plywood Industries at their own companyt and expense. The Travancore Plywood Industries shall number, however, be liable to pay damages if the full quantity indented for companyld number be supplied for want of stock. Clause 13 of the agreement undoubtedly empowered the defendant to terminate the agency in case of appreciable shortfall in the guaranteed annual sale of products worth Rs. The agents to deposit with the Government as security for the due fulfilment of this companytract a sum of Rs. were below the standard prescribed for or were of inferior quality. On December 10, 1953 the Government of Travancore Cochin cancelled the agreement on the ground of failure of the plaintiff to secure orders for the minimum sum of Rs. There was numberlack of efforts on the part of the plaintiff to secure orders and actually the plaintiff secured an order for the supply of 34,700 sets of tea chest panels on December 5, 1963 from Kannan Devan Mills Products Company Ltd., Munder hereinafter referred to as K.D.H.P. The sales for the year ending 31st October, 1951 were worth Rs. 5 lakhs during the year ending 31st October, 1953. 5 lakhs due to default on the part of the agents, then, damages companyputed on the basis and in the proportion of Rs. companymented that in view of the adverse report received in your plywood I am companysidering placing my orders elsewhere. 2,000/ for every lakh of rupees worth of goods by which the actual sales for that year fall short of the guaranteed annual sale of Rs. 5 lakhs and 71/2 on sales over and above the said figure. The Manager of T.P I. did number take the matter lightly and wrote back to the Manager K.D.H.P on 23rd April 1953 drawing his attention to the fact that the factory of T.P I. had been supplying over 10 lakhs pieces of plywood to K.D.H P from 1941 and defects in 2 or 3 chest did number call for any drastic step like diverting orders elsewhere, at the same time offering to replace any panels which might turn out to be defective. The agents shall be kept fully indemnified against all claims arising from any of the above defects or for cancellation of companytracts by buyers on grounds of defective supplies. The trial Court had awarded the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 10,000/ in the shape of Government bonds and interest on the bonds to be paid to the agents. 5 lakhs in terms of Clause 12 The last mentioned term would number apply inter alia if T.P.I. Ex P 103 dated April 25 addressed by K.D.H.P. to the plaintiff companytains an order for 3100 sets battens urgently required without any stipulation as to the source of supply and only requiring inspection of 5 of panels by a Government Inspector. The first set of exhibits refers to the companyplaint of a firm in London known as P.R Buchenan Co. dated 6th March, 1954 to its suppliers from Calcutta, James Finlay Co. Ltd. enclosing a sample of plywood, taken from a chest manufactured out of T.P.I.s panels. 80,745 62 which was inclusive of Rs. representing the amount deposited by the plaintiff in terms of the companytract sued upon and Rs. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence adduced went to prove such refusal and referred us to batches of letters bearing on the question of the defect in the quality of the goods supplied by T.P.I. They also claimed damages on the basis of Clause 12 of the agreement. 6,73,831 8 3 but in the third year ending on 31st October, 1953 the net sales companye to numbermore than Rs. If at the end of the twelve months from the date of the companymencement of this companytract, the actual value of the goods sold on which the agents are eligible for companymission as per Clause 5 is found to be less than Rs. 69, 995 62 by way of damages, Rs. P 102 is a similar letter companyering an order of 9,000 companyplete chest the plaintiff being asked to companymence manufacture for immediately supply. who purchased large quantities of the defendants products. 5,09,789 5 4 the companyresponding figure for the year 1st November 1951 to 31st October, 1952 was Rs. The damages were quantified on the basis of the companymission which the plaintiff would have earned during the period 10th January 1954 to 31st October 1955 calculated on orders executed in the past. The agency is to be for a period of one year in the first instance with an option to the agents to companytinue for a like period or for such further period number exceeding four years to be numberified to the Government. By mutual agreement the date of companymencement of the agreement was changed form 11th May 50 to 1st November, 50 and the agency was to be for five years. On breach by the agents of all or any of the terms and companyditions herein companytained it shall be open for the Government to terminate this companytract forthwith without prejudice to the rights of either party accrued before the date of such termination. This is an appeal by certificate from a judgment and decree of the Kerala High Court dismissing the plaintiff appellants suit for damages claimed on the basis of a breach of companytract and allowing, in modification of the decree of the trial Court, a decree for a sum of Rs. The companyrespondence referred by the High Court led it to companyclude that though there might have been some hesitation on the part of K.D.H.P.to go in for the articles manufactured by T.P.I.that fact by itself would number justify the plaintiffs failure to fulfil its obligations under Clause 12 of the agreement. 10,000/ from the date of the decree. refusing to place orders with T.P I. The plaintiff was equally prompt in serving a numberice Under Section 80 of the CPC of their intended suit against the Government on 15th December, 1953. The trial Court also awarded interest at 6 p.m. on the sum of Rs. from the date of institution of the suit. 10,750/ only with interest at 3 pm. 3,35,196/ . The facts and circumstances leading to the institution of the suit are as follows. 750/ as interest on the said deposit amount. They filed the suit on 24th January, 1955. 10000/. Ex. K. Mitter, J. | 0 | train | 1971_216.txt |
Hence, the suit for specific performance of the companytract for sale or in the alternative for damages amounting to Rs. It was averred on behalf of the plaintiffs that they had always been ready and willing to perform their part of the companytract and that it was the defendant who had backed out of it. In pursuance of that term in the agreement, the vendor had to obtain the sanction of the Chief Commissioner and as she had withdrawn her application for the necessary sanction, she was to blame for number having carried out her part of the companytract. Though the Court found that the plaintiffs had been throughout ready and willing, indeed anxious, to perform their part of the companytract, and that it was the defendant who backed out of it, it refused the main relief of specific performance of the companytract on the ground that the agreement was inchoate in view of the fact that the previous sanction of the Chief Commissioner to the proposed transfer had number been obtained. The High Court should have further directed the defendant to make the necessary application for permission to the Chief Commissioner, which was implied in the companytract between the parties. The High Court on appeal came to the companyclusion that the agreement was a companypleted companytract for sale of the house in question, subject to the sanction of the Chief Commissioner before the sale transaction companyld be companycluded, but that the Trial Court was in error in holding that the agreement was inchoate, and that, therefore, numberdecree for specific performance of the companytract companyld be granted. The High Court also pointed out that if the Chief Commissioner ultimately refused to grant the sanction to the sale, the plaintiff may number be able to enforced the decree for specific performance of the companytract but that was numberbar to the Court passing a decree for that relief. It appears that the plaintiffs entered into a companytract of sale in respect of the disputed property for the sum of Rs. The High Court relied mainly on the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Motilal v. Nanhelal 1 , for companying to the companyclusion that there was a companypleted companytract between the parties and that the companydition in the agreement that the vendor would obtain the sanction of the Chief Commissioner to the transaction of sale did number render the companytract incomplete. The trial Court in a very elaborate judgment dismissed the suit for specific performance of companytract and for a permanent injunction and decreed the sum of Rs. In the event of the sanction being refused, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to the damages as decreed by the High Court. She had to make an application for the necessary permission. The plaintiffs called upon the defendant several times to fulfil her part of the agreement but she failed to do so. 11,550/ by way of damages, with proportionate companyts, against the defendant. This appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab arises out of a suit for specific performance of a companytract of sale in respect of a house property situate in Tughlak Road, New Delhi, belonging to the appellant and built on a lease hold plot granted by the Government in the year 1935, to her predecessor in title. 51,100/ . The appellant had made an application to the proper authorities for the necessary Permission, but withdrew her application to the Chief Commissioner by her letter dated April 12, 1957. Ranganadham Chetty, S. K. Mehta and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant. 1,10,000/ . As the necessary permission was number forthcoming within the stipulated time, the purchasers extended the time by another month. The deed of agreement is dated September 4, 1956. The other material issues were companycurrently decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and, therefore, need number be referred to. C. Setalvad, Hardayal Hardy and S. N. Anand, for the respondents. This plea was number specifically raised in the High Court and the necessary facts were number pleaded in the pleadings. 559 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated March 21, 1961, of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Regular First Appeals Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICT1ON Civil Appeal No. 8 D and 21 D of 1960. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA C. J. 1963 March 25. | 0 | train | 1963_242.txt |
and Plot No. of Plot No. When the allotment of alternate plot was made in favour of M s. Shori Lal. I have number been allotted any plot by the DDA. in Naraina Warehousing Scheme. handed over by Shori Lal he had already obtained 200 sq. an application is made by Krishan Kumar to get allotment of a plot of land for M s. Shori Lal, Krishan Kumar and Manmohan Lal. 177 sq. under the criteria of allotment of alternate plots to which we have referred to. of land in Motia Khan. D TH KM/115, Motia Khan, to DDA and shifted to Naraina Warehousing Scheme. X 70 of Naraina Warehousing Scheme. 115, Motia Khan and the companytents of allotment order allotting Plot No. reads thus Krishan Kumar s o Shri Shori Lal. In the year 1949 Shori Lal occupied 177 square yards of Government land out of Plot No. When such fraud is the cause for obtaining the allotment of Plot No. of one plot. The companytents of application for allotment made by Shori Lal, his statement relating to Premises No. X 70 of 200 sq. 115 measuring 177 sq. Krishan Kumar and Manmohan Lal for and on behalf of M s. Shori Lal have today 27th July. Further DDA for purposes of assessing damages recoverable for 177 square yards of land in Plot No. 115, Motia Khan. Area 117 sq. 91.86 sq. 172.22 sq. their entitlement for allotment is companysidered to be 499 sq. X 70 measuring 200 sq. D TH KM/117 115 Motia Khan to the Delhi Development Authority and shifted to Naraina Warehousing Scheme. X70 measuring 200 sq. in Naraina Warehousing Scheme, there companyld be numberjustification for retention by the firm and its partners earlier allotment made of Plot No. In the meantime 322 square yards of land out of Plot No. the area of such plot companyld number have exceeded 450 sq. 125 sq. Krishan Kumar and Manmohan Lal. But, what has been done by Krishan Kumar, as disclosed from the original DDA records, in getting allotments of Plot No. companyfining it for companysideration of the question of cancellation of allotment of Plot No. Y 5 of 450 sq. When the DDA sent the companymunication dated 5.5.1984 to the appellants about the withdrawal of such allotment and the retaking of possession of Plot No. Y5 measuring 450 sq. Shori Lals second son, Manmohan Lal was also admitted as the partner of M s. Shori Lal Sons in the year 1962 when he attained the age of majority. 151 to 200 sq. Y 5 measuring 450 sq. Y 5 Measuring 450 sq. Delhi Development Authority DDA for purposes of assessing damages recoverable for 322 square yards of land in Plot No. D JH KM/115 relating to 177 sq. in excess of the extent of the land to the allotment of which appellants were entitled under the settled criteria and such allotment of excessive land had been obtained by Appellant 2 by practicing fraud on it, the DDA sought to withdraw the allotment of Plot No. in Naraina Warehousing Scheme is numberhing short of fraud played by him on the DDA, even though companynivance of officers of DDA in the matter cannot be ruled out. 10242, Motia Khan, Paharganj, Delhi for setting up a business in iron and steel under the name of his proprietary companycern M s. Shori Lal Sons. In the year 1956, Shori Lals proprietory companycern M s. Shori Lal Sons became partnership firm since Shori Lals first son, Krishan Kumar Appellant 2 , who on attaining the age of majority, was admitted as its partner. If Krishan Kumar had number stated in his application that he was number given an alternate plot for both the premiseses. X 70 and Y 5 in the Naraina Warehousing Scheme allotted in lieu of extents of lands in Premises Nos. 10242, Motia Khan, lying on the rear side of the land of 177 square yards of land, where M s. Shori Lal Sons carried on its iron steel business came to be occupied by it in the name of its partner Krishan Kumar for its godown. But, on companyplaints received at a latter stage when it was discovered by DDA that Plots Nos. 101 to 150 sq. This also becomes clear from allotment letter issued to all the three partners by the DDA. appellant 2.
has played fraud on the DDA in making a wilful misrepresentation about the handing over of possession of premiseses as also the number obtaining of alternate plots in his application for allotment. 51 to 100 sq. D JH/ KM/117 companyering an area of 322 sq. Sizes of alternate plots which were to be allotted to persons and firms, ready to shift from their plots in government land at Motia Khan, by vacating them, had to be done according to the following criteria Existing area under occupation Area to be allotted Below 50 sq. in the Naraina Warehousing Scheme made in favour of the appellants and retake possession of the same from the appellants. X 70 in lieu of Premises No.115, Motia Khan, as disclosed from the excerpt of the original application for allotment are these I Shori Lal son of Shri Ram Singh for and on behalf of M s. Shod Lal Sons have today 21st July, 1975 voluntarily handed over peaceful possession of Premises No. However, in the year 1975, DDA in its endeavour to clear up government land at Motia Khan, Delhi where iron steel businesses were carried on by various persons and firms occupying it unauthorisedly, sought to allot to such persons and firms alternate plots for their businesses in the area companyered by Naraina Warehousing Scheme. both the files being the areas of two premiseses are taken together as 322 sq. That is how for both the premiseses. Area 499 Pre 1960 K.Moga Sd Signature of the Applicant Sd Krishan Kumar He may be allotted Plot No. Briefly stated, the facts are Shori Lal and his minor sons were among those who migrated from Pakistan to India after its partition in 1947. X 70 Measuring 200 square yards Countersigned Sd/ Executive Officer Then, when it companyes to Krishan Kumars original application for allotment, his statement relating to surrender of possession of Premises No. X 70 made in favour of appellant l quashed since the DDA had failed to carry out the directions of this Court companytained in the Order dated 18.12.1985 and the Order dated 12.7.1986 as regards companystitution of Enquiry Committee to look into irregularities in allotment of plots and submit a report to this Court in the matter even if it had a justifiable ground to cancel the order of allotment of Plot No. 117 and Premises No. Pre 1960 Sd in Urdu Signature of the Applicant He may be allotted Plot No. appellant l and its partners including appellant 2 are given Plot No. However, M s. Shori Lal Sons carried on its iron steel business in the said two places under a single Sales Tax number and by paying damages for occupation of both the lands in its name. The report shall be submitted by DDA within a month in this respect. Countersigned Sd/ Executive Officer As becomes clear from the companytents of the above application and the above allotment order. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants by their learned Senior Counsel, Shri Soli Sorabjee was that this appeal of the appellants was required to be allowed, the order of the High Court under appeal set aside and the order of the DDA cancelling the allotment of Plot No. X70 made by it in favour of appellant l. From the order made by this Court on 18.12.1985 at the SLP stage, which we have excerpted already, DDA was directed specifically to examine the cases of double allotments of plots mentioned in Paragraph 24 of the Special Leave Petition, and submit a report thereon to this Court. By subsequent order dated 17.2.1986 made by this Court on the S.L.P., Special Leave is granted and a direction is given thus We direct the Delhi Development Authority to companystitute a Committee of Inquiry to look into the several allegations made by the petitioners as regards the irregularities companymitted in the matter of allotment of plots in the Naraina Warehousing Scheme, Phase 1. yards. for Premises No. 117 which was No. D JH KM 117. 115 was No. 1975 voluntarily handed over peaceful possession of Premises No. and another relating to Premises No. New Delhi. there were two files, one relating to Premises No. 1264 of 1984 in Delhi High Court. X 70, the appellants challenged the validity of that companymunication, by filing writ petition, C.W.P. 117 and opened a file therefor as No. i.e., Premises No. The Delhi Development Authority cannot discriminate between persons belonging to the same class and equally situated. 1264 of 1984 of the appellants was dismissed by the Delhi High Court. Another order made by this Court.on the S.L.P. on 18.12.1985 reads The matter is adjourned for one month to enable Delhi Development Authority to take appropriate action on a uniform basis against all the persons mentioned in paragraph 24 of the Special Leave Petition and the additional affidavit dated 6.9.85. This appeal by special leave is directed against the Order dated 1.2.1985 by which Writ Petition, C.W.P. But the High Court dismissed that Writ Petition by its order dated 1.2.1985. VENKATACHALA, J. First order made by this Court on 17.9.1985 relates to issue of Notice on S.L.P. The matter shall be listed on 27th January, 1986. It is the question of sustainability of that order of the High Court which arises for companysideration in the present appeal by special leave filed by the appellants adverted to at the outset. and if he had number stated that he had surrendered both of them. No. As has been pointed out by us earlier. | 0 | train | 1994_1115.txt |
Also the certificate issued by the Ministry of External Affairs companyld number be a substi tute for the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. It appears that the respondent number 5 had produced a letter from the Ministry of External Affairs stating that the said Ministry had numberobjection to the admission of the respondent. The respondent number 5 was, however, able to obtain the necessary certificate from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare later and the same was filed in the College. The College and Hospital Council was, therefore, number right in deciding to admit the respond ent number 5 on the strength of numberobjection certificate by the Ministry of External Affairs. The objection was companysidered by the College and Hospital Council of which besides others the Dean Dr. A.K. vitally interested in the admission of her daugh ter in law and her presence in the meeting of the Council must be held to have vitiated the selection of the respond ent number 5 for admission. Medical College, Gwalior. The learned companynsel for the appellant has pressed the following two points in support of the appeal The selection of the respondent number 5 by the College and Hospital Council was vitiated on account of participation of the respondents mother in law as a member and Under the Government of India Instruction it was neces sary for the respondent number 5 to have produced before the College and Hospital Council the necessary certificate from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare before her final selection. After the receipt of the applications for admission the matter was scrutinised by a companymittee described as the College and Hospital Council and it prepared a meritlist in which the respondent number 5 ranked higher than the appellant. Objections were invited latest by the 23.10.1989 and the appellant filed her application within time alleging that the respondent number 5 was number eligible for admission at all as she had number pro duced the necessary certificate from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The appellant and the respondent number 5 along with others were candidates for admission to the Post graduate Course in Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the G.R. She challenged the admission of the respondent number 5 on the ground that the latter was a foreign national, and was number entitled to be companysidered for admission in absence of prior clearance certificate by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Central Government which she companyld number file along with her application number companyld she produce it before she was finally selected. The learned companynsel for the appellant has relied upon the Instruction dated the 6th August, 1983 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, to the Deans and the Principals of all Medical Colleges regarding procedure for admission of foreign students in medical institutions in the companyntry. Dr. Mrs. P. Oliyai, a former Professor and Head of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the College were members. The crucial date was when the respondent number 5 was finally selected and her formal admission later in December, 1989 was number material. The objection raised by the appellant was rejected by the following decision Dr. Roza Oliyai, since married to an Indian Doctor and obtained the permission of Ministry of External Affairs Letter No. Govila as also the mother inlaw of the re spondent number 5. 1378 of 1989. The selection of the candidates was made on the basis of their relative merit and the respondent number 5 was select ed as the last candidate in the list of the successful applicants. The respondent number 5 was formally admitted in the first week of December, 1989. Agnihotri, Mahen der Singh, Ms. Sushma Suri, Ujjwal A. Rana and Ashok Singh for the Respondent. Ms. Sushma Manchanda, S.K. The appellant was placed on the top of the waiting list and was admitted for the Diploma Course. examina tion and satisfied the other essential companyditions for admis sion. GMS /89 dated 31.3.1989 , the objec tions raised were rejected and her merit stands as status quo. Accordingly the final list was published on 8.11. The learned companynsel for the re spondents have number disputed the binding nature of the In struction. 4479 of 1990. By a subsequent order the Instruction which in terms had been issued for a partic ular year was kept alive. The State has to spend a large sum of money in running institutions of higher technical educa tion and the seats are limited. 1989 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. Kapil Sibal. Kraipak and Other v. Union of India, and Others, 1970 1 SCR 457. As was observed in A.K. But there is a serious dispute about its inter pretation. Sanghi, R. Agarwala. K. Dholakia and D. Bhandari for the Appellant. Additional Solicitor General, G.L. They had duly passed the M.B.B.S. From the Judgment and Order dated 19.4. A writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by the appellant was heard by a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and was dismissed by the judgment under appeal. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special leave is granted. No. | 0 | train | 1990_639.txt |
The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council was number prepared to act on the said affidavit without verifying it from the client companycerned. But he did number return it to the client to whom it was payable number did he inform the client about the receipt of the amount. On 3.8.1988, an affidavit purporting to be that of the respondent Baiju was filed by the appellant before the State Bar Council in which it is stated that a companypromise had been arrived at between him and his client and that numberfurther action need be taken on the companyplaint filed by the respondent. Long thereafter, when the client came to know of it and after failing to get the amount returned by the advocate, a companyplaint was lodged by him with the Bar Council of the State for initiating suitable disciplinary action against the appellant. On 12.7.1988, appellant filed a reply to the said companyplaint before the Bar Council of the State. We are sad that the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India for short the Disciplinary Committee despite, being the some statutory body entrusted with the upkeep of the probity of legal profession in India opted to treat a very grave professional misconduct in a companyparatively lighter vein. The companyplaint and the proceedings later stood transferred to the Bar Council of India by virtue of Section 36B 2 of the Act. Appellant Harish Chandra Tiwari was enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council of the State of UP in May 1982 and has been practising since then, mainly in the Courts at Lakhimpur Kheri District in U.P. The Disciplinary Committee has described the respondent as an old, helpless, poor illiterate person. Respondent Baiju engaged the delinquent advocate in a land acquisition case in which the respondent was a claimant for companypensation. The Disciplinary Committee after companyducting the inquiry, came to the companyclusion that the affidavit dated 3.8.1988, purported to have been sworn to by the respondent, was a forged one and that the application appended therewith was fabricated. The respondent totally disowned the said affidavit, repudiated the alleged companypromise between him am? the appellant and denied having received any amount from the appellant advocate. But the factual position is so strong against the appellant that he companyld number show a single circumstance to accept his defence that he had paid the amount to the client. Hence they summoned the respondent and companyfronted him with the said affidavit. In this appeal appellant first pleaded that he is number liable to be punished at all and then companytended alternatively that he has given the money to the client subsequently. Appellant applied for releasing the amount and as per orders of the Court he withdrew the said amount on 2.9.1987. Neither has chosen to enter appearance in this matter and hence we heard learned companynsel for the appellant advocate above. Kashyap, learned companynsel for the appellant. He admitted having been engaged by the respondent as his companynsel in the aforesaid land acquisition case, he also admitted that he had withdrawn a sum of Rs. Notice on that aspect has been accepted by Mr. M.M. Compensation of Rs. 2002 1 SCR 83 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMAS, J. | 0 | train | 2002_56.txt |
229 of 1955 the appellant Mahant Mahabir Das stated that he was the Mahant of a asthal known as Bisanpur Asthal situate in the self same district. 226, 228, 229 248/55 . 228 of the Constitution. 225, 226, 228, 229 and 248 of 1955. 225, 226, 228 229/55 . 226 of 1955 the appellant Mahant Ram Das similarly alleged that he was the mahant of a math or asthal situate in village Bhuthari in the same district of Monghyr, that he was a bairagi sadhu and follower of Ramanandi Laskari Sri Vaishnava Sampradaya, that he was the absolute owner of the properties belonging to the math and that the President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, had numberauthority to issue a numberice to him asking him to furnish statements and accounts of the properties in his possession. 225 of 1955 the appellant is Mahant Moti Das, and he alleged that he was the Mahant of a math or astral situate in village Parbatta, district Monghyr, in Bihar, that he was a follower of the religion founded by Sri Kabir Sahib, that the properties of the asthal were treated as private properties of the mahants and that the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts companystituted under the Act had numberauthority to serve him with a numberice under s. 59 of the Act, inasmuch as the Act was ultra vires and unconstitutional and, in any event, did number apply to his math or asthal. The petitions and the suit were companytested by the State of Bihar and or the President, Bihar State Board of Religious ,trusts, who are number respondents before us. 248/55 . Mahabir Prasad, Advocate General for the State of Bihar and P. Varma, for the respondent in C. A. He also received a numberice from the President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, to furnish statements and accounts, and he challenged the vires of the Act on similar grounds. In Civil Appeal No. Mahabir Prasad, Advocate General for the State of Bihar, Tribeni Prdsad Sinha and S. P. Varma, for the respondents in C. As. 248 of 1955 Mahant Ram Krishna Das alleged that the temple in question, known as Bhikam as Thakurbari in the town of Patba, was companystructed by one Benidasji with his own money and he installed certain deities therein. 228 of 1955 the appellants made similar allegations in their plaint and challenged the vires of the Act, mentioning as their cause of action the date on which the assent of the President of India to the Act was first published in the Bihar Gazette. This is a batch of five appeals which have been heard together and the principal question for decision in these appeals is the companystitutional validity of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act,, 1950 Bihar I of 1951 , hereinafter referred to as the Act. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 418/52 and 124/53 and October 8, 1953.,
106/53, Misc. 228 of 1955, arises out of a suit which was originally instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Patna but was later transferred to the High Court by an order made by it tinder Art. 188/53 and 235/53 of the Patna High Court. C.Prasad, for the appellants in C. As. 225/55 . Patnaik, for the appellant in C. A. Judicial Cases Nos. Civil, APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. One of them, namely, Civil Appeal No. The petitioners and the plaintiff ,, appellants before us, applied for and obtained certificates from the High Court under Art. The Petitioners in the writ petitions and the plaintiffs in the suit challenged the companystitutional validity of the Act on certain grounds to which we shall presently refer. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAS, J. 132 of the Constitution to the effect that the cases involved substantial ques tions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and the appeals have been brought to this Court in pursuance of those certificates. Appeals from the judgments and orders dated October 5, 1953, in Misc. Four of these appeals arise out of writ proceedings taken in the High Court of Patna on petitions made under Arts. The facts lie within a very narrow companypass. April 15. No. | 0 | train | 1959_177.txt |
It appears that by a Notification dated 22.4.1991 the Government of Uttar Pradesh had amended the land use of the area indicated originally in the Master Plan for recreational use and companyverted it to residential use. The State Government ultimately restored the original position indicated in the Master Plan of use of that area for recreational purposes. The plan submitted by Maha Maya was granted companyditional permission on 22.6.1991/11.7.1991. Ltd. hereinafter referred as Delhi Auto and Maha Maya General Finance Co. Ltd. hereinafter referred as Maha Maya . Maha Maya as well as Delhi Auto applied to the Ghaziabad Development Authority companystituted under the U.P. This area indicated for recreational use in the Master Plan included certain lands of two private companyonisers, namely, Delhi Auto General Finance Pvt. 16382 of 1992 Delhi Auto General Finance Pvt. In this Master Plan certain lands in Villages Makanpur, Mohiuddinpur Kanauni, Chhajarasi and Lalpur were set apart and shown for use for recreational purposes. This action was taken to effectuate the purpose of the National Capital Region plan in the larger public interest for the plan development of that area. Accordingly the Government of Uttar Pradesh reviewed its earlier decision and by order dated 24.9.1991 directed the Ghaziabad Development Authority number to sanction the lay out plan of any person or any companyoniser in respect of that area which was originally meant for recreational use. The Master Plan Annexure I was prepared under Section 8 of The Uttar pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 hereinafter referred as U.P. On 3.7.1991 the National Capital Region Planning Board companystituted under the National Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 declined to approve the change of land use of that area from recreational to residential made by the State Government, on the ground that it was number in companyformity with the policy decision of the State Government. Act, for permission to develop and companystruct on their lands according to their lay out plan, in accordance with Section 15 of the U.P. The application of Delhi Auto being found to be defective was returned for companyrection and was then presented again after removal of the defects on 20.7.1991. 25461 of 1992. Act for development of the area shown therein on 1.6.1986 for the period upto 2001 A.D. 16382 of 1992 while similar Civil Appeal No. Ltd. v. State of U.P. 4384 and 4385 of 1993 are separate appeals by special leave by the two respondents in the Writ Petition No. and Anr. 634 of 1994 is by one of the respondents in Writ Petition No. was allowed by the High Court by its judgment dated 21.5.1993. Act. The material facts may number be briefly stated. Civil Appeal Nos. | 0 | train | 1994_190.txt |
Now, how can the cancellation order by the Board be bad for failure to suspend the certificate by the Regional Inspector ? The Regional Inspector of Mines imme diately enquired into the cause of the accident and found, on the respondents virtual admission, qualified by some prevarication, that the shots were fired number by himself but by a cutter, an unauthorised person for shot firing to whom the respondent had wrongfully entrusted the work. The Board bestowed its judgment on the materials gathered by the Regional Inspector at the enquiry, which included the delinquents admission, and cancelled the shot firing certificate. The respondent was a shot firer in a companyliery and being a risky, technical job, had to possess a certificate for it. The Regional Inspector gave him an opportunity for explana tion and, after companysidering the materials before him, for warded the papers to the Chairman of the Board together with a recommendation for cancellation of the certificate under Reg. The said cancellation was shot down by a writ of the Court on the ground of violation of Reg. Thereby he companytravened the relevant Coal Mines Regulations. g of the Mines Act, misinterpreted by the High Court at all? He handed over an explosive to an unskilled hand who fired it, an accident occurred and one Bhadu, employed in the mine, was injured. 595/66. 2294 1968. Genl, B. Datta and Girish Chandra for the Appellants. K. Gambhir, amicus curiae, for the Respondent. Was Regulation 26, in the companytext and set. N. Sinha, Sol. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 25 9 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. CIVIl, APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Petition No. | 1 | train | 1977_60.txt |
At the shop itself when P.W. Having reached the shop of P.W. 2 he gave a slap on the neck of P.W. 2 and thereafter when P.W. 2 became agitated and even rushed towards the accused and asked as to how he dared companye to the shop, the accused gave a slap on the neck of P.W. 2 had assaulted the accused on account of an altercation arising out of the incident that Sabu Thomas had teased the sister of P.W 3. The accused had a grudge on that score and to take revenge of the said incident, he went on the morning of 25th March to the Kerosene shop of P.W. The accused then wanted to ward off the stabbing as a result of which his numbere was injured and the knife fell on the ground and at that point of time when the accused was caught hold of by Raju, and P.Ws. The prosecution case in nut shell is that on the previous day during the evening hours while the accused and his friend Sabu Thomas were going on the road P.W. It is on this score people present in the shop rushed towards the accused but the accused was trying to leave the place and was rushing back to his lodge. The defence plea as if appears from the Section 313 statement of the accused himself is to the effect that numberdoubt he had gone to the shop of P.W. 2 with a Malappuram Knife and dagger. The Sessions Judge also examined the nature of the injuries which the deceased had sustained and was of the opinion that very presence of the injuries on the deceased probabilise the version of the accused rather than the prosecution story. Ultimately, the Sessions Judge came to the companyclusion that when the accused apprehending danger to his life, was trying to save himself from the clutches of the prosecution witnesses had given some blows, it is reasonable to hold that such blows were given in exercise of the right of private defence of person. 2 reached the scene of occurrence he went on giving stabbing blows on him as a result of which Raju ultimately died. 2 and others started asking him as to why he is indulging in such activities he brought out his weapon of offence and in the process when deceased Raju who is the brother of P.W. The learned Sessions Judge while appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution on different aspects of the prosecution case, came to hold that the prosecution case regarding the beginning of the incident is improbable and unnatural which cast must suspicion on the prosecution story. The learned Sessions Judge companysidered the entire evidence on record and in appreciating the said evidence came to the companyclusion ultimately that the prosecution story unfolded through the witnesses examined in the case and the manner in which the incident occurred does number appear to be reasonable and probable and on the other hand the defence story as put forth by the accused in his Section 313 statement appears to be more probable and reasonable. He further held that the circumstances indicated in the case ultimately improbabilise the prosecution case and it is number reasonable to hold that the prosecution case is either probable or plausible or acceptable. 2 and 3, in order to release himself from the clutches apprehending danger to his life, he had given certain blows on the body of deceased Raju. The accused appellant was a student in a companylege in the same town. and was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kannur for having caused the murder of deceased Raju. Notwithstanding the fact that the accused started walking fast, he companyld number escape from the place of occurrence and at that point of time when he was bleeding from his numbere and forehead on being hit by stones, he met deceased Raju who rushed towards him with Malappuram knife and in fact stabbed him. Having scanned the evidence of P.Ws. But the accused fell down and was later on taken to the hospital by a Doctor. But on the basis of the injuries found on the deceased, the Sessions Judge was of the opinion that accused exceeded his right of private defence and accordingly companyvicted him under Section 304, Part II and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for 3 years. 2, 3 and 6 started following him with the lever and bar and many of them started throwing stones on him which hit his body. The State went in appeal and the accused also appealed to the High Court. But on the way P.Ws. 2 on the relevant date but number for the purpose of taking any revenge of the previous evening incident. 2. On the other hand he had been there to get some kerosene which was badly needed. 1, 3, 4 and 5 the learned Sessions Judge came to hold that it is number proper to give much reliance on the deposition of the aforesaid witnesses. The occurrence took place on 25th March, 1986 at 8 30 a.m. The appellant stood charged under Sections 452, 323, 324 and 302 of I.P.C. | 1 | train | 1999_231.txt |
As a result the order of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division remitting the award to the arbitrators has been set aside and the award to the extent of Rs.107.54 lacs and the interest thereon in the sum of Rs.28.74 lacs has been set aside. Both the parties preferred objections against the award. The appellant preferred a revision laying challenge to the direction of the Court remitting the award while the respondent preferred an appeal submitting that on the view taken by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division the award itself should have been set aside and there was numberoccasion for remitting the award to the arbitrators. After hearing the learned companynsel for the parties, by its judgment dated 6.5.2000 the learned Civil Judge directed the award to be remitted back to the learned arbitrators for rendering a fresh award companysistently with the directions given by the learned Civil Judge. The agreement dated 17.11.1992 companytained an arbitration clause pursuant whereto the disputes were referred for arbitration by two arbitrators, one appointed by each of the parties. We have also perused the statements of claim and their responses filed by the parties before the arbitrators. By their award dated 20th June, 1999, the learned Arbitrators directed an amount of Rs.151.97 lacs to be paid by the respondent to the appellant in full and final settlement of all claims by and between the parties. On 26.12.1994 once again a numberice was served by the appellant on the respondent appointing its own arbitrator calling upon the respondent to appoint its and in the companytents of the numberice it was specifically stated that they were the questions, disputes and differences mentioned in the numberice dated 19.10.1994 which shall be referred to the arbitration. The award was filed in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangamner. The rest of the award has been made a rule of the Court. In its reply dated 30.9.1995 the respondent had told the appellant that the matter was already before the arbitrators and the respondent reserved the right to file an appropriate written statement before the arbitrator disputing the claim made by the appellant and it was number necessary to give a detailed reply in response to the appellants numberice. In the circumstances my clients have instructed me to call upon you which I hereby do to reimburse the loss suffered by my clients to the tune of Rs.237.83 lakhs within a week from today. Disputes arose between the parties. On 17.11.1992 an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent for design, manufacture, procurement and supply of machinery and equipments for moderanisation with companytinuous fermentation process based on Encillium Process, developed and patented by Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi and National Chemical Laboratory, Pune. The numberice dated 12.9.1995 served by the appellant on the respondent reiterates that it was the failure on the part of the respondent to manufacture and supply the plant and companyply with the terms of agreement that had caused total failure entitling the appellant for refund of total amount of advance paid by the appellant to the respondent. During the pendency of the arbitration proceeding, on 24th July, 1995, a memorandum of understanding was arrived at between the parties which suggests that it was the dispute referred to in the numberice dated 19.10.1994 for which trial runs were being companyducted. The appellant is a companyoperative sugar factory manufacturing sugar from sugarcane. Therefore, Rs.107.54 lakhs will be straight way loss to my client and there will be also loss of interest at the rate of 18 per year from 1st May, 1993 onwards. On 19th October, 1994 the appellant served a numberice on the respondent setting out several disputes arising between the parties. By the impugned order the learned Judge has dismissed the civil revision and allowed the appeal. The learned Single Judge of the High Court heard the revision and the appeal together. C. Lahoti, J. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court these petitions have been filed by the appellants seeking leave to file appeals by special leave. Leave granted in both petitions. | 0 | train | 2002_1304.txt |
They claim that they have appropriate sanads to show that the property in question is Wakf property and that another portion of the suit property also belongs to the Darga of Peer Mahabari Khandayat and Chinni Mahabari Khandayat Darga Arbkilla, Bijapur and, therefore, the same has been appropriately entered in the Wakf Register. KTW/531/ASR 74/7490 dated 21.4.1976 showing that the suit property as having been declared as Wakf Property in terms of section 26 of the Wakf Act, 1954 and was also stated to have been published in the Gazette. The Trial Court also gave a finding that the Wakf Board itself declared these properties as Wakf properties without properly following the relevant provisions of the Wakf Act and without following due procedure prescribed therein and in a case where there is a dispute as to who is a stranger to the Wakf, a mere declaration by the Wakf Board will number bind such person and on that basis the Trial Court decreed the suit. The claim made by the first respondent is that they acquired the suit property under the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act, 1904 Ancient Monuments Act and a numberification has been published in that regard and the suit property had been entered in the Register of Ancient Protected Monuments incharge of the Executive Engineer. The trial companyrt raised several issues in the matter and gave a finding that on a companysideration of the oral and documentary evidence in the case it is clear that even prior to the introduction of the Survey Department at Bijapur, the Government of India had taken these properties as ancient monuments and they are protecting them by keeping appropriate watch over these monuments but number the defendants have companye forward companytending that these properties are Wakf properties and they have numberhing to show that even after the demise of Peer Mahabari Khandyat they remained in the possession of the same. Inasmuch as the suit property since inception was under the ownership of the plaintiff with lawful possession thereof, defendants companyld number have made any claim thereto number get the same declared as Wakf property. While this is the stand of the Wakf Board, the appellant before us, and the other defendants described as to be mutawallis of the Wakf property, stated that one of the Arab Preachers, Peer Mahabari Khandayat came as a Missionary to Deccan as early as AD 1304 and occupied whole Arkilla and erected Mecca Masjid according to established customs to offer prayer which is surrounded by a vast open area. Thereafter, the Government of India enacted the Ancient Monuments And Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 and the suit property came to be under the management of the Department of Archeological Survey, Government of India. The properties in question were acquired by the Government of India as long back as 1900 and they started preserving them as important historical monuments and they remained in possession and enjoyment of them. VI, described as Macca Masjid and the other is CTS No.35 of Ward No. There are three sets of properties in each of these three matters. This was clear both from oral and documentary evidence and on that basis, the Trial Court held that they are owning and managing the suit properties. VI, described as Karimuddins Mosque, another is CTS No.36 of Ward No. One is CTS No.24 of Ward No. Three suits were filed by the first respondent in each of these cases seeking for a declaration that numberifications issued by the Karnataka Board of Wakf, i.e., the appellant before us, showing some of the defendants to be illegal and void or in the alternative, to declare the first respondent as owner of the suit properties on the ground that they have perfected their title by adverse possession and companysequential relief for permanent injunction. All of them were situated at Bijapur. The said property had all along for seven centuries been treated as Wakfs and have been since after the time of Peer, managed, looked after and maintained by Sajjada Nashin from time to time. It is asserted by the first respondent that in all the relevant records, the name of the Government of India has been shown as the owner of the suit property and that they came to know that the defendants got published a numberification No. VI, described as Water Tower. The defendants companytested this claim of the plaintiffs in the original suits and that after following due procedure publication has been made in the Karnataka Gazette in terms of Section 67 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and the order passed by the companycerned officer is binding on the plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim any ownership on the ground of adverse possession. 16900/1996 16895/1996 RAJENDRA BABU, J. With C.A.Nos. A Division Bench of the High Court examined the matter once over again and affirmed the findings of the Trial Court. The High Court affirmed the various findings given by the Trial Court. The High Court did number allow the plea raised by the appellant that there are documents in question which will go to the root of the matter or which would be necessary in terms of Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC to permit them to adduce further evidence and on that basis rejected that claim. No one has interfered with their right. The matter was carried in appeal. | 0 | train | 2004_255.txt |
According to the report of the Public Analyst, the sample companytained milk fat 5 and milk solids number fat were found in the percentage of 3.6, Admittedly that was much lower than is prescribed for a companys or a buffaloes milk. It was alleged that on November 30, 1967, the appellant sold to Suresh Chand, Food Inspector, a sample which on analysis was found to be a sample of mixed companys and Buffaloes milk. It was sent for report to the Public Analyst, Chandigarh. At the appropriate stage a charge was framed against the appellant in the charge sheet it was stated that the sample taken from the appellant was found adulterated and thereby he had companymitted an offence punishable under Section 16 1 a of the Act. 200/ in default of payment of fine he was to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two months. On being asked whether he pleaded guilty to the charge the appellant answered in the affirmative. By means of a companyplaint dated January 16, 1968, made by the Food Inspector, proceedings were initiated against the appellant under the Provisions of the Prevention of Food adulteration Act, 1954 hereinafter called the Act . On August 14, 1968, the charge was read out to the appellant and he stated that he had heard and understood it and it had been explained to him. It is stated in the judgment of the High Court that the companyviction of the appellant was number seriously questioned before it, though a casual suggestion had been thrown by the companynsel for the appellant that the plea of guilty was perhaps obtained in obvious circumstances. It was observed that such a suggestion had number been sought to be substantiated from the record. The Magistrate thereupon made an order sentencing the appellant to a term of six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. Nor had any serious attempt been made to obtain an acquittal on the merits. The facts may be briefly stated. The matter was taken in revision before the High Court. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Delhi High Court Himachal Bench . The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Sessions Judge. The appeal was rejected. | 0 | train | 1972_142.txt |
These two companynected appeals by special leave are on behalf of Workmen of M s Williamson Magor Co. Ltd. renamed as M s Macneill Magor Ltd. represented by Williamson Magor Company Employees Union hereinafter called the union and are directed against the award of the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. 7537 IR dated 10.12.1974. 3278 IR dt. VIII 39/74, G.O. VIII 282/74, GO No. 2.4.1974. The union took up the cause of the workmen with the management. 351 352 of 1976 Appeals by special leave from the Award dated the 31st May, 1975 of the Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, Published by the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department in Reference Case No. The material facts may be stated thus According to the union, all the employees of the aforesaid companypany, the respondent before us who will hereinafter be called the management are the members of the union. L. Gupta S. K. Nandi and Krishna Prasad for the Appellant. B. Pai, N. C. Shah, J. R. Das and Parveen Kumar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BAHARUL ISLAM, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. No. | 1 | train | 1981_333.txt |
The effect of the judgment of the learned single Judge was that the appellants were also to be extended the benefit of the regular pay scale with annual increments with effect from 1.7.1981. From 1.7.1983, they were extended the benefit of the minimum in the pay scale applicable to regular employees, i.e. In Jai Kishan, the High Court had affirmed the decision of the Labour Court directing that certain employees of the Bank whose cases were espoused by the Union shall be extended the benefit of pay scale by starting with a minimum of Rs.325/ per month with effect from 1.7.1981 with annual increments in the regular pay scale and all other allowances. In the year 1990, they approached the Allahabad High Court by filing a writ petition seeking the benefit of regular pay scale, allowances and other benefits which were extended to regular employees, with effect from the date of their stop gap or ad hoc appointment. Rs.325/ per month, with allowances, but without yearly increments. In terms of the said rules, the appellants were regularised on different dates 1.10.1985, 9.12.1985, 24.4.1986 and 29.9.1986 and they were also extended the benefit of regular pay scales with all allowances. vs. UP Co operative Bank Ltd. From 1.7.1981, they were paid companysolidated salary of Rs.368/ per month which was increased to Rs.575/ per month from 1.4.1982. The appellants were appointed during 1978 1981 on daily wage basis by the first respondent UP Co operative Bank Ltd., for short the Bank , by way of stop gap arrangement. Upto 30.6.1981, they were on daily wages. A learned single Judge of the High companyrt, by order dated 6.7.2005, allowed the writ petitions and directed the first respondent Bank to treat the appellants on par with employees, who were the petitioners in Jai Kishan Ors. On 30.7.1985, the UP Regularisation of Ad hoc appointments on posts within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board Regulations, 1985 were numberified and came into force. Ors.,
WP No.1941 of 1985 and companynected cases which were decided by the High Court on 3.3.1989 . Feeling aggrieved, the Bank appealed and the Division Bench of the High Court allowed the special appeals of the Bank, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petitions. Heard the parties. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2010_60.txt |
Although the posts of Jailor and that of D.P.O. He companytended that the post of the Jailor and that the D.P.O. Grade II subscquently, and the posts of Jailor and D.P.O. the date on which he was initially posted as a Jailor. The post of D.P.O. However, since his initial appointment was to the post of Jailor, he was taken back as Jailor when a clear vacancy arose treating him as a direct recruit to the post of the Jailor w.e.f. Prisons and the Government all along wanted to treat him as a Jailor. Prisons dated 24th October, 1970 reverting him from the post of the Jailor to that of the Deputy Jailor and for restoration of his seniority in the cadre of Jailors over two other jailors viz.,
S Shri K. Vasantha Rao and M.Rama Rao. Jail Subordinate Services Rules in favour of the appellant for his regular appointment as a Jailor. The appellants initial appointment as Jailor did number survive after the post of the jailor came to be abolished companysequent upon the closure of the Camp Jail w.e.f. 27th June, 1969 when the order posting him as a Jailor was passed. Secondly, his service as a Jailor were never terminated and without terminating the said services, he was appointed as D.P.O. He companytinued to discharge the duties of the Jailor thereafter and he was appointed formally in one of the three temporary vacancies of Jailor by the order of 30th September, 1975. He companytinued as D.P.O. The first is that he was originally appointed as a Jailor on 26/27th June, 1969 though the post was temporary. He was so appointed as a Jailor in the vacancy caused due to the retirement of Shri Doraiswamy. Prisons pointed out that the post of the Jailor was sanctioned temporarily to man the Camp Jail in question where the appellant was posted. and till he was brought back and appointed temporarily as Jailor in one of the three temporary vacancies by the order of 30th September, 1975, he was number in the cadre of JailOrs. carried a higher salary than that of the Jailor as is clear from the letters of appointment to the respective posts. By the order of 24th June, 1969, he was appointed as Jailor in the scale of Rs. He also pointed out that his period of training on appointment as D.P.O Grade II in between, was treated as service on other duties and he was being companytinued as Jailor. and that he was also paid the salary of Jailor straightaway and number the pay admissible during the training period for the said post that even when he was appointed as D.P.O., his services as Jailor were number terminated by any formal order, and that even the order of appointment to the post of D.P.O. Prisons to appoint the appellant temporarily as Jailor, for the time being in one of the 3 temporary vacancies. Jail Subordinate Services Rules which required training for a period of 9 months for a direct recruit to the post of the Jailor. Prisons, therefore, in the said letter, pleaded that the appellants services as a Jailor should be regularised. This order, however, did number make it clear as to from what date his services as a Jailor were regularised. mentioned that his services companyld be transferred as Jailor at any time according to the exigencies of the administration, and that the appellant was given the unmistakable impression that the Department desired to treat him as a Jailor on Deputation. were number interchangeable, the fact remained that the services of the appellant as a Jailor were never terminated. Grade II and had to undergo probation period of that post, shows that his earlier service as a Jailor had companye to an end and he was freshly employed as a D.P.O. Although there is numberformal order terminating the services of the appellant as a Jailor, the very fact that by the order of 3rd October, 1969, the appellant was appointed as D.P.O. His appointment as a Jailor was for the first time made under the memo of 30th September, 1975 issued by the Government. It was, therefore, asserted in the letter that in the circumstances, his appointment to the post of the Jailor was number irregular. 3rd October, 1969 when he was appointed to the post of D.P.O. Prisons, Although, from 16th June, 1970 till 4th October, 1975 he was posted to work as Jailor, his substantial appointment was as a D.P.O. were number interchangeable, the appellants appointment order as D.P.O., made it clear that he was liable to be transferred as a Jailor whenever the exigencies of the service so required. According to the learned Counsel, it is too late in the day to companytend that his initial appointment was as a Jailor, since the appellant had ceased to be so, after he was appointed as a D.P.O. Since the appellant had started his first service as a Jailor for the first time on 30th September, 1975, he had number even companypleted 2 years of service as a Jailor on 30th July, 1977, i.e., the date he was appointed as a temporary Deputy Superintendent of Jails. Hence by their detailed order of 23rd December, 1987 in which the history of the appellants service was traced right from the day he was appointed as the Jailor under order dated 24th June, 1969, the Government made it clear that the regularisation of the appellant as a Jailor was w.e.f. The I.G. What was made regular by the order of the 1st September, 1976 was the irregular appointment of the appellant as a Jailor made on 30th September, 1975. This order, however, did number state, in terms, as to from which date the regularisation of the appellants services as a Jailor was made. While rejecting the representations, the Government asserted that since there was a vacancy in the post of Jailor on 27th June, 1969, there was numberhing wrong in appointing the appellant temporarily to the said post from that date. Prisons wrote a letter to the Home Secretary of the State Government pointing out that the appellant was directly recruited as Jailor temporarily during the Telangana agitation and later, on account of the abolition of the temporary post of the Deputy Superintendent of Jails and companysequent reversions, he was absorbed as D.P.O. Grade II during 1969 and he was temporarily appointed as Jailor in the same year although the jails wing and the probation wing are two separate entities and inter transfers are number permissible. By their order of 30th July, 1977 the State Government temporarily promoted the appellant as Deputy Superintendent of Jails alongwith another jailor, Shri M. Rama Rao. Grade II on other duty at District Jail, and appointed him to the post of the Jailor temporarily subject to the companydition that his services were liable to be terminated at any time without numberice and without assigning any reasons. Within about 8 months, by the order of 16th June, 1970, he was transferred and appointed to discharge the duties of a Jailor numberwithstanding the fact that he was technically holding the post of the D.P.O. the I.G. That is why another order was passed on 23rd December, 1987 making it clear that the appellants regularisation in the post of the Jailor was from 27th June, 1969, i.e. The Government further made clear that although the appellant was reverted to the post of D.P.O. Prisons forwarded the said representation to the Home Secretary of the State Government with his own companyments and giving a detailed profile of the appellants service, pointing out in particular that the appellant was initially appointed as a Jailor though against a temporary post, and number as a D.P.O. The Government by the same order again made it clear that the orders issued on 1st September, 1976 in the matter of relaxation of rules and regularisation of the appointment of the appellant as a Jailor, would be operative from 27th June, 1969. The Government further stated that the appellant had from time to time made representations to regularise his services as a Jailor and hence the Government had relaxed the rules in his favour by its order of 1st September, 1976. Although the facts are many, the only question involved in the present case is whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of his service as jailor from 26/27th June, 1969 to 30th September, 1969 as a qualifying period of service for being appointed to the post of the Deputy Superintendent of Jails on 30th July, 1977. It appears that barely 8 months thereafter, by the order dated 16.6.1970, the appellant was transferred and posted temporarily as Jailor at Maulaali Agricultural Colony Jail. from 6th October, 1969 to 29th June, 1970 when he was absorbed as such D.P.O. The regularisation companyld number be made from 26/27th June, 1969 since the appellant was appointed as a D.P.O. The Government also suited that since the appellant was an experienced Ex Air Force officer besides being educationally qualified, the Government companysidered that his services would be more useful as Jailor right from his temporary appointment to that post on 27th June, 1969. 180 375/ temporarily under Rule 10 a 1 i of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Services Rules hereinafter referred to as the Rules and he assumed office on 26th June, 1969 as Jailor at Camp M. Jail, Yrragadda, as a evidenced by the order of June 27, 1969. September 1969. However, this order was reconsidered by the Government in appeal and by its later order of 10th May, 1974 the Government set aside the order of reversion and restored Shri Doraiswamy to the post of the Jailor. It was, however, made clear in the said appointment letter that whenever occasion demanded, the appellant was likely to be posted as Welfare Officer Jailor Brother and Deputy Superintendent of certified schools. As a result, the appellant was again sent back as the D.P.O. Prisons on the recommendation of the State Public Service Commission, regularized the services of the appellant as Deputy Superintendent of Jails w.e.f. On 6th August, 1969 the I.G. The second companytention of the learned Counsel was that according to the rules governing the appointment to the post of the Deputy Superintendent of Jails, the said appointment companyld be made either by transfer promotion or direct recruitment and the promotee candidate had to serve as a Jailor for a minimum period of 5 years. In this letter, the I.G. By their order of 8th June, 1983, the Government temporarily promoted the appellant to the post of the Superintendent of Jails alongwith other 5 Deputy Superintendents of Jails who included respondents 1 to 3. 27th June, 1969. The said service has also a bearing on his seniority as a Deputy Superintendent of Jails over respondents 1 to 3 who were directly appointed as Deputy Superintendent of Jails on 25th September, 1979 and companypleted their probation in 1981. In the seniority list, the appellant was shown senior to respondents 1 to 3 both in the post of the Deputy Superintendent as well as in the post of the Superintendent of Jails. Prisons by his order dated 4th October, 1975, treated the appellant as a leave reserve D.P.O. Prisons that he should companysider the question of companytinuing the appellant as a Jailor companysidering his past experience and his suitability and efficiency in the said post, without, however, affecting the order dated 10th May, 1974 passed in favour of Shri Doraiswamy. As against this respondents 1 to 3 came in the service as a direct recruits for the first time as Deputy Superintendents of Jails in 1979 when by that time the appellant had companypleted his service as the Deputy Superintendent of Jails for numberless than two years. Ultimately, the Government by its letter of 30th September, 1975 advised the I.G. In view of the said letter of the Government, the I.G. He would, however, undergo in service training after the emergency, while working in the jail. Although the Government did number have any doubt with regard to the date from which his services as a Jailor were regularised by the order of 1st September, 1976, the subsequent order of 23rd December, 1987 became necessary in view of the decision of the State Tribunal on 10th February, 1987 whereby the Tribunal had remanded the proceedings before them, to the Government for reconsideration of the whole issue afresh. Grade II by an order of 3rd October, 1969. Prisonsdeclared that the appellant had companypleted his period of probation as Deputy Superintendent of Jails on 19th August, 1978. 9th September, 1969 as stated in the order of the Inspector General of Prisons dated 18th September, 1969. The Government also pointed out that by virtue of the relaxation given to the appellant, only he companyld be promoted as a Deputy Superintendent of Jails though temporarily on 20th August 1977, the date on which respondents 1 to 3 were number in service at all. By its letter of 29th April, 1975 the Government informed the I.G. 6th October, 1969 to 29th June, 1970. On 2nd November, 1971, the I.G. By his order of 16th March, 1983, the I.G. On the date he assumed office, the temporary jail at Yrragadda was in existence and it was closed only w.e.f. Since the Commission companyld give companycurrence only on 29th February, 1982, the appellants services in the cadre of the Deputy Superintendents of Jails companyld number be regularised till 25th February, 1983. While doing so, the Government observed that the appellant was selected to the post of the D,P.O. By his order of 22nd March, 1983, the I.G. The last companytention of the learned Counsel was that Rule 23 a under which the relaxation was made was number available in the present case for regularisation of the appellants service from the 26/27th June, 1969. thereafter by the order of 3rd October, 1969. They also pointed out that the appellant companyld have been regularly promoted to the said post from 20th August, 1977 or his services companyld have been regularised from that date but for the fact that the post was under the purview of the State Public Service Commission and pending approval by the Commission, numberperson companyld be promoted regularly. Grade II w.e.f. It appears that in the meanwhile, one Shri Doraiswamy had made an appeal to the State Government against the order of the I.G. On 7th September, 1974, the appellant made a representation to the Government. He was directly appointed to the post without inparting training as it was companysidered unnecessary. Grade II. The said appointment was thereafter regularised by the order dated 1st September, 1976. There was a need of persons who companyld maintain discipline in jails and such persons companyld be available only from the military services. The Government pointed out that respondents 1 to 3 were number in service on 1st September, 1976 and, therefore, companyld number argue that they were adversely affected by the relaxation given to the appellant. The Government further stated that they were number expected to keep in view the interests of future entrants in service while providing such relaxation of rules in favour of any in service person. On the other hand, if the relaxation was number made in favour of the appellant, he would have been definitely subjected to great hardship as all the service rendered by him from 27lh June, 1969 would have gone unaccounted for. Prisons wrote a letter to the Home Secretary requesting for relaxation of Rule 9 of the A.P. It was also added that though the appellant was at that time working against a temporary post, he would later on be absorbed against a clear vacancy. By his order of 1st September, 1976, the Governor in exercise of his powers under Rule 47 of the State Subordinate Services Rules relaxed Rule 6 b of the said Rules and Rule 9 of the A.P. Against the seniority given to the appellant over them, respondents 1 to 3 made representations to the Government, and by their order of 15th February, 1990, the Government rejected the representations. as is stated in the order dated 2nd November, 1971 passed by the I.G. The learned Counsel also relied upon the order dated 11th July, 1975 which stated that in accordance with the order of July 11, 1975, the appellant reported as Leave Reserve Probation Officer Grade II on 11th July, 1975 in his office and he was directed to report immediately before the Superintendent, District Jail, Secundrabad to assist him in companynection with the emergency. That order further neither affected the companyditions of service of any member of the service number caused any undue hardship to anyone. The Government further pointed out that had the date been mentioned in the original order of 1st September, 1976, respondents 1 to 3 would number have had any locus standi to challenge it since they had entered the service only in the year 1979. By its order of 23rd November, 1972, the Government had rejected the said representation. The companytentions raised by Shri Madhava Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents against the seniority given to the appellant over respondents 1 to 3 in the post of the Deputy Superintendent may be summarised as follows. The Government companytended that the only omission on the part of the Government was that they had number mentioned the date from which the. It was only by a mistake that the date from which the relaxation was given was number mentioned in the said order. 20th August, 1977. It appears that from 2nd September, 1974 the appellant went on leave. 1299 of 1986 which was filed by the respondents 1 to 3 against the rejection of their representation by the Government on 30th January, 1986. The facts narrated earlier clearly bring out some prominent features of the appellants service. No representation was also made against the said order at that time. relaxation should be given and that they had to make good that omission after it was pointed out by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in its order dated 10th February, 1987 in R.P. Instead of, therefore, recruiting fresh hands and placing them under training, in view of the urgency, he had directly appointed, through the Employment Exchange, the appellant who had the requisite educational qualifications, was within the prescribed age limit and who had also worked as a number Commissioned officer in the Indian Air Force for 10 years and 10 months. The appointment of the appellant was made about 20 years ago and a review of the appointment at that distance of time was number desirable as it would be companytrary to the law declared by the Supreme Court in Rabindra Nath v. Union of India AIR 1979 SC 470 reiterated in 5.5. B. Sawant, J. The admitted facts are that the appellant is an Ex Air Force officer and possesses a Commerce and Law Degree. Megha v. Union of India . belonged to two different cadres. This clarification had become necessary since in the meanwhile the following events had taken place. Leave granted. 200 400/ . No. | 1 | train | 1993_388.txt |
BDA had initially fixed the tentative price of a HIG house as Rs.2,85,000/ . units was received by BDA only on 15.05.1989. During the pendency of the companyplaint before the companymission, BDA delivered one HIG house on 21.1.1997 and remaining 10 HIG houses on 12.3.1997. The project related to companystruction of 558 HIG Houses. BDA delivered 4 HIG houses in December, 1989 and May, 1990. This appeal relates to delay in delivery of 11 HIG houses at M.V. Thus there was deficiency of service on the part of BDA. BDA registered the request for allotment of 15 HIG Houses, vide companyfirmation letter dated 20.8.1984. By letter dated 22.08.1985, BDA informed the respondent about the revision of price of HIG Houses from Rs.2.85 lakhs to 4.75 lakhs per unit. Nevertheless, BDA allotted 15 houses as per intimation dated 27.5.1987. It held BDA had promised to deliver the houses to the Respondent by December, 1986. The allotment of 15 HIG Houses identified by House numbers was only by resolution dated 16.1.1987 and companymunicated to Respondent on 27.5.1987. Respondent alleged that it had to pay a rent of Rs.3000/ per house or Rs.33000/ for 11 Houses, per month, due to the number delivery of 11 HIG Houses. The Respondent companytends that it is entitled to reimbursement of the rents paid by it in respect of 11 houses, on account of the delay on the part of BDA in delivering the houses. The brochure relating to the BDA scheme did number mention any specific date for delivery of possession of the houses. By letter dated 27.5.1987, BDA informed Respondent that 15 Houses including three companyner houses had been allotted to Respondent on 16.1.1987 and furnished the numbers of the houses allotted. The companyt of 15 HIG houses was Rs.73.5 lakhs that is, three companyner units at the rate of Rs.5.5 lakhs each and 12 other units at the rate of Rs.4.75 lakhs each . Even though the 11 houses were delivered in 1997 after the companyplaint, BDA was guilty of deficiency in rendering service. houses and the balance due was Rs.54,16,075/ . By letters dated 29.11.1989, 17.01.1990, 9.7.1993 and 11.1.1994, the Respondent pointed out the delay in delivery of the HIG houses and requested for early delivery of possession of the houses. BDA also indicated the total amount due in respect of 15 HIG Houses and required the Respondent to pay the said amount in installments as shown in the Annexure thereto. BDA also informed the Respondent that the units would be ready for occupation in December, 1986. The companyplainant was in numberway companycerned with the dispute between BDA and its companytractor and the companysequential delay. By letter dated 15.5.1989, BDA adjusted and appropriated the said sum of Rs.54,16,075/ due in respect of 15 HIG Houses and a sum of Rs.21,66,250/ due in respect of MIG Units , from out of Rs.98,85,210/ paid towards LIG units, and refunded the balance of Rs.23,02,885/ to the Respondent. Syndicate Bank Respondent herein made an application dated 17.7.1982 for allotment of 250 flats houses under the said scheme, that is, 15 HIG Houses, 110 MIG units and 125 LIG units. The only document on which reliance is placed by the respondent is a letter dated 22.8.1985 wherein BDA makes a reference to the expected date of companypletion of companystruction while intimating the revised companyt of the HIG houses on account of escalation etc. Claim, defence and the decision The Respondent sought the following reliefs against BDA, in its companyplaint Completion and due delivery of the remaining 11 HIG houses Payment of Rs.1,98,40,930/73 by way of interest on the sum of Rs.53 lakhs being the price of the said 11 houses from 01.01.1986 to 31.12.1994 the interest claimed at the bank rate varying from 16.5 to 24.25 P.A. BDA had number placed any material on record to show why the houses companyld number be companypleted and delivered between 1985 to 1991. As respondent did number pay the instalments, BDA sent a letter dated 20.10.1986 demanding payment. 490 houses were companypleted during 1989. Alternatively, it is the rent paid by the Respondent for the houses taken on lease due to number availability of the allotted houses. houses in RMV Extension, Bangalore was delayed. The Respondent did number produce any document to show that it paid Rs.3,000/ per month per house for similar houses between 1991 and 1997. The price was revised to Rs.4.75 lakhs per unit Rs.5.5 lakhs in respect of companyner units . The Facts The Banglore Development Authority Appellant herein, BDA for short introduced a Self Financing Housing Scheme for companystruction of flats houses in Banglore in the year 1982. No agreement was entered into between the parties stipulating any time for performance or delivery of houses. The companypletion of companystruction and delivery of remaining 11 H.I.G. The said Scheme companytemplated companystruction of three types of flats houses categorized as Higher Income Group, Middle Income Group, and Low Income Group HIG, MIG, and LIG for short . It was submitted that even if a reasonable time of two years is provided for companystruction from the deemed date of payment 15.5.1989 , BDA would be liable to companypensate the Respondent for the rent paid by it for 11 houses from 15.5.1991 till January March, 1997. 53,00,000/ plus Rs.33,000/ per month by way of reimbursement of the rent, from 01.01.1995 till delivery of possession BDA resisted the claim both on the question of maintainability, as also merits. When BDA failed, the respondent filed a companyplaint before the Commission under section 21 of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 Act for short . Nor did it produce any evidence to show that Rs.3000/ was the prevailing rent for similar houses. 16.5 lakhs as reimbursement of the rent paid by the Respondent for 11 houses at the rate of Rs.3,000/ per house per month from 01.01.1987 to 31.12.1994 Note Though for 96 months the amount works out Rs.31,68,000/ , claim was restricted to Rs.16.5 lakhs which is the rent for 11 houses for 50 months Payment of Rs.25,00,000/ as companypensation for mental agony and harassment Payment of future interest at 19.5 P.A. The companytractor M s. Khoday Engineering, raised a dispute and delayed the work relating to the remaining 68 houses including 11 houses to be delivered to the respondent . A sum of Rs.98,85,210/ paid by the Respondent towards the companyt of LIG units became refundable to respondent, on account of surrender of allotment of the 125 LIG units. Respondent also demanded interest on the price paid, at the bank rate from 01.01.1986 till date the delivery of the houses apart from reimbursement of the losses incurred on account of the number delivery. The more serious issue is whether the facts and circumstances warrant a finding of negligence and deficiency in service on the part of BDA necessitating award of companypensation. When the officers of the respondent met the officers of BDA personally to enquire about the 11 Houses, they were informed that the delay was on account of the companytractor M s. Khoday Engineering raising a dispute and stopping the work in respect of part of the project, and assured that possession will be delivered immediately after companypletion. The said letter stated that the total companyt of 15 HIG houses would be Rs.7125000/ and after adjustment of Rs.1068750/ , the balance of Rs.6036250/ was payable in seven bi monthly instalments from November, 1985 to December, 1986, the first six instalments being Rs.862327/ and the last instalment being Rs.862288/ . It also incidentally stated that the houses would be ready for occupation in December, 1986. The loss is the rental income which the houses would have fetched if they had been delivered earlier from the agreed due date to date of actual delivery of possession. The payment was only on 15.5.1989. In spite of respondent having made full payment and making repeated demands, 11 houses were number delivered till the companyplaint was filed in 1995. The companytract did number stipulate any period for companypletion and delivery. The instalments were number paid and respondent itself was the defaulter. The respondent had paid a sum of Rs.19,33,925/ in advance towards the companyt of the 15 H.I.G. Under the said scheme an applicant for allotment was required to make an initial deposit of 15 of the companyt of the unit and pay the balance in eight quarterly instalments of 10 and the last instalment of 5. Delivery companyld number, therefore, obviously be by the end of December, 1986. The Commission also assumed that mere delay automatically meant deficiency in service and in all such cases, the allottee will be entitled to interest at 18 per annum from the date of payment till date of delivery by relying on its decision in HUDA vs. Darsh Kumar. The Commission by order dated 11.04.2002 allowed the companyplaint. Even if it was treated as a service provider and the companyplaint was held to be maintainable, as there was numbernegligence or deficiency in service on its part, it was number liable to pay any interest or companypensation. The Respondent submitted that the companypensation payable would therefore be around Rs.23 lakhs and that as it had restricted its claim to Rs.16,50,000/ in the companyplaint under this head, the said amount may be awarded as companypensation. It is number the case of the Respondent that documentary evidence for payment of rent was number available. If reasonable period for companystruction is to be reckoned as two years as assumed by the Commission , then the question of delay would arise only after 15.5.1991. What remained was the claim for interest and companypensation. Thus it would be seen that the companyt of I.G. Extension, Bangalore. companypounded quarterly Payment of Rs. The Respondent thus secured the main relief sought in the companyplaint. In brief, the companytentions were It was number a service provider number a seller of goods and the respondent was number a companysumer and therefore the companyplaint under the Act was number maintainable. This appeal by Special Leave is filed against the order dated 11.04.2002, passed by the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission Commission for short in O.P.No. Being a building companytract, time was number the essence of the companytract. Where documentary evidence was available, but number produced, obviously a mere statement in the affidavit cannot be the basis for award of damages. The Respondent issued a final numberice dated 11.07.1994 through companynsel demanding performance within one month. Parties led evidence by way of affidavits. Neither party sought leave to cross examine the witness deponent of the other party. 21 of 1995. on Rs. V. RAVEENDRAN J. | 1 | train | 2007_414.txt |
The Vice Chancellor in his proceedings dated 27.1.1983 and the Chancellor in his proceedings dated 12.8.1983 had given their approval under the relevant provisions of the U.P. The appropriate resolution has been passed by the appellant on 22.9.1982 to dismiss the respondent from service, subject to its approval by the Vice Chancellor and the Chancellor. Consequently, the enquiry officer had submitted his report on 9.5.82. From time to time, the enquiry was postponed. The respondent had given the reply on April 13, 1981 to the charge sheet. Therefore, on March 22, 1991 a charge sheet was given to the respondent, after appointing an enquiry officer. Ultimately, the respondent did number participate in the enquiry. Instead, the enquiry officer in his letter dated 18.5.1981 had given the reply stating that since the respondent had already given the reply to the charge sheet item wise, he was at liberty to inspect the documents at the time of final arguments on June 7, 1981. At the earliest, he wanted inspection of the documents mentioned in the charge sheet. Admittedly, neither the documents had been supplied number an opportunity of inspection had been given to the respondent. The charge levelled against the respondent was that he had misappropriated certain funds belonging to the Institution. 30.6.1993. Pending its disposal the respondent retired on reaching the age of superannuation on 12.12.1992.It would appear that the respondent was reappointed till the end of academic year as per rules and on the expiry of the academic year he stood superannuated according to rules w.e.f. He did number ask the enquiry officer for an opportunity to examine the witness on his behalf The question of hearing him by the Committee did number arise inasmuch as there is numbersuch provision in the bye laws of the society or the rules. The judgment was rendered on 5.2.1993 setting aside the orders of dismissal and leaving open the holding of fresh enquiry, if necessary. But there being numberprovision to give hearing to an employee in the meeting of the companymittee, the same was number given to the respondent. Based on that report, on 23.6.1982 the show cause numberice as to why he should number be dismissed from service was given to the respondent. Admittedly, the respondent acted as a principal of the appellants Institution. 11542/83 in the High Court at Allahabad. The respondent challenged the order of dismissal in P. No. Thereafter the appellant dismissed the respondent from service. Therefore, there was numberviolation of principles of natural justice, on the facts of this case. This appeal by Special Leave has been filed on 3.5.1993. Universities Act. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1994_1166.txt |
The appellant accordingly paid Rs.83,120/ to the BSES in terms of the order dated 27.02.2015 in three equal installments. By order dated 27.02.2015 Annexure P2 , the case was settled at Rs.83,120/ against full and final payment of the aforesaid bill of Rs.97,786/. Accordingly, it is number agreed between the parties that the petitioner shall deposit a sum of Rs.83,120/ in full and final settlement against the impugned bill of Rs.97,786/. Rajesh Arora submits that after examining this proposal, the companypetent authority has agreed to settle this bill for a sum of Rs.83,120/. It is further agreed between the parties that the petitioner shall deposit the said amount of Rs.83,120/ in three equal installments. 3 because he being in occupation of the house was found companysuming the electricity supplied by the BSES. On 15.12.2014, the officials of the Enforcement Department of BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd.respondent No. On verification, the BSES made assessment in relation to the companysumption of the electricity and accordingly sent a bill for theft for Rs. 25201 72444/SAKET PLA No. ID RJ 151214SC102 CRN No. On 27.02.2015, the BSES organized one Permanent Lok AdalatI in Lower Courts at Delhi under the provisions of Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 to settle their several recovery cases. The order reads as under In this case, the petitioner had approached this Court for settlement with regard to DT bill amounting to Rs.97,786/ based on inspection dated 15.12.2004. F11/75 SF , Khasra No. 1/37/2015. 2271/4, Malviya Nagar, Khirkee Extn.,
New Delhi. 2 herein inspected the electricity meter installed in the aforesaid house and found that the meter was number recording companyrect reading. A proposal for settlement was given on behalf of the petitioner, which was duly recorded in the Order dated 13.02.2015. The appellants case was also fixed for settlement. 97,786/ to the appellant and respondent No. The case was accordingly registered against the appellant and respondent No.3 being case No. 3 the name of respondent No.3 was deleted from the array of the parties by this Court order dated 25.04.2019 on monthly rent. The said amount will be deposited at Andrews Ganj office. ANITA MALHOTRA Date 2019.08.19 171302 IST Reason The appeal involves a short point as would be clear from the facts mentioned hereinbelow. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 05.09.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. The appellant let out this house to respondent No. The appellant is the owner of the house bearing No. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. This offer has number been accepted by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner. No.4476 of 2018 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by filed by the appellant herein. M.C. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2019_1012.txt |
11 Raghbir Singh was working as an Assistant Cashier in the same Corporation. Raghbir Singh raised a hue and cry after the appellant left the place. reached the scene of the occurrence and he found Raghbir Singh company fined inside the room and he found traces of robbery and also found serious injuries on the person of Raghbir Singh. The Doctor who examined Raghbir Singh found one lacerated wound on the left parietal region a reddish bruise towards the right eye and another reddish bruise on the back of left hand and also an incised wound on the front of terminal phalanx of right index finger. It is alleged that on 22 10 1976 at about 8 p.m. the appellant robbed Raghbir Singh a sum of Rs. One Kartar Nath numbericed Raghbir Singh and on the information given by him went and informed Sham Lal and in turn the Police was informed. The appellant was gunman in the Pepsu Roadways Transport Corporation at Kapurthala. 11 in a room bolting it from outside. 32,936.84 and also caused injuries to him. and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for six months. The plea of the accused was one of the denial that he was falsely implicated. He companyfined P.W. The appellant is companyvict ed under Sections 392 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. P.W. The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that investigation was followed and the Police did number take prompt action and it is only out of the suspicion, the appellant has been implicated. The A.S.I. After companypletion of the investigation a charge sheet was laid. The accused was absconding and he was arrested in the month of January, 1977. 5,000/ . Investigation was taken up. He is also companyvicted under Section 342, I.P.C. Sentences are directed to run companycurrently. The appeal preferred by the companyvicted accused was dismissed by the High Court. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court. | 0 | train | 1992_369.txt |
Orders passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal were number challenged by the State Transport Undertaking or the State Government but were challenged by the Permit Holders who were running mini buses. | 1 | train | 2001_668.txt |
Examiner No. The marks assigned by the examiners were subjected to statistical scaling and the results of written examination based on such scaled marks, were declared on 7.3.2005. After such interview, the Commission declared the final results of the examination on 1.5.2005 based on the aggregate of scaled marks in the written Main examination and the marks awarded in the interview. Low raw marks were further lowered or made into 0 and higher raw marks were further increased due to scaling Example Law Paper II. 10 9 became 49 and 83 became 156. 9 1 became 60 and 107 became 184. 6 9 became 66 and 85 became 184. 9 4 became 0 and 122 became 156 In companytrast, in some cases all raw marks whether low or high, became higher. 4 1 became 56 and 102 became 177. The answer scripts relating to each subject were distributed to several examiners for valuation, as it was number possible to get the large number evaluated by a single examiner. Example Law Paper I. Civil Judge Junior Division Examination Main , 2003 which was of descriptive companyventional type. The preliminary examination was of objective type companysisting of two papers General Knowledge and Law. Judicial Service Civil Judge, Junior Division Preliminary Examination, 2003 companyducted by the Commission on 21.3.2004. The number of examiners, to whom the answer scripts were distributed for valuation, were as follows General Knowledge 18, Language 14, Law I 11, Law II 10, and Law III 14. The number of candidates who took the said examination was 5748. The result was declared on 30.6.2004 and 6046 candidates were declared qualified to appear for the U.P. The Main examination companysisted of five papers each carrying 200 marks General Knowledge, Language, Law I, II and III and was held between 5th and 7th October, 2004. On the recommendations made by Commission, appointments were made to 347 posts of Civil Judge, Junior Division. These petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India have been filed by the unsuccessful candidates who appeared in the examinations companyducted by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission Commission for short for recruitment to the posts of Civil Judge Junior Division . As many as 51524 candidates appeared for the U.P. On the request of the Allahabad High Court, to companyduct the examination for filling 347 posts of Civil Judge Junior Division , the Commission issued an advertisement in the Employment News dated 28.11.2003. Thereafter, 1290 candidates were interviewed between 14.4.2005 and 26.4.2005. The petitioners have referred to certain other absurdities arising from the application of scaling, with reference to the results of 2000 examination which was the subject matter of S.C. Dixit. 162/2004 and Curative Petition No.43/2004 filed in respect of S. C. Dixit supra were rejected on 04.2.2004 and 6.10.2004 respectively. C Nos.172, 409, 466 and 467 of 2005 RAVEENDRAN, J. The petitioners, who were unsuccessful, are aggrieved. It is also pointed out that Review Petition Civil No. With W.P. | 1 | train | 2007_1028.txt |
On 15.11.1992 she was given in marriage to Satvir Singh A 1 , a businessman, and thenceforth she was living in her husbands house. In the month of November 1995 her father Narender Singh PW 6 paid Rs.20,000/ to her husband Satvir Singh presumably for appeasing him so that he would desist from causing any harassment to Tejinder Pal Kaur. Devinder Singh A 2 and Paramjit Kaur A 3 who are the parents of Satvir Singh A 1 were also living in the same house. But that appeared to be only a modicum of pelf for abating the shower of abuses heaped up on the housewife. Thus the miseries she longed to end transformed into a monstrous dimension clutching her as long as she is alive. degree before her marriage. But the destiny also was cruel to her as the locomotive which she desired to be her destroyer, instead of snuffing her life out in a trice, companyverted her into a veritable vegetable. The events which culminated in the said tragedy have been set out by the prosecution like this Tejinder Pal Kaur PW 5 daughter of Narender Singh PW 6 obtained B.A. They used to hurl taunts on her pertaining to the subject, including telling her that she had brought rags instead of wedding companytumes. degree and B.Ed. She herself described her present plight as a living companypse. A young mother of two kids, who is a double graduate, ran into the rail in front of a running train to end her life as well as her miseries once and for all. She was driven to that action on account of the cruel treatments suffered by her at her nuptial home. She turned into a paraplegic. On the first companynt they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two and a half years and a fine of Rs.10,000/ each, and on the second companynt they were sentenced to imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs.5,000/ each. After about a year a male child was born to her and about one and a half years thereafter she gave birth to another male child. Though dowry was given at the time of marriage the appellants started harassing the bride after about 4 or 5 months of the wedding for number giving a car and a house as part of the dowry. She lost her left hand from shoulder joint and got her spinal companyd ruptured. Her husband, father in law and mother in law the appellants before us were companyvicted by the Sessions Court under Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC, besides Section 498A. When the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court in challenge of the said companyviction and sentence the victim also made a motion before the same High Court as she felt that companydign punishment has number been meted out to the guilty persons. The findings made by the Sessions Court were companycurred with by the High Court. THOMAS, J. Both were disposed of by the impugned judgment delivered by a single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. | 0 | train | 2001_1091.txt |
Financial swindling and duping of gullible investors depositors is number unique to India. The object of the Tamil Nadu Act was to give a speedy remedy to the innocent depositors who were vulnerable to the temptation of earning high rates of interest and were victimized by the financial establishments fraudulently. It has been referred to in Charles Dickens numberel Little Dorrit, in which Mr. Merdle sets up a Ponzi scheme resulting in loss of the savings of thousands of depositors including the Dorrits and Arthur Clennam. By means of the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioner and others challenged the companystitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act, 1997 for short the Tamil Nadu Act . the get rich quick scheme of the scamster Bernard Madoff in which the estimated losses of investors were estimated to be 21 billion dollars. Non banking financial companypanies have duped thousands of innocent and gullible depositors of their hard earned money by promising high rates of interest on these deposits, and then done the moonlight flit, often disappearing into another State or even foreign companyntries leaving the depositors as well as the State police high and dry. 26108/2005. The Reserve Bank of India Act, the Banking Regulation Act and the Companies Act do number occupy the field which the impugned Tamil Nadu Act occupies, though the latter may incidentally trench upon the former. In recent times there have been many such scandals e.g. By the impugned judgment the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has held the aforesaid Act to be companystitutional. The present case illustrates what has been going on in India for quite some time. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order of the Full Bench of the Madras dated 02.03.2007 in writ petition No. Delay companydoned. Hence, this appeal. Heard learned companynsel for the appellant. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2011_231.txt |
Dr. Manjunath PW 4 who had medically examined PW 1 victim specifically stated that numberhing was found to show that the victim was subjected to sexual intercourse. Upon registration of such crime PW 1 victim was sent for medical examination by Dr. Manjunath PW 4 who however, found numbersigns of any sexual intercourse but found two abrasions on the forearms of PW 1 victim. Muniyappa PW 2 supported her version, but Venkateshappa PW 3 turned hostile. PW 1 victim in her testimony admitted her age to be 60 years. It was alleged that her screams attracted Muniyappa PW 2 and Venkateshappa PW 3 and on seeing them the appellant had run away from the spot. She reiterated that she was subjected to forcible intercourse by the appellant. P 9 lodged by PW 1 victim alleging that on 06.03.1991 at about 4.00 PM while she was returning from the bus stop of their village after having sent her husband and son to sell silk companyoons at Vijayapura, the present appellant wrongfully restrained her near eucalyptus grove, gagged her mouth and despite her protest had forcible sexual intercourse with her. The learned trial companyrt found that though PW 1 victim had stated that her sari was torn in the incident, said sari was number produced before the companyrt, that as per PW 2 there were numbereucalyptus trees in between the bus stop and the village, that though as per the version of PW 1 victim the incident lasted for about half an hour during which time she was trying to escape and had bitten the right hand of the appellant, the medical evidence did number support such assertions and that because of civil and criminal cases pending between the parties the possibility of false implication companyld number be ruled out. Patil PW 5 who had examined the appellant stated the age of the appellant to be 17 18 years. It was suggested to these witnesses in their cross examination that the appellant was related to PW 1 victim, that there were civil and criminal cases pending between the parties in support of which companytention certified companyies of the civil suit and criminal cases Ext. State of Karnataka carried the matter further by filing Criminal Appeal No.1360 of 2001 in the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. Crime No.48 of 1991 was registered with Devanahalli Police Station pursuant to FIR Ext. The appellant was arrested and also medically examined. This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 10.06.2008 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.1360 of 2001 setting aside the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Ld. Dr. S.B. Considering the entire evidence on record learned trial companyrt found that the prosecution had failed to establish that the appellant was guilty of the offences as alleged. The learned trial companyrt, therefore, by its judgment and order dated 06.08.2001 acquitted the appellant of the charges leveled against him. After due investigation the charge sheet was filed and the appellant was tried for having companymitted the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 341 IPC vide Sessions Case No.62 of 1994. Uday U. Lalit, J. The appellant being aggrieved preferred special leave to appeal and this Court after grant of special leave to appeal also directed vide order dated 13.04.2009 that the appellant be released on bail pending this appeal. D 1 and D 2 were also filed. | 1 | train | 2014_501.txt |
That the respondent had taken recourse to Section 218 D 1 in filing an appeal against the appellate order of the learned Additional Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court is number in dispute. The respondent herein had preferred an appeal before the Additional Chief Judge of Small Causes Court under Section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Additional Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court decided the appeal vide order dated 8th February, 1996. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judge, Small Causes Court dated 8th February, 1996, the respondent filed a second appeal in the High Court under Section 218 D 1 of the Act. Thus, according to Section 218 D, an appeal shall also lie to the High Court from any decision of the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court in an appeal under Section 217, upon a question of law or usage having the force of law or the companystruction of a document. The appellant questioned the order of the learned single Judge dated 31st of January, 1997 through a Letters Patent Appeal. The appellant has number questioned the maintainability of the appeal filed by the respondent under Section 218 D of the Act before the learned single Judge of the High Court before us. The objection found favour with the learned Division Bench and without going into the merits of the order of the learned single Judge, the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed as number maintainable. An objection was raised before the Division Bench of the High Court regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that against an order of dismissal of the second appeal by the High Court, numberfurther appeal companyld He either under Letters Patent or any other law. The learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court on 31 1 1997 allowed that appeal partly. This appeal by special leave calls in question an order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay Dated 13th January, 1998 dismissing the Letters patent Appeal on the ground that the same was number maintainable. Provided that numbersuch appeal shall be heard by me High Court Unless it is filed within one month from the date of the decision of the Chief Judge. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, with respect to appeals from original decrees shall so far as, they can be made applicable, apply to appeals under sub section 1 and orders passed therein by the High Court may on application to the said Chief Judge be executed by him as if they were decrees made by himself. Reliance was also placed on Section 100 A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1998 Supp 3 SCR 288 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted. A brief reference to the facts, at this stage, would be apposite. | 0 | train | 1998_955.txt |
14119 of 1985 by M s Modi Carpets Ltd. Ors. Since the companyditions of companysent were number being companyplied with by M s Modi Carpets Ltd., a letter dated 30.4.1983 was sent by the appellant Board to M s Modi Carpets Ltd., Raebareli informing that number companypliance of the companysent companyditions is an offence under Section 44 of the Act. On 19.01.1984, the Board again sent a letter to M s Modi Carpets Ltd. that companyditions of the companysent order dated 22.1.1983 were number companyplied with. On the application submitted by M s Modi Carpets Ltd., Raebareli, seeking companysent to discharge effluent, the appellant Board granted companyditional companysent to discharge their trade effluent in the river Sai. The High Court while accepting the case of Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi perused the companyplaint of the Board. Pollution Control Board, Lucknow through its officers against M s Modi Carpets Ltd. Raebareli and 12 others under Section 44 of the Water Prevention Control of Pollution Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as the Act pending in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate Pollution , Lucknow. Pollution Control Board hereinafter referred to as the Board which is the appellant herein vide numberification No. For this, Modi Carpets Ltd. sent a reply dated 18.10.1984 to the appellant Board giving clarifications for number companyplying with the companysent companyditions and the same was companysidered and rejected by the Board on 31.10.1984 on the ground that the unit was number companyplying with the prescribed standards, companysent companyditions and also the application was incomplete in various aspects. 44 of 1988 filed by the appellant Board be quashed. Since M s Modi Carpets Ltd. was number companyplying with the provisions of the Act and there was violation of Sections 25 26 of the Act, a companyplaint under Section 44 was filed by the Board through its Assistant Environmental Engineer against respondent No.1 as well as other persons namely, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Managing Director, Joint Managing Director, Directors, General Manager, Commercial Manager and Company Secretary of M s Modi Carpets Ltd. before the J.M., Raebareli. Pollution Control Board discloses any material against the first respondent i.e., Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi, Joint Managing Director, particularly, his companytrol over the decision making process of the Company and whether the High Court was justified in quashing the same in so far as Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi in a petition under Section 482 Cr. The Board moved before the High Court in a revision against the said order. On 13.09.1984, the unit was again inspected by the officers of the Board and it was found that effluent was being discharged without any treatment. Background facts, in a nutshell, are as follows The State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution was companystituted on 03.02.1975 by the Government of U.P. 44 of 1988 filed by the U.P. Again it was reiterated that number compliance of the companyditions of companysent would be an offence under Section 44 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on satisfying the averments in the companyplaint of the Board issued process against the accused at the first instance. It was specifically mentioned in the companyplaint that the aforesaid persons are responsible for the companyduct of the business of the companypany and for their monetary benefits companytinued to discharge numberious and polluting trade effluent of the companypany without companyplying with the companyditions of companysent and mandatory provisions of law. In the said petition, it was alleged that the first respondent, Dr. Bhupendra Kumar Modi, Joint Managing Director was number companycerned with day to day business of the companypany and cannot be prosecuted for the offence companymitted by the Company, hence, it was prayed that Complaint Case No. 1347 of 2001 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench quashing the Complaint Case No. Aggrieved by the said judgment of the Lucknow Bench, the appellant Board has filed the above appeal by way of special leave. before Lucknow Bench of the High Court being Crl. 1347 of 2001. Heard Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant Board and Mr. L.N. In the meanwhile, the Sessions Judge, Lucknow entertained a revision moved by the accused against the order issuing process to them and quashed it on the erroneous ground that the Magistrate did number pass a speaking order for issuing such summons. Questioning the same, the Board filed special leave petition before this Court and ultimately leave was granted by this Court. for quashing the aforesaid companyplaint and also for other reliefs. The CJM before whom the companyplaint was filed thereafter passed a detailed order on 25.04.1984 and again issued process to the accused. The only point for companysideration in this appeal is whether the companyplaint of U.P. The respondents Company and its Directors desired the trial Court to discharge them without even making their first appearance in the Court. By impugned order dated 29.11.2004, the High Court quashed the companyplaint so far as it related to respondent No.1 on the main ground that there was numbermaterial on record to show that respondent No.1 was, at the relevant time, incharge and responsible to the companypany for companyduct of its business. The order was again challenged by the accused in revision before the Sessions Court and the same Sessions Judge again quashed it by order dated 25.08.1984. Vide order dated 5.11.1985, the High Court stayed further proceedings in the companyplaint case. and it has been named as U.P. 2179/9 2 100 74 dated 13.07.1982. When the attempt made for that failed, they moved for exemption from appearance in the Court. This appeal is directed against the order dated 29.11.2004 passed in Crl. Though the revision was moved in 1984 itself it took 15 years for the High Court to dismiss the revision petition as per the order passed by a learned Single Judge on 27.07.1999. Rao, learned senior companynsel, appearing for the 1st respondent. A petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code was filed before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad being Criminal Misc. Case No. Sathasivam, J. P.C. Petition No. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2008_1729.txt |
103 of 1956. 144 of 1956 . 103 of 1956 and 129 of 1957 . 126 to 128 and 248 of 1956 , and for the State of Madhya Pradesh respondent in Petition No. 4 is a gut merchant, while Petitioner No. 83 there are 180 petitioners residing at different places in the State of Bihar who are all Muslims whose occupation is that of Kasais or cattle dealers or exporters of hides. 129 are eight in number all of whom are Muslims residing and carrying on business in Uttar Pradesh either as gut merchants or cattle dealers, or Kasais or beef vendors or bone dealers or hide merchants or cultivators. 117 of 1956, 126 of 1956, 127 of 1956, 128 of 1956, 248 of 1956, 144 of 1956 and 145 of 1956 have been filed by 6, 95, 541, 58, 37, 976 and 395 petitioners respectively, all of whom are Muslims belonging to the Quraishi Community and are mainly engaged in the butchers trade and its subsidiary undertaking such as the supply of hides, tannery, glue making, gutmaking and blood dehydrating. 103 of 1956 has been filed by two petitioners, who are both Muslims residing in Uttar Pradesh and carrying on business in that State, the first one as a hide merchant and the second as a butcher. After slaughtering the cattle these petitioners sell the hides to tanners or bide merchants who are also members of their companymunity and the intestines are sold to gut merchants. 1 and 2 are butchers and meat vendors who, according to the petition, only slaughter cattle and number sheep or goats and are called Kasais in companytradistinction to the Chicks who slaughter only sheep and goats. It is said that there are approximately 500 other Kasais in Patna alone apart from 2 lacs of other Kasais all over the State of Bihar. Petitioners in Petition No. 58, 83, 84, 103, 117, 126, 127, 128, 248, 144 145 of 1956 129 of 1957. 58 of 1956 there are 5 petitioners, all of whom are Muslims belonging to the Quraishi companymunity which is said to be numerous and an important section of Muslims of this companyntry. Petitioner No. Adhicary, Advocate General for the, State of Madhya Pradesh and I. N. Shroff, for the State of Madhya Pradesh respondent in Petition No. The members of the companymunity are said to be mainly engaged in the butchers trade and its subsidiary undertakings such as the sale of hides, tannery, glue making, gut making and blooddehydrating, while some of them are also engaged in the sale and purchase of cattle and in their distribution over the various areas in the State of Bihar as well as in the other States of the Union of India. Verse 29 of Hymn 1 in Book X.of Atharva Veda forbids company slaughter in the following words The slaughter of an innocent, O Kritya, is an awful deed, Slay number company, horse, or man of ours. Petitioners Nos. In companysequence of such re organisation of the States the State of Bombay has had to be substituted for the respondent State of Madhya Pradesh in the first five petitions and to be added in the sixth petition, for a part of the district in which the petitioners resided had been so transferred, while the State of Madhya Pradesh companytinues to be the respondent in the seventh petition. 145 of 1956 , adopted the arguments of C. K. Daphtary. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the State of U. P. respondent in Petitions Nos. By these two petitions the petitioners challenge the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 LT.
P. 1 of 1956 , hereinafter referred to as the U. P. Act and pray for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent State of Uttar Pradesh number to take any steps in pursuance of the U. P. Act or to interfere with the fundamental rights of the petitioners. 5 is the General Secretary of Bihar State Jamiatul Quraish. Most of them reside at different places which, at the dates of the filing of these petitions were parts of the State of Madhya Pradesh, but which or parts of which have, in the companyrse of the recent re organisation of the States, been transferred to and amalgamated with the State of Bombay. By these petitions the petitioners II of whom are citizens Of India, challenge the validity of the C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949 C. P. and Berar Lll of 1949 , as subsequently amended. The companyrectness of these figures is number admitted by the respondent State but we do number doubt that the number of Kasais is companysiderable. O companys, ye fatten een the worn and wasted, and make the unlovely beautiful to look on. Though the custom of slaughtering of companys and bulls prevailed during the Vedic period, nevertheless, even in the Rg. All the petitioners in these two applications are citizens of India. In Petition No. Petition No. High praise was bestowed on the company as will appear from the following verses from Rg. J. Umrigar, N. H. Hingorani and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the petitioners in all the petitions except Petition No. The Bill, as eventually passed by the Bihar Legislature, received the assent of the Governor on December 8, 1.955, and was published in the Official Gazette on January 11, 1956. Veda, Book VI, Hymn XXVIII Cows attributed to the authorship of Sage Bhardvaja The kine have companye and brought good fortune lot them rest in the company pen and be happy near US. There was a school of thinkers amongst the Rsis, who set their face against the custom of killing such useful animals as the company and the bull. In petition No. Prosper my house, ye with auspicious voices, your power is glorified in our assemblies. II , Part II by P. V. Kane at pp. Petitions Nos. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor General of India, G.C. Here let them stay prolific, many companyoured, and yield through many morns their milk for Indra. Translation by Ralph Griffith . On applications for an interim order restraining the State of Bihar from issuing a numberification under s. 1 3 of the Act bringing the Act into operation having been made in these petitions, the respondent State, by and through the learned Solicitor General of India, gave an undertaking number to issue such numberification until the disposal of these petitions and, in the premises, numberorder was companysidered necessary to be made on those applications. The company gradually came to acquire a special Sanctity and was called Aghnya number to be slain . ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petitions Nos. 772 773. | 1 | train | 1958_118.txt |
In spite of the aforestated direction, the respondent did number pay any amount towards the unpaid instalments and interest thereon. In pursuance of the aforestated direction, the appellant had given a statement giving details about the amount payable by the respondent with 10 interest on the unpaid instalments. There was a companydition in the auction sale that in case of default in payment, the respondent had to pay interest 10 per annum on the unpaid amount and it was also open to the appellant to impose further amount of penalty and to resume possession of the booth. In the aforestated circumstances, the respondent had filed a suit challenging the validity of the action of the appellant of charging 18 companypound interest and resumption of the booth. As he did number pay the remaining instalments, he was called upon to pay the same along with interest 18 per annum, companypounded quarterly. The balance amount of Rs.3 lakhs was to be paid by the respondent to the appellant authorities in 10 half yearly instalments along with interest 10 per annum. With the passage of time, value of the property has increased substantially and it is clear that the respondent is number inclined to pay the unpaid amount along with interest thereon even at the rate of 10 per annum, which was agreeable to him. It was mainly companytended in the suit filed by the respondent that it was number open to the appellant to charge 18 companypound interest. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a nutshell are as under The present respondent had participated in an auction companyducted by the appellants for disposal of certain booths situated in Sector 9 at Panchkula and had offered the highest bid of Rs.4 lakhs for booth number103 situated in the said sector. The respondent had deposited Rs.40,000/ , being 10 of the amount of bid, immediately and thereafter he had further deposited a sum of Rs.60,000/ so as to make 25 of the total amount offered by him. According to the respondent, the appellant companyld have charged only 10 interest on the delayed payments. After companysidering the facts and submissions made by the learned companynsel, the High Court dismissed the second appeal by observing that the appellant was entitled to charge only 10 interest and number 18 interest companypounded quarterly, as demanded by the appellant. In the aforestated circumstances, the appellant had filed Regular Second Appeal No.790 of 2008 before the High Court. As he was the highest bidder, subject to the companyditions of the auction, he was allotted the said booth vide Memo No.12351 dated 14th September, 1988. After companysidering relevant evidence, the trial companyrt had decreed the suit, especially on the ground that it was number open to the appellant to charge 18 companypound interest. Finally, on 5th September, 2014, this Court had passed an order directing the respondent to pay at least Rs.13 lakhs before 10th October, 2014 and the said amount was, in fact, much lesser than the amount which was payable by the respondent even as per his own statement of accounts. It is an admitted fact that the respondent companymitted several irregularities in making payment of the remaining amount. The respondent had been directed to make the payment from time to time so as to know his bona fides. No.790 of 2008 delivered by the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh, this appeal has been filed by the original defendant Haryana Urban Development Authority, through its Chief Administrator. Being aggrieved by the final outcome of the suit, the appellant had filed first appeal, but the same had been dismissed. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 10th December, 2009 in R.S.A. ANIL R. DAVE, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2014_467.txt |
singari in favour of outsiders plaintiffs claimed possession of the property by way of pre emption on the ground that they have superior rights being fathers brothers sons of nathu companyered under section 15 1 a thirdly of the punjab pre emption act 1913.
that claim was decreed so far as nathus half share in the property was companycerned and the claim as against the alienation of half share by his wife was rejected. 911/71 sonu ram defendant i was the owner of about 9 bighas of agricultural properties in which bachan singh and niranjan singh plaintiffs claimed to be the cultivating tenants. 639/85 in this appeal the alienation was on numberember 22 1972 by one nathu and his wife smt. number 378 of 1963.
civil appeal number 639 of 1985 from the judgment and order dated 3.12.1984 of the punjab haryana high companyrt in r.s.a. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ranganath misra j. these two appeals by special leave are directed against two different judgments of the punjab haryana high companyrt in suits for pre emption. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 91 of 1971 from the judgement and order dated 21.8.1978 of the punjab haryana high companyrt in r.s.a. sonu ram sold the property under a registered sale deed dated july 22 1959.
the tenant filed a suit on july 21 1960 for a decree for possession by preemption. number 1721 of 1976.
k. bagga for the appellants. k. puri for the respondents. the alienees appeal to the district judge as also the high court did number succeed. | 1 | test | 1986_176.txt |
Aggrieved by the disparity with regard to grade pay of Brigadier vis vis civilian Chief Engineer in the MES, the Respondent filed O. A. No.155 of 2012 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Jaipur and sought a direction to the Appellants that he shall be entitled to the grade pay of Rs.10,000/ at par with his civilian companynterparts. filed before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Jaipur was transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kolkata. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kolkata by which the Appellants were directed to companysider the claim of the Respondent for payment of grade pay of Rs.10,000/ or more, at par with his civilian companynterparts holding the post of Chief Engineer in the Military Engineering Services MES , with all companysequential benefits. The Respondent was promoted to the rank of Brigadier and was posted as Chief Engineer, Shillong Zone in the Military Engineering Service. The Respondent further sought a direction to the Appellants herein to pay the arrears companysequent to re fixation of grade pay at Rs.10,000/ with all benefits along with interest at 18 on such arrears. The Respondent was companymissioned in the Army on 16.12.1978 and he was allotted to the Corps of Engineers in 1 Page July, 2005. The O.A. By a judgment dated 13.08.2015, the Tribunal allowed the O.A. By relying on the judgment of this Court in Confederation of Ex. filed by the Respondent and granted the relief sought by the Respondent. NAGESWARA RAO, J. The application filed by the Appellants seeking leave to appeal to this Court was dismissed by the Tribunal. | 1 | train | 2020_240.txt |
139 and 215 of the Act. 139 and for the payment of advance tax under Sec. 139 and 215 of the Act were number appealable, the appellant filed two revision petitions before the Commissioner of Income tax under s. 264 of the Act, one objecting to the levy of interest under sub s. 8 of s. 139 and the other to the interest levied under s. 215. Interest under sub sec. 139 of the Income tax Act, 1961 amounting to Rs.56, 391 and interest under sec. c of s. 246 of the Act before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax, Nagpur raising objection to the total income assessed and also including grounds objecting to the interest charged under ss. 8 of sec. The appellant is a sterling companypany which exports manganese extracted from its manganese mines situated in the States of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. It was mentioned in the revision petitions that an appeal had been filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and that numberwithstanding its pendency the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Income tax was being invoked. Thereafter, a few days later, the appellant made an application to the Appellant Assistant Commissioner in the appeal filed by it referring to the revision petitions preferred before the Commissioner of Income tax on the question of interest levied under s. 139 and s. 215 of the Act and requesting permission to withdraw the grounds relating to the levy of interest specially as those grounds companyld number be taken in the appeal and the orders levying interest were number appealable. 215 of that Act amounting to Rs.9,42,336, subsequently reduced to Rs.5,07,880 were levied against the appellant. It held these manganese mines up to June 30, 1962. The acceptance of Commissioners view would have meant that in order to maintain its revision petitions challenging the levy of interest the appellant would have been obliged to abandon also the challenge to the assessment of its income. The Commissioner informed the appellant that by reason of clause b of sub section 4 of s. 264 of the Act, which specifically directs that the Commissioner shall number revise any order under s. 264 where that order is pending on an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, he was powerless to interfere so long as the appeal was number withdrawn. On being advised thereafter that the grounds objecting to the charge of interest were infructuous inasmuch as orders under ss. In the two revision petitions the appellant explained the circumstances accounting for the delay in filing the return and in underestimating the advance tax. On June 8, 1962 it entered into an agreement with the Government of India under which all the manganese mines except one were transferred to a new companypany, the Manganese Ore India Limited, Nagpur in which the Central Government, the Governments of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh and the appellant had shares. The appellant filed writ petitions in the Bombay High Court at its Nagpur Bench assailing the orders of the Commissioner of Income tax rejecting its revision petitions, and on April 24, 1972 the High Court rejected the Writ Petitions in limine. It does number appear that any order was made specifically by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on that application, but it is apparent from the appellate order passed by him disposing of the appeal that he did number companysider the grounds relating to the levy of interest. 212 at a figure less than 75 per cent of the assessed tax. According to the appellant there was ample and clear justification for the delay in furnishing the return under sec. The appellant was assessed to income tax for the assessment year 1967 68, the relevant previous year being the year ended December 31, 1966. These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgments and orders of the Bombay High Court at its Nagpur Bench dismissing two writ petitions filed by the appellant. On March 22, 1971 the appellant preferred an appeal under cl. PATHAK, J. | 0 | train | 1986_152.txt |
313.1987 when he also attained the superannuation age of 58 years. Subsequently, the Government issued another order dated 17.9.1984, treating some of the retired Government servants who had retired on superannuation at the age of 55 years, but had been re employed in State Civil Service on companytract basis as those companytinuing in State Civil Service till they attained the superannuation age of 58 years, if they were to satisfy three companyditions specified thereunder. On their re employment, the State Government issued an order dated 24.8.1984 enhancing the retirement superannuation age of all Government servants in State Civil Service from 55 to 58 years and gave retrospective effect to it from 2.8.1984. 2382 of 1987 before the KAT calling in question a provision in the Revised Pay Rules which had made those rules inapplicable to pensioners who had been re employed in Government service after retirement. However, the Karnataka Civil Services Revised Pay Rules, 1987 the Revised Pay Rules, came into force w.e.f. The KAT which decided that application by its order dated 11.10.1988, while held that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of the Revised Pay Rules and directed the State to give the benefit of those Revised Pay Rules to them, disallowed the claim of the respondents for companynting the period of their service between their earlier superannuation and their subsequent superannuation, for granting then pensionary benefits. He was working as Secretary, Karnataka Housing Board on 31.7.1984 when he was ordered to retire on attaining the superannuation age of 55 years. However, while the first relief claimed in that application was that the respondents should be given the benefit of the revised Pay Rules, the second relief claimed therein was that the service rendered by each of them to the State between their earlier retirement at the superannuation age of 55 years and their subsequent retirement at their superannuation age of 58 years, ought to be taken into account as their companytinued State Civil Service for companyputing their pensionary benefits. H. Someshwar, respondent 2, who belonged to the Karnataka State Secretariat Service, was ordered to retire on 31.3.1984 on attaining the superannuation age of 55 years, while he was working as Joint Secretary to Government, However, he was re employed by the State Government on companytract basis w.e.f. Thereafter, the State Government, by its order dated 3.7.1987 retired respondent 1 from service on 31.7.1987 A N , when he attained the superannuation age of 58 years on 15.7.1987, as was being done in respect pf other regular Government servants. However, he was re employed by the State Government on companytract basis w.e.f 1.8.1984, subject to the companyditions of service companytained in rule 313 b of the Karnataka Civil Service Rules, 1957 the KCS Rules, as Secretary to the Chairman, Karnataka State Sports Council, for the period companyterminus with that of the Chairman. 204 of 1989 and the State by making Review Application No. Similarly, respondent 2 who satisfied the three companyditions of the said Government order dated 17.9.1984 and who had been specifically companytinued in State Civil Service as Joint Secretary to Government under Government order dated 25.1.1985, was subsequently retired from service w.e.f. The KAT on companysideration of the said Review Applications, by its companymon order made in them on 3.9.1990 while allowed the Review Application of the respondents, dismissed the review Application of the State. While respondents 1 and 2 were in State Civil Service. 1.7.1986 enhancing the scales of pay of the State Government servants, while respondents 1 and 2 had companytinued in State Civil Service because of specific orders made in that regard on the basis of Government order dated 17.9.1984 Which treated the periods of re employment also as their regular companytinuing Civil Service, Yet, the benefits of the Revised Pay Rides were denied to the respondents, as regards their pay and pension. 220 of 1989 before the KAT sought from it, review of the said order dated 11.10.1988 in so far it had gone against each or them. 1.4.1984 subject to the companyditions of service in rule 313 b of the KCS Rules, as Secretary, Dr, Sarojini Mahishi Committee, for the period company terminus with that of the companymittee. These appeals by special leave, of the State of Karnataka are directed against a companymon Order of the Karnataka Ad ministrative Tribunal the KAT made on September 3, 1990 in Review Application Nos. However, the respondents by making Review Application No. Since respondent I satisfied the three companyditions of the Government order dated 17.9.1984, the State Government, by its order dated 5.6.1985, treated respondent 1 as one who had companytinued in regular Civil service and appointed him as Assistant Director Co ordination , Directorate of Backward Classes and Minorities. 204 and 220 of 1989. It is the said companymon order made in the Review Applications which is questioned by the State in the present appeals, by special leave. Vasudeva Mayya, respondent I was a Govt. servant belonging to the cadre of KAS, Group A Junior Scale . This situation led respondents 1 and 2 to the filing of a joint Application No. Vice Sri R. Stanty Joseph, promoted. 4 SCR 254 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALA, J. 1994 SUPPL. Bangalore. | 0 | train | 1994_741.txt |
Summons of the suit were served upon the first respondent. An ex parte decree was passed against him on 19.2.1986. An application for mutation on the basis thereof was filed which was allowed on 07.03.1996. Allegedly, the first respondent having companye to know about passing of the said ex parte decree on 03.02.1997, filed an application on 07.02.1997 for setting aside the same, in terms of Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Revision Application filed thereagainst by the first respondent herein was allowed by the High Court. Appellant filed a civil suit on or about 6.4.1985. It was furthermore numbericed that the first respondent herein, while examining himself in the said proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in his cross examination, admitted that one and a half year prior to filing of the said application, he and his brother approached Dharam Singh for getting the judgment and decree set aside but he negated their plea. Appellant is before us being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with a judgment and order dated 14.2.2005 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Civil Revision Petition No.5999 of 2003 whereby and whereunder the Revision Application filed by the first respondent herein was allowed. The learned Trial Judge, by reason of an order dated 28.07.2000, dismissed the said application, inter alia, holding that summons had been duly served upon the first respondent. The High Court in the impugned judgment opined that the appellant had played fraud on the Court as neither the summons were properly served, number the publication was made in the newspapers. Order V Rule 19A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, according to the High Court, companyld have been taken recourse to, had also number been resorted to. Arising out of SLP C No.9325 of 2005 B. Sinha, J. Adverse companyments were also made by the High Court in regard to the application for mutation filed by the appellant only after 10 years, i.e., in the year 1996. An appeal was preferred thereagainst. He did number appear. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2007_808.txt |
The Federation felt that this action of the Respondent in causing legal numberices to be served on the International Chamber of Commerce was taken with a view to bringing the Federation into disrepute, and it was capable of so bringing it in the eyes of the International Chamber of Commerce which Act being inconsistent with his duties and obligations as an employee companystituted misconduct. This claim was number admitted by the Federation with the result that the Respondent caused a Lawyers numberice to be issued to the Federation, to the Indian National Committee of International Chambers of Commerce and to the International Chamber of Commerce with its Head Office at Paris, demanding payment of his dues amounting to about Rs. register maintained for all such workmen who were engaged to work for the Congress irrespective of the fact whether those were the employees of the Federation or otherwise, that in spite of the representations when the management did number reply, the Respondent companysulted two Lawyers and instructed them to serve necessary legal numberices who, advised him that as the work related to the 20th Congress was managed by an independent Committee his claim for the remuneration against the Federation alone would number lie and that he would have to make a claim on all the three bodies namely the Federation, the Indian National Committee of International Chamber of Commerce and the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, who companystituted and managed the affairs of the Congress. In February, 1965, the 20th Congress of International Chamber of Commerce was held in Delhi for which purpose a companymittee known as the Indian National Committee of Indian National chamber of companymerce was brought into existence and the service of the respondent along with other workmen were loaned to it by the Federation .The respondent worked for about 40 days but was only paid overtime for about 7 days and companysequently he claimed overtime for the remainder of the days as acccording to him other workmen had also been paid similarly. In this Appeal the Award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the Respondent R. K. Mittal, an employee of , the Appellant hereinafter referred to as the Federation with full back wages and companytinuity of service is challenged. Thereafter it is alleged that he filed a suit against the Federation and subsequently raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court for determination of the following issues namely whether the termination of the services of Shri R. K. Mittal is illegal and unjustified and if so what directions are necessary in this respect. K. Ramamurthi, J. Ramamurthi and Madan Mohan, for the respondent. A chargesheet was served on the Respondent and a domestic enquiry was held in which he was held to be guilty of misconduct. Appeal by special leave from the Award dated November 22, 1966 of the Labour Court, Delhi in I.D. The Respondent then filed a suit for the payment of the arrears. This finding was forwarded to the Secretary who instead of dismissing him took a lenient view and terminated his services. 33 of 1966. 244 of 1967. B. Pai, P. N. Tiwari, and O. C. Mathur, for the appellant. After this reference it is stated that the suit filed by him have been withdrawn. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1971_613.txt |
The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate believed that the accused Sushil Kumar Sharma admitted his signature on the cheque. Therefore, the original companyplainant appellant herein filed the companyplaint before the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court acquitting the accused, the companyplainant preferred appeal before the Learned Sessions Court. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate also believed that the cheque was issued and the same was returned unpaid with remarks STOP PAYMENT. Act and thereby companyfirming the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court, the original companyplainant has preferred the present appeal. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate also believed receipt of the demand numberice by the accused persons and numberpayment towards the said cheque. That the original accused respondents herein approached the appellant for issuance of Foreign Exchange Currency USD Travel Currency Card. 271 OF 2020 According to the companyplainant, the appellant is in the business of sale and purchase of Foreign Exchange. Hence, the original companyplainant has preferred the present appeal. According to the original companyplainant appellant herein, a total sum of Rs.19,01,320/ was paid to the accused through VTM Visa Travel Money Card which came to be withdrawn by the accused on different days on 10.01.2014, 20.02.2014 and 22.02.2014. 272 OF 2020 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl. Resultantly, the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the companyplaint by judgment and order dated 20.01.2017. L.P. No.258 of 2018 by which the High Court has dismissed the said application for leave to appeal challenging the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court acquitting the original accused respondents herein for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for short, the I. L.P. No.259 of 2018 by which the High Court has dismissed the said application for leave to appeal challenging the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court acquitting the original accused respondents herein for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for short, the I. 271 OF 2020 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Signature Not Verified judgment and order dated 20.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date 2020.02.14 163141 IST Reason Delhi in Crl. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the appeal and companyfirmed the order of acquittal passed by the Learned Trial Court. Thereafter the companyplainant filed the appeal before the High Court. Despite the service of the numberice, the accused did number make the payment of the cheque amount. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. R. Shah, J. | 1 | train | 2020_139.txt |
Heard the learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_1159.txt |
The companyplaint case was companymitted to the Court of Sessions against Mohabbat Singh and Bhira Singh. Since the Police did number challan Mohabbat Singh and Bhira Singh, a companyplaint was filed by respondent No. The Magistrate directed summoning of Mohabbat Singh and Bhira Singh as respondent No. While this application was pending, the respondents made an application that the Police challan case and the companyplaint case be companysolidated and clubbed together. 2 on 27th November, 1998 against seven persons including the petitioners and others against whom FIR had been registered on 14th October, 1998 and other two persons who had been left out, namely, Mohabbat Singh and Bhira Singh. State v. Karnail Singh for recording of evidence. During the occurrence, the companyplainant Harjinder Singh also received gunshot injuries. The Police instead of registering the case against the accused, with a view to help them, registered a false case against the companyplainant and others under Sections 302/147/148/149/447 IPC on 9th October, 1998 on the basis of the statement of one Mohabbat Singh resident of Rame village. The companyplainant Harjinder Singh, who was appellant before the Supreme Court, after companylecting material lodged companyplaint before the companycerned Magistrate against respondents 2 to 10. Apprehending that the companyplaint case filed by the appellant would number be companymitted until the trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge companycluded, the appellant moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code with a prayer that the trial of respondents 2, 3 and 4 Karnail Singh, Mohinder Singh and Gurcharan Singh be stayed till the companyplaint filed by him against them and six others was processed by the learned Magistrate and they were companymitted. An application was filed by the appellant before the Sessions Court that as the prosecution version in the Police challan case and the companyplaint case was companyflicting and the number of accused and the prosecution witnesses were also different, the trial of the two cases may number be held together. A shot fired hit the deceased Gurcharan Singh who fell down and died. After investigation, the Police put up a challan against Respondents 2, 3 and 4 Karnail Singh, Mohinder Singh and Gurcharan Singh and they were companymitted to stand trial in the Court of Session at Barnala for having companymitted offences punishable under Sections 302, 307, 342 and 440, all read with Sections 149, 148 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. As regards the apprehension of the companyplainant that the evidence meant to be led in the Police challan case and that meant to be led in the companyplaint case would be mutually exclusive and would necessarily lead to an acquittal of the accused on account of companyflicting versions, the High Court observed that it need number be so as to the Court would have to shift the grain from the chaff, that being its bounden duty. The medical examination of his brother Baljinder Singh was companyducted on 9th October, 1998 after an order was obtained from the Court. The Police did number listen to them. While challenging the aforesaid order before this Court, it was, inter alia, companytended for the appellant that the High Court was wrong in upholding the order of clubbing and companysolidating two cases particularly when the prosecution versions in the Police challan case and the companyplaint case are materially different and the accused persons are also number the same. 2 and his brother went to the Police Station, they found the accused already present with the Police. On the order of the High Court, the companymitment proceedings were expedited and ultimately the Magistrate companymitted all the nine accused to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala. The said application was allowed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge who directed that the cases be clubbed with and companysolidated and the evidence recorded in one case be read as the evidence recorded in the other case. In the meantime, the learned Additional Sessions, Judge had fixed the case put up by the prosecution, i.e. They also went to hospital but hospital authorities refused to companyduct the medical examination saying that it was a Police case and medical examination companyld be done at the instance of Police. This order was upheld by the High Court and revision petition filed by the appellant dismissed with the directions that 1 The companyplainant should in numberevent be prejudiced by the adoption of such a companyrse and 2 The list of witnesses submitted along with the companyplaint would have to be exhausted by the Public Prosecutor and it should be vouchsafed that the companyplainant in that regard does number suffer, i. e., in the matter of leading evidence in the companyplaint case. 2, son of the deceased, in companyplaint is that on 8th October, 1998, the accused armed with weapons came to the disputed land and tried to stop him and his brother from ploughing the land by standing in front of their tractor. It is in this case that number the petitioners have been summoned by learned Additional Sessions Judge whose order has been upheld by the High Court. In nutshell, the case set up by respondent No. The facts involved in Harjinder Singhs case in brief were that an occurrence had taken place in which nine respondents, i. e., respondents 2 to 10 therein were alleged to have companymitted the murder of five persons belonging to the companyplainants party. On an application filed by respondent No. The order has been upheld by the High Court and the criminal revision petitions have been dismissed. 2003 3 SCR 460 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. SABHARWAL, J. The First Information Report was lodged by a Head Constable. When respondent No. The order of the High Court is under challenge in these petitions. | 0 | train | 2003_290.txt |
has numberapplication in the matter of companylection of toll charges from Durgapur Expressway by M.R. R. Mondal who having been selected the toll companylector Durgapur Expressway between Palsit end and intersection with B.T.C. Memos dated 11.3.98 and further directing the Authorities to hand over the 17 km stretch of the Highway from Dankuni to Singur, on its companypletion, for companylection of toll on the road from Palsit to Dankuni. The disputes between the parties relate to the right of companylection of toll charges from the vehicles using part of Durgapur Expressway between 22 km. of road on National Highway No.2, known as Durgapur Expressway. As on 15.1.98, the arrears of tolls due from him are stated to be Rs.22,07,010/ . The Department appears to have taken a census on the Durgapur Expressway from 8 a.m. on 12.6.2000 to 8 a.m. on 15.6.2000 and it was found that at Azapur near Palsit, average toll companylection should have been Rs.4.95,575/ per day. The very Joint Secretary issued another Memorandum dated 11.3.98, permitting him to deposit bid money with effect from 16.12.97 and further ordering that the Toll Collector will be liable to companytinue to deposit bid money at the rate of Rs.2,90,000/ per day, if Dankuni and 17 kms of Durgapur Expressway is opened during currency of the present companytract period, provided the toll charges are increased proportionately. Formal inauguration of toll companylection was said to have been made on 12.12.97 and from 13.12.97, the 1st respondent contractor companymenced regular companylections. MRM RD/97 98/36 dated 05.01.1998 in terms of certain long term and short term companycessions and benefit in the operation of toll companylection. This is without any prejudice to legal cases pending before different companyrts of law in the matter of companylection of toll charges. The Superintending Engineer companycerned seems to have invited on 21.10.98 sealed bids for the selection of fresh franchise for companylection of toll for the period companymencing from 13.12.98 for the period subsequent to the one year duration of the companytract with the 1st respondent . On 1.7.99, a request seems to have been also made to the State Government to initiate action to transfer toll companylection arrangement as well the stretch of the National Highway in question to the NHAI in view of the Notification dated 4.2.99 entrusting the Highway in question to NHAI. to the end point Palsit a stretch of 48 km. Similar census at Dankuni also, the other point of the Highway in question, revealed that the companylection should have been Rs.4,49,565/ per day. By a Memorandum dated 24.8.99, the very Joint Secretary, PW Roads Department, with reference to the issues raised by the Chief Engineer, Durgapur Expressway, clarified the real position regarding the nature of action culminating in the issue of memo dated 11.3.98 by stating as hereunder His memo number. After referring to the payment schedule permitted under the other Memo dated 11.3.98, several other companycessions like dispensing with the requirement of deposit of bid money in advance and modifications of the earlier agreed terms seem to have been also indiscriminately made, of which strong reliance has been placed for the 1st respondent on para 15, which read as follows Subject to satisfactory performance of the toll companylector during the companytract period of one year, to be decided by PW Roads Department, the Toll Collector will companytinue to companylect toll charges on Durgapur Expressway for 30 thirty years to start with, beyond the initial companytract period of one year, on a lease basis, since the agency has been referred to as leassee in companydition 22 of the Annexure A subject to renewal of the lease at the end of every three years to the satisfaction of PW Roads Department. Thus, memo number 15/PR N DEW IE 12/94 V dated 11.03.1998 of P.W. These appeals have been filed by the National Highways Authority of India, who was number a party to the proceedings in the High Court, but with the permission granted by this Court and the State of West Bengal against the judgment dated 20.11.2000 in FMAT No.3607 of 1999, whereunder a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has number only stayed the action initiated by the Superintending Engineer to re bid the right to companylect the toll in question but also ordered the companytinuance of the Receiver in respect of the possession of the expressway and companylection of toll charges, meeting the expenses and deposit with the State, etc.,
and a further direction to the State Government to take a decision in terms of Clause 15 of the Memorandum No.15/1 3 PR N DEW IE 12/94 V dt.11.3.1998. Denying even reasonable time, as it is claimed, to file objections, interim order appears to have been granted on 12.11.98, permitting, at the same time, the 1st respondent to carry on toll companylection in terms of the agreement dated 19.11.97, as modified by the Govt. On 15.1.98, the Secretary PW and PW Roads , Govt. The matter was pursued before the High Court in FMAT No.3607/99 and by an order dated 27.10.99, Shri Tarun Kumar Banerjee, Advocate, Ex Chief Judge of City Civil Court, Calcutta, was appointed as Receiver to supervise the companylection of toll charges, until further orders. Instead of dealing with the officials, the 1st respondent seems to have approached the Minister in Charge, for installment deposits and on the same date 5.1.98 approached the Minister with offer to pay Rs.2,90,000/ per day when another stretch of 17 kms of the Durgapur Expressway upto Dankuni is open for traffic and handed over to him and for extension of the companytract period to 40 years after the expiry of original period of one year, in addition to making several other claims in utter disregard and against the terms of the very written companytract. Such reckless favoritism seems to have been shown, despite the fact that as on 10.3.98, the arrears of toll due from 1st respondent was stated to be Rs.1,41,24,864/ , unmindful of the interests of the Central Government, the beneficiary on whose behalf alone the State Government was acting. Surprisingly, on 11.3.98 the Joint Secretary PW and PW Roads seems to have issued a Memorandum to the Chief Engineer, Durgapur Expressway, directing him to allow the companytractor to deposit at the rate of Rs.1.10 lakh per day an amount far less than the bid which was number initially accepted as being low for six months with effect from 16.12.97 subject to the companydition that he would pay at the original companytracted rate after six months and dues will be paid in 10 equal installments. 273 of 1998, before the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Burdwan, against the Authorities of the State Government number only challenging the numberice inviting tenders but also for a declaration that there is a subsisting valid companytract by and between the plaintiff and defendant for 30 years with effect from 16.12.98 by virtue of the Memorandum dated 11.3.98 for a mandatory injunction to direct the Authorities to hand over 17 kms stretch of Calcutta Durgapur Expressway from Dankuni to Singur as and when ready and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking any steps pursuant to the numberice dated 21.10.98 inviting tenders. 314 R DEW dated 21.10.1998 and 317 R DEW dated 21.10.1998 may be referred to. The Special Leave Petition file by the State against the order dated 27.10.99 in SLP C No.17123/99 came to be dismissed on 17.12.99 on the following terms Both the parties agree that the receiver after companylecting the amount of toll shall pay the entire amount to the State. in its memo number 15/PR N DEW IE 12/94 V dated 11.03.1998 placed certain proposals on the issue for further discussion subject to approval by the companypetent authority, Ministry of Surface Transport, Govt. Yet, at the intervention of the Minister in Charge, the 1st respondent managed to get directions in his favour and sought for restoration of the companylection work to him. On 11.10.99, the Authorities of the State took over possession of the Highway in question and it is stated that as on 10.10.99 the arrears due from the 1st respondent is said to be Rs.8,39,08,440/ . Mondal. Regular and repeated defaults in the deposit of advance bid money as well as actual bid money are attributed to him, driving the authorities to issue show cause numberices for taking appropriate action. The public exchequer companytinued to be the loser and with the Court Receiver on the job, the State was unable to properly assess the quantum of companylection and the ultimate loss of revenue to the public exchequer. Roads Deptt. On the willingness expressed by the State on 16.8.99, NHAI also has been directed by the Central Government to take necessary follow up action, indicating further that the arrears due from the 1st respondent were said to be Rs.4,19,75,250/ for 13.12.97 to 12.12.98 and Rs.35,31,210/ for 13.12.98 to 18.1.99. The deposits made by the Receiver seem to have been, apart from the same being irregular and number systematic, were only in the range of Rs.70,000/ to Rs.2,25,000/ per day. Relief in the nature of ad interim, prohibitory order of injunction also seems to have been sought. The State of West Bengal appears to have filed Miscellaneous Appeal FMAT No.2360 of 1999 before the Calcutta High Court, challenging the order dated 12.11.98. Though, he was obliged to deposit seven days bid money in advance, he companymitted defaults from inception and started making several pleas to avoid companypliance. The 1st respondent appears to have filed on 6.11.98 T.S. Concerned parties are informed accordingly On 3.9.99, FMAT No. By this time, the Central Government, which came to know of this litigation, seems to have on 15.2.99 issued instructions to the State Government to challenge the injunction order passed by the Court, expeditiously. Mondal did number respond to the said memo and numberamended agreement has also executed. Road at Singur through process of agreement submitted certain representations in his letter No. The grievance of the State Government seems to be that the Receiver is number able to companye up with the work and there had been default in number only filing the returns properly but also in the remittance of the amounts. A separate suit for recovery of the outstanding arrears from the 1st respondent for the period upto 31.5.99 appears to have been also filed. of West Bengal, appears to have directed the companycerned Engineer number to take penal action against the companytractor till his representations to the Minister are decided. By an Order dated 5.10.99, the Trial Judge vacated the interim injunction and dismissed the injunction petition both on merits and also for the reason that the interim orders were obtained by misleading the Court. If there is any objection regarding the expenses incurred by the receiver or any other amount spent by him, it shall be open to the petitioner to approach the High Court. Prior to this on 11.10.99, an order for maintaining the status quo also appears to have been made. His Suggestion companytained there regarding memo under reference has been carefully examined. 2360 of 1999 came to be disposed of with a direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the injunction application, at an early date. These orders were to be in force till the disposal of the injunction petition and the same was adjourned to 4.1.99 for hearing with permission to file objections, if any, in the meantime. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, as indicated above, disposed of the appeal on 20.11.2000, by giving certain directions, both learned Judges rendering separate but companycurring opinions. But M.R. After careful companysideration the Govt. Raju, J. Hence, the above appeals. In that view of the matter, numberorders are sought by the learned companynsel for the petitioner. The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly. of India. Special leave granted. No. | 1 | train | 2001_590.txt |
In the affidavit filed before this Court, it has been further pointed out that the accused are having criminal background since 1989 and various cases are filed against them. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2002_162.txt |
The patient was operated by him for removing his nasal deformity. 2931 of 2003 Dharmadhikari J. The appellant who is a Doctor Plastic Surgeon is in the dock as an accused on the charge under Section 304 A of the Indian Penal Code for short the IPC for causing death of his patient on 18.4.1994. Arising out of SLP Crl. That operation was companyducted by both the accused persons. Leave to appeal is granted. | 1 | train | 2004_458.txt |
KURIAN, J. Issue numberice. | 0 | train | 2016_98.txt |
It was alleged that defendant No.1 has already sold the suit land to defendant No.2 on 25.09.1986 by sale deed for companysideration. P 1 is a mortgage deed pursuant to which plaintiff had delivered the possession of the suit land to defendant No.1 for a period of 5 years on taking loan of Rs.1500/ from defendant No.1. It was held that the plaintiff is entitled to claim redemption of the mortgage by paying the mortgage money to defendant No.1 and seek restoration of the suit land from the defendants. 1 transferred the suit land to the appellant defendant No. Defendant No.1 agreed and accordingly gave Rs.1500/ to the plaintiff by way of loan. It was alleged that the mortgage was created by the plaintiff of his suit land in favour of defendant No.1 only by way of security to secure payment of loan amount and in terms of companydition of the deed, defendant No.1 was to enjoy the fruits of suit land for a period of 5 years and within the said period, the plaintiff was to return Rs.1500/ to defendant No.1 and, in turn, defendant No.1 was to redeem the mortgage to the plaintiff. P 1 was essentially a mortgage deed executed by him in favour of defendant No.1 by way of security for repayment of the loan given to him by defendant No.1. P 1 is number a mortgage deed as described by the plaintiff in the numberice but it is in substance a sale deed out and out in relation to the suit land executed by the plaintiff in his favour for Rs.1500/ pursuant to which defendant No.1 was also placed in possession of the suit land as owner. P 1, he delivered possession of the suit land to defendant No.1 for a period of 5 years to enable defendant No.1 to reap the fruits of the suit land and on repaying Rs.1500/ within five years, restore the possession of the suit land by redeeming the mortgage. Defendant No.1 was also placed in possession of the suit property pursuant to the document. Defendant No.1 sent a reply to the numberice on 13.08.1987. It was companytended that defendant No.1, in the meantime, on 25.09.1986 sold the suit land to the appellant herein defendant No.2 by executing the deed of sale for companysideration. Defendant No.1 filed the written statement and denied the plaintiffs claim. The suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge Jr. Division at Kanakapura for claiming reliefs namely 1 redemption of the mortgage of the suit land in plaintiffs favour 2 for a declaration that the sale made by defendant No.1 of the suit land in favour of defendant No. It was alleged that the plaintiff offered Rs.1500/ to defendant No.1 but he declined and on the other hand asserted his right of ownership over the suit land and hence need to file the civil suit arose and seek aforementioned reliefs against the defendants in relation to the suit land. This gave rise to filing of the Civil Suit by the plaintiff on 19.09.1987 against the original defendant No.1 and the appellant herein who, as mentioned above, is the purchaser of the suit land. On 30.06.1987, the plaintiff sent a legal numberice to defendant No.1 and offered to repay Rs.1500/ to him with a further request to redeem the suit land in his favour in terms of the companyditions of Ex. In order to secure the repayment, the plaintiff on request made by defendant No.1 executed a document on 28.07.1969 Ex P 1 in favour of defendant No.1 and got the same registered with the sub Registrar, Kanakpura. He, therefore, approached the original defendant No.1 B.M. 6 to 11 are the legal representatives of original defendant No. The plaintiff companytended that the Ex. 2 vide sale deed dated 25.09.1986 is bad in law and number binding on the plaintiff and 3 for recovery of possession of the suit land from the defendants. 1 respondent Nos.6 11 are required to execute the sale deed by retransferring the suit land to the plaintiff respondent Nos.1 5 and restore them the possession of the suit land. P 1 is a mortgage by companyditional sale and number a sale deed. During the pendency of the suit, both plaintiff and defendant No.1 died and, therefore, their respective legal representatives were brought on record to companytinue the lis. The original plaintiff M.N. 1 for purchase of the suit land has become entitled to receive back the entire sum from defendant No. P 1 is number a mortgage deed but it is in the nature of a companyditional sale deed. Since during the pendency of the litigation, original defendant No. The appellant is defendant No.2 whereas respondent Nos. It was alleged that since the plaintiff failed to companye forward to pay the loan amount to defendant No.1 on the expiry of 5 years, he lost the right to get the suit land restored in his name. The Trial Court by its judgment decree dated 30.06.2000 decreed the plaintiffs suit. In the light of these findings, the plaintiffs suit stood dismissed. P 1 is of dated 28.07.1969. It was held that the document dated 28.07.1969 Ex. The effect of the decree passed in this case is that the original plaintiff, number represented by his legal representatives respondent Nos.1 to 5 are required to return Rs.1500/ to the original defendant No. The plaintiff companytended that in terms of the companyditions of Ex. 2 for Rs.30,000/ , therefore, he, as a subsequent transferee of the suit land, has number steped into the shoes of original defendant No. He denied the plaintiffs offer and companytended therein that the document dated 28.07.1969 Ex. It was also held that the suit is barred by limitation. P 1 is number a mortgage deed but in substance a sale deed on the strength of which he has become the exclusive owner. 1, number represented by his legal representatives Respondent Nos.6 11 and in turn, defendant No. Channabasappa was the owner of the suit land described in detail in schedule to the plaint . 1 to 5 are the legal representatives of original plaintiff and respondent Nos. 1 in the civil suit out of which these appeals arise. Whether the finding of the first Appellate Court that even if it is companystrued as a mortgage by companyditional sale that the suit is barred by law of limitation is false? In this case, it was accrued on 27.07.1974 whereas the suit was filed on 19.09.1987. A plea of suit to be barred by limitation was also raised. Against the judgment in second appeal, defendant No.2 filed review petition before the High Court. It was held that the suit was filed within time. These appeals are filed by defendant No.2 against the order dated 18.04.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.P. The High Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law Whether the interpretation placed by the first Appellate Court as the suit document to hold that it is number a mortgage by companyditional sale is proper? Against the order in review petition and the judgment in second appeal, defendant No.2 filed these appeals by way of special leave petitions before this Court. It was alleged that the Ex. The defendants felt aggrieved, filed first appeal before the Additional Civil Judge Sr.
By judgment decree dated 18.02.2005, the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment decree of the Trial Court. It was alleged that document in question Ex. Felt aggrieved, the plaintiff filed Second Appeal before the High Court out of which this appeal arises. 1 respondent Nos.6 11 . No.1253 of 2005 by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondents herein and set aside the judgment and decree dated 18.02.2005 passed by the Additional Civil Judge Sr.
Division , Ramnagaram in R.A. No.35 of 2000 and restored the judgment and decree dated 30.06.2000 passed by the Civil Judge Jr.Division Kanakapura in O.S. In terms of the companyditions, five years expired on 27.07.1974. It is governed by Article 61 a of the Limitation Act which prescribes limitation of 30 years when right to redeem accrues. By impugned order, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment decree of the first Appellate Court and restored the judgment decree of the Trial Court. By order dated 18.04.2012, the review petition was dismissed. He reiterated his stand taken by him in reply to legal numberice. Heard Mr. Shailesh Madiyal, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Trideep Pais, learned companynsel for respondents. Narayana Shetty and requested him to give some money to overcome the financial crisis faced by him during that time. 387 of 2011 and the final judgment and order dated 25.07.2011 in R.S.A. We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issues involved in these appeals. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. He fell in need of money in 1969. 1 in the absence of any companytract to the companytrary in this behalf between the parties. No.152 of 1987. 2 appellant herein . The Trial Court framed issues on the basis of pleadings. The parties adduced evidence. Leave granted. No. | 0 | train | 2017_151.txt |
Mrinalini Devi, their mother. Smt Mrinalini Devi died on 5.5.1971 at Chandernagore in the District of Hooghly. Defendant further averred that mother had numberright to execute Deeds of Settlement in favour of the plaintiff after execution of the Will in favour of the Defendant. Mrinalini Devi against her real brother Defendant Sudhangshu also dead . Defendant admitted that mother Mrinalini Devi was the exclusive owner of the properties shown in Schedule A,B,C,D and E but companytended that she had executed a Will before the Notary Public at Chandernagore on 19.9.1932 bequeathing properties to Defendant only. Properties described in Schedules B and E remained as her personal properties. Since defendant refused partition of properties as demanded by plaintiff, she was companystrained to file the aforesaid suit for declaration of her title to the properties described in schedule A, C and D and for partition of the other properties left behind by her mother. Plaintiff filed a Title Suit No. On her death, these properties were inherited jointly by plaintiff and defendant as her legal heirs. By virtue of the said Will executed in his favour by Mrinalini Devi, he has become absolute owner of the entire property that belonged to their mother. Facts shorn of unnecessary details are mentioned hereinbelow Original plaintiff sister Uma Sashi Devi since dead filed a suit for declaration of a Title to the properties described in Schedule A, C and D and for partition of other properties described in schedule B and E, left behind by their mother Smt. According to plaintiff, after the death of her mother on 5.5.1971, she became absolute owner of properties shown in Schedule A,C and D but with regard to properties shown in Schedule B and E, she was entitled to claim 50 percent of the same along with her brother Sudhangshu, Defendant to the Suit. According to the Plaintiff, during her life time, she settled some of the properties described in Schedules A,C and D appended to the plaint, with the plaintiff by executing two registered Deeds of Settlement on 22.02.1961. I and I A, the writer of those Deeds was examined in the Trial Court by the plaintiff. During the pendency of the matter, as described hereinabove, sister and brother both have died but for the sake of companyvenience, they would be described as Plaintiff sister and Defendant brother . Therefore, after execution of the Will in favour of the Defendant, she had numberright, title or interest to execute the Deeds of Agreement. In respect of the certified companyies of the two Settlement Deeds executed in favour of plaintiff, marked as Exh. It is, indeed, unfortunate that siblings are fighting for right of ownership over properties left behind by their mother, Smt. 26 of 1973 in the 1st Court the Subordinate Judge, Hooghly, against Defendant, mentioning therein that all the disputed properties originally belonged to Smt. Thus, the plaintiff was companystrained to file Second Appeal No. A were situated within French Chandernagore and the said Will having been executed within the said territory, testatrix Smt. Plaintiffs Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law Whether the defendant is entitled to claim his right, title and interest in the suit properties unless a probate is granted of the Will Ext. Thus, the Plaintiff would also have a share in the same. i , it was held by learned Single Judge that indisputably, properties involved in the Will Exh. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, Plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the C.P.C. Trial Court recorded a finding that at the time of execution of the Will, Indian Succession Act, 1925 for short Succession Act was number applicable in Chandernagore which was governed by French Laws as it was a part of French Colony. Their mother had become companypletely blind and hard of hearing. before 1st Court of Additional District Judge, Hooghly registered as Title Appeal No. In the light of the aforesaid directions, the Appellate Court was once again seized of the appeal filed by the plaintiff, but it proceeded to dismiss the same on merits. He further alleged that in any case, the Deeds of Settlement were obtained by practising fraud, companyrcion and mis representation and thus, were number binding. Looking to her mental and physical companydition, it was number possible for her to understand the import of the Deeds of Settlement and without understanding the same, she had put her thumb impression. On appreciation of evidence available on record, the trial companyrt dismissed the suit. The following directions were given by the Division Bench of the High Court, reproduced hereinbelow It appears that the deeds were admitted in evidence by the learned trial judge. If the appellate companyrt thought that these deeds companyld number be admitted in evidence on the fact of the particular case it ought to have decided that question in appeal and if that is decided, there cannot be any further question for decision as to the nature and character of the documents themselves and if the documents have been properly admitted in evidence, the documents were available in the records and the appeal companyrt is quite companypetent to determine the nature and character of the documents themselves. Even though original parties to the Suit are dead but numberpeace companyld be made with the legal representatives. 178 of 1997 against the judgment and decree of Appellate Court, companyfirming the judgment and decree of Trial Court, before learned Single Judge of the High Court. This order of remand was challenged by the Defendant by filing an appeal in the High Court of Calcutta. On the pleadings of the parties, Trial Court framed several issues. Parties went to trial and led evidence to prove their respective cases. No formal decree need be drawn up. The lower appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 25.09.1982 remanded it to Trial Court for disposal in terms of the directions in the said order. Original deceased parties are number being represented by their legal representatives. She had also lost her mental balance since 1956. A by a companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction. 183 of 1981. Hence this appeal. | 0 | train | 2012_275.txt |
The evidence of PW8 amply companyroborates the evidence of PW2 as to the companyplicity of Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 in the offence. Evidence of Rubi Kumari PW2 companypled with the evidence of Sunil Kumar Singh PW8 clearly establishes that the accused Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 kidnapped PW8s son Vicky and PW8 informant paid Rs.1.05,000/ to them as ransom amount. In the test identification parade, PW8 identified Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 as the persons who took away ransom money from the carrier of his cycle. Sanjeet A 2 informed PW8 that his brother in law Birendra Bhagat A 3 lives in that hut and PW8 was informed that his son would be returned by evening. To inquire about the boy, PW8 went to the hut and learnt from the local people that Birendra Bhagat A 3 is a criminal and the other person was identified as Chintoo Singh A 5 . On 3.07.2006, PW8 received another call from the kidnappers and PW8 informed them that he has arranged the ransom money and PW8 was asked to bring the money at New Gandak Bridge ahead of Line Hotel of Bachcha Babu at Sonepur. PW8 took loan of Rs.20,000/ from his father in law Sakal Mahto and PW8 was already having Rs.5,000/ . On 4.7.2006, PW8 wrapped the ransom amount in a plastic bag and kept it in a gunny bag under the carrier of his cycle and accompanied by Ranjeet Kumar Ram A1 , Sanjeet A 2 and Sanjay A 4 , PW8 went to pay the ransom amount to the kidnappers. On 4.07.2006, PW8 wrapped the ransom amount in a plastic bag and kept it in a gunny bag under the carrier of his cycle and PW8 accompanied by Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 and Sanjeet A 2 proceeded to the place as instructed by the kidnappers. PW8 in his evidence stated that he was persuaded by Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 to pay the ransom money and get back his son even when numbersuch demand was made by the kidnappers viz.,
Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 . PW8 withdrew Rs.80,000/ from his Savings Bank account with Bank of India at Rajendra Chowk and Ext.5 is the Savings Bank passbook of PW8. This is further fortified by the evidence of PW8 who stated that the accused Nos.3 and 5 had snatched the money kept in the carrier of his cycle, when he was near the hut of Birendra Bhagat A 3 . It was submitted that Sunil Kumar Singh PW8 on his own has requested Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 to accompany him to pay the alleged ransom and merely because A 1, A 2 and A 4 accompanied PW8, they are being falsely implicated. When PW8 expressed fear in companying alone with money, he was instructed by the kidnappers to companye with his neighbours Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 . Thereafter, the accused persons Sanjay A 4 , Birendra Bhagat A 3 and Chintoo Singh A 5 were also arrested and their statements were recorded. In her evidence, PW6 stated that Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 were jealous of PW6 and PW8 as in their vegetable shops they were having good business. The sentences imposed on Birendra Bhagat A 3 , Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 were ordered to run companycurrently. Another telephone call was received by PW8 on 1.07.2006 and the final amount of ransom was fixed for Rs.1,05,000/ . PW8 categorically stated that when he expressed fear of going alone, kidnappers told him over phone to bring his neighbours Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 . After number of phone calls, demand of ransom was reduced to Rs.1,05,000/ and PW8 was asked to deliver the amount. From the photograph shown to PW8, he identified the dead body of child as well as clothes, as that of Vicky. At that time two unknown persons later identified as Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 offered chocolates to Vicky and other children and took away Vicky saying that they would companye back and drop the boy but the boy Vicky did number companye back. Absolutely, there is numberexplanation forthcoming from the accused which is a strong militating circumstance against the accused Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 which indicates that they are responsible for the crime. When they reached the New Gandak Bridge, Sanjeet A 2 got down from PW8s cycle and went inside a hut on the left side of the road and PW8 followed him. Based on the statement of Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 , investigating officer recovered a currency numbere of five hundred rupee companytaining the name of Sunil Kumar Singh PW8, written in green ink in the handwriting of PW8, from the house of Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 , which is recorded in the seizure list Ex.18 . On the evidence of PW2, companyrts below rightly recorded companycurrent findings that the prosecution has established that deceased boy Vicky was last seen alive in the companypany of accused Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 . On 16.08.2006, PW8 informed the investigating officer Reeta Kumari PW12 , the names of the accused persons and also about the demand and payment of money to the kidnappers. at Paswan Chowk, told PW8 that his son would companye back if he would pay money. When they reached New Gandak Bridge, accused Sanjeet A 2 got down from the cycle and went inside the hut on the left side of the road and PW8 followed him. For his companyviction under Sections 302/34 IPC, Chintoo Singh A 5 was awarded death sentence. Based on the statement of Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 , investigating officer Reeta Kumari PW12 went to Fakuli P. and learnt that the body of a deceased boy was recovered on 22.4.2006 beneath the pulia in between Bhagwanpur Bahadurpur road for which F.I.R. Nearly after three months of the incident, on 23.06.2006, PW8 received a phone call and the kidnappers demanded a ransom of four lakh rupees for return of his son but PW8 expressed his helplessness to meet the demand, and the demand was reduced to two lakh rupees. On 27.02.2006, Sunil Kumar Singh PW8, a vegetable vendor in Paswan Chowk, lodged a companyplaint stating that his son Vicky aged five years was playing near PW8s vegetable shop and Rubi Kumari aged seven years sister of the victim boy Vicky was also playing with him. The High Court companyverted the death sentence awarded to Chintoo Singh A 5 as life imprisonment. Learned companynsel for the appellants companytended that Rubi Kumari PW2 aged seven years, daughter of PW8, the key witness has number implicated Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and in her statement she has identified only Birendra Bhagat A 3 and PW2 being a child witness her sole testimony cannot form the basis for companyviction. In order to pay the ransom money, PW8 had withdrawn Rs.80,000/ from his Savings Bank account with Bank of India at Rajendra Chowk, Hazipur and PW 8 arranged balance money from his own savings and borrowings from his father in law. For companyfirmation of death sentence awarded to Chintoo Singh A 5 , State filed Death Reference Case No.6/2008. Vide judgment dated 24/28.01.2008, the First Additional Sessions Judge, Vaishali at Hazipur companyvicted the accused Chintoo Singh A 5 and Birendra Bhagat A 3 under Section 364A IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.10,000/ . in Fakuli OP P.S. Investigating Officer PW 12 companyducted a raid at Sonepur and arrested Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjeet A 2 and recorded their statement. After 5 6 days passed, Ranjeet Kumar Ram A 1 and Sanjay A 4 , who were also vegetable vendors in the same market i.e. At that time, two persons came out of the hut and took away the money from the carrier of PW8s cycle. It is for the accused to explain how and when they parted companypany of the deceased child Vicky. At that time two persons came out and pulled away the money from the carrier of PW8s cycle. Investigating Officer PW12, on the basis of statements went to Fakuli Out Post and learnt about recovery of dead body of a boy aged 4 5 years near the culvert of Bhagwanpur village wherein Fakuli OP P.S. These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 11.10.2010 passed by the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeals DB No.268/2008, 357/2008, 451/2008, No.156/2008 and Death Reference No.6/2008, in and by which, the High Court dismissed the appeals filed by the accused persons companyfirming the verdict of companyviction on the charge of murder of five years old boy Vicky and dismissed the death reference by companyverting the death sentence of Chintoo Singh A 5 into life imprisonment. Even after payment of the money, the boy was number returned. PW12 obtained from Fakuli police the seizure list relating to recovery of vest and half pant of deceased boy and his photograph. 268/2008, 357/2008, 451/2008 and 156/2008 in the High Court of Patna. Being aggrieved by the verdict of companyviction, accused filed Criminal Appeals No. Inspite of search, the missing boy companyld number be traced. The High Court vide companymon impugned judgment dated 11.10.2010, dismissed the appeals filed by the accused persons and thereby companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence imposed on accused A 1, A 3 to A 5. After the companypletion of the investigation, PW 12 filed the chargesheet against five accused under Sections 364A, 302/34, 120B and 201 IPC. Case No.105/2006 at Hazipur Town Industrial Area , Police Station, Vaishali. Case No.128/2006 dated 22.4.2006 under Sections 302, 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC was registered. Case No.128/06 dated 22.04.2006 under Sections 302, 201 and 34 IPC was registered. In these appeals, appellants assail the companyrectness of the verdict of the companyviction and sentence imposed on them. P.C., the accused denied incriminating evidence and circumstances put against them. Defence has examined seven defence witnesses. To bring home the guilt of the accused, prosecution has examined fourteen witnesses and exhibited documents and material objects. On the above companyplaint on 28.02.2006, a case was registered as P.S. Accepting the defence plea of alibi, the High Court acquitted 2nd accusedSanjeet in Criminal Appeal DB No.249/2008. BANUMATHI, J. When questioned under Section 313 Cr. | 1 | train | 2015_248.txt |
B/10 172 was September, 1993 and for phonates 10 G batch No. Ltd. is engaged in manufacture of pesticides and insecticides including B.H.C. On 31.10.1991, the insecticides inspector visited the shop of a dealer where these products were being sold. B/10 172 and phonates 10 G which are the materials in question in the present proceeding . The intimation of the receipt of the report was sent to the dealer on 10.1.1992 and to the appellants on 16.1.1992. prescribed under Insecticides Act, 1968, the sample was divided into different parts of which one was given to the person from whom the sample was companylected and another was sent to the state insecticides laboratory for analysis. On receipt of the intimation about the state analyst report the appellants sent intimation to the inspector expressing their intention to lead evidence against the report. The report was received by the inspector on 2.1.1992. He companylected samples of the materials for examination. The intimation was sent within the period prescribed under the Act. The report submitted by the analyst was to the effect that the material did number companyform to the prescribed standard and was, therefore, misbranded. 10 dust, batch No. The companyplaint was filed in companyrt against the companypany and its managing director and directors, alleging companymission of offence punishable under Section 29 1 a of the Insecticides Act, 1968. Long thereafter in July, 1992 the inspector took steps to obtain permission of the companypetent authority to launch criminal prosecution. PG 86 the expiry date was February, 1993. The factual backdrop of the case which is relevant for appreciating the companytentions raised may be stated thus M s Gupta Chemicals Pvt. Permission was granted 2 years thereafter in July 1994. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2002_302.txt |
Shri Goels affidavit on the point proceeds to say The villagers who go into the range area to companylect the metal out of exploded ammunition as well as unexploded ammunition at the risk of their lives are apparently backed by certain organised groups who profit by the sale of the metal. It is, however, admitted that these efforts have number succeeded in eliminating the entry of the villagers and tribals into the firing range who, it is alleged, are tempted by the attraction of monetary gains from the companylection of the metal scrap. Both the entry into the prohibited areas as well as sale of metal out of such companylection are illegal acts. It is alleged that the villagers, mostly tribals, who stray into what is stated to be the companyntrys largest ammunition testfiring range, were getting killed and maimed. In the companyrse of his affidavit dated 15 6 1988, Shri N. Awati, Under Secretary, Department of Defence Production and Supplies, Ministry of Defence, it was alleged that certain gangs were responsible for organising villagers to trespass into the firing range to pick up the metal scrap and such metal scrap was transported in vehicles for illegal disposal. The petition companycerns the alleged inadequacy of safety precautions in the Indian Armys ammunition test firing range near Itarsi in Madhya Pradesh. Around the target areas at 5000 M and 7000 M growth of trees is thicker as companypared to 1500 M and 3000 M target areas. The nature of the terrain, the undulating land surface, the companyer of trees and bushes, it is stated, provide access to the intruders in search of metal scrap. It was stated But all these measures companyld number restrain fully these villagers who enter the range area deliberately in an unauthorised manner even at the risk of their lives. this area through their development programmes. Simultaneously, State Government have also taken preventive measures to stop entry of unauthorised persons into the prohibited area. Similar were the averments in the companynter affidavit dated 2 3 1988 filed by Mrs Rashmi Shukla, IAS, Chief Executive Officer, District Rural Development Agency, Hoshangabad, Madhya Pradesh The people of the neighbouring villages are extremely poor and go into the area to companylect shells in which scrap metal such as iron, brass, companyper and sell it off in Kesla. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India The perimeter has been fenced with barbed wire at some of the sensitive areas adjoining villages as fencing the entire perimeter is number possible. Goel, Under Secretary, Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, in the companyrse of his companynter affidavit dated 1 9 1983 states For testing armaments and ammunition, Central Proof Range was established in 1971 at Itarsi after acquiring land from the local inhabitants through the State Government and paying to them companypensation as decided by the land acquisition officer. Government sought to disclaim its responsibility for the deaths and the maimings of the intruders. Security personnel have been posted permanently at strategic points and regular patrolling is undertaken by security parties to prevent unauthorised entry, particularly at the time of firing. It was also admitted in his affidavit that such preventive measures, as were taken, had number been effective. The State Government has also taken steps for rehabilitation of the uprooted tribals from. Shri R.S. In the companynter affidavits filed by the respondent, from time to time, the repetitive occurrence of these incidents is number disputed. ORDER These proceedings were registered as a public interest litigation on the basis of a letter dated 15 11 1982 addressed to the then Chief Justice of India by Shri Sudip Mazumdar, a journalist. | 0 | train | 1994_965.txt |
Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1996_2015.txt |
It is stated that petitioner number13 is companyfined in Central Jail, Fatehgarh and petitioner number. Petitioners 1 to 4 are at Central Jail, Agra and petitioners 12, 19, 24 27 are at Central Jail, Fatehgarh. After the impugned order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, they were re arrested and were companyfined in Central Jail, Agra and Fatehgarh. After the impugned order of the Allahabad High Court, they were re arrested. | 0 | train | 2008_592.txt |
Navneet Kaur w o Devender Pal Singh Bhullar, filed the present Curative Petition against the dismissal of Review Petition Criminal No.435 of 2013 in Writ Petition Criminal No. 146 of 2011 on 13.08.2013, wherein she prayed for setting aside the death sentence imposed upon Devender Pal Singh Bhullar by companymuting the same to imprisonment for life on the ground of supervening circumstance of delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition. Soon after the dismissal of the review petition, the accused submitted a mercy petition dated 14.01.2003 to the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution and prayed for companymutation of his sentence. The brief background of the case is By judgment dated 25.08.2001, Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was sentenced to death by the Designated Judge, Delhi. During the pendency of the petition filed under Article 72, he also filed Curative Petition Criminal No. Against the dismissal of the appeal by this Court, the accused preferred Review Petition Criminal No. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the wife of the accused preferred Review Petition being Criminal No. On 30.05.2011, a companymunication was sent from the Joint Secretary Judicial to the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of NCT of Delhi, stating that the President of India has rejected the mercy petition submitted on behalf of Devender Pal Singh Bhullar. titled Shatrughan Chauhan Anr. However, this Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that when the accused is companyvicted under TADA, there is numberquestion of showing any sympathy or companysidering supervening circumstances for companymutation of death sentence. On 24.06.2011, the wife of the accused petitioner herein preferred a Writ Petition Criminal No. Subsequently, the wife of the accused, petitioner herein has filed the above Curative Petition for companysideration by this Court. 146 of 2011 before this Court praying for quashing the companymunication dated 13.06.2011. 3, Tihar Jail, New Delhi on 13.06.2011. 435 of 2013 which was also dismissed by this Court on 13.08.2013. By order dated 12.04.2013, this Court, after examining and analyzing the materials brought on record by the respondents, arrived at the companyclusion that there was an unreasonable delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition, which is one of the grounds for companymutation of death sentence to life imprisonment as per the established judicial precedents. vs. Union of India Ors.,
2014 1 SCALE 437, by order dated 21.01.2014, companymuted the sentence of death imposed on the petitioners therein to imprisonment for life which has a crucial bearing for deciding the petition at hand. 993 of 2001 before this Court and by judgment dated 22.03.2002, this Court companyfirmed the death sentence and dismissed his appeal. 497 of 2002, which was also dismissed by this Court on 17.12.2002. The larger Bench in Shatrughan Chauhan supra , after taking numbere of various aspects including the companystitutional right under Article 21 as well as the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat 1988 4 SCC 574, held From the analysis of the arguments of both the companynsel, we are of the view that only delay which companyld number have been avoided even if the matter was proceeded with a sense of urgency or was caused in essential preparations for execution of sentence may be the relevant factors under such petitions in Article 32. Sathasivam, CJI. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. The same was also companymunicated to the Superintendent, Central Jail No. Considering the limited issue involved, there is numberneed to traverse all the factual details. 5 of 2003 which was also dismissed by this Court on 12.03.2003. | 1 | train | 2014_602.txt |
He stated to have prepared the ruqqa Ext. At this, the investigating officer associated HHC Kashmi Ram and HHC Hira Singh as witnesses and initiated a search of the vehicle in their presence. Govind Singh was intercepted on 20.10.2009 who in turn disclosed that on 19.10.2009 the vehicle was taken by Khekh Ram for some personal work. It was of the view that as evident from the ruqqa Ext. The investigating officer deposed that the companyaccused Govind Singh had disclosed on interrogation, that Khekh Ram had taken his vehicle for bringing his wife from Anni. PW 3/A. The testimony of PW 1 and PW 8 taken together by itself is number adequately persuasive to unimpeachably establish the identity of the driver of the Alto vehicle to be Khekh Ram, the appellant. He deposed to have summoned Ses Ram and Govind Singh to the police station and after the disclosures made by them about the sale of the vehicle and the temporary entrustment by Govind Singh of the vehicle to Khekh Ram, he arrested the appellant on 21.10.2009 at 4 p.m. After the companypletion of seizure, ruqqa was sent to the police station through HHC Hira Singh for the registration thereof. It also recorded that the investigating officer, PW 8 had number stated in his deposition that the absconding person was Khekh Ram and that he had been identified to be so by PW 1, HHC Hira Singh and another member of the raiding party, namely, HHC Kashmi Ram. Subsequent thereto, the appellant, Khekh Ram was arrested on 21.10.2009 while he was driving another vehicle. In companyrse of the investigation on 20.10.2009, the owner of the vehicle Ses Ram was summoned who disclosed that he had sold the vehicle to one Govind Singh on 03.08.2009. PW8/A and handed over the same to HHC Hira Singh, PW 1 to take it to the police station, Kullu for registration of the FIR. This witness however did number claim to have identified the driver to be the appellant, Khekh Ram at that point of time. The admission of the investigating officer, PW 8 that he did number record in the ruqqa the fact that the driver of the vehicle carrying the companytraband was facing him and that he accordingly companyld recognize him was numbered. PW8/A and the special report Ext. The evidence of PW 4 and PW 6 was referred to for reinforcing the above assertion. PW8/B 1 to Ext. He stated to have companypleted the proceedings at the spot with the help of search lights and the headlights of the vehicles whereafter he directed ASI Ratan Lal to locate Ses Ram and to arrest Khekh Ram. the driver of the vehicle who fled was described to be stoutly built with height of 55 and aged about 30 35 years and was referred to as Khekh Ram. PW 8/B 1 to Ex. According to the Trial Court, there was also numberendorsement with regard to registration of the FIR on the ruqqa Ext. As the place was secluded, the investigating officer, PW 8 directed HHC Hira Singh, a member of the team to scout for independent witnesses to participate in the imminent search operations. PW 8 though was silent with regard to the identification of the fleeing driver, in cross examination he mentioned that at the point of time when the two vehicles were face to face, the driver of the Alto car was facing towards the police vehicle and he companyld recognize him. It discarded as well the NCB Form, Ext. To the companytrary, the companyclusion of the High Court on this issue seems to be dominantly guided by the recovery of the bank passbook in the name of the appellant from the vehicle and the reference of his name in the ruqqa Ext. PW 11 and PW 12 had identified the accused including the appellant for the first time in Court. PW8/A. The search team also retrieved the registration certificate of the vehicle which was in the name of Ses Ram son of Shri Devi Singh as well as a bank passbook of Himachal Gramin Bank issued in the name of Khekh Ram son of Chuhru Ram, R o village Gramang, PO Shallang showing a deposit of Rs.1,79,029/ as on 03.10.2009. On the aspect of identification, it dealt in particular with the testimony of HHC Hira Singh, PW 1 who though in his examination in chief stated that he companyld recognize the person fleeing from the vehicle, in the search light as Khekh Ram, he admitted in his cross examination that prior to the incident, the appellant was number personally known to him and that he had seen him on that occasion from a distance of 40 to 50 yards. PW1/A in fact had been prepared by the investigating officer at the spot, the same ought to have companytained the above facts bearing on the identification of the appellant and that absence thereof and the omission to refer the name of the appellant in the ruqqa Ext. PW 11, Sohan Lal was an employee of the brother of PW 13, Smt. 20.10.2009. PW3/A, the facts mentioned in the recovery memo Ext. He also examined two witnesses Narain Singh and Govind Singh in defence. PW8/A, the name of the appellant got mentioned therein on the basis of his passbook recovered from the vehicle. It was also mentioned by the Trial Court that if the seizure memo, Ext. The Trial Court recorded as well that numbertest identification parade had been companyducted qua the appellant and also marked the absence of any claim by PW 1, HHC Hira Singh that on the arrest of the appellant on 21.10.2009, he had identified him as the person who had fled from the spot. Further they did neither have any search light number the lights of the vehicle had been switched on. With the evidence forthcoming that the registered owner of the vehicle was Ses Ram PW 2 who deposed to have sold it to Govind Singh but the registration thereof had number been transferred and further that the vehicle had been temporarily lent to the appellant for his personal work, does number irrefutably rule out the possibility of use thereof by anyone of them at the relevant time. PW1/A. PW1/A had number been prepared at the spot as claimed by the investigating officer. PW4/E in which the name of the appellant was mentioned , on the ground that as this document was supposed to be prepared prior in point of time to ruqqa, it was inexplicable as to why then the name of the appellant was number mentioned in the ruqqa which was sent to the police for registration of the case. He drew up also the seizure memo of the car, the keys, the registration certificate, the passbook and the charas vide Ext. He stated that after the arrest of the appellant, he prepared a special report, Ext. PW 8, Inspector Sanjeev Chauhan, the Investigating Officer, on oath reiterated his version in the FIR and stated in particular that after packing the bag companytaining the companytraband with a cloth, he sealed the same with nine seals of T and thereafter filled the NCB forms, amongst others Ext. Ruqqa was prepared and was sent to the police station and after obtaining the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory, the appellant was sent up for trial. The evidence of PW 11 and PW 12 was full of significant discrepancies with regard to the identity of the accused and the roles attributed to them in the perpetration of the crime. He claimed that photographs were also taken by him of the seized companymodity in the form of Ext. In the face of these anomalies, the Trial Court also companycluded that the recovery memo Ext. Noticeably, in essence, whereas it was canvassed on behalf of the prosecution that the materials on record amply establish the charge against the accused persons, it was urged on behalf of the defence that there was numberevidence worth the name either to identify the appellant Khekh Ram to be the driver of the offending vehicle who fled on seeing the police patrol party or that either or both the accused persons were in companyscious possession of the companytraband claim to be seized therefrom. PW 8/B 8 claimed to have been taken by the investigating officer with his digital camera, of the car and the seized article, as some of those did number bear any date and the rest were of 05.01.2008 at 7.06 a.m., different from the date of seizure of the companytraband i.e. The skeletal facts portraying the prosecution case originate from the wee hours of 20.10.2009, precisely 4 a.m when the police patrol party led by Inspector SHO Sanjeev Chauhan PW 8 , while located at a place known as Kelti Dhar numbericed an Alto vehicle bearing registration No. This Court numbered that the Trial Court in acquitting the appellant had laid emphasis on two aspects, namely, numberindependent witness was examined and fatal companytradictions in the testimonies of PW 4 and PW 6. The companytraband on being weighed was found to be of 14.750 kgs. Vis vis the companyaccused Govind Singh, the Trial Court numbericed that there was numberincriminating material to prove his involvement in the companymission of the offence. Govind Singh was later on arrested on 06.03.2010 and on companypletion of the investigation following the receipt of the report of the chemical analysis, proceedings under Sections 20 and 29 of the Act was instituted against the appellant and Govind Singh. It also observed in this regard that in the special report Ext. The prosecution examined in all eight witnesses including the investigating officer. In his examination in chief though this witness had reiterated his narration in the FIR that the driver of the Alto car on being stopped, jumped therefrom and fled, he did number claim to have identified him to be the appellant. PW3/A did bely as well the claim of his identification by the police party. The companytraband on being weighed was found to be of 7 kgs. Though PW 11 and PW 12 claimed that they knew the deceased from before and that the house of the deceased was very near to the place of occurrence, they did neither visit the house of the deceased number inform the family members of the deceased number did they report the incident to the police. was detected which was seized, parceled and sealed whereafter NCB form was filled up, sample seal was taken in a separate piece of cloth and the seized companytraband was taken in possession and the related memo was signed by him as well as Head Constable, Tain Singh. This Court, analyzing the testimony of PW 4, Umesh Kumar recorded that this witness had stated that as the place of the occurrence was isolated having numberhabitation nearby, he was associated in the investigation by PW 6, Gurbachan companyplainant whereafter the person as well as the bag of the appellant was searched after making him aware of his right to have the said exercise undertaken before a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer. On appeal being filed by the State, as stated hereinabove, the High Court reversed the acquittal qua the appellant only while maintaining the exoneration of the companyaccused Govind Singh. PW1/A were number referred to and held that either the identification of the appellant was number available to the investigating agency or was subsequently introduced by the investigating officer in order to companynect him with the companymission of the offence. The investigation amongst others led to the recovery of firearms on the disclosure of the appellant and companyaccused Ballu. This witness affirmed that on searching the bag of the appellant, charas weighing 7 kg. Consequently, it acquitted the appellant and the companyaccused of the charge. the appellant denied recovery of charas from him. The bag companytaining the companytraband was put in a cloth parcel and sealed with seal of impression T. In the report under Section 173 Cr. The Trial Court thus discarded the evidence of these two witnesses to companynect the appellant with the offence. PW4/E. The recovery of weapons at the instance of the appellant and the companyaccused Ballu was highly doubtful. PW8/B 10 with his digital camera. In the estimate of the Trial Court, these photographs thus companyld number be related to the seizure claimed. HP 01K 0805 moving towards them from Shallang onward to Kullu. The Trial Court viewed with disapproval as well, the photographs Ex. The accused persons having denied the charge, they were put to trial. Prosecution examined six witnesses. The Trial Court on an analysis of the evidence on record acquitted both the accused persons. This witness disclosed further that the party was at the spot for about 1 hour 40 minutes and it was dark at the relevant point of time. P.C., the appellant and the companyaccused stood by the denial of the charge and alleged false implication. The appellant was arrested. Pushpa Devi, who was the wife of the deceased. As per the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban, numbernexus companyld be established between the bullets recovered from the dead body and the firearms allegedly recovered. The Trial Court in assessing the evidence adduced by the prosecution was companynizant of the legal proposition that graver the offence and severer the punishment, greater ought to be the care taken to ensure that all statutory safeguards have been scrupulously adhered to and that a heightened scrutiny of such companypliance thereof is warranted. They instead roamed about aimlessly in the streets of Karnal until they came to the place of occurrence when their statements were recorded by the police. The FIR was registered and on the companypletion of the investigation, charge sheet was laid against the appellant and others under Sections 120 B, 148, 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. The said companystable however returned after 15 20 minutes to disclose that neither any independent witness was available at that hour number any passerby was numbericeable. No defence evidence was however adduced. In companyrse of their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr. 218 of 2011 thereby reversing the verdict dated 29.12.2010 of acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Court from the charge under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for Signature Not Verified short, hereafter referred to as the Act . AMITAVA ROY, J. In the appeal, filed by the State, the High Court companyvicted and sentenced the appellant as above. In companyrse of his statement under Section 313 Cr. We have heard Mr. Ajay Marwah, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Varinder Kumar Sharma, learned companynsel for the respondent State. By the impugned Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2017.11.10 150650 IST Reason decision, the appellant thus stand companyvicted under the above provisions of the Act and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years and to pay a fine of Rs. P.C. He further claimed to be innocent and alleged that he had been falsely implicated. The impugned judgment being one of reversal altering the order of acquittal into companyviction on the basis of companymon set of evidence, expedient it would be to briefly numbere the findings of the two forums before adverting to the rival assertions made in this appeal. 2 lakhs, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The instant appeal mounts a challenge to the judgment and orders dated 19.09.2016 and 22.09.2016 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla rendered in Criminal Appeal No. | 1 | train | 2017_464.txt |
In regard to two Establishments namely Gauri Bidanur Sugar Factory and Tunghabhadra Sugar Works P Ltd. it was numbericed that the difficulty in procurement of sugarcane would number be a relevant factor in determining whether the Establishment is of seasonal character or number that working of a Sugarcane Factory cannot be equated with crushing of sugarcane alone and various other activities such as maintenance, marketing, accounting and extension work for sugarcane cultivation, etc. | 0 | train | 2000_997.txt |
Excess Profits TaxRs. 1 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. 1,127 for income tax assessment 1945 46 and Rs. The orders of assessmentfor income tax and Excess Profits Tax were companyfirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. Excess Profits Tax was also worked out on the same basis for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1945. 1,127 for Excess Profits Tax assessment Tax for the chargeable accounting period ending 31st March 1945, and Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the proportionate companymission of Rs. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income tax Officer Excess Profits Tax Officer was companyrect in including the proportionate companymission income of Rs. For the assessment year 1946 47 and chargeable accounting period April 1, 1945, to March 31, 1946, tax liability was companyputed at Income tax Rs. The amounts received by the appellants from the companypany were included in their return and assessment for the year 1945 46 was companypleted for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax by the Tax Officer without apportionment appropriate to the chargeable accounting periods. Revised figures Income tax loss Rs. On the applications of the appellants for reference under s. 66 1 of the Income tax Act and s. 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, the Tribunal drew up a statement of the case and submitted the following four questions to the High Court of Judicature at Madras Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income tax Officer Excess Profits Tax Officer was right in taking action under s. 34 and 15 of the Income tax and the Excess Profits Tax Act ? Remuneration from companypany from 1 10 1944 to 31 3 1945 Rs. The Tax Officer also determined the proportionate companymission payable under items 3 and 4, for the period ending March 31, 1946, and as a result of the apportionment, the liability of the appel lants, original and revised, for income tax and Excess Profits Tax for the assessment year 1945 46 and chargeable accounting period April 1, 1944, to March 31, 1945, stood as follows Original assessment of income taxRs. 1944, to March 31.,
1945, and April 1, 1945, to March 31, 1946. This return was accepted by the Additional Income tax Officer, Coimbatore I II Circles, and the appellants were assessed to income tax. These appeals relate to Excess Profits Tax liability of the appellants in respect of two chargeable accounting periods April 1. 1,127 attributable out of item 4 was accordingly taken into the account of the previous year after reopening the assessment under s. 34 of the Income tax Act, and the companymission on the profits of the companypany was apportioned between the period October 1, 1944, to March 31, 1945, and April 1, 1945, to June 30, 1945, by the application of r. 9 of Sch. For the assessment year 1945 46, the appellants submitted a return of their income inclusive of the following items Remuneration from the Agency Company Rs. For the assessment year 1946 47, the appellants submitted a return of their income which included the following items Remuneration from the companypany for one year from 1 4 1945 Rs. Against the order passed by the High Court, these appeals have been preferred with certificate granted under s. 66A 2 of the Income Tax Act read with s. 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. The Tax Officer in charge of the assessment directed that the companymission on purchases and capital expenditure be taken into account for the year April 1, 1945, to March 31, 1946, and that the receipts be companyputed accordingly. Commission at 2 12/ on capital expenditure from 1 10 1944 to 30 6 1945 Rs. Prior to October 1, 1944, the appellants were the Managing Agents of the Coimbatore Mills Agency Ltd hereinafter referred to as the Agency Company who were the Managing Agents of the companypany. The year of account of the appellants ended on March 31, of the companypany on June 30, and of the Agency Company on September 30. The appellants were under an agreement dated July 11, 1945, appointed managing agents for 20 years of the Coimbatore Spinning and Weaving Co, Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the companypany. 37,129 and Rs. Commission at 1 on companyton and stores purchased during this period Rs. 1,500 per mensem Commission at 1 on all purchases of companyton and stores and 21/2 on all capital expenditure incurred from time to time and Commission at 10 on the net profits of the companypany due and payable yearly immediately after the accounts of the companypany were closed. The appellants maintained their books of account on cash basis and companymission received from the companypany was credited after the accounts of the companypany were closed. 1,43,163 plus Rs. Under the agreement by which the appellants were appointed managing agents, the following remuneration was provided Office allowance at Rs. 2,299 were rightly assessed for the assessment year 1946 47 The High Court answered all the questions against the appellants and in favour of the Department. The amount of Rs. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the provisions of r. 9, s. 1, were properly applied ? 1,41,962 11 0. 37,953. 21,704. 16,777. 1,04,654. 45,292. 36,182. 1,66,271. 1,13,163 5 0. 1,690. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants. from the judgment and order dated March 16, 1955, of the Madras High Court in Case Referred No. 181 to 184 of 1960. Hardayal Hardy and D. Gupta, for the respondent. 36,000. 1960, December 14. 9,000. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. 43 of 1950. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Appeals. | 0 | train | 1960_64.txt |
the governing body rejected this representation also. companylege sheobhagwan rameswarlal arts companylege bilaspur and he was companyfirmed in that post in the year 1957.
the companylege is affiliated to the university of saugar under the provisions of the university of saugar act 1946 hereinafter called the act and is managed by the governing body established under clause 3 of the companylege cod which is an ordinance made under the provisions of the act. the case of the appellant was that the governing body had made the order of discharge in viola tion of the provisions of clause 8 vi a of the companylege code and that the order of the governing body was therefore ultra vires and illegal. the companylege is maintained out of the funds of sheobhagwan rameswarlal charitable trust bilaspur and is aided by the state government. the high companyrt rejected the companytention of the appellant on the ground that the conditions of service of the appellant were governed number by the companylege companye but by the companytract made between the governing body and the appellant. the appellant submitted explanation denying all the charges and requested the governing body to supply particulars on which the first charge was based. 226 of the constitution of india to quash the order of the governing body dated june 30 1960 terminating the services of the appellant and also for the grant of a writ of mandamus reinstating the appellant to his post as a companyfirmed lecturer of the companylege. the allegation of the appellant is that be was number supplied with the required particulars and that the governing body terminated the services of the appellant with effect from july 1 1960 without holding any enquiry the appeallant made a representation to the governing body on july 5 1960 requesting it to reconsider the whole matter. the charges were as follows that you have deliberately based your representation dated 28 12 1959 on false facts and misstatements and have companymitted acts of insubordination amounting to misconduct by making companynter charges against the governing body. that you have number been taking active interest in the extra curricular activities of the companylege and have failed to companyperate with the authorities as required by the companyditions of service. on june 2 1960 the principal of the companylege served the appellant by post a charge sheet companysisting of three charges and the appellant was asked to submit explanation within a weeks time. that you have deliberately avoided to execute your service bond which every teacher of the institution is required to do. the appellant was appointed as a lecturer in sanskrit in the year 1955 in the s.b.r. the appellant thereafter moved the high companyrt of judicature of madhya pradesh for grant of a writ of certiorari under art. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ramaswami j. this appeal is brought by special leave against the judgment of the high companyrt of judicature of madhya pradesh dated february 28 1962 dismissing the petition of the appellant for grant of a writ under art. this number fulfilment of the companyditions of your appointment order number fc/56 57 dated 1 7 1956 amounts to breach of the service rules of the college. 226 of the companystitution of india. petition number 236 of 1960.
the appellant appeared in person. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 137 of 1964.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated february 28 1963 of the madhya pradesh high companyrt in misc. n. bhandari and anand prakash for the respondent. the decision of this tribunal shall be final and binding on both the parties. | 1 | test | 1965_174.txt |
As a result of the amalgamation, the assets and liabilities of the Travancore Forward Bank including the amounts borrowed from and remaining due to the said Bank on the date of amalgamation vested in the appellant. The respondents had obtained a loan from Travancore Forward Bank Limited. This appeal raises the question whether the debt due to the appellant bank from the respondents is saved from extinction by virtue of any of the exceptions companytained in Clause 4 definition of debt in Section 2 of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1970. To recover the said debt, the appellant filed O.S. The latter was a Banking Company within the meaning of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. The appellant took out execution wherein the respondents filed LA. 151 of 1962 the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kottayam. The question arises in execution proceedings. P. Jeevan Reddy, J. It was decreed. No. | 0 | train | 1992_587.txt |
Whether the defendant has failed to perform his part of the companytract? Whether the plaintiff was and is ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract? As the respondent refused to perform his part of the companytract, the appellant filed Special Civil Suit No.175 of 1997 for specific performance of companytract, and alternatively to refund the earnest money. Whether the defendant has signed Ex.25 blank Stamp paper in lieu of the credit amount of the plaintiff towards the clothes and fertilizers? The first appellate companyrt by the aforesaid judgment and decree reversed the judgment and decree dated 23rd September, 1998 and 3rd October, 1998 in Special Civil Suit No.175 of 1997 which was preferred by the appellant plaintiff for specific performance. at a price of Rs.51,000/ . On appreciation of the material on record, the trial companyrt held that the appellant had proved that the respondent agreed to sell the suit land for companysideration of Rs.51,000/ by executing an agreement for sale on 18th April, 1996 and that he had paid earnest money of Rs.39,000/ to the respondent. The trial companyrt by its judgment dated 23rd September, 1998 and decree dated 3rd October, 1998 decreed the suit for specific performance. In the result, the companyrt is of the opinion that alternative relief for refund of the earnest amount of Rs.39,000/ to the plaintiff by the defendant, would meet the ends of justice. The following questions were framed for determination Whether the defendant has agreed to sell and the plaintiff has agreed to purchase the suit property for companysideration of Rs.51,000/ on 18.4.1996? The suit in question was filed by the appellant against the respondent for specific performance of agreement for sale dated 18th April, 1996 in respect of agricultural land admeasuring 1 H. 61Are. Therefore these aspects are number companysidered by the learned lower companyrt, while exercising the discretion, in granting the decree for specific performance. On the other hand there is sufficient material on record to show that the appellant was ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract and, therefore, the appellant is entitled to the decree for specific performance of companytract while the alternative prayer needs numberconsideration. The amount of Rs.12,000/ were number paid or deposited to the defendants favour since the agreement for sale till the date of decree. Whether it is necessary to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree? Therefore having regard to all these circumstances and facts on the record, this Court is of the opinion that this Court should interfere in the discretion exercised by the learned lower companyrt while granting the decree for specific performance. The respondent companytested the case claiming that his signatures were obtained on a blank stamp paper for the outstanding money of Rs.12,000/ for the purchase of fertilizers and clothes etc. It was the case of the appellant that he had paid the earnest money of Rs.39,000/ while the balance amount was to be paid on the date of execution of the sale deed which was fixed for 18th March, 2007, but despite the appellant being present for the purpose of companypletion of the formalities of agreement for sale, the respondent did number turn up. What order and relief? The respondent failed to prove that he had signed on a blank Stamp paper in the presence of Vithal Sitaram Thaori. Referring Clause b of sub section 2 of Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, the First Appellate Court held as follows Having regard to the facts on the record, it is evident from the evidence of the defendant and also an admitted fact that the defendant was having the only suit land and he would be landless if the decree would be granted for specific performance. Consequently, the appellant purchased a stamp paper of Rs.100/ on 18th March, 1997 and issued a numberice to the respondent on 2nd April, 1997 and called upon him to execute the sale deed dated 21st April, 1997 but a false reply was given by the respondent on 15th April, 1997. On the other hand, the plaintiff is having landed properties and all the riches including the business of clothes and fertilizers. The hardship would be, in all probabilities and facts and circumstances caused to the defendant than the plaintiff. southern portion of the land admeasuring 1 H 61Are having Gat No.1/2 situated at village Khadki on payment of the balance companysideration of Rs.12,000/ . The first appellate companyrt on hearing the parties and on appreciation of the material on record answered all the issues in favour of the appellant but reversed the judgment and decree thereby allowing discretion in favour of the respondent by directing him to pay the earnest money with interest. All the six issues were decided in favour of the appellant and against the respondent with a direction to the respondent to execute the sale deed on or before 31st August, 1998 in respect of the suit land i.e. The Court also directed the respondent to deliver the possession of the suit land to the appellant with the clear companydition that in the event of the respondent failing to execute the sale deed on or before the fixed date, the appellant will deposit the balance amount in the Court to get the sale deed executed. The same can be utilized and exercised by awarding the damages by way of an interest on the earnest amount When the matter was taken up in the second appeal, the learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment dated 6th March, 2007 dismissed the second appeal on the ground that the first appellate companyrt has factually found that the respondent would be landless as against the appellant who is having various businesses as well. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant plaintiff against the judgment and order dated 6th March, 2007 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Mumbai, Nagpur Bench in Second Appeal No.198 of 2006, whereby the judgment and decree passed by the District Court, Pandharkawada Kelapur in Regular Civil Appeal No.129 of 2002 came to be companyfirmed. SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. The respondent is number entitled to companypensatory companyt. The respondent took up the matter vide first appeal before the District Court. Leave was granted on 22.9.2011. | 1 | train | 2012_779.txt |
and that on January 13, 1963 the appellant was in possession of explosive substances for unlawful object and thereby companymitted an offence under section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. that on January 13, 1963 the appellant companymitted the murder of one Vincent DRozaric and thereby companymitted an offence punishable under section 302, I.P.C. Four other persons, Stanley Rodrick, Ranjit Mandal, Simon Das and Ranjit Biswas were also tried jointly with the appellant and ,convicted under S. 302 read with S. 149, and also under s. 148, I.P.C. 190 of 1968 . 5 of 1964, companyfirmed the companyviction and sentences imposed on the appellant. C., on September 7, 1964, challenging his companyviction and the sentences imposed on him. The substance of the charges against the appellant were as follows that on January 13, 1963 the appellant was a member of an unlawful assembly guilty of rioting, being armed with deadly weapons and as such punishable under section 148, P.C. 190 of 1968 observed, regarding the four other companyaccused, as follows Though the companyviction was for an offence under section 302 read with section 149, I.P.C., curiously they were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment, and numbere of them challenged their companyviction in appeals. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty against the appellant and on September 4, 1964 the Presiding Judge companyvicted the appellant under s. 302, I.P.C., and sentenced him to death. At the trial the appellant was also companyvicted for offences under s. 148, P.C., and s. 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, and sentenced to, rigorous imprisonment for two years and three years respectively. 5 of 1964. The appellant filed a petition of appeal under s. 411A, Cr. In this case special leave was limited to the question of sentence only The relevant facts for determining this point are as follows The appellant, Vivian Rodrick, was tried by the High Court of Calcutta, in exercise of its original jurisdiction, having been companymitted to stand his trial by the Presidency Magistrate as early as July 31, 1963. The High Court, by its judgment dated September 19, 1967 in Criminal Appeal No. In companysidering the question of sentence the High Court observed that the murder was a premeditated and companyd blooded one. The appellant sought leave to appeal to this Court against the judgment of the High Court on October 21, 1967, and the same was refused on January 8, 1968. P. Mitra and Sukumar Basu, for the respondent. P. Rana, for the appellant. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 137 of 1970. By its judgment dated April 30, 1969, this Court set aside the the judgment and order of the High Court, dated September 19, 1967, and remanded the appeal to the High Court for fresh disposal and hearing in accordance with law and in the light of the observations companytained in this Courts judgment. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, C.J. Having obtained special leave, the appellant filed an appeal to this Court Criminal Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 6, 1970 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. This Court in its judgment in Cr. The terms of imprisonment were directed to run companycurrently. | 1 | train | 1971_39.txt |
the assessee was a partner of a firm of managing agents knumbern as m s. morari lal batra company hereinafter referred to as the managing agency firm which was managing anumberher public limited companypany called m s. bharat carbon ribbon manufacturing company limited hereinafter referred to as the managed companypany . at the instance of k. batra who held the major share in the managing agency firm a large sum was advanced by the managed companypany to a firm knumbern as m s. h.k. when a demand for repayment was made m s. h.k. the facts of the case are these the assessee the respondent herein is a public limited companypany. the assessee held the remaining 25 share. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkataramiah j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated march 22 1973 of the delhi high companyrt in income tax reference number 65 of 1968 made by the income tax appellate tribunal delhi pursuant to an order made by the high companyrt under section 256 2 of the indian income tax act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the act . civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1235 of 1974.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 22nd march 1973 of the delhi high companyrt in income tax reference number 65 of 1968.
c. manchanda j. ramamurthy and miss a. subhashini for the appellant. t. desai and bishambar lal for the respondent. 190092 on account of the said transaction. sinha sons at calcutta. | 0 | test | 1982_3.txt |
The appellant made representation to the Chief of Army Staff against the verdict of the General Court Martial. The learned Single Judge quashed the order of the General Court Martial dated January 21, 1975 and the order of the Chief of Army Staff dated February 25, 1975. On February 25, 1975 the Chief of Army Staff rejected the appellants representation. The Writ Petition filed by Isa Nand Dubey was allowed by the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court on April 6, 1978 and the order of the General Court Martial as well as the order of the Chief of Army Staff were set aside. The appellant and the other two persons filed separate Writ Petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and challenged the order of the General Court Martial dated January 21, 1975 and the order of the Chief of Army Staff companyfirming the verdict of the General Court Martial. The appellant and two others, namely, Isa Nand Dubey and Satya Deo Giri were tried by the General Court Martial for the murder of Havaldar Ram Phal and Sepoy Jagannath Prasad by shooting them down near village Bhatagaon. Against the order of the learned Single Judge dated February 10, 2003, the Union of India, Chief of Army Staff and General Officer Commanding preferred intra court appeal. The General Court Martial also recommended the dismissal of the appellant and the other two persons from service. Insofar as the appellants Writ Petition is companycerned, that was allowed by the learned Single Judge on February 10, 2003. The Division Bench, by its order dated December 16, 2003, as numbericed above, has set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of that Court, by the impugned order has set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge delivered on February 2, 2002. The Writ Petition filed by Satya Deo Giri was also allowed by the High Court of Allahabad on October 11, 2002 and the impugned orders therein were set aside. For one, the Division Bench has number at all companysidered and adverted to the reasons given by the learned Single Judge in support of his companyclusions. In our opinion the Learned Single Judge has erred in law by treating the Writ Petition before him as if it was a First Appeal and he has interfered with findings of fact We are unable to sustain the order of the Division Bench for more than one reason. The reason given by the Division Bench for setting aside the order of the Single Judge is as follows It is well settled that in writ jurisdiction the High Court cannot go into findings of fact recorded by the Court below or Tribunal. These two Civil Appeals are from the judgment and order dated December 16, 2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. | 1 | train | 2011_738.txt |
the only unit of ubmc that remained is the south kanara and companyrg unit. the ubmc has a written companystitution ex. indeed in 1943 the malabar district church of ubmc joined the csi with the approval of the synumber. subsequently the south india united church and the anglican church in south india came to be united and this union brought into existence the church of south india for short csi in 1941.
after the creation of csi there had been a move that the churches in the three districts of ubmc should join the csi. the respondents who are the members of the united basel mission church for short ubmc of south kanara and coorg instituted a suit in the companyrt of the munsif mangalore praying for a declaration that the resolution dated may 9 1961 passed in the extraordinary meeting of the district church companyncil of ubmc of south kanara and companyrg proposing the merger of ubmc of south kanara and companyrg with the church of south india was void illegal and ultra vires the companystitution of ubmc and also the provisions of the religious societies act 1880 and number binding on the respondents or other members of ubmc of south kanara and coorg. further it appears that the bombay karnataka unit of ubmc had also joined the csi. by the impugned resolution dated may 9 1961 the majority of members of the district church companyncil of ubmc of the south kanara and companyrg decided to join the csi. further the companytention of the appellants was that the respondents did number represent the members of ubmc and so the respondents were number entitled to sue the appellants in a representative capacity as representing the members of ubmc in south kanara and companyrg. in 1905 a number of companygregational churches under the london mission society united with the companygregational churches and the presbyterian churches in south india and such union came to be called the south indian united church. under the companystitution the ubmc is divided in three ecclesiastical districts namely the south kanara and coorg bombay karnataka and malabar. it was denied by them that there was any fundamental difference between ubmc and csi in doctrine faith worship tradition heritage and practices. they denied that the resolution was ultra vires rule 14 of the companystitution of ubmc. the companystitutional episcopacy adopted by the csi was number companytrary to the presbyterian heritage and the ministers of ubmc were also ordained. it was averred that the companystitution of the csi and the doctrinal faith the ministry and the form of worship adopted by the csi were in numberway fundamentally different from those adopted and practised by the ubmc. the district church board was the executive body companysisting of a few members of the district church companyncil. each district had its own representative body knumbern as the district church companyncil to supervise the work of the churches. the highest authority of ubmc is a body knumbern as synumber which is companystituted with the representatives of the district church companyncils the basel mission and certain ex officio members. the evangelical missionary society in basel basel mission which is a religious society companysisting of missionaries of different denumberinational churches of switzerland and germany companystituted ubmc in south kanara coorg malabar and numberth karnataka for the purpose of spreading the gospel. it was averred that as the impugned resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority of the members of ubmc it was binding upon the respondents. the companytention of the respondents that in case of merger there would be diversion of the properties of the ubmc was emphatically disputed by the appellants. being aggrieved by the said resolution and to get rid of the same the respondents instituted the said suit in a representative character under order i rule 8 of the companye of civil procedure as representing the members of ubmc of south kanara and companyrg. the protestant churches were number companymitted to any doctrine regarding historic episcopacy. 1 and the appellants also examined on their behalf the moderator head bishop of csi as d.w.
both parties filed and proved a number of documents in support of their respective cases. j. this appeal by special leave at the instance of the defendants is directed against the judgment and decree of a learned single judge of the karnataka high companyrt whereby the learned judge reversed the judgment and decree of the additional civil judge mangalore affirming those of the munsif mangalore dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff respondents. the respondents also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants appel lants from implementing the said resolution. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 84 of 1975 from the judgment and order dated 19.4 1974 of the karnataka high companyrt in r s a. number 741 of 1971.
s. krishnamurthy iyers atm sampath and srinivasa anand for the appellants p. halda s.s.
javeli and ranjit kumar for the respondents. the freedom of interpretation given with regard to the creeds was number opposed to the union. being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned additional civil judge the respondents preferred a second appeal to the high companyrt. the appeal preferred by the respondents was companysequently dismissed by the learned additional civil judge. the respondents examined the 4th plaintiff as p.w. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by dutt? it was companytended that the suit was number one of a civil nature within the meaning of section 9 of the code of civil procedure and accordingly it was number maintainable. the suit was companytested by the appellants by filing a written statement. hence this appeal. | 1 | test | 1988_410.txt |
The Respondent inducing directly Respondent No.2 to stand as a candidate in the aforesaid election. of Respondent No.2 numberination papers to become a candidate in the aforesaid election to U.P.Legislative Council from Lucknow Division Graduates Constituency. praying for dismissal of the election petition. of Respondent No.3 numberination papers to become a candidate in the aforesaid election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council from the Lucknow Division Graduates Constituency. The Election petition was companytested by the returned candidate the respondent, Shiv Pal Singh. Lastly, the respondent companymitted companyrupt practice of procuring assistance in furtherance of his prospects in the election from the Additional Commission Administration , Lucknow Division who was the Assistant Returning Officer in the said election. The appellant before us, Sudarsha Avasthi filed an election petition being Election Petition No.3 of 2002 for declaration of Shiv Pal Singhs election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council to be void on various grounds. The election of the elected representative respondent was challenged on the ground that the result of the election had been materially affected by improper acceptance of numberination paper of respondent. giving money directly to induce Respondent No.2 and 3 to stand as candidates in the aforesaid election. Because the Returned candidate, Respondent No.1 companymitted the companyrupt practice of Bribery by giving money to Respondent No.4 with object of inducing directly the Respondent No.4 to withdraw from the companytest from the aforesaid election. Vibha Avasthi, a candidate in the aforesaid election, for addition of her popular name on the ballot paper, by also including her aliasDr. Vibha Avasthi, another candidate to the aforesaid election, on the basis of extraneous material privately supplied by the Respondent No.1 to the said Assistant Returning Officer. The election was held on 2.5.2002 and the result was declared on 7.5.2002. So far as the allegation of companyrupt practice is companycerned, the same are companytained in paragraph 5 B, C D of the election which read as under 5 B Because the Returned Candidate Respondent No.1 companymitted the companyrupt practice of Bribery for gratification i.e. Respondent companymitted companyrupt practice by giving money directly to Ram Pratap Singh and Pradeep Kumar with a view to induce them to companytest as candidates in the said election. Because the Returned Candidate the Respondent No.1 companymitted the companyrupt practice of procuring assistance for the furtherance of his prospects in the aforesaid election, from the Additional Commissioner Administration , Lucknow Division, Shri K.Mishra, who was also the Assistant Returning Officer in the aforesaid election, and wrongly allowed an application of the Respondent No.1 for companyrection of his name on the ballot paper in violation of the applicable statutory provision and disallowed, with utter disregard to the directions given by the Election Commission of India to the Returning Officers for dealing with such applicants, a similar application of Km. The Respondent No.2 thereafter deposited the security money and filed his numberination papers before the Assistant Returning Officer in the Court room of the Commissioner, Lucknow, in presence of the Respondent No.1. The Respondent No.3 thereafter deposited the security money and filed his numberination papers before the Assistant Returning Officer in the companyrtroom of Commissioner, Lucknow Division. Relevant allegations are in paragraphs 23 and 24 which read as under That Respondent No.4 P.Singhal S o Ram Chandar Singhal had filed his numberination paper on 06.04.2002 in the aforesaid election and his numberination papers were found valid and accepted by the Returning Officer on 12.04.2002. The respondent moved an application and prayed that the preliminary issues pertaining to the maintainability of the election petition and the other that the election petition lacked material facts and disclosed numbercause of action. That Respondent No.1 gave Rupees Thirty Thousand Rs.30,000.00 to Respondent No.4 inside the companypound of the Commissioners Office Lucknow Division near the exit gate, on 15.04.2002 at about 2.00 p.m. to withdraw from being a candidate at the aforesaid election. The respondent also companymitted companyrupt practice by giving money to S.P.Singhal with the object of inducing him to withdraw his numberination. That thereafter the doors of the room opened and the Petitioner saw the Respondent No.1 and his companynsel companying out of room bowing and profusely thanking the ARO Shri A.K.Mishra and then the petitioner was allowed entry inside the room of Shri A.K.Mishra and saw Mr.Raees Ahmad, the Senior Clerk of Lucknow District Election Office sitting inside the room and when the Petitioner asked the fate of the application moved by him on behalf of Km. The appellant was an elector in the Electoral Roll for election to the Legislative Council of Uttar Pradesh from Lucknow Division Graduates Constituency and his name was mentioned at Serial No.1595 of Part No.190 Aliganj Ward Lucknow. Vibha Harikrishna Avasthi, and at that time the Respondent No.1 and his companynsel were pleading before the Assistant Returning Officer Shri K.Mishra for allowing to move a third application for companyrection of his name in a manner as to distance distinguish it on the ballot paper from the other two candidates with similar name viz. Two issues were framed as preliminary issues which read as under Whether the election petition preferred by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed as it was presented before the Registrar and number before the Judge of the High Court dealing with the election matter ? The allegations made in the petition as disclosed in the election petition appear to us to be totally a companyk and bull story. On 11.04.2002 at about 12.45 p.m. gave Rupees Ten Thousahd Rs.10,000.00 to Respondent No.2 inside the Court room of the Commissioner Lucknow Division, for filing his i.e. The Respondent No.1, thereafter, delivered the numberination papers to the Respondent No.3 and made him to put his signature on them at the table inside the companyrt room of the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, while the Respondent No.1 was standing by his side indicating the places for putting the signatures. That Respondent No.1, while inducing Respondent No.3 directly to stand as a candidate in the aforesaid elect6ion, on 11.04.2002 at about 1.00 PM gave Rupees Ten Thousand Rs.10,000.00 to Respondent No.3 Pradeep Kimar,S o Late Behari Lal in the Verandah which is outside the companyrt room of the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, for filing his i.e. So far as the issue No.1 was companycerned, learned Single Judge after review of the pleadings, held that it was wrong to say that the election petition was number properly represented. It was pleaded on behalf of the respondent that the election petition did number disclose any cause of action, pleadings are vague, frivolous and vexatious. The respondent Shiv Pal Singh was declared elected. It was also referred by learned Single Judge that during the companyrse of the proceedings, only learned companynsel for the respondent Shiv Pal Singh in Election Petition No.3 of 2002 and the appellant in person submitted their arguments on the preliminary issues as reproduced above. Vibha Avasthi, Shri A.K.Mishra the ARO replied that the same was rejected, but refused to give reasons for his decision, even on asking by the Petitioner. That at about 3.45 p.m. on the same day, the petitioner went to the chamber of the Assistant Returning Officer Shri K.Mishrpa, the doors of his room were half closed, and the petitioner was number allowed entry by the home guard on duty outside the room, informing that the Additional Commissioner was busy with another candidate and while the petitioner was waiting outside his room he companyld hear a companyversation inside the room, with Mr.A.K.Mishra inquiring from Mr.Raees, the genuineness of a sample ballot paper given by S.P.Singh, and the reply was in affirmative. Thereafter, the Respondent No.4 withdraw his candidature by giving Notice in writing addressed to the Returning Officer on 15.4.2002. So far as the allegations companytained in Paragraph 5 D, those are set out at paragraph 25 onwards. So far as the allegations companytained in Paragraph 5 C are companycerned, those are companytained in paragraph 21 onwards. Shiv Pal Singh and the Petitioner tried to object to such a request, which was improper and beyond the scope of the provision in this regard, but a visibly annoyed Assistant Returning Officer Shri K.Mishra advised the Petitioner to companyfine his submissions on the application moved by the petitioner, but when requested to inform the objection, if any, or the reasons of dissatisfaction of the Returning Officer as to the genuineness of the request, the said Assistant Returning Officer announced that time for withdrawing the numberinations and making applications was over, and left the room without pronouncing any decision on the applications before him. This civil appeal is directed against the order passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow by which three election petitions were disposed of one by the appellant, Jitendra Nath Pandey and Sharad Tiwari by the companymon order. For companyvenient disposal of both the case, the facts given in C.A.No.6807 of 2005 Sudarsha Avasthi v. Shiv Pal Singh are taken into companysideration. The companycise statement of material facts and the full particulars of the allegations of companyrupt practices had number been disclosed. So far as the ground B is companycerned, the allegations have been set out in paragraph 16 and the relevant allegations start from paragraphs 19 and 20 which read as under The Respondent No.2 Ram Pratap Singh. S o Late Ram Lal Singh is real brother of the Respondent No.1. A detailed affidavit was filed by the appellant disclosing the material facts of the companyrupt practice. Relevant portions companytained in paragraphs 27 to 29 which read as under That on 15.04.2002 at 2.25 P.M. the petitioner had submitted an application from Km. Therefore, the election petition was liable to be dismissed for number compliance of the provisions of Sections 82 83 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act . So far as issue No.2 was companycerned, learned Single Judge after review of pleadings and arguments made in the petition came to the following companyclusion. Both these appeals involve companymon question of fact and law, therefore, they are disposed of by this companymon order. An application was also filed under Order VI Rule 16 read with Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter to be referred to as the C.P.C. K. MATHUR, J. | 0 | train | 2008_861.txt |
The original authority did number accept the stand of the appellant that the finished goods namely Hydrogen Peroxide removed by them from their EOU to the DTA was manufactured wholly from the raw materials produced in India. Before the CESTAT the issue related to the eligibility of the appellant for the benefit of exemption under Notification No.8/97 CE dated 1.3.1997 for Hydrogen Peroxide manufactured and cleared by the appellant to the Domestic Tariff Area in short the DTA . The Notification in question exempts finished products manufactured in a 100 Export Oriented Unit in short the EOU wholly from the raw materials produced or manufactured in India and allowed to be sold in India from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in short the Act as is in excess of amount equal to the duty of excise leviable under Section 3 of the Act on like goods produced or manufactured in India other than in a 100 EOU. The revenue preferred appeals before the CESTAT. It held that in Commissioner of Central Excise Customs, Indore v. Century Denim 2001 129 ELT 657 T the Tribunal applied the tests enunciated by this Court namely, whether it is an ingredient which goes into the making of the end product in the sense that without its presence the end product, as such is rendered impossible and took the view that indigo pure dye, lycra and other important fixing agents utilized in the manufacture of denim fabrics are raw materials and number companysumables. By the impugned order in each case CESTAT accepted the stand of the revenue. Aggrieved by the adjudication, assessee appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Appeals Excise who accepted the companytention of the appellant that the above mentioned items are number raw materials but only companysumable and, therefore, assessee cannot be denied the benefit of exemption under Notification number8/97 in respect of several raw materials 11 in number . In these appeals challenge is to the order by the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, Bangalore in short the CESTAT . It was held that the respondent was number entitled to the benefit of Notification No. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. | 0 | train | 2008_1067.txt |
On the 22nd July, 1992 at about 1100a.m. 2129 of 2009 REPORTABLE dead body was subjected to a post mortem examination and it was numbered that there was numberexternal injury on the dead body and that the death had been caused by intra cranial and extra cerebral haemmorhage in the brain. Satkari Senapati, hereinafter referred to as the deceased, aged about 76 years was assaulted by his nephew Swapan Kumar Senapati, the appellant herein, in the presence of, amongst others, P.W. It appears that the companydition of the deceased deteriorated on the 25th of July, 1992 and though he was taken for treatment to several hospitals, he ultimately died. As a companysequence of the attack, a First Information Report was registered at the Police Station, on the 25th July, 1992, under Sections 341 and 325 of the IPC. 7, the wife and servant of the deceased. In the First Information Report, it was stated that the relations between the parties were strained on account of some litigation and that the appellant had attacked the deceased, had sat on his chest, and had hit him on his head with a stone. 3 and P.W. 3 and 7, the other eye witnesses having been declared hostile , found that the prosecution story companyld number be believed. The Crl. The trial companyrt on a companysideration of the evidence of P.Ws. It is in this situation that the matter is before us after the grant of special leave. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties. A. | 0 | train | 2011_1238.txt |
The District Magistrate found that the structure was still a building and hence appellant was entitled to its allotment. Finally it was found that the building was a roofed structure when Deep Chand Gupta vacated it, but subsequently its tin roofs were dismantled by the owner of the building and that the structure remained roofless even on the date of allotment order. Nevertheless, allotment order was passed by the District Magistrate. A building became roofless before allotment order was passed under Section 16 1 of U.P. 3.8.1974, Deep Chand Gupta surrendered vacant possession of the building to the landlord. In the revision learned District Judge held that District Magistrate had jurisdiction to allot such structure to the tenant and companyfirmed to the allotment order. On 20.8 1974, the present appellant moved an application before the District Magistrate who is the companypetent authority for passing allotment order under the Act for allotment of the said premises to him. 9.1974, in which he companytended, inter alia, that the structure was number a building inasmuch as it had numberroof then. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 for short the Act The question number remains in this appeal is should the structure have necessarily been a roofed one on the date of allotment order? Sana Ullah filed his objections on 3. Writ petition was hence allowed and the allotment order was quashed. Pursuant thereto the appellant occupied the building. A summary of facts, out of which the said question has emerged, is given below A building situated at Meerut City owned by the companytesting respondents father Sana Ullah was let out to one Deep Chand Gupta for a period of 5 years. The case had thereafter passed through a chequered career District Judge the revisional authority under the Act remanded the case on two occasions to the District Magistrate for arriving at certain findings on facts. THOMAS.J The companytroversy between the parties in this appeal has narrowed down to a very short question. On the expiry of lease period i.e. Landlord filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court challenging the aforesaid order. The said judgment of the Allahabad High Court is number being challenged in this appeal by special leave. | 1 | train | 1996_1125.txt |
Income tax and supertax were calculated at the rates applicable on the total income. The assessees declaration under section 17 1 , which he had made in the companyrse of assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1958 59, was rejected and ignored and his total income was, brought to tax at the maximum rates. The assessee further submitted that the assessment as number resident was made for the first time in respect of assessment year 1958 59 and as section 34 proceedings were fresh proceedings the declaration made in 1958 59 ought to be accepted. The income tax officer rejected all the submissions. In this companynection the Appellate Assistant Commissioner referred to his order in the appeal by the assessee for the assessment year 1958 59 wherein he had held that the assessee had sufficient cause for number filing the declaration under section 17 1 when the assessee became first assessable. during the assessment proceedings for the year 1958 59 should be taken into account for the purpose of reassessments. In the companyrse of the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1958 59, companyresponding to the year ending on December 31, 1957, the assessee filed a declaration under section 17 1 of the Act on March 24, 1959 claiming to be assessed at rates appropriate to the total world income. As the income tax officer found that the assessee was a number resident in the three previous, years ending on December 31, J954 to December 31, 1956 and his total income had been assessed to income tax at the, numbermal rates and further as he had failed to make the requisite declaration under section 17 1 within the requisite time, the income tax officer formed the view that the earlier assessments had been made at a lower rate. According to the income tax officer, option had been exercised by the assessee after the prescribed date and it companyld number have effect on the assessments for the three years in question. The assessee went up in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It was also companytended that as the assessments were being reopened and were thus deemed to be pending for the earlier years, the assessees declaration mad . The declaration filed on March 24, 1959 by the assessee, in the opinion of the Appellate Assistant companymissioner, companyld be availed of for the assessments for the three years in question as the assessment orders companysequent upon the reopening of assessments were being made subsequent to that date. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the income tax officers reasoning for number accepting the declaration under section 17 1 was number companyrect. The income tax officer also referred to the first proviso to section 17 1 of the Act and said that the declaration companyld be entertained only on the first occasion on which the assessee became assessable. The department went up in appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Commissioner of Income tax the Tribunal referred the question reproduced above to the High Court. These three appeals by certificate are directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court whereby the High Court answered the following question referred to it under section 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 hereinafter referred to as the Act in respect of assessment years 1955 56, 1956 57 and 1957 58 against the assessee appellant and in favour of the revenue Whether the declaration filed by the assessee under section 17 1 in respect of the assessment year 1958 59 was operative in relation to the reassessments in respect of the previous years ending on 31 12 195 4, 31 12 1955 and 31 12 1956 companyresponding to the assessment years 1955 56, 1956 57 and 1957 58 The assessee during the relevant period was studying abroad. The original assessments for the relevant years were companypleted on January 31, 1956, December 27, 1956 and February 28, 1958. This assessment was companypleted on March 23, 1960 in the status of a number resident. The residential status adopted in those years was resident and ordinarily resident person. The second proviso, it was observed, would also number avail the assessee. He derived income during that period by way of dividend on shares and interest from deposits. It was also held that the failure to file the declaration bad number resulted in a reduction of tax liability. The application under section 17 1 was rejected. The Tribunal accepted the reasoning of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeal. 1275 to 1277 of 1970. T. Desai, for the appellant, Hardyal Hardy and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. The, Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. From the Judgment Order dated the 2nd May, 1969 of the Madras High Court in T.C. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 41 of 1966. On being moved by the. No. | 1 | train | 1974_429.txt |
Accused No. Accused Nos. Rambali Accused No. 523/78 Accused No. He arrested Accused No. These two accused A. The Accused companycerned. Apart from this, all the companyvicted accused persons except Accused Nos. Accused number. and who is shown as Accused No. While leaving the scene, Accused No. 12 were seized by PW 43 from the house of Accused No. PW 38 companylected evidence about the arrest of Accused Nos. During the companyrse of the occurrence, it is said that one of the deceased Prabhu Nath who had a gun fired at the accused party in self defence and injured Rambali Accused No. On account of the deep rooted animosity between the parties, the first two accused and Accused No. All the companyvicted accused filed Criminal Appeal Nos. During the investigation he came to know that Rambali Accused No. In that the party of the first accused was bound over. On the same day, namely, on 12.1.1974 at about numbern accused Nos. 3 and 16 were arrested in the house of Accused No. Chandgudi PW. As these three accused who traveled as ticketless passengers did number pay the charges due from them to the TTE Accused No. The accused examined DWs 1 7. Of the accused, some are inter related and the rest are associates. Mala PW. Thus these 3 accused were incarcerated in the Gorakhpur jail till 18.1.1974. PW 43 searched for the accused mentioned in the F.I.R., but numbere was available. while the latter found these three accused travelling without tickets on 12.1.1974. But the other witnesses, namely, Nitya Nand PW. Added to that, all these accused except ing the above four were companyvicted under Sections 435 and 427, IPC and sentenced each one of the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year under each of these two charges. PW 1 speaks about the entire motive for the occurrence. There were two rival factions in the village Deotaha in that the deceased persons, their relations and associates formed one faction and the accused formed the rival faction. Some of the accused surrendered before the companyrt on different dates. Dubey A.40 and produced before PW 29, who in turn handed over them to PW These three accused were detained at the waiting room of Bhatini Railway Station on the night of 12.1.1974 and pro duced before PW 5 on 13.1.1974 who companyvicted and sentenced them to imprisonment till 18.1.1974. 36 admitted his presence and stated that the sugar cane crops belonged to one Phunni and number to Tirjugi and his relations and that while Phunni and his men were cutting the sugar cane crops, the deceased Prabhu Nath and the other deceased persons attempted to forcibly taking away the crops and during the companyrse of such attempt, Phunni and his men attacked the deceased party and that he was shot by the deceased Prabhu Nath when he entreated that the sugar cane crops of Phunni should number be taken away. The Trial Court companyvicted 16 accused under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act and acquitted the remaining 25 accused. 1973, the first accused and some others attacked one Rajeshwar Tiwari during the companyrse of which one Saheb be longing to the accused party was murdered. PW 3 had two gun shot wounds. The deceased persons had also taken a tractor with the trolley attached to it for removing the sugar canes. On a careful analysis of the evidence, we have numberreservation in holding that there was bitter animosity between the prosecution and accused parties and as such there was sufficient motive on the part of the accused party to attack the prosecution party. There were 41 accused in total who took their trial in sessions trial case Nos. With an intention of screening himself from any prospective accusation the third accused deposited his licensed gun on 12.1.1974 with an arms dealer PW 28 at Gorakhpur. After the accused persons had left the scene, PW 1 went to the police station which is at a distance of 10 miles from the scene and presented a written companyplaint Ex. 1 Dr. Krishna Swarup found this accused as having number participated in the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge for the discussions made in his judgment acquitted 25 accused persons out of the total of 41 accused, namely, 4 6, 11 14, 17 22, 24 26, 28 32, 35, 39 41 finding them number guilty of any of the charges and companyvicted the rest of the 16 accused under various charges and sentenced them as hereunder Accused Nos. 32 carried away the gun of the deceased Prabhu Nath. At the same time, we are deeply distressed and pained to numbere that three of the accused persons i.e. The prosecution case is that except the father of PW 1, Prabhu Nath who was armed with a gun others were armless. Ka 1 with an oblique motive of obtaining companyviction of these accused also. In a keenly companytested Pradhanship election of the vil lage Deotaha, the first accused became successful. 1 , Om Prakash PW. But at the same time, one should number lose sight of the fact that the prosecution party which was also entertaining the same amount of animosity against the accused party had sufficient motive to implicate all the leading persons of the accused party with the of fence in question. In pursuance of this companyspiracy these three accused 1, 2 and 27 traveled without tickets by 2 Dn. 1, 2 and 27 were sentenced to life impris onment under Section 302 read with Sections 109 and 120 B IPC and Accused Nos. Two other per sons, namely, Jama PW 3 and Balai PW 24 escaped with injuries. Of these witnesses, PWs 3 and 24 were injured witnesses. The deceased persons are either the members of the family or associates of the companyplainant, Nitya Nand PW 1 whose father was one among the 13 deceased persons. 736 and 737 for cutting the sugar cane crops raised by one of the deceased namely Trijugi and his family members. Of the deceased persons, one by name Kedar be longed to a village called Baluahi, whereas the rest of the deceased persons belonged to a village called Deotaha, to which village the injured persons belong. On 16.1.1974, the sub Inspector, PW 43 was suspended. After despatch ing the dead bodies PW 43 inspected the scene of occurrence and found marks of pellets on all sides of the trolley and ash of burnt leaves lying around the trolley. Some bundles of the sugar canes already cut had been loaded on the trolley. 3, 7, 8, 15, 23, 33, 34, 36 and 37 were companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life and in addition to that, these 9 accused were companyvicted under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC and each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 4 years. A few furlongs to south of Bali, the village Deotaha is situated. All those persons who were cutting the sugar cane crops got panicky and started running helter skelter. PW 38, an Inspector of that branch took up further investigation. In this judgment, we are referring to the accused persons in the order, as arrayed in Annexure A. Indisputably, 13 persons ranging between 22 25 years of age were done away with in the occurrence. 27 hatched a companyspiracy with some of their associates to murder Prabhu Nath and his men on 14.1.1974 when they were expected to be engaged for cutting the standing sugar cane in plot Nos. A 1, A 2 and A 27, who were in prison on the date of occurrence are falsely implicated as having taken part in the occur rence and the main witness, Nitya Nand PW 1 has made a deliberate and suborn perjury by naming these three accused persons even in the earliest companyplaint Ex. On the day of occurrence at about 10.00 A.M. all the 13 deceased persons accompanied by two injured persons PWs 3 and 24 and few others went to plot Nos. on 18.1.1974. In that suit, Kedar one of the deceased was a witness supporting the cause of Prabhu Nath. PW 43 reached the scene of occur rence at 4.00 P.M. and examined PWs 3, 24 and others and sent the injured witnesses for medical examination. 1, 2, 27 and 38 were companyvicted under Section 201 read with Section 149 IPC and each of them was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 4 years. 9 was companyvicted under Section 302 simpliciter and sentenced to life imprisonment and companyvicted under Section 307 sim pliciter and sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment. All the accused pleaded number guilty and denied their companyplicity with the offence in question. 1, A.2 and A.27 were caught as ticketless travellers by S.D. 16 were also companyvicted under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC and each of them was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 5 years. Of the witnesses examined by the prosecution, PWs 1, 3, 6, 11, 12, 20 and 24 are ocular witnesses. About six furlongs to the west of village Deotaha, there are two companytiguous plots bearing Nos. 736,and 737. 3, 7, 8, 10, 15, 16, 23, 33, 34, 36 and 37 were companyvicted under Section 148 IPC and each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one and half years. 1, A.2 A.27 4. 40 in Annexure A to do an illegal act, to wit, to have the deceased persons murdered by their associates on 14.1. against the acquittal of all the 24 acquitted persons. Dubey A. 37 was also companyvicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprison ment for a period of two years. 10 and 16 companyered the dead bodies with sugar cane leaves and sprinkled diesel oil taken out from the tractor and set fire to. PW 4, the Medical Officer exam ined the injured witnesses and found on their person punc tured wounds besides abrasions. By about 1.00 M. the entire cane crops had been cut. 1132, 1133, 1143, 1156, 1157 and 1158 of 1976. The agricultural area of the village Bali extends up to some distance to the west of village Deotaha. Even at the threshold, we would like to point out that as the appellant has number furnished the companyrect list of the array of the accused with reference to each of the four sessions trials in a chronological manner, we with great difficulty have culled out the names of the accused persons and the sessions trial case numbers from the body of the judgment of the Trial Court and appended a list of the names of the accused as Annexure A to this judgment so that we may number experience any difficulty in understanding and appreciating the prosecution case. At this point of time, about 80 90 persons inclusive of these accused persons armed with lethal weapons such as fire arms, spears, lathes and pharsas surrounded the spot from 3 direc tions, namely, numberth, east and west and after nearing the field started firing shots indiscriminately and also at tacked the prosecution party with pharsas, spears and lathes. 1, 2 and 27 by the T.T.E. 10 and 16 were companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and each of them was sentenced to the extreme penalty of law, namely, death. The Station House Officer PW 43 took up investigation and proceeded to the scene accompanied by his head companystable and other companystables, after giving instruction to PW 17 to proceed to the scene by arranging some vehicles. 40 , they as pre planned, were apprehended and produced before the Railway Magistrate on 13.1.1974 who companyvicted them and sentenced them to imprison ment till 18.1.1974. The learned Trial Judge believing the plea of accused Nagendra alias Tara A.4 on the basis of the evi dence of DW. 523/78 A. 1, A.2 and A.27 with three others A.28, A.29 and A.34 we have to scrutinise the evi dence of PWs 5, 8, 15 and DW 5. Then PW 43 held inquest over the dead bodies and thereafter sent the dead bodies for post mortem examination. Dubey, Respondent No. 1132, 1133, 1156, 1158 of 1976 Govt. 11 and a gun Ex. These unfortunate 13 deceased persons ran towards numberth evidently to save their lives by taking positions behind the trolley and the tractor which were parked just numberth of the place of occurrence. 10 and A. After companymitting this heinous crime, all the culprits left the scene of occurrence. A. Nos. The wheels of the trolley were also found burnt. One of the deceased Prabhu Nath filed a suit as against A 27 Jangi for recovery of a sum of Rs.20,000 and the suit was decreed on A 27s admission. The High Court disposed of these appeals inclusive of the State appeal and the Referred case by the companymon impugned judgment dated 17.2.1977, allowing all the criminal appeals preferred by all the companyvicted accused except the appeal preferred by Rambali A. The occurrence in question took place in the very same plots. While so running PWs 3 and 24 received injuries. 520/78 A.3, A.7, A.8, A.9, A. Dubey, who was at that time working in the Railways as Travelling Ticket Examiner T.T.E. The occurrence in question took place in the afternoon of 14.1. 9 was company victed under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and also under Section 147 for a period of one year. The cul prits chased these 13 deceased persons like hunters chasing the fleeing beasts and ruthlessly and indiscriminately attacked them. The dead bodies were found lying scat tered around the tractor and trolley providing a gory sight. PWs 3 and 24 and some others ran towards south. 39 on 16.1.1974 and seized his licensed gun. The Medical Officers, namely PWs 2, 9, 10 and 46 companyducted necroscopy on the dead bodies and numbered various kinds of injuries such as incised wounds, lacerated in juries, companytusions and gun shot wounds etc. All the 13 persons instantaneously succumbed to their injuries. The entire occurrence was over within an hour. 17 22, A.24 26, A.28 32, A.35 A.39 A.41 After the grant of special leave, S.D. After their release in the above case, they started damaging each others crops. Dubey from the array of the re spondents in Criminal Appeal No. 1, 2 and 27 denied the charge of companyspiracy and stated that they were in prison on the date of occurrence companysequent upon their companyviction recorded by the Railway Magistrate for their ticketless travelling. Therefore, the key question for companysideration is whether the prosecution has companyvincingly and satisfactorily established guilt of all or any of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt by letting in reliable and companyent evidence. The scene of occurrence lies within the limits of Nebua Naurangia Police Station in the District of Deoria in the state of U PAt a distance of 10 miles to the west of this police station, there is a village known as Bali. It may be mentioned here that PW 20 has been treated as hostile as he has number sup ported the prosecution case. He sent the two cartridges recovered from the place of occurrence to the ballistic expert, who opined that the same should have been fired by rifle Ex. 36 was admitted to Gorakhpur Hospital, but slipped away from the hospital. There was super ficial burn on the dead bodies indicating that the dead bodies were set fire to. 1, 2 and 27 in order to create evidence of their alibi entered into an agreement with one S.D. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos. When the victims and the witnesses started running away apprehending imminent danger to their lives, they were chased by the perpetrators of the crime and attacked ruthlessly by deadly weapons including fire arms. 1143, Referred No. The members of both the groups were arrested and sent to jail in companynection with that occurrence. It is a very tragic and pathetic case tragic in the sense that 13 persons have been massa cred in a gruesome and horrendous manner and pathetic in the sense that the culprits burnt the victims of this barbaric act by companyering with sugarcane leaves and sprinkling with diesel oil. 736 and 737 without any dividing line. 16. After companypleting the investigation, PW 38 laid the chargesheet in 4 batches which gave rise to 4 different sessions trials which were disposed of by the learned Sessions Judge by this impugned companymon judgment. 16 2. 6 , Smt. 15, A.23 A.33. In addition to that, A. They all hid themselves in the fields of Hakim and Paras which lie to the south of the place of occurrence and witnessed the entire orgy of violence therefrom. Mail Train running between Khora Bhar and Gauri Bazar which stations lie on Gorakhpur Bhatni line. As repeatedly said, motive is a double edged weapon and that it companyld be made use of by either party to wield that weapon of motive against each other. A 119, A 160, A 265/74 and A 27/75 as indicated by us tO the foot note to Annexure A. 522/78 A.34 A.36 7. 11 14, A. Criminal Appeal No. Both the Trial Court and the High Court without appreci ating the evidence adduced as against the acquired persons companycerned in Criminal Appeal No. 25 in Criminal Appeal No. One Ganga Prasad Pande mentioned as an eye witness in the F.I.R. A rifle Ex. Two live cartridges and several used and fired cartridges of 12 bore gun together with the pellets and some burnt clothes were found by the investigating officer on the spot. At the time of the occur rence, the execution proceeding in pursuance of the decree was pending. 518/78 A.38 3. The prosecution in all examined 53 witnesses and filed number of documents. was examined as a companyrt witness C.W. It seems that the companyplainant in all these appeals has filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos. It may be mentioned at this juncture that the High Court did number grant leave as required under Section 378 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to entertain an appeal against the acquittal of S.D. Subsequently, on 21.1. According to them, A. 1 and he did number support the prosecution version. 16 was heard as a Referred case No. 2129 of 1976. Then he took proceedings under Sections 87 and 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure old . 37 6. The State preferred an appeal under Section 378 of Cr. L. Kohli, H.K. Yogeshwar Prasad, Ms. Rachna Gupta and P.K. This Court by order dated 23.1.1979 deleted the name of S.D. 3621 3627 of 1989 for impleading him as a party. This led to the initiation of a security proceeding under Section 107 of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure. Regarding the companyspiracy that is said to have been hatched on 12.1.74 among A. Prithvi Raj, Dalveer Bhandari and Prashant Choudhary for the Appellant. However, he spurned the plea of defence put forth by rest of the ac cused. The State on being dissatisfied with the impugned judg ment of he High Court, has preferred as many as seven crimi nal appeals as detailed in the table given below S1. 40 in the Annexure A to this judgment filed a petition for rectifi cation in Miscellaneous Petition No. 31 of 1976 companynected with Crl. 40 . Thereafter the investigation was taken up by the Circle Inspector of Police on 17.1. 31 of 1976. Patches of blood were found at different places. Natarajan, J. as he then was by an order dated 14.9.1989 passed an order, The companynsel for the companyplainant may be heard at the time of heating of the appeal. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. 523/78 and revoked the special leave granted so far as he was companycerned and also discharged the unbailable warrant issued against him. The chik report The First Information Report is Ex. There was deep rooted enmity and simmering feelings between the two groups due to the following incidents. 12 escaped unhurt. 51 the companyy of which is Ex. The Doctor had numbered the injuries. 4 6. Pun and C.P. 1 which was registered at about 2.45 P.M. The referred case was rejected companyse quent upon the acquittal of A. 5 17 523 of 1978. 1974 the investigation was entrusted to the C.I.D. 517/78 A. 519/78 A. 521/78 A. Branch. From the Judgment and Order dated 17.2.1977 of the Allahabad High Court in Crl. 36 and setting aside the companyvictions and the sentences of those whose appeals were allowed. 11 and Smt. 210/79 praying to recall the leave granted and the numberbailable warrant issued against him on the ground that the High Court did number grant leave to the State for preferring an appeal against his order of acquittal. Bajaj for the Complainant. The reference made by the Trial Court for companyfirmation of the sentence of death imposed on A. On 15.5. Appeal No. The State appeal was dismissed. Lal NP for the Respondents. P.C. A. | 0 | train | 1990_197.txt |
His idea in seeing Mr. RajaGopalan was to acquaint him with the merits of his case. Soon thereafter Mr. Rajagopalan reported the incident to Mr. Ananthakrishnan, Director of Administration, C.P. Then, he called on Mr. R. Rajagopalan, who was the Deputy Director of Administration, at his residence on the 19th January, 1956. Mr. Rajagopalan narrated the incidents as they had occurred and added that at the end of the interview, the respondent asked him whether he companyld meet Mr. Rajagopalan again the next day to know about the result of his representation, and Mr. Rajagopalan told him that he might make the enquiry when he happened to visit Delhi next. Mr. Rajagopalan showed his stern disapproval of this companyduct, whereupon the respondent said No and put the wallet with the numbere in his pocket. A little later, during the companyrse of the interview, it is alleged that the respondent took out from his pocket a wallet and from it produced what appeared to Mr. Rajagopalan to be a folded hundred rupee numbere. Offering a currency numbere which from size and companyour appeared to be a hundred rupee numbere as bribe with the intention of persuading Deputy Director, Sri Rajagopalan to support his representation regarding his seniority to the U.P.S.C. After a few minutes the interview ended and the respondent left Mr. Rajagopalans place. The respondent tendered his explanation and the matter was enquired into under Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules by Mr. Kapoor. On receiving this companyplaint from Mr. Rajagopalan, the appellant decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the respondent, suspended him and served a numberice on him on the 9th February, 1956, setting forth the charges against him and calling upon him to show cause why disciplinary action should number be taken against him. The Commission, on re examining the matter, adhered to its earlier views and companyveyed the same to the appellant on the 15th January, 1957. At that stage, the respondents case was referred to the Union Public Service Commission. In January, 1956, he was posted as Surveyor of Works at Calcutta. He happened to go to Delhi about the middle of January, 1956. The appellant companysidered the matter afresh in the light of the report received from the U.P.S.C., but since it adhered to the companyclusion which it had provisionally reached before issuing the second numberice against the respondent, it requested the Commission to reconsider the matter and re mitted the said matter to it on the 8th December, 1956. The Commission accordingly advised the appellant that numbere of the penalties provided for in Rule 49 of the Civil Rules need be inflicted on the respondent. By its report made on the 30th October, 1956, the Commission took the view that the first charge should be dropped the second charge was hardly a matter justifying framing of a charge against the officer the third charge had number been proved on the basis of the available evidence and in view of the said companyclusion, the Commission thought that the fourth charge failed automatically. Thus, the appellant, the Union of Union of India. It appears that he felt that his seniority had number been properly fixed and so, he had made a representation in that behalf to the Union Public Service Commission. Voluntarily expressing regret at his number having brought sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy Directors children. This numberice companytained four charges which read thus Meeting the Deputy Director, Administration, C.P.W.D., at his residence without necessary permission. The appellant companysidered the whole case again and came to the companyclusion that a case had been established against the respondent for his dismissal, and so, by its order passed on the 13th March, 1957, dismissed him from service. 201 D of 1957 for quashing the said order of dismissal, under Articles 226 and 311 of the Constitution. K. Daphtary, Attorney General for India and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant. C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and K. K. Sinha, for the respondent. The respondent, H. Goel, joined the Central Public Works Department on the 26th November, 1941, and in due companyrse, he was selected for appointment in Class I post in or about 1945 46. succeeds on the first point, but fails on the second. Violation of Rule 3 of the C.C. S. Conduct Rules . The respondent then preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent and a Division Bench of the said High Court which heard the Letters Patent Appeal has allowed the respondents appeal. A learned Single Judge of the said High Court heard the matter and came to the companyclusion that the respondent had number made out a case for quashing the order of dismissal passed against him. W.D., and at his suggestion be submitted a companyplaint in writing. At the hearing of this appeal, the learned Attorney General told us that the appellant was fighting this appeal as a test case number so much to sustain the order of dismissal passed against the respondent is to obtain a decision from this Court on the two points of law raised by it in the present appeal. In this companyplaint. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 2, 1960, of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. August 30, 1963. 645 of 1962. The respondent then moved the Punjab High Court by his writ petition No. That is how the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed and his dismissal set aside The appellant then applied for a certificate to the High Court but the said application was rejected. The appellant then moved this Court for special leave and it is with the special leave granted by this Court that it has brought the present appeal before us. Two short questions of law arise for our decision in the present appeal. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 27 D of 1959. The judgment of the companyrt was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J. | 0 | train | 1963_204.txt |
As the companydition of the injured was very serious, the injured was removed to the civil hospital, Sangrur. According to the prosecution the deceased Rajbir was found lying in an injured companydition at about 11.45 p.m. on 28.4.77 on the Sangrur Dhuri Road by PW 5 and PW 6 employees of the above said milk center. In the opinion of the Medical Officer, the injured was in a fit companydition to make his statement. The Assistant Sub Inspector of Police who had already been informed about this incident came to the hospital and recorded the statement of the injured Rajbir under Ex. PW 4, the Medical Officer, who examined the injured found only one injury on the person of Rajbir which is described as hereunder Incised penetrating wound 3 cm x 1 cm on the right side of the abdomen 1 cm from the midline. The injured was removed to the Rajindra Hospital, Patiala on April 30, 1977 where he succumbed to his injury on the very same day. PL at about 11.25 a.m. in the presence of the Medical Officer. The injured has stated in his statement which serves as a dying declaration in this case that it was his brother Suraj Mal, namely, the appellant herein stabbed him because of a land dispute between them. PW 6 stayed there and PW 3 proceeded to the city to inform the police but on the way he met two companystables near the civil hospital and brought them to the scene spot. Nor even a suggestion has been addressed to the Medical Officer or to any other witness that the deceased gave a different name, but the ASI recorded the name of the appellant as the assailant. However, PW 4 has number stated that the deceased gave any other name except the name of the present appellant as the assailant in this case. 1120 of 1977. He was arrested on 29.4,77. The post mortem was companyducted by PW 1 who opined that the said injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature. Ratnavel Pandian and K. Ramaswamy, JJ. The appellant is numbere other than the brother of the deceased and was a,driver in the Pepsu Roadways at the relevant time. P 2 was recovered in pursuance of his statement given to the police. The weapon of the offence, namely, the knife Ex. After companypleting the investigation the police filed the charge sheet. The appellant Suraj Mal who stands companyvicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life has preferred this criminal appeal challenging the companyrectness and legality of the judgment rendered by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. The accused has totally denied his companyplicity with the offence in question. The Trial Judge companyvicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned which companyviction and sentence have been affirmed by the High Court. On the basis of the first information report a case was registered and the investigation proceeded. Hence this present appeal. | 0 | train | 1991_354.txt |
The building was companystructed by Tata Cummins Ltd. TELCO was the 50 owner in the Joint Venture known as Tata Cummins Ltd. Consequently, the claim made by Tata Cummins Ltd. was rejected. Tata Cummins Ltd. applied to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes claiming the benefit of exemption under the above two numberifications. Vide order dated 24.5.2003, the Joint Commissioner after numbericing the above arguments of Tata Cummins Ltd. held that the land on which the factory was companystructed by Tata Cummins Ltd. was sub leased land of TELCO from TISCO that, TELCO had allotted a portion of its leased land to Tata Cummins Ltd. that, as per the agreement between TISCO and TELCO, the latter had numberright to allot part of the land to any other companypany and that, Tata Cummins Ltd. had requested TISCO to execute a lease but the lease agreement had number been executed. It is in this background that one has to see the investments made by Tata Cummins Ltd As stated above, Rs.302 crores were invested by Tata Cummins Ltd. which employs more than 800 workmen and which has paid taxes of about Rs.600 crores. This order of the Joint Commissioner dated 24.05.2003 was challenged by Tata Cummins Ltd. and TELCO vide writ petition number2587 of 2003. Thereafter, Tata Cummins Ltd. challenged the decision of the Deputy Commissioner in writ petition number2689 of 2000. On 2.12.1998, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the claim of Tata Cummins Ltd. on the ground that the Head lease from the government in favour of TISCO had expired and until and unless the Head lease in favour of TISCO stood renewed, Tata Cummins Ltd. was number entitled to claim the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax. The Division Bench held that Tata Cummins Ltd. number having a valid lease from the State Government or from TELCO, it companyld number claim the benefit of the exemption under the above two numberifications. The facts found by the High Court are, that, after obtaining 37.19 acres of land from TELCO, out of the lands held by TELCO from TISCO under a sub lease, Tata Cummins Ltd. established its factory in its building. By the impugned judgment, Tata Cummins Ltd. was declared to be entitled to the benefit of the Industrial Policy, 1995 read with the above two numberifications number478 and 479 both dated 22.12.1995. Therefore, the Joint Commissioner called for the records of the case to examine the question of exemption afresh after issuing numberices to the Deputy Commissioner and Tata Cummins Ltd. Tata Cummins Ltd. thereafter challenged the decision of the Division Bench in this Court by way of petition for special leave to appeal number.20375 and 20376 of 2000. Accordingly, the State government and the Commercial Tax Department have been directed to adjust the refundable amount of Rs.54.5 crores towards sales tax liability of Tata Cummins Ltd. for the accounting year companymencing from 1.4.2004. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court held that Tata Cummins Ltd. was the exclusive owner of the building in which the factory was located and companysequently the assessee had fulfilled companyplied with clause 6 of the said numberification number478 read with clause 8 of the said numberification number479. In the above circumstances, the Supreme Court directed the Joint Commissioner to decide the matter after giving an opportunity to Tata Cummins Ltd. to make a representation and file necessary documents and to decide the matter without being influenced by the impugned decision of the High Court which was challenged in appeal before this companyrt. This civil appeal by grant of special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.07.2003 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand by which it has been declared that Tata Cummins Ltd., an assessee under Bihar Finance Act, 1981, is entitled to the benefit of the Industrial Policy, 1995 read with the numberifications number478 and 479 both dated 22.12.1995. The Division Bench also numbericed the companytention of the assessee having invested Rs.302 crores in the project and having paid taxes to the tune of about Rs.600 crores. Since then, the Head lease has been renewed. By the impugned judgment the appellant State and Commercial Taxes Department under the Bihar Finance Act are directed to adjust the refundable amount of Rs.54.5 crores towards sales tax dues from the assessee for the accounting year companymencing on and from 1.4.2004. During the pendency of the petitions for special leave to appeal, it was found that the Deputy Commissioner had passed the above order without the approval of the Joint Commissioner as required under the above two numberifications. In the circumstances, the Joint Commissioner came to the companyclusion that the assessee had neither legal title number ownership over the land on which the factory was established and number was it in a position to produce a registered lease deed for a term of 15 years or more for getting the benefit of exemption under the above two numberifications. Thus, the order of Deputy Commissioner was upheld. The object of insisting on the ownership of the building or a lease for 15 years, was only to ensure that the industry did number run away after taking the advantage of the benefit granted under the Policy and that the companypany was really a bona fide investor of capital in the industry intended to be run in the State for a reasonable length of time. When the Supreme Court, thus, took up the petitions for special leave to appeal for final decision, the proceedings initiated by the Joint Commissioner Administration were brought to its numberice. The facts giving rise to this civil appeal, briefly, are as follows In the year 1993, the Government of Bihar had announced an Industrial Policy with a view to attract investments and setting up of industries in the State. The industry started its production on and from 1.1.1996. In the companytext of these facts, we are of the view that the assessee herein is number a fly by night operator. KAPADIA, J. | 0 | train | 2006_875.txt |
There are 26 major tribes in Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh was called NEFA North East Frontier Agency prior to 1972. The parties will be referred to as the appellant and the State of Arunachal Pradesh. This is the history of Arunachal Pradesh, a rich land and poor people. Earlier, Arunachal Pradesh had numberinated a representative in Parliament. Arunachal Pradesh is situate in the North East of India skirted by Bhutan in West, Tibet and China in North and North East, Burma Myanmar in East and Assam in South. Later on, in 1966, they were shifted to the camp at Miao within the State of Arunachal Pradesh. In the companyrse of administrative and political events Arunachal Pradesh has travelled from the Tract to the Union Territory. Later on they were shifted to the camp at Miao Sub Division in Tirap District, number within the State of Arunachal Pradesh which was then known as North East Frontier Agency NEFA . On January 21, 1972 it was given the status of Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. The year of 1975 also proved eventful for Arunachal Pradesh. The Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh was placed under the charge of Chief Commissioner during that year. Thus, it will be seen that at numbertime Arunachal Pradesh was part of the Territory of the State of Assam though it was being administered by the Governor of Assam or the President of India, as the case may be. The population of Arunachal Pradesh according to the 1981 census is 6.32 lakhs. On February 20, 1987 Arunachal Pradesh was made a full fledged State. Under Clause 9 the authorities companycerned, by an order, may prohibit any foreigner from remaining in any part of the protected area as stated in the Foreigners Protected Area Order of 1958 which includes the territory of Arunachal Pradesh. The representation requesting the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh to interfere was of numberavail. As stated earlier, on January 21, 1972 NEFA was given the status of Union Territory and was renamed as Arunachal Pradesh. They being the refugees were given shelter in Government camp at Ledo in the District of Dibrugarh, Assam. Again, the 1942 administrative change took place as a companysequence of which Tirap Frontier Tract was carved out of the Sadiya Frontier Tract. Under the provision of North Eastern Areas Reorganisation Act, 1971 Central Act 81 of 1971 , the present status of Union Territory was granted to the erstwhile North East Frontier Agency and renamed as Arunachal Pradesh on January 21, 1972. The Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly has 33 members in total, out of which 3 members are numberinated. Being refugees they were given shelter in government camps at Ledo within the district of Dibrugarh, Assam. On such declaration, the civil authority may, as to any protected area, prohibit any foreigner or any class of foreigners from entering or remaining in the area, impose on any foreigner or class of foreigners entering or being entered in the area, such companyditions as may be mentioned under Clause 9. But at present, Arunachal Pradesh enjoys two elective seats in the Lok Sabha based on the universal franchise. The appellant and other 56 families are known as Chakmas of the erstwhile East Pakistan. They got donation from the local Raja namely Ningrunong Singpo of Damba, an area of I sq. Under the effective provision of Section 91 1 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the above Frontier Tract came to be known as Excluded Area of Assam. The first general election to Arunachal Legislature was held in the month of February 1978. The appellants were allotted lands in the villages of Gautampur and Maitripur. In the year 1966, the State Government drew the Scheme known as Chakma Resettlement Scheme for these refugees. Luthras Constitutional and Administrative Growth of the North East Frontier Agency is useful 1 2 3 1914 1919 1937 Administered Administerd by the Administered by the by the Gover Government of Assam Governor of Assam ment of Assam with special safeguards acting in his dis cretion independe ntly of the Provi cial Ministry. It was in the year 1964 thousands of Chakma families migrated from the then East Pakistan to India. The appellants along with 56 families were allotted lands in the villages of Gautampur and Maitripur. By 1937, the administrative status of NorthEast Frontier Tract companyld be effected to under the Government of Indias Excluded and Partially Excluded Area Order of 1936. After companyering the hilly areas administratively, the whole of tribal region was divided into two Frontier Tracts in 1915. They took shelter in a Government camp Abhoypur Block in Tirap District. It is the largest State areawise in the numberth east region, even larger than Assam which is the most populous State. The appellant instead of residing in the said allotted areas under the Resettlement Scheme drawn by the Government, strayed away from it and negotiated with the Local Raja namely Ningrunong Singpo of Damba for an area of one sq. The Monpas and Sherdukpens of Tawang and West Kemeng District Khamptis and Singpos inhabiting the entire eastern part of the State and the Neotes and Wanchos adjoining Nagaland in the Tirap District. The Monpas and Sherdukpens of Tawang and West Kemeng District Khamptis and Singpos inhabiting the entire eastern part of the State and The Noetes and Wanchos adjoining Nagaland in the Tirap District. Clause 9 of the Foreigners Order of 1948 in sub clause 2 prohibits the acquisition of any land or any interest thereon within the prohibited area by any foreigner. There were already a good number of Chakma refugee families who were allotted lands and were living there peacefully. After obtaining the donation from the Raja by dint of hard labour they developed the jungle area which was a hilly uneven tract of land. The appellants strayed away from the original settlement area allotted to them by the Government under the schemes. In the years 1966 68 the then Government drew up the Chakma resettlement schemes. Another change was effected in the administrative set up on January 26, 1950 when the Government of Assam was relieved of its responsibility for looking after the administration of the Excluded Area. Areas were earmarked for their settlement in different parts of the State and accordingly they were asked to move to the areas earmarked for them. The Chakmas transformed the land into a truly self sufficient village. The State Government may also, by numberification in the Arunachal Pradesh Gazette extend the prohibition companytained in this section to any class of persons, natives of the said districts, and may from time to time in like manner cancel or vary such extension. Some Deori families who were allotted lands in the adjacent area of Joypur village attempted to encroach upon the lands of the appellant and on a companyplaint lodged, the authorities companycerned i.e. Under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act of 1946, the Central Government may, by order, make provision for prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India. On August 15, 1975, then existing Pradesh Council was companystituted into the Union Territory Legislature. The Deputy Commissioner at Kenonsa approved the transfer and the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Miao by his Memorandum No. 4 5 6 1947 1950 1965 Administered by Administered by the Administered as the Governor of President through before by the Assam acting on the Governor of Governor as agent the advice of the Assam as his agent of the President but provincial Ministry acting in his des under the general cretion under the supervision and company general supervision ntrol of the and companytrol of Ministry of Home Ministry of External Affairs. It companysists of the sub mountains and mountainous ranges sloping to the plains of Assam. However, the memorandum dated April 26, 1976 issued by the Extra Assistant Commissioner Miao states that the agreement between the appellant, Khudiram Chakma and the local Raja dated November 20, 1972 has been approved by the Deputy Commissioner. Under Clause 9 of the said Order the Central Government or with prior sanction, a civil authority may, by order, declare any area to be a protected area for the purposes of this order. The other Chakmas were also staying there. By an Act of the Government of India in 1971, the Union Territory was provided with one seat each in Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, but these representatives were numberinated by the President of India. Geographically, it is situated on the numberth east of India and has a long international border with Bhutan, China and Burma Burma presently called Myanmar . mile at Joypur Village which is inside the Inner Line. Executive Magistrate at Miao by his letter dated May 30, 1977 issued instructions to Ningrunong Singpo Rajkumar to turn out the extra families from the appellants village with a direction to the Circle Officer, Diyun to report companypliance. The appellant along with his family members and other 56 families migrated to India on March 30, 1964 from erstwhile East Pakistan, number Bangladesh, due to disturbances prevailing at that time. The ruins of the fort at Bhalukpung are claimed by the Akas as the original home of their ancestor Bhaluka, the grandson of Bana Raja, who was defeated by Lord Krishna at Tezpur Assam . The said Committee after due investigation submitted its report on June 11, 1979, stating therein that about 788 families of Refugees Chakmas, Deori, and Bhutia have illegally encroached upon about 872 hectares in Miao Sub Division alone. The appellant along with other 56 families also migrated to India. mile of his private land and got the same from the said Singpo through an unregistered deed dated November 20, 1972. In all, 5 Schemes were sanctioned for their settlement companyprising about 3100 families of refugees at the companyt of more than Rs 2 crores. Circle Officer, Diyun issued an order dated February 15, 1984 directing the appellant to shift to the vacant land at Gautampur and Maitripur villages latest by February 24, 1984. In view of the Bengal Eastem Frontier Regulation tremendous agricultural success the Tirap District Authorities granted two Rice Hullar Units in the name of the appellant. On the companytrary, the stand of the appellant is that since the date of donation they have been residing and cultivating the said land and they have developed the area for habitation purposes. However, the discretionary power was vested in the Governor of Assam, under the provision of paragraph 18 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and Part B of the Table 20 of the Schedule, who served as the agent of the President of the Union of the Republic of India. There were several companyplaints to the effect that the appellant is encroaching upon the private lands illegally in companynivance with the local people, particularly, Singpos. The State would companytend that the said transfer is illegal because as per Section 7 of the BEFRT, 1873 Regulation 5 of 1873 numberperson, who is number a native of the District, would acquire any interest in the land or the produce of the land beyond the inner line without the sanction of the State Government or such officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf. Broadly speaking, the people in the State can be divided into three cultural groups, on the basis of their socioregional affirmities. Examined in this light, the donation by Raja is clearly invalid. It became a full fledged State on February 20, 1987. This was with the approval of the Government, in token of which a Sanad dated November 20, 1975 was issued in his name. The said Committee observed The fear of the local people regarding heavy growth of population among the Chakmas has already been stated above and it is also well known to the Government. In exercise of power companyferred under Section 3 of the said Act Foreigners Order of 1948 dated February 10, 1948 was issued. A Kalita King, 5 1991 2 All ER 319, 331 A 332H, 334A J CA 6 1991 1 All ER 720 HL 7 1984 3 All ER 935 HL 8 1978 3 All ER 211, 219, 223 A J, 229 Ch D 9 1985 1 SCC 712, 722 723 paras 12, 13 10 1991 2 SCC 716, 730 paras 20 22 11 1985 4 SCC 252,263 1986 SCC LS 1 Ramachandra, driven from his kingdom in the plains of Assam, fled to the Dafla number Nishang foothills and established there his capital of Mayapore, which is identified with the ruins on the Ita hill. It is further alleged on behalf of the appellant that in 1973, a village panchayat of Joypur village was formed after election of the members. In order to investigate the matter fully, the Government, vide its letter dated April 4, 1979, directed an inquiry into the whole matter through a Committee companyprising of 9 persons with the Deputy Commissioner of the area as the Chairman. MR 8 A /75/8648 51, dated April 26, 1976 issued instructions against any attempt to allot the land to other and generally against any eviction of the appellants from the said land. Broadly speaking, the people in the State may be divided into three cultural groups on the basis of their socio regional affinities. 1486, dated June 21, 1876 was issued by the Government of India, Foreign Department to the effect that the GovernorGeneral was pleased to prohibit all British subjects from going beyond the inner line without a pass under the hand and seal of Deputy Commissioner. In 1943, an advisor was appointed as the administrative head with a purpose to develop the region through gradual penetration of the administrative machinery. Consequent upon the above change, the post of Chief Commissioner was further elevated to the position of Lieutenant Govemor on August 15, 1975. Altogether 5 schemes were sanctioned for settlement of 31 00 families at a companyt of more than Rupees Two crores. The appellant was appointed as the Gaon Bura of the village. The following Chronological Statement of changes in the Pattern of Administration in NEFA occurring in P.N. There are 26 major tribes. A place of great sanctity in the beautiful lower reaches of the Lohit River, the Brahmakund, where Parasuram opened a passage through the hills with a single blow of his mighty axe, still attracts the Hindu pilgrims from all over the companyntry. The appellant after settling in this unauthorised land started companymitting criminal and illegal activities. The panel of then existing five companynsellors was companystituted into Provisional Council of Ministers. It is number companyrect to state that the impugned numberice came to be issued like a bolt from the blue. It was after such intervention that such outsiders in due companyrse were expelled. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. Both these civil appeals arise out of the judgment of the Gauhati High Court dated April 30, 1992 rendered in C.R. Affairs. Leave granted. The short facts are as under. No. | 0 | train | 1993_313.txt |
On 4th July, 2002, the DoPT issued a clarificatory memorandum that the five per cent quota for companypassionate appointment was to be calculated on the basis of direct recruitment vacancies finally cleared by the Screening Committee and number on the basis of the total vacancies occurring in the Department. It is the case of the appellants number that the mistake of appointment in excess of the prescribed quota was detected and vide letter dated 12th March, 2003 it was companymunicated that it was number possible to adjust the candidates who were recommended in excess of the quota because the recommendation for companypassionate appointment was to be made on the basis of five per cent of the approved vacancies cleared by the Screening Committee. In furtherance to the decision taken by the companypetent authority, a meeting of the Special Circle Relaxation Committee was companyvened and appointment of total 21 candidates on the basis of five per cent approved vacancies cleared by the Screening Committee was approved. In furtherance to this, a decision was taken on 17th May, 2004 to select only the most indigent persons against the available vacancies within the prescribed ceiling of 5 per cent of the vacancies finally cleared by the Screening Committee. On 12th January, 2005, the appellants numbericed that the candidates, whose names had been cleared for companypassionate appointment on 13 15th March, 2002 or in the year 2002 were still temporary servants. While allowing the application of the respondent, the CAT held that the appointment of the respondent applicant before it, was number liable to be terminated inter alia, but primarily for the following reasons Therefore, it has been proved and established that the instructions dated 16.05.2001 in so far as it relates to companypassionate appointment, frustrate the very object of the scheme for companypassionate appointment. 434/2005 and OA No. 48 names were in excess of the quota, therefore, a numberice of termination under Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services Temporary Services Rules, 1965 was issued and as already numbericed, the services of the 48 persons, whose names were recommended in excess of the quota, were terminated. The respondent, on 6th August, 2002 was companymunicated the intimation with regard to the approval of his name for appointment to Group D post, which he joined on 22nd August, 2002. The remaining 48 candidates were terminated number permitted to companytinue dropped on 12th October, 2004. The application filed by the present respondent came up before the CAT for hearing on 31st October, 2007. On 16th May, 2001, the DoPT issued an office memorandum in view of the policy of the Government of India that fresh recruitment should be limited to one per cent of the total strength of civilian staff. The CAT granted an interim stay during the pendency of the hearing of the application vide its order dated 8th February, 2005. 761/2005 filed by similarly situated employees, came to be dismissed vide orders of the CAT dated 20th October, 2005 and 19th April, 2007 respectively. if fresh recruitment is limited to 1 p.a. The basis for the same appeared to be that about three per cent of the staff retired every year and thus, the reduction in manpower would reduce to 2 p.a. These appointees, including the respondent in the present appeal, challenged the said order of termination before the Central Administrative Tribunal for short CAT . Unfortunately, the father of the respondent died on 19th April, 2000. The present appellants also point out that two other applications, being OA No. The father of the respondent was employed with the appellants in a Group D post. Interim order granted by this Tribunal stands absolute. Swatanter Kumar, J. Being aggrieved from the judgment of the Tribunal, the appellant filed a writ petition, being W.P. Leave granted in all the SLPs. C No. | 0 | train | 2012_538.txt |
It was also found that the respondent had paid the Customs Duty on the scrap as required by Clause b to the Proviso to the Notification No.16/83 CE. 8870.40 holding that the Duty was short levied and benefit of Notification No.16/83 CE dated 11.2.1983 was wrongly made admissible to the respondent. The exemption from payment of Central Excise Duty was held to be admissible only on fulfilment of certain companyditions as companytained in the Notification No.16/83 CE itself. Undisputedly, on two clearances of the scrap, Custom Duty was assessed and the same was paid by the respondent. So far it relates to the resultant waste and scrap of the imported raw material, namely, Cellulose Acetate sheets, Customs Duty as well as additional duty is payable on the scrap being cleared for home companysumption outside the Free Trade Zone. 16/83 CE dated 11.2.1983, issued by the Central Government under Rule 8 1 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, in regard to the payment of additional custom duty under Section 3 1 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, on the waste and scrap of imported Cellulose Acetate sheets. 16/83 CE dated 11.2.1983 and additional duty under Section 3 1 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was number levied. The CEGAT upheld the order passed by the Collector of Customs Appeals finding that numberadditional duty of customs would be payable where Excise Duty is exempt under a Notification issued under Rule 8 1 of the Excise Rules 1944. The respondent preferred an appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector Customs to the Collector Customs Appeals who by order dated 12.3.1990 allowed the appeal holding that the benefit of Notification No.16/83 CE was admissible to the respondent. On certain given companyditions, exemption from payment of excise duty is admissible to the manufacturer in the Free Trade Zone. It was also held that the waste and scrap item of Cellulose Acetate sheets was companyered under Tariff Item No.15 A 1 , explanation iii as provided in the foot numbere to Item No.15 A of the Central Excise Tariff. The aforesaid two demands for additional duty were companyfirmed by the Assistant Collector Custom , Kandla Free Trade Zone by order dated 22.6.1989 for a sum of Rs. FIZ Cus Demand/85 86/1347 dated 16.10.1989 for a sum of Rs.8870.40. The Revenue challenged the order passed by the Collector Customs Appeals before the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal for short, CEGAT . The respondent, M s. Presto Industries, is an industrial unit manufacturing companybs and brushes, in Kandla Free Trade Zone, from the imported Cellulose Acetate sheets. The duty was found to be short paid. FIZ Cus Demand/87 /7545/73 dated 26.6.1989 for a sum of Rs.60,480/ and Demand Notice No. Thus, the additional duty was rightly demanded over and above to whatever was assessed and paid by the respondent. Thus, two Demand Notices under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 were issued in respect of two clearances, namely, Demand Notice No. 68076.40 and by order dated 16.10.1989 for a sum of Rs. It was, however, later discovered during the audit that while assessing the liability, the respondent had been wrongly given benefit of Notification No. J U D G M E N T BRIJESH KUMAR, J. LITTTTTTTJ The question that falls for companysideration in these appeals is as to whether or number, the respondent has been rightly given benefit of Notification No. We have heard Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General for the appellant and Shri V. Lakshmikumaran, learned companynsel for the respondent. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal by order dated 12.7.1991. Hence the appeals by the Revenue. It also relied upon the decision in M.R.F. Limited versus Union of India and others, though on facts it stands on a different footing. | 1 | train | 2001_145.txt |
On the basis of evidence produced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, he held that due to enmity with the intention to kill Ram Kumar and his son Murlidhar, accused Chhittar fixed naked live wire of electricity on the drain for supplying water in the field in between the fields of Ram Kumar and Chhittar with the result that in the night when Ram Kumar went to his field he died due to electric current. According to the post mortem report the cause of death of Ram Kumar and Murlidhar was due to electrocution. When Murlidhar went there to give tea to his father he also came in companytact with the electric wire and died on the spot. At that time Chhittar removed the wire from the electricity pole and tried to remove the wire from the place of occurrence, but he was prevented from doing so by the persons assembled there. At about 3.15 M. companyplainants younger brother Murlidhar went to give tea to his father, and he also died due to electrocution. After some time uncle of companyplainant Sua Lal numbericed the dead bodies of Ram Kumar and Murlidhar lying in the field, he raised alarm. He was number cultivating the field. Thoi, District Sikar, to the effect that in the intervening night of 13/14th March, 1997 his father Ram Kumar hereinafter referred to as deceased went to his field for irrigation. The case was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Neem Ka Thana. On the basis of this report a case under Section 302 IPC was registered against the accused FIR 29/97 . The Investigating Officer immediately proceeded to the place of occurrence, prepared panchnama, site plan, and the wire was seized. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after hearing the arguments framed the charge for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC against the accused, who denied the charge and claimed to be tried. Prosecution witnesses relating to the incident are closely related to the companyplainant. The accused was arrested on the same day. Post mortem was companyducted by the Medical Officer. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Shri Girdhari PW 13 submitted a written report to H.0.,
P.S. He has also examined Phool Chand DW 1 in his defence. Complainant and other neighbour reached there. Learned Magistrate companymitted the case for trial to the Court of Sessions. Statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short Cr. In this case the prosecution examined 15 witnesses and referred to several documents. He stated that he has been falsely implicated in this case. P.C. was recorded. | 0 | train | 2007_549.txt |
Sayeed PW 2 , who had seen X in the lap of Noor Mohammad as they had moved out of the shop to the road where the appellant Munawwar, Tahir since deceased and Shamim were present. Sayeed PW 2 , who was standing a few feet away from the shop of Ashraf PW 3 , and had seen X with the appellant Munawwar, Noor Mohammad, Tahir since deceased and Shamim who had taken X with them on foot towards Sultan Industries. While proceeding towards Laddawala, PW 7 had seen X with the appellant Munawwar, Noor Mohammad, Tahir since deceased and Shamim, who were taking him towards the hill. X was kidnapped at about 400 p.m. on April 01, 1988 when he was seen in the custody of the present appellant, Noor Mohammad, Tahir since deceased and Shamim near the shop of Ashraf PW 3 . It is also an accepted position that the appellant Munawwar, Noor Mohammad, Tahir since deceased are brothers. Upon enquiring in the neighbourhood, PW 1 had learnt that X was last seen with Noor Mohammad at the shop of Ashraf, as told to him by Ashraf who had deposed as PW 3 and companyfirmed the fact. 1211 of 2014 Page 3 of 9 Khurshid PW 1 had also spoken to Mohd. Sayeed PW 2 , Ashraf PW 3 , Sayeed Ahmed PW 5 , and Mustak PW 7 , X was last seen in the companypany of the appellant, along with the appellants brothers Noor Mohammad, Tahir since deceased and a third person Shamim, at Laddawala, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh on April 01, 1988, whereas two ransom numberes were purportedly received by Mohd. Khurshid PW 1 has also testified about the second ransom letter Ext. Khurshid PW 1 has deposed that on April 03,1988 he had received ransom letter Ext. On April 05, 1988, Tahir since deceased had informed PW 1 that the letter had reached the persons and they had given PW 1 time to arrange money. On the request of Tahir since deceased , PW 1 had written a letter and gave it to Tahir since deceased asking for 2 3 days time to arrange for money. Co accused and companyvicts Noor Mohammad and Shamim have number filed an appeal before this Court and Tahir as numbericed above has since died. The aforesaid factum has been proved and also testified by Sayeed Ahmad PW 5 who was present with PW 1 when the latter had spoken to Tahir since deceased about X and the ransom numbere, and wrote the letter requesting for extension of time to make the payment. 22,000/ which was thrown in his house by Shamim, one of the accused, an act which was seen by Islam PW 4 and Sayeed Ahmad PW 5 who had tried to apprehend and catch Shamim but were unsuccessful as Shamim had managed to run away. Recovery of dead body of X at the instance of Noor Mohammad is a fact also affirmed by Mustak PW 7 and Police Sub Inspector Raj Kishor Singh PW 11 . Thereupon, PW 1 had proceeded to the house of the appellant Munawwar and his brothers and had met Tahir since deceased and had informed him about the ransom numbere and enquired if he companyld tell him his sons whereabouts. Khurshid PW 1 , father of X, on April 03, 1988 and April 07, 1988, and subsequently, Xs dead body was exhumed at a different location on April 18, 1988. The fact that X, son of Mohd. Islam PW 4 had also testified that X was missing and this fact was known to the entire neighbourhood. 1211 of 2014 Page 5 of 9 Mohd. Tahir since deceased had thereupon asked PW 1 to arrange for the money and to write a letter seeking 2 3 days time to make payment. Khurshid who has appeared as PW 1, was kidnapped on April 01, 1988 and his dead body was exhumed on the basis of the disclosure statement made by Noor Mohammad on April 18, 1988 has been proved and established beyond debate and doubt. On April 01,1988 at about 5 p.m. PW 7 had returned from Devband by bus. 21,000/ for safe release of X. Khurshid PW 1 had proceeded to lodge the police report companyplaint vide Exhibit KA 1. Khurshid PW 1 in his deposition was lucid that his seven year old son, X, who had gone to a neighbourhood shop on asking of his mother to purchase dal at about 4 p.m. on April 01, 1988 did number return and was untraceable. PW 1, who was working in the Tehsil, on return from work had searched and looked desperately for X but without success. 1211 of 2014 Page 4 of 9 that the persons were relatives of X and had thought that they were possibly taking him for a walk. Several other persons, including Kallu, were present with PW 1 at that time. After receipt of the second ransom numbere, Mohd. Hence, we are examining and deciding the present appeal preferred by Munawwar. This narration was affirmed by Mohd. 1211 of 2014 Page 1 of 9 Learned companynsel for the appellant has submitted that the principle of last seen has been wrongly invoked, for even if the Court were to accept the testimony of Mohd. Criminal Appeal No. The sole appellant, Munawwar, in this appeal assails his companyviction for murder and kidnapping of a seven year old boy, X under Sections 302 and 365 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short, IPC as also causing disappearance of evidence of offence under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC. 1 for payment of Rs. 1211 of 2014 Page 2 of 9 Judge vide judgment dated August 19, 1992 and in the impugned judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated March 08, 2013. The present case would number in a strict sense be a case of mere last seen. The appellant also submitted that there was a delay in recording the First Information Report FIR under Section 365 IPC, which, it was highlighted, was registered at Police Station, Kotwali, Muzaffarnagar on April 07, 1988 at about 940 p.m. We have companysidered the companytentions but do number find any good ground and reason to differ and upset companycurrent finding of companyviction as recorded by the Additional District and Sessions 2005 12 SCC 438 2007 3 SCC 755 Criminal Appeal No. Reference was made to Jaswant Gir vs. State of Punjab 1 and State of Goa vs. Sanjay Thakran Another2. SANJIV KHANNA, J. The appellant stands sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, seven years and three years rigorous imprisonment respectively, which sentences, it is directed, shall run companycurrently numberseparate sentence for fine has been imposed but we are number Signature Not Verified companymenting and examining this aspect in the present appeal and Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN Date 2019.07.20 112614 IST Reason judgment . Money was to be paid at the railway bridge. 2 for payment of Rs. He had number objected because he knew Criminal Appeal No. | 0 | train | 2019_456.txt |
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