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On 18th November, 1996, the respondent gave a cheque for Rs.5,38,425/ towards the interest on the aforesaid amount. This cheque was deposited in the bank on the 9th of January, 1997 which was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. 1,40,00,000/ had been borrowed by the respondent from the appellant on the 5th October, 1996. 5,000/ would meet the ends of justice. A companyplaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was, accordingly, filed and it was numbericed that the only dispute was with regard to the payment of the interest as the principal amount of Rs.1,40,00,000/ had already been paid within Crl. 41 of 2005 time. Admittedly a sum of Rs. A very limited prayer is made in this appeal. A revision was thereafter filed by the appellant and the same has been dismissed. It arises from the order of the High Court. A.
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2011_895.txt
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He suggested me that number the financer of your vehicle is Real Auto Deals. 45,000/ would be paid to the companyaccused Man Mohan Sharma. Vijay Lakshmi Finance, Real Auto Deals and Man Mohan Sharma, have sold my vehicle to some other place by making my forged signatures and by playing fraud with me, in companynivance of each other. On the basis of the above FIR charges were framed against the appellant and companyaccused Man Mohan Sharma. Sanjay Pal 31.1.97 Attested Sd Snglish Satya Narayan ASI 31.1.97. After that Shri Man Mohan Sharma R o D 131, Jhilmil Colony, came and told me that your finance is fabricated one, that is why your vehicle has number been financed by me from Real Auto Deals which is run by my brother in law. It is also alleged in the FIR that the appellant sold the vehicle of the companyplainant to some other party by making forged signature and by playing fraud with him. Man Mohan Sharma used to receive the installments in cash every month from me. The cheques received from me, encashed him in different different names instead depositing in the account of Real Auto Deals. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations against the appellant were that he forged documents in respect of a vehicle and thereafter indulged in cheating and deposited the cheques received from the companyplainant against financing of the vehicle in different accounts. The allegations in the FIR are as follows Statement of Sanjay Pal S o Mahendra singh Pal R o House No. 45,000/ would be paid to the appellant Manoj Sharma and a further sum of Rs. Vivek Vihar East Delhi against the appellant should be quashed. A 25, Jhilmil Colony, Vivek Vihar, Delhi, stated that I reside at the above mentioned address with my family. The receipts issued to me put up with neither rubber stamp number used the letter head of Real Auto Deals. ALTAMAS KABIR,J. He gave me the new R.C I returned him the old R.C. In that writ petition an affidavit was filed by the companyplainant stating that in view of the settlement between the parties he is withdrawing the allegations against both the writ petitioners and he is also withdrawing the FIR. 3954/ as first installment. I was shocked that how the vehicle got transferred without signing any form and paper. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court for quashing the FIR on the ground that the matter had been companypromised between the companyplainant and the accused. J. ALTAMAS KABIR New Delhi DatedOctober 16, 2008 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.OF 2008 Special Leave Petition Criminal No. or Article 226 of the Constitution when the accused and the companyplainant have companypromised and settled the matter between themselves. The question involved in this case is whether an FIR under Section 420/468/471/34/120 B IPC can be quashed under Section 482 Cr. Thereafter, on 27.12.1995 at about 10 Oclock he came to me in Jhilmil along with an unknown person, I can recognize him if he companyes to me, took my said Maruti Van with his help without my companysent by showing me a paper duly stamped by the police. Kabir, J. and I respectfully agree with his companyclusion that the appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the High Court as well as the criminal proceedings pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Court, Delhi in FIR No. 5265 of 2007 Manoj Sharma Appellant versus State Others Respondents J U D G M EN T Markandey Katju, J. I have read the judgment of my learned brother Hon. He asked me to give return the first R.C. Sd English. As per the amicable settlement a sum of Rs. 50 of 1997 dated 31st January, 1997 P.O. However, I wish to give a separate companycurring judgment in view of the importance of the issue involved in this case. However, the Delhi High Court by the impugned judgment dated 17.8.2007 rejected the writ petition and hence this appeal. The appropriate legal action may kindly be taken against all these persons. The objection taken in the said case has also been raised by Mr. B.B. Statement heard which is companyrect. I have received the payment given by you and your file. Singh, learned advocate for the respondent State. P.C. Leave granted.
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2008_1460.txt
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The rubber seal order put on the companyplaint itself reads as follows Presented on 19/4/2000 Cognizance taken Register put up on 1/6/2000 Sd This has been signed by the 14th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. The said petition has been disposed of by a brief order, the relevant portion of which reads as follows On presentation of the companyplaint before the Magistrate, the Magistrate neither endorsed on the companyplaint by applying his mind to proceed with the companyplaint by taking companynizance number in the order sheet produced. The cheques were dishonoured since the respondent No.2 stopped payment of those cheques. It appears that the order sheet is number signed by the Magistrate himself, though the rubber seal order is signed by him. The appellant filed a companyplaint before the 14th Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore who on 19.4.2000, the date of filing of the companyplaint itself, directed the matter to be put up on 01.06.2000. The appellant is the companyplainant, and he is aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court whereby the High Court remitted the matter to the Magistrate on a finding that the Magistrate had issued process against the respondents without taking companynizance of the offence, and since taking of companynizance was a companydition precedent, the issuance of process was bad. The order sheet of the companyrt of that date records that companynizance was taken against the accused persons in the presence of the companyplainant whose statement was to be recorded on 1.6.2000. On 29.7.2000, the Magistrate proceeded to record the statement of the companyplainant and thereafter by order dated July 31, 2000, issued process against the respondents finding that there was ground to proceed against the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It is number in dispute that four cheques were issued by respondent No.2, the Managing Director of the respondent No.1 Company for the total amount of rupees five crores. The payments were made by respondent No.2 on behalf of the respondent No.1 companypany of which he was a Director. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dt.21st September, 2004 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Petition No.4469/2002. No.320/2005 Special Leave granted. After about four years, the respondents moved an application before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceeding. The same has been assailed in this petition on various grounds. The companyrectness of this order is challenged before us.
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2005_733.txt
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301 of 1954, arising out of the Award dated the 20th October 1954, of the Second Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. There was a dispute between the companypany and its workmen about bonus, which was referred by the Government of West Bengal by its order of December 17, 1953, to the Second Industrial Tribunal. The appellant is the Graham Trading Co. India Ltd. hereinafter called the companypany . N. Mukherjee, for the respondents. Sen and S. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants. 161 of 1959. This is an appeal by special leave in an industrial matter. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 31st January 1956 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Calcutta in Appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO J. May 7.
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1959_67.txt
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14841, dated October 27, 1967 and other numberifications mentioned therein was removed and it was ordained that the market fee levied, companylected or to be levied and companylected shall number be illegal and invalid merely on the ground of such number publication. The High Court seems to have companymitted a grave error in minimising the effect of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Validation Act, 1982 Bihar Act No. 64 of 1982 whereby the defect of number publication of numberification No. As a sequence, the companytrary effect of any judgment, decree or order of any companyrt was removed and the said numberification as also the other numberifications were mandated to be deemed to be valid and effective and all levies made and market fees companylected deemed to have been validly realised, taken, done and issued as if the provisions of the Act were at all times in force. We are inclined to allow this appeal. ORDER Leave granted.
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1994_930.txt
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Petitioner is a companyperative society. 31.7725 Acres. In the said proceedings, 59.94 acres of land was acquired. Land acquisition proceedings were initiated pursuant thereto. Tiwari were asked to receive re possession of 22.12 acres vacant land. The possession is to be restored in favour of applicant Society on 49.4545 17.68 i.e. A requisition was made for acquisition of land for the said purpose on their own behalf before the State on or about 3.07.1973. A direction was issued on 7.04.2006 by this Court issuing numberice to the PRDA. A numberification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued. Petitioner Society deposited the entire amount of companypensation. The High Court pursuant to the said direction had passed an order dated 20.06.2001 directing release of 12.9603 acres of land. An affidavit was also filed by PRDA on 10.07.2006 assuring this Court that it would carry out each and every direction of this Court. Secretary, Bihar Finance Services Housing Cooperative Societies Mr. Arun Kumar Sinha and Chairman, Mr. S.P. They refused to take possession and asked to hand over the entire land in a single block at a time, after demolishing the entire building existing on it. However, on an appeal preferred thereagainst, this Court in Shyam Nandan Prasad and Others v. State of Bihar and others since reported in 1993 4 SCC 255 , while clarifying the law operating in the field stated that where such a requisition is made on the part of a Company which a companyperative society is, Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply. The owners of the land filed objections under Section 5A of the Act. 1357 OF 2003 B. SINHA, J This companytempt proceeding has a chequered history. Overruling the said objection, the proceedings were companytinued. On the spot, the Hon. It intended to have a plot for companystruction of houses for its members. Several writ applications came to be filed before the Patna High Court questioning the said proceedings. CONTEMPT PETITION C NO. 44 OF 2005 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.
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2008_2044.txt
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Prior to the orders of the Commissioner of Income tax under s. 5 7A of the Act companyplained against, the petitioner was being assessed by the Income tax Officer, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling. All these petitioners were, prior to the orders of transfer made by the Commissioner of Income tax under s. 5 7A of the Act, being assessed by the Income tax Officer, A Ward, Amritsar, but their cases were transferred on or about June 29, 1953, from the Income tax Officer, A Ward, Amritsar, to the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Amritsar. Before October 20, 1953, they were being assessed by the Income tax Officer,, Hoshiarpur, but on that date their case was transferred under s. 5 7A of the Act by the Commissioner of Income tax to the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala. On March 5, 1946, the cases of the petitioner were transferred from the Income tax Officer, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle 1, Calcutta, and a companyple of months thereafter they were again transferred to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Calcutta. Prior to June 29, 1959, he had been assessed to income tax by the Income tax Officer, Special Survey Circle VII, Calcutta. There were further orders dated December 15, 1947, and sometime in September, 1948, transferring the cases of the petitioner from the Income tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Calcutta, to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle 1, Calcutta, and back from him to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle,IV Calcutta. His case also whichprior to the order companyplained against, was being entertained by the Income tax Officer, F Ward, Amritsar, was transferred on some date in 1954 by an order of the Commissioner of Income tax under s. 5 7A of the Act to the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Amritsar. On June 8, 1946, there was a further transfer assigning the cases to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle 1, Calcutta, and on July 27, 1946, orders were passed by the Commissioner of Income tax Central, Calcutta, under s. 5 7A transferring the cases of the petitioner to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Calcutta. On December 21, 1953, however, the Commissioner of Income tax Hyderabad, issued a numberification under S. 5 7 ordering that the case of the petitioner should be transferred from the Additional income tax Officer, Raichur, to the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Hyderabad. Income tax was first imposed in the Hyderabad State in 1946 by a special Act of the Legislature and the petitioner was assessed under the Hyderabad Income tax Act by the Additional Income tax Officer, Raichur, for the assessment years 1948 49 and 1949 As from April 1, 195o, the Indian Income tax Act was applied to Hyderabad but the Additional Income tax Officer, Raichur, companytinued to assess the petitioner. The petitioner in Petition No. Before September 28, 1954, they, being assessed by the Income tax officer, Special Circle, Patna. 2 to the Income tax Officer Central Circle VI,Delhi, and on July 12, 1955, it similarly transferred the cases of petitioner No. Each one of them filed a separate petition challenging the said orders of transfer by the Commissioner of Income tax and the proceedings entertained by the Income tax Office r, Special Circle, Amritsar, against them on the score of the unconstitutionality of s. 5 7A of the Act. After the dates of such transfer to the Income tax Officer, Central Circle VI, Delhi, the said officer instituted several proceedings against them and the petitioners challenged in these petitions the validity of the said orders of transfer and all the subsequent proceedings including the assessment orders as well as the order levying penalty for number payment of the income tax which had been assessed prior thereto, on the ground that s. 5 7A of the Act was ultra Vires the Constitution and all the proceedings which were entertained against the petitioners by the Income tax Officer Central circle XI Calcutta, and by the Income tax Officer Central Circle VI, Delhi, were without jurisdiction and void. These are the orders which are companyplained against as unconstitutional and void invalidating the proceedings which were companytinued and subsequently instituted by the Income tax Officer, Central Circle IV, Calcutta, against the petitioner on the score of the unconstitutionality of s. 5 7A of the Act. of M s bhagwan Das Sud Sons and the cases of both these petitionrs were transferred to the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala, as above, by the said respective orders. It appears, however, that shortly before May 19, 1955, the Commissioner of Income tax, Hyderabad, made another order under s. 5 7A and s. 64 5 b of the Act transferring all the cases of the petitioner to the main Income tax Officer, Raichur. These petitioners also thereupon filed the petition challenging the validity of the order of transfer made by the Commissioner of Income tax on October 20, 1953, and the proceedings entertained by the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala, thereafter, on the same ground of the ultra vires character of s. 5 7A of the Act. ment order was passed against him but he also challenged the validity of the said order of transfer and the proceedings entertained by the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Amritsar, thereafter, on the same grounds as the other petitioners. Demands were made upon the petitioner for payment of the amount of income tax thus assessed whereupon he filed this petition impeaching the validity of the order of the Central Board of Revenue dated June 29, 1955, and the proceedings entertained by the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala,on the ground that s. 5 7A of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution. These, however, are number material for our purposes, the only order challenged being the order of the Commissioner of Income tax Central, Calcutta. On June 29, 1955, the Central Board of Revenue transferred his case to the Income tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala,, and the said officer companytinued the proceedings in the transferred case and also instituted further proceedings against the petitioner and assessed him under s. 23 4 of the Act for the assessment years 1946 47 and 1947 48. These petitions companycern the assessment of the petitioner to income tax for the respective years 1944 45, 1945 46, 1946 47, 1947 48 and 1948 49. I to the same officer. for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. Curiously enough, the petitioner challenged both the orders one dated December 21, 1953, and the other made sometime in May, 1955, under s. 5 7A of the Act and the proceedings companytinued and instituted by the respective officers thereunder as unconstitutional and void on the ground that s. 5 7A was ultra vires the Constitution even though ultimately he was being assessed by the main Income tax Officer, Raichur, under the latter order. On September 28, 1954, the Central Board of Revenue made an order transferring their cases to the Income.tax Officer, Central Circle XI, Calcutta. dated July 27, 1946, which was passed under s. 5 7A of the Act. Shri A. L. Sud, the petitioner in Petition No. On January 22, 1955, the Central Board of Revenue transferred the cases of petitioner No. C. Chatterji and V. S. Sawhney, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, G. N. Joshi, Porpus Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents Union, of India, the Central Board of Revenue and various Income tax Officers in all petitions. P. Lal, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 97, 97A, 44, 86 to 88, 111, 112, 85, 158, 211 to 251 and 225 to 229 of 1956. 97 97 A of 1956 The petitioners are M s. pannalal Binjrai, Oilmill owners, merchants and companymission agents, carrying on business at Sahibganj in the district of Santhal Pargans, having their branch at 94 Lower Chitpur Road, Culcutta, petitioner No. These three are brothers and the petitioner in Petition No. 88/56 is the father, S. Narain Singh, son of S. Basdev Singh. 86, 87, 88, 111, 112 and 158 of 1956 These petitions may be companypendiously described as the Amritsar group. Bhagirth Das and M. L. Kapur, for the petitioner in petition No. The latter officer companytinued the assessment proceedings and issued numberices under s. 22 .4 of the Act on July 1, 1954, November 2, 1954, November 30,1954, December 19, 1954, and March 11, 1955, in respect of the said years of assessment. 85/56 was filed by M s. Bhagwan Das Sud Sons, Merchants, Hoshiarpur, carrying on business in rosin and turpentine there. 44 and 85 of 1956 The petitioner in Petition No.44/56 is Shrii A. L. sud, the sole proprietor of 14/B. C. Chatterji and D. N. Mukherji, for the petitioners in Petition No. 225 to 229 of 1956 These Petitions may be classed as the Raichur group. Assessments for the said years were made on March 21, 1955, and on April 24, 1955, the petitioner made an application under s. 27 of the Act to reopen the assessment for the year 1950 51 as on default under s. 23 4 of the Act. 112156 is S. Ram Singh, soil of S. Narain Singh. The said officer companytinued the said case and reopened the assessment for the years 1944 45 to 1050 51 and companypleted the assessment for the assessment, years 1947 48, 1950 51 and 1951 52. 97 and 97A of 1956. They companycern the assessment for the respective assessment years 1950 5l, 1951 52, 1952 53, 1953 54 and 1954 55. 211 to 215 of 1956. 225 to 229 of 1956. These cases were companytinued by the latter officer and numberices under a. 158 of 1956. 111/56, which is located at Chheharta near Amritsar. The cases in respect of the assessment years 1950 51, 1951 52 and 1952 53 were pending before that officer and proceedings were taken in companynection with the assessment for those years. petitions Nos. Petitions Nos. 86 to 88, Ill and 112 of 1956. 87/56 is Dr. Sarmukh Singh, son of S. Narain Singh. 86/56 is Sardar Gurdial Singh, son of S. Narain Singh. 85 of 1956. The petitioner in each of them is the same individual, one Kalloor Siddannal who resides and carries on business in Raichur in the State of Hyderabad as companymission agent and distributor of agricultural products. 211 to 215 of 1956 These petitions may be described as the Sriram Jhabarmull group. The principal place of business is at Kalimpong, in the district of Darjeeling, though there is also a branch at Calcutta. Petitions NOs. Though separately filed, the petitioner in each of them is the same individuals Nandram Agarwalla, who is the sole proprietor Of a business which he carries on under the name and style of I Sriram Jhabarmull. No objection wag taken by the petitioner to this order of transfer until after the assess. Petition No. It may be numbered, however that these orders were all prior to the Constitution and having been made on July 27, 1946, as aforesaid were followed up by companypleted assessment proceedings in respect of the said respective years and also certificate proceedings under S. 46 2 of the Act. 1, and R. B. Jamuna Das Chowdhury, resident of the same place and erstwhile karta of the Hindu undivided family, which carried on business in the name and style of M S. Pannalal Binjr petetioner No. 158/56 is one Shri Ram Saran Das Kapur, the head and karta of the Hindu undivided family carrying on business outside Ghee Mandi Gate, Amritsar. 2 and 3 in Petitions Nos.211 to 215 of 1956 . Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights C. Chatterji A. K. Sen, B. P. Maheshwari and Tarachan Brijmohan Lal, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos. 34 of the Act were also issued by him against them for the assessment years 1947 48 to 1951 52. The father and the three sons were the directors in the Hindustan Embroidery Mills Private Ltd., petitioner No. Amritlal Sud Construction who orginally belonged to Hoshiarpur district in the State of Punjab but has since 1948 been residing and carrying on business in Calcutta. JURISDICTION Petitions Nos. It is a business, inter alia, of import and export of piece goods as companymission agents, and dealers in raw wool and other materials. 44/56 is a member of the Hindu undivided family carrying on business in the name and style. 1 in Petition No. These petitions under Art. Sen and P. K. Ghose, for the State of West Bengal Respondents Nos. C. Isaacs and K. R. Chaudhuri. The facts which led to the filing of the petitions nay be shortly stated. December 21. Purshottam Tirukumdas and 0. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J. ORIGINAL.
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1956_116.txt
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In Ballari Zilla Panchayat, the post of Adhyaksha was reserved for the category of Backward Caste B Women . Application dated 22.04.2016 for issue of caste and income certificate Xerox companyy . 6 pointing out the discrepancies with regard to issuance of caste and income certificate on 26.04.2016 the Revenue Inspector has submitted a report recommending to issue caste certificate to the petitioner in Backward Caste II B revenue inspector had companyducted mahazar along with the Village Accountant and opined that there is numberobjection for issue of caste certificate to the petitioner in Backward Caste II B statement of Smt. After the said numberification, since the appellant intended to companytest the election to the post of Adhyaksha of Ballari Zilla Panchayat, she made an application on 22.04.2016 to the jurisdictional Tahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste Certificate, a certificate which was a prerequisite for submitting the numberination form for the election to the post of Adhayaksha. Act, 1990 and the Rules framed thereunder, the Income and Caste Certificate has been forwarded to the District Caste Verification Committee Ballari. Consequently, writ of quo warranto is issued directing the 6th respondent to vacate the office of Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat, Ballari. The fact that the appellant belongs to Kapu Caste, which is numberified as B Category Backward Class and the declaration regarding income made by the appellant, are issues which are intrinsically mixed with the issuance of the Income and Caste Certificate. 6 has filed application for issue of caste and income certificate on 23.04.2016 the jurisdictional Revenue Inspector has issued numberice to respondent No. Later, the State Government published a numberification on 15.04.2016 declaring the reservation for the post of Adhyaksha and Upa Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayats in the State. That certificate was issued by the Tahshildar on 26.04.2016 on the basis of which the appellant companytested the election held on 29.04.2016 and was declared elected. True companyies of the Affidavit dated 06.02.2016, 26.04.2016 and Caste and Income Certificate issued by the 5th Respondent dated 26.04.2016 are produced herewith as Annexure E,F and G respectively. The entire process of issuance of caste certificate is companycluded in five days, i.e., application was filed on 22.04.2016 and the caste certificate was issued on 26.04.2016, which cannot be said to be illegal, as companytended by the learned companynsel for respondent No.6. This judgment will be of numberavail to the writ petitioners in the present case, so long as the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant is in force. Mahazar Statement Affidavit of the applicant sworn before the Advocate Notary Applicants identity card Xeroxcopy Applicants voter identity card Xerox companyy Transfer Certificate certified companyy Study Certificate certified companyy Original Caste and Income Certificate bearing No. The substance of the allegation made in the said writ petition against the appellant was that she played fraud on the Government and public by submitting a false affidavit before the Tahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste Certificate, on the basis of which she companytested the election for the post of Adhyaksha Zilla Panchayat and got elected to the said post, to which she was otherwise number entitled to or qualified for. Further, the writ petitioners were only voters and therefore, had numberlocus to challenge the election of the appellant as Adhyaksha, which was an indirect election. Fraud played by the appellant is manifest from the certificate issued by the jurisdictional Tahasildar. 26.04.2016, based on the application bearing No. Area on 26.04.2016 Xerox companyy of the original voters list of the year 2015 Xerox companyy of the voters identity card certified companyy of the transfer certificate certified companyy of the study certificate and also the original certificate issued by the Special Tahasildar, Kurugodu, declaring the caste of the respondent No. Chu/01/16 17 dated 26.04.2016. Kam.01/06 07 dated 26.04.2016. The case of the writ petitioners was that the appellant, in order to grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, submitted a bogus and false certificate indicating that she belongs to the backward companymunity B category, which was surreptitiously obtained from respondent No.5. Further, the caste certificate was issued on the same day of the application without any proper inquiry as required under the law. KAM PraHaGu chunavana/05/2016 17 declaring the 6th respondent as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari, vide Annexure H is hereby quashed. Report of the Revenue Inspector dated 26.04.2016 bearing No. So long as the said certificate was valid and in force, issuance of writ of quo warranto was misplaced. Similarly, the affidavit filed by the appellant dated 26.04.2016 was also true, faithful and accurate as it disclosed facts in reference to the qualification required for companytesting the election of Adhyaksha at the relevant time, in respect of post reserved for B Category Women Backward Caste. Whereas in the second affidavit dated 26th April, 2016 filed in support of the application for grant of Income and Caste Certificate, she has stated that the annual income of her family was only Rs. Finally, the High Court companycluded that since the issue regarding the validity of Income and Caste Certificate was pending before the Caste Verification Committee, which was a fact finding Committee, the Committee would decide the same on its own merits. 12 and 13, supra, the appellant filed an application before the jurisdictional Tahsildar for issue of Caste cum Income Certificate on 22.04.2016 in the prescribed format as per the Notification dated 13.01.1995. It is number in dispute that the statements were made by the appellant on the E stamp paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. and the jurisdictional Tahasildar has issued the certificate on the very same day i.e. The numbere predicates that numberperson falling under category B would be entitled to the benefit of reservation in the seats and office of Adhyaksha and Upa Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and Gram Panchayat if, inter alia, he she or either of his her parents guardians was an income tax assessee wealth tax assessee Clause ii . As regards the allegations in the writ petition that the appellant had made false declarations and filed incorrect affidavits, the appellant companytended that the Income and Caste Certificate was issued in favour of the appellant by the companypetent authority after companypleting all the formalities and procedure. The allegation about the nature of fraud companymitted by the appellant can be discerned from the assertions made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition, which read thus It is submitted that the 6th Respondent in order to grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat has submitted a bogus and false caste certificate to show that she belongs to the Backward companymunity B Category obtained from the 5th Respondent. Based on these facts, the Government of Karnataka has number suspended the jurisdictional Tahasildar for providing false certificate. As required in terms of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes Reservation of Appointment etc. Based on the statement declared by the appellant, the jurisdictional Tahasildar has issued verification certificate certifying that the appellant belongs to backward Class B Category in terms of the numberification dated 13.1.1995. 5 along with her application for obtaining Backward Class B Community certificate. According to the appellant, at the behest of the unsuccessful candidates who companyld number file any election petition to challenge the election of the appellant, respondent Nos.6 to 9 filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad being Writ Petition No.106417 of 2016, about 3 months after the election of the appellant as Adhyaksha. It is number open to question the validity of the said certificate much less to entertain the prayer for issuance of a writ of quo warranto on the assumption that the said certificate was fraudulent because of some fortuitous circumstances. The appellant also asserted that the fact that the Income and Caste Certificate was issued within five days from the date of application for the said certificate or on the same date the affidavit dated 26th April, 2016 was filed before the Tahshildar, companyld number give rise to a presupposition, inference or assumption that the same was issued without necessary and proper enquiry. After adverting to these circumstances, the High Court opined that there was something seriously wrong about the process adopted by the respondent No.5 for issuance of caste certificate, which was obviously done to favour the appellant who companyld then companytest the election. That numberification had been issued by the State Government in exercise of powers companyferred under Section 2 2 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, for classifying and numberifying the classes of citizens as Backward Class, for the purpose of reservation of seats and office of Chairperson in Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and Gram Panchayat. It is further submitted that in the application filed by 6th Respondent to 5th Respondent for issuance of caste certificate, she filed an affidavit stating that her livelihood is agriculture and that she owns 1.03 acres of agricultural land in Badanahatti village and 3.50 Acres of land in Sy. The reason for doing so may have some bearing on the matter in issue as in that case, there was dispute about the caste status of the appellant. The said declaration made by the 6th Respondent is totally false to the knowledge of herself, which is clear from the Affidavit filed by the 6th Respondent before the 2nd Respondent while companytesting for the member of Bellary Zilla Panchayat General Elections. During the hearing, the original official file relating to the grant of caste certificate to the appellant was produced by the Government Advocate, as numbered in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge and extracted in paragraph 9 above. Thimma Reddy sworn before the Advocate Notary, Ballari Tq. The High Court also numbered that the respondent No.5 who had issued the stated certificate was later on suspended, pending departmental enquiry against him in reference to the selfsame certificate issued to the appellant. The two Judge Bench of this Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the appellant on the finding that the voter of the Panchayat cannot be rendered remediless and if he is aggrieved by the election of the Adhyaksha of the Panchayat, it is open to him to seek the remedy of judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of the India. This inference has been drawn by the High Court in light of the facts revealed from the original official file that the appellant purchased stamp paper for preparing affidavit at 5.27 p.m. on 26th April, 2016 and used the same for numberarization and also submitted it to the respondent No.5, who then issued the caste certificate on the same day i.e. Thimma Reddy before the Revenue Inspector affidavit of Smt. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the writ petitioners respondent Nos.6 to 9 herein carried the matter in Writ Appeal No.101459 of 2016. According to the writ petitioners, this declaration was false to the knowledge of the appellant. Briefly stated, pursuant to numberification dated 04.12.2015, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by DEEPAK GUGLANI Date 2018.03.06 elections were held and the appellant was elected on 125119 IST Reason 28.03.2016 as a member of the Zilla Panchayat from 13 Badanahatti Constituency, Ballari District, Karnataka which was reserved for General Women Category. It was also pointed out that the writ petition filed by the said respondents was a politically motivated petition and filed at the behest of unsuccessful candidates who companyld number prevent the appellant from getting elected as Adhyaksha. The companycurrent finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court is that the process of issuance of the certificate to the appellant by the jurisdictional Authority was done in a mortal hurry. On such finding, the Court entertained the writ petition under Article 226 and declared the appellant to be occupying the public office without legal authority and issued a writ of quo warranto. The appellant also pointed out that the allegation made in the writ petition, regarding the false or incorrect income disclosure made by the appellant, was wrong and ill founded. Before the remanded writ petition was taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge, the appellant filed a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No.108700 of 2017 LB RES before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench, challenging the numbere appended to the numberification dated 13.01.1995. Reverting to the remanded writ petition from which the present appeal arises as aforesaid, the same was to be heard by the learned Single Judge on merits of the companytroversy for grant of reliefs prayed in the writ petition including for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. Notice dated 23.04.2016 issued by the Revenue Inspector. The writ petitioners respondent Nos.6 to 9 herein also filed a cross appeal being Writ Appeal No.100657 of 2017. In that, first, a numberice was issued by the Revenue Inspector, then, a report of the Revenue Inspector was obtained, Mahazar was prepared, statement was recorded, and then affidavit of the appellant came to be filed along with other documents, as has been numbered in the original file. In other words, both the affidavits and the information disclosed therein were truthful, accurate and companytextual, as numbered in the respective affidavit. On these companytentions, the appellant prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Thus, the circumstances relied upon by the writ petitioners were neither relevant number sufficient to draw any inference on fact, much less legal inference, so as to companyclude that the certificate was fraudulently issued. However, on perusal of the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 26th April, 2016. The affidavit dated 06.02.2016 submitted along with the numberination form filed for companytesting elections from 13 Badanahatti Constituency was in reference to the factual position stated therein. emphasis supplied Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.5872 of 2017. The relevant paragraphs have been extracted in paragraph 3 of this judgment, being paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition. On perusal of the documents it is seen that on 22.04.2016 the respondent No. In that, in the first affidavit dated 6th February, 2016 she had declared that she was receiving rent of Rs. The learned Single Judge, after examining the rival companytentions and after taking numbere of the original documents forming part of the original file 1 2010 7 SCC 202 2 1992 Supp 3 SCC 210 produced by the Government advocate, opined vide judgment and order dated 21.09.2017 as under Learned AGA appearing for respondents 1,3 to 5 filed following documents pertaining to issuance of caste and income certificate to respondent No. In support of this plea, the crux of the allegation is that a false, incorrect and misleading declaration was given by the appellant in respect of her financial status and income. 1,00,00,000/ per annum and is assessed to Income Tax and Commercial Taxes. The appellant therefore, approached this Court by way of Special Leave Petition Civil No.17059 of 2017 companyverted to Civil Appeal No.10587 of 2017 wherein the preliminary objection regarding the bar under Article 243 O of the Constitution of India and locus of the writ petitioners, as also the companytention that the only remedy to challenge the election of the appellant would be an election petition, was reiterated. This appeal, by special leave, takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench dated 04.12.2017 in Writ Appeal No.5872 of 2017. Preliminary objection regarding bar of jurisdiction in terms of Article 243 O of the Constitution of India and locus of the writ petitioners raised by the appellant companymended to the learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 21.10.2016. For, there is legal presumption about the validity of the said certificate in terms of Rules 3 C of the Rules of 1992 framed under the 1990 Act. emphasis supplied The moot question in the present case is whether the High Court, in the facts of the present case, was justified in invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo warranto? Let us advert to the assertion made in the writ petition in support of such a relief claimed by the respondent Nos.6 to 9. In Kurapati Maria Das Vs.
Ambedkar Seva Samajan6 the Court distinguished the decision in K. Venkatachalam supra being on the facts of that case and reversed the judgment of the High Court under challenge, whereby a writ of quo warranto was issued against the appellant therein. 01/16 17, dated 25.04.2016. Accordingly, the proceddings dated 29.04.2016 bearing No. Three lakh fifty thousand and that she and her husband were number paying income tax and companymercial tax. emphasis supplied This writ petition was companytested by the appellant inter alia on the ground that the same was number maintainable in view of the bar companytained in Article 243 O of the Constitution of India. Both the appeals were heard and decided together by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench vide judgment and order dated 04.12.2017. Additionally, the High Court has found that there was discrepancy in the two affidavits filed by the appellant, which is in the nature of suppression and number disclosure of material financial information. First, we must numberice the other material which had companye on record during the hearing of the writ petition and which weighed with the High Court. C. Bharathi w o V.C. 01/16 17 issued by the 5th Respondent vide Annexure G. d. pass such other or further orders or directions as this Honble Court may deem fit, in the interest of justice. Such allegation was based on far fetched logic and untenable assumptions. The Division Bench broadly reiterated the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and affirmed the companyclusion of the learned Single Judge both on factual and legal matters. Bharati Reddy w o Sri Thimmareddy for perusal of this Court. On these assertions, the matter proceeded before the High Court. The High Court being prima facie companyvinced with the said companytention granted interim stay to the said stipulation Clause ii in the numberification dated 13.01.1995. 24 regarding applicants land holding. While analysing the factual matrix, the Division Bench observed as follows 35 As narrated in the preceding paragraph Nos. 24 regarding holding of land by the respondent No. Jaa and Aa Zi. In other words, the matter was decided on the basis of indisputable and established facts. The process of verification thereof is still in progress. We will advert to the explanation offered by the appellant a little later. Four lakh eighty thousand per annum. The Court has also numbered that there was some overwriting in relation to the date. One lakh forty thousand per annum and her husband was receiving rent of Rs. This stipulation has been assailed by the appellant as being in the teeth of the exposition of this Court in K. Krishna Murthy Dr. and Others Vs.
Union of India and Another1 and Indra Sawhney and Others Vs. M. Khanwilkar, J. 6 Smt. Form No. Rev. Rest of the prayers do number arise for companysideration and accordingly they are rejected.
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2018_725.txt
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On the basis of the recording of excess load capacity availed of by the appellant as per the MDI meter reading, the appellant has, also been called upon to pay for the excess load companysumption over and above the companytracted load. on 28.8.93 an excess companynected load of 186 H.P. and when an action was taken on the basis of the recording of excess drawal of load of electrical energy than the actual permitted load capacity by the MDI meter installed in the premises in question resort to the High Court seems to have been made by filing W.P. electrical energy by entering into an agreement with the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board for a companytracted load capacity of 100 H.P. As in the other case, MDI meter has been installed in the mill premises, in question and on the basis of the said meter recording for the companysumption of energy availed in excess of the companytracted load, additional demand was said to have been raised, in addition to the regular companysumption charges based on the ordinary meter fixed for recording unit of companysumption of electrical energy. Aggrived against the action taken by raising a demand for the excess drawal companysumption of energy than the companytracts sanctioned load, on the basis of the reading recorded by the MDI meter at the premises, this appellant also filed W.P. Electrical energy by entering into an agreement with the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board with the sanctioned companytract load of 100 H.P. The Board opposed the claim companytending number only that the installation of such a meter was permissible and the companyrse of action taken by them on the basis of the result of the MDI meter reading raising further demand in respect of utilization of the excess load over and above the companytracted load capacity were legal and proper and that the meter readings relating to all these were said to be either in the presence of a responsible representative of the appellant and that numberexception companyld be taken either to the companyrectness of the readings recorded or the legality and propriety of the additional demand raised on account of such companysumption of energy in excess of the companytracted load. tariff F on the basis of kilowatt recorded by the MDI meter and that as in the case of low tension companysumer 440 volt supply MDI meter was being also utilized in HT companynections 11000 volt or 33000 volt supply in which also, it is stated that there is similar provision for single part and two part tariff and companysequently it is claimed that the MDI meter can be utilized in single part opted tariff as well as two part opted tariff. electrical power supply by entering into an agreement with the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board with power load of less than 100 H.P. By these pleadings the appellant disputes the accuracy of the recording by the device of MDI meter in its actual working of what is stated as drive needle in the MDI meter to which the Board replied stating that the MDI meter had 2 needles, one called the pointer needle which shows the load utilized in kilowatts and this pointer is always said to be moved by carrier needle or drive needle and after companypletion of 30 minutes cycle of companytinuous drawal the carrier needle alone resets automatically to O position leaving the pointer needle to remain and retain its position as per the load recorded and new cycles per 30 minutes gets repeated by themselves from time to time recording any further fluctuations on the higher side. Low Tension A C 400 volts that, an initial inspection disclosed use in excess of the companytracted load, rendering the appellant liable to pay for units companyresponding to the excess load at twice the numbermal tariff rate inclusive of fuel charges and other charges paid as per tariff as envisaged in the tariff numberification dated 18.12.94 for the previous 3 months in which the existence of excess load was detected that, this circumstance necessitated the installation of the MDI meter and the same was within the companypetency and powers of the Board under the relevant provision of the statute as well as the very terms and companyditions of the companytract relating to supply of energy that, the recording of the drawal of a load capacity at a particular point of time over a companytinuous duration of 30 minutes through the device of MDI meter is a technically approved method of certainty that having regard to Clause 31 f of general companyditions for supply with is part and parcel of the low tension agreement entered into between the parties, as well as Clause 15 a and b of the same the Installation of the MDI meter is justified that , if the actual companysumption load exceeded the companytract load capacity without prior permission of the Board, action may be taken either to discontinue the supply and or if any tariff becomes further payable on account of such excess load companysumption, the same has to be paid as supplementary charges based on such increase and companysequently based on the MDI meter reading which records actually the maximum load availed of by the companysumer along with actual energy companysumed, the Board is entitled to re rate the charges to be paid and such re rating is binding on the companysumer that, the MDI meter was installed only in the presence of responsible member of the management itself that, as regards the claim on behalf of the appellant based on the thrust load companycept Board companytends that the MDI meter records only the excess capacity drawn over a companytinuous period of 30 minutes duration at any time during a month that, reference to the thrust load companycept is numberhing but an attempt to companyfuse the real issue, in as much as MDI meter does number record the thrust load experienced by the motor machinery at the time of starting which hardly is set to take only a few seconds or higher load maximum load experienced by the motor machinery for a fraction of time that, this method and system was being uniformly applied without making any discrimination among different companysumers and said to be also a well recognised and widely accepted one and, therefore, the demand raised was legal proper and quite in accordance with law and cannot be avoided by the appellant. 3113 of 2000 This appellant also, has availed of supply of LT Electrical energy for the steel mill in question by entering into an agreement with the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board for the companytracted load capacity of 98 H.P. The sum and substance of the claim on behalf of the appellant is a that, there is numberprovision for installation of MDI meter on the low tension companynection in the premises of the appellant either in the statute or in the agreement executed between the parties and, therefore, it is unauthorized and illegal and cannot be used against the appellant b that, merely on the basis of the working of the MDI meter which has a limited role, even if it be, the quantum of load capacity availed of for companysumption companyld number either be safely or accurately determined and that the Board has to go only by the total capacity of the motors which was even said to have been certified by the officials of the Board themselves for purpose of determining the alleged excess utilization over and above the actual companytracted load capacity c that, such utilization is to be treated merely as the thrust load necessarily required by the motor /machinery only when the same is put in motion and thereafter what is actually companysumed is said to be only the actual load capacity of the motor machinery as permitted under the provisions of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 and the companyditions of supply relating to the supply of electrical energy d that, the MDI meter companyld number be installed for the purpose of raising additional bills but may to be only for determination of the power factor in the premises of the LT companysumer and that in the actual working of the said meter, as in this case, it was said to have exceeded and event went as high as 236 H.P. and availed supply of L.T. Per companytra, the respondent Board companytended that, the appellant had entered into an agreement for supply of electricity for re rolling of iron or steel on a companynected load agreement of 150 H.P. 876 of 1995 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, seeking to quash the bills raised for an additional demand of the nature numbericed above and also prayed for restraining the Board from raising such bills in future on the basis of the MDI meter installed in the premises. The admitted position in this case seems to be that the inspecting authorities have found on different dates viz.,
12.2.93 excess companynected load of 148 H.P. The agreed payment for companysumption of energy was said to be at Rs. 1.90 per unit upto 100 H.P. No. No /2003 Arising out of SLP C No. It is also urged for the Board in traversing in the claim of the appellant to the companytra, that the appellant was billed only as per single part tariff Alternative I of L.T. 2300/2000 This appellant has a steel rolling mill in Raipur District and for purposes of the mill he obtained L.T. 2794/2000 This appellant also claims to have established a manufacturing unit in the name and style of M s. Kishan Steel, Rolling Mill at the Industrial Estate, Uria, Raipur Distt and for purposes of his manufacturing activities availed supply of L.T. Aggrieved, LPA No. On threat of disconnection of supply the said amount was said to have been paid to avoid any inconvenience resulting from such disconnection. Not satisfied, he filed LPA No. The method is claimed by the Board to be an appropriate and technically precise and proved one besides being a worldwide approved method of such measurement. /2003 Arising out of S.L.P. The grounds raised in the petition and the companytentions raised in the companynter filed in this Court seems to have evoked further response in the form of rejoinder by the appellant and additional companynter by the Board. This appellant also unsuccessfully filed W.P. 2.25 per unit. Thereupon the appellant filed LPA No. 240 of 1999, and thereafter filed this appeal, raising companytentions identical and similar to those raised in the other appeals. 3079/2000 This appellant claims to have established M s. Shree Krishna Steels at Jawahar Nagar, Raipur M.P. 241 of 1999 unsuccessfully. As in the other case, this appellant also approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur with W.P. A. In this appeal identical companytentions as have been raised in the other appeals are raised before this Court. No /2003/ Arising out of SLP C No. When the same came to be dismissed along with the other group of writ petitions, the appellant filed unsuccessfully LPA No. 236 of 1996 which also did number meet with success, resulting in the filing of this appeal, raising identical issues and companytentions, as in the other appeals. The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition along with a batch of other similar writ petitions rejected the claims of appellant while accepting the stand taken for the respondent Board. and companysequently the same is said to be ex facie, unrealistic and even impossible to be believed and cannot, therefore, be a creditworthy process for being companyntenanced, to raise and additional demand on the basis of such materials alone against the appellant. 3002 of 1994 seeking for relief as in the other cases and when the said petition came to be dismissed filed also LPA No. 3043 of 1994, which also came to be dismissed on 20.7.99. The companytentions of the parties on either side are almost similar to the one numbericed in the earlier appeal and therefore, it is unnecessary to advert to the same in great detail. C No. 2996 of 1994, which came to be heard and disposed by a companymon order in a batch of cases, resulting in the dismissal of the writ petition. 239 of 1999 and the Division Bench also companyfirmed the order of the Single Judge by rejecting the appeal. When representations in this regard with the authorities did number bring forth any positive results, the appellant filed W.P. 311 of 1999 was filed before the Division Bench and by an order dated 5.10.99 the Division Bench companycurred with the decision of the learned Single Judge and rejected the appeal. 3115/2000 The Judgment was delivered by RAJENDRA BABU, J. Hence, this appeal. Not satisfied the appellants have approached this Court. 326 of 1995. and rest and Rs. Leave granted.
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2003_474.txt
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8209 8821 of 83. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos.
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1985_83.txt
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Directors Shri Navnitlal Sakarlal. ORDINARY RESOLUTION RESOLVED that for the sake of safety and caution the Company hereby approves and companyfirms that the amount of companymission on the net profits payable by the Company to each of the Managing Director Shri Navnitlal Sakarlal, Shri Nandkishore Sakarlal and Shri Saurabhbhai Navnitlal in accordance with provisions of law, for the financial year 1972, be expended by the Company for such year towards the purchase of single premium deferred payment Annuity Policies from the Life Insurance Corporation of Managing Directors companycerned so as to provide for the payment of annuity to each of them for his life and upon his death to his dependants, such payments to companymence from the date of his retirement from the Company as a Managing Director or such other date as may be mutually agreed upon between the Company and the companycerned Managing Director, it being clarified that the re appointment of a Managing Director on the expiry of his present tenure of office will number amount to his having retired as Managing Director or having ceased to be a Managing Director of the Company or from the date of his death whichever shall occur first provided always that numberbenefit shall occur to any of the said Managing Director or his dependants as the case may be number shall any one of the said Managing Directors or his dependants be entitled to any benefit or have any right, lien or interest in the aforesaid Annuity Policies until the date of the first payment of the annuity. Clause 6 d permitted the companypany to pay to the Managing Directors additional remuneration. The assessee respondents are Managing Directors of a public limited Company called Sarangpur Mills Limited. 2 RESOLVED that subject to the approval of the Company in General Meeting to be obtained by way of abundant safety and caution, or the financial year 1972, the amount of companymission payable to each of the Managing Directors Shri Navnitlal Sakarlal, Shri Nandkishore Sakarlal and Shri Saurabh Navnitlal under the respective Managing Director Agreements executed with each of them should be expended in the purchase of single premium deferred Annuity Policies from the Life Insurance Corporation of India on the life of the companycerned Managing Director so as to provide for the Payment of annuity to each of them for his life and upon his death to his dependants, such payments to companymence from the date of his retirement as Managing Directors of the Company or such other date as may be mutually agreed upon between the Company and the companycerned Managing Director or from the date of his death whichever shall occur first provided always that numberbenefit shall occur to any of the said Managing Directors or his dependants as the case may be number shall any of the said Managing Director or his dependants be entitled to any benefit or have any right, lien or interest in any of the aforesaid Policies until the date of the first payment of annuity and the Balance Sheet and Profit Loss Account of the Company tor the Year 1972 be prepared accordingly. The resolution reads thus EXTRACT FROM THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE SARANGPUR COTTON MFG. 78,663 paid to Life Insurance Corporation by Sarangpur Mills for purchase of Deferred Annuity Policy is includible in the hands of the assessee as income chargeable under the head Salaries? Clause 6 e reads thus Notwithstanding anything to the companytrary, the Directors may in respect of any year resolve that the Managing Director shall number be paid any remuneration mentioned in sub clause a or b or the perquisites mentioned in the sub clause a hereof for that year or that he shall be paid such lesser remuneration or benefits than these mentioned in sub clause a and or sub clause b hereof in respect of that year as they may think fit in their absolute discretion in respect of such year and the Managing Director shall refund any sum as may be necessary as a companysequence of such resolution of the Directors from any sum on account of remuneration for that year drawn by him during the year. 26,221 utilised by Sarangpur Mills towards purchase of Single Premium for obtaining the Deferred Annuity Policy did number form part of remuneration payable to the assessee for the calender year 1972 relevant to the assessment year 1973 74 in question? Resolution No. Shri Nand Kishore and Shri Saurabhbhai Navnitlal did number take part in the discussions number did they vote on the resolution. On 12th April, 1973 a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the Mills relating to the Financial Year 1972, which in the case of the Mills ended on 31st December, 1992. The Income Tax Officer rejected the companytention since, in his view, the payment for the purchase was made out of the remuneration that was due to Nandkishore. The relevant clause in that behalf was clause 6 . FURTHER RESOLVED that the following Resolution which is hereby approved and proposed to be passed as an Ordinary Resolution at an Extra Ordinary General Meeting of the members of the Company to be companyvened for the purpose and the Secretary is authorised to send the relevant numberice and explanatory statement to the member of the Company. Nandkishore carried the matter in appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. They had entered into agreements with the Mills. 26,221 being 1/3rd of the sum of Rs. We are companycerned with the Assessment Years 1973 74 and 1974 75 in these appeals. Under the terms thereof they were, inter alia, entitled to receive remuneration from the companypany. In appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the Income Tax Officer. HELD ON 12.4.73. They read Whether the amount of Rs. Whether on the facts, circumstances and the evidence on record, the Income tax Appellate Tribunal was right in law in companying to the companyclusion that the amount of Rs. Common questions of law arise. 2000 Supp 4 SCR 652 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHARUCHA, J.
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2000_908.txt
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Indira Gandhi International Airport TDI Karamchari Union preferred LPA No.38 of 2007 against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Against the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, two appeals were preferred by DIAL and three by AAI and one by the Indira Gandhi International Airport TDI Karamchari Union. De lhi International Airports P.Ltd. 136 workers were employed by the companytractor M s. TDI International Pvt. These orders were challenged by DIAL in Writ Petition C No.139 of 2008. As such, the numberification dated 26th July, 2004 cannot be applied to the new entity DIAL. Hence at the airport, there was numberlonger any establishment of AAI existing but a new establishment of DIAL was operating due to which the numberification dated 26th July, 2004, prohibiting the engagement of companytract labour in trolley retrieval activity in the establishment of AAI at the Delhi Airports companyld number automatically apply to the new entity, DIAL and a new numberification by the appropriate government would have to be issued. This numberification was challenged by AAI before the High Court of Delhi. Both the writ petitions of AAI and DIAL were heard and disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court along with these LPAs by the impugned judgment. U nion of India v .
Indira Gandhi International Airport TDI Karamchari Union LPA No.1065 of 2007 This Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the Union of India against the learned Single Judges judgment dated 28th November, 2006 passed in Writ Petition C No.15156 of 2008 on a very limited point of certain observation in the judgment. This is the subject matter of SLP C No.369 of 2010 filed by DIAL. Ltd. to do the work of trolley retrieving at the Domestic and at the International Airport at Delhi in the year 1992. Meanwhile, 136 workers who were engaged as Trolley retrievers by the companytractor M s. TDI International Private Limited working at the airport since 1992 were removed from service on 5th December, 2003 as the companytract of M s. TDI International Private Limited had companye to an end and a new companytractor Sindhu Holdings came in its place. By order dated 22nd November, 2007 the documents and file relating to DIAL were sent to the Central Government. After getting the permission, AAI filed another Writ Petition C No.6763 of 2008 challenging the said numberification on merit. v. Union of India Writ Petition C No.139 of 2008 DIAL had preferred this writ petition challenging the order of the Chief Labour Commissioner, Government of India dated 24th September, 2007 by which the Central Government was held to be the appropriate government for DIAL for the purposes of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as ID Act and CLRAA. During the pendency of these LPAs, an order dated 24th September, 2007 was passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner, Government of India holding that the appropriate government for DIAL is the Central Government. This judgment would decide these appeals preferred before this Court against the following Letters Patent Appeals and Writ Petitions decided by the High Court In dira Gandhi International Airport TDI Karamchari nion v .
Union of India and others LPA No.38 of 2007 This Letters Patent Appeal was filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 28th November, 2006 in Writ Petition C No.15156 of 2006. The Union of India also preferred LPA No.1065 of 2007 against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Ai rports Authority of India v. Union of India Writ Petition C No.6763 of 2008 AAI after getting permission of the High Powered Committee to go ahead with the litigation challenged the numberification dated 26th July, 2004 by filing the said writ petition. On 26th July, 2004 the Central Government accepted the recommendations of the Contract Labour Court and issued numberification dated 26th July, 2004 abolishing the companytract labour system. The order dated 22nd November, 2007 of Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi by which all documents companycerning DIAL were directed to be shifted to the Central Government machinery was also impugned. These 136 members filed Writ Petition No.15156 of 2006 before the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi praying for their absorption in service as regular employees and for implementation of the numberification dated 26th July, 2004. The workers Union had preferred the writ petition for seeking implementation of the Notification of prohibition dated 26th July, 2004 and for absorption in service amongst other things. The appropriate government shall have to issue a fresh numberification. Consequently, the Writ Petition filed by the said 136 workers stood dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Accordingly, the matter went to the HPC and the numberification was number given effect to. Taking numbere of the ONGC judgment reported in Oil and Natural Gas Commission and Another Vs.
Collector of Central Excise 1992 Suppl. The Division Bench of the High Court heard all these matters together and passed the impugned order of 18th December, 2009. BRIEF FACTS 6.
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2011_657.txt
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Earlier a three Judge Bench of this Court has companysidered that whether the High Court would be justified in refusing to companydone the delay and permitting to pay the deficit companyrt fee in S.C. Cooperative Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India3 and held that the refusal to companydone the delay and number directing to pay the companyrt fee was justified and this Court did number interfere with the order. The Bench disposing of Chand Kaur case does number appear to have been numbericed number brought to its numberice the binding precedent of three Judge Bench. From the Judgment and Order dated 30 1 1989 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in C. Misc. On similar situation, number of matters have been filed before this Court.
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1994_232.txt
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The final EIA report was placed before the SEAC and the SEIAA in October 2014. The SEAC was under a companyresponding obligation to refuse the companysideration of any EIA report prepared after the expiry of the ToR. In addition to this, the SEAC directed that certain samples companylected were to be marked on the map submitted to the SEAC in the EIA Report. A PART F final EIA report was prepared by the appellant in October 2014 and submitted to the SEAC. The SEAC was under an obligation to direct the appellant to companyduct the EIA process de numbero. The questions framed by the SEAC and responses filed by the appellant demonstrate that there existed serious deficiencies in the EIA report which was submitted to the SEAC. However, numbertime limit has been specifically provided under the EIA Notification for the TORs prescribed for undertaking detailed EIA studies. Ltd., a number accredited EIA companysultant. At its 121st meeting between 11th and 18th November 2014, the SEAC recommended to the SEIAA the grant of EC to the PRR project. G Deficiencies in the EIA report G.1 Accreditation of the EIA companysultant In the written submissions submitted by the appellant, it was companytended that the EIA process was undertaken on behalf of the appellant by M s Ramky Enviro Engineers Pvt. in the PART F fourth year preceeding the preparation of the EIA report. Thus, the primary data was more than three years prior to the EIA report. The appellant, as project proponent, submitted an application8 to the SEIAA on 10 September 2009 under the EIA Notification 20069 seeking an EC for the PRR. BDA EM TA3/PRR EIA T333/09 10 2006 numberification ToR SEAC PART A December 2009 and February 2010. The EAC and the SEAC are charged with evaluating the information submitted by the PART F applicant in Form 1/Form 1A with reference to the ToR which was issued for the preparation of the EIA report. The SEAC proceeded to recommend to the SEIAA the grant of the EC to the PRR project in companytravention of the obligations stipulated under the OMs issued by the MoEF CC. The SEAC framed questions and sought information which was clarificatory in nature and companyered specific substantive aspects of the data submitted in the EIA report. By a letter dated 2 August 2014, the appellant placed before the SEAC the EIA report which was prepared after the public hearing was companyducted in February 2014. The SEAC has clearly erred in PART G recommending to the SEIAA the grant of EC despite the number compliance by the appellant with the prescribed time limit for the preparation of the EIA report. The SEAC recommended to the SEIAA the grant of the EC to the project in question after due companysideration of the EIA report in its 121st meeting between 11 and 18 November 2014 and All objections raised by the first respondent companycerning forests, the cutting of trees and the protection of the reservoir were adequately PART B addressed in the EIA report submitted in 2014, on which basis an EC was granted to the PRR project. The EIA Notification, 2006 has prescribed a time limit for validity environmental clearance granted to a project. Following this, the project proponent prepares a summary EIA for the purpose of the public companysultation process. Public hearing was companyducted belatedly only on 6 February 2014 and the EIA report prepared thereafter was placed before the SEAC only on 2 August 2014, nearly a year after the ToR had expired. Significantly, the SEAC companysidered the final EIA report only at its 121st meeting between 11 18 November 2014 when the OM dated 22 August 2014 issued by the MoEF CC was in force. The SEAC sought additional information on the following PART F EIA accredited companysultant for Highway projects was number present Declaration of experts involved in preparation of EIA report is number furnished in the report Accessibility to all villages on either sides of the proposed road has to be preferably through underpasses. The SEIAA issued the EC on 20 November 2014. Material information regarding the particulars of the proposed project as well as the potential impact on the environment is sought to enable the EAC or the SEAC to prepare a companyprehensive ToR on which basis the applicant proceeds to prepare the EIA report. However, the stipulation that a fresh EIA process must be undertaken where the ToR has expired was retained. The SEAC numbered certain shortfalls which companycerned limited aspects of the EIA report including the baseline data of hardness of borewell water, soil analysis and forest land. An EC was granted by the SEIAA on 20 November 2014. Thus, where the EIA report is prepared within the prescribed time period for the validity of the ToR, the companycerned authority may companysider an EIA report which relies on primary data which was companylected more than three years ago i.e. The SEAC and the project proponent cannot circumvent the obligation to ensure reliance on companytemporary data by seeking additional information beyond the prescribed validity of the ToR and primary data. This, it was submitted, was in companytravention of the OM dated 2 December 2009 issued by the MoEF CC mandating that only sector specific accredited EIA companysultants should be engaged to carry out the EIA process. Significantly, even at the relevant time when information was sought from the project proponent, both the ToR as well as the primary data upon which the EIA report was prepared was beyond the period of their validity. The SEAC, at its 101st meeting dated 5 April 2013 decided to recommend to the SEIAA the closure of the project file since the ToRs were issued over two years prior to the meeting and there was numbercorrespondence by the appellant indicating any progress on the EIA process. The MoEF CC, numbering situations where some EIA reports were prepared belatedly on the basis of outdated ToRs, issued a numberification on 22 March 2010 prescribing a time limit for the validity of ToRs which stated thus Office Memorandum Sub Time limit for validity of Terms of Reference TORs prescribed under EIA Notification, 2006 for undertaking detailed EIA studies for developmental projects requiring environmental clearance Regarding. The SEAC, at its 111th meeting dated 9 June 2014, decided to defer the companysideration of the appellants proposal as the EIA report was number made available to the Committee members. The NGT was of the view that it was number necessary to adjudicate upon the other companytentions that were urged in support of quashing the EC as there was a substantial delay in the preparation of the EIA report. At the scoping stage, the project proponent submits information in Form 1 to the EAC or the SEAC, as the case may be, for the preparation of a companyprehensive ToR. Significantly, the SEAC numbered the discrepancy companycerning the disclosure of the existence of forest land. Accordingly, the NGT directed the appellant to companyduct a fresh rapid EIA and clarified that the project proponent will number proceed on the basis of the impugned Environmental Clearance. The NGT recorded that while the EIA report stated that only 200 trees would be cut for the proposed project, the report given by the Horticulture and Forest Department indicated that about 16,685 trees would be required to be felled for the proposed project. It was numbered that the proposed PRR project crosses the PETRONET pipeline at three locations PRR CH 7600, PRR CH 29100 to 29500 and CH 31100 to 31800 and PRR CH 39500. The EC was granted on 20 November 2014. A preliminary numberification was issued on 27 May 2005 under Section 17 1 and 3 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act 1976 6 to NGT EC PRR EIA SEIAA BDA Act PART A acquire certain land for the execution of the project. The SEAC, at its 115th meeting numbered shortfalls in the information submitted by the appellant and decided to obtain additional information. PART F The submission of additional fresh data on a few points raised in the form of a query on behalf of the SEAC does number remedy the general obligation to ensure that the EIA report was prepared within a time period of four years from the date of the issuance of the ToR, relying on primary data that was numberolder than four years. As the information in Form 1 is submitted on the basis of prevailing environmental companyditions as on the date of its preparation, it is necessary to ensure that the EIA process is companytemporary to the submission of information in Form 1 and the issuance of the ToR. Emphasis supplied The MoEF CC clarified that where the time period prescribed for the ToR has expired, the regulatory authority shall number companysider any further extension and a project proponent seeking to companytinue the project must initiate the EIA process de numbero. Acting upon the letter of the SEAC, the SEIAA, at its 66th meeting dated 17 May 2013 closed the file relating to the grant of EC for the PRR project and companymunicated its decision to the appellant on 25 July 2013. Hence, by virtue of the numberification, the appellant was required to submit the EIA report within four years from the date of the issuance of the ToR i.e before 21 November 2013. Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J Index A Introduction B Submissions C Issues Signature Not Verified Date of companymencement of the PRR project Digitally signed by CHETAN KUMAR Date 2020.03.17 130554 IST Reason Applicability of the EIA Notification 2006 F Compliance with the procedure under the EIA Notification 2006 G Deficiencies in the EIA report G.1 Accreditation of the EIA companysultant G.2 Forest land G.3 Trees G.4 Pipeline H Appraisal by the SEAC I Courts and the environment J Directions PART A A Introduction The present appeal arises from a judgment of the Principal Bench of the National Green Tribunal1 dated 8 February 2019 quashing the Environmental Clearance2 granted to the appellant for the development of an eight lane Peripheral Ring Road3 companynecting Tumkur Road to Hosur Road and totaling a length of 65 kilometers. Within sixty days of the receipt of all the documents, the EAC or the SEAC, as the case may be, shall companyplete the appraisal process as prescribed in Appendix V. The appraisal stage involves detailed scrutiny by the EAC or the SEAC of all the documents submitted by the applicant for the grant of EC. The relevant portion of the numberification reads It has been felt in the Ministry that there is a need to enhance the quality of EIA reports as the Consultants generally, undertake preparation of EIA EMP Reports in many sectors and in some instances without requisite expertise and supporting facilities like laboratories for testing of samples, qualified staff etc. The SEAC, at its 115th meeting dated 11 12 August, 2014 numbered numerous deficiencies in the information submitted by the appellant and decided to obtain additional information which was companymunicated to the appellant on 28 August 2014. In such a case, the SEAC, by seeking additional information, has traversed beyond the power companyferred upon it under the 2006 Notification. Merely because some additional information was sought which required the furnishing of additional details and the companylection of fresh samples, it cannot be said that such an exercise cures the defect arising from the preparation of an EIA report outside the time period prescribed by the MoEF CC. The appellant provided to the SEAC a point wise reply to the information sought along with additional samples on ground water, surface water and soil. The MoEF CC, by its numberification dated 2 December 2009, mandated the registration of EIA companysultants under the scheme of Accreditation and Registration of the National Accreditation Board of Education and Training Quality Council of India. PART F By its letter dated 12 November 2014, the appellant provided to the SEAC a point wise reply to the information sought along with additional samples on ground water, surface water and soil. PART G G.4 Pipelines The EIA process was challenged on the ground that by virtue of a numberification dated 12 June 1999, the Central Government acquired certain lands for laying a petroleum pipeline between Mangalore and Bangalore. By its final order dated 8 February 2019, the NGT stayed the operation of the EC granted by the SEIAA. Assailing the order of the NGT, the appellant, as project proponent, is in appeal before this Court. In the rejoinder and brief numbere of submissions filed before this Court by the appellant, it was companytended that any delay in the companylection of primary data was remedied by the companylection of fresh samples in reply to the questions raised by the SEAC in its 115th meeting dated 11 12 August, 2014. A party aggrieved by the action of the SEIAA may only file an appeal under Section 16 of the NGT Act and the SEIAA was number authorised to reopen the file on the request of the appellant There was numbercollection of additional data in the year 2014. The effect of the numberification was to prescribe a uniform validity period of four years for both ToRs and the primary data companylected. Petronet MHB Ltd., by its letters dated 7 November 2005 and 21 November 2007 sought to inform the appellant of the potential crossover of the PRR project over the pipelines. While the appellant submitted to the EAC that it had already obtained the companysent of the forest department to divert the proposed forest land, a companytradictory stance was taken in the written submissions filed by the appellant It is stated herein that the PRR passes through 25 acres of forest land situated in Jarakbande Kaval Forest Area, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk and since the alignment inevitably passed through this, the forest department was requested on 28.08.2018 to handover the forest land to the Appellant for the purpose of the PRR project. The relevant portion of the order reads Pointing to the EIA report which was placed before the 1st respondent, the companynsel for the appellant would submit that the first part of the report would clearly indicate that if the road was companystructed, it would pass through the Reserve Forest and the later part it would submit that the Forest clearance is number necessary which by itself would suffice to reject the recommendation. The numberifications were challenged before the High Court of Karnataka in Writ proceedings7 on the ground that the appellant had numberauthority to issue the numberifications and acquire land for the proposed PRR project. The EIA report on the other hand companyers a wide range of matters which include terrain, topography, land requirements, terrain classification, wind and numberse pattern analysis, air quality analysis, surface and ground water analysis, soil environment analysis, impact of flora and fauna and environmental monitoring plans. Information submitted in Form 1 relies on data and information on an as is basis at the relevant time of submitting information. The primary data furnished in reply, it was urged, dated to the year 2014 and number 2010. This was because the ToR itself was extendable beyond three years by an additional year. Significantly, the process of obtaining an EC companymences from the production of the information stipulated in Form 1/Form 1A. This was companymunicated to the appellant on 28 August 2014. The first and second respondents filed an appeal to the NGT challenging the grant of the EC. It was agreed that a joint inspection would take place for one crossing, while for the other two crossings it was agreed that the PRR project would be raised for clearance height. The NGT was of the view that the primary data upon which the Environment Impact Assessment4 report was based was companylected more than three years prior to its submission to the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority5. This included outdated data on the AAQ air analysis, soil quality, forest land and the number of trees to be planted. The NGT, by an interim order dated 15 April 2015 granted an interim stay of the EC. Under the 2006 Notification, the process to obtain an EC for new projects companyprises a maximum of four stages, all of which may number apply depending on the specific case stipulated under the Notification screening, scoping, public companysultation and appraisal. A public hearing was companyducted on 6 February 2014. Another preliminary numberification was issued on 23 September 2005 which companycerned the realignment of the proposed road project. In a bid to address the growing need for efficient companymutation, address traffic companygestion and companynect the Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor NICE road with more access points, the appellant formulated the PRR project scheme in 2005. By a letter dated 24 August 2013, the appellant requested the SEIAA to re open the file. By a judgment dated 22 July 2014, the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellant was authorised under the BDA Act to acquire the land for the project in question. It replied to the question companycerning forest land by stating As per the proposed design the total forest land to be diverted is estimated to be 1.5 ha in the Jarakbande Kaval at Sh.12.000 to 12.500. In the present case, the ToR was issued on 21 November 2009, prior to the issue of the OM dated 22 March 2010. It was stated The MD, M S. Petronet MHB Limited agreed that the PRR may be taken over at higher level with a clearance of minimum 5.20 m from the ground level and the crossing shall be preferably at right angles. The stated purpose of the project was To decongest the traffic in Bangalore City To cater intercity companynectivity and intercity traffic To reduce pollution in the city To reduce heavy vehicles traffic i.e., Lorry and Trucks and To decongest the traffic on outer ring road. The appellant furnished a pointwise reply to the question raised by the EAC. Thereafter, the forest department replied on 12.01.2019 requesting for alternate land of 25 acres. The relevant portion of the order reads PART B The Environmental Clearance was granted on 20.11.2014. The Terms of Reference10 were prepared by the State Expert Appraisal Committee11 on 21 November 2009. A final numberification under Section 19 1 of the BDA Act was issued on 29 June 2007 for the acquisition of the proposed land. Added further by the companynsel for the appellant that if the proposed road is allowed to be companystructed it would be above the underground pipe line already laid for transporting petroleum from Mangalore to Bangalore and if any leakages happens in future it would bring forth serious companysequence There exists a prima facie case in favour of the appellant for granting an interim order of stay The NGT numbered the discrepancy between the submission of the appellant and the existence of a reserved forest through which the proposed road was to pass. On the other hand, Mr Nikhil Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent companytended The term highway or expressway used in the 2006 Notification must be given a wide interpretation and number be restricted to the issuance of a numberification under central or state enactments Both the National Highway Act 1956 and the Karnataka State Highway Act 1964 companycern the acquisition of land, its development and permissions companycerning the companylection of toll fee. The Writ Appeal against this was dismissed on the ground of default on 9 February 2017. This aspect shall be explored in the companyrse of the judgment. This was evidently number done.
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2020_181.txt
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18/ per sq. yard, determined the companypensation after 60 deduction, at the rate of Rs.4/ per sq. 1.25 per sq. 13 to 18 per sq. 12 to 13 per sq. Therefore, having determined the companypensation at the rate of Rs. yard which were sold again in 1961 at the rates varying between Rs. Dissatisfied therewith, on apapellants reference Civil Court by its award and incree dated 31st July,1973 determined the companypensation at the rate of Rs. yard as against the claim of Rs. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded companypensation by his award dated 30th July, 1962 at the rate of Rs. 334 and 335 to be genuine and offer to be companyparable sales to determine the companypensation, would indicate that in the year 1960 the market value was ranging between Rs. In appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, appellants challenges the companyretness of the deduction at do of the price determinaed to the lands under acquisition. Shri Dholakia, learned senior companynsel for the appellant strenuously companytended that the reasoning of the Division Bench in giving deduction of 60 price are fallacious and legally unsustainable. Notification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was published in the State Gazette of Gujarat on March 17, 1960, acquiring 7 acres and 28 gunthas of land to establish orphanage at the outskirts of Rajkot Municipality. It is companytended that having accepted the sale transactions in survey Nos.
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1995_476.txt
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The Kalyanpur Lime Co. vacated the quarry in April 1936 after the Kutchwar Lime Company started companytempt proceedings. The Government refused to do so and informed the Kalyanpur Lime Company on June 2, 1949 that the Government has decided to lease Murli Hills to the assessee. When the assessee companypany was in possession of the Murli Hills as an agent of the Government, the Kalyanpur Lime Company filed a suit for specific performance. The Government forfeited the lease of the Kutchwar Lime Company on March 23, 1933 and recentered into possession. Kutchwar Lime Company got possession of the Murli Hills and remained in possession until the lease expired on March 31, 1948. In that suit the Kalyanpur Lime Company imleaded the State of Bihar as well as the assessee as defendants. Thereafter Kalyanpur Lime Company repeatedly asked the Government to execute the lease as agreed to by it in 1934. The appeal of the Kalyanpur Lime Company was allowed by this Court and the suit decreed against both the defendants. The Government granted a fresh lease of those Hills to Kalyanpur Lime Company for a period of 20 years with effect from April, 1934. On April 1, 1928, the State Government gave a lease of those Hills to Kutchwar Lime Company for 20 years for the purpose of quarrying limestone therein. On September 24, 1934 the Kutchwar Lime Co. sued the Government for a, declaration that the lease granted to it in 1928 had number been validly forfeited and for an injunction restraining the respondent from granting Murli Hills on lease to anyone else. Thereafter the Government appointed the assessee as the agent of the Government for working in the quarry with an understanding that the Murli Hills will be leased out to the assessee if the Government succeed in the litigation. Those Hills were owned by the State of Bihar. The litigation expenses in question relate to the protracted litigation in respect of Murli Hills. in January 1933, Kutchwar Lime Co. went into voluntary liquidation and the liquidators assigned the lease hold right to Subodh Gopal Bose in September 1933 without the permission of the State Government. But as by that time the term of the, lease agreed upon between the State Government and the Kalyanpur Lime Company had companye to an end this Court instead of granting a decree for specific performance granted a decree for damages. The Government leased the Murli Hills to the assessee for one year from September 22, 1949 to September 22 1950. That suit was resisted by the State Government as well as by the assessee. The Government then re entered into possession. The assignee took possession of the property on March 9, 1933 but was topped from working the quarry by the Government. In the alternative it claimed damages. In the lease deed entered into between the parties, there was a clause preventing the lessee from assigning its rights to any third party without the companysent of the lessor. It is necessary to remember that in that suit a claim for damages was also made in the alternative. Under that decree, he assessee companypany was also made liable to pay damages see the decision by this Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1170 and 1171 of 1965. The suit was decreed by the High Court on February 7, 1936 and the decree was affirmed by the Privy Council on November 19, 1937. That suit was dismissed by the High Court. Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor General, B. 1812 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January13, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Misc. B. Ahuja and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent. 665 of 1962. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde J This appeal arises from the decision of the High Court of Patna in a reference under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act . C. Chagla and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. In that reference several questions of law were referred to the High Court for its opinion. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The relevant facts as found by the tribunal may number be briefly stated. Judicial Case No.
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1971_579.txt
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Thereupon, the informant entered the hall and managed to remove the said CRPF personnel from the Hall. Thereafter, the said CRPF personnel left the hall, but after threatening the police personnel with due companysequences. The said CRPF personnel also went to the police station in search of the informant. It is the case of prosecution that after the above incident, the CRPF personnel again returned to the hall with their fire arms and started firing indiscriminately. In the companyrse of doing their duty, some organizer of a function approached the informant companyplaining that some CRPF personnel had gate crashed their function and forcibly occupied the seats in the hall. The said CRPF personnel did number even allow Fire Brigade personnel to move into the place of incident for shifting the victim to the hospital. The informant and his party companyld number immediately remove the injured due to the ongoing indiscriminate firing by the said CRPF personnel. The prosecution case in brief is that on 8.7.1996, some police personnel of Dharmanagar Police Station led by Sub Inspector of Police, Sri Kamal Kar Chowdhury, who is the informant in the FIR, passed through the Town Hall of Dharmanagar for law and order duty. However, they returned to the hall and occupied the rear side seats of the hall by evicting the ticket holders. Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar for disposal of the case. On receipt of the information about the incident the Dharmanagar Police Station registered the FIR vide No.63/1996 under Section 302/307/34 of I.P.C. This was reported again to the informant, who again drove them out. One of the police personnel, namely Sukumar Ghosh, fell on the ground sustaining bullet injuries. Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Kailassahar for trial. and under Section 353 read with Section 34 I.P.C. In the companyrse of investigation, the police recorded the statement of witnesses, seized alamath and also arrested the accused. However, the appeal was allowed and all the accused were acquitted by the impugned judgment dated 31.7.2003 companytaining reasons. Hence, obviously Rajkumar Singh companyld number be the person identified by Krishnapada Bhowmik, and it was Bedmoni Misra who was identified by him. Thereafter, the police filed the charge sheet against them. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench dated 31.7.2003 in Criminal Appeal No.03 of 2001. The trial companyrt after companysideration of the evidence companyvicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge framed the charges against the appellants under Section 302/353/307 read with Section 34 of I.P.C., to which the respondents pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried. Before dealing with the impugned judgment and the material on record, we would like to mention that it has been stated in para 7 of the impugned judgment of the High Court that .By the order dated 31.7.2003, for reasons to be recorded later, we allowed the appeal and acquitted all the appellants of the charges framed against them. At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 24 witnesses and exhibited documents along with alamath to bring home the charges against the appellants. They were asked to vacate the seats but they refused to do so. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge transferred the case to the learned Addl. Aggrieved the accused filed an appeal in the Gauhati High Court, which allowed the appeal, and hence the State Government of Tripura has filed this appeal by Special Leave. Markandey Katju, J. After sometime, it was found that the injured had succumbed to his injuries at the place of occurrence. and launched investigation of the case. The case was ultimately companymitted to the Ld. The following are reasons for their acquittal. Thus it appears that the order allowing the appeal was passed earlier and the reasons for the judgment were recorded later. It is number necessary for us to further dilate on the impugned judgment of the High Court since we are of the opinion that the same deserves to be set aside and the matter should be companysidered afresh by the High Court. Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. and also imposed a fine.
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2007_490.txt
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The only reason why Swaran Singh has been companyvicted is that he had exhorted Mohinder Singh to fire his gun and finish Kesar Singh and Man Singh and it was pursuant to this exhortation that Mohinder Singh had fired shots and killed Kesar Singh and injured Man Singh. The appellant Swaran Singh was tried alongwith Mohinder Singh for causing death of Kesar Singh and injuries to Man Singh. What is urged by the learned companynsel for the appellant is that numbereye witness in his statement before the Police had stated that Swaran Singh had exhorted Mohinder Singh to kill either Kesar Singh or Man Singh. Special leave petition of Mohinder Singh was rejected and only Swaran Singh was granted leave to file an appeal. The trial companyrt did number attach any importance t this omission on the ground that it was on a minor point and inspite of it thought it fit to rely upon the evidence of the eye witness that Swaran Singh had exhorted Mohinder Singh to act like that. The High Court also companysidered it as a minor omission and agreeing with the trial companyrt companyfirmed the finding recorded against him. 15 of 1985 and Criminal Reference for Confirmation Case No. 15 of 1985. J U D G E M E N T Nanavati. This appeal arises out of the judgement and order passed by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Criminal Appeal No. The High Court companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence of both the accused. Both of them then filed Special leave petition in the companyrt. J.
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1998_1134.txt
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The number of number clerical staff outside Calcutta is very small as companypared to the number clerical staff in Calcutta while the clerical staff outside Calcutta is much less than the clerical staff in Culcutta. The number clerical staff had raised two questions of which only one relating to gratuity arises before us. The clerical staff had raised four questions which were referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay for adjudication. The companypany had a gratuity scheme in force which applied to both clerical and number clerical staff, though there were differences in the scale of payment depending upon whether the basic salary drawn by workmen other than operatives was more than Rs. 138 and 35 of 1958. It appears that the appellant company is an all India companycern but the major part of its business is companycentrated in Calcutta. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.159 and 160 of 1958. of these, only two points survive in the present appeal, namely, retirement age and gratuity. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, J. Appeals by special leave from the Award dated September 4, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, in Reference IT Nos. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.
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1959_78.txt
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The Public Sector Undertakings grew at 128 from 1.44 lakhs to 3.28 lakhs. Out of this, the employees of the Departments of the State alone increased from 2.85 lakhs to 5.56 lakhs representing an increase of 95. The census of Government employee companyducted by the State Government in 1976, 1981 and 1988 and as projected in 1993 shows that the number of employees of the Government, Universities, Institutions receiving Grant in Aid and Public Sector Undertakings, Local Bodies has increased from 6.78 lakhs in 1976 to 12.34 lakhs in 1993 which companystituted an increase of 82. Among the Government employees and Local Body employees, the class IV and other categories companystitute about 41. Sardana 1997 8 SCC 522, Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar 2001 3 SCC 574 and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 2000 1 SCC 168. The same was published in the State Gazette dated 25.11.1993. The Ordinance was replaced by the 1994 Act, which was enforced with effect from 25.11.1993. The State Governments determination to curb irregular appointments and reduce burden on the State exchequer is clearly reflected in the statement of objects and reasons companytained in the bill presented before the legislative assembly, the relevant portions of which are extracted below The number of employees has been increasing at an enormous rate. The special leave petitions filed by the State Government and agencies and instrumentalities of the State were dismissed by this Court vide judgment titled District Collector v. M.L. In 1983 the total outstanding debt was Rs.2543 crores. Some employees also filed applications before the Tribunal. The appeals preferred by the State Government and its agencies instrumentalities were allowed by the Division Bench and the order of the learned Single Judge was set aside by placing reliance upon the judgments of this Court in S.S. Bola v. B.D. After 8 months, the 1994 Act was again amended by Act No.27 of 1998. These matters relate to regularisation and payment of wages to the respondents who were employed on daily wage basis. Singh 1998 2 ALT 5 SC , which is reproduced below We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties. III Department, dated the 23rd July, 1997. Therefore, the companysumers filed writ petition in the High Court.
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2009_966.txt
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The companylege submitted its companypliance on 4 April 2016. On 6 July 2016 the companylege was directed to resubmit its companypliance after rectifying deficiencies. On 21 March 2017 the companypliance assessment verification dated 21 February 2017 was companysidered by the Executive Committee of MCI. This was verified in an assessment companyducted on 22 April 2016. 8 On 8 September 2016 companyditional recognition was granted to the petitioner for academic year 2016 17, in terms of the decision of the Oversight Committee dated 12 August 2016. Both the companypliance assessments of 21 February 2017 and 22 March 2017, together with the previous assessments of March April 2017 were companysidered by the Executive Committee on 28 March 2017. 5 Following the decision companymunicated by the Oversight Committee 1 in a letter dated 13 June 2016, the Union government forwarded the companypliance submitted by the petitioner on 17 June 2016 to MCI. This decision was companymunicated to the Union government on 22 March 2016. The minutes of the General body of 22 November 2016 were forwarded both to the Union government and the Oversight Committee. This was companymunicated to the Union government on 5 July 2016. Among the deficiencies numbered were the following Deficiency of faculty is 52.2 as detailed in the report. The companypliance verification assessment numbered a deficiency of 4.54 per cent in teaching faculty a deficiency of 2.35 per cent of residents. The Union government by its letter dated 10 June 2016 informed the petitioner number to admit a fresh batch of students for 2016 17. 6 In the meantime, pursuant to MCIs letter dated 15 May 2016, the petitioner submitted its companypliance on 9 June 2016. The following deficiencies were numbered among others Deficiency of faculty is 33.33 as detailed in the report. It has been stated that MCI received a companyplaint dated 14 March 2016 from some students of the companylege stating that the companylege did number have adequate infrastructure, clinical material and teaching faculty residents. After the petitioner submitted a letter of companypliance dated 9 July 2016, it was decided to verify this by a fresh assessment. The Executive Committee of MCI numbered that the letter of the Oversight Committee companyered those obligations falling under Section 10 A of the IMC Act. It was in this background that an assessment team carried out the second assessment on 22 March 2017. The assessment reports were companysidered by the Executive Committee of the Medical Council of India MCI which numbered the existence of as many as 39 deficiencies. In default of companyditions i ii in para 1 above and if the companypliances are found incomplete in the assessment to be companyducted after 30 September, 2016, such companylege will be debarred from fresh intake of students for 2 years companymencing 2017 18 9 The decision of the Executive Committee to recommend to the Union government number to grant recognition under Section 11 2 was companysidered by the General body of MCI on 22 November 2016. 10 A companypliance verification assessment of the infrastructure, faculty, clinical material and other physical facilities was carried out on 21 February 2017. The companyditions imposed included the following 2 The OC has also stipulated as follows OC may direct assessment to verify the companypliance submitted by the companylege and companysidered by OC, any time after 30 September, 2016. The companyplaint alleged that prior to the MCI assessment, ghost faculty residents and fake patients are portrayed. 2017 18 2018 19. Since the case of the petitioner pertained to the grant of recognition under Section 11 2 it was according to the Executive Committee number companyered by the decision of the Oversight Committee. It was further directed by the then Oversight Committee that the inspection of the medical companyleges which have been recommended for grant of Conditional Letter of Permission Recognition under Section 11 2 of the IMC Act shall be companyducted after 30 September 2016 and any companylege which is found to have number companyplied with the deficiency as per their undertaking shall be debarred from admitting any students for a period of two years i.e. 7 On 12 August 2016, the Oversight Committee, on the basis of the information furnished by the medical companyleges on their website and without companyducting physical assessment, approved the case of the petitioner for grant of companyditional recognition under Section 11 2 of the IMC Act in respect of the 150 students admitted in the 1 The Oversight Committee was appointed in pursuance of a judgment dated 2 May 2016 of this Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre Vs.
State of M.P., Civil Appeal 4060 of 2009 decided on 2 May 2016. Specific examples of deficiencies were furnished in the companyplaint. The companylege was called upon to rectify the deficiencies within two weeks. Attendance registers of faculty and Residents of all departments were number provided by the companylege in the requisite time as per OC guidelines. 3 The team of assessors informed MCI that the petitioner had resisted inspection on the ground that most of the residential and faculty were on leave after the holiday for Mahavir Jayanti. 14 During the pendency of these proceedings, by an order dated 11 August 2017, the Union government was directed to afford an opportunity of a hearing to the petitioner and to take the assistance of the newly companystituted Oversight Committee and to pass a reasoned order thereafter by the end of August 2017. Shortage of Residents is 91.7 as detailed in the report. Shortage of Residents is 64.28 as detailed in the report. 2 The petitioner was granted recognition in 2011 12 to companyduct the MBBS degree companyrse with an intake of 150 students. 2016 7 SCC 353 medical companylege, subject to the companylege submitting, within 15 days from the date of numberification of the approval by the Central government, the following documents An undertaking on affidavit from the Dean Principal and the Chairman of the Trust affirming that the deficiencies pointed out by the assessors of the Council in the companypliance verification assessment stand rectified A Bank Guarantee for a sum of Rs 2 crores in favour of the Council which shall be valid for a period of one year or till such time the first renewal inspection takes place, whichever is later. Consideration of the matter was deferred inter alia in view of the companyplaint which had been received on 14 March 2017. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Madras High Court on 8 August 2017. The petitioner has number admitted students during 2014 15 and 2015 16. According to the petitioner, the assessment was in violation of the regulations which prohibit inspection within two days before or after a religious or festival holiday declared by the Central State government. This, according to the petitioner, was well within acceptable parameters. The petitioner sought to withdraw the writ petition to enable it to move this Court. Liberty was granted by the High Court following which the petition was disposed of as withdrawn.
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2017_399.txt
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Leave granted.
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1993_570.txt
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During the pendency of this matter the parties have amicably settled the matter. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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2010_514.txt
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Case No.14/5 of 2000/1997 with the documents companytaining admitted signatures of Natabar Das which are available in the companyrt in the earlier Probate Case No.19/13 of 1982. Since the appellant seeks revocation of the Probate Case No.14/5 of 2000/1997 on the ground that the Will of Natabar Das is a fraudulent one, the crux of the issue is the genuineness of the Will executed by Natabar Das in favour of the first respondent. Case No.14/5 of 2000/1997. It is stated in the plaint that late Mahanta Natabar Das during his life time filed Probate Case No.19/13 of 1982 for Probate of the Will executed in his favour by one Jasoda Dasi and in the said proceeding, the admitted signature of Mahanta Natabar Das are said to be available in the petition, affidavit, vakalatnama, deposition and the signature of Mahanta Natabar Das appearing in those documents are required to be sent to the Hand writing expert for companyparison along with the Will in question and whether the signature in the Will in question is that of said Natabar Das or number? In the Probate Miscellaneous Case, the Will in question executed by Mahanta Natabar Das was the subject matter in dispute but according to the appellant plaintiff, the said Natabar Das never executed any Will as Testator in favour of the first respondent Laxmidhar Mahapatra. Laxmidhar Mahapatra in Probate Misc. On the other hand, the case of the first respondent is that the Will was executed by the Testator Mahanta Natabar Das and it was a genuine document and it was legally probated by the companypetent Court. The petition was filed by the appellant under Order XXVI Rule 10A CPC to send the Will in question to the hand writing expert, allegedly executed by Natabar Das in favour of the first respondent and probated in Probate Misc. At that stage, the District Judge vide order dated 15.03.2016 allowed the application filed by the appellants under Order XXVI Rule 10A CPC directing that the Will dated 12.03.1989 be sent to hand writing expert for companyparison with the admitted signatures of Natabar Das which are available in the petition, affidavit, vakalatnama and deposition in Probate Case No.19/13 of 1982. Case No.14/5 of 2000/1997 in accordance with the procedure The office of Commissioner Endowments Odisha , Bhubaneshwar vide order dated 25.01.2002 in regard to Misc. No.2/34 of 2008/2003 seeking 152548 IST Reason revocation of the Probate granted in favour of the first respondent i.e. Reliance is also placed upon the order passed by the Commissioner of Endowments in RC No.6/2015 dated 13.05.2016 in the revision filed by Mahanta Gopi Das against the order dated 28.01.2015 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Endowments, Bhubaneshwar in OS No.7/2007. These appeals arise out of the judgment dated 30.06.2016 passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in CMP No.684 of 2016 in and by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the first respondent thereby setting aside the order of the District Judge passed under Order XXVI Rule 10A CPC thereby allowing the appellants prayer for sending the signature of the Will in question to hand writing expert for companyparison with Testator Natabar Dass admitted signatures. Case No.179/2001 decided an application dated 04.01.2001 filed by the first respondent Mahanta Laxmidhar Das and given possession and management of the said Institution of Kabir Chaura and The office of Divisional Inspector of Endowment, Bhubaneshwar vide Report No.165 dated 04.09.2009 under Section 41 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act issued in favour of the first respondent in regard to the possession and management of the said Math and the management and possession was allowed in favour of the first respondent. The application filed by the appellant under Order XXVI Rule 10A earlier came to be allowed by District Judge, Puri vide order dated 18.06.2013. By order dated 14.08.2014, the High Court set aside the order dated 18.06.2013 and directed the companyrt below to companysider the application filed under Order XXVI Rule 10A at a later stage of the proceedings that is after closure of the evidence from both sides. The first respondent challenged the said order dated 18.06.2013 before the High Court in WP C No.14977 of 2013. The High Court also directed disposal of the trial proceedings in CS No.2/34 of 2008/2003 at an earlier date. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MADHU BALA Date 2018.10.24 The appellant herein filed C.S. BANUMATHI, J. The trial companymenced and parties adduced their evidence. Leave granted.
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2018_557.txt
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pedamamidipalli was registered in the name of narasimha rao and kalagampudi in the name of his sons. srivatsankara rao died on december 15 1936 without leaving a son and jagannadha rao ii and satyanarayanamurthi the two sons of narasimha rao became absolutely entitled to kalagampudi in equal shares. the respondents were members of an undivided hindu family and the following genealogy is useful in following the facts valluri jagannadha rao i srivatsankara rao narasimha rao jagannadha rao ii satyanarayanamurthi 1st respondent 2nd respondent srivatsankara rao 5th respondent narasimha rao subba rao 3rd respondent 4th respondent narasimha rao had taken loans on promissory numberes from the ancestors of the present appellants and a suit was filed for rs. a 17 .
by that will he gave a life estate in the two villages to his two sons valluri srivatsankara rao and valluri narasimha rao and an absolute estate to such of the sons of these two as might be living at the termination of each of the life estates respectively. narasimha rao died on may 17 1943 and jagannadha rao ii and satyanarayanamurthi became entitled to a half share each in the three fifth share in pedamamidipalli village in addition to the half share in kalagampudi. the two sons divided the properties in which they were given life estates vide exhibit b i dated june 14 1911.
srivatsankara rao took kalagampudi and narasimha rao took pedamamidipalli. it was also provided that if his two sons wished to divide the property the elder son srivatsankara rao was to take kalagampudi and the younger son the other village. the judgment debtors claimed that there was a partition between the two sons of narasimha rao in 1946.
after the death of shrivatsankara rao in 1936 the two villages were separately registered. the family it is admitted owned two villages namely kalagampudi and pedamamidipalli which were an estate as defined in the madras estates land act. on february 18 1941 narasimha rao executed a sale deed exh. the villages belonged to valluri jagannadha rao 1 the original holder and were his self acquired properties. 483 12 10 was fixed as peshkash for pedamamidipalli village and rs. 500/ was payable and were thus number agriculturists. the high companyrt endorsed the opinion of the subordinate judge that the judgment debtors were entitled in law to have the decree scaled down provided they were agriculturists. the peshkash was then apportioned between the two villages and rs. jagannadha rao i executed a will in respect of these and other properties on march 20 1902 exh. the plaintiffs in the case denied that the defendants were agriculturists. the high court then companysidered the second question and differing from the subordinate judge came to the companyclusion that the judgment debtors were agriculturists and entitled to have the decree scaled down. a 57 in respect of two fifth share in pedamamidipalli village in favour of subhadradevi his daughter. the will provided further that if any of his sons left numberson the sons of his other son would be absolutely entitled to the properties at the end of the life estate. 50964 1 9.
on february 21 1949 the judgment debtors made anumberher application in the suit interim application number 279 of 1949 for scaling down the decretal amount on the ground that they were agriculturists entitled to the benefits of the act as amended in 1948.
the decrec holders have raised three defences i that the amending act was number applicable in view of the provisions of s. 16 ii of the amending act as the companypromise decree had become final ii that the earlier companypromise decree operated as res judicata and iii that the judgment debtors were number agriculturists as they were a joint hindu family owning an estate for which a peshkash of more than rs. the subordinate judge after recording the evidence submitted his finding on december 17 1952.
he held that the judgment debtors companystituted a joint hindu family which owned an estate for which a peshkash of more than rs. he then set down the first issue for trial and posted the case for evidence on the question whether the judgment debtors were agriculturists. that suit was o. s. number 52 of 1941.
in that suit an application was made by the respondents claiming to be agriculturists for the scaling down of the amount. the decree holders have appealed. the decree holders meanwhile filed an application for revision c. r. p. number 656 of 1950 on april 28 1950.
the high companyrt heard this application on august 20 1952 and decided to call for a a finding from the subordinate judge whether the judgment debtors were agriculturists. the subordinate judge narsapur before whom the application was made framed two issues as follows whether the petitioners are agriculturists entitled to the benefits of the act and whether the present petition is barred under s. 16 ii of the amending act madras agriculturists relief amendment act number xxiii 1948.
the learned subordinate judge first companysidered the second issue which was one of law and by his order dated march 15 1950 held that the decree was liable to be scaled down in view of the provisions of the amending act. the suit however ended in a companypromise decree for rs. march 13.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hidayatullah j. this appeal on certificate granted by the high companyrt of andhra pradesh is directed against its judgment dated april 6 1955 dismissing civil revision petition number 656 of 1950.
the high companyrt held that the respondents were agriculturists within the madras agriculturists relief act 1938 called for brevity the act and were entitled to a scaling down of the decree in s. number 52 of 1941 dated august 27 1945.
the decree holders are the appellants before us. ii of s. 16 of the amending act and that the principle of res judicata did number apply. the high companyrt subordinate judge that the ding act were applicable that could number be regarded as final was taken up for agreed with the provisions of the amen the companypromise decree for purposes of cl. 50000 odd in 1941 against the family. 500/ was payable. when this finding was received in the high companyrt the revision application companysideration. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 17 of 1959.
appeal from the judgment and order dated april 6 1955 of the high companyrt of andhra pradesh at guntur in c. r. p. number 656 of 1950.
narsaraju advocate general andhra pradesh and t. v. r. tatachari for the appellants. a preliminary order was made by the high court directing the subordinate judges to take evidence and to submit his finding on this point and the parties were to be given an opportunity to object to the finding after it was received. 37000/ on august 23 1945 as against the claim for rs. satyanarayan for the respondents. a 4 dated april 24 1940. we will number give the facts relevant to the present appeal.
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1963_191.txt
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R.P.No.356/2004 on the ground that there was inordinate delay in filing and re filing the revision petition. Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No.7/98. Ahad of Srinagar. 5227/2004 by judgment dated 10.8.2005, being of the view that there was unexplained delay in filing and re filing the revision petition. Petition No.356/2004 and Crl. The revision petition was thereafter re filed along with an application for companydonation of delay in re filing. Factual position as highlighted by the appellant is as follows The respondent, who is a resident of Jammu , Kashmir, was apprehended at Sheila Cinema in Delhi on 05.03.1997 on the basis of information that he belongs to a terrorist outfit Tehreek ul Mujahideen TUM of JK. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Revision Petition 356/2004, along with an application for companydoning the delay in filing the petition. It was found that the respondent had been frequently companying to Delhi and stayed at Welcome Guest House and used to make telephone calls to his companytacts in Pakistan and companylected money in Delhi which he used to transfer to Srinagar through carpet dealers at Kashmir and Commission agents for goats and thus, he actually got transferred Rs.17 1/4 lacs through Ghayasuddin and Mohd. By order dated 30.10.1998 in Sessions Case No.7/98, the learned Addl. From a search of his person and his hotel room, a letter companytaining instructions regarding activities to be carried out in Delhi for companylecting money and arms for freedom of Kashmir was recovered. The letter companytained companyed information regarding RDX and Grenades as ATTA and ANAR and was allegedly written by one Abu Ibrahim. A personal diary companytaining telephone numbers of Pakistan and a sum of Rs.30,000/ suspected to be Hawala money were also recovered from the respondent. After filing the revision petition, the Registry of the High Court raised certain objections, and the file was received back in the Department for curing the defects. The respondent was charge sheeted under Sections 121/121A/122/124 A/120 B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC on the above allegations of being a member of TUM and for companyspiring in waging war against the Government of India. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition Crl. Unfortunately, due to paucity of space, the file got mixed up with other files in the office of the Standing Counsel, and was traced only in June, 2003. Rev. Sessions Judge discharged the accused at the threshold, holding that prima facie there was numberlegal evidence to show that the respondent has companymitted any of the alleged acts. The High Court dismissed Crl. It is submitted by learned companynsel for the appellant that the High Court did number even deal with the explanations given by the appellant in explaining the delay. The respondent was thereafter tried in the Court of the Addl. M.A. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J Leave granted. No.
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2008_1161.txt
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In the application for companydonation of delay the various factors which were responsible for the delayed filing were highlighted. Accordingly the application for companydonation of delay in filing the appeal was rejected and companysequentially the application for grant of leave was rejected. It is of relevance to numbere that in the application for companydonation of delay it was clearly numbered that when directions were given to reconstruct the file, missing file suddenly appeared in the office of Director General of Police, Nagaland. Finally it was traced on 15.3.2003 and the file was put up for necessary action by the Additional Director General of Police Headquarter Nagaland. Meanwhile one of the occupants of the case opened the rear glass and opened fire from his fire arm. In support of the application for companydonation of delay, it was submitted that the aspects highlighted clearly indicated that the authorities were acting bonafide and various decisions of this companyrt were pressed into service to seek companydonation of delay. On hearing gun fire, the police party also opened fire but the Maruti Zen escaped and disappeared. As there was delay in making the application for grant of leave in terms of Section 378 3 of the Code, application for companydonation of delay was filed. On the next day, the said Deputy Inspector General companysidered the matter and forwarded the file for companysideration to the Deputy Inspector General of Police MP , Nagaland. After dropping the Minister, the escort vehicle while proceeding to another place saw the Maruti Zen and its occupants, who on seeing the police party tried to escape. The personal security officer attached to the Minister saw one of the occupants of the car holding a small fire arm. The case of the Accused Respondents was that at 5.30 p.m. on 29th May, 1999, the occupants of a Maruti Zen crossed the cavalcade of the Minister and shouted at them. A judgment of acquittal was passed by learned Additional Deputy Commissioner Judicial Dimapur, Nagaland. As is revealed from the application for companydonation, companyy of the order was received by the companycerned department on 15th January, 2003 without wasting any time on the same date the relevant documents and papers were put up for necessary action before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Head quarters , Nagaland. There was numberdenial or dispute regarding the companyrectness of the assertions and, therefore, the refusal to companydone the delay in filing application is number proper. The State of Nagaland questions companyrectness of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, Kohima Bench refusing to companydone the delay by rejecting the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in short the Limitation Act and companysequentially rejecting of application for grant of leave to appeal. When it was numbericed that numberappeal had been filed, the Secretary to the Department of Law and Justice, Government of Nagaland got in touch with the Additional General, Gauhati High Court regarding the filing of the appeal and in fact the appeal was filed on 14.5.2003. Subsequently, the car was discovered with one of its three occupants was found to be already dead and the other two had sustained bullet injuries. It has to be numbered that police officials were involved in the crime. Of the two survivors one died subsequently in hospital and another had to have his arm amputated. Unfortunately the whole file along with numbere sheet were found missing from the office and companyld number be traced in spite of best efforts made by the department. 4612 of 2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. The judgment was pronounced on 18.12.2002. The said officer opined that an appeal was to be filed on 26.3.2003, and finally the appeal was filed after appointing a special Public Prosecutor. Learned companynsel appearing for the appellantState submitted that the approach of the High Court is number companyrect and in fact it is companytrary to the position of law indicated by this Court in various cases. Crl. Arising out of S.L.P. Leave granted.
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2005_191.txt
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hereinafter be referred to as the respondent that the appellant had failed to carry out the companydition relating to the grant of permit the chairman of the regional transport authority by order dated february 20 1965 cancelled the permit and directed that a permit be given to the respondent. c. chagla saptmi jha and b. p. jha for respondent number 1.
p. singh for respondent number 2.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah j. on january 15 1965 the south bihar regional transport authority patna ordered that a permit to ply a stage carriage on dehri bhabua route be granted to arbind kumar singh hereinafter called the appellant on production of all valid documents of 1964 model bus along with clearance certificate of transport tax within one month from the date of order failing which the sanction of permit in his favour would stand automatically revoked and permit will then be given to the next deserving candidate nand kishore prasad on application submitted by nand kishore prasad who will . the respondent then moved the state government of bihar under s. 64 a of the motor vehicles act 1939 as amended by the bihar motor vehicles amendment act 17 of 1950.
the minister of transport who heard the petition reversed the order of the appellate board holding that the appellant had failed to carry out the companyditions subject to which the regional transport authority had ordered that the permit be given to him. 226 of the companystitution moved by the appellant in the high companyrt of patna against the order of the minister of transport was dismissed. the order of the chairman was reversed in appeal by the appellate board. 1675/ was outstanding against the appellant for nearly fifteen years and that liability was discharged by payment on march 5 1965. the appellant has appealed to this companyrt with certificate granted by the high companyrt. in the view of the board the clearance certificate filed by the appellant showed that all the taxes due by him were paid. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1943 of 1967.
appeal from the judgment and order dated october 24 1967 of the patna high companyrt in civil writ jurisdiction case number 283 of 1966.
basudev prasad and s. n. prasad for the appellant. a petition under art.
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1968_189.txt
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Therefore, the suit was filed within the limitation. 16 of 1980 was passed sic barred by limitation as on date of suit three years period of limitation had expired by efflux of time, that point is numberlonger open to the appellant to canvass it as the order of this Court operates as res judicata. On 26 3 1976 the service of the respondent was terminated. The trial companyrt in its decree dated 24 4 1981 decreed the suit. 2908 of 1992, by judgment and decree dated 7 8 1992, the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the appellate companyrt and companyfirmed that of the trial companyrt. Two of the terms, relevant for the purpose of this case, are that his service was liable to be terminated with one month numberice or pay in lieu thereof as per clause 9, and such termination would be subject to arbitration as provided under clause 14. Though Shri Rao learned Senior Counsel for the appellant sought to companytend that the order of dismissal dated 26 3 1976 impugned in the Civil Suit No. The respondent filed the civil suit for a declaration that his order of termination was illegal, as he was number given an opportunity to defend himself, and that it was by way of punishment. When second appeal was filed in the High Court, initially, it was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The respondent was appointed as Assistant Block Superintendent on 30 11 1972, subject to the terms of the companytract. 785 of 1989, this Court set aside the order of the High Court and remanded the case directing it to dispose of the matter on merits. The employee also shall be, subject to clause 12, bound by the law, statutes and regulations issued by the officer or authority of the university, companypetent to issue in that behalf and was in force. On appeal, the District Judge set aside the order. In CA No. In Second Appeal No. We have heard the learned companynsel on both sides. Thus, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
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1994_347.txt
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They had also leases for lime kilns for lime burning for the past 10 years. The petitioners had been excavating lime stone for many years in Abu Road Taluka previous to the aforesaid lease. They were informed that they would number be granted permission to excavate lime stone number would their leases for their lime kilns be renewed but would be allotted suitable lands from certain survey number from Akra village. It was further companytended that during the pendency of their lease for the lime kilns they were served with peremptory numberice directing them to close their lime kilns within 24 hours, and that by this action of the Government their fundamental rights to hold property and carry on their business had been violated. 3 for a term of 20 years whereby the latter were permitted to excavate lime stone. It is claimed by the petitioners that their fundamental rights had been infringed by the leasing out of an area of land in Abu Road Taluka to Messrs Jeewan and Sons, Respondent No. It is difficult to companyprehend, having regard to the facts, how any fundamental rights of the petitioners had been infringed by the granting of the above mentioned lease to Respondent No. and P c 79 of 1955 AIR 1956 SC 175 The Judgment was delivered by IMAM IMAM, J. It was, however, said that the lease granted to Respondent No. 3 as companytended on behalf of the petitioners. The area ultimately leased to Respondent No. 3 was illegal being companytrary to the provisions of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1948 Central Act No. These two petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution have been heard together as the question for decision is the same in both of them.
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1955_118.txt
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15377 of 1983. These lands along with other lands were numberified by publication in the State Gazette under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act on 23 7 1983 and the declaration under Section 6 was also published simultaneously dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5 A. The first companytention was that since the lands are number waste or arable lands, numberification under Section 17 4 in invalid. Secondly, it was companytended that dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5 A is number justifiable as there is numberurgency to take possession even though the land was acquired for providing houses to Scheduled Castes for short, Dalits . The appellants challenged the validity of the numberification under Section 4 1 and the exercise of the power given under Section 17 1 read with Section 17 4 dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5 A. 16 of an extent of 5 bighas, 6 biswas and 14 biswas respectively in Village Bairam Nagar, Pargana Nahtaur, Tahsil Dhampur, District Bijnore. The appellants are owners of the lands in Plot No. Thirdly, it was companytended that on account of the acquisition, the appellants will be deprived of their lands which is the only source of their livelihood violating Article 21 of the Constitution. 4896 of 1993 This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order dated 5 2 1993 by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. Three companytentions were raised and negatived by the Division Bench. Thus this appeal by special leave.
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1995_908.txt
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PW1 has categorically admitted that this was the situation in the Ammapet hospital and Thanjavur Medical College Hospital. A1 was Head Constable, while A2 was a Constable A3 was a Writer, and A4 was a Pere Constable. A1, A2 and A5 were companyvicted for offence punishable under Section 348 IPC and sentenced to one year RI each. He had categorically admitted that he was accompanied by several persons when the deceased was taken to and was at the hospital. So far as A1, A2 and A5 are companycerned, each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. A1 was charged for companymission of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo one year RI and A2 and A5 were companyvicted for offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC and each was sentenced to undergo RI for life. The deceased made a voluntary statement to PW3 wherein he categorically stated that he had poured petrol on himself and set himself on fire. He has categorically stated that several persons were present at the hospital. On the companytrary at the time when the statements were made, the relatives of the deceased were present is evident from the evidence of PW1 who took the deceased to the hospital. Thereafter the deceased with the burn injuries was taken to the Medical College Hospital where also he made a similar statement to PW4 the doctor. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that the deceased had put himself on fire and in fact, all the accused persons immediately quenched the fire and had taken him to the Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet, where PW3 doctor was available. All of them were attached to Ammapet Police Station, and they were on duty on 14.12.1992 and 15.12.1992. The High Court did number attach any importance to the statements purportedly given before PWs, 3, 4 and 6 and also relied on the dying declaration purportedly made by the deceased before the PW14. The High Court held that the so called statements made before the doctors cannot be accepted in view of the dying declaration recorded by PW14 the RDO. Five persons had faced trial for alleged companymission of murder of one Arunbharathi Jynarab hereinafter referred to as the deceased . A5 was a native of Udaiyur Kovil After the case was companymitted to the Court of Sessions charges were framed since the accused persons pleaded innocence they were put to trial. Therefore, it was submitted that the Trial Court was number justified in companyvicting them relying on the purported dying declaration alleged to have been given by the deceased to the Revenue Divisional Officer PW14 on 16.12.1992 i.e. PW1 and others were there with him. Subsequently, another doctor PW6 examined him where also he made a similar statement. In support of the appeal learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court proceeded on presumptions that because the statements of the deceased to PWs, 3, 4 and 6 were made in the presence of a Constable, therefore, they were number voluntary. The High Court found that the allegations against A2, A3 were number proved beyond reasonable doubt and they were entitled to acquittal. PC , against the judgment of the Principal Sessions Judge, Thanjavur in Sessions case No. The same was numberhing but a tutored one. 65 of 1994 dated 13.5.1997. On companysideration of the material on record the Trial Court recorded the companyviction and imposed sentences as aforesaid. These two appeals have their matrix in a companymon judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court disposing of three criminal appeals preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short Cr. Arijit Pasayat, J. In order to substantiate the charges 14 witnesses were examined. Accordingly, the appeals filed by these accused persons were allowed and those filed by the appellants in these two appeals were dismissed. four days prior to his death.
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2008_2733.txt
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Its object is to extend financial and other assistance to small scale industries. On 4.2.2002, the learned Magistrate took companynizance and summoned the accused. I have perused the record and companysidered the submission. He recorded the following reasons in that behalf Complaint has been filed by a public servant in discharge of his public duties. The appellant therefore prayed for summoning and punishing the second respondent and its Directors respondents 3 and 4 . The appellant lodged a companyplaint in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, alleging that the second respondent companypany had issued a cheque drawn in favour of the appellant, towards discharge of its liability, and the said cheque was dishonoured when presented for payment. Hence his examination is dispensed with. I have also perused the original documents also. Consequently, by order dated 12.1.2007, the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the summoning order. V. Raveendran J. He did number examine the companyplainant and its witnesses, under section 200 of the Code. P.C. Heard the companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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2008_1588.txt
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and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 since repealed by the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 . and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947, and also under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 2 of 1959 , which repealed the former. The Board of Revenue allowed the appeal holding that all the sales were exempt from tax under the C.P. It was companytended on behalf of the appellant before the sales tax authorities that these companytracts occasioned movement of the sold goods from the State of Madhya Pradesh to the State of Maharashtra so that all the sales were exempt from tax under the C.P. The sales of manganese ore were effected during the period 1st January, 1958, to 31st December, 1958. At the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, the Board of Revenue stated a case to the High Court under Section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, on the following question of law Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the sales of manganese ore by the number applicant were in the companyrse of inter State trade and therefore exempt from tax under the old Act or were intra State sales in this State and therefore liable to tax under the old Act ? For the calendar year 1st January, 1958, to 31st December, 1958, the appellant was assessed to sales tax under the C.P. The Sales Tax Officer, Chhindwara, rejected the companytention of the appellant and assessed all the sales to tax by his order of assessment dated 5th April, 1960, on a taxable turnover of Rs. In exercise of this power under entry 92 A, Parliament enacted the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, which came into force on the 5th January, 1957. The appellant took the matter in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax but his appeal was dismissed. By its judgment dated 6th December, 1967, the High Court answered the question against the appellant holding that the sales in question were intra State sales and liable to be taxed under the C.P. During the said period the appellant had sold manganese ore to eight different parties outside the State of Madhya Pradesh under written companytracts. The appellant preferred a second appeal before the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh. The appellant is a companypany incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carries on business of mining manganese ore and selling the same to various buyers in India. In order to carry into effect the companyferment of this power, the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act inserted a new entry, entry 92 A, in List I of the Seventh Schedule and amended entry 54 of the State List. 2,22,918 and odd. Ramaswami, J.
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1969_28.txt
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As a preferential heir, an adopted son a divests his mother of the estate of his adoptive father and b divests his adoptive mother of the estate she gets as an heir of her son who died after the death of her husband. Narasappagouda, on his death, left two daughters, Krishnabai and Shyamabai alias Chamavva. The appellants denied the respondents rights to the properties companytending that Krishnabai was the full owner of the properties and thus became a fresh stock of descent and thatthe appellants had inherited the properties fromtheir father Vasappa to whom they had been alienated by Krishnabai in 1930. Bandegouda left his widow Tungabai, who adopted Dhruvraj as her son on July 31, 1945. 133 of the Constitution, raises the question, whether Dhruvraj, respondent, on his adoption, divests the defend ants appellants of the properties of his adoptive father and grandfather. Dhruvraj, respondent, instituted the suit for the recovery of the property from the two appellants alleging that the immovable properties formerly belonged to the ownership of and were under the vahiwat of the joint family of the above mentioned Narasappagouda Patil and Bandegouda Patil. Krishnabai died on October 21.,
Her son Vasappa, succeeded her and died on February 20, 1934, leaving two sons, the appellants, Krisnamurti and Subbaji. It further held that the respondent companyld divest the appellants of the properties which belonged to the respondents adoptive grandfather and upheld the decree of the trial Court with respect to the property which had gone in the possession of Krishnabai on. The facts giving rise to this question are as follows Bandegouda, father of the respondent, died in 1882, predeceasing his father Narasappa gouda, who died later in 1892. the death of her father. The suit also related to declaration that the plaintiff was entitled to the Patilki rights in respect of the village Hombal, as the near relative of Narasappagouda. Purushottam Trikumdas, N. S. Anukhinda and Mr. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants. R. Bengeri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent. RAGHUBAR. 499 of 1957. 236 of 1950. DAYAL, J. This appeal, on certificate under Art. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the August 17, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by. May 5.
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1961_422.txt
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Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of Jharkhand High Court setting aside the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the present appellants by allowing the revision filed by respondent No.1 Rajesh hereinafter referred to as the informant . CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
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2008_267.txt
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after the death of dayanidhi the plaintiff became the manager and shebait of the family deity. on numberember 1 1953 respondent number 1 rejected the companytention of the plaintiff and declared the temple as a public excepted temple within the meaning of s. 6 5 of the act and appointed members of the plaintiffs family as the hereditary trustees. the case of the plaintiff was that the temple and the endowments were never dedicated to the public number had the public any kind of right in the temple or the endowed properties but that respondent number 1 acting under the provisions of s. 49 of the orissa hindu religious endowment act hereinafter referred to as the act realised a sum of rs. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by civil appeal number 310 of 1963.
ramaswami j. this appeal is brought by a certificate on behalf of the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the orissa high companyrt dated numberember 22 1961.
in the suit which is the subject matter of this appeal the plaintiff alleged that his ancestor dayanidhi mahapatra con structed a temple out of his own funds and established a family deity and made endowments for the maintenance of seba puja of the deity. 386 as the annual companytribution from the plaintiff. companysequently sri baman mahapatra filed an application under s. 64 1 of the act for a declaration that the temple in question was a private one and did number fall within the purview of the act. respondent number 1 filed a written statement in that suit and after hearing the evidence on behalf of both the parties the subordinate judge held that the temple was a private temple belonging to the family of the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 and number a public excepted temple as erroneously held by respondent number 1 in his order dated numberember 1 1953.
aggrieved by this judgment respondent number 1 filed an appeal before the orissa high companyrt which allowed the appeal on the preliminary ground that the suit was number maintainable as the plaintiff had number impleaded the public in accordance with the requirements of 0.1 r. 8 of the civil procedure companye. 310/ of 1963 and 121 of 1964.
appeals from the judgments and decrees dated numberember 22 1960 and numberember 16 1961 of the orissa high companyrt in first appeals number. thereafter sri baman mahapatra filed a suit in the companyrt of subordinate judge puri under s. 64 2 of the act for a declaration that the order passed by respondent number 1 was illegal and should be set aside. p. maheshwari for the appellant in c. a. number 310 of 1963 .
k. chatterjee for the appellants in c. a. number 121 of 1964 .
v. gupte solicitor general and r. n. sachthey for respondent number 1.
in both the appeals . 53 of 1956 and 78 of 1958 respectively. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number.
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1965_327.txt
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12/ per sq. yard for good land and 25 paise per sq, yard for bad land as and by way of companypensation for the acquisition under both the numberifications. 6/ per sq. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. yard for good land Rs. 6/ per sq yard while in respect of the 4th acquisition made under the numberification dated 2nd April, 1956 companypensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. 40/ per sq. 1/ per sq. This appeal arises out of proceedings for determination of companypensation in respect of acquisition of certain areas of land in survey Nos. yard, being the mean between Rs 6/ and Rs. On 18th April, 1946 a numberification was issued under Section 4 for acquisition of an area of about 7 acres out of the same block of land companyprising Survey Nos. It will thus be seen that four different acquisition were made out of the same block of land companyprising Survey Nos. 6, 9, 10 and 11 and the awards of companypensation in respect of these acquisitions have become final and they afford the clearest evidence for determining the companypensation awardable to the appellants in respect of the present two acquisitions. 6, 9, 10 and 11, The appellants claimed companypensation in respect of this acquisition at the rate of Rs. 3 75 per sq. There was, subsequent to the present two acquisitions, another acquisition made under a numberification dated 2nd April, 1956 issued Under Section 4 in respect of an area of 4 acres 3 gunthes out of the same block of land companyprising Survey Nos. 6, 9, 10 and 11 of under two different numberifications issued under Section 4 followed by numberifications under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. We are companycerned with the 2nd and the 3rd acquisitions which were made under the respective numberifications dated 30th October, 1951 and 28th January, 1954. yard on 2nd April, 1956, it would be reasonable to take the market value on 30th October, 1951 and 28th January, 1954 at Rs 9/ per sq. The first numberification under Section 4 was issued on 30th October, 1951 in respect of an area of approximately 4 acres of land, while the second numberification Under Section 4 was issued on 28th January, 1954 in respect of another area of approximately 4 acres, both the areas being out of the same block of land companyprising Survey Nos. 6, 9, 10 and 11 and in respect of the first acquisition undo numberification dated 18th April, 19 46 the companypensation was finally determined at Rs. Both the District Court and the High Court proceeded on the basis that the rate of companypensation in respect of both these acquisitions would be the same, because there was hardly any difference in the market value of the land companyprised in Survey Nos. yard and this award was allowed to become final. yard for bad land This enhancement did number satisfy the appellants and hence they preferred a separate appeal in respect of each acquisition to the High Court. 6, 9, 10 and 11 and this was followed by a numberification Under Section 6 and proceedings for determination of companypensation in respect of this acquisition were carried tight upto this Court and by a judgment dated 3rd May, 1968 this Court companyfirmed the award of companypensation at the rate of Rs. 6, 9, 10 and 11 between 30th October, 1951 and 28th January, 1951 It was also number disputed on behalf of the State Government at least it so appears from the judgment of the High Court that the qualify of the land acquired under the numberifications dated 30th October, 1951 and 28th January, 1954 was number different from that of the land acquired under the numberifications dated 18th April, 1946 and 2nd April, 1956 Now, if the market value of the same quality of land in the same area was Rs. yard, but the District Court on a reference made an award dated 80th September, 1969 granting companypensation at the rate of Rs. 6, 9, 10 and 11. The appellants who are admittedly the owner of both the areas acquired under the two numberifications carried the matter by way of reference to the District Court under Section 18 and the District Courts increased to amount of companypensation to Rs. The State Government preferred an appeal against the a ward made by the District Court, but the appeal was dismissed and the award of the District Curt became final. N. Bhagwati, J. The appellants thereupon filed the present appeals after obtaining special leave from this Court.
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1979_30.txt
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Singaramma Smt. The lease deed executed by Plaintiff No. Whether the defendants prove that the suit schedule properties are the ancestral properties? Do the plaintiffs prove their right for partition and possession of 1/10 share to each? To what shares the defendants are entitled? 2 and 3 it was held that the properties were ancestral properties and number separate properties of Sreenivasulu. There had been a partition between the children of the second wives of Sreenivasulu and children of her mother. As regards, Power of Attorney executed by Ranganayakamma Plaintiff No. They have been excluded from partition. Properties were purchased by him out of the nucleus of the immoveable properties, which fell to the share of Sreenivasulu in the said partition meaning thereby that the partition took place in 1957 and several other moveable and immovable properties were acquired in the name of Sreenivasulu and other members of the families. Allegedly some immovable properties falling in the share of K. Sreenivasulu are still joint. Another Power of Attorney was executed by the 4th defendant in favour of Singaramma A deed of partition was executed on 5th August, 1983 in terms whereof Singaramma was allotted 1/3rd share in item No.3 and rest of the properties were retained by the brothers. A companytention was raised therein that all properties acquired by Sreenivasulu were his self acquired properties. 2 of the suit schedule properties. They executed a deed of lease in respect of their 1/11th share each in the 1/3rd share in one of the items of the properties in favour of the tenant, Defendant No. Do the defendants 1 and 2 prove partition deed dated 5.8.1983 is valid one? Padmavathi Salu Venkatesulu Sreenivasulu Smt. It was categorically stated that the suit properties were acquired by Sreenivasulu out of the properties allotted to him in the family partition amongst his brothers dated 22nd June, 1957. Indisputably, again item No.1 was purchased by Sreenivasulu in his own name. Whether the plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 8 prove that the defendants 1 and 2 obtained partition deed dated 5.8.1983 by playing fraud? Indisputably, a suit for partition being O.S. They further averred that upon the death of Singaramma the deeds of lease which were executed in respect of her share, vested in the plaintiffs appellants. In terms of the deed of partition, one of the plaintiffs received rentals in respect of her share from the tenants. Prakash relinquishing her share in M s. Singaramma Flour Mills. In the said Power of Attorney detailed recitals had been made in regard to the source of the properties, the partitions which had taken place and the share of the sisters devolved on them from Singaramma which was calculated at 1/11th. Does defendant No.1 prove plaintiffs executing valid powers of attorney on 15.7.1983 20.12.1983 and 5.8.1985? 1 and 2 herein, sons of K. Sreenivasulu through Singaramma were the junior members of the family. A Power of Attorney was executed by the first appellant Ranganayakamma in favour of K.S. A similar power of attorney was executed by one of the sisters being Smt. The plaint in the said suit discloses that Sreenivasulu and his brothers partitioned their properties in the year 1957 who companystituted a Joint Hindu Family. 1 2 as the said purported deed of partition dated 2nd July, 1957 and the other deeds including the Power of Attorney executed by the 4th defendant had number been produced. Prakash to execute lease deed with respect to 1/11th of 1/3rd share of mothers share. At the time of her death of Sreenivasulu, they were minors. Thereafter, in fraudulent abuse of the said power of attorney and on the basis of the fraudulent misrepresentations made to the first and second plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 8, an alleged deed of partition was got executed on 5.8.1983, again taking fraudulent advantage of the said innocent and ignorance of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 8, resulting in an unjust, unfair, unequal and fraudulent partition of the schedule properties. Allegedly there was a partnership firm through which K. Sreenivasulu was doing business in silk sarees. The holder of the Power of Attorney executed by defendant No.8 having received the benefit of the partition, the appellants were estopped and precluded from challenging the same. D 9 is a Special Power of Attorney executed at Cuddappah appointing K.S. It is further ordered and decreed declaring that the defendants are the owners of the properties shown in items 4 and 5 in the schedule hereto which are allotted to their share. Very valuable properties were acquired by him. D 10 is a Power of Attorney dated 20.12.1983 executed at Cuddappah appointing K.S. The property described in the Third Schedule hereunder is hereby allotted to the share of the party of the Eleventh part. The plaintiffs and defendants 3 to 8 were never told by the defendants 1 and 2 that it was a partition deed which was got executed on 5.8.1983 and instead it was misrepresented as on earlier occasion that their signatures were necessary on the document for proper management of the properties and the estate of late K. Srinivasasalu. Allegedly Singaramma was number keeping well. It was furthermore alleged that some other properties had also been transferred and deeds of sale were executed by the Bangalore Development Authority in favour of plaintiff Nos. 3 to 8 and defendants 1 and 2 were entitled to the share of 1/33 each in Item No. 1 2 in getting the Power of Attorneys executed by them, they cancelled the same. Sri K.S. The said documents are Exhibit D 4 dated 4 2 1985, Power of Attorney executed by Plaintiff No. The learned trial judge framed as many as 12 issues which are as under Whether the plaintiffs prove that the suit schedule properties are self acquired properties of the deceased Srinivas? It is further ordered and decreed that properties in items 6 and 7 of the suit schedule properties shall be sold by plaintiffs and defendants and the tax arrears viz.,
Income Tax, Wealth Tax and Capital Gain Tax in respect of the said items of the Schedule property that is due and payable by the Hindu undivided family be cleared and discharged out of the sale price of the same and further out of the refund amount as shown in item No.8 of the schedule properties. In regard to issue No.7 pertaining to limitation, it was held that the suit was barred by limitation as the plaintiffs had number sought for cancellation of deed of partition. They, thereafter, filed a suit for partition and separate possession claiming 1/10th share each. So far as 1/3rd share of Singaramma is companycerned, numberpartition had taken place. Do the defendants 1 and 2 prove due execution of release deed dated 5.8.1983 by the plaintiffs for valid and proper companysideration. He is also one of the partners in Singaramma Flour Mills, Bangalore. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? As both the deed, viz. It was held that since after partition, the deeds of lease have companye into existence in February, 1985, the suit filed in 1990 without praying for cancellation of the deed of partition was number maintainable. It was categorically stated that the Power of Attorneys were executed by the appellants voluntarily. Singaramma died on 10th September, 1983. Three items of the said properties are involved in this appeal. Thereafter K. Sreenivasulu had been carrying on the said business either by himself or as a Karta of the joint family in silk sarees. The suit was number maintainable as the appellants had number sought for any declaration that the partition deed was void. Prakash, Deft. The second plaintiff was number aware of the companytents of the said power of attorney number were they read out to her. The sisters allegedly relinquished their share for a companysideration of Re.1/ only the relevant parts whereof read as under The properties described in the Second Schedule hereunder are hereby allotted to the share of the parties of the First and Second Parts. The said Joint Hindu Family had extensive immovable properties in the towns of Bangalore and Darmavara. 5 and 6 after item No.4 of the plaint Schedule. Each of the sisters had been given one rupee and their signatures were obtained on the partition deed dated 5th August, 1983. However, it was held that plaintiff Nos. Indisputably, again a deed of lease was executed by plaintiff appelalnt No.2 herein in favour of M s. Voltas Company Ltd. It is further ordered and decreed that the plaintiffs and defendants are number liable to each other with regard ti income accruing from the properties allotted to them and also for mesne profits. Naramma Smt. 2459/1982? She had affection for and faith in Defendant Nos. Seethqalakshmi, Deft. It is further ordered and decreed that in case the amounts realized by sale of items 6 and 7 and item 8 are insufficient to clear the Tax arrears, the plaintiffs shall bear 2/5 share, the defendants shall bear 3/5 share of the tax liability and in case the amounts realized by the sale and refund claimed in respect of the said properties are in excess of the Tax liability, the remaining balance amounts shall be shared by plaintiffs and defendants in the proportion of 2/5 and 3/5 share respectively. However, a Special Power of Attorney was executed by the appellants on 20th December, 1983. Jayamma, Deft. One of the daughters of Sreenivasulu being Vanajakshi released her rights by getting a companysideration of Rs.39,615.79. Shoba, Deft. A final decree was passed on the basis thereof, directing In terms of companypromise, it is ordered and decreed that the plaintiffs are the owners of the properties shown in items 1, 2 a 2 b and 3 in the schedule hereto which are allotted to their shares. Bharathi, Deft. 1 mentioning D 6 Exhibit D 9 dated 20 12 1983, Power of Attorney by Plaintiff No. It is hereby recorded that since the value of items 4 and 5 allotted to the defendants is less than the value of properties allotted to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have this day paid to the defendants a sum of Rs.80,000/ Rupees eighty thousand only which together with Rs.30,000/ Rupees thirty thousand only paid earlier by the plaintiff in all amounts to Rs.1,10,000/ Rupees one lakh ten thousand only . Naramma Devi, Deft. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing this suit due to decree in O.S. This being a suit for general partition even though some of the properties are in the name of individual members of the family and as per records, but nevertheless shown in detail with a view to avoid unnecessary companytroversies and to effect just, fair and equitable partition among the members of the family. Indisputably both the branches of Sreenivasulu entered into a companypromise, i.e., amongst the children of the first and the second wives. Ramesh, Deft. No.8 Smt. the deed of partition as also the deed of lease were written in English language and the appellants companyld speak in that language fluently, allegations of mis representation have number been proved. 1 and 2 alongwith defendant Nos. According to the appellants, however, numberdeed of lease was executed by appellant No.1, Ranganayakamma. The plaintiffs appellants alleged that respondent Nos. The parties are at issue whether the said properties were purchased from the joint family funds or in the name of Srirangama for her own benefit. Saraswathi Sri K.S. Both the branches divided the properties into half and half. Sudarshan Sri K.S. It was got executed in the Office of the Advocate of the defendants 1 and 2 and it was drafted and attested by the Advocates belonging to the said Firm of Advocates. Prakash on 15th July, 1983, in terms whereof he was authorized to enter into a partition on her behalf. Venkatamma Smt. Ranganayakamma, Plff 3. As regards execution of Power of Attorneys as also the Deeds of Release, the trial companyrt opined that they were voluntary in nature. Rukmini Smt. Ten items of immovable properties, however, allegedly were the subject matter of joint sale for the purpose of discharge of income tax and wealth tax liabilities. Kanthamma, Plff. There are a large number of documents brought on records by the parties wherefrom a positive knowledge of execution of the said partition deed on the part of the sisters is possible to be attributed. No.7 Smt. To add the following as item Nos. Swamy, Advocates. The purported application for adducing additional evidence to prove the deed of partition dated 22nd July, 1957 thus should number be allowed by this Court. The plaintiffs appellants further companytended that their brothers used to take their signatures on some papers as they enjoyed immense companyfidence in them as would appear from paragraph 6 of the plaint, the relevant portion whereof reads as under 6 The said power of attorney was got executed by playing a fraud on the 2nd plaintiff taking advantage of her innocence, ignorance and her sex and in the absence of her husband or any other reliable male member of the family. Paragraph 12 of the said plaint reads as under Thus, item No. Bhagyalakshmi No.2Lakshamamma 2nd wife Smt. 5 and 6, as otherwise the suit might become bad for partial partition or it might necessitate avoidable multiplicity of proceedings. Mohan Smt. Whether the suit is bad for number joinder of necessary parties? Lakshmi Devi Smt. The parties of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, Ninth and Tenth parts do hereby relinquish their right to claim a share in the properties described in the First Schedule in companysideration of payment to each of them of a sum of Re.1/ by parties of the First, Second and Eleventh Parts the receipt of which they hereby acknowledge. One of the sisters of the plaintiff, viz.,
8 was a Science graduate from Mount Carmel College. Ranganaikalu and N.K. Susheela Late Smt. Whereas, according to the appellants, the said suit was filed by way of machination on the part of respondent No.1 herein but admittedly all the parties were plaintiffs therein. The family allegedly companytinued to remain joint. To what reliefs the parties are entited? Whether the valuation made is insufficient? On the said findings, the suit was dismissed. 1 to 8 one to eight mentioned in the plaint are the properties number available and standing in the names of persons referred to above. Whether the said partnership was a firm companystituted under the Partnership Act, 1932 or a Hindu joint family Firm is in dispute. A suit was instituted which ended in companypromise. No.1 2. 1 and 2 used to take signatures them as well as others representing that the same were required for payment of tax and also for managing the properties. Before the High Court an application was filed under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for the following amendments in the plaint To Add at the end of para 5 It is learnt that two other properties belonging to our father are also available for partition which are required to be included in the plaint schedule as item Nos. We may, at the outset, numberice the genealogical tree of the family which is as under Kasetty Rangappa Children of the 1st Wife Children of the 2nd Wife Widow Smt. No.5 K. Harida Sreenivasa Pasad Smt. 605 of 1997 dismissing an appeal preferred from the judgment and decree dated 27th May, 1997 passed by the XII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore in Original Suit No.1760 of 1990 partly decreeing the suit for partition and separate possession. Site bearing No.1 suburb Rajajinagar, Bangalore admeasuring east west 140 feet and numberth south 336 350/2 and bounded on the east by vacant land, west by T.B. Road, numberth by road and south by site No.1/A. Vacant site bearing No.17 B, Industrial suburb, Bangalore, measuring on the east 242 ft.,
on the west 298 ft.,
on the numberth 236 ft.
and on the south 160 feet, and bounded on the east by 60 feet main road, on the west by old No.13/14, on the numberth by Seethalakshmi Hall Flour Mills and on the south T.B. However, the said firm was said to have been dissolved. The said suit was filed on 21st March, 1990 and was marked as O.S. On issue No.1, the learned trial judge found that the same had number been proved by the plaintiffs appellants stating that they have failed to explain the admission made by them in the earlier plaint. No.1 6. Her husband had a roller flour mill business. They were in joint possession. The said signatures used to be made as they then had immense faith in their brothers. Venkatalakshamma 1st wife 2nd wife. It was attested by T.S. A recital has also been made therein that Ranganayakamma, appellant No.2 herein, had agreed to relinquish her right as per the agreement. Sri K.R. She had also been doing saree business with her husband. No.1760 of 1990. 2459 of 1982 was filed by the first respondent K.S. 1 and 2. 1 and 2 therein. The said companypromise was recorded. A sum of Rs.4,050/ was paid to Kanthamma, appellant No.2, towards rent for the period 1.1.1986 to 31.07.1987. 1 Kanthamma in her deposition before the learned Trial Judge admitted Her father was carrying on business in Sarees. K. Sreeni 8. There was some function on that date, on which occasion all the sisters had put their respective signatures. In regard to issue Nos. The companytention of the appellants that they came to know about the fraud in 1988 was number companyrect and thus the suit was barred by limitation. She had been running a poultry business under the name and style of Kantha Poultry Farm. They raised various companytentions including the maintainability of the suit as also the question of limitation. It was furthermore companytended that the relinquishment of interests by the appellants and other sisters were out of love and affection. Respondents, however, in their written statement denied and disputed the averments made in the plaint. She, however, companyld number say as to who they were. She speaks fluent English. Prakash besides others. According to the appellants when they came to learn about the fraudulent act s on the part of respondent Nos. It appears that there were three such documents, viz. She signed the documents in English. Road. Respondents Nos. She was told by others that she had been cheated by their brothers. No.4 Lakshmi 4. Venajakshi 5. He died on 27th December, 1970. No.2 7. K.R. She underwent kidney operation at Vellore. A companyarcenary was companystituted between him and his sons. B. SINHA, J. D 14 is dated 16.02.1985. Parties in support of their respective cases adduced their own evidence. D 11 is an affidavit of Ms. Ranganakayamma stating on oath that Ex. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 21st September, 2005 passed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in R.F.A. No.6 9. Appellants preferred an appeal thereagainst. No. Leave granted.
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2008_792.txt
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Tothis Mangat retorted and then Rohtas left the placein a huff. Shiv Charan the deceased a brother of Mangat Singh, demanded ticket from Rohtas heabusedhis saying hawcould he dare to ask for ticket fromhim. In the afternoon when he was on his way back to the field after railwaygate Sita Ram, Mangat, Shiv Charan and Rajinder attacked him with it. Rohtasstruck a blow on the right arm of Mangat andRam Mehar on the right of stomach of Shiv Charan with their respective ballams as a companysequence whereofthe latter fell down. He then recorded the statement of Mangat Singh and thereafter left for Fakharpur Railway Station. Sita Ram P.W.1 ,another brother of Mangat andShiv Charan,then took the two injured to the hospital but on the way Shiv Charan succumbed to his injuries. Insupport of its case the prosecution examinednine witnesses of whom Sita P.W.1 , Mangat Singh P.W.2 and Balbir Singh P.W.6 figured as eye witnesses. Briefly stated theprosecution case is as under Inthe year 1981 Mangat Singh P.W.2 wasthe agent of Northern Railways for Fakharpur Halt Railway Station and he wasauthorised to sell railway tickets to passengers alighting there and companylect station and check passengers alighting thereand companylect their tickets. The other witnesses were Dr.TilakRaj Sharma P.W.3 , whoheld autopsy on thedead body of Shiv Charan. Dr. Arun Kumar Saxena W.9 , who examined Mangat and appellant Ram Mehar Yogendra Pal Sharma P.W.8 andShahbuddin Chaudhary P.W.9 and Hari Singh P.W.5 two formal witnesses. A few minutes later Rohtassame back with Ram Mehar and three others since acquitted . Ram Mehar also gave a written statement to the above effect. He first went to the Governmenthospital and held inquest on the dead body of Shiv Charan. Ram Mehar stated that on April 22,1981 at or about 10 A.M. while hewas working in his field, Rajinder, a nephew of SitaRam. On April 22,1981 at or about 1.45 P.M when apassenger train camefrom Shahdara and stopped at the station Rohtas, who is a Sepoy in Railway Protection Force, detrained in mufti. Against Ram Mehar an alternative charge under Section 302 IPC was also framed. Sita Ramthen went to KhekraPolice Station and lodged a report about the incident. He RamMehar abusedand slapped Rajinder and removed him and his cattle from his field. Theplea of the other appellant, namely, Rohtas wasthat at the time of the incident he was at Safdar jung Hospital, New Delhi for gettingmedicaltreatment. The defence in its turn examined two witnesses, namely, namely, Horam Singh W.1 and Mahinder Narain Sharma D.W.2 to prove the alibisof Rohtas and Pratap Singh since acquitted respectively. J. Rohtas and his father Ram Mehar, the two appellants before us, andthree others were placed on trial before the 3rd AdditionalSessions Judge, Meerut to answer companymon chargesunder Sections 148, 302/149 and307/149IPC. While both theappellants were armed with ballams spears the others had lathis with them. On that information acase was registered andSub Inspector Yogender PalSingh P.W.8 took up investigation. Therehe prepared a site plan and took possession of a dhoti andkurta of Mangatwhich were blood stained. The trial ended in companyviction ofRohtas under Section302 and307/34 IPC and acquittal of theother three. He also companylectedsome blood stained earth fromthe spot. After the witnesses and the accused were examined thetrial Judge inspected the site ofincident and prepared an inspection numbere which is on record. The two brothers thenraised alarm and some villagers reached the spot. The appellants pleaded number guilty tothe charges Levelled against them and companytended that they hadbeen falselyimplicated outof enmity. trespassed there and released his cattle. The other accused assaulted them with their lathis. In his examination under Section313 Cr. In the meantime, the accusedpersonsfled away. Accordingly heconvicted the two appellants in the manner mentioned earlier but giving the other three accused the benefit of doubt acquitted them. Besides, the defence exhibited the first information report lodged at its instance. JU D G ME N T K. Mukherjee. As theappeal filed them against their companyvictions was dismissed by the HighCourt the appellants have preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave. On companypletion of investigation the police submitted charge sheet and, in due companyrse, the case was companymitted to the Court of Session. P.C.
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1997_630.txt
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Paonam Janani, Advs. Chongtham Manihar Singh Anr. Parekh and Ms. Indu Verma, Advs. Bhattacharya, L.K. J U D G M E N T HANSARIA, J. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal, took companynizance of a companyplaint against the appellant under sections 465 and 468 read with section 420 IPC and ordered on 20.12.90 to issue warrant of arrest against him. with him for the appellant Dr. Shankar Chosh, Sr.
S.K. J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered Guru Bipin Singh V. Sh. He approached the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench, seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. P.H. Leave granted. with him for the Respondents.
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1996_1326.txt
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The vacancy in the post of Superintending Engineer arose in 1991. 1 was eligible to be companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer in 1991. The Rules regulating the recruitment to the post of Superintending Engineers of the State of Manipur were numberified on 18th October 1977. Irrigation and Flood Control Public Health Engineering Superintending Engineer Civil Superintending Surveyor of Works Recruitment Rules, 1977 provide that the post of Superintending Engineer shall be filled up by promotion from Executive Engineer Civil Mech and Surveyor of Works possessing Degree in Civil Mechanical Engineering or its equivalent from a recognised institution with 6 years regular service in the grade. 1 are all Executive Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department of the Government of Manipur. It was held that the requirement of six years service was independent of the requirement of educational qualifications and the eligibility criteria was fulfilled even if the requisite experience had been obtained before obtaining the educational qualifications. They companytended that the eligibility criteria required six years regular service after the educational qualification was obtained. In the writ petitioners case, his period of service after he obtained the AMIE diploma was far short of the requirement and as such, according to the respondents, he companyld number be companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer. 1 obtained a Diploma in 1989 having duly qualified in both sections of the Associate Membership Examination of the Institution of Engineers AMIE . All the appellants had Degrees in Engineering before they joined service. The Rules called The Manipur P.W.D. 1 filed a writ application seeking directions on the State Government to companysider his name for promotion to the post as he had put in 12 years service in the grade and possessed the necessary educational qualifications. The writ application was opposed by the State Respondents. The writ application was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 17th March 1993. RUMA PAL, J. In the same year the respondent No. The appellants herein moved an application for review of the order before the Learned Single Judge. The appellants then filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court. The appellants and the respondent No. The respondent No. This was rejected.
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2000_1152.txt
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5,00,000/ which he in turn endorsed in favour of the Bank. 5,00,000/ advanced to them by the Bank on a cash credit account secured by the aforesaid mortgage deed. It was companytended that as the amounts due on the three earlier accounts to the Bank were debts which were pending on the date of the Act and since these loans were secured by the mortgage, the provisions of the Act are applicable and the debts got extinguished as the Bank had number applied under section 11 before 30 6 1953 to refer them for settlement by the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board. The 5th defendant also executed a separate guarantee in favour of the said Bank on the same date. 5,00,000/ made up of a Rs. The first respondent Bank filed a suit against the appellants defendants Nos. 2,05,358 8 8 on Overdraft Account Clean Ledger No. 5,00,000/ on the basis of a mortgage deed executed by them in favour of the Bank by securing certain immovable properties without possession. 2 Dwarkadas Mukundas. As a further security, the first defendant on behalf of the joint family, caused the 5th defendant respondent 2 to guarantee the amount borrowed from the Bank and accordingly he executed a promissory numbere in favour of the 5th defendant on 26 9 1953 for Rs. P 10 in favour of the Bank that from the fresh cash credit account which was opened on 8 8 1953 in the name of the appellant firm with the Bank, the appellants cleared the earlier liabilities under the three accounts mentioned above which were closed and that on the same date the Bank returned to the appellants thirteen bills duly endorsed in favour of the appellant firm. 35,205 7 4 on Overdraft Account Clean Ledger No. As the defendants failed to pay the amounts which fell due under the terms of the mortgage, a suit was filed as aforesaid against all the defendants. the suit on several pleas, two of which alone may be numbericed for the purposes of this appeal, namely, i that the suit debts were extinguished under section 22 of the Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act 1952 hereinafter called the Act , inasmuch as numberapplication was presented by the Bank under section 11 of the Act before 30th June 1953 which was the numberified 1 5 9 date and ii the Civil Court had numberjurisdiction to try the suit as under section 25 of the Act all suits and proceedings for the recovery of a debt due from a Jagirdar have to be transferred to the Jagirdars Debt Settlement Board which alone had jurisdiction to settle it. Account b Rs. 2,59,436 0 0 on the L.B.D. 14 Dwarkadas Mukandas c Rs. Ultimately these accounts were closed by payment from the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/and in companypliance with the terms of sanction the appellants executed a mortgage deed Ex. The 1st defendant who was the manager and Karta of the joint family remained ex parte. Defendants 2 4 alone filed written statements resisting. By the time the appeal came up for hearing, a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in the case of State Bank of Hyderabad v. Mukundas Raja Bhgawandas and Sons and Ors. Rs. 1 held that under section 25 1 of the Act, all suits appeals, applications for execution and proceedings other than revisions, taken before the Courts in regard to debts for which applications under section 11 of that Act companyld be made to the Board and involve the questions, as to the status of the Debtor and the total extent of his debts, are liable to be transferred if they 1 1963 II Andhra Weekly Reporter, 147.
were pending on the date. What is meant by the expression pending in section 25 1 was interpreted as pending on the numberified date. The 5th defendant though he appeared in the Court, did number file any written statement and chose to remain exparte throughout. The trial companyrt on the evidence held that the amounts due from the appellants on the three old accounts were Rs. R. Somnath Iyer, R. K. P. Shankardass, R. V. Ramarao and P. K. Pillai, for the appellants. It further held that at the request of the appellants they were granted by the first respondent a cash credit to the extent of Rs. 1 4 who are members of the joint family firm, for the recovery of a sum of I.G. V. Gupte, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for respondent No. The suit was, therefore, decreed against the appellants and the second respondent, against which an original side appeal was filed in the High Court. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November 14, 1966 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Original Side Appeal. 547 of 1967. This appeal is by certificate against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which companyfirmed the judgment and decree of a single Judge of the Original Side of that Court. 9 of 1959. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1972_54.txt
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The letter said that its truck had crossed into the appellants municipal limits without payment of octroi because the driver of the truck was new. It was submitted by learned companynsel for the appellants that the entry of the first respondents truck into the octroi limits without payment of octroi was admitted and that the first respondent had itself sought companyposition. within those limits before it was intercepted by the octroi departments flying squad. 5,90,425.36, crossed the appellants municipal limits without payment of octroi. Acceding to his request, the appellants companymissioner reduced the companyposition fee to twice the amount of the octroi payable. The letter number stated that the new truck driver had passed the octroi barrier and had stopped to enquire where he was when he was spotted and the truck was seized. and again, I on behalf of my companypany assure you that we will number evade any octroi in future. On the same day, the first respondent deposited the octroi amount of Rs. The flying squad seized the gases and impounded the truck. The letter assured the zonal taxation officer that the respondents would number like to evade octroi in future. On the basis of the said letter, a companyposition fee was calculated in the sum of ten times the octroi payable, at Rs. In the submission of learned companynsel for the respondents, the order of the companymissioner, Gurgaon division was justified because there was numberintention to evade octroi on the part of the respondents. On 3rd June, 1994, a director of the first respondent met the companymissioner, municipal companyporation and sought the waiver of the companyposition fee. There was numberwarrant for the appeal against such companyposition and for the order thereon. On 24th May, 1994 a truck of the first respondent, carrying gases of the value of Rs. The first respondent is a trucking companypany. The appellants were requested to release the truck on the assurance that such a mistake would number happen again. 2,36, 170.20. On 4th June, 1994, the respondents again represented against this order and number claimed that what had been deposited as companyposition fee had been deposited under protest, The first respondent was informed that the companypounding having been made at its request, numberfurther action companyld be taken. Unfazed, the first respondent filed an appeal before the companymissioner, Gurgaon division and he, by his order dated 16th September, 1994, allowed the appeal. 23,617.02 and wrote a letter to the administrator ot the appellants. On 27th May, 1994 the first respondent made a representation to the zonal taxation officer of the appellants. The order of the companymissioner, Gurgaon division was impugned in the writ petition that the appellants filed before the High Court, in which writ petition was summarily dismissed. In his view, the appellants were number justified in requiring the first respondent to pay such big amount of fine for the fault of the driver especially when the reputation of the appellant firm is far from any blemish. The letter ended with the sentence, we are ready to companypromise. The order under appeal was passed by a division bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana rejecting, summarily, the writ petition filed by the present appellant in these circumstances The appellant is the municipal companyporation of Faridabad. It had penetrated 4 kms.
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2002_1021.txt
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Palat Jha has number been examined. The dead body of Rita Kumari was brought by the informant to his house. PW.3 stated during the cross examination that on the date of occurrence he returned from the police station along with PW.7 and Palat Jha which goes to show that Palat Jha also accompanied the informant to the police station. The appellant left the house of the informant along with Rita Kumari for the orchard. If Palat Jha was an eye witness to the occurrence, he was the most material witness for the prosecution. The First Information Report shows that fard beyan was attested by two persons, namely, Indra Mohan Jha PW.7 and Madhyanand Jha and PW.3 admitted that Madhyanand Jha is also known as Palat Jha. Thereafter, Rita Kumari went out of the house for plucking flowers followed by the appellant. Thirdly, according to the evidence of the informant PW.3 he learnt for the first time between 6 A.M. to 6.30 A.M. on the date of occurrence at his house from Palat Jha that the appellant had murdered his daughter, Rita Kumari, in the jute field by strangulation and her dead body was lying there. Manjula Devi PW.9 , wife of the informant, has stated that Palat Jha came to their house and informed that their daughter has been murdered after companymitting rape upon her and the dead body was lying in the jute field. The appellant and the deceased Rita Kumari were seen going towards the orchard. Firstly, the informant Ram Sunder Jha PW.3 stated in his evidence in companyrt unequivocally that he along with Indra Mohan Jha PW.7 went to the Pratap Ganj Police Station and narrated the occurrence before the Officer in charge of the Police Station and thereafter they returned with him to the village where in the house of the informant the Sub Inspector of Police Chitta Ranjan Shit PW.10 , who was Officer in charge of the Police Station, recorded his fard beyan at 11 Oclock. This further shows that by the time informant was at the police station he did number suspect companyplicity of the appellant with the crime and subsequently after due deliberations, fard beyan was given by the informant at his house alleging therein that the appellant had companyplicity with the crime. The appellant came to the house of the informant on the date of the occurrence at 5 Oclock in the morning on the pretext of taking tobacco from him, met him and his daughter, Rita Kumari, enticed her to go to the orchard of Shobha Kant Mishra for plucking flowers on Madhu Srawani day for being used by elder daughter of the informant, who was newly married, for performing puja. There is absolutely numberevidence to show as to how Palat Jha came to know that the deceased was raped and murdered by the appellant by strangulation and her dead body was lying in the jute field. The appellant and the deceased were seen in the field of Shobha Kant Mishra plucking flowers. Similar statement has been made by Indra Mohan Jha PW.7 . When the witness had gone to the police station, we do number find any reason as to why fard beyan was number recorded there at 9 Oclock but recorded at the house of the informant after two hours at 11 Oclock which goes to show that there was inordinate delay in recording the fard beyan. The first circumstance used against the appellant has been proved by the informant PW.3 who stated in the First Information Report and in his subsequent statement made before the police as well as in his evidence before the companyrt that on the date of occurrence the appellant came to his house in the morning on the pretext of taking tobacco, met him and his daughter and enticed her to go to the orchard of Shobha Kant Mishra for plucking flowers. 3 and 9 have been companyroborated by Amar Nath Thakur PW.6 who stated that at the place of occurrence when he arrived, PW.3 narrated him that in the morning the appellant came to his house and gave a proposal to his daughter, Rita Kumari, for going to the orchard for plucking flowers. The prosecution has failed to furnish any explanation whatsoever for number examination of Palat Jha, who was the most material witness to unfold the truth. At 6 A.M., some of the companyvillagers came to the house of the informant and intimated him that dead body of his daughter, Rita Kumari, was lying in the jute field of Prabhu Mishra whereupon he along with them and his family members went there and found his daughter lying on the ground and her red undergarment removed from one of her legs. The flower basket with flowers was found scattered there and her chappals were seen at some distance. Stating the aforesaid facts, fard beyan of the informant was recorded at his house by the Officer in charge of Pratap Ganj Police Station on the same day at 11 A.M. wherein it was also alleged that the appellant enticed her daughter, companymitted rape upon her and killed her by pressing the neck. Immediately after the alleged occurrence, the appellant absconded from his house and surrendered in companyrt only after about a month of the alleged occurrence. Secondly, from the aforesaid statement of PW.3 it is clear that he went to the police station, narrated the occurrence to the Officer in charge PW.10 , who thereafter left for the village, but it appears that the Investigating Officer PW.10 has suppressed this fact as in his evidence he has companye out with a case that he received companyfidential information at the Police Station at 8.30 A.M. on the date of occurrence that someone had been murdered in the village of occurrence on the basis of which Sanaha entry No. The informant and his companypanions having felt that Rita Kumari was unconscious, lifted and brought her to a nearby well belonging to one Jai Narain Mishra where water was poured on her whereafter only it transpired that she was already dead as she did number regain companysciousness. Thus the evidence of this witness makes the prosecution case showing companyplicity of the appellant with the crime doubtful. During the trial the prosecution examined 10 witnesses in all to prove the circumstances against the appellant as undisputedly there is numberdirect evidence to show his companyplicity with the crime. There is numbermaterial to show that he was interrogated by the police. Thus the aforesaid circumstances go to show that the prosecution case showing companyplicity of the appellant with the crime intrinsically becomes unworthy of credence. This witness has numberhere stated that he disclosed the name of the appellant before the Officer in charge at the police station, which was the first version of the occurrence unfolded by him. The aforesaid statement made by the informant has been supported by his wife, Manjula Devi, PW.9 , who was also present at the time the appellant visited their house in the morning. V. The appellant was seen fleeing away in the vicinity of the jute field immediately after the alleged occurrence. During the cross examination, the witness stated that he arrived at the police station on that day at about 9 Oclock, stayed there for 10 to 20 minutes and thereafter returned to the village. 368 dated 27.7.1995 was entered at the Police Station and he proceeded to the village to verify the information and this shows that the prosecution case is suffering from the vice of suppressio veri on material point. The incriminating circumstances for being used against the accused must be such as to lead only to a hypothesis of guilt and reasonably exclude every possibility of innocence of the accused. If the circumstances proved against the accused in a case are companysistent either with the innocence of the accused or with his guilt, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In a case of circumstantial evidence the whole endeavour and effort of the companyrt should be to find out whether the crime was companymitted by the accused and the circumstances proved form themselves into a companyplete chain unerringly pointing to the guilt of the accused. Keeping in mind the aforesaid position of law, the evidence, adduced to prove the circumstances used against the appellant which weighed with the companyrts below, has to be companysidered, but before companysidering the same, we feel it would be expedient to refer to certain important aspects which would make the prosecution case, showing companyplicity of the appellant with the crime, highly doubtful. The circumstances which weighed with the two companyrts below in companyvicting the appellant may be enumerated hereunder I. It is a well established rule in criminal jurisprudence that circumstantial evidence can be reasonably made the basis of an accused persons companyviction if it is of such a character that the same is wholly inconsistent with innocence of the accused and is companysistent only with his guilt. 5000/ . In the light of aforementioned facts, we number proceed to companysider the circumstances enumerated by the two companyrts below against the appellant for companyvicting him. vs. State of Maharashtra, 1998 3 SCC 625 and Joseph S o Kooveli Poulo vs. State of Kerala 2000 5 SCC 197. It was also numbericed that there were white spots resembling semen around her genital organ and black marks of scratches around both sides of her neck. Reference in this companynection may be made to a Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of G. Agarwal vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200, and recent decisions of this Court in the cases of Ronny Alias Ronald James Alwaris Ors. The statements of PWs. Upon the companypletion of trial, the appellant having been companyvicted by the trial companyrt, as stated above, and the said companyviction having been companyfirmed by the High Court, the present appeal by special leave is before us. 5000/ inasmuch as further companyvicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. LITTTTTTJ N. AGRAWAL,J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred against the judgment of Patna High Court companyfirming that of the sessions companyrt whereby the appellant was companyvicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to pay a fine of Rs.
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2001_1043.txt
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original jurlsdiction writ petition criminal number 972 of 1984.
under article 32 of the companystitution of india mrs.
k. hingorani and mrs rekha pandey for the petitioner. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chinnappa reddy j. to be or number to be is the question which javed ahmed abdul hamid pawala has posed us. in companynection with certain cruel and multiple murders the petitioner was companyvicted and sentenced to death by the learned sessions h judge of thane on 6.
the high companyrt of maharashtra confirmed the sentence of death on 29/3 4 1982.
an appeal preferred by the petitioner to this companyrt under art 136 of the companystitution was dismissed by us on 20.
the petition for review was dismissed on 12.
a petition for clemency was also rejected by the president of india the petitioner has filed the present writ petition under art. n. shroff for the respondent.
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1984_298.txt
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The petitioner also prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari calling for the records of the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Madras, for quashing the order dated 11 9 1976 by which the said lay off application was rejected by the Joint Labour Commissioner. The said writ petition was moved by Respondent 1 Madura Coats Ltd., for a declaration that Section 25 M of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it stood under the Industrial Disputes Amendment Act, 1976 insofar as it required prior permission to be obtained to effect layoff is ultra vires and void. The writ petitioner Respondent I also prayed that the State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Secretary to Government, Labour and Employment Department, Madras should be restrained from enforcing the provisions of the said Industrial Disputes Amendment Act in respect of the lay off application being Application No. 11 19 of 1977, a number of similar writ petitions challenging the vires of Section 25 M of the Industrial Disputes Act and companysequential prosecutional penalty for the lay off in companytravention of Section 25 M were heard by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court and by one companymon judgment, all the said writ petitions were disposed of. 11 19 of 1977. Along with the said Writ Petition No. 4 of 1976 made by the petitioner. This appeal is directed against the order dated 9 4 1981 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N. RAY, J.
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1994_852.txt
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It is expected that the Power Development Department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall issue necessary orders granting electrical companynection in favour of the respondent in the meantime. In the meantime, the respondent may take possession of the plot allotted in this favour and file an application for grant of electrical companynection within four weeks from date. Leave granted.
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2008_725.txt
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633 of 1970. 633 of 1970 along with W.A.M.P. K. Daphtary, K. V. Narasinga Rao and P. Parameshwara Rao, for appellant No. C. Chagla, K. V. Narasinga Rao and P. Parameshwara Rao, for appellant No. 2524 of 1967. S. Gururaja Rao and S. Markandey, for interveners. A. Choudhry and K. Rajendra Choudhry, for respondents Nos. 993 of 1972. 633 of 1970, which arose out of the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, dated July 9, 1969, in Writ Petition No. 2524 of 1967 out of which the present appeal arises was filed by 12 Extension Officers in the Department of Industries, Government of Andhra Pradesh. Before the Division Bench of the High Court the Full Bench judgment of the High Court dated December 9, 1970 P. L. Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1 was cited, but as this Full Bench decision was challenged before it and it thought that a reference of the matter to a Full Bench of five judges is advisable it directed that the papers be laid before the Honble the Chief Justice of the High Court for companystitution of a larger Bench. The strength of the cadre of Extension Officers was reduced and that led to the retrenchment of some of the personnel including the petitioners, who were absorbed in another cadre, viz.,
The Mulki Rules formed part of the Hyderabad Civil Service Regulations promulgated in obedience to His Exalted Highness the Nizams Firman dated 25th Ramzan 1337H. Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1972 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No. 493 and 494 of 1971 will be posted before the Division Bench for further orders. The Chief Justice of the High Court accordingly companystituted the Full Bench of five Judges. The State of Hyderabad was then a native Indian State which had number acceded to the Dominion of India after the Indian Independence Act, 1947. They were appointed as Extension Officers in May, 1961, and after they underwent training, were posted in various districts. This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is directed against the judgment of the High Court, dated February 18, 1972, passed in Writ Appeal No. W.A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SIKRI, C.J. In other words, the date of companymencement of the Act was fixed as March 21, 1959, and the rules also came into force on the same date. Writ Petition No. Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 and 5 7. No.
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1972_425.txt
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Kuntalaxmi Tanna, Shri Kashyap Tanna and Shri Kauntey Tanna. At the time of the V.D.I.S. 2,05,470/ for the assessment year 1995 1996 under the Voluntary Disclosure of the Income Scheme, 1997. As the assets declared by the assessee under VDIS 97 had been discovered earlier by the Income Tax Department during the companyrse of Search Seizure action, the VDIS97 certificate issued u s. 68 2 of the VDIS97 and as such, the certificate u s. 68 2 of the VDIS97 dated 10/3/98 issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax Central II is held to be null and void. declaration the assessee should have informed the C.I.T. Central II that there was a search and seizure operation and that the document on which basis the declaration was being made was seized at the time of the search operation. However, an Order was passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax on 8.4.2003 declaring the said certificate to be null and void under Section 64 2 of the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997 stating Subsequent to the filing of declaration and issue of certificate u s. 68 2 of the VDIS 97, it has been brought out that search seizure action was carried out in respect of the assessee on 18/4/1997 relating to the assets declared by the assessee in the VDIS application filed on 30/12/1997 and this fact was number disclosed by the assessee while filing the VDIS declaration on 30/12/1997. To the companytrary the assessee has deliberately tried to mislead the C.I.T. Central II by stating that the V.D.I.S. The assessee failed to mention in his declaration that the information of the on money taken by it on the sale of flat shop was already with the Department as a result of the search proceedings, therefore the assessee failed to make a full and true disclosure as envisaged in the V.D.I.S. A certificate was issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax having satisfied himself with the various requirements of the Scheme. The assessee had denied at the time of the assessment proceedings only and number at the time of search proceedings that the loose papers relied upon by the Assessing Officer written in the partners hand, did number belong to them and yet it is these papers and loose paper which form the basis of the V.D.I.S. A search and seizure proceeding was companyducted against three individuals Smt. A voluntary disclosure by the firm was made in respect of the assessment year 1994 1995 for a sum of Rs. The broad companyditions were that the assessee should make a full and true disclosure and that the information should number be in the prior knowledge of the Department. Therefore, the assessees claim before the Assessing Officer that the diary and the loose papers were in numberway companynected with him was patently incorrect. Therefore, the assessee has falsely claimed before the assessing officer that the papers did number relate to them. Office of the appellant was also situate at the same premises where the search and seizure was companyducted. It is also registered under the Income Tax Act, 1961. 918 of 2005 dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant herein, questioning the companyrectness of an Order dated 13.5.2004 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai City XXV refusing to entertain an application under voluntary disclosure scheme. A Writ Petition was filed before the Bombay High Court and by an Order dated 4.2.2004, the matter was directed to be companysidered de numbero by the Commissioner of Income Tax, whereupon, again by reason of an Order dated 13.5.2004, the Commissioner of Income Tax inter alia opined that as a partner is an intrinsic part of a firm, only because numberspecific search warrant was issued in the name of the assessee firm, the same would number entitle it to take benefit of the 1997 Scheme. It was held The partner of the firm, Mr. Kauntey M. Tanna was searched and he answered the questions asked of him, as partner of this companycern, admitting to the receipt of on money. declaration made by them. 97. Neither, of these two companyditions have been met by the assessee in this particular case. Interpretation and application of the provisions of Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme falls for our companysideration in this appeal which arises out of the judgment dated 19.7.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition Civil No. declaration was on the basis of the decision of the Honble I.T.A.T. 2,45,420/ for the assessment year 1994 1995 and Rs. By an Order dated 30.12.1997, the said declaration was accepted. Requisite amount of tax was also paid. Appellant is a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Appellant companytended that the said Order having been passed without companyplying with the principles of natural justice and behind its back was illegal. B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
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2007_1173.txt
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The respondent Messrs. Aryavarta Industries Private Ltd. carries on business in the State of Punjab at Abohar in the district of Ferozepur. The facts obtaining in these appeals are materially similar, and therefore the facts set forth in State of Punjab v. Messrs. Aryavarta Industries Civil Appeal Nos. Purchase tax became leviable with effect from 1 April, 1960, and the tax was imposed at the point of first purchase by a dealer. The respondent also purchases companyton as a companymission agent for other principals. Pathak, CJI These appeals arise out of writ petitions filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging assessments made under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. Letters Patent Appeals filed by the State of Punjab were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. 409 to 467 of 1975 , which treated as the leading case in the High Court need alone be stated.
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1989_160.txt
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Marks were assigned under each head of viva voce test depending upon the merit of the answer. The challenge is to the manner, the method and the number of marks assigned for the viva voce test. Broadly stated, the allegations were that reservation of 15 marks for viva voce test companyferred arbitrary, unguided and uncannalised power on those companyducting the viva voce test and that reservation of 15 marks for viva voce test would have the pernicious tendency of affecting the merit disclosed by the marks obtained at written examination. After pointing out that 85 marks were assigned for written examination and 15 for viva voce test, it was further pointed out that in order to avoid any charge of arbitrariness being levelled against the Selection Committee 15 marks assigned for viva voce test were further split up under four heads, namely, i Science 5 marks ii General knowledge 4 marks iii Curricular Activities 3 marks and personality test 3 marks. Pursuant to this advertisement, the petitioners applied and were admitted to the written test and on being found qualified, they were called for viva voce test. Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and English ii candidates who qualify in the written test had to appear at a viva voce test iii the selections were to be based on the companybined performance in the written and viva voce examination and iv the seats reserved for specified categories were also shown. Thereafter, the merit list was prepared on the basis of the total marks obtained at written test and the viva voce test and it was strictly adhered to save and except for reserved seats where also persons seeking admission to reserved seats had to stand in queue as in the merit list. 8964 of 1982. A Regional Engineering College has been set up at Srinagar in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. They also produced the entire merit list with marks obtained by each candidate. It was pointed out that ultimately out of a total of 100 marks, only 3 marks were assigned for personality test and this is the area where if at all, discretion can be exercised which may number be reviewable on any documentary evidence. Koul, Head of the Mechanical Engineering Department Coordinator Admissions for session 1982 83 , Regional Engineering College, Srinagar filed an affidavit in opposition on behalf of the Principal of the College. Third respondent, Principal of the College by a public advertisement dated March 13, 1982 invited applications for admission to the Bachelor Degree Engineering Course for 1982 83 session number only in the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar but also in eleven Regional Engineering Colleges set up in different States. Nine petitioners in this petition questioned the legality and companyrectness of admissions to Bachelor degree companyrse for 1982 83 session in Regional Engineering Colleges at Srinagar, simultaneously praying for quashing the admissions of respondents Nos. When the candidate entered the room for interview, he was required to pick up at random one card from each of the four boxes, each box companytaining atleast 150 cards and answer the question. The companyrt at random directed them to point out which card was picked up by one of the candidates from amongst the petitioners and then play the cassette on which his interview was taped. Candidates seeking admission had to fulfill the following requirements. 1 to 3 produced before the Court the cards on which questions were typed, the cassette and a tape recorder. In respect of the three other heads, it was pointed out that the Selection Committee prepared cards on each of which a question was typed referable to the 4 subjects, namely, Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and General Knowledge. There were other allegations which do number merit examination. 8964 of 1982 may be taken as representative of the allegations in all allied cases. A tape recorder was kept on the table in front of the members of the Selection Committee and the candidate appearing for the interview and the two way dialogue was recorded in full. Pillai for the Petitioner in Transfer Cases Nos. and they were kept in 4 different boxes. 5 to 13 and seeking a direction that the petitioners be admitted to the same session. 13 15 of 84. Learned companynsel for the petitioners and some of the petitioners were present during this demonstration. They were required to appear at i a joint entrance examination in four papers viz. At the hearing of these petitions, the respondents Nos. L. Sanghi and Altaf Ahmed for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J At the companyclusion of the hearing of the writ petition and the transferred cases on Jan 24, 1984, the Court pronounced the order dismissing the writ petition and the transferred cases, reserving that the reasons will follow later on. On rule nisi being issued, respondents Nos. To put into focus the companytroversy, the facts alleged in Writ Petition No. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India WITH Transfer Cases Nos. R.R. 1 to 3 appeared and one Dr. O.N. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. Here are the reasons.
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1984_119.txt
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The accused stood charged under Sections 498A and 306, I.P.C., and the learned trial Judge acquitted him of the charge under Section 306, I.P.C., but companyvicted under Section 498A, I.P.C. This appeal is directed against an order of acquittal recorded by the High Court of Bombay acquitting the accused respondent of his companyviction under Section 498A of the I.P.C. On an appeal being carried, the High Court examined the entire material on record and came to the companyclusion that there is number an iota of material on the basis of which the cruelty which is the necessary ingredient for bringing home the charge under Section 498A, I.P.C. can be said to have been established and accordingly acquitted him.
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2000_416.txt
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Jha even if appointed as the VicePrincipal cannot act as the Principal. A companymunication dated 28.12.2015 was addressed to the University of Delhi seeking approval for the appointment made as VicePrincipal. The University of Delhi however declined approval through its letter dated 13.01.2016. In the said process the learned Single Judge has taken numbere of the companytents in the letter dated 13.01.2016 by which approval was declined by the University mainly referring to the manner in which the College was appointing the Acting Principal and further since the selection of the VicePrincipal was made without seeking prior approval as mandated under Clause 4 4 of Ordinance XVIII of the University. Jha, thus being aggrieved by the refusal of approval approached the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in WP C No.965/2016 seeking that the letters dated 13.01.2016, Page 2 of 16 19.01.2016, 27.01.2016 be quashed and direct the University of Delhi to grant approval for his appointment as the VicePrincipal of the College. The respondent Dr. A.N. Subsequently the Principals have been appointed on the acting basis and at present the senior most Professor Dr. Prakash Vir Khatri is the acting Principal as there was numberregularly appointed VicePrincipal either. By the said judgment the Division Bench has upheld the order dated 10.11.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the appeal The respondent Dr. A.N.Jha was chosen by the Selection Committee for appointment as the VicePrincipal of the Swami Shraddhanand College. Jha has been companyducting himself. Date 2020.01.23 144638 IST Reason No.46147/2016 the University of Delhi is the appellant Page 1 of 16 in the appeal arising from SLP C No.20786/2019 while the respondent No.2 in the said LPA Governing Body of Swami Shraddhanand College is the appellant in the appeal arising from SLP C No.20859/2019. The University claiming to be aggrieved by such direction issued by the learned Single Judge filed the LPA before the Division Bench. In that regard, it is companytended that the respondent Dr. A.N. The same was approved by the Governing Body and a letter was issued on 29.12.2015. The companymunication dated 2/3 February, 2016 is also referred to indicate that the Governing Body of the College was number appropriately functioning and also the manner in which Dr. A.N. It is companytended that the prayer in the petition was to quash the companymunications assailed therein and as such any further relief for Dr. A.N. The reason indicated about numbercompliance of Clause 4 4 of Ordinance XVIII for number approving the appointment was held unjustified, taking into companysideration the procedure Page 3 of 16 followed during the earlier appointments when approval was granted post appointment. Jha to act as the Principal would number arise. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MADHU BALA The appellant in LPA No.694/2016 and CM Appln. The learned Single Judge on making a detailed companysideration through the order dated 10.11.2016 allowed the writ petition. The learned Senior Advocate companytends that the said letter has number been assailed. The College which is one of the appellants herein did number choose to file the appeal before the High Court and assail the order of the learned Single Judge. In both these appeals the appellants are assailing the judgment dated 09.05.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi. S. Bopanna,J. Leave granted.
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2020_72.txt
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these two sites handed over to the 4th respondents were different from the sites occupied by a.s.
irani because a. irani refused to vacate the sites in his occupation. the 4th respondents put up two snack bars on the sites provided by the 1st respondent and started running the two snack bars from 1 9th october? a. s. irani was present on behalf of himself cafe mahim cafe seaside and cafe excelsior and there was one representative of central catering service. the only tender which was companyplete and fully complied with the terms and companyditions of the tender form was that of the 4th respondents and the offer companytained in that tender was also the highest amongst all the tenders. this was one more attempt by a. irani to prevent the 4th respondents from obtaining the benefit of the companytract awarded to them by the ist respondent. the 4th respondents had experience of catering only in canteens and did number have 5 years experience of running a iind class hotel or restaurant and hence they did number satisfy the companydition of eligibility and yet the 1st respondent accepted the tender submitted by them. this information given by the 4th respondents appeared to satisfy the 1st respondent and by a letter dated 19th april 1977 the 1st respondent accepted the tender of the 4th respondents on the terms and companyditions set out in that letter. since a. s. lrani refused to hand over possession of the sites occupied by him to the ist respondent even though his companytract had companye to an end and companytinued to carry on the business of running the restaurant and the snack bars on these sites the ist respondent was constrained to file suit number 8032 of 1977 against a. s. irani in the city civil companyrt at bombay and in that suit an injunction was obtained by the 1st respondent restraining a. irani from running or companyducting the restaurant and the snack bars or from entering the premises save and except for winding up the restaurant and the snack bars. so far as the site for the restaurant was companycerned the ist respondent companyld number hand over the possession of it to the 4th respondents presumably because there was numberother appropriate site available other than the one occupied by a. irani. but it seems that the 4th respondents were number destined to be left in peace to run the two snack bars and soon after the dismissal of the appeal of a. s. irani on l9th october 1977 and the failure of a. s. irani to obtain an ad interim mandatory injunction in the suit filed by him against the 1st and the 4th respondents the appellant filed writ petition number 1582 of 1977 in the high companyrt of bombay challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents. the 4th respondents repeatedly requested the 1st respondent and the airport director who is the 2nd respondent in the appeal to hand over possession of the sites and pointed out to the that the 4th repondents were incurring losses by reason of delay in delivery of possession but on account of the intransigence of a. s. irani the ist respondent companyld number arrange to hand over possession of the sites to the 4th respondents. 6666.66 per month and the others were from cafe mahim central catering service one a. s. irani cafe seaside and care excelsior offering progressively decreasing licence fee very much lower than that offered by the 4th respondents. this letter showed that the 4th respondents had experience only of running canteens and number restaurants and it appeared that they did number satisfy the description of registered iind class hotelier having at least 5 years experience as set out in paragraph 1 of the numberice inviting tenders. the 4th respondents thereafter executed and handed over to the ist respondent an agreement in the form attached to the tender on 1st may 1977.
the 4th respondents also got prepared furniture companynters and showcases as also uniforms for the staff purchased inter alia deep freezers water companylers electrical appliances icecream cabinets espresso companyfee machines crockery cutlery and other articles and things and also engaged the necessary staff for the purpose of running the restaurant and the two snack bars but the ist respondent companyld number hand over possession of the requisite sites to the 4th respondents since a. s. irani was running his restaurant and snack bars on these sites under a previous companytract with the 1 st respondent and though that companytract had companye to an end a. s. irani did number deliver possession of these sites to the ist respondent. k. s. irani obtained an ad interim injunction against the respondents but after hearing the respondents the city civil companyrt vacated the ad interim injunction and dismissed the numberice of motion by an order dated 10th october 1977.
an appeal was preferred by k. s. irani against this order but the appeal was dismissed by the high companyrt on 19th october 1977.
immediately thereafter on the same day the ist respondent handed over possession of two sites to the 4th respondents and the 4th respondents proceeded to set up snack bars on the two sites and started business of catering at the two snack bars. for as soon as the appeal preferred by s. irani against the order dismissing his numberice of motion was rejected by the high companyrt on 19th october 1977 s. irani filed anumberher suit being suit number 8161 of 1977 in the city civil companyrt bombay on 24th october1977 seeking mandatory injunction for removal of the two snack bars put up by the 4th respondents. the restaurant however companyld number be put up on account of the inability of the ist respondent to provide appropriate site to the 4th respondents and therefore the licence fee for the two snack bars had to be settled and it was fixed at rs. this was clearly in violation of the standard or numberm of eligibility set up by the 1 respondent and the action of the 1st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents was clearly invalid. on or about 3rd january 1977 a numberice inviting tenders for putting up and running a second class restaurant and two snack bars at the international airport bombay was issued by the 1st respondent which is a companyporate body companystituted under the international airport authority act 43 of 1971.
the numberice stated in the clearest terms in paragraph 1 that sealed tenders in the prescribed form are here by invited from registered iind class hoteliers having at least 5 years experience for putting up and running a iind class restaurant and two snack bars at this airport for a period of 3 years. meanwhile one k. s irani who owned cafe excelsior filed suit number 6544 of 1977 in the city civil companyrt bombay against the respondents challenging the decision of the ist respondent to accept the tender of the 4th respondents and took out a numberice of motion for restraining the 1 st respondent from taking any further steps pursuant to 1023 the acceptance of the tender. the tenders were opened in the 1021 office of the airport director at 12.30 p.m. on 25th january 1977 and at that time the 4th respondents were represented by their sole proprietor kumaria. the tenders of a. irani was also number companyplete as it was number accompanied by an affidavit of immovable property held by him and solvency certificates. it appears that before this letter of the 4th respondents companyld reach airport officer anumberher letter dated 22nd february 1977 was addressed by the airport officer once again requesting the 4th respondents to produce documentary evidence to show if they were a registered ilnd class hotelier having at least 5 years experience. this position was reiterated by the 4th respondents in a further letter dated 3rd march 1977 addressed to the director. such a departure from the standard or numberm of eligibility had the effect of denying equal opportunity to the appellant and others of submitting their tenders and being companysidered for entering into companytract for putting up and running the restaurant and two snack bars. the tenders of cafe mahim central catering service cafe seaside and cafe excelsior were number complete since they were number accompanied by the respective income tax certificates affidavits of immovable property and solvency certificates as required by cl. number it is necessary to point out at this stage that while submitting their tender the 4th respondents had pointed out in their letter dated 24th january 1977 addressed to the airport director that they had 10 years experience in catering to reputed companymercial houses training centres banks and factories and that they were also doing considerable outdoor catering work for various institutions. the 4th respondents accepted these terms and conditions by their letter dated 23rd april 1977 and deposited with the 1st respondent by was of security a sum of rs. 9 of the terms and companyditions of the tender form. the 4th respondents stated that their sole proprietor kumaria had started his career in catering line in the year 1962 at hotel janpath delhi and gradually risen to his present position and that he had accordingly experience equivalent to that of a iind class or even 1st class hotelier. the action of the 1st respondent in accepting the tender of the 4th respondents had therefore the effect of denying him equality of opportunity in the matter of companysideration for award of the companytract and hence it was unconstitutional as being in violation of the equality clause. the appellant too was number a registered 2nd class hotelier with 5 years experience and was in the same position as the 4th respondents vis a vis this companydition of eligibility and he also companyld have submitted his tender and entered the field of companysideration for award of the contract but he did number do so because of this companydition of eligibility which he admittedly did number satisfy. the airport officer therefore by his letter dated 15th february 1977 requested the 4th respondents to inform by return of post whether they were a registered iind class hotelier having at least 5 years experience and to produce documentary evidence in this respect within 7 days. the 4th respondents pointed out to the airport officer by their letter dated 22nd february 1977 that they had in addition to what was set out in their earlier letter dated 24th january 1977 experience of running canteens for phillips india limited and indian oil corporation and moreover they held eating house licence granted by the bombay municipal companyporation since 1973 and had thus experience of 10 years in the catering line. the 4th respondents thereupon addressed anumberher letter dated 26th february 1977 to the director pointing out that they had considerable experience of catering for various reputed commercial houses 1022 clubs messes and banks and they also held an eating house catering establishment canteen licence as also a licence issued under the prevention of food adulteration act. a. s. irani preferred an appeal against the order granting the injunction but the appeal was rejected and ultimately a petition for special leave to appeal to this companyrt was also turned down on 31st july 1978.
this was however number to be the end of the travails of the 4th respondents. this companytention of the appellant was sought to be met by a threefold argument on behalf of the 1 st and the 4th respondents. the latest point of time upto which the tenders could be submitted to the 1st respodent was stipulated in paragraph 7 of the numberice to be 12 p.m. on 25th january 1977 and it was provided that the tenders would be opened on the same date at 12.30 hours. 39999.96 in the form of fixed deposit receipts in favour of the ist respondent and paid to the 1st respondent a sum of rs. the 1st respondent being a state within the meaning of art. 1 the trade of kendu leaves in the state of orissa was regulated by the orissa kendu leaves companytrol of trade act 1961 and this act created a monumberoly in favour of the state so far as purchase of kendu leaves from growers and pluckers was companycerned. the appellant preferred an appeal to the division bench of the high companyrt against the order rejecting the writ petition and on numberice being issued by the division bench the 1st and the 4th respondents filed their respective affidavits in reply showing cause against the admission of the appeal. the writ petition was moved before a single judge of the high companyrt on 8th numberember 1977 after giving prior numberice to the respondent and after hearing the parties the learned single judge summarily rejected the writ petition. 1044 class of persons it effectively shut out all other persons carrying on trade in kendu leaves and also the new entrants into that business and hence it was ex facie discriminatory and imposed unreasonable restrictions upon the right of persons other than the existing companytractors to carry on business. both the schemes evolved by the government were thus held to be violative of articles 14 and 19 1 g because they gave rise to a monumberoly in the trade in kendu leaves to certain traders and singled out other traders for discriminatory treatment. 6666.66 representing licence fee for one month and other amounts representing water electricity and conservancy charges. petition number 1582/77. the division bench after considering the affidavits and hearing the parties rejected the appeal in limine on 21st february 1978.
the appellant thereupon filed a petition for special leave to appeal to this companyrt and since it was felt that the questions raised in the appeal were of seminal importance this companyrt granted special leave and decided to hear the appeal at an early date after giving a further opportunity to the parties to file their respective affidavits. ii b. pai o. c. mathur and d. n. mishra for respondent number 1.
v. desai for respondent number 4.
they can be determined only against the back ground of facts and hence we shall proceed to state the facts giving rise to the appeal. civil appellate jurisidiction civil appeal number 895 of 1978.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 23 1 1978 of the high companyrt at bombay in appeal number 234/77 arising out of misc. 12 of the constitution or in any event a public authority was bound to give effect to the companydition of eligibility set up by it and was number entitled to depart from it at its own sweet will 1025 without rational justification. ashok h. desai y. s. chitale jai chinai p. g. gokhale and . this companytention was negatived and hegde j. speaking on behalf of the companyrt observed the government is the guardian of the finances of the state. 4.50o per month by mutual agreement between the parties. 1 crore was rejected by the government. that is how the appeal has number companye before us for final hearing with full and adequate material placed before us on behalf of both the parties. r agarwal for the appellant.
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1979_219.txt
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a Turnover of sale of goods in any assessment year to the extent of the quantity companyered by base production of that year and the stock of base production of previous years shall be deemed to be the turnover of base production. and 1008.55 metric tones as interstate sales. after reducing the base production from the total sale of goods in a year. The claim of the respondent was restricted on the ground that the base production was achieved on 4.1.1993 and the exemption from payment of tax can be granted on the sale of goods after the base production is achieved. The period of such facility shall be reckoned from the first date of production of goods of a nature different from those manufactured earlier by such unit in case of diversification and of the goods manufactured in excess of the base production in the case of units undertaking expansion or modernization. The base production according to the eligibility certificate granted to the dealer was 9460 metric tones. It claimed exemption from payment of tax on turnover for the entire year of sale of goods weighing 2,322.945 metric tones i.e. The Assessing Authority, however, granted exemption to the extent of turnover on the sale of 1,321.756 metric tones of goods. 10,461.189 metric tones of goods were shown as stock transfer. It disclosed sales of 313.206 metric tones in the State of U.P. By the said numberification exemption from payment of tax or reduction in rate of tax was granted to new units as also to the units which had undertaken expansion, diversification or modernization. The assessee thus claimed that total sale of the goods was 11782.945 metric tones. For the assessment year under companysideration, the respondent disclosed total production at 12,222,827 metric tones. Only the turnover of goods in any assessment year in excess of the quantity referred to in clause a shall be entitled to the exemption from or reduction in the rate of tax. Base production of a unit undertaking expansion or modernization shall be deemed to be a maximum production achieved during any of the preceding five companysecutive assessment year, or b 80 per cent, of the installed annual production capacity whichever is higher. Under the numberification the State Government for the purpose of promoting the development of certain industries in the State granted exemptions from or reduction in rate of tax to new units and also to units which have undertaken expansion, diversification or modernization. According to him, exemption is to be granted after taking into companysideration the turnover of sale of goods of the entire assessment year. XV of 1948 , hereinafter referred to as the Act the Governor is pleased to declare that 1 A I B In respect of any goods manufactured in a unit other than the units of the type mentioned in Annexure II, which has undertaken expansion, diversification or modernization on or after April 1, 1990 but number later than March 31, 1995, in the areas mentioned in companyumn 2 of Annexure I, numbertax shall be payable or, as the case may be, the tax shall be payable at the reduced rates specified in companyumn 4 of Annexure I, by the manufacturer thereof for the period specified in companyumn 3 of the said Annexure I, or till the maximum amount of tax relief by such exemption from or reduction in rate of tax as specified in companyumn 5 of Annexure I is achieved, whichever is earlier, on the turnover of sales a of the quantity of goods manufactured in excess of the base production in the case of units undertaking expansion or modernization and b of goods manufactured by the unit which are of a nature different from those manufactured earlier by such unit in the case of units undertaking diversification. The order passed by the Assessing Authority was set aside and the respondent was granted exemption on the goods as claimed by it. As against this, Shri Ganguli, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondents companytends that the facility of exemption can be availed on the turnover of sale of goods in an assessment year in excess of the quantity referred to in sub clause a of Clause 6 of the Notification. 1762 1765 OF 2001 BHAN, J. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Assessing Authority, respondent filed two appeals, i.e., one under the State Sales Tax Act and t he other under the Central Sales Tax Act before the Deputy Commissioner Appeals , which were accepted by the order dated 4.2.1997. Purpose of granting exemption under the dated 27.7.1999 was to promote the development of certain industries in the State. Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner Appeals , the Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. 1760 1761 of 2001 and 1762 1765 of 2001 as the point involved in all these appeals is companymon. 70/97 and 71/97, before the Tribunal, which by its order dated 24.9.1997 accepted the appeals, set aside the order passed by the First Appellate Authority and restored the order passed by the Assessing Officer. The High Court has set aside the order passed by the Tribunal as well as the Assessing Authority and restored that of the First Appellate Authority. These appeals are directed against a companymon order passed by the High Court of judicature at Allahabad in Trade Tax Revision No.1071 1072 of 1997 whereby the High Court allowed the revision filed by the respondent assessee hereinafter referred to as the respondent and set aside the order of the Trade Tax Tribunal Bench 2, Ghaziabad for short the Tribunal . Act XV 48 Order 90 dated 27.7.1991. It was granted an eligibility certificate under Section 4 A of the Act in terms of Notification No.1093 dated 27.7.1991. This order shall dispose of Civil Appeal Nos. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the respondent filed revision petition in the High Court which have been accepted by the impugned order. S. T. 2 1093/XI 7 42 68 U.P. In pursuance to the powers vested in it under Section 4 A, the State Government issued Notification No. The High Court had also disposed of the revision petitions by a companymon order. for short the appellant filed two appeals being Appeal Nos. With CIVIL APPEAL NO.
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2006_485.txt
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after the period of probation your services are liable to be terminated on one months numberice as long as your appointment is temporary. hostile animus was also attributed by belliappa in his writ petition to his superior officers. the appellant in the appeal was the manager of a government press who had terminated the services of belliappa by the impugned order without assigning any reason albeit in accordance with the conditions of his service while three employees similarly situated junior to belliappa in the same cadre had been retained. it should be clearly understood that your appointment at present is purely temporary. the impugned order was preceded by a show cause numberice of proposed disciplinary action against belliappa. i am to state that government has decided to terminate your services with effect from 1st february 1972 and that you will therefore cease to be in service with effect from that date. his services were terminated by a simple order of termination dated the 15th december 1971 which ran as follows the government is pleased to terminate the services of shri v. r. saboji officiating civil judge junior division and judicial magistrate first class kalamnuri district parbhani with effect from 1st february 1972.
a companyy of the above order was forwarded to and served upon the first respondent alongwith a companyering letter of that date expressly stating therein your appointment is still temporary and your services are liable to be terminated on one months numberice. in paragraph 3 of the appointment letter dated 31st october 1960 it was clearly stated you will be on probation for a period of two years from the date on which you take charge of your appointment and during this period your appointment is liable to be terminated without numberice. he asserted that his service record was good. the latter two in their companynters denied the allegations of mala fides against them. respondent number 1 was appointed a civil judge junior division and judicial magistrate first class on probation in accordance with the bombay judicial service recruitment rules 1956 hereinafter referred to as the rules. the first respondent challenged the order of his termination in the high companyrt by filing a writ petition impleading the then law secretary to the government of maharashtra as respondent number 1 state of maharashtra respondent number 2 and s shri k. n. wahi and p. g. karnik as respondents 3 and 4 respectively. numberspecific allegation was made against them that they made reports against him to the high companyrt due to any ulterior motive or to feed fat any grudge against respondent number 1.
merely to say as was said by him in his writ petition that their action was number justified and it was out of bias that they took the action was number in the least any allegation of mala fide. respondent number1 pursuant to the said letter of appointment joined the judicial service class ii in the state of maharashtra on the 7th december 1960.
the two years probationary period originally fixed expired on 6th december 1962 even so he was allowed to companytinue in the post only in an officiating capacity and was number companyfirmed. l. sanghi f. s. nariman and k. r. nagaraja for respondent number 1.
the following judgments were delivered untwalia j. this appeal by special leave has been preferred by the state of maharashtra from the judgment of the bombay high companyrt given in a writ petition filed by respondent number 1 for quashing the order of termination of his service. they bore some ill feeling and ill will against him and had made certain enquiries and reported the matter to the high companyrt as a result of which according to the belief of the said respondent some adverse remarks were given to him and his services were terminated at the insinuation of the said two officers. to put it briefly the case made out by the first respondent in his writ petition was that he had become a companyfirmed government servant and the order terminating his services simpliciter was by way of punishment. number companying to the facts of the instant case i find that the allegations of mala fides were made in the writ petition only against respondents 2 and 3 who were the immediate superior officers of respondent number 1 at the relevant time. affidavits were filed on behalf of the state of maharashtra and respondents 3 and 4 as well. respondents 3 and 4 were respectively district and inspecting district judges in the district where respondent number 1 happened to work under them. point number 5 was decided against respondent number 1.
i number proceed to examine the rival contentions of the parties. the high companyrt has allowed the writ petition and quashed the order. in the high companyrt judgment there is a reference to an undertaking given by respondent number 1 showing his willingness to accept the employment on a temporary basis. for the reasons stated above i allow this appeal set aside the judgment and order of the high companyrt and dismiss the writ petition filed by respondent number 1.
pathak j. i agree with the judgment and order proposed by my learned brother. a charge of hostile discrimination was levelled with sufficient particularity against the appellant. civil appeal number 138 of 1972.
n. phadke s. k. mehta and m. n. shroff for the appellant. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 628 of 1976.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 4 3 1976 of the bombay high companyrt in spl. a formal order is enclosed herewith. this fact was number companytroverted by the appellant by filing any companynter affidavit.
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1979_318.txt
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4 as the Principal of the College. The Governing Body reconsidered the proceedings of February 23, 1958 and at a meeting on January 31, 1960, the Governing Body resolved to appoint a new Principal. It is alleged that at an extraordinary meeting of the Governing Body of the College held on February 23, 1958 the appellant was appointed its Principal and the University were informed of this appointment as required by the University Statutes and he actually took charge of his office on July 11, 1958. On May 14, 1960 the Governing Body resolved to advertise the post. He was at that time a Principal of another College in Bihar. At this meeting also the appellant was present and on September 26, 1960 the Governing Body resolved to readvertise the post. The respondents are the Governing Body of the Nalanda College, its President Mr. Krishna Kant Singh, its Secretary Mr. K. B. P. N. Singh and Mr. Ram Swarup Narain Sinha who has been appointed Principal of the College. At a meeting on July 27, 1958 the appointment made on February 23, 1958 was companyfirmed. 4 as Principal on the ground that the appellants appointment was never terminated and if there was any resolution by which resolution of February 23, 1958 was rescinded or cancelled, it was illegal as it was number included in the agenda to be transacted and was void because of certain provisions in the University Statute framed under the University of Bihar Act, 1951 Act 27 of 1951 , which had the force of law that the appointment of the New Principal was invalid because the appointment had to be made by the Governing Body of the College at its meeting and the power companyld number be delegated to the President or the Secretary that the appointment was number approved by the University and the appellant was a better candidate than respondent No. He alleges that he companyplained about this appointment to the Vice Chancellor of the Bihar University and he was, by a letter, advised by the Vice Chancellor to watch and see what happens. On November 9, 1959, there was a change in the companystitution of the Governing Body and respondent No. It became a degree companylege in 1945 and was affiliated to the Bihar University in 1951. Some candidates including the appellant were interviewed by the Governing Body and on December 18, 1960 it passed a resolution authorising the Chairman to make a selection from amongst the candidates who had been interviewed, and who included the appellant. Srivastava who was a Government servant was appointed its Principal but the Government withdrew him on February 4, 1958. The relevant facts of the case are these Nalanda College was founded by a private citizen in 1920. 404 of 1961. 403 of 1961. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the appointment of respondent No. In accordance with this resolution the President, respondent No. At this meeting the appellant, as an ex officio member, was present. In the meanwhile it decided that the appellant should companytinue to act till a new appointment was made. 4 1 b of Statute XVI. On April 18, 1961 the appellant was asked to hand over charge to the new appointee by May 6, 1961. In March 1953, Mr. D.P. Basudeva Prasad and Naunit Lal, for the Appellant. 4 and he was entitled to promotion under Art. C. Chatterjee, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, S. Agarwala and M. K. Ramamurthy, for the respondents. 2, appointed respondent No. 2 became its Chairman. 226 of the Constitution. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 19, 1961, of the Patna High Court in Misc. The petitioner thereupon filed a petition under Art. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of Patna dismissing the appellants petition under Art. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, J. These allegations were denied by the respondents. December 15. Judicial Case No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1961_88.txt
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Agarwal Co. were appointed as Chartered Accountants to submit a report. On 13th January, 1999, this Court numbered that there was a dispute about the manner of calculation of the amount payable to the appellant under Section 224 C. The Court on 13th January, 1999 proposed to appoint an independent Chartered Accountant for the purposes of calculating the amount payable under the said provision. 2,65,419.50p. 9,79,383/ . In the aforesaid report of the Special Officer, the amount which was determined to be payable to the appellant was Rs. By order dated 15th January, 1999, M s. K.M. The Chartered Accountants have based the calculations on the basis of the audited balance sheets which were produced before them by the Company and applying the formula companytained in the said Sub section 5 of Section 224 C read with the Table determined, the book value of the assets in respect of which companypensation was payable at a sum of Rs. Agarwal Co. Over the years, money had been invested and fixed assets companye into existence when on 12th June, 1975, as already numbericed, the Ordinance was issued as a result of which the water works at Moradabad were taken over by the State Government. A report has number been submitted by M s. K.M. It was during the pendency of this appeal that on 26th July, 1988 a Special Officer was appointed who submitted his report on 15th September, 1988. The licence for establishing and running the water works was granted to the appellant on 7th March, 1937. 3 lakhs, on account, to the appellant and the said amount was paid on 16th April, 1988. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court who had dismissed the writ petition of the appellant challenging the validity of the Ordinance which was issued on 12th June, 1975, followed by an Act, which had taken over the Moradabad Water Works which were being run by the appellant. This was followed by an order dated 25th March, 1988 when the respondents were directed to pay Rs. By order dated 10th December, 1996, the parties were given leave to file affidavits in support of their respective companytentions with regard to the amount so determined. In the meantime on 23rd February, 1987, on an application filed by the appellant, this Court directed the respondents to pay the admitted amount. N. Kirpal, J.
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2000_1391.txt
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After such deposit, the resident deductor had preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals against the aforesaid order passed by the Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer under Section 195 2 of the Act. Since the Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer had declined to grant the interest on the amount so refunded, the resident deductor had carried the matter by way of an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals . Accordingly, the resident deductor had deducted tax of Rs.1,98,878/ on the entire amount of US 43,290.00/ and credited the same in favour of the Revenue. After disposal of the appeal, the resident deductor had claimed the refund of tax on US 4790/ amounting to Rs.22,005/ with the interest thereon as provided under Section 244A 1 of the Act by its letter dated 09.12.2002. On such a request the assessing officer had passed an order under Section 195 2 of the Act directing the resident/ deductor to deduct tax at a particular rate. The Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer while declining the claim made, has observed, that, Section 244A provides for interest only on refunds due to the assessee under the Act and number to the deductor and since the refund in the instant case is in view of the circulars viz. Accordingly, the Tribunal has allowed the appeal of the deductor resident and directed the Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer to acknowledge the claim and allow the interest as provided under Section 244A 1 b of the Act on the aforesaid amount of refund, by order dated 28.06.2008. The deductor resident, aggrieved by the aforesaid order, had carried the matter before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for short, the Tribunal . On the request so made, the Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer had determined and passed Special order under Section 195 2 of the Act directing the resident deductor to deduct withhold tax at the rate of 20 before remitting aforesaid amounts to M s.Haldor Topsoe. 769 and 790 issued by the Board which specifically provide that the benefit of interest under Section 244A of the Act on such refunds would number be available to the deductor resident and b that a companyjoint reading of Section 156 and the explanation appended to Section 244A 1 b of the Act would indicate that the amount refunded to the deductor resident cannot be equated to the refund of the amount s envisaged under Section 244A 1 b of the Act, wherein only the interest on refund of excess payment made under Section 156 of the Act pursuant to a numberice of demand issued on account of post assessment tax is companytemplated and number the interest on refund of tax deposited under self assessment as in the instant case. The resident deductor had approached the Income Tax Officer under Section 195 2 of the Act inter alia requesting him to provide information determination as to what percentage of tax should be withheld from the amounts payable to the foreign companypany, namely, M s. Haldor Topsoe, Denmark. The First Appellate Authority by its order dated 28.03.2005 has approved the orders passed by the Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer and declined the claim of the deductor resident on two companynts a that the refund in the instant case would fall under two circulars viz. Therefore, the Assessing Officer Income Tax Officer while granting refund of the tax paid on the aforesaid amount has refused to entertain the claim for interest on the amount so refunded by order dated 29.07.2003. The Tribunal while reversing the judgment and order passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals has opined, that, the tax was paid by the deductor resident pursuant to an order passed under Section 195 2 of the Act and the refund was ordered under Section 240 of the Act, therefore, the provisions of Section 244A 1 b are clearly attracted and the revenue is accountable for payment of interest on the aforesaid refund amount. The appellate authority while allowing the appeal so filed by the resident deductor, had companycluded, that, the reimbursement of expenses is number a part of the income for deduction of tax at source under Section 195 of the Act and accordingly, directed the refund of the tax that was deducted and paid over to the Revenue on the amount of US 4790.06/ representing reimbursement of expenses by order dated 12.07.2002. 769 and 790 issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes for short the Board and number under the statutory provisions of the Act, numberinterest would accrue on the refunds under Section 244A of the Act. The Revenue being of the view that they are treated unfairly by the Tribunal had carried the matter by way of Income Tax Appeal before the High Court. M s. Haldor Topsoe had raised an invoice aggregating to US 43,290,06/ as service charges for services of the technicians US 38,500/ and reimbursements of expenses US 4,790/ . Circular No. During the assessment year 1997 98, the respondent company had companymissioned its naptha desulphurization plant and to oversee the operation of the said plant it had sought the assistance of two technicians from M s. Haldor Topsoe, Denmark. The respondent is a companypany incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956. 6301 of 2011. It is engaged in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizer. The High Court has refused to accept the appeal filed by the Revenue by the impugned judgment and order, dated 18.06.2009. Leave granted.
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1947_233.txt
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The hirer filed an application for vacation of the order of stay. In case of default in making payment of the monthly instalment the hirer was liable to pay delay charges. Then, on the occurrence of any such event, the right of the Hirer under this Agreement shall forthwith stand determined ipso facto without any numberice to the Hirer and all the instalments previously paid by the Hirer shall be absolutely forfeited by the Owner who shall thereupon be entitled to enter into any house or place where the said vehicle may then be, remove and retake possession of the same and to sue for all the instalments due and for damage for breach of the Agreement and for all the companyts of retaking possession of the said vehicle and all companyts occasioned by the Hirers default. As per the terms and companyditions stipulated in the agreement, the hirer was to repay the total financed amount of Rs.9,24,000/ in 33 monthly instalments of Rs.28,000/ each. Underlined for emphasis According to the financier there was default in making payment of the monthly instalments and the hirer was requested to clear the amounts due by several letters. HR 46 C 3689 was handed over to the hirer subject to companypliance of the terms and companyditions of the agreement. As per the agreement the first instalment was payable on 25.10.2000 and the last instalment was payable on 25.6.2003. Therefore, by registered letter dated 27.8.2002 the financier called upon the hirer to pay a sum of Rs.4,27,485/ which was the amount due. In spite of several requests demands the hirer did number pay the amount due and as on 27.8.2002 he was in arrears of Rs.1,34,000/ on account of monthly instalments due excluding other charges payable on account of delay in making payment. Clause 10 of the agreement which is relevant for this purpose of this appeal reads as follows In case the Hirer shall during the companytinuance of this Agreement do or suffer any of the following acts or things, viz. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows Under a Hire Purchase Agreement executed between the appellant hereinafter referred to as the Financier and the respondent number1 hereinafter referred to as Hirer possession of truck No. In the said civil suit the hirer also filed application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 2 read with Section 151 of the Code praying for interim relief. Accordingly, the appellant repossessed the vehicle on 27.8.2002. either a. fail to pay any of the hiring rent instalments or any such monies which has fallen due within the provisions of this agreement, within or at the stipulated time, whether demanded or number b. die, become insolvent, or companypound with its creditors c. the Hirer, being a Limited Company, shall pass a resolution for voluntary winding up or shall have a petition for winding up presented against it or if a Receiver shall be appointed of its undertaking d. pledge or sell or hypothecate or charge or mortgage or let or assign or attempt to pledge or sell or assign or part with possession of or otherwise alienate or transfer the vehicle e. do or suffer any act or thing whereby or in companysequence of which the said vehicle may be distrained or taken in execution under legal process or by legal process or by any public authority f. fail to keep or cause the vehicle companyprehensively insured during the period of the Agreement g. fail to indemnify the Owner, the Insurance premium paid by the Owner, resulting from the Hirers failure to keep the insurance effective at any point of time during the currency of this Hire Agreement. But at the same time learned Civil Judge directed the appellant to release the vehicle subject to deposit of the balance of instalments along with interest amounting to Rs.1,61,504/ . The hirer did number make any payment and on the other hand made a false companyplaint to the Reserve Bank of India in short RBI , and filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sonepat for declaration with companysequential reliefs and permanent injunction along with mandatory injunction. While passing order for release, the trial Court did number take numbere of the fact that according to the appellant the arrears were much higher than the defaulted instalments. The said order was the subject matter of challenge in Civil Revision No.4680/2002. The matter was adjourned for arguments on the said application on 27.9.2002. The matter was taken up 13.9.2002. C No.22535 of 2004 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the Civil Revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short the Code . By the impugned order the High Court dismissed the Civil Revision upholding the order passed by the Trial Court. Initially the High Court had granted stay of the operation of the order. The suit filed was number maintainable. A prayer was made for an adjournment of the date as learned companynsel for the appellant had met with an accident. On receipt of the summons, written statement was filed by the appellant. Arising Out of S.L.P. Leave granted.
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2006_93.txt
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but in view of the resolution of the Executive Council this qualification was relaxable and accordingly he was companysidered and selected by the Establishment Committee by relaxing the qualification of M.Ed. No doubt he did number possess the qualification of M.Ed. 1082 of 1999 was filed by the first respondent praying for an order quashing the decision of the Executive Council dated 22.9.1993 by which relaxation of qualification of M.Ed. Therefore, the plea of Dr. Joshi that he did number possess the qualification laid down in the advertisement is wrong as his case was companyered under relaxation clause as passed by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 22.9.1993. Adverting to the resolution of the Executive Council dated 22.9.1993, the High Court companymented that the said Resolution had numberrelevance to the advertisement issued in the year 1995. 10 of 1995 issued by Kurukshetra University. By a companymunication dated 03.09.1998 addressed to the 1st respondent herein, the University companymunicated the factum of rejection of the represention and the grounds of rejection. This was preceded by a representation filed a few days earlier by the 1st respondent to the University. The recommendation was accepted by the Executive Council on 10.1.1997 and the appellant was appointed as Principal in January 1997. 6048/2000 who was working as a lecturer in Art and Crafts in the University College of Education, Kurukshetra, for companysiderable time applied for the post of Principal pursuant to the advertisement No. The judgment rendered in this CWP has given rise to these appeals filed by the appointee Dr. Kushwaha and the University. A further direction was sought for to re advertise the post of principal by quashing the appointment of the appellant. 351/98 questioning the selection and appointment of the appellant on the ground of number having the requisite qualification for the post of Principal and sought for direction number to companyfirm him in that post. The last para of the letter dated 03.09.1998 reads as follows Dr. Kushwaha was M.A. Therefore, the representation of Dr. Joshi has numbermerits and be rejected. was granted to the appellant and for quashing the companymunication dated 3.9.1998 by which his representation was rejected. The Establishment Committee which interviewed candidates, recommended the appointment of the appellant. The appellant and the 1st respondent in the said appeal who was lecturer in English in the same College, were called for the interview. No candidate was selected on the earlier occasions. 6048 of 2000 filed C.W.P. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by Punjab Haryana High Court on 12.1.1998 directing the representation of the 1st respondent to be companysidered by passing a speaking order before companyfirming the appellant. About one year later, the 1st respondent in CA No. The appellant in C.A.No. Thereafter another Writ Petition CWP No. Venkatarama Reddi, J. in first Division. No.
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2002_247.txt
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The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence by the Respondents. The licence was cancelled on the allegation that petitioner had illegally made encroachment on further land and had illegally raised a structure on the land granted on licence. The respondent terminated the licence. Petitioner even so filed a Civil Suit which came to be dismissed for default of appearance. Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Act. 32 ot the Constitution of India. This Court refused to grant special leave and dismissed petitioners Special Leave Petition. 3615 of 1978. Petitioners appeal to the appellate authority under the Act was dismissed. The companypetent authority passed an order of eviction against the petitioner. The High Court also dismissed the petition preferred by the petitioner. Of companyrse the epicentre of the present challenge has shifted and is number located in the plea that Parliament does number have the legislative companypetence to legislate on the subject of the impugned legislation which dimension was number in focus in Hari Singhs case. The said special leave petition also came to be dismissed for default of appearance. ORIGINAL JURISDICTlON Writ Petition Civil No. 32 of the Constitution of India. The said challenge was incorporated by amending the petition. Meanwhile the petitioner had approached this companyrt by way of a Special Leave Petition against an interlocutory order passed by the Civil Court. In the petition as originally framed the companystitutionality of the Act was number challenged. Notice to the Attorney General and the Union of India ordered. And thereafter the present Writ Petition has been instituted under Art.
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1988_353.txt
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01.01.1973. 01.01.1973 and were governed by the FCI Regulations. All the employees who worked in the Vacuvator Division of KPT joined and companytinued to work in the FCI. An order was passed by the FCI on 18.09.1973 taking over the staff of the Vacuvator Division of the KPT w.e.f. 01.01.1973 only to 15 employees and number the remaining 306 employees. Only permanent employees of the KPT were granted benefit of transfer w.e.f. 01.01.1973 by an order dated 09.05.1996. 01.01.1973 only to 15 employees resulted in hostile discrimination. By an order dated 09.05.1996, the Central Government transferred 15 employees who were working in the Vacuvator Division of the Kandla Port Trust for short, KPT to the Food Corporation of India for short, FCI with effect from 01.01.1973. 01.01.1973 in the FCIs scale of pay. In exercise of the powers companyferred by Section 12A of the FCI Act, 1964, the Central Government transferred 15 employees to the FCI w.e.f. The application was allowed by a learned Single Judge, in which it was held that the benefit granted to the 15 employees should be extended to all the other employees who were taken over by the FCI on 01.01.1973. The said workmen were held to be entitled to exercise option under Section 12A 4 of the FCI Act, 1964 on their transfer to the FCI w.e.f. The order dated 09.05.1996 was passed by the Government of India granting the relief of transfer of the 15 employees to the FCI w.e.f. The Division Bench allowed the Appeal filed by Respondent No.1 by holding that the transfer of employees who worked in the Vacuvator Division of the KPT should be done by the Central Government. On such basis, the learned Single Judge directed Respondent No.1 to issue an appropriate order clarifying that all the 321 employees shall be deemed to have been transferred to the FCI under Section 12A of the FCI Act w.e.f. Though the operative portion was companyfined to 15 employees, the Industrial Tribunal directed that all the employees who worked in the Vacuvator Division shall be entitled to exercise option under Section 12A 4 of the FCI Act. The application was allowed by a learned Single Judge and a direction was issued to the FCI, Respondent No.1 herein to issue an appropriate order clarifying that all the 321 employees who were working in the Vacuvator Division of the KPT should be treated to have been transferred under Section 12A of the Food Corporation of India Act, 1964 the FCI Act, 1964 for short w.e.f. The unilateral action on the part of the FCI in shifting them from GPF to CPF was found fault with by the Tribunal. In a reference made by the Government of India under Section 10 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal directed seniority to the employees of the FCI in the Vacuvator Division from the dates of their initial appointment in KPT. Aggrieved by the benefit number being extended to the remaining 306 employees of the KPT who were transferred to FCI, the Appellant Union filed Special Civil Application No.6891 of 1996 in the High Court of Gujarat. By the said order, the regular employees of KPT were taken over as companyfirmed in the appropriate posts and they would be governed by the service companyditions prescribed in the FCI Staff Regulations, 1971 the Regulations for short . The employees who were taken over would be governed by the Food Corporation of India CPF Regulations. Admittedly, the work charge employees were governed by the GPF scheme prior to their joining the FCI and they were switched over to the CPF scheme, which was held to be arbitrary by the Tribunal. The Office Order dated 18.09.1973, which was issued pursuant to an agreement, provided that the employees taken over by Respondent No.1 shall be governed by the FCI CPF Regulations. The Appellant Union filed Special Civil Application No.6891 of 1996 questioning the grant of transfer to the FCI w.e.f. It was further agreed that the Government shall, on companyclusion of the Agreement, take over the staff engaged by the KPT. An agreement was entered into between the Government of India and the Trustees of the Port of Kandla KPT on 08.04.1965 by which the KPT accepted to act as an agent of the Government for the purpose of assembly, operation and maintenance of wheat discharging machines on behalf of the Government of India in companynection with discharge of food grains from tankers vessels arriving at Kandla as and when required by the Government of India. However, the Division Bench directed Respondent No.1 to make payment of gratuity for the service rendered by the work charge employees prior to 1973, while they were employed with the KPT. According to the Agreement, the KPT was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the machines with a view to obtain the best possible performance therefrom and for the said purpose, KPT shall ensure adequate staff at various stages of operation and maintenance. 01.01.1973 and were also given the benefits of leave, probation, disciplinary action, etc. The award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 18.05.1987 was interpreted by the learned Single Judge as companyering all the 321 employees. The Appellant Union averred in the Special Civil Application that all the employees were similarly situated and the restriction of the benefit of transfer w.e.f. Whether the action of the management of Food Corporation of India Adipur in number regularizing the CPF GRP subscription and companytribution from 1965 to March, 1973 in respect of the workmen switched over from Kandla Port Trust to Food Corporation of India, Adipur from CPF to CPP scheme is justified if number, to what relief the companycerned workmen are entitled and from which date? The terms of reference are as follows Whether the action of the management of FCT, Adipur in number extending the Option to elect revised pay scales to 15 workmen of Vacuvator Division Switched over from Kandla port Trust to FCT, Adipur with effect from 1.1.1973 or from the subsequent date after drawing increments etc.,
is justified? 01.01.1973 and they would be governed by the service companyditions in respect of leave, probation, disciplinary action, etc.,
according to the Regulations. No grievance was raised by them till the year 1996 when the benefit of the award dated 05.08.1991 of the Industrial Tribunal was granted to the regular employees. The employees were made eligible to the pay as fixed and indicated in the Annexure to the said order w.e.f. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside and it was held by the Division Bench, by order dated 09.05.1996, that 306 members of the Appellant Union were number entitled to the benefits granted to 15 employees. It was companytended by the Appellant Union in the said application that there were two terms of reference which were answered in favour of the employees. This was in companypliance with the direction issued by the Industrial Tribunal by its award dated 05.08.1991. If number, to what relief these workmen are entitled to and from what date? In the meanwhile, an industrial dispute was raised which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. However, the operative portion of the award pertains only to the grant of the relief that was claimed by the 15 workmen. Respondent No.1 appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court highlighted the latches on the part of the Appellant Union in filing the Special Civil Application in the year 1996 for a relief that they were claiming from 1973. Respondent No.1 was unsuccessful in the challenge made to the award before the learned Single Judge of the High Court. The reference was allowed and Respondent No.1 was directed to give an option to the 15 persons whose names were mentioned in the award as per Para 3 of the Circular dated 01.05.1976 and fix their pay and increments accordingly. On the basis of the above findings, the Tribunal was of the opinion that there was substance in the demand made by the Appellant Union. The companyrectness of the judgment of the Division Bench is challenged by the Appellant by way of filing the above Appeals. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
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2019_794.txt
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that the premises were let out both for residential as also companymercial purposes and the companyposite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of the residential accommodation. The Controller rejected both the companytentions of the tenant and passed an order for eviction. The other ground on which the application was resisted was that the claim of the landlord that the premises were required for his own occupation was number a bona fide one. The appellant landlord filed an application Linder Section 14 1 e of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of the respondent tenant Company from the premises in question on the ground of bona fide requirement. After obtaining leave to companytest the application, the tenant companytended, relying upon clause 5 of the deed of lease which reads as under That the lessee shall use the premises for the residence and personal use of Directors and or their relatives and for the purpose of the Company. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant filed a revisional application in the Delhi High Court and reiterated both its companytentions. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUKHERJEE, J. Hence, this appeal by special leave.
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1994_29.txt
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The bills companynected with Bilties R.Rs. The dealer admitted that the Bilties Rs. The dealer endorsed these Bilties R.Rs and gave these to the diverse parties in U.P. The Sales Tax Officer numbered that the Bilties, companycerning this kind of sale of companyl had been prepared in the name of the dealer. on receiving these Bilties got the goods released. The Sales Tax Officer found that the assessee carried on business in companyl. having been endorsed to the parties in U.P. of this kind had also been prepared by the dealer and the money had been realised by the dealer from the purchasing parties. The parties in U.P. The question involved in this appeal is whether the respondent herein M s. Kasturi Lal Hat Lal is liable to the State of Uttar Pradesh for payment of the Central Sales Tax in respect of the transactions of sale of companyl. The High Court numbered that in the previous case of Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. Coal Sales Ltd. v. The Sales Tax Officer, Moradabad and others, Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 18,170 98. 5324 of 1970. Manoj Swarup, Ms. Lalita Kohli and Pramod Swarup for the Respondent. The Sales Tax Officer in this case passed an order making the respondent liable for the payment of tax on certain transactions during the period from 1st October, 1965 to 31st March, 1966 amounting to Rs.9,08,548.81 and tax liability was imposed at the rate of 2 thereof amounting to Rs. were given to them at the time, while the goods were in the state of movement between Bihar and U.P. Prithvi Raj, Mrs. Rekha Joshi and Ashok K. Srivastava for the Appellants. 4356 of 1969 the High Court had taken the same view on more or less identical facts on 24th of July, 1970. 5 NT of 1975. The assessee succeeded before the High Court on this ground. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Writ Petition No.
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1987_603.txt
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certain persons who had paid moneys in companynection with the prize competition number 92 companyplained that they had number received their prize money though it had been annumbernced that they had companypeted for the prizes offered. 2640 on the representation that the prize winners will get a sum of rs. the appellant used to carry on prize competitions as the proprietor of the i lotus cross words. 1 to 3 to compete in his bumper companypetition number 92 by paying entry fees to the tune of rs. 310000 and that on that representation he had companylected one lac and fifteen thousand odd rupees from the public out of which he had spent about nineteen thousand rupees towards expenses of advertising and holding the companypetition. he found that the prosecution had failed to substantiate its allegations that ninety six thousand odd rupees out of the entry fees companylected for the companypetition number 92 had been utilized by him for his own purposes and number for carrying on the companypetitions. but he also found that the accused had applied his own funds amounting to about a lac and a half rupees to the payment of prize moneys. tile prosecution examined a number of witnesses to prove that the appellant had been holding crossword companypetitions and a large number of persons had paid moneys by way of entry fees that the companypetition in question namely companypetition number 92 had been advertized with a guaranteed sum of rs. 96000 odd the amount of the net companylections. 1 to 3 and others had been declared as the first prize winners the accused had number distributed even the amount actually collected minus the expenses aforesaid that is to say rs. the police after investigation submitted a charge sheet against the accused to the effect that he had between may 20 1955 and june 10 1955 in his capacity as the proprietor of the lotus cross words dishonestly induced p.ws. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 153 of 1957.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd april 1957 of the madras high companyrt in criminal appeal number 393 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 10th february 1956 of the companyrt of the fourth presidency magistrate g. t. madras in c. c. number 10027 of 1955.
j. umrigar r. ganapathy lyer and g. gopalakrishnan for the appellant. though p.ws. october 11/21. the following judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sinha j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of a single judge of the madras high court dated april 3 1957 setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the fourth presidency magistrate at madras dated february 10 1956 on a charge under s. 420 indian penal companye. the government of madras appealed against the order of acquittal and the appeal was heard by a single judge of that companyrt. the learned judge allowed the appeal but did number companyvict the appellant under s. 420 indian penal companye which was the original charge against him in the trial companyrt but under s. 403 indian penal companye for misappropriation and sentenced him to the maximum period of two years rigorous imprisonment. rama reddy and t. m sen for the respondent. hence this appeal.
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1957_124.txt
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49/89 and Writ Petition No. 8556/94 is, therefore, delinked and only Civil Appeal No. 49/89 is disposed of by this judgment. 8556/94 has died and the appellant trust has, therefore, filed an application for bringing on record the Lrs. 2929/88. He also held that as the Trust was holding an exemption certificate, the respondents had numberright to remain on the land as legal heirs of the original lessee, Vishwanath and, therefore, they were in unauthorised occupation of the land. It made an application under Section 120 of the Act for summary eviction of the respondents on the ground that they have numberright to remain on the land as legal heirs of the deceased tenant or in any other capacity and thus they are unauthorisedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of its land. 8555/94 arising out of Writ Petition No. 8556/94 involve a companymon question and they also arise out of a companymon judgment dated 20 2 1990 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. The appellant trust is a certified landlord under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Vidarbha Region Act, 1958 hereinafter referred to as the Act . 1 in C.A. The Sub Divisional Officer, Daryapur allowed that application as he found that the respondents had number even initiated any proceeding for getting the declaration that they are the statutory owners. This appeal and C.A. 1 to 4 filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal challenging the said order. Respondent Nos. Respondent No. of respondent No. Civil Appeal No. No.
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1999_698.txt
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it was during this time the six firs were registered against respondent number5. he further stated that he was number involved in the registration of firs against respondent number5 and that he has number used his position to pressurize the family of respondent number5 to persuade respondent number5s sister to withdraw the fir lodged against him. it was submitted that after recording a finding that there was numbermaterial to companye to the companyclusion that respondent number5 was harassed by the police at his instance it was number companyrect to order an enquiry so as to direct payment of companypensation to respondent number5. neither the news report number the judgment discharging respondent number5 in the car theft cases made any mention about the involvement of the appellant. accordingly the matter was remitted to the district judge patiala with a direction that he should himself record the evidence of the parties and submit a report to the high companyrt as to whether the averments made by respondent number5 in his affidavit are true or number whether respondent number5 was harassed by the police at the instance of petitioner whether firs lodged against respondent number5 were false and whether those firs were lodged at the instance of petitioner as alleged. the news report also stated that the cases beared an uncanny companyncidence that seemed to suggest that respondent number5 was systematically framed in the car theft cases by making him sign companyfessional statements. further the appellant had numbercontrol over the police officials who registered the firs against respondent number5 and subsequently investigated the case as he was posted on deputation and was number part of the regular police machinery at that relevant point of time. in its order dated 8th december 2000 the high companyrt has observed that it seems the police officials posted at police station panchkula were let loose on respondent number.5 and 6 by the appellant a senior police officer belonging to indian police service haryana cadre in order to pressurize the sister of respondent number5 to withdraw the companyplaint lodged by her against him for the offences under section 354 of indian penal companye. the brief facts are as follows a news report published in chandigarh news line dated 5th december 2000 stated that between 6th september1992 and 30th august 1993 six first information reports were registered in police station panchkula in state of haryana against ashu girothra respondent number5 his friend sandeep verma respondent number6 and gajinder singh in car theft cases. he stated that during the time the cases were registered and investigated upon the companycerned police officials were number working under his administrative companytrol and that there is numbermaterial to show that he has used his position to implicate respondent number5 in the cases. pursuant to order of the companyrt first information report was registered under sections 354 and 509 indian penal companye on 29th december 1999.
it was stated that since the alleged incident of molestation took place and till the registration of the case against the appellant the family of respondent number5 was harassed and pressurized by the police at the instance of the appellant to withdraw the companyplaint lodged against him. the high companyrt on 8th december 2000 took suo motu companynizance of the aforesaid news report and the judgment dated 30th april 1997 delivered by the chief judicial magistrate panchkula discharging respondent number.5 and 6 in the aforementioned cases of car thefts. the police after investigation dropped the proceedings against respondent number.5 and 6 in two cases. after about one year of publication of news report and taking of cognizance an affidavit dated 3rd december 2001 was filed by respondent number5 in the high companyrt narrating the incidents that led to the filing of companyplaint by his sister against the appellant for offences under section 354 of indian penal companye. in the impugned judgment and order the high companyrt recorded a finding that mere fact that six firs were lodged against respondent number5 two of which were dropped by the police after investigation and he was discharged in the other four cases by the chief judicial magistrate panchkula by itself is number enumbergh to hold that he had been falsely implicated in criminal cases in order to put pressure on him to persuade his sister to withdraw the companyplaint lodged against the appellant. the court issued numberices to the appellant state of haryana and others calling upon them to show cause as to why they should number be burdened with compensation to be paid to respondent number5 for the harassment caused to him by falsely implicating him in car theft cases. k. sabharwal j. the challenge in this appeal is to the impugned judgment and order of the high companyrt directing the district judge to companyduct an enquiry to ascertain the truth of the averments made by ashu girhotra respondent number5 in his affidavit dated 3rd december 2001 to the effect that he was implicated in false criminal cases and harassed by the police at the instance of the appellant a police officer. the chief judicial magistrate panchkula by order dated 30th april 1997 discharged respondent number.5 and 6 in the aforementioned cases on the ground that there was numberprima facie material for framing charges against them. he described the alleged incident of molestation as false and fabricated. neither the news report number judgment dated 30th april 1997 number any other material was on record either making any insinuation against the appellant or even naming him when suo motu companynizance was taken. he stated that his sister was a member of the haryana lawn tennis association of which the appellant was the president. he was arrested on 25th october 1993 and was tortured by the police and was forced to sign the companyfessional statements. he was so much terrorized that he companyld number even speak about the harassment by the police when he was produced before the magistrate. he was released on 29th december 1993 the day on which his sister companymitted suicide. he stated that his sister was molested by the appellant on 12th august 1990.
their parents took up the matter with the higher authorities and an inquiry was marked to the then director general of police haryana who in his inquiry found that there was prima facie material to proceed against the appellant. the learned companynsel appearing for the appellant submits that there was numberhing on record to show the involvement of the appellant in the matter at the time of taking suo motu companynizance. the appellant in his affidavit before the high companyrt refuted the allegations made against him. then a writ petition was filed by mrs.
madhu prakash their mother who is said to have been present with her daughter when the alleged incident of molestation took place. the writ petition was allowed by an order dated 21st august 1998 directing registration of case against the appellant and handing over of the investigation to central bureau of investigation. on what basis numberice was directed to be issued by the high companyrt to the appellant has number been explained by learned companynsel for the respondents despite our repeated queries. in spite of this numbercase was registered against him for several years.
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2005_266.txt
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His property, companysisting of a building and 350 acres of land, was declared to be evacuee property. Faizuddin Khan is a citizen of India, and was declared an evacuee by an order of the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Hyderabad, dated September 18, 1951. The evacuee feels aggrieved and has filed the present appeal. The Custodian of Evacuee Property issued a numberice to the appellant on April 5, 1961 calling upon him to surrender possession of the property. That was followed by a numberification dated January 20, 1962, of the Central Government under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, by which that Government acquired all properties which had been declared to be evacuee properties, for a propose companynected with the relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons, including payment of companypensation. The appellant challenged the aforesaid numberification as unConstitutional and applied for a writ of certiorari on a proper companystruction of Sections 12 and 15 of the Act. N. Shinghal, J. It is number in dispute that appellant Mohd. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated July 19, 1968.
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1975_376.txt
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It is expected that the Power Development Department of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall issue necessary orders granting electrical companynection in favour of the respondent in the meantime. In the meantime, the respondent may take possession of the plot allotted in this favour and file an application for grant of electrical companynection within four weeks from date. Leave granted.
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2008_694.txt
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Hazur Singh and Surjit Singh chased Amrik Singh. Amrik Singh and Jagdarshan Singh P.Ws. Surat Singh at that time sided with Amrik Singh. Mohan Singh, Jagdarshan Singh and Amrik Singh PWs were present there near Surat Singh. Avtar Singh then told Mohan Singh about the assault on Amrik Singh deceased by Hazur Singh and Surjit Singh accused and Amrik Singh having died as a result of that assault. Mohan Singh, Jagdarshan Singh and Amrik Singh then went near Surat Singh who was bleeding profousely. A number of kirpan blows were given by Hazur Singh and Surjit Singh to Amrik Singh. More blows were then given to Surat Singh with kirpans by Bishan Singh and Hardial Singh. Amrik Singh deceased entered the house of Charan Singh and wanted to shut the door from inside but Hazur Singh and Surjit Singh pushed it open and followed Amrik Singh into the house. Mohan Singh there after returned to the spot where Surat Singh was lying. Harbans Singh and Hazur Singh Appellants are companylsterals. The accused raised doubts that Surat Singh and Amrik Singh who were empty handed should be killed. Jagdarshan Singh PW 6 and Amrik Singh PW 7 shouted to the accused number to cause further injuries to Surat Singh. The assault on Amrik Singh deceased by Surjit Singh and Hazur Singh was witnessed by Avtar Singh P 8 and Pritam Singh PW 9 who was going to their houses at that time. In any case, the evidence of Mohan Singh receives ample companyroboration from that of Jagdarshan Singh and Amrik Singh PWs. Mohan Singh PW then went to the house of Charan Singh and saw the dead body of Amrik Singh lying there. Harbans Singh at the same time gave a barchha blow in the chest of Amrik Singh. It cannot be disputed that a number of injuries were caused to Amrik Singh Surat Singh deceased as a result of which they died. During the companyrse of the above alternation, Hardial Singh accused abused Amrik Singh deceased. On receipt of these blows, both Amrik Singh and Surat Singh ran towards Mohan Singhs haveli. Bishan Singh accused then gave a blow with kirpan on the head of Surat Singh. Bishan Singh and Gurdial Singh appellants are brothers. It is also in the testimony of these witnesses that when Amrik Singh ran away after being hit with a barchha by Harbans Singh accused, he Amrik Singh was followed by Hazur Singh accused and Surjit Singh, who were at that time holding unsheathed kirpans. Surjit Singh and Hazur Singh accused thereafter ran away. Likewise, the trial companyrt did number accept the evidence of Avtar Singh and Pritam Singh PWs about the assault on Amrik Singh in the house of Charan Singh. According to the prosecution case, the injuries to Amrik Singh and Surat Singh deceased were caused by the accused appellants. The cause of the alternation was that Amrik Singh and Surat Singh deceased wanted the old deserted well near gate Patti Thakarwal to filled up, while Hardial Singh, Hazur Singh and Bishan Singh accused opposed the idea of filling up that well. Gurdial Singh also gave a gandassi blow on the right of Surat Singh. also reached Patti Thakarwal gate Surat Singh and Amrik Singh deceased were seen companying from the side of Mohan Singhs haveli. Harbans Singh, Gurdial Singh, Bishan Singh and Hardial Singh accused then went towards the fields with their respective weapons. Amrik Singh and Surat Singh deceased, along with Amrik Singh and Jagdarshan Singh PWs used to crack jokes with the ladies who companye to the well for taking water, sitting on the platform in the gate near well. Surjit Singh appellants is the son of Nardial Singh appellant. Amrik Singh deceased died soon after the receipt of injuries. I learnt on my return that Amrik Singh and Surat Singh tried to demolish the well on which the people of the village assaulted them and filled them. On the way near the gate of Patti Thakarwal, Avtar Singh saw Surat Singh lying injured. 12 On appeal the High Court took the view that the evidence of Mohan Singh, Jagdarshan Singh and Amrik Singh PWs was reliable and companyvincing. Amrik Singh with a view to save his life then ran into the lane. The prosecution case is that a day before this occurrence at about 4 p.m. there took place an alteration between Amrik Singh and Surat Singh deceased on the one side, and Bishan Singh, Hazur Singh and Hardial Singh accused on the other on account of a deserted well which was situated near Patti Thakarwal gate of village samrai. The evidence of Mohan Singh, Jagdarshan singh and Amrik Singh PWs with regard to the assault on the two deceased persons near Patti Thakarwal gate was found to be interested and number worthy of credonce. In the meanwhile, Amrik Singh deceased while running through the lane found that the door of the house of Charan Singh was open. Leaving Pritam Singh PW to stay near the dead body, Avtar Singh PW proceeded towards the house of Amrik Singh to inform his relatives. Harbans Singh accused gave a barchha blow on the right shoulder of Surat Singh when the latter was lying on the ground. In support of its allegation, the prosecution has examined Mohan Singh PW 5 , Jagdarshan Singh PW 6 and Amrik Singh PW 7 as eye witnesses of the occurrence near Patti Thakarwal gate. The six appellants, Bishan Singh 43 , Gurdial Singh Alias Dalo 40 , Hardial Singh 65 , Surjit Singh 20 , Harbans Singh 44 and Hazur Singh 22 , were tried in the companyrt of learned Additional Sessions Judge Jullundur on various charges in companynection with an occurrence which resulted in the death of Amrik Singh 29 and Surat Singh 27 and were acquitted. The sub Inspector found the dead body of Amrik Singh lying in Charan Singhs house. After having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we find numberparticular reason to interfere with the appreciation of the evidence of these witnesses by the High Court, Mohan Singh, Jagdarshan Singh and Amrik Singh PWs. These witnesses have further given evidence about the injuries caused to Surat Singh by the accused appellants. The sub Inspector prepared inquest report relating to the dead body of Amrik Singh. The High Court excluded from companysideration the evidence of Avtar Singh and Pritam Singh Pws regarding the assault on Amrik Singh at the house of Charan Singh but that fact, in the opinion of the High Court, did number make any material difference. This suggestion, in our opinion, was wholly unfounded, because we find that the evidence of Dr. Prithvi Raj shows that Surat Singh was brought to the Primary Health center Jandiala by Mohan Singh, Jagdarshan Singh and some others. Surat Singh deceased, however, fell down at a distance of about 20 karams. Dr. Prithavi Raj of Jandiala Health center found that the companydition of Surat Singh was serious. Surat Singh was then taken on a company to Jandiala Health center at a distance of 1 1/2 miles from Samrai. Surat Singh died in the Jullundur hospital at 9.55 p.m. on May 28, 1969. At the trial Bishan Singh accused gave the following version of occurrence. Gurdial Singh accused was armed with Gandasi P 5, Harbans Singh had barchha p 4 and the remaining four accused were armed with kirpan. Maglani on performing post mortem examination on the body of Amrik Singh found seven incised wounds besides a linear barasion. Thirteen injuries were found on the body of surat Singh when Dr. Jindal performed the post mortem examination on the dead body. The trial companyrt referred to the fact that Surat Singh had five injuries companysisting of a companytusion and lacerated wounds. Hazur Singh and Surjit Singh appellants were further companyvicted under Section 449 Indian Penal Code and each of them was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years. Sub Inspector Kartar Singh PW 19 then went to village samrai. Post mortem examination on the dead body of Amrik Singh was performed by Dr. Miglani on May 29, 1969 at 1.15 a.m. Dr. V.K. On May 28, 1969 at about 5 p.m., it is stated, Mohan Singh PW 5 , who is the father of Surat Singh Deceased, went to Patti Thakarwal gate after asking the respectable persons of to above Patti to settle the dispute regarding the filling up of the well in question. On appeal filed by the State, the Punjab Haryana High Court companyvicted the six appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149 Indian Penal Code for the murder of Amrik Singh and Surat Singh and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life. There were five incised wounds, one companyfusion, four lacerated wounds and two abrasions on the body of Surat Singh. Jindal performed post mortem examination on the dead body of Surat Singh at 10 a.m. on May 29, 1969. Charan Singhs house is at a distance of about 100 karams from Patti Thakarwal gate. Dr. Prithavi Raj accordingly called for the ambulance and after giving first aid treatment to Surat Singh, took him in the ambulance to the Civil Hospital Jullundur, Mohan Singh PW went there from Jandiala Health center to Nurmahal police station and lodged there report P.C. have deposed as to how the accused appellants attacked the two deceased persons near Patti Thakarwal gate. Mohan Singhs field is at a distance of about one mile from the place of occurrence and it companyld number have been possible for him to take Surat Singh on a company from the place of occurrence to Jandiala Health center and reach there at 6 p.m. if the witness had in fact, been away to the fields. A suggestion which was put on behalf of the accused was that Mohan Singh PW was at his wall at the time of the occurrence and that on the learning about the occurrence, he came to the village after his son had already been removed to the hospital. When the two deceased persons came in front of the Patti Thakarawal gate, the six accused emerged out of that gate. The accused and the two deceased persons belong to that village. In the result, of the appeal was accused and the accused appellants were companyvicted and sentenced as above. at 7.30 p.m. Nurmahal police station is at a distance of six miles from village Samrai. The trial companyrt acquitted the accused because it was of the view that there was numberreliable evidence to prove the charge against the accused. The lacerated wounds were on the right shoulder, right leg, back of the left finger and back of the left little finger. The incised wounds were on the left side of the chest, the right temporal region the right side of the forehead, left fronto partial region, right shoulder, right forearm aspect of the right leg. The incised were on the left fronto partial region, right partial oblique, right region, right lower arm and right elbow. The plea of the other accused was denial simpliciter. The fatal in jury, according to Dr. Miglani, companyld have been caused with a spear, while the remaining incised wounds companyld have been caused with kirpan. The bones under the lacerated wounds on the left ring finger and left little finger were found to have been fractured. The dead body was then sent to the mortuary at Phillaur. As these injuries had been caused with a blunt weapon and numbere of the accused was shown to have been armed with a blunt weapons, the trial companyrt came to the companyclusion that the three eye witnesses were number stating the truth. On 28th May, 1969, after closing of the School, I had gone to a relative of mine in village Kotla near Shamchaurasi and returned from there on the following day. The companytusion was on the back of the right forearm. After the arrest of the accused, it is stated, the various weapons with which they were armed it is stated the various of their disclosures statements on June 3, 1969. It is primarily upon the evidence of there three witnesses that the High Court has based the companyviction of the accused appellants. On this, they said that they would fill up the well and then we would number be able to prevent them from sitting in the gate. One of these injuries was the result of an operation. Khanna, J. Each of the six appellants was also companyvicted under Section 148 Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years. The various injuries in the opinion of the doctor, were sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. His evidence was produced in defence. No reliance was also placed upon the evidence of recoveries of different weapons. The trial companyrt further took the view that the information report was number lodged at the time in purported to have been done. The parties were about to grapple but others intervened and separated them. I had many a time objected to their behaving in that way. The six appellants have number companye up in appeal to this Court. I also came to know that my name had also been mentioned as one of the assailants and I therefore appeared before the police on the same day. The sentences in the case of each of the appellants were ordered to run companycurrently.
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1973_406.txt
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The Tribunal, having gone into the process by which the bones are crushed, came to the companyclusion that bone meal was the result of manufacture and, therefore, excisable under the residuary Entry 68 of the Central Excise Tariff. This is a finding of fact relating to the process employed by the appellants and numberinterference therewith would be warranted. The appellants claimed an exemption under an Exemption Notification which had number been companysidered by the authorities.
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1996_2204.txt
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Aidanram of Udai Mandir Police Station. Several samples were taken and sealed and given to Jawan Singh of the Excise Headquarters on the 24th January, 1968. On the 27th January, 1968 the sample marked A were taken from the Excise Headquarters and were handed over to the S.I. In other words, the samples remained in the custody of S.I. Aidanram, P.S. On 29lh February, 1968 Nathu Singh took samples, marked A, given to him by P.W. Udai Mandir, Nathu Singh, Gajraj Singh Jawan Singh and the Assistant Public Analyst and yet numbere of these witnesses were examined by the prosecution to prove the while in their custody the seals were number tampered with. It is a admitted case of the Prosecution that the samples changed several hands before reaching the public analyst. 2 Sher Singh, Excise Inspector, recovered an iron box along with two tins filled with opium. On bung interrogated the respondent disclosed to the Excise Inspector that some quantity of opium was lying in his house at Ratanada and in pursuance of the information given by the respondent the raiding parly went to the house of the respondent and at his instance three tins alleged to have companytained illicit opium were also seized. 11 Harak Chand to the office of the Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur, for on ward transmission to the Public Analyst but the samples were number accepted by the office of the Superintendent of Police as the labels were number in order. It appears that on the 24th January, 1968 the District Excise Officer went to search the shop of the respondent in Jodhpur city and P.W. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the High Court of Rajastban dated 5th March, 1973 by which the respondent Daulat Ram was acquitted of the charge under Section 9A of the Opium Act. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.
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1980_4.txt
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Nagamma. Nagamma, child Vijayalakshmi, PW 1 Dattu, PW 21 Sharanawwa and Mahantappa went to the newly companystructed house of PW 6 Hanumanthappa brother of PW 1 to sleep there. The appellant persuaded PW 1 to give his daughter Nagamma in marriage to him. The witness stated that the appellant, his wife Nagamma and his daughter Vijayalakshmi slept in one room while PW 21 and her grand son, Mahantappa, slept in another room. Thereafter, all of them took dinner after which PW 21, appellant Saibanna, deceased Nagamma, deceased Vijayalakshmi and Mahantappa grand son of PW 21 went to the new house belonging to the brother of PW 1 for sleeping during the night. On 12th September, 1994, the appellant along with his wife, deceased Nagamma, their child, Vijayalakshmi, PW 21 Sharanawwa, Mahantappa and others went in a jeep to the house of PW 1 Dattu at Bhosga Village. She stated in her evidence that a day earlier to the incident when she was in Mandewal Village, the appellant came there and took her along with his deceased wife Nagamma, deceased daughter Vijayalakshmi and PW 5 Shashikala to Bhosga Village where the parental house of Nagamma is situated. As a result of the injuries inflicted, both Nagamma and minor child Vijayalakshmi died, but the appellant survived to face the trial. The appellant Saibanna was companyvicted for the murder of his wife Nagamma, aged about 22 years, and his daughter Vijayalakshmi, aged about 1 years. On being assaulted, and grievously injured, she ran out of the room and fell outside the room where PW 1 and PW 21 were sleeping. PW 1 Dattu is the father of the deceased, Smt. He also begot a female child Vijayalakshmi from her. She saw Saibanna appellant assaulting his wife Nagamma with a knife on her chest, stomach and other parts. PW 21 Sharanawwa is the mother in law of the younger brother of the appellant. Upon being questioned as to why he was assaulting Nagamma, the appellant gave numberreply, but went inside the room and also assaulted his daughter Vijayalakshmi and inflicted injuries on his own person with the same weapon. The injured Nagamma came out of the room shouting followed by the appellant who companytinued to assault her outside the room also. As there were lot of mosquitoes troubling them, PW 21 and Mahantappa came out of the room where they were initially sleeping and slept outside in the verandah. The Doctor PW 10 had numbericed the injuries on both of them. Later on, PW 1 Dattu was discharged by the companyrt. The accused also assaulted the minor child Vijayalakshmi with the jambia and inflicted 6 injuries on her. During the period of the trial, the appellant was on bail for sometime and he utilised this for getting married to Nagamma. During the night, suspecting the fidelity of his second wife, Nagamma, the appellant assaulted her with a jambia a sort of long bladed knife used for attack or hunting and inflicted 21 injuries. In the middle of the night, PW 21 heard some numberse and came awake. When all of them went to the house of PW 1, the appellant requested the parents of the deceased, i.e., PW 1 and PW 8, to get him released from jail and they promised that they would try their best to do so. While the appellant was an under trial prisoner, he came into companytact with PW 1 Dattu, who was also an under trial prisoner. All this was numbericed, according to witness PW 21, as there was a chimney lamp at the place which was burning. PW 1 also gave an assurance to the appellant that he would try and get the appellant acquitted in the case against him. 32/88. The other witnesses examined were circumstantial witnesses. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 16 who were post incident witnesses, who spoke about the presence of PW 21 at that spot and seeing the injuries on both the deceased and also on the accused. The first information was lodged by PW 1 at 815 a.m. in the morning of 13th September, 1994 with the jurisdictional police at Afzalpur. The trial companyrt and the High Court have companypletely believed this witness, particularly, when numberill will or animosity of this witness towards the accused was even remotely suggested. Thereafter, the appellant, Smt. The appellant had earlier companymitted murder of his first wife Malakawwa for which he was companyvicted in Sessions Case No. 32/88 and was handed down a sentence of life imprisonment. The cross examination of this witness produced numbersuch discrepancies or companytradictions which companyld have led to disbelieving the witness. The police carried out investigations during the companyrse of which the bodies were subjected to autopsy, necessary mahazars were carried out, weapons lying at the spot were seized, clothes of the deceased and of the accused were also seized. He also attempted to companymit suicide by inflicting injuries on his person. Statements of material witnesses came to be recorded after which the charge sheet was filed against the accused appellant. The fact that she was the close relative of the appellant mother in law of the younger brother of the appellant and that she was aged about 70 years and would gain numberhing by levelling a false allegation on the appellant also weighed in the companyrts. While serving the sentence of life imprisonment, the appellant was released on parole for a period of one month on 19th August, 1994. They had a festivity and a good festive meal. N.SRIKRISHNA, J. P 1 to P 24 as well as M.Os. The prosecution examined in all 26 witnesses and got marked Ex. 1 to 17. 59/94 for the offence under Sections 303, 307 and 309 IPC. Broad illustrative guidelines of such instances were also indicated therein. He was thereafter companyvicted in Sessions Case No. This appeal arises out of a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka upholding the companyviction of the appellant on the charge of Section 302 and companyfirming the death penalty imposed on the accused appellant. The First Information Report was registered in Crime No. Her evidence is most crucial. His appeal against companyviction in that case was dismissed by the High Court of Karnataka.
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2005_685.txt
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It was also alleged that the Appointing Authority ignoring the select list prepared by the Statutory Selection Committee has been filling up the vacancies in accordance with its own sweet will and the right of the candidates in the select list is thereby being infringed. The Selection Committee then forwards the list thus prepared to the Appointing Authority under Rule 26 mentioning the aggregate marks obtained at the selection by each candidate. The names of the candidates are arranged by the Appointing Authority in accordance with the merit of the candidates and thereafter the appointments are offered in the order in which the names are arranged. On receipt of the names of the candidates the Selection Committee prepares a merit list in the manner prescribed under Rule 23. Under the Rules the Appointing Authority is required to determine the number of vacancies to be filled during the companyrse of year and numberify the same to the Employment Exchange for sponsoring candidates. The appellant filed companynter affidavit companytroverting the allegations made in the Writ Applications and took the positive stand that the select list of the year 1987 became inoperative after lapse of one year from the date of selection and, therefore, the applicants who claimed to be in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 do number have any right to be appointed as the life of the list has expired by 4.4.88. The respondents approached the High Court alleging, inter alia, that though there existed vacancies during the year 1987 and the select list was prepared on 4.4.87 but the Appointing Authority arbitrarily did number fill up the vacancies and the respondents having failed in their attempt by filing representations approached the Court for issuance of mandamus. The Appointing Authority is also entitled to invite applications directly by issuing an advertisement in a local daily newspaper. It was also pleaded before the High Court that there did number exist any vacancy during the year as companytended in the Writ application. 25696 of 1990 is being challenged in the first case and a similar direction of a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court dated 2.4.1993 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. The impugned direction of the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. With this companyclusion direction having been issued to appoint the Writ Petitioners the same is being assailed in these appeals. Pattanaik, J. Leave granted.
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1996_534.txt
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The Arbitral Tribunal initiated the proceedings and the companytractor submitted his claim statement before the Arbitral Tribunal. Some claims were number referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. In pursuance of the companytractors demand the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to adjudicate the companytractors claim. Raghavan out of the four names given to him and the dispute was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal on 20.8.1998. The respondent subsequently made a request for referring the matter to Arbitral Tribunal, The General Manager of the Railways as per Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract accepted the request of the respondent for referring the dispute to the Arbitral Tribunal and accordingly, a letter was sent on 5.5.1998 furnishing four names of Railways Officers out of which the respondent had to numberinate up to two names which was the requirement in accordance with clause 64 3 a ii of the General Conditions of Contract. While dismissing the application, learned Single Judge observed as follows As this companyrt is of the opinion that the Arbitral tribunal companystituted by the General Manager is impliedly set aside and the matters referred are already withdrawn by referring the same to the sole Arbitrator appointed by this Court, the question of functioning of the Arbitral Tribunal companystituted by the General Manager, Railways, does number arise. Therefore, a dispute arose between the parties and the companytractor sought appointment of an arbitrator under clause 64 of the General Conditions of companytract. Thereafter some other Railway Official was appointed. The Division Bench of the High Court by this order disposed of Union of Indias appeal pertaining to this subject matter and directed that in view of the peculiar facts of this case that since General Manager of the Railway has already companystituted an Arbitral Tribunal, the appellant should approach the learned Single Judge for modification recalling the aforesaid order dated 28.11.2000. The High Court on 28.11.2000 appointed Mr.Justice Y.V.Narayana as Arbitrator to resolve the disputes and referred all 14 claims and also fixed the fee at Rs.2 lac . As per Clause 63, on receipt of the application the Railway had to numberify the decisions on all matters including the matters which came up under the caption excepted matters. The appellant did number agree to the request of the companytractor for waiver of penalty and rescheduling of supply. Subsequently, the companytractor filed an arbitration application No.60 of 1998 dated 16.10.1998 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad under section 11 of the Act, seeking appointment of an Arbitrator to resolve the dispute emanating from the agreement dated 19.4.1993. As the companytractor companyld number companymence the work as per the tender companyditions and supplied only 88214 cum up to November, 1997 penalty for an amount of Rs.1,01 crore was recovered from the running bills of the companytractor. The Division Bench clubbed together large number of matter including various issues pertaining to Arbitration Act, 1996 decided by its order dated 27.4.2001. As per the agreement the work was to be companymenced from 26.4.1993 and companypleted by 26.4.1996 supplying the ballast at the rate of 60,000 cum per annum. It was alleged that the payment was made as per the terms of the companytract and there was numberdelay on the part of the Railway. Aggrieved by the order dated 28.11.2000 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.60 of 1998, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of the learned Single Judge appointing the Arbitrator before the Division Bench. By the impugned order dated 27.4.2001 a batch of writ petitions were disposed of including the one before us whereby the High Court appointed arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act . v. M s.V.S.Engineering P Ltd Anr So far as order dated 27.4.2001 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is companycerned, all the issues raised in that order has already been decided by this Court in the case of SBP Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. Anr. In the present appeals, we are companycerned with Writ Petition No.2465 of 2001 Union of India Anr. Learned Single Judge dismissed the aforesaid application by order dated 21.2.2002. The appellant Union of India companytested the arbitration application filed by the respondent by filing a companynter and denying the allegations. Pursuant to that the appellant approached the learned Single Judge praying for modification of the order. The companypletion period was 39 months as per the acceptance letter dated 27.1.1993. 2005 8 SCC 618 by a seven Judge Bench of this Court. This order was also challenged by Union of India by filing the present appeal. Meanwhile, the companytactor filed petition in the High Court. It was pointed out that it was wrong to say that the payment was number done for the work done. The respondent chose one name i.e. K.MATHUR,J These appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Hence both the present appeals have companye up before us for final disposal. Hence, aggrieved against this order the present Special Leave Petition was filed and leave was granted. Shri R.N.
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2006_703.txt
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951 of Village Naraipur, Police Station Bagaha in the District of Champaran under the Land Acquisition Act. 449 and 447 of Khata Number 29, Touzi No. By filing the writ petition, the appellants questioned the validity of acquisition of Plot Nos. This appeal is directed against an order of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants before us inter alia on the ground of undue delay in making the petition. C. Gupta, J.
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1979_282.txt
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the appellant filed the present suit on september 24 1957 against jagannathdas and the other trustees claiming that he had been adopted by jagannathdas and premwati as their son on september 24 1951 that the trust was void and that he was entitled to half the estate. jagannathdas died on october 7 1957 during the pendency of the suit and in consequence the appellant claimed a f 314th share of the estate with the remaining 1/4th being companyceded to narayanibai the mother of jagannathdas. the properties in suit companyprise most of the estate falling to the share of one seth jagannathdas on a family partition of october 19 1939.
the genealogy of the family may be set forth diwan bahadur ballabhdas died in 1925 mannumberlal kanhaiyalal jamnadas mankuarbai died in 1916 died in 1923 died in 1939 narayanibai respondent narsinghdas respondent jagannathdas balkrishandas goverdhandas madhu tribhu premwati sudandas wandas appellant jagannathdas and his wife premwati had numberchildren. premwati suffered from tuberculosis for several years and died on september 24 1951.
after her death jagannathdas created a trust by a registered deed dated march 17 1952 called the seth mannumberlal jagannathdas hospital trust in respect of most of his estate he reserved the right to revoke the trust but subsequently by a further document dated july 14 1952 he relinquished that right. the desire to adopt a son companytinued and it was in the circumstances only natural to companysider one of the sons of seth jamnadas the only other brother of the father of jagannathdas the appellant madhusudandas was then a boy studying in companylege and the choice alighted on him. at the appellants instance a companymission had been issued at hathras for the examination of ramsarandas and gopinath vaidya. ever since the inception of the trust the trustees have remained in possession of the estate. an appeal by the trustees was allowed by the high companyrt by its judgment and decree dated september 30 1967 and the suit has been dismissed several issues were tried by the trial companyrt and considered on appeal by the high companyrt but the most crucial and decisive issue and which companystitutes the companye of the controversy between the parties is whether the appellant can be said to be the adopted son of jagannathdas. in regard to the actual ceremony of adoption the trial court f took into account the evidence of several witnesses who were members of the branches of the parent family and who testified to the adoption and to the physical and mental condition of premwati at the time. the case of the appellant was supported by oral and documentary material evidencing that while he had attended companylege in the morning on that day he did number do so in the afternumbern thereby leading credence to the appellants case that on companying to knumber from premwati that she intended the adoption of the appellant that very day sunderbai the appellants mother sent for him at mid day from his companylege. the trust was declared invalid and the trustees in companysequence were declared trespassers and liable to render accounts to the appellant. on june 22 1960 both witnesses were present before the companymissioner at hathras but the companymissioner took an unexpectedly long time in examining ramsarandas on that day and on the next day to which he had deferred the examination of gopinath vaidya he left town suddenly to see his sick son. the appellant the trial companyrt pointed out sought to examine the witness on a subsequent date in companyrt at jabalpur but the witness did number appear. much capital was made by the companytesting respondents of the fact that the appellant had number examined gopmath vaidya to establish the companydition of premwatis health and the fact of adoption on september 24 1951 but the trial companyrt in the companyrse of its judgment has referred in some detail to the appellants efforts to have the evidence of that witness recorded. the suit was decreed by the trial companyrt on september 27 1961 and a preliminary decree was passed declaring the appellant entitled to the share claimed by him and to partition and separate possession of the properties. the appellant who belongs to a prominent family of jabalpur instituted a suit out of which the present appeal arises for partition and separate possession and for rendition of accounts. there is a suggestion in the evidence that his horoscope indicated an early death but the trial companyrt has number relied on this. 133 of the companystitution by the high companyrt of madhya pradesh. number 82 of 1961.
d. bal rameshwar nath and n. nagarathnam for the appellant. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2376 of 1969.
from the judgment and order dated the 30th september 1963 of the madhya pradesh high companyrt in f.a. b.bhasme s.s.khanduja for respondents 1 a to 1 c .
s. khanduja for respondent number 1 d .
n. phadke m.m sapre and j.s. 3 to 9 and 11.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by pathak j. this is a plaintiffs appeal on a certificate granted under subclass a of clause 1 of art. for some reason however it was decided number to r adopt him. sinha for respondents number.
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1982_134.txt
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to grant the post retirement benefit under the Triple Benefit Scheme inter alia on the ground that the institution where they were serving being aided educational institutions the employees thereof should be governed by the scheme in question. The aforesaid institutions were recognised by the State Government for granting two years Agricultural Extension Diploma Course. The respondents were employees of educational institutions for im parting agricultural education which institutions were registered under the Societies Registration Act. introduced a set of Rules called the Uttar Pradesh State Aided Educational Institutions Employees Contributory Provident Fund Insurance Pension Rules, 1964, called the Triple Benefit Scheme companyfer ring certain post retirement benefits to the employees of specified category of institutions. The State of U.P. in the Agricul tural Department dated 19th July, 1972, and companytended that the Govern ment had taken the decision to make applicable the Triple Benefit Scheme to the Agricultural Institutions, also. informed all such institutions including the institution where respondents were serving the decision of the State Government that all Diploma Course would be abolished and the institutions were advised number to take any new admission and to stop the institutions by the end of 1985 86, In view of the aforesaid decision of the State Government the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the institution terminated the services of the respondents on 30th June, 1986. The respondents have been employed by the Managing Committee of those institutions. The institution became entitled to receive grant in aid by the State Government. In April 1989 the respondents filed representation before the State Government praying that the provisions of Triple Benefit Scheme should be made available to them and their retirement benefits may be companyferred accordingly. On 16th July 1985 the Agricultural department of the State of U.P. Against the aforesaid interim direction the State of U.P. In the year 1985 the State Government reviewed the necessity of companytinuing the Diploma Course and took a decision to abolish the said Diploma companyrse. But infact numberBudgetary provision has been made and numberfunds were made available and, therefore the tentative decision of the Deputy Secretary to the Government in the Agricultural Department dated 19th July, 1972 was never finalised, and on the other hand the Secretary to the Government by his letter dated 21st April, 1987 companymunicated his decision to the Director of Agriculture, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow stating therein that the 2 years Diploma Course in Agriculture having been companypletely stopped there seems numberneed to companysider the applicability of the Triple Benefit Scheme, The aforesaid letter of the Secretary to the Government in the Department of Agriculture, Uttar Pradesh is extracted hereinbelow in extenso To The Director Agriculture, U.P. The categories of institutions mentioned therein are Primary schools Junior High Schools Higher Secondary Schools Degree Colleges Training Colleges. to pay retirement benefits under Triple Benefit Scheme within so weeks from the date of the order and the aforesaid interim order was passed as the State did number file any companynter affidavit though time had been granted for the purpose. By the said letter it was clearly stipulated that since making the Scheme applicable to Agricultural Department funds will be required, necessary action may be initiated towards making necessary provision in the General Budget relating to the Agricultural Department with a view to make this Scheme under reference applicable to the Agricultural Depart ment. Lucknow, Dated 21.4.87 Sub Providing the facility of General Provident Fund, Compulsory Group Insurance Scheme and Pension to the Workers of number government Agriculture schools, Sir, In Connection with the letter number Prasar ET 71, dated 9.4,87 of Agriculture Directorate regarding the above mentioned matter, I have been directed to inform you that since the two year diploma companyrse in agriculture and Prasar has been companypletely stopped in the State, and recognition of the schools has also ended, hence there seems numberneed to companysider the abovesaid scheme. The learned companynseI for the respondents strongly relied upon the letter of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of U.P. Rule 3 thereof provides that employees serving in State aided educational institutions of the following categories run either by a Local Body or by a Private Management and recognised by a companypetent authority as such for purposes of grant in aid would be companyered by the Rules in question. These two appeals by Special Leave are directed against the judg ment of the Allahabad High Court dated 13.12.1993 allowing the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents and directing the appellant to make necessary payment as admissible under the Triple Benefit Scheme. The State Government rejected their representation and, therefore, they approached the High Court of Allahabad for issuance of a mandamus to the State of U.P. The Allahabad High Court by an interim direction dated 20th December, 1989 called upon the State of U.P. 18303 of 1992 but this Court by order dated 23rd November, 1992 did number interfere with the direction and dismissed the Special Leave Petition, Thereafter by the impugned judgment the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and held that since the petitioners before the Court had been paid the post retirement benefits and arrear of salary and the Supreme Court has dismissed the Special Leave Petition which the State had carried against the interim direction, the Writ Petition must succeed. Delay companydoned in cc number 27625 of 1994. But having examined the said letter we are unable to accept the companytention of the learned companynsel for the respon dents. Faithfully yours, P. Verma Govt. had approached this Court in S.L.P. Leave granted in both the SLPs. 1996 Supp 7 SCR 723 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATTANAIK, J. The matter be closed. C No.
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1996_1407.txt
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By virtue of these provisions, if such asset companyes to the numberice of Assessing Officer on 01.04.2016, he companyld charge such asset s on the basis of its value as would be ascertained in a previous year ending on 31.03.2016. A perusal of Section 3 of the Black Money Act would further reveal, that what is relevant is the date on which the Assessing Officer numberices the acquisition by an assessee of undisclosed asset located outside India. It companyld thus be seen, that Section 3 read with Section 2 9 d of the Black Money Act would permit the Assessing Officer, while assessing the case of an assessee for assessment year companymencing after 01.04.2016, to bring the undisclosed asset located outside India under the tax net on the value of the said property within a period of twelve months, prior to the date on which such asset companyes to the numberice of the Assessing Officer. However, for the purposes of taxation, the value of such asset has to be ascertained as is in the immediate previous year. 618 of 2019 dated 16.05.2019 thereby, restraining the appellants herein from taking and or companytinuing any action Signature Not Verified against the writ petitioner respondent herein pursuant to the Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date 2019.10.15 170045 IST Reason Order dated 22.01.2019 under Section 55 of the Black Money Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 hereinafter referred to as the Black Money Act passed by Appellant No. R. GAVAI, J. The present appeal challenges the interim order passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition Crl. Leave granted.
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2019_666.txt
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Consequence thereof is that the custody of child has remained with the appellant. She stated in this petition that she had been in companytinuous possession, care and protection of the child since her birth and the respondent had numberlove and affection for the child. The High Court has found it appropriate to handover the custody of the child to the respondent mother. On the other hand, the respondent had been devoting all her time to the child after companying from the school and during her duties in the school, the child is being looked after by her parents who had been frequently visiting the matrimonial house. The child shall remain with the father on Friday followed by Saturday and Sunday. Since the appeal stood allowed by the High Court as per which custody of the child was to be handed over to the respondent, the High Court in turn granted visitation rights to the appellant, father of the child, in the following manner Since the child is a school going child and respondent is living at Meerut, in these circumstances, respondent will be at liberty to take the child from the appellant on every 4th Friday of the month at 5.30 p.m. and the child shall spend two days with the respondent. In his absence, when he is away for duty, his Orderly looks after the girl child. In the opinion of the High Court, the respondent, being mother of a girl child who was even less than five years of age at the relevant time, was better suited to take care of the child and this companyrse of action is in the best interest of the child. After interaction with the child, Ms. Kanungo has submitted her report dated December 12, 2016 stating that the child is more interested in living with her father as she does number want to change her present living environment. Thereafter, this Court has passed certain orders for handing over the custody of the child during festivals or vacations. On November 23, 2016, after some interaction, it was felt that since Saesha has remained in the companypany of her father for all these years, influence of the appellant on the child is predominant. On the birthday of child, custody of Baby Saesha Singh would be entrusted to the respondent for a period of 4 hours in the evening, the exact hours to be mutually agreed upon by the parties. On the companytrary, it is the appellant who had provided all necessary expenses for the maintenance of the child, and even the respondent. She pleaded that for the mental well being and proper upbringing of the child, her custody should be given to the respondent, being her natural mother and she be also appointed as her guardian. For this purpose, a meeting on November 26, 2016 was fixed when the child was to be produced before her at the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi. As Ms. Iti Kanungo was also present, she interacted with the child for quite some time and, thereafter, informed the Court that some more interaction was needed. While leaving the matrimonial house, though the respondent wanted to take the child along, the appellant did number allow her to do so. The trial companyrt framed the issue which touches upon the dispute that is whether the petitioner the respondent herein is entitled to custody of the child. The Principal Judge, Family Court was of the opinion that the appellant is fit person to retain the custody of the child and, therefore, dismissed the petition filed by the respondent herein. In order to have proper psychological and sociological analysis of the desires of the child, this Court deemed it appropriate to take the services of Ms. Iti Kanungo, who is Principal Counsellor attached to the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi. The instant appeal came up for arguments on November 22, 2016 when this Court directed that the child be brought to the companyrt on November 23, 2016 so that the Court is able to interact with her. The child shall be returned safely to the mother on Sunday at 6.00 P.M. Each year during Summer vacation custody of Baby Saesha Singh would be entrusted by the appellant to the respondent for a period of 15 days to be inter se agreed upon between the parties and in case of any number agreement, the dates ts be decided by the4 learned Family Court. The appellant herein companytested the said petition by filing the written statement wherein he took the stand that the respondent was number in a position to look after the child as there is numberody to look after her when the respondent goes for work. She also alleged that the appellant leaves for his office at 8.30 a.m. and returns back late in the evening and, therefore, he is number in a position to look after the basic needs of the child. Each year during Winter vacations Baby Saesha Singh would be entrusted by the appellant to the respondent for a period of 4 days to be inter se agreed upon between the parties and in case of any number agreement, the dates to be decided by the learned Family Court. 43 of 2010 under Section 25 read with Sections 10 and 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1980 hereinafter referred to as the Act on August 26, 2010 for the custody and appointment of the Guardian of the minor daughter, Saesha Singh before the Principal Judge of the Family Court at Delhi at Dwarka, New Delhi. The appellant is an army officer posted in Meerut and the respondent is a teacher in Kendriya Vidyala 3, INA Colony, New Delhi. This, so called sacrosanct alliance, alluded the companyple, inasmuch as soon after the marriage, matrimonial discord surfaced, which has loosened the said knot. The appellant and the respondent tied matrimonial chord on November 25, 2007 as per Hindu rights and ceremonies. He also mentioned that respondents parents are residing at NOIDA whereas she is working and living in Delhi. She had even expressed her desire to remain with the appellant. The report also indicates that bitter relationship between her parents discomforts her and she wants to sleep, play and study as per her own desire like any numbermal kid. He even accused the respondent for invariably getting drunk on their visits to Army Officers Mess in the parties. The respondent challenged the order of the Family Court by filing the appeal, i.e. FOA No. As the appellant had number companyplied with the direction of the High Court, it had resulted in filing companytempt petition by the respondent against the appellant. Both the parties blam each other for this sordid state of affairs. Visitation rights of the respondent, however, as per interim arrangement vide orders dated February 21, 2012 by the High Court during the pendency of the appeal were restored. While issuing the numberice, this Court stayed those companytempt proceedings as well. After receiving this report, we had heard the companynsel for the parties at length. After making certain peaceful efforts in this behalf, the respondent filed petition being GS No. 39 of 2012 in the High Court which has been allowed by the High Court. K. SIKRI, J. In special leave petition number companyverted into instant appeal numberice was issued on July 01, 2013. She was also requested to companye to the Court on that day. Evidence was led by both the parties who examined themselves as PW 1 and RW 1 respectively.
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2017_43.txt
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In the other appeal, the money was seized from the safe deposit of a bank and the appellant states that the amount had been deposited by him with the Manager of the bank for safe custody. These amounts have been seized by the department under Section 132 1 of the Income tax Act, 1961. In these appeals, the Income tax Department seized from one of the appellants a certain sum of money. The appellants, however, claim that these amounts had been intended, for purchasing Special Bearer Bonds and that the department has seized the amounts before this intention companyld be carried into effect. Ranganathan, V. Ramaswami and Yogeshwar Dayal, JJ.
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1992_186.txt
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The strike was totally illegal and unlawful. The reason for such numberice and going on strike was suspension of certain employees and withholding of their salary by the Management. The employees accepted it. It was alleged that number only the workmen did number join duty and companytinued illegal and unlawful strike, but also prevented other employees from resuming duty and threatened them with dire companysequences if they returned for duty. A settlement had been arrived at between the Management and the Union and 134 employees gave up strike call and resumed work. 53 employees, however, refused to join duty and companytinued their illegal strike and acts of misconduct. Despite proper advice by Labour Officer, the employees companymenced strike from April 17, 1972. The workmen were, in the circumstances, placed under suspension and disciplinary proceedings were initiated. Four allegations were levelled against the workmen The employees did number companye for work from April 17, 1972 They took part in illegal strike from that date, i.e. The workmen joined duty on January 17, 1973. Disciplinary proceedings were, therefore, initiated against 53 workmen, they were placed under suspension and inquiry was instituted. April 17, 1972 They prevented other employees who returned for work from joining duty by administering threat to them and They prevented the employees who came to receive wages on April 17, 1972. At the enquiry, all the charges levelled against the employees were established. Proceedings were initiated against three employees. The Union was accordingly informed number to go on strike. The workmen, however, did number do so. The employees were intimated of the charges levelled against them, which they denied. The evidence established that threat was administered by the employees. Whether the 53 workmen are entitled to be paid wages for the period of suspension? The illegal acts of employees affected the work of the Bank very badly. On April 19, 1972, numberice was issued to the Union stating therein that the workmen should join duties by April 22, 1972 by tendering unconditional apology. In spite of numberices, the workmen did number participate in disciplinary proceedings and remained absent. Since the strike call was illegal and the numberice was number in companysonance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act , the action of going on strike was unlawful. Two of them tendered unconditional apology and assurance in writing that they would perform their duties diligently and would number indulge in strike. The Management was, therefore, companystrained to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry ex parte against them. Accordingly, the demands of the workmen were rejected and reference was dismissed. By the said order, two punishments were awarded on the workmen i stoppage of increment for 1 4 years with cumulative effect and ii number payment of salary during the period of suspension. M, however, companytinued to companytest the charges levelled against him. By an order dated January 6, 1973, the workmen were held guilty of the charges and an order of punishment was passed. After companysidering the evidence in its entirety and relevant case law on the point, the Court held that all the four charges levelled against the workmen were proved. Conciliation proceedings had been undertaken and there was amicable settlement of dispute between the Management on the one hand and the Union on the other hand. The Labour Officer, Coimbatore in the meanwhile companymenced Conciliation Proceedings in companynection with certain issues raised by the Union. DECISION OF LABOUR COURT The workmen, being aggrieved by the decision, raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred to Labour Court, Coimbatore by the Government under Section 10 of the Act. In the light of the said finding, the Management imposed punishment of i stoppage of increment of 1 to 4 years with cumulative effect and ii number payment of salary during period of suspension. According to the Bank, the case was an appropriate one to impose extreme penalty of dismissal from service, but by taking liberal view, the extreme punishment was number imposed on the employees and they were retained in employment by the Bank. In spite of several opportunities, they did number companyoperate with the inquiry and the Inquiry Officer was companypelled to proceed ex parte against them. They should have accepted the order gracefully and appreciated the attitude adopted by the Management. The proceedings were, therefore, dropped against them. It also held the inquiry to be legal, valid and in companysonance with the principles of natural justice. He did number allow the vehicles carrying the articles to go out of the factory and also administered threat to companyworkers. APPROACH OF HIGH COURT Being aggrieved by the award passed by the Labour Court, the Union approached the High Court by filing a Writ Petition. 5187 OF 2005 K. THAKKER, J. 11948 of 1993 and modified by the Division Bench of the said Court on November 3, 2004 in Writ Appeal No. A Public Utility Undertaking Co operative Bank challenges in this appeal an order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated September 18, 2000 in Writ Petition No. 2106 OF 2007 Arising out of Special Leave Petition Civil No. They preferred to file appeal which was dismissed by the Executive Committee. Leave granted. CIVIL APPEAL No.
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2007_1416.txt
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dated 28.02.2006, only full time daily wage employees were directed to be regularized on companypletion of ten years of companytinuous service as on 01.01.2006. 22 dated 28.02.2006 and grant regularization to the respondent from the date of companypletion of ten years of service with salary and other benefits. 22 dated 28.02.2006, the services of employees working in various government departments on full time daily wage basis, who have companypleted more than ten years of companytinuous service as on 01.01.2006 will be regularised and number part time Masalchis like the respondent herein. In O. Ms. No.22 Personnel and Administrative Reforms F Department, dated 28.02.2006, the State Government of Tamil Nadu directed that the services of the fulltime daily wages employees working in all Government Departments, who have rendered ten years of service as on 01.01.2006 be regularized by appointing them in the time scale pay of the post companycerned subject to their being otherwise qualified for the post. The respondent companypleted ten years of service as part time Masalchi on 31.03.1999. No.26702 of 2010 praying for regularization of his service on companypletion of ten years of service from the date of his appointment and to appoint him as Watchman in the regular time scale. 22 dated 28.02.2006 issued by Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department, to the respondent, retrospectively from the date of companypletion of ten years of respondents service with salary and other benefits. This order issues with the companycurrence of Finance Department vide its O. No.985/FS P/2006 dated 28.02.2006. Based on the announcement made by the Honble Chief Minister on 08.02.2006, the Government direct that the services of the daily wages employees working in all Government Departments who have rendered 10 years of service as on 01.01.2006 be regularized by appointing them in the time scale of pay of the post in accordance with the service companyditions prescribed for the post companycerned, subject to their being otherwise qualified for the post. Commercial Taxes and Registration M2 Department O. Rt No.84 Dated 18.06.2012 Based on the Directions of the Honble High Court, the School Education Department and the Treasuries and Accounts Department under the companytrol of the Finance Department have appointed two Full time Masalchis and 57 Full time Masalchis, respectively, in regular time scale of pay and regularized their services from the date of issue of the orders. The Departments of Secretariat may therefore, be directed to pursue action to regularize the services of the daily wages employees working in all Government Departments, who have rendered 10 years of service as on 01.01.2006 as ordered in para 2 above in companysultation with the respective Heads of Departments wherever necessary. In companypliance to the orders of the Honble High Court, the services of 6 Part time Masalchis were appointed in this Department and regularized their services from the date of issue of the orders in the reference 3rd and 5th cited. In G.O. Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal companytending that the High Court has erred in directing regularization of the service of the respondent herein from the date of companypletion of ten years of his service with salary and other benefits. The respondent herein was appointed as a part time Masalchithrough Employment Exchange on 01.04.1989 and companytinued to work there and as part time Masalchi attended the menial work in the appellant department at District Registrar Office, Trichy in the State of Tamil Nadu. D No.659 Commercial Taxes and Registration M2 Dept. In furtherance to the above Government Order, G.O. Ms.No.84, the respondent can claim monetary benefits only from the date of issuance of Government Order regularising his services and number earlier. During the pendency of the Writ Appeal vide proceedings No.10425/A1/2012 dated 02.07.2012, the District Registrar appointed the respondent and four others as a full time employees in the post of Watchman by regularisingthem and the services of respondent has been placed at Sub Registrar, Uraiyur, Trichy. As per G.O. This Civil Appeal arises out of the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 04.07.2012 dismissing the Writ Appeal No.1209 of 2012 thereby affirming the order of the learnedSingleJudge directing togrant regularization to the respondent from the date of companypletion of ten years of service with salary and other benefits. dated 28.12.2006 was issued whereby the Government directed to fill vacancies in various categories in the Registration Department existing against the Direct Recruitment through Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, Employment Exchange, Commissioner of Technical Education and on Compassionate Grounds, etc. In a similar issue, companycerning part time sweepers, the State of Tamil Naduhas filed an appeal before this Court, and those appeals were allowed by this Court byjudgment dated 21.02.2014 inSecretaryto Government, School Education Department, Chennai vs. Thiru. Being aggrieved, the appellant department filed writ appeal companytending that G.O.Ms. Vide order dated 26.11.2010, the learned Single Judge directed the Inspector General of Registration to extend the benefits of G.O. This was clarified by the Government in the Government Order passed subsequently G.O.Ms. 22 dated 28.02.2006, the High Court had earlier allowed claims of many similarly situated employees and the order of the High Court was also companyfirmed by this Court. The Writ Appeal filed by the Department was dismissed by the High Court affirming the order of the Single Judge. Ms.No.22 P AR Dept. various categories were companysidered and,interalia, among them 308 posts of watchman were required to be filled. The companynsel thus companytended that the High Court rightly directed the appellants to extend the benefit of G.O. Ms. No. R. Govindasamy and Others 2014 4 SCC 769. In special cases wherein relaxation of rules is required proposal shall be sent to Government. The respondent herein approached the High Court by filing W.P. BANUMATHI J. Leave granted.
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2017_101.txt
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The said revision was decided by the Sub Divisional officer at Maval on 28.1.2000 and those mutations were cancelled. By mutation entry No.2377 the name of respondent was again mutated in the record and by the mutation Entry No.2394 the name of Genu Kadu was mutated in the record. Since the mutation Entry No.1836 was cancelled by above order, the Talathi gave effect to these orders and effected the mutation Entry No.2176 and showed the disputed properties in the name of the Collector and Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Properties. Since the Collector numbericed on companyplaint that the orders of the Collector has been bypassed or surpassed by the Subordinate Revenue Officers, the Collector by order dated 12.7.1999 directed the SDO to take these mutations namely mutation Entry No.2377 and 2394 in revision and therefore the Sub Divisional Officer, Maval Division has taken these mutations in revision bearing RTS Revision No.12 of 1999. Both these RTS Appeals were heard by the Additional Collector, Pune and by order dated 28.5.2001 the Addl. Collector, Pune dismissed the said appeals and companyfirmed the order of the Sub Divisional Officer, Maval. The directions were issued by the Collector to the Tahsildar to place the appellant in possession of the property as per the orders of the Deputy Collector and the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Properties. However, this transaction was cancelled by the Collector and Custodian of Evacuee Property on 17.4.1949 as per Section 8 i of the Evacuee Properties Act and these lands were accordingly entered as Evacuee Property by the Tahsildar, Maval on 26.10.1949. Therefore, the RTS Appeal No.128 of 1987 was preferred before the Collector, which was disposed off by the Additional Collector on 13.7.1993. 130B 2934.02 sq.mts 133 3237.00 sq.mts Total 7897.21 sq.mts. However, in the facts of the companyflicting claims, the Appellant made grievance to the Deputy Collector and the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Properties in respect of the Mutation made in favour of the Respondent Gulabai and other Respondents and, therefore, by order dated 18.9.1984 the Deputy Collector and Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Properties, Pune, directed the Sub Divisional Officer, Haveli Sub Division to take up the case in revision under Section 257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and pass necessary orders. Aggrieved by the said order of the Additional Collector, Respondent No.2 preferred RTS Revision No.330 of 2001 under Section 257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 before the Additional Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune. were as under 129 55.16 sq.mts. In view of these directions, the Sub Divisional Officer, Haveli, Sub Division, Pune, initiated proceeding RTS Revision 14 of 1984 and by order dated 30.7.1985 cancelled the mutation Entry No.1836 which companyprises land admeasuring 7897 sq. The Revenue Minister allowed the said proceeding and set aside the orders passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Maval dated 28.1.2000, order dated 28.5.2001 of Additional Collector, Pune and of Additional Commissioner dated 22.11.2001, and thus, restored the position as reflected by the Mutation Entries Nos.1836 and 2377 and 2394. However, instead of giving effect to those orders, it appears that the Revenue Officers at Tahsil level effected two mutations, viz, Mutation No.2377 and 2394. Being aggrieved by the order passed in the said revision, Respondent No.2 Lalwani preferred RTS Appeal No.81 of 2000 and the Respondent No.3 Genu Kadu preferred RTS Appeal No.114 of 2000. 129, 130 A, 130 B and 133. 130A 1651.1 sq.mts. No 129, 130 A, 130 B and 133 of Village Lonavala were mentioned. The said revision was decided by the Additional Commissioner, Pune by order dated 22.11.2001 and the said revision was dismissed. On the basis of the said sale certificate the mutation Entry No.1836 was effected in the village record in favour of Gulabai Desai, and thereby her name was entered in Survey Nos.118/1B and 328 of village Lonavala to the extent of 29.30 Ares and 70 Ares respectively. The Survey Nos.118/2 and 351, being Evacuee Properties, were allotted to the Appellant in the year 1956. Thereafter, Gulabai sold CTS No.133 admeasuring 33 Gunthas on 24.4.1977 to Respondent No.3 Genu Kadu. Respondent No.2 challenged this order of the Additional Commissioner by filing the proceeding RTS 3402/Pra.kra.309/L 6 by way of second revision before the Revenue Minister for State and the said proceeding was decided by the Minister for State on 18.10.2002. By the said order, the Order of the third Sub Divisional Officer was maintained. It appears that in CTS No.129, 130 A, 130 B and 133, apart from vacant land there is a bungalow No.52 Habib Villa. Thus, all the entries in favour of the Respondents were protected and maintained by the order of the State Minister for Revenue. The said Haji Habib Tar Mohammed Janu migrated to Pakistan and while going to Pakistan, he sold his property to one Smt. After remand, the Sub Divisional Officer, companyducted inquiry and again passed an order on 29.10.1987 and companyfirmed the earlier order. The facts in brief, as narrated in the impugned order, are that Survey Nos.118, 328 and 351 of Lonavala were originally owned by one Haji Habib Tar Mohammed Janu. In the impugned order, Division Bench made it clear that since the dispute between the parties was in respect of the area, as to what has been purchased in auction sale by Gulabai Desai and what is the area allotted to the Appellant by the orders of the Deputy Collector and Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Properties, the Appellant requested the Bench number to enter into the merits on this question in this LPA since the parties may prosecute their remedies in the Civil Court for such adjudication, and therefore, that aspect was number companysidered by the High Court. It appears that the said order was taken in appeal by the respondent and the matter was remanded to the Sub Divisional Officer. The said Gulabai also gifted her remaining area from this Survey numbers to her grandson Anil Gajanan Desai on 15.1.1979, who in turn has sold his properties to Respondent number2 Prem Hasmatraj Lalwani in the year 1980. It appears that the Regional Settlement Commissioner placed this property for auction through Government Auctioner and one Gulabbai Desaipurchased the said property in auction for a companysideration of Rs.16,750/ on 17.5.1956 and, accordingly, sale certificate was issued by the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Bombay on behalf of the Government. Later on, it was found that the Appellant is in possession of more area and, therefore, the said order was modified on 6.5.1982 and excess area was granted to the Appellant on payment of Rs.31,360/ , which Appellant had paid on 17.5.1982 in Government Treasury and thereby the Deputy Collector and Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Pune granted the excess land to the Appellant, and thereafter the dispute started between the parties. Hajrabi Haji Yusuf on 4.6.1949. The area of this CTS Nos. Thereafter, the appellant filed Letters Patent Appeal, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench holding that when the State Minister for Revenue entertained the matter, he was possessed of jurisdiction under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and, therefore, the order passed by him under the said authority is within his jurisdiction, power and companypetence. However, further inquiry as directed by the SDO was to be companyducted. In the said sale certificate the C.T.S. Dismissing Letter Patents Appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of the learned Single Judge who dismissed his writ petition and companyfirmed the orders passed by the State Minister for Revenue in the proceeding T.S.3402/ Pra.kra.309/L 6 dated 18th October, 2002. It appears that these survey numbers were also given C.T.S.No. Appellant challenged the order dated 19.10.2002 passed by the Minister by filing a writ petition, which was dismissed by learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. yards and directed necessary companyrections in the record as per the observations made in the order. Y. Eqbal, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against order dated 13.7.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Hence, the present appeal by special leave.
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2015_482.txt
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The orders of termination are dated 10.12.1989 and 11.12.1989. In the year 1985, the Government of Gujarat thought it expedient to permit the Chief Minister and other Ministers to appoint persons of their choice in their respective establishments. 8627 to 8633 of 1989, 8635 to 8638 of 1989 and 2937 of 1991. With the exit of the Ministers in whose establishments the respondents were appointed, the respondents were also issued orders of termination with effect from 18.12.1989. This appointment is for a limited period up to the tenure of Ministers establishment. The Gujarat High Court directed the status quo to be maintained which implied their companytinuance in Service. Aggrieved by the said orders of termination the respondents filed a batch of writ petitions in the Gujarat High Court claiming that they are entitle to be absorbed as permanent employees in the Service of the State of Gujarat Alternatively they companytended that the impugned orders of termination are bad being companytrary to Rule 33 of Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959, as also Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Kampavat Clerk Typist 20.5.55 Relaxation is given on upper age limit. The State has placed before us a companyy of the Office Order dated 12.7.1985 issued from the General Administration Department, Government of Gujarat relating to the appointment of some of the respondents. The order reads as follows The following persons are appointed as direct recruits on purely temporary basis in the office of the Chief Minister with effect from 6.7.1985 after office hours on the posts shown against their names. Anil Nauriya and Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents. 2 Whether the impugned termination orders were companytrary to BCS Rule 33 and hence, they were null and void and the inoperative of law. These appeals filed by the State of Gujarat are directed against the Judgment of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court allowing partly a batch of writ petitions filed by respondents 1 to 12. From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1991 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application Nos. Respondents 1 to 12 were accordingly appointed in the category of Clerk Typists Director Peon. Out of the above, those appointed on class III posts, are number eligible for special pay whereas those appointed on class IV posts are eligible to get special pay as per rules. A. Dave, Bimal Roy Jad and Anip Sachthey for the Appellants. In the light of the rival companytentions, the Gujarat High Court framed three questions for their companysideration, viz.,
1 whether the respondents State had discriminated against the petitioners by numberabsorbing them in the State service and instead terminating their services by impugned orders and whether the said action was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Having filed the writ petitions, they moved application for staying the operation of the termination orders. They will number get any right for absorption in regular cadres of Sachivalaya and they will have to furnish an undertaking to this effect. The orders of appointment issued to the respondents are identical. They will have to furnish physical fitness certificate from the Civil Surgeon immediately. In December 1989, a new Government came into office following the General Elections to the Legislative Assembly. P.J. Name of Post Date Remarks No. 1826 37 of 1992. Employee of Birth 1. The State, however, carried the matter to this Court which vacated the said orders, with result that the respondents went out of the office. Their services shall be liable to be terminated at any time without giving any numberice or assigning any reasons. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 2 to 10 omitted. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. 3 What reliefs were the petitioners entitled. Heard companynsel for both parties. Leave granted.
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1992_214.txt
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On the application of Bhagwant Rai, Shri Joginder Singh Karam garhia, Magistrate 1st Class, Patiala, who succeeded Shri Harish Chander Gaur, filed a companyplaint under ss. Capoor, J., accepted the recommendation made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, and quashed the criminal proceedings against Kirpal Singh. The High Court Capoor, J. , on revision, found it unnecessary to companysider the, scope of s. 479A, Cr. Bhagwant Rai and Chhota Ram were tried, under s. 325, I.P.C., read with s. 34, I.P.C., in the Court of Shri Harish Chander Gaur, Magistrate 1st Class, Patiala. Capoor, J., further held that s. 42 of the Police Act.1861, had numberapplication to a case in which a companyplaint was made by the Court under s. 476, Cr. P.C., because the, companyplaint had number been filed by or directed to be filed by Shri Harish Chander Gaur, who had disposed of the case ending in the acquittal of Bhagwant Rai. P.C., vis a vis s. 476, Cr. Shri O. P. Gaur. Capoor, J., also held that as the order of Shri Joginder Singh, Magistrate, directing the making of the companyplaint against the respondents was number appealed from and had become final, the companypetency of the Court to make the companyplaint under s. 211, I.P.C., against Jaswant Singh, one of the accused, companyld number be companysidered at that stage. Revision was filed before the Additional Sessions Judge who accepted the prayer of Kirpal Singh and recommended to the High Court that the criminal proceedings pending against him in the Court of Magistrate First Class, Patiala. The matter was then placed before Sharma, J., who held that all the points urged in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition had been taken into companysideration and repelled by Capoor, J., in his order dated April 4, 1961. 8 of 1964, in criminal revision, in the High Court, praying that along with the recommendation made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, for quashing the criminal proceedings against Kirpal Singh, the grounds urged by them might also be taken into companysideration. He, however, directed that Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 8 of 1964 in Cr. 193, 195, 211 and 120B, I.P.C., on October 31, 1958, against six persons including the appellants, Ajaib Singh and Malkiat Singh. Magistrate First Class, by his order dated June 1, 1959, discharged the accused, holding that the companyplaint was number companypetent as it was barred by sub s. 6 of S. 479A, Cr. P.C. 1957, acquitted both the accused and, inter alia, observed that Bhagwant Rai had been falsely implicated in the case as he was number even present on the, day of the occurrence at Patiala. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. s.211 and s. 120B, P.C., did number fall within the purview of s.479A. He, however, declined to interfere with the proceedings pending against the appellants mainly on the ground that the objections number taken by them before the Trial Magistrate had been heard and finally disposed of by Capoor, J., in his order dated April 4, 1961. Nishat Singh Grewal, Ravindra Bana and O. P. Rana, for the appellants. In the meantime, the appellants put in Criminal Miscellane ous Petition No. P.C., because two of the offences mentioned in the companyplaint, namely. The Magistrate, by his order dated April 5. 8 of 1964. Revision No. In the revision filed against this order the Additional Sessions Judge upheld this view. On the case going back fresh objections were filed before the Magistrate trying the case but these were overruled. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab dismissing Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. might be quashed. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 1, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Misc. N. Sachthey, for the respondent No. Therefore, what the order said was that the criminal case as a whole was to proceed against all the respondents and so the petitioners companyld number be heard number to say that the case was remanded to the trial companyrt for trial of the respondents for offences punishable under sections 211 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code. 8 of 1964 should be placed before another Bench for disposal. 157 of 1965. 1375 of 1963. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. The High Court accordingly set aside the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and directed that the respondents be proceeded against according to law. The appellants having obtained special leave, the appeal is number before us. This petition arose out of the following facts.
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1968_131.txt
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In pursuance of this letter, the appellant submitted its reply and on 26 11 1982, the Deputy Commissioner rejected the claim of the appellant and observed as under In my opinion the term industrial raw materials input means those inputs to the extent they are raw materials. To be very clear items of inputs which are in a finished state and are just to be fitted in the chassis without any further modifications etc.,
which are number undergoing any further process of manufacture are number industrial raw materials and are merely fittings. To this the reply given by the Deputy Commissioner was that companyplaints were received that the appellant was paying tax of 1 only, on all kinds of purchases irrespective of whether materials were raw material or number. The appellant claimed that such goods being raw material having been required directly for use in the manufacturing of goods for sale in the State or in companyrse of inter State trade, the appellant was entitled to companycessional rate of tax at 1 on such goods. Since there was numberunconditional right to pay companycessional rate of tax and it depended on satisfying the companyditions mentioned in the numberification, the appellant companyld number claim that the numberification suffered from any infirmity or that the appellant was number liable to be subjected to tax on what was raw material even though used as finished products for the manufacture of the vehicles. The short question of law that arises for companysideration in this appeal is whether any raw material, including those which were otherwise finished products, used by the appellant in manufacture or processing of companymercial vehicles, spare parts and other engineering products were Industrial raw material inputs within the meaning of the expression used in the numberification issued by the State Government on 12 4 1982 in exercise of its power under Section 13 1 b of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981. It made an application on 27 4 1982 before the Deputy Commissioner for issuing certificate to enable the appellant to purchase the goods at companycessional rate on which the order was passed to the following effect Only industrial raw material purchases will be subject to tax at I. Consumables, machinery, equipments etc.,
will still be subject to 3. Since, according to appellant, the order was vague, it filed another application on 16 8 1982 in which the details of the industrial raw material that the appellant intended to purchase were mentioned. The purchases of such fittings to bring a chassis in saleable companydition are number companyered by the aforesaid Notification No. Special rate of tax on certain sales or purchases. The appellant, a registered dealer, under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 for purpose of manufacturing and processing its products, namely, motor vehicles, trucks and bus chassis, excavators and other engineering products, purchased companymodities including such companymodities as tyres, tubes, batteries and various other items which are used for producing the goods and making them saleable companymodities. The appellant challenged this order by way of a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed by the Division Bench and it was held that the claim of the appellant that the numberification should be so read as to extend to all the goods required for use in manufacture or processing as companytemplated by Section 13 1 b and number only to raw material as mentioned in the numberification, was number companyrect as the section itself permitted the appellant, a manufacturer, to avail of the benefit subject to the companyditions and restrictions to be prescribed. SO604 dated 12 4 82. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by M. SAHAI, J.
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1994_743.txt
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The tanker was accordingly brought to its destination by some other route by Nana Saheb. The accused also abused PW.12 Dada Saheb and the deceased Nana Saheb. Ashok PW.1, arranged a water tanker on the 6th May, 2004. Nana Saheb and Ashok, thereafter, went to police station Shioor for lodging a companyplaint with respect to the behaviour of the appellants and while they were returning from the police station they were waylaid by the appellants, Nivrutti armed 2 with an iron rod and all the others with sticks. As the tanker was being taken towards Ashoks house the accused appellants, obstructed the way by putting stones and thorny bushes. Ashok reached the village at about 9.30 a.m. and was told by the deceased number to take the tanker to his well, as planned as, the appellants had obstructed the passage in that direction. He was, thereafter, removed to the hospital by some of the witnesses and an FIR was lodged at Police Station Shioor. This appeal arises out of the following facts On 9th May, 2004, the marriage of the daughter of one Bhausaheb, the brother of Ashok PW.1, was to be solemnized in village Janephal, District Aurangabad. They also attacked Nanasaheb with their weapons on which he became unconscious and fell to the ground. This judgment has been companyfirmed by the High companyrt in appeal.
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2009_1033.txt
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As the companyplainant in this case was Shri Sham Sundar Mathur the appeal companyld number be filed by the Delhi Municipal Corporation. In the present case Shri Sham Sundar Mathur, Municipal Prosecutor filed the companyplaint under s. 20 of Act 37 of 1954 under L14Sup. Shri Sham Sundar Mathur, M.A., LL.B., Municipal Prosecutor and Shri Bankey Behari Tawkley, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor were authorised by the erstwhile Delhi Municipal Committee tinder the above section. Since the Municipal Corporation, Delhi, is a local authority within the meaning of S. 20 of Act 37 of 1954 and since it companyferred authority on the Municipal Prosecutor the companyplaint was properly filed by Sham Sundar Mathur. C.I/69 8 the authority given to him by the resolution of the Municipal Corporation. But in filing the companyplaint Shri Mathur was number acting on his own personal behalf but was acting as an agent authorised by the Delhi Municipal Corporation to file the companyplaint. On August 29, 1960 Shri Sham Sundar Mathur, Municipal Prosecutor of the Delhi Municipal Corporation filed a companyplaint in the companyrt of Magistrate First Class against the respondent, Jagdishlal under S. 7 read with S. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 37 of 1954 . When the appeal came up for hearing a preliminary objection was raised on of the respondent that the only person companypetent to file the appeal was the companyplainant, Shri Sham Sundar Mathur. In the said companyplain Shri Sham Sundar Mathur said that lie was companypetent to file the companyplaint under S. 20 of the aforesaid Act in accordance with a resolution passed by the Corporation in its meeting held on December 23, 1968. But the leave application was number filed by him and, therefore, the Municipal Corporation was number companypetent to prosecute the appeal. The Delhi Municipal Corporation made an application to the High Court asking for special leave under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal against the order of acquittal. This appeal is brought by special leave on behalf of the Delhi Municipal Corporation against the judgment of the High Court dated April 29, 1965 in Cr. 163 D of 1962. It was companytended that only the companyplainant was companypetent to present an application for special leave under S. 417 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 164 D of 1962. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 states No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written companysent of, the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12, if he produces in companyrt a companyy of the report of the public analyst along with the companyplaint. Sardar Bahadur and Yougindra Khushalani, for respondent No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 29, 1965 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. The application was ranted on September 3, 1962. The resolution was carried. The High Court upheld the preliminary objec tion of the respondent and dismissed the appeal by its order dated April 29, 1965. Bishan Narain, K. K. Raizada and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. By his order dated April 30, 1962 the learned Magistrate acquitted the respondent. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. 8 of 1966.
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1969_302.txt
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26 and 27 of 1954 24 and 437 of 1955 256 of 1956 and 16 17 and 73 of 1957.
these petitions under art. 26 and 27 of 1954 24 and 437 of 1955 256 of 1956 12 16 17 and 73 of 1957.
petition under article 32 of the companystitution of india for the enforcement of fundamental rights. 16 and 17 of 1957.
s. bindra and govind saran singh for the petitioner in petition number 73 of 1957.
n. sanyal additional solicitor general of india h.j. 26 and 27 of 1954 24 and 437 of 1955 256 of 1956 and 12 of 1957.
adhikary advocate general for the state of madhya pradesh and i. n. shroff for the respondent in petitions number. 437 of 55 and 256 of 56.
k. jha j. m. thakur s. n. andley and j. b. dadachanji for the petitioner in petition number 12 of 1957.
s. bindra and harbans singh for the petitioners in petitions number. 26 and 27 of 54 and 24 of 1955.
n. swami and m. s. k. sastri for the petitioners in petitions number. s. k. sastri for the petitioners in petitions number. 26 and 27 of 1954 24 of 1955 and the present petition number 12 of 1957 .
in these petitions the agreements with the petitioners are made by registered documents and the terms during which they are to operate have yet to expire. 16 17 and 73 of 1957.
march 9.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hidayatullah j. the judgment in petition number 12 of 1957 shall also dispose of petitions number. petitions number. these sections it is companytended do number apply to profit a prendre which the petitioners enjoy under these agreements. the main objection against these petitions is that the agreements having expired there is numberhing left to enforce either in favour of the petitioners or against the state government and the remedy if any of the petitioners is to sue the state and or the proprietors for the breach. the recognition was number in favour of the petitioner but in favour of one thakur kamta singh who claimed under an agreement entered into by one vishwanath singh on a date when he had already transferred his interest in the zamindari to his son onkar prasad singh. the last group companysists of petitions number. umrigar and r. h. dhebar for the respondent in petitions number. original jurisdiction petitions number. this point was therefore number taken before us at the hearing and numberhing more deed be said about it.
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1959_122.txt
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Nos.51 52 of 2011 in Civil Appeal No.4060 of 2009. It is prayed that the appellants be permitted to fill the Non Resident Indian for short NRI seats at their discretion and in case sufficient students are number available, the appellants should be at liberty to admit other students within the NRI quota as per the discretion of the management, subject to maintaining inter se merit, amongst the students admitted against the said quota as has been permitted in the past. Nos.51 52 of 2011 have filed these applications for modification of the scheme companytained in the order dated 27.5.2009. As regards the NRI seats, they will be filled as provided under the Act and the Rules in the manner they were done earlier. The appellants, Modern Dental College and Research Centre and others in I.A. This order would dispose of I.A. Dalveer Bhandari, J. The Writ Petitions challenging this Act are pending adjudication before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.
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2011_726.txt
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In any event the lawyer who was earlier appearing had withdrawn form the case without any intimation to the appellant. In support of the appeal, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that numbernotice was received by the appellant regarding number appearance of his lawyer. It is numbered in the order that there was numberevidence to show that the numberice was served on the appellant or number, yet the High Court disposed of the matter ex parte. From the order of the High Court it appears that numberice was issued to the appellant for engaging another companynsel as the High Court numbericed that he was number represented.
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2007_546.txt
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The Income tax Department took some time to revise the seniority list of Income tax Officers Class I in accordance with 1952 Seniority Rules and finally on November 26, 1956 the revised seniority list of Income tax Officers Class I Grade I as on October 1, 1956 was issued. The same position was reflected in a seniority list issued in 1953. The petitioner was shown in that list senior to respondents 4 to 26. This list was in accordance with the earlier list of Income tax Officers as on October 1, 1956 showing the petitioner to be junior to respondents 4 to 26. On January 24, 1950 a seniority list of Income tax Officers Class I Grade 11 as on January 1, 1950 was issued on the basis of 1947 Seniority Rules. In pursuance of the above judgment of this Court, seniority of Income tax Assistant Commissioners promoted before April 1, 1964 was recast and the impugned seniority list was accordingly issued. Another seniority list of Assistant Commissioners was issued as on January 1, 1958. In this list respondents 4 to 26 were shown senior to the petitioner and were entitled to be promoted to higher posts earlier than the petitioner. This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India by Malcom Lawrence Cecil DSouza, Additional Commissioner of Income tax for an appropriate writ to quash the seniority list of the Additional Commissioners of Income tax as On February 1, 1971 circulated by the Government of India,, Ministry of Finance. The petitioner claims that he is senior to respondents 4 to 26, but in the impuged list he is shown junior to those respondents. On July 1, 1947 the petitioner was appointed Income tax Office Class On August 12, 1949 the petitioner was appointed Income tax Officer Class I Grade It ,in post 1945 vacancy reserved for candidates with war service. The petitioner was promoted as Income tax Officer Class I Grade I with effect from January 1, 1951 and companyfirmed in that post from the said date. 4 to 26. Apart from respondents 4 to 26, the petitioner has impleaded the Union of India, the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes as respondents I to 3. Ram Panjawani and B. R. Agarwala, for the petitioner. The petitioner served in the Royal Navy as a Sub lieutenant from March 1945 till November 1946 when he was released from the naval service because of the end of war. Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and Insurance has been filed in opposition to the petition. Prayer has also been made by the petitioner for other companysequential reliefs. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 296 of 1971. The petition has been resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of P. S. Mehra, Under Secretary to the Government of India,. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos. Memo for the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. This Court as per judgment dated September 7, 1970, reported in 78 ITR 243 dismissed that appeal. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
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1975_155.txt
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It appears that subsequently on 14.8.2002 the Contractor Registration Board debarred the respondent No. It appears that subsequently action was taken by the Contractor Registration Board in terms of the Rule 22.3 k of the Enlistment Rules of DDA. 1 companypany. On 25.10.2001 the Works Advisory Board decided that the tender of respondent No. 1 companypany and its Director for a period of five years. 1 Company being an incorporate body who acts through its Directors, when the act of a Director of the Company itself was found to be objectionable, attracting criminal action, there was numberhing wrong in the Appellant Authority deciding number to accept the tender offered by the respondent No.l Company. 1 Company. 1 companypany was rejected. The High Court proceeded on the erroneous premises by observing that numberaction for blacklisting the respondent No.l companypany was taken. The matter was also referred for enquiry to the Executive Engineer Headquarter of DDA. Mr. Ashok Sehgal submitted a letter to the Commissioner of Police at about 8 P.M. on the same date making allegations against officials of DDA. 1 companypany in the light of the Enquiry Report referred to above. 1 on 5.12.2001 requiring it to show cause why it should number be blacklisted by the appellant Authority. On 8.11.2001, after companysideration of the lowered rates offered the work was awarded to respondent number 2 respondent No. It appears that subsequently on 3.1.2003 a fresh order, debarring the respondent number 1 companypany and its Director for a period of five years, has been passed. On 19.6.2001 Enquiry Officer submitted a report inter alia observing that Mr. V.K. It was also decided that in case the rates were number lowered, fresh tender was to be issued. The High Court proceeded is if there were mala fides involved and that the action of the Director of respondent No. Show cause numberice was issued to respondent No. Reply to the show cause numberice was submitted on 13.12.2001. Background facts as projected by the appellant DDA which need to be numbericed are as follows In March 2001, tenders were invited by the appellant for the supply and installation of Clear Water Boosting Pumping Station at Command Tank No. Kapoors version was companyrect and that the allegations made by Mr. Ashok Sehgal appear to be in retaliation. A Writ Petition was filed before the Delhi High Court challenging the order passed by the Contractor Registration Board. 1 companypany in assaulting an employee of the Appellant Authority and causing serious injuries was number sufficient to take action against the respondent No. 23987/2002. In the instant case all the relevant aspects were taken by the Authority into account and thereafter the tender submitted by the respondent No. By the impugned judgment, the High Court, inter alia, held that the Director of the Company and the Company itself are two separate legal entities and even if any unbecoming act was done by the Director, that should number stand in the way of the companytract being awarded to the respondent No. At about 3.45 P.M., an FIR was lodged by Mr. V.K. The Delhi Development Authority herein after referred to as the DDA calls in question the legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby it has held that the act of the appellant in number awarding companytract to the respondent No. 1 questioning award of the companytract to respondent number 2. Liberty was also granted to the respondent No.l to file a suit for damages if it so thought appropriate. Learned Single Judge quashed the order of the Contractor Registration Board keeping in view of the impugned judgment dated 12.7.2002. 1 should number be companysidered since show cause numberice was being issued to it. Therefore, other tenderers were called for negotiations to lower the rates offered. Respondent No. Though the companytract awarded to the second respondent was number nullified, it was held by the High Court that the first respondent who was deprived of its right was entitled to companyts to be paid by the appellant. Kapoor for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Sections 186, 353, and 332 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC before the Dabri Police Station, Delhi. 1 at Sector 7. However, liberty was given to the Appellant Authority to issue a detailed and reasoned order. A Writ Petition was filed by the respondent No. 2004 3 SCR 286 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Therefore the Writ Application was disposed of with the directions as numbered above. 3 in the writ petition before the High Court . Ltd. was number in accordance with law. Leave granted in SLP C No.
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2004_851.txt
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Besides the quantity of teak logs originally companytracted to be supplied, the respondent firm subsequently supplied a quantity of 1676.95 c.ft. The respondent firm claimed return of this quantity of timber and companypensation for its deterioration. The case of the respondent firm was that in order to companyer up possible rejection, a quantity of timber much in excess of the companytracted quantity was despatched to the companysignees and the excess quantity measuring 3,400 tons i.e. It was provided in clause 17 c of the acceptance of tender that the respondent firm was to offer the timber for inspection at its own premises at Halisahaar and Lillooah. 1,70,000 cubic feet was still lying with the Lillooah companysignnee and 1,500 tons i.e. 3,50.085.99 against the respondent firm out of which it recouped Rs. Halisahaar and Lillooah, both in West Bengal near Calcutta. 73,50,000 while the appellant companytended that the respondent companymitted breach of the companytract by number supplying the stipulated quantity of timber under the companytract and as such claimed damages to the extent of Rs. 9/12/ Vet c.ft. Although the delivery time was extended from time to time, upto 26th January, 1958.
the respondent firm supplied only 77,21/.89 cubic feet of timber and the companytract in respect of the unsupplied quantity was cancelled on 20th june, 1958 and that the supplied quantity was repurchased by Government from third party at a loss of Rs. 75,000 cubic feet with the Halisahaar companysignee and had number been returned despite repeated requests. In pursuance of the arbitration .clause the respondent firm appointed one Mr. T.R. Sharma as its arbitrator and the appellant appointed Mr. R.R. 133 which states as follows Arbitration In the event of any question or dispute arising under these companyditions or any special companyditions of companytract or in companynection with this companytract except as to any matters the decision of which is specially provided for by these companyditions the same shall be referred to the award of an arbitrator to be numberinated by the Purchaser and an arbitrator to be numberinated by the Contractor, or in case of the said arbitrators number agreeing then to the award of an Umpire to be ,appointed by the arbitrators in writing before proceeding on the reference and the decision of the arbitrators, or in the event of their number agreeing, of the Umpire appointed by them, shall be final and companyclusive and the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, and of the Rules thereunder and any Statutory modification thereof shall be deemed to apply to and be incorporated in this companytract. The respondent firm claimed a sum of Rs. By a savingram dated 21st December, 1953 the Union of India hereinafter called the appellant entered into a companytract of purchase of 1,01,750 cubic feet of teak logs at Rs. 438 D of 1964. Upon every and any such reference, the assessment of the companyts incidental to the reference and award respectively shah be in the discretion of the arbitrators or in the event of their number agreeing of the Umpire appointed by them. 128 of 1963 was an application by the Union of India under sections 5, 12 2 ,31 3 , 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for obtaining a declaration that the reference of the claim of the respondent firm in respect of excess quantity of timber alleged to have been delivered and certain other matters was number companyered by the arbitration agreement and for leave to revoke the authority of the Arbitrators and Umpire. 1,79.366 from the sums due to the respondent firm leaving a balance of Rs.1.70,719.99. Burma teak squares at the same rate and the companytract was accordingly amended on 13th December, 1957. The companytract in question is governed by the arbitration agreement companytained in clause 21 of the form W.S.B. Both the parties filed their respective claims before the arbitrators. The formal acceptance of tender companyfirming the savingram and companytaining the other terms of the companytract was issued on 13th January, 1954. Mr. S. Bindra, a retired District Judge was appointed as the Umpire by order of the Sub Judge dated 2 8 1961. 438 D of 1964 by which the revision petition of the appellant against the order of Shri D.R. Khanna, Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Delhi dated 20th April, 1964 in Suit No. The companysignee was the District Controller of Stores, Eastern Railway. The petition was rejected by the Subordinate Judge by his order dated 20th April, 1964. 1,54,541.36 on 23rd July, 1958. 128 of 1963 was dismissed in limine. A. Seyid Muhammad and S.P. Desai, Deputy Legal Adviser, Ministry of Law, Government of India as its numberinee. Nag, for respondents Nos. G. Ratnaparkhi, for respondent No. 3,00,000. to be delivered F.O.R. Appeal by special leave from the order dated October 23, 1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 549 of 1966. Nayar, for the appellant. Including this item the appellant made a claim of Rs. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J.This appeal is brought by Special leave against the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Civil Revision No. V. Gupte and A.K. Suit No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 and 2.
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1968_68.txt
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He was also numberified for war disability pension for which he was paid arrears with effect from 30.11.89. As stated above, appellant retired on 30.11.89. During the period 30.11.89 to 25.10.99 the appellant was given 8 years weightage in years to be added to his qualifying service in order to companypute his service pension. He was entitled to weightage of 5 but since his pension fell below that payable to a Major he was given an additional weightage of 3. When he retired, in 1989, he was allowed weightage of 53 in years in order to protect his pension. Appellant companytended that he was also entitled to such enhancement and that Government of India was number entitled to discriminate in this regard junior officers who retired before 1.1.96 and those who are in service on or after 1.1.96. As stated above in the writ petition, the appellant also claimed enhancement of percentage of disability. After war, he was retained in service, granted permanent companymission and allowed to work till 30.11.89 when he was released on superannuation on companypletion of 51 years of age after putting in qualifying service of 26 years. By filing writ petition in the Delhi High Court, petitioner appellant herein , a retired Lieutenant Colonel Time Scale , sought weightage of 8 years to be added to the actual qualifying service as also enhancement of percentage of disability, in short, he asked for refixation of the pension. According to the appellant, under Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, vide Circular No.45/22/97 PPW C dated 3.2.2000, the percentage of disability stood enhanced from 30 to 50 in case of junior officers in the armed forces who were in service on 1.1.96. Before his retirement appellant was subjected to examination by the Medical Board which assessed the appellants war injury disability at 30, permanent for life. C No.268/2001 dated 8.11.2004 and Review Petition No.438/2004 dated 15.12.2004. This was during National Emergency created by Chinese invasion. He was an officer in the Sikh Light Infantry. In 1965 while fighting in Jammu and Kashmir sector against Pakistani troops appellant got a shell injury in his left shoulder. In 1962 appellant was companymissioned as an officer in Indian Army. KAPADIA, J. Appellant appeared in person. The facts giving rise to the writ petition are as follows. Both these challenges failed as can be seen from the impugned judgments of the High Court in W.P. Hence, this civil appeal.
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2007_109.txt
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15, 139, 331, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 347, 352, 159, 389 and 746 748 /63 . 591, 582, 597, and 689/62 and 140, 267 and 268/63 . 139, 159, 330, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 347 and 352/63 . 429 439, 591, 592, 597, 689, 694, 724, 725 and 727 of 1962 and 15, 139, 140, 159, 267 to 269, 331, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 347, 352, 389, 746 and 748 of 1963. 591, 597 and 689/62 and 140, 267 and 268/63 and respondent No. 746, and 748 of 63 . Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, Yogeshwar Prasad and B. R. K. Achar, for the respondents in C. As. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, M. S. K. Sastri and B. R. K. Achar, for the respondents in C.A. Narsaraju, T. Anantha Babu, M. V. Goswami and B. R. G. Achar, for the respondents in C. As. 436, 437, 724, 725 and 727/62 . K. Achar, for the respondents in C. As. 429434, 438, 439 and 694/62 and 269 of 63 . V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants in C.A. The Government of Madras entered into agreements with several companysumers in the State, including the appellants, for the supply of energy in bulk at the specified rates which were called tariffs, for the years 1951 and 1952. Nos. One of these terms stipulated the rate at which the supply of electricity had to be charged against the companysumers. It appears that the Government of Madras, and subsequently, its successor, the respondent, had a single power grid system for the whole State companyprising Tungabhadra and Machkund Hydro Electric System and the Thermal System of Nellore. On the same lines, the Madras Legislature passed an Act in 1946 No. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants in C.A. C. Setalvad, P. Kodandaramayya, E. V. Bhagarathi Rao and T. V. R. Tatachari, for the appellants in C.A. C. Setalvad, and R. Ganapathi Iyer, for the appellants in C. A. Nos. 592/62 . Jayaram and R. Thiagarajan, for the appellants in C.A. By this Act, the Legislature of the respondent State virtually adopted the Madras Act. In due companyrse, the Defence of India Act came to an end in 1946, but the Central Legislature thought it necessary to pass another Act to take its place and that was the Essential Supplies Temporary Powers Act, 1946 No. The Government of Andhra then issued the two impugned orders relating to Machkund and Nellore, and Tungabhadra and Chittoore District areas respectively, enhancing the agreed rates. 429 to 434 and 694 of 1962 and C.A. When the Andhra Legislature passed Act No. The appellants were naturally aggrieved by these orders, because they added to their liability to pay the rates for the supply of electricity by the respondent to them. Accordingly, the question of revision of tariffs was companysidered in the State of Madras, but was number decided because reorganisation of the States was then in companytemplation. Appeals from the judg ments and order dated December 19, 1958, March 7, 1959, March 11, 1959, April 22, 1959, April 24, 1959 in Writ Appeals Nos. 15 and 389 of 63 . 24 of 1946 . The dispute which has given rise to these appeals centres round the validity of two numberified orders issued by the respondent, State of Andhra Pradesh on the 28th January, 1955, and 30th January, 1955 respectively, and it is the companytention of the appellants that the said numberified orders are outside the purview of s. 3. Sharma and T.Satyanarayana, for respondent No. By virtue of the powers companyferred on the Central Government by s. 2 of the said Act, several Rules came to be framed by Central Government known as the Defence of India Rules. The increase in the rates effected by these orders was thus to operate number retrospectively, but prospectively. Amongst these Rules was Rule 81 2 which clothed the Central Government with power to issue orders which may appear to the Central Government to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the companymunity. After the respondent State was created under the Scheme of Reorganisation of States, it passed Act No. After the war came to an end, it was realised that the eco numberic situation in the companyntry companytinued to be serious, and for the proper regulation of economic affairs, it was thought necessary to companytinue the orders issued under the Defence of India Rule 81 2 , because shortage of supply of essential articles was very much in evidence then. These Rules were in operation during the companytinuance of the war. The entire energy was integrated into one power system. Srinivasamurthy and Naunit Lal, for the appellants in C. As. Later, it was replaced by Act No. That is how the impugned numberified orders came to be issued by the respondent. 1 of 1955 and this Act received the assent of the President on the 21st of January, 1955. Accordingly, a large number of companysumers moved the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Art. 14 of 1946 . The Andhra Act was originally intended to be in operation until the 25th January, 1956, but it was later companytinued from time to time. Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the appellant in As. After the Division Bench had pronounced its decision on this point, several other writ petitions were filed by other companysumers, and naturally the single Judge who heard them followed the decision of the Division Bench and dismissed the said writ petitions. 1 of 1955 and adopted the Schedule of essen tial articles for its purpose, the number of these articles was reduced to two they are charcoal and electrical energy. According to these orders, these increased tariffs were to take effect from the date on which meter readings were to be taken in the month of February, 1955 and were to operate for the future. It is companymon ground that these agreements did number companytain any provision authorising the Government to increase the rates during their operation. 438 and 439/62 . In the result, the writ petition filed by some of the appellants before us were allowed and an appropriate order was issued against the respondent restraining it from enforcing the revised tariff rates. The purpose of companytinuing the orders was to ensure the supply of essential articles to the companymunity at large at reasonable prices and to secure their equitable distribution. The present group of appeals thus companysists of matters which have been decided by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as well as those which have been decided by a learned single Judge, and they all raise the same companymon question about the companystruction of s. 3 of the Act, and the validity of the impugned numberified orders. The impugned orders have purported to increase this rate, and the appellants companytend that the respondent had numberauthority to change this important term of the companytract to their prejudice by taking recourse to s. 3 1 and issuing numberified orders in that behalf. After the respondent State wits born, its Chief Engineer sumbitted proposals for revisions of tariffs in all the areas companyered by the relevant schemes. The appellants in all these appeals are supplied electricity by the respondent for many years past, and several individual agreements have been passed between them and the respondent during the period 1946 to 1952 prescribing the terms and companyditions on which the said supply would be made to them. That, in substance, is the nature of the companytroversy between the parties before us. The principal question of law which arises in this group of 37 civil appeals relates to the companystruction of section 3 of the Madras Essential Articles Control and Requisitioning Temporary Powers Act, 1949 No. The companysumers who were aggrieved by the decision of the learned single Judge were then allow ed to companye to this Court directly by special leave, because the points which they wanted to raise were exactly the same as were raised by the other companysumers who had companye to this Court against the principal decision of the Division Bench. The impugned orders indicate that the main reason which inspired the said orders was the knowledge that the existing electricity tariffs which were formulated nearly 15 years before, had become companypletely uneconomic the charges of labour and the price level of all material had enormously increased and that in evitably meant companytinuously growing loss to the Government. The charges fixed were calculated at graded regressive rates according to increasing slabs of companysumption units, and the overall unit rates including the demand charge were number to exceed 66 annas without prejudice to the monthly minimum payment and the guaranteed companysumption. 35 of 1939 on the 29th of September, 1939. 226 of the Constitution, and challenged the validity of the two impugned orders. These enhanced rates were specified in Schedules A and B attached to the said orders. The Accountant General made queries in respect of this recurring loss and drew pointed attention of the State Government to the deficits in the working of the Power System. March 25, 1964. The learned single Judge who heard these writ petitions upheld the appellants plea and came to the companyclusion that the impugned orders were number justified by the authority companyferred on the respondent by s. 3 of the Act, and were unauthorised, illegal and inoperative. 135, 122 of 1957 etc. The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, C. J. These agreements were to be in operation for ten years. These decisions were challenged by the respondent by preferring several Letters Patent Appeals. 269/63 . That is why the Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the respondent were allowed and the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed. It is against these orders that the appel lants have companye to this Court with a certificate issued by the said High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. V.K. 29 of 1949 with which we are companycerned in the present appeals. 1 in A. No.
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1964_279.txt
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As regards the aforesaid two companycerns, their functional integrity was found by the Commissioner in his report as under The fact of companymon Head Office at New Delhi, a companymon branch at Bombay, companymon telephone at Kota for residence and factories has also been number denied by Shri Krishan Kumar in his evidence. Leave granted.
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1996_835.txt
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