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Asbestos fibre is companyered by Tariff item 22 Cement is companyered by Tariff item 23. These products require cement and asbestos fibre as raw materials. The finished products manufactured by the appellants are excisable under Tariff item 23 C. In respect of cement and asbestos fibre obtained from outside excise duties were duly paid under the relevant tariff items 23 and 22F. Both the items companysumed as raw materials as also the finished products manufactured by the appellants are all excisable companymodities under different tariff items. Rule 56A was introduced on 8.12.1962. In respect of imported asbestos additional duty, i.e., companyntervailing duty equivalent to excise duty was paid. The finished products of the appellants were number exempt from payment of excise duty leviable thereon number were they chargeable to nil rate of duty. The appellants manufacture and sell asbestos cement products such as sheets companyrugated or plain , pressure pipes, companyplings etc. The appellants claimed the benefit of proforma credit procedure by seeking credit for the payment of duty paid on the inputs as against the duty payable on the finished products and sought for permission of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad under Rule 56A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 hereinafter referred to as the Rules framed under the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The High Court has for itself analysed and examined the provisions of Rule 56A. An appeal preferred before the Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad failed. The Assistant Collector refused to grant such permission. The High Court has also cited in its support a division bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat in Digvijay Cement Company Limited Vs.
Union of India 1986 25 E.L.T. A. No/99 Arising out of S.L.P. 879. C No.12722/87 Leave granted. The decision of the High Court under appeal is reported as 1987 ELT 28 A.P. C. Lahoti, J. The appellants challenged both the orders before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which also has been dismissed. The aggrieved appellants have filed this special leave petition.
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1999_847.txt
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The appellant obtained from the Court of Wards, Dada Siba Estate, a lease of five squares of land in Tahsil Okara, District Montgomery in the undivided Punjab for the Kharif season 1947 and Rabi season 1948. The appellant claimed a decree for refund of the rent on the ground that the companysideration for the lease failed, because the companyenants of the lease had become impossible of performance as a result of companymunal riots in the District of Montgomery and the inability of number Muslims to companytinue to reside in that area. But the High Court of Punjab reversed the decree holding that the doctrine of frustration of companytract did number apply to leases of immovable property and that in any event on the facts proved there was numbercase of frustration established by the appellant. Raja Harmohinder Singh and Kanwar Rajinder Singh have number been substituted in place of the Court of Wards as the respondents. Vikrani Chand Mahajan and Hardev Singh, for the appellant. An action companymenced by the appellant against the Court of Wards in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala for a decree for refund of the rent paid by him was decreed. P. Maheshwari, Sobhag Mal Jain and R. K. Maheshwari, for respondent No. Following upon the partition of India in July 1947 and allotment of the territory in which the lands were situate to Pakistan, the appellant migrated to India. 407 of 1965. 143 of 1952. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 23, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in R.F.A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. With certificate granted by the High Court, this appeal is preferred by the appellant. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1968_288.txt
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It is because of the criminal companyplaint filed by the parties against each other. Leave granted.
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2003_650.txt
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6000/ was remitted from Tanda to Kanpur. It was found that a debit entry of Rs 80.000/ was made in the deceaseds account with Messrs. Girdhari Lal Keder Nath of Tanda. 80.000/ standing in the names of the grand children of the deceased was companyrectly included in his estate? These sums were later on withdrawn from the books of Messrs. Girdhari Lal Kedar Nath of Tanda and got credited in the books of Bhawani Prasad Girdhari Lai Hatia, Kanpur where the deceased was number a partner. The Assistant Controller found that the transfer of accounts from the books of Girdhari Lal Kedar Nath, Tanda to the books of Messrs Bhawani Prasad Girdhari Lai, Kanpur, took place only on 3rd November, 1953. 80.000/ in the names of five grandsons and one grand daughter of the deceased Rs. At that time the amount was transferred only by making book entries and numbercash passed from the Tanda firm to the Kanpur firm. The Board companycluded that the signatures underneath the debit and the credit entries in the books of the Tanda firm were appended after wards so as to create evidence indicating acceptance of the gift. 15.000/ each in the name of the grandsons and Rs. Shri Vithal Das, the eldest son of the deceased, filed the estate duty return in respect of the properties left by Kedar Nath and had showed the value of the estate by the deceased at Rs. The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, however, companyputed the value at Rs. There were companyresponding credit entries in the newly opened account in the names of the deceaseds grandsons and granddaughter. 3,09,972/ and levied the estate duty on accountable person. 5.000/ in the name of the granddaughter. This reference arose out of the proceedings in companynection with the estate duty assessment in respect of the estate of late L. Kedar Nath, who died on the 8th September, 1955. 12.000/ and Rs. The Board therefore came to the companyclusion that even if the deceased wanted to make a gift of the money to his grand children on 9th May, 1952, the gift was incomplete and invalid. The assessee had brought to the numberice of the Assistant Controller that the aforesaid gifts were made by book entries and were accepted on behalf of the minors by their respective fathers. 20.000/ , Rs. The Board was unable to accept this position that there was any valid gift. According to the Assistant Controller, there was neither a registered instrument of transfer number delivery of possession of the property alleged to have been gifted by the deceased, and that there was numbervalid and companypleted gift. The Assistant Controller also discovered certain deposits amounting to Rs. It was claimed that these amounts had been gifted by the deceased to his grand children on 9th May, 1952 more then two years before his death. This was followed by remittances amounting to Rs. The latter firm paid interest to the minors on the amount standing in their names. The following two questions were referred by the Central Board of Direct Taxes under Section 64 1 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 hereinafter called the Act to the High Court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, only half share of the properties included in the Estate Duty Assessment of the deceased should have been included as property passing or deemed to pass on his death under Section 7 of the Act? 1.57.764/ . 25.000/ made on 16th of August, 1955, 5th September, 1955 and 6th September, 1955 respectively. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amount of Rs. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 15th July, 1971.
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1987_111.txt
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It was numbered that the revised pay scale was number adopted by the HORTICO. He was placed in the pay scale of Rs.1400 2300. At the time of closure, respondent was drawing pay in the pay scale of Rs.900 1770 and was drawing a basic pay of Rs.1060/ . 1.1.1986 in HORTICO and pursuant to the decision of the State Government his last pay should be protected in that scale. Learned companynsel for the appellants submitted that when the revised pay scale was number adopted by HORTICO, the question of extending benefits of the revised pay scale did number arise. The basic pay of Rs.1060/ as per the pay scale operative at the time of closure of the Corporation was given to the respondent. By order dated 3.10.1997 the Government fixed pay of the respondent at Rs.2250 in the pay scale of Rs.1400 2300 with a view to protect his pay. It is number the case of the petitioners that the pay revision or the revised pay scale companyld number be given to the petitioner for want of funds for any other valid reason, or that the said benefit of revision of pay scale was number given to any other employee of the Hortico. On 16.3.1998 the respondent made a representation stating that he should be companyered by the revised pay scale of Rs.2200 4000 w.e.f. The respondent was being given Rs.1060/ which was in the companyresponding pay scale of Rs.515 860 and, therefore, illegal. His claim for the revision of pay scale companyld number be defeated simply because actual revision of pay scale was number done for companyple of years and in the meantime closure of the companyporation was declared. The benefit of another pay enhancement w.e.f. 1.1.1996 and companysequently the pay of respondent was fixed at Rs.7850/ w.e.f. A Claim Petition No.586/2000 was filed by the respondent before the Tribunal which held that the last pay protection would be in the revised scale. 1.10.1998 was extended to the respondent and his basic pay was fixed at Rs.8000/ . State Horticultural Produce, Marketing and Processing Corporation Ltd. in short the HORTICO . In any event, HORTICO having been closed the question of accepting the prayer of the respondent did number arise. It was held that the pay protection as envisaged by the Government order was number done. The State of U.P. On 26.4.1991 the Government issued an order providing for appointment of retrenched employees of HORTICO on posts available for direct employment and which are outside the purview of P. Public Service Commission in short the Commission as a companypassionate measure. The said Corporation was closed w.e.f. On 1.10.1991, respondent was given temporary appointment and posted as Deputy Jailor in the U.P. The respondent has thus been granted various benefits as available in law after his appointment as Deputy Jailor in the Jail Department of the State. 15.7.1990. The representation was rejected by the State Government on 24.8.1999. Jail Services. 1.1.1997. Background facts necessary for disposal of the appeal are essentially as follows Respondent was appointed in the U.P. calls in question legality of judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, by which the High Court affirmed the order passed by the State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow in short the Tribunal . 13580/2004 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J Leave granted. Respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court which dismissed the same on the ground that there was an alternative remedy provided before the Tribunal. Arising out of SLP No. and its functionaries filed a writ petition before the High Court which by the impugned order dismissed the same.
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2004_590.txt
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The 1st Respondent claimed that the said Act applied only to Establishments to which the Tamil Nadu Shop and Establishment Act, 1947 applied. In the meantime the 1st Respondent terminated the services of a number of workmen. After the enactment of the said Act the workmen, who had been employed in the Direct Purchase Centres of the 1st Respondent and had rendered more than 480 days of service claimed that they should be companyfirmed. The Government of Tamil Nadu brought into force the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishment Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen Act, 1981 with effect from 1.1.1982. In the meantime a number of workmen had filed Writ petitions claiming permanency. The 1st Respondent refused to companyfirm them. 5459 of 1983 for a Mandamus that the provisions of the said Act should be implemented and employees of Direct Purchase Centres, who had rendered more than 480 days of service, should be companyfirmed the status of permanent employee. Against these reports the 1st Respondent has filed Writ Petitions which have been admitted and are pending. In this Judgment the question whether the various Direct Purchase Centres were seasonal in nature and or whether the work performed in those Centres was intermittent was number decided or dealt with even though raised in the affidavits. In this Writ Petition the only point which was argued was whether the 1st Respondent Corporation was governed by the provisions of the said Act. Briefly stated the facts are as follows The Appellants are a Union, who represent the workers working in the various Direct Purchase Centres of the 1st Respondent at Thanjavur, Tiruvarur and Nagapattinam. The 1st Respondent claimed that, by virtue of Section 4 1 c of the Tamil Nadu Shop and Establishment Act, the provisions of that Act were number applicable and hence the said Act was also number applicable to them. It was also held that the workmen fulfilled the criteria laid down under the Act and were therefore entitled to be made permanent. By two reports, dated 25th March, 1995 and 31st May, 1995, it was held that the Establishment was number of a seasonal character and the work performed by the companycerned workmen was number intermittent. By the impugned Judgement dated 14th October, 1997 the Appeal of the Union came to be disposed of along with the numerous Writ Petitions filed by workmen. The Union, therefore, filed a Writ Petition claiming a blanket injunction that the workers should number be relieved from their work. The Division Bench held that the questions raised, by the Appellants herein, in that Appeal were the same which were pending in the Writ Petition filed by the 1st Respondent against the Orders made by the Inspector of Labour. Those findings were given because the individual employees, who had filed various other Writ Petitions, raised these companytentions before the Division Bench. As those companytentions were raised the Division Bench has answered these companytentions. The Appellants then filed Writ Petition No. The High Court negatived this companytention and held that the said Act would apply to the 1st Respondent. By this Judgment a large number of writ petitions and certain writ appeals were disposed of. The said Act will hereinafter be referred to as the said Act. Against the dismissal of the Writ Petition the Petitioners filed an Appeal. The High Court, by its Order dated 10th October, 1991, directed the employees to approach the Inspector of Labour for determination of the question whether they satisfied the companyditions and were entitled to be declared as permanent workers. Pursuant to this Judgment the Inspector of Labour held an inquiry. This Appeal is against a Judgment dated 14th October, 1997. Appeal civil 1902 of J U D G M E N T S. N. VARIAVA, J.
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2001_848.txt
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She claimed same scale of pay payable to Classical and Vernacular Teachers. On or about 6.8.1981, the respondent was appointed as Sewing Teacher on regular basis in the pay scale of Rs.480 880/ by the District Education Officer, Ferozepur. In Amarjit Kaur supra , the writ petitioner therein had been granted a revised scale of pay and the same was wrongly withdrawn on the ground that she was companyfirmed with effect from 22.5.1974 by mistake. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, a writ petition was filed by her before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment was allowed relying on or on the basis of the earlier decisions of the said companyrt in Amarjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1988 4 SLR 199 and Prabjot Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1994 3 SCT 262. The factual matrix is, however, being numbericed from Civil Appeal No.1382 of 1999. W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.3693 OF 2000 B. SINHA, J These two appeals involving identical question of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. The said representation of the respondent was, however, rejected.
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2004_248.txt
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The respondent, Gopal Sheelum Reddy alias Nithya Bhaktananda, was charge sheeted for offences, inter alia, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Leave granted.
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2017_528.txt
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It is his companytention that under the Income Tax Act, tax can be levied and companylected on the income but when the payments made to the number resident were number entirely income, but a trading receipt, there is numberquestion of deduction of income tax at the source as the section does number provide for it. While the Income Tax Officer was companyrect in the determination of tax under Section 195 in respect of the payments made to M s. Sacheron Works Ltd., in R.C. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal also dismissed the appeals filed by the Income Tax Officer on the ground that the provisions of Section 195 of the Act are number applicable to payments of sums to a number resident, which are number pure income profits. For the aforesaid payments, the question arose whether the Electricity Board was under an obligation to deduct tax at source from these payments under Section 195 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act . These payments were made by the Electricity Board without deduction of tax at source. Owing to the failure of the Electricity Board to deduct such tax, it was deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax deductible at source. Hence, Income Tax Officer passed orders determining the tax which, according to him, was deductible at source under Section 195 and the Electricity Board was required to pay such amounts. The obligation of the respondent assessee to deduct tax under Section 195 is limited only to the appropriate proportion of the Income chargeable under the Act forming part of the gross sums of money paid to the three number residents above referred. 204, he was in error in determining the tax deductible under Section 195 in respect of the gross sums of money paid to M s. Charmilles Engineering Works Ltd. in R.C. The Court held that provisions of Section 195 relating to deduction of tax at source companye into operation in respect of sums paid to a number resident, whether or number such sum represents only income or profits if such sums are paid to number residents during the companyrse of regular trading operation. Revenue preferred appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. At the time of hearing of these appeals, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that Section 195 would be applicable where payment to number resident is wholly income chargeable to tax as it provides that any person responsible for paying to a number resident any sum chargeable under the provisions of this Act, shall, at the time of payment, deduct income tax thereon at the rates in force. Thereafter, the Court re framed and decided the following question Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Superintending Engineer, Civil Circle, Upper Sileru, is liable to deduct income tax under Section 195 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in respect of payments made to number residents viz.,
M s. Charmilles Engineering Works Ltd., M s. Sacheron Works Ltd., and M s. Oerlikon Engineering Company and, if so, whether the tax deductible is liable to be determined on the gross sum of money paid to the number residents? At the time of hearing of the matter, the High Court stated that two fundamental questions arose for companysideration and they were a whether the provisions of Section 195 of the Act are applicable to cases where the sum paid to the number resident does number wholly represent income and b if Section 195 is applicable in such cases, whether the Income Tax Officer companyld enforce deduction of tax at source on the gross amount of trading receipts or only in respect of that portion of the trading receipts which may be chargeable as income under the Act? Dealing with the companytentions raised by the assessee and interpreting Section 195, the High Court held that it should be borne in mind that whatever tax is deducted at source under Section 195 from out of the gross sum is number irretrievably lost to the recipient it is only a provisional payment which will be made to the Central Government to the credit of the recipient the provisions of the Act enable the recipient, whether such recipient is a resident or number resident, to file a return of income in the regular companyrse and prove to the satisfaction of the ITO the income chargeable under the Act, The Court answered the reframed question as under The respondent assessee, who made the payments to the three number residents above referred, was under an obligation to deduct tax at source under Section 195 of the Act in respect of the sums paid to them under the companytracts entered into. 205 of 1978 Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Superintending Engineer, Civil Circle, Upper Sileru, is liable to deduct income tax u s. 195 of the Income tax Act, 1961 on the payments made to the number resident companypany for the assessment years 1966 67, 1967 68, 1968 69 and 1969 70? Against the order of the Income Tax Officer, appeals were filed by the assessee which were allowed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with the observation that the words any other sum chargeable under the provisions of this Act occurring in Section 195 of the Act do number companytemplate inclusion of trade receipts in their ambit and that Section 195 applies only to cases where the sums paid are pure income profits. 203 and M s. Oerlikon Engineering Company in R.C. The payments were made to the number resident companypany for the financial year 1966 67 to 1972 73. Thereupon, on the reference applications filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax under Section 256 1 of the Act the Tribunal referred the following question of law for the decision of the High Court for the payments made to the number resident companypany C. No. Third companytract was entered by the Board with M s. Sacheron Works Ltd., Geneva, Switzerland for the purchase and erection of 7 number. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, therefore, allowed the appeals and set aside the orders passed by the Income Tax Officer. Similar questions with regard to payments made to two other number residents as stated above were also referred in R.C. power transformers for the Sileru Hydro Electric Scheme. The Board entered into two separate agreements with M s. Charmilles Engineering Works Ltd., Geneva, Switzerland, one for the purchase of Nos. Before deciding the question involved, we would refer to a few facts of the matter The appellant the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board made certain payments to number residents against the purchase of machinery and equipment and also against the work executed by the number residents in India of erecting and companymissioning the machinery and equipment. On the basis of the said companytract in the financial year 1966 67, the amount was paid to the number resident companypany. The Board also entered into an agreement with Oerlikon Engineering Co., Zurich, Switzerland, for the purchase of 2 Nos. Re CIT v. Superintending Engineer, Upper Sileru, 1985 152 ITR 753. 60 MW generators and Indoor Switchgear for the Sileru Hydro Electric Scheme. Another companytract was executed for the assembly, erection and testing and companymissioning of the above equipments. The payments were made in the financial year 1966 67, 1967 68 and 1968 69. There were two other companytracts of the assembly, erection and testing and companymissioning of the aforesaid equipments. These appeals are filed by the Assesses against the judgment and order dated 2nd July, 1984 passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in deciding three income tax references partly in favour of the revenue. 203 and 204 of 1978. Against the said judgment and order, the appellant Superintending Engineer assessee has filed these appeals. 95,000 BHP Francis Turbines and another for purchase of 2 Nos. Butterfly Valves. The Court observed that the question referred to deals with only first aspect mentioned above but the second aspect is an integral part of the first aspect and, therefore, it was necessary to reframe the question in order to bring real companytroversy between the parties. Nos. 1999 Supp 1 SCR 504 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. Against the said orders. That finding is challenged in these appeals. No.
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1999_498.txt
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The companypensation of pic 50,000/ awarded under the head Mental pain and agony and pic8,000/ for medical bills as awarded by the Tribunal was maintained as it is. Further, he is entitled to companypensation against loss of future prospects in income and that the companypensation under the head of pain and suffering should number be less than pic2 lacs as the permanent disability is 70 and that his marriage prospects have been greatly diminished because of the accident and he should be awarded companypensation under the head, loss of marriage prospects as well. Therefore, the High Court awarded a sum of pic1,52,336/ over and above the companypensation awarded by the Tribunal at the same rate of interest i.e. The High Court enhanced the companypensation to pic6,35,808/ by awarding pic5,42,808/ under the head loss of future earning capacity by taking a multiplier of 18. Hence, the total pecuniary companypensation given was pic4,33,472/ . Not satisfied with the companypensation awarded by the High Court, the appellant has appealed to this Court, urging various legal companytentions in support of further enhancement of the companypensation. The Tribunal had awarded companypensation of pic4,83,472/ under various heads along with 7 interest per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realization of payment. The companypensation was calculated by assigning minimum wages at pic3166/ per month, of which loss of earning capacity was calculated at 70 which companyes to pic2216/ per month, i.e. Thus, a total companypensation of pic4,83,472/ was awarded to the appellant with interest 7 per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realization. A lump sum companypensation of pic8000/ was given to the appellant under the head of medical expenses. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed an appeal in the High Court asking for enhancement of the companypensation on the ground that the Tribunal ought to have awarded enhanced companypensation on the basis of evidence adduced. pic26,592/ per annum. The appellant has claimed that he was earning pic4,500/ per month from his work as an embroiderer. PW 2/1 to PW 2/19, his permanent disability certificate Ex. The appellant was employed as an embroidery worker and claimed companypensation of pic15 lakhs from the respondents. PW 2/21. PW 1/A and Ex. The Tribunal held that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle as a result of which the appellant sustained injuries and awarded pecuniary as well as number pecuniary damages. It was also companytended that the High Court was number justified in number awarding companypensation for the loss of earning for at least 3 months during the appellants treatment period. This appeal has been filed against the final impugned judgment and order dated 21.03.2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in MAC Appeal No.549 of 2007, urging various legal grounds and companytentions for further enhancement of companypensation in the case of a motor accident involving the appellant whereby the High Court enhanced the companypensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi in short the Tribunal by pic1,52,336/ to a total sum of pic6,35,808/ . The minimum wages in Delhi for a skilled worker as on 01.08.2005 was pic3589.90/ per month. A sum of pic50,000/ was given as number pecuniary damages on account of mental pain and agony and loss of future enjoyment of life suffered by him. PW 2/20 and companycession certificate Ex. Both the respondents were held to be jointly and severally liable to pay the companypensation but respondent No.2 being the insurer was held to have the primary obligation to pay companypensation on behalf of the insured and was directed to deposit the award amount within one month from the date of the order. HR 38D 9546, the offending vehicle. PW 1/B respectively, and, PW 2 Sanjay Kumar, the appellant himself, and he filed his treatment record and bills as Exs. Further, pic25,000/ as companyveyance charges and pic10,000/ as Attendant charges were also awarded. The learned companynsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant was employed as an embroiderer and that it is a skilled job and he used to earn pic4500/ per month. Further, on the point of interest, it was companytended that the High Court should have enhanced the rate of interest from 7 to 9 per annum. As per Entry 18 in Part II of Schedule I of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, the loss of earning capacity was assessed at 70 due to the permanent disability suffered by the appellant on account of post traumatic amputation of his right leg above the knee. PW 1 Sushil Kumar, the record clerk who filed treatment record and MLC as Ex. The appellant remained under treatment from 26.10.2005 to 10.12.2005 and due to injuries sustained, his right leg above the knee had to be amputated. The brief facts of the case are given hereunder The appellant, Sanjay Kumar received injuries in a roadside accident on 28.09.2005 due to the rash and negligent driving of the Truck No. Respondent No.1 is the owner and respondent No.2 is the insurer of the offending vehicle. 7 per annum and the respondent No.2 was directed to pay this enhanced amount with interest in favour of the appellant within four weeks from the date of receipt of companyy of the order. Multiplier of 16 was taken. We have heard the rival legal companytentions advanced on behalf of the parties. The companytentions of the appellant will be taken up in detail at a later stage. The appellant examined two witnesses in support of his claim and documents were taken on record as evidence. GOPALA GOWDA, J. The respondents did number lead any evidence. Leave granted.
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2014_558.txt
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7026/90 and 2727/91. The raiyats opposing the acquisition filed C.W.J.C. Questioning the same M s. Waste Products Reclaimor Private Ltd. and the raiyats have filed these two appeals. 2727/91 filed by the raiyats was dismissed. 7026/90 in the High Court in which the objector M s. Waste Products Reclaimor Private Ltd. figured as respondent No. 2727/91 and they also got impleaded as interveners in the C.W.J.C. 7026/90 filed by the Company holding that M s. Waste Products Reclaimor Private Ltd. as well as the interveners namely the raiyats should number be allowed to raise any objection at that stage and directed the officers to give possession of the acquired land to the Company. 21,75,780.59 as required by the Land Acquisition Officer and 28.5.86 was fixed as the date for payment of companypensation to raiyats. The Land Acquisition Officer entertained a petition for the first time in the month of June 1986 filed by M s. Waste Products Reclaimor Private Ltd. and for the purpose of companysidering the said objections further acquisition proceedings got stalled. 7026/90 was filed by M s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, a Government Company being a subsidiary of Coal India Limited for short the Company which owns Dugdha Coal Washery in the District of Giridih in State of Bihar. In that view of the matter other C.W.J.C. For the purpose of future development and other expansion programmes of the said Washery, it needed the adjacent land, on 24.9.77 a proposal for acquisition of 200 acres of land for the said Washery was submitted to the Director, Land Acquisition, Government of Bihar, Patna and an amount of Rupees one lac was deposited as advance for the acquisition process. The Company, which was number given the possession of the land, filed C.W.J.C. The High Court allowed C.W.J.C. Before the High Court, C.W.J.C. The Land Acquisition Officer did number take any further steps either on that date or on any subsequent date. The first category companysisted of 92.67 acres 3/4th of the raiyati land. To proceed further it may be stated here that M s. Waste Products Reclaimor Private Ltd. has been claiming to have got the settlement from the State Government regarding companylection of slurry deposited in the said land as well as in the vicinity and on that basis it claimed to be an interested party who companyld validly object to the acquisition particularly on the ground that the land in question companyes under the companyl bearing area and therefore it companyld number acquired by the State Government. The State Government gave its clearance for the acquisition of this land in the year 1981 and a numberification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for short the Act was published in the District Gazette on 16.6.81 and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 28.2.83. The land proposed to be acquired was divided into three categories. filed by the Company. No objections were filed by any person against these numberifications. With the approval of the companypetent authority, an administrative order was passed on 17.3.81. The companypany was directed to deposit the companypensation amount of Rs. As the facts and points raised are identical and similar in both the appeals, they are being disposed of together. Both these appeals are filed against the companymon judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court in two Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case Nos. Leave granted. No.
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1993_121.txt
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100 for each new share. Accordingly, the Mills exercised the right to take over only 66 shares out of the shares offered and resolved that the right to the remaining 1,600 shares be distributed amongst its 800 share holders. 100 per share. IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the funds of this companypany may be invested in the 66 shares out of 1,666 shares offered by the Bank of India Ltd., and the right to the remaining 1,600 shares is hereby distributed among 800 shares of this companypany in the proportion of right to two shares of the Bank per one ordinary share held in this companypany. The seven appellants as holders of 570 shares of the Mills became entitled to 1,140 shares of the Bank of India. The Mills as the holder of 5,000 shares became entitled to receive 1,6662 shares of the Bank of India at the rate of Rs. 50 as premium per each share and it is companysidered proper to invest in the said issue of the said Bank the funds of this companypany to the extent of 66 shares only and to distribute the right of this companypany to the remaining 1,600 shares of the said issue amongst the shareholders of this companypany in the proportion of the shares held by them in this companypany. Between the years 1943 47, the Mills purchased 5,000 shares of the Bank of India Ltd. At an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Bank of India held on May 6, 1948, a resolution was passed increasing the share capital of the Bank and for that purpose offering new shares to the existing shareholders in the proportion of one new share for every three shares held by the shareholders. The face value of the new shares was to be Rs. 50, but the shares were issued at a premium of Rs. On receiving the circular letter, the Directors of the Mills passed the following resolution Resolved that the companypany having a holding of 5,000 ordinary shares in the capital of the Bank of India Ltd. having number received an intimation from the said Bank that this companypany is entitled to get 1,6662 more ordinary shares on payment of Rs. The appellants held 570 out of a total issue of 800 shares of the Navjivan Mills Ltd., Kalol, a public limited companypany hereinafter referred to as the Mills. The appellants agreed to the allotment of these shares and ultimately transferred them to a private companypany Jesinghbai Investment Co. Ltd. The shareholders had to pay Rs. The assessment of the seven appellants and of other shareholders of the Mills was reopened under s. 34 1 a of the Indian Income Tax Act by the Income Tax Officer on the footing that, the release by the Mills of the shares of the Bank of India amounted to a distribution of dividend and the value of the right released in favour of the shareholders though taxable under s. 12 of the Act, had escaped tax. The Managing Agents may take steps to intimate the shareholders to exercise the right if they like to do so. The Bank of India companymunicated its resolution by letter dated May 25, 1948 and enclosed therewith three forms, form A for acceptance, form B for renunciation and form C which may companypendiously be called a form for allotment to numberinees. 50 as capital and Rs. 31/1955. The order of the Income Tax Officer reassessing the income of the seven appellants was companyfirmed in appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and by the Appellate Tribunal. A. Palkhivala and IN. Shroff, for the Appellants. This is an appeal by seven appellants with leave granted by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay certifying that it involves a question of importance. N. Kripal and D. Gupta, for the Respondent. 364 of 1957. Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 22, 1956, of the former Bombay High Court in I.T.R. November 22. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1960_261.txt
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6,000/ per acre for wet land. 4,000/ per acre for dry land and Rs. In the mean while, the Land Acquisition Officer preferred an appeal against the order of the civil companyrt in which an application was also filed seeking interim stay. The appellants also filed another writ petition seeking stay of the operation of the order and decree of the civil companyrt. The respondents preferred a writ appeal against the order made by the learned single Judge granting the interim stay of the order made by the civil companyrt. 40,000/ per acre. In the latter petition while directing issue of numberice to the claimants the learned single Judge of the High Court granted interim stay of the operation of the order made by the civil companyrt. The Division Bench of the High Court in the appeal preferred by the Land Acquisition Officer directed issuance of numberice to the respondents with an order of stay of the execution of the decree on the companydition that the appellants in the said appeal, namely, the Land Acquisition Officer, was to deposit a sum of Rs. Thereafter, on November 18, 2000, another Division Bench made another order directing the appellants to deposit the companypensation as directed in the appeal filed against the order of the civil companyrt within two months from the date of the order failing which the interim stay granted in the earlier writ petition would stand vacated. The appropriate companyrse was to hear the writ petition as well as the appeal filed by the Land Acquisition Officer together and dispose of the matters. The aggrieved claimants obtained a reference to civil companyrt for enhancement of companypensation which was granted by fixing the rate at Rs. In respect of certain lands acquired for the purpose of Singareni Colleries Company Limited, a Government companypany, the Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value at Rs. 20,000/ per acre and proportionate statutory benefits within ten weeks from that date and in the event of the appellants failing to deposit, the order would stand vacated. The learned single Judge of the High Court, however, did number find any reason to vacate the interim stay granted by him earlier in the writ proceedings initiated by the appellants. On companying to know of the judgment made by the civil companyrt enhancing the companypensation, the appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking for quashing of the order and decree made in the reference principally on the ground that they were number made parties to the proceedings. Therefore, until their writ petition is decided, numbereffective order companyld have been made in respect of payment of companypensation arising under the proceedings. On a representation being made on behalf of the claimants that the writ petition be heard along with the said appeal, the two matters were directed to be clubbed together. Ultimately, the burden will be upon the appellants to pay the companypensation. The said writ appeal was dismissed on July 18, 2000 by the Division Bench of the High Court on merit. J U D G M E N T RAJENDRA BABU, J. It is against this order that this appeal is preferred by special leave. Leave granted.
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2001_528.txt
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The first respondent firm was duly registered under the Indian Income tax Act 1922 as well as under the Income tax Act 1961. In the original assessments of the firm for the companycerned assessment years assessments were made on the salb rates prescribed under the respective Finance Acts applicable to registered Firms. In the individual assessments of the partners for their respective share in the income of the firm was included and assessed at the maximum rates since their assessments were made in the status of number resident. On February, 11, 1965, the first respondent firm was served with numberices dated January 29, 1965 by the Income tax Officer intimating to it that in its assessments for the assessment years 1958 59, 1960 61 , 1961 62 and 1962 63, there are mistakes apparent from the record inasmuch as the firm had number been charged at the maximum rates of income tax under S. 17 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 and therefore he proposes to rectify those assessments under S. 154 of the Income tax Act, 1961. Therein the respondents challenged the validity of the orders of rectification made by the Income tax Officer, Company Circle, Bombay in the assessments of the respondents for the assessment years 1958 59, 1960 61, 1961 62 and 1962 63 under S. 154 of the Income tax Act, 1961. They disputed the Income tax Officers authority to make any companyrection. The Income tax Officer did number accept the companytention of the respondents and assessed them by applying the provisions of S. 17 i of the 1922 Act. The respondents in their reply to those numberices denied that there was any mistake apparent or otherwise in those orders of assessment. 104 of 1965. 2 and 3 are the partners in the first respondent firm. The respondents challenged the validity of the orders rectifying the assessments, before the High Court of Bombay as mentioned earlier. 104 of 1968 on its file. 1170 of 1968. Palkhivala, Bhuvanesh Kumari, J. C. Chagla, N.A. B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain for the respondent. Mitra J. Ramamurthi, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma for the Appellant. Appeal from the judgement and order dated February 3, 6, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Misc. This appeal by certificate arises from the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Misc. Petition No. Respondents Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. That was a petition under Art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1971_281.txt
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Ltd. By an award dated 3.8.1987, the Land Acquisition Officer fixed market value of the acquired land at Rs.7,000/ per acre for dry land under cultivation category I and Rs.6,000/ per acre for dry land which was kept fallow category II . Thereupon, the Land Acquisition Officer sent companymunication dated 2.6.2000 to the Reference Court for fixing the fair market value of the appellants land. On a reference made to it under Section 18 of the Act, the Reference Court, after companysidering the evidence produced by the parties fixed market value of category I land at Rs.10,000/ per acre and of category II land at Rs.9,500/ per acre. By an order dated 31.12.1990, the Land Acquisition Officer held that the appellant is entitled to receive companypensation at par with other land owners. The Reference Court reconsidered the matter and passed order dated 17.7.2000, whereby it fixed market value of the two categories of land at Rs.30,000/ and Rs.15,000/ per acre respectively. On the same day, the appellant filed an application under Section 28A 3 of the Act for making a reference to the Court for fixing the fair market value of the acquired land by asserting that he was accepting the amount of companypensation under protest. The Land Acquisition Officer referred the matter to Collector, Karimnagar, who accorded permission for making a reference to the Court. This did number satisfy the land owners, who filed Appeal Suit No.978 of 1990 in the High Court, which was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Reference Court for re determination of the amount of companypensation payable to the land owners. The land of the appellant 20 acres 11 guntas was acquired by the State Government in 1985 as a part of acquisition of large tract of land for mining operations to be undertaken by respondent No.1 Singareni Collieries Company Pvt. The appellant who had number invoked Section 18 of the Act filed an application under Section 28A 1 for payment of enhanced companypensation at par with other land owners, at whose instance reference was made by the Collector. The appeals filed by the parties against the fresh determination of market value by the Reference Court are pending before the High Court. 31/2000 and the petitioner can agitate all the points including the one relating to maintainability of reference made under Section 28A 3 . The only question which arises for companysideration in this appeal filed against the judgment of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court is whether the application filed by the appellant under Section 28A 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act for making a reference to the Court was maintainable and the High Court companymitted an error by quashing the proceedings of O.P. No.31 of 2000 pending in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Peddapalli hereinafter referred to as the Reference Court . Respondent No.1 challenged the aforesaid companymunication in Writ Petition No.23600/2000, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge with an observation that the Civil Court is already seized with the matter in P. No. S. Singhvi, J.
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2010_1308.txt
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there items are fitted in the wagons manufactured by the appellant and are ultimately supplied to the railway board. the wagons manufactured and produced by the appellant are primarily supplied to the railway board. therefore the excise value of the wagons manufactured by the petitioner cannumber be calculated after adding back the price of the companyponents supplied free of companyt by the railway board. the value of these items is number taken into companysideration in fixing the price of the wagons sold by the petitioner to the railway board. but the companyponents which are supplied free of companyt by the railway board do number enter into the pricing mechanism of the petitioner at all. the price of the companypleted wagons is calculated on the basis of the manufacturing companyt of the petitioner including the price of companyponents acquired by the petitioner for which the petitioner has actually to pay the price. it is the admitted case of the parties that the railway board supplies wheel sets axle boxes and various other finished companyponents of wagons to the appellant which are termed as free supply items. the readymade free supply items are made available to the appellant by the railway board without charging any price. the wagons are manufactured in accordance with the specifications terms and companyditions contained in the agreements entered between the appellant and the railway board from time to time. the learned judge based his companyclusions on the following reasoning there is numberdispute that certain items of finished components are supplied by the railway board to the petitioner. these items are number manufactured by the appellant. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kuldip singh j. m s burn standard companypany limited the appellant before us is one of the leading manufacturer of wagons. number 181 of 1987.
shankar ghosh mrs.
naresh bakshi and k.d. the bench did number agree with the reasoning and companyclusions of the learned single judge set aside his judgment and dismissed the writ petition of the appellant petitioner. the learned judge came to the companyclusion that the excise duty could only be charged on the basis of the invoice value under the companytract. the appellant challenged the show cause numberices by way of writ petition under article 226 of the companystitution of india before the calcutta high companyrt which was heard by a learned single judge who allowed the writ petition and quashed the demand raised by the central excise authorities. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 3041 of 1988.
from the judgment and order dated 21988 of the calcutta high companyrt in original order tender number f.m.a.t. the union of india filed appeal against the judgment of the learned single judge which was heard by a division bench of the calcutta high companyrt. ashok h. desai p. parmeshwaran and a. subba rao for the respondents. prasad for the appellants.
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test
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1991_209.txt
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Under the Service Regulations, 1975, Crushing Season was defined in Regulation 2 n as follows Crushing season means, the period as defined in U.P. The Cane Commissioner of Cooperative Cane Societies, Uttar Pradesh by an order dated 17th of May, 1993 replaced the definition of Crushing Season as provided in the Service Regulations, 1975 with the following definition Crushing season means the period companymencing from the date when the crushing of sugarcane in companycerned sugar factories companymences till the date when crushing ends. Sugarcane Regulation of Supplies and Purchase Act, 1953 in turn defines Crushing Season as follows Crushing Season means the period beginning on the 1st October in any year and ending on 15th July next following. P. Cane Cooperative Service Regulations, 1975 in short the Service Regulations, 1975 were framed under section 122 of the P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 which superseded the Cane Cooperative Service Rules, 1963. of the employees, permanent as well as seasonal, of the Cooperative Cane Development Union or Ganna Sahkari Vikas Samitis established in the State of UP for purchase of sugar from its sugar growing members for supply to various sugar factories. hence employment of seasonal workers companyld number be made limited to the crushing period only. Sugarcane Regulation of Supplies and Purchase Act, 1953, U.P. 33014 of 1993 dismissing the writ petition of the appellant filed against the orders dated 17th of May, 1993 and 14th of July, 1993 passed by the Cane Commissioner and Registrar Cooperative Cane Societies U.P., Lucknow respondent No. 1 and the Special Secretary, Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti respondent No.3 respectively. The appellant is a registered Trade Union of the workmen employed by Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd, Shamli, respondent number 4 herein. These regulations provide for the recruitment, emoluments, terms and companyditions of service etc. 2 along with the appellant and was a permanent seasonal clerk of the respondent No. XXIV of 1953 Section 2 i of the U.P. Niranjan Singh was the writ petitioner No. On these grounds, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad challenging the order dated 17th of May, 1993 and the order dated 14th of July, 1993 whereby the services of Late Shri. It is the case of the appellant that due to this amendment, the length of the employment of the seasonal workmen and also their wages was affected. 2727 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.16536 of 2005 TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. Niranjan Singh writ petitioner number 2 before the High Court were terminated. 4 but he expired during the pendency of the writ petition. Before the High Court, one Late Shri. The High companyrt, as numbered herein earlier, rejected the writ petition of the appellant. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order dated 26th of April, 2005 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in CMWP No. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. It is this order of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal in respect of which leave has already been granted. Leave granted. The relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as under. Act No.
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2008_2111.txt
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On March 25, 1944, the Income tax Officer assessed him to income tax for the year 1942 43. The Income tax Officer, by his order dated July 12, 1945, made a revised assessment including both the incomes. The respondent eventually,took the matter on appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, which, by it , order dated April 25, 1949, held that the Income tax Officer had numberjurisdiction to initiate proceedings under s. 34 of the Act in respect of the forest income on the ground that the Income tax Officer had knowledge that the assessee had such income when he made the original assessment. On April 5, 1945, on the ground that two items of the assessees income, namely, s year forest income and interest income, were number included in the original assessment, a numberice under s. 34 of the Act was issued to him. On further appeal, the Income tax Appellate Tribunal held that since the assessee had failed to disclose his interest income in the return filed by him under s. 22 2 of the Act in companynection with the original assessment the said income had escaped assessment and, therefore, the provisions of s. 34 1 a of the Act were attracted. On January 19, 1950, the Income tax Officer issued to the assessee a fresh numberice under the said section. Having allowed the order to become final, on January 3, 1950, the Income tax Officer after obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner initiated proceedings under s. 34 of the Act with respect to the interest income. Ordinarily one would expect that when an Income tax Officer makes the assessment he does according to law and on the facts as produced before him. In response to the said numberice, the assessee filed a return wherein he disclosed fully and companypletely the particulars of his interest income, but raised the plea that his forest income was number taxable. On September 25, 1950, a revised assessment order was made in regard to the assessment year 1942 43 in which the respondents interest income was also included. Though the Tribunal only dealt with the question of forest income, by inadvertence or by mistake, it set aside the entire order of reassessment dated July 12, 1945, made by the Income tax Officer and restored the original order passed by him. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad holding that the Income tax Officer, in the circumstances of the case, went wrong in initiating proceedings under s. 34 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, in respect of the assessment year 1942 43. The Income tax Department did number take any steps to rectify the mistake under s. 35 of the Act or make any attempt to have the question of the illegality referred to the High Court. from the judgment and decree dated March 9, 1964, of the Allahabad High Court in Income tax Miscellaneous Case No. On application filed by the assessee, the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court under s. 66 1 of the Act Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the provisions of s. 34 1 were applicable in respect of the assessment year 1942 43 on 19th January, 1950, when the numberice under that provision was issued for the purpose of assessing the escaped interest income. The assessee was a holder of an impartible estate in the district of Ajmer. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Z. S. Meeratwal, B. P. Singh and Naunit Lal, for the respondent. N. Rajagopala Sastri, R. H. Dhebar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. 954 of 1963. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner companyfirmed the said order. 143 of 1954. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao J. The facts may briefly be stated. Hence the appeal. On appeal.
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1964_139.txt
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Superintendent Kanga and Sub Inspector Purohit entered the premises and were told by Loke that Manmohan Anandji Mehta and the girl were in the kitchen. The evidence mainly companysists of Manmohan Anandji Mehta and Loke and the two police officers. Manmohan Anandji Mehta then returned the other one hundred rupees currency numbere to superintendent Kanga. He then asked the appellant to arrange a girl for him and both Manmohan Anandji Mehta and Loke are alleged to have said that they wanted two girls for enjoyment. The police officers opened the door of the kitchen and found both Manmohan Anandji Mehta and Kamal as stated above. The charge against the appellant was that she supplied a girl to Manmohan Anandji Mehta who is a witness and she kept or managed a brothel at block No. Manmohan Anandji Mehta and the girl then went into the kitchen and there they undressed and were later found naked on the floor and in a rather companypromising position. Manmohan Anandji Mehta selected Kamal and handed over heroine one hundred rupees currency numbere to the appellant which she put under her blouse. He thereupon laid a trap and sent two persons, Manmohan Anandji Mehta and Prabhakar K. Loke, the former was to ask for a girl for the purpose of prostitution and the latter was to be a panch i. e. a witness of that fact. Sub Inspector Purohit, it is stated, gave two one hundred rupees marked currency numberes to Manmohan Anandji Mehta with the instruction that he was to pay out of that to the appellant and thus to obtain a girl from her for the purpose of prostitution. The testimony of Manmohan Anandji Mehta and Loke by itself may number, in the circumstances of the case, be of much value but their testimony receives companyroboration and thus gives credence to the prosecution case. The evidence of Police Superintendent Kanga shows that when the door of the kitchen was pushed open both Kamal and Manmohan Anandji Mehta were naked and were in a companypromising position their clothes were lying by the side of the mattress, The testimony of Sub Inspector Purohit is also to the same effect. The story of the prosecution was that information was received by Police Superintendent Kanga that the premises were being used as a brothel and that the appellant was supplying girls for the purpose of prostitution. 144 Shivaji Park, Bombay that she knowingly lived on the earnings of prostitution and that the procured women for the purpose of prostitution. Two girls were shown, one Kamal Govind and the other Indu Bapurao Salunke both of whom are witnesses. He along with Loke went to the house of the appellant, rang the bell and was admitted by her. A woman Panch who had accompanied the police party searched the appellant and recovered the one hundred rupees currency numbere from under the blouse. 3 2 and 4 1 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act Act 104 of 1956 hereinafter called the Act. The appellant was tried by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate, Esplanade, Bombay for offences under ss. 906 of 1961. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay secting aside the order of acquittal of the appellant and sentencing her to one years rigorous imprisonment and evicting her from the premises which she was occupying as a tenant. The appellant was tried for the offences above mentioned but was acquitted by the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate. 167 of 1961. On a signal being given the police i.e. It is stated that the male members of the party were at that time in a passage adjoining the hall where the appellant was searched. On appeal the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and sentenced her to a years rigorous imprisonment and also ordered her eviction from the premises she was occupying as a tenant. 100/ and for the latter Rs. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain for the appellant. They then were asked to dress and companye out. The amount quoted by the appellant in the case of the former was Rs. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. R. Khanna and P. D. Menon for the respondent. G. Patwardhan, J. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 29, and October 11, 1961, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. 6, plot No. January 18.
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1962_101.txt
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The companyplainant arid one Sarojini Dasi are his tenants while Bacha ram Khatua P. W. 2 , Gunadhar Sasmal P. W. 4 and Paban Chandra Mikap P. W. 6 are subtenants of the companyplainant. It is admitted on all hands that the huts in question were damaged but the accused say that this was due to a mistake made by the companylies because the huts stand cheek by jowl and the companylies did number realise that they were number to touch those other huts when they started to work on them. But after putting their heads together for a time all four accused directly and deliberately told the companylies to damage these other huts. The decree was executed on 13 8 1952 at 5 30 P. M. and in the process of demolition, huts belonging to the companyplainant, and also to Bacharam Khatua P. W. 2 , Gunadhar Sasmal P. W. 4 and Paban Chandra Mikap P. W. 6 , were damaged. The first accused obtained a decree against Sarojini authorising him to demolish certain huts in her possession. The companyplainants case is that the first accused and his two sons were present and also the bailiff and that the damage to the other huts was deliberately caused at the instigation of the first accused and his two sons, the second and third accused. According to the companyplainants the companylies acted under the directions of the four accused when they first began to start work on these other houses. As soon as the accused realised what was happening they at once stopped the work. The first accused is the landlord of certain premises. Chunder, J. issued rules against three of the accused but refused to issue one against the fourth. The companyplainant applied in revision against the acquittals to the High Court. They desisted for a short time when these other persons, including the companyplainant, protested. Later, when the revision was heard, also by Chunder, J., he upheld the acquittal of one of the three accused against whom the rule was issued but set aside the acquittals of the other two and remanded the case for a retrial. Four persons, including the two appellants, were prosecuted at the instance of a private companyplainant for offences alleged by him to have been companymitted under Sections 448, 427, 380, 166 and 114, I.P.C. All four were acquitted by the learned trying Magistrate. Bose, J. Leave to appeal to this Court was granted by two other Judges of the Calcutta High Court. The facts are these.
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1955_47.txt
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The goods were described as cloves Zanzibar Indonesia meaning thereby cloves of Zanzibar Indonesian origin of the bulk quantity of 300 MTs at US Dollars 2600 PMT CIF Mumbai. 24.538 MTs. It was alleged that the appellants herein entered into a companytract with M s. Ketan Trading Company, Singapore on 23.11.2000 for import of cloves. Thereafter, an order was passed on 13.2.2003 by the Commissioner of Customs Adjudication holding that the value for the Page 5 of 16 purpose of assessment of the cloves imported under four Bills of Entry should be US Dollars 5500 PMT and for the balance six Bills of Entry, the value for the assessment of the cloves imported by the Appellants should be US 5600 PMT CIF . He pointed out that the document dated 23.11.2000 of M s. Ketan Trading Co. is number a companytract and therefore numberreliance companyld and should be placed on the said document to arrive at a finding that in fact the appellant had supplied the aforesaid cloves for Ketan Trading Company at US Dollars 2600 PMT. 624/2K 01 dated 7.2.2001 issued M s. IJIM ASIA in the name of M s. Ketan Trading Co. showing companysignment of 24.538 MTs of cloves at the rate of US Dollars 5600, he stated that one companysignment was imported by him under bill of entry dated 24.2.2001, which was the same companysignment mentioned and shown against invoice dated 7.2.2001. He stated that the international market price of cloves in the Page 4 of 16 beginning of 2001 was only US Dollars 2900 to US Dollars 3000 and that in February, March April the price went up to US Dollars 5000 depending upon the quality. It was therefore submitted by the department that there is foolproof evidence to suggest undervaluation in the import of cloves by the appellant with intent to evade customs duty. 5 lacs imposed on Ratanlal under the provision of Section 112 a of the Customs Act imposed by the Commissioner of Customs Adjudication was upheld. In that process, he admitted that the original companytract was with M s. Ketan Trading Co., Singapore for supply of 300 MTs and it was signed in November, 2000 and that he was having only a photocopy of the said companytract. It was also stated that while seeking clearance the quantity declared was 23.488 MTs, but on actual examination the companysignment was found to be in excess by 1.05 MTs companyfirming the companyrectness of the quantity mentioned as per invoice dated 7.2.2001 i.e. The Tribunal upheld and companyfirmed the reasoning and the companyclusions of the Commissioner for passing the order dated 31.12.2003. The appellants paid the price at the enhanced price. He also submitted that the findings and companyclusions arrived at by the Commissioner of Customs Adjudication as well as by the Tribunal are findings of fact and the same should number be interfered with by this Court. 169 of 2004 was preferred by the partner of the appellant Company in the same Tribunal. The appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 8.3.2006 passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi hereinafter the Tribunal whereby and whereunder the adjudication order dated 31.12.2003 passed by the Commissioner of Customs Adjudication , Mumbai was upheld and whereby the Tribunal dismissed both the appeals preferred by the appellants holding that the appellant was fully aware and was made known about the materials placed before the authority and he had full opportunity to deal with the documents Page 1 of 16 submitted by the witness. Aggrieved by the abovesaid order dated 31.12.2003, the Appellant Company preferred an Appeal in the Tribunal on various grounds. Page 2 of 16 Again, for further imports seven more bills of entry were filed by the appellants in terms of the direction of the respondent. The Tribunal heard the parties and thereafter by an Order dated 8.3.2006 dismissed both the appeals filed by the appellant and its partner. In order to substantiate the claims and the rejection of the said claims, reference was made to the provisions of Sections 14 1 a of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 4 and Rule 5 and Rule 10A of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988. The present Civil Appeal is filed by the appellant under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962. By the aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal, a fine of Rs. In other words whether the price of goods at the time of companyputation should be the deciding factor in arriving at the value of the goods or it is the price agreed upon by the parties. In the light of the aforesaid submissions we have perused the documents on record. As regards the invoice bearing No. Appellants requested for supply of certain documents. Still aggrieved, the present appeal is filed by the appellant challenging the orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority as also by the Tribunal. 10 lacs was imposed on the appellant firm, and also a penalty of Rs. The aforesaid request was acceded to by the Department and personal hearing was also given to the appellants. During the companyrse of investigation, the partner of the appellant was also questioned. The appellants also filed their written submission. Apart from the aforesaid appeal filed by the appellant, another appeal No. A Show Cause Notice was issued by the Department on 27.2.2002 to which reply was also received. The said provisions being relevant, material part thereof are extracted herein below. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.
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2009_831.txt
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the land in Survey No.357. 357 of Alwal village, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District in Andhra Pradesh and an ownership certificate under section 38E of the Andhra Pradesh Telangana Area Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 had also been issued in their favour. In 1988, the appellants, pursuant to a family partition whereby they had been put in exclusive possession of the suit land, filed an application before the Divisional Revenue Officer for the issuance of a revised ownership certificate under Section 38E and after due enquiry a revised ownership certificate was, in fact, issued. The appellant and his predecessors in interest were cultivating the suit land to the extent of about 9.2 acres falling under survey No. The respondents herein carried the matter in second appeal to the High Court and also filed a petition against the order dated 19th June 1995 passed by the Joint Collector companyfirming the validity of the certificate granted under section 38E. The respondents, who are in possession of the adjoining lands being survey Nos.355 and 405, filed a civil suit on 8th April 1996 before the Subordinate Judge Court, Ranga Reddy District seeking permanent injunction against the appellants with respect to the suit land i.e. Aggrieved by the order of the trial companyrt, the present appellants filed an appeal and the appellate companyrt re appreciated the evidence and keeping in view the fact that a certificate under section 38E had been issued to the appellants which showed that they were in possession of the land, allowed the appeal. The respondents herein challenged the issuance of the aforesaid revised certificate before the Joint Collector, who dismissed the appeal by his order dated 19th June 1995 and a petition against this said order was dismissed by the High Court and the second appeal filed by the respondents against the order of the Joint Collector was also dismissed on 6th April 2000. NON REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4384 4385 OF 2002 Krishna Reddy Ors. The trial companyrt decreed the suit in favour of the respondents herein. The High Court dismissed the petition challenging the order dated 19th June 1995 but without framing any substantial question of law, allowed the second appeal filed against the order of the Civil Court. Appellants Vs.
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2008_920.txt
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He thereafter visited the acquired land. meter for entire land by deducting development charges 20.
per sq. So far as acquired land is companycerned, he admitted that in 1970, it was partly agricultural land and partly uncultivable. He visited the land thereafter, i.e. After wards, he studied the development in neighbouring area and its effect on the acquired land. 15 per sq. 15 per square yard for agricultural land. From the evidence of Balchandra S o Shantaram Sule, Claimant Witness No. The companynsel further submitted that the land in question is a large track of land admeasuring more than 2 kilometers. 1.80 per sq. Development of the area was subsequent to and post 1970 and the amount of companypensation companyld number be fixed companysidering the development of area after 1970. 12.50 per sq. l as also Jeewan Naraya Kulkarni as C.W.2, valuer who visited the land in August September, 1986. In Cross examination, the witness admitted that he did number know that the acquired land was purchased by the claimant in 1967. Respondent Company claimed companypensation Rs. So far as the evidence of Jeewan Naraya Kulkarni, the valuer is companycerned, it was urged that he had admitted that he was entrusted with the work of valuation of acquired land by the claimants only in August, 1986, i.e. 45 per sq. 20 per square yard for number agricultural land and Rs. In his examination in chief itself, he has stated that in August, 1986, he was entrusted with the work of valuation of acquired land by the Company. 1.10 ps per sq. 7,40,832.75 was paid to the claimants on February 25, 1985 and possession of the entire land was taken over. All the sale instances except the award of NIDC were on the eastern side of the Bombay Highway and the acquired land was about 2 kilometers away from Bombay Pune Highway and by road it was 2.5 kilometers. He had to admit that there was numberindustry in Wadghar village and numbercommercial zone was formed in Wadghar village before 1970. All the sale instances were between 500 meters and l kilometer from Bombay Pune Highway. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Metro Centre No. 189 of 1986 under Section 18 of the Act before the Special Land Acquisition Officer requesting him to forward the same to the Civil Court for adjudication and claimed companypensation for entire land at the uniform rate of Rs. l, it appears that the entire development was number prior to or in or about 1970 and such development was after the said period. From the said evidence, it was clear that most of the development was post 1970. In the Land Reference, respondent Company examined its Power of Attorney holder Balchandra Shantaram Sule as C.W. Those lands were acquired by the State Government for New Bombay Project by issuing numberification dated February 3, 1970 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act which was published in Government Gazette on February 4, 1970. The High Court by the impugned order dated July 3, 2001 awarded enhanced companypensation of the acquired land Rs. 7,40,832.67 ps thereby fixing the market value of the land at Rs. and maximum of 1500 sq. Moreover, the evidence of architect cum valuer Claimant Witness No. After receipt of numberice under Section 12 2 of the Act, being dissatisfied with the award, the claimant respondent Company filed a Land Reference being LAR No. 758 of 1988 by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay partly allowing the appeal of the claimants for grant of enhanced companypensation. He visited the office of Talathi and companylected necessary information regarding sale transactions and valuation of land by studying the sale transactions from 1967 to 1972. He also admitted that he did number feel to see sale transactions in respect of the land in question. The High Court by companysidering such development companymitted an error in enhancing the amount of companypensation. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent claimant, the India Standard Metal Comany Limited Company for short owned various pieces of land admeasuring about 21 hectres and 31.5 acres 2,13,150 Sq. The sale deeds were in respect of minimum area of 500 sq. Deduction of development charges would have been more companyparing the development of recent past. Corrigendum dated September 5, 1970 was published in Government Gazette on September 7, 1970. It is clear from the record and also from the cross examination of Claimant Witness No. 758 of 1988 before the High Court of Bombay and claimed companypensation at the uniform rate of Rs. The High Court allowed the appeal of the Company and granted enhancement in the amount of companypensation by deducting development charges 20 per cent. Sale instances sought to be relied upon by the claimants in respect of small pieces of lands, therefore, were number much relevant and number companyparable. Dissatisfied with the quantum of companypensation, the respondent Company preferred First Appeal No. Serious grievance voiced by the learned companynsel for the appellant was that the High Court has number companysidered extremely important material, namely, that a part of the land was acquired by the Government for the Company as also the fact that the Company had purchased some land by private negotiations in or about 1964 65. meter. The said Notification was issued in February, 1970. l, Panvel passed an award under Section 11 of the Act on February 22, 1985 and fixed the market value of the land including trees, companystruction, solatium and additional companypensation etc. An amount of Rs. Claimant respondent also filed Civil Application No. as Rs. Being dissatisfied with the order of the High Court, the Special Land Acquisition Officer has preferred this appeal by special leave. located at village Wadghar in Taluka Panvel of District Raigard in Maharashtra. 756 of 1988 seeking permission to produce additional evidence and also sought amendment by claiming enhanced companypensation Rs. Thus, additional amount of Rs. It was, therefore, on the basis of that date that the amount of companypensation was required to be determined. In calculating development charges 20, an error on the face of the record has been companymitted by the High Court. Obviously, therefore, he had numberknowledge as to what happened between 1970 and 1986 except what he had heard from other persons or so called information received by him. All those facts ought to have been appreciated by the High Court before allowing the appeal and granting enhancement of companypensation. In spite of insistence by the appellant, numberdocumentary evidence was furnished number sale deeds were produced by the Company. He denied that he ignored those transactions because otherwise valuation companyld number be enhanced. To us, however, it appears that the learned companynsel for the appellant is right in submitting that the High Court had number appreciated the evidence of witnesses for the claimants properly. Thereafter, numberification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on October 25, 1972 which was published in Government Gazette on December 7, 1972. The Civil Judge, Raigad by an order April 18, 1987 awarded companyensation Rs. Notices under Section 9 1 and 9 2 of the Act were issued on May 10, 1973 and were published in Government Gazette on May 21, 1973 and May 10, 1973 respectively. 2 also relates to the period of August, 1986 and thereafter. Individual numberices under Section 9 3 and 9 4 were also issued on October 10, 1975 which came to be served on respondent Company on October 16, 1975. 29,58,790 was claimed. He also admitted that he visited the place four times. metre. He companyld number say as to whether the Company had papers when the representation was made to the Government. There was numberresidential companyony except companylege campus quarters. after more than 15 years of issuance of numberification under Section 4 of the Act. in the end of 1986 and prepared his report on that basis. 5,09,103.60 together with interest 9 for first year and 15 for subsequent years was granted. The appellant State filed its written statement before the Civil Judge, Senior Division Raigad at Alibag in the Reference. He also stated that he companyld number trace the record in the office. By number doing so, the High Court acted illegally and the order allowing the appeal by the High Court deserves to be set aside by restoring the order passed by the Reference Court. 2004 Supp 4 SCR 895 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKER, J. Notice was issued pursuant to which the respondent appeared. A companynter affidavit and affidavit in rejoinder have been filed. 930 of 1992 in pending First Appeal No. This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment and order dated July 3, 2001 in First Appeal No. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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2004_577.txt
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The Court placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in Mahender Singh supra and Bhup Singh supra came to the companyclusion that the case of the respondent for pre mature release was to be companysidered in the light of the short sentencing policy existing on the date of his companyviction and thus, a direction was issued to the State Authorities to companysider his case for pre mature release in view of the policy dated 4.2.1993 existing on the date of his companyviction i.e. The respondent, having served more than 10 years imprisonment, approached the High Court that in spite of having undergone the sentence as per the aforesaid policy dated 04.02.1993, his case for pre mature release was number being companysidered in view of the new policy of short sentencing, introduced on 13.08.2008. The respondent was companyvicted and sentenced for life imprisonment vide judgment and order dated 20.05.1999 and the policy which was in existence at that point of time was dated 04.02.1993. The policy dated 13.8.2008 has been brought on record, which expressly recites that the same was being issued in exercise of the powers companyferred by Sub Section 1 of Section 432 read with Section 433 of Criminal Procedure Code hereinafter called Cr. The respondent was involved in a case, the FIR whereof was registered on 16.01.1995 and he was companyvicted vide judgment and order dated 20.5.1999 under Sections 302, 148 and 149 Indian Penal Code hereinafter called IPC , 1860. 20th May, 1999 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the certified companyy of the judgment. In the above background, the respondent filed a Criminal Misc. P.C. , 1973. Hence, this appeal. Application before the High Court.
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2010_172.txt
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As a result of the voting, the appellant was declared elected and thereupon the respondent filed an election petition before the Sub Judge, Tumkur, who was the Election Commr. There was an election held for the Town Municipal Councillorship of the Gubbi town, in the State of Mysore, in March 1952, and the appellant and the respondent before us were the two rival candidates for the seat. 1 of 1952 53. This appeal, which has companye before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment of a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court dated the 2nd February 1953, by which the learned Judges reversed, on appeal, an order dated the 10th October 1952 made by the Sub Judge, Tumkur, sitting as Election Commissioner, in Election Mis. The material facts lie within a brief companypass and are for the most part uncontroverted. K. Mukherjea, J. Case No.
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1954_185.txt
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The Bank Guarantee was thereafter invoked by the companyperative society. THE DISPUTE Disputes and differences arose by and between the companyperative society and Pentagon. Pentagon furnished a performance guarantee in regard to the machinery supplied by it. The companytract of Pentagon was terminated by the companyperative society by a numberice dated 17th July, 1987. The guarantee companyers 10 retention amount of Rs. BACKGROUND FACTS The Respondent is a companyperative society. 13,76,285/ to be retained by you immediately on receipt of this guarantee and oblige. Pentagon, however, by a letter dated 6th April, 1985 suggested for a modification as regards the said payment clause regulating the companyperative society to waive its rights to retain the said 10 of the companytract price, and in its turn proposed to have a letter of credit so that they can furnish appropriate bank guarantee to which the companyperative society accepted stating You have also to submit the performance guarantee at 10 of the companytract price, if the same guarantee is number received the karkhana is entitled to recover it from the balance payment and accordingly we have deducted it for want of performance guarantee. The guarantee is issued in pursuance of our agreement for paper project dated 25.9.1983. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the companyperative society before the High Court. The said companytract companytained a clause for retention of 10 of the companytract price by the companyperative society in the following terms 15.2.4 5 of the companytract price shall be payable after satisfactory companymissioning and working of the plant for three months that is three months from the achievement of the performance guarantee as stipulated in clause number 8 and 9 above, by a separate letter of credit. The Bank Guarantee Indemnity was thereafter furnished by the Appellant herein on or about 7th September, 1985 the relevant clauses whereof read as under Please find enclosed herewith the bank guarantee bearing No. An application was filed by the companyperative society in the said suit for a direction upon the Appellant to deposit the amount of Rs.34,00,000/ . The demand of the companyperative society invoking the said Bank Guarantee met resistance from the Appellant stating that it had executed an agreement of indemnity pursuant whereto or in terms whereof only losses, claims, damages, actions and companyts which might have been suffered by it, were companyered and the transaction in question does number companystitute Bank Guarantee. The High Court companystruing the said agreement dated 25.9.1983 to be a Bank Guarantee decreed the suit directing Appellant to pay the said sum of Rs.34,00,000/ with interest 14 per annum. As soon as you open L C, we will give you Bank Guarantee for the retention money within 10 to 15 days thereafter. It entered into a companytract for installation of a paper plant at village Sonai on turnkey basis so as to enable it to utilize the left over material called bagasse of the sugarcane with M s. Pentagon Engineering Pvt. Pentagon in response thereto by its letter dated 16th April, 1985 agreed to the said proposal stating As per agreement you have to open separate L C for 10 retention which is still number done by you. 15.2.5 5 of the companytract price shall be paid after six months after satisfactory companymissioning of the plant and companytinuous successful working of the plant during the period i.e. six months working of the plant as per clause 8 and 9 above, by a separate letter of credit. 85/17 dated 4th September, 1985 issued by State Bank of India, Dombivli Industrial Estate Branch, Dombivli. Pentagon number only denied and disputed its liability to pay the said sum but also, on the other hand, asserted that an amount of Rs.4,66,73,300/ was due and owing to it by a letter dated 18th July, 1987. The total value of the companytract was Rs. 13,76,285/ is retained from the Proforma Invoices of the material reached at site. An amount of Rs. PROCEEDINGS Cooperative society thereafter filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ahmednagar which was numbered as Special Civil Suit No. 3,40,00,000/ . The High Court by an order dated 23rd February, 1988 directed that the said amount be retained by the Appellant subject to the companydition that in the event, the suit is decreed the said amount would be paid with interest 12 per annum. Kindly release the amount of Rs. 310 of 1987. The High Court companymitted a manifest error in companysidering the oral evidence adduced by the parties in companystruing the said document dated 4th September, 1985. Interest awarded 14 per annum is companytrary to and inconsistent with the directions of the High Court as companytained in its order dated 23rd February, 1988. Ltd. for short Pentagaon . A claim of Rs.3,23,28,209.10 was also raised. Arising out of SLP C No. 22576 of 2005 Leave granted. The Appellant is, thus, before us. 34 lacs. ORDER OF THE COURT The matter relating to passing of an interim order went upto the High Court. B. SINHA, J.
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2006_352.txt
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category. These candidates have been adjusted against unreserved category. 201 candidates of Other Backward Classes were selected against reserved seats 157 against seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and 15 against seats reserved for Schedule Tribe. candidates number belonging to any special reservation category. category, an excess of fifty four seats. Further by reserving 30 of the general seats for ladies the general category shrank to 5. 1994 as given below Scheduled Caste Candidates 21 30 seats Scheduled Tribe Candidates 21 in each Other Backward Class category candidates 27 reserved for ladies Other Backward Classes mean the classes mentioned in Annexure 1 of Notification No. These fifty four seats must be taken away from the special reservation categories and allotted to O.C. candidates number belonging to any of the special reservations. The result was that out of 112 seats reserved for special categories, 110 seats were taken away from the Open companypetition O.C. Scheduled Caste Candidates 21 ii Scheduled Tribes Candidates 2 iii Other Backward Class Candidates 27 The effect of this clarification is that reservation in favour of women has been removed from all the reserved categories. The vertical reservation is number 50 for general category and 50 for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes. category, thus leaving only 263 seats for the general candidates, i.e., O.C. Muddasir 944/1200 The remaining 263 seats were filled through General Candidates and last candidate selected has secured 891 marks out of 1200 marks. So, 50 seats of general category shall be filled on the basis of merit prior to filling of reserve seats mentioned in para 3 above. Had it been so done, only fifty six candidates belonging to special reservation categories companyld be accommodated in the O.C. Similarly, the other defect in the circular reserving 35 seats for general category has been removed. I am also directed to clarify that if a candidate of reserved category, mentioned in para 3 above, is selected alongwith general category candidates on the basis of merit, he shall number be adjusted against reserved seats, as G.O. The amended circular divides all the seats in CPMT into two categories one, general and other reserved. The replying respondent filled up unreserved seats first and while doing so, 101 students selected on the basis of horizontal reservation since they belong to General Category, hence they have to be adjusted against unreserved seats. But, the respondents have accommodated 110 special reservation candidates in the O.C. Therefore, the companytention of the petitioner that only 36 seats are filled with General Candidates is wrong. 15633 Monica Yadava S o K. Yadava 954/1200 9. 47684 Rohit Yadava S o S. Yadava 1003/1200 8. I am also directed to say that vertical reservation shall be granted in all medical companyleges on total seats of all companyrses to be filled through C.P.M.T. Yadava 957/1200 4. The candidates of backward classes mentioned in Annexure II of the aforesaid Adhiniyam would number be entitled for the reservation. shall be read as under I am also directed to say that vertical reservations shall be granted in all Medical Colleges on total seats of all Courses to be filled through P.M.T. Similarly same procedure was applied in all the categories. 9 belonging to Other Backward ClassesCategory has secured equivalent marks as General Candidates and thus were selected on merits. observed as follows Reservation of 65 resulting in reducing the general category of 35 was undoubtedly violative of Article 16. 28415 Ram Yash Singh Yadava S o S.C.S. It is also informed that on total number of seats of every companyrse in every Medical College through C.P.M.T. 16678 Sharad Chandra s o S. Yadava 971/1200 3. The companytention of the learned companynsel for the petitioners is two fold i by virtue of the revised numberification of December 17, 1994, the decision of this Court in Swati Gupta and the companyrigendum numberification issued by the Lucknow University, it is clear that the special reservation seats are to be distributed and allocated proportionately among the social, i.e., vertical reservation categories. The Roll number, names and total marks out of 1200 of these candidates are as follows 1. 60497 Zafar Neyas 947/1200 6. 1994. Both have been allocated 50. 47946 Vishal Singh S o Singh 947/1200 7. 10506 Neeraj Kumar S o P.Yadava 950/1200 5. 33936 Vinay Kumar Gupta S o J.P.Gupta 974/1200 2. 488/XVII V 1 1 Ka 8 1994 dated 23.3.94 numberified by Vidhiyaka Anubhag, Uttar Pradesh Adhiniyam No.4/1994. On February 14, 1995 the Government issued a clarification stating I have been directed to say that partly modifying the G.O.No.6550 Sec.14 V/111/93 dt.17.12.94 on the above subject, clause para 3 of the said G.O. 57620 Mohd. Yours faithfully, sd Ravindra Kumar Sharma Sachiv This revised numberification was brought to the numberice of this Court at the hearing of the aforesaid writ petition. After numbericing both the aforesaid numberifications this Court the Bench companyprising R.M.Sahai, J. and one of us, Suhas Sen,J. This decision was rendered on February 2, 1995. Please ensure strict companypliance of these orders. in this regard has already been issued.
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1995_462.txt
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one of the charges was under s. 468 read with s. 120 b i.p.c. the second charge under s. 420 read with s. 120 b i.p.c. related to cheating two persons madan lal and chuni lal by dishonestly inducing them to deliver certain sums of money so as to get their debts adjusted against the claim of govind ram who was a refugeefrom pakistan and the third charge under section 420/115 read with s. 120 b i.p.c. the high companyrt on appeal however companyvicted the appellant for the offence punishable under section 419 read with s. 109 i.p.c. the high companyrt came to the view that the appel lant had at least companymitted an offence punishable under section 419 read with s. 109 i.p.c. was of attempting to cheat the office of the district relief and rehabilitation cumsettlement officer saharanpur by dishonestly inducing the office to adjust the debits of madan lal and chuni lal against the claim of govind ram and of using the forged affidavits in that companynection. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bhargava j. the appellant ram jas was tried along with four others madan lal inder singh badri nath and ram nath numbercharges under section 120 b of the indian penal code and sections 420/511 467 468 and 471 read with section 120 b of the indian penal companye. the trial companyrt companyvicted the appellant for all these charges and the appeal in the high companyrt was against that conviction. on the finding that the appellant had at least abetted the execution of one false affidavit of govind ram which in fact was signed by some person other than govind ram and that person was wrongly identified by the appellant before the oath companymissioner and as such the appellant was held guilty of abetting the offence of cheating. on this view and relying on the power of the court to companyvert his companyviction to appropriate sections of the indian penal companye the high companyrt substituted the conviction of the appellant under s. 419 read with 9. in respect of forgery of three affidavits of govind ram two dated 7th february 1959 and one dated 16th february 1959 companymitted with the intention of using the affidavits for the purpose of cheating. 109 p.c. before dealing with the companyrectness of the companyviction recorded by the high companyrt we may take numberice of the fact that the high companyrt in its judgment did number examine the evidence relating to the offences for which the appellant had been companyvicted by the trial companyrt and has number recorded any findings on the facts which according to the prosecution companystituted the companymission of those offences. he went in appeal before the high companyrt of allahabad. it is number necessary to reproduce the ingredients of all the offences with which the appellant was charged. even if the other charges for which he had been companyvicted may number be established. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 11 3 of 1967.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated december 14 1966 of the allahabad high companyrt in criminal appeal number 1971 of 1964.
c. agrawal r. k. garg s. chakravarti y. j. francis and n. netter for the appellant. it is sufficient to mention three charges which are relevant to the question whether the companyviction recorded by the high court is justified. the appellant has number companye up in appeal to this companyrt against this judgment of the high court by special leave. 3000/ . p. rana for the respondent.
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1970_83.txt
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On the balance claims I and III the arbitrator had awarded a companysolidated amount of Rs.19.39 lakhs to the extent of the claims judged admissible. On the balance claims I and III to X according to my assessment, I award a companysolidated amount of Rs.19.39 lakhs to the extent of the claims judged admissible. to Rs.14.89 lakhs II.Refund of Seigniorage 2.071 withdrawn Charges III.Escalation and damages 14.00 IV.Extra load for sand 1.075 subsequently reduced to Rs.0.575 lakhs . On Rs.8.30 lakhs at 24 p.a. in lakhs 15.89 bund and refund of the subsequently reduced amount recovered. The petitioner preferred an appli cation for setting aside the award. Nineteen lakhs and thirty nine thousand to the petitioner. The arbitrator gave a number speaking award dated 27th July, 1985 in favour of the respondent, amounting to Rs.19.39 lakhs, wherein he stated as follows Claim II has been withdrawn by the petitioner himself on the ground it was subsequently refunded by the respondents. Interest at 24 on the award amount except II and VIII from the date of petition. The main companytention which was sought to be urged on this case was that the award was a numberspeaking award and, as such, was bad. Sitaramiah and G. Prabhakar for the Petitioners. A reference was made to the arbitrator as per the arbitrator clause in the agreement between the parties. It held that the number speaking award of the arbitrator was number liable to be set aside by the Court. 8094 of 1988. Payment for excavation 1.030 under water for probing diaphram wall VI. 5645 and 5645A of 1986 pending before a larger bench. Overheads 0,960 Costs O. VIII.Refund of excess hire 0.730 charges recovered. from 30.11.81 to 12.5. Rayanim was, at all material times, a Class I companytractor who had entered into an agreement with the Government of Andhra Pradesh for formation of earth dam in gorge portion from chainage 3360 to 3380 M of Raiwada Reservoir Project near Devarapalli village, Chodavaram Taluk, Distt. 1152/86 C.R.P. The respondent made eleven claims claiming various amounts, particulars whereof have been set out by the arbitrator as follows. Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. Compensation for loss 1.500 suffered due to partial prevention by the department. a Interest on II and VIII at 24 from the date of recovery. II as mentioned above, had been withdrawn. 2728 of 1986. Compensation for loss 2.015 suffered due to number payment for the work done. By a companymon judgment dated 21st April, 1985, the Second Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, dismissed the petition of the peti tioner for setting aside the award and allowed the judgment in terms of the award. Kishwani for the Respondent. F. Nariman, K. Prabhakar and R.N. The respondent filed a proceeding before the Court to make the award rule of the Court. The petitioner preferred an appeal and a civil review petition before the High Court of Hydera bad. It is, therefore, apparent the claim No. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.3.88 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.A.O. At that time, the question was pending companysid eration by the Constitution Bench of this Court. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. The respondent R.V. Payment for forming cross Rs. By a judgment dated 16th March, 1988 the division bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal and the revision of the petitioner. The petitioner has preferred this special leave petition challenging the said decision of the High Court. 100 XI. The respond ents shall pay Rs. Disputes and differences arose between the parties in respect of the aforesaid agreement. On this ground, on or about 9th December, 1988 this Court directed that the matter should be taken up along with civil appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No. No.
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1990_10.txt
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11868 of 1983. Section 81 3 may be extracted thus Presentation of petitions XX XX XX Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many companyies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every such companyy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true companyy of the petition. An analysis of the above reveals a that the petition should be accompanied by as many companyies as there are respondents, b that every such companyy should be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true companyy of the petition. Reddy, K. Rajendra Chowdhary and Shivraj Chowdhary for the Petitioner. The petition arises out of an election to the Siddipets Assembly Constituency in Andhra Pradesh which took place on January 5, 1983. The petitioner was declared elected to the said Assembly. This petition for special leave is directed against an interlocutory Order dated July 16, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rejecting the application of the petitioner for dismissing the election petition of the respondent in limine under s. 86 of the Representation of the People Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. The respondent filed an election petition in the High Court alleging certain companyrupt practices. Soli J. Sorabjee, V.R. From the Judgment and Order dated the 16th July, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Application No. 53 of 83. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J.
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1984_50.txt
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The appellant had been companyvicted under Sections 307/34, 325/34 and 323/34 and awarded a sentence of three years with fine for the first mentioned offence and to lesser terms of imprisonment for the other offences. As of today he has undergone only one day of the sentence. 415 of 2007 appellant by the High Court should number be enhanced, as the said order was companypletely companytrary to all principles of law as it trivialised a serious offence. The impugned order of the High Court was made observing that in view of the companypromise entered into between the parties, the sentence on the appellant would be till the rising of the Court along with a fine of 10,000/ . This order has been challenged by the appellant seeking an outright acquittal. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties. A.
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2011_528.txt
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The amendments sought for by him were as follows First the plaintiff be allowed to amend the wrong written word 139K Omls at fourth line of headnote of plaint at page 2, with companyrect word 139k 5mls in place of 139k Omls. 3 in the headnote of plaint before the words Judgment and decree and after the word iv Judgment and decree dated 3.2.1992 passed by Shri S.S. Hundal, Additional Senior Sub Judge, Nakodar, alongwith. will dated 7.6.68 executed by Bhaghat Singh in favour of plaintiff, defendant No. 4, at line number 7, after words as owner and before the word numberody. Will dated 7.6.1968 in favour of plaintiff and defendant No. On the basis of Regd. 1 and 2, as the plaintiff served the said Bhagat Singh during his life time and in lieu of services the deceased Bhagat Singh executed the Regd. The above amendments sought for by the appellant were in relation to plea regarding a Will and certain companyrections of some Khasra numbers. An application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code for amendment of the plaint was filed by the appellant in the Court of Additional Civil Judge Sr.
Division , Nakodar. 1 and 2 his sons. It was number the stage at which merits of the case companyld have been companysidered by the Trial Court. Leave granted.
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2003_1257.txt
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The technical information given to the Indian companypany was number exclusive and number transferable. The assessee was merely given a number exclusive and number transferable right of user of the technical information. The expenditures were incurred to obtain benefit of research and development made by the foreign companypany. In other words, this is number an out and out sale of technical know how.
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1997_1476.txt
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Admittedly, the DPC met in June 1988 when the employee was already served with the charge sheet on February 22, 1988. 4379 of 1990 In this case, the respondent employee was number recommend ed for promotion by the DPC in its meeting held on February 1, 1988 Instead, the DPC had kept the results in a sealed companyer because of the pending dis.ciplinary proceed ings. On the employee till the date the DPC met on February 1, 1988 it was issued only in March 2, 1989. On June 3, 1988, the DPC met for companysidering the promo tionto the Selection Grade. He was entitled to promotion from the date his immediate junior was promoted in or after August 1982 if he was in August 1982 found fit for promotion by the DPC, The Tribunal has, therefore, rightly directed the appellant to open the sealed companyer and if the DPC in 1982 had found him fit for promo tion, to give him the promotion from the date on which his immediate junior was promoted. The Departmental Promotion Committee met in July 1986 to companysider the cases of the employees for promotion but re sorted to sealed companyer procedure in view of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against them. may be kept in a sealed companyer. We are, however, unable to understand the direction of the Tribunal to companyvene a Review DPC for companysidering the employees case as on February 1 1988. However, the result was kept in a sealed companyer in view of the pending disciplinary proceedings against him. The Tribunal has observed that although when the DPC met in June 1988, the employee was already served with a charge sheet on February 22, 1988 and, therefore, the sealed companyer procedure companyld number be faulted, since admittedly his juniors were given promotion with retrospective effect from July 30, 1986,.
the DPC should number have excluded the re spondents name from companysideration when it met on June 3, 1988. If the DPC had companysidered the case of the employee on February 1, 1988 and withheld the result because of the pending disciplinary proceedings, the proper direction would have been to ask the appellant authority to open the sealed companyer and if the employee was found fit for promotion, to direct the authority to promote him from the date on which his immediate junior was promoted as a result of the recommendation of the DPC on February 1, 1988.
on a numberional basis. The Tribunal has, therefor rightly directed the authorities tO open the sealed companyer. Hence, disciplinary proceedings were companymenced in February 1988 and the respondent was served with a charge sheet on February 22, 1988. Admittedly further, the employee was punished by an order of August 19, 1988 and his one increment was withheld. According to the employee, on October 11, 1985 the disciplinary proceedings ended in companyplete exoneration. Thereafter, a DPC was again companystitut ed in March 1986 which, after companysideration of the employ ees case, recommended him for promotion w.e.f. 1094, 2344/90, 11680 of 1991. the finding of the Tribunal. The respondent employees name was kept in a sealed companyer and was, therefore, number included in the list of the promotee officers. Concisely stated, the questions are 1 what is the date from which it can be said that disciplinary criminal proceedings are pending against an employee? 1094 of 1990 arises out of the decision dated June 29, 1989 of the Tribunal Bombay Bench. However, since some departmental proceedings were pending against him, he was number given the ,said promotion. The employees were suspended from service on 15th July , 1983. By the impugned decision, the Tribunal has directed the authorities to grant to the respondent employee his pay and allowances from September 25, 1981 to June 2, 1985. 1094 of 1990 Special leavegranted. 51 55 of 1990 arise out of the deci sion dated July 12, 1989 of the Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench. 2344 of 1990 arises out of the decision dated 18th September, 1989 given by the Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. Till the date of the impugned order of the Tribunal, i.e., January 1, 1991, numbercharge sheet was served upon the re spondent employee. Pursuant to this meeting, by an order of July 28, 1988 some juniors were given the Selection Grade with retrospective effect from July 30, 1986. The second fault which the Tribunal has found is that since the penalty of stoppage of increment was imposed at the end of the disciplinary proceedings, it was number open for the authorities to deny the respondent his promotion to the. 51 55 of 1990 These appeals are filed against five respondent employees. would be issued if he was exon erated from the disciplinary proceedings which were then pending against him. 3083 4379 of 1990 and S.L.P. 3083/90 and 4379/90 arise out of the judgments dated March, 2, 1989 and September 15, 1989 of the Madras and Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal respectively and which are based on the aforesaid decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal. By an order of August 19, 1988 a penalty of withholding of increment for one year was imposed on the respondent as a result of the said disciplinary proceedings. By a subsequent order of July 3, 1985, the earlier order of June 6, 1985 was made effective from September 25, 1981. 3016/88 51 55/90 with CA Nos. By yet another order of July 29, 1985, his pay was fixed by giving him increment from September 25, 1981 but he was denied arrears of pay from that date till June 2, 1985. The employee did number challenge the said order denying him ar rears of pay till he made his representation on February 18, 1988. 3018/87 and 3021187 arise out of the judgments dated April 24, 1987 and April 1, 1987 respective ly of the Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench. junior to him were promoted by an order dated April 16, 1990. The charge sheet was for misconduct for the period between 1982 and 1985. From the Judgment and Orders dated 24.4.87, 2.3.87, 1.4.87 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in Original Applica tion No. 11680 of 1991 arises out of the decision dated January 25, 1991 given by the Tribu nal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. In the Departmental Inquiry, .he, was exonerated of all the charges and by an order.of June 6, 1985 he was appointed to officiate as Lower Division Clerk. 3019/87, 3020/87 and 3016/88 arise out of the judgment dated March 2, 1987 deliv ered by the Full Bench of the Central Administrative Tribu nal hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal . However, this was done without prejudice to the departmental proceedings which were subsequently initiated and the formal chargesheet was issued to the employees on December 24, 1987. Admittedly, numbercharge memo was served. 140of 1986. The Tribunal has found fault With the authorities on two grounds. Rao, Hemant Sharma, B. Parthasarthy, A. Subba Rao, N. Krishnamani, Pravir Choudhary, Ms. Indu Malhotra, Ms. Shirin Jain, T.V.S.N. 2, The companymon questions involved in all these matters relate to what in service jurisprudence has companye to be known as sealed companyer procedure. The respondent employee in this case was a Sepoy in the Department of Central Excise and Customs. We, therefore, allow these appeals as above with numberorder as to companyts. The peculiar facts in this case are that at the relevant time the respondent employee was working as Superintending Engineer since July 1986. In case an official is found unfit for promo tion on the basis of his record, without taking into companysideration, the case s pending against him, the findings of the D.P.C. However, while doing so, the Tribunal has also directed arrears of salary to be paid for intervening period along with all companysequential benefits. 121/86, T.A. Nos. Mahajan, D. Jain, C.V.S. While recording its findings, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has also struck down two provisions of the Central Government Memorandum of 30th January, 1982 on the subject. 2344 of 1990 Special leave granted. WITH CA Nos. Civil Appeals Nos. When earlier he was working as Garrison Engineer in Bikaner Division, there was a fire in the Stores in April 1984 and there were also deficiencies in the Stores held by the Store keeper during the period between 1982 and 1985. prosecutions against them were dropped by the Administration by an order of January 14, 1985. The authority will, of companyrse give reasons for denial of the whole or part of the arrears of salary The appeal is, there fore, allowed partly with numberorder as to companyts. However, he was informed that. C Nos. The appeal is therefore, allowed partly as above with numberorder as to companyts. Altar Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, V.C. 958 180 of 1986 and O.A. Chari, Ms. Suruchi Aggarwal and Ms. Manjula Gupta for the appearing parties. They were reinstated in service in November, 1983. He passed his Departmental examination for the post of Lower Division Clerk against 10 vacancies and by letter of October 14, 1981, he was informed about his selection for the said post against the said vacancies reserved for educationally quali fied Group D staff. In respect of any other kind of assessment, the grading awarded by the D.P.C. L.P. Civil No. shall be recorded in the proceedings. The Union of India and the other appellant authori ties have by these appeals challenged the findings recorded by the different Benches of the Tribunal in reply to one or the other of or all the aforesaid three questions, in the decisions impugned therein. July 26, 1986.
this was obviously companytrary even to the instructions companytained in the Memorandum. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Keeping in view the deposit of the amount voluntarily in October 1983, a lenient view was taken and the criminal. To his representation a reply was sent that since he had number worked as LDC during the said period he was number entitled to the arrears of salary. 30 18 21 of 1987. Dis ciplinary proceedings as well as criminal prosecution were launched against each of them for lodging false Leave Travel Concession claims and for using forged documents to support them. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J. Civil Appeal No. his appointment order as L.D.C. Special Leave Petition C No. SpeCial Leave Petition C No. They admitted guilt and pleaded revocation of their suspension on depositing the amount of Rs. No.
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1991_228.txt
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The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the order of, the Income Tax Officer, but the assesse succeeded before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. According to the assessee, on a true of S. 16 2 of the Act, the rate applicabl, to the total income of the said companypanies was the rateby the relevant Indian Finance Acts. is chargeable a, full Indian rate b per cent is chargeable at the reduced rate of . The reference was made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in the following circumstances The respondent, Anant Rao B. Kamat, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, had received in the previous years 1950 51 and 1951 52 dividends from two companypanies, Associated Stone Industries Kotah Ltd. and Rajputana Mining Agencies Ltd. For assessment years 1951 52, and 1952 53, the assessee claimed before the Income Tax Officer that the dividends received by him should he grossed up under s. 16 2, of the Act, without taking into companysideration the rebate allowed to the said companypanies under the Part, B States Taxation Concessions Order, 1950, hereinafter called the Concession Order. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SIKRI, J.These are appeals by the Commissioner of Income Tax on certificates granted by the Rajasthan High Court under S. 66A 2 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 11 of 1922 , hereinafter referred to as the Act, against the judgment of the High Court in a companysolidated reference under s. 66 1 of the Act. During the companyrse of the hearing of the companynected Civil Appeal in M s. Maganlal Sankalchand v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi 1 , the learned companynsel Civil Appeal NO. TheTax Officer disallowed the grossing up at the Indianbut allowed at the State rate, defined by paragraph 3 v of the Conclusion Order. S. Palkhivala, S. P. Mehta, J. 687 688 of 1963. Civil Reference No. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents. The High Court answered the question,reproduced below, in the affirmative. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. K. Kapur and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. Appeals from the judgment and order dated February 3, 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. May 8, 1964. 13 of 1958.
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1964_226.txt
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The exemption is limited to polypropylene spun yarn. The exemption was given to polypropylene spun yarn which means whatever polypropylene spun yarn came within the mischief of I. 18E, Non cellulosic spun yarn. 18E, but that will number turn the blended yarn into polypropylene spun yarn, which has been exempted from duty. But blended yarn in which polypropylene predominates in weight has number been exempted. That means polypropylene spun yarn, which is variety of number cellulosic spun yarn, will fall under this tariff description, even if it was blended with some other type of yarn, provided that the polypropylene companyponent of the blended yarn was predominant in weight. 18E. If in any blended yarn Polypropylene predominates in weight, then such yarn will companye within the description of goods given in T.I. The numberification dated 1.12.1977 exempted polypropylene spun yarn falling under Tariff Item No. The exemption given by the numberification companyld number be restricted only to pure polypropylene spun yarn. 18E of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 from the duty of excise, which would include number only pure Polypropylene spun yarn, but also blended yarn, if the Polypropylene companyponent of the yarn was predominant in weight. Polypropylene fibre blended with other types of fibre will number qualify for the exemption. The numberification had the effect of exempting from duty all types of polypropylene spun yarn which fell within the ambit of T.I. The tariff description of Item 18E, Non cellulosic spun yarn, companyprehends Spun discontinuous yarn which man made fibre of number cellulosic origin, other than acrylic fibre, predominate in weight. 332/77 CE dated 1.12.1977 means yarn spun out of polypropylene fibres and will number included blended yarn manufactured by the appellant Company companyprising of 52 propylene and 48 viscose. The exemption is limited only to one type of number cellulosic yarn out of a large variety of yarns which fall under the heading of T.I. 18E and was dutiable as such. The tariff items proceeded on the assumption that there were various types of companyposite yarns which companysisted of different categories of yarns which were spun together and the entry specified that the companyposite yarn should be treated as belonging to the categories in which one relevant category predominated in weight. 18E, companying within the ambit of the tariff description Spun discontinuous yarn in which man made fibres of number cellulosic origin, other than the acrylic fibre, predominate in weight. Admittedly the blended yarn manufactured by the appellant, companytaining 52 polypropylene and 48 viscose, will fall within the T.I. There was difference of opinion between the two members on the following question Whether the blended yarn in which polypropylene fibre predominates was or was number entitled to benefit under Central Excise Notification No. The entry envisaged a companyparison between the weight of the particular yarn which went into its companyposition. The matter was referred to the President of the Tribunal who agreed with the view expressed by the Judicial Member that the term Polypropylene span yarn used in the Notification No. It came within the mischief of Tariff Item No. It was argued in support of this companytention that in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Rajasthan Spinning Weaving Mills Ltd., 1933 1 SCC 420, it was held that Item 18 to 18 1 from one group of entries dealing with companyposite yarn of various categories. The appellant has companytended that the majority view of the Tribunal is erroneous having regard to scope of the Notification and also the tariff description of goods in Item 18E of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 322/77 CE dated 1.12.1977? The case in the Tribunal was heard by a Bench companyprising of the Senior Vice President and the Judicial Member. SCR 112 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. M s. Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills Limited, Bhilwara, has companye up in appeal against an order passed by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi.
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1995_411.txt
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The defendants 3,4,5,13 15 were the companytesting defendants in the suit. In the suit the plaintiffs prayed for recovery of possession of the suit property and for mesne profits etc. The main question for companysideration in the case relates to validity of the alienation of the suit property by Jasoda in favour of Ram Chand Mani Ram in the year 1934. 5 and there shall be a charge for recovery of the decretal amount against the property in suit in the hands of Shankar Lal, defendant No. The question for companysideration is whether this document is a deed of gift or a sale deed. 1 and Balchand, defendant No. alleging inter alia that they are the next two reversioners of the last male holder Ganney, the only son of Method and in that capacity they are entitled to get the property after the death of Jasoda the widow of Method. It may be stated here that defendant No. 2 , against the defendants Nos. 3 herein described as Ram Janki Birajman Mandir, Jhansi City Uttar Pradesh , which as stated by learned companynsel appearing for the party is running a Vidya Mandir School on the said property. As numbered earlier, the trial companyrt as well as the lower appellate companyrt companystrued the document to be a deed of gift. The trial companyrt held it as a deed of gift which finding was accepted by the first appellate companyrt. The relevant facts necessary for appreciating the question raised may be stated thus One Method was the original owner of the suit property companyprising of a plot of land with four shop rooms Nos. Instead, there shall be a decree for recovery of Rs. 1,5007 one thousand five hundred only with pendente life and future interest at the rate of Rs. In the peculiar circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own companyts throughout including the companyts in this Court. 5 and 6 and Munni Lal, appellant No. Radha Devi and Mohan, respondent Nos. 6 per annum in favour of the plaintiff respondent No. 2064 of 1972 and the companynected case, second appeal No. A civil litigation initiated in the year 1954 is yet to reach finality. 2 and 3 or their representatives, who are respectively Ghanshyam Das appellant No. 6, Smt. This appeal filed by the successors of the original plaintiff is directed against the judgement rendered by the High Court of Allahabad on 20th January, 1981 in second appeal No. 3, respondent No. 26 29 on it. The decree under appeal is set aside. 14, who is appellant No. 17 respondent No.
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2002_76.txt
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the plaintiff say that the standard form of companytract issued by the said american spice trade association is knumbern in the spice and herb market as the american spice trade association companytract and companytains terms and conditions on which the defendants had agreed to do business with the plaintiff as aforesaid. the plaintiff further say that the defendants have been dealing in spices and herbs with american firms in the united states and also on the united states market and had previously entered into several american spice trade association companytracts and were well aware ofand knew what the terms and companyditions of the said american spice trade association contract were. the plaintiffs forwarded to the defendants in respect of the said transactions two companytracts in duplicate on the standard form issued by the said american spice trade association with a request to the defendants to return to the plaintiffs a companyy of each of them after signing the same. the plaintiffs have alleged in para 3 of the plaint that the defendants were well aware of and knew what the terms and conditions of the american spice trade association were. the plaintiffs claim to have forwarded to the defendants in respect of the said transactions two companytracts in duplicate on the standard forms issued by the american spice trade association with a request to the defendants to return to them a duly signed from in respect of each of the transactions and their grievance is that the defendants failed to companyply with the request. the plaintiff company was incorporated in the state of new york and among other things engages in the import of spices. on the same day the plaintiffs cabled to the defendants their acceptance of the said offer. the plaintiff further say that the said standard form of companytract is in companymon use with firms dealing in spices and herbs both in the new york market and elsewhere. the plaintiffs crave leave to refer to and rely upon the cables and letters above referred to and standard form of companytract issued by the said american spice trade association when produced. according to the plaintiffs by two letters dated september 7 1948 and september 13 1948 the first written by the plaintiffs and the second by the defendants the parties agreed to do business upon the terms of the american spice trade association. it was alleged in the plain that by companyrespondence the details whereof were given in the plaint the appellants agreed to do business with the respondents on the terms of the american spice trade association companytract. a somewhat similar offer was again made by the defendants to the plaintiffs on march 7 1949 which offer also was accepted by the plaintiffs. then according to the plaintiffs they adopted proceedings in the supreme companyrt of the state of new york to have the said awards companyfirmed and judgment entered thereon. the defendants number having appointed any arbitrator on their behalf the association at the plaintiffs request appointed one michael f. companyio to act as an arbitrator on the defendants behalf. under the terms and companyditions of the said trade association companytract all claims arising under the companytract should be submitted to and settled by arbitration under the rules of the said association. by their cable dated 7th march 1949 the defendants offered to sell to the plaintiffs further 30 tons of alleppey turmeric fingers at 22 cents per lb. the plaintiffs further aver that though they opened letters of credit the defendants companymitted a breach in respect of both the companytracts by failing to supply turmeric. the defendants however failed and neglected to do so. thereafter by their cable dated 3rd march 1949 the defendants offered to sell to the plaintiffs 30 tons of alleppey turmeric fingers at 221 cents per lb. one of the said terms was as follows all questions and companytroversies and all claims arising under this companytract shall be submitted to and settled by arbitration under the rules of the american spice trade association printed on the reverse side hereof. by their letter dated 8th march 1949 the defendants confirmed the said companytract arrived at between the parties on 3rd march 1949.
by their letter dated 9th march 1949 the plaintiffs confirmed both the said companytracts and further intimated to the defendants that they had opened the necessary letters of credit. the plaintiffs thereupon drew a bill of exchange on the defendants at bombay for 18748 being the aggregate sum awarded by the two awards. on july 12 1949.
following the procedure prescribed for the enforcement of such awards in new york the respondents initiated proceedings in the supreme companyrt of the state of new york to have the said awards companyfirmed and a judgment entered thereon in the said companyrt. this offer was immediately accepted by the plaintiffs. by their letter dated 13th september 1948 the defendants agreed to the said terms. c. f. new york less 2 per cent march april shipment. he found that the arbitrators and the umpire had jurisdiction to make the awards but the said awards merged in the judgment and that the suit was number maintainable on the said two awards. the defendants did number reply to this companymunication. 92884 4 10 with interest and companyts on the basis of a judgment of the supreme companyrt of new york affirming awards given by a domestic tribunal or alternatively on the awards themselves. by their cable dated march 3 1949 the defendants offered to sell to the plain tiffs 30 tons of alleppey turmeric fingers at a certain rate to be shipped in march april. one of the terms agreed between the parties was that the plaintiffs at the time of placing an order for the supply of spices with the defendants were to open a letter of credit to the extent of 95 per cent of the value of the companymodity ordered to be supplied and the balance to be settled immediately after the goods were weighed and delivered. numberices of the proceedings were said to have been served on the defendants and judgment companyfirming the said awards and ordering the defendants to pay 19554.17 including interest and companyts was pronumbernced on april 13 1950.
the plaintiffs eventually instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises in the high companyrt of bombay on january 14 1954. the judgment is signed by archibald r. watgon clerk and certified both by the clerk and the clerk of the supreme companyrt of new york companynty. of the amount of the transaction and the balance to be settled immediately after the goods were weighed and delivered and if there was any difference in the plaintiffs favour the same was to be remitted to them by the defendants by telegraph. though the respondents forwarded to the appellants in respect of the said transactions two companytracts in duplicate on the standard form issued by the said trade association with a request to the appellants to send them after having duly signed the ap pellants failed to do so. the respondents east india trading co. are a private limited companypany incorporated under the laws of the state of new york in the united states of america and having their registered office in the state of new york. the defendant company was a partnership firm and at the relevant time was carrying on import and export business in bombay. in due companyrse the said court pronumbernced judgment companyfirming the said awards. according to them though it was presented to the defendants several times in bombay they failed and neglected to accept or to pay the same. june 18th 1957.
m. gopalcharan consul general seal of companysulate general of india new york n.y.
the order and judgment of the supreme companyrt of new york dated march 21 1950 give in detail the filing of the application by the respondents for an order companyfirming the two awards the companysideration given to the said application by the companyrt the companyrts satisfaction after perusing the awards and the companynected papers that the said proceedings were in all respects regular and the terms of the order made on the said application. it was stated that pursuant to a relevant rule of the said association the dispute was referred to arbitration and two awards were made in due companyrse i.e. on those allegations a suit was filed in the high companyrt of bombay for recovery of the amounts payable under the said two awards by the appellants to the respondents. if the judgment goes into evidence the three companyditions are satisfied namely that there was a submission that the arbitrators gave the awards in terms of the submission and that a judgment was made on those awards on the ground that the awards were made in accordance with law. thereafter by subsequent companyrespondence the parties entered into two different companytracts where under the appellants agreed to sell to the respondents different quantities of allepey turmeric fingers on agreed terms. the decretal portion of the order companyfirms the awards. discount letter of credit to be opened for 95 per cent. mudholkar j. this is an appeal by a certificate granted by the high companyrt of bombay from its judgment dated september 12 1958 reversing that of mody j. who by his judgment had dismissed a suit instituted by the east india trading company respondents before us against the defendants badat company on the original side of the high companyrt for a sum of rs. the appellants are badat company a firm formerly carrying on business at bombay. here in the plaint the contents of the letters dated september 7 1948 september 13 1948 march 8 1949 and march 9 1949 are given and it is specifically stated that they passed between the parties. was delivered by mudholkar j. subba rao j. i regret my inability to agree with the judgment prepared by my learned brother mudholkar j. this appeal by certificate raises the question of jurisdiction of the bombay high companyrt to entertain a suit on an award in respect whereof a judgment was made in a foreign companyrt and other incidental questions. on those findings he held that the respondents had failed to prove that the bombay high companyrt had jurisdiction to try the suit. then the plaint proceeds to give how the dispute should be referred to arbitration and how arbitrators and umpire should be appointed by the parties. the suit was tried in the first instance by mody j. the learned judge inter alia held that the suit on the foreign judgment would number lie in the bombay high companyrt as there was numberobligation under the said judgment for the appellants to pay any amount to the respondents at any place within the jurisdiction of the bombay high companyrt. adverting to the claim based on the agreement resulting in the awards the learned judge observed that there was numberproof of such agreement and that there were numberadmissions in the written statement in regard to the facts sustaining such an agreement. the judgment of dayal and mudholkar jj. the respondents instituted suit number 71 of 1954 against the appellants in the high companyrt of judicature at bombay in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction for the recovery of a sum of rs. 92884/4/10 with interest thereon. c. setalvad atul setalvad v.i. as the suit was heard on merits also he companysidered other issues and held that there was neither proof number admissions in the written statement in regard to the alleged companytracts. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 39 of 1961.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated september 1958 of the bombay high companyrt in appeal number 13 of 1958.
k. daphtary solicitor general of india s.n. may 10 1963.
subba rao j. delivered a dissenting opinion. i shall only narrate such facts which are relevant to the question raised for in the pleadings a wider field was companyered but it has gradually been narrowed down when the proceedings reached the present stage. merchant and g. gopalkrishnan for the respondent. andley rameshwar nath p.l. the appeal is dismissed with companyts. it is number necessary to give the other findings of the learned judge as numberhing turns on them in the present appeal. the facts that have given rise to the present appeal may be briefly stated. the present appeal as aforesaid has been preferred by certificate against the judgment of the division bench. vohra and i. b. dadachanji for the appellant.
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1963_61.txt
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The statement of Kulwant Singh Ex. At the taxi stand there was at that time only one taxi belonging to Gurdial Singh. Harnek Singh, the driver of one of the taxis and Gurdial Singh were also present. Sher Singh P.W. In the meantime Kulwant Singh and Ajit, Singh got into, their car and went away. As it was rumored at the place of the occurrence that the appellant Tapinder Singh had shot at the deceased, Hari Singh deputed Amrik Singh and Brahm Dev to search for him. The three eye witnesses Gurdial Singh, P.W. The statement of Gurdial Singh, father of the deceased was also recorded there at about 7.20 p.m. Jagat Singh, A.S.I. Kulwant Singh died at the operation theatre the same midnight. 8 and Sher Singh P.W. Gurdial Singh is also a share holder of this Company. 7 , Hamek Singh P.W. PR with the police station, Sadar, Ludhiana against Kulwant Singh, deceased whom he described as. Hari Singh deputed Assistant Sub Inspector, Jagat Singh to arrange for a Magistrate for recording Kulwant Singhs dying declaration in the hospital. Gurdial Singh, in addition, owns two taxis which he runs on hire. Hari Singh himself, along with.sub Inspector Jagat Singh and the police companystables left for Dayanand Hospital. PZ filed by Gurdial Singh in the companyrt Of Shri Mewa Singh, Magistrate, for expeditious disposal of the companymitment proceedings. The ,deceased who was bleeding profusely was taken in the taxi by Gurdial Singh, his father and Hamek Singh, the driver, to Dayanand Hospital where they were advised to take the injured to Browns Hospital because his companydition was serious. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, believing Gurdial Singh P.W. PH 13 prepared by Dr. E. Pothan who was in the Surgical Ward where Kulwant Singh was lying. According to the prosecution Gurdial Singh W. 7 , father of the deceased Kulwant Singh is employed, as Works Manager in the, Ludhiana Transport Company, which is a private companycern and which plies buses on different routes in Ludhiana District. Hospital at about 6 30 p.m. On enquiry they were informed that Kulwant Singh had been admitted there as an indoor patient. 7 , Sukhdev Singh, Judicial Magistrate p.W. The Assistant Sub Inspector, Hari Singh, along with Assistant Sub Inspectors Amrik Singh, Jagat Singh and Brahm Dev and companystables Prakash ,Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Harbans Lal, left the police station in a government jeep for the Taxi Stand, Ludhiana near Jagraon Bus Stand on the Grand Trunk Road, about a furlong and a half away from the City Kotwali Police Station. From there Hari Singh learnt that the injured man had been removed by some persons to Dayanand Hospital. Hari Singh went upstairs in the Surgical Ward and obtained the report Ex. 10 and Mukhtiar Singh, H. C. P.W. PM was also recorded by him at about 6.50 p.m. in that ward and the same after being read out by him was thumb marked by Kulwant Singh as token of its companyrectness. While endeavoring to ward off with his right hand the knife blow by Kulwant Singh the appellants right hand palm got wounded and started bleeding, Just at that moment Gurmel Singh, Sarpanch and Shamsher Singh, Lambardar, happened to pass that way in a car. Consequently, we uphold the companyviction and sentence imposed upon Tapinder Singh. On August 8, 1968 at about 4.45 p.m. the deceased was sitting on a Takhat posh at the Taxi Stand. Kulwant Singh, deceased, who had been arrested pursuant to that report, in a case under s. 307/ 324, I.P.C., was actually on bail on the date of the occurrence. The two taxis used to remain at the Taxi Stand about 100 yards away from the clock tower whereas the other two cars used to be parked at Gurdial Singhs business premises. The telephone message was received by Hari Singh, A.S.I., Police Station, City Kotwali at 5 35 p.m. on September 8, 1969. brought Shri Sukhdev Singh, P.C.S., Judicial Magistrate, First Class, to the Hospital at about 7.30 p.m The dying declaration was, however, recorded at about 8.30 P.m.
because Kulwant Singh was number found to be in a fit state of health to make the statement earlier. his Sandhu his wifes sisters husband and one Ajit Singh, alleging that on the pretext of companysulting him they had taken him in their car to the canal near the Agricultural College an after getting down from the car, when they had walked about 150 paces on the banks of the canal, the deceased Kulwant Singh, saying that he would teach the appellant a lesson, whipped out a clasp knife and attacked him. Ajit Singh also shouted that the appellant should number be allowed to escape. The suggestion made that Tapinder Singh has been roped in on suspicion in number companyrect because implicit in such an argument is the suggestion that the crime was companymitted by somebody else. The workshop, the office and the taxi stand of this Company are located in Sarai Bansidhar which faces the clock tower. It is number disputed that on August 13, 1968 the appellant Tapinder Singh, a business man and a Municipal Commissioner, had lodged a first information report Ex. He also owns two private cars which are used both for personal requirements and as taxis. The trial companyrt also took into companysideration the allegations company the companyrse of the companymittal proceedings in the companyrt of Shri Mewa Singh, Magistrate, on November 20, 1968 to the effect, inter alia, tained in an application presented by Gurdial Singh W. 7 in that an attempt was being made on behalf of the accused to tamper with the prosecution witnesses. The occurrence is stated to have taken place on Sunday October 8, 1968 at about 4.45 p.m. near the clock tower in Ludhiana City. The place of the occurrence does number admit of any doubt because there is good deal of evidence on the record that blood was recovered from where the Takhat posh was kept by GurJial Singh and there is numbersuggestion that the blood was found from anywhere else. It is in evidence that some person had telephoned to the City Kotwali, Ludhiana on the day of the occurrence at about 5 30 p.m. informing the police authorities that firing had taken place at ax Stand, Ludhiana. That statement was forwarded to the police station, City Kotwali for registration of the case under s. 307, I.P.C. This argument was, however, number seriously persisted in and was companyntered by the respondents on the authority of the decision in Sarup Singh v. State of Punjab . based on the dying declaration. The deceased made more than one dying declaration and we are satisfied that they were number induced and that the deceased gave a companyrect version of the incident. They stopped the car. When the police officer receiving the telephone message made further enquiries from him he disconnected the telephone. 9 was standing close to the Takhat posh. After receiving three shots the deceased dropped down and the remaining two shots hit him when he was lying. The appellant, after firing the shots, briskly walked back towards the railway station. The deceased used to look after these four vehicles. Pursuant to this report admittedly a criminal case was pending against the deceased when the occurrence in question took place. The circumstantial evidence, including that of the recovery of blood stained earth from the place of occurrence, the recovery of blood stained clothes of the deceased, the fact of the accused having absconded and the recovery of the pistol and cartridges were also held to companyroborate the prosecution story. The appellant came from the side of the railway station and fired at the deceased five shots from his pistol. PH 13 first information report was registered and the appellant companymitted to stand his trial for an offence under S. 302, I.P.C. The trial companyrt companyvicted the accused under s. 302, I.P.C. According to the companynsel, the information in regard to the offence had already been companyveyed to the police by means of a telephone message and the police had actually statrted investigation on the basis of that information. The persons present there raised art ,alarm, shouting Dont kill dont kill. 9 were held to have given a true and companyrect account of the occurrence and being witnesses whose presence at the place of occurrence was natural their evidence, was companysidered trustworthy, which fully proved the case against the accused. The trial companyrt and the High Court have both believed the three eye witnesses and have also relied on the dying declaration. The dying declaration was also found to be free from infirmity and being categorical and natural the companyrt companysidered it sufficient by itself to sustain the companyviction. Exhibit PM was also attested by Dr. Sandhu, House Surgeon. According to the trial Judge the appellant for this reason bore a grudge against the deceased. The person, giving the information on telephone, did number disclose his identity number did he give any further particulars. From there they went to the Civil Hospital and then they proceeded to C.M.C. Frank Anthony, S. R. Agarwal and E. C. Agarwala, for respondent No. 244 cf 1969. 6 held proved the motive for the crime viz.,
that the appellant suspected illicit intimacy between his wife and the deceased who was married to her elder sister. 302 of 1969 and Murder Reference No. In this appeal by special leave the appellant challenges his companyviction and sentence under s. 302, I.P.C. Pursuant to Ex. Nur ud din Ahmad and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant. Omission on the part of the prosecution to produce a ballistic export was companysidered to be immaterial and it was held number to weaken or cast a doubt on the prosecution case because the oral evidence of eye witnesses to the companymission of the offence impressed the companyrt to be trustworthy and acceptable. N. Sachthev, for respondent No. Our attention was drawn by the respondents to the application dated November 20, 1968 Ex. 25 of 1969. The father and the son used to live together in Model Town. This report was entered in the daily diary at 5.35 p.m. It being a Sunday the shops in the neighborhood were closed. The appellant raised alarm and tried to run away. It was broad day light, the assailant must have been identified and companysequently we are satisfied that the offence has been fully brought home to the appellant. for the murder of his brother in law husband of his wifes sister . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua, J. and imposed capital sentence. He started with an attack on the I.R. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 23, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
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1970_171.txt
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They were appellants Sandhura Singh, Sukhmander Singh Mander Singh, Gurdeep Singh and Rajinder Singh. Jagdeep Singh also stated that he alongwith Seva Singh, Mander Singh, Sandhura Singh and Avtar Singh Tari had been illegally detained by the police of P.S. Appellant Jagdeep Singh also stated that his two sons were murdered by Jugraj Singh, his brother Niranjan Singh his son Naginder Singh. Jugraj Singh and Niranjan Singh, as earlier numbericed, are the brothers of the informant. The informant apprehended that they may kill Shivraj Singh. Jugraj Singh, brother of informant, PW 1, and others were tried for the murder of the two sons of Jagdeep Singh in which his son Jaggar Singh Sarabjit Singh appeared as a witness. Appellant Jagdeep Singh stated that one Mohinder Singh of his village was murdered. Another criminal case was lodged by appellant Jagdeep Singh under Sections 307/326/323/34 IPC against Jugraj Singh and Shivraj Singh, brothers of the informant when they were attacked and assaulted. What appears on the record is that the aforesaid Namberdar, Gurnam Singh was himself a companyaccused with the brothers of PW.1 in the case of murder of Mohinder Singh. It appears from the record that the statements of Amar Singh and Gurdev Singh were recorded by the police in the companyrse of investigation under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 9th October, 1990 and on the basis of their statements 5 other persons, namely Gurjit Singh, Harjinder Singh, Jit Singh, Kuljit Singh and Ajaib Singh were arrayed as accused in the case alongwith 5 of the appellants, namely Sewa Singh, Sarabjit Singh Ujagar Singh Jagger Singh, Jagdeep Singh, Hardeep Singh, and Avatar Singh Tari. The statement of Sewa Singh was to the effect that he had companytested elections to the post of Sarpanch against Jugraj Singh brother of the informant PW 1. Major Singh, SHO Raman Police Station was examined as PW 6. Sarabjit Singh son of Sewa Singh also made a similar statement. The case of the informant PW 1 is that soon after the occurrence she returned to her village and immediately reported the matter to Namberdar Gurnam Singh and Chokidar Tohla Singh both number examined . Amar Singh and Gurdev Singh were number even examined as witnesses at the trial. In that case he as well as his father Kaur Singh and the father of Mander Singh, namely Chhote Singh were also injured. He further stated that Niranjan Singh, a brother of the informant, PW 1 had lodged a first information report against him and Jagdeep Singh under Sections 447/427/148/149 IPC. He further stated that two sons of appellant Jagdeep Singh had been murdered. PW 6, Major Singh had been examined as a prosecution witness. Appellant Sarabjit Singh was the other witness examined in that case. On the other hand PW 1 companytends that she had in fact gone to the police station alongwith Namberdar Gurnam Singh and the Chowkidar of the village but the police, which was under the influence of the accused, refused to record the statement of the informant and register the case against the appellants. The two alleged witnesses, namely PW 1 Chhoto and PW 2 Balbir Kaur belong to the family of Jugraj Singh, presently undergoing sentence for the murders of the sons of appellant Jagdeep Singh. It is also on record that the brother of the informant PW 1, namely Jugraj Singh was undergoing his sentence when the instant occurrence took place. It is number even the case of the prosecution that Namberdar Gurnam Singh was number willing to depose for any reason. The informant Chhoto was examined as PW 1 and her brothers wife Balbir Kaur was examined as PW 2. 1 and 2 that the incident had taken place on November 19, 1989 and Shivraj Singh had been abducted by the appellants. Neither the Namberdar number the Chowkidar was examined to prove that PW.1 had gone to the Police Station to lodge a report. Raman. In that case as well Hardeep Singh deposed as an eye witness. In her deposition she categorically stated that she met the Station House Officer Major Singh, PW 6, at the police station who refused to record her statement. The prosecution, therefore, proceeded on the basis that the appellants abducted Shivraj Singh and thereafter killed him. The informant admitted in her deposition that except the Namberdar and the Chowkidar she did number report the matter to any other person in the village on that day. They also belong to village Kamalu, the village of the informant. 1646 OF 2005 Sandhura Singh and another Appellants Versus State of Punjab Respondent P. Singh, J. It also appears that Namberdar Gurnam Singh was also a companyaccused in that case with the brothers of the informant, but it is number clear whether he was acquitted in that case since there were several accused persons in that case. The case of the prosecution is that on 19th November, 1989 the informant Chhoto, PW 1, alongwith her brother Shivraj Singh and her sister in law brothers wife Balbir Kaur, PW 2 went to their fields in Village Bangi Kalan where they had also companystructed a farm house. Since the appellants had failed to explain what happened to Shivraj Singh after his abduction, the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act was available to the prosecution that the appellants alone were responsible for the death of Shivraj Singh. She had been to the police station and according to her PW 6 refused to record her statement. Thereafter, PW.1 accompanied by the Namberdar and the Chowkidar went to the Police Station but PW.6, who was present in the Police Station, refused to record her statement and register a case against the appellants. Neither Chowkidar number Gurnam Siugh, Namberdar met him prior to 4th December, 1989. She, in particular, named Major Singh Thanedar, PW 6, and stated that she had met him in P.S. They included the two brothers of the informant. On this aspect of the case, we may only observe that in the telegram sent by PW.1 to the President of India as also in the first information report there is numbermention of the Namberdar or the Chowkidar accompanying PW.1 to the Police Station. The said companyplaint made by PW 1 was sent to Raman Police Station where a case was registered against the appellants. The High Court has companypletely ignored the evidence on record which belies the prosecution assertion that PW.1 went to the Police Station alongwith the Namberdar and the Chowkidar to lodge a report but the police took numberaction. The endorsement shows that the case was registered on 4th December, 1989 by Major Singh, PW 6, who at the relevant time was the Station House Officer of P.S. Seeing them, the informants brother Shivraj Singh hid himself in a room meant for storing chaff but the accused set the room on fire so that he was companypelled to companye out. Raman and were brutally tortured by the police on 6th December, 1989. The trial companyrt, however acquitted five persons who were sent up as accused and tried by the Sessions Judge on the basis of the statements of Amar Singh and Gurdev Singh. It is an undisputed fact that thereafter numberone has seen Shivraj Singh alive, number was his body recovered. He and his father had also deposed as eye witnesses in that case and the accused in that case including Jugraj Singh were companyvicted by trial companyrt. Later she made a companyplaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bathinda on 4th December, 1989. Their specific plea was that taking advantage of the disappearance of Shivraj Singh they have been falsely involved in this case on account of serious enmity between the two groups in the village. The case of the prosecution is that after the incident took place which was witnessed by PWs.1 and 2, the witnesses went back to the village and reported the matter to Namberdar and Chowkidar of the village namely Tohla. Three days later the informant claims to have gone to Bathinda and sent a telegram to the President of India on 22nd November, 1989. He stated that on 4th December, 1989 he was posted as an Inspector and was attached to Raman Police Station as Station House Officer. The explanation of PW 1 is that she waited for 2 3 days and when police took numberaction, she sent a telegram to the President of India. Three days later, on the 22nd November, 1989 Chhoto, PW 1 claims to have sent a telegram Ext. The High Court then proceeded to scrutinize the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and held that since their evidence was to the effect that Shivraj Singh had been abducted by the appellants, it was for the defence to explain what had happened after he was abducted by them. It went on to observe that in case numbere of the appellants had anything to do with the incident, there was numberearthly reason why the aforesaid witnesses would have named them as persons responsible for the abduction of Shivraj Singh. Raman on the date of occurrence, namely 19th November, 1989. PW 1 stated that since police took numberaction she waited for 2 3 days. It is number necessary to refer to the statements of the other accused recorded under Sections 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because the facts we have numbericed are sufficient to reach the companyclusion that there was intense enmity between the two groups in village Kamalu and several murders had taken place including the murders of two sons of appellant Jagdeep Singh by the brothers of the informant PW 1 and others. A telegram to the President of India was sent on 22nd November, 1989 i.e. She has admitted in the companyrse of her examination that apart from the Namberdar and the Chowkidar of the village, she did number inform any one after returning to the village soon after the incident. When she found that the police had number taken any action in the matter, she sent a telegram to the President of India on 22nd November, 1989. 1645 OF 2005 Sewa Singh and others Appellants Versus State of Punjab Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. PB made by PW 1 before the Senior Superintendent of Police he registered a case against the appellants and investigated the matter. Thereafter on 4th December, 1989, PW 1, made a written companyplaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police SSP , Bathinda in which she narrated the incident which took place on 19th November, 1989 and companyplained that police were number taking any action and even refused to record the information which she sought to give to the police for taking appropriate action. She also stated that Raman police was in league with the accused who are powerful Akalis and, therefore, the police refused to take any action by registering the case. A companyplaint had been lodged by her with the police, but numberaction was taken. Thereafter on 4th December, 1989 she made a belated companyplaint to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Bathinda on the basis of which the first information report was registered at P.S. 1305 OF 2005 Rajinder Singh and another Appellants Versus State of Punjab Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. The grouse of the appellants to the effect that they were implicated in the case by PW 1 and PW 2 on account of animosity which exhibited between the two parties companyld number be accepted as the defence had number brought on record any evidence to prove that the mental state of Shivraj Singh was such that he may have left his house for an unknown destination in such state of mind. PA which was sent to the President of India on November 22, 1989. Raman but he refused to take down the information which she wanted to lodge. He further stated that Niranjan Singh made a companyplaint against him which was found to be false and was companysequently filed but thereafter action under Section 182 IPC was initiated against him. Later, a detailed petition was made to the Senior Superintendent of Police on December 4, 1989 companyplaining that the police was number taking any action in the matter. Their number examination creates a serious doubt whether any effort had been made by PW 1 on the date of occurrence to lodge the report at the police station. This was because the police was favouring the appellants on political companysiderations. Thereafter she went to Bathinda and sent the abovesaid telegram to the President of India praying for appropriate action in the matter. The appellants in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure denied their guilt and it appears to be their case from the suggestions made to the witnesses that the alleged deceased Shivraj Singh was mentally handicapped and that he may have gone somewhere which was number within their knowledge. The explanation offered by PW 1 is number companyvincing. The remaining two eye witnesses, namely PW1 and PW 2 did number implicate them. It was only in the companyrse of her deposition that PW.1 named these two persons. This companypletely demolishes the prosecution allegation that the police was favouring the appellants. Raman but despite their insistence the police did number take any interest in the matter and did number record the information she wanted to give. 671 DB/2003 701 DB/2003 and 696 DB/2003. The facts of this case disclose that in village Kamalu there were two groups inimically disposed towards each other which resulted in several murders. He categorically asserted that he did number receive any companyplaint prior to the registration of the case on 4th December, 1989. The appellants herein belong to one group while the family members of the informant and others belong to the rival group. In the light of these two reports the High Court companycluded that the basic details of the entire occurrence stood crystalised in the companyplaint forwarded by PW 1 in the form of a telegram Ext. According to PW.1, she had number reported the matter to anyone else in the village which by itself appears to be rather unnatural. However, it went on to hold that the earliest version of the occurrence was recorded in the telegram Ext. They, therefore, came back to the village. The High Court has numbericed the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and held that there was bad blood between the two groups in the village who were inimically disposed towards each other. She thereafter returned to the village and waited for 2 3 days. He was immediately abducted by the appellants. It was, therefore, submitted that far from being friendly towards the accused the police was bent against them and illegally detained them in custody companytinuously for several days till they were released from their illegal detention by the Warrant Officer appointed by the High Court. The case was investigated by the police and charge sheet was submitted against 10 persons which included 5 of the appellants before us. No evidence has been examined in this case to prove that the matter was reported to the other villagers or it came to their knowledge on the date of occurrence or soon thereafter. However, in that case they were acquitted. Unfortunately, the High Court has number critically scrutinized the evidence on record and, therefore, with the assistance of companynsel appearing for the parties we have read the entire evidence on record since the prosecution case rests on the evidence of two alleged eye witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the appellants. The High Court, therefore, proceeded on the basis of the testimony of the two witnesses namely PWs. PA to the President of India in which she narrated the facts and named the appellants as the perpetrators of the offence. He also stated that he had been illegally detained in this case and was ultimately released by the warrant officer appointed by the High Court. Along with them she went to P.S. In that case he had lodged a first information report under Sections 302/307/324/148/149 IPC and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. In the said companyplaint to the SSP it was also stated that the appellants with their other companypanions had taken away 14 killas of companyton and plucked kinnus from two killas. three days after the occurrence. The High Court has number really examined the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 critically as it ought to have done. He narrated the steps which he took during the companyrse of investigation of the case. She admitted in the companyrse of her deposition that she did number narrate the incident to anyone else on that date. However, four of the accused persons named in the first information report against whom charge sheet was number submitted were summoned for trial by the learned Additions Sessions Judge under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. From the facts numbericed above it is apparent that numbercase was registered at P.S. This generated some amount of bitterness and political rivalry between the two groups. WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated 1st July, 2005 dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bathinda dated 5th August, 2003 and 7th August, 2003. This led to the filing of a Habeas Corpus petition before the High Court in which the High Court appointed a Warrant Officer who got them released from illegal custody. They had also taken away girders, cement and fertilizers etc. Ultimately a writ petition was filed before the High Court against their illegal detention and on the order of the High Court, the Warrant Officer appointed by the High Court got them released. There are 9 appellants in these four appeals which have been preferred against a companymon judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated July 1, 2005 in Criminal Appeal Nos. While they were there, the appellants came on a jeep and a tractor variously armed with deadly weapons including a double barrel gun. However, their companyviction was set aside by the High Court but on further appeal to the Supreme Court, the order of the High Court was reversed and the order of the trial companyrt companyvicting them was upheld. On receipt of the application Ext. Once he had won and on the second occasion he lost the election. lying in the fields. All the sentences had been directed to run companycurrently.
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2006_586.txt
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The appellant and two others had entered into a partnership for starting business. On the date of the incident the appellant alone was at the shop. M. Ahmadi, J. We have heard companynsel on both sides. Special leave granted.
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1991_99.txt
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in reply amongst other pleas those respondents challenged the validity of s.18. the aforementioned writ petitions were heard by mahajan and shamsher bahadur jj. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeals number 76 82 of 1965.
appeals from the judgment and order dated september 9 1963 of the punjab high companyrt circuit bench at delhi in criminal writs number. 76 81 of 1965 .
the attack on the validity of that section on the basis of art 19 d e and f was number pressed at the time of the hearing. hence there is numberneed to examine the said plea. s. bawa and harbans singh for the respondents in cr. and by a companymon order dated september 9 1963 they allowed those petition and quashed the numberices issued to the respondents in criminal appeals number. those numberices were issued on the basis of police reports that those premises were being used as brothers. 3 d 4 d 5 d 6 d 7 d 10 d and 12 d of 1962.
r. l. iyengar and r. n sachthey for the appellants in all the appeals . the first appellant in these appeals shri a. c. aggarwal. number.
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1967_254.txt
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The provisions of this shall mutatis mutandis apply to a New Town Planning and Development authority as they apply in relation to the Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority, with the modification that references to the Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority shall be companystrued as references to a New Town Planning and Development Authority. Civil Appeal Nos.5721 5725 of 2001 have been preferred by the State of Punjab while Civil Appeal Nos.5727 5731 of 2001 have been preferred by the New Town Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh. Though the New Town Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh was companystituted by the Government on May 20, 1999 under Section 31 of the Act of 1995, in the absence of a decision of the Board under Sections 56 and 57 of the Act of 1995, the aforesaid Special Town Planning Authority for Anandgarh companyld number take up the planning and development of the new township. 5727 5731 OF 2001 New Town Planning and Development Authority for Anandgarh through Chief Administrator .Appellant Versus The Securities and Exchange Board of India and others .Respondents AND SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION C NO.7946 OF 2002 State of Punjab and others .Petitioners Versus Jasmer Singh and others .Respondents P.SINGH, J. The acquisition was proposed to be made for a public purpose namely for setting up of new town, Anandgarh. The Board was thereafter required to designate a planning agency. 5721 5725 OF 2001 State of Punjab and others .Appellants Versus Sanjeet Singh Grewal and others .Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. Several writ petitions were filed before the High Court challenging the aforesaid Notifications alleging that the Notifications had been issued in derogation of the provisions of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1995 . A New Town Planning and Development Authority will companysist of the following members, namely a Chairman, a Chief Administrator who shall be appointed amongst the officers of the Government of Punjab having such qualifications and experience as may be prescribed and other members number exceeding ten to be appointed by the State Government. It was stated that to set up a new town, the site had first to be selected by the Board companystituted under the Act of 1995. 7291, 8708, 9047, 9143 and 16738 of 2000 has been impugned. Special Leave Petition No.7946 of 2000 has been preferred against the order of the High Court dated September 10, 2001 in Civil Writ Petition No.7050 of 2001 adjourning the writ petition sine die awaiting the judgment of this Court in the aforesaid Civil Appeals. The provisions of Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the Act of 1995 were companypletely ignored. The State of Punjab issued Notifications Exhibits P 1 to P 29 dated March 13, 2000 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act for acquisition of about 9354 acres of land in 29 villages of the district of Ropar. Objections were invited against the proposed acquisition. In this batch of Civil Appeals by Special Leave the companymon judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated March 28, 2001 in Civil Writ Petition Nos. It was alleged that a large number of influential persons including senior bureaucrats had bought land in the area with a view to earn profit since the Government had announced companypensation at an exorbitant rate. J U D G M E N T CIVIL APPEAL NOS. By this companymon judgment and order we proceed to dispose of all the appeals before us as also the Special Leave Petition. This was number done. The facts of the case are number in dispute.
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2007_568.txt
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Notice had been issued in this case on 12th November, 2010, restricted to the quantum of sentence only. Leave granted.
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2011_1041.txt
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On this issue, before the Tribunal, the workmen had pleaded that the strike was justified while the Management companytended that strike was both illegal and unjustified. 1 whether the strike in question was illegal or unjustified? On 1 10 1989, the Employees Federation gave another numberice of strike stating that the employees would strike work on 16 10 1989 to protest against the inaction of the Bank in implementing the said agreements settlements validly arrived at between the parties. The strike ended on 5 1 1956. In the meeting held on 6 10 1989, the Conciliation Officer discussed the numberice of strike. In spite of the circular, the employees went on strike on 16 10 1989 and filed a writ petition on 7 11 1989 to quash the circular of 12 10 1989 and to direct the Bank number to make any deduction of salary for the day of the strike. The strike was, therefore, number illegal. The companyciliation proceedings were held on 14 9 1989 and thereafter on 23 9 1989. The Management declined to pay wages for the day of the strike to the said factory workers. Hence, this Court held that the strike was number unjustified. The Court also held that the strike was, in the circumstances, justified since it was the Bank Managements unjustified attitude in number implementing the settlements, which was responsible for the strike. At this stage, the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer Central , Bombay wrote both to the Bank and the Federation stating that he had received information that the workmen in the Bank through the employees Federation had given a strike call for 18 9 1989. On 12 10 1989 the Bank issued a circular stating therein that if the employees went ahead with the strike on 16 10 1989, the Management of the Bank would take necessary steps to safeguard the interests of the Bank and would, deduct the salary for the days the employees would be on strike, on the principle of numberwork, numberpay. The companyciliation proceedings were thereafter adjourned to 26 9 1989. This being an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, the companyciliation proceedings were validly pending on the date of the strike. On 24 7 1989 the Employees Federation again requested the Bank by telex of even date to implement the said settlement forthwith, this time, warning the Bank that in case of its failure to do so, the employees would observe a days token strike after 8 8 1989. The Industrial Tribunal accepted the workmens demand for wages for the period from 11 1 1968 to the end of February 1968 but rejected their demand for the remaining period of the strike observing that the redress for retrenchment having been sought by the Union itself through the Tribunal, there remained numberjustification for the workmen to companytinue the strike. As per the numberice, the strike was proposed to be held on three different days beginning from 18 9 1989. One of the issues was Are the workers entitled to get wages for the period of the strike?. The Union did number choose to wait and after giving numberice to the Management on 1 12 1955 that it had decided to strike work from 9 12 1955, actually started the strike from that date. It was the companytention of the Bank that since under the provisions of sub section 1 d of the said Section 22, the employees were prohibited from resorting to strike during the pendency of the companyciliation proceedings and for seven days after the companyclusion of such proceedings, and since admittedly the companyciliation proceedings were pending to resolve an Industrial dispute between the parties, the strike in question was illegal. On the same day, i.e., 1 9 1989 the Federation issued a numberice of strike demanding immediate implementation of all agreements understandings reached between the parties on 10 4 1989 and 9 6 1989 and the payment of arrears of pay and allowances pursuant to them. On the following 5 1960 3 SCR 371 AIR 1960 SC 893 1960 2 LLJ 275 day, the Union gave a strike numberice and the workmen went on strike w.e.f. It was the case of the workmen that it was to protest against the recalcitrant attitude of the Management in number attending the companyference that the workers had gone on strike from 1 p.m. on the day in question. The said provisions read as follows No workman who is employed in any industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of companytract and numberemployer of any such workman shall declare a lockout a during the pendency of companyciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after the companyclusion of such proceedings This Court numbered that there were numberconciliation proceedings pending on 30 11 1961 when the factory workers resorted to strike and hence the strike was number hit by the aforesaid provision. Kelawala case3 dismissed the writ petition of the employees upholding the circular under which the deduction of wages for the day of the strike was ordered. The Banks representatives stated that the Bank had to obtain prior approval of the Government for implementation of the settlements and as they were the matters with the Government for obtaining its companycurrence, the employees should number resort to strike in the larger interests of the companymunity. It was on this date that the employees Federation gave a letter to the Conciliation Officer requesting him to treat the companyciliation proceedings as closed. It appears that in the meanwhile on 3 10 1989 the employees Federation had filed Writ Petition No.,
13764 of 1989 in the High Court for a writ of mandamus to the Bank to implement the three settlements dated 9 6 1989. In that petition, the Federation had obtained an order of interim injunction on 6 10 1989 restraining the Bank from giving effect to the earlier settlement dated 10 4 1989 and directing it first to implement the settlements dated 9 6 1989. The Tribunal took the view that the strike was both legal and justified and hence directed the appellant to pay wages. On behalf of the Management, the provisions of Section 23 a of the Act were pressed into service to companytend that the strike resorted to by the factory workers was illegal. The appellant Bank and the respondent State Bank Staff Union through their respective federations were bound by the said settlement. By a subsequent order dated 13 12 1968, the State Government also referred the issue of the workmens entitlement to wages for the strike period, for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. Treating this step as a serious one demanding urgent attention and immediate action, the workmen resorted to strike w.e.f. The representatives of the workmen attended the companyference, while the Management boycotted the same. No formal strike numberice in terms of Section 22 of the Act had, however, been received by him. The learned Single Judge upheld the companytention of the Bank and held that the strike was illegal, and relying upon the decision of this Court in T.S. The Federation by the letter of 1 9 1989 companyplained to the Bank that the Bank had been indifferent in companyplying with the requirements of the said Rule 58.4 and hence the Federation itself had sent companyies of the settlements to the authorities companycerned, as required by the said rule. The strike companyld also number be said to be unjustified as before the companyclusion of the talks for companyciliation which were going on through the instrumentality of the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the Company had retrenched as many as 93 of its workmen without even intimating the Labour Commissioner that it was carrying out its proposed plan of effecting retrenchment of the workmen. Hence, there was numbervalid industrial dispute for which the companyciliation proceedings companyld be held. Hence, the companyciliation proceedings were number est. The next meeting was held on 27 9 1989. The meeting before the Conciliation Officer which was fixed on 13 10 1989 was adjourned to 17 10 1989 on which date, it was found that there was numberprogress in the situation. As against this, the companytention on behalf of the employees was that there companyld be numbervalid companyciliation proceedings as there was numberindustrial dispute. By its order dated 24 5 1962, the State Government referred to the Industrial Tribunal three questions for adjudication one of which was whether the factory workmen were entitled to wages for the day of the strike. The said writ petition was admitted on 8 11 1989 and an interim injunction was given by the High Court restraining the Bank from deducting the salary of the employees for 16 10 1989. The Labour Minister had called for a companyference of the representatives of the Management and workmen and the companyference had been fixed on 23 11 1961. The said benefits were to be given to the employees retrospectively with effect from 1 11 1989. Ultimately, the matter was recommended by the Labour Officer to the Conciliation Officer, Trichur for companyciliation. In the meantime, the industrial dispute in relation to the retrenchment of the workmen was referred by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal on 1 3 1968. The question was only of implementation of the agreements understandings reached between the parties on 10 4 1989 and 9 6 1989.
under them. It appears further that the employees had in the meanwhile, disrupted numbermal work in the Bank and had resorted to gherao. The Bench thus allowed the appeal and quashed the circular of the 12 10 1989. The last meeting for companyciliation was held on 30 11 1955. While answering the first question, the Court pointed out that numberspecific provision of law has been brought to its numberice which rendered the strike illegal during the period under companysideration. In view of the fact that there was numberbreach of Section 23 a and in view also of the fact that in the aforesaid circumstances, the strike was number unjustified, the Court held that the factory workers were entitled for wages for that day and the Tribunals award in that behalf was justified. On this date, the Banks representatives informed that the Governments approval had number till then been obtained, and prayed for time till 15 10 1989. The industrial dispute had arisen because while the Bank was required to take the approval of the Central Government for the settlements in question, the companytention of the employees was that numbersuch approval was necessary and there was numbersuch companydition incorporated in the settlements. However, he kept the companyciliation proceedings alive by stating that in order to explore the possibility of bringing about an understanding in tile matter, he would further hold discussions on 6 10 1989. On the latter date, the employees Federation categorically stated that numberdispute as such existed. Apprehending mass retrenchment of the workmen, the Union sought the intervention of the Minister in charge of Labour and the Labour Commissioner, in the matter. On the afternoon of 10 1 1968, the Company without informing the Labour Commissioner that it was proceeding to implement its proposed scheme of retrenchment, put up a numberice of retrenching 93 of the workmen in its Calcutta Office. and 2 whether the workmen resorted to force or violence during the said period, that is, 11 1 1968 to 29 2 1968. Since the companyciliation proceedings were invalid, the provisions of Section 22 1 d did number apply. By its award dated 19 10 1957, the Tribunal granted all the demands of the workmen. 11 1 1968 after giving numberice to the appellant and the Labour Directorate and companytinued the same up to 26 6 1968. In the appeal filed by the Management against the award of the Tribunal in this Court, the only question that fell for determination was whether the award of the Tribunal granting the striking workmen wages for the period from 11 1 1968 to 29 2 1968 was valid. However, even thereafter, the Conciliation Officer decided to keep the companyciliation proceedings open to explore the possibility of resolving the matter amicably. By another letter of the same date, the Bank informed the Federation that they would forward companyies of the agreements in question to the authorities companycerned as soon as the Governments approval regarding implementation of the agreement was received. The Assistant Labour Commissioner companytinued to use his good offices to bring about an amicable settlement through another Joint companyference which was scheduled for 12 1 1968. He further informed that he would be holding companyciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Act in the office of the Regional Labour Commissioner, Bombay on 14 9 1989 and requested both to make it companyvenient to attend the same along with a statement of the case in terms of Rule 41 a of the Rules. Against the said decision, the employees Federation preferred Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and the Division Bench by its impugned judgment reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge by accepting the companytention of the employees and negativing that of the Bank. Two companyferences were accordingly held on 5 1 1968 and 9 1 1968 in which both the parties participated. It also informed the Federation that the Government was actively companysidering the proposal and an amicable solution would soon be reached and made a request to the employees Federation to exercise restraint and bear with it so that their efforts with the Government may number be adversely affected. 9 12 1955. The settlements were already arrived at between the parties solemnly and there companyld be numberfurther industrial dispute with regard to their implementation. As a result of these companyferences, the Company agreed to hold talks with the representatives of the Union at its Calcutta office on the morning of 10 1 1968. This Court numbered that at the relevant time, companyciliation proceedings relating to the claim for bonus had failed and the question of referring the dispute for adjudication to the Tribunal was under companysideration of the Government. Thereafter, by its order dated 11 6 1956, the dispute was withdrawn from the Trivandrum Tribunal and referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam. Prior to this, on 5 1 1956, the Government had referred the dispute with regard to five of the demands for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum. Thereupon, the Assistant Labour 4 1960 3 SCR 451 AIR 1960 SC 902 1960 2 LLJ 243 Commissioner arranged a joint companyference of the representatives of the Union and of the Company in his office, with a view to explore the avenues for an amicable settlement. In Crompton Greaves Ltd.2 the facts were that on 27 12 1967, the appellant Management intimated the workers Union its decision to reduce the strength of the workmen in its branch at Calcutta on the ground of severe recession in business. It would, therefore, have been proper and reasonable for the workers Union to address the Government and request that a reference be made to the Industrial Tribunal. The Bank brought these facts, viz.,
filing of the writ petition and the interim order passed therein as well as the disruption of the numbermal work and resort to gheraos by the employees, to the numberice of the Conciliation Officer. The Management also laid off without companypensation all the workers of the estate from 1 12 1961 to 8 12 1961. The Conciliation Officers efforts proved ill vain. The Conciliation Officer found that there was numbermeeting ground and numbersettlement companyld be arrived at. Before the High Court, it was number disputed that the Bank was a public utility service and as such Section 22 of the Act applied. The appeal before this Court was filed by the Management on three of the demands. These appeals have been referred to the Constitution Bench, in view of the apparent companyflict of opinions expressed in three decisions of this Court a three Judge Bench decision in Churakulam Tea Estate P Ltd. Workmen1 and a two Judge Bench decision in Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. Workmen2 on the one hand, and a two Judge Bench decision in Bank of India v. TS. The provisions of Section 22 1 d did number, therefore, companye into play. Since the matter has been referred to the larger bench on account of the seeming difference of opinion expressed in TS. The talk did take place but numberagreement companyld be arrived at. Kelawala3 on the other. He also pleaded for some more time to examine the feasibility of resolving the matter satisfactorily. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B. SAWANT, J.
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1994_201.txt
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3 to 7 were working as Drillers before their promotions as Assistant Drilling Engineers. 3 to 7 in the said cadre of Assistant Drilling Engineers. The appellant was subsequently promoted by the State Government to the next higher post of Drilling Engi neer in 1980 and further as Chief Drilling Engineer in 1984 which post he was holding at the date when his seniority came to be disturbed. 3 to 7 under the provisional seniority list issued in 1987 and the final seniority sen iority list issued in 1989. 3 to 7 were placed above him in the seniority list. After the recruitment rules for Junior Engineers Mechani cal were framed and brought into effect w.e.f. 3 to 7 were promoted as Assistant Drilling Engineers by the Directors order dated 16th December, 1974. Respondents Nos.3 to 7 were shown in both the provisional and final seniority list at Serial Nos.1 to 5 whereas the appellant was shown at Serial No.6. 23rd August, 1973, it was felt that the two posts of Junior Engineers were filled by direct recruitment companytrary to the said rules which provided a ratio of 50 by promotion from the cadre of Drillers and 50 by direct recruitment. The appellant, therefore, chal lenged the provisional seniority list as well as the final seniority list by an Application No. Even in the final seniority list dated 4th May, 1989 he was shown junior to respondents Nos. Since both the posts were filled by direct recruitment, it was felt that this ratio was violated. They companytended that since they were regular employees and had entered service before the appellant and were promoted to the post of As sistant Drilling Engineers along with the appellant they were clearly senior tothe appellant and the State Govern ment was, therefore, justified in showing them at Serial Nos.1 to 5 and the appellant at Serial No. The appointment order was issued after the Public Service Commission had advertised the post and had selected persons for appointment to the said posts. The appellant who was then working as a Rigman in the Drill ing Unit of the Department was appointed Junior Engineer Mechanical in the scale of Rs. 3 to 7 entered service as Drillers in 1964 65. 2564 of 1989. The factual background which has given rise to this companytroversy, briefly stated, is as under In the year 1966 posts of Junior Engineer Mechanical were created in the Department of Mines and Geology Ground Water Surveys and Drilling Unit of the State of Karnataka. The Tribunal by its order dated 3rd September, 1990 rejected his application holding that his initial entry into service as a Junior Engineer was itself irregular and since he did number have the requisite experience of three years as a regular incumbent he was number qualified to be promoted to the next higher post of Assistant Drilling Engineer because his regular employ ment companyld only be related from the date of framing of the Recruitment Rules for the adre which came to be numberified on 23rd August, 1973. Subsequently, he was regularly recruited through the State Public Service Commission in the said post w.e.f. 3 and 5 are companycerned, they supported the action taken by the state Government in preparing both the impugued provisional as well as the final seniority lists. Thus, for the first time, since his regular appointment in the year 1970, he was shown junior to respondents Nos. Before the appellant was regularly recruited through the State Public Service Commission in the year 1970 the Director had apprised the Government of the action which he proposed to take to fill up the post. 3 to 7. The Office Order No.676/74 75 shows that the appellant and one another were working as Junior Engineers at the relevant time whereas respondents Nos. 2564 of 1989 preferred to the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal. The appellant was shown senior to respond ents Nos. The appellant was throughout shown senior to respondents Nos. The Director who was companypetent to make the appointment by virtue of Rule 7 issued a letter of appointment dated 24th April, 1970 whereapon the appellant took charge w.e.f. 29th September, 1972 it was number open to the Tribunal to hold that his appointment was irregular and thirdly, the Tribunal had erred in overlooking the guideline issued by the state Government on 5th July, 1976 which specifically provided that all appointments made by the Government or under specific authority of Government either by direct recruitment or by promotion or on or after 1st November, 1956 but prior to the companymencement of the Rules regarding recruitment to such cadres may be treated as regular. However, even though the Director had requested the State Government to frame Re cruitment Rules for the newly created post immediately after its creation, the Recruitment Rules were number finalised till the issuance of a Notification dated 26th June, 1973. 200 375 on one of the said posts by an order dated 14th August, 1967 issued by the Director of the department. The State Government did number approve of the Directors action in promoting the appellant since he was a local candidate and directed that he be reverted. The appellant was initially appointed on probation for one year and on his satisfactorily companypleting the probation period he was companytinued in service and was later companyfirmed in the said post by an order dated 13th June, 1974 w.e.f. The companytroversy which we are required to resolve in this appeal by special leave is regarding the appellants senior ity vis a vis respondents Nos.3 to 7. The appellant and the respondents Nos. 4th May, 1970. From the Judgment and Order dated 3.9.1990 of the Karna taka Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore in Application No. Respondents Nos. 3 and 5 companytested the appel lants claim while the State Government avoided entering into the arena by filing a companynter but instead presented the relevant files to the Tribunal. 29th September, 1972. 23rd August, 1976 and hence respondents number. Raju Ramachandran, M. Veerappa and Kh. K. Ramamurthy, S. Ravindra, K.V. Bhat for the Appellant. Nobin Singh P. for the Respondents. Mohan and S.R. However, numbersuch reversion took place. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.4375 OF 1991. The Judgment of the Court was delivered AHMADI, J. Special leave granted.
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1991_543.txt
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of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5181 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5173 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. 5175 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5173 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5174 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5176 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5179 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. 5178 of 2007 arising out of S.L.P. C No.12325 of 2004. C No.12609 of 2004. After processing, the assessee returns the processed cashew nuts to the exporters. C No.5647 of 2004, Civil Appeal No. C No.6267 of 2004, Civil Appeal No. C No.13747 of 2004, Civil Appeal No. Processing Civil Appeal No. C No.12609 of 2004, Civil Appeal No. C No.13748 of 2004 , Civil Appeal No. Thereafter he exports the cashew nuts as an exporter. C No.13748 of 2004 , Civil Appeal No.3687 of 2005. He earns processing charges. C No.12325 of 2004, Civil Appeal No.3687 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No.3167 of 2006. For processing, the assessee has companyplete infrastructure. Processing and Negative Profits loss Civil Appeal No. C No.24617 of 2003, Civil Appeal No. C No24617 of 2003 With Civil Appeal No. Assessee is a companypany engaged in cashew business. The figure of Rs.1,94,08,220 included the processing charges receipts amounting to Rs.1,54,68,811. Assessee respondent has a factory in which he processes cashew nuts which are grown in his farm. The assessee did number include processing charges receipts in his total turnover. At the same time, the assessee processes cashew nuts which are supplied to him by the exporters on job work basis. However, the assessee did number include the processing charges amounting to Rs.1,54,68,811 in his total turnover. Therefore, the assessee is an exporter and a job worker. Loss Negative Profits Civil Appeal No. CIVIL APPEAL NO. C No.24617 of 2003 Commissioner, Income Tax, Thiruvananthapuram v. K. Ravindranathan Nair. In his return, he indicated his business profits at Rs.1,94,08,220. This is a batch of civil appeals filed by the Department. The assessee made a claim for Export Incentive under Section 80HHC 3 in his returns filed for the assessment year 1993 94. Computation of Export Incentive under Section 80HHC 3 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 I.T. For the sake of companyvenience we state the facts occurring in Civil Appeal No. Act, for short , is the issue for determination in this batch of civil appeals. Leave granted. Accordingly, the impugned judgments of the High Court and the Tribunal are set aside and the above civil appeals filed by the Department are accordingly allowed with numberorder as to companyts. KAPADIA, J. This argument was number accepted by the Department. No order as to companyts.
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2007_858.txt
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The supplier sent response to the letter dated 22.03.2007 on 23.03.2007 asking the purchasers as to when the supplier companyld companylect the payment. It is number in dispute that the supplier received letter dated 22.03.2007 from the purchasers cancelling the purchase orders and requesting the supplier to return both the cheques. The supplier says that the advance payment was made by the purchasers as it had to procure the parts from abroad. Thereafter, on 12.04.2007, the supplier sent a numberice to the purchasers and then filed a companyplaint against the purchasers under Section 138 of the N.I. Ltd. hereinafter referred to as supplier . These cheques got dishonoured when they were presented on the ground that the purchasers had stopped payment. On 22.05.2007, the companycerned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took companynizance of the alleged offence and issued summons to the purchasers. One of the terms and companyditions of the companytract was that the entire payment would be given to the supplier in advance. In respect of these purchase orders, the purchasers also issued two post dated cheques dated 15.03.2007 for a sum of Rs.34,57,164/ and 20.03.2007 for a sum of Rs.15,91,820/ . The supplier challenged the order of the Additional Sessions Judge in a petition under Section 482 of the Code before the High Court. The said cheques were issued by way of advance payment for the purchase orders. The brief facts are these On 19.02.2007 and 26.02.2007, the purchasers placed two purchase orders for supply of certain aircraft parts with respondent No.1, M s. Magnum Aviation Pvt. The purchasers challenged the order issuing summons in a revision petition under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short, Code . Act before the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi. The Additional Sessions Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed the revision petition vide order dated 02.09.2008 and quashed the process issued by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. M. LODHA, J. of funds in the account. The Delhi High Court in the impugned order has held that to be so. Leave granted.
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1948_0.txt
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80,000/ was paid to the 1st respondent. 80,000/ as payable to it by the 1st respondent. In the suit the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent took the stand that the 1st respondent was number created by the 2nd respondent, that the lease was by the 1st respondent and the amount was paid to the 1st respondent alone and number to the 2nd respondent. It arises out of a mining lease granted by the 1st respondent but alleged to have been ,done so in the name of the 1st respondent by the 2nd respondent in favour of Haricharan Singh J.D. Haricharan Singh J.D. The plaint allegation was that the 1st respondent was a Limited Company created by the 2nd respondent. 80,000/ and certain other sums. The 1st respondent also companytended that the leased properties were handed over to the plaintiff, that they were number aware that respondents 3 and 4 were resisting the plaintiffs claim and that the 1st respondent was number in any case responsible therefor and that therefore the plaintiff was number entitled to any relief. In pursuance of the lease a sum of Rs. There was an earlier lease in respect of the same property in favour of respondents 3 and 4 which expired on 4 4 1950. As the plaintiff did number get the possession of the leased property it instituted a suit for recovery of possession of the leased property along with mesne profits and in the alternative for refund of the sum of Rs. It is necessary at this stage to mention that after the institution of the suit the Bihar Land Reforms Act came into force as a result of which any lessee working a mine became direct lessee under the State, and ,as the plaintiff was number working the mines any claim in respect of the possession of the mines became unenforceable. N. Mukherjee and N. R. Chaudhury, for respondent Nos. N. Prasad, for respondent Nos. Co. later changed its name to Kuju Collieries Ltd. who are the appellants. Co. on 7 9 1950. P. Singh, S. C. Aggarwala, V. J. Francis and S. S. Bhatnagar,for the intervener. As the lease came into force on September 7, 1950 and money was paid on that date, the fact that there was an earlier unregistered companytract does number make any difference to the question at issue. P. Malhotra and D. N. Mishra, for the appellant. The appellant has, therefore, companyfined his claim to the sum of Rs. 1865 of 1967. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment Decree dated the 19th October, 1965 of the Patna High Court in Original Decree No311 of 1960. During the pendency of this appeal respondents 2 and 3 died and their legal representatives have number been brought on record. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. 1, 3, 5. The present appeal is, however, companycerned only with that amount. This appeal is against the judgment of the Patna High Court by Special Leave granted by this Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1974_200.txt
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In 1980 proceedings were taken to transfer the Imphal Centre from the Jawaharlal Nehru University to the Manipur University. The Centre of Postgraduate Studies was set up at Imphal as an activity of the appellant University. To effectuate this the Syndicate of the Manipur University passed a Resolution on 19 December, 1980 detail ing the terms for the transfer of the Centre to the Manipur University, and the Manipur University and the Manipur Government requested the Jawaharlal Nehru University for transferring the Centre accordingly. Meanwhile on 3 February, 1981, the Syndicate of the Jawaharlal Nehru University provided for the transfer of the Centre to the Manipur University. become members of the staff of the Manipur University. It was further resolved that the members of the faculty employed by the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Centre of Postgraduate Studies, Imphal, immediately before its merger into the University would on and from that date. It was resolved that the said Jawaharlal Nehru University for Post graduate Studies would cease to exist as such and the Divisions of the Centre would become the Divisions of the Manipur University and function accordingly. The Jawaharlal Nehru University by its Resolution dated 3 February, 1981 accepted the proposal and authorised the Vice Chancellor to transfer the Centre to the Manipur University. Section 1 4 of the Act provided that on and from the date on which the Act came into force in respect of post graduate education and research, the Jawaharlal Nehru University would cease to exercise jurisdiction over the Centre of Post graduate Studies in Imphal, and that the State Government of Manipur may make provision for the transfer of employees from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Centre of Post graduate Stud ies, Imphal to the Manipur University. By letter dated 21 March, 1979 the Jawaharlal Nehru University offered the respondent the post of Assist ant Professor in the Political Science Division at the Centre of Post graduate Studies of the University at Imphal for a period of two years. The argument proceeds on the assumption that the Centre of Post graduate Studies at Imphal was an independent entity which existed by itself and was number a department of the appellant University. Then on 12 June, 197 1, the Executive Council passed a resolution that a Centre of Post graduate Studies be set up at Imphal under s. 5 2 of the Jawaharlal Nehru University Act. On 3 October, 1970, a resolution was passed by the Executive Council of the Jawaharlal Nehru University agreeing with the proposal of the Ministry of Education to set up an Institute of Post graduate Studies at Imphal. Thereafter on 23 December, 1977 an advertisement was issued by the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Centre of Post graduate Stud ies, Imphal Manipur for appointment to, inter alia, the posts of Associate Professor Fellow and Assistant Professor Assistant Fellow in the Political Science. Thereafter an order dated 31 March, 1981 was made by the Governor of Manipur providing that the members of the faculties of the Jawahar lal Nehru University, Centre of Post graduate Studies, Imphal, immediately before its merger into the Manipur University would, on and from the 1 April, 1981, become members of the staff of the Manipur University on the same terms and companyditions of service as they were entitled to immediately before that day. He was directed, in case he accepted the offer, to join the Post graduate Centre, Imphal Manipur as early as possible. By letter dated 29 April, 1978 the Jawaharlal Nehru University offered him the appointment of Assistant Professor in Political Science on an ad hoc basis in the Centre of Post graduate Studies, Imphal, for a period of one year or until his services were required by the Centre, whichever was earlier. Thereafter, by letter dated 29 November, 1973 the Vice Chancellor of the appellant University offered the respondent the post of Associate Fellow in the Post graduate Studies Centre of the University at Imphal for a period of one year in the first instance, the appointment being made on ad hoc basis, and his regular appointment at the Centre of the Post graduate Studies at Imphal or at the New Delhi campus of the University would be subject to the recommenda tions of the Selection Committee. On 21 September, 1970 the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Education and Youth Services wrote to the Vice Chancellor of the University informing him of the intention of the Government of India, to establish a Central University at Shillong to serve the needs of the North Eastern Region of India, and that in August, 1969, the University Grants Commission had approved the proposal of the Manipur Adminis tration to have a Post graduate Centre at Imphal under the auspices of the Gauhati University, and companysidering the fact that the proposed Central University for the Hill Areas was also intended to cater to the needs of Manipur, it would be appropriate, he said, that the Jawaharlal Nehru University should establish a Centre at Imphal also which companyld later be made over to the proposed new University to be estab lished by the Centre. To give expression to that activity the appellant University set up and orga nised the Centre at Imphal and appointed a teaching and administrative staff to man it. On the same date the re spondent accepted the offer of appointment as Associate Fellow, Centre of Post graduate Studies, Imphal, under the terms and companyditions of the Vice Chancellors letter of that date. He was informed that in all matters relating to leave and other companyditions of service he would be required to enter into an agreement with the Centre of Post graduate Studies, Imphal. The respondent filed a writ petition in this Court on 27 March, 1981 challenging his transfer from the Jawaharlal Nehru University to the Manipur University, and that peti tion was dismissed as withdrawn on 21 September, 198 1. The Jawaharlal Nehru University Act, 1966 sets forth as the objects of the Jawaharlal Nehru University to dissemi nate and advance knowledge, wisdom and understanding by teaching and research and by the example and influence of companyporate life, and in particular the objects set out in the first Schedule. Thereafter the respondent filed a writ petition on 22 May, 1982 in the Delhi High Court praying for the quashing of the Resolution of the Jawaharlal Nehru University on 3 February, 198 1 transferring his services to the Manipur University. 1973 the respondent reiterated his acceptance of the offer of appointment as Associate Fellow at the Centre of Post graduate Studies, Imphal, and stated that he was reporting for duty to the Head of the Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, New Delhi with effect from 3 December, 1973 so that after necessary briefing at the Centre he would proceed to Imphal as early as possible. Meanwhile, the Manipur Legisla ture passed the Manipur University Act, 1980, which was assented to by the Governor on 28 May, 1980. On 12 June, 197 1, the Executive Council of the University recorded their agreement in principle to the proposal of the Ministry of Education to set up an Institute of Post graduate Studies at Imphal and numbered that the companymittee had submitted its re port. It was stated that he was expected to take part in the teaching and research pro grammes of the University. 2376 dated 24 August, 1974 the term of appointment of the respondent as Associate Fellow at the Centre of Post graduate Studies, Imphal, was extended for a period of one year from 3 December, 1974 to 2 December, 1975. The respondent, however, wrote back on 2 May, 1978 stating that he had number applied for the post of Assistant Professor in Political Science and that he deserved to be appointed as Associate Professor at the Imphal Centre. Thereafter the respondent was appointed as Assistant Professor by a Resolu tion of the Jawaharlal Nehru University dated 29 October, 1979 on a regular basis with effect from the date of his initial appointment dated 29 August, 1979 and he was company firmed with effect from that date. On 27 January, 197 1, the appellant University informed the respondent that he had been selected for the post of Research Assistant in the Department of South Eastern Stud ies, School of International Studies of the University, that the appointment would be temporary for a period of six months and his services companyld be terminated on one months numberice on either side. On 29 August, 1979 the respondent joined as As sistant Professor in accordance with the terms mentioned in the Universitys letter dated 21 March, 1979. The respondent applied for the post of Associate Professor but the Selection Committee did number find him suitable for that post and recommended him for the lower post of Assistant Professor. This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in a Letters Patent Appeal upholding the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court in a writ petition filed by the first respondent for a declaration that he companytinues to be in the service of the Jawaharlal Nehru University. A companymittee was set up to study the problems company nected with the setting up of such an Institute and to submit companycrete proposals in that regard. 2440 dated 23 September, 1974 the respond ents term of appointment in the same capacity at the said Centre was number enlarged from 3 December, 1974 to 2 December, 1976. On 25 April, 1973, the term of tempo rary appointment as Research Assistant in the School of International Studies was extended by the appellant Univer sity for a further period of six months with effect from 4 June, 1973. The date for transfer was fixed as 1 April, 1981. 295 dated 21 June, 1975 with effect from 1 January, 1973. Ramaswami, Additional Solicitor General, S.C. Dhanda, S. Vaidyanathan, P. Chowdhary and S.R. 1 In person, Girish Chandra, Ms. Sushma Relan and P. Chowdhary for Respondents. On 3 December. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ. Sethia for the Appellant. 2948 of 1984 From the Judgment and Order dated 20.1.1984 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. His existing scale of Rs.400 40 800 50 950 was revised to Rs.700 40 1100 50 1600 by Office Order No. The submission proceeds on a fallacy. By Office Order No. Thereafter by Office Order No. 145 of 1982. This agreement was never executed. Respondent No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1989_180.txt
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These objections were overruled by the Assistant Custodian and the property of Daulat Ram was declared evacuee property on the 15th February,1954. Custodian, Evacuee Property, the Authorised Dy. Custodian and the Assistant Custodian were impleaded as respondents. The respondent came to know of the said proceedings, appeared before the Assistant Custodian and raised objections to the property of Daulat Ram being declared as evacuee property. An Indian citizen named Daulat Ram Surana was carrying on business at Delhi as a jeweller in the name of Sardar Singh Daulat Ram. the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a numberice under S. 7 1 of the Act to Daulat Ram and other interested persons to show cause why be should number be declared an evacuee under S. 2 d i of the Act. On the 14th March, 1950, Nanak Chand and certain other persons claiming to be his creditors, filed a petition of insolvency against the firm of Daulat Ram and against Daulat Ram himself. What is the relevant date by reference to which the character of the property has to be determined in issuing a numberification of evacuee property under section 7 1 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 No. On June 17, 1950, both the firm and Daulat Ram were adjudicated insolvents and the respondent, the Official Receiver, was appointed the Receiver of the estate of the insolvents. Custodian, and when the appeal was dismissed, he moved the Custodian General in his revisional jurisdiction. The respondent then moved the Punjab High Court by a writ petition and challenged the validity of the orders passed by the respective authorities under the Act, declaring the property of Daulat Ram as evacuee property. In August, 1951, the Official Receiver wanted to sell some items of the insolvents property and the sale was fixed to be held on the 18th August, 1951. He had a Muslim mistress and it appears that by reason of Ms affection for the said mistress he migrated to Pakistan in the first week of February, 1950. To this petition, the Dy. He was possessed of extensive properties, both movable and immovable, but apparently, he was involved in financial difficulties about that time, and so, before he migrated to Pakistan he transferred his I share in his ancestral house in Baidwara Street, Delhi for a companysideration of Rs. 31 of 1950 hereinafter called the Act ? The respondent challenged this order by preferring an appeal before the Authorised Dy. S. Pathak and B. C. Misra, for the respondent. The decision of this question lies within a very narrow companypass, because it has to be found on a reasonable companystruction of the material words used in s. 7 1 itself but the deter mination of the scope and effect of these material words presents a somewhat difficult problem of companystruction and it has to be resolved after reading the said provision in the light of other relevant circumstances. Ganpathy Iyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellants. When this matter was taken up before Bishan Narain J. of the Punjab High Court, he took the view that the point raised for his decision was of companysiderable importance, and so, he thought that it should be decided by a larger Bench. 489 of 1962. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 18, 1960, of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Writ No. CIVIL, APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. That is how the writ petition was placed before a Division Bench of the said High Court. Two days prior thereto, however,. 200 D of 1955. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar C. J. That is the short question which arises in this appeal. It is against this order that the appellants have companye to this Court with a certificate granted by the High Court. The revision application filed by the respondent was also dismissed. These are the appellants before us.
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1964_133.txt
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The Hill Bungalow companysists of two tenanments, one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor. The Truth Bungalow companysists of only one tenement with a separate room on the ground floor. One bungalow is known by the name of Truth Bungalow while the other is known by the name of Hill Bungalow. The ground floor of the Hill Bungalow was let out by the appellant to one Mahendra Prasad as far back as 1957 it a rent of Rs. Dr. Bharucha was thus in occupation of the Truth Bungalow, barring the ground floor room in the possession of the appellant, from January 1967 on leave and licence from the appellant. The second and the fifth respondents, however, left the ground floor premises and went away from Navsari soon after the death of Mahendra Prasad. There was some companytroversy before, the lower companyrts as to whether in respect of the first floor occupied by her, Soonabai was a tenant or a licence of the appellant. Though the tenancy in respect of the first floor premises was thus terminated by the appellant, the respondents failed to hand over vacant possession of the ground floor premises to the appellant and the appellant was accordingly companystrained to file regular suit No. The first floor is occupied by Soonabai, the mother of the appellant since the last several years. The appellant is the owner of two bungalows in Navsari, a town situate in South Gujarat. Now, the suit filed by the appellant against the respondents for possession of th, ground floor premises was already pending and the appellant, therefore, with the leave of the Court, amended the plaint in that suit introducing an additional ground that the appellant reasonably and bona fide required the ground floor premises for his personal use and occupation and was, therefore, entitled to recover possession under s. 1 3 1 g of, the Bombay Rent Act. 50/per month to the appellant for the occupation of the first floor and receipts in respect of such payments were produced by the appellant. It was companymon ground between the parties and that appears clearly from the evidence and has also been found by the High Court as well as the lower companyrts, that this separate room on the ground floor of the Truth Bungalow was at all material times in the possession of the appellant. Sometime prior to the death of Mahendra Prasad, respondents 3 and 4 together with the members of their respective families had companye to reside in the ground floor premises and after the death of Mahendra Prasad, they companytinued to stay with the first respondent. The appellant, by a numberice dated 15th October, 1966, terminated the tenancy of respondents 1, 2 and 5 on the ground that they had unlawfully sub let the ground floor premises to respondents 3 and 4. The trial companyrt, on companysideration of the evidence led on behalf of the appellant and respondents 1, 3 and 4, took the view that, though respondents 3 and 4 together with the members of their respective families were residing in the ground floor premises with the first respondent, it was number established by the appellant.that they were subtenants of the first respondent and the appellant was, , therefore, number entitled to recover possession of the ground floor premises on the ground of unlawful sub letting. ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal use and occupation was companycerned, the trial companyrt held that the evidence companyrecord was sufficient to establish that the appellant reasonably and bona fide required the ground floor premises for personal user and, occupation and it was also clear from the evidence that greater hardship would riot be caused to respondents 1, 2 and 5 by passing a decree for eviction than what would be caused to the appellant by refusing to pass it. Respondents 2 and 5 did number companytest the suit of the appellant as they were number residing in the ground floor premises and the main defence was on behalf of respondents 1, 3 and 4 who denied the allegations made in the plaint and disputed the grounds on which possession was sought to be recovered by the appellant. The rest of the Truth Bungalow was, some two and a half to three years prior to the recording of the evidence, let out to a tenant, but after a period of about one year and a quarter the tenant surrendered possession and thereafter it was 5 L954Sup. The ground on which possession was sought by the appellant in the plaint as originally framed was unlawful sub letting by respondents 1, 2 and 5 to respondents 3 and 4 which is a ground of eviction under s. 13 1 e of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act . 26 of 1967 in the companyrt of the ,Civil Judge, Senior Division, Navsari on 18th January 1967. 475/ per month. This appeal, by special leave, arises out of a suit filed by the appellant to recover possession of certain premises from the respondents. in Bombay and pay a high rent of Rs. 50/ per month. He lived in a flat in Bombay for which he paid a rent of Rs. The main ground on which the appellant attacked the judgment of the High Court was that in reversing the findings of the District Judge on the question of reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal use and occupation as also on the question of greater hardship, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under s. 29, subs. This led to the filing of a revision application before the High Court under s. 29, sub s. 3 of the Bombay Rent Act. Mahendra Prasad died in September 1966 leaving him surviving as his legal representatives his widow the fifth respondent. S. Rao, for the Respondent. 475/ per month which was a serious drain on his purse. The principal area of work in the early stages of his professional career was Bombay and South Gujarat but by about the middle of 1968 his work in Bombay practically dwindled to nil and his professional activities became companyfined almost exclusively to South Gujarat. The trial companyrt accordingly passed a decree for eviction against the respondents. appellant accordingly decided to settle down in Navsari which was his native place, where his mother was living for the last several years and from where he would be able to carry on his profession companyveniently, economically and with advantage. He said that it was given in January 1966 or it may be in January 1967. Respondents 1 to 4 being aggrieved by the decree for eviction preferred an appeal in the District Court, Bulsar. The lower companyrts held that she a tenant, while the High Court took the view that she was a licence. /74 given by the appellant to one Dr. Bharucha on leave and licence on payment of companypensation of Rs. 65/ per month. We shall, for the purpose of this appeal, proceed on the basis that it was given in January 1967, for that would be more favourable to the respondent than taking January 1966 as the time when it was granted. M. Mehta, S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia, for the Appellant. the appellant was carrying on his Profession as architect and companysulting engineer in Bombay since 1960 when he retired from Army service. The appellant in his evidence companyld number state precisely when this leave and licence was granted by him. We shall presently examine this companytroversy but one thing may be made clear at this stage namely, that Soonabai was paying a sum of Rs. Tire High Court, it was companytended, companyld number interfere under s. 29, sub s. 3 with findings of fact recorded by the District Judge unless it companyld be shown that they disclosed an error of law in arriving at them, which according to the appellant, was number the position in the present case. his son the first respondent and his. She is an old lady, aged about 82 years at the time of giving evidence but, as the evidence shows, age does number seem to have withered away her interest in life. he District Judge, who heard the appeal, found himself in companyplete agreement with the companyclusions reached by the trial companyrt and he accordingly companyfirmed the decree for eviction and dismissed the appeal. 2208 of 1972. However, so far as the. The appellant found that in the circumstances there was numberpoint in his companytinuing to live. 3 , since both these findings were findings of fact which did number suffer from any mistake of law and the jurisdiction of the High Court under that section was limited only to examining whether the decision of the District Judge was according to law. daughter the second respondent. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 3rd April, 1972 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. In order to appreciate the companytention that has been raised in the appeal, it is necessary to numberice the facts giving rise to the appeal in some detail. 325 of 1970 . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Hence the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court. C. I.
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1974_396.txt
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bakht ram moved the labour officer for relief. 30/ from bakht ram and put the currency numberes in his pocket. one bakht ram a labour supplier had to get about rs. at the trial the appellants plea was that bakht ram had borrowed from him rs. was the amount paid by bakht ram towards the discharge of that loan. within their hearing bakht ram told the appellant that he had brought rs. bakht ram thereupon reported the matter to the deputy superintendent of police anti corruption branch and produced three currency numberes of the denumberination of rs. bakht ram called the appellant out from his house and they both went to a tea shop nearby. bakht ram then proceeded to the office of the labour officer along with the said two witnesses followed by the police party headed by the deputy superintendent of police. the numbers of these currency numberes were numbered by the deputy superintendent of police in the presence of two witnesses and bakht ram was instructed to make the payment in the presence of those witnesses. the labour officer stopped payment to the companytractor to the extent of the amount claimed by bakht ram but as the case was number being dealt with as expeditiously as bakht ram expected or desired he approached the appellant who was the dealing clerk for expeditious disposal of the case. he requested the appellant to see that the labour officer passed requisite orders on bakht rams application claiming rs. anti corruption branch delhi and addressed to the appellant stating that the anti corruption branch of delhi administration was number competent to make an enquiry into the allegations levelled against c.p.w.d. anthony reads offences to be investigated by special police establishment the central government may by numberification in the official gazette specify the offences or classes of offences which are to be investigated by the delhi special police establishment. in this companyrt mr.
anthony questioned the legality of the in vestigation by submitting that the only police agency having jurisdiction to investigate into the allegations against the appellant was the delhi special police establishment. 1 bakht ram on the date of the offence under s. 4 of the prevention of companyruption act the burden lay upon him to prove that this amount had been received otherwise than by way of illegal gratification. our attention was also drawn to the resolution of the government of india number 4/31/61 t dated april 1 1963 reproduced at p. 681 of the anti corruption laws of india by v. ramakrishna by means of which it was decided to set up a central bureau of investigation at delhi with six divisions one of which was described as investigation and anti corruption divisions delhi special police establishment . according to this ground the delhi special police establishment act as amended prescribes special powers and procedure for investigation of offences of bribery and companyruption in the departments of the central government and as the appellant was an employee of the central public works department offences against him companyld only be investigated by the special police establishment. the investigation by the anti corruption branch delhi being thus without jurisdiction it was companytended that the appellants trial and companyviction were on this ground alone wholly illegal. his application for leave is dated december 20 1969.
in that application one of the grounds taken by him questioned the legality of the investigation into the offences against him by the deputy superintendent of the anti corruption department of the delhi administration. and the anti corruption branch had power to investigate it being a matter of internal administrative arrangement for the appropriate authorities to regulate the assignment of investigation of cases according to the exigencies of the situation. as the point raised related to the validity of central laws we directed numberice to the attorney general and pursuant to that numberice heard mr.
nariman additional the short but important question with far reaching effect if the appellants companytention were to prevail requiring our decision is whether with the setting up of the delhi special police establishment the anti corruption branch of the delhi police had been companypletely deprived of its power to investigate into the offences like the present or whether both the s.p.e. anthony relied on the preamble of the delhi special police establishment act 25 of 1946.
both sides referred to the background of this enactment for the purpose of supporting their rival companytentions about its scope and effect. number 21/8/63gd dated october 5 1963 addressed by the central bureau of investigation ministry of home affairs government of india to the inspectors general of police inviting their attention to the government of india resolution number 4/31/61 t dated april 1 1963 establishing the central bureau of investigation companysisting of six divisions to assist the state police forces. employee being a central government employee. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by dua j. the appellant was the dealing clerk in the labour offic e delhi in april 1965.
he was also found guilty and companyvicted of an offence under s. 161 i.p.c. 3500/ . 50/ and the amount was to be paid on april 27 1965 at the labour office or at the house of the appellant. 30/ from p.w. in his view the defence witnesses were interested in the appellant and one of them being the general secretary of the companygress mandal lajpatnagar new delhi and in that capacity wielding some infouence had also tried to help the appellant. as the appellant was number present in the office of the labour officer the party proceeded to his house. the currency numberes in question were recovered from the appellants possession. 40/ on april 1 1965 and the amount recovered from him by the d.s.p. exclusive jurisdiction for investigating the offences specified by the central government by numberification in the gazette. the testimony of these witnesses did number impress the special judge. one of the two witnesses at this stage gave a signal and the d.s.p. anthony relied on r. j. singh ahuluwalia v. the state of delhi 1 in sustaining his right to raise this point for the first time in this appeal as according to his submission it goes to the root of the validity of the investigation. his appeal to the high companyrt of delhi was dismissed by a learned single judge. the appellant agreed to see that the labour officer passed the necessary orders. the two witnesses followed them. they bore the same numbers as had been numbered by the d.s.p. 3500/ from one umrao singh a companytractor who was evading this payment. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 28 of 1973.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 29th october 1969 of the delhi high companyrt at new delhi in cr. a. number 1 of 1966.
frank anthony and k. b. rohatgi for the appellant. if the investigation is unauthorised the trial springing from it cannumber be considered lawful said the companynsel. the testimony of the defence witnesses was number companysidered acceptable and the order of the trial companyrt was affirmed. the appellant demanded rs. s. nariman additional solicitor general of india and d. sharma for the attorney general for india. he also produced four witnesses in support of his version. according to the high companyrt also the appellant having admitted receipt of a sum of rs. he appeals to this companyrt by special leave. he received rs. after considering the appellants plea and appraising the evidence produced by him in support thereof the learned special judge companycluded that the burden had number been discharged. the learned special judge companysidered the prosecution evidence and held that the receipt of money having been admitted by the appellant the onus lay on him to rebut the presumption raised by s. 4 of the prevention of companyruption act. on appeal the high companyrt agreed with the view taken by the trial companyrt. 30/ with him and that he would pay the balance later. 100/by way of bribe for using his good offices. the matter was ultimately settled at rs. 10/ each which he proposed to pay to the appellant. lant having been permitted to urge additional ground and there being numberobjection by the other side in the interest of justice we heard the parties on the new objection. holding the appellant guilty he convicted him and imposed the sentence as already numbericed. in support of this ground the appellant presented in this companyrt an application dated january 13 1970 seeking permission to place on the record a letter dated february 10 1966 purporting to have been written by the s.p. the appel 1 1970 3 s.c.r. the two substantive sentences were directed to be companycurrent. gobind das and r. n. sachthey for the respondent. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. we number turn to the facts giving rise to this case. came to the spot.
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1973_29.txt
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1 and they were inducted into the IPS Cadre subsequently. 4250/ particularly because of the Rules governing the pay scales of such State Cadre Police Officers who were inducted into the IPS Cadre. 1 was entitled to get his initial pay in IPS Cadre fixed at Rs. The first respondent is directed to pass appropriate orders and ensure removal of the anomaly in the applicants initial pay fixation in the IPS by applying the provisions of Clause 6 and fixing the applicants initial pay in the IPS on the basis of his actual pay in the higher scale of Super Indent of Police Non IPS as on the date of his promotion to the IPS. It also came to the companyclusion that the Central Government had the power to erase any anomaly caused in fixing the pay of the companycerned officer who had been inducted into the IPS Cadre. Issue a direction to the respondents to fix the basic pay of the applicant in the post of Superintendent of Police IPS Cadre at Rs. Yet, inspite of the fact that all these officers were junior and inducted into the IPS Cadre after the induction of respondent No.1, their pay were fixed at higher level than that of respondent No. 1 getting more pay than that of the respondent No.1 who, though was inducted into the IPS Cadre earlier to his juniors, faced an anomaly of earning salary lower to his juniors and even lesser than what he earned as a State Cadre Police Officer. 1 who was a member of the state police service was inducted into the Indian Police Service IPS in short w.e.f. 100/ Besides this, the Tribunal also took into account Section I of Schedule II of the IPS Pay Rules, 1954. Instead of removing that anomaly, it was reiterated in a companymunication dated 2.9.1997 received from the Accountant General AE , Kerala that the fixation of pay was made placing reliance on Clauses iii iv of Schedule II of IPS Pay Rules, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the IPS Pay Rules and hence, there was numberanomaly at all. At that time, his basic pay in the state cadre was Rs. For that purpose, the Tribunal took stock of IPS Pay Rules, 1954 and more particularly, Rule 4 5 thereof. 1 again sent a detailed representation dated 6.10.1997 wherein he had elaborately explained the facts and the relevant rules with regard to the pay fixation on his appointment to the IPS cadre on promotion from the State Police Service and the provisions regarding the power of relaxation companyferred on the Union of India under Rule 6 of Section III of Schedule II of the IPS Pay Rules. The Tribunal had held that the pay of respondent No. 4650 p.m. special pay of Rs. 4250 special pay of Rs. 4900/ and he was also entitled to special pay of Rs. 1 made a representation dated 16.8.1997 to the Accountant General AE , Kerala, Thiruvananthapuram for the purpose of removal of the anomaly companysisting in the reduction of pay in the IPC cadre vis a vis higher pay in the State Police Service. 1 were number found fit to be inducted into the IPC cadre along with the respondent No. 4650 to Rs. On reading of the same, the Tribunal companyrectly came to the companyclusion that the pay of respondent No. In para 8 of its order, the Tribunal explained as to how the respondent No.1 was entitled to higher pay. Very curiously, after his entry into the IPS.,
his pay came to be refixed at Rs. Ultimately, the Tribunal also referred to the peculiar anomaly caused in this case by the number of juniors of the respondent No. 1 that those officers were also junior to him. The Tribunal also took into account Section III of the Schedule II which is referred to in Rule 4 5 . 1 should have been fixed at Rs. 4900/ p.m. in accordance with the proviso to Clause 2 Section I of Schedule II. They were Shri Somasundra Menon, Shamsudeen, Vijayan. 1.12.1996. 9.12.1995. 1 companyld number be reduced from Rs. The respondent No.1, therefore, challenged the same by way of filing Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench and sought the following reliefs Call for the records leading to Annexure A1 A2 and set aside the same. The Union of India challenged the order of the Tribunal by way of filing review application which was dismissed. 22783 of 2002. Ultimately, it wrote a finding that the respondent No. It also became apparent that few other officers similarly placed with the respondent No. However, that was also rejected by companymunication dated 4.1.1998. 200 w.e.f. Respondent No. It was pointed out by the respondent No. The above orders and directions shall be carried out and the companysequential benefits including arrears, if any, flowing therefore granted to the applicant at an early date and in any case, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of companyy of this order. Ultimately, the matter reached before the High Court. The High Court also dismissed the O.P. Hence, the present appeal. NO.
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2009_1322.txt
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Subsequently, the respondent sought transfer from the office of Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh to the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore. After transfer to the post of Clerk in the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore the pay of respondent was fixed at Rs.1260/ per month. No.6422/98 was working as Accountant in the office of the Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in the pay scale of Rs.1200 2040. No.6423/98 was working as a Senior Accountant in the pay scale of Rs.1400 2600 in the office of the Accountant General, Maharashtra at Nagpur and was drawing a pay of Rs.1260/ per month. Subsequently for personal reasons the respondent sought transfer to the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore. On acceptance of terms and companyditions the respondent was transferred as a Clerk to the office of Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore. The said transfer was accepted with certain terms and companyditions to the effect that in case of such a transfer she has to technically resign from the post of Accountant and accept the reverted post of Clerk and has to join as a direct recruit. After the transfer to a lower post her pay was erroneously fixed at Rs.1250/ per month. Subsequently it was found that the pay of respondent on reversion ought to be fixed at Rs.1090/ . Subsequently when the mistake came into light her pay was fixed at a stage of Rs.1070/ by order dated 1.12.1995. Her request for transfer was accepted on certain terms and companyditions stipulated by the appellants and the same were accepted by the respondents. The order for recovery of excess pay to the respondent was also passed. Consequently, orders for re fixation of pay and recovery of excess amount were issued. The respondent in C.A. N. KHARE, J. LITTTTTTTJ The respondent in C.A. The respondent challenged the said order before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the tribunal allowed the Original Application filed by the respondent. The writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed.
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2000_367.txt
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28, J.N. Datta, on February 28, 1963, at the same address. Mukherjee Road, Howrah. 1 issued a numberice to the assessee under Section 33B of the Act for cancelling the assessments and March 6, 1963, was fixed as the date of hearing. The numberice was presented for delivery on February 28, 1963, March 2, 1963, March 4, 1963, March 5, 1963, and finally on March 7, 1963, when the numberice number having been claimed by the appellant or on her behalf was returned to the sender. On February 25, 1963, respondent No. Mukherjee Road, for personal service on February 25, 1963, and again on February 27, 1963, and having failed in these attempts he served the numberice by affixing it on February 28, 4963, at that address. There is also evidence that companyies of numberice under Section 33B of the Act were sent by post to the address of the appellant at No 28, J.N. 1 reopening the assessment under Section 33B of the Act was number defective in law. On or about March 3, 1961, the assessee submitted voluntarily returns of income for the assessment years 1953 54 to 1960 61 to the Income tax Officer, D Ward, Howrah. On March 18, 1961, the Income tax Officer made assessment orders for the aforesaid assessment years under the provisions of the Income tax Act, 1922 hereinafter referred to as the Act . On the date of hearing numberone attended on behalf of the assessee and an order was made by the respondent in exercise of the powers companyferred under Section 33B of the Act cancelling the said assessment orders and directing the Income tax Officer to make fresh assessments according to law. Datta stated in his report that he attempted to companytact the assessee at No. It was alleged that numbernotice was issued in companynection with the proceedings under Section 33B of the Act and numberopportunity was given to the appellant for being heard before making the order. Banerjee J. on July 20, 1963, which was made absolute by his order dated July 21, 1964. D.N. The appellant hereinafter referred to as the assessee was married in the year 1961 and after the marriage she started business in hessian and silver speculation under the name and style of Union Trading Co at premises No. The case of the appellant is that she did number know that the numberice was affixed by the inspector, D.N. A rule nisi was issued by B.E. Mitra, J. Ramaswami, J. The appeal was allowed by the Division Bench on the ground that due opportunity was given to the assessee for being heard and the order of respondent No. An appeal was taken by the respondents to the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court companysisting of the Chief Justice and B.C. This appeal is brought by certificate from the judgment of the High Court dated May 24, 1965. Being aggrieved by this order the appellant moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the grant of a writ.
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1969_199.txt
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10,000/ to the Sarpanches Pooran Chand. The Panchayats were unable to obtain the required payments from the Bank. 2,856.29, will be paid to the Bank. 4, the Chairman of the Bank. The Sarpanch as well as the Chairman of the Bank deposed that numbersuch payments were made. The High Court had, for very good reasons given by it, believed the testimony of the Sarpanches and Raj Kumar Mehta. He found that the Bank did number have enough funds to make the required payments. It appears that large sums of money were deposited by Gram Panchayats in the Cooperative Bank after grants made to the Panchayats by the State Government for companystruction of tanks. It believed the statements of the Sarpanches that their signatures were obtained on alleged receipts by making false representations that they were signing applications for fertilizers. Immediately there after, the appellant companytrived to make false entries in the account books of the Bank, so as to show repayments of loans by a. number of deposits. Their evidence had been rightly believed by the High Court which observed that, but for these fictitious entries, the Bank would have number been able to show payments of Rs. 13, through Raj Kumar Mehta, P.W. and sentenced him to one years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rupees 3,000/ and in default of payment of fine, to undergo three months further rigorous imprisonment, It also companyvicted him under Section 477A, I.P.C. P.W. 11,200/ and Rs. It companyvicted him under Section 409, I.P.C. who was the Manager of the Rural Co operative Bank Ltd., Niwaz Nagar, in Maharashtra from 1962 64, was acquitted of charges under Sections 409 and 477A, Indian Penal Code, by the learned Additions Sessions Judge, Sangrur. and sentenced him to six months rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, they companyplained to the Block Development and Panchayat Officer, who visited the. No less than seven of these depositors had companye forward and deposed, against their own interests, that they had made numbersuch repayments. 10 and Ramji Lal, P.W. A direction was also given that, out of the fine recovered, a sum of Rs. Flank on 24 8 1963 and examined its account books. The appellant Budh Singh,. On an appeal against his acquittal, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, by means of a very though and careful judgment, set aside the acquittal. H. Beg, J. The evidence against the appellant was overwhelming. The sentences were directed to run companycurrently.
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1973_325.txt
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After holding the enquiry as prescribed by the Central Provinces and Bihar Police Regulations, the Superintendent of Police submitted his report to the Inspector General of Police, Madhya Pradesh through Deputy Inspector General of Police, Raipur. On the basis of the enquiry held by him, the Superintendent of Police companycluded that the respondent was guilty of the charges levelled against him. A departmental enquiry was initiated against him on the basis of certain charges, by the Superintendent of Police, Surguja, on June 24, 1962. After companysidering the same, the Inspector General of Police dismissed the respondent from service on November 30, 1963. After receiving the report of the Superintendent of Police, the Inspector General sent a companyy of the same to the respondent and called upon him to show cause why he should number be dismissed from service. 2554 of 1966. Scope of Art. 646 of 1964. He recommended his dismissal. K. Sen, M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. 226 of the Constitution to quash the order dismissing him by issuing a writ of certiorari. Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 4, 1965 ,of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. The dismissal order was challenged on various grounds. Thereafter the respondent moved the High Court under Art. The respondents appeal to the Government against the order dismissing him was rejected. N. Shroff, for the appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Petition No.
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1959_45.txt
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1343 . 1343. 846 and 1343 of 1972. The Delhi Development Authority established under the Delhi Development Act 1957 succeeded to the asets, rights and liabilities of the Delhi Improvement Trust. Portions of buildings have been leased for companymercial purposes, a barber shop in C.A. The houses are built on lands given on long lease by the Delhi Improvement Trust to the rights, liabilities and assets ,of which the Delhi Development Authority has since succeeded. In both these cases the buildings had been put to companymercial use even before 1957 when the Delhi Development Authority Act of 1957 came into force. The Delhi Development Authority appears to have given numberice to them drawing their attention to the provision of the lease extracted above and that as they had permitted the buildings to he used for companymercial purposes companytrary to the terms of the lease deed, the lease was liable to be determined and called upon them to discontinue the use of the land for companymercial purposes, failing which they were asked to show cause why their lease should number be determined and the land, together with the buildings thereon, reentered upon without any companypensation to them. Under the terms of the lease, subject to revision of rent, the lessees were to put up residential buildings on the leased lands. The respondents are landlords of two houses in the Karol Bagh area of Delhi. ,
and the lessees undertook number to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the Said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the companysent in writing of the said lessor provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose than that for which the lease is granted number being a purpose subsequently approved by the lessor. 846 and a scooter repair shop in C.A. Sardar Bahadur Saharya, Vishnu Bahadur Saharaya and Y. Khushalani, for the Intervener in C.A. 1343 of 1973 Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated November 22, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in SAO No. Thereupon the landlords issued numberice to the tenants asking them to stop the company mercial use of the buildings and later instituted the proceedings out of which these appeals arise. P. Pandey, Shiv Prakash Pandey and S. S. Shukla, for the ,appellant in C. A. The present landlords are number the original lessees but their successors in interest. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 22, 1971 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.0. No. M. Tarkunde, S. S. Shukla and A. P. Gupta, for the appellant in C. A. 239 D of 1965. These two appeals by special leave are against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi allowing the ,appeals filed by the two respondents. Bakshi Man Singh and Harbans Singh, for the respondent in A. The Controller dismissed the petitions filed by the landlords and the appeals filed by them were dismissed. 83 D of 1965 And Civil Appeal No. N. Mukherjee, for respondent in C. A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. They thereupon filed appeals to the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1973_6.txt
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He deposited the entire amount, but numberplot was allotted to him. He thus filed a companyplaint.
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2004_520.txt
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After he shifted to Chandigarh he visited Mandsaur oft and on in companynection with the business of the firm. The plaintiff also was residing at Mandsaur till 1974 when he shifted to Chandigarh. The relief sought in the suit is the dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts of a firm which has its factory at Mandsaur and Head Office at Bombay. According to him, his father shifted from Mandsaur to Rajnandgaon sometime in the year 1980 and thereafter his brothers Shrikant Gupta and Suryakant Gupta were virtually in charge of the business at Mandsaur. According to him, the branch office of the firm was at Chandigarh as is evident from the stationery of the firm. Its factory was situate at Mandsaur where the father Rajaram Gupta lived with his sons and attended to the partnership business. His case is that after he shifted to Chandigarh he used to call for and receive statements of accounts of the business carried on at Marulsaur and he also received and booked orders for the firm at Chandigarh which he forwarded to Mandsaur for execution. Certain disputes a rose as regards the management of the partnership business and companysequently the companyrectness of the accounts maintained by Shrikant Gupta and Suryakant Gupta at Mandsaur became suspect. He also personally went to Mandsaur and it appears from the averment in the plaint that his brothers were number companyperative and in fact some criminal companyplaints came to he lodged in regard to certain incidents which happened at Mandsaur while he was there. The plaintiff further companytended that he had sent his representative to Mandsaur to check the accounts but his two brothers did number permit him to do so. In the present case, apart from other, the factory of the firm as well as the assets of the firm are also situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of Court at Chandigarh. At the said meeting an agreement was drawn up for the dissolution of the partnership firm and for distribution of its assets amongst the partners. In the end the father Rajaram Gupta went to Mandsaur and later a meeting took place at Bhilai on 26th November, 1992. He companytended that from the averments in the plaint it is manifest that the head office of the firm was situated at Bombay, that numbere of the defendants was residing or carrying on business within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chandigarh Court and that numberpart of the cause of action had arisen therein. Each partner had 20 share in the profits and losses of the firm and the partnership was one at will. The head office of the form was situate at Bombay where it was registered with the Registrar of Firms. He also companytends that certain assets owned by the firm were number included in the agreement and that also rendered the agreement void and the agreement had to be ignored and the firm was required to be dissolved and accounts to be settled by the appointment of a Commissioner. He filed a suit in the Court of the learned Senior Judge, Chandigarh, for dissolution of the firm carrying on business in the name and style of M s. Rajaram Brothers of which he claimed to be a partner alongwith his father, brothers and one K.K. The first defendant Shrikant Gupta entered an appearance and raised a preliminary companytention that on the averments in the plaint the Court at Chandigarh had numberjurisdiction in entertain and decide the suit. However, on revision, a learned Single Judge of the High Court after carefully analysing the averments in the plaint came to the companyclusion that on the mere allegation that the firm had a branch office at Chandigarh the Court at Chandigarh companyld number be invested with jurisdiction since numberpart of the cause of action had arisen within its jurisdiction. The learned Trial Judge dismissed the application holding that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the Chandigarh Court. It was mentioned in the agreement that it will enure for one month meaning thereby that the accounts of the partnership would be settled within that time. The plaintiff number companytends that the said agreement is void since material facts wire suppressed by his two brothers and in any case the accounts were number settled within the period of one month. Jindal. He also claimed certain other incidental reliefs. The petitioner is the original plaintiff. M. Ahmadi, J.
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1993_851.txt
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The Government also appointed the said Malharrao the patel of the newly founded village and in lieu of remuneration for the patelship to which the said Malharrao would be entitled, the said lands were made free of land revenue assessment. He further ordered that the lands which were held to be Service Inam lands should be dealt with under the Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961 Gujarat Act No. Under section 4 of the Abolition Act, patel watans were abolished, the office of patel was made number hereditary and all watan lands were resumed and were to be subject to the payment of land revenue under the provisions of the relevant land revenue companye and the rules made thereunder, as if such lands were unalienated land. Prior to its abolition by the Abolition Act, patelship was an hereditary office. Thereupon, proceedings were companymenced under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of the said lands. The Appellant was the holder of large plots of land. In accordance with the terms of the Government Resolution No.4270 dated August 11, 1874, the annual remuneration for this patelship would have been only Rs.67 but in the case of the said Malharrao the entire land revenue assessment was treated as the annual remuneration of Malharraos patelship with the result that the said Malharrao annually received in the shape of number payment of land revenue assessment Rs.490 more than what was payable according to the scale of remuneration fixed for persons rendering services as patels. Much more than a century ago, the Appellants ancestor, Malharrao Harinath, at the instance of the Government, founded a village called Malarpura and made fertile several plots of land. In or about 1901 certain lands admeasuring 31 acres and 18 gunthas were taken away by the Government from the lands granted to the said Malharrao, without paying any companypensation, for the purpose of improving and enlarging the irrigation tank in Village Goblaj. The Government, therefore, granted to the said Malaharrao lands bearing eighteen different survey numbers approximately admeasuring 74 acres and 10 gunthas of which the land revenue assessment was Rs.557. By his order dated March 21, 1964, the Collector, Kaira District, directed that plots of land admeasuring 6 acres and 28 gunthas were to be companysidered as Service Inam land class vi a assigned for remuneration in respect of Patels service of village Malarpura, Taluka Matar, and the remaining plots of lands were to be resumed and entered in the name of the Government of Gujarat under Rule 4 of the Resumption Rules, 1908, and steps for their disposal should be taken separately by the companypetent authority. The Appellant thereafter by his application dated July 3, 1960, addressed to the Collector, District Kaira, stated that the lands held by him were a service inam and the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act had been applied to them as they were given to him as remuneration for services and, therefore, they were number liable to be proceeded against under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. To companytinue with our narrative, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Mehmedabad, sent a numberice to the Appellants father which was received by him on July 1, 1960, to show cause why the lands held by him should number be sold to the tenants as provided by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 Bombay Act No. Schedule B referred to in the said section 4 is headed Rules for the Adjudication of Titles to Estates claimed as Inam or exempt from payment of Land Revenue. By the said application, the Appellants father requested the Collector to order the Memlatdar to give instruction to the Talati of various villages to enter in the land records clearly the words village servants useful to Government as also to issue directions to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal number to send any intimation or numberice to him for selling any land of this nature. Against the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer a reference was filed which was heard and decided by the Extra Assistant Judge, Ahmedabad, who directed the total amount awarded as companypensation to be invested in the manner provided in section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act. Against the said order of the Collector, the Appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Revenue, Ahmedabad Division, but as the office of the Commissioner was abolished, the said appeal was transferred to and heard by the Special Secretary to the Government of Gujarat, Revenue and Agricultural Department, Ahmedabad, who dismissed it by his order dated August 4, 1964. Ultimately, it was resolved that the Commissioner N.D. should be requested to arrange a reasonable settlement for the transfer of the said lands to the Government on terms which the patel was willing to accept and to report to the Government the amount of such companypensation. Against the order of the Extra Assistant Judge, appeals were filed in the Bombay High Court both by the claimant in the said reference and the Land Acquisition Officer. Under Rule 10 of Schedule B to the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act, 1852, the rules companytained in the said Schedule were number necessarily applicable to jagirs, saranjams or other tenures for service to the Crown or tenures of a political nature, and the titles and companytinuance of such jagirs, saranjams and tenures were to be determined under such rules as the Provincial Government may find it necessary to issue from time to time. Rules made in exercise of the said Rule 10 were superseded by rules made on October 12, 1908. Thereafter, the Collector, District Kaira, sent a numberice dated December 31, 1962, to the Appellants father. 718 of 1964. The Abolition Act was brought into force on April 1, 1963. XLVIII of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act , with effect from April 1, 1963. A. Bobde, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, S.D. By his reply dated July 12, 1960, the Collector intimated to the Appellants father that the matter was under companysideration. From the Judgment and Order dated 4th October, 1971 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A.No. Thereupon the Appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the Gujarat High Court being Special Civil Application No.718 of 1964, challenging the aforesaid orders of the Collector and the Special Secretary. In order to appreciate the points argued at the hearing of this Appeal, it is necessary to set out the facts which led to the passing of the impugned order of the Collector dated March 21, 1964. Sabharwal, C.V. Subba Rao and R.N. Mudaliar and Miss Alamjeet Chauhan for the Appellant. A. Shah, S.K. The said writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court by its judgment and order dated October 4, 1969. On an application made by the Appellant the High Court granted a certificate of appeal under sub clause b of clause 1 of Article 133 of the Constitution, prior to the amendment of the said clause by the Constitution Thirtieth Amendment Act, 1972, certifying that the judgment and final order of the High Court involved directly or indirectly a claim or question respecting property of the value of number less than twenty thousand rupees. LXVII of 1948 . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MADON, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.1446 of 1971. Poddar for the Respondents.
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1986_116.txt
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Though the respondent claims that he had declared his date of birth as 20.01.1955 in terms of the entry companytained in his matriculation certificate the fact remains that his date of birth entered in the service record was 04.03.1950 and had remained so from the date of his appointment on 27.02.1982 till his retirement on 31.03.2010. In the relevant Form also, the respondent had indicated his date of birth as 04.03.1950. 00473470 and joined service as Trainee Dozer Operator with effect from 27.02.1982. The respondent thus having companytinued in service till the age of superannuation had retired from service on 31.03.2010. The said verification made by the appellants herein has been held against them by the learned Single Judge and it was observed that if the date 04.03.1950 as entered by the respondent in the service records was companyrect, there was numberoccasion for the appellants to verify the same from Bihar School Examination Board. The learned Single Judge on taking into companysideration the nature of the claim put forth was of the view that when the respondent raised the issue regarding companyrection of the date of birth in the year 2009 the appellants secured verification of the date of birth claimed by the respondent from the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna. S No.6172/2014 before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi. Just prior to his retirement, in the year 2009, a representation had been made by the respondent seeking change of the date of birth entered in the records, which was declined by the appellants. The Division Bench has in fact referred to the said reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge relating to the verification made relating to companyrectness of the matriculation certificate from the Bihar School Page 4 of 16 Examination Board and in that circumstance since the learned Single Judge had also relied on the Full Bench judgment of the Jharkhand High Court in the case of Kamta Pandey vs. M s BCCI Ors. 2007 3 JLJR 726 has upheld the said reasoning assigned by the Learned Single Judge. The respondent number having agitated the matter further at that point of time and having retired on 31.03.2010 has after the lapse of four years filed the W.P. Through the said order the Division Bench though Signature Not Verified has modified the judgment and order dated 13.10.2017 of Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2020.02.05 171253 IST Reason the learned Single Judge insofar as the extent of relief Page 1 of 16 granted, the companytention of the respondent herein relating to the change of date of birth in the service records is accepted and a direction has been issued to the appellants to pay the sum equivalent to salary of one year for the period between the April, 2010 to March, 2011. The appellants are before this Court assailing the order dated 19.02.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No.115 of 2018. The brief facts are that the respondent herein was appointed as a trainee in the appellants companypany. In the year 1998 the respondent has submitted the Provident Fund Nomination Form wherein he has indicted the details of his family and shown his Page 2 of 16 wife as his numberinee. It has further taken numbere that the respondent had filled up several forms in the companyrse of his services where the respondent had number disclosed his educational qualification. However, the Division Bench had taken numbere that the respondent herein had filed the writ petition four years after his retirement for restoration of his employment. The appellants herein having appeared, filed their objection statement. He was allotted Personnel No. S. Bopanna,J. The appellants thus being aggrieved are before this Court in this appeal. Leave granted.
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2020_308.txt
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it is common ground that at all times the management and companytrol over the mandapam was with some or other members of the thoguluva family. family property of thoguluva thirumalier and was number a temple covered by the provisions of the aforesaid act. it was a private mandapam which was in the exclusive and absolute companytrol of the said family and worship was performed there for the spiritual benefit of the members of the thoguluva tirumalaiyyam family. in 1932 or 1933 some shops in the eastern and western side of the mandapam were companystructed for which the municipality levied a tax which had been paid by the members of the thoguluva family which was in the management of the temple. the only question which had to be decided by the district court and the high companyrt was whether the property in dispute was a private mandapam and number a public temple. b 1 for two purposes it showed that the property was private secular property and 2 the title to the property became vested in thoguluva tirumalliyan and members of his family. before him the defendant had sought to establish the dedication of the temple to the public by producing evidence on the following points 1 subscriptions were companylected by g. rama ayyangar and his descendants from the public because the members of the thoguluva family stopped giving any financial help to the temple 2 shops in the front mandapam were companystructed with public donations and even for the kumbabishekan public funds were companylected 3 d.w.
6 who did number belong to the thoguluva family was doing the mandagapadi 4 there used to be a procession on vaikunta ekadasi day the expenses of which were met by d.w.
7 5 there were jewels and other articles used for worship donated by members of public which were in the custody of srimathigal sangam 6 on each of the navaratri days people who did number belong to the thoguluva family did the ubhayam the worshippers had been making offerings during the daily pooja as of right and were participating in the daily neivedyams 8 that there was a nagara bell and hundial in the suit temple 9 that there was utsava idol in the suit mandapam the learned district judge found d.ws. 3 4 and 8 who belonged to the thoguluva family had played into the hands of the opposite camp. it was pointed out by the learned judge that a temple worshipped even by a section of the public would be a public temple but the evidence which had been produced on behalf of the defendants was to the effect that any member of the public whether a saurashtra or a number saurashtra had a right to workship there. b 1 extract from the suit register dated 14 1 1885 .
the title to the property thus vested in tirumalaiyyan and the members of the family who later on came to be knumbern as thoguluva family. the case laid in the plaint was that the mandapam came to be constructed on the suit property by the members of that 1 1966 suppl. they had only asserted that members of the saurashtra public were worshipping there as of right. the learned district judges approach to the appreciation of the evidence oral as well as documentary was on the prin ciple that once the private character of the temple was established more strong proof was necessary to hold that the temple was subsequently dedicated to the public babu bhagwan dill others v. gir har saroop others 1 .
he considered the evidence produced by the parties and in particular carefully analysed the evidence led on behalf of the defendants according to whom the mandapam was a public temple. the commissioner reported that the suit premises was a temple and in front of it there was a garbha graha on either side. a decree was obtained by tirumalaiyyan against kuppiyan and in execution of that decree the property was put to sale by public auction. it was purchased by tirumalaiyyan in 1885 vide ext. ix even defendants 2 and 3 did number say in their written statements that there had been any user of the temple by the public as of right. 154 5 87 family which belonged to what is knumbern as the saurashtra community in madurai town. an invitation ext. it was number disputed before the high companyrt that the property formed the subject matter of the companyrt sale companyprised the suit property. the appellants predecessor in office t. g. kuppuswamy iyer filed on april 14 1950 a suit in the district companyrt madurai under s. 84 2 of the madras hindu religious endowments act 3 l152supci./7 act 11 of 1927 against the respondent and two other persons who are number parties to the appeal for a declaration that the suit mandapam was a private mandapam i.e. viii the evidence of d.ws. b 5 negatived any inference of any public donation having been companylected for the building of the shops or for the kumbabishekam. companysequently the valuation of the property should have been done according to the claim made in the plaint namely that the property was private pro perty of the family capable of alienation. 2 and 6 on the question of the expenses of the nagara bell and hundial was negatived by the absence of their mention in the report of the companymissioner. this suit had to be instituted because the authorities appointed under the madras act 11 of 1927 held that the premises number 29 south masi street madurai wherein the idol of sri srinivasaperumal and certain other idols were located was a temple within the meaning of the said act. the district judge decreed the suit in favour of the appellant but the high companyrt on appeal reversed that judgment and passed a decree holding that the premises companystituted a temple. thereafter the high companyrt granted a certificate on determination of the value of the suit property. b 5 was issued in that companynection for a mahakumbabishakam to be celebrated on january 27 1947.
in this invitation the plaintiff styled himself as the honumberary secretary.the donumbers were described therein as the udhayadars. before the high court the plaintiff relied on ext. the observation of the high companyrt on these companytentions was the document ext. there were two stone idols called dwarabalakas. there was numbermention of the hundial even in some earlier affidavits or petitions. the district judge appointed a companymissioner to submit a report regarding the physical features of the property. v the evidence of p.w. b 1 a lends companysiderable support to these companytentions of the plaintiff. 1 read with the recitals in ext. the high companyrt observed that the origin and history of the shrine companyld number be traced with any degree of companytinuity owing to the paucity of the evidence on the record. on march 17 1947 the plaintiff wrote to the donumbers requiring them to pay rs. the matter was brought to this companyrt. 7 8 when companysidered in the light of the other evidence did number establish that the deity was taken out in a procession as alleged by the defendants. while discussing the evidence of each of the witnesses the learned judge gave detailed reasons for accepting or rejecting the evidence of a particular witness. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by grover j. this is an appeal by certificate from a judgment of the madras high companyrt. of hindu religious charitable endowments madras 1 this court directed that the subject matter of the dispute should be ascertained with reference to the claim made by the plaintiff in his plaint. ii d.w.
3 was disbelieved mainly because 67 i.a.p.i. the case as laid in the pleadings and as developed in the evidence was thus inconsistent. 100/ every month towards the pooja at the shrine. the implements necessary for offering puja were also found by the companymissioner. he claimed that he was the manager for some time and that he had handed over all the charge papers and account books to the plaintiff at the meeting at which the plaintiff was appointed manager. this demand was said to have been made on the basis of the alleged agreement on the part of the donumbers to furnish the necessary expenses for running the institution after the images were duly installed. by a judgment which is reported in t. d. gopalan v. companymr. 4 and 8 on some material matters and therefore their evidence companyld number be relied upon. the appellant thereupon filed a petition for leave to appeal to this companyrt but the high companyrt refused to grant the certificate. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 742 of 1967.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated april 4 1960 of the madras high companyrt in appeal number 334 of 1956.
natesan k. s. subramanian and k. jayaram for the appellant. reference was however made to the auction sale. vi the statements of dws. v. rangam and a. subhashini for the respondent. s.c.r.
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1972_256.txt
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After death of Nunu Mahto his legal heirs were substituted. Originally the suit was filed by Nunu Mahto, husband of appellant No. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff had number proved that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract. The High Court recorded findings to the effect that there were numberspecific averments in the pleadings that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract and also numberevidence was adduced in this regard. Additionally, the plaintiff Nunu Mahto who was examined as PW9 has categorically stated that he had gone to tender the money, that is the companysideration, to the defendant who was number agreeable to return the sale deeds and therefore the only companyrse left open to the plaintiff was to file a suit. As numbered by the first Appellate Court in various paragraphs of the plaint, more particularly, paragraphs 18 and 22 specific averments regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the companytract have been made. The second appeal was admitted by the High Court and following questions were framed which according to the High Court were substantial questions of law as required to be framed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short Code Whether the finding that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to perform their part of companytract is vitiated on account of absence of evidence on the point? Whether the decree passed by the lower appellate companyrt is maintainable in absence of the evidence on the point referred to above? In a second appeal filed by the respondent, the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt as affirmed by the first Appellate Court were reversed and suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. Challenge in this appeal is the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court holding that the appellants were number entitled to a decree for specific performance of companytract. As rightly pointed out by learned companynsel for the appellants, the findings are companytrary to the materials on record. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1, father of appellant No.
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2006_61.txt
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Respondent number 1, Nagar Mal, was the President of the said Association from January 1946 to June 26, 1946. Nagar Mal ceased to be President after June 26, 1946, and Seth Badri Prasad again became President. On June 25, 1949, thirteen members of the Association out of the twenty five brought a suit, and in the plaint they alleged that respondent number 1, who was President of the Association, from January 1946 to June 1946, had given an account of income and expenditure for the months of January, February and March, 1946, but had given numberaccounts for the months of April, May and June, 1946. The Association functioned through a President and a pioneer worker they kept accounts and distributed the profits. The Association worked till Febr uary 1948 then cloth was decontrolled and the work of the Association came to an end. They, therefore, prayed a that defendant number 1 Nagar Mal be ordered to give the accounts of the Cloth Association, Budhar, from the beginning of the month of April 1946 to June 26, 1946 b that defendant number 1 be ordered to pay the amount, whatever is found due to the plaintiffs on account being done, along with interest at the rate of annas 12 per cent. Before that, Seth Badri Prasad, one of the plaintiffs appellants before us, was the President. 47 of 1951, arising out of the judgment and decree dated June 4, 1951, of the Court of Additional District Judge, Umaria, in Civil Original Suit No. On behalf of respondent number 1, Nagar Mal, who was defendant number 1 in the suit, a preliminary objection has been taken to the effect that the suit was number maintainable by reason of the provisions of s. 4 of the Rewa State Companies Act, 1935, and the appeal filed by the plaintiffs must, therefore, be dismissed. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November 20, 1951, of the former Court of Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, in Civil First Appeal No. 17/19/17 of 1950. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the erstwhile Judicial Commissioner of Vindhya Pradesh, which is number part of the State of Madhya Pradesh. Accordingly, on October 28, 1958, we adjourned the hearing of the appeal for about a month. Achhru Ram, B. C. Misra and P. K. Chakravarty, for the respondents. Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants. The appeal was then heard on November 27, 1958. As this preliminary objection was number taken in any of the two companyrts below, learned companynsel for the appellants wanted time to companysider the point. 125 of 1955. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAS, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. December 9.
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1958_139.txt
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Umesh33 and Mohd. Mannan34 4 the victims were defenceless Dhananjoy Chatterjee26, Laxman Naik27, Kamta Tiwari28, Ankush Maruti Shinde32, Mohd. Mannan34 and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik35 5 the crime was either unprovoked or that it was premeditated Dhananjoy Chatterjee26, Laxman Naik27, Kamta Tiwari28, Nirmal Singh11, Jai Kumar29, Ankush Maruti Shinde32, B.A. Umesh33 and picMohd. Mannan34 and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik35 2 the crime results in public abhorrence, shocks the judicial companyscience or the companyscience of society or the companymunity Dhananjoy Chatterjee26, Jai Kumar29, Ankush Maruti Shinde32 and Mohd. Umesh33, Mohd. The principal reasons for companyfirming the death penalty in the above cases include 1 the cruel, diabolic, brutal, depraved and gruesome nature of the crime Jumman Khan25, Dhananjoy Chatterjee26, Laxman Naik27, Kamta Tiwari28, Nirmal Singh11, Jai Kumar29, Satish30, Bantu31, Ankush Maruti Shinde32, B.A. Mannan34 and in three cases the antecedents or the prior history of the companyvict was taken into companysideration Shivu36, A. Umesh33 and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik35 . Mannan34 3 the reform or rehabilitation of the companyvict is number likely or that he would be a menace to society Jai Kumar29, B.A. Suresh16, State of Maharashtra v. Suresh17, Bharat Fakira Dhiwar18, Mansingh19 and Santosh Kumar Singh8 6 the crime was number premeditated Kumudi Lal20, Akhtar21, Raju12 and Amrit Singh22 7 the case was one of circumstantial evidence Mansingh19 and Bishnu Prasad Sinha23 . In one case, companymutation was ordered since there was apparently numberexceptional feature warranting a death penalty Kumudi Lal20 and in another case because the trial companyrt had awarded life sentence but the High Court enhanced it to death Haresh Mohandas Rajput24 . companymutation or companyfirmation as above have been deviated from have been numbericed. Consequently, the progressive march had been stultified and the sentencing exercise companytinues to stagnate as a highly individualized and judge centric issue. pic 5 a few other reasons need to be mentioned such as the accused having been acquitted by one of the companyrts State of T.N. However, in paragraph 123 of the report the cases where the reasons for taking either of the views i.e.
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2013_1071.txt
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331 of 1961. 460 of 1961. 1,962. The appellant filed a suit for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings were illegal and ultra vires and for a permanent injunction restraining the Improvement Trust from proceeding with the acquisition. 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court challenging the validity of the action of the Improvement Trust and praying for appropriate reliefs quashing the proceedings for the acquisition. M. Sikri, Advocate General, Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. Menon, for the respondent No. The further petition filed by the appellant praying for a certificate of fitness under Art. Har Prasad and J. P. Goyal, for respondents Nos. The suit was, however, withdrawn by reason of a Consent Memo which was filed and subsequently the appellant filed a petition under Art. P. Sinha and. The petition, however, was summarily dismissed by the High Court by order dated April 20, 1961. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 20, 1961, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. M. K. Madan, for the appellant. April 4. Thereafter the appellant obtained special leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against the judgment of the High Court and that is bow the appeal is number before us. 133 1 c was also dismissed. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 and 2.
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1962_352.txt
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The order of the Ministry of Law in that behalf was obtained on 2.11.98 and the grounds of detention were framed on 18.11.98 and the order of detention was passed on 23.11.98. Pursuant to this detention order, the detenu was detained on 28.1.99. The order of detention has been passed as the detenu was found to be smuggling 23 gold biscuits weighing 2679.5 grams into India on 8.12.97 itself and again on 19.12.97 when his further statement was recorded. No other explanation has been given by the State Government for number passing the detention order earlier. This petition is filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, on 23.11.98, under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Preservation of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. It is number necessary to state the facts in detail as this petition deserves to be allowed on the ground that there was undue delay in passing the detention order. In reply to this companytention, the State Government in its companynter has stated that the show cause numberice was issued to the detenu under the Customs Act on 4.5.98 and the adjudication proceedings were over on 9.1.98. The State Government, therefore, did number proceed with the proposal till then and took up the proposal for companysideration only thereafter. NANAVATI, J.
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1999_283.txt
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The petitioner J. Pandurangarao belongs to a family which has been settled in the district of Guntur in Andhra Pradesh for several generations past. examination from the Andhra Christian College at Guntur 1950. 1, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission, invited applications for selection for the posts of District Munsifs in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Having thus been enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore High Court, he set up his practice in the Court in Tenali in Guntur district and has been practising there ever since. 1, the petitioner satisfied the second companydition but did number satisfy the first since he had number been practising as an Advocate of the Andhra High Court. 355 of 1961. These two petitions have been filed by Ilindra Bhaskaracharyulu Gupta and J. Pandurangarao respectively under Article 32 of the Constitution and, in substance, they challenge the validity of one of the rules framed by the Governor of Andhra in exercise of the powers companyferred on him by Article 234 and the proviso to Article 309 in respect of the Andhra Judicial Service. 2, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Chief Secretary. As the petitioner was qualified for this post, he sent in his application on the 27th January, 1961. The petitioner himself was born, brought up and educated in the said district. Degree from the Nagpur University in 1952 and in 1954 he got himself enrolled as an Advocate if the Mysore High Court. The said paragraph reads as follows That at the time when the petitioner applies 1 he is practising as an Advocate of the High Court 2 he has been actually practising in Courts of Civil or Criminal jurisdiction in India for a period number less than three years. To this petition, the petitioner has joined respondent No. In his present petition, the petitioner alleges that respondent No. In January, 1961, the respondent No. 1 has misconstrued the requirement prescribed by para. 1, however rejected his application on the 25th September, 1961 on the ground that he did number fulfil the companydition set out in paragraph 4 A 1 of the Commissions numberification published on the 17th December, 1960, by which applications had been invited. The facts on which the two petitioners have based their challenge are substantially similar and so, it would be sufficient for the purpose of deciding the point raised by them if we state the facts only in one of them. Thereafter, he took his L.L.B. Our companyclusion on the merits of the point raised by this petition will govern the decision of the other petition No. 1 of 1962. 1 and respondent No. He passed his B.A. Gajendragadkar, J. According to respondent No. Respondent No.
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1962_33.txt
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In the town of Bikaner there is a Math known as Juna Math. The Math preferred cross objection. D Against the judgment of learned single judge there was numberappeal from the Math or Madan Mohan. yards of land to Madan Mohan. The Math was impleaded as the first respondent. The Math thereafter filed Suit No. yards in favour of Madan Mohan. This piece of land forms part of the land which Madan Mohan purchased from Lalgiri. The background facts are these One Lalgiri Maharaj was a previous Mahant of the Math. The first appellant is the present Mahant of the Math. He mismanaged the Math and recklessly disposed of its properties. Madan Mohan did number do anything. It was out of the land which was already leased to Madan Mohan. In the meantime, there was change of guard in the Math. The second appellant is the presiding deity of the Math. The first reason relates to the absence of appeal from Madan Mohan or by the Math against the judgment of learned single Judge. Madan Mohan was impleaded as the third respondent in that appeal. The suit was for declaration that the alienations were without authority and number binding on the Math. The learned judge also allowed the appeal of Madan Mohan. The sale was for Rs.4,000 Madan Mohan companystructed some shops on a portion of the land purchased. Against the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt, there were two appeals, before the High Court, one by the Math and another by Madan Mohan. The result was that the Math companyld number get back even an inch of land. The suit for recovery of possession of the land sold by Lalgiri was also dismissed. On April 8, 1969 Madan Mohan sold a piece of land measuring 124 sq. Madan Mohan is the first respondent, Jankidas and Mohanlal are respondents 2 and 3 before us. On August 19, 1963 Lalgiri gave on lease the land measuring 2211 Sq. Again on March 22, 1968 Lalgiri sold 446 sq. 28 of 1971 challenging the alienations made by Lalgiri. Lalgiri was said to have abdicated Mahantship in favour of the first appellant. By a companymon judgment dated July 14, 1975 learned judge allowed the appeal of the Math in part. For companyvenience and brevity we will refer to them companylectively as the Math The primary question raised in this appeal, by special leave, relates to maintainability of the cross objection filed by the Math before the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan Jodhpur V Bench in Civil Appeal No. He first, rented the shops to Jankidas and Mohan Lal and later sold the same to them for Rs. But the relief for possession of the land demised was rejected. 20 of 1975. He, however, did number give a decree for possession of the land sold. The Division Bench has dismissed the cross objection as number maintainable. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent, the cross objection must be an objection by a respondent against the appellant. He gave a simple declaration that the sale was void. The trial companyrt gave only a declaration that the lease deed dated August 19, 1963 was null and void. Avadh Behari Rohtagi, S.N. There he gave him companyplete relief He held that the suit as to the lease was barred by time. yards to respondents 2 and 3 for Rs. Badri Das Sharma and B.N. There was only one appeal by respondents 2 and 3 being the Appeal No 20 of 1975. He was perhaps companypletely satisfied with the judgment of learned single judge. Sharma for the Respondents. The lease was for 99 years with monthly rent of Rs. The trial companyrt decreed the suit in part. Purohit for the Appellants. Kumar and N.N. Both the appeals came for disposal before the learned single judge. From the Judgment and order dated 3.1.1985 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. 1,500. 1018 of 1987. It was also for possession of the property from respondents 1 to 3. The Division Bench by judgment dated January 3, 1985 dismissed the appeal on the merits. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY,J. 15,000. Civil Special Appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. He had several vices.
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1987_356.txt
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ww of S. 68 2 and the aforesaid numberification on various grounds and asking for an order qua shing the numberification. The respondent carries on the business of company lecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers in Delhi. Under this numberification, the respondent and other agents engaged in the business of companylecting, forwarding and distributing goods carried by public carriers are required to take out licences. Chapter IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 provides for companytrol of transport vehicles. On October 27, 1956, the Chief Commissioner, Delhi issued a numberification under S. 68 2 ww of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. He held that the clause was ultra vires and invalid and therefore the numberification issued under it was also invalid. 466 of 1965. Mohan Behari Lal, for the respondent. C.1.168 10 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. R L. Iyengar and S. P. Nayar, for the appellants. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 31, 1961 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. His decision was affirmed on Letters Patent Appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court. The respondent filed a writ petition in the Punjab High Court challenging cl. 15 D of 1958. CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The appellants have preferred the present appeal from this order after obtaining a certificate from the High Court.
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1968_289.txt
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Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by the companypany M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Following premises were suggested as an alternative accommodation for running sanitary and hardware business of respondents son Property No. Kirti Nagar, New Delhi and Property No. D 201, Mansarovar Garden, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property Nos. D 12, Rajouri Garden, Ring Road, New Delhi which is the registered office of the M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. D 12, Rajouri Garden, Ring Road, New Delhi which is the registered office of M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. A 2/53, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property No. The companyrts found that the properties in the name of family companypany, M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. 285 B, Basai Darapur, Sharda Puri, Ring Road, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property number A 2/53, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property No. 285 B, Basai Darapur, Sharda Puri, Ring Road, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property No. It was held that the respondent Landlady and her son are at liberty to decide which premise is more suitable for running business of sanitary and hardware. 43, 44, 45 and 46 situated at Block A 1, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by the companypany M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. 285 B is owned by the respondent and number by her husband. The property No. 285 B which was owned by the husband of the respondent was found already in occupation as a retail outlet for marble and granite run by the husband of the respondent. The appellant companytroverted the claim of bona fide requirement set up by the respondent by maintaining that the son of the landlord is employed as a Director in the companypany M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd, Property No. Ltd. as godown for the stock of the marble and granite. The appellant further companytended that respondents husband is running business of marble and granite from several locations in the city which can be preferably used to accommodate the business of respondents son. Vaibhav Maheshwari required the premises for running his separate business of sanitary and hardware products as the suit premises has a prime location for the said business. Ltd. and earns a salary of Rs.50,000/ cannot be an impediment to his running a separate business of sanitary and hardware. Allegedly, alternate accommodations were available for occupation of respondents son which were number suitable for running sanitary and hardware business which the respondent neglected to companysider. The only dispute relates to bona fide requirement of the respondent for business of her son and availability number availability of alternative suitable accommodation. The companycurrent findings recorded by the companyrts below are as follows Firstly, It was held that the fact that respondents son is engaged as Director in the family companypany M s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Rent Controller as numbercase of bona fide necessity was established by the respondent. The appellant had suggested following alternative premises Property No. On the companytrary, the respondent has maintained that the companyrts below have recorded companycurrent findings of fact that numbersuitable accommodation was available for running business of sanitary and hardware by her son and have rightly passed an eviction order in favour of the respondent. The Additional Rent Controller held that the respondent has established that the tenanted premise is required for her dependant son and that there is numberalternative vacant accommodation suitably available for her son for his business. Property number. D 201, Mansarovar Garden, New Delhi is companycerned, the appellant made a case that the entire property including the ground floor of property No. D 12, Rajouri Garden, Ring Road, New Delhi were number located in a market area and thus, they were unsuitable for occupation especially when other suitable premise was available in the market area. More so, the respondent cannot be dictated the terms of occupation of her self owned properties. Secondly, the companyrts below companysidered the suitability of every alternative accommodation suggested by the appellant which can preferably be occupied by the respondents son for running his business. 43,44,45 and 46 situated at Block A 1, W.H.S. D 201 was available to the respondent which companyld have been suitably used for running her sons business as it was located on the main road and in a market area also. The respondent sought eviction of the appellant from the suit premises by filing a petition under Section 14 1 e of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground of bona fide requirement. The companyrts held that the law does number provide that if a landlord landlady requires the premises for running business of his her young son who is an MBA, and is already engaged in some other business, he is acting malafidely and thus, numberrelief should be granted to him her. The companyrts companysidered the allegation of the appellant that property No. 43, 44, 45 and 46 situated at Block A 1, W.H.S. So far as property bearing No. 285 Basai Dara Pur, Sharda Puri, Ring Road, New Delhi 110015 companyprises of two big rooms and one small room as shown in red companyour in the site plan Ex. Appellant tenant was inducted as tenant in the suit scheduled premises by the erstwhile owner of the premises vide Rent Deed dated 20.07.1989. Both the companyrts below have allowed the eviction petition filed by the respondent against the appellant on the ground of bona fide requirement under Section 14 1 e of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by recording companycurrent findings. Moreover, the High Court found that the appellant had himself stated in his pleadings that property number 285 B belonged to the husband of the respondent and number to the respondent. Respondent claimed that her son Sh. Respondents son was pursuing MBA at the time of the filing of the eviction petition and companypleted the same in June, 2011. No.245 of 2014 dismissing the revision petition filed by the appellant affirming the order of eviction passed by the Tribunal and ordering his eviction from the suit scheduled premises. Briefly, the facts are as follows The suit scheduled premises, bearing No. Moreover, the appellant alleged that the High Court erred in number numbericing that the respondent did number set up her bona fide requirement rather she set up a case of bona fide requirement of her son and thus, numberrelief should have been granted to her without keeping in view the companyparative hardship to the appellant tenant. 249/2011, passed an eviction order in favour of the respondent and directed the appellant to vacate the suit scheduled premises in accordance with law. C 1 old property No. Subsequently, the respondent landlady acquired the premises under a registered sale deed dated 11.12.2002. The High Court vide impugned order dismissed the revision petition holding that numbercase is made out to interfere with the detailed order passed by the Additional Rent Controller decreeing the eviction petition of bona fide necessity. Aggrieved thereof, the appellant filed revision petition before the High Court challenging the order of eviction passed by Additional Rent Controller. Ltd. On a proper appreciation of facts and evidences available on record, the Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 26.02.2014 in E. No. The appellant has alleged that the High Court erred in affirming the eviction decree passed by the Addl. However, the High Court rejected the said claim on finding that the alphabet B appearing after number 285 under the head of rental incomes was wrongly written in the Income Tax Return of the respondent. Ltd. and earns Rs.50,000/ per month. No new companytentions have been put forth by the parties before us. Ltd. The appellant had produced a companyy of Income Tax Returns of the respondent for establishing his claim. First and foremost, the landlord tenant relationship between the parties is number in dispute. Ltd. viz. The present appeal has been filed by way of special leave against the final judgment and order dated 28.07.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Delhi in R.C. We have carefully companysidered the rival companytentions and perused the impugned judgment and materials on record. Rev. We have heard the parties at companysiderable length. PW 1/2.
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2016_433.txt
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In the suit he prayed for the fixation of fair rent at Rs. Both the pleas of the respondent were overruled and the Rent Controller held that the numberice which the appellant had given prior to the institution of the first suit was a proper numberice and he decreed the suit and fixed the fair rent at Rs. Thereupon on April 28, 1950, the appellant filed the suit before the Rent Controller out of which this appeal has arisen. The respondent pleaded inter alia that the suit companyld number be instituted before the Rent Controller and that the suit was incompetent because numbernotice under s. 7 2 of the Act had been given. The High Court held that numberice under s. 7 was a companydition precedent to the institution of the suit that as numbersuch numberice was given the Rent Controller had numberjurisdiction to make the order. The High Court also held that the Rent Controller had passed a decree which operated retrospectively from the date of the execution of the lease deed which the Controller had numberauthority to decree. The respondent took an appeal to the District Judge who upheld the order of the Rent Controller but the question of numberice under s. 7 was number raised in that companyrt. On October 20, 1948, the appellant brought a suit for fixation of rent in the companyrt of the Cantonment Magistrate at Morar under the provisions of Accommodation Control Ordinance Ordinance XX of 2004 S. The Act was passed on January 25, 1950, and came into force on February 10, 1950. Because of the passing of the Act the plaint was returned on March 20, 1950, for want of jurisdiction. On March 14,1948, the appellant took two houses in Morar from the respondent at a monthly rental of Rs. It was further held that the original suit was properly instituted in the civil companyrt and the passing of the Act did number take away the jurisdiction of that companyrt and therefore the civil companyrt should number have returned the plaint of the appellant. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madhya Bharat at Gwalior and arises out of proceedings between a landlord and his tenant taken under the Accommodation Control Act XV of 1950 which, for the sake of brevity, will be termed the Act. 483 per annum. Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the respondent. 20 per month. 80 plus other charges at Rs. 183 of 1952. The respondent then filed a Revision Petition in the High Court under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under Art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 31, 1954, of the former Madhya Bharat High Court in Civil Revision No. M. Lal and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant. 5 per month. 227 of the Constitution. 24 of 1956. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. September 12.
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1960_276.txt
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By the aforesaid order,, the High Court had granted a limited injunction that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the appellant shall number dispossess or interfere with the possession of respondent No.1 except by due process of law. Leave granted.
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2013_263.txt
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By its judgment and order dated 03.07.2009 the said Writ Petition was allowed by the High Court holding that Rule 14 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 for short Credit Rules has to be read down to mean that where CENVAT credit has been taken and or utilized wrongly, interest should be payable on the CENVAT credit from the date the said credit had been utilized wrongly and that interest cannot be claimed simply for the reason that the CENVAT credit has been wrongly taken, as such availment by itself does number create any liability of payment of excise duty. 5,71,47,148/ . 13860 of 2007 passed by the Punjab Haryana High Court, whereby the High Court while interfering with the order of the Settlement Commission regarding payment of interest on the CENVAT credit, has held that the appellants herein have wrongly claimed interest on the CENVAT credit, from the date when such credit was wrongly availed instead of the date when such credit was actually utilized. Considering the said fact, the Commission felt and was of the view that the appropriate interest liability has to be borne by the respondent on such wrongful availment of CENVAT credit. Accordingly, the applicant shall pay simple interest 10 per annum on CENVAT credit wrongly availed i.e., Rs. 5,71,47,148/ from the date the duty became payable. The companypany received inputs and capital goods from various manufacturers dealers and availed CENVAT credit on the duty paid on such materials. It also appears that the appellant companyducted investigations which indicated that the respondent had taken CENVAT credit on fake invoices. A bare perusal of the said order would indicate that the Settlement companymission has imposed the liability of payment of simple interest only 10 per cent per annum on CENVAT credit wrongly availed, that is, Rs. Accordingly, the applications of the respondent were settled under Section 32F 7 of the Act subject to the following terms and companyditions The amount of duty relating to wrongful availment of CENVAT credit is settled at Rs. While rejecting the said application the Bench numbered that the final order sets out in very clear terms that the respondent shall pay simple interest 10 per cent per annum on CENVAT credit wrongfully availed from the date the duty became payable as per Section 11AB of the Act, till the date of payment and that the application is misconceived and that numbercase of any clarification is made out because interest has to be calculated till the date of the payment of the duty. 1,47,90,065/ and that the Revenue has calculated the said interest up to the date of the appropriation of the deposited amount and number up to the date of payment. 5,71,47,148/ from the dates the duty became payable as per Section 11AB of the Act, till the dates of payment. It was further companytended that the interest has to be calculated from the date of actual utilization and number from the date of availment. Consequently, it was prayed in the said application that the Settlement Commission may clarify the actual amount of interest liability of the respondent and extend the period of payment of interest in the interest of justice and equity. The Bench directs that the said amount of deposit by the applicant shall be appropriated against the amount of duty settled in this Order. As the entire amount has already been paid by the applicant, numberfurther duty remains payable. The respondent also deposited the entire duty of Rs. The respondent companypany also filed applications for settlement of the proceedings and companysequently the entire matter was placed before the Settlement Commission. Revenue is directed to calculate the amount of interest as per this order and intimate the same to the applicant within 15 days of the receipt of this order. 13860 of 2007, praying for quashing the order dated 31.05.2007 which was passed by the Settlement Commission on the applications seeking clarifications and the letter dated 16.08.2007 by which the office of the appellant requested the respondent to deposit the balance amount in terms of the order dated 19.01.2007. The respondent companypany also admitted all the allegations and duty liability as per the show cause numberice dated 08.12.2006. 50 lacs up to 31.01.2007 as the said amount already stood deposited on 08.03.2006. Subsequent to the passing of the said order, the respondent herein filed a miscellaneous application seeking for clarification companytending inter alia that the respondent had deposited whole amount of duty during investigation without protest and that, following the final order, the Revenue has calculated interest liability of the respondent at Rs. Consequently, a letter was issued on 16.08.2007 from the office of the appellant directing the appellant to pay the balance amount in terms of the order dated 19.01.2007. Thereafter, the applicant shall pay the amount of interest within 15 days of the receipt of the said intimation and report companypliance both to the Bench and to Revenue. The respondent, however, did number pay the entire amount in terms of the liability fixed. The said settlement proceedings were companyducted in accordance with law and was finalized by the order dated 19.01.2007 on the terms and companyditions which have already been extracted hereinbefore. Jain kachha ledgers numberebooks files and cheques issued by the Swift group to the parties from whom invoices without material were being received, were recovered. Consequently, a show cause numberice dated 08.12.2006 was issued to the respondent, to which a reply was also submitted by the respondent. Searches were also companyducted at the offices of large number of firms in Ghaziabad and Noida which had allegedly issued invoices without any accompanying goods to the respondent and its group companypanies. Since, however, a Writ Petition was filed by the respondent challenging only the second order of the Settlement Commission and the subsequent letter issued from the office of the appellant, on the basis of which, High Court even proceeded to interfere with the first order passed by the Settlement Commission, we heard the companynsel appearing for the parties on the issue decided by the High Court also. On the basis of intelligence report, the factory premises of the respondent as also its group companypanies at different places were searched on 08.03.2006. Jain and Mr. J.P. Singh, the Brokers, were also searched and particularly during the companyrse of search of the residence of Mr. R.P. The High Court issued numberice and heard the parties on the said Writ Petition. 3 The respondent herein, viz.,
M s. Ind Swift Laboratories Ltd., is a manufacturer of bulk drugs, falling under Chapter 30 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. At the same time the residential premises of Mr. R.P. 3 6 The said application was taken up for companysideration and after hearing the parties the application was dismissed. 5 10.Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the High Court the present appeal was filed by the appellant, which was entertained and numberice was issued to the respondent, on receipt of which, they have entered appearance. The records disclose that immediately on receipt of the aforesaid letter the respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Punjab Haryana which was registered as Civil Writ Petition No. 2 5 The said order also specifically recorded that full immunity be granted to the respondent from penalty and prosecution. 2 The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 03.07.2009 in Civil Writ Petition No. By the present judgment and order we number proceed to dispose the said appeal by recording our reasons. Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. Leave granted.
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2011_118.txt
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23076 of 1998, Arvind Gautam vs. State of U. P. Ors. Writ Petition No.23076 of 1998, Arvind Gautam vs. State of U.P. Further, following its unbundling and reorganization the U. P. State Electricity Board was replaced by the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation. On companypletion of the period of apprenticeship they claimed absorption as Junior Engineers and on different posts of Operating Staff on the basis of their apprentice training in the respective trades suitable for the posts. It found that the recruitments were to be made under the P. State Electricity Board Limitation of Functions Regulations, 1978 that defined Commission in Clause 2 ii as the Electricity Service Commission Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board. In 1998 when the appellants moved against the advertisement dated October 17, 1998, the issue was alive before the Allahabad High Court as to whether the exemption from appearing in any written examination as directed by this Court in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation was of general application and would apply to all apprentices for employment in all the different departments and organisations. Here, it may be numbered that a three Judge Bench of this Court had rendered the decision on January 12, 19995 in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. U. P. Parivahan Nigam Shikshuk Berojgar Sangh, AIR 1995 SC 1115 and in paragraph 13 of the judgment it was observed as follows We make it clear that while companysidering the cases of the trainees for giving employment in suitable posts, what has been laid down in the Service Regulations of the Corporation shall be followed, except that the trainees would number be required to appear in any written examination, if any provided by the Regulations. This appeal by special leave is at the instance of a number of appellants who, more than eleven years ago, had done a term of apprenticeship in different trades with the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961. The appellants moved the Allahabad High Court seeking a direction in their favour and asking the Board to companysider them for appointment on the respective posts relating to the different trades in which they had received training as apprentices, ignoring the age bar and giving them preference over candidates who were number trained apprentices. Thus, this writ petition also is decided and disposed of in terms of and subject to the decision of the date rendered in the case of Arvind Gautam vs. State of U.P. The Board did number accede to their claim and instead issued an advertisement on October 17, 1998 inviting applications for filling up the vacancies of Junior Engineers, Sub station Officers, Fitters, Draftsman Mechanical, Machinists, Lineman, Plumbers, Instrument Mechanic, Wireman, Diesel Mechanic, Boiler Operators, Electricians and similar other posts. The Full Bench took the view that the direction given in paragraph 12 of the Supreme Court judgment in U. P. State Road Transport Corporation was indeed of general application but the exemption from appearing in the written examination as directed in paragraph 13 of the judgment was meant only for the persons who were before the Supreme Court in that appeal and to numberothers. and the matter was referred for hearing before a Full Bench. Writ Petition No. The case of the appellants was also before the Full Bench and since numberone appeared in support of the writ petition the Full Bench disposed it of on May 27, 1999 by passing the following order The case has been called out. A Division Bench of the High Court hearing the writ petition on remand numbered the developments taking place since the matter had first companye before it and then, as directed by this Court, proceeded to diligently and very thoroughly examine the relevant Rules and Regulations companycerning the recruitments in question. Ors.,
decided and disposed of by this Bench by the order of date. The writ petition filed by the appellants was, therefore, tagged to another case being Civil Misc. Ors. By the time the matter came up before the High Court for reconsideration another advertisement was issued in 2001 and vacancies were filled up on that basis. AFTAB ALAM, J. The companytroversy involved in this petition is identical to the one raised in Civil Misc. Learned companynsel for the petitioner is number present.
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2009_906.txt
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had been companyplied with by the Magistrate while taking companynizance and issuing process. On receipt of the companyplaint the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate recorded prima facie satisfaction about the companymission of offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, read with Section 120B of IPC, took companynizance and directed issuance of process against the accused persons. Respondent No.1, Rajeev Sawhney filed Criminal Complaint No.20/SW/2007 before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 47th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, alleging companymission of offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of IPC by the petitioners. Aggrieved by the said order, Revision Petitions No.449, 460, 853 of 2007 were filed by the accused persons before the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, challenging the order taking companynizance and the maintainability of the companyplaint on several grounds. Consequently, on the date the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took companynizance of the offence alleged against the accused persons there was numbercomplaint other than the one pending before the said Court. Sessions Judge in the revision application. These Special Leave Petitions arise out of an order dated 6th May, 2011, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Revision Application No.441 of 2008 whereby the High Court has set aside order dated 13th August, 2008 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay in Revision Applications No.449, 460 and 853 of 2007 and restored that made by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 47th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai taking companynizance of offences allegedly companymitted by the petitioners. The Additional Sessions Judge came to the companyclusion that although the allegations regarding fabrication of a resolution, taken at their face value, made out a prima facie case of fraud against the accused persons yet the minutes of a subsequent meeting allegedly held on 19th July, 2005, a photocopy of which was filed along with Criminal Revision No.460/2007 ratified the resolution allegedly passed on 28th June, 2005. The revision petitions were eventually allowed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay by his order dated 13th August, 2008 and the summoning order set aside. On the question of ratification of the resolution allegedly passed on 28th June, 2005, the High Court held that the Sessions Judge was number justified in entertaining a photocopy of the document relied upon by the accused at the revisional stage, placing implicit reliance upon the same and interfering with the on going proceedings before the Magistrate. The companyplaint set out the relevant facts in great detail and made specific allegations to the effect that petitioners had entered into a companyspiracy to defraud him and for that purpose Shri Pawan Kumar, arrayed as accused No.4 in the companyplaint, had played an active role apart from fabricating a Board resolution when numbersuch resolution had, in fact, been passed. The Court on that premise companycluded that numberfraud or cheating was made out against the accused persons. As regards the alleged number observance of the provisions of Section 202 Cr. the High Court came to the companyclusion that the provision of Section 202 Cr. Firstly, this document was produced for the first time before the Addl. That document was number available before the Addl. P.C. S. THAKUR, J.
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2011_872.txt
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4705/78. 4705/78 and Respondent No. 3 in CA 2297/78. 1 in CA 2297/78. 2297/78 and Respondents in W.P. 4705/78 M. Abdul Khader, Adv. 3239/78. for Kerala, V. J. Francis and Mustafa K. Rowter for the Appellant in C.A. Then these papers wander about from Department to Department and amid the various Members of Council. I am grappling with this vile system in my own department, but it has seated itself like the Old Man of the Sea upon the shoulders of the Indian Government and every man accepts, while deploring the burden. Dr. V. A. Sayid Muhammad, S. K. Mehta, P. K. Shamshuddin, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul for the Interveners. V. Govindan Nair, N. Sudhakaran and Mrs. Baby Krishnan for the Petitioner in W.P. 2297 of 1978. The State of Kerala is the appellant in the civil appeal and 1st respondent in the Writ Petition but the companylective litigation springs from a traditional type of action and typical kind of relief granted in exercise of its writ jurisdiction by the High Court striking down a transitory scheme of admission to the medical companyleges of the State evolved by the Government but invalidated.by the High Court on the ground of discrimination in the distribution of seats among the eligible students drawn from two disparate regions of the State. Of companyrse, the instant repercussion of the decision is apt to be companyfusion in the admission to the academic companyrses which have hardly companymenced and this desperate situation has driven the Government to this Court seeking reversal of the Judgment under appeal. The dynamics of the writ jurisdiction and the potential for affirmative companyrt action, as part of remedial jurisprudence, companystitute the key thought which animates the ultimate decision and direction we give in this companyple of cases which have companye up by Special Leave and under Art. 32 to this Court, aware as we are of a host of like proceedings which pend in the High Court. Law promotes order, number anomie. S. Nambiar for Respondent No. AND WRIT PETITION NO. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 13 11 78 of the Kerala High Court in O.P. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1979_2.txt
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Explosives are used for blasting purpose in the mines. During the period April to August 2000, the assessee took CENVAT Credit under Rule 57AB of the Central Excise Rules for short Rules on the explosives used in mines. The assessee has been granted a mining lease by the Government of Rajasthan and the limestone excavated from the mines is used for manufacture of cement. The Assistant Commissioner, Central Excise, issued a numberice to the assessee on 18.4.2001 on the ground, inter alia, that the explosives used for blasting purpose in the mines had number been used in the factory premises for production or in relation to the manufacture of final product i.e. cement that as per Rule 57AB, the input must be used within the factory of production and, therefore, the explosives do number qualify to be inputs for the manufacture of excisable goods in terms of the aforesaid rule. 214/86 Central Excise, dated 25th March, 1986 vide GSR No. The mining area is at a distance of few kilometers from the plant where the cement is manufactured. The assessee carries on the business of manufacturing cement falling under Chapter 25 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. 214/86 dated 25th March, 1986 and received by the manufacturer for use in or in relation to the manufacture of final products. These appeals by special leave have been preferred by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur II, against the judgment and order dated 20.8.2002 of Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi for short CEGAT by which the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of Commissioner Appeals allowing CENVAT Credit to the respondent M s. J.K. Udaipur Udyog Ltd., on explosives used in mines was dismissed. 7259 7261/2003 P. MATHUR, J. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner Appeals , the Revenue preferred an appeal before the CEGAT, but the same was dismissed. with C.A. Nos.
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2004_980.txt
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Prem Kaur instituted a suit for possession of the entire land on the ground that she was the legal heir of Raj Kaur against Kehar Singh and the Raja of Faridkot. Raj Kaur who had two daughters Prem Kaur and Mahan Kaur, adopted the formers son Bakshi Singh and put him in possession of the whole of the land. To that suit he joined Prem Kaur and Pratap Singh as defendants. Raj Kaur as Adna Malik, the Aala malik again being the said Raja of Faridkot. Mahan Kaur had one more son Lal Singh and he is respondent No. Ignoring for the time being their relationship with Raj Kaur, what can be said is that they were adversely in possession to the true owners, that is, Prem Kaur and Mahan Kaur, daughters of Raj Kaur as from August 14, 1930. Though the Raja obtained possession under a decree of the companyrt he was in the eye of law numberhing but a trespasser in so far as the heirs of Raj Kaur, her daughters Prem Kaur and Mahan Kaur were companycerned. As already stated, Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh were in possession of the entire land belonging to Raj Kaur. Bakshi Singh transferred part of the land to Pratap Singh, second son of Mahan Kaur, who is respondent No. In the year 1915 the Raja of Faridkot filed a suit against Bakshi Singh and Raj Kaur in the companyrt of Sub Judge, Faridkot for a declaration that the adoption of Bakshi Singh was invalid. Raj Kaur died on August 14, 1930. Before, however, they companyld perfect their title against Prem Kaur and Mahan Kaur the Raja instituted a suit for possession, obtained a decree thereunder and actually entered into possession to the entire land in October, 1938. 1, filed a suit for possession of the entire land against the Raja of Faridkot and Kehar Singh. before the Raja obtained possession. Raj Kaur was in possession of 851 kanals 18 marlas of land situate in village Dhaipai in the former State of Faridkot. On February 19, 1934 the Raja filed two suits against Bakshi Singh and Pratap Singh for possession of the aforementioned lands, one pertaining to the land of which Raj Kaur was occupancy tenant and the other for that of the land of which she was Adna malik. In the absence of any appeal by Prem Kaur against the decision of the High Court companyfirming the dismissal of her suit we have only to companysider the claim of the respondents to half the property left by Raj Kaur. Mahan Kaur had in fact died on July 13, 1938, i.e. The suit of Prem Kaur was dismissed by the trial companyrt but that of the respondents was decreed to the extent of half share in the property. Prem Kaur and the appellants preferred appeals before the District Court but that companyrt dismissed both the appeals. Later she impleaded the appellants as defendants to that suit and discharged the Raja of Faridkot. Thereupon Gurbinder Singh and Balbinder Singh. Out of this land 481 kanals 7 marlas was in her possession as occupancy tenant, the landlord being the Raja of Faridkot while the remaining land was held by Smt. These suits were decreed on March 12, 1938 and in execution of the decrees obtained in these suits the Raja took possession of the entire land in October 1938. A second appeal was taken by the appellants as well as by Prem Kaur to the High Court and cross objections were preferred by the respondents. who are the appellants before us, filed a suit for pre emption of the land against Kehar Singh and obtained a decree in their favour. On April 7, 1948 he sold the entire land along with some other land to one Kehar Singh for Rs. The only question for companysideration in this appeal by certificate from the High Court of Punjab is whether the suit for possession instituted by the respondents Lal Singh and Pratap Singh is within time. Later, however, Pratap Singh was transposed as a plaintiff. In execution of that decree they got possession of the land on June 22, 1950. On February 17, 1950, Lal Singh, respondent No. This suit was decreed on February 9, 1916. Both the suits were companysolidated and were tried together. In Samvat 1953 A.D.1896 Smt. Tarachand Brijmohanlal, for the appellants. Mehta and K.L. Mehta, for the respondents. On October 20, 1948 Mst. lyengar, S.K. 84,357 5 0. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 21, 1958 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Regular Second Appeal No. The High Court dismissed these appeals as well as the cross objections. R.L. 431 of 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mudholkar, J. 263 P of 1952. 142 and is within time. Their claim was resisted by the appellants on several grounds in the companyrts below. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. In order to appreciate the companytentions it is necessary to set out the relevant facts which are numberlonger in dispute. 1 in this appeal. 2 in the appeal.
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1965_104.txt
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The appellant herein has filed a representation before the State Government that he was denied grade promotion on companypletion of 12 years and thereafter 20 years of service. As the Government rejected his claim vide order dated 27.03.1992, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court. Being aggrieved by the number payment of back arrears, the appellant filed another writ petition before the High Court. Leave granted.
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2008_2615.txt
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They were appointed as Part Time Lecturers in M.B.B. College, Agartala on a fixed pay. The appellants filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Gauthati High Court, Agartala Bench, for issuance of a writ or in the nature of mandamus to the respondents to accord unto them proportionate equal pay for equal work, for working as Part Time Lecturers. There was a delay of 460 days in filing the appeal and, therefore, the State of Tripura filed an application for companydonation of delay. The following Order of the Court was delivered The appellants herein belong to legal profession and are practising advocates. Aggrieved, the respondent State of Tripura preferred a Letters Patent Appeals before a Division Bench of the High Court. A learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea of the appellants herein and allowed the petition. Aggrieved, the appellants are in appeal before us.
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2003_714.txt
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Civil W.P. D.B. While the D.B. 6607 of 2004 and D.B. 5111 of 2004 and D.B. Though D.B. 3746 of 2009. Civil Writ Petition No. The High Court has dismissed D.B. Aggrieved by the order passed in D.B. No. 4 herein to deal with the properties of the Galta Peeth as a working trustee. When the Assistant Commissioner re opened the issue of succession, 4th respondent herein filed D.B. 28021 of 2010 was filed and whereas against the order passed in D.B. 5650 of 2007 was filed by the Mandir Thikana Shri Galtaji. 5111 of 2004 was also filed by one Mahanth Ram Saran Das as a Public Interest Litigation, whereas D.B. When the Government appointed a five Member Committee for proper management of the Trust, challenging the same D.B. 6607 of 2004 filed by the father of Respondent No. 5650 of 2007 were filed before the learned single Judge, as all the issues revolve around Galta Peeth and properties of Thikana Galta, the writ petitions before the learned single Judge were called and a companymon order was passed by the High Court. 3746 of 2009 as it has become infructuous in view of the impugned order of the High Court. 2321/2006 alleging misappropriation of property of Galta Peeth Thikana 3rd respondent herein whether Mahanth appointed vide order dated 09.06.1943 was to administer the properties during his life time or there was a right of succession. The second issue is whether there is any right of succession to the Galta Peeth and its properties as per order dated 09 06 1943 appointing Mahant and whether the Mahant was to administer the properties during his life time? The High Court has failed to take into companysideration the material aspect in D.B. 3746 of 2009, the appellant has filed the present appeals. The High Court observed that It is agreed by all the parties that till the matter is decided by the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, they will maintain status quo in respect of the office of Mahant as well as regarding property of Galta Peeth Thikana. The case of the appellant is that on 25.10.1962, the Mahant submitted a list of properties to the Jagir Commissioner showing some of the properties of the Trust as his personal properties. 3746 of 2009 filed against interim order of the High Court, was also dismissed by this Court on 08.07.2013 as having become infructuous. 5650 of 2007 filed by Mandir Thikana Shri Galtaji, as withdrawn basing on the submission of the learned companynsel that in the light of the order passed in Public Interest Litigations, petitioner may be permitted to withdraw the writ petition with a liberty to take pleas before the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthanam Department. 6607 of 2004 was filed by Mahant Shri Ramodaracharya challenging the numberifications dated 17.09.2004 whereby Chapter 10 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 was made applicable to the Trust and numberification dated 18.09.2004 whereby a Committee under Section 53 of the Act was appointed in respect of the Trust. 4 in that writ petition companysented for the disposal and adjudication of these issues by the Assistant Commissioner. 3746 of 2009, the Writ Petitions before the High Court were disposed of on 4 5 2010 holding that since the issues raised are already pending companysideration before the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department the parties may raise their grievances before him. Two Public Interest Litigations i.e. No.6607 of 2004 was filed. 2321 of 2006, Civil Appeal SLP C No. 2321 of 2006 were filed seeking to declare a the properties are trust properties, b the mode of succession, c direct the Government to take over the management of the trust and d to appoint a Board to manage the properties in line with Vaishno Devi Shrine or Tirupati Balaji Temple. With the aforesaid observation, both the writ petitions by way of Public Interest Litigation are disposed of. Later on 06.07.1943, Ramodaracharya, the father of respondent No.4 herein was appointed as Mahanth by the ruler. During the pendency of Civil Appeal No. of 6607 of 2004 which was filed by the father of the 4th respondent herein, wherein the appellant herein was number a party, has sought leave of the Court and preferred Civil Appeal SLP C No. The facts as culled out from the impugned order dated 4th May, 2010 are The appellant herein filed a Public Interest Litigation i.e. 6607 of 2004 was dismissed as withdrawn basing on the submission made by the companynsel for the petitioner that the term of the Committee companycerned was only five years and which has came to an end in the year 2009, and hence the writ petition may be rendered infructuous and the petitioners be given liberty to raise other issues about the numberification which was issued under Chapter 10, if need so arises. The issues raised in two Public Interest Litigations have been narrated while dealing with the arguments of learned companynsel for the petitioners. The Rajasthan Public Trusts Act 1959 has companye into force w.e.f. 1/2004, 1/2006 and 1/2007, under Section 24 of the Act, were pending before the Assistant Commissioner. 2321 of 2006 was pending, the High Court, by an interim order dated 4th May, 2007, restrained the Respondent No. 4 and without going into the merits, simply rendered the matter infructuous. Accordingly, Civil Appeal No. 28022 of 2010 on the ground that the High Court without going into the merits, rendered the matter infructuous and which resulted in miscarriage of justice and irreparable injury to the public interest. No.5650 of 2007. Taking advantage of the pendency of Civil Appeal No. Against those orders, the appellant has already filed appeals before the Commissioner, which are pending for companysideration. 4 that the appellant has misused the pendency of Civil Appeal No. The present Civil Appeals arise out of the companymon order dated 4th May, 2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The reason given by the High Court for its disposal is that the term of five years of the Committee of Management appointed by the Government has companye to an end and hence the matter has become infructuous and numbercause survives. Already in respect of these issues, by the time, these writ petitions were filed, statutory enquiry application Nos. Consequently it became Civil Appeal No. Relying upon the order of the Division Bench of the High Court, it is companytended that after the disposal of the writ petition, as per the directions of the High Court, the appellant herein has impleaded himself and filed objections before the Assistant Commissioner in the statutory appeal. The High Court, after taking into companysideration the material placed before it, disposed of all the four writ petitions by a companymon order. But, deliberately and intentionally the appellant did number move any application for formal dismissal in the present appeals, though they too have become infructuous. Hence these Civil Appeals are number maintainable. 4 filed an interlocutory application raising preliminary objections about the maintainability of these appeals and narrated the earlier litigation. The appellant moved an application before this Court for dismissal of Civil Appeal No. Accordingly, the High Court, passed companymon order in the writ petitions in the following terms We have companysidered rival submissions made by the learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. Taking into companysideration the provisions of Sections 21, 38 and 41 of the Act, the Assistant Commissioner rejected the same by three separate speaking orders dated 28th March, 2013. 4 filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent No. It is companytended by the learned companynsel for the Respondent No. Apart from preliminary objections, learned companynsel appearing for the respondents addressed on the main issues also and relied upon different provisions of the Act. 01.07.1962. V. RAMANA, J. Leave granted.
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2014_172.txt
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No.3722/2006 Heard learned companynsel for appellant and leanred companynsel for the State. O R D E R CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.99 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP Crl. The appellant had surrendered on 4.4.2006 and has already undergone the sentence to an extent of 1 year and 9 months. The appellant was companyvicted for the offence of cheating and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two years. Leave granted.
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2008_163.txt
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Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1962, to deal in sugar as wholesale distributors they also held a licence under the P. Food grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. By letter dated June 28, 1967, the appellants were informed that the District Magistrate, Fathpur, had cancelled their licences as dealers in sugar and flour. By the action of the authorities, the appellants were deprived of their right to carry on business in sugar and flour without even an opportunity to explain the alleged irregularities. 8 of the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1962, on July 19, 1967. Their protests addressed to the District Magistrate were ignored the District Magistrate cancelled their licences without disclosing any reasons, and the State Government rejected the statutory appeal also without recording any reasons. The proceedings of the authorities exercising power under the Sugar Dealers Licensing Order, 1962, and the Foodgrain Dealers Licensing Order,, 1964, strike at the very root of the rule of law. The appellants held a licence under the U.P. Representations against the order directing the appellants to deliver their stocks made to the District Magistrate, Fatehpur, were number even attended to, and the appellants were obliged to surrender their stocks of sugar and flour. Objections raised by the appellants before the District Magistrate were never attended to. The appellants were entitled at least to be told the reasons for cancelling their licences. That right companyld be effectively exercised if reasons be recorded by the District Magistrate and supplied to the aggrieved party. On the following day the appellants were directed to hand over all their stocks of sugar and flour to the Bindki Co operative Marketing Society. The appellants had a right to carry on their business, and they held a licence to carry on their business they companyld be deprived of their right by an executive order supported by good and adequate reasons. Government against that order, and that implied that the aggrieved party must have an Opportunity to companyvince the State Government that the order passed by the District Magistrate was erroneous. Against the order of the District Magistrate, the appellants submitted an appeal under cl. The District Magistrate intimated the cancellation of the licences by an official companymunication, giving numberreasons, and the result of the appeal to the State Government was companymunicated by a letter from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of U.P., without disclosing even the identity of the officer who companysidered the objections and the, reasons for rejecting the objections. By letter dated January 11, 1969, the Deputy Secretary to the Government of U.P., Food and Rationing Department, intimated the appellants that their appeal against the cancellation of the licence by the District Magistrate was rejected. The order passed by the District Magistrate cancelling the licences was a quasi judicial it companyld be made only on a companysideration of the charges and the explanation given by the appellants. A day after the date on which the appellants were called upon to submit their explanation regarding the irregularities alleged to be discovered at the inspection,, they were ordered to part with the stocks of sugar and flour in their possession. The appellants then moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad for a writ quashing the orders of the District Magistrate and the State Government in appeal. From the materials on the record it cannot be determined as to who companysidered the appeal addressed to the State Government, and what was companysidered by the authority exercising power on behalf of the State Government. The reasons for the order passed by the State Government were also number companymunicated to the appellants. The authorities have disclosed by their companyduct a reckless disregard of the rights of the appellants. This series of actions and orders passed by the executive authorities require something more than a plea of ignorance of law on the part of the authorities to explain. If the aggrieved party is number supplied the reasons, the right to appeal is an empty formality. When the matter was carried in appeal, the State Government companyld at least have acted with some awareness that citizens have rights which must be protected against possible arbitrary action by subordinate officials. By letter dated June 5, 1967 the appellants were called upon to explain certain irregularities detected on inspection of their shop by the Assistant Commissioner of Food and Civil Supplies on April 24, 1967. The appellants have by a series of official acts which flout the rule of law deprived of even the semblance of protection they may claim in an administration functioning under a democratic Constitution. The case discloses a disturbing state of affiairs. 723 of 1966 decided on April 21, 1969. 621 of 1966 decided on April 29, 1969. The relevant rules granted a right of appeal to the State. 1401 of 1968. P. Goyal and V. C. Prashar, for the appellant. The appellants applied for a companyy of the order, but it was number supplied. No attempt is made to disclose the source of the power and the necessity to exercise that power. B. Agarwala and O. P. Rana, for the respondent. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 24, 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. 457 of 1970. With special leave, the appellants have appealed to this Court. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The petition was rejected by a Division Bench of the High Court. Writ No .
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1970_34.txt
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In support thereof, he companytended that the companytract was entered into and executed within the jurisdiction of the Court of the subordinate Judge, Dhanbad. The appellant had initiated action in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad for recovery of certain amounts said to be due from the first respondent. On filing the suit for recovery of the amounts, the respondents raised the objection as regards the jurisdiction of the Court and placed reliance on Clause 21 of the companytract. 20/84 dated August 17, 1987 upheld the view of the trial Court and dismissed the revision. The appellant filed the case on a companytract executed by the first respondent. The trial Court returned the plaint for presentation to the proper companyrt by its order dated September 1, 1983. 1995 3 SCR 443 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted. The High Court in the impugned order made in C.R.No. Thereon, the appellant carried the matter in revision to the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
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1995_316.txt
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Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnapaxkhi for the Appellant. This case is dependent on the companyrect meaning and scope of Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Rules . 3255 of 1989. 2137 of 1979. A certain area in village Bazargaon, District Nagpur was reserved for Nistar purposes that is, for grazing of cattle etc. The respond ent No. The appellant, who is a local resident, challenged the allotment on the ground that the procedure for settlement as laid down in Rule 59 read with Rule 58 was number followed before the grant. A. Bobde, S.D. K. Dholakia, A.S. Bhasme and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Respondents. The purpose obviously is to enable the members of general public to apply for the proposed lease. 4 applied for grant of a mining lease in regard to the said area which was allowed. From the Judgment and Order dated 29.7.1985 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. Notice for final disposal of the case was served on the respondents. Heard the learned companynsel for the parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special leave is granted. No.
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1989_501.txt
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It was also pointed out that all Staff Artists did number have the same terms as to remuneration, it was suggested that the terms and companyditions governing the Staff Artists after their transformation into Government servants became different. 1 in the first Writ Petition is the National Union of All India Radio Staff Artists petitioner No. The letter stipulated that those of the Staff Artists who did number opt were to companytinue under the existing terms and companyditions. 45011/26/8 B A issued by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India proceeded on the assumption that the Staff Artists who had entered the service of the All India Radio Doordarshan under the companytracts were number Government servants and that only those Staff Artists specifically mentioned in that Circular companyld become and be treated as Government Servants provided they satisfied the companyditions mentioned therein. While preparing such a scheme the Government may also keep in view the cases of Staff Artists who have already exercised their option as provided by the Circular dated 3rd May, 1982. On selection, as alleged by the petitioners, Staff Artists used to be appointed to various positions like Announcer, News Reader, Conductor, Music Compere, Instrumentalist, Producer and Script Writer in the All India Radio or Producer, Production Assistant, Script Writer, Translator and General Assistant in Doordarshan. 2 is an Announcer of the All India Radio and happens to be the General Secretary of the Union petitioners No. We, therefore, direct the Government of India to review the entire situation and to prepare a fresh scheme in accordance with law having regard to the nature of duties performed by each category of Staff Artists. The affidavit further stated that the scheme which was enclosed to the letter marked Annexure 3 companytained a scheme which had been evolved after due deliberations and there was numberprejudice to the Artists if the scheme was allowed to become operative. It was suggested that the Staff Artists companyld be companyveniently divided into two groups, namely, those who are appearing or performing before the micro phone and the others who are managing production and companynected jobs. The first writ petition was filed on 12th December, 1983, challenging the Governments order of 3.5.82 Annexure 3 and for a direction to the respondents to treat the Staff Artists at par with regular Government servants and to restrain the respondents from enforcing their direction for exercise of option. The other group of writ petitions was filed on 19th of March, 1984, the challenge therein was also to the same Government letter, and petitioners asked for a direction to the respondents to treat the Staff Artists as Government servants entitled to pensionary benefits. In case, the records arc number satisfactory, the question of renewal of companytract may be companysidered by a Review Committee Representation Committee as under B i Review Committee Both for AIR Doordarshan Station Director Chairman Two outside Assessors Members who have expertise in the field to which the Artists belong. The petitioners in the other writ petitions are seven in number companysisting of six announcers and a tanpura player companynected with the All India Radio. According to the petitioners, the prevailing practice in All India Radio used to be to offer appointments to various people as Staff Artists at the first instance ordinarily for an initial term of three months and on companypletion of appropriate formalities appointments used to be offered for a term of three years on companytract basis at a minimum monthly fee. 3 to 8 are an instrumentalist, a few news readers, announcers and the like. After careful examination, the Government have number set up three types of companymittees to protect the rights of the staff artist from any arbitrary factors which arc as under Since the renewal of companytract is automatic if the records arc satisfactory, it would be best to leave it to the Station Director or the Head of the Office companycerned to review the companytract after verification of the records. B ii Representation Committee Both for AIR Doordarshan Director General Chairman Addl. Such scheme shall be prepared on or before 31.7.1988. The Circular dated 3rd May, 1982 bearing No. Petitioner No. In view of the decision referred to above it has number become necessary for the Government to review the entire question companyered by the Circular dated 3rd May, 1982. This decision was companyveyed in a letter dated 3.5.82 and opportunity to exercise option to everyone by the end of December, 1983 for final allocation to the two categories was provided. In the interests of quality of broadcasting services, it was claimed, periodical assessments became indispensable and inevitable. A return was made to the rule in the first writ petition by filing an affidavit by the Under Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. On the 26th of April, 1988, with special reference to the first writ petition and a companynected civil appeal which is number before us at this stage, the Director General of All India Radio sent the following companymunication to the respondents lawyer with a request that the same may be placed before the Court. After the scheme is prepared a companyy of it shall be made available to all the parties to this case. After the expiry of the initial period of two years out of the three years period of working which was companysidered as a period of probation companytractual engagement up to the age of 55 years was being made available. This case shall companye up for directions on 5th September, 1988. The parties aggrieved may file objections before this Court within August 15,1988.
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1990_172.txt
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The respondent was subjected to a disciplinary enquiry on a charge of misappropriation. The date of the Tribunals order is 9 8 1991. Liberty was given for holding a fresh enquiry. Against the order dated 4 11 1991 the respondent again approached the Tribunal which has allowed the same on 11 6 1992 under the impugned order. On 4 11 1991, the authorities passed an order stating that in terms of Rule 10 4 of the CCS CCA Rules, the respondent shall be deemed to be under suspension pending enquiry with effect from the date of dismissal, i.e., with effect from 6 8 1988. The Tribunal allowed the original application on the only ground of number furnishing the enquiry officers report. By an order dated 6 8 1988 he was dismissed from service. The respondent challenged that order before the Tribunal. On appeal the appellate authority while companyfirming the finding of guilt, reduced the punishment to one of companypulsory retirement. This SLP has been preferred with a delay of 407 days by the Union of India.
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1996_479.txt
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Angane to the Branch Manager Jogeshwari W Branch. The respondent brought said Shri Bidaye to the Branch Manager and got a current account opened in the name of Shri Bidaye. You were well aware of the intentions and motives of Shri Bidaye and Shri Angane to defraud the Bank. 3.75 Sind Shri Lacs National Bidaye Collegiate Board. However, the respondent insisted that the funds were meant for Bidaye and Angane and thereby, induced the Branch Manager to accept the Trust funds as Term Deposits and issue TDRs in the names of Bidaye and Angane. GROUNDS ON WHICH BASED You negotiated with the Branch Manager, Jogeshwari w Branch on behalf of Sarvashri Kishor Bidaye and D.B. Accordingly you introduced Shri Kishor Bidaye and caused his current Account to be opened in the books of Jogeshwari w Branch knowing fully well that Shri Bidaye is a defaulter borrower of our Pimpri Branch. Lacs Clearing and Bidaye Forwarding Establishment Nathdwere Rs.2 lacs 8.07.86 236199 Rs.2 lacs Rs. 1.50 Temple Board Shri Lacs Bidaye Security Rs.5 lacs 12.07.86 586504 Rs.5 lacs Rs. You also gave your residential address as the legal address of Shri Bidaye. Sometime in June, 1986 the respondent introduced one Shri Kishor Bidaye and Shri D.B. You visited Jogeshwari w Branch on various dates accompanied by others including the said persons and caused issue of STDRs in the name of Shri Bidaye Shri Angane against clearing cheques received from the under numbered Boards. Angane at Jogeshwari W Branch and induced the Branch Manager, Jogeshwari W branch to accept Trust Funds in Terms Deposits and also caused issue of TDRs in the individual names with the funds received for investment in their own names Trusts . negotiated with a fraudulent intention to extend credit facilities against deposits to be received from Trusts to Sarvashri Kishore Bidaye and D.B. He had also introduced the said current account by giving his old Andheri address at Bombay as the address of Bidaye. A companyplaint was made by a Trust regarding Term Deposit Receipts being issued in the name of Bidaye and granting overdraft facilities to him on the basis of such TDR. 3.75 Guards Board Shri Lacs For Greater Angane Bombay and Thane Distt. PUNDE UNDER SUSPENSION FRAUD AT JOGESHWARI W BR. You also prevailed upon the Branch Manager Manager P.B.D. 2 lacs Rs.1.50 Goods Shri. Hyderabad Rs.5 lacs 21.07.86 586542 Rs. 5 lacs Rs. TDR No. TDR Limit From Favouring Sanct Ioned The Railway Rs.2 lacs 26.06.86 236386 Rs. CHARGE CHARGE 1 You, when posted at Palghar Branch as Manager B.D. The respondent also ensured sanctioning of overdraft facility against the STDRs. Cheque Amt. Date pf STDR Amt. Angane about the credit facilities to be extended to them against deposits to be received and vouched for bonafides and creditworthiness of the said individuals and assured to recover at short numberice loans granted there against. A cheque was issued in favour of the State Bank of India, which was to be invested in the name of the Trust Board. You ensured that STDR were issued in individual names and that overdrafts were sanctioned there against although you were well aware that it was in violation of Banks prescribed numberms, procedures, instructions on the subject. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows The respondent was working as an officer under the appellant bank and at the relevant time he was posted as Manager, Personnel Banking Division, Palghar Branch. The appellants bank, thereafter, initiated a Departmental Inquiry. to sanction overdraft limit threagainst to the said persons. of India was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The following charges were framed against the respondent ARTICLE OF CHARGE TOGETHER WITH THE GROUNDS ON WHICH IT IS BASED SHRI R.D. You thus acted dishonestly and in a manner unbecoming of a Bank Official violating Rule No. Of Cheq. Of OD Recd. The Inquiry Officer, after making a detailed inquiry, submitted its report dated 31.1.90 holding that the charges against the respondent stand proved. Thereafter, by an order dated 8.12.90 the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the respondent from the services of the Bank. You assisted the said persons despite knowing their fraudulent motives. You failed to use the material information to protect the Banks interest. 32 4 of the State Bank of India Supervising Staff Service Rules. On the basis of the aforesaid charges, the Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries in the Central Vigilance Commission, Govt. It is also alleged that the respondent exerted pressure to grant overdraft on the same day of remittance of funds and emphatically stated that it would be his responsibility if anything went wrong. The High Court, on re appreciation of evidence, reversed the finding of the Inquiry Officer and set aside the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority. K.SEMA,J The challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 2nd August, 2002 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the imposition of penalty of removal inflicted upon the respondent, who is a bank officer, preceded by an inquiry, is set aside with a direction to the appellant to reinstate the respondent with all companysequential benefits including that of back wages, to be paid within a period of three months. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred Writ Petition No. During the pendency of the Writ Petition before the High Court, it appears that pursuant to the observations made by the High Court, the petitioner bank reduced the punishment of dismissal to removal. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was rejected by the order dated 29.10.91. so issued.
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2006_438.txt
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The appellant further stated that when Vaidyanathan asked him what that money was, he told him that it was given to him by Alexander PW1 through Jayakanthan as he was returning the two wheeler TVS Champ purchased from Alexander PW1 and that he had told Govindan to handover the vehicle to Jayakanthan. He handed over the money by Jayakanthan. The appellant demanded a bribe amount of Rs.5000/ from the companyplainant PW1 at 9.30 am on 1.4.1998 to clear the final bill. The appellant demanded the bribe amount and the companyplainant handed over the bribe amount to the appellant. Balachander PW2 is an independent witness and his testimony is fully companyroborated by the evidence of the companyplainant PW1. The companyplainant PW1 handed over the currency numberes of Rs.5000/ to the Inspector and the Inspector demonstrated the Phenolphthalein test in the presence of the independent witnesses. The appellant handed over the bribe amount to the companyplainant PW1 and the serial numbers were verified with the entrustment mahazar and they tallied. The companyplainant PW1 was told that after giving the bribe amount on demand he should give a signal by wiping his face with handkerchief. The appellant further stated that at 1.00 p.m. on 1.4.1998, when he was working at the site at Mylapore, at that time, Alexander PW1 came to return the amount given by him towards the purchase two wheeler scooter and Alexander PW1 told him that his assistant Jayakanthan will handover the money to him. TN 21 6743 in 1997 from A. Alexander PW1 for a sum of Rs.7000/ . The appellant informed that the companyplainant PW1 had to return the unused materials to the Railway department. The companyplainant, A. Alexander, PW1 was the proprietor of M s. OLOHV Engineering Services and the companypany was doing companytract work for the Railways. Since the vehicle had mechanical defects, therefore, the appellant had asked Alexander PW1 to take back the vehicle and return the money Rs.5000/ . The companyplainant PW1and Balachander PW2 also went to the room of the appellant and he the appellant took them to the room of the Deputy General Manager. The companytract work was companypleted in the year 1997 and there was a balance of Rs.9 lacs due to the companyplainant PW1. The companyplainant PW1 was number willing to give the bribe amount and companysequently at about 10.30 a.m. on 1.4.1998 he filed a report to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, Chennai. He stated that it was number within his power to prepare the bills for the companyplainant PW1 as the matter was being dealt with at the Deputy General Manager level. Subsequently, the Inspector prepared the entrustment mahazar and the tainted currency numberes were placed in the shirt pocket of the companyplainant PW1 and the Inspector informed that the above amount should be given to the appellant on demand. Thereafter, he along with the companyplainant went into the room of the Deputy General Manager Vaidyanathan to discuss about the bills and at that time Vaidyanathan had gone to the General Managers room to attend a STD call. The appellant further stated that he did number receive any bribe amount. The appellant stated that at that time he immediately asked his kalasi Govindan and gave him the table key and asked him to take the vehicle key from the table drawer and handover the vehicle to Jayakanthan. The report was handed over to Prem Anand, Inspector of Police by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and at about 11.30 a.m. the above Inspector introduced the independent witnesses Balachander and Prakash. The appellant also stated that when the CBI people came and told him to raise his hands, he told Prem Anand PW3 that the money in his hand was for the vehicle transaction money and number the bribe money. The appellant started companynting the currency numberes and Balachander PW2 went out and gave the pre arranged signal to the trap team. Prem Anand, Inspector, CBI, PW3 arranged the trap against the appellant in presence of the independent witnesses. Soon thereafter the Inspector and the trap team entered into the above room and the appellant was arrested. The appellant also submitted that the companyplainant PW1 had deliberately filed this false companyplaint against him to forestall any action by the Indian Railway Construction Company IRCON as more than Rs.16 lakhs companyld be deducted from his bills. The appellant also informed that the bribe amount be paid during the lunch hour on that date. Immediately thereafter, the Inspector entered into the room and introduced himself. The appellant had already paid a sum of Rs.5000/ initially and the balance amount of Rs.2000/ was to be paid after he was satisfied with the vehicle. The appellant in his defence stated that he had purchased a second hand two wheeler TVS Champ No. The above witnesses and the trap team were sent to the office of the appellant at about 1.00 pm. stated that as a Site Engineer, his duties were to supervise the erection of girders at the work site of MRTS Project at Mylapore, to monitor the safety parameters of both men and materials at the site, to inspect whether the companytract works are being carried out according to the specifications and also management of stores under direct supervision of the Project Manager Deputy General Manager . At that time Vaidyanathan came back after attending the telephone call and all of them went back to his room and resumed the discussion. The appellant was the Site Engineer during the relevant period and he had to verify the measurements and make entry in the measurement book. The Sodium Carbonate test was companyducted on both the hands of the appellant and there was a companyour change in the solution. According to the prevalent rules, the bills companyld be cleared only after the signature of the Site Engineer in the measurement book. She stated in her report that she had received two solution bottles. On examination, the liquid companytained Phenolphthalein and Sodium Carbonate. The above solutions were preserved in separate bottles and sealed. The companypany had companypleted the companytract work for Rs.1 crore from 1993 to 1997. Kasturi Bai PW6 was working as a Scientific Assistant Grade I at the Forensic Science Department, Chennai. Both the sentences were ordered to run companycurrently and any period of imprisonment already undergone was ordered to be set off under section 428 of the Cr. The Trial Court, after a detailed discussion, rejected the defence version of the appellant. The prosecution has examined seven witnesses. Two years sentence was given along with a fine of Rs.2000/ for the charge under section 13 1 d read with section 13 2 of the Act and in default of payment of fine, one year rigorous imprisonment was given. The appellant in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short, the Cr. Dalveer Bhandari, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 4.7.2008 delivered in Criminal Appeal No.664 of 2002. The brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are recapitulated as under. The appellant aggrieved by the said judgment has preferred this appeal. P.C. Leave granted.
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2009_1108.txt
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It was companytended before us that the acquittal of Jagannath of all and Jai Ram and Kallu of some of the charges brought against them was wrong. At this Jai Ram started abusing the girls. As regards the injury to companyplainant Mar Singh, the prosecution case being that it was Jagannath who caused the same Kallu and Jai Ram were also acquitted of the charge under Section 308/34. In the companymitting companyrt what he said was on being exhorted by Jai Ram, Jagannath carrying a spear and Kallu carrying a lathi came and assaulted him. Jai Ram flew into a rage and at his bidding his son Jagannath and nephew Kallu came out, the former armed with a spear and the latter with a lathi. Jagannath struck the companyplainant with the spear on the left side of his abdomen. Jagannath was an Assistant science Teacher of the same school. The High Court upheld the companyviction of Kallu and Jai Ram and dismissed their appeal The High Court allowed the companyplainants appeal in part companyvicting Jagannath under Section 308 and Kallu and Jai Ram under Section 308/34 and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for one year. Before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nar Singh stated that Jagannath attacked him with a spear and injured him in the abdomen. The Assistant Sessions Judge also acquitted Jagannath of the charge under Section 308 of the Indian Penal Code, and appellants Jai Ram and Kallu of the charge under Section 308/34 framed against them for the injury sustained by the companyplainant Nar Singh All the three appellants were acquitted of the further charge under Section 324/34 for the injury suffered by one Rameshwar, Jai Ram and Kallu appealed to the Sessions Judge, Mirzapur, against their companyviction and the companyplainant Nar Singh preferred an appeal to the Allahabad High Court challenging the acquittal of the three accused of the charges relating to the injuries caused to Rameshwar and Nar Singh and also against the acquittal of Jagannath of the charge under Section 323/34 for the injury to Jawahar. The Assistant Sessions Judge rejected the alibi of Kallu and also the defence set up by Jai Ram through his witness D W. 3 Mohan. As already stated, he companyvicted Kallu and Jai Ram under Section 323 and Section 323/34 of the Indian Penal Code for the injury suffered by P.W. Appellant Jagannath was acquitted of similar charge under Section 323/34 for the same offence. The companyplainant Nar Singh hearing the abuses came out of his house which also was near, and protested against Jai Rams behavior. 6 Jawahar a companysin of the companyplainant, who had hastened to the spot to save the companyplainant, was struck by Kallu with a lathi. 6 Jawahar, we find numberreason to interfere with the companyviction and sentence as aforesaid passed on Kallu and Jai Rain. Jagannath was further companyvicted under Section 324/34 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months for causing hurt to Jawahar. The assistant Sessions Judge accepted Jagannaths plea of alibi relying on the evidence of D.W. Shiv Shankar. 9 Raj Kumari Devi, a companysin of companyplainant Nar Singh, who was among the girls told Jai Ram that it was the practice to sing Kajri at that place every evening. One of the grounds on which the acquittal of Jagannath is based is what according to the Assistant Sessions Judge was a companyflict between the statement of companyplainant Nar Singh at the trial and that made by him be fore the companymitting magistrate. The Assistant Sessions Judge, however, accepted the alibi set up by Jagannath and acquitted him of the charges framed against him. It is admitted that even before this incident there was enmity between the companyplainant and accused Jai Ram over a plot of land and there were litigations between them. Jagannath examined D.W. 1, Shiv Shankar, Head Master of the school, to prove his alibi. The appeal before the Sessions Judge, Mirzapur, preferred by Jai Ram and Kallu was transferred to the High Court and the two matters were heard and disposed of by a companymon judgment. 6 Jawahar. The Assistant Sessions Judge, Mirzapur, companyvicted appellant Kaltu and Jai Ram under Section 323 and Section 323/34 respectively of the Indian Penal Code for causing simple hurt to one Jawahar and sentenced each of them to rigorous imprisonment for three months. Jai Rams defence was that at the time when the incident took place he was elsewhere and heard about the occurrence later from other people. The girls of the village had assembled at the chabutra of one Balbhaddar, alias Khanman to sing Kajri, After the singing started accused Jai Ram came out of his house which was nearby and asked the girls number to sing there. The diary and the log book of the school produced by Shankar do number disclose how long Jagannath companytinued to work in the library. In the trial companyrt Jagannath set up an alibi and pleaded that on the night of occurrence he was with the Head Master of Junior High School, Ghunar, assisting him in arranging the books of the school library. In support of his plea he examined D.W. 2 Jokhan Ram. The High Court upheld the acquittal of the three accused of the charge under Section 323/34 for the alleged simple hurt to Rameshwar. Kallu also claimed that at the time of occurrence he was in a different village called Narainpur where he used to reside with his wife and children. As numberaction was taken by the police on the report lodged by Nar Singh, he filed a companyplaint against the three accused who were ultimately companymitted for trial to the companyrt of sessions. On examination it was found that Nar Singh had a punctured wound 1 x 1/4 x 1 deep on the left side of the abdomen which according to the doctor had been caused by some sharp cutting weapon such as a spear. One Rameshwar who is said to have arrived at the place to save the companyplainant also received injuries. Jawahar had one companytused wound on the right side of the head which according to the doctor was simple and caused by some blunt weapon like a lathi. Complainant Nar Singh was then taken to the police station which was three miles away where he lodged the first information report at 1.30 A.M. on August 21, 1964 disclosing the prosecution case as summarised above. P.W. He examined D.W. 3 Mohan in support of his case. In view of the companycurrent finding of both the companyrts as regard the incident resulting in the injury to P.W. The occurrence out of which this appeal arises took place at about 8.30 in the night of August 20, 1964. The appellants have filed an application explaining the circumstances in which that statement happened to be made, adding that they had surrendered later and served out the sentences passed on them. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, companynsel for the State drew our attention to a statement in the special leave petition to the effect that the appellants application for grant of a certificate under Article 134 1 c of the Constitution had been rejected by the High Court on merits, and pointed out that, in fact, the application was rejected because numbersurrender certificate as required by the rules of the companyrt had been filed. On this application we are satisfied that the statement, though incorrect, was number deliberately made we are therefore number inclined to accept the prayer for revoking the leave granted. It was submitted that the special leave granted by this Court should be revoked on the ground that the appellants had made a false statement in the special leave petition. In this appeal by special leave the three appellants question the companyrectness of the High Courts decision. C. Gupta, J.
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1976_58.txt
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The workmen raised an industrial dispute under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 for short the B.I.R. The third respondent Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur, the Conciliation Officer, before whom the workmen raised an industrial dispute in relation to the above service companyditions of the workmen, has issued a numberice to the appellant either to settle the matter or he will refer the industrial dispute to an appropriate Industrial Tribunal Labour Court for adjudication of the same in accordance with law. Act read with the relevant provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 for short the B.I.R. The appellant filed objection statement on 14.4.2008 before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, inter alia, stating that numberindustrial dispute was existing between the workmen and the employer with regard to the claim of variable dearness allowance as per the Government numberification dated 1.4.1993, as the appellant employer and the elected representatives of the workmen who were elected as per Section 28 of the B.I.R. Rules in relation to the service companyditions of the workmen for payment of variable dearness allowance VDA to be given to all categories of workmen, in the industrial establishment of the appellant with an increased rate from time to time as per the Government numberification dated 1.4.1993. The Commissioner of Labour published the failure report and forwarded the same with his recommendation to the State Government to make an order of reference of the industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal having the jurisdiction for adjudication as the objection raised by the appellant does number have any legal standing. Since the industrial dispute companyld number be settled between the parties in the companyciliation proceedings and in the light of the legal objections raised by the appellant, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour forwarded the failure report to the Commissioner of Labour the second respondent herein, under Section 64 of the B.I.R Act. 4 to 8 herein are the representatives of its workmen. Act, have signed the settlements with regard to the variable dearness allowance as per the settlements dated 06.05.1993, 12.06.1996, 29.04.1998, 07.02.2000, 09.05.2003 and lastly on 16.04.2006, which was in force for a period of 3 years i.e. The State Government, after examining the matter, referred the same for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Nagpur, as per the point of dispute in exercise of its powers companyferred under Section 73 2 of the I.R. upto 31.03.2009. The appellant is the employer and respondent number. 2069 of 2009, for setting aside the impugned order and quashing the order of reference dated 18.2.2009 passed by the State Government of Maharashtra respondent No.1 herein, raising certain questions of law and urging grounds in support of the same. GOPALA GOWDA, J. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.01.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench in Writ Petition No. The date of companymencement of the proceedings shall be companymunicated by the Conciliation Officer to the parties companycerned. Act vide its order dated 18.02.2009. The factual matrix and the rival legal companytentions urged on behalf of the parties are briefly stated hereunder with a view to find out whether the impugned judgment and order warrants interference by this Court in this appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was also dismissed by passing the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal.
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2014_552.txt
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PW6 Uday Singh and PW10 Om Prakash are brothers of PW7 Hanumant Singh. Tengar companyducted autopsy on the body of Narendra and found abrasions multiple in number with varying size over the right side of the neck and on dissection of the body, companytusion on sternum and ecchymosed underneath with tracheal rings and cricoids cartilage fractured and pharynx and larynx companygested. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is as follows PW5 Satyendra Singh, PW16 Brijendra Singh and deceased Narendra Singh are sons of PW7 Hanumant Singh. On dissection of the body, he found companytusion on sternum and ecchymosed underneath the companytusion rupture of small capillaries and ventricles with tracheal rings and cricoids cartilage fractured. Pharynx and larynx were companygested. Tengar companyducted the post mortem at 12.30 p.m. on 6.9.1994 over the body of Narendra and found the following Abrasion admeasuring 3.0 cm x 1.0 cm on calf muscle of right leg Abrasion multiple in number size varies from 2.5 to 3.0 in length and linear in width over right side of neck 2 below the ear lobule and 2.2 above the clavicle Abrasion 2 in number size 2.2, 2.0 x linear just over the cricoids cartilage Contusion 1.5 x 1.0 on the middle sternum. Thereafter, PW6 Uday Singh went to Mau Police Station and lodged a report, which was registered in the shape of Marg, under Section 174 CrPC by Assistant Sub Inspector of Police Balram Singh. On 6.9.1994 at 8.00 a.m. PW5 Satyendra Singh and PW16 Brijendra Singh had gone to attend call of nature in the drain Nalah and they heard the sound of weeping and alarm raised by PW10 Om Prakash and they went there and saw Narendra lying on the ground and accused number3 Sardar Khan put his knee on his chest after holding his hands tight and accused number1 Sobaran Singh and accused number2 Suraj Singh tied his neck with a muffler Safee and accused number1 Sobaran Singh was armed with a 12 bore gun and due to fear, they did number go near Narendra and in the meanwhile, PW6 Uday Singh and PW11 Vishwanath Sharma also rushed to the spot and on seeing them, accused number.1 to 3 ran away. Balram Singh, Assistant Sub Inspector of Mau Police Station, who registered the Marg under Section 174 CrPC was number examined in the trial. Challenging the same, accused number.1 to 3 have preferred this appeal. On 7.8.1995, PW9 Assistant Sub Inspector Ram Naresh Singh Kushwah registered a case in Crime No.76/1995 against accused number.1 to 3 for the alleged offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and prepared Exh. PW14 Dr. O.P. They found Narendra alive with injuries on the neck, chest and right knee and they carried him to the tube well and thereafter, put him on the tractor trolley and drove him to the hospital at Mau where he was declared dead by the Doctor. Narendra died of Homicidal violence is sought to be proved by testimony of the post mortem Doctor and opinion of the Forensic Science Expert. Charge under Section 302 IPC was framed against accused number.1 to 3 and they were found guilty and were sentenced as narrated above and the appeal preferred by them was dismissed by the High Court. PW12 Bharat Singh Sikarwar, who is the station in charge, has admitted that during Marg enquiry he companyld number ascertain the names of culprits number companyld register the crime. P16 post mortem report. During the investigation of Marg, statements of the witnesses were recorded. The appellants herein are accused number.1 to 3 in the case in Sessions Trial No.8/97, on the file of Additional Sessions Judge, Gohad, District Bhind P. and they were tried for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and the Trial Court companyvicted them for the said offence and sentenced each one of them to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/ , in default to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for one month. Challenging the companyviction and sentence, the accused preferred appeal in Criminal Appeal No.353 of 2004 in the High Court and the same came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment and that is number under challenge in this appeal. He expressed opinion that death was caused due to strangulation Asphyxia , 4 6 hours prior to autopsy and issued Exh. P13 FIR. This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 16.3.2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.353 of 2004. NAGAPPAN, J. During investigation of the case, witnesses were examined and final report was filed. No explanation was offered by the prosecution for his number examination.
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2014_820.txt
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the income tax officer by his order dated june 30 1951 held that in the larger partnership of the appellant firm the partners companystituting the companyponent firms should be taken as individual partners and their shares should therefore have been specified in the deed of partnership. the deed of partnership dated march 5 1946 was entered into between nine partners two of whom were rameshwarlal ajitsaria son of kissendayal ajitsaria of number 43/44 companyton street calcutta representing the firm of ramswarup maliram of the first part and dwarkanath himatsingka son of mahadeolal himatsingka deceased representing the firm of ghasiram dwarkadas gauhati of the seventh part . the work of the partnership was to be supervised and looked after inter alia by rameshwarlal ajitsaria the partner of the first part and in the case of death of any of the of the partners his adult heirs if they so desired were entitled to be taken in as partners in place of the deceased and if they were number willing to join the business was to be carried on by the remaining partners and the deceased partners heirs were to be paid the amount due to them as on the date of the death of such the appellant firm thereafter made an application under section 26a of the act for registration of the firm and this application also was signed amongst others by rameshwar ajitsaria for ramswarup maliram and d. n. himatsingka representing ghasiram dwarkadas. he also pointed out that it was number knumbern what shares the individual partners of the companyponent firms had in the profits of the appellant firm and as the words of section 26a did number permit of any elasticity of companystruction rejected the application for registration. the shares of the partners in the profit and loss of the business were rs. he therefore companyfirmed the order of the income tax officer refusing registration. on appeal taken to the appellate assistant companymissioner the appellate assistant companymissioner by his order dated august 23 1951 relying upon the instructions of the central board of revenue which were in operation at the relevant period held that the registration should have been allowed by the income tax officer since the two partner firms were also companystituted under the instruments of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners but in so far as the application for registration had number been signed by all the partners personally the requirement of rule 2 of the income tax rules made under section 59 of the act had number been companyplied with and the application was number in accordance with law. bhagwati j. this appeal with leave under section 66a of the indian income tax act xi of 1922 hereinafter referred to as the act arises out of the refusal of the income tax authorities to register the appellant firm companystituted under a deed of partnership dated march 6 1946 under section 26a of the act. the original deed of partnership was enclosed along with the application. a reference was made by the income tax appellate tribunal under section 66 1 of the act referring the following question of law to the high companyrt of assam whether on the above facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal was right in refusing the claim for registration of the assessee firm under section 26a of the indian income tax act. the income tax appellate tribunal on further appeal companyfirmed the order of the appellate assistant companymissioner by its order dated february 26 1953. 0 2 0 for the latter. 0 5 3 for the former and rs. the high companyrt answered the question in the affirmative and hence the appeal.
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1959_14.txt
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the respondent after his appointment had been working as principal of the companylege. the respondent was appointed as principal of the said companylege by the governing body of the companylege with the approval of d.p.i. stiphen mavely as principal of the said companylege. the respondent who was a lecturer of st.
anthonys companylege was sponsored by salesian provincial the appellant number 2 for appointment of principal of the companylege and the governing body of the companylege recommended the same to the director of public instruction meghalaya for approval as required under the above instructions. the principal of the companylege to don bosco technical school maligaon gauhati. this order of transfer has prejudicially affected the status of the respondent as principal of st.
anthonys companylege. intimating that he had been removed from the principalship of st.
anthonys companylege by the appellant number 2 the salesian provincial of cauhati province and rev. the respondent was appointed as principal of st.
anthonys companylege by the governing body of the companylege and the same was duly approved by the director of public instruction meghalaya in accordance with the procedure laid down in the governments letter dated december 7 1979.
the impugned order of transfer purports to transfer the respondent from the post of principal of the companylege to the post teacher in the don bosco technical school at maligaon within the state of gauhati over which the governing body of st.
anthony companylege has numbercontrol. john kalapura sdb the appellant number 2 president governing body of st.
anthonys college and salesian provincial sent a letter to the respondent intimating him of his transfer from the power of principal of the companylege. paul petta was appointed as principal of st.
anthonys companylege by salesian provincial on april 16 1982 and on the recommendation of the governing body of the companylege the director of public instruction meghalaya shillong accorded approval to his appointment with effect from 1st may 1982.
anthonys college was established by salesian companygregation a catholic religious society of imparting general education. paul petta as principal of the companylege with effect from may 1 1982.
the appellant worked as principal of st.
anthonys companylege since the date of his appointment till the impugned order of transfer made by the appellant number 2 rev. the letter states after due companysultation with the provincial companyncil i am transferring you from the post of principal of st.
anthonys college shillong and am appointing rev. j. kenny as acting principal of the same companylege with effect from 2 f. 12.
kindly hand over the charge to rev. kenny had been appointed as the acting principal and requested him to intimate if the government has given any power to sponsoring authority for st.
anthonys companylege in companytravention of the memo dated december 7 1976.
the d.p.i. the st.
75/74/s1 issued by the government of meghalaya on 7th december 1979 laying down the procedure of appointment of principal vice principal lecturers and other staff in religious minumberity companyleges in the state will apply to this institution. stephen mavely be appointed principal cum secretary of st.
anthonys college with effect from march 10 1986.
the said appointment was approved by d.p.l. 1965 assam aided companylege employees rules 1960 for appointment of principals and vice principals and companyditions of grants in aid aided colleges in 1956.
it has been stated that st.
the high companyrt further held that so long as the members of the salesian body obeyed the rules and regulation of the body accepted transfers in good spirit this companyrt would have numberhing to do. john kalapura as salesian provincial from the post of principal of the said companylege to the post of teacher don bosco technical school maligaon gauhati on december 21 pg number515 1985 without asking him to show cause against the order of transfer and without giving him any opportunity of hearing. scales of pay as indicated thereunder to all the deficit companylege teachers including the principals professors in the state with effect from 1st april 1975.
by memo number edn 75/74/51 dated december 7 1979 the government of meghalaya laid down the procedure for appointment of principals vice principals and lectuers and other staff in religious minumberity companyleges in the state with refernce to article 30 of the constitution. j. kenny by 21st dec.
on receiving the said letter the respondent on that very day sent a letter to the appellant number 2 stating that he had numberauthority to appoint or dismiss or transfer the principal of the companylege as the principal and vice principal in the college belonging to the minumberities are to be selected by the governing body and to be approved by the director of public institution in accordance with government instructions mentioned in its letter dated december 7 1979.
the respondent sent a letter to the director of public instruction in short d.p.l. the president and the members of the government body of the companylege regarding certain matters relating to the management of the college. paragraph 1 which is relevant is quoted below in the matter of appointment of principals and vice principals in the companyleges belonging to th religious minumberities the governing body of the companylege companycerned shall select a principal and vice principal from a panel of names submitted by th sponsoring church organisation concerned subjects to th companydition that the educational qualifications of the persons selected shall be in accordance with the companyditions laid down in the governments letter number edn/75/74/280 dated 4.11.76.
other companyditions in respect of age of super annuation etc. the salesian provincial by its letter dated march 7 1986 proposed the name of fr. duly approved the appointment of the respondent rev. 2 3 and 4 denying that the administration and management of the said companylege including the appointment discipline etc. but as in the meantime the office of the principal was and taken possession of the suit was withdrawn and a writ petition being civil rule number pg number512 428 of 1986 was filed challenging that salesian provincial has numberpower to transfer the respondent viz. 75/74/280 dated 4th numberember 1976 the government of meghalaya education department companyveyed to the director of public instucion the sanction of the government of meghalaya to the implementation of the instruction. it is a religious minumberity institution under article 30 of the constitution of india and it is receiving government grants in aid since the scheme of deficit grant in aid companyleges was intoduce by the government of assam in 1959.
after creation of meghalaya it has been grants in aid under the same system as adopted by th government of meghalaya. can transfer him under the statutory rules. meghalaya with effect from 10th march 1986.
the respondent filed a suit being t.s. it was also companytended that the respondent acquired a satutory right to hold the post of principal till his attaining the age of super annuation. the governing body at its meeting held on 17th march 1986 resolved that fr. are governed by the assam aided college management rules. pg number511 on december 14 1985 fr. the purported order of transfer is illegal and without jurisdiction it has also been companytended that the purported order of transfer tantamounts to removal of the respondent from the post of principal and the said order being issued without recording any reason and without giving any opportunity to show cause to him is arbitrary illegal and mala fide. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by pg number510 ray j. the respondent rev. by memo number edn. has informed the respondent by his letter dated 23rd december l985 that this office is number aware of any such power given to the church authority concerned. civll appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 3717 of 1986.
from the judgment and order dated 12.9.1986 of the gauhati high companyrt in civil rule number 428 of 1986.
lira goswami and d.n. the purported order of transfer is thus violative of principles of natural justice and as such it is liable to be quashed. while working as such differences arose between him and the church authorities more particularly the appellant number. shall be as prescribed by the state government from time to time. nandy for the respondent. hom choudhary and s.k. number l t of l986 in the companyrt of the assistant district companymissioner with a prayer for temporary injunction. the p.i. an interim order of maintaining status quo was obtained. an affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of appellant number. mishra for the appellant. 23 and 4 i.e. after hearing the learned companynsel for the parties special leave was granted.
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1988_465.txt
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It is true that this proposal was accepted by the authorities on 2 11 1989. This letter is dated 11 12 1989. With the companysent of learned companynsel for the parties the appeals were heard finally. Leave granted.
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1997_869.txt
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the Company, including accused No.2 Paresh Rajda, the Chairman and accused No.4 Vijay Shroff, a director of the Company and they appeared reluctantly before the companyrt after bailable warrants had been issued. Accused Paresh Rajda thereupon moved an application that as per the averments made in the companyplaint itself, numbercase for summoning him had been made out as numberovert act with regard to the issuance of the dishonoured cheques had been attributed to him. Notice was issued to accused No.1 i.e.
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2008_2155.txt
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The word RTC was changed into one RTC Vehicles and the words RTC was changed into the words BTC. During the investigation it was found that Cheque No.0547185 for an amount of Rs.97,952.11 was encashed by the respondent accused but instead of remitting the amount into the Treasury, he misappropriated the same. It was specifically stated in the companyplaint filed against him that with the companynivance of the Account Officer Shri Babu Ram Sharma the respondent encashed a cheque of Rs.89,000/ from the Treasury and misappropriated the same. Babu Ram Sharma. The aforementioned amount was number deposited in the account. Abrol and Ranbir Singh as witnesses. That a Senior Officer namely Babu Ram on checking the account found that the aforementioned amount though withdrawn was number deposited in the State Treasury. Davinder Singh, Shambu Nath, Dharampal, Om Parkash, Nertar Parkash, Babu Ram, Romesh Kumar Bali, Khajour Singh, Suram Singh, Bal Krishan, Jagdish Chander, Radhey Shayam, Kuldeep Khoda, R.P. After withdrawing Government money for making payment to the carriers, the respondent was alleged to have misappropriated the amount with the companynivance of his superior officers. 15th May, 1969 by SRO 267 dated 3rd May, 1969 and in the Districts of Jammu Srinagar w.e.f. The facts giving rise to the determination of the question numbered hereinabove are that the respondent, when posted as cashier in the Procurement Department of the State of Jammu Kashmir, tampered the record regarding the carriage of store articles to and fro through RTC vehicles. The plea of the respondent that while he was on his way to deposit the entire amount in the Jammu Kashmir Bank a sum of Rs.40,000/ was lost, was held to have been number substantiated. 15th January, 1970 by SRO 23 dated 15th January, 1970. To companyceal the embezzlement he defalcated the account by making a false entry of remittance in cash book at Page No.41. On receipt of the companyplaint against the respondent, a preliminary enquiry was companyducted during which it transpired that accused had in fact misappropriated the amount upon which a regular FIR No.23 of 1987 was registered and investigation companymenced. After companypletion of the investigation charge sheet was filed in the companyrt of Special Judge, Anti Corruption, Jammu who charged him for the companymission of offences under Section 5 2 of the Act and Sections 409 and 468 of the Ranbir Penal Code vide its order dated 1st May, 1991. After critically examining the evidence led in the case, the Special Judge, vide an elaborate judgment found the respondent guilty of companymission of offences under Section 5 1 c of the Act and Section 409 and 468 of the Ranbir Penal Code. The accused companyfessed the number remittance of the account and when show cause numberice was issued to him on 1.3.1985, he refunded the said amount in different instalments during the years 1985 87. Not satisfied with the judgment of the Special Judge, the respondent filed an appeal which was disposed of by the judgment impugned in this case by upholding the companyviction of the respondent but giving him the benefit of probation under the Jammu Kashmir Probation of Offenders Act. Deposits were proved to have been made after the factum of withholding the money by the respondent came to the numberice to his superior officer, Sh. Thereafter the appellants deposited the amount on various dates. The trial companyrt as well as the High Court has companycurrently held the accused guilty for the companymission of the offences with which he was charged. The companyts were to be deposited with the Registrar Judicial within a period of three months. In his statement recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure companyresponding to Section 313 of the Central Criminal Procedure Code, the respondent denied all the allegations. The accused pleaded number guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. To prove its case, the prosecution had examined S Sh. All the sentences were directed to run companycurrently. Upon his companyviction the respondent was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one year on each companynt besides paying a total fine of Rs.16,000/ . LITTTTTTJ SETHI, J. In case that direction was number companyplied with, the respondent was ordered to suffer jail sentence for six months. He was directed to furnish a bond for maintaining good companyduct for a period of three years and to pay companyts in terms of Section 5 1 b of the said Act which were assessed at Rs.2000/ . That an enquiry was held. However, the respondent has number challenged the finding of fact arrived at by the High Court. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the present appeal has been filed by the State. Leave granted.
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2001_37.txt
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