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The Designated Authority proposed levy of anti dumping duty. 94/2000 Customs came to be issued. Briefly stated the facts are as follows M s. Sterlite Industries India Limited made a companyplaint to the Designated Authority that optical fibre were being dumped in India. Three appeals were filed before CEGAT. CEGAT has set aside the numberification by the impugned order. All these appeals are against the Order of Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal CEGAT dated 13th December, 2000. On the basis of that companyplaint inquiry was companyducted. Pursuant to that, Notification dated 28th June, 2000 bearing No.
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2003_810.txt
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In the order dated 19.3.1991 reliance was placed on its earlier decision dated 14.3.1991 and as regards the argument of promissory estoppel it was held that there was numberdocument on the record filed by the petitioners where any promise was held out to any of the petitioners that the ownership will be transferred to them. After the aforesaid decision dated 14.3.1991 the Delhi High Court by its order dated 19.3.1991 dismissed similar writ petitions in which an additional argument of promissory estoppel was companysidered and decided against the petitioners. All the above Special Leave Petitions have been filed against the aforesaid decisions of the High Court dated 14.3.1991, 19.3.1991 and 22.3.1991 and the same are disposed of by one companymon order. The allotment of the flats were made to the petitioners in their capacity as employees of DESU and it was an admitted position that the petitioners were paying rent to the respondents. The Delhi High Court also dismissed the writ petition by order dated 22.3.1991 following its earlier decision dated 14th March, 1991 and 19th March, 1991.
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1992_582.txt
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of SKO from the storage tank. of SKO under the Customs Receipt No. of SKO and for levy of enhanced rate of duty on the further remaining quantity of SKO. In the Budget for the year 1998 99, Basic Customs Duty and Special Customs Duty was levied on SKO 30 and 2 ad valorem respectively. The respondent made a further deposit under protest of Rs.12,78,116/ towards Basic and Special Customs Duty on the quantity of SKO lifted between 2nd of June, 1998 and 6th of June, 1998. At that time, the duty payable on importation of SKO was only the companyntervailing duty of 10 ad valorem. of Superior Kerosene Oil hereinafter referred to as SKO on 15th of May, 1998. The respondent had also subsisting companytract with IBP Company Ltd., the owners of the storage tank for storage of SKO belonging to the respondent in the said tanks. Thereafter, the Customs Authority the appellant hereinafter withheld the clearance of SKO from the said tank on the companytention that the respondent was required to pay Basic and Special Customs Duty 30 and 2 ad valorem and accordingly, wrote a letter to the respondent on 18th of June, 1998 companytending that the differential duty would be payable on SKO number physically lifted before 2nd of June, 1998. 62,63,000/ on 3rd of August, 1998 under protest Basic and Special Customs Duty towards balance quantity of the said material lying in the storage of IBP. During the period 28th of May, 1998 to 1st of June, 1998, the respondent lifted a quantity of 463.31 M.T. In the said registration certificate, it was clearly mentioned that SKO would be stored by the respondent in IBPs storage tank at Budge Budge. Keeping in view the fact that lifting of goods was stopped by the Customs Authorities, the respondent deposited under protest an amount of Rs.24,48,822/ towards Basic and Special Customs Duty on 1000 M.T. In the said show cause numberice, the claim of the appellant was, inter alia, for appropriation of the sum of Rs.12,78,116/ paid towards differential duty on the material removed between 2nd of June, 1998 and 6th of June, 1998, appropriation of the sum of Rs.24,48,822/ deposited towards differential duty on 1000 M.T. Ex Bond bill of Entry for home companysumption for quantity of 133.156 M.T. was filed on 28th May, 1998. The full amount of duty was paid thereon amounting to Rs.35,75,836/ . The full amount of duty was paid thereon amounting to Rs.92,635/ . On 20th May, 1998, respondent filed Ex bond bill of Entry to get them de bonded for home companysumption for a quantity of 5140 M.T. 1 1631 dated 25th of June, 1998. That, after the duty was paid, the companytrol over the goods was lifted and numbersuch charge was thereafter companylected. It was held that once full duty has been paid by the importer and the clearance for home companysumption has been permitted by the Customs Officers, any subsequent enhancement of the rate of duty would number be leviable on the goods which remain stored in the warehouse under the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. The respondent had paid hire charges for the said tank to IBP under the agreement dated 22nd of October, 1997 which was further extended by an agreement dated 7th of July, 1998. Respondent, thereafter, started lifting goods from the storage tank from time to time in accordance with the requirements of its customers. A show cause numberice was issued by the appellant to the respondent for charging the enhanced rate of duty. Respondent assessee hereinafter referred to as respondent imported 5273.156 M.T. After the passing of the order by the Tribunal, respondent filed a miscellaneous application before the Tribunal praying for a direction upon Customs Authorities to refund the amount deposited. The Tribunal accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the Commissioner of Customs. Respondent filed his reply to the aforesaid show cause numberice dated 23rd of July, 1998. The respondent deposited a further sum of Rs. In terms of the orders passed by the Tribunal, a sum of Rs.99,89,938/ which was deposited under protest by the respondent, was refunded to it. The Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta vide his order dated 5th of November, 1998 companyfirmed the assessment as detailed in the show cause numberice and also imposed a penalty of Rs.5,000/ upon the respondent. Respondent, thereafter, filed an application before the Customs Authorities seeking payment of interest in terms of Section 27A of the Act on the aforesaid amount for the period during which the said sums were lying deposited with the appellant. The present appeal has been filed under Section 130 E of the Customs Act, 1962 for short, the Act against the judgment and final order dated 9th of August, 2001 passed by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, ERB, Cal. The claim of the respondent on this account was for the sum of Rs.61,97,886/ . Tribunal by its order dated 1st of November, 2002 directed the Revenue Authorities to refund the amount of duty inter alia in order to avoid uncalled for interest liability on the public exchequer. The proper officer endorsed on the reverse of the Bill of Entry to the effect that the goods may be released by the officer in charge of the warehouse. The respondent being aggrieved, filed statutory appeal before the Tribunal. BHAN, J. C R 84 116/1999. As the appellant had, in the meanwhile, filed an appeal in this Court, the appellant vide companymunication dated 15th of January, 2004 informed the respondent that the claim cannot be companysidered due to pendency of the matter in this Court. 302 OIL . in Appeal Nos.
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2008_262.txt
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26.01.1989. Kolhapur, Maharashtra. After marriage, Hasina was staying with the appellant in her matrimonial home at Ujalawadi Taluka Karveer, Dist. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as under On 26.01.1989, Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh A1 the appellant accused married one Hasina Mustafa Shaikh since deceased at Tembalalwadi, Dist. at Karveer Police Station, Kohlapur alleging torture and harassment faced by the deceased on account of demand for dowry. On 23.08.1989, when she was at her matrimonial home, she companymitted suicide by companysuming poison. On the same day, Abdul Rahim Shaikh PW 4 the grand father of the deceased lodged an F.I.R. By order dated 07.12.1990, the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, while acquitting the sister A 4 of the appellant herein, companyvicted the appellant and his parents for the offence punishable under Sections 498 A and 304 B read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced them to suffer RI for 1 year along with a fine of Rs.1,000/ , in default, to further under RI for 6 months and RI for 7 years respectively. The appellant and his parents informed about her death to her family members. She was taken to CPR Hospital at Kolhapur where the doctor declared that she was brought dead. 891 of 1990 whereby the High Court companyfirmed the order of companyviction and sentence dated 07.12.1990 passed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge at Kolhapur against the appellant herein. The evidence of PW 6 the father of the deceased also proves the torture and harassment for the settlement for the payment of money and, in fact, this was narrated on 18.08.1989 i.e. 20 , the evidence of PWs 4, 6, 7 and 9 and other relevant circumstance, viz.,
the death occurred on 23.08.1989 i.e. Explanation For the purpose of this sub section, dowry shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 28 of 1961 Whoever companymits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall number be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment of life The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 186/89 Exh.20 was registered against the appellant and his family members for the offence punishable under Sections 306, 304 B and 498 A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter referred to as IPC . Being aggrieved, the appellant and his parents preferred Criminal Appeal No. 7 of 1990 and A 1 Husband, A 2 Father, A 3 Mother, A 4 sister in law were arrayed as accused number. The case was companymitted to the Court of Sessions and numbered as Sessions Case No. Heard Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, learned companynsel for the appellant accused and Mr. Sachin J. Patil, learned companynsel for the respondent State. In support of the above charges, the prosecution heavily relied on the companyplaint Exh. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, the parents A 2 and A 3 of the appellant expired and the appeal against them stood abated. within a period of 7 months from the date of marriage i.e. Discussion The only point for companysideration in this appeal is whether the prosecution has made out a case in respect of the charges leveled against the appellant relating to Section 304B and 498A IPC. By the impugned judgment dated 28.11.2007, the High Court dismissed the appeal while companyfirming the companyviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court against the appellant. Sathasivam,J. just 5 days prior to the date of her death. During the trial, prosecution examined 12 witnesses and marked several documents. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. However, he did number listen to him and left his house. 1 to 4. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant has preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
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2012_801.txt
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The assessee was the Oxford University Press and number the University of Oxford. The University of Oxford did number exist in India number did it carry on the activities of a University in India. The assessee is a branch of the Oxford University Press, which, as the question itself numberes, is a part of the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom. The High Court stated in the judgment and order under challenge that, admittedly, the assessee was the Oxford University Press and number the University of Oxford, but there was a finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the assessee was a part of the University of Oxford. Income made therefrom companyld number be regarded as the income of a University existing solely for educational purposes merely because the assessee claimed to be a part of the University of Oxford, which did number exist in India. In other words, a University or an educational institution, whether established in India or abroad, had to retain the character of a University or an educational institution in India, and the income in respect of which the exemption was claimed had to be income derived by it in its capacity as a University or an educational institution. If it did number carry on its activities as a University or educational institution in India, it companyld number be regarded as a University or educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and, hence, the income derived by it from any other activities would number qualify for exemption under Section 10 22 . The question that arose for companysideration in references to the High Court under Section 256 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in holding that Oxford University Press, Bombay, which is part of Oxford University, is exempt under section 10 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ? The Income tax Officer rejected the companytention and brought the income to tax. 19.94 lakhs, but, in the companyrse of the assessment proceedings before the Income tax Officer, it claimed that, as it was a branch of the University of Oxford, the same was exempt from the payment of income tax by virtue of the provisions of Section 10, clause 22 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In the companytext and setting of clause 22 , the word existing in the expression existing solely for educational purposes and number for the purposes of profit meant and referred to the existence of such University or institution solely for educational purposes in India. For the Assessment Year 1976 77 the assessee returned an income of Rs. The Commissioner Appeals , in the appeal filed by the assessee, overturned the assessment by the Income tax Officer. The assessee publishes books and carries on similar business in India. The only activity carried on by the Press, which was the assessee, in India was the activity of printing and publishing books and selling them as well as publications of other publishers to earn profit. Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner Appeals , the Revenue approached the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. These appeals by special leave are filed by the assessee. They impugn the companyrectness of the judgment and order of the High Court at Bombay dated 21st December, 1995 in respect of the Assessment Year 1976 77 and subsequent orders of the High Court following the aforestated judgment for the Assessment Years 1972 73, 1973 74, 1974 75, 1977 78, 1979 80 1983 84. Arising out of the judgment and order of the Tribunal, the question aforestated was referred to the High Court. It was treated as a number resident companypany under the terms of a Notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue on 31st July, 1954 at its request from the Assessment Year 1952 53 onwards. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The question was answered by the High Court in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. LITTTTTTJ J U D G M E N T Bharucha, J.
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2001_780.txt
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the suit was instituted on the original side of the calcutta high companyrt. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by untwalia j. the defendant appellant in this appeal by certificate of the calcutta high companyrt is a firm carrying on business in the town of calcutta. the plaintiff respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from the first and second floors of the building number 86 purshottam rai street calcutta on the ground that he reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and that he had numberother house in or around calcutta where he companyld reside. it has companye to this companyrt after obtaining a certificate of fitness from the high companyrt. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1937 or 1974.
from the judgment and decree dated the 6th august 1974 of the calcutta high companyrt in appeal from original decree number 21 of 1972.
purshottam chattarjee and rathin das for the appellant. govinda mukhoty and g. s. chatterjee for the respondent. the learned trial judge decreed the suit. it was companytested by the appellant on several grounds. the appellants appeal was dismissed by a bench of the high court.
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1975_320.txt
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TAX REFERENCE NO. TAX REFERENCE No. TAX REFERENCE NOS. and Miss Subhashini. For the Interveners Central India Industries Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar. For the Interveners 1 M s. Jardine Henderson Ltd. Dr. Debi Pal and D. N. Gupta, 2 Indore Exporting Importing Co. Ltd. Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar, and 3 M s. Ajay Investment Co. Praveen Kumar and Miss Bina Gupta. For the Intervener Central India Industries Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar. For the Intervener Central India Industries Ltd Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar. For the Respondent Miss A. Subhashini. 16 OF 1975 From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Reference Application No. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini. 6 9 OF 1975 From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Tribunal Ahmedabad in R. A. Nos. For the Interveners 1 Ramakrishna Sons Ltd. S. P. Mehta, T. A. Ramachandran and M s. J. Ramachandran, 2 M s. Jardine Henderson Ltd. Dr. Debi Pal and D. N. Gupta, 3 Indore Exporting Importing Co. Ltd. Dr. Debi Pal, Miss Bina Gupta and Mr. Praveen Kumar, and 4 Ketu Investments Ltd. S. T. Desai, Mrs. A. K. Verma and J. Genl, S. P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini. For the Respondent S. N. Kacker, Sol. 18 OF 1975 From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench in R.A. No. Ltd., and H. K. Investment Co. Pvt. 2 OF 1975 From the Tax Reference made by the Income Tax Tribunal Ahmedabad against its order dated 7 7 1973 in I.T.A. B. Dadachanji, Mrs. A. K. Verma and Miss Arti Mehta. 2 OF 1975 For the Appellant S. N. Kacker, Sol. For the Respondent S. N. Kacker, Solicitor General, P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini. Ltd. and one is at the instance of the Commissioner of Income tax, Gujarat. Ltd. and assessment years 1965 66 to 1969 70 in case of H. K. Investment Co. Pvt. For the Respondent F. S. Nariman, I. N. Shroff, and S. Parihar. Out of these References, three are at the instance of the assessees, namely, C. V. Mehta P Ltd., M s. Distributors Baroda Pvt. 117 118/75 For the Appellant Mr. B. Sen, I. N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar. 117 118 of 1975. 6 9 OF 1975 For the Appellant F. S. Nariman, I. N. Shroff, and H. Parihar. 16 OF 1975 For the Appellant Mrs. A. K. Verma and J. They relate to different assessment years assessment year 1969 70 in case of C. V. Mehta P Ltd. and Distributors Baroda Pvt. B. Dadachanji, K. J. John and Shri Narain. 62/AHD/74 75 arising out of I.T.A. 271/AHD/74 75 arising out of I.T.A. 18 OF 1975 For the Appellant S. P. Mehta, K. C. Patel, Shri Narain, J. 946 949/AHD/72 73 for Assessing years 1966 67 to 1969 70 . This group of appeals and References raises a short question of companystruction of sections 85A and 80M of the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the present Act . 580/AHD/72 73 . 2431/AHD/72 73 decided on 29 7 74 assessment year 1969 70 . The appeals are preferred by the assessee, namely, Cloth Traders P Ltd. against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court and they relate to the assessment years 1965 66 and 1966 67 when section 85A was in force. 103 106/AHD/74 75 arising out of T.A. The question is whether on a true interpretation of these sections, rebate of income tax is admissible on the actual amount of divident received by an assessee, being a companypany, from an Indian companypany, or it is companyfined only to the dividend income as companyputed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is, after making the deductions specified in section 57 including deduction of the interest paid on borrowings for making the investments. 643 AHD /71 72 . Nos. The Reference before us have been made directly by the Tribunal under section 257 of the Act in view of the companyflict of opinion amongst the High Courts. The Gujarat High Court has taken a view against the assessee while a different view has been taken by the Bombay, Madras and Calcutta High Courts. No. Gen., B. CIVIL APPEAL NOS. From the Judgment and Order dated 28 11 1973 of the Gujarat High Court in I.T.R. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 21 of 1972 .
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1979_221.txt
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Both the reports should be sent by TNPCB to CPCB for analysis. Reports were obtained after inspection of the premises by the TNPCB. The sampling of the above should be taken in the presence of an official from TNPCB. The Company before disposing companyper slag, gypsum or any other waste product will seek previous permission from the TNPCB. After obtaining the requisite permissions, the companysent to operate the plant was issued on 14.10.1996 by the TNPCB. The State of Tamil Nadu TNPCB should companylect data from their primary health centres and Govt. in and around the factory premises and nearby villages once a month and such report should be furnished to the TNPCB. On 13.04.2016, the TNPCB granted companysent to operate the plant for one year subject to certain companyditions. Finally, on 08.08.2013, the NGT set aside the TNPCB order dated 29.03.2013, against which, Civil Appeal Nos. On 19.04.2005, the TNPCB issued companysent to operate, subject to fulfillment of various companyditions for the expanded capacity. The TNPCB granted its companysent under the Air Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1981 Air Act and Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, 1974 Water Act on 22.05.1995. On 01.08.1994, the respondent received a No Objection Certificate NOC from the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board TNPCB for the production of blister companyper and sulphuric acid. 87 of 2018 under Section 16 of the NGT Act. On 12.04.2018, an order was passed by the TNPCB under Section 33A of the Water Act and Section 31A of the Air Act directing that the respondents unit shall number resume production without obtaining prior approval renewal or companysent from the TNPCB. On 20.05.1999, the TNPCB granted its companysent for production of two more products, namely, phosphoric acid and hydrofluorosilicic acid. On 09.04.2018, the TNPCB refused renewal of companysent to operate to the respondents unit based on number compliance with certain companyditions that were laid down under the Air Act and the Water Act. Based on these reports, the TNPCB issued a show cause numberice dated 24.03.2013 and directed closure of the unit under Section 31A of the Air Act on 29.03.2013. Against this, the TNPCB filed Civil Appeal Nos.4763 4764 of 2013, which will be disposed of by the judgment delivered in this case. On the same date, the TNPCB issued a letter to the District Collector, inter alia, directing him to seal the respondents unit. In addition to the above, the sampling of effluent emission and solid waste should also be done by a monitoring group to be companystituted by TNPCB companyprising a representative of the District Collector, an official of TNPCB, NGOs and academicians as per companydition number43 of Consent Order dated 19 04 2005. On 06.09.2017, an inspection report by the TNPCB was made, and an order passed on 07.09.2017, granting renewal of companysent to operate only till 31.03.2018 subject to various companyditions. The direction number iii on Source Apportionment Study and direction number on companyducting a study on health hazards passed by the NGT in its judgment dated 8/8/2013 in Appeal 58 of 2013 should be carried out by the Tamil Nadu State Government and TNPCB. Meanwhile, the Madras High Court, on 28.09.2010, allowed the various writ petitions that had been filed and quashed the environmental clearances granted to the respondent and directed the TNPCB to close down the plant. Application of the Company for obtaining valid authorization for disposal of hazardous waste under Hazardous Other Wastes Management, Transboundary Movement Rules, 2016 should be disposed of by the TNPCB in a time bound manner. Owing to various interim orders passed by the NGT, the respondent companytinued to operate its plant. Post inspection of the unit of the respondent in March 2017, the TNPCB issued a show cause numberice dated 14.03.2017 for violations under the Air Act and the Water Act which, apparently, was number pursued. Further, the Company should ensure that the generation and disposal of companyper slag is maintained in the ratio of 11 and that the Company at best, can retain 10 days generation of companyper slag in its dump yard. As this was number being disposed of by the NGT, this Court, by its order dated 17.08.2018, directed the NGT to render its final findings, both on maintainability as well as on merits. Subsequently, on 23.5.2018, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board has also issued directions for closure and disconnection of power supply to the Unit. Under sections, 18 1 b of the Water Act, 1974 in the larger public interest, the Government endorse the closure direction of the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board and also direct the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board to seal the unit and close the plant permanently. This order was stayed by the NGT on 31.05.2013, allowing the respondent to companymence production subject to certain companyditions. Thus, the NGT is the appellate authority of the appellate authority companystituted under Section 31 of the Air Act by the State Government. Even though there is numberrequirement of analyzing the air samples through an accredited laboratory numberetheless a direction should be issued to the appellant that they will companyduct a periodical survey for ambient air quality/ numberse level stack emission through accredited laboratories of MoEFCC NABL and furnish such report to the TNPCB. The dead stock of companyper slag lying in the dump yard inside the factory premises which has solidified should be removed in a time bound manner. It is important to numbere that the appellants herein raised the issue of maintainability of the respondents appeal before the NGT, stating that an appeal should have been filed first before the appellate authority under the Air Act the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 NGT Act. The Committee companystituted by the NGT then inspected the site on various dates in September October, 2018, and heard all companycerned parties as well as intervenors. The respondent, Sterlite Industries India Ltd. Vedanta Ltd., was operating a companyper smelter plant at the State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu Ltd. SIPCOT Industrial Complex at Thoothukudi, Tamil Nadu. As a postscript to this order, the TNPCB looked into the matter again, and issued yet another rejection letter dated 22.01.2019, by which the respondents application seeking renewal of companysent to operate was rejected, stating that the companyditions of various previous companysents over the last 20 years had number been followed. Finally, on 28.05.2018, an order was issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu under Section 18 1 b of the Water Act stating It is brought to the numberice of the Government that Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board did number renew the Consent to Operate to M s.Vedanta Limited, Copper Smelter Plant, SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Thoothukudi District in its order dated 9.4.2018. In these appeals, various orders were passed, until, on 06.06.2018, the following order was passed APPLICATIONS 28 29 2018, APPLICATIONS 30 31 2018 AND APPEALS 36 37 2018 Heard. In other words, the appellate order passed by the proper authority under Section 31 of the Air Act is appealable to the NGT in terms of Section 31B. The appellant shall undertake a fresh detailed hydrogeological study for determining aquifer vulnerability and migration of leachate from the existing phosphogypsum pond through a reputed organization approved by the TNPCB as per companydition No.15 of the Consent Order dated 19/04/2005. Thereafter, the bottom of the dump yard and the side walls should be companyered with HDPE liner. If companyper slag has been used for landfill purposes, then the excess amount of the slag over and above the level of ground would be removed and thereafter the landfill should be companypacted with one feet of soil, so that the companyper slag is number blown away by the strong winds. On 20.08.2018, the NGT companystituted a Committee to go into the material produced by the parties to the Civil Appeal and to visit the site. Finally, on 18.12.2018, i.e., three days after the impugned order was passed by the NGT on 15.12.2018, an order passed by the appellate authority was as follows APPLICATIONS 28, 29, 30 31 2018 AND APPEALS 36 37 2018 Ms. Janani, companynsel for the appellant and Mr. V. Vasanthakumar, companynsel for the respondent Board are present. Further, the Company should ensure that the generation and disposal of gypsum is maintained in the ratio of 11 and that the Company at best, can retain 10 days generation of gypsum in its dump yard. On 12.04.2018, the respondent filed Appeal Nos.36 37 of 2018 before the appellate authority under Section 28 of the Water Act. Copper slag dumped at all the eleven sites including the Uppar River should be removed. It then came out with a detailed Enquiry Report dated 20.11.2018, in which it companycluded as follows On the basis of the site visit, public hearing and after hearing the appellant Company, State of Tamil Nadu, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board, and the interveners and, upon companysideration of the issues raised, the Committee is of the opinion The impugned orders cannot be sustained as it is against the principles of natural justice. On 10.07.2018, the matter was further adjourned as follows APPLICATIONS 28 29 2018, APPLICATIONS 30 31 2018 AND APPEALS 36 37 2018 In view of the remarks made in the adjudication proceedings on 6.6.2018 and as the position is same number, the Appeals and Applications are adjourned to 21.8.2018. The dead stock of gypsum lying in the dump yard inside the factory premises which has solidified should be removed in a time bound manner. The environmental clearance to the project by the Ministry of Environment, Forest, and Climate Change MoEF followed on 16.01.1995. On 17.05.1995, the State MoEF also granted environmental clearance to the respondent. The present appeals arise out of orders that have been passed Signature Not Verified by the National Green Tribunal NGT dated 31.05.2013, 08.08.2013, Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN Date 2019.02.18 164308 IST Reason and 15.12.2018. It recommended to the MoEF that the environmental clearance for the proposed expansion should number be granted, and if granted, should be revoked. Ms. No 72, Environment Forests EC 3 Department Dated 28.5.2018, directing the Tamilnadu Pollution Control Board to close the plant permanently, we feel it is number appropriate to hear the Appeals and decide the issue at this juncture. This Committee was ultimately headed by Justice Tarun Agarwala, former Chief Justice of the Meghalaya High Court, together with two experts, one being a representative of the Central Pollution Control Board CPCB and another a representative of the MoEF. Meanwhile, a protest had been organized in March 2018 by some persons against the proposed expansion sought by the respondent. As per companydition No.44 of the Consent Order dated 19 04 2005, the appellant should be directed to monitor ground water quality including heavy metals such as Arsenic, Cadmium, Silver, Copper, Fluoride, etc. This was followed by two orders, both dated 23.05.2018, again issued under the same Sections, this time to close down the respondents unit and disconnect power supply to it. due to emissions from Sterlite Industries. However, the environmental clearances that were granted were challenged before the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos.15501 15503/1996, 5769/1997, and 16961/1998. The respondent, therefore, had to file Writ Petition No.7313 of 2018 before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court for police protection. On 21.09.2004, a Supreme Court Monitoring Committee was companystituted to verify the companypliance status of hazardous waste management. In view of the order passed by the Honble National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi on 15.12.2018 in Appeal No. 87 of 2018 setting aside the impugned order dated 9.4.2018 which is subject matter of these appeals pending before this Appellate Authority, the Appeals have become infructuous and hence they are closed. In the event the Honble Tribunal is of the opinion that the factory should companymence production, the companymittee is of the opinion that the following directions may be issued. Meanwhile, on 23.03.2013, the residents of nearby areas started companyplaining of irritation, throat infection, severe companygh, breathing problem, nausea etc. Recommendations made by CPCB should be followed. Hospitals to monitor the various ailments that are being companyplaint of by the inhabitants living in and around the factory premises. A writ petition was filed by the respondent before the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on 18.06.2018 so that the respondent companyld access its unit to maintain its plant. Other issues raised also does number justify the closure of the factory even if the appellant was found to be violating the companyditions numberms directions. Production companymenced on 01.01.1997. 8773 8774 of 2013 were filed, which again will be disposed of by this judgment. This ground of maintainability was decided against the appellants by the impugned order dated 08.08.2013. The appellant companypany should be directed that they shall develop a green belt of 25 metres width around the battery limits of its factory by planting native and high foliage tree and also in and around the factory. Both the respondent as well as the appellants made their detailed companyments on the Committees report. Hence the Appeals and applications are adjourned to 10.7.2018. This Writ Petition was disposed of by an order dated 04.04.2018 with a direction to companysider the respondents application. In view of the Government Order passed by the Government of Tamilnadu in G.O. Under Article 48 A of the Constitution, the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the companyntry. The power supply has been disconnected on 24.5.2018. None is present on behalf of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd interveners. These six orders became the subject matter of a companyposite Appeal No. F. NARIMAN, J. The appellants then took up a plea of maintainability of the companyposite appeal. Aggrieved by this order, the appellants knocked on the doors of this Court. Counsel for the appellant seeks permission to withdraw the Appeals. No numberice or opportunity of hearing was given to the appellant. The brief facts necessary to appreciate the companytroversy raised in the present case are as follows. This was dismissed as withdrawn on 09.07.2018. She has also filed a memo to that effect.
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2019_80.txt
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Leave granted in SLP C No.2110 of 2011. Heard Mr. Rakesh K. Khanna, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellant and the learned companynsel appearing for the respondents in each of the three appeals. All these appeals seek to challenge the orders passed by the Delhi High Court in the writ petitions which were filed by the appellant New Delhi Municipal Council before the Delhi High Court. Those three writ petitions sought to challenge the Award passed by the Labour Court in favour of the respondents in each of the three matters.
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2013_1047.txt
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The file was companysidered by the Under Secretary on 9.2.1998 as 7.2.1998 and 8.2.1998 were holidays in view of Saturday and Sunday and sent to Deputy Secretary on 9.2.1998 itself. Thereafter the file was companysidered by the Deputy Secretary on 9.2.1998 itself. The aforesaid order was passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu on 18.12.1997 and she companytinues to be in detention. A representation forwarded by her on 13.1.1998, was rejected by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The factual position is the following The representation was sent by her 13.1.1998 which after passing through the prescribed route reached the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu Prohibition and Excise Department on 5.2.1998. Rajammal, a thirty two year old is kept under detention dubbing her as a bootlegger, as per the detention order passed under Section 3 1 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 hereinafter referred to as the TN Act . Thereafter the file was companysidered by the Deputy Secretary who in turn sent the same to the Minister for Law for approval. Second is that her family members were number informed about the place of detention number even about the detention. In the affidavit sworn to by Sri R. Poornalingam, IAS, Secretary to the Government, Prohibition and Excise Department in answer to the companytentions of the appellant in the Special Leave Petition the delay is sought to be explained in the following lines The remarks were submitted with the relevant files before the Under Secretary of the companycerned Department on 6.2.1998. She filed a habeas companypus petition before the High Court of Madras in which the detention order was challenged mainly on three grounds. first is that there was delay in companysidering the representation submitted on her behalf. The third is that report of the Advisory Board was number submitted within the statutory period of seven days as companytemplated under Section 11 of the TN Act. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court has repelled all the aforesaid three companytentions and dismissed her petition. THOMAS, J. This appeal has, therefore, been filed by special leave challenging the judgment of the High Court. Leave granted.
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1998_1211.txt
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While to proceed, the deceased had started the vehicle but the vehicle did number start. Act and had died in an accident arising out of and in the companyrse of his employment under Respondent number2. The vehicle in which the accident had occurred possessed a National Route Permit, and the deceased often drove the vehicle to destinations outside the state. 50/ per day as bhatta. On 19.07.2011, he met with an accident while on his way to deliver wheat bags in the truck from Berhampur, Orissa to Paralakhemundi, Andhra Pradesh. The deceased saw that the vehicle was moving ahead, he immediately climbed into the vehicle through the iron stepping of the truck, but unfortunately, he fell down from the truck and sustained severe and grievous bleeding injuries on the back side of the head and died at the spot. OR 15J 1047 owned by the P.IOn 19 07 2011 at about 4.30 A.M., the deceased received personal back head injury near Sandhigam village by vehicular accident arising out of and in companyrse of his employment as a driver of the truck No. 100/ per day and bhatta of Rs. Hence, the deceased and the cleaner got down from the vehicle and checked the battery box and removed the wooden log piece kept for obstructing the right wheel of the said truck. The learned Commissioner relied upon the testimony of the witnesses to companystruct the following chain of events leading up to the accident The deceased was working as a driver in truck No. OR 15J 1047 which was loaded with wheat bags. Further, Respondent number2 had also admitted before the learned Commissioner that the death of the deceased had occurred due to an accident arising out of and during the companyrse of the employment for which a companypromise was sought to be reached by Respondent number2 with the appellants, to the amount of Rs.3,50,000/ . Another truck bearing No. On the question of the monthly wages being earned by the deceased at the time of his death, the learned Commissioner companycluded that the companytentions advanced by Respondent number2 that he was being paid wages of Rs. The learned Employees Compensation cum Assistant Labour Commissioner companysidered the above aspect of the matter at length and arrived at the companyclusion that the deceased was working in the employment of Respondent number2 at the time of his death and that he had lost his life in an accident caused during and in the companyrse of his employment with Respondent number2. Thereafter, he and the cleaner of the vehicle saw the companydition of the deceased and had companysulted with the village Revenue Officer of Sandigam village and told the fact. The learned Commissioner, relying on the date of birth of the deceased as 01.07.1984, as mentioned in the drivers license and Transfer Certificate, came to the companyclusion that the age of the deceased was 27 years at the time of the accident. 100/ per day as wages, and Rs. The cleaner of the truck, who was present at the time of the accident, gave information regarding the accident to the Mandasa Police Station, Srikakulam, whose personnel reached the spot and companyducted the inquest, prepared the panchnama and sent the body of the deceased for post mortem. He claimed that he was number liable to companypensate the deceased as he had died on the spot due to his own negligence, as he had tried to enter the vehicle while it was in motion. On the way, they stopped and kept the vehicle and took the rest and slept there on 18 07 2011. In the light of the said fact stated by the appellants, the wages of Rs.4,000/ per month and bhatta of Rs.200/ per day and trip charges of Rs.3,000/ per month i.e.Rs.13,000/ per month seemed genuine. After removal of the wooden log piece, the vehicle moved to run down. They claimed that he was getting monthly wages at Rs.4,000/ per month, daily bhatta allowance at Rs.200/ which companyes to Rs.6,000/ per month, along with additional trip benefit amounting to Rs.3,000/ , the total amounting to Rs.13,000/ per month. He along with the cleaner Sarada Prasana Patnaik loaded the said wheat bags on 18 07 2011 at about 11.30 P.M. at godown. Further, he had already given financial assistance to the father of the deceased for the cremation. 61 of 2011 before the Court of the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Berhampur, Ganjam District. Accordingly, the learned Commissioner came to the companyclusion that the deceased was an employee within the meaning of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923 hereinafter referred to as the E.C. OR 07B 8791 which was also followed with the offending vehicle had also halted and stopped there along with them. They immediately reported the matter to the police, Mandasa Police Station and informed the same to the O.P.I as well as to the father of the deceased. In response, the owner of the truck, respondent number2 herein filed a Written Statement and denied his liability. They claimed additional amount of Rs.20,000/ towards funeral expenses, Rs.30,000/ towards mental agony, physical shock and pain, and Rs.50,000/ towards expectation of life and Rs.1,00,000/ towards loss of estate, inconvenience and hardships caused to the family members of the deceased on account of the death of deceased. The cleaner also informed the father of the deceased Appellant No.1 herein , who made arrangements for taking the dead body of his son back to the native village for cremation. 50/ per day cannot be believed. The claim of the appellants was that the deceased was aged around 26 years at the time of death and had died while he was in and during the companyrse of employment of respondent number 2 herein. The vehicle proceeded few distance on the public road and capsized in the field. Accordingly, the learned Commissioner calculated the companypensation as under Rs.8,000/ wage limited to x 50 x 213.57 27 years of age factor Rs.8,54,280/ The learned Commissioner further awarded an interest 12 per annum to the appellants from the date of accident, as well as Rs.20,000/ as the companyt of proceedings, the total amount of companypensation thus companying to Rs. 1 and 2 worked as a truck driver with one Bikram Keshari Patnaik respondent number 2 herein . He sustained severe injuries on the back of his head and died on the spot. On 03.11.2011, the appellants, being the father, mother and younger brother of the deceased, filed claim petition W.C. Case No. They all had taken rest and slept there and got up early morning at about 4.30 A.M. on 19.07.2011 and started to proceed to Paralakhemundi for unloading the goods. On this basis, they claimed a lump sum of Rs.18,00,000/ as pecuniary damages towards loss of past and future wages and loss of earning. 472 of 2013 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, wherein the learned single Judge reduced the amount of companypensation awarded to the appellants by the learned Commissioner for Employees Compensation from Rs.10,75,253/ to Rs.6,00,000/ and also waived the award of 50 penalty with interest. 10, 75, 253/ . Act before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. He was also a highly skilled workman. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Respondent number 2 also companytended that in any case he is number liable to pay the amount as claimed by the appellants. Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Company filed an appeal under Section 30 of the E.C. He submitted in the Written Statement that he has been paying only Rs. The brief facts of the case required to appreciate the rival legal companytentions advanced on behalf of the parties are stated here under The elder son of appellant Nos. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated 13.08.2014 passed in F.A.O. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the companyrectness of impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. Leave granted. No.
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2016_56.txt
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By order dated 12.12.2006 this companyrt had directed that the present matter be placed for disposal after the decision of this Court in CCE v. Ratan Melting Wire Industries, which had been referred to a larger bench. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
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2009_662.txt
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The appellant has approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for recovery of the loss of diamonds entrusted to the Commission Agent. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in its order dated 28 9 1995 passed the order holding that since the Insurance Company has repudiated the claim, it declined to grant the relief. Thus, this appeal.
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1996_610.txt
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The prosecutrix asked them as to who they were and they disclosed their identity. The prosecutrix refused to open the door as her mother was number at home. The prosecutrix was sent to the District Hospital for medical check up. She was first raped by accused respondent Mannoo and thereafter by accused respondent Pappoo. To similar effect was the plea of accused Mannoo. The accused persons pleaded innocence. But both the accused persons went to the neighbouring house and came to the roof of her house and jumped into the companyrtyard and showed her a tamancha. After sometime her mother came home and knocked the door and hearing the voice of knocking, the accused persons ran away and climbed over the roof. The accused persons were also sent for medical examination and their clothing were sent for chemical examination. The factual position in a nutshell is that while the prosecutrix was alone in her house, at about 11.00 a.m. on 21.5.1987 since her mother had gone out to market for purchasing vegetables, the respondents who belonged to her locality came to her house, knocked the door. Placing reliance on the evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother who were examined as PWs 1 and 2 respectively learned trial Judge found accused persons guilty, companyvicted and sentenced them as afore noted. While they were climbing, the mother had seen them and she started shouting and hearing it one Vimalesh Kumar Verma of the locality came there and he also saw both the accused persons running away. There is number even any discussion on the evidence adduced, and practically on the sole ground that the mother of the prosecutrix accepted that the victim was of easy virtues, the acquittal has been directed. After companypletion of investigation, change sheet was filed and accused persons were sent up for trial. The companyviction and the sentence were questioned by the accused person persons by failing an appeal before the High Court and as numbered above the High Court directed their acquittal. In the additional statements submitted during examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code respondent Papoo stated that the prosecutrix was number having a good character and since her house was in front of his house, he and his family members asked them to leave that place and hence the false case was foisted. has questioned in this appeal companyrectness of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow directing acquittal of the respondents hereafter referred to ase the accused . The Vth Additional District and Sections Judge, Sitapur found them guilty and sentenced each to undergo RI for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. Written report of the incident was lodged at the Police Station at 3.10 p.m. Investigation was undertaken. The respondents were charged for alleged companymission of offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC . 2004 Supp 6 SCR 585 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The State of U.P. Leave granted.
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2004_1154.txt
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In the said suit, the Governing Body of the College in question which was defendant No. After companystitution of the regular Governing Body, defendant No.2 passed an order terminating the services of plaintiff in companytravention of Statutes of Bihar University which necessitated filing of the present suit. In the said execution case, an objection under Section 47 of the Code was filed on behalf of Principal of the College as well as the Bihar University objecting to the executability of the decree on grounds, inter alia, that during the pendency of the suit on Ist October, 1980, the College in question became the companystituent unit of the Bihar University and the erstwhile Governing Body ceased to exist but the University was number impleaded party in the suit and companysequently the decree was number executable against it inasmuch as the exparte decree was obtained against the erstwhile management by suppressing this fact. As subsequently during the pendency of the execution case, Jai Prakash University was formed and the companylege in question thereupon became a companystituent unit of the said University, the same also filed similar objection to the executability of the decree. 1 entered appearance but numberwritten statement was filed and the defendant absented itself and the suit was fixed for exparte hearing which was decreed exparte and the defendants were permanently restrained from giving effect to the order of termination. 2 respondent No.3 who was Secretary of Governing Body, Ganga Singh College, terminating the services of plaintiff, was illegal. Plaintiff appellant filed suit for a declaration that order dated 11th October, 1977, passed by defendant No. As the judgment debtors refused to companyply the directions companytained in the decree, the appellant levied execution. N.AGRAWAL, J. Hence, this appeal by Special Leave. Leave granted.
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2001_921.txt
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The respondent, therefore, was informed by the Commission that he had to vacate the quarter. The said quarter was leased by him to the Commission at the rate of Rs.880 per month. As an employee of the Commission, he was allotted quarter on December 10, 1982. It was the policy of the Commission to grant four months time to retain a quarter by an employee after his retirement. It is the case of the appellant that after the retirement, an employee has to vacate the residential accommodation given to him by the Commission. In view of the retirement of the respondent on February 28, 1990 and in view of the fact that he had to vacate the residential quarter of the Commission, possession of the quarter that belonged to the respondent and let out to the Commission was given back to him on June 3, 1990. His prayer for retention of quarter was companysidered by the Commission but in view of number availability of quarters to several other employees, the prayer was rejected and the respondent was asked to vacate it. The Commission was required to initiate eviction proceedings and only thereafter an undertaking was filed and possession of quarter was given back to Commission. It was submitted that though the respondent retired on February 28, 1990 and was allowed four months time to occupy the quarter as per the policy of the Commission, he failed to vacate the quarter. It is an admitted fact that the respondent did number vacate the quarter. In spite of such companymunications and letters, the respondent failed to vacate the quarter. In the capacity of an employee of the Commission and for efficiently discharging his duties, he was allotted accommodation in Building No. Accordingly, the respondent was asked to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the quarter to the Commission latest by 30th June, 1990. In those proceedings, an undertaking was given by the respondent that he would vacate the quarter latest by May 30, 1991. Since the respondent did number vacate the quarter, proceedings were also initiated by the Commission under the Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971. The Commission, however, deducted an amount of Rs.53,632 towards unauthorized occupation charges of official accommodation from July 01, 1990 to May 15, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5,100 being 75 per cent of the basic pay of Rs.6,800 per month. He prayed for quashing of an order of appropriation of Rs.53,632 as unauthorized occupation charges of official accommodation from July, 1990 to May, 1991 at the rate of Rs.5,100 by permanently restraining the Commission from recovering the said amount. In the circumstances, the Commission was within its power to deduct the amount recoverable from the respondent towards unauthorized occupation of residential quarter from July 1, 1990 till May 15, 1991 and the employee had numberreason to make grievance against it. Pursuant to the said undertaking, the respondent vacated the quarter on May 16, 1991. Statutory regulations framed by the Commission are more liberal and beneficial than the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The respondent herein petitioner before the High Court was in service of Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Commission for short appellant herein. In the event of unauthorized occupation of staff accommodation, liquidated damages are recoverable as double the rent i.e. Since the respondent did number vacate the quarter, the impugned action of charging penal rent was taken and the amount was appropriated from gratuity benefits payable to the respondent. It was also stated by the deponent that the Commission had issued Allotment of Residences Instructions, 1970. 205 x 4 Unauthorised occupancy Rs.53,632 from 1/7/90 to 16/5/91 Rs.5100 p.m. being 75 of the basic pay of Rs.6800 p.m. Rs.53,632 Rs.54,452 Deficit amount Recoverable Rs.5,196 The Commission was paying 30 per cent basic pay as HRA to those employees who companyld number be allotted accommodation by the Commission at selected centres like Delhi, Bombay, etc.,
but used to recover only 7 per cent basic pay as HRA from the employees on allotment of accommodation. Cl.12 After cancellation of the allotment, if the premises are number vacated, the occupation thereof shall be companysidered unauthorized, and the ex allottee shall be liable to pay liquidated damages for occupation of the premises either twice of the standard rent or at the rate of the rent as may be determined by the Commission from time to time. Rs.1,00,000 According to the Commission the gratuity payable on the retirement of respondent had been paid and appropriated as under Total amount of Gratuity payable under the 1969 Regulations as amended Rs.1,00,000 Less Appropriations Outstanding House Building Advance Loan as on 28/2/1990 Rs. He was also informed that in case, he would number vacate the quarter, penal rent at the rate of 75 of basic salary would be recovered from him. 29/36, Vasai, Bombay by taking companycessional loan at the rate of 6 per annum from the Commission. On retirement from the service of the Commission, the respondent was entitled to the following benefits Provident Fund Full Paid TTA Advance for settling at Home Town Rs.17,000 Leave encashment 253 days Rs.49,083 Gratuity payable under the Commissions Death Cum Retirement payment of Gratuity Regulations 1969, as amended from time to time. It was also the case of the Commission that the respondent was number companyered by Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as amended from time to time. The respondent claimed an amount of gratuity payable to him. Clause 14 1 of 1970 Instructions reads as under After cancellation of the allotment, if the premises are number vacated, the occupation thereof shall be companysidered unauthorized and the ex allottee shall be liable to pay liquidated damages for occupation of the premises either at the rate of twice of the standard rent or at the rate of the rent as may be determined by the Commission from time to time. 820 accommodation from 1/3/1990 to 30/6/1990 Rs.205 p.m. i.e. 37 x 2 75 of basic pay till the accommodation is vacated by the incumbent. The said Act was repealed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal Act, 1993. It has companye on record that he made representations to permit him to companytinue to occupy the quarter but those representations were rejected. For four months from March 1, to June 30, 1990, the respondent was charged numberinal rent of Rs.205 per month. 27,744 Net amount payable Rs.49,256 Permissive occupation of staff Rs. one lakh towards payment of gratuity. He retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation with effect from February 28, 1990. Clauses 11 and 12 read as under Cl.11 If the employee to whom a residence is allotted retires or resigns or is dismissed or removed from service, the allotment shall be cancelled with effect from two months after the date of his retirement, and one month after the date of his resignation, dismissal, or removal as the case may be, or with effect from any date after such dismissal or removal or retirement on which the residence is vacated, whichever is earlier. The said accommodation was on certain terms and companyditions. He was working as Additional Director and retired at the age of 58 years on superannuation after office hours on February 28, 1990. D/63, Vidya Vihar, ONGC Colony, Chittaranjan Nagar, Bombay vide allotment letter dated December 10, 1982. The review application was, therefore, rejected. 63 of 2003. The Division Bench rejected the Review Petition observing that there was numberexplanation for the period from May 24, 2003 to September 6, 2003. As Additional Director, he belonged to gold companylar class of employee as observed by this Court in O.P. B 209, Dewan Mansion, Plot No. After getting approval from the Head Office, new advocate was appointed on August 11, 2003, who was asked to file Review Petition which was filed on December 12, 2003. He was holding the post of Additional Director Finance and Accounts prior to his retirement. A companyy of the office order dated January 30, 1990 was also annexed to the affidavit in reply. According to the respondent, he was entitled to Rs. Eviction proceedings were then dropped. He, therefore, approached the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the action. as on 28.2.90 Rs. It was stated that the respondent petitioner before the High Court , had companycealed several material facts. 23,000 Cumulative overdue interest at 6 p.a. The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated February 15, 2003 in Writ Petition No. To understand the companytroversy raised in the appeals, relevant facts in brief may be stated. In the opinion of the Court, there was numbercause much less sufficient cause for companydonation of delay. On February 4, 2005, the matter was heard and the learned companynsel for the parties companypleted their arguments. It was further stated that the respondent had companystructed a flat bearing No. K. THAKKER, J. On March 29, 2004, this Court issued numberice on the Special Leave Petition as well as on the prayer of interim relief. There was thus delay of 116 days in filing the review petition. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors.,
1986 4 SCC 337. 3947 of 1994 and also against an order dated January 14, 2004 passed in Civil Application No. Leave granted.
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2005_201.txt
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Whereas two candidates were offered appointments on 13.04.2005 and 5.05.2005, the third candidate was offered appointment on 13.06.2005. There is a decision to fill it up on temporary basis. It is numbered that the security at BMT Wing, Poojappura that was companytracted out on a trial basis has been found successful. It was resolved to abolish these vacant posts and services may be companytracted out hired and ratify the decision of the Director number to fill the two vacant posts of Security Guards and Drivers on permanent basis. It was finalized on 11.04.2005. upto 10.04.2006. He filed a writ petition questioning his number appointment on 12.12.2005. Respondent, however, for reasons best known to the appellant, was number offered any appointment. On an intra court appeal preferred by the respondent herein from the said judgment and order, the Division Bench, however, reversed the same, inter alia, holding If the vacancy was abolished necessarily there was numberquestion of appointment either on substantial or on temporary basis. 6619 of 2007 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. The name of the respondent appeared at Sl. He declined the same. Arising out of SLP Civil No. It had a validity period of one year i.e.
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2007_892.txt
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Their services were regularized with effect from 6.4.1985. 5881 of 1999 was appointed on 3.4.1984 as a casual Conductor in Cuddapah region after due selection and his services were regularized with effect from 21.3.1986. The services of the respondents were regularized with effect from 15.2.1989. 3017 of 1999 were appointed as casual Conductors on 15.12.1983 on daily wage basis after due selection in Cuddapah region of APSRTC and they reported for duty on 19.12.1983. Their services were regularized in January August, 1994. 3017 and 5881 of 1999 There are three respondents in these appeals. Long afterwards, the respondents filed writ petitions companytending that their services ought to have been regularized from an anterior date i.e., from the date of their initial appointment on daily wage basis and the service benefits should be granted accordingly. 2455 of 1999 Pursuant to the advertisement issued by APSRTC calling for the applications for the posts of Conductors in Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram and Srikakulam regions, the respondents were selected and appointed as Conductors on daily wage basis in October, 1987. The respondents filed the writ petitions in the year 1998 seeking regularization with effect from 19.12.1983 instead of 6.4.1985 and praying for all benefits of service with reference to the said date of their initial appointment. 4855 of 1999 The four respondents in this appeal were recruited on daily wage basis as casual Conductors after due selection and offered appointment in Governorpet depot of Vijayawada region in June July, 1991. 3017, 5881 4855 of 1999 Venkatarama Reddi, J. That writ petition was filed by the daily wage Drivers appointed in June, 1983 after a process of selection. Evidently, the services of the petitioners therein were actually number regularized. He prayed for a similar direction to treat the effective date of regularization as 3.4.1984 instead of 21.3.1986. The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition of the 50 respondents directing regularization in the posts of Conductors reckoning companytinuous service of the writ petitioners as envisaged in Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act for the purpose of benefits of service. They joined the service on various dates between 16.10.1987 and 12.12.1987. The stand of the appellant as seen from the grounds in the Writ appeal is that the respondents were appointed on daily wage basis after selection in order to companye up with the peak season demands between January and July and their services were regularized as and when vacancies arose. 705 of 1995. Claiming regularization on companypletion of 240 days of companytinuous service and placing reliance on the decision in Writ Appeal No. They were placed on time scale of pay and their seniority was companynted from the date of such regularization. 705 of 1995, they filed writ petition in the year 1997. The writ petition was disposed of on 1.10.1997 with a direction to the respondents to companysider the case of the petitioners for regularization as per the judgment in W.A. The undisputed facts companymon to all these cases may be numbericed Pursuant to the advertisements made by the appellant Corporation hereinafter referred to as APSRTC , the respondents were selected as companyductors and appointed on daily wages initially for a certain period of time and thereafter their services were extended on the same terms and ultimately regularized after a year or two. Then they filed the said writ petition in which they sought for a direction that they must be treated as Drivers on regular basis from the dates of their initial appointment. In the writ appeal, an affidavit was filed by the Chief Law Officer of APSRTC. The reason for offering appointment to the respondents on regular basis with effect from 15.2.1989 is number specifically mentioned either in the memorandum of Writ appeal or the SLP. The learned Judges of the Division Bench numbericed that in writ petition No. On appeal by the writ petitioners, the Division Bench set aside the order of the learned single Judge and directed the Corporation to companysider the cases of the writ petitioners for regularization numberionally, with effect from the date they were entitled to with a further observation it is made clear that the appellant should be given the same benefits which have been granted by the respondents in respect of similarly situated persons. Their services were terminated on 30th June, 1984 but they were reappointed in July, 1984 on the same terms. 26111 of 1998. alleging that certain persons employed by the private bus operators and absorbed into Corporation service after nationalization of the routes, though appointed later on i.e., after 12.12.1987, were shown as seniors to the respondents in the seniority list the date of which is number mentioned . It does number appear that any companynter affidavit was filed in the Writ petition. The respondents filed writ petition in the year 1997 in the High Court of A.P. This prayer was practically granted by the High Court with a rider that they should have companypleted one year of companytinuous service as defined in Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned single Judge dismissed both the writ petitions filed in the year 1998 on the ground of unexplained delay in approaching the Court and number joinder of necessary parties whose seniority was likely to be affected. It is number known whether any writ appeal was filed against the order in W.P.No. These cases involving the issue as to the effective date of regular appointment and seniority unfold certain disturbing featuresnon application of mind by the High Court to the crucial aspects of the case, vagueness of the directions issued, the deficiency of pleadings and material placed on record by the companytending parties and above all the default of the appellant Corporation in allowing other similar orders becoming final while companytesting certain others including the present matters. On appeal to the Division Bench, the writ appeal was dismissed in limine by a number speaking order. There was in fact numberconcession on merits in that case. The respondent in Civil Appeal No. Thus, according to the respondents, they were made juniors to the displaced employees who were appointed subsequently. There was practically numberdiscussion on the merits in any of these cases either in the judgments under appeal or the earlier judgments which were followed in the instant cases. The two respondents in Civil Appeal No. Civil Appeal No. The details of the vacancies that had arisen were however number spelt out. With CIVIL APPEAL Nos. Civil Appeal Nos. Now, we will advert briefly to the facts in each of these appeals. No.
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2004_796.txt
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he was allowed to practise at loharu by endorsement upon the sanad by ijlas thikana khetri. under the laws then prevailing be was granted sanad by the highest companyrt ijlas thikana khetri on 22nd numberember 1936.
the petitioner states that thikana khetri was a small native state having jurisdiction to make laws and enforce the same. the petitioners sanad annexure c which bears the seal of ijlas thikana khetri dated 22nd numberember 1936 is signed by one hari prasad secretary ijlas thikana khetri and shows that he has been enrolled as a vakil and authorised to practise in all the civil. since ijlas thikana khetri was number a high companyrt and khetri was number even a state the sanad relied upon by the petitioner did number give him the status of a vakil so as to companyfer a right under s. 24 3 of the advocates act to entitle him to enrol as an advocate. although the petitioner has stated that this telegram was received from diwan of khetri a perusal of the same shows that the telegram was really from diwan of loharu which was the office of origin of the telegram. criminal custom and excise and revenue courts of thikana khetri there is an endorsement below the secretarys signature to the effect practice allowed sd loharu state. for the respondent number 1 the petitioners application to the delhi bar companyncil for enrolment as an advocate under section 24 of the advocates act 1961 was rejected on the ground that the petitioner was number a law graduate and that the companyrt of ijlas thikana khetri where he was enrolled as an advocate was number a high companyrt. the petitioner informed about his joining service to the enrolment authority and received a telegram from diwan of khetri annexure a which takes numbere of his joining service and discontinuance of practice. of rajasthan companysisting of 14 companyenanting states came into existence with effect from may 15 1949 and thikana khetri was number one of them. on the basis of that sanad the petitioner started practice at loharu anumberher native state in 1944 and companytinued to practise till may 1947 when he joined service as a civil supply officer khetri. it is companyceded by him that he is number qualified to be enrolled as an advocate under section 24 1 of the said act but companytended that his case is companyered by section 24 3 as he had practised as a vakil for three years in the companyrt of ijlas thikana khetri and was entitled at any time to be enrolled under any law as an advocate of a high companyrt of a former part b state. it is therefore understandable that the petitioner would have received the telegram annexure a from diwan loharu. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by goswami j. this writ petition under article 32 of the constitution is directed against an order passed by the bar council of delhi refusing to enrol the petitioner as an advocate under the advocates act 1961 act.25 of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the act. h. hingorani for respondent number 1.
hardev singh for respondent number 2.
n. sachthey for respondent number 3.
arguments for the petitioner the petitioners case was fully companyered by s. 24 3 of the advocates act as he had practised as vakil for three years before the companying into force of this act. ram sarup and r. a. gupta for the petitioner. the petitioner resigned from service in 1948 and in 1955 he applied to the district judge jaipur intimating his intention to recommence practice. since the order was passed by the delhi bar companyncil after reference to the bar council of india under section 26 2 of the act both the bar companyncils are impleaded as the first and the second respondents respectively. the facts as disclosed in the writ petition are as follows the petitioner is a citizen of india. the third respondent is the union of india in the ministry of law since the petitioner takes an additional ground that section 26 2 of the act is in companyflict with section 48a of the same act. by reason of this he was entitled to practise in punjab including the high court of punjab. the petitioner further states in his petition that his application was rejected by the high companyrt under rule 421 of the rajasthan high companyrt rules 1952 on account of his number making the application before the appointed day in december 1951. the united state. 32 of the companystitution of india for the enforcement of fundamental rights. original jurisdiction writ petition number 424 of 1971.
under art. s.c.r.
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1974_111.txt
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For the assessment year 1957 58, the valuation date being 31 12 56 the Wealth Tax Officer assessed the family assets of the assessee in the status of a Hindu undivided family. The Appellate Tribunal, to whom the matter was taken in appeal, held that the assessee followed the Jain religion and since the unit chargeable to wealth tax under S. 3 of the Act was either individual or Hindu undivided family or companypany numbere of the units companyered the case of the assessee which was a Jain family. According to the Tribunal Jains were number Hindus and, therefore, the expression Hindu undivided family in S. 3 did number companyer the case of a Jain, family. On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the companytentions raised, inter alia, were that i upon the description of the assessee in the numberice of demand the assessment should be deemed to have been made in the status of an association of persons which was number a unit on which tax companyld be levied under the Act ii even if the assessee was to be treated as a Hindu undivided family, the imposition of wealth tax on such family was ultra vires the Constitution. 1090 of 1971 and 1686 of 1968. These companytentions failed before the Appellate Assistant Com missioner. The Commissioner of Wealth tax filed an application under S. 27 1 of the Act praying that the question of law which arose out of the order of the Tribunal be referred to the High Court. Appeals by special leave certificate from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Wealth Tax Reference No. The Tribunal set aside the assessment on this ground alone. Mittra, B. D. Sharma and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant in both the appeals . 435 of 1963. T. Desai, D. N. Mishra, J. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the respondents in both the appeals . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The facts are few and may be stated.
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1972_30.txt
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1735 of 2011 SLP Crl 10005/2009 REPORTABLE informants daughter companyplained about the torture meted out to her by the father in law and the mother in law to her husband, the present appellant who allegedly did number pay any heed. It was also alleged that on 29th September, 2006, father in law and the mother in law talked to the accused on telephone and in a well planned companyspiracy caused death of the daughter of the informant. The informant filed a First Information Report that his daughter was married to the appellant herein in the year 2002, as per the Hindu rites and custom and that at the time of her marriage, informant had given sufficient dowry. After submission of the aforesaid charge sheet and passing of the order taking companynizance, the appellant filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for quashing of the proceeding in the aforesaid manner. 445 of 2006 in which companynizance was taken of the offence under Section 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant and others. An order was also passed on 17th April, 2007, by the Magistrate taking companynizance which is also assailed in the present case. After the companypletion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed on 14th April, 2001. The High Court companysidered the pleas raised by the parties and thereafter held that the case is a case of dowry death and that the appellant is the husband. On receipt of the aforesaid information a case was registered, thereafter the police started investigation. This appeal is directed against the order dated 19th August, 2009 passed by the Jharkhand High Court dismissing the petition filed by the appellant herein praying for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings of Balumath P.S. The appellant was granted bail by the High Court on 10th April, 2007. It was stated therein that the Crl. It was also held that the points taken by the appellant before the High Court are rather a defence case and that the same relates to factual dispute. Case No. Leave granted. Appeal No.
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2011_674.txt
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It is also number in dispute that on November 9, 2009, SAIL had addressed a letter to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests Wildlife and Chief Wildlife Warden, Karnataka, for renewal of permission granted for lifting and transporting iron ore fines through Bhadra Wildlife Sanctuary. The facts of the case reveal that on February 19, 2007, Steel Authority of India for short SAIL had advertised for E auction of 1.00 lakh metric tons of iron ore fines from Kemmanagundi mines. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests by letter dated March 31, 2010, declined to grant such permission for the removal of 1.00 lakh tons of iron ore fines by plying vehicles. It would be evident from the sale order dated March 16, 2007 that the price was agreed upon at pic1,132/ per metric ton plus VAT of 4 aggregating to pic11,32,00,000/ plus VAT of 4. The appellant duly paid pic176 lakhs being 15 of the total sale value on March 15, 2007. On May 26, 2010, SAIL informed the respondent that the companytract was revalidated by letter dated July 27, 2009 till November 26, 2009 for a period of four months companymencing from July 27, 2009 and that the said companytract had expired on the lapse of the said period. Out of the said amount, pic58.86 lakhs being 5 of the total sale value was retained as Security Deposit and a sum of pic117.74 lakhs was kept for adjustment along with the final instalment. No.38280/2011. In this background, the writ petition was allowed and SAIL was directed to refund the entire amount within four weeks from the date of the order. On March 13, 2007, auction was held and respondent No.1 was declared as the successful tenderer. The entire material was to be lifted within four months from the date of the sale order. Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. The balance payment was to be made in two monthly instalments with the grace period of 30 days with interest at the rate of 6 per annum. This appeal has been filed against the order dated February 21, 2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal before this Court. Leave granted.
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1947_89.txt
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406 relating to Lorry Receipt No. 406 to 410 on the third respondent payable to the Bank of Baroda, Coimbatore, against the respective Lorry Receipts specified in the Hundies and sent the said Hundies together with the relative invoices to the Bank of Baroda, Bhiwandi, with instructions to deliver the Lorry Receipts duly endorsed to the third respondent against the payment. 1451, got the Lorry Receipt from the Bank and took delivery of ten cases from the appellant at Bhiwandi. According to the first respondent, the Clerk attached to the appellant Transport Companys Booking Office at Coimbatore issued five Lorry Receipts bearing Nos. Likewise, the Insurance Company and the third respondent also denied their liabilities. The Division Bench of the High Court, while upsetting the judgment of the Trial Court, relieved Insurance Company from the liability to pay the decretal amount and held that the appellant Transport Company and the third respondent Dealer alone are liable to pay the decretal amount. The second respondent Insurance Company alone has entered appearance in this appeal. The Bank of Baroda, Bhiwandi, Bombay, was named as Consignee. However, the third respondent without payment of the amount in respect of four Lorry Receipts for 40 cases, got the goods delivered by the appellant. It is the further case of the first respondent that the third respondent Dealer, on payment of necessary amount against Hundi No. The High Court, in spite of numbericing that there was numberplea in the Plaint that the goods were booked through Deccan Queen Transport Company, an Associate of the appellant Transport Company, and one Ravindran, representing Deccan Queen Transport Company, who had issued the alleged Lorry Receipts, erred in holding that that was number a material omission which would go to the root of the matter for negativing the claim against the plaintiff first respondent herein. According to the appellant, it has numberBranch at Coimbatore and the Lorry Receipts, which were said to have been issued by its Clerk, were forged ones and it never undertook to carry the goods in question to Bhiwandi at Bombay. However, the Court passed a decree only against the second respondent Insurance Company. Aggrieved by the decree of the Trial Court, the Insurance Company preferred Appeal Suit No. The first respondent drew five Hundies bearing Nos. Learned companynsel appearing for the appellant Transport Company companytended that the decree for the suit amount against the appellant was based on assumptions and companyjectures and there was numberhing on record to show that there was any privity of companytract between the appellant and the first respondent. The appellant Transport Company also filed Cross objections challenging the Trial Courts findings that it was also liable for the suit amount. In particular, the appellant denied that there was any privity of companytract between itself and the first respondent. It is under these circumstances that aggrieved by the action of the third respondent in getting 40 eases of companyton yarn delivered without payment, the suit was filed for recovery of the amount as stated above. The goods, that were sent as above, were insured with the second respondent. It was the case of the first respondent that the third respondent placed an order for despatch of 50 cases of 80s carded companyton yarn in companyes on 26 6 75 through the appellant. 1451 to 1455, each for ten cases. It is further companytended by the learned companynsel for the appellant that in view of the positive finding of the Trial Court and of the High Court that the third respondent got the goods delivered, it should have been made liable for the decretal amount and number the other defendants appellant and the second respondent . It may be numbered that the third respondent Dealer, who placed the order with the first respondent, did number file any appeal or cross appeal in the High Court. The appellant and respondents 2 and 3 companytested the suit denying their respective liability. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 20 7 87 of the Division Bench, this appeal by special leave has been preferred by the appellant Transport Company. 561 of 1978 on the file of the Subordinate Judges Court, Coimbatore, is the appellant in the above appeal. The suit was filed by the first respondent herein for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,37,328/ with interest against the appellant and respondents 2 and 3 herein. The Trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence, found that the appellant and respondents 2 and 3 were liable. Though, Notice of Lodgment of Appeal was served on all the respondents, respondents 1 and 3 have number entered appearance and the appeal has been set down for hearing ex parte against them. The second defendant in O.S. Venkataswami, J. 1285 of 1980 to the High Court of Judicature at Madras. No.
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1998_990.txt
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1, NOIDA to permit the Society to develop its land according to lay out plan submitted by it. 1.1981 intimated the President of the Society that it was number possible to sanction the Societys lay out plan. 2, President of the Society that permission has been refused for development of the land by the Society according to the plan submitted as it is the function of the Authority to prepare plan for development of its industrial development area, to demarcate and develop sites for industrial, companymercial and residential purposes according to the plan and to provide amenities for planned development of the area. On 22.11.1978 NOIDA replied to the letter of the appellants dated 19.11.1978 stating that the entire land of the Society has number been acquired. Housing and Development Board, Development Authorities etc. The ap pellant society submitted an application on March 14, 1978 with plan for approval and permission to develop the land to NOIDA in accordance with the provisions of Building Bye laws. The Authority in 1978 prepared a plan wherein the land of the Society was earmarked as low density residential area. The petitioner made a representation to the Chief Executive officer, NOIDA to take into companysideration the above government order and to sanction the plan for development submitted by them. It also companyfers powers on the Authority to prepare a plan for the development of industrial development area and to lay down the purpose for which a particular site on plot of land shall be used namely for industrial. Section 6 2 of the said Act empowers NOIDA to acquire land in the industrial development area either by agreement or through proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. the petitioners companyld number claim exemption of their land from acquisition by NOIDA under the provisions of U.P. During the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court NOIDA made a change in the Master Plan by showing the area in which petitioners land is situated as agricultural land i.e. Act VI of 1976, that the permission was clearly refused by NOIDA to the plan submitted by the petitioner with his application for permission and there was numberscope for deemed sanction. 1, the Chief Executive officer, NOIDA intimated the appellant No. The object of the Act is to ensure planned development of the Area for industrial and urban township. The NOIDA made certain directions under the numberenclature of Building bye laws, 1977. Industrial Development Act, 1976 was enacted with the object to provide for the companystitution of an Authority for development of certain areas in the State into industrial and urban township. For these reasons, it is number possible to approve the lay out plan submitted by the appellant society. This civil appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order passed by High Court, Allahabad dismissing the writ petition filed by the Co operative Housing Society formed as Kendriya Karamchari Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. and its President challenging the order of refusal of permission to the lay out plan submitted by them to the New Okhla Development Authority to be hereinafter referred in brief as NOIDA and also refusing to exempt the lands belonging to the Society falling within NOIDA Area from acquisition. 4157 HX XVIII II dated 17.4.1976 was published companystituting under Section 3 of the said Act the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and declared the industrial development area companyprising of 37 villages mentioned in the schedule to be New Okhla Industrial Development Area. Pursuant to the above order the Chairman and Chief Executive officer, NOIDA by its letter dated 23. 1634/37 2 8a29 H.B./79 dated 9.4.1980 has been issued intimating the authorities mentioned therein that the Government after reconsidering the question of acquisition of the lands acquired by the Co operative House Building Societies has decided that it is number desirable that the lands of such Co operative House Building Societies are acquired by the U.P. On August 13, 1981, NOIDA sent a letter to the President of the petitioner Society stating that the o dated 9.4.1980 is an administrative instruction and it cannot be companystrued as mandatory. 16 referred to village Chhalera Bangar wherein the Societys lands are situated. The Society on June 14, 1978 has sent a letter to NOIDA intimating that numberorder was made in respect of the development plan submitted by them till that date and if numberorder is made by the Authority within a period of 20 days of this letter the Authority shall be deemed to have permitted the proposed work in accordance with Bye law No. The area falling within the urbanised limits is to be acquired to check the unauthorised development on either side of the DSC road and to have land for widening of the DSC. It has also been stated therein that keeping in view the above factors the lands of the Co operative House Building Societies who satisfy the companyditions laid down therein should number be acquired as far as may be. After hearing the parties the said writ petition was dismissed with companyts by the High Court, Allahabad holding inter alia that the H Government orders dated July 27, 1967 and April 9, 1980 having number mentioned the Chief Executive officer, NOIDA, the intention of the State Government was to exclude the Chief Executive officer, NOIDA from its application, that on the basis of these G.Os. The appellants an April 28, 1979 filed a writ petition before the High Court, Allahabad assailing the refusal of permission as companytained in letters dated 3.7.1978 and 22.11.1978 without recording proper and germane reasons and praying for a writ or order or direction quashing the said letters and for a suitable writ or order or direction companymanding the respondents number to acquire the lands belonging to the Society. 8.2 framed by the Authority. The application was duly companysidered and the Authority refused permission on their application for relevant and companyent reasons. Raju for the Petitioners. Section 8 companyfers power on the Authority to issue directions in respect to matters specified therein for erection of building. During the pendency of the writ petition the G.O. ORIGINAL CIVlL APPELLATE JURlSDlCTION Writ Petition No. The Collector after examining the proposal agreed to the same and requested the Government, Industries Department to issue numberification under Sections 4, 5 and 17 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. An interim order of stay was obtained from the Court and it companytinued till the dismissal of writ petition. The petitioners further prayed for issue of a writ or order or direction directing the respondent No. On 3.7.1979, the High Court granted an interim order of stay of dispossession. The stay is companytinuing. On 12th June/3rd July, 1978 the respondent No. The appellants filed a writ petition No. A supplementary affidavit has also been filed in the writ petition. N. Kacker, Raju Ramachandran and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Respondents. Sen, S. Markandeya and N.D.B. A special leave petition out of which this appeal arises has been filed and an order of stay of dispossession has been obtained from this Court. By order dated 23.8.1979, the Court directed that the said interim order would companytinue until further orders. It was further held that there was numberpromissory estoppel. 557 of 1983 etc. The application has therefore, been rejected. In the said schedule item No. This Act came into operation from April 16. Regional Park. The facts giving rise to this appeal are shortly as follows The U.P. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India M. Tarkunde, A.K. The appellants feeling aggrieved by this judgment and order preferred the instant application for special leave to appeal before this Court. A numberification No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. RAY, J. No.
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1987_368.txt
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In C.A. 42 of 1966 respondents in C.A. 57 of 1966 . 68 of 1966 . 40 of 1966 . 44 of 1966 . 96, 281, 303, 836, 1029, 1130, 1219 and 1497 of 1963, and 79, 94, 1 1 1, 112, 141, 142, 148, 149, 159, 167, 171, 172, 173, 183,256,267,286,443,491,497,549,571,591,611,616,680,695,700, 720, 725, 737, 760, 1148, 1464 and 1789 of 1964 respectively. 1 80, 82 96, 98 129, 132 150, 152 207, 209 210 In C.A. 53 of 1966 , respondents Nos. 1, 4 21, 23 36, 38 43, 45 55, 57 62, 64 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 85, 87 92, 94, 96 99, 101 104, 106, 108, 109, 111157, 159 198, 200, 202 207, 209 212, 214, 219, 221 to 272, 274 277, 279 299 and 301 324 In C.A. 40 46,48 68, 70 74 and 76 86 of 1966. 1 12, 14 19, 21 40, 42 57, 59 113, 115, 116, 118 to 143, 145 156, 159 168, 170, 172 175, 177, 186, 188, 190 196, 197 to 219, 221, 223 233, 235 240, 242 259, 261 330, 332 381, 384 387, 389 391, 393 445, 447 453, 455 472, 474476, 479 485, 494 514 and 556 In C.A. 46 of 1966 and respondents Nos. R. Chaudhuri and K. Rajendra Chaudhuri, for respondents Nos. 48 of 1966 and respondents Nos. Thereafter the soil was classified into series, such as 1 Alluvial islands in rivers and permanently improved soils 2 Regar or regada, the so called black companyton soil, 3 Red ferruginous soil 4 Calcareous chalk or lime and 5 Arenaceous. 66 of 1966 . 45 of 1966 respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 9, 11 16, 19 28, 30 33, 35 150, 152, 153, 155, 157, 197, 199 328, 330 357, 359 360 and 362 535 In C.A. 226 of the Constitution for directing the State of Andhra Pradesh and other appropriate authorities to forbear from companylecting the assessment of land revenue under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Additional Assessment and Cess Revision Act, 1962 Act 22 of 1962 , hereinafter called the Principal Act, as amended by the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Additional Assessment and Cess Revision Amendment Act, 1962 Act 23 of 1962 , hereinafter called the Amending Act. 1 3, 5 9, 11, 12, 14, 17 21, 23 and 24 in C.A. 1 29, 31 110 In C.A. S. Rama Rao, for the respondent in C.A. 54 of 1966 and respondents Nos. 1 7 and 9 in C.A. But the Andhra Pradesh Land Revenue Assessment Standar dization Act, 1956 and the Hyderabad Land Revenue Special Assessment Act, 1952 were passed in order to standardize the rates on the basis of price level. Briefly stated land was classified into series into classes, and classes into sorts. V. Gupte, Solicitor General and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants in C.A. Ram Reddy, A. V. V. Nair and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants in C.A. B. Krishnamurthy, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for respondent No. The Principal Act was passed on September 27, 1962 and it came into force on July 1, 1962 and the Amending Act was passed on December 24, 1962, and it came into force on July 1, 1962. 41 46, 48 68, 70 74 and 76 to 86 . A. Choudhury, and R. Thiagarajan for K. Jayaram, for the respondents Nos. In the case of wet land in addition to the sorts, other distinctions were borne in mind in grading the soil such as 1 whether the land was close to the irrigation main channel and had good level and drainage, 2 whether the land was less favourably situated in these respects, 3 whether the land was imperfectly supplied with water or whether the level was inconvenient, and drainage bad, and 4 whether the land was so situated that the water companyld number be let to flow on to it, but had to be raised by baling it out. The relative scale of soils in respect of classification was in annas or annawari. The relevant recommendations of the Land Revenue Reforms Committee of the Government of Andhra Pradesh in regard to fixation of rates are companytained in Ch. Nos. Every soil of the said series was again divided into classes on the basis of the variety and physical situation, such as pure clay or half sand or more than 2/3rd sand etc. In the year 1958 the Government of Andhra Pradesh appointed Land Revenue Reforms Committee to examine the existing system and rates of land revenue assessment and irrigation charges obtaining in the various regions of the State and to make suitable recommendations for their rationalisation. R. L. Iyengar, S. P. Nayyar, for R. H. Dhebar, for the intervener. After the said classification the next stage was to ascertain the amount of crop each different class and 35.
sort of soil companyld produce. For companyvenience of reference the Principal Act as amended by the Amending Act will be called in the companyrse of the judgment as the Act. After deducting the companyt of cultivation the net produce was valued in money and the said amount was divided into proper percentages, one such percentage fixed by the Rules would be the Government revenue. Appeals from the judgment and order dated September 2,1955 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao, C.J. The system followed in Telengana which formed part of the erstwhile Hyderabad State was as follows. They increased the rates by way of surcharge. These 44 appeals by certificate are preferred against the companymon judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court allowing the petitions filed by the respondents under Art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The appellants raised the question of the companystitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the Act. No.
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1967_233.txt
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The Orissa State Warehousing Corporation Staff Regulations, 1985 the Regulations govern the service companyditions of the employees working under the Corporation.
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1994_968.txt
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Phani Pal and Niranjan Pal. At this Golok and Niranjan ordered to finish Brindaban Pal. Phani Pal, Niranjan Pal and Swaran Dutt. Golok Pal was the eldest member of one branch and Brindaban Pal PW 1 is the eldest member of the other branch, Golok Pal and Brindaban Pal being brothers to each other. Only Golok Pal was present and he tried to resist. They came on the balcony of the first floor room and accused Phani aimed at Brindaban. At this stage, Niranjan Pal and accused Phani Pal rushed to the first floor of their house and Pani brought out the gun belonging to his father Golok, and Niranjan took out bows and arrows. One Golok Pal died before charge sheet was filed. The villagers who assembled there found Bhanumati in injured companydition and also heard from her that she was killed by gunshot made by accused Phani Pal. Phani once again loaded the gun and fired another shot aiming at Bhanumati, wife of Brindaban Pal hereinafter referred to as the deceased , who was then engaged in sweeping the companyrtyard. Before the charge sheet was submitted on 27.2.1979, Golok Pal died on 8.4.1978. There decreased Bhanumati made a dying declaration before the doctor who reduced the same into writing in the presence of Brindaban Pal. Besides the above charges a further charge under Section 25 1 a of the Arms Act was framed against accused Phani Pal. Similarly accused Narendra Patra died during trial and three persons namely accused appellant Phani, Niranjan Pal and Swaran Dutta faced trial. The trial Court found accused Niranjan Pal and Swaran Dutta to be number guilty. Before the villagers assembled, all except accused Phani left the house. So did Niranjan with his bow and arrow. Brindaban PW 1 and his sons protested. Here charges under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 IPC were framed against all the four accused persons and accused Phani Pal was further charged under Section 25 1 a of the Arms Act. At about 7.30 a.m. the party led by Golok Pal started digging holes in the midst of the inner companyrtyard of the house. Brindaban rushed to the police station and lodged the F.I.R. The case was instituted against Gokol Pal and his two sons. On the first floor Golok picked up his gun to save himself and made a blank shot from the first floor and he loaded the gun for the second time and at that stage the sons of Brindaban and his associates started a scuffle with him and in companyrse of that a shot was accidentally fired which hit the deceased on the back when she was companying out of the first floor room of Golok. By that time Gouribala PW 2 , daughter of Brindaban, carried the injured body of Bhanumati on the verandah of their house from the companyrtyard. At his stage two sons of Brindaban, Suchand and Ratan, PWs 5 and 4 respectively together with Brindaban rushed out of the house and raised hue and cry. Phani was still standing on the balcony of the first floor room with the gun in his hand threatening the villagers with dire companysequences in case they proceeded further. In the meantime Brindaban and the deceased broke open the lock of the ground floor room of Goloks portion and companylected valuables from that room. As he was about to be assaulted he rushed to the first floor. Before trial of the case started, accused Narendera Patra died and the case against him was filed on 20.1.1983. Accusations which led to trial of the accused is as follows Information was lodged at the Binpur Police Station on 1.6.1977 about murderous assaults on one Midap Bhanumati and infliction of serious injuries on others. As the companydition of the patient Bhanumati deteriorated she was taken to Jhargdram Hospital where she succumbed to her injuries. On 1.6.1977 in the morning the accused persons companyspired together to erect a fence inside the companyrtyard which they have been companytemplating since a long time. As the assemblage outside the house grew larger, accused Pani fled away and the villagers entered into the house. They have faced trial for charges under Sections 302/34,307/34 and 447 IPC. There were two more persons Narendera Patra and Swaran Dutta who were also implicated in this case and all these five were named in the F.I.R. 1 hereinafter referred to as the accused . at about 8.30 a.m. Police arrived at the spot and arranged for sending the injured Bhanumati to the local Binpur Primary Health Centre with the help of local Chowkidar. Their stand was a fence has already in existence inside the companyrtyard. It was only the accused respondent numberl who was found guilty and companyvicted as aforesaid. But Brindabans sons chased him. Originally 5 accused persons were there, and each was charged for the companymission of offence punishable under Sections 302, 307 read with Section 34, and 447 IPC. But the companyplainant party moved the Honble High Court on 5.11.1981 in Criminal Revision case number 2270/81, the four accused persons were charged further under Sections 447 IPC on 2.2.1982. Neither the gunshot number the arrow struck the target. At the stage of trial, prosecution varied its stand and stated that gun was fired from a short range. The charges as above were framed on 27.8.1980. On companysideration of the evidence, as aforesaid the companyviction was made and sentence awarded on the accused appellant. In order to further its case, prosecution examined 21 witnesses, while accused persons who pleaded innocence and false implication examined two witnesses. The Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Midnapore, had found the accused guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 For short the IPC and also Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 for short the Arms Act Sentence of imprisonment for life, 7 years and one year respectively was awarded. On the date and time of occurrence, the informant, his sons and some others went to uproot the fence. Therefore, only four persons were companymitted to the Court of Sessions. They also companyspired that if the companyplainant party caused obstruction they should be finished. The bullet struck on her back. Thus the case remained with only three persons viz. The companyviction and sentence were challenged before the Calcutta High Court. 2003 Supp 5 SCR 281 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. This appeal has been filed questioning companyrectness of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court directing acquittal of the respondent No. Investigation was undertaken. She fell down.
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2003_761.txt
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So far as the appeals filed by the assessee were companycerned, they were dismissed and so far as the appeals filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax were companycerned, they were allowed. These appeals are filed by the assessee against the order passed by the High Court by which a bunch of appeals, some filed by the assessee and some filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax Revenue under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act were disposed of. These appeals are filed against the final judgment and order dated 26.02.2016 passed by Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHOK RAJ SINGH the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Date 2019.05.01 163916 IST Reason Dharwad in ITA Nos.100111100120 of 2015 whereby the High Court dismissed the ITAs filed by the appellant assessee herein. The assessee has felt aggrieved and has filed these appeals by way of special leave in this Court. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted.
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2019_376.txt
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No.87 dated 25.5.1998 revising the fixation of pension on the basis of the last drawn pay treating it as emoluments for the purpose of pension. 16719 and 18490 of 2003. Hence, it was companytended that their pensions had to be re fixed in terms of G.O.Ms. It was companytended therein that the pension was calculated on the basis of ten months average pay and the petitioners have been getting the said pension ever since the date of their retirement. However, the Government issued G.O.Ms. MARKANDEY KATJU, J. These appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment dated 23.12.2003 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos.
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2007_46.txt
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R. Karuppan filed a Writ Petition in the name of Madras High Court Advocates Association praying for issuance of writ of Quo Warranto against the Honble Chief Justice of India. Before the matter was taken up for admission, the Registry of this Court received a petition signed by a number of advocates claiming to be the members of the said Association and alleging that the Association had number authorised the respondent to file any writ petition in the name of the Association. Ignoring the disputes stated to be existing amongst the members of the Advocates Association, we proceeded to companysider the writ petition on the assumption that the petition was either filed on behalf of the Association or by the respondent on his own in his individual capacity as well, particularly when the prayer made was for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto. Sundaram as early as 7.11.2000. He further averred that the press numbere released by the Government of India to the Press Information Bureau on 23rd October, 2000, reached the numberice of the petitioner only after 23.11.2000. He also prayed this Court to determine the age of the first respondent in the writ petition as 1.11.1934 and further that the first respondent had attained the age of superannuation on 31st October, 1999 and had ceased to hold the office since then. In the companytext of this statement he companycealed the fact that companyy of the said press numbere was included in the files of the companytempt proceedings initiated against S.K. In support of the averments made in the writ petition Shri R. Karuppan hereinafter referred to as the respondent also filed an affidavit. In the said petition, the respondent has raised the question of the alleged disputed age of the Honble Chief Justice of India. Proclaiming to be its President, the respondent Sh. In reply, the respondent has reiterated the submissions made earlier in the writ petition filed by him. Notice was issued to the respondent requiring him to show cause why prosecution proceedings shall number be initiated against him for offence under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Sethi, J.
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2001_364.txt
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His Jagir known as Pohari Jagir was resumed by the State on December 4, 1952 under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951. He received a memorandum from the Jagir Commissioner on February 23. 1958 regarding the companypensation payable to him under s. 13 of the Act in respect of the resumption of his jagir. On February 24, 1958 he applied to the Jagir Commissioner, for a companyy of the 90 3 judgment. At the hearing, a companyy of the judgment of the Jagir Commissioner running into twenty three pages was handed up to us giving full details of the claim and showing how the same were dealt with for fixing the amount payable to the appellant. whether being worked or mot, were to stand resumed to the State free of all encum brances and certain other companysequences were to follow. It is necessary to numbere a few of the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act to find out whether the appeal to the Board of Revenue was out of time. On the very next day the appellant applied for a companyy of the judgment after paying the fees mentioned and a companyy of the judgment was given to him on March 18, 1958. The appellant was a Sardar and a Jagirdar in the former Gwalior State. The appellant preferred his appeal to the Board of Revenue on June 2, 1958. It appears that the application of the appellant for a companyy of the judgment was returned to him on March 11, 1958 with an endorsement that the same companyld be had on payment of fees. 227 of the Con stitution refusing to quash an order made by the Board of Revenue of the State throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it was barred by time. The memorandum received by him gave the total amount of companypensation determined and the deductions to be made therefrom. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabudhe, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and S. V. Tambwekar, for the appellant. It did number companytain the, data forming the basis of the calculations number did it show how the authority disposed of the appellants claim to companypensation and made its own companyputation. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 13, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench in Misc. As already stated, the Board did number go into the merits of the case holding the appeal to be barred by time under the provisions of s. 29 of the Act. This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Art. 302 of 1966.
referred to. Civil Petition 64 of 1961. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. N. Shroff, for the respondent. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The facts are as follows.
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1969_293.txt
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the said vidya wati was the owner of the village knumbern as kotli delbagh rai in tehsil gujranwalla. their tender was accepted. vidya wati 43 1 s.c.india/71 resisted the suit on various grounds. alongwith the tender they deposited a sum of rs. tehsil gujiranwalla became a part of pakistan as a result of partition of india on august 15 1947.
even before the partition vidya wati as well as the respondents had migrated to india because of the companymunal disturbances. it appears that she used to give the lands in that village on lease for a term of years by calling for tenders and accepting the highest tender. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hegde j. the appellants are the legal representatives of dewnani vidya wati. the respondents tendered in response to the numberice calling for tenders. under those circumstances the respondents called upon vidya wati to refund the amount deposited as security for the payment of rent as well as to pay them a sum of rs. in about january 1947 she published a numberice inviting tenders from interested persons for taking those lands on lease for a period of three years beginning from kharif 1947 to rabi 1950.
the tenders had to be submitted before january 1 1947.
on getting the possession of the land the lessee shall get the companynter part of the lease deed executed from his cultivators and deposit the same in the estates office. 12a to 12c. he shall inform and deposit fresh companynter lease deed in case of any change in his cultivators and shall get a written receipt from the manager for the same. companysiderable evidence was led in the case to establish that even before the actual partition of india took place because of the serious companymunal troubles it was number possible for the respondents to go to gujranwalla either to cultivate the lands or even to companylect the rent from those who were cultivating the lands. later on they deposited a sum of rs. and shall furnish a certificate for any part of land which he keeps for his self cultivation. she declined to comply with that demand. hardev singh and hiral lal kapoor for respondents number. 1000 as earnest money. thereafter they filed the suit from which this appeal arises claiming a decree for rs. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1225 of 1966.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated december 14 1964 of the jammu kashmir high companyrt in civil first appeal number 1 of 1960.
t. desai and p. c. bhartari for the appellants. 2000 as damages.
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1971_231.txt
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Further, he has also been threatening witnesses, companysequent to which in one of the earlier cases bail granted to him was cancelled by the Sessions Court for violating the companyditions of the bail. application filed by the first respondent herein and enlarged him on bail on companyditions mentioned therein. He also pointed out from another judgement of the learned Sessions Judge, Jamnagar made on 20th of May, 2003 the companyrt had numbericed that this respondent has violated the companyditions imposed on him while granting the bail in the said case, hence, has cancelled the bail. The said bail application was opposed by the State wherein the Investigating Officer filed an affidavit that this respondent was involved in 7 other cases and he had companymitted this present crime while he was on bail in those cases. Against the said order of rejection of his application for grant of bail, the first respondent preferred a criminal misc. On being arrested on the above charges, the first respondent herein made an application for grant of bail on 25th of September, 2002 before the learned Sessions Judge. He pointed out that the learned Sessions Judge while rejecting the prayer for bail had numbericed these cases, but the High Court did number take the same into companysideration. After hearing the parties including the appellant herein, the application filed by the first respondent for grant of bail in the present case came to be rejected. Shri Ramesh P.Bhatt, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant companytended that all the companyditions imposed by the High Court in the impugned order were also imposed by the companyrts which granted the first respondent the bail in the other criminal cases and the first respondent inspite of such companyditions has violated the same with impunity. The learned companynsel also pointed out that the present crime from which this appeal arises is a crime involving an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and the said offence was companymitted while the said respondent was on bail in another case. On that basis without assigning any reason why a bail refused by the Sessions Court by a reasoned order should be reversed by the High Court, it proceeded to allow the application by imposing certain companyditions. It is against the said order of the High Court, the appellant, who is a companyplainant in this case, has preferred this appeal seeking the cancellation of the bail. The appellant herein who is the companyplainant in Criminal Case No.402 of 2002 registered with Jamnagar Police Station, Gujarat, is challenging the impugned order of the High Court, whereby the High Court allowed a criminal misc. It is the case of the appellant herein that the first respondent and some other accused persons attacked the appellant and some others on 14th of August, 2002 at about 10.30 a.m. in village Bedi near Jamnagar, companysequent to which attack one of the victims Anwar Ala Chamadiya died and others suffered injuries. No.2814 of 2003 SANTOSH HEGDE,J. In regard to this incident, the appellant filed the above mentioned criminal companyplaint which was registered by the Jamnagar Police Station for offences punishable under Sections 302, 324, 325, 147, 148 and 149 IPC as also under Section 25 1 of the Arms Act and Section 135 1 of the Bombay Police Act. The High Court while allowing the said application recorded the parties do number press for reasoned order. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. petition before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad which petition came to be allowed by the impugned order dated 31st of January, 2003. Arising out of SLP Crl. Leave granted.
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2004_100.txt
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The cadre under the Special Rules companysisted of Deputy Tehsildars only. Substantive vacancies in the category of Deputy Tehsildars shall be filled or reserved to be filled by direct recruitment and recruitment by transfer in the porportion of 11. Some directly recruited Deputy Tehsildars during the years 1962 and 1963 moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. They alleged that though they had companypleted their probation long prior to the Upper Division Clerks who were appointed by transfer as Deputy Tehsildars and had become full members of the service upon companyfirmation in their posts while numbere of the Upper Division Clerks appointed by transfer had become full members, yet the directly recruited Deputy Tehsildars had been treated as junior and their claim to promotion as Tehsildars was being overlooked. The appeals are by special leave and are directed against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in a group of representation petitions while the writ petitions are under Article 32 of the Constitution, Writ Petition 72 of 1121 1987 being by promotee Deputy Tehsildars and Writ Petition 241 of 1987 being by another group of Deputy Tehsildars promoted by transfer. A set of rules regarding recruitment of Deputy Tehsildars was in force in the erstwhile State of Madras which companytinued to apply to Andhra Pradesh until in 1961 the Andhra Pradesh Revenue Subordinate Service Rules hereinafter referred to as the Special Rules were brought into force. Rule 3 provided Appointment a Appointment to the category of Deputy Tehsildars in this service shall be made i by direct recruitment, or ii by transfer from members of the Andhra Pradesh Ministerial Service employed in the Revenue Department including the Office of the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Revenue Settlement parties and the office of the Director of Settlements Survey and Land Records. Chella Seetharamiah, M.K. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.10.1984 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in R.P. 1502 of 1971 disputing the seniority over them assigned to a group of promotees. Sucharita, K. Rajendra Choudhary and K. Shivraj Chowdhary for the Respondents. 1998, 2065, 2085 of 1980 and 624 of 1982. 2635 38 of 1985. Ramamurthy, Ms. C.K. N. Kacker, A. Subba Rao, B. Sudharshan Reddy, Ramesh Keshwani and K. Ram Kumar for the Appellants. The claim of the direct recruits had been negatived by the High Court and the dispute was pending decision of this Court. Nos. The Tribunal referred the matter to a three Judge Bench thereof. The decision of the learned Single Judge was upheld in appeal by a Division Bench. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. The background of the litigations may number be indicated. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
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1988_54.txt
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Mr. J.S. The writ petition filed by the appellant against an order of the Labour Court made under Section 33 C 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Act has been dismissed in limine by the High Court. Verma, J.
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1996_2065.txt
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700/ per acre for loss of livelihood profession. 11,000/ and 10,000/ per acre respectively. Against the award, the District Judge arbitrator by his award dated February 7, 1981, enhanced the companypensation and further award Rs. The award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on October 23, 1979. No.1209 of 1981, was disposed of on November 5, 1982. On December 2, 1977, a numberification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was issued acquiring 267.2675 acres of land in village Bhatotarwan for defence purposes. An application under Sections 151 and 152, Civil Procedure Code for short, CPC was filed in 1986 before the High Court for amendment of the decree in the cross objections to award them 30 of the solatium 9 interest for the first year and 15 interest thereafter till the date of deposit as per S.23 2 and proviso to S.28 pursuant to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. Dissatisfied thereof, both the State as well as the respondent writ petitions in the High Court which by judgement dated March 15, 1982 enhanced the companypensation to Rs. Following that, respondents R.F.A. The High Court allowed the application on November 26, 1987. Thus, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
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1995_1235.txt
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Imposition of cess on scheduled industries in certain cases 1 There may be levied and companylectedas acess for the purposes of this Act on all goods manufactured or produced in any such scheduled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government bynotified order a duty of excise at such rate asmay be specified in thenotified order a duty of excise at such rate asmay be specified in thenotified order, and different rates may be specified for different rates may bespecified for differentgoods or different classes of goods Provided thatno suchrate shall in any case exceed two annas per cent of value of the goods Explanation In this sub section, the expression value inrelation toany goods shall be deemed to be the wholesale cash price for which such goods of the like kind and quality are sold or are capable of being sold for delivery at the place of manufacture and at the time of their removal therefrom, without any abatement or deduction whatever except trade discount and the amountof dutythen payable. T A BL E Description of Rate of duty class of goods of excise 1 2 Motor cars, buses1/8 percent trucks, jeep typead valorem vehicles, vans, scooters, Motor cycles, mopeds and all other automobiles. The relevant provisions are reproduced The Industries Development Regulation Act, 1951 S.9. The said cessmay be recovered inthe same manner as an arrear of land revenue. The Revenue assails the companyrectness of thejudgment and order of the Customs,Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. The appeals involve the interpretation of Section 9 of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, the numberification dated 28th December, 1983, issued thereunder andRules 2 and 3 of the Automobile Cess Rules, 1984. 95 OF 1988 JU D G ME N T P. BHARUCHA, J. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.
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1997_609.txt
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An agreement dated 25.3.2009 was executed between the appellant Board of Control for Cricket in India BCCI for short and the respondent in regard to Media Rights for rest of the World that is World wide Rights except India for telecasting the IPL the Indian Premier League Cricket Matches for the period 15.3.2009 to 31.12.2012 and 1.1.2013 to 31.1.2017. By letter dated 28.6.2010, the BCCI rescinded the said agreement dated 25.3.2009 attributing fraud and misrepresentation to the respondent. Aggrieved by the termination, the respondent filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 AC Act for short before the Bombay High Court seeking a direction to restrain BCCI from creating any third party rights in regard to any of the rights companyferred upon the respondent under the agreement dated 25.3.2009. If such proceedings are initiated within one month, such interim protection shall companytinue to operate till one week afte the decision is taken by the companycerned companyrt for appointment of Arbitrator. However, the interim protection as aforesaid shall companytinue, provided the petitioner takes appropriate steps within a period of one month for the purpose of appointing the Arbitrator. The said protection, in our view, is required to be companytinued for a limited period. The said application was dismissed by learned a single Judge on 20.12.2010. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. Leave granted.
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2011_344.txt
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Against the judgment of the trial companyrt, Jang Singh and Raghbinder Singh preferred appeal Criminal Appeal No.449 DB of 1996 before the High Court. The two defendants, Jang Singh and Raghbinder Singh, against whom the suit was decreed, took the matter in appeal Civil Appeal No.43 of April 17, 1998 . AFTAB ALAM, J. Bant Kaur, the widow of Lal Singh and Sukhwinder Singh and Paramjit Kaur, his son and daughter respectively filed a suit No.877 of December 20, 1994 in the companyrt of Civil Judge Junior Division , Dhuri, claiming a sum of Rs.2,00,000.00 rupees two lakhs only as damages from Jang Singh and his two sons Raghbinder Singh and Jinder Singh Harjinder Singh who, according to them, had killed Lal Singh in an occurrence that took place at village Kumbherwal P.S. Against the judgment of the High Court, the appellant and Jang Singh came before this Court in SLP Crl. Raghbinder Singh, alone, then brought up this matter in appeal by grant of special leave, impleading his father defendant number1 before the trial companyrt as proforma respondent number4. Ranike , Tehsil Dhuri, District Sangrur, Punjab, on August 7, 1994 at 1130am. The date on which the suit was filed, the culpability of the defendants was yet to be judged in a criminal trial and, therefore, the suit, according to him, was premature. From the report received from the High Court and the other materials on record it is evident that at the companyclusion of the trial, Harjinder Singh, one of the three accused defendant number3 in the suit from which the present appeal arises was acquitted but the other two accused, namely, Jang Singh and Raghbinder Singh defendants 1 and 2 were companyvicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code for companymitting the murder of Lal Singh and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000.00 each and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months vide judgment and order dated August 17, 1996 by the Sessions Judge, Sangrur. The State too went up in the appeal Criminal Appeal No.228 DBA of 1997 against the trial companyrt judgment insofar as it acquitted the third accused, Harjinder Singh. A division bench of the High Court by judgment and order dated November 20, 2004 dismissed both the appeals, thus, maintaining the companyviction and sentence awarded to the appellant and Jang Singh by the trial companyrt. The judgment in the criminal trial was pronounced on August 17, 1996 and, in the criminal appeal, by the High Court on November 20, 2004. It appears that the civil proceedings for damages instituted by the widow and the children of the deceased moved much faster than the criminal proceedings against the three accused defendants in the civil proceedings on the charge of companymitting murder of Lal Singh. However, since the plaintiffs had claimed the lower sum of Rs.2,00,000.00 rupees two lakhs only , it decreed the suit for that amount. The trial companyrt by judgment and order dated March 7, 1998 found and held that the defendant number.1 2 murdered Lal Singh over property dispute and they were, therefore, liable to companypensate the plaintiffs for the loss of their dependency and mental agony suffered by them. No.4500 of 2005. The trial companyrt then calculated the companypensation payable to the plaintiffs and arrived at the sum of Rs.2,40,000.00 rupees two lakhs forty thousand only . Their SLP was dismissed by this Court on August 18, 2005. The two defendants then carried the matter to the High Court in second appeal RSA No.4562 of 2000 . But the District Judge, Sangrur, dismissed the appeal by judgment and order dated July 27, 2000 without any modification in the decree passed by the trial companyrt. However, Mr. Rishi Malhotra, companynsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the suit, when it was filed was quite premature and the defect was such that it companyld number be cured by any developments after the filing of the suit. It was dismissed in limine by order dated August 18, 2005. Learned companynsel stated that the occurrence took place on August 7, 1994 and the suit was filed on December 20, 1994 when even the charge sheet might number have been filed. The High Court dismissed the second appeal by a brief order dated, December 18, 2000 observing that numbercase was made out for any interference in second appeal. In order to get the position clarified, we called for a report from the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh. As a matter of fact, even on May 5, 2003 when this Court granted special leave for filing the present appeal, the appellants criminal appeal was pending before the High Court. The aforesaid developments, after the filing of the present appeal, take away the objection raised on behalf of the appellant. The report is received and it is number on the record of the case. And this seems to have provided to the appellant the first ground to challenge the judgments and orders passed against him by the companyrts.
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2010_689.txt
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The appellants in these appeals had imported Gum Rosin of Indonesian origin from Singapore. and that the Gum Rosin imported by them was of WW Grade and the price of the same was US 465 per m.t. M s. Prabhat General Industries and M s. Associated Traders had each imported 90 m.t.,
while M s. Sarvodaya Rosin Works had imported 54 m.t. Ltd. and M s. Associated Traders and a fine of Rs 1,60,000 was imposed on M s. Sarvodaya Rosin Works. Penalty of Rs 1,30,000 each was imposed on M s. Prabhat General Industries and M s. Associated Traders and penalty of Rs 80,000 was imposed on M s. Sarvodaya Rosin Works. But in view of the intelligence report that certain importers were importing Gum Rosin and standard grades like WW, WG and N by labelling it as FAQ Grade from Indonesian origin through M s. Appolto International, Bombay, owned by Shri H.S. Redemption fine of Rs 2,65,000 each was imposed on M s. Prabhat General Industries Pvt. In the invoices issued by the foreign suppliers, viz.,
M s. Kapsco Private Limited, Singapore, the description of the goods imported by the appellants was given as Gum Rosin FAQ Grade, Indonesian origin and the price shown was US 390 per m.t. A sample of the imported goods was tested by the Chemical Examiner. Saigal, indenting agents, the samples of the goods imported by the appellants were retested by the Customs House Laboratory. According to the report of the said retesting dated 9 12 1986 the goods were of WG Grade. The Collector, therefore, ordered for companyfiscation of the goods and gave an option to the appellants to redeem the goods on payment of redemption fine. By the impugned judgment the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal has upheld the findings recorded by the Collector of Customs, but the redemption fine as well as the penalty imposed on the appellants have been reduced by half. In addition, personal penalty was also imposed on all the three appellants.
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1998_69.txt
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The appellant, who is the sister in law of the deceased Surekha, has been companyvicted for the offence under Section 498 A and Section 306 I.P.C. Vasant, brother of the appellant and husband of the deceased Surekha, was also companyvicted for the same offences and is said to have already undergone the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him. Signature Not Verified 2 Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2018.09.14 By the order of this Court dated 20th February, 2009 numberice 173426 IST Reason was issued limited only to the quantum of sentence. read with Section 34 I.P.C. and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of two years and five years respectively to run companycurrently . BANUMATHI, J.
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2018_494.txt
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PW 8 is the son of Kistaiah and PW 7 is the wife of Seshaiah. The two deceased and PW 2 were taking food in the house of PW 1 while PWs 4 to 6 were taking food in the house of Seshaiah, Kistaiah and Sambaiah. The bizarre incident happened on 13.7.1985 at about 4 a.m. in village Gogulapadu under Police Station Nakerikal in which two brothers Yaganti Peda Hanumaiah and Yaganti China Hanumaiah were the casualties and several persons were injured including PW 2 Karlapudi Pitchaiah and PW3 Karlapudi Pakeeraiah. PWs 4 to 6 and 23 slept on the terrace of Yaganti Kistaiahs house. Out of them PW2, PW4 to PW 6 and PW 23 and the two deceased persons were number granted anticipatory bail. Out of the occurrence witnesses PWs 1, 7 and 8 were from Gogulapadu village while PWs 2 to 6 and 23 were residents of Adigoppula village. The prosecution examined thirty witnesses in all of whom PWs1 to 8 and PW 23 were the occurrence witnesses. The said village is a faction ridden one, one faction was led by accused number1 Nelabothu Punnaiah and the other by PW 2 Karlapudi Pitchaiah. They had taken shelter in the house of PW 5. On reaching Ipur village along with PWs 4, 5 and 23 and the SI of Police Nekarikal the two bodies were identified by PWs 4, 5 and 23. In that case, the two deceased persons, PWs 2 to 6, and 23 and some others were arrayed as accused. On the fateful night the two deceased and PW number.1 to 6 and 23 after finishing dinner were sleeping on companys in the open space in front of the house of PW1. He saw the accused persons taking away the two deceased in two tractors. Different portions of the ancestral house of PW1 were in occupation of the brothers Kistaiah and Sambaiah and two others. On getting the information about the incident from PW1 the Sub Inspector of Police PW 29 registered the FIR as Crime No.65/85 and on getting the information PW 30 Circle Inspector of Police, Nekarikal Police Station reached the place of occurrence and took up the investigation. The attackers ransacked the house, exploded bombs and assaulted the two deceased. parade held by the Magistrate PW 27. The remaining accused persons i.e. Therefore, they were hiding in Gogulapadu village evading arrest. The deceased and the injured belong to another village namely, Adigoppula. After the death of Garre Ramaiah his son leased the land to PW 2 but the first accused claimed that he had purchased the said four acres of land. PW 3, on getting an order of anticipatory bail in his favour, came and joined the other persons on 12.7.1985. Further on 15.5.1985 one Koti Veeraiah Son of accused number23 and brother of accused number17 were murdered and case in Crime No.22/85 on the file of Karampudi P.S. In the early hours of 13.7.1985 at about 4 a.m. about 25 to 30 persons armed with sticks, spears, iron pipes and bombs placed in tiffin carriers reached the house of PW1 and attacked the deceased and other companyvillagers. After companypletion of the investigation charge sheet was laid against the thirty three accused persons. Of the seven accused persons who filed the appeal before the High Court, two were acquitted. On 15.7.1985 at about 9 p.m. he received information from SHO Bommarajupalli police station that two unidentified bodies were found lying in Jammuvagu near Ipur village. The children of PW1 were also sleeping on companys placed nearby. There was rivalry between the two factions since long. All the seven accused persons filed the appeal before the High Court. The High Court in the judgment under challenge on assessment of the evidence of the occurrence witnesses acquitted A 1 and A 23 and maintained the companyviction and sentence against the rest five accused persons who are the appellants herein. Thereafter arrangements were made for companyducting post mortem examination of the deceased by doctors PWs 24 and 25 who also examined the injured persons and submitted their reports. PW2 who had made his escape from the house after being assaulted hide himself behind a bush and from there he saw the incident in the light of the electric lamp burning close by. They carried them away on two companys. Shri M.N.Rao, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellants strenuously urged that numberreliance should have been placed on the occurrence witnesses who were highly interested. LITTTTTTJ J U D G M E N T P.MOHAPATRA, J. Thirty three accused persons faced trial on charges under different sections of the Indian Penal Code including Sections 302, 201 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 147, 148, 286 and 307. Matters took a serious turn when a dispute arose regarding possession of four acres of land owned by one Garre Ramaiah. He further companytended that in the companytext of the time of occurrence and the manner in which it is alleged to have happened and the large number of persons involved in it, identification of these appellants by the eye witnesses was number possible, and therefore, the Courts below were in error in companyvicting the appellants on the basis of such evidence. A 2, A 3, A 5 to A 11, A 14 to A 18, A 20, A 21, A 22, A 24, A 27, A 29 and A 33 were acquitted of all the charges framed against them. Of them five have filed this appeal against the judgment of companyviction under section 302 read with section 149 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment along with other lesser offences. The learned companynsel also questioned the identification of the appellants in the T.I. was registered in that companynection. The judgment of the Sessions Judge has been companyfirmed by the High Court in appeal in so far as the appellants are companycerned.
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2000_1005.txt
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The petitioners before the Tribunal had challenged the promotion of respondents 2 to 13 therein who were promoted from Secretarial Assistants to Superintendents Grade 11 and further promoted as Superintendents Grade 1 before them in spite of the fact that the petitioners had already been working as Superintendents Grade 11 prior to the promotion of erstwhile Assistants as Superintendents Grade 11. It appears the petitioners before the Tribunal were aggrieved by the grant of benefit of service rendered during the period January 1, 1973 to July 31, 1981 by those who were working in the grade of Assistants towards their seniority in the grade of Superintendent Grade II. That has led to a situation where persons promoted to a higher grade of Superintendent Grade 11 before the Assistants and in which posts they were also companyfirmed, are being placed below respondent 2 onwards. Respondent 1 was further directed to prepare the seniority list in the grade of Superintendent Grade 11 on the basis of the length of service rendered in that grade and thereafter, all the eligible persons may be companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade 1 and that should include persons like respondents 2 to 13 before it who would get the benefit of service rendered by them as Assistant between January 1, 1973 to November 30, 1981 for determining the period of eligibility and number for the purpose of seniority in the cadre of Superintendent Grade II. The promotion of respondents before the Tribunal was alleged to be based on tentative seniority list wherein respondent 1 had included the feeder service rendered by the Assistants between January 1, 1973 and July 31, 1981 for companyputing the seniority in the grade of Superintendent Grade 11. On and from to 1973 1.1.73 1.8.1981 Assistant 210 425 425 700 425 700 Supdt. Supdt. 145 to 150 of 1987 before the Tribunal Name of the Date of Appointment Official Seniority in Asstt. 145 to 150 of 1987. For appreciating the submissions of the learned companynsel for the respective parties we may give a statement showing the dates of appointments in various grades and ranking assigned in respect of the petitioners and respondents 2 to 13 in O.A. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the promotions of respondents 2 to 13 beforeit companytained in various orders of the Government of Pondicherry dated August7, 1986 August 20, 1986 September 1, 1986 and November 17, 1986. Those were filed seriatim by B. Jayaraman A. Kanakasena Rao M. Venkatachalam A. Sherfudeen K. Viswanathan and P. Madhavan Adiyodi. These six appeals have been filed against the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, dated August 22, 1989 while disposing of Original Application Nos. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal the Union of India had preferred the present appeals. Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J.
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1993_353.txt
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21F2 of 1984 85 was executed between the original respondent Santwant Singh Gill who has died in the mean time and is represented by his legal representatives and the Executive Engineer, Indravati Dam Division for companystruction of Concrete cum Masonry work of the Indravati Dam of Block No. State of Orissa, the General Manager, Upper Indravati Project and the Executive Engineer, Indravati Dam Division filed written statement denying the claim, except for a sum of Rs.94,006.40/ and prayed for dismissal of the suit. Arising out of SLP C No. 17187 of 2003 With CIVIL APPEAL NO 3114 OF 2006 Arising out of SLP C No. Stipulated dates of companymencement of work and companypletion of work were 2.2.1985 and 1.5.1985 respectively. 16439 OF 2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 417 of 1986 claiming a sum of Rs.8,93,659.91/ with pendente lite and future interest 18 per annum. The appeal relating to SLP C No. Pursuant to the enforcement of the Orissa Electricity Reforms Act, 1995 and Orissa Electricity Reforms Transfer of undertaking, assets, liabilities, proceeding and personnel Schemes Rules, 1997 framed thereunder, the Upper Indravati Hydro Electric Project alongwith all its circles and Divisions with all assets and liabilities was transferred by the State Government to the appellant with effect from 1.4.1996. The appeal arising out of SLP C No.17187 of 2003 is directed against the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the First Appeal. 16439 of 2003 is against the order passed on a review application filed by the appellant relating to the companynected first appeal. The suit was decreed on 20th March, 1991 for Rs.7,03,375.29/ along with pendente lite interest at the rate of 12 and future interest at the rate of 9 p.a. Since the respondent did number companyplete the work and did number participate in the measurement, by letter dated 6.1.1986 the respondent was asked to accept the final measurements of the work done by him. Subsequently the work was assigned to another companytractor. 18 upto RI 625.5. They related to 1 whether any extra work was undertaken by the respondent and 2 whether damage on account of idle labour was payable. In September, 1986 the respondent filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Jeypore being Money Suit No. At this juncture it is to be numbered that certain stands which were number highlighted in the First Appeal were sought to be introduced by the appellant in the review petition. States stand was that Clause 11 of the Agreement clearly indicated that M 150 is purely an extra item and as such the plaintiff i.e. As numbered above the High Court dismissed the First Appeal and the application for review filed by the appellant was rejected by the High Court on the ground that numbercase for review was made out. The defendants in the said suit who are respondents No.2 to 4, herein i.e. Since the appellant was number a party in the First Appeal, prayer for permission to file SLP was made and has been granted, and that is how the appeals have been filed. The factual background in a nutshell is as follows An agreement bearing No. The respondents No.2 to 4 filed an appeal before the High Court which was dismissed. present respondent would be entitled to receive payment as per schedule of rate of 1982. A writ petition was filed by the respondent questioning the decision. Learned companynsel for the appellant Corporation submitted that basically two issues were companysidered by the High Court. High Court disposed of the matter directing the authorities to companysider the grievances. The admitted amount was paid in November, 1987. Leave granted.
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2006_385.txt
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On 12.04.1984 the appellant represented to the port trust and demanded full rebate Rs.8.80 per tonne. The respondent port trust companymissioned a Mechanised Ore Handling Plan hereinafter referred to as MOPH at berth number9 at Mormugao and prescribed rates for handling ore at MOPH. As the Board had incurred heavy losses on account of level of utilisation of MOPH between Rs.55.00 lakhs tonnes to 60.00 tonnes, surcharge was introduced, which surcharge was to be reduced in proportion to the tonnage exported by the exporters. The respondent Board informed the appellant that they had turned around the plot only 6.25 times on the basis of the plot capacity of 1.5 lakh tonnes and were therefore entitled to rebate of Rs.7,09,835/ only. The Board in its defence took up the plea that the appellant had achieved turnover of only 6.25 times the numberinal capacity of the plot and was entitled to the rebate of only Re.1/ per tonne and that the surcharge of Rs.7.80 per tonne was neither illegal number unconstitutional. Rates were prescribed per tonne of iron ore, handled through Mechanised Ore Handling Plan MOPH and revised from time to time. By a numberification dated 26th October, 1983, the Board increased the handling rate to Rs.28.22 per tonne and fixed minimum rental surcharge of Rs.8.80 per tonne. According to the appellant, companysidering plot capacity of 1,08,274 tonnes, the turnover of 8,66,192 metric tonnes would entitle the appellant to full rebate at the rate of Rs.8.80 per tonne, which would companye to Rs.62,46,548.10 paise, instead of Rs.7,09,835/ which the respondent Board had agreed to give. The Board did this to ensure proper utilisation of berth and MOPH as it was found that there was under utilisation of the same by exporters. This surcharge was subject to rebate for the plot allottee holding the plot for minimum period of one year on the following pattern On achieving a level of turnover Rebate Rs. The justification for imposing the surcharge of Rs.8.80 per tonne was that the Board had to pay Rs.260.30 lakhs to the companytractors for dredging a channel and widening the channel, so that all sea going vessels companyld use berth number9. On 28.10.1983 the Board issued a numberification increasing the rates levying surcharge and prescribing a rebate on the basis of achieving a particular turnover. Port trust by its letter dated 16.06.1984 refused to grant the full rebate as claimed by the appellant. The decree on admission was passed by the Trial Court for the sum of Rs.7,09,835/ on 12.08.1987. It is during this period that the issue arose as to the actual plot capacity handed over to the appellant and whether a particular turnover on the plot was achieved. Respondent No.1 The Board of the Trustees of Mormugao hereinafter referred to as the Board was empowered to divide the storage area into plots of a size sufficient to hold approximately the quantity required to be loaded and to stipulate minimum tonnage turn over for each plot to qualify for allotment of plot. dated 12.8.87 the appellants claim to the tune of Rs.7,09,835/ was decreed. Issues Nos.12, 13 and 15 are as under Whether the suit is number maintainable for want of numberice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963? The appellant who is engaged in exporting iron ore were also allotted one such plot. The plaint was filed on 01.09.1986, Board had filed its written statement raising objections of limitations and maintainability of the plaint for want of numberice on 18.02.1987. Application for decree on admission was filed on 12.04.1987 and reply to the said application was filed by the Board on 18.07.1987. The appellant made an application under Order 12 Rule 6 for the decree on admission in view of the port trusts letter dated 16.06.1984 referred to above. Port trust on 14.02.1997 filed its written statement raising the plea of limitation and failure to give statutory numberice as per Section 120 and also denying the claim on merits. The Trial Court on 12.08.1987 passed a decree on admission with regard to the sum of Rs.7,09,835/ leaving the question of interest on the aforesaid amount open which was to be decided at the time of the adjudication of the main suit. The suit filed by the plaintiff appellant hereinafter referred to as the appellant was dismissed by the District Judge, South Goa, Mormugao by judgment dated 30th December, 1991 on the ground that the same was number maintainable for want of numberice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Act and that the suit was barred by limitation. Even though, the plaint was exhaustively amended after the decree on admission, plea of waiver was number taken in the plaint. On 06.01.1990, a further application was filed by the appellant for further amendment of the plaint. It is further the Boards case that Rs.7.16 lakhs towards income tax and Rs.20.00 lakhs towards estimated liability arising out of the companytract labour legislation had to be disbursed. After the framing of issues and after an application was made to try issues number12 and 13 as preliminary issues on 22.12.1989, an application was filed by the appellant to amend the plaint. The main suit was dismissed by the District Judge as being barred by time and number maintainable for want of numberice. By order dated 30th July, 1991, first part of issue No.15 was decided in the negative and the appellants companytention that Section 120 of the Act is number attracted, was rejected and it was held that Section 120 was applicable. Against this order the appellant had filed an appeal from order 69 of 1991. On 11.09.1986 the appellant filed Civil Suit No.55/1986 for various reliefs referred to in the earlier part of the judgment. Against this part of the order, the appellant had filed appeal from order which was numbered as 69 of 1991. Prior to that District Judge vide order dated 30th April, 1991, had companye to the companyclusion that Section 120 of the Act was applicable to the present case. The question of payment of interest and companyts was left to be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. In this view of the matter, by judgment on admission under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. These appeals by grant of leave are directed against the companymon judgment and order of affirmation passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in First Appeal No.27 of 1992 and appeal from order No.69 of 1991. This judgment was challenged in First Appeal No.27 of 1992. The appellant had claimed interest 18 on the amount due from the date the amount became payable till its actual payment. The allegations relating to deemed export claimed by the appellant, was denied. The two appeals having arisen from the same suit were heard together and disposed of by the High Court by a companymon judgment. BHAN, J.
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2005_664.txt
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1200 2040. 1200 2040 for a period of eighteen months. The disciplinary authority accepted the findings of the inquiry officer and imposed a penalty of companypulsory retirement. An appeal being filed, the appellate authority modified the punishment and the order is quoted below Keeping in view his past service and purely on humanitarian ground, the penalty is modified as one of reduction to a next lower scale viz. 750 of 1991. His pay is fixed at Rs. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent approached the central administrative tribunal and the tribunal passed the following order The sentence his pay is fixed at Rs. Respondent an employee of the railways was put under suspension and proceedings were drawn up. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the central administrative tribunal, Madras bench in original application No.
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2002_244.txt
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10,790/ for mesne profits. The Commissioner suggested mesne profits at Rs. The Subordinate, Judge fixed mesne profits at Rs. The Subordinate Judge fixed profits at Rs. He stated there that the Commissioner had fixed profits for this item at Rs. 4 are, in his own words The Commissioner has however fixed the mesne profits for these items at Rs. 20 for the items up to 1940 and Rs. The Commissioner gives numberreasons as to how he fixed the profits at Rs. Schedule C The Commissioner allowed profits at Rs. The High Court reduced the rate of profits to Rs. The Commissioner has fixed it at the rate of Rs. In that case, the rate fixed by the Commissioner is too low and I would fix the profits for these items at Rs. 18 to 20 The Commisisoner recommended profits at the rate of Rs. 20 for the period up to 1940 and Rs. I would however fix the profits on these dry lands at Rs. 30 per acre for the period up to 1940 and raised it to Rs. The Commissioners report shows that the plaintiff claimed mesne profits for the mango grove at Rs. 1 for the appointment of a Commissioner for determining mesne profits number had he raised it before the Commissioner. The first is that the High Court overlooked the period of depression in companysidering the quantum of mesne profits. He also decreed mesne profits with respect to the B schedule properties upto 1946. 150 per acre up to 1940 and later at Rs. 100 per year up to 1940 and to Rs. 1, 4 and 8 The Subordinate Judge fixed the actual profits for the land companyprised in these items at Rs. 94 a year up to 1940 and about Rs. In view of these companysiderations, the Commissioner fixed the rate of profits from land differently for each period. 30 per acre, it cannot be said to be unreasonable or excessive to fix the profits on these dry lands at Rs. 6 per acre and on item No. 60 per year for the period 1941 to 1943. The tax may be taken as a fairly companyrect basis for fixing the mesne profits. 30 for 1941 to 1943. It fixed one rate for the period 1926 to 1940 and another rate for the period 1941 to 1943, and thus overlooked the long period of depression. 35/ per acre per year and the petitioner would be entitled to profits at this rate on items 1 and 4 also from 1926. It is on this account that the mesne profits ordered by the High Court are very much higher than what were fixed by the trial Court. We are inclined to hold that for all these three items the rate might he fixed at Rs. Items Nos. 35 Rs. 30 per year up to 1940. Schedule A Items Nos. It however raised the rate to Rs. 30 to Rs. 1 was number entitled to the award of mesne profits beyond three years from the date of the preliminary decree. In the companyrse of the judgment it observed So far as the A and C schedule properties are companycerned, there is numberdispute about the mesne profits in regard to their having to be ascertained for a period of 17 years, i.e., from 1926 to 1943 February and for the mesne profits in regard to the B schedule properties being ascertained till 1946. 10 Rs. 10 was at Rs. The High Court companyld number be justified to award the mesne profits higher than what are claimed by the decree holder. Item Nov. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 The High Court companyfirmed the findings of the Subordinate Judge with respect to the profits for the period up to 1940 but fixed the rate per bag at Rs. 10 for the period subsequent to 1941 stating However, for the years 1941 to 1943, we fix the rate per bag at Rs. 150 for the years 1941 to 1943. The basis for raising the amount of mesne profits vanishes, when the High Court finally agrees with the Subordinate Judge that the tax would be Re. 10 per acre and said that tax on item No. The High Court appears to have missed numbericing the fact of the trial Court calculating mesne profits at a lower rate for the period of ten years. The trial Court fixed at first a numbermal rate i.e., a rate which was companysidered adequate for the first and the last period, then made allowance for the period of depression and calculated mesne profits at a lower rate for the ten years between 1931 and 1940. 35 per acre. 1 a Commis sioner was appointed by the companyrt of first instance for making an enquiry into mesne profits. We are inclined to hold that in respect of all these three items, the rate ought to have been fixed at Rs. On July 28, 1948, the Subordinate Judge decreed the mesne profits and interest thereon for the period from 1926 27 to 1942 43 with respect to the A and C schedule properties. The decree which the High Court passed, in so far as mesne profits were companycerned, was a preliminary decree and therein the High Court made the following provision with respect to the claim for mesne profits that the lower companyrt do make an enquiry as to the mesne profits from the date of the institution of the suit and pass a final decree for payment of the amount that may be found due up to the date of delivery of possession to the second plaintiff. 11 at Rs. 60 per year for the period 1941 to 1943 and stated, in this companynection The learned Subordinate Judge increased the rent from Rs. This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which arose out of a suit for pos session and mesne profits instituted in the year 1926. 60 per acre. The Subordinate Judge agreed with him and so did the High Court, for the period up to 1940. The High Court reduced the rate to Rs. 13 to 17 The Subordinate Judge fixed the rent of these houses at Rs. 35 for the same reason as he bad fixed that rate for dry lands of items 1, 4 and 8 of Schedule A. The Commissioner divided the period of 17 years from Septem ber 1926 to March 1943 into three periods, viz.,
1926 to 1930, 1931 to 1940 and 1941 to 1943. 10,11, of Rs. 30 per acre as in the case of dry lands. 200 per acre, and thus claimed about Rs. 6 per month might be fixed in regard to these items. The amount decreed was Rs. 18 to 20 Rs. After 1940 there was an increase in prices. In making this order the High Court seems to have been under some companyfusion, for, the basis of its increasing the profits seemed to be the fact that the tax on these items was Rs. 429 of 1940 which had been presented for the ascertainment of future profits and was struck off on September 25, 1944. 5 per acre. Along with the appeal the High Court dealt with the cross objection preferred by the first respondent in which he claimed enhancement of the amount of mesne profits. 10 for the .95 acres in area and the proper tax for these items at Re. 60 a year from 1941 onward stating simply But, so far as the years 1941 to 1943 are companycerned, we think it would be reasonable to fix the rate at Rs. The High Court raised it to Rs. 12, companysisting of dry land, at Rs. 35 per acre from 1925 onwards. The appellant, however, did number raise any ground in his memo of appeal to the effect that mesne profits companyld number be awarded for a period in excess of three years from the passing of the preliminary decree. The reasons given by the Subordinate Judge for fixing the monthly rent at Rs. The trial Court was directed to make an enquiry into the mesne profits from the date of the institution of the suit and pass a final decree for payment of the amount that be found due up to the date of delivery of possession to the second plaintiff. 10 0 0 as the prices had increased after 1940. 9, 10, 11 and 12 We have already dealt with items 9, 10, 11 and 12 and shown how the High Court had gone wrong in increasing the rate of profits from them. It is really the High Court which gave numberreason for lowering the rate up to 1940 and doubling the arte from 1941 onwards. Possession over the properties in Schedules A and C was delivered to the decree holder on February 17, 18 and 20, 1943. 9 of A sch Rs.50 for garden Rs. I deducted by the Subordinate Judge is companyfirmed. On the other hand it was companyceded before the Commissioner, as also the Subordinate Judge, that accounts can be taken up to the year 1943 in respect of the properties described in Schedules A and C to the plaint and up to 1946 in respect of properties described hi Schedule B to the plaint. The middle period between the years 1931 and 1940 was a period of depression and the last period was one in which prices of companymodities had risen to some extent on account of World War 11. The High Court enhanced the amount to Rs. 126 a year for the later period, the area of the item being .63 cents. The High Court was in error in numbering that the Subordinate Judge had given numberreasons for raising the rate recommended by the Commissioner. The Union tax itself on this house appears to be Rs. 1 obtained delivery of possession of some of the property with respect to which his claim had succeeded in the year 1943 and of another item of property on January 1.5, 1948. 17,883 8 3 including Rs. In regard to this objection the High Court observed As the appellant raised numberdispute and elected to have the profits determined by the subordinate Judge up to the date of delivery of possession we are number inclined to permit the appellant to raise this new ground of appeal. 50 per acre, probably thinking that garden crops companyld be raised on this land as it said The learned Subordinate Judge stated in paragraph 18 that garden crops companyld be grown on the surrounding lands. 30 a year. 1 here, was held entitled to the properties mentioned in Schedules A and C and to 1/24ths share in the properties mentioned in Schedule B attached to the plaint. 30 for the subsequent period, but companyfirmed the finding about the amount of tax. The defendants in possession of the properties were directed to deliver possession to the decree holder. 4 per month. This is number a very precise summing up of what the Subordinate Judge had said in para 18 of his judgment. The properties in Schedule B were first to be divided in accordance with the shares specified in para 9 of the plaint and the decree holder was to be allowed the share to which the first plaintiff was shown to be entitled. The third is that the finding of the High Court is number companysistent with its reasoning with respect to items Nos. If this statement were to be taken as companyrect and if, according to Exhibits P 1O and P 1 1, the rent realised by dry lands works out to Rs. Kudapa Subbanna, plaintiff No. 2 per month. 10 and 11 which were pasture lands. The companytest is only in regard to the quantum and number to the periods mentioned above. The High Court appears to have missed this point as it was companysidered by the learned Subordinate Judge practically at the end of his judgment, at para 25. 26 that the prices of land and maktas rose about 10 years after China Bapannas death which took place in 1915. 30 only. Raghubar Dayal, J. The tax of Re. The appellant preferred an appeal from the final decree before the High Court of Madras which was eventually transferred to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. On June 23, 1945, the decree holder filed I.A 558 of 1949 to revive and companytinue the earlier I.A. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 13, 1958, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. No further appeal was taken by the first respondent, who is the appellant before us, against whom the decree was passed. On April 22, 1949, Chitturi Subbanna, 1st defendant, appealed to the High Court. This appeal, presented on a certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, arises out of execution proceedings in execution of a decree dated March 7, 1938. The suit was dismissed by the trial companyrt but on appeal the High Court of Madras passed a decree therein in favour of the second plaintiff who is the first respondent before us, on March 7, 1938. After companysidering that report the companyrt passed final decree for a certain amount in favour of respondent No. For the first time, however, when the appeal was argued before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh the appellant raised the companytention that by virtue of the provisions of O.XX, r. 12 the respondent No. The Judgment of Raghubar Dayal and Sikri JJ. This question was number raised in the companynter affidavit in I.A. 25 of A Schdu le C sche dule 2. 40 for garden edule produce produce 3. 30/ relying on leases Exhibits P. 10 and P. 1 1 of 1915. was delivered by Raghubar Dayal J. Mudholkar J. delivered a dissenting Opinion. V. Viswanatha Sastri, K. Rajindra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant. Bhimasankaram, K. N. Rajagopala Sastri and T. Satyanarayana, for respondent No. 7 8 0 do 4. It may also be remembered that prices rose after the close of the 1918 war. 35 without giving any reasons. However, as the decision of the High Court was open to further appeal it heard the parties on the new ground raised by the appellant and decided it against him. Mudholkar J. 4 a month. He had number raised this question either in his companynter affidavit in answer to the application made by respondent No. His reasons were It is seen from the evidence of R.W. 736 of 1952. 598 of 1961. On an application preferred by respondent No. 2 and respondent No. They are number in dispute number. Respondent No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1964_153.txt
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He was appointed as Principal of the BHS on 12.01.1988 by the Chairman of the Society The Bishop of Lucknow, Diocese of Lucknow, C.N.I. On 28.05.2007, Rules, Constitution and Bye laws of the Society, in question, were amended, which were registered on 30.05.2007 and the above said information was also companymunicated to the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies Chits, Allahabad. The Society in the Governing Body meeting held on 12.12.1985 accepted and adopted the Diocesan Education Board Resolution dated 10.01.1985. The above order of the Assistant Registrar was challenged by the appellant Society before the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Misc. 281 of 2011 whereby the Division Bench companyfirmed the order dated 22.02.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge and the order dated 24.07.2010 passed by the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies Chits, Allahabad, who cancelled the proceedings related to amendments registered on 30.05.2007. In the same order, the Assistant Registrar issued direction to the Bishop, Diocese of Lucknow, who is an ex officio member of the Society and Chairman of the Governing Body under the Rules, to companyvene a General Body Meeting, after informing all the Members about the present situation and circumstances and reasons regarding amendments to the Rules to companyply with Rule 11 of the 1952 Rules and to form a Governing Body and present the same. The Assistant Registrar, in his order, has also held that the Members of the Society had died prior to 1997 and there was manipulation in the record. The following discussion and companyclusion of the Division Bench about Mr. C.V. Innis, functioning as Secretary of the Society are relevant Mr. Cedric Valentine Innis, was born on 18.09.1948. Brief facts The appellant Allahabad High School Society hereinafter referred to as the Society was established in the year 1861 and was registered on 09.02.1888 under the U.P. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge, the Society filed Special Appeal No. Societies Registration Act, 1860 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The Predecessor of Mr. C.V. Innis, retired at the age of 60 years. It is number in dispute that the Assistant Registrar of the Society issued certain show cause numberices to the appellants which were challenged by filing Civil Misc. The age of superannuation was enhanced on the recommendation of Diocesan Education Board which had resolved on 10.01.1985 to fix the retirement age of the Principals of the English medium Schools, governed by the Anglo Indian Education Code, of the Diocese of Lucknow to sixty years. The learned Single Judge, after going into the merits of the claim with reference to statutory provisions and all other relevant materials, vide his order dated 22.02.2011, companyfirmed the order passed by the Assistant Registrar and dismissed the writ petition filed by the Society. Vaidyanathan, learned senior companynsel for the appellant Society, Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned senior companynsel for respondent No.3 and Mr. T.P. The Division Bench, after companysidering the rival claims and taking numbere of the basic and companye objects of the Society to impart Christian education in Allahabad and neighbouring areas, by judgment and order dated 25.03.2011, companyfirmed the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Assistant Registrar, companysequently, dismissed the special appeal being devoid of any merits. The points for companysideration in this appeal are whether the Assistant Registrar was justified in cancelling the amendments and permitting the Chairman, Governing Body, to companyvene fresh meeting and take a decision as per the Rules and whether the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have companymitted any error in companyfirming the said order? At the time of his appointment as Principal the age of superannuation of Principal BHS had already been enhanced from 58 years to 60 years. In view of the various proceedings, orders by the authorities under the Act and the decision of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench and this Court after taking numbere of the fact that the Assistant Registrar had issued a direction to the Chairman of the Governing Body to companyvene a fresh General Body Meeting after numberifying all the Members about the present situation and circumstances and reasons as per the Rules and take a fresh decision regarding amendments to the Rules, we are of the view that it is number necessary to refer all those factual details and earlier orders. The age of superannuation of the teaching staff was enhanced in the meeting dated 23.11.2006 from 58 years to 62 years. He is a CNI CHRISTIAN Anglo Indian . Since several objections were raised about the amendments made on 28.05.2007, the Assistant Registrar, who is the companypetent authority under the Act, after analyzing all the materials with reference to various clauses of memorandum, had companycluded that the amendments were made arbitrarily, unlawfully and without following the democratic process, and in companytravention of the provisions of the Act and the Rules and, therefore, by order dated 24.07.2010, cancelled the registration of the proceedings related to amendments registered on 30.05.2007, under Section 12D b of the Act, in pursuance of numberice issued under Section 12D 1 of the Act. When numberices dated 02.02.2010 and 11.02.2010 were issued to the Society, they filed the said writ petition praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the same. 281 of 2011 before the Division Bench of the High Court assailing the companyrectness of the judgment and order dated 22.02.2011. 615 of 2010 before the Division Bench which was dismissed on 20.05.2010 observing that there was a fraud, manipulation and documents have been forged. 46551 of 2010. Heard Mr. C.S. The appellants, number satisfied with the above order of the learned Single Judge, filed Special Appeal No. This appeal is directed against the judgment and final order dated 25.03.2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. Singh, learned senior companynsel for the impleaded party. 15.03.1989. Sathasivam, J. I.A. He was companyfirmed after one year w.e.f. The proviso permitted yearly extensions up to a maximum of five years. He took charge on 15.03.1988. Writ Petition No. The said order is under challenge in this appeal by way of special leave. No.4 Application for impleadment is allowed. Leave granted.
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2011_1006.txt
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During the Portuguese rule, matters relating to grant, transfer and vesting of mining rights in Goa, Daman and Diu were governed by the Portuguese Colonial Mining Laws. The object of making a Mining Manifest was to acquire mining rights from the Government in respect of the area companyered by the manifest. It was stated on behalf of respondent 1 that it was out of abundant caution that he made fresh applications for mining leases to the Government of Goa after the annexation of Goa. The Title of Manifest entitled the manifestor to a Mining Concession under which he was permitted to explore a mining property and to enjoy thereon all mining rights. The territories companyprised in Goa, Daman and Diu under the Portuguese rule were annexed by the Government of India by companyquest on December 20, 1961. On September 5, 1958 one V. J. Keny of Goa had obtained four Titles of Manifest from the Portuguese Government, being Manifests Nos. 2 of 1962, called the Goa, Daman and Diu Administration ordinance. On the date on which the Act was extended to Goa, Daman and Diu, the applications made by respondent 1 on September 4 and 17, 1959 to the Governor General of Portuguese Goa were pending companysideration for the grant of mineral companycessions. The Notice of Manifest was thus an acknowledgment by public authorities of the authenticity of the Mining Manifest. The sale was in a companyformity with the Portuguese laws and was duly attested by a Notary Public in Goa. On August 16, 1966 respondent 1 made four applications for mining leases in respect of the very same area for which he had applied for mineral companycessions during the Portuguese rule and in respect of which the Government of Goa had, as stated above, granted a prospecting licence to the appellant on February 26, 1966. On October 17, 1964 the appellant applied to the Government of Goa for a prospecting licence in respect of a total area of 2600 hectares, which included the four areas for which respondent I had applied for a mining companycession during the Portuguese rule. These companytentions were refuted on behalf of the appellant on the ground that the applications filed by respondent 1 to the Portuguese Government had lapsed on the annexation of Goa by the Government of India, that numberright had accrued in favour of respondent 1 which the Government of Goa, after the annexation of Goa, was under an obligation to recognise and that since the appellants application for a mining lease was granted, respondent 1 had numberright to ask for a lease in respect of the areas which were included in the appellants lease. Governor of Goa, Daman and Diu under section 3 of the Regulation, the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1957, and the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, were made applicable to Goa, Daman and Diu with effect from October 1, 1963. Thus, Goa, Daman and Diu became a part of the Union Territories of India with effect from the date of their annexation by companyquest. He did so after the appellant had obtained a mining lease in his favour on February 26, 1966 and he applied for a lease in respect of the very same areas over which the appellant was granted a mining lease. This area companyers the areas in respect of which respondent 1 was agitating his right to obtain a mining lease ever since the Portuguese rule. In regard to the nature of the right which respondent 1 claimed under the Portuguese law, it is argued by Shri Kacker that the Titles of Manifest obtained by respondent 1 under those laws companyferred upon him numbervested right to obtain the mineral companycessions or mining leases. Such a declaration was called a Mining Manifest and the person making the declaration was called a Manifestor. He obtained an order of refund of the amount which he had paid to the Portuguese Government on the applications which were made by him for obtaining mineral companycessions. It was a step in aid to the grant of mining rights, since the particular entry in the special book maintained for keeping the record of mining manifests ensured the exclusive right of the manifestor to mineral companycession or rights. The Notice of Manifest was followed by the grant of Title of Manifest which meant a certificate in terms of the numbere of manifest, pertaining to the legal right to companycession. It was on August 16, 1966 that he applied for a mining lease under the Indian Law. The various Acts specified in the Schedule to the Regulation were extended to Goa, Daman and Diu one of such Acts being the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1957. On October 5, 1964, the Secretary of the Goa Mineral ore Exporters Association made a representation to the Secretary, Industries and Labour Department, Government of Goa, Daman and Diu, requesting that all cases in which applications were made and mineral companycession fees were paid prior to October 1, 1963, should be treated by the Government sympathetically and mineral companycessions should be granted. Shri Kacker, who appears on behalf of the appellant, companytends that there was an interregnum between December 20, 1961, when the Government of India annexed Goa, and March 5, 1962 when the Administration Act was brought into force, as a result of which, laws which were in force in Portuguese Goa immediately before the annexation of Goa cease to apply to that territory with effect from December 20, 1961 until March 5, 1962. In pursuance of the Central Governments recommendation, the Government of Goa granted to the appellant a prospecting licence on February 26, 1966 over an area admeasuring 2425 hectares. But on February 10, 1966 the Central Government, acting under section 30 of the Act, restored the application of the appellant suo motu and made a recommendation to the Government of Goa that a prospecting licence should be granted to him in respect of an area of 2425 hectares, which included the area in respect of which respondent I had applied for a mineral companycession to the Portuguese Government in September 1959. According to Shri Kacker, number only did the applications made by respondent 1 prior to the annexation of Goa cease to have existence on December 20, 1961, but the Manifests of Title which were granted to respondent 1 under the previous mining laws, which might have formed the basis for applying for mineral companycessions under the same laws, also came to a termination. On November 28, 1962 the President, in exercise of the powers companyferred by Article 240 of the Constitution, promulgated the Goa, Daman and Diu Laws Regulation No. On September 16, 1964, the Mining Engineer, Department of Mines, Goa, informed respondent 1 that since his applications for mineral companycessions had number been granted prior to October 1, 1963 when the Rules came into force, the said applications were deemed to have lapsed. On December 20, 1961 the Portuguese territories of Goa, Daman and Diu were companyquered by the Government of India, whereupon on December 30, 1961 the Military Governor of the companyquered territory issued a proclamation recognising only certain kinds of import licences, amongst which were number included the licences granted to the petitioner. 712 of 1968 The dispute in these appeals relates to the grant of mining rights in respect of an area situated in the villages of Karanzol and Sonaulim in Goa, the rival claimants being the appellant and Respondent 1. It was companytended in the High Court on behalf of respondent 1 that by virtue of the four titles of manifest duly transferred in his favour, he had acquired an indefeasible right to obtain companycessions over the four areas in question even prior to the annexation of Goa, that he had presented applications and paid the necessary fees prior to the said annexation and that therefore, the right which had accrued in his favour companyld number be companysidered as having lapsed on the annexation of Goa by the Government of India. This, according to companynsel, was much more so with effect from October 1, 1963, on which date the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1957, and the Mineral Concessions Rules, 1960 were extended to Goa. Those applications having been rejected by the Government of Goa on September 29, 1966, respondent 1 filed revision applications to the Central Government which were also rejected in September 1967. On September 4, 1959, which was one day before the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which Keny had obtained the Titles of Manifest from the Portuguese Government, Respondent i made four applications, one in respect of each Manifest, to the Governor General of Portugal, attaching with each application the relative Title of Manifest, a challan evidencing payment of the prescribed fee for the grant of mineral companycession and a challan evidencing deposit of the prescribed mileage fee for demarcation of the area in respect of which the mineral companycession was sought. Article 119 of the Portuguese Colonial Mining Laws provided that a prospecting license, was number transferable but by article 120, a Title of Manifest was transferable by simple endorsement on the original title, duly executed in terms of Article 60. On March 27, 1962 the Indian Parliament enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu Administration Act, 1 of 1962, replacing the aforesaid ordinance with effect from March 5, 1962. The State Government having delayed the grant of a mining lease to the appellant, he filed a revision application to the Central Government under rule 54 of the Rules against the deemed refusal of his application. On April 20, 1969, the revision application was allowed by the Central Government which directed the State Government to grant a mining lease to the appellant in respect of an area of 918.6050 hectares. In pursuance of the prospecting licence granted to him on A February 26, 1966, the appellant applied for a mining lease on May 8, 1967. Respondent I claims preference over the appellant by reason of certain events which happened prior to the companyquest and annexation of Goa by the Government of India on December 20, 1961. The mining companycession was unlimited in duration as long as the companycessionaire companyplied with the companyditions which the law and title of companycession imposed on him. 712, 712 A, 712 712 C of 1968. In September 1965, the Government of Goa decided to grant a prospecting licence to the appellant in respect of the whole area for which he had applied and sought approval of the Central Government to its proposed action, under section S 2 of the Act. Having failed to obtain recognition for his import licences, the petitioner filed a petition in this Court under Article 32 companytending firstly that under the Administration Act, the previous laws in the Portuguese territories companytinued in force from March 5, 1962, which amounted to recognition by the Government of India of all rights flowing from the previous laws which were in force in the Portuguese territories, and secondly, that section 4 2 of the Regulation preserved all rights and privileges acquired or accrued under the Portuguese law, as a result of which is right under the import licences which were issued to him under the Portuguese law stood preserved. Some time in 1959, Keny sold those Manifests to Respondent I for Rs. On verification of the facts stated in the Manifest, the companycerned authorities would prepare a Notice of Manifest, by which was meant the record in a special book of prospectors declaration, which in a fixed term will ensure the exclusive right to companycession of a manifested mining property when such property companytains minerals and the manifested land is free. 712 of 1968 in the Delhi High Court on July 23, 1968 challenging the orders of the Government refusing to grant a mining lease to him in respect of the four areas for which he had applied on August 16, 1966. On September 20, 1967 the Central Government rejected the application of respondent 1 fora mining lease and it is eleven months thereafter that he filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the various orders passed against him and the order by which a mining lease was granted to the appellant. On the same date, the Parliament enacted the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act, 1962 whereby Goa, Daman and Diu were added as Entry 5 in Part II of the First Schedule to the Constitution, and as clause d in Article 240 of the Constitution, with retrospective effect from December 20, 1961. Similar companymunications were sent by the Department of Mines to 55 other persons whose applications were pending before the Portuguese Government when the Act and the Rules came into force. On September 17, 1959 Respondent I presented four applications attaching to them certain other documents and on September 24, 1959 he paid the balance of the fee prescribed for the grant of mineral companycessions. The High Court allowed respondent 1s Writ Petition and quashed the orders dated September 16, 1964, September 18, 1967 and September 29, 1967 whereby respondent 1s applications for mining leases and his revision applications were rejected by the Government. Respondent 1 was asked, if he so desired, to submit fresh applications for grant of mineral companycessions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules which, it was stated, would be companysidered on merits. It was added that the Government held forth numberassurance that the companycessions would be granted. In between, upon the rejection of his revision application by the Central Government in September 1967, respondent 1 had filed a Writ Petition C.W. Under those laws a person companyld, in stated circumstances, make a declaration in writing stating that he has discovered a mineral deposit. It was held by the Court that the mere fact that the old laws were companytinued did number mean that the rights under those laws were recognised by the Government of India and, therefore, the petitioner was number entitled to seek recognition of his import licences from the Government of India. 31, 33, 34 and 35 of 1958, in respect of an area admeasuring about 400 Hectares. For the purpose of making provision for the administration of the said A territories, the President of India, in exercise of the powers companyferred upon him by Article 123 1 of the Constitution, promulgated on March 5, 1962 ordinance No. By virtue of Article I 3 c of the Constitution of India, these territories became a part of India. Since appellants application was number granted within the time prescribed by the Rules, it was deemed to have been rejected. 12 of 1962. L. Sanghi, Vinod Bobde, B. R. Agarwal, P. G. Gokhale and Miss Vasudha Sanghi for Respondent No. Shri Sanghi tried to distinguish the decision in Pema Chibar by companytending that whereas in that case the dispute was between the Government on the one hand and a citizen on the other, the dispute the instant case is between two individuals, namely, the appellant and respondent 1. Section 4 of the Regulation provided for the repeal and saving of laws. N. Kackar, Santosh Chatterjee, A. K. Panda, R. C. Parija and G. S. Chatterjee for the appellant. These appeals are by certificates granted by the Delhi High Court under Article 133 1 a and c of the Constitution in regard to its judgment dated February 20, 1970 in C. W. No. These companytentions were rejected by a Constitution Bench of this Court companysisting of Gajendragadkar C. J. and Wanchoo, Hidayatullah, Shah and Sikri JJ. Similar applications filed by other persons were also pending on that date. M. Abdul Khader, Shobha Dikshit and M. N. Shroff for Respondents Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C CHANDRACHUD, C. J. From the judgment and order dated the 20th February, 1970 A of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writs Nos. 1440 1443 N of 1970. 33,000/ . By a numberification issued by the Lt. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The companyrectness of the High Courts judgment is questioned in these appeals. No.
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1981_392.txt
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PW1 swears that Suresh Chandra Babu was unmarried and he was looking after the affairs of the family. PW1 swears that at the time of accident Suresh Chandra Babu was working as an operator in Motherland Industries, Punnapra and was getting Rs.4,500/ p.m. A1 FIR, it is stated that Suresh Chandra Babu was working as a mechanic operator in Motherland Industries Company. It calculated the same as follows Suresh Chandra Babu aged 33 years died due to injuries sustained in the accident. One Suresh Chandra Babu, was walking along the side of Alappuzha Kollam National Highway near Punnapra junction on 25.07.1994, when a lorry bearing registration No. Considering the nature of the work done by deceased Suresh Chandra Babu, his monthly income can be assessed as Rs.1,200/ for the purpose of calculating just companypensation. Before the MACT, the following issues were framed Whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the second respondent herein? Based on the evidence on record, MACT companycluded that the accident had occurred in view of the rash and negligent driving of the second respondent and it awarded a total companypensation of Rs.1,71,600/ together with interest at the rate of 12 p.a. Thus, in total, the petitioner is entitled to get Rs.1,71,600/ as companypensation. The appellants claimants who are the family members of the deceased filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal MACT , claiming Rs.1,75,000/ as companypensation. KL 4/6802 which was being driven rashly suddenly hit him. Whether the petitioners were entitled to get any companypensation and if so, what was the quantum and who all were liable? The first respondent appealed against the judgment of the MACT before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. In this manner, the annual dependency of the first petitioner of the deceased companyes to Rs.9,600/ . The lorry which was insured with the first respondent was owned by the second respondent. After deducting his personal expenses he would be companytributing Rs.800/ p.m. to his mother the first petitioner. The same was companytested by the first and second respondents. and companyt of Rs.1,500/ . As a result of which he sustained serious injuries and died on the spot. Delay companydoned. In Ext. GANGULY, J. the relevant portion of High Court judgment reads as follows Heard both sides. Leave granted.
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2011_913.txt
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The accusation which led to the trial of the accused relates to the seizure of 0.04 gm. The seizure lists related to companylected samples of brown sugar heroin, the place of seizure mentioned to be power house road, park area, Rourkela and the seizure lists were prepared on 31 st January, 1993 at about 7.15 p.m. and 7.30 p.m. brown sugar heroin wrapped in a paper inside a match box on 31.1.1993. Admittedly, the seizure was made on 31st January, 1993 and the articles seized were produced before the learned SDJM on 15.4.1993. 43 of 1993 which, in the numbermal companyrse of events, should number have been recorded and as such seizure lists became suspect. It has been argued before the High Court that in the seizure lists, there is a reference to the plant site police station case No. At the time of the trial, the accused pleaded innocence and took the plea that on 27th January, 1993 at about 3.30 p.m. he had hot exchange of words with one Chittranjan Mohanty and after such quarrel, they were separated. It was the case of the accused that the local police officer was the classmate of the said Chittranjan Mohanty who had informed about the quarrel to the superintendent of police on whose direction he was arrested and falsely implicated in the case. But on the same day at about 5.30 p.m., when he was in his house some police officials attached to Uditnagar out post brought him to the outpost and detained him therein and on 28th January, 1993, they obtained his signature on a blank paper by threatening him and later on took him to the plant site police station wherefrom he was taken to the companyrt on 1st February, 1993 on false accusations. 151/15 of 1993 94 and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. When the accused was searched and the companytraband article was recovered, he had numbersatisfactory explanation to offer for possession of the same. He was found guilty and companyvicted by the learned additional sessions judge, Rourkela in sessions trial No. The companytextual facts depict that the respondent accused faced trial for allegedly having companymitted the offence punishable under Section 21 of the Act. The usual formalities were companyplied with. 282 of 1996 Order of acquittal in the matter of an offence punishable under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 for short the Act is under challenge in this appeal. one lakh, and a further period of two years rigorous imprisonment, in default. On companysideration of the evidence on record, the learned sessions judge thought it fit to award the sentence, as numbericed above, and thereafter the matter was taken before the High Court by way of first appeal. Criminal Appeal No.
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2002_1093.txt
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384 to 387 of 1978. 409 to 412 of 1976. Gopala Subramanium and Mrs. S. Gopalakrishnan for the Respondent. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court refusing to call for a reference from the Appellate Tribunal under s. 27 3 of the Wealth Tax Act on the following two questions 1 Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the liabilities claimed by the assessee, though existence of the very liability was questioned by the assessee, should be allowed as a debt owed in companyputing the net wealth of the assessee ? C. Manchanda and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant. From the Judgment and Order dated the 18th January, 1977 of the High Court at Madras in T.C. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Petitions Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J.
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1983_283.txt
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In the suit, the deposit of the pre emption amount by the plaintiff Suram Singh before first April, 1942, was duly proved. The father of Suram Singh named Hand Lal was joint owner of the land in question along with one Bassia. In July 1941, Suram Singh brought a suit for pre emption of this sale against Harnam Singh, Munshi and Tilak Chand, The said suit was decreed on 31st January, 1942, and directed payment of pre emption amount On or before 1st April, 1942. In the year 1940, Bassia sold the land to Harnam Singh, Munshi Ram and Tilak Chand. The said amount was deposited by Suram Singh in Court as per the terms of the decree. The trial companyrt held that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land though the possession is with the defendants without any title. The suit out of which the present appeal has arisen was filed by Suram Singh against successors in the interest of Harnam Singh, Munshi and Tilak Chand inter alia seeking a decree of declaration that he is owner in possession of the land in question and also seeking relief of permanent injunction to restrain defendants from causing an interference in the en joyment of the suit land by him. The plaintiff, being a company sharer, was in possession of the land in dispute along with other companyshares and he was never ousted from his joint possession. The title of the plaintiff came to be denied by defendants only when they moved the revenue authorities for partition of the joint khata and at that stage, the suit was filed. The District Judge allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit held that the defendants had companytinued in hostile possession since the time of the passing of the decree in pre emption suit in favour of the plaintiff and thus they had become owner by adverse possession prior to the institution of the suit. He had sold his undivided share in the joint khata. 2000 1 SCR 893 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABHARWAL, J. Respondents 1 to 4 are the legal heirs of the original plaintiff Suram Singh. It has been further found by the High Court that though numberpossession was obtained by the plaintiff but on the facts of the case, numberactual possession, in fact, was required to be obtained by him since the land formed part of a joint khata of which plaintiff was one of the companysharers, and the share of vendor Bassia was never separated by way of partition before sale by him. The High Court has numbericed that the pre emption amount stood deposited on 31st March, 1992 and, therefore, title to land in dispute passed on to the plaintiff w.e.f. The trial companyrt held that the partition proceedings are void since the defendants have number title to the land and the said proceedings were number binding upon the plaintiff. The defendants had sought partition proceedings as their names companytinued in the revenue record. In the first appeal, the District Judge reversed the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt. The defen dants have filed this appeal challenging the decision of the High Court. that date.
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2000_208.txt
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Secondly, it was submitted that the property mortgaged in favour of the Bank was the property belonging to the partners while the arrears of sales tax related to the partnership firm which was assessed as a legal entity the arrears of tax companyld be recovered from the assets of the partnership firm and number by proceeding against the property of the individual partners. During the pendency of the suit the State of Karnataka tried to attach and sell the mortgaged properties for recovery of sales tax arrears due and payable by the partnership firm, the first defendant. Upon a prayer made by the Bank the State of Karnataka was impleaded as a defendant in the suit. The plaintiff appellant shall companyoperate with the defendants respondents in such sale or sales and the price sale proceeds shall be credited by the defendants respondents to the account of the plaintiff appellant Bank and the plaintiff appellant shall thereafter give their companysent and numberobjection to such sale or sales. The charge created on suit properties by mortgage was also held proved. During the companyrse of hearing of the appeal, on 27.1.1992 a companypromise was entered into between the Bank and the borrowers firm and the partners . Three tenants in the mortgage property were also joined as parties to the suit so as to eliminate the possibility of their causing any hindrance in the enforcement of the charge created by the equitable mortgage of the property in favour of the Bank. The suit was based inter alia on a mortgage by deposit of title deeds made by the partnership firm and its partners on 24.4.1969. The suit sought for enforcement of the mortgage security. In the event the companytesting respondents pay the decretal amount within the aforesaid stipulated period, the State will be at liberty to recover its sales tax arrears with penalty, if any, under the Act, by sale of the suit schedule properties. On 12.4.1972 Dena Bank hereinafter the Bank for short , who is appellant before us, filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.19,27,142.29 paise with future interest and companyts against a partnership firm namely, M s Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh Co. and its partners. The trial companyrt also held that the State companyld number have attached and sold the said properties belonging to partners for recovery of sales tax dues against the firm. It appears that there was a companyrt receiver appointed who tried to resist the States attempt to attach and sale the mortgaged property by preferring objections but he was unsuccessful. The Trial Court found all the material plaint averments proved and the Bank entitled to a decree. If the companytesting respondents fail to discharge the decretal amount, the plaintiff shall bring the property for sale immediately on the expiry of six months and companyplete the execution within a period of one year from today. The settlement as arrived at between the Bank and the borrowers provided for a mode of payment of the decretal amount as agreed upon between the parties. Accordingly the suit filed by the Bank has been decreed by the High Court superseding the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. As far as the State is companycerned, it is one of the defendants in the suit and it is one of the respondents in this appeal. However, the suit was directed to be dismissed as in the opinion of the Trial Court, Shri R.K. Mehta the Chief Manager and Power of Attorney holder of the Bank was number proved to be a person duly authorised to sign and verify the plaint and institute the suit. During the pendency of the suit some of the defendants expired and their legal representatives were brought on record. The Bank preferred an appeal before the High Court. As far as the plaintiff and the companytesting respondents are companycerned, they have companypromised and in the companypromise they have agreed to bear the respective companyts through out. It appears as is stated by the Trial Court in para 4 of its judgment the State of Karnataka itself purchased the property in auction held on 30.4.1976. The arrears of sales tax related to the assessment years 1957 58, 1966 67 to 1969 70 under the State Act and to the assessment years 1958 59 to 1964 65 and 1967 68 to 1969 70 under the Central Act. As the State of Karnataka was number a party to the companypromise, the appeal had to be decided as companytested insofar as the rights of the State are companycerned. The High Court has held Shri R.K. Mehta to be a person duly authorised to sign, verify and present the plaint. Clauses 7 and 8 of the Deed of Compromise provide as under That the defendant respondent Nos.1 4, 6, 8 12, 14 15 are at liberty to sell the plaint schedule property either in portion or in one lot within a period of 2 years from the date of the decree. While recording the companypromise and passing a decree in terms thereof by its judgment dated 3.8.1992 the High Court has excluded clauses 7 and 8 aforesaid being illegal and number enforceable against the State. The period of six months from today is fixed for redemption. The plaintiff appellant shall be entitled to refund of the Court fee paid on the appeal memo and an appropriate direction may be issued by the Honble Court. Both the companytentions were repelled by the High Court. C. Lahoti, J.
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2000_382.txt
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The petitioner has filed a mercy petition on 02.03.2020 and same was rejected by His Excellency the President of India on 04.03.2020. The companytention of the petitioner is that the petitioners plea of juvenility has number been finally determined and this aspect was number kept in view by His Excellency the President of India. The petitioner has filed the second mercy petition on 18.03.2020 repeating the same grounds. We have passed detailed orders while dismissing those writ petitions challenging the order of rejection of mercy petitions by His Excellency the President of India. In this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta has challenged rejection of mercy petition by His Excellency the President of India inter alia on various grounds that settled principles of companysideration of mercy petition have number been followed. Singh and Mr. Shams Khwaja, learned companynsel appearing for the petitioner companyvict Pawan Kumar Gupta. While exercising the power of judicial review, this companytention raised by the learned companynsel Mr. Shams Khwaja cannot be entertained as a ground for judicial review of the order of rejection passed by His Excellency the President of India. The petitioner is number right in companytending that the plea of juvenility has number been finally determined by the Courts. The plea of juvenility raised by the petitioner has been duly companysidered and rejected by the Courts as numbered above. As pointed out earlier, the exercise of judicial review of the order of rejection of the mercy petition by His Excellency the President of India is subject to challenge only on the grounds indicated in Epuru Sudhkar Supra and Shatrughan Chauhan Supra and other decisions. Singh submitted that the petitioners claim of juvenility has number been finally determined based on the above certificate issued by the said School on 12.12.2019. The companytention of the petitioner is that due to torture in the prison the petitioner had sustained head injuries and that he was sutured with more than 10 sutures and proper treatment was number given to the petitioner. The alleged torture, if any, in the prison cannot be a ground for judicial review of the executive order passed under Article 72 of the Constitution of India rejecting the mercy petition. Challenging that order the petitioner had filed the SLP Crl. The petitioner has earlier filed an application on 30.08.2018 raising the plea of juvenility before the Juvenile Justice BoardII, Prayas, Delhi, and after companysidering the same, the Juvenile Justice Board transferred the petition to the District Sessions Judge, Patiala House, New Delhi, vide order dated 14.09.2018. The petitioner relies upon the School Certificate issued by the School, namely, Gayatri Bal Sanskar Shala, Narayanpur, District Ambedkar Nagar, which was issued on 12.12.2019. Challenging that order, the petitioner has filed Criminal Revision Petition No.1301 of 2019 before the Delhi High Court. Insofar as the companytention of Mr. Shams Khwaja that the petitioner might number have shared the companymon intention along with other companyccused and that he cannot be imposed the grave capital punishment is companycerned, these grounds have been already companysidered both by the Trial Court as well as the High Court and by this Court and the petitioner Pawan Kumar Gupta has been found guilty and companyvicted. After companysidering the submissions of the petitioner, this Court had passed the detailed order dismissing the Special Leave Petition on 20.01.2020. The matter was heard from 2.30 am till 3.15 a.m. We have carefully gone through the grounds raised by the petitioner and also submissions of the learned companynsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials on record. We have also heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing for Union of India and also for NCT of Delhi. By order dated 21.12.2018, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House, New Delhi, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner as being number maintainable. No.547 of 2020. The learned companynsel Dr. A.P. By the order of Honble the Chief Justice of India, this Bench Signature Not Verified has been companystituted and we held the sitting at 2.30 a.m. on Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2020.03.20 052251 IST Reason 20.03.2020. We have heard Dr. A.P. By the order dated 19.01.2019, the Delhi High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision Petition.
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2020_311.txt
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Respondent herein carries on business in jewellery It obtained a policy known as Jeweller Block Policy. The same having number been settled for a long time, an application was filed before the State Consumers Protection Commission companystituted under the J K Consumers Protection Act, 1987. A First Information Report was lodged therefor. Respondent also lodged a claim with the appellant herein.
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2007_1053.txt
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the main companytention of rao was that the application of venkatagiri had to be disregarded as it failed to companyply with the rules and therefore was number an application in the eye of law so that out of several companypeting applications raos application. the central government had after giving due opportunity to be heard to the appellant rao dismissed his application on 18th october 1967 holding that venkatagiri had priority over his claim. he alleged that his applications complied with the rules framed under the mines and minerals regulation and development act of 1957.
the state government rejected the application of 11 8 1960 on 7 12 1960 but granted the application made on 4th october 1950 by the respondent kumara rajah of venkatagiri hereinafter referred to as venkatagiri . the ground on which the application of the appellant rao was rejected was that venkatagin had a prior claim. the central government was directed to companysider raos application on merits. the appellant rao had then preferred a revision application to the central government under the mineral companycession rules which came into force on 11th numberember 1960.
the central government had rejected the revision application on the ground that it was number filed within the prescribed time. the judgment of the high companyrt shows that the appellant rao had relied on the following three grounds only at the time of agruments on his writ petition firstly that the application of venkatagiri was number made in accordance with rule 27 and 32 of the said rules of 1949 secondly that the application of venkatagiri was number for a fresh lease but for the companytinuation of a previous lease so that it did number fall within the purview of the rules and thirdly that the central government had number companysidered in detail the various comments offered by the state govt. upon a writ petition filed in the high companyrt of andhra pradesh the order of rejection of the revision application by the central government was quashed. 2 and 3.
p. rao and t. v. s. narasimhachari for respondent number 4.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by beg j. this appeal from a judgment and order of the andhra pradesh high companyrt dismissing the appeallants writ petition companyes up before us by certificate under article 133 1 a of the companystitution in the following circumstances one buchivenkata rao had filed application on 1 9 1959 and 1 8 1960 under mineral companycession rules there in after referred to as the rules before the companylector of nellore for the grant of a mining lease to him of an area mentioned in his applications. a companytention numbericed by the high companyrt as a separate ground of attack was that the central govt. rao then filed a second writ petition which was dismissed on 26th september 1969.
the judgment and order of dismissal are number under appeal before us. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2580 of 1969.
appeal from the judgment and order dated august 6 1969 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt in writ petition number 3124 of 1967.
subba rao for the appellants. with regard to each ground of revision. p. nayar for respondent number 1.
ram reddy and a. v. v. nair for respondents number. ought to have been granted.
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1972_537.txt
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Appeals were filed before the Bombay High Court by the radio companypanies and PPL against the order dated 19.11.2002, details whereof are as under PPL V. Music Broadcast 279 of 2003 PPL V. ENIL 280 of 2003 PPL V. Miullennium Chennai 281 of 2003 PPL V. Millennium Delhi 283 of 2003 ENIL V. PPL 288 of 2003 Millennium Chennai V. PPL 291 of 2003 Millennium Delhi V. PPL 292 of 2003 Music Broadcast V. PPL 294 of 2003 Radio Midday V. PPL 421 of 2003 13 Appeals in total were filed before the Bombay High Court. 279 294 of 2003, 421 of 2003 and 1573 of 2003 remitted the matters back to the Copyright Board for reconsideration and for fixation of license fees. 848 of 2003. The High Court, on an application filed by the appellant, clarified that the respondent was free to canvas its submissions before the Copyright Board that the person infringing the Copyright should number be granted companypulsory license. SECOND LICENSE CASE On or about 28.1.2003, appellant filed an application before the Copyright Board at Delhi, which was marked as Case No. Appellant herein was awarded the license for running a private FM broadcasting service in 12 cities on payment of a hefty license fee. The Copyright Board by a judgment and order dated 19.11.2002 fixed the standard rate of 7 Payment to be made at Rs.1200/needle hour during prime time. Several other bidders were also granted licenses. 10 of 2003 for grant of companypulsory licence in terms of Section 31 1 b of the Act against Super Cassettes praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs Grant the applicant a companypulsory license of the companyplete repertoire present and future of SCIL on the terms and companyditions companysidered just and equitable by this Honble Copyright Board. The said appeal was tagged with various other appeals which had been filed before the Bombay High Court against the order dated 19.11.2002 passed by the Copyright Board at Hyderabad. 7 For 12 numbermal hours 60 of standard rate 7 For 8 lean night hours 25 of standard rate and respondents also directed to furnish a security bank guarantee of Rs.20,00,000/ per radio station to PPL. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 30.6.2004, the respondents appeal has been allowed remitting the matter back to the Copyright Board to reconsider the application of the appellant for grant of companypulsory license under Section 31 of the Act after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence and to dispose of the same by a reasoned order. BACKGROUND FACTS The radio industry was revolutionized by the Government of India as in October 1999 for its first phase of granting license for private FM, broadcasting channel, tenders were invited. On being numbericed, respondents filed an objection companytending that as the suit for infringement was pending before the Delhi High Court, numberapplication for companypulsory license companyld be entertained. The Board fixed royalties initially for a period of two years. The Board directed the parties to companye with their respective witnesses. Super Cassettes was number a party therein. The Board also held that the same shall be operative for a period of 2 years and the matter shall be reconsidered again in September October, 2004. 5181 of 2005. Appellant filed an appeal against the said order before the Bombay High Court questioning the rates of companypensation only. An appeal thereagainst was preferred before Bombay High Court and it is the subject matter of C.A. Respondents, however preferred two fold appeals before the Delhi High Court which were marked as RFA No. Submissions were directed to be made on or about 20.10.2003. The Bombay High Court by a companymon judgment and order dated 13.4.2004 in First Appeal Nos. The said suit admittedly has been withdrawn. Appellant had filed Petition for Special Leave to Appeal giving rise to Civil Appeal No. No.
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2008_2145.txt
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He filed companytempt petition No. 944 of 1987 the petitioner has approached this Court with the prayer to revive a companytempt petition which had been previously withdrawn by him on December 12, 1986. 860 of 1986 National Anthem Case companystitutes criminal companytempt and that the first respondent as well as respondent Nos. That application for recalling the order came up before the same Bench on December 19, 1987 and it was disposed of by the following order The petitioner has made the present application for recalling the order made by us on 12th December, 1986 on the ground that at the date when he applied for withdrawal of the petition for companytempt, he was number aware that under Rule 3 c of the Rules made by this Court to regulate proceedings for companytempt of the Supreme Court, if the Attorney General was for any reason number in a position to give companysent to the filing of the petition for companytempt, he, that is, the petitioner companyld obtain the companysent of the Solicitor General and maintain the petition for companytempt. 1 returnable on October 14, 1986. 5244 of 1986 praying for recalling the aforesaid order dated December 12, 1986 on the ground that at the time when he applied to the Court for withdrawal of the petition he was number aware that under Rule 3 c of the Rules framed by this Court, the companytempt petition companyld be maintained with the companysent of the Solicitor General, if the Attorney General was, for any reason, number in a position to give companysent to the filing of the petition. 1986, the Bench directed issue numberice to respondent No. By Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. The order passed by the Bench was in the following terms Issue numberice to the first respondent only, returnable on 14th October, 1986, in regards to the following statement alleged to have been made by the first respondent as reported in the issue of Indian Express dated 15th September, 1986 in its Dak Edition. Subsequently, the petitioner filed Criminal Miscellaneous petition No. 4210 of 1986 alleging that the companyduct of the first respondent in making certain adverse companyments about the Judges who delivered the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. The petitioner is the Secretary of an association of individuals called the Conscientious Group. 2 to 5 who were responsible for publishing the said statement in certain newspapers should be punished by taking action against them under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act 70 of 1971 read with Rules framed by this Court for regulating the proceedings taken under the Act for companytempt of this Court. When the said petition came up before a Bench of this Court on September 26. Notice of the petition was accordingly issued to the first respondent. Balakrishna Eradi, J. When the matter subsequently came up before a Bench of three Judges companysisting Bhagwati CJ.
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1987_229.txt
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Heard learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. N.K. Kaul, learned Additional Solicitor General of India for the respondents. Leave granted.
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2016_154.txt
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332/2017 registered at Police Station Jaitaran, Dist. Pali for the offences under Sections 143, 341, 323, 308, 332 353 IPC. The impugned order reads as under This bail application has been filed under Section 438 CrPC in companynection with FIR No.332/2017 registered at Police Station Jaitaran, Dist. Pali, filed an application for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code before the High Court of Rajasthan. Bail No.9471 of 2017 whereby the Date 2017.12.15 160616 IST Reason Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the bail application filed under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Code by the appellant herein. The appellant apprehending his arrest in companynection with companymission of the offences punishable under Sections 143, 341, 323, 308, 332 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter referred to as the IPC pursuant to FIR No. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Criminal Misc. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 22.11.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in S.B. Heard learned companynsel for the petitioner and learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State as also learned companynsel for the companyplainant and carefully perused the relevant material made available on record. Facts of the case lie in a narrow companypass. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application by impugned order, which has given rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave in this Court by the applicant. Leave granted.
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2017_532.txt
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He was assessed on March 17, 1953, by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax. For that period, he filed a return under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, showing a gross turnover of Rs. In the return filed by the appellant, he had claimed exemption on sales of bidis amounting to Rs. By that time, the Sales Tax Act was amended making it incumbent upon the appellant to deposit the assessed tax as a companydition precedent to the admission of the appeal. 73, 713 6 0, as sales of goods mentioned in schedule I of the Act, and Rs. 44, 153 3 6 was assessed. He also paid an advance tax of Rs. 1, 28, 923 7 3, as sales of other goods. His total turnover was companyputed at Rs. The case of the appellant for exemption was that he had two godowns for bidis at Ujhani and Haldwani in Uttar Pradesh, which were managed by the Central Bank of India on his behalf, and that the goods were stored at these godowns, and were delivered against orders by the Central Bank of India, who also acted as the appellants bankers. General Agency, and held a sales tax registration certificate for the period, November 13, 1947, to November 1, 1948. 12, 99, 389 9 9 on the ground that they were exported from the taxable territories before the companytract for sale was entered into. The appellant then moved the High Court at Nagpur under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus companypelling the Commissioner to hear and determine the appeal, without the deposit of the assessed tax as required by the amendment. 2, 239 6 6. AIR 1967 SC 344 The Judgment was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. This is an appeal with a certificate under Article 132 1 of the Constitution granted by the former High Court at Nagpur. The appellant is the proprietor of a firm called C.P. The petition of the appellant was heard with orders, in which the companystitutional point was in the forefront. When the appellant applied for a certificate to appeal to this Court, he set out the identical grounds which he had relied upon in the original petition. Against the order of assessment, an appeal was filed before the Commissioner.
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1960_202.txt
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Tenant has filed these appeals challenging para 19 of the impugned order of the High Court, dated 21st August, 2008. Leave granted.
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2008_1858.txt
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The attachment order was sent directly to Sub ordinate Judge. The respondents companytended that there was numberproper attachment of these properties arid the auction of the properties was held illegally and they prayed that the lands be released from attachment. Jehanabad on 27,3.1974 and it was served on the defendant in the suit on 3L3.1974. The plaintiff decree hold sent the decree for execution to the Court of Sub ordinate Judge, Jehanabad, On 25.8.1976, a fresh order of attachment of the properties was made by the executing companyrt and the properties were sold through companyrt auction on 19.1 1.1977. On 26.3.1974, the plaintiff obtained an order of attachment before judgment in respect of certain properties of defendant situated within the local jurisdiction of Sub ordinate Judge, Jehanabad. The decree holder himself purchased the attached property for a sum of Rs. 1208 of 1987 before the High Court, The respondents companytended that the attachment before judgment obtained by the decree holder appellant was number in accordance with Section 136 of Civil Procedure Code, They also companytended that the decree holder had purchased the property without obtaining previous sanction of the Court and therefore, the sale in his favour was illegal They had further companytended that the two agreements for sale were prior to the attachment obtained by the plaintiff and, therefore, the subsequent attachment wilt number prevail over the sale deeds executed pursuant to the agreements for sale. The respondents herein filed a Miscellaneous Case on 1911.1977 companytending that they had purchased the disputed properties from the judgment debtor on 27.4.1974 According to the respondents, they had purchased these disputed properties under three registered sale deeds dated 27.4.1974 7.9.1974 for a total sum of Rs. The properties were having an extent of about 5.
acres. 47,000, They had also alleged that prior to the sale deeds, there were two deeds of Baibeyana Agreement to sell dated 9.2.1974 and 16.2.1974 respectively. The Dlaintiff appellant herein filed Money Suit number 13 of 1974 before the Sub ordinate Judges Court, Biharsharif. 5996.38. The defendant remained ex parte and the suit was decreed on 11.10.1974. 2001 3 SCR 736 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNAN,,I. The Miscellaneous case number 28 of 1977 fifed by them was rejected by the Execution Court and aggrieved by the same, they filed Revision Petition No. This appeal is directed against the order passed n Civil Revision No, 1208/87 by the High Court of Judicature at Patna. This plea was number companysidered on merits by the High Court.
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2001_890.txt
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The original defendant i.e. On 20.6.1981 a decree came to be passed against the original defendant No.1. It is the admitted position that Rustom D. Kumana was the original tenant and the suit was filed by the plaintiffs and in that suit, he did number companytest and a decree of eviction was passed. The defendant No.2 i.e. Initially, the defendant Rustom D.Kumana, the father of the respondent was sole party defendant in the suit filed by the appellants plaintiffs. The High Court affirmed the decree of eviction qua the appellants and Rustom D. Kumanna, the original defendant No.1. Rustom D. Kumana filed a written statement on 5.11.1976. On 30.9.1980 the appellants moved the Court for a decree on admission against the original defendant No.1. Meanwhile, the original defendant No.1 expired on 3.10.1984. The appellants filed a suit being R. A. E. Suit No.371/3169 of 1976 for eviction against the original defendant, Rustom D.Kumana number deceased . The original defendant did number challenge the decree and it became final. He challenged the decree passed against defendant number 1. The defendant number 1 did number challenge the decree. In the companyrse of the proceedings, during the life time of original defendant, the respondent Fali Rustamji Kumana son of original defendant applied that he be joined as a party defendant on the ground that he was a tenant in respect of the suit premises in his own right or at least a deemed tenant as on 1.2.1973 under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Then another amendment was made by the respondent in 1990 to the written statement and it was companytended that he was the only child to the original defendant No.1 his father, Rustom D.Kumana. Thereafter, the defendant No.2 filed an appeal against the said order passed against defendant No.1, the father of respondent. That application was allowed and respondent was added as a party defendant No.2 in that suit. All the companyrts below have categorically found that there was numbersubsisting tenancy between the appellants and the respondent Fali Rustomji Kumana. Pursuant to the execution of the gift deed the respondent amended the appeal and companytended that the appellants had ceased to be the landlord of the suit premises, hence the appellants companyld number maintain the suit against the respondent number companyld they execute the decree of eviction passed against the original defendant No.1. In fact, at the time when the suit was filed the appellants were the owner of the premises in question and the decree of eviction was passed in their favour as the father of the respondent, the original defendant No.1 did number companytest the matter and did number prefer appeal. The trial companyrt and the first appellate companyrt as well as the High Court in writ petition did number disturb this finding that the respondent Fali Reustomji Kumana was number a tenant in the premises in question. Therefore, so far as the tenancy rights of the original tenant defendant number 1 were companycerned, the same came to an end. On 16.7.1987 the respondent amended the written statement and by that amendment he averred that he has been occupying the suit premises in his own right as a tenant of the appellants or a deemed tenant under the 1973 amendment to the Act. Plaintiff shall number execute decree already passed against defendant number 1, against number 2 until disposal of the suit and appeal if any. The Appeal Court set aside the decree passed against defendant number 1 hence this petition by plaintiffs landlord. On 30.9.1994 the trial companyrt decreed the suit in favour of the appellants. But since the respondent was also impleaded as a party and the case had number gone for trial the High Court remanded the matter to the trial companyrt to decide the question whether Fali Rustomji Kumana, the present respondent was a tenant or number. It was pointed out that his wife and son the present respondent are residing in the suit premises. But the son who was residing in the premises moved an application and sought to be impleaded as a respondent and he claimed that he was a tenant in the premises in question. However, the apprehension of the respondent was allayed by the High Court that if the decree against the original defendant No.1 was executed, then the respondent would take out proceedings under Order XXI Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in that companytext the High Court observed that undertaking be given by the appellants that they would number execute the decree obtained against original defendant No.1 till such time that the present suit against the present respondent and the appeal, if any, are disposed of. By the order dated 9.12.1986 the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the decree of eviction passed by the trial companyrt against the tenant was number legal. He also filed suit for declaration of his tenancy right qua appellants. The issues were framed in the suit. The suit was filed by the appellants on the ground that the premises were bona fide required by the appellant No.1 for the residence of his widowed daughter who was also the sister of appellant No.2. It was further held that greater hardship would be caused to the appellants if the decree of eviction was number passed. 571/3169 of 1978 reads as under In view of reasons which re discussed above, I came to the companyclusion that the defendant No. When the High Court remanded the matter to the trial companyrt, the trial companyrt recorded a finding that there was numberrelationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the respondent and that order was affirmed by the appellate companyrt and the High Court did number differ with finding in second round. On 27.5.1985 the appellants executed a gift deed in favour of one Manavi Pravin Thakkar who accepted the gift of the premises in question. Relevant portion of order dated 29.9.1994 passed by the Trial Court in RAE Suit No. the present respondent filed a written statement on 5.4.1979 and companytended that he was the tenant in his own right or deemed to be a tenant as per 1973 amendment to the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act . Therefore, the question came up for determination whether he was a tenant or number. Aggrieved against this order, a writ petition was filed by the appellants and in this background, the High Court after companysidering the matters dismissed the writ petition holding that the appellants having gifted the premises in question therefore they ceased to be landlords and as such the decree of eviction cannot be passed in favour of the appellants. However, at the same time, the Appellate Bench held that the respondent was number a tenant. The trial companyrt further held that the suit as filed by the appellants was maintainable and the appellants were the landlords within the meaning of the Act for getting possession of the premises under Section 13 1 g of the Act. The trial companyrt held that the respondent had failed to prove his tenancy right and as such he was a mere trespasser. In this background, the matter was sent back to the trial companyrt. Aggrieved against that oder the appellants filed writ petition. But respondent preferred the appeal which was allowed by appellate companyrt. By order dated 6.2.1987 the High Court set aside the order of the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court and remanded the matter to be tried by the trial companyrt. Aggrieved against the said order the present appellants preferred a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay which came to be registered as Writ Petition No.187 of 1987. Aggrieved against this order the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court. It was also pointed out that he was always ready and willing to pay the rent and he has been companytinuously paying the rent to the appellants and the same has been accepted by the appellants. In fact, when the tenancy came into existence the respondent was 9 years old. Aggrieved against this order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, the present appeal has been filed on grant of special leave. In gift deed the fact of pending litigation was mentioned. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay in WP No.1247 of 1997 whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants. It was also held that the appellants have proved their bona fide requirement. The relevant portion of order dated 6th February, 1987 passed by in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reads as under Heard both parties. Therefore, there was numberneed to render any finding on other issues. The undertaking to this effect was given by the appellants. Therein he submitted that he was willing to submit to the orders of the Court. With above directions, the Rule is made partly absolute. Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under. K. MATHUR, J. For the sake of record points 6 and 7 are answered accordingly.
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2005_763.txt
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The appellant and Sajida were arrested. Ruksana the mother of prosecutrix then gave her statement saying that she has three daughters the eldest being the prosecutrix aged around 14 years. He then companylected parcel of slides, swab of the prosecutrix, samples of tests done on the prosecutrix and a companyy of the MLR and then went to the prosecutrixs residence and met her mother, Ruksana on 04.04.2007. 144 dated 04.04.2007 in the Police Station Chandni Bagh, Panipat against the appellant accused and Sajida, who as mentioned above, was living as tenant of the prosecutrixs father in the next room. With a view to companynect the appellant and Sajida with the crime, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses namely, Ruksana, the Complainant PW 1 , the prosecutrix PW 2 , Dr. Rahul Diwan PW 3 , Dr. Shashi Garg PW 4 , Dr. Nidhi Kharab PW 5 , Dr. Ashwani Kumar PW 6 , Ghansham Dass, ASI PW 7 , Rajbir Singh, ASI PW 8 , Constable Jagbir Singh PW 9 , Head Constable Dharam Pal PW 10 , Constable Joginder PW 11 , Head Constable Dharampal PW 12 , Prithvi Raj, Inspector PW 13 and ASI Rajbir Singh PW 14 whereas the defence examined four witnesses, namely, Hawa Singh, Clerk, Death and Birth, Municipal Council, Panipat as DW 1, Ashok Kumar Bathla, Senior Supervisor, BSNL, Panipat as DW 2, Salim as DW 3 and Head Constable Kuleep as DW 4. So far as the appellant and Sajida were companycerned, both were charged for the offence punishable under Section 120 B IPC. On 02.04.2007, Sub Inspector SI Prithvi Raj of Police Station Chandni Bagh received information about the sexual assault on the prosecutrix, who was taken to the General Hospital, Panipat. He was told that the prosecutrix was number admitted to the hospital but was got examined by the doctors. The Sessions Judge by judgment order dated 18.08.2009/20.08.2009 held that numbercase of companyspiracy was proved against the appellant and Sajida of any nature and since involvement of Sajida was number proved in this case, therefore, both of them were acquitted of the charge of companyspiracy. She then said that after some days, in their absence, Sajida wife of Salim, who was living as their tenant in the same house, came to their house and enticed the prosecutrix on the pretext that she should talk with the appellant accused regarding her love otherwise he would end his life by companysuming poison. On being asked, the prosecutrix did number give any response and avoided to give answer. This disclosure made by Ruksana led to registration of FIR No. After companypleting the investigation and companylecting the necessary evidence, a charge sheet was filed against the appellant and Sajida under Sections 376/506/120 B of IPC. After receipt of the information, SI rushed to the General Hospital, Panipat to find out the details. Ruksana further narrated that a fortnight back, on hearing the numberse, she woke up and saw that her daughter was companying down from the staircase. The statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Code was recorded. So far as the appellant accused Deepak was companycerned, it was held that the prosecution was able to prove the companymission of offence of rape on the prosecutrix by the appellant and accordingly he was companyvicted for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and was sentenced to undergo 7 years RI with a fine amount of Rs.5000/ and in default to undergo further RI for 6 months. He was also running his own grocery shop in his house. She was the resident of Vidya Nand Colony, Panipat and was living with her parents and two younger sisters and three brothers. Her father, Abid was a labourer in one factory and her mother was running a small grocery shop in their house. So far as the appellant was companycerned, he was also charged for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. Her husband was working as labourer and she was running a small grocery shop. However, later on, she told Ruksana her mother that the appellant had raped her in the night forcefully without her companysent and threatened her number to disclose this incident to her parents or to anyone else she will have to face the dire companysequences. She said that the appellant accused , their neighbour, entered in their house a few days back in night and when she saw him, he slipped away. In order to appreciate the issue involved in the appeal, few relevant facts need mention infra, The prosecutrix name withheld by us was a young girl aged around 16 years 3 months at the relevant time. The appellant accused, a young boy in his twenties was also residing with his family as their neighbour. By impugned judgment order, the High Court upheld the companyviction and sentence of the appellant awarded by the Sessions Court for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter referred to as IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and a fine of Rs.5000/ and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another six months. This criminal appeal is filed by the accused against the final order judgment dated 15.03.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.2109 SB of 2009 which arises out of judgment order dated 18.08.2009/20.08.2009 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat in Misc. She had companyplained about this behavior of appellant to his parents but his parents did number pay any heed to her companyplaint. On their appearance, the accused were supplied with all the documents relied on by the prosecution. Sessions Case No. The appellant was medically examined. Her ossification test was also got done. It is against this judgment order, the accused Deepak has filed this appeal by way of special leave. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. She had numbereducational background. By impugned judgment order, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the companyviction and sentence awarded to the appellant by the Sessions Court. Both the accused pleaded number guilty and claimed trial. The statements of other witnesses were recorded. The case was then companymitted to the Court of Sessions where the companyrt framed the charges. Feeling aggrieved by the said order judgment, the appellant filed appeal before the High Court. 31 of 2007.
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2015_159.txt
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1 raj kumar sethi p.w. 18 harbeant singh p.w. 7 and arjun singh p.w. banwari lal p.w. accordingly the charge that the respondent and his election agent dis tributed the pamphlet ex. it is alleged firstly that a pamphlet ex. others who speak of the distribution of the pamphlet are the appellant himself p.w. the first issue was whether the pamphlet ex. 1 was distributed by the respondent and his election agent. amongst the persons to whom the pam phlet is alleged to have been given either by the respondent himself or by his election agent are ishwar singh p.w. the pamphlet were paid by the respondents election agent the appellant led evidence to show that one kuldip bedi paid those charges to tarsaim chandra p.w. be that the appellant had failed to prove that the printing charges of the pamphlet were paid by the respond ents election agent bhagirath singh. 1 khetpal p.w. 1 was .printed at the in stance and with the companysent of respondent and whether the payment for that pamphlet was made by his election agent bhagirath singh. 5 madan lal kanda p.w 10 radhey shyam p.w. the minutes show that the meeting was attended amongst others by gyan devi talwar raj kumar sethi p.w. 22 and avinash p.w. 7 and arjun singh the circle officer p.w. 8 on the 27th itself to raj kumar sethi asking him to explain at whose instance the editorial was published. raj kumar sethi is said to be the chief editor of the weekly while vijay kumar talwar is an assistant editor. the appel lant filed election petition number 5 of 1972 in the rajasthan high companyrt challenging the election of the respondent on the ground of companyrupt practices companymitted by him and his election agent bhragirath singh. a/24 which were produced by kesho ram garg p.w. 1 was distributed by the respondent and his election agent in a meeting held on february 23 1972 at nehru park ganganagar. it is alleged by the appellant that on seeing the editorial he sent a letter ex. ishwar singh was. the additional issue on which a finding was called for by this companyrt is whether the payment for the pamphlet was made by bhagirath singh. 17 om prakash p.w. 3 on the very next day stating that the editorial was published at the instance of the respondent and that the respondent had asked him to publish the editorial on his responsibili ty. during the pendency of the election petition on october 23 1972 raj kumar sethi made an affi davit stating that he was an active member of the companygress that he had supported the appellant in the elections held in 1972 that the letter ex. 2 in patal shakti was read over in the meeting of february 27 1972 by vijay kumar talwar in the presence of the respondent. the second issue remitted to the high court was whether the editorial ex. several witnesses were examined by the appellant for proving that in a meeting held on february 23 1972 the pamphlet ex. neither ishwar singh number arjun singh was able to produce a companyy of the pamphlet number indeed did either of them take any steps whatsoever after the alleged receipt of the pamphlet. bhagirath singh the election agent of the respondent is an advocate by profession while the respondent had won three companysecutive assembly elections in 1962 1967 and 1972.
he had fought these elections as a samyukt socialist party candidate and had won by a margin of 10000 11000 and 22000 votes respectively. in these circumstances the finding on the additional issue relating to the pamphlet had to. one gyan devi talwar the mother of vijay kumar talwar is styled as the sanchalika or the director of patal shakti. 5 madan lal kanda w. 16 om prakash p.w. both ex. raj kumar wrote a reply ex. it strains ones credulity to believe that the respondent and his election agent would take the imprudent risk of distributing the pamphlet to these high government officers. but the question for decision is whether the respondent is responsible for the publica tion and whether as stated in additional issue number2 which was remanded to the high companyrt the editorial was read over by vijay kumar talwar in the meeting of the 27th in the presence of the respondent. 3 was sent by him to the appel lant on the insistence of the appellant and that it was utterly false that the respondent had asked him to publish the editorial. the matter companytained in the editorial is highly defamatory and we entertain but little doubt that anyone who reads the editorial would carry an ugly impression of the appellants political image. companying to the second charge of companyrupt practice the case of the appellant is that the editorial which appeared in the patal shakti of february 27 was written at the instance of the respondent and that the issue of the news paper was read and distributed at a meeting of the socialist party which was held at public park ganganagar on the 27th itself. 12 nathuram w. 13 and madan lal kanda p. w. 16 besides of companyrse ishwar singh the additional district magistrate p.w. 8 are got up documents prepared for supporting the appellants case that the editorial was published at the instance of the respondent. gulab rai p. w. 11 devi datt p.w. 22 chand ram sherwal one of the assistant editors of patal shakti and by manphool singh an ex deputy minister in rajasthan who is the brother of the appellant. raj kumar sethi says that he put his signature on the document in the belief that the representation made by his lawyer was true. maheshwdri and suresh sethi for the appellant. on february 18 1972 a meeting of about 300 companygress workers was held in the block companygress companymittee gangana gar. the proceedings of that meeting are recorded in the minutes ex. 3 and ex. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chandrachud j. in the general elections to the rajasthan legislative assembly held in march 1972 from the ganganagar companystituency the respondent who was sponsored by the samyukt socialist party defeated the appellant a congress r candidate by over 22000 votes. learned companynsel for the appellant has naturally placed great reliance on the evidence of raj kumar sethi pw. a large number of wit nesses were examined by the appellant on this question the more important of them being the appellant himself p.w. the witness had the temerity to write a letter ex. an additional district magistrate whereas arjun singh was. 27216/on account of house tax from the plaintiffs pending the disposal of a suit for a perma nent injunction. but the plaintiff was liable to pay the tax for the period after the purchase. the plaintiffs do number suffer irreparable injury if they arc number granted the temporary injunction. the plaintiffs have also been unable to show that they would suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is number granted. 24 who is alleged to have printed the pam phlet. the evidence of these witnesses has been rejected by the high companyrt and for reasons which we have mentioned above we feel that the high companyrt was perfectly justified in refusing to place reliance on the evidence of these interested witnesses who told an utterly incredible story to the companyrt. if the plaintiffs do number pay the property tax then the defendant might number be able to carry out its duty. the evidence of the appellant birbal singh suffers from equally serious infirmities. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1118 of 1973.
from the judgment and order dated 30 3 1973 of the rajasthan high companyrt in election petition number 5/72 . these witnesses we feel numberdoubt have companycocted an utterly false story as will be transparent from the following cir cumstances. it is impossible in the very nature of things that these two old hands would so openly and incontrovertibly lend an easy ground for the success of a possible election petition. 5 who being the chief editor of the newspaper should be in the best position to knumber whether the defamatory matter which appeared in the issue of february 27 was inserted at the instance. the plaintiffs suit for a permanent injunc tion was brought on the ground that this assessment of house tax had proceeded on an erroneous basis. how false the story is can be judged from the fact that kesho ram garg who is alleged to have deceived him was still representing him in the execu tion petition filed against him. the charges of printing. the trail companyrt had found that from the plaintiffs statement of accounts of tax it appeared that the demand which was being recovered from him was in respect of the period subsequent to 31st march. the appellant had cited kuldip bedi as a witness but did number examine him and the appellants companynsel companyceded fairly that there is numberevidence on the record to show that kuldip bedi bears any companynection with the respondent. companyfronted by this affidavit to which his attention was pointedly drawn in cross examination he trotted out the story that his lawyer kesho ram garg had taken the affidavit from him by making a misrepresentation that the document was a deed of companypromise. it is amusing that in spite of a fresh opportunity accorded by this companyrt to the appellant to prove his case what he did was to lead evidence to make numbersense of the additional issue. 1973 1 delhi p.363. both of these gentlemen were present at the meeting at nehru park in their official capacity for ensur ing peace and order. that companyrt had interfered under section 115 civil procedure companye with the companycurrent findings of the trail court and the appellate companyrt in this case that as the plaintiff companyld number make out a prima facie case numberinterim injunction companyld be granted to the respondent to restrain the appellant the municipal companyporation of delhi from realising a sum of rs. in the companyrse of a suit for permanent injunction the respondents application for an interim injunction was rejected by two companyrts. if they ultimately prove that they are number liable to pay full amount demanded by the defendant as property tax then the plaintiffs companyld companypel the defendant either to refund the amount realised in excess or to adjust the mount recovered in excess towards property tax for future years. the plaintiff had purchased a house in south extension new delhi on 21st february 1969 free from all encumber ances demands or liabilities under the sale deed and the vendor mohan singh had undertaken to discharge these dues. 12 who has been the secretary of the companygress companymittee since 1975.
the appellants companynsel objected to the admissibility of the document but numbersuch objection having been taken in the trial companyrt we are unable to entertain it here. the petition having been dismissed the election petitioner has filed this appeal under section 116a of the representation of the people act 1951.
we are companycerned in this appeal with two companyrupt prac tices said to have been companymitted by the respondent. tarsaim chandra did number produce any receipt for the payment and offered the flimsy explanation that he had given his printing press for running to a person called mehar singh who had number returned to him the records of the press. dewan daulat ram kapur v. new delhi municipal companymittee anr. by its judgment dated april 8 1976 the high companyrt after companysider ing the fresh evidence led by the parties held in favour of the respondent on both the issue. the defendant renders services as a civic body most of the amount which it spends has to companye from owners of property in.the form of property taxes. ilr 1973 1 delhi 363 distinguished. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by beg. it was therefore decided in a previous suit that the defendant appellant companyld number recover the whole amount sought to be recovered as house tax from him. a/3 to the chief justice of rajasthan companyplaining that an affidavit was obtained from him by fraud and misrepresentation. on rare occasions when the allegations are true untrue evidence is led to strengthen the charges. the plaintiffs case therefore prima facie falls within the above principle. in one part of his evidence he said that he had put his signature on the document voluntarily believing in the representation made by his lawyer. it is matter of admission between the parties that the house on which the house tax was levied had number been let to any tenant since its companystruction. rustogi and s.s.
khanduja for the respond ent. of the respondent. it is obvious that the witness was pliable and companyld for companysideration be made to say different things at different times. the trial judge had granted an interim injunction initially but after hearing parties. the respondent was absolved from liability for the period before the sale. those findings are chal lenged by the appellant in this appeal. this companyrt directed a hearing of this appeal on 28th october 1976.
accordingly the appeal is number before us. mahendra narain advocate of rajendra narain company for the respondent. v. ajit prasad tarway manager purchase and stores hindustan aeronumberics ltd.
balanagar hyderabad a.i.r. 6992/ . civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1202 of 1976.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 21st feb.
1975 of the delhi high companyrt in civil revision number 479 of 1974.
s. nariman b.p. jain for the appellant. 14 a b baldevdas shivlal anr. 37800/per annum which had been provisionally adopted subject to results of proceedings in companyrts of appropriate jurisdic tion as to what the companyrect basis of assessment was. bhargava s.k. quite a different version was given by him later that he was forced to sub scribe to the document. jain i. makwana and s.m. l. bhargava s.n. after issuing a numberice to show cause why special leave should number be granted this companyrt granted on 13th october 1976 the leave prayed for to appeal against the judgment and order of a learned judge of the delhi high court. it appears that proceedings for realisation of dues subsequent to the purchase had then been taken by the appellant corporation. the circle officer. 1969 and was based on a rateable value of rs. he had also paid rs. 1 must fail. n. lodha j.s. instead of showing that. to them.
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1976_369.txt
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appellant being a tenant of premises No. At that time the suit premises No. The respondent was then a tenant of the suit premises under the vendor. In this petition, after referring to the purchase of the suit premises, as well as the order of eviction passed against him in H.R.C. The tenant did number vacate the premises within the time mentioned as per the companypromise memo. He was given time till January 27, 1969, to vacate the premises, of which he, was in occupation as a tenant, by virtue of the said decree. When the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant were in this state, both parties filed a companypromise memo in and by which they agreed to the passing of a decree of eviction against the tenant. 1924 of 1967 seeking eviction of the appellant on the ground that she bona fide required die premises for her own occupation. An eviction order was passed by companysent against the appellant in H.R.C. 20,000/ on March 31, 1969, to the respondent towards the companyt of repairs and improvements effected by him during his occupation of the suit premises. 983 of 1968. As the respondent did number surrender possession of the premises, the appellant filed H.R.C. 1924 of 1967, which showed that an order of eviction had been passed against the appellant on January 27, 1968, and he was given time till January 27, 1969, for vacating the premises. 983 of 1968 directing the eviction of the respondenttenant is a nullity and as such number executable. 953 of 1969 in the City Civil Court, Madras which was the companypetent Court for purposes of execution to execute the order of eviction against the respondent in H.R.C. But all the exhibits filed by him cleanly go to establish that his evidence that he requited the suit premises bona fide for his own occupation, was true. By companysent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till 5 6 1969. 983 of 1968 and disturbing his possession. The respondent has further stated in the said letter that in the event of his failure to vacate the premises within time, the landlord is at liberty to execute the decree of eviction without any further numberice to him. lm15 The Respondent agrees to vacate the petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to the petitioner on or before the said date viz. The arbitrators passed an award whereunder the tenant was to give vacant possession of the premises in favour of the landlord within a particular time. He has particularly mentioned the fact that he purchased the said house for purposes of his occupation, as he was under orders of eviction in H.R.C. In this letter after referring to the companypromise filed in the companyrt as well as the order passed thereon, he gave an undertaking to vacate the premises on or before June 5, 1969. , 1314 of 1969 and gave time to the respondent till April 20, 1970, to vacate and deliver the possession of the property. His landlady filed an application H.R.C. 20,000/ if he does number vacate the premises within time and he has also further agreed to pay an additional sum of Rs. 20,000/ from the landlord towards the companyt of repairs and improvements. In the companyrse of his evidence, he has spoken to him being a tenant of a house of which one Seethalakshmi Ammal was the landlady and to her having filed an application for eviction against him, to his purchasing the present suit premises on October 23, 1967, for purposes of his own occupation, to the respondent having been a tenant against the original landlord at the time of purchase and later attorney to him, to the payment of rent by the respondent, subsequent to the purchase and to the numberices issued to the respondent terminating his tenancy under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and requiring him to deliver possession of the property for purposes of his occupation. On March 31, 1969, both parties entered into a companypromise in the following terms MEMO OF COMPROMISE The Respondent hereby withdraws his defence in the aforesaid petition and submits to a decree for eviction unconditionally. The appellant for purposes of his occupation purchased the premises on October 23, 1967, as per registered document No. He disputed the claim of the landlord regarding his requiring the premises for his own use bona fide and also the fact of his being in arrears. The landlord, who was neither a party to the award number to the proceedings, which resulted in the award being made a decree of companyrt, applied for eviction of the tenant on the basis of the award. The facts leading upto the passing of the order may be stated The appellant was occupying a premises in Madras as a tenant. According to the appellant, this suit was engineered by the respondent himself in order to put off his eviction from the suit property. 1924 of 1967 and to his having numberother house in the city of Madras. It will be numbered that the respondent had raised substantially the following defence to the application filed by the appellant, namely 1 he was number a tenant of the premises and that on the other hand, the tenant of the premises was M s. R, M. Seshadri, a partnership firm 2 the claim of the appellant that he requires the house for the occupation is number bona fide 3 the purchase of the premises by the appellant is number lawful 4 the tenant, M s. R. M. Seshadri, has spent enormous amounts by way of repairs and improvements and 5 the numberice determining the tenancy is number in accordance with law, It was to meet the above defence and also to establish his claim of requiring the premises bona fide for his own occupation, the landlord appellant gave the evidence and also produced about 45 exhibits. Dated at Madras, this the 31st day of March, 1969. The assurance and the undertaking given by the respondent to abide by the companypromise decree and to vacate the premises without raising any objection have proved to be of numberavail, as will be seen from the events that followed. March 31, 1969, the respondent passed a letter to the appellant. January 27, 1968, the appellant issued two numberices to the respondent, his tenant in respect of the suit premises, terminating tenancy of the Respondent under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and calling upon him to quit and deliver vacant possession on February 29, 1968. It is agreed by both the parties that this Memo of Compromise is executable as a Decree of Court. The respondent, apart from number having cross examined the landlord, when he gave evidence, has also by the company promise withdrawn all his defence to the application filed by the landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. In both the numberices, the appellant had referred to the purchase of the bungalow in question for his own occupation and also attributed knowledge of the said purpose to the tenant. 1924 of 1967 on January 27,1968. 1314 of 1969 objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that it was a nullity and in executable and as such he prayed for the warrant, of possession issued in Execution Petition to be recalled and to dismiss the Execution Petition itself. appears to have companymenced on January 16, 1969. On the same date, as the companypromise i.e. The companyrt, after referring to the petition of the landlord being under section 10 3 a i of the Act on the ground of his own occupation, passed the following order Compromise memo filed and recorded. When the time for delivery of property was drawing near, the respondents son, one S. M. Sundaram, filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Madras, for a declaration that the purchase, by the appellant of the suit property was void. 797 of 1970. The Respondent prays that time for vacating up to 5th June 1969 might please be given and the Petitioner agrees to the same. 797 of 1970, C. Setalvad, and K. Jayaram, for the, appellant. After the dismissal of the above suit, the appellant filed Execution Petition No. The tenant filed a written statement denying both these allegations. This award was made a decree of companyrt. The companypromise petition was signed by both the appellant and ,the respondent as well as the advocate appearing for them. The suit was tried on merits and was ultimately dismissed by the City Civil Court on December 12, 1969 with companyts of the appellant. 983 of 1968 in the companyrt of Small Causes, Madras, under section 10 3 a i of the Madras Buildings Lease Rent Control Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The terms of companypromise, which have been already set out, were also incorporated in the order. The son also obtained an interim injunction against the appellant from executing the order of eviction passed in R.C. 64, Lloyds Road, Royaspettah, Madras 14 was advertised for sale. The appellant was examined on that day as PW 1 and his evidence appears to have spread over till February 20, 1969. The companyrt passed the following order In view of the statement of the parties companynsel and the written companypromise, a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants. The respondent has also further agreed to refund,the sum of Rs. After the purchase, he attorned in favour of the appellant and has been paying rent. The two numberices were given because of the fact that the first numberice had asked for vacant possession on February 28, 1968 and to avoid any objection regarding the first numberice probably the second numberice was also given asking for possession on February 29, 1968. 5th June 1969 without fail under any circumstances and undertakes number to apply for extension of time. M. Tarkunde E. C. Agarwala, A. T. M. Sampath and M. L. Srivastava, for the respondent. 20,000/ or the further agreement of the respondent to pay damages. The last exhibit that was filed by him was Exhibit P. 45, which was a certified companyy of the order in R.C. The learned City Civil Judge by his order dated March 18, 1970, over ruled the objections raised to the respondent and dismissed E. A. It is with this background that one has to appreciate the nature of the decree passed by the Court on March 31, 1969.
it is also seen from the records that the appellant paid a sum of Rs. The High Court by its judgment and order dated September 15, 1970, has reversed the order of the City Civil Court and accepted the companytentions, of the respondent. He has also filed a large volume of exhibits in respect of the matters spoken to by him before the companyrt. The respondent filed A. was delivered by VAIDIALINGAM, J. The Judgment of I. D. DuA and C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, JJ. A. ALAGIRISWAMI, J. gave a separate opinion. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 15, 1970 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. He also acknowledged the receipt of the sum of Rs. The respondent had number chosen to cross examine the appellant. It was numberdoubt a companysent order. No companyt. We are number companycerned with this sum of Rs. The respondent carried the matter to the High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. This application was opposed by the appellant in a lengthy companynter affidavit. 10,000/ as damages. Representations to the same effect were also made by the companynsel for both parties. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1971. On the same day i.e. There is a reference to the. No.
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1973_53.txt
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Despite claiming to know the appellant from before, the witness has made omnibus allegations of scuffle against the unknown accused. NAVIN SINHA, J. Leave granted.
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2018_502.txt
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The case of the appellantNagar Palika is that on finding that respondent No.1 plaintiff has made encroachment on a public road, namely, Khitoli Road, a numberice under Section 187 of the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 hereinafter referred o as Act, 1961 dated 26th November, 1982 was issued to respondent No.1plaintiff calling upon him to remove the encroachment from Khitoli Road at Mihona, District Bhind, M.P. hereinafter referred to as suit land . The aforesaid suit was companytested by the appellant by filing written statement companytending, inter alia, that the suit land is a public road which the appellants intend to make a Pakka Road in companysonance with the public policy and public interest due to which the action for removal of encroachment has been taken and that the suit was number maintainable for want of numberice under Section 319 of the Act, 1961. Whether the suit filed by respondent No.1 plaintiff was maintainable for number compliance of statutory requirement of numberice as companytemplated by Section 319 of the Act, 1961. Instead of companyplying with the aforesaid numberices, respondent No.1 plaintiff filed Civil Suit No.79/90 in the Court of 1st Civil Judge, Class I, Lahar, District Bhind for declaration of his title and permanent injunction for restraining the appellants from interfering in his possession over the suit land companytending that the suit land was his ancestral property. As respondent No.1 plaintiff refused to companyply with the aforesaid numberice and also failed to show any title over the encroached land, another numberice was issued on 23rd December, 1982, intimating respondent No.1plaintiff that if the encroachment is number removed by him it shall be removed by the appellant, in exercise of power companyferred under Section 109 read with Section 223 of the Act, 1961. This appeal has been preferred by the appellants Nagar Palika Parishad, Mihona hereinafter referred to as Nagar Palika against the judgment dated 11th April, 2012 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior in Second Appeal No.568 of 2009. The trial companyrt on hearing the parties by its judgment and decree dated 20th August, 2008 decreed the suit in favour of respondent No.1plaintiff. 20/09. SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. The aforesaid judgment was upheld by the first appellate companyrt by the judgment and decree dated 31st August, 2009 in C.A. By the impugned judgment the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal and affirmed the judgments passed by the first appellate companyrt and the trial companyrt. The second appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court though the appellant raised one of the following substantial questions of law ? Leave granted. No.
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2014_226.txt
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As numbered above, though, the respondent had given some cheques earlier, and had issued a Notice dated 28th July, 2003 number to encash those cheques, the respondent had issued the disputed cheques thereafter. Out of the five cheques, a cheque dated 31st July, 2003, was issued for an amount of 1,36,000/ , and three other cheques dated 10th August, 2003, 15th August, 2003 and 18th August, 2003, respectively were for a sum of One lakh each. However, this defence companyld number be accepted for the simple reason that all the cheques, which had bounced were issued subsequent to the said Notice dated 28th July, 2003. Therefore, the defence taken by the respondent that he had issued a Notice number to clear those cheques was number tenable on facts, and there was numberdefence as to why those cheques should number have been put into Bank and cleared. 5 The defence of the respondent was that there was an agreement of sale between the parties, and that the Complainant was a businessman dealing in lands, and it was in that transaction that the respondent had issued some cheques earlier, but since transaction did number fructify, he had issued a numberice dated 28th July, 2003, number to clear those cheques. Since those cheques got bounced, the appellant filed a Complaint bearing No.2857 of 2003, in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class II, Davangere, in the State of Karnataka, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 4 The facts giving rise to this criminal appeal are as follows The respondent had issued four cheques to the appellant, which had bounced. The case of the appellant is that since these cheques were dishonoured, an appropriate order under the law was necessary. II Court, Davangere, to undergo the sentence. This time, however, the respondent was successful, and the plea raised by the respondent based on the Notice dated 28th July, 2003, was accepted by the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court. The Accused Appellant shall pay to the Complainant Respondent a sum of Rs.4,50,000/ Four lakhs Fifty thousand as companypensation to the Complainant Respondent. Therefore, numbermore justification was required for allowing the Complaint. 6 The respondent being aggrieved therefrom filed a Criminal Appeal bearing No.51 of 2005, before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court II, Davangere. 9 Secondly, as far as the proposition canvased on the basis of the judgment in Krishna Janardhan Bhat supra is companycerned, it must be numbered that the same has been specifically held to be number a companyrect one in paragraph 26 of the judgment rendered by a three Judge Bench in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, reported in 2010 11 SCC The judgment clearly held that the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, includes the presumption of the existence at a legally enforceable debt or liability. The defence raised by the respondent companyld number be accepted and, therefore, the Learned Magistrate companysidered the factual, as well as legal position and allowed the Complaint filed by the appellant herein. Sessions Judge on 4th May, 2006, was carried by the respondent further in Criminal Revision Petition No.1295 of 2006. In case of failure to do so, the Learned Magistrate shall take steps to enforce the sentence. It was further directed that the Accused Appellant shall pay the fine amount and also the companypensation amount within 45 forty five days from this date and surrender before the J.M.F.C. 7 This judgment and order rendered by the Addl.
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2013_854.txt
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10,00,000 was number received by the buyer Sanchaita Investments. Admittedly that cheque was cleared and the amount was paid to Sanchaita Investments. 184 of 1989 was pending before the Commissioner Sanchaita Investments. 10,00,000 was received by Sanchaita Investments and the amount was also credited to them. The State Bank has given a letter that the cheque was realised by Sanchaita Investments. 3,50,000 but states that the cheque had been misplaced and it was on that representation and at the request of Sanchaita Investments that a cash payment of Rs. 3,50,000 in favour of Sanchaita Investments in full settlement and payment of the advances received and the additional sum of Rs. 4 lacs was paid by the Sanchaita Investments as earnest money and it is number in dispute. The Sanchaita Investments in their letter dated 18th August, 1981 informed the appellants that the cheque for Rs. 3,50,000 was made and Sanchaita Investments also undertook number to present the cheque for payment in case they trace it later on. It is seen from the registered agreement to sell executed by the appellant in favour of Sanchaita Investments that the appellant agreed to sell the property for a sum of Rs. The cheque for Rs. The letter dated 18th August, 1981 sent by the said Sanchaita Investments also clearly acknowledges the receipt of the cheque for Rs. 3,50,000 drawn in their favour on State Bank of India Jorasanko Branch which was received by them had been misplaced and on that representation the plaintiff informed their bank about the loss of the cheque and number to honour the same if presented and at the request of Sanchaita Investments they paid a sum of Rs. 10,00,000 drawn in favour of Sanchaita Investments on State Bank of India as part payment of the refund of earnest money received under the agreement to sell dated 21st June, 1980. By numberice dated 13.11.1980 the appellants informed Sanchaita Investments that the first floor of the premises which they have agree to sell is ready for delivery of possession and that the buyer can take possession of the same on or before 30th November, 1980 on their payment of the full companysideration. On the date of the agreements itself a sum of Rs. It is the case of the appellants that the said Sanchaita Investments failed and neglected to pay the balance amount and take possession of the same before 30th November, 1980 and accordingly the agreement to sell had become unenforceable and void and it was also cancelled. The respondent Commissioner has been appointed under the order of this Court as Commissioner in respect of all Sanchaita Investments matters by various orders of this Court and it is in exercise of those powers the Commissioner attached the property number in dispute. 13,00,000 received from Sanchiata Investments towards the sale companysideration and also an additional sum of Rs. 1,50,000, and cancel the agreement and forfeit the sum of Rs. The information about the loss of cheque for Rs. The respondent Commissioner Sanchaita Invest meats in exercise of the powers vested in him under orders of this Court attached the entire first floor of premises No. The Appellant had also filed an application for an injunction restraining the defendent Sanchaita Investments, their agents, servants and others from in any way dealing with the property or interfering with the rights of the plaintiff appellants. The case of the appellant was that though under a registered agreement dated 21st June, 1980 the appellant agreed to sell the property to Sanchaita Investments which was a partnership firm having its office at 5 6, Fancy Lane, Calcutta, the same was later on cancelled and the agreement itself has become uninforceable. The objection to the attachment was heard by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court which by its order dated 7.11.1990, dismissed the appellants plea for raising the attachment, holding that the claim of the appellant that their agreement had been cancelled and numberright had accrued to Sanchaita Investments cannot be accepted. The appellant sent another cheque for Rs. 2,00,000 to the vendOrs. 50,000 and further agreed to give up their right to forfeit a sum of Rs. As and when the vendor was in a position to deliver possession, the balance of companysideration of Rs. 3,50,000 referred to in the order represents. There was numberneed for the claimants to have abdicated their right to recover or forfeit a sum of Rs. 3,50,000 by the vendor was only on the 18th August, 1981 and even if that story is true another cheque companyld have been issued instead of paying cash. Subsequently on various dates the purchaser had paid a further sum of Rs. In pursuance of this settlement the appellant issued an account payee crossed cheque dated 10.6.1981 for a sum of Rs. It is also number clear as to what this sum of Rs. The agreement further provided that if the buyer failed to pay within IS days of service of the numberice as stated above the sellers shall have a right to refund to the buyer all the payments received except a sum of Rs. The agreement further provided that the buyer shall pay the balance and take possession of the entire first floor within 15 days to the receipt of the numberice received from the vendor that the premises is ready for delivery of possession. 1,50,000 if the purchaser had failed and neglected to take possession in spite of the fact that the vendor was ready and willing to deliver possession of the building in November, 1980 itself. 50,000 agreed to be paid under the settlement. The materials on record do number show that the vendors had any immediate buyers for purchasing the property. If the case of the appellant had number been believed only a sum of Rs. 3,50,000 in cash and obtained acknowledgment of the same and also an undertaking that they shall number present the said cheque in case they trace it for encashment. It appears from the agreement itself that the purchaser had inspected the original documents of title and the satisfied themselves as to the title of the vendor Appellants . The balance of companysideration was to be paid at the time when the vendor companyld deliver possession of the entire first floor premises. There was numberneed for the purchaser to have backed out from the agreement to purchase because the property prices were going up and the vendor would have known that on the date of settlement the property would have fetched much larger money. 10,00,000 issued on 10th June, 1980 refunding part of the advance of Rs. 50,000 to the purchaser which means a total financial loss of Rs. 1,50,000 on the default of the buyer to perform their part of the companytract. The High Court was also of the view that there was numberneed for paying the additional sum of Rs. The endorsement of cancellation in the original agreement to sell had number been registered. 9 lacs before 21st October, 1980 as provided in the agreement. 13,00,000 received is admitted. It was the further case of the appellant that while the suit was pending the parties entered into a settlement by which the appellant plaintiff agreed to return the sum of Rs. It is in those circumstances the appellants filed a claim application before the Commissioner claiming that the property is number liable for attachment and for removal of the attachment. 1,50,000 by way of liquidated damages and the burner shall have numberclaim over the sellers or in respect of the property. 3,00,000 was agreed to be paid and the sale companypleted. There is numberdispute that the property in dispute belonged to this partnership firm. The appellant who claimed to be the owner of the property in possession filed an objection against attachment on 24th April, 1987 before the respondent. 329 of 1981 on the file of the High Court at Calcutta for a declaration that the agreement had became void and unenforceable and also for a praying for cancellation of the same. 158, Dharamtolla Street, Calcutta along with all appurtenants attached thereto under an order of attachment dated 14th April, 1987. The learned Judges further directed the Commissioner to take steps to put up the property for sale by public auction. 3,00,000 was remaining unpaid. The Appellant Kali Durga Estate is a partnership firm of which Mr. Manicklal Mukherjee who is representing the same in this appeal in a partner. In order to avoid any cloud of title the appellants also filed on 28th April, 1981 suit No. 16 lacs. The records do number show whether any interim order was given but do show that numberice was issued in that application to the defendent. The learned Judges have proceeded on surmises and suspicion. The learned Judges rejected the claim on the following reasoning. Ramaswami, J. The objection petition was forwarded by the respondent to the High Court for adjudication.
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1992_483.txt
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A 3 dated 21.7.1963. After taking delivery of the possession on October 20, 1961, they assigned the Plaint Schedule property to the plaintiff. A 3 on July 21, 1961, he lawfully came into possession and the same was delivered in turn to the plaintiffs. Under those circumstances, the question arises whether they are entitled to a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his possession? Though the trial Court and the appellate Court had accepted the case of the appellant, the High Court has pointed out that aforesaid documents are material for deciding the companytroversy and the companyrts below had number companysidered those documents in proper perspective. Leave granted.
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1996_1531.txt
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Yashpal Mehra. The main thrust of the defendants was that this tenancy which was entered into between the plaintiff and the four defendants namely Sh Charanjit Lal Mehra, Sh. It was also admitted that the tenancy companymenced from October 1,1977 on a monthly rent of Rs.2500/ under rent numbere dated September 4,1977. The defence put in by the defendant petitioners was that the tenancy was number a joint one but it was a separate, independent and distinct tenancy of the four individuals and they were liable to pay rent individually. This according to the defendants, indicated that the plaintiff herself treated the defendants as separate tenants. This application was opposed by the defendants by filing a detailed reply and a plea taken was that it was number a joint tenancy and it was individual tenancy and each one of the tenants has to pay rent at the rate of Rs.625/ . From this letter an argument was sought to be raised that this was number a companyposite tenancy but it was an individual tenancy. Therefore, one isolated letter does number change the character of the tenancy and accordingly, learned Single Judge found that there is admission on the part of the defendants that there is a joint tenancy and the rent exceeded more than Rs.3500/ . The plaintiff respondent No.1 then terminated the tenancy of the defendant petitioners by separate legal numberice dated October 8,2001. Therefore, it was number a joint companymon tenancy and as such the quantum of rent of each individual tenant did number exceed Rs.3500/ per month. In this companynection, the plaintiff wrote a letter on September 17,1992 that Yashpal Mehra is one of the tenants and he is number the only tenant. Since the monthly rent of the demised premises became Rs. 42,000/ as it was tendered on behalf of one of the defendants only. It was also companytended that the defendants individual share of rent never reached the figure of Rs.3,500/ . The rent was increased from time to time by serving numberice under Section 6A of the Act. It was also companytended that the numberice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been taken to be one whereas there should have been four separate numberices for four separate tenancies and this single numberice cannot terminate the four tenancies. But later on the plaintiff accepted the cheque on March 24,1994 for a sum of Rs.60,000/ which was tendered on behalf of all four defendants. Respondent No.1 filed a suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages mesne profit against the defendant petitioners alleging therein that the premises in question was let out to the defendant petitioners jointly on a monthly rent of Rs.2500/ vide agreement dated September 4, 1977. Learned Single Judge of the High Court examined the matter in detail and found that in fact there was a companymon companyposite tenancy and number individual tenancy created in favour of four defendants each. The defendants did number dispute their liability to pay the arrears of rent from September, 2004 but they denied the liability to pay damages mesne profits. On July 28,2001 the plaintiff respondent No.1 served a numberice on the defendant petitioners under Section 6A read with Section 8 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act , numberifying therein that the rent would be increased by 10 per cent with effect from September 1,2001. For the period from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 2001 the defendant petitioners paid rent at the rate of Rs.3327/ per month. The above stipulated rent will include the ground rent if any house tax and all other Government and Municipal Corporation rates, charges and taxes of all kinds which are payable by the lessor as owner or which may be levied by any Authority hereinafter on the Lessor as owner. The rent was increased from time to time at the rate of 10 per cent per month. The tenancy companymenced with effect from October 1, 1977. The learned Judge rightly companymented that the letter did number indicate that there were separate tenancies. It was pointed out that in the companymunication made by the plaintiff on September 17,1992 the plaintiff refused to accept the cheque for a sum of Rs. In fact, in the said letter, Yashpal Mehra was described as a companytenant. Xx xx xx. Therefore, on the admission of the defendants, learned Single Judge accepted the application under Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C. The defendants did number dispute the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. And whereas the Lessees have agreed to take the demised premises on lease on the companyenants and companyditions mutually agreed to and appearing hereinafter NOW THIS DEED OF LEASE WITNESSETH AS UNDER In companysideration of the rent hereby reserved and the companyenants hereinafter companytained to be observed and performed, the Lessor do hereby grant to the Lessees ALL THAT the aforesaid demised premises more particularly shown in the plan annexed hereto on a monthly rent of Rs.2500 Rs. One of the companymunications was of the date August 19,1992 when a cheque for a sum of Rs.42,500/ as arrears of rent was tendered to the respondent No.1 plaintiff for the period from April 1, 1991 to August 31,1992 and the cheque was signed by only one person i.e. 3659/ which is more than Rs.3500/ with effect from September 1,2001, the provisions of the Act ceased to apply to the demised premises. The suit was companytested by the defendant petitioners by filing written statement. Aggrieved against the said order, a revision application was filed before the High Court and the learned Single Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties and examining the matter in detail came to the companyclusion that the admitted facts are that i there existed the relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties which is created by the lease deed executed on 4th September 1997 numberice of termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been duly served and numberice for enhancement of rent from time to time under Section 6A of the Act had also been served iii the rate of rent exceeded Rs.3500/ per month when the numberice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served the rent was always tendered on behalf of all four brothers and number individually on behalf of any of them. A N D S Shri Charanjit Lal Mehra, Ashok Kumar Mehra, Ashwani Kumar Mehra and Yash Pal Mehra all sons of late Shri Devi Dass Mehra r o G 25, N.D.S.E.I, New Delhi hereinafter called the lessees which expression shall include unless repugnant to the companytext its heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns and shall include partnership firms and private limited companypanies in formation by the partners of the above said firms of the other part. The plaintiff respondent No.1 thereupon filed the suit for recovery of possession as well as for recovery of arrears of rent for the month of September October, 2001 and pendente lite and future interest and mesne profit damages at the rate of Rs.40,000/ . The said numberice was duly served on the defendant petitioners by registered post with acknowledgment due on October 11,2001. In their written statement they also made a reference to letters dated August 3,1992 and September 17,1992, which according to the defendants, supported their version that they were separate, independent and distinct tenants. A caveat was filed on behalf of plaintiff respondent No.1. and Municipal rates, charges and taxes of all kinds shall be payable by the Lessor. The learned Single Judge examined the matter and found that this subsequent cheque of Rs.60,000/ was sent on behalf of four brothers. Subsequently when a cheque for a sum of Rs.60,000/ was sent as rent for the period from April 1, 1991 to May 31, 1993 the same was accepted by the landlady vide receipt dated May 24,1993. Kamal Saroj Mahajan wife of Shri Madan Mohan Mahajan, r oAsandh Road, Panipat, hereinafter called the lessor which expression shall include unless repugnant to the companytext its heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns of the one part. The lease deed recital reads as under LEASE DEED This lease deed made this 4th day of Sept.1977 between Smt. Service of numberice dated July 28,2001 under Section 6A of the Act and numberice dated 8th October, 2004 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was number denied. Hereinafter referred to as the Deemed Premises. Whereas the Lessor has agreed to let out of the Showroom on Western side on the ground from together with the entire lot on the verandah of the companymercial building No. and observed that the application made at this stage is number maintainable and the suit shall be decided recording necessary evidence of the parties in order to do companyplete justice and dismissed the application of the plaintiff filed under Order XII Rule 6, C.P.C. Learned Single Judge also referred to certain companymunications referred to by appellants. E 3 East Showroom of Escorts Modelle West Verandah and Road. E 1 and E 2 facing main Ring Road in the New Delhi South Extension Part II, Market, New Delhi known as Mahajan House, measuring about 1200 sq.ft and bounded as under North Main Ring Road South Shop No. This Special Leave Petition is filed against an order dated August 25,2004 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi whereby learned Single Judge has set aside the order dated February 13,2004 passed by the trial companyrt whereby the trial companyrt declined to pass an order of eviction moved by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter to be referred to as C.P.C. From the pleadings of the parties the trial companyrt framed certain issues and when the case was at the stage of evidence an application under Order XII Rule 6 was filed by the plaintiff on April 26,2002 for passing a judgment on the admission made in the pleadings. The said revision application came to be disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on August 25, 2004. However, learned trial companyrt did number decide this issue and felt that the same be decided after evidence was adduced and therefore, dismissed the said application. Therefore, both the parties were heard at length. Therefore, the question of number applicability of the provisions of the Act does number arise. All the taxes and all other Govt. In order to dispose of the present petition, brief facts may be detailed herein. They have also filed their written submissions. and passed a decree for eviction. Aggrieved against the said order, the present Special Leave Petition has been filed. Hence the present revision was filed before the High Court. K. MATHUR, J. Two thousand five hundred only .
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2005_156.txt
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While so, on 14.1.1998 at about 7.00 A.M., A.6 and Kilari Manoz and Chintagumpala Vamsee went to the Pathuri lands of Kilari Venkata Subbamma and others to graze their cattle. Kilari Manoz went to the village and informed about the quarrel between A6 and Chandra Murali to the elders and A.2, in spite of the request made by Chintagumpala Manohar number to do so. After some time at about 7.30 A.M., Chintagumpala Sunil, Chandra Murali and Chintagumpala Manohar also went to the Pathuri lands of Kilari Venkata Subbamma and others for answering the calls of nature and they met A.6 and Kilari Manoz and Chinthagumpala Vamsee there. A2 beat the deceased with a stick on his back. to 3 belong to the group of Chandra Tirupathaiah. All the accused hurled stones against P.Ws.1 to 3 and the deceased. A 1 beat P.W.3 with an axe on his head and A 11 beat P.W.3 with a stick on his eyebrows. On the same day, at about 12.00 numbern, A2 went to the house of Chintagumpala Manohar and kicked him on his stomach for his prevention and interference with Kilari Manoz when he was proceeding to the village for informing the quarrel to the elders. A 1 beat P.W.1 with an iron rod on his head. A6 enquired from Chandra Murali about the cricket match, as to whether it was ended as draw by calling as cricket raddaindira. The wife of A5 and the mother of Chandra Tirupathaiah i.e. At about 1.00 p.m. Al and A3 to A19 armed with deadly weapons beat the deceased and also injured P.Ws.1 to 3. P.Ws.1 and 2 and Chandra Venkateshwarlu hereinafter referred to as the deceased tried their best to companyvince P.W.3 to adjust the matter. A 1 also beat the deceased with an iron rod on his head and all over the body. A12 also beat P.W.1 with a stick on his shoulder. Al, A3, A4 and A6 to A19 are the followers of A5. By hearing such reply, A6 felt offended and grew wild against Chandra Murali and picked up quarrel with him, and there was a scuffle between them. A6, who was passing through the street, heard the cries of P.W.3 and picked up quarrel with him. P.W.11 took up investigation, examined P.Ws.1 to 3. Then, he replied in the same manner by calling A6 as match raddu kaledura. At about 5.00 p.m. P.Ws.1 to 3 went to Lingasamudram Police Station, where P.W.1 gave a statement to the police. Chandra Punnamma companytested in the Panchayat elections and was elected as Sarpanch of the village. P.W.14 companyducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased and sent the dead body for postmortem examination. P.W.14 visited the scene of offence in the presence of mediators Chandra Venkateswarlu and Choppara Kotaiah, seized sticks, iron rod and stones under a companyer of observation report and sent the deceased to the nursing home of P.W.13 for treatment. W.13 after examining the deceased declared him dead. Factual scenario giving rise to the present appeals is as follows There are political grudges and ill feelings between the groups led by A5 and Chandra Tirupathaiah in R.R. No.1 of 1998 under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 307 read with Section 149 IPC and sent the injured P.Ws.1 to 3 to the Government Hospital for treatment. Palem village. P.W.3, who is the father of P.W.6, on his return from the field came to know about beating of his son by A2, he went to Ramalayam Street questioning loudly about the illegal and high handed act of A2. As a result the deceased fell down with injuries and became unconscious. P.W.12, the Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Kandukur companyducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and issued Ex. Out of them PWs 1 to 3 were stated to be injured eye witnesses. P10 postmortem certificate opining that the deceased would appear to have died of shock due to injury No.2. PWs 1 to 3 fell down with injuries. Since then the group of the accused was waiting for an opportunity to prove their supremacy in the village. Stand of the accused before the trial Court was that the best witness would have been the father of the deceased who was number examined for reasons known to the prosecution. P.W.9 recorded the statement of P.W.1 and registered a case in Cr. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding the companyviction of the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 307 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC . The appellants who were A 1, A 2, A 5, A 8, A 11 and A 12 have been found guilty of various offences. On giving death intimation, provision of law was altered to Section 302 IPC. On companypletion of investigation police laid the charge sheet for the above offences. Accused persons pleaded innocence. In order to establish the accusations prosecution examined 14 witnesses. A 4, A 6, A 7, A 10 and A 13 to A 19 were found to be number guilty of the charged offences and they were acquitted by the trial Court. PW 4 was stated to be another eye witness. A 3 died during the companyrse of appeal. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. All the accused left the place thereafter. It was also submitted that in the Ext. P 1 report details have number been given. A 9 was acquitted by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
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2008_1688.txt
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He speaks to the respondent giving him Exs. He speaks to respondent giving him Exs. P 3 and P 4. He also speaks to the respondent having given him Exs. He speaks to the presence of P.W.2 at that meeting. P 3 and Ex. He speaks to Om Prakash Rai being present along with the respondent at that time. He speaks to Raghubar Prasad Modi speaking at that meeting as also to Om Prakash Rais speech. W. 11 speaks to respondent having given him Ex. P 3, P 4 P 5 on 10th March. He speaks about the meeting presided over by Vijay Kumar Malaiya who was proposed by the respondent as the president. He also speaks of having gone to the respondents house and having seen Vinod Kumar Rai there. He speaks to his having attended the meeting on 4 3 1972 and refers to the speech made by Raghubar Prasad Modi, Om Prakash Rai and the respondent. He speaks to the meeting held on 4th March 1972 to support the respondent addressed by Om Prakash Rai Vijay Kumar Malaiya and also to the respondent giving him pamphlets Exs. He speaks to respondent accompanied by Vinod Kumar Rai having companye to his Mohalla and his being given leaflets for distribution. P 4, accompained the respondent on his election propaganda. He speaks to respondent giving him 10 or 11 leaflets for distribution. P 3, P 4, P 5, P 6 and P 8 and two public meetings held on 4 3 1972 and 8 3 1972. W.26 worked for the respondent in his election. If the witness was a Congress man he was number to be believed as he was a Congress man. P 3 first. P.W.1 gave evidence that Suman worked for the respondent in the election and he and Vijay Kumar Agarwal, who is responsible for the printing of Ex. He speaks to P.W.1 and Om Prakash Rai working for respondent, as also Raghubar Prasad Modi and his sons Ajit Modi and Kamal Modi, Uma Agarwal and his son V. K. Agarwal as well as Atul Kumar Shrivastav, respondents companysin. P 52 was filed by the respondent along with the account of his election expenses. He was number working for any candidate in the election. He had taken numberinterest in the election of any candidate. If he was a number Congress man he was a tenant of a Congress man or a tenant of a relative of a Congress man and therefore companyld number be believed. R.9 and R.10 are the declarations in respect of the pamphlet given by Suman. W.24 is a member of the Jan Sangh party who worked for the respondent in his election. He also gave evidence that the manuscript was given to him by the respondent who was accompanied by Suman and one Vinod Kumar Rai. W.65 is another witness who was engaged by the respondent to distribute the pamphlets. The respondent would number have been foolish enough to hangover the pamphlets to the witness. W.6 does number belong to any political party number did be work for any of the candidates in the election. The printing of this pamphlet was admitted by R.W.2, Ramesh Chand Jain, an advocate, who got it printed along with Atul Kumar Shrivastaya, a companysin of the respondent. He spoke to the respondents part in the printing of this document. It was printed in the Kailash Printing Press and the son of the proprietor was examined as P.W.64. In the election held on 11th March, 1972 to the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh from Damoh companystituency the respondent, an independent candidate, was declared elected. The appellant, the Congress candidate filed an election petition for declaring the election of the respondent void on various grounds all of which were found number proved by the learned Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh who tried the petition. The declaration in respect of this document was given by one Ajit Modi who also is an active worker of the respondent. W.7 is a retired Assistant Conservator of Forest and belongs to numberpolitical party and he did number work for any body in the election. Admittedly also the respondent bad placed other orders with Chhabi Printing Press. 29 of 1972. 50 said to bave been paid for this printing. But their case was that it was printed in order to present it to the Chief Minister, Mr. P. C. Sethi when he was expected to visit Damoh on 28 2 1972 and as he did number do so the pamphlets were destroyed. We are companycerned only with the charge of companyrupt practices under section 123 4 of the Representation of the People Act in respect of five pamphlets marked Exs. His brother and father also were respondents partisans. But his father did number give any evidence prejudicial to the respondent. From the judgment and order dated the 5th April, 1973 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. A suggestion made to him was that his brother was sentenced to death in a murder case and the murdered man was a relative of the respondent. It is unnecessary to go on multiplying the evidence. In certain cases he has disbelieved the evidence of witnesses on the ground that they were number on visiting terms with the respondent. W.4 is a kirana shopkeeper. One of the reasons for disbelieving him was that his father also gave evidence. We shall number take up the question regarding Ex. K. Gambhir and V. J. Francis, for the respondent. The learned judges criticism regarding this witness and the rejection of his evidence cannot be supported. 1174 of 1973. He is number shown to belong to, any party. W.5 is a retired Sub Inspector of Police. S. Dharamadhikari, T. P. Naik and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. The petition was companysequently dismissed and this appeal is against that dismissal. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1975_47.txt
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1,000/ only towards arrears of tax. The companyplainant then approached Lokayukta Police on 09.07.1993 and lodged his companyplaint Ext. On 09.07.1993 the appellant along with his driver A 2 and peon came to the office of the companyplainant and demanded the amount of Rs.1,000/ . As directed by the appellant, the companyplainant gave the amount to the driver A 2 who kept the amount with himself. On the other hand the explanation offered was that the amount was forcibly thrust by the companyplainant. It was observed that the amount of Rs.1,000/ was number given towards the bribe but was paid towards the arrears of tax and that, the machinery having been released in favour of the companyplainant numberwork was in fact pending. 15,000/ and it was unimaginable that the companyplainant would pay Rs. After a signal was given, Lokayukta Police came and caught hold of the appellant as well as the driver A 2 from whose person the amount of Rs.1,000/ was recovered. 1,000/ as bribe and that the amount was paid as per his directions to accused No.2. It was further submitted that the facts on record would show that the companyplainant PW1 and shadow witness Umesh PW3 had deposed companysistently about the appellant demanding Rs. The High Court after analyzing the evidence on record found that in the explanation given by the appellant Exhibit P 9 immediately after the trap, numberhing was suggested that the amount in question was received towards arrears of taxes. In the Appeal preferred by the State it was submitted that 50 of the arrears on tax would companye to about Rs. After taking requisite steps a trap was laid. The Special Judge acquitted the appellant and the driver A 2 mainly on two grounds. On companypletion of investigation and grant of sanction vide Ext. P 2, the charge sheet was submitted. 2 was affirmed. The acquittal of accused No. In this appeal after grant of special leave to appeal, the appellant was directed to be released on bail.
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2014_536.txt
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The rice was sold as ordinary boiled rice. It is alleged on behalf of the State, that the price for which the boiled rice. The permit was described as an export permit. The stuff should be got checked by the Assistant Grain Purchasing Officer assisted by the Food Inspector companycerned while loading into the wagon and a certificate should be got recorded on the permit itself that the stuff loaded is broken rice and number whole rice and the quantity loaded. numberices of auction of boiled rice were issued under the orders of the High Court. But, they companytented themselves with some cross examination of the Assistant Director of Marketing in the companyrse of which it was number suggested to the Assistant Director that the test of broken rice was itself incorrect. This price, it was submitted, companyld only be fetched by whole rice. If the respondents understood what their permits meant, they companyld number, under the guise of these permits, transport any other kind of rice. The Assistant Director of Marketing, who made the analysis, was produced in evidence. 256 302/75 and 437 483/75 respectively. Director of Marketing should have himself given evidence before his report companyld be treated as evidence. The District Judge did number companysider the report of the Assistant Marketing officer of Chitur, after an analysis carried out in the presence of the District Revenue officer, to be a sufficient companypliance with the requirement to give due opportunity to the respondents to show what the companysignments companytained. Hence, with the abovementioned numberification of the orders of the Revenue Officer by adding 2 for foreign matter to the amount released as equivalent of broken rice, the respondents appeals were dismissed by the Sessions Judge on 20th November, 1974. It was their duty to abide by the terms of their permits, and to show, when proceeded against, that they did so. And, this second analysis took place in the presence of the respondents. seized from the Railway wagons, was sold on 5th October, 1972.
was about Rs. After the case had been remanded, there was a fresh analysis with fresh samples taken under the orders of the High Court. 100 146 of 1976. The respondent had full opportunity of cross examining him and also of giving their own versions. During the pendency of the revision applications in the High Court. Both sides filed revision applications. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos. 30 lakhs. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 29 8 75 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl.
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1976_178.txt
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It utilised the import entitlements in purchasing palm oil from foreign companyntries. The imported palm oil was companysumed internally by the assesses for manufacturing other products. Since the assessee paid a lower price for the imported palm oil the assessee made a larger profit than what it would have made had it purchased palm oil locally at a higher rate. The companytention of the assessee is that the oil which was purchased by the assessee from foreign companyntries on the strength of the import entitlement was at a rate much lower than the rate obtaining in the Indian market for similar products. The particulars of the products manufactured by the assessee utilising palm oil have number been given in the order of the Tribunal. The assessee is a manufacturing companypany. The assessee had also exported groundnut oil which resulted in an apparent loss of Rs. However, for the exports made at a loss, the assessee was rewarded with import entitlements. 3,44 lakhs. The assessee, therefore, would be entitled to benefit of Section 2 5 i of the Finance No. The assessment years involved in these matters are 1962 63 and 1963 64. In the relevant years of account, it made large profits.
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1997_1471.txt
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to them the employees provident fund act does number apply. therefore the only item in reference number 54 of 1966 which is relevant for the purpose of this appeal is the following whether the benefit of the employees provident fund act 1952 should be extended to any additional categories of workmen ? the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by alagiriswami j. this appeal is by special leave granted by this companyrt against the award of the industrial tribunal bihar at patna in reference number 54 of 1966 made by the government of bihar on 25th numberember 1966.
the special leave granted is limited only to the question whether there should be a companytributory provident fund scheme on the basis of basic wages or total wages. it was numbered at the time of granting the special leave that the appellant board is willing to extend that scheme to all the workers except the government servants who are on deputation and those to whom the employees provident fund act applies. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2104 of 1969.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 27th february 1969 of the industrial tribunal bihar patna in reference number 54 of 1966.
v. gupte and u. p. singh for the appellant. if so what should be the terms and companyditions and from what date ? e k. nag and d. p. mukherjee for respondents.
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1975_284.txt
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In the year 1976 his name was number included in the select list as there was an adverse entry in his companyfidential roll of 1973 74. It appears that there were also adverse entries in the annual companyfidential roll of the appellant for the year 1974 75. The adverse entry made in the companyfidential roll for the year 1973 74 was expunged by the State Government on December 3, 1980 and the adverse entries in the companyfidential roll for the year 1974 75 were expunged by two orders dated February 21, 1978 and October 7, 1980. On this occasion the appellant represented to the Committee that the adverse entries in his companyfidential rolls had been removed by the State Government by various orders and requested them to companysider his case for promotion to the Indian Police Service Cadre. There was numbermeeting of the Selection Committee from 1977 to 1980. The Selection Committee took the decision to supersede the appellant at its meeting held on December 22, 1976 in view of the above entry in the companyfidential roll of the appellant. On this occasion the Committee did number look into the companyfidential rolls of the appellant for the years 1979 80 and 1980 81 which companytained entries very favourable to the appellant for numberfault of the appellant. The reasons given by the Committee for superseding the appellant based on the companyfidential roll were these Delayed disposal of pending papers and supervision numberes. The appellant represented to the Committee and the State Government against the decision taken by the Committee. In the years 1973, 1974 and 1975, he companyld number be included in the select list as he was junior to those who were included in the select list. The appellant made representations in respect of both the adverse entries in time. It is number disputed that the said adverse entry was companymunicated to the appellant in the year 1977 after the above meeting was over. The Committee, however, classified him as good but did number include him in the select list while some of his juniors were included. The Committee again met on October 14, 1981. His case was placed before the Committee companystituted under Regulation 4 of the Regulations for the purpose of preparation of the list of suitable officers for promotion to the Indian Police Service Cadre of the State of Bihar in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. They were companymunicated to the appellant in the year 1976. In 1973 he was eligible to be companysidered for appointment as a member of the Indian Police Service under the provisions of the Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Rules read with the Indian Police Service Appointment by Promotion Regulations, 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Regulations framed under sub rule 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules. 1420 of 1982. From the Judgment and Order dated 5th October, 1982 of the Patna High Court at Patna in C.W.J.C. When numberhing came out of the representations made by him, the appellant filed a writ petition questioning the validity of the decisions of the Selection Committee before the High Court of Patna. The facts of the case are these The appellant was directly recruited and appointed as a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Police Department of the State of Bihar in the year 1964. 20th Oct., 1975. Jha, for the Appellant. It, however, met on March 11/12, 1981. No.1420 of 1982 on the file of the High Court of Patna dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8491 of 1983. This is an appeal by special leave against the order dated October 5,1982 in C.W.J.C. Inadequate companytrol over office, judgment, initiative, sense of responsibility and management reported to be just fair. R. Mridul, and M.P. His main grievance was that they had been made by his official superior who was biased against him. B. Singh, for the Respondents The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1984_16.txt
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Nanda as the arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause. It was companytended on behalf of the appellant that the arbitrator had numberjurisdiction to deal with such claims. The value of the work was Rs.9,99,510. All the documents and relevant papers were produced before the arbitrator. Before the arbitrator, the respondent filed the claim raising some claims which, according to the appellant, were fictitious and baseless. However, on the application of the respondent the learned Subordinate Judge removed Shri A.N Nanda and appointed one Shri B. Patnaik as the arbitrator. The respondent, thereafter, raised a claim and gave numberice for appointment of an arbitrator. It may be mentioned that the application was made for removal of the arbitrator Shri B. Patnaik but the same was ultimately dismissed. These claims were for the alleged extra work in respect of which the decision of the Superintending Engineer under clause 11 of the companytract was final and the same was excluded from the purview of the arbitration clause. The arbitrator made the said award on 18th March, 1983 but the same was a number speaking and numberreasoned award for a lump sum of Rs.15,23,657 plus interest 10 from 9.9.1975 till the date of payment or decree. The appellant filed a companynter claim for Rs.2,11,400, denying all the claims of the respondent. It is asserted by the appellant that the respondent companytractor accepted the final payment and was duly paid a sum of Rs.23,74,001 for the work done by him including the extra work. The work pursuant to the companytract companymenced on 4th May, 1973 and 4th November, 1974 was the stipulated date of company pletion of the work. During 1973 74 the respondent was entrusted with the job of Construction of Ramaguda Minor Irrigation project in Kukudakhandi Block vide agreement No. Consequently, the Chief Engineer appointed one Shri A.N. K. Mehta and Miss Mona Mehta for the Appellant. However, on 30th December, 1975 the work was actually companypleted. There was an appeal to the High Court and the High Court set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and made the award of the arbitrator, rule of the Court. It arises out of a companytract entered into between the State and the respondent for the companystruction of certain projects for irrigation. L. Sanghi and Vinoo Bhagat for the Respondents. From the Judgment and order dated 6.7.1987 of the Orissa High Court in C.M.C. On 28th September, 1976 the last payment was alleged to have been made by the respondent. On 30th October, 1976 the last bill was prepared which was nil one. Thereafter, numberamount was due to the respondent, according to the appellant, and he did number raise any claim whatsoever before the Department. 1389 of 1988. 375 of 1984. Being aggrieved thereby the State of Orissa has preferred this appeal. Objections to the said award were filed in the Court. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. It also directed payment of further interest at 6. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of orissa, dated 6th July, 1987. 4 F 2. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1988_210.txt
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Having heard learned companynsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal having found that the driver of the vehicle in question did number possess an effective and valid licence and, therefore, while directing the appellant to pay the amount to the claimants on the premise that they were third parties and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle, the High Court while entertaining the appeal of the appellant companyld number have set aside that portion of the order. Leave granted.
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2008_2390.txt
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Accused Mukesh died during the pendency of the trial, while another accused PappuDeepak was acquitted by the trial companyrt. As numbered above, accused Mukesh died during the pendency of the trial and accused Deepak was acquitted of the charges. It is stated that on 17.11.1995, the occurrence took place in which due to the assaults made by the accused persons Umesh breathed his last, while three of the persons 2 Bhagirath PW8, Bherulal PW9 and Yogesh PW10 sustained injuries. Reliance was placed on the evidence of PWs 8,9 and 10 by the trial companyrt to record, companyviction, so far as accused Rakesh and present appellant Jitu Jitender are companycerned. Four persons faced trial for allegedly companymitting murder of one Umesh hereinafter referred to as the deceased . On the basis of the information lodged by PW8 law was set into motion and investigation was companyducted. Dr.ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. On companypletion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench upholding the companyviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC . The High Court found numbersubstance in the appeal and, as numbered above, dismissed it. The stand taken before the High Court is reiterated in the present appeal by the learned companynsel for the appellant.
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2009_418.txt
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Group were companynected with the Indian Company through the export companypany. Cameron stated in that affidavit that he was the Secretary of the assessee and was in superin tendence of the proceedings relating to the assessments of the assessee as representative assessee of the ten number residents. 1955 between the Indian Company and Crane Packing Ltd. companypany in Group B , the Tribunal was right in holding that the number resident companypany had business companynection with the Indian Company and, therefore, the Indian Company was company rectly treated as an agent of the said number resident companypany under section 163 of the Income tax Act, 1961? Ltd. number resident companypany in Group B , the Tribunal was right in holding that the number resident companypany had business companynection with the Indian Company and, there fore, the Indian Company was companyrectly treated as an agent of the said numberresident companypany under section 163 of the Income tax Act, 1961? Along with the memoranda of appeal filed before the Tribunal, the assessee filed the affidavit of Cameron. The Tribunal grouped the ten numberresident companypanies under three heads six in Group A, three in Group B and one in Group C. In regard to the companypanies under Group A, the assesee had numberdirect agreement but had dealings by virtue of its agreement with the exporting companypany. The Tribunal referred the following six questions for opinion of the Court Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on a proper companystruction of the agreement between the Indian Company and the Export Company, the Tribunal was right in holding that the six number resident companypanies in Group A had a business companynection with the Indian Company and therefore that the Indian Company was companyrectly treated as an agent of the said number resident companypanies under section 163 of the Income tax Act, 1961? The Income tax Officer also found that the Group A companypanies belonging to the T.I. Group in the United Kingdom with which the Indian Company had numberdirect companytract, but which supply goods to India as per orders placed by the Indian Company through the number residents . M. Sales Ltd., assesseerespondent, was assessed to income tax as a representative assessee of ten number resident companypanies. Before him, the assessee tried to establish the actual companyrse of dealing between the Indian Company and the ten number residents and companytended that numberliability under the Act accrued. So far as the three companypanies under Group B are companycerned, the assessee had numberbusiness companynection with them and so far as the only companypany under Group C is companycerned, the assessees stand was that it had an agreement dated 16.12.1948 with the export companypany, but numberliability accrued under the law in respect of the trans actions. Along with the grounds of the appeal filed before the Tribunal, an affidavit dated 27.12.1965 of Carol Sturart Cameron was filed. That affidavit is dated 27.12.1965. The Income tax Officer referred specifically to the agreement of 1948 and refuted the stand of the assessee by saying The agreement of 6.12.1948 referred to above which companytinued during the relevant years is clear authority that the number resident had employed the Indian Company for selling its goods in India on companymission. The Indian Company is in receipt of companymission calculated with reference to the aforesaid values of goods sent number only by the number residents, but also by some manufacturers of the T.I. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shows that Cameron appeared before him at the hearing on 3.9.1965 and 4.9.1965 and the appeals were dismissed by order dated 17.9.1965. In the light of the affidavit of Cameron, it took numbere of the fact that numberattempt had been made by the Revenue to traverse the facts stated therein, referred to and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income tax, Punjab R.D. The Appellate Authority dismissed the companytentions of the assessee by holding that the assessee has produced numberproof of its assertions and on the companytrary, has blocked the enquiry by me thereon. The Revenue had numberice of it and the Tribunal in its decision has stated along with the grounds of appeal before us, there is an affidavit by Shri Cameron setting out the companyrse of dealing and alleging that several of these representatives files were inspected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner at the time of hearing of the appeals. The agreement certainly brings into existence a business companynection between the two. If the answer to question No. Aggarwal Co., 56 ITR 20 and came to hold that there was numberelement of business companynection and, therefore, the assessee was number liable. In that affidavit, he denied the fact that before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner any obstruction was offered to an attempted probe by the said Appellate Authori ty. It is the stand of the respondent that Camerons affida vit came within the ambit of Rule 10 and had, therefore, been filed along with the memoranda of appeals before the Tribunal. The short facts relevant for appreciating the background in which these questions arose are these T.I. C. Manchanda, V.Gauri Shankar, M.B. These are appeals by the Revenue by special leave and are directed against the decision of the Calcutta High Court dated 15.9.1972 rendered upon references made under section 256 1 of the Income tax Act of 1961. Questions 1, 3 and 5 were thus answered in the negative and against the Revenue and, there fore, Questions 2, 4 and 6 which were required to be an swered only if the answer to the other three questions was in the affirmative did number arise. Appeals challenging the assessment were taken to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 1449 1456 of 1974. Dutt, Ms. S. Seal and D.N. Dr. Devi Pal, H.K. 128 and 160 of 1967. From the Judgment and Order dated 15/21.9.1972 of the Calcutta High Court in I.T.R Nos. Rao and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Appellants. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. Gupta for the Respondent.
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1987_171.txt
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The employees then filed writ petition No. 3885 of 1994 challenging the order of termination dated 30.12.1993. The original writ petitioners before the learned single Judge worked for certain periods with the appellant Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams as Nominal Muster Rolls for short NMR employees. This order was challenged by the employees by filing Writ Petition No. The appellant then issued numberices to the companycerned employees on 26.10.1993 and after companysidering their reply, passed an order on 30.12.1993 terminating their services on the ground that they were over age and, therefore, ineligible for appointment. The order of termination dated 16.4.1993 was set aside leaving it open to the appellant to take fresh action after giving numberice to the companycerned employees. 1060, Revenue, Endt. After verification of the records and other documents it was found that all the five writ petitioners were overage and were number eligible for appointment and accordingly their services were terminated on 16.4.1993. A circular was issued by the appellant on 25.7.1990 wherein it was mentioned that in case of any vacancies, ex employees should be appointed in order of seniority. 5176 of 1993, which was allowed only on the ground that the action had been taken against the writ petitioners without issuing any numberice and without giving an opportunity of hearing. 5 was entitled for exemption from the requirement of age limit having regard to certain GOs issued by the Revenue Department of the State Governments. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 21.1.2003 of a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court by which the writ appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed and the judgment and order dated 20.11.1997 of a learned Single Judge, by which the writ petition filed by the respondents was allowed with certain directions, was affirmed. I department, dated 24.10.1989 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a companyy of this order. The writ appeal filed by the appellant was summarily dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by a brief order. P. MATHUR, J.
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2007_1432.txt
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Nafees, Ishrat and Farukh came there. Sangita had introduced her to Nafees, Anwar, Salim, Farukh and Ishrat. Sangita told her that he was Shamshu Meradona. Farukh and Anwar were also with him. Sangita and Nafees went out and sat in the verandah and only she remained in the room with Anwar. Three boys came to that party who were introduced by Sangita as Anwar, Farukh and Nafees. On the other hand Ishrat and Nafees denied having those photographs. She had told Sangita about it, Sohail avoided giving the photographs on the pretext that they were with Ishrat and Nafees. Nafees etc. She told her that Nafees etc. Sangita also introduced her to Archana and Poonam. The house where the party was held was the house of Farukh accused as told by Sangita. She identified Farukh, Ishrat, Anwar, Meradona and Puttan in the dock. Another person came there whose name was Ishrat as told by Sangita. This witness companyrectly identified Ishrat, Meradona, Farukh and Anwar in the dock. Nafees was also present there. They had told her that if she brought her Sangita then they would return the photographs. The time then was about 9.30 10.30 a.m. After they had reached that house Farukh, Anwar, Ishrat and Nafees came there. While Meradona was strolling outside the house the four girls alongwith Anwar, Farukh and Nafees sat in the house and were chatting with them. Farukh requested Archana to accompany him for a stroll whereafter Archana went with Farukh. She alongwith Monika, Farukh and Naseem went to the poultry farm of Farukh in a Maruti van at about 10.00 a.m. Anwar and Ishrat accused had also companye there. Therefore, when Sangita again requested her to accompany her 2 3 days later she refused to accompany Sangita and in fact stopped talking to Sangita. She asked Sangita to persuade her mother to permit her to attend the function and Sangita obliged her. She had told Sangita about the photographs and she had assured her that she would recover the photographs and in that companynection they had talked to Rajendra Singh Rajawat Sohail had told her that she companyld get back the photographs only if she came with Sangita because photographs of Sangita have also to be taken in that very posture. She later gave her photograph to Nafees directly. After reaching the farm house she was taken to a room by Sangita where she sat alone. She alongwith Sangita, Archana and Poonam went to the farm in a white Maruti van standing outside the school driven by Meradona. She went with Nafees to another room to discuss about her joining the Congress Party while Farukh and Anwar waited outside. Some days later Farukh and Nafees met her near the Collectorate while she was on her way to school. All of them sat in the car and she identified two of them, namely Nafees and Farukh. Nafees had told him that Babli was his boss and that she should please him. She was known to Sangita Sharma PW 15 . Farukh was also in the car. She had once seen Monika and Nirmala in the companypany of Farukh and Anwar at the Fie Sagar farm house. It was represented to her by Sangita that they were sons of her fathers friend. Thereafter Ishrat and Poonam went out of the room. Instead of dropping her at the school they took her to the farm house where Anwar and Ishrat were also present. In this manner PW 17 alleged that she had been raped by Ishrat, Nafees, Zameer, Farukh, Babli, Sohail and Puttan. It was decided that she would pick her up at 8.00 a.m. Sangita came to her house alongwith Anwar and Salim. 10 15 days thereafter Sangita again requested her to accompany her to poultry farm near Hatundi. In the companyrse of her cross examination she stated that she did number mention to Sangita about the behavior of Anwar. After taking food while they were talking, Monika went with Anwar while Farukh took her to a room. 2 3 days thereafter she was again requested by Sangita to accompany her. Some moments later Nafees also came out of the room. The Maruti van was being driven by Meradona accused . She was told by Sangita that the farm belonged to the boy named Salim, who was also present there. Chhavi Daka PW 53 was also a friend of Sangita PW 15 . She knew Sangita PW 15 very well as they used to study in the same school. Ishrat accused again took her for a stroll. They were dropped by Meradona who was driving the Maruti van. She refused his proposal and requested Sangita to leave immediately. She had gone in a Maruti van to a farm house near Hatundi. She stated that Sangita had taken her to the farm on the pretext of her birthday party but after going to the farm she found that there was numberbirthday party. She companyld number identify Puttan or Anwar. They all sat in the lawn and Ishrat took her around and showed her the farm. Archana Chaudhary PW 34 deposed that in the year 1991 she had been invited by Sangita PW 15 for her birthday party at the farm. When she enquired about Ishrat they closed the door and Puttan as well as Sohail Gani raped her. A white Maruti van was standing outside the school driven by Meradona. 2 4 days later Sangita again requested her to go with her and then she again went to that place. One day Sohail Gani and Puttan accused met her in the market and told her that Ishrat had called her. One day when they were going together Nafees met them on the way. Thereafter they all sat in the Maruti van and were dropped outside the school. Nafees hugged and kissed her despite her opposition to which she protested and came out of the room. They had companye in a Maruti van. That was the first day when she had been to the farm house and thereafter she never went to the farm house. In or about the year 1990 1991 Sangita had invited her to a family party where some other friends were also invited. In the process she was also raped by Farukh and one Babli who had companye from America. 1 as her photograph and that was the photograph which was taken by Puttan but she companyld number identify the person who was with her in that photograph. They all went to poultry, farm of Salim in Hatundi. Puttan also photographed her while she was being raped by Sohail Gani. However, she identified accused Anwar in the dock. Thereafter Ishrat forcibly removed her clothes and she started crying. He look her to the bungalow of Farukh at Fie Sagar Road. Apart from the driver there was another person in the van whose name was Anwar. One day when she was going to school Nafees told her that he would drop her at the school and since she was getting late she accepted the offer. She was raped by Nafees in the bungalow who threatened her saying that her sister will also be kidnapped and they would do the same thing to her. Thereafter when she went inside the room to bring her dupatta Nafees pushed her inside the room and bolted the door. Food was called for which was brought by Meradona. On 15th January, 1991 she was told by Sangita that there was a function at Hatundi which will be attended by her family members as well as those five persons i.e. She did number approve of Anwar touching her as it appeared to be improper. Five photographs were shown to the victim and she identified photograph No. Thereafter she did number visit the farm house. When they came to her again she found that another girl Chhavi Daka was also in the Maruti van. They enquired about Madhu and she introduced Madhu to them. She came outside and told Archana and Poonam to leave for home. She was surprised to find that other family members were number present and when she questioned Sangita about it she did number get a proper reply. They all sat in a room and talked for a while. They talked for sometime and thereafter food was brought by Meradona but she ate the food which she had carried with her to the school. After sitting for a companysiderable period in the room she came out and met Anwar who sought her friendship. She was introduced to those two persons by Deepak Chaudhary and ultimately Nafees offered to get her an assignment in the Congress Party so that she companyld begin her political career. While talking with her Anwar caught hold of her hand and tried to kiss her and also started touching her clothes. Seven days later she again met Nafees near the Collectorate and he had warned her that if she mentioned about the earlier incident to anyone anything companyld happen. Thereafter at about 3 45 p.m. they were all taken in the Maruti van and dropped outside the school. Ishrat accused became emotional and started narrating companyplets and his love story. They were both students of Class XI and had gone in a Maruti van which was standing in front of the school. Thereafter he raped her and told her that she should number talk about it to anyone. Amongst the accused only Sayed Anwar Chisti examined four witnesses in defence. She was forcibly thrown on the bed in that room and was raped by Ishrat who warned her number to talk to anyone about the incident as that would only result in her loss of reputation. Rajendra Singh Rajawat had once asked them to accompany him to recover the photographs and therefore she alongwith Madhu had gone to Dargah area. She also companyfirmed that on 15th January, 1991 she had gone to the poultry farm at Hatundi with Chhavi Daka PW 53. Some days later Madhu came to her house and started weeping. Farukh Chisty was found to be mentally unbalanced and, therefore, the trial against him was suspended. had raped her and that they had also photographed her. She further deposed that she knew one Madhu Bala who was also studying in the Savitri School. After taking food Anwar asked her as to whether she would like to be his friend and to this request she answered in the affirmative. All other persons were outside the room. With a view to help Madhu she had accompanied her to get the photographs returned. She attended that party where Archana and Poonam were also present. This witness has only mentioned about this solitary incident which took place at the farm house. After they had moved about in the farm they came to the room where others were sitting but they found numberone there. She knew Monika, Nirmala, Archana and Poonam who studied with her in the same school, though in junior classes. Once she was also raped by one Zameer. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order, while upholding the companyviction of the appellants before us only under Section 376 IPC against Puttan and Ishrat and under Section 376/120B IPC against Anwar and Shamshuddin Meradona, acquitted Parvez Ansari, Mahesh Ludhani, Kailash Soni and Harish Tolani of all the charges leveled against them. She was earlier a student of Savitri School and later of Savitri College. To a question put by the Court she clarified that by touching her clothes she meant that accused Anwar had touched her clothes as also touched the organs of her body simultaneously but only the clothes were between his hand and the organs of her body. She had tried to get back those photographs from them but they made her run from pillar to post but the photographs were never given to her. They all had food at the farm and left at about 3.00 or 4.00 p.m. for their respective homes. She was companypelled to do whatever they told her to do. They went to the same house where they had gone earlier. She was thereafter taken in the car and dropped at her house. Monika Jain PW 43 deposed that in the year 1990 she was studying in XI class in Savitri School, Ajmer. While Rajendra Singh Rajawat was at some distance from them one person came and told Madhu that the game which they were playing was a game they had played long back. One other girl also joined them in the van whose name she did number know. In these circumstances she and Madhu had told one Rajendra Singh Rajawat a police companystable who introduced them to one Shri Soni working in the Special Branch of the Police. She was introduced to one Deepak Chaudhary with a view to getting some assignment in the Congress Party. PW 17, Madhu Bala was another victim who was sexually exploited by the accused. They had threatened her and told her that whenever they called her through anyone she must companye. They talked for sometime and thereafter they were served food. Thereafter they, sat under a tree. One day when she alongwith her younger sister and Deepak Chaudhary and another friend Rajesh was proceeding towards the bus stand from her house, a white Maruti car came from the opposite direction which had 2 or 3 occupants who seemed to know Deepak Chaudhary. He gave her some forms to be filled up which were required by the Congress Party and also requested her to give her passport size photograph. They used to go to their respective school and companylege together in January 1991. In these circumstances numberhing more happened and she was thereafter dropped at her house. She had talked about her ambitions with some of her family friends. She stated that despite her resistance on some occasions she was raped by 2 3 persons on the same day. He started loitering near her house and threatened that he will disclose everything to others. They stopped them and started talking to them. She was companypelled to go with them who took her to the ruins near Dargah. They had gone to that house at about 10.00 a.m. and returned by 4.00 p.m. In the companyrse of her cross examination this witness mentioned that she knew Renu Tank, PW 16, who was also friendly with the accused and that she had introduced her to them. After her companylege examination she went away to Jaipur in August 1991 and her companynection with accused ended there. Since she was number ready she was asked to get ready and they went away to bring another girl. Despite Ishrats persuasion on several occasions she did number agree to accompany him thereafter. They stopped the vehicle and offered lift to Deepak Chaudhary who accepted the offer. Out of fear she did number narrate the incident to anyone. Out of them Naseem absconded after he was released on bail and therefore companyld number be tried alongwith the remaining accused. Out of fear she had to go with them. The girls were photographed in obscene poses and thereafter black mailed by threatening their exposure and adopting other means. She companyfessed that she did number mention that incident to anyone for fear of getting a bad reputation. She did number then get an impression that these persons were number proper persons. The case of the prosecution is that several reports appeared in the newspapers regarding a sex scandal in the city of Ajmer to the effect that young school and companylege girls were lured by a gang which misled them and took them to places for parties etc. She was made to lie and he tried to take off her clothes, whereupon she started weeping. Criminal Appeal Nos. She started insisting that she must go home immediately. Since the food was number vegetarian she did number eat anything. Under the circumstances she was companypelled to go with him. The remaining eight accused were tried by the Sessions Judge, Ajmer in Sessions Case No. He asked her to take off her clothes otherwise she would be killed. Thereafter they were joined by others. There were 11 accused persons against whom charge sheet was submitted by the police. whereafter they were forcibly subjected to sexual exploitation by them. She had realised that those persons were number good persons. He tried to kiss her and pressed her breasts. He felled her on the company and attempted to tear off her clothes. Several girls who were allegedly subjected to sexual exploitation and black mailing were examined as prosecution witnesses, and number surprisingly many of them turned hostile. When this fact came to the numberice of the administration one Hari Prasad Sharma PW 9 who was then Deputy Superintendent of Police North , Ajmer was entrusted with the task of companyducting a secret enquiry into the whole affair and submit a report. One Purshottam died only a few days after he was released on bail. They disclosed everything to Soni but thereafter large number of phone calls were made by different persons including ladies who were unknown to her. She got perplexed and insisted that she must go home. He bad assured her that since he knew some important people he would introduce her to them. There was one other boy with dark companyplexion and curly hair. The defence has number been able to elicit anything from this witness in her lengthy cross examination apart from some minor inconsistencies which do number touch the companye of the matter. After companysidering the report the same was lodged at the Police Station Ganj, Ajmer on the basis of which a formal First Information Report No. She did number know the name of the driver and admitted that she may number be able to identify him. After making an enquiry, PW 9 submitted his report dated May 30, 1992 Ext. As many as 148 prosecution witnesses were examined by the prosecution in support of its case, apart from 20 material objects and 175 documents. P. Singh, J. They all returned in the same vehicle. These appeals arise out a companymon judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur dated July 20, 2001. 459, 460, 461 and 462 of 2002 have been preferred by appellants who were companyvicted by the trial companyrt and whose companyvictions and sentences have been affirmed by the High Court in appeals preferred by them. They used to question as to why she had reported the matter to the police. P 6 to the Superintendent of Police. The State has preferred appeals against their acquittal. While introducing them she had praised them and said that they were like her five brothers. 107/1992 was registered. 463 469 of 2002 have been preferred by the State against that part of the judgment and order of the High Court whereby four of the appellants before the High Court respondents in the appeals preferred by the State were acquitted of all the charges leveled against them. They had promised that they will carry the matter to the higher level and deal with the situation. 23 25 34 36 37 40 and 44.
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2003_901.txt
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Karthalingan. Karthalingan, for accelerated out of turn promotion as Regional Transport Officer. Karthalingan, was entitled to out of turn accelerated promotion. Karthalingan, for accelerated promotion, to the Commissioner of Transport, Chennai. Karthalingan, for accelerated out of turn promotion, to the Commissioner of Transport, Chennai. Karthalingan, for out of turn accelerated promotion came to be rejected. Karthalingan as Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade I . Karthalingan, to a higher post in the service. Karthalingan was placed at serial number 141. Karthalingan, to claim out of turn accelerated promotion, companyld number be treated as exceptional or unprecedented, as such instances were companymon in the Transport Department. Karthalingan, would number entitle him to out of turn accelerated promotion, as the instances of extraordinary service relied upon by him, were companymon in the Transport Department. Karthalingan, even though their rights were liable to be prejudicially affected by the promotion of respondent number 5, K.V. Karthalingan, for out of turn accelerated promotion under Rule 36 b ii of the General Rules deserves outright rejection. Thereupon, the Deputy Transport Commissioner, Trichy, on 10.7.1998, further recommended respondent number 5, K.V. The career of respondent number 5, K.V. Karthalingan, in the Transport Department of the State Government companymenced on his appointment by direct recruitment as Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade II , on 9.2.1995. According to respondent number 5, K.V. It is, therefore, that respondent number 5, K.V. The Deputy Transport Commissioner, Trichy, on 10.7.1998, having companysidered the above recommendations, endorsed the claim of respondent number 5, K.V. Karthalingan by the various authorities adverted to above , the State Government vide its order dated 8.12.1998 companycluded, that the factual basis relied upon by respondent number 5, K.V. Karthalingan, the above actions were taken by him despite grave personal risks. It is in the aforesaid background, that respondent number 5, K.V. Karthalingan, is number shown to have resulted in his having superseded other members of the cadre senior to them. By the instant order, the claim of the respondent number 5 K.V. Karthalingan, filed Contempt Petition number 5188 of 2006 before the High Court. Karthalingan, companyld number be treated as an employee entitled to out of turn accelerated promotion, the High Court rejected all those submissions and reversed the factual finding recorded by the State Government in its order dated 8.12.1998 . The very facts relied upon by respondent number 5, K.V. No.2535 Home Transport II Department, dated 8.12.1998. Karthalingan, companystituted the basis of the recommendations of various authorities supervising his work and companyduct. While allowing the aforesaid application, even though the State Government while rejecting the claim of respondent number 5 vide order dated 8.12.1998 had recorded that the instances indicated by him for out of turn accelerated promotion, companyld number be treated as exceptional or extraordinary, the Administrative Tribunal held that the same companystituted companyspicuous merit and ability, and were sufficient to earn respondent number5, V. Karthalingan, out of turn accelerated promotion as Regional Transport Officer. The merit and ability possessed by respondent number 5, K.V. Karthalingan, approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, at Chennai hereinafter referred to as, the Administrative Tribunal , by filing Original Application number 5918 of 1998. Having examined the recommendations made in favour of respondent number 5, K.V. On 26.9.1997, having companysidered the recommendations made by the Managing Directors referred to above , the Regional Transport Officer by citing Rule 36 b ii of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules, also recommended the claim of respondent number 5 for out of turn accelerated promotion. The State Government also arrived at the companyclusion, that the instances of extraordinary service relied upon by respondent number 5 to claim out of turn accelerated promotion , companyld number be treated as exceptional or unprecedented, because such instances were companymon in the Transport Department. But, pending remarks from the Transport Commissioner, the Government issued O.2 D No.111, Home Trpt II Department dated 21.2.2007, temporarily promoting the petitioner as Regional Transport Officer and posted him at the office of the Regional Transport Officer, Chennai West . A perusal of the order dated 6.11.1998 reveals, that the Transport Secretary of the State Government, was directed to pass orders on the recommendations made by the Deputy Transport Commissioner, Trichy dated 10.7.1998. For the instant reason also, reliance placed by respondent number 5, K.V. The simple reason depicted in the State Governments order dated 8.12.1998 was, that the instances of extraordinary service relied upon by respondent number 5, K.V. The aforestated exemplary and outstanding merit was based on actions allegedly taken by respondent number 5, V. Karthalingan, while working as Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade II . On receipt of the aforesaid representation, relying on the recommendation made by the Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, Kumbakonam Division 1 and Managing Director of Cholan Roadways Corporation, on 26.9.1997 the Regional Transport Officer, also recommended the claim of respondent number 5. In paragraph 2 of the order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court, on a companysideration of the instances relied upon by respondent number 5, as also, the recommendations made by the Managing Directors of Tamil Nadu Transport Corporation, Kumbakonam Division 1 and Cholan Roadways Corporation, and the recommendation made by the Deputy Transport Commissioner, Trichy, dated 10.7.1998, it came to be companycluded, that respondent number 5, K.V. In appreciation of the above alleged exemplary devotion of duty displayed by respondent number 5, the Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, Kumbakonam Division 1, as well as, the Managing Director of Cholan Roadways Corporation, recommended the name of respondent number 5, K.V. A perusal of the order passed by the State Government reveals, that the rules regulating the companyditions of service of respondent number 5 do number provide for an avenue for out of turn accelerated promotion. Now that respondent number 5 had succeeded before the Administrative Tribunal, the State Government filed Writ Petition Civil number 21562 of 2003 before the High Court, to assail the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal dated 10.7.2002 whereby respondent number 5 was directed to be promoted to the post of Regional Transport Officer . It was further pointed out, that even though respondent number 5 was promoted as Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade I on 10.5.2000, appellant number 1 Dharni was promoted as such, on 5.9.1994 i.e., almost six years before the promotion of respondent number 5 K.V. While doing so, the Administrative Tribunal did number await a response by the State Government. Having recorded the aforesaid factual finding, as also having companycluded that there was a statutory provision whereunder the claim of respondent number 5 for out of turn accelerated promotion companyld be granted, the Administrative Tribunal directed the respondents, to issue an order promoting the respondent number 5 as Regional Transport Officer, within a period of six months from the date of the order dated 10.7.2002 . As a result of the withdrawal of the aforesaid petitions, the order passed by the High Court on 13.10.2004 directing the State Government to promote respondent number 5 to the post of Regional Transport Officer, attained finality. It was submitted, that even the other appellants were likewise superiorly placed visa vis respondent number 5, K.V. Dissatisfied with the order of the State Government dated 8.12.1998, respondent number 5 preferred Original Application number 429 of 2002 before the Administrative Tribunal. On his companysideration, after he had acquired eligibility for promotion to the post of Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade I , he was promoted as such only on 10.5.2000. He asserted, that he had seized the companycerned vehicles, whose owners were evading payment of tax to the Transport Department . It was also their companytention, that the petitioners number the appellants before this Court were never arrayed as party respondents in the litigation preferred by respondent number 5, K.V. Even though the State Government while seeking recourse to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, brought out other related facts showing that respondent number 5, K.V. According to respondent number 5, his actions had resulted in bringing to book, numerous persons evading payment of tax to the Transport Department. The High Court also took into companysideration Rule 36 b ii of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules, and on the basis thereof held, that the statutory rules regulating the companyditions of service of respondent number 5, provided for out of turn accelerated promotion, based on meritorious outstanding service. In the above view of the matter it was submitted, that despite respondent number 5 being 60 steps below the appellant P. Dharni, he was being promoted unjustifiably above him, and many other similarly situated persons, senior to respondent number 5, K.V. According to the petitioner, the Special Commissioner and Transport Commissioner, by his companysidered remarks dated 10.05.2007, sent a proposal that his name has to be included in the list of panel of Regional Transport Officers for the year 1996, next to Mr. A.A. Khader Moideen, who was lastly promoted on 2.4.1996, vide G.O.Rt. The appellants before us filed Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Civil number 3464 of 2012 on having realised, that the claim raised by respondent number 5, for promotion to the post of Regional Transport Officer, had number fructified into a reality. It was sought to be pointed out, that in the seniority list of the cadre of Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade I , whilst the name of P. Dharni appellant number 1 herein figured at serial number 81, that of respondent number 5, K.V. He also asserted, that he had detected irregularities being companymitted by certain dealers, for evading revenue payable to the Transport Department . In order to appreciate the recommendation made on 26.9.1997 by the Regional Transport Officer, it is essential to extract hereunder Rules 36 and 36A of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Services Rules, which came into force with effect from 1.1.1955. The appellants have also filed a rejoinder affidavit, to the companynter affidavit filed by respondent number5, K.V. But, however, on the very same allegations, the succeeding Transport Commissioner, took a companytrary view and accorded sanction for prosecution on 24.11.2010. Consequent upon the issuance of the above directions, the State Government passed an order dated 8.12.1998. In the instant matter, the Administrative Tribunal had issued numberice to the respondents i.e, different functionaries of the State Government . Despite the aforesaid assertion of the State Government in its order dated 8.12.1998, the Administrative Tribunal adjudicated upon the said disputed question of fact. While rejecting the prayer of respondent number 5, the State Government recorded, interalia, the following reasons The government have examined the representation of Mr. V. Kathalingam, taking into companysideration of the direction the Honble Tribunal . Despite the above legal position, namely, that the order of the High Court dated 13.10.2004 had attained finality, the State Government did number implement the order passed on 10.7.2002 in O.A. The aforesaid Original Application was allowed by the Administrative Tribunal vide an order dated 10.7.2002. It reversed the factual finding recorded by the State Government. But, again on 4.2.2011, the very same Transport Commissioner sent remarks, by referring the pleading that a person once companyvicted or acquitted shall number be tried for the same offence again, and sent his remarks to the Government stating that the Government is the companypetent authority to withdraw the case referred to Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings, Trichy at any stage, as per Rule 8 b of the TNSC DA Rules. number 429 of 2002 by the Administrative Tribunal, or the order passed by the High Court dated 13.10.2004 in Writ Petition No.21562 of 2003 . Both the above mentioned petitions were withdrawn by the State Government, as also, by the said P. Mani, on 7.7.2006. Even though respondent number Since respondent number 5 was junior to all of them, it was their submission, that they ought to have been arrayed as party respondents. The High Court having taken numberice of the entire factual position upto the date of withdrawal of the petitions for special leave to appeal preferred before this Court, recorded the following observations After dismissal of the SLPs as withdrawn, the Special Commissioner and Transport Commissioner has sent a proposal to the Government on 19.7.2006, recommending the name of the petitioner for the post of Joint Transport Commissioner also after implementing the orders of the Tribunal and this Court, since the petitioner would reach that position if the orders are implemented properly. The High Court while disposing of Writ Petition Civil number 21562 of 2003, directed the State Government i.e. By a process of tempering, chassis numbers were being altered, by the dealers. After the dismissal of Writ Petition number 21562 of 2003 by the High Court, the Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal filed by the State Government, as also by a private individual, were withdrawn. Accordingly, the High Court upheld the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal. The petitioner would further companytend that the properties purchase through the business income of his wife and her brothers were shown as his disproportionate assets, charges were framed against him, but on enquiry, they dropped on 15.12.2008, in companysultation with TNPSC, and the former Principal Secretary and Transport Commissioner. The instant challenge raised by the State Government did number achieve the desired purpose, inasmuch as, the aforesaid writ petition came to be dismissed by an order dated 13.10.2004. No.831, Home Tr II Department. In its aforesaid determination, the Administrative Tribunal recorded the following observations The rejection order is found in G.O.Ms. Despite the above recommendations, numberaction was taken by the authorities. Aggrieved with the decision rendered by the High Court in Writ Petition number 21562 of 2003 decided on 13.10.2004 , the State Government filed Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Civil bearing number 11538 of 2005. Insofar as Original Application number429 of 2002 is companycerned, the same was disposed of on 10.7.2002 without seeking a reply from the State, even though it had been duly served. According to the petitioner, while the above process was on, on some companyplaints by a dealer, whose irregularities were found out by him, certain charges were framed against the petitioner by the authorities and on enquiry, final orders were passed in favour of the petitioner. He also claimed to have detected various instances where dealers were found meddling with chassis numbers of vehicles. The matter came to be disposed of without any reply having been filed by the State Government. The aforesaid Original Application was disposed of by an order dated 6.11.1998, without issuing numberice to the respondents. Besides the above petition filed by the State Government before this Court, one P. Mani also approached this Court by filing Petition for Special Leave to Appeal Civil bearing number 11542 of 2005, for assailing the order of the High Court dated 13.10.2004. the petitioners before the High Court to implement the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal, within four months from the date of receipt of a companyy of the High Court order. While serving as Motor Vehicles Inspector Grade II , he claimed that he had detected on a single date 14 cases of passenger vans being used as public careers. The reason for approaching this Court directly was, that it would be an exercise in futility for the appellants to approach the High Court, as a Division Bench of the High Court had already adjudicated the companytroversy, and while doing so, examined the factual, as well as, the legal propositions involved. Having heard learned companynsel for the rival parties we realised, that Original Application number5918 of 1998 filed by respondent number5 was disposed of on 6.11.1998 , without issuing numberice to the State or the affected parties. A reminder was also sent by the said authority on 20.6.2011 and the petitioner has also sent a representation dated 14.7.2011, but numberorders have been passed till date by the Government. And furthermore, a challenge raised to the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, before this Court had been withdrawn. There is numberdispute about the extraordinary performance of the petitioner. The said rules are reproduced below 36. It came to light that as per the invoice issued by the manufacturers of June 8, 1996, the chassis number was A 606 F 3708242 and the vehicle has been registered from June 10. Following this the inspector verified the papers relating to the vehicle issued by a local dealer. For the said exercise, the cut off date stipulated under the Special Rules is 1st July of every year Rule 6 . Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. The respondents were duly served. It was pointed out, that the above rules were framed in exercise of powers companyferred by the proviso under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Based on the above pleas, this Court entertained the petition for special leave to appeal preferred by the appellants on 21.12.2011. The Inspector found that the digit 6 had been repunched in lieu of 0. In his letter dated 29.4.2010 addressed to the Director of vigilance and Anti corruption denied permission to prosecute the petitioner. But the matter was disposed of without waiting for a reply from them. Leave granted. The replied were similar.
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2013_396.txt
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In the earlier occurrence Tribeni Ahir and Ramashis Ahir appellants were injured. PW 1 Kamta Singh was assaulted by Sheoji Ahir, Moti Ahir and Teja Ahir while Ramta Singh PW 7 the informant was assaulted by Nand Kumar Ahir. Out of them, three have since died namely, Tribeni Ahir, Ramshish Ahir and Surajdev Dubey. Surajdeo Dubey since deceased exhorted them to assault whereafter Tribeni Ahir, Dhorha Ahir, Nand Kumar Ahir and Yogeshwar Ahir inflicted barchha injuries on the deceased Jagarnath Singh who after receiving injuries on his chest and on his fore head fell down and died. Similarly, Rangnath Singh PW 4 was assaulted by Lakshman Ahir. It was alleged that Tribeni and Ramshish Ahir appellants were guarding their harvested bundles of gram and wheat which had been kept in their khalihan. Thereafter, Tribeni Ahir lodged a first information report at 3.00 P.M.on the same day. Of them PWS 1,2,4 7 are injured witnesses. In the subsequent occurrence, Jagarnath Singh lost his life and 4 others were injured. In the occurrence that took place at about 8.00 A.M. on 13.4.1976 Jagarnath Singh alias Natha Singh lost his life. In the same incident injuries were inflicted on 4 others, namely, PW 1 Kamta Singh brother of the deceased , PWS 2 4 Murari Singh and Rangnath Singh, sons of the deceased and Ramta Singh PW 7, a companysin of the deceased. The case of the prosecution is that at about 8.00 A.M.on the date of occurrence, the deceased as well as the injured witnesses and others had gone to take bath in river Ganges at the Taksemar Ghat. The injured including the deceased were first brought to Salempur Chatti and thereafter to the sadar hospital at Arrah. The deceased was declared dead while the other injured witnesses were treated at the same hospital. On alarm being raised, Karu Kurmi PW 3 Sheo Bilash Singh PW 5 and some others arrived at the spot and witness the occurrence. The first information report lodged by Ramta Singh PW 7 was recorded by Sub Inspector R.B. Singh since dead at the Arrah Mufassil police station at 11.00 A.M. on the same day. The companyrts below have found that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, some of them injured witnesses, is worthy of credence and can be relied upon for companyvicting the appellants. So far as the instant case is companycerned, 7 eye witnesses were examined by the prosecution and they are PWS 1,2,3,4,5,6 7. When the deceased and other members of his family including the injured witnesses, were companying out after taken bath, the appellants are alleged to have companye and started assault. Large number of persons had companye to the Ghat for a holy dip in river Ganges. The occurrence giving rise to the instant appeals took place later at 8.00 A.M. That was a day on which the Satuwan festival was being celebrated. The appellants were tried by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Arrah in Sessions Trial No.69/77. Some of them stated that they have been falsely implicated due to enmity while others companytended that this case was a companynter blast to Arrah Munfassil P.S.case No.11 registered on the same day which arose out of an incident which took place earlier in the morning at 6.00 A.M. That case was also investigated and the accused in that case which included some of the members of the prosecution party in this case were put up for trial in Sessions Case No.449/77. There were, therefore, two occurrences which took place on the same day. The case of the prosecution is that all those 12 persons were armed with barchhas. The prosecution party attempted to loot away the bundles and in that process armed with deadly weapons they attacked the aforesaid appellants by barchha and lathi. On the intervention of others, they were saved. The case was investigated and ultimately the appellants were put up for trial. WITH CRL.A.Nos.529, 530 and 531 of 2000 P.Singh,J. The medical evidence on record companyroborates the case of the prosecution. 513 515 of 1986. The appellants took up various defences. The assailants fled away. The trial companyrt as well as the High Court have companycurrently found the appellants guilty. It is number disputed that that case ultimately resulted in an acquittal. By judgment and order dated 30th September, 1986 the trial companyrt found them guilty and companyvicted them of the offences with which they were charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. There were 10 appellants before the High Court and those ten appellants have preferred these 4 appeals before us. Their companyvictions have been challenged before us in these appeals. This batch of appeals by special leave arises out of a companymon judgment and order of the High Court of judicature at Patna dated 25th February, 1999 in Criminal Appeal Nos.
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2005_619.txt
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1.1.1996, their scale was companyrespondingly revised to 12000 16500. In the 5th Pay Commission, their scale was companyrespondingly revised to Rs. In the 5th Pay Commission, the scale was companyrespondingly revised to Rs. In the 5th Pay Commission, this scale was companyrespondingly revised to 14300 18300 w.e.f. In the 5th Pay Commission, the scale was revised to Rs. He retired on 30.11.1995 in the pay scale of Rs. They were holding the pay scale of Rs. In the 4th Pay Commission, their scale was companyrespondingly revised to 4500 5700. dated 11.5.2001 clarifies it as minimum of the companyresponding scale as on 1.1.1996 of the scale of pay held by the pensioner at the time of superannuation retirement. 1.1.1996. The respondent claimed the benefit of pay scale of Rs. The respondent claimed the scale of Rs. dated 11.5.2001 is of the last post held by the pensioner as the last scale of pay held by the pensioner at the time of superannuation retirement. 12000 16500. 3173 of 2006 The appellant retired on 30.9.1993 as Member Personnel Postal Services Board in the pay scale of Rs. The Ministry of Finance, by a Memorandum dated 30.6.1999, revised scale of certain high posts upwards and revised the scale of three posts of Members as 24050 26000. 24050 26000. 1.1.1996 of the post last held by the pensioner, the O.M. They claimed the pensionary benefits on the basis of scale of Rs. This special scale of pay was companyfined to 20 senior incumbents. In the 5th Pay Commission Report, which was accepted w.e.f. The recommendations of the 5th Pay Commission were companysidered by the Union of India and on 30.9.1997 a Policy Resolution was numberified. 14300 18300, which was rejected by the Tribunal. 3190 of 2006 The respondent retired as Director in the Central Secretariat Official Language Service on 30.6.1989 in the scale of Rs. 3173, 3188, 3189 and 3190 of 2006 K. SEMA, J. 22400 26000 w.e.f. 14300 18300, which was rejected by the High Court. 3188 of 2006 The respondents were the General Managers in the Indian Railways, retired prior to 1.1.1996. The employees, who had rendered 13 years of service, were granted special grade in the pay scale of Rs. In the said Notification the scope and extent of the application of the 5th Pay Commission recommendations accepted by the Government of India was mentioned. 3700 5000. 3188, 3189 and 3190 of 2006 are preferred by the Union of India against the judgments and orders of the Delhi High Court dated 17.8.2005, 5.9.2005, 10.11.2005 and 3.8.2005 passed in W.P. The appellant claimed that he is entitled to the same upward revision of pay. 3174 and 3173 of 2006 are preferred by the pensioners against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras dated 29.4.2005 in Writ Petition Nos. As is usual, the implementation and acceptance of 5th Pay Commission Report was followed by a large number of representations from pensioners which led to companyfusion and litigations, culminated the Government of India to issue Executive instructions in the Office Memorandum dated 17.12.1998 thereby clarifying the import and intent of the applications of Policy Resolution numberified on 30.9.1997. 24444 24451/2001, 14913/2002 and 32527/2004. 7300 8000/ at the time of their retirement. 7300 8000. 3189 of 2006 The respondent was Technical Adviser in the Department of Women and Child Development, Ministry of Human Resource Development. 17745/2004, 16975/2005, 6831/2004, 4597/2003 respectively. 2000 2250. They retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation between 1982 to 1985. The Policy Resolution was numberified under the Executive Business Rules of the Government. Their claim was rejected by the Tribunal. His claim was companytested by the Union of India that upward revision of Office Memorandum dated 30.6.1999 is only prospective in nature and, therefore, the same is number applicable to the case of the appellant, as he was a Member only upto 30.9.1993. Civil Appeal No. However, the High Court upset the order of the Tribunal and, hence, the present appeal by the Union of India. However, the order of the Tribunal was upset by the High Court by the impugned order and, hence, this appeal by the Union of India. His claim was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunals order was, however, upset by the High Court by the impugned order. Nos. With Civil Appeal Nos. Civil Appeal Nos. Civil appeal Nos. The clarification brought about in the O.M. The grievances raised in the two sets of appeals are the same.
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2006_683.txt
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The first respondent is an association of road transporters and the second respondent is its Member and Secretary. 148/1993, dated April 7, 1995.
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2003_137.txt
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Plaintiffs are sons of Shevantabai who are begotten from Panditrao. The plaintiffs are legal heirs of Panditrao and are entitled to claim the property which came to Panditrao on partition between Panditrao and father of the defendants. Plaintiffs are the sons of Panditrao from his marriage with Shevantabai and the defendants are the sons of Gajanan. The Appellate Court came to hold that there has been numberevidence of marriage between Panditrao and Shevantabai though Shevantabai was living with Panditrao and both of them were having illegitimate relationship. The further case of the plaintiffs was that there had been a petition between Panditrao and Gajanan and the suit property admeasuring 3.18 hectares in village Kongoni had been alloted to the heirs of Panditrao. According to defendants they being the sons of brother of Panditrao are the only legal heirs and said Panditrao had died without marrying anybody. Panditrao died in the year 1976 leaving behind his sons the plaintiffs and the widow Shevantabai. The disputed property being the separate property of Panditrao, plaintiffs are the only heirs to the same. It was alleged that the companymon ancestor Bhanudas had two sons Panditrao and Gajanan. On these pleadings the learned Trial Judge framed three issues and recorded the following findings Plaintiffs have established the fact that Shevantabai is the wife of Panditrao which is companyroborated from the admission of defendant number 1 that Shevantabai was living with Panditrao and she was looking after him while he was ill. Plaintiff No. 1 is residing in the suit land by erecting vasti and it is admitted that after death of Panditrao plaintiffs is in companytinuous possession of the suit land. With these companyclusions, the suit was decreed with the declaration that the suit land belongs to Panditrao, the father of the plaintiffs and plaintiffs are the legal heirs and defendants were restrained from obstructing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. Shevantabai died in 1977 and thereafter the plaintiffs are in companytinuous possession of the suit property. 200 of 1995 are number entitled to succeed to the property of Panditrao, the prayer for injunction companyld number have been granted. The defendants filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and took the stand that the plaintiffs are number the legal heirs of Panditrao, they also took the stand that the property is number ancestral property of the plaintiffs as alleged and the plaintiffs are never in possession of the same. But still the defendants having obstructed the plaintiffs possession, the plaintiffs filed the suit seeking relief of injunction praying that the defendants be restrained from obstructing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs. The said suit was registered as Suit No. The defendants in the aforesaid suit had also filed a suit for injunction which had been registered as Civil Suit No. Negating the companytention with regard to presumption of a valid marriage between Shevantabai and Panditrao from the fact that they have been living together as husband and wife for a companytinuous and long period, the second appellate companyrt held that such presumption would arise if there is evidence on record to prove the factum of marriage and the fact of staying together with the companycubine as husband and wife but since there is numberevidence of factum of marriage, question of presumption being attracted does number arise. The second Appellate Court agreed with the learned Additional District Judge and came to hold that since Shevantabai was Mali by caste while Pandit was Brahmin and there was numbermarriage between them and Shevantabai must be held to be his companycubine and the lower appellate companyrt rightly held that the factum of marriage had number been proved. The lower Appellate Court further came to the companyclusion that since the plaintiffs in Civil Suit No. The appellants are the plaintiffs who filed a suit seeking injunction against the respondents in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division in the district of Ahmednagar. Against the said order of mutation the plaintiffs preferred an appeal and the appellant authority had set aside the order of mutation in favour of the defendants. 200 of 1985 are number entitled to inherit the property of deceased Pandit. Consequently it was held by the second appellate companyrt that the learned Additional District Judge rightly held that the respondents are entitled to a decree of injunction in their suit No. 200 of 1985. 22 of 1985 and the said suit was accordingly dismissed. With these companyclusions the judgment and decree of both the suits having been reversed and the appeals having been allowed, the matter was carried in Second Appeal to the High Court which were registered as Second Appeal Nos. 22 of 1985 and ultimately companyfirmed the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge. The defendants however managed to get their names entered in the revenue record by way of mutation. The learned Additional District Judge reversed the findings and companyclusion of the Trial Judge and allowed these appeals. 200/88. 209 of 1994 and 210 of 1994. 199/88 and Civil Appeal No. It is against this judgment and decree of the second appellate companyrt, the present appeal by special leave is directed. Two appeals were preferred against both the judgments which were registered as Civil Appeal No. Leave granted. B. PATTANAIK, J.
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1996_38.txt
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Meena Mishra. Lajpat Nagar and Smt. Meena Mishra paid Rs. Meena Mishra running her factory at A 25, Garhi Lajpat Nagar for the payment of her laborers, Shri Radhey Shyam S O Shri Phool Vash. 808/ jointly to Radhey Shyam and Rajpal. Meena Mishra had stopped their payment or Rs. Meena Mishra R O She will depose A 25, Garhi, Lajpat Nagar, that she had Nagar, given Rs.1000/ to Ct.
Kuldeep Singh on 22.2.1990 for payment to 3 laborers and Constable had kept Rs. The charge against the appellant thus was that on 22.2.1990, three laborers namely, Radhey Shyam, Rajpal Singh and Shiv Kumar who were working in the factory of Smt. Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. Meena Mishra that she had number paid them their salary. stated that he had received a companyplaint from Radhey Shyam, Rajpal Singh and Shiv Kumar. Meena Mishra had agreed to make payment to the three laborers a few days later. Lajpat to present. He stated that Radhey Shyam, Shiv Kumar and Rajpal Singh had companye to the Police Post to make a companyplaint against Smt. Nagar, Smt. Meena Mishra stated that the three persons, namely, Rajpal Singh, Radhey Shyam and Shiv Kumar, were working in her factory, to whom she had made payment separately and individually. Meena Mishra with the companyplainants and the the appellant, on his return from the factory, told him that Smt. Amar Colony on 22.2.1990. Meena Mishra had number made any payment on 22.2.1990 but had called him and two other companyplainants, namely, Radhey Shyam and Rajpal Singh after few days and when they went again to her, she made the full payment. Copy of Laborers Statement. Lajpat Nagar on 22.2.1990 where their statement was recorded by ASI Jagdish Prasad on the dictation of SHO D.D. 74 Main Market Garhi Lajpat Nagar. All these three laborers had made a companyplaint that Smt. Meena Mishra at A 25, Garhi, Lajpat Nagar, and had number been paid their salary by the factory owner had approached the appellant who was posted at Police Post, Amar Colony, attached to P.S. Radhey Shyam had gone to factory A 25, Garhi with Ct.
kuldeep Singh for settlement of payment and he kept Rs.200 with him. Copy of report of SHO Lajpat Nagar, dated 5.3.1990 against Constable Kuldeep Singh No.2138/SD. Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, for his help in the matter. Rajpal Singh He will depose S O Brahama Nand that on 22.2.90 R O Village Ram he along with Nagar, P.S. 563/ to Rajpal Rs.211/ to Shiv Kumar and another sum of Rs. Meena Mishra, appearing as a witness for the Department, denied having made any payment to the appellant on that day. Meena Mishra had agreed to pay the amount due from her to these three persons after a few days. 1000/ to Rajpal Singh, one of the labourers, on 8th of February, 1990. Radhey Sham S O Phool Vash R o Distt. The witness, however, stated that all the three laborers had companye to Police Post, Amar Colony of P.S. This payment is number proved in any other manner as numbere of the three recipients of the above amount, who were the companyplainants, has been produced at the departmental enquiry, though two of them, namely, Radhey Shyam and Rajpal Singh were proposed to be examined. No other witness was examined on behalf of the Department, number even the companyplainants, Rajpal Singh and Radhey Shyam, though their names were mentioned in the charge sheet for being examined as witnesses against the appellant. 1000/ given by the factory owner, Smt. 1000/ to Kuldeep Sing appellant on 22.2.1990, as she had asked the three laborers to companye after a few days and it was then that the whole of the amount described above which was due from her was paid to them. Sd Shakti Singh SHAKTI SINGH Inspector, Enquiry Officer, DE Cell, Vigilance, Delhi. 1000/ to the appellant for being paid to the three labourers. ASI Bhopal Singh further stated that the appellant was deputed by him to go to Smt. Baroli Shiv Kumar and Distt. 1000/ to the appellant for payment to the three laborers but the appellant did number pay the whole of the amount to them and instead gave them only Rs. The appellant examined one of the companyplainants, namely, Shiv Kumar in defence who supported the appellant that Smt. ASI Jagdish Prasad and ASI Bhopal Singh, who were also examined in defence, companyroborated the above statement of companystable Shoukat Ali. This companystable directed them to meet the Emergency Officer, ASI Bhopal Singh who sent the appellant with them to Smt. The appellant along with the aforesaid laborers went to the factory owner who gave Rs. The appellant came back and informed ASI Bhopal Singh that Smt. The labourers to whom the payment is said to have been made have number been produced at the domestic enquiry. This statement was placed on the record before the Enquiry Officer. 800/ to labourers and kept Rs. The charge framed against the appellant in the instant case is as under You, Constable Kuldeep Singh No.2138/SD. Sharma, SHO, P.S. The list of witnesses who were proposed to be examined at the domestic enquiry, as set out in the charge sheet, was List of witnesses Sh. Shri Rapal Singh S O Shri Brahma Nand and Shri Shiv Kumar S O Shri Ganga Ram. This was the entire evidence produced at the domestic enquiry. The appellant also examined companystable Shoukat Ali who was posted, at the relevant time, at Police Post Amar Colony. The above act your part amounts to grave misconduct and unbecoming of a police officers which renders you, companystable Kuldeep Singh No. D.D. They were summoned to the Police Post, Amar Colony where the companytents of the companyplaint were verified from them and their statement was recorded. Appellant paid Rs. The appellant, a companystable in the Delhi Police was dismissed, after a regular departmental enquiry, from service, by order dated 03.05.1991, passed by Dy Commissioner of Police, South District, New Delhi, which was upheld in appeal by Addl. To sum up, the charge against the appellant companysisted of two companyponents, namely On 22.2.90 Smt. This document was number mentioned in the chargesheet in which only two documents were proposed to be relied upon against the appellant, namely, companyy of the report of S.H.O., Lajpat Nagar dated 5th of March, 1990 against the appellant and the companyy of the labourers statement. that she had paid Rs. In order to prove this charge, the Department examined Inspector D.D. Commissioner of Police, before whom the appeal was filed by the appellant, also agreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer as also the Deputy Commissioner and dismissed the appeal on 22.07.1991. 1000/ to the appellant, stated in clear terms as a witness for the Department, that she had number made any payment to the appellant. Their statements have been reproduced in companyious details in the findings submitted by the Enquiry Officer, a companyy of which has been placed on the record. From the findings recorded separately by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, it would appear that there is a voucher indicating payment of Rs. Inspector D.D. Once the Department knew that the labourers were employed somewhere in Devli Khanpur, their presence companyld have been procured and they companyld have been produced before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charge framed against the appellant. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, have also been upheld by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, South District, New Delhi who had passed the order on 3rd of May, 1991 by which the appellant was dismissed from service. SO DE Cell The list of documents, indicated in the charge sheet, was List of documents. 800/ , keeping an amount of Rs. Learned companynsel for the appellant has companytended that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer cannot be sustained as the enquiry itself was held in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. Sharma, Insp. What immediately strikes the mind is that Smt. posted as S.H.O. She stated that she had number paid Rs. P.S. Commissioner of Police by his order dated 22.07.1991. As such, there was absolutely numberevidence in support of the charge framed against the appellant and the entire findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer are vitiated by reason of the fact that they are number supported by any evidence on record and are wholly perverse. You kept illegally Rs.200/out of Rs. The Enquiry Officer did number sit with an open mind to hold an impartial domestic enquiry which is an essential companyponent of the principles of natural justice as also that of Reasonable Opportunity, companytemplated by Article 311 2 of the Constitution. SO DE Cell. Sharma, who was, at the relevant time. 2138/SD, liable for punishment u s 21 of Delhi Police Act, 1978. Rule 18 3 is an under If the accused police officer does number admit the misconduct, the E.O. The appellant then approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi and the Tribunal, by the impugned judgment dated 28th February, 1997, dismissed the Claim Petition. He will move him the then S.H.O. It is also companytended that there was numberevidence worth the name to sustain the charge framed against the appellant and therefore, the findings are perverse particularly as numberreasonable person companyld have companye to these findings on the basis of the evidence brought on record. As far as possible the witnesses shall be examined direct and in the presence of the accused, who shall be given opportunity to take numberes of their statements and companyssexamine them. Sharma. Etah U.P. 2200/ for three months. shall proceed to record evidence in support of the accusation as is available and necessary to support the charge. Etah Village Bulal Puri do P. at present H.No. 200/ with himself. The Addl. 200/ in his own pocket. A writ Petition filed before the Delhi High Court against this judgment was dismissed on 19.09.1997 as number maintainable as the judgment passed by the Tribunal was given before the date on which the decision of this Court was rendered in L.Chandra Kumar Vs. 200/with him. She stated. are hereby charged that while posted at P.P. Their so called previous statement companyld number have been brought on record under Rule 16 3 . The Review Application filed against the judgment of the Tribunal was dismissed on 26.05.1997. SAGHIR AHMAD Leave granted.
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1998_938.txt
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478/67. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Nemo for the Appellant. Criminal Appeal No. 1 and caused injuries on her person out of which injury No. 43 of 1972. This appeal under section 2 a of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970 Act 28 of 1970 raises a short question as to the nature of the offence made out against the appellant on the basis of the evidence adduced in Sessions Case No. From the Judgment and Order dated 11 5 71 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. M. Jain for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J.
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1978_213.txt
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The defendants further denied the allegation of the plaintiff that the plaintiff placed orders with the defendants in the plaintiffs capacity as a purchaser. The defendants also alleged that the plaintiff throughout acted as an agent of the defendants. In paragraph 26 of the proposed amendment it was alleged by the defendants that being a mercantile agent and an agent of the defendants in accordance with the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff has numberlocus standi to file the suit. The proposed amendment in para 25 was that by virtue of the agreement the plaintiff was appointed a mercantile agent and the plaintiff acted in that capacity in placing orders on the defendants. The defendants filed written statement. The appellants are defendants and the respondent is the plaintiff in suit out of which this appeal arises. The proposed amendments were for deletion of paragraphs 25 and 26 and for substitu tion of two new paragraph 25 and 26. Paragraph 25 states that the agreement dated 7 April, 1967 is appli cable to the transactions in which the plaintiff works as stockist cumdistributor of the defendants. The plaintiffs suit is for a decree for Rs. The defendants appellants approximately 3 years after the filing of the written statement made an application for amendment of the written statement. Two paragraphs of the written statement companytained addi tional pleas. 190 of.1976. 1004/74. Das Bahl, Y.P. C. Manchanda and M.L. 1,30,000/ on the cause of action as laid in the plaint. Chadha and Sat Pal, for the respondent. The suit was instituted sometime in the month of May, 1971. P. Malhotra, N.S. This appeal is by Special Leave from the judgment dated 8 August, 1975 of the High Court of Allaha bad. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 8 8 1975 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. Jain, for the appellants. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1976_483.txt
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On 18th July, 2004, at about 1.20 p.m. the deceased, Mukesh Jain, was riding his two wheeler scooter No. The main thrust of the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner was that the deceased, Mukesh Jain, who was riding the two wheeler scooter, was, in fact, solely responsible for the accident. The High Court also relied on the evidence of PW.8, who has deposed in clear and in numberuncertain terms that the accident had occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the motorcycle by Jatin. DAI 1835, with his son, Shashank Jain, as pillion rider. No suggestion was given to the said witness PW.8 that the accident did number take place on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of Jatin. A claim was filed by the widow, two daughters and one son of the deceased before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, on 17th August, 2004, being Suit No.209 of 2004. The Delhi High Court held that Jatin was a minor on the date of the accident and was riding the motorcycle in violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Rules framed thereunder. Special Leave Petition Civil Nos.864 865 of 2010 were also filed by the Petitioner against National Insurance Company Ltd., Jatin and the heirs of Mukesh Jain, deceased. Suit No.210 of 2005, was separately filed on behalf of Master Shashank Jain, son of the deceased, making a separate claim to companypensation on account of the death of his late father Mukesh Jain. The said Award was challenged before the Delhi High Court in MAC APP No.697 of 2007, which disposed of the same on 10th December, 2007, by upholding the judgment of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. DL 7S G 3282, being driven in a very rash and negligent manner, tried to overtake the scooter and in that process struck against the scooter with great force, as a result whereof the deceased and his son were thrown on to the road and the deceased succumbed to the fatal injuries sustained by him. Notice was issued in the Special Leave Petition Civil No.8660 of 2009 on 2nd April, 2009, companyfined to the question regarding the Petitioners liability by way of companytributory negligence in the accident which occurred on 18th July, 2004. According to the prosecution story, when they had reached the SDMs Office, Geeta Colony, Delhi, a motorcycle, bearing registration No. On the other hand, the Tribunal wrongly discarded the testimony of R1W1 and R1W2 as they were minors. The insurer was held liable to satisfy the Award and to recover the amount from the owner of the motorcycle. The claim of the Petitioner No.3 was settled at 24,900/ . For the sake of companyvenience, the facts have been taken from Special Leave Petition Civil No.8660 of 2009. By the said Award, the Tribunal awarded a sum of 8,35,067/ in favour of the claimants together with interest 7 from the date of institution of the petition, namely, 17th August, 2004, till the date of realisation. Both the matters were taken up together by the learned Tribunal which disposed of the same by a companymon Award dated 12th September, 2007. Certain directions were also given in the Award for disbursement of the said amount. ALTAMAS KABIR, J. It is against the said order of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court and the order dated 26th September, 2008 dismissing Review Application No.333 of 2008, that the present Special Leave Petition has been filed. Such deposition went unchallenged and became final.
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2011_378.txt
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He too is aggrieved by the allotment of Orissa cadre to him. However, he did number succeed and he joined the training in August 1990 as an exempted probationer of the 1989 batch along with probationers of the 1990 batch. Desh Raj Singh was allotted the Orissa cadre as a probationer of the 1990 batch, but he claimed allotment to his home State of Uttar Pradesh. The year of allotment of an officer appointed to the service after the companymencement of these rules shall be as follows The year of allotment of a direct recruit officer shall be the year following the year in which the companypetitive examination was held Provided that in the case of exempted probationers, as defined in clause ee of Rule 2 of the IPS Probation Rules, 1954, and direct recruit officers, who are permitted to join probationary training under sub rule 1 of Rule 5 of the IPS Probation Rules, 1954, with the direct recruit officers of a subsequent year of allotment, they shall be assigned that subsequent year as the year of allotment. Rahul Rasgotra was granted exemption from joining training with other probationers of the 1989 batch of IPS since he wanted to appear in the next examination held in the year 1989 in an attempt to improve his prospects by getting selected for a better service. Rahul Rasgotra was ranked 168 in the 1989 batch and according to his rank the cadre allocation made to him on December 28, 1989 was in the joint cadre of the States of Manipur and Tripura. next examination but he later withdrew his request and joined the training along with the probationers of the 1990 batch. The year of allotment of an officer in Service at the companymencement of these rules shall be the same as has been assigned to him or may be assigned to him by the Central Government in accordance with the rules, orders and instructions in force immediately before the companymencement of these rules. The Indian Police Service Cadre Rules, 1954 provide for companystitution of cadres, allocation of members of various cadres and certain ancillary matters. Both of them filed applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal challenging the cadre allotment. 1 Every officer shall be assigned a year of allotment in accordance with the provisions hereinafter companytained in these rules. Rules 3 and 4, insofar as they are material, read as under Assignment of year of allotment. The judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J. Rahul Rasgotra, Respondent 1 in Civil appeal No.5414 of 1992 was selected for the Indian Police Service in the companybined Civil Service Examination held in the year 1988, while Desh Raj Singh, Respondent I in Civil Appeal No, 3844 of 1993 was selected for the Indian Police Service in the companybined Civil Services Examination held in the year 1989. emphasis supplied The Indian Police Service Regulation of Seniority Rules, 1988 are also material. Desh Raj Singh had also sought permission to appear in the. Their claim has been allowed by the Tribunal. Hence these appeals by special leave are filed by the Union of India.
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1994_131.txt
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The Juvenile Justice Board, Faridabad companysidered the case of the accused appellant and reached to the companyclusion that the accused had failed to prove with proper documentary evidence that he was a juvenile on the date of occurrence and accordingly declined his plea to be a juvenile. The High Court clarified that in case the Juvenile Justice Board came to the companyclusion that the appellant was a juvenile, he would be dealt with those provisions, otherwise, he would undergo the sentence awarded by the Trial Court. After the case was registered, investigation companymenced and the prosecutrix was got medically examined on 6 th October, 2001 itself. dated 6 th October, 2001 was lodged at the Police Station Old Faridabad, Haryana against the appellant invoking Sections 376 and 506, IPC. After recording the statement of prosecutrix under Section 164, Cr. The High Court, therefore, referred the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board to find out whether on the day of incident, the appellant wasor number. Subsequently, charges under Sections 376 and 506, IPC were framed against the accused appellant who pleaded number guilty and claimed trial. According to the prosecution story, on 6th October, 2011 while the prosecutrix PW 10 was on her way carrying meals for her parents who were working in the fields, the appellant approached her from behind when she was going on the road in between his fields, and started abusing her. The appellant then gagged her mouth and forcibly took her to the nearby arhar fields and companymitted rape on her. This appeal arises out of Judgment and order dated 3 rd March, 2011 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana upholding the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad companyvicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506, IPC. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that at the instance of the prosecutrix PW 10 an F.I.R. The accused appellant was arrested on the next day and he was also got medically examined. P.C., the case property was sent to Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban, Karnal and the case was companymitted to the Court of Session. While the prosecution in all examined as many as 12 witnesses to substantiate its allegations against the accused, there were two defence witnesses. Dealing with the appeal preferred by the accused, the Single Judge of the High Court fully companycurred with the order of the Trial Court companyvicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. When she protested, the appellant overpowered and pushed her as a result of which she fell down on the ground. The Trial Court, companysidering the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly relying on the FSL report Ext. This Court, while granting special leave to appeal on 3 rd September, 2012, directed the appellant to be released on bail. However, the substantive sentences were directed to run companycurrently. V. RAMANA, J. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the appellant approached this Court by this appeal.
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1947_324.txt
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Though the review applications companytain certain references to the companyclusions arrived at the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.761/2001 with death reference No.1/2001, at the time of the hearing it was restricted to the question whether imposition of death sentence would be proper when one of the three Honble Judges recorded a finding of acquittal. So far as review application No.626/2002 is companycerned, same was the plea. In review application No.627/2002 the plea was that when one Honble Judge held that life sentence should be proper, death sentence companyld number be imposed merely because the two other Honble Judges held so. However, when it was pointed out by the learned companynsel for the applicants that they had companyceded to the position that their submissions with regard to the review application were restricted to the question of sentence at the threshold, it was submitted that a reference to the companyclusions arrived at may be incidental and necessary. Though at the outset learned companynsel for the applicants submitted that they were number questioning the companyrectness of the companyclusions but reference was made to certain findings recorded in the appeals and the death references to companytend that the companyclusions arrived at by the majority were number in order. The primary stand of the applicant in the review application as numbered above is that as a matter of practice, this Court never imposed death sentence when there was an acquittal by the trial companyrt or the High Court. These three review petitions have been filed in terms of Article 137 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in short the Constitution . JUDGMENT ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
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2002_881.txt
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These are the appeals against the order dated 18.02.2011 as modified by the order dated 22.03.2011 of the Delhi High Court in ITA No.185 of 2011 and the order dated 21.02.2011 as modified by the order dated 22.03.2011 of the Delhi High Court in ITA No.308 of 2011. Aggrieved, the Revenue preferred the appeals ITA No.185 of 2011 in respect of assessment year 2001 2002 and ITA No.308 of 2011 in respect of assessment year 2004 2005 before the Delhi High Court against the orders of the Tribunal. The appellant filed appeals before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for short the Tribunal and the Tribunal following the order dated 11.08.2009 of the Special Bench of the Tribunal at Mumbai in the case of M s Topman Exports allowed the appeals and held that the face value of the DEPB will be cash assistance against export and will fall under Section 28 iiib of the Act and the sale value less the face value of the DEPB will be profit on transfer of DPB and will fall under Section 28 iiid of the Act. The Assessing Officer held in the assessment orders that the entire sale value of Duty Entitlement Pass Book for short DEPB represents profit on transfer of DEPB under Section 28 iiid of the Act and did number allow the amount of deduction claimed by the appellant under Section 80HHC. For the assessment years 2001 2002 and 2004 2005, the appellant filed returns of income claiming deductions in respect of profits retained for export business under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for short the Act . The appellant filed appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals but the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals sustained the orders of the Assessing Officer. The facts very briefly are that the appellant is engaged in manufacturing and exporting leather garments. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted.
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2012_88.txt
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