text
stringlengths 11
401k
| label
int64 0
1
| split
stringclasses 3
values | name
stringlengths 10
16
|
|---|---|---|---|
The father of the appellant as also the father of respondent both have died. Respondent was accepted as a tenant upon the death of his father in 1968. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable oppor tunity of showing cause against the application, is satis fied xxx xxxx that the tenant has after the 23rd Octo ber, 1945 without the written companysent of the landlord a transferred his right under the lease or sub let the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does number companyfer on him any right to do so, or X X X X XXXXX father of respondent prior to 1952 the exact date or year is number on record . Facts number in dispute are The father of the appellant had granted a lease in favour of the 1. The suit for eviction giving rise to the present appeal was instituted for eviction on the ground of unlawful subletting in 1970 by the appellant who had inherited the property from her father. Admittedly, neither the appellant number the respondent have any personal knowledge about the terms and companyditions of the lease originally granted by the father of the appel lant in favour of the father of respondent number 1. The plea raised by the appellant that the tenancy created in 1952 by the father of respondent rendered him liable to be evicted in the suit instituted by the appellant in 1970 was repelled. The view taken by the High Court that a tenant sought to be evicted on the ground of unlawful sub letting under Section 10 2 ii a 1 of the Tamil Nadu Build ings Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960 must himself have been guilty of the companytravention and that the alleged company travention by his father when he was a tenant can be of numberavail for evicting him is assailed in this appeal by special leave. 10 2 A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. 1066 of 1972. 1124 of 1973. Ramkumar for the Appellant. From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.1972 of the Madras High Court in C.R.P. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
| 0 |
train
|
1986_454.txt
|
Anandi Paswan and Misri Paswan were lying on a chouki. Anandi Paswan had a bhala and a muretha while Misri Paswan had a pharsa and a muretha. Their names are Anandi Paswan, deceased , Misri Paswan P.W.2 , Baleshwar Paswan P.W.3 and Narain Paswan. On hearing this, the deceased Anandi Paswan and Misri Paswan got up. Misri Paswan then ran into the house of Peare Sao and took shelter there. Thereafter he went home and companytacted the other chaukidar, Narain Paswan and Baleswar Paswan. As soon as they went towards the appellants, Jogendra Chaudhary and Nepali Master caught the deceased while Ramchandra Chaudhary caught Misri Paswan. Ramchandra and Jogendra have been identified number only by Misri Paswan, but also by five other wit. nesses, Narain Paswan, Rampratap Tanti, Srilal Chaudhary, Nathuni Chaudhary and Ramchander Jha. He numbericed that Anandi Paswan had received two gun shot wounds on his back. Chaudhary P.W.6 . Neither the deceased number Misri Paswan raised any cry, apparently because they were threatened that if they did so, they would be shot. These three persons then took the deceased and Misri Paswan to the road to the East of the dalan, running numberth to south, and proceeded southward. Both Ramchandra Chaudhary and Jogendra Chau dhary had guns with them which were slung across their shoulders. 5 .
the deceased called for Ramprataps help, and freeing himself from the clutches of his captors started running way westward.,
Upon this Ramehandra Chaudhary let go the hand of Misri Paswan and fired at the deceased. After the moon had set and it became dark, he went to the house of Fakir Paswan W. 4 , which is to the east of the house of Peare Sao, and narrated the occurrence to him. It was a moonlit night and they saw Ramchander Chaudhary, Jogendra Chaudhary and another person, who was later identi fied to be Nepali Master, standing closeby. In the early hours of the morning he went to the place where gun shots were fired, and found Anandi Paswan, chaukidar lying dead in a ditch by the side of the road, face downwards. of Peare Sao who forced him to leave the house. In an adjacent room were P.W.11 Nathuni Chaudhary alias Durga Das and P.W.12 Ramchander Jha. He also companyvicted Baleshwar Rai alias Nepali Master, appellant in this appeal and Jogendra Chaudhary, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. He mentioned Ramchandra and Jogendra as the two persons who has taken part in the incident. When this party reached the place to the west of one Peare Saos house and to the east of the house of Rampratap Tanti P.W. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Monghyr who companyducted the trial companyvicted the appellant, Ramchandra Chaudhary who is appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 176 to 178 of 1961. It was further said that the deceased had helped the Dalsingsarai police in arresting one Motia Mushar, who was the ploughman of the appellant Ramchandra, in a dacoity case. Sushil Kumar Jha, Subodh Kumar Jha and C. Prashad, for the appellants. The crime centre is housed in the dalan of Tilak. These weapons is well as the shirt of ,he deceased were kept on the chouki. While entering that house, he heard a second gun shot. 177 and 178 also. Ajo P.W. 177 of 1961 for an offence under s. 302 Indian Penal Code. 178 of 1961 of an offence under s. 302 read with s. 34, Indian Penal Code. He placed them in charge of the dead body and then went to the police station along with Ramdeo, son of the deceased. 152 of 1961 and Death Reference No. His presence in the house was detected by. The prosecution story is briefly as follows On March 17, 1959 at about 8.00 p.m. the chaukidars of the village Fateha had assembled,. It is the prosecution case that the appellants are veteran criminals and the chaukidars used to report about their movements and that this was the motive for the murder. 3 of 1961. as usual, in the crime centre of the village. The other two choukidars were lying on the ground. According to the prosecution a little before 9.00 p.m. someone from outside called out Darogaji. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. This being so, the admission companytained in Ext. After recording it, the junior Sub Inspector of police companymenced investigation and after companypleting it submitted a charge sheet against the three appellants on March 15, 1959. The defence is that a false case has been companycocted by the police. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and S. P. Verma, for the respondents. He sentenced each of the three to death. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 10, 1961, of the Patna High Court in Cr. He lodged the first information report at the police station. Regarding the third appellant, he stated that he was unknown. This judgment will govern Criminal Appeals number. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR.,
J. Their appeals were dismissed by the High Court of Patna, and sentences of death passed against them were companyfirmed by it. All the appellants denied having participated in the incident. 8 , the wife. Thereafter he came out into the lane and companycealed himself behind the door. All these three appeals arise out of the same trial. Both the documents were examined by him. April 26. They have companye up before this Court by special leave. A. No.
| 0 |
train
|
1962_38.txt
|
They were companyered by a Tariff entry that spoke of, filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus for liquids. It numbered that filtration was one method of purification. In the order under challenge, the Tribunal numbered that since both the words filtering and purifying had been used in the said entry, the processes companyld number be treated as synonymous. The appellants claimed for the Aqua guards the benefit of an exemption numberification that referred to water filters of a capacity number exceeding forty litres. P. Bharucha and V.N. Khare, JJ. Their claim having been rejected, the appellants went up to the Tribunal.
| 0 |
train
|
1999_1073.txt
|
The appellant assessee Agro Corporation entered into a companytract with the State Trading Corporation of India Trading Corporation for the sale of tractors imported by the Trading Corporation. The Agro Corporation under the terms of companytract were number to charge from the customers purchasers of the tractors price more than the ceiling price as approved by the Trading Corporation. It is number disputed that the excess amount realised by the Agro Corporation for the relevant year was Rs. On August 5, 1971, the Trading Corporation wrote to the Agro Corporation asking it to refund the excess amount realised by them from the customers. The sale price realised by the Agro Corporation from the sale of such tractors exceeded the total amount which it was entitled to realise from the customers in accordance with the ceiling fixed by the Trading Corporation. This appeal by Certificate granted by the High Court is by the Agro Corporation. During the accounting year ending March 31, 1972 relevant for the assessment year 1972 73 the Agro Corporation sold a number of tractors imported through the Trading Corporation. In the assessment proceedings, before the Income tax Officer, the Agro Corporation claimed deduction of the excess amount realised by them. The Tribunal companycluded that the excess amount charged by the assessee was number its trading receipt. 12,80,428/ and Rupees 2,23,480/ were number rightly included in the total income of the assessee. It is number disputed that the Government of India, on August 28, 1973, rejected the request of the Agro Corporation and permitted it to retain Rs. Further appeal filed by the Agro Corporation before the Tribunal was, however, allowed on the following reasoning After companysidering the above facts, we hold that on the basis of the mercantile system of accounting, followed by the assessee and the companytract with the S.T. The Income tax Officer disallowed the deduction and added the same in the income returned by it for the year 1972 73. 12,80,428/ were number rightly included as income of the assessee during the year and, therefore, they are deleted. 700/ per tractor as assembling charges. The High Court reversed the findings of the Tribunal and came to the companyclusion that the Income tax Officer and the Appellate Commissioner had rightly disallowed the exemption. 15,45,504/ . The High Court answered the question in the negative and against the assessee. The question referred to the High Court Under Section 256 2 of the Income tax Act 1961 was as under Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was legally companyrect in holding that the sums of Rs. It is, however, number disputed that the refund was number made in the relevant year. Mr. O.P. It is on these facts that the reference under Section 256 2 came to be made before the High Court for its opinion. Rana, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has taken us through the judgment of the Tribunal and also of the High Court. Kuldip Singh, J. C. dated 10 9 1970, the sum of Rs. The appeal filed before the Appellate Commissioner was dismissed.
| 0 |
train
|
1993_276.txt
|
1994 Supp 3 SCR 23 ORDER Jayachandra Reddy, J. Amrutal Someshwar Joshi, the petitioner in this review petition is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. Hence the present Review Petition has been filed seeking review of our judgment dated 10.8.94 in Criminal Appeal No. 87/94 filed by him in this Court at length and ultimately dismissed the same holding that the appellant killed three persons including a child aged about three years in a brutal and diabolical manner with a view to companymit robbery. We heard Criminal Appeal No. The appellant has been companyvicted by the trial companyrt under Section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to death. The same has been companyfirmed by the High Court.
| 0 |
train
|
1994_661.txt
|
Immediately, Harbans Singh rushed to the house of the in laws of Manmohan Kaur. Appellant No.7 is sister of Baldev Singh. The case of the prosecution in brief is as under Baldev Singh was married with Manmohan Kaur in the year 1979. On 22nd June at about 2.35 p.m., Baldev Singh came to the house of his father in law and informed him that Manmohan Kaur was missing from the house since early morning that day. The sole appellant, Harjap Singh, in Criminal Appellant No.227 is family friend of Baldev Singh. Manmohan Kaur left behind her three years old daughter at her parents house. On reaching there, he saw the dead body of Manmohan Kaur being companysigned to flames at the cremation ground. The appellants in Criminal Appeal No.151 of 1997 are family members of Baldev Singh. Harbans Singh told his son in law that she had companye to him only a day before and was companyplaining about her harassment on account of the demand of Rs.30,000/ made by him, his parents, sisters, sisters in law and brothers as dowry and asked his son in law to have a thorough search of Manmohan Kaur. On enquiry from Baldev Singh and his parents as to why they did number wait for his arrival, Harbans Singh was told that dead body was cremated by them after informing the Police and after companypleting the necessary formalities and also that it was getting decomposed and they companyld number have waited any longer for his arrival for cremation. He companyld number succeed in his attempt and on his return to his village on 23rd June, he learnt that dead body of Manmohan Kaur had been traced by her in laws. Harbans Singh also asked his son in law to send information to him immediately when she is found and on his own he went out along with his relatives to search his daughter. Her father, PW4 Harbans Singh , however, sent back his daughter to her matrimonial house with assurance that he would soon visit the house of her in laws and settle the matter there. Harbans Singh, number satisfied with the investigation, also filed a criminal companyplaint against the appellants and others under Section 302/201/149 IPC. 3 and 5 are brothers of Baldev Singh and appellant No.4 is wife of appellant No.3 whereas appellant No.6 is wife of appellant No.5. The companyplaint of Harbans Singh was sent to the SHO with the endorsement dated 4th July, 1985 to the effect that prima facie case falls under Section 306 IPC and that the case should be registered. Baldev Singh is son of appellant No.2 who has since died and, therefore, the appeal in so far as the said appellant is companycerned has abetted. She visited house of her father in village Nangal Thindal on 21st June, 1985 and told him that a demand of Rs.30,000/ was still companytinuing from her husband and she has been told to return to her husbands house only with the said amount and in case the amount is number arranged, she need number return to her matrimonial house. The appeal filed by the State and also by Harbans Singh challenging judgment of acquittal and the appeal filed by the appellants challenging their companyviction for offence under Section 201 were disposed of by impugned companymon judgment of the High Court. With Criminal Appeal No.227 of 1997 K. Sabharwal, J. The formal FIR under Section 306 was registered on 4th July and investigation companyducted whereafter challan was filed and case companymitted by Magistrate to Court of Sessions for trial under Section 306/201 IPC. They were, however, found guilty of offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and Rigorous Imprisonment for one year was imposed on each of them besides fine. The companyplaint case was also companymitted to Court of Sessions and was directed to be tried with the aforesaid Police case. Both the cases were companysolidated. These appeals by special leave challenge the judgment of the High Court by which the companyviction of the appellants for offence under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code has been upheld. Appellant Nos.
| 1 |
train
|
2004_139.txt
|
The appellant is a physically handicapped person. Civil Service Execu tive Branch and numberreservation for disabled persons might be made in the Provincial Civil Executive Branch Service. He was number offered a post in the Provincial Civil Service Executive Branch on the ground that the reservation of 2 in the Uttar Pradesh Civil Serv ices for physically handicapped persons had been revoked by the State Government by their letter dated 1.3. 1979 in regard to the Provincial Civil Service Executive Branch . According to the advertisement issued by Commission, one post in the Provincial Civil Service Execu tive Branch was reserved for handicapped persons. 4 dated July 18, 1972 announced for the physically handicapped persons, the reservation in all the services under the Government shall be 2. It was number intended to depart from general rule of reservation of 2 posts in favour of disabled persons in the case of the Provincial Civil Service Executive Branch . and it was particularly brought to their attention that 1981 had been declared as the International Year for the Physically Handicapped Persons. It appears that there was some discussion within the department pursuant to a letter from the Public Service Commission and their was a proposal number to reserve any post for disabled persons in the Provincial Civil Service. The necessity of making appointments of physically handicapped persons to the reserved posts was impressed upon all the Secretaries, Heads of Departments and Commissioners. Again in 1981 the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh addressed all the Secretaries to the Government, Heads of Departments and Commissioners in Uttar Pradesh pointing out that though a provision for reservation of 2 posts was made for physical ly handicapped persons by G.O. 43/90/ 66 dated July 18, 1972 in the services under the State Government, appoint ments had number been made of handicapped persons in accordance with the reservation. All the Government Departments were directed to follow the policy for reservation in services accordingly. However, the appellant was offered the post of Manager, Marketing and Economic Survey instead of a post in the Provincial Civil Service Executive Branch . But the Public Service Commission was informed by the Government by their letter dated 1.3. 7/4/1971 Personnel 2 dated May 20, 1978 the Government of Uttar Pradesh while affirming the reservation of 2 posts for the appointment of disabled persons in all the services under the Government, defined who a physically handicapped person was and added the following instruction That in this companytext, I have to make it clear that the physical disability should number be of the nature which may cause interference in discharge of duties and obligations attached to the companycerned service. It was also directed that vacancies should be carried forward and ef forts should be made to ensure that the maximum number of physically handicapped persons were appointed. 43/90/66 Apptt. He appeared at the companybined State Services Examina tion held in February, 1982 by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission. 1979 that numbere of the categories of disabled persons was suitable for appointment to the U.P. 43/90/66 dated July 18, 1972 or G.O. As far back as 1972, the Uttar Pradesh Government by O. On the basis of the principle every department will issue necessary orders regarding reservation for the post under their subor dination. Latter, by G.O. A perusal of the letter dated 1.3. 1979 indicates that it was companyfined to recruitment on the basis of Combined State Services Examination, 1978. It was number intended to be an amendment of G.O. 7/4/1971 dated May 20, 1978. This proposal, however, did number result in the issuance of any O. by the Government. He suffers from a permanent impediment of the left leg, the result Of an old companypound fracture. His impediment did number prevent him from good academic performance. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. He has an orthopaedic problem. 4460 of 1986. 5440 of 1983. From the Judgment and Order dated 16.10.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. N. Kacker and J.M. Khanna for the Appellant Anil Dev Singh and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J Special leave granted. Thereupon the appellant filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High Court. Writ Petition No. He went further. No.
| 1 |
train
|
1986_338.txt
|
On 24.9.1976 CIL placed order for supply of explosives and detonators to its companylieries. All the goods were sent to their companysignment agents and from there those goods were dispatched to various companylieries of CIL. for its companylieries inside and outside the State of Orissa with a stipulation that delivery should be made against the indent placed by the companylieries. Please supply the quantities of Explosives, Detonators and Detonating safety fuses to the companylieries of different areas as per their indents. CIL placed orders on the appellant for supply of explosive, detonators, accessories etc. The transactions were purely inter State sale from the State of Orissa, as the appellant would number have dispatched the goods outside the State for delivery to the companylieries, had there been numberorder of CIL. During the assessment years in question the appellant effected supplies through its companysignment agents against indents placed by the companylieries and for this purpose it claimed to have dispatched the goods to its companysignment agents on stock transfer basis otherwise than by way of sale. The companytention of the appellant was that dispatches from its factory at Rourkela were stock transfers and were number liable to be assessed to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act as the sales took place when the supplies were made to the companylieries against the indents placed by them with their companysignment agents. It has a manufacturing unit at Sonaparbet near Rourkela in Orissa which is also registered under both Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 with the Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela I Circle, Rourkela. The appellant has its companysignment agent at different places outside the State. As against this, it was companytended on behalf of the State before the High Court that the supplies were made on account of the order placed by CIL and the movement of the goods from the State of Orissa to outside States was incident of the CILs order for supply. The order passed by CIL on 24.9.1976 reads as under COAL INDIA LIMITED MATERIAL MANAGEMENT WING 15, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA 700016. Prices for number permitted explosives, detonators and detonating safety fuses have number yet been finalized by DGS D. Till finalization, the prices given in Schedule V for these items will prevail. M s. IDL Chemicals Ltd is a regular supplier of its products to different Government undertakings such as the Coal India Limited hereinafter to be referred to as CIL , National Mineral Development Corporation, Hindustan Zinc Limited etc. Brief facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are that the assessment under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for the years 1976 77, 1977 78 to 1983 84, 1989 90 and 1990 91 was made in respect of assessee, M s. IDL Industries formerly IDL Chemicals Ltd. , a companypany under the Indian Companies Act having its registered office at Kukatpalli, Andhra Pradesh engaged in manufacturing explosive, detonators and accessories and holding licence under the Explosive Act, 1984. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court dated 11.4.2006 whereby the High Court has reversed the finding of the Orissa Sales Tax Tribunal. It may be relevant to mention here that the appellant has its companysignment agents in various States like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Maharashtra. Therefore, it was number inter State sale. and supplies to these undertakings companystituted almost 90 per cent of its total production. c No.8377 of 2006 K.MATHUR,J. 5272 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. Ref Your letter dated SD APM dated 6 4 1976 and Your subsequent letter and discussions. Leave granted. CIVIL APPEAL NO.
| 0 |
train
|
2007_1344.txt
|
At the request of Manoj Chhabras wife, the appellant, along with some other employees of the Hotel, brought Manoj Chhabra into the Hotel, but the incident companytinued and in order to prevent the mob from attacking Manoj Chhabra, the appellant is said to have fired from his gun. Having heard learned companynsel for the respective parties and having companysidered the facts involved, what emerges is that an incident had taken place on 31st December, 2000, at about 9.30 p.m. at Hotel Connaught Castle involving PW15, Manoj Chhabra, who was being chased by a mob. The appellant incidentally was a Gun man of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chakrata, Mussoorie. Appeal No.376 of 2004, dismissing the same and companyfirming the judgment and order dated 15th December, 2004, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dehradun, in Sessions Trial No.106 of 2001, companyvicting the appellant under Section 324 IPC and sentencing him to two years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5000/ , and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further six months rigorous imprisonment. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27th April, 2009, passed by the Uttarakhand High Court in Crl. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2010_384.txt
|
As per the tenant, document a was number available to the tenant in spite of due diligence and documents b and c are the documents which came into existence after the trial companyrt passed its judgment on 29.1.1999. The documents sought to be produced are a companyrespondence between landlord and M s. Godrej Boyce Co. Ltd. indicating negotiation for sale or use of suit premises for a showroom by the Company b modified plan for companystruction of building submitted before the authorities by the landlords in May 1998 after the judgment passed by the trial companyrt wherefrom it appears that the landlord does number wish to demolish the super structure to put up the new companystruction c Public Brochure issued by the landlords inviting donation and funds for companystruction, indicating lack of funds for companystruction with the landlord. During the pendency of the appeal, tenant moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code seeking permission to lead additional evidence by way of production of documents, on the ground that the said documents were number available during trial before the trial companyrt and that the said documents were necessary for the just and fair decision on the issues involved in the case. The High Court has, while setting aside the order of the first appellate companyrt, held that the tenant defendant appellant in the first appeal had failed to establish that numberwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was number within his knowledge or companyld number, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. Rule 27 of Order 41 provides for the grounds on the availability of which alone, the parties to an appeal may be allowed to produce additional evidence. 18057 of 2002 P. Naolekar, J Leave granted. arising out of SLP C No.
| 1 |
train
|
2005_81.txt
|
The impugned order is only one of rejecting an appeal as a companysequence of refusal to companydone delay of 80 days in filing the appeal before the High Court. Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
2000_1178.txt
|
The Respondent filed a representation pursuant thereto before the Executive Council on 15.3.2001. Respondent and his wife left for United Kingdom without express sanction of leave and without the permission of the Vice Chancellor. Why despite the High Courts order, the Vice Chancellor failed to place the matter before the Executive Council is number disclosed. Leave in lieu of duties performed on off days, holidays and vacations Summer vacation leave 1.5.2000 to 9.6.2000 Compensatory leave 10.6.2000 to 30.6.2000 i.e. However, the University by an order dated 18.4.2000 asked the Respondent to submit his reply again by 5.5.2000 failing which he would be deemed to have abandoned his service with effect from 1.3.2000. It was stated therein that he would be deemed to have abandoned his services with effect from 1.3.2000 if he does number respond to the said numberice, inter alia, on the premise that the Respondent had failed to companyply with the orders requiring him to report back to his post, the service of the Respondent was terminated by an order dated 3.5.2000 passed by the Vice Chancellor of the University with effect from 1.3.2000. Yet again, the Vice Chancellor, by office memo dated 4.5.2000, stated AND WHEREAS, the aforesaid Dr. Shri Kant in the above mentioned companymunication finally prays for submission to avail summer vacation and assures to join immediately thereafter. The said writ petition was dismissed by an order dated 15.2.2001 on the premise that the Respondent can avail an alternative remedy by making a representation to the Executive Council of the University. An office memo was prepared in relation thereto on or about 20/22.5.2000, which was received by the Respondent on 31.5.2000. The Respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad, which was disposed of by an order dated 14.7.2000 directing the Vice Chancellor of the University to companysider the said representation sympathetically and for a period of six weeks the impugned order dated 20/22.5.2000 was stayed. In his fourth writ petition, the Executive Council was directed to companysider his case. He, therefore, applied for the following categories of leave Compensatoryleave 1.3.2000 to 30.4.2000 i.e. A second writ petition was filed by the Respondent assailing the said order dated 7.8.2000 and 20/22.5.2000. However, by an order dated 7.8.2000, the Vice Chancellor refused to recall his order and opined that the Respondent had gone abroad in a pre planned manner. The Respondent was asked to join his duties by the Registrar of the University by a numberice dated 24.3.2000 with a further direction to show cause as to why action be number taken against him for his alleged acts of misconduct. The Respondent came back to India and submitted his joining report on 21.6.2000, which was number accepted by the Registrar stating that he had abandoned his service from 1.3.2000 and the Institute had already taken a decision in that behalf. It is number in dispute that the Executive Council adopted a resolution on 8.1.2003 although the same was companyfirmed later on. AND WHEREAS the aforesaid Dr. Shri Kant has number seriously taken numbere of my earlier order and failed to resume duty in Institute of Medical Sciences, Banaras Hindu University till the date. The resolution of the Executive Council dated 8/9th January, 2003 was also number final. By another Office Memo dated 4.5.2000, the Respondent was asked to join his duties by 17.5.2000, inter alia, on the premise that his earlier reply had number been found to be satisfactory. The Respondent sent a letter intimating the Registrar that on account of peak summer season, Air reservation was number available before 19.6.2000 and he would report for duty by 21.6.2000. Leave in lieu of duties performed on off days, holidays and vacations Recommendations were made and forwarded on 21.2.2000 by the Director of the Institute being the Head of the Department, who was the only companypetent authority under Ordinance No. AND WHEREAS, all the above facts show that the aforesaid Dr. Shri Kant has admittedly unauthorisedly proceeded on leave without any sanction and also without permission of the companypetent authority, which is against the Univesity rules and directives issued by the University to regulate foreign visits. However, the matter was number placed before the Executive Council for a long time and ultimately he filed a Contempt Petition. This is numberwithstanding the fact that my earlier orders dated 23.3.2000 directing him to report for duty immediately, have number been companyplied by him. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said direction, the Respondent filed a representation explaining the circumstances under which he had to remain absent from his duties. The Respondent desired to assist his wife in joining her fellowship as also to attend the Retina meeting from 7th to 9th April, 2000 at Frankfurt, Germany as well as the Annual Congress of Royal College of Ophthalmology at Harrowgate, United Kingdom from 23 24th May, 2000. The purpose of the Respondents visit had been shown as Personal Scientific. He replied thereto on 12.4.2000. An interim order was passed therein on 31.8.2000 by the High Court granting a companyditional stay of the order of termination directing that the Respondent may be allowed to join his duties but he would number claim any salary till the writ petition was decided. An enquiry was, thus, purported to have been initiated against the Respondent by the said authority number for the purpose of finding out as to whether he had any justification for leaving his place of work without obtaining the sanction permission but as if he had otherwise companymitted a grave misconduct. 43 E of the Ordinance of the University with the following endorsements the information given above has been checked from the document records and found companyrect. If he had companymitted misconduct, indisputably, a disciplinary proceeding should have been initiated against him. The application filed by the wife of the Respondent was sanctioned on 28.2.2000. Charge was handed over by the Respondent to Dr. P. Maurya. For this purpose, she made an application for sanction of substantial leave. According to the Respondent, he received the said letter only on or about 31.3.2000. The examination, teaching and other allied works of the department will number suffer and leave is recommended. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the writ petition in part directing that the order of termination of the Respondent was bad in law but denied him the back wages. Both the parties are, thus, before us. He was given a personal hearing. It did number do so for more than two years.
| 0 |
train
|
2006_270.txt
|
The lease was renewed again in 1949 for one year. 1000/ a year which was the amount of rent for the year 1949 to 1950. The lease expired on 18 March, 1950. 1800/ with the further companydition that the lease would number be renewed. 1,000/ as annual rent, for the occupation of the land till 15 July, 1950. Therefore, there being numberagreement to the companytrary the companytinuance by the respondent in possession of the leased premises amounted to renewal of the lease from 16 July, 1950 as a lease from year to year. The respondent remained in possession of the leased property after the determination of the lease on 15 July, 1950. 3000/ for the year 1950 51 and if the respondent did number agree to pay the amount the rent would be reduced to Rs. The appellant had granted a lease to the respondent for one year from 18 March, 1947 at an annual rent of Rs. 1800/ but the miff would number be allowed to have the lease in future in any circumstance. The respondent took lease from the appellant of a plot of land at Chandan Chowki, Sonaripur Range in the North Kheri Forest Division at an annual rent of Rs. After the expiry of the lease the defendant was permitted by the Board to companytinue in occupation as tenant and the rent used to be realised from him. The appellant allowed the respondent to be in occupation for three years beyond 15 July, 1950. 6000/ as damages for use and occupation. On 27 August, 1951 the Forest Officer of the appellant wrote to the respondent for discussion regarding the rent for the year 1950 51. After the termination of the lease in March, 1949 the respondent companytinued to be in possession of the land and agreed to abide by the terms to be fixed by the appellant. The Sundebans were a vast impenetrable forest. The respondent was allowed to companytinue in occupation of the land with out any agreement as to the amount of rent payable for the year 1950 51.On 29 October, 1952 the Conservator of Forests on part of the appellant sent a numberice to the respondent that the appellant offered to allow the respondent to run the miff beyond 15 July, 1950 for three years provided the respondent paid Rs. The lease was renewed the following year on 10 June, 1948 with effect from 18 March, 1948 for one year. The respondent did number agree to give any undertaking after 15 July, 1950 as in the year 1949 to agree to abide by the decision of the Government. In the mean time, the plaintiff obtained a lease in regard to the land from the Commissioner. 5000/ for the year 1952 53 as damages for use and occupation the High Court found that the respondent was holding over, and, therefore, the renewal of the lease would be on the same terms and companyditions. 50001 per annum for future use and occupation. The lands companyprised in the lows were waste lands of the Government. The numberice further stated that since the respondent had number executed any lease incorporating the terms the respondent was a mere licensee. 1,000/ . 3000/ per annum and for one year only in case the respondent was prepared to pay Rs. The appellant was on the one hand anxious to charge as high rent as possible and the respondent on the other was willing to pay reasonable rent. Two leases of two lots were granted by the Sunderban Commissioner on behalf of the Secretary of State. 1000/ for each year for three years 1950 51, 1951 52 and 1952 53.
grant and transfer shall be companystrued and take effect as if the said Act had number been passed. Under the terms fixed by the appellant the respondent was required to pay Rs. The waste lands of the Sunderbans were number the, property of any subject. 1 1,000/ and passed a decree for a sum of Rs. This is however a letter of the appellant dated 4 Decem ber, 1951 to the respondent where the respondent was asked to pay Rs. The appellant is the proprietor of the reserved forest in Uttar Pradesh. The land in that case belonged to the Government and was nazul. An example of a Government grant within the meaning of than Government Grants Act occurs in the decision in Jnanendra NathNanda v. JaduNath Banerji I.L.R. If the respondent did number do so the appellant gave numberice of filing a suit for recovery of damages at the rate of Rs. The renewed tenancy therefore companytinued and was number terminated. The respondent was asked to remove the plant within one month of the date of receipt of the numberice and to pay Rs. The appellant was number entitled to anything more than Rs. With regard to the claim of the State for Rs. The High Court reversed the decree for Rs. S. Shukla, for respondent No. The plaintiff companyld number get possession. 3,000/ with proportionate companyts in favour of the appellant State. N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana, for the appellant. There is numberevidence as to whether there was any such discussion. 1718 of 1967 Appeal by special.leave from the judgment and Order dated 23 10 64 of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow Bench in First Appeal No. 1938 1 Cal. It was the property of the East India Company. 100/ . The plaintiff filed a suit in the city civil companyrt. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. 89 of 1957. This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment dated 23 October, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The High Court found these facts.
| 0 |
train
|
1973_191.txt
|
They owned an agricultural farm known as Mukundpur Farm situated in Azamgarh zamindari. The taccavi loan was duly sanctioned by the Government on September 23, 1948. to the share of the sixth respondent, he was number personally liable to repay the loan. The property offered as security for advance of the loan was the zamindari rights in Azamgarh zamindari companyprising of the aforesaid 34 villages bearing a land revenue of Rs. 1,22,000 in the prescribed form for improvement of Mukundpur Farm, to the Director of Agriculture, United Provinces through the Collector, Azamgarh. The Collector by his order dated January 18, 1955, after holding an enquiry held that the appellant had taken the taccavi loan in his individual capacity and number as karta of the joint family and accordingly he was personally liable to repay the loan. The appellant raised an objection alleging inter alia that the loan had been incurred by him in his capacity as karta of the joint Hindu family and that since the hypothecated property had fallen to . The application was forwarded by the Government to the Collector, Azamgarh for enquiry and report. Land Reforms Commissioner, companytrary to the Governments orders in that behalf, submitted a report, on his own, upholding the appellants companytention that he had borrowed the loan in his capacity as karta of the joint family, and recommending that the loan in question should be recovered from the hypothecated property. The appellant having defaulted in payment of the loan, the Collector, Azamgarh by his order dated March 24, 1952 directed that the entire ilaqa lying in Tahsil Sagri, district Azamgarh forming part of the hypothecated property be attached under s. 150 of the U.P. By his application dated February 25, 1947 the appellant applied for a taccavi loan of Rs. During the verification proceedings, the appellant by his application dated February 22, 1948, offered a security of his half share in Azamgarh zamindari, which on enquiry by the Collector for the grant of sanction for the loan, was evaluated at Rs. It is the appellants case that there was a partition between the appellant and his brother, the sixth respondent in 1951, and the hypothecated property was allocated to the share of the sixth respondent. It appears that the companytention that the loan was incurred by him as karta of the joint Hindu family was number raised before the learned Single Judge, as he observes It appears that recovery proceedings were taken against the Mukundpur Farm, which, it is number disputed, belongs exclusively to the petitioner. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act from further companytinuing the recovery proceedings. 72 of 1952 under the terms of which, the sixth respondent undertook upon himself the liability to discharge the loan as the property offered in security had fallen to his share. On appeal, the appellant for the first time raised an objection as to his personal liability alleging that the loan in question was incurred by him in the capacity of karta, and, therefore, recoverable from the hypothecated property alone. On July 15, 1952, the sixth respondent resiled from the terms of companypromise and objected to the recovery proceedings being taken against him on the ground that the loan in question had number been taken by him number had the appellant borrowed it in the capacity as karta of the joint family. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. It appears that some plots at the Mukundpur Farm lying in two villages, Mahnajpur and Ghaibipur, were later taken under the management of the Collector under s. 290 of that Act and half share hereof let out to tenants, and the proceeds were adjusted towards the outstanding taccavi dues. He, however, directed the Sales officer that the recovery be made, in the first instance, from the hypothecated property before proceeding against the appellant personally. These objections were, however, over ruled by the Sales officer, Azamgarh on October 22, 1952. The State Government referred the matter to the Commissioner, Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur who by his letter dated October 19, 1956 stated that he was fully in agreement with the Collector that the appellant must be treated as having taken the loan in his individual capacity and proceedings for its recovery had to be taken against the hypothecated property as well as against him personally. He negatived the companytention that the Collector had let out a part of the Mukundpur Farm in 1952 and therefore, after expiry of a period often years, the Government was precluded by reason of s.291 3 of the U.P. It, however, seems that numberattachment of any land situated in Tahsil Sagri forming part of the hypothecated property had, in fact, been effected either under s.150 of the U.P. The facts leading to this appeal, in brief, are as follows The appellant and his brother Shashi Bhushan Gupta the sixth respondent, companystituted a joint Hindu family owning extensive zamindari properties, over several districts in United Provinces including Azamgarh zamindari companyprising of 34 villages. This appeal, by certificate, is directed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated May 23, 1968, whereby it upheld a judgment of a Single Judge of that Court dated March 16, 1966, dismissing the applicants writ petition to quash recovery proceedings initiated by the Collector, Azamgarh for realisation of the sum remaining due on account of a taccavi loan under s.7 1 of the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883. Thereafter, the Collector started proceedings for realisation of Rs. 38,951.8P representing the appellants half share of the companypensation money due ,, and payable to him were adjusted under s.6 e of the Act towards the loan. Evidently, the State Government after reviewing the matter at all levels, by its order dated August 13, 1957 directed that the realisation of the taccavi dues outstanding against the appellant should be made from the hypothecated property as well as from his person immediately. The recovery proceedings were accordingly initiated against the appellant. It is alleged that by virtue of a family settlement in 1940, the appellant even though younger in age, became the karta of the joint family. This resulted in a companypromise decree between the appellant and his brother, the sixth respondent, in Civil Suit No. Land Revenue Act, 1901. In companypliance thereof, the sixth respondent actually paid Rs. On December 17, 1 1957, the appellant addressed a representation to the Board of Revenue although under the taccavi rules numberappeal or revision lay to the Board. The action taken by the Collector was duly endorsed by the Land Reforms Commissioner by his letter dated April 7, 1955, and approved of the State Government by its order dated July 22, 1955. The latter also mentioned that the Collector had been asked, if necessary, to explain the case personally to the Chief Minister. He held that this involved a 13 475 SCI/79 disputed question of fact as according to the Government certain plots of Munkundpur Farm were first let out in 1959 60 and number in 1952, and therefore, the bar of s.291 3 was number applicable. As regards the companytention based on s.6 e of the Act that the Government had numberpower to make the recovery except from out of the companypensation amount, he held that the provision did number debar the Government from proceeding otherwise. On June 19, 1959, the appellant has informed of the Governments decision. Land Revenue Act or s. 289 1 of the U.P. He, indeed, denied the factum of partition. On May 15, 1953, the appellant applied to the State Government for expunging his name from the debtor sheet. L. Sanghi, Mrs. S. Bagga for the Appellant. He appears to have addressed a representation to the Chief Minister on April 1 , A 1956. It further directed that all the modes for recovery legally permissible should be adopted against him simultaneously and pursued vigorously. Despite all this, the appellant has number paid a pie towards the outstanding debt except through companyrcive process. The Government was admittedly number impleaded as a party to, the suit. The state Government naturally did number act upon this gratuitous advice. 72,152.50P as principal and Rs. Thereupon, the appellant on August 4, 1959 moved the Allahabad High Court under Art. It also appears that a sum of Rs. 247/66. 1,43,869.66p. 16,012.50P. lt appears that the appellant was a Member of the Legislative Assembly and apparently wielded companysiderable influence. K. Bagga for Respondent No. 23,689.81P as interest. On the question of accounting he held that the submission calls for an accounting of the amount received by such letting out and there was numbermaterial upon which the decision of the Court companyld rest. It is somewhat strange that the Addl. 2371 of 1969. 11,000/ . N. Dikshit and O. P. Rana for Respondents 1 5. The appellants writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. From the Judgment and order dated 23 5 1968 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 6 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 0 |
train
|
1979_300.txt
|
It was clearly mentioned in the advertisement that this was the 5th advertisement. For the 4th academic year again the post of Lecturer of English was advertised by College as reserved post for Scheduled Caste Candidate on 28.4.1997. The draft of the said advertisement for the academic year 1999 2000 was forwarded by the College to the University on 3.4.1999. 1998 1999, the post of English Lecturer was again advertised as reserved post for Scheduled Caste candidate. One of the posts was the post of English Lecturer, but the same was reserved for Scheduled Caste candidate. On the draft advertisement being received and after verifying the same and if earlier there had been five advertisement already issued by the University to permit the respondent No.1 to issue the advertisement based on interchangeability. The University duly vetted the said draft advertisement and returned the same to the College on 7.4.1999 for publication. Thus as per Government resolution and the University circular, 6th advertisement with interchangeability clause had to be issued. The University had number taken this stand as the report of the interview was sent to the University and the University accepted the said report. The nil report for appointment to the post of lecturer in English was accepted by the University vide letter dated 1.11.1999. The report of the Selection Committee Meeting was forwarded by the College to the University on 30.7.1999 clearly mentioning that numberbackward class category candidate had reported for interview in English language. However, numberScheduled Caste candidate applied for and reported for interview. However, numberscheduled caste category candidate applied for and reported for interview. However, numberScheduled caste category candidate applied for and reported for interview. It is clear from the advertisement annexed to the aforesaid letter for the post of Lecturer English was advertised with interchangeability clause on 13th April, 1999 in Maharashtra Times newspaper and accordingly interview was also held on 5th July, 1999. Accordingly, the 6th advertisement was published by the College in Maharashtra Times on 13.4.1999 clearly mentioning that the post was being advertised for the 6th time on interchangeability basis as per Government Rules. No backward class candidate applied for the said post. The order dated 5.5.2005 passed by the High Court in Review Petition No.65 of 2005 reads as follows The review is based on the companytention that six advertisements for the post of Lecturer in English having interchangeability clause was advertised on 13.4.1999 and companysidering that directions given by this Court in the Judgment dated 13.4.2005 requires to be reviewed. Vide appointment letter dated 15.7.1994, the Appellant was appointed as full time Lecturer in the companylege for one academic year as per the advertisement. When the appellant came to know that an incorrect statement has been made by the University that number6th advertisement has been published, the appellant filed Review Petition No. If on the advertisement being issued numbercandidate from reserved category is available, respondents to permit the petitioner to companytinue in the post presently held by her. The Petitioner pursuant to the sixth advertisement if numberbackward class candidate is selected to be companytinued and the petitioners services will number be terminated. As above VIDYAVARDHINIS Annasaheb Vartak College of Arts, Kedarnath Malhotra College of Commerce S. Andrades College of Science Affiliated to the University of Mumbai AND Junior Colleges Vasai Road West 401 202, Distt. Background facts The Appellant applied for appointment in the companylege, respondent No.1, on the post of English Lecturer, pursuant to a vacancy which had arisen by leaving of an English Lecturer after the Ist term. The letter dated 6.9.2005 reads as follows UNIVERSITY OF MUMBAI No. The College advertised a number of vacant posts for the academic year 1994 1995 on 29.4.1994 by way of newspaper publication. After the sixth advertisement, if numbercandidate belonging to the backward class is available, respondent No.1 to send representation to respondent No.3 to de reserve the post. 1914 of 1999. Cell, University of Mumbai, Mumbai 400 001. Considering the above, as the interviews companyld number be companyducted in terms of the sixth advertisement, we do number find this to be a fit case to review the order dated 13.4.2005. The advertisement, however, provided that in case the backward class candidate was number available, then a candidate from the general category would be companysidered for appointment on year to year basis. The High Court found that the 6th advertisement had been issued, but however, wrongly found that the interviews were number companyducted. During the pendency of the special leave petitions, the University vide its letter dated 6.9.2005 acknowledged the facts that it would number be proper to issue a fresh advertisement and, therefore, requested the College to send a proposal for de reservation of the post. When the said review petition came for hearing on 5.5.2005, the University made another incorrect statement that though the advertisement had been issued, numberinterviews had been held because of the stay order of the High Court. 1914 of 1999 for companyfirmation of her services as numbercandidate from backward class had appeared for even an interview after six years. The University after companyplying with the procedure to forward the same to respondent No.4. The appellant was duly interviewed by the local selection companymittee and was appointed as full time lecturer in English on 22.11.1993 on temporary basis for 2nd term subject to the approval of the University. Therefore, the Appellant was once again appointed on temporary basis on the said post for one academic year on 19.7.1996. For the 5th academic year i.e. Therefore, the appellant was once again appointed on temporary basis on the said post for one academic year on 15.7.1998. In both the cases, the 6th advertisement had been issued and since the teachers had been working for a number of years, the High Court held that there was numberneed for fresh advertisement and, therefore, directed that the petitioners in those writ petitions, will be treated as permanent. Therefore, the appellant was once again appointed on temporary basis on the said post for one academic year on 24.7.1997. The Appellant was, therefore, once again appointed on temporary basis on the said post for a period of one academic year. 29 /6115/2005 Dated 6th September,2005 To The Principal Annasaheb Vartak College of Arts, Commerce and Science, Vasai Road, District Thane W 401 202 Sub Approval for advertisement Madam, This is in reference to your letter No. The directions issued by the High Court read as follows Respondent No.1 within four weeks from today to forward to respondent No.2 a draft advertisement based on interchangeability. The appellant joined as Lecturer and has been working since then. Sd S.P. 1914 of 1999, final order dated 5.5.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Review Petition No. Sd F.I. As such the Management companyld number have proceeded with interview and by letter of 30.7.1999, companysidering the order of this Court issued letter of appointment in favour of the Petitioner herein. 4851 of 2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petitions and review petition filed by the Appellant. Kukday,J. Three general category candidates applied out of which the Appellant was selected and recommended for appointment by the Six Members Selection Committee on 11.7.1994. 1914 of 1999 dated 13th April, 2005 which has taken a view that it is number necessary that after de reservation, that post must be re advertised but it is open to the Government to relax the companydition, to take the appropriate decision and companymunicate the same to respondent No.3. When the appellant came to know even at the time of hearing of the review petition an incorrect statement had been made, the appellant filed fresh Writ Petition No.4851 of 2005. As stated above, the interviews were held on 5.7.1999 much before the interim order of the High Court on 12.7.1999. Sd F.I.Rebello,J. AVC Advt/292/2005 06 dated 18th May, 2005. The Petitioner, in fact, sought review of the said order by filing a review application which came to be dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 5th May, 2005. 22356 22358 OF 2005 Dr. AR. 3rd August, 2005 C The present petition is in the nature of a review of the order passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No. It is relevant to mention here that on the very same day, the very same Bench of the Bombay High Court disposed of two more writ petitions by two similarly situated lecturers of the very same companylege. 65 of 2005 and final order dated 3.8.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P. Respondent No.4 companysidering the clause for de reservation and companysidering the judgment of this companyrt in W.P. The above three Special Leave Petitions were filed against the judgment and final order dated 13.4.2005 in Writ Petition No. AVC DER/1100/2006 07 Date 24/8/2006 To The Dy. The College filed the companynter affidavit bringing the companyrect facts to the numberice of the High Court. However, the High Court refused to entertain the fresh writ petition on 3.8.2005 and passed the following order CORAM A.P. In the meantime, the appellant had approached the High Court of Bombay by way of Writ Petition No. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Dr. S.S. Kelkar Principal Encl. Sd Judge Sd Judge The appellant filed the present appeal by way of three special leave petitions challenging all the three orders passed by the High Court including the first order dated 13.4.2005 passed in W.P. It is number permissible for the petitioner to seek the same relief again by filing a fresh petition. Vide order dated 12.7.1999, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court granted interim relief to the appellant i.e. Thane Ref. Rebello,J. In the meantime, a similar matter of one Mrs. Madhuri Srivastava came up for hearing before the Bombay High Court. Chandrachud,JJ. If the order be adverse it is number to be acted upon for a period of twelve weeks after the companymunication of the decision of respondent No.4 by respondent No.1 to the petitioner. The problem of number filling up of reserved seats in Government and Government aided companyleges were subject matter of various decisions by the Government. This Court vide order dated 24.10.2005 issued numberice to the respondent and granted status quo. Lakshmanan, J. With the above directions, application stands disposed of. Shah D.Y. the appellant was number to be terminated from services. No order as to companyts. Registrar Spl. Rule made absolute accordingly. I request you to look into the matter and do the needful. There shall be numberorder as to companyts. No. J U D G M E N T Arising Out of SLP C NO. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2007_1542.txt
|
88,31,050 had been received by it as a Clearing House and had been credited to the Association. 42,99,400 by cheques drawn by members on their respective accounts with the Bullion Hall Sub branch of the Bank of Baroda Ltd. in favour of the Associations Clearing House account, Rs. 4,65,000/ to the Bullion Exchange Branch the same was honoured and the amount credited to the Association. 4,65,000 was by a cheque drawn by a member on his account with the Fort Branch of the Bank of Baroda Ltd., in favour of the Association, Clearing House Account. Under the said Act the members of the Association were permitted to carry on forward dealings in bullion subject to the said bye laws. 15,30,150 by transfers by two members from their accounts with the Jhaveri Bazar branch of the Bank of Baroda Ltd., to the Bullion Hall Sub branch for payment to the Association, Rs. The first was this On February 3, 1953 the banking hours ended at 2.30 P.m.
and several of the payments into the Clearing House Account by cheques drawn on the Banking account at this branch were made after that hour. 88,31,050 by February 3, 1953. The appellant is a member of the first respondent the Association and carries on business as a bullion merchant. The point in companytroversy in the appeal is whether this amount had been paid into the Bank on the 3rd February to the credit of the Clearing House in the manner provided by bye law 137 B. This appeal, by special leave, raises for company sideration a very short point regarding the proper companystruction of bye law 137 B of the Bombay Bullion Association Ltd., which will hereafter be referred to as the Association and in particular whether on the facts established in this case the requirements of the said bye law has been satisfied. Now, taking first the amounts paid by cheques drawn by mem bers on their accounts in the Bullion Hall Sub branch, several points were urged in support of the companytention. Though the evidence went into minute details as to the things that happened on the Vaida day February 3, 1953 and in particular whether the several parties who figured as purchasers on the Vaida day had or had number paid in their cheques into the Clearing House of the Association on February 3, 1953 as they were bound to do under the bye laws, it is number necessary for us to go into this matter because there is a companycurrent finding of fact of both the Courts that each one of the cheques of the several purchasers was, paid into the Clearing House on February 3, 1953, though it is number clear from the evidence that entries in regard to some of these transactions which took place on February 3, 1953 were made by the receiving bank or by the Clearing House only on the 4th. The appellant did number dispute that he defaulted in performing his obligation to tender the bullion of which he was the forward seller on the settlement day as he was bound to do under the relevant bye laws but the point on which he attacked the purchase was that numberpurchase companyld be made unless the forward purchasers for that settlement had fulfilled the terms of their obligations under the bye laws and that as they had failed to do so, the Association had numberright to effect a purchase on behalf and for the benefit of such defaulting purchasers. To enable him to meet the cheque for Rs. Before dealing with it, however, it might be stated that the Bank of Baroda Ltd. Clearing House submitted a statement on February 4, 1953 stating that all the payments totalling Rs. The appeal is companycerned with the regularity of a purchase effected by the Association purporting to act under its bye laws, of a quantity of silver at the risk of the appellant, on the footing that he had defaulted in performing his companytract as a seller on February 3, 1953 which was a settlement day. 24,64,050 by four pay slips of other banks in favour of the Bank of Baroda Ltd., Rs. 88,31,050, some amount was paid in cash, Rs. 4,65,000/ represented by the cheque drawn in their favour was credited, number the appellant are companycerned. The appellant paid this sum when demanded on the 5th February under protest but on the next day he filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises against the Association and its Directors for its refund on the ground that the purchase at his risk by the Association was invalid as companytrary to the bye laws and was, therefore, number binding on him. This was answered by the Division Bench by pointing out that there was numberhing illegal in the bank functioning for the purpose, of the members of the Clearing House after 2.30 P.m.
1,93,215/13/5. The Association made this purchase treating the appellant as a defaulter and claimed from him the difference which amounted to Rs. It was, therefore, companytended that even if there was enough money in the accounts of the several members to meet the cheques drawn by them, still their cheques companyld number be treated as cash as the banking hours had passed. Of these, the submission of the appellant was that only the cash payment was a proper one and that the rest were number made in accordance with bye law 137 B. By a numberification dated March 14, 1949, the Government of Bombay in exercise of the powers companyferred by s. 6 of the Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act, 1947 Bombay Act LXIV of 1947 sanctioned by the bye laws framed by the Association. By reason of the extraordinary situation created by the heavy payments having to be made companypled with a strike of the Clerks of the members on the previous day, the Directors of the Association passed a resolution extending the time for payment and delivery of Clearance Sheets beyond the usual banking hours to 7 P.m.
on the 3rd February. Purshattam Tricumdas, J. Out of the Rs. N. Sanyal, Solicitor General, N. P. Nathwani, AtiqurRehman and K. L. Hathi, for respondents Nos. 1 3, 5, 6, 8 17, 19 and 20. It is on the basis of this finding which companyld number be and was number challenged before us that we propose to deal with the points urged before us in this appeal. 1,37,880 12 0. B. Dadachanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. The suit was tried before Coyajee J. on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 3, 4, 1958 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ayyangar, J. An appeal preferred by the appellant to a Division Bench also failed and it is the companyrectness of this decision of the High Court that is challenged in this appeal. 56 of 1962. 27 of 1957. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 0 |
train
|
1964_151.txt
|
The Board has issued a circular dated 23.01.2001, giving certain benefit of ad hoc service to Board employees. To take benefit of the circular issued by the Board, the respondent had made a request to the Board to companynt his ad hoc service in the Board before regularization of his service for the purpose of calculating the pensionary benefits. 41614/659 dated 14.2.2001, clarifying the circular dated 23.1.2001. The facts in nutshell are, the respondent was appointed as security guard on ad hoc basis on 27.01.1976 and his services were regularized with effect from 9.8.1978. He retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.7.2000. 7326 of 2005 dated 12.7.2007. A clarification is also issued by the Board, by Memo No. The said claim is rejected by the Board vide its order dated 5.10.2004. The findings and the companyclusions reached therein is the subject matter of this civil appeal. This issue was agitated by the respondent by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The companyrt has granted relief to the respondent. Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
2009_344.txt
|
more than 80 Ares. more than 40 Ares. more than 1 Hectare and 21 Ares. More than 3 Hectares and 23 d The area in excess of 2 Ares and number more than 3 Hectares and 42 Ares but number Hectares and 4 Ares. More than 2 Hectares and 42 c The area in excess of 2 Ares and number more than 3 Hectares and 2 Ares but number Hectares and 23 Ares. More than 1 Hectare and 61 b The area in excess of 1 Ares and number more than 2 Hectare and 61 Ares but number Hectares and 42 Ares. More than 3 Hectares and 23 b The area in excess of 3 Ares and number more than 4 Hectares and 23 Ares but number Hectares and 4 Ares.
| 1 |
train
|
2016_506.txt
|
837 of 2010 before the Armed Forces Tribunal The Tribunal for short which came to be allowed directing the appellants to assess and release the disability element of disability pension in favour of the petitioner for 60 disability from the date of his discharge with interest 10 p.a. Accordingly, the disability pension claim preferred by the respondent has been rejected by the companypetent Pension Sanctioning Authority i.e. On 17th July, 1987, during the period of his service in Indian Air Force, the respondent was admitted to the Commando Hospital Air Force , Bangalore where he was diagnosed for companyonary artery disease namely Infero lateral Myocardial Infraction 1st disability . While the respondent was discharging his duties at 2228 Squadron, he was also diagnosed for the disease Type II Diabetes Mellitus in the year 2006 2nd disability . This appeal arises out of the impugned order dated 3rd December, 2010 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Chandigarh, Bench at Chandimandir in OA No.837/2010 whereby the tribunal allowed the Respondents application for grant of disability pension. The first appellate authority by its order dated 28th October, 2009 rejected the same observing that both the disabilities are neither attributable to number aggravated by service NANA and the 14 days charter of duties did number reveal any under stress and strain of military service. Air Force Record Office by its order dated 16th April, 2009. The undisputed facts of the case are that the respondent herein was enrolled in Indian Air Force on 13th November, 1971 in the Clerical trade. At this point of time, the respondent was superannuated from service on 31.10.2009 after rendering 30 years, 11 months and 18 days of service. At the time of his recruitment, the respondent was medically and physically examined by the companycerned medical officers and was found fit as per prescribed standards in medical categorization known as SHAPE I. Thereafter, on 27th November, 2008 the respondent was referred to the Release Medical Board. Throughout his employment, the respondent has served in peace station. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed first appeal before the Appellate Committee. The second appeal before Defence Ministers Appellate Committee was also rejected. The appellants Union of India, having aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, preferred this appeal. The respondent then filed O.A. V. RAMANA, J. on the arrears. No.
| 0 |
train
|
2015_733.txt
|
On October 1, 1963 the Government passed a repatriation order repatriating the respondent from the Department of Horticulture back to the Department of Agriculture and this order was challenged by the respondent on the ground that since the entire Cardamom Development Scheme along with the staff attached to it had become a part of Department of Horticulture there companyld be numberrepatriation to the Department of Agriculture. But after this repatriation order was passed Siddappa was allowed to companytinue in the Department of Horticulture and was given successive promotions, though temporarily, in that Department and the respondent was forced to revert to the Agricultural Department. Admittedly two officers, namely, Siddappa who was junior to the respondent and the respondent were ordered to be repatriated to the Department of Agriculture from the Department of Horticulture in spite of the fact that both were given option and they had exercised their option to companytinue in the Department of Horticulture and the ground for their repatriation was one and the same, namely, that both were trained in soil companyservation and as such their services companyld be better utilised in the Department of Agriculture. It was number disputed before us that had the respondent companytinued in the Department of Horticulture in the same way as Siddappa was allowed to companytinue the respondent would have got the promotions and number Siddappa who was junior to him. Admittedly by a Governments order dated 13th February 1963 Cardamom Development Scheme in the Department of Agriculture where the respondent was working as a Research Assistant along with 12 other Development Schemes and other research schemes stood transferred to the Department of Horticulture and para 2 of the said Government order stated that the staff working in several schemes should companytinue to work in the respective schemes but they should henceforth be under the companytrol of the Director of Horticulture for all administrative and disciplinary purposes. As a result of this order the respondent stood transferred to the Department of Horticulare. 2350 of 1966 whereby the High Court struck down Governments order dated 1st October, 1963 repatriating the respondent to his so called parent department, namely, department of Agriculture. The High Court accepted this companytention and set aside the repatriation order. There is numbersubstance in this appeal challenging the High Courts judgment rendered on 7th April, 1969 in writ petition No.
| 0 |
train
|
1985_303.txt
|
In the case of a registered firm the Income tax Officer has to determine the income tax payable by the firm and also to determine the total income of each partner of the firm and the sum payable by him on the basis of such assessment. The partners of the firm were Smt. 22,234/ and companyputed the income of the firm at Rs. The order of the Income tax Officer directing that the income of the partners and the shares allocated to the minors admitted to the benefit of the partnership shall be assessed in the hands of the respective Hindu Undivided Families was plainly without jurisdiction. Once the Income tax Officer has granted registration of the firm, be cannot proceed to inquire whether the share allocated to a partner is beneficially held by some other person or entity. The Income tax Officer was of the opinion that since the capital companytributed by the partners and the minors who were admitted to the benefits of the partnership was out of the capital of the respective Hindu Undivided Families to which they belonged, the profits allocated to the partners and to the minors were liable to be assessed in the hands of the respective Hindu Undivided Families to which they belonged. Whenever the Income tax Officer makes a determination in accordance with the provisions of sub section 5 , he shall numberify to the firm by an order in writing the amount of the total income on which the determination has been based and the apportionment thereof between the several partners. Sub sections 5 and 6 of s. 23 of the Income tax Act as they were in force in the year of assessment read as follows Notwithstanding anything companytained in the foregoing sub sections, when the assessee is a firm and the total income of the firm has been assessed under sub section 1 , sub section 3 or sub section 4 as the case may be, the income tax payable by the firm itself shall be determined the total income of each partner of the firm, including therein his share of its income, profits and gains of the previous year, shall be assessed and the sums payable by him on the basis of such assessment shall be determined. . The Income tax Officer must allocate the profits in accordance with the deed of partnership registered by him and to the persons admitted to the benefits thereof according to their respective shares. The order passed by the Income tax Officer was companyfirmed in a revision application by the Commissioner. In proceedings for assessment of tax for the assessment year 1957 58, the Income tax Officer rejected the claim of the firm to set off loss from certain speculative transactions aggregating to, Rs. The firm then moved a petition under Art. He has then to certify the determination in accordance with sub s. 6 and the apportionment thereof among the partners. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. M s J. P. Kanodia and Company is a firm registered under the Indian Income tax Act, 1922. He cannot at that stage hold an inquiry whether the partners represented other persons. Three minors Pradeep Kumar, Anand Prakash and Rajendra Prasad were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. 26,365/ . Shanti Devi and Badri Prasad. 972 of 1964.
jagadish Swarup, Solicitor General, G. C. Sharma and B. D. Sharma, for the appellants. 501. 193 of 1967. 1 55 I.T.R. The order of Manchanda, J., was companyfirmed in a special appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court. Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 29, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in S.A. No. V. Goswami, for the respondent. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Allahabad. This appeal is filed by the Commissioner with certificate granted by the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 1 |
train
|
1970_44.txt
|
Admittedly, the appellant had attained majority on March 19, 1968 and the numberice of option to purchase the property was exercised by the tenant within one month thereafter. Resultantly, even before the proceedings came to be terminated, the tenant had opted to purchase the property by issuing the numberice on April 21, 1968. Since she died pending proceedings and in the meanwhile, the appellant had attained majority, the need to issue numberice by the tenant opting to purchase the property arose only after the disability ceased. Admittedly, the mother having already opted for termination of the tenancy for personal resumption and the appellant having been a minor, stepped into the shoes of his mother mother and companytinued the proceedings for resumption of the land those proceedings, as stated earlier, came to be terminated on March 13, 1972. In the meanwhile, the appellant had attained majority on March 19, 1968. Resultantly, the tenant got issued numberice on April 21, 1968 under section 32F of the Act opting to purchase the land under Section 32. The disability ceased on March 19, 1968 and the numberice of option was given by the tenant within one month thereafter, namely, on April 21, 1968. Since the mother, disabled landlady, was companytinuing the proceedings and on her demise the appellant having got substituted himself as landlords, but he being further disabled landlords, the need to issue numberice to the mother of the appellant did number arise because she had already exercised the option under Section 31 3 to resume the land by terminating the tenancy for personal cultivation and the proceedings therefore were initiated. The admitted facts are that the appellant was a minor when his adoptive mother Guru Santabai Ganpati Waykar had initiated the proceedings under Section 31 3 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 for short the Act for ejectment of the respondent tenant on the ground that she was entitled to resume the land. Admittedly, as on the date of the death of his mother the appellant was a minor. The proceedings under Section 31 3 ultimately ended in dismissal of the suit on March 13, 1972. Pending proceedings, she died and thereafter the appellant had companye on record. 2589/74 filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus the tenant respondent filed writ petition in the High Court. The application, appeal and the revision arising under the Act came to be dismissed. Under these circumstances, the limitation of one year had number expired. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment dated November 23,1978 of the High Court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. Thus this appeal by special leave.
| 0 |
train
|
1996_1249.txt
|
hereinafter referred to as, the suit accommodation from the landlord on rent of Rs.30/ p.m. which was later enhanced to Rs.40/ p.m. The tenant obtained premises No. The High Court modified the judgment of the first appellate companyrt companyfirming the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt and decreed the suit of the landlord for eviction of the tenant from the suit accommodation by judgment and decree, impugned in this appeal. The appellants are the legal representatives of the original tenant, late Kanwar Lal Soni referred to in this judgment as, the tenant and the respondents are the successors in interest of the landlord, late Madho Lal Basant Lal hereinafter referred to as, the landlord . The tenant pleaded that the rent due was deposited after the service of numberice of the suit and that the alleged unauthorised companystruction was made with due permission of the landlord. The landlord companytended before the first appellate companyrt that during the pendency of the appeal the tenant did number pay deposit the rent of the suit accommodation and that he did number vacate the disputed portion of the house within the time granted by the trial companyrt. The landlord filed the suit Civil Suit No.63 A/86 in the companyrt of Second Civil Judge, Class II, Shivpuri, against the tenant for eviction of the suit accommodation on two grounds i default in payment of rent of Rs.1080/ and claiming total sum of Rs.1210/ , said to be due, from the tenant under Section 12 1 a and ii encroachment on a portion of land number let to him and raising companystruction thereon referred to as, the disputed portion under Section 12 1 o of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 for short, the Act . This appeal is from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior, decreeing the suit of the landlord against the tenant, by allowing the Second Appeal No. Dissatisfied by the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt, the landlord filed First Appeal No.30 A of 1992 in the Court of the Second Additional Judge to District Judge, Shivpuri. The trial companyrt gave the benefit of sub section 5 of Section 13 of the Act to the tenant on the first ground and passed a decree directing the tenant to vacate the disputed portion and to pay to the landlord damages at the rate of Rs.10/ P.M. for the said portion within two months from the date of the judgment on the second ground and, thus, decreed the suit on August 24, 1987. Challenging the validity of the judgment and decree of the first appellate companyrt, the landlord filed Second Appeal No.18 of 1993 in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. 83 situated at Agra Mumbai Road, Shivpuri, M.P. J U D G M E N T SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J. 18 of 1993 on May 4, 2000. Leave is granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2001_962.txt
|
The appellants were appointed prior to 29.1.1981 by the then Managing Committee of the B.T.S. A Notification dated 29.1.1981 was issued by the Health Department, Government of Bihar to take over the private medical companyleges with effect from 1.4.1981. In the Notification dated 2 29.1.1981, it was made clear that these institutions will be taken over by the Government of Bihar with effect from 1.4.1981. Homeopathic Medical College and Hospital, Muzaffarpur. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
2011_1045.txt
|
The appeal of the judgement debtors was dismissed. An application for restitution of the said property was made by the judgement debtors. It may be stated here that the appellant purchased the property belonging to the predecessor in interest of the judgement debtors in auction in execution of money decree passed against the judgement debtors. The judgement debtors and auction purchaser both filed appeal and cross objections before the High Court and the impugned judgement has been passed in such proceeding. The decree obtained by the judgement debtors is a joint decree and number divisible. After the remand, auction purchaser filed objection to the judgement debtors application for restitution, inter alia, companytending that the auction purchaser was entitled number only to the payment of Rs.8,000/ being the sale price but also Rs.17,254/ and odd which the auction purchaser had deposited to prevent further sale of the said property in execution of another decree passed against the judgement debtors. By the impugned judgement, the High Court disposed of the Second appeal and the cross objection filed by the parties, inter alia, holding that the judgement debtors respondents were entitled for the restitution of possession of the property purchased by the appellant in auction in execution proceeding and also for a sum of Rs.20,309/ from the auction purchaser appellant by way of damages and mesne profits subject to payment of Rs.8,000/ by the said judgement debtors to the auction purchaser. The said judgement debtors jointly obtained the said decree holders, numbereffective order can be passed in this appeal. Being aggrieved by such order of the executing companyrt, the auction purchaser appellant preferred an appeal and the judgement debtors also filed appeal against the said order. The restitution application was allowed and the executing companyrt directed for delivery of possession of the disputed property to the judgement debtors together with a sum of Rs.65,565/ on account purchaser appellant. After such auction purchase, the property was again put to auction in execution of the another money decree obtained by a different decree holder and the judgement debtor in order to save the property had put the decretal amount in order to avoid further sale in execution of the said decree. Such application was opposed but ultimately the order of restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure was passed in favour of the judgement debtors. Both the appeals were disposed of by the Civil Judge allowed the appeal of the auction purchaser and directed that the judgement debtors should pay Rs.8,000/ along with interest which companyes to Rs.22,400/ and also a sum of Rs.19,723/ and odd but numberdirection was given for payment of interest on the aforesaid amount. The auction purchaser also claimed Rs.3500/ as companyt of repairs and Rs.50/ per annum for such repairs since 1942. During the pendency of this appeal, unfortunately, at the instance of the appellant, the names of the respondent 1/2, 2/1 and 2/2 being heirs of one of the judgement debtors were deleted from the array of parties at the risk of the appellant. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, Mr.Mehrotra, the learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondents, took a preliminary objection that the decree passed by the High Court in the restitution application which is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal, cannot be maintained in the absence of some of the judgement debtors whose names were deleted at the risk of the appellant. An appeal was taken by the appellant auction purchaser against such order and the appeal was allowed by order dated October 31, 1952 and the case was remanded . 2270/1968. Therefore, if any order is passed by the High Court the same will bring inconsistent position vis a vis the respondents on record and decree holders number on record. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on April 17,1980 in Second Appeal No.2269/1968 being companynected with Second Appeal No. Subsequently, a further order was passed by this Court directing that the attention of the Court should be drawn about such deletion and companysequences flowing therefrom.
| 0 |
train
|
1998_270.txt
|
The appellants were working as Hereditary Village Accountants in Gulbarga District of the State of Karnataka. As a companysequence of the companying into force of the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961, the office of the hereditary accountant was abolished. Nov. 21, 1980 dismissed the writ appeals on the following reasoning In these appeals, the only companytention urged by Sri B. G. Sridharan, learned Counsel for the appellants petitioners, was that under the proviso to Rule 10 of the Karnataka General Services Revenue Subordinate Branch Village Accountants Cadre and Recruitment Rules, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Rules , the petitioners were entitled to be appointed afresh as Village Accountants without hereditary rights. The appellants were, however, permitted to companytinue in their respective offices till the time fresh appointments were made to the posts of Village Accountants. Writ Appeals 1864 65/80 arising out of W.P. 5034/77 and 5615/77 were heard by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court and the Bench by its Judgment dt. The appellants challenged the fresh selection by way of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Karnataka High Court. Thereafter, fresh recruitment was made but the appellants were number selected. A learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petitions. Nos.
| 0 |
train
|
1994_947.txt
|
825/ the plaintiffs or defendant Nos. Mohori with possession with original appellant defendant No. 825/ to defendant appellant No. Mohori and as the plaintiffs suit under Section 4 of the Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act, 1913 for short the Act was dismissed by the Court therefore, the right of redemption of the plaintiffs had extinguished and, the suit of the plaintiffs was liable to be dismissed. 1 defendant No. Mohori in lieu of old khasra numbers which was mortgaged by Smt. 1 in the present civil suit, was reluctant to release the suit land after receipt of the amount of mortgage, so the plaintiffs respondents instituted the present suit impleading defendant Nos. The plaintiffs 6 and 7 filed Civil Suit No. The suit was resisted and companytested by original defendant appellantTundal number dead . The learned Trial Court passed preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiffs for redemption of the suit land subject to the companydition of the payment of Rs. 232 of 1980 instituted by the plaintiffs respondents for possession of the land by way of redemption. Mohori, widow of Dan Sahai, was the owner in possession of the agricultural land companyprising Khasra Nos. After the acquisition rights, Khillu was left with 1/6th share whereas Rumali, Pitamber, Ramvati got 1/6th share each. 565/1974 for the redemption of the suit land, which came to be dismissed on 13th December, 1976 by the Revenue Court. As such, the present suit was barred by limitation, as the suit was number filed within one year of the dismissal of the petition by the Collector for redemption of the mortgage land. 7, respondents herein, have acquired rights in the suit land on the basis of decree of Civil Court in Suit No. Hukam Singh original plaintiff No. The original defendant Tundal raised preliminary objections inter alia that the mortgaged amount was Rs. Being aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, defendant No. The other defendants appellants 3 to 5 and 7 to 10 in their written statement have admitted the claim of the plaintiffs respondents and also pleaded that they are entitled to get their respective shares in the suit land after redemption. 825/ in the decree of Civil Court and pursuant to the said decree mutation of the land was sanctioned on 2nd April, 1957. The main defence pleaded by the defendant No. 101 of 1983 preferred by original defendant appellant Tundal against the judgment dated 7th June, 1983 of Sub Judge First Class, Palwal, decreeing the Civil Suit No. 200 dated 30th March, 1974 in respect of the shares of Khillu, Rumali widow, Ramvati daughter and Pitamber son of Giasi. 724/1985, 1740/1990, 725/1985 and 307/1991 filed by the appellants defendants against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge II , Faridabad. 6 and Dal Chand plaintiff No. 576 of Khatoni No. 871, 872, 873, 900, 901, 903 and 907 of Khatoni No. 2 9 as proforma defendants appellants herein as they were number available at the time of filing of the earlier suit. Mohori died in the year 1967 and the mutation of the inheritance was sanctioned in favour of the heirs mentioned in the pedigree table given in paragraph 5 of the plaint. 1 was that the suit was time barred as the order of the Collector under the Act was recorded on 30th July, 1974 and that the present suit was filed after the stipulated period of one year. 2,200/ and number Rs. The mutation of their shares was entered in the Revenue Record, which was sanctioned on 12th October, 1974 by the companypetent authority. 2,200/ which amount was reduced to Rs. Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned companynsel for the appellants submitted that the order of the Collector dated 13th July 1974 dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs filed under Section 4 of the Act was based on merits after scrutiny of the entire evidence placed on record by both the parties. 7 admeasuring 14 bighas, 9 biswas situated in village Raidaska, Tehsil Palwal, District Faridabad. 1 Tundal number dead , vide registered Mortgage Deed dated 18th September, 1951 registered on 25th September, 1951 for an ostensible companysideration of Rs. Defendants appellants filed four Regular Second Appeals before the High Court, which came to be dismissed by a single judgment and decree impugned in these appeals. During companysolidation proceedings, lands measuring 45 kanals 8 marlas was allotted to Smt. 21 and Khasra No. We have heard Ms. Madhu Tewatia, learned companynsel for the appellants and Mr. Arvind Kumar, learned companynsel for the respondents, who have taken us through the relevant material on record. 1 on or before 28th July, 1983. On the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed as many as ten issues, which were reproduced by the learned Single Judge in his judgment and we do number think it necessary to reproduce them again for unnecessarily burdening the record. 22, Khewat No. 2 to 9 are number legal heirs of Smt. 1 preferred appeal which came to be dismissed by the First Appellate Court companyfirming the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. These appeals are directed against the companymon judgment and decree dated 5th January, 1995 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing Regular Second Appeal Nos. Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. The Additional District Judge has dismissed the Civil Appeal No. Brief facts giving rise to the filing of the appeals are that one Smt. We have taken up and heard these appeals together as they involve same and identical issues and they shall stand disposed of by this companymon judgment. The appellant No.
| 0 |
train
|
2006_484.txt
|
the companylector made an award on october 25 1953 by which he allowed companypensation at the rate of rs. on december 24 1954 that is more than a year after the award the respondents made an application to the collector in which they said that certain agricultural lands of villages salarpur and nasirpur were companypulsorily acquired by the companylector by an award dated october 301953 october 30 was presumably a mistake for october 25 but they were number given any numberice of the acquisition proceedings. the respondents who were evacuees were owners of 55 bighas and 7 biswas of land in two villages knumbern as salarpur and nasirpur in the district of gurgaon. 96/ per acre as given in the award but about rs. timur jehan begum has filed an affidavit to the effect that she had numberknumberledge of the award at the time it was made and that she only came to knumber about it in july 1955 when she received the award money. the amount of companypensation appears to have been paid on july 22 1955 and on september 30 1955 the respondents made an application to the companylector for a reference under s. 18 of the act. a reference was made accordingly to the civil companyrt and the senior subordinate judge of gurgaon who heard it came to the conclusion that the application made to the companylector for a reference war barred by time because the companylectors award was made on october 25 1953 and the application for a reference was made on september 30 1955.
the high companyrt accepted the application in revision set aside the order of the learned subordinate judge and directed him to deal with the reference on merits. the respondents alleged and this was number denied that the companylector treated the property as evacuee property and numbere of the numberices companytemplated by the land acquisition a.i.r. the respondents were number numberified about the acquisition and were number present at the time of the award. the companylector accepted this application in a very short order which stated public prosecutor has been heard. the respondents further stated that the awerd had fixed the compensation to be given to the land owners affected by the acquisition but the amount to be paid to each owner was number apportioned therein. in this application the respondents stated that they knew about the award on july 22 1955 when they received the companypensation amount and therefore the petition was within time. the principal objection which they raised to the award was that the market value of the land was number rs. numberhing has been shown to me to the companytrary to prove that the award was made within the knumberledge of the petitioners. p. sinha and saukat hussain for respondent number 2.
february 11.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by k. das j. this is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated numberember 16 1959 passed by the punjab high companyrt on an application in revision in respect of an order dated december 17 1957 by which the learned senior subordinate judge of gurgaon held that a reference by the companylector of gurgaon under s. 18 of the land acquisition act act 1 of 1894 was incompetent by reason of the circumstance that it was made on an application filed beyond time. their lands in the aforesaid two villages along with lands of other persons in other villages were acquired by the appellant for use as a field firing and bombing range. the respondents then referred to a judgment and decree of the lahore high companyrt dated numberember 13 1944 under which they were held to be the owners of the lands in question. a prayer was made on behalf of the respondents for payment of the companypensation money at an early date for the purpose of defraying the expenses of a daughters marriage but without prejudice to the claim of the respondents for enhancement of the amount of compensation. 1958 punjab 490. 600/ per acre. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 592 of 1961.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated numberember 16 1959 of the punjab high companyrt at chandigarh in civil revision number 268 of 1958.
ganapathy iyer and r. n. sachthey for the appellant. act 1894 were issued to them. 2 1962 1 s.c.r. we proceed number to state the relevant facts. it is from this order of the high court that the appeal has companye to us by special leave.
| 0 |
dev
|
1963_26.txt
|
This information was received by the Tender Committee from JSEB. He also wrote to many officials of the CSEB. Jain was deputed to get the desired information from JSEB. As the respondent did number submit the necessary documents, the CSEB sought the information from the Chief Engineer of JSEB arrayed in the companyplaint as accused No.2 vide letter dated 10.12.2004 about the performance of the respondent. The respondent companyplainant alleges that on suspicion of such Certificate Cum Report, the companyplainant visited the CSEB and on verifying about the same, he found that the said tender was being given to Company of the 1st accused against the Complainants Company and so he wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary and Chairman of JSEB for verifying and cancelling such certificate. Appellant No.2 herein was also deputed to get the desired information from JSEB. When the report was sought by CSEB in December, 2004, the Tender Committee took the view that the respondent did number fulfill the pre qualifying companyditions and rejected his tender. He met the officials of JSEB and submitted his report to the effect that the works carried out by the respondent at Patratu Thermal Power Station was number satisfactory. The respondent companyplainant alleges that the said Certificate cum Report is false, fabricated, motivated and malafide and the same was companytrary to the minutes of meeting that the companyplainant and his officials had with the officials of PTPS and JSEB. On such assurance, the Tender Documents were issued to the respondent. As per the appellants, even technical expertise was sought from SE ETI KW CSEB and found that the respondent was number technically suitable as per the technical vetting and companyparative data of SE ETI KW letter dated 04.02.2005. On that basis, tender of the respondent was rejected. The CSEB submitted its report on 21.02.2006 stating that there were numbersuch irregularities and that the respondent had number furnished the necessary documents despite repeated requests. 2 was approached so as to tailor the certificate totally discrediting the CEI Company of the Complainant with reference to supply and service relationship with Patratu Thermal Power Station for short the PTPS and JSEB. 3 herein alleging that the Tender Documents were number issued to the respondent. However, the said report was number found enclosed and even after repeated requests from the CSEB to furnish documents, respondent did number fulfill the necessary requirement. After meeting the officials of JSEB, appellant No.2 submitted his report stating that the works carried out by the respondent were number satisfactory as many defects were found therein. As per the appellants, tender of the respondent was rejected on the ground that plant and equipment erected by the respondent at Patratu Thermal Power Station, Patratu, Jharkhand was number functioning well. It was followed by several letters requesting for issuance of Tender Documents. At this stage, the respondent filed the Civil Suit 26 A/06 before the Civil Judge Class II, Korba against the CSEB. He was informed that rather than pressurising the appellants here or other officials, he should furnish documents as per pre qualifying companydition of the Tender. In spite of the aforesaid material, the tender Committee acted with caution and even the technical expertise was sought. Even the report of the technical experts went against the respondent as it opined that the respondent was number technically suitable on the technical vetting and companyparative data. The respondent herein submitted an application on 26.08.2004 as Chief Executive Officer of M s Control Electronics India CEI requesting for Tender Document. He further alleges that for the said reasons, the accused No. The appellants submit that as an outburst, in number getting the Tender in his favour, the respondent made companyplaints alleging irregularities to various fora including the State Government, which ordered the CSEB to companyduct an enquiry. It is only thereafter criminal companyplaint is filed with the allegation that accused No.1 is favoured by creating a false certificate dated 28.12.2004. The respondent companyplainant alleges that the said companyspiracy started with an agreement entered into by the 1st accused and the appellants herein and they planned to fabricate the said certificate dated 28.12.2004. In response thereto, vide his letter dated 05.11.2004, the respondent filed a companyy of purchase order dated 28.01.2002 placed by Jharkhand State Electricity Board for short the JSEB and assured to supply other documentary evidence performance report subsequently. The respondent made a companyplaint dated 06.09.2004 against appellant No. After the exhaustion of these remedies, albeit unsuccessfully, the respondent filed a companyplaint before K.K. and the companyplaint was blatant misuse and abuse of the process of Court which was filed by the companyplainant after exhausting the civil remedies in which he had failed. The respondent vide his letter dated 08.12.2004, mentioned that the Performance Report was enclosed in Part II. These appeals are filed by four appellants, who were arrayed as accused persons in the companyplaint case No.183/2007 filed by the respondent herein before the Court of Judicial Magistrate No. The learned Judicial Magistrate took companynizance of the said companyplaint and summoned the appellants. Ram, General Manager of the said Power Station furnished his report dated 28.12.2004 wherein it was summed up that due to the defects in the scanning system, supplied by the respondent, generation had been adversely effected and the said Electricity Board was number satisfied with the equipment supplied by the respondent. The companyplaint has been filed under Sections 120 B, 468, 420 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code for short the IPC . 183/07 and the trial Court issued summons to the appellants herein and accused No.1 Successful Bidder accused No. II, Tiruchirapalli, Tamil Nadu. He further alleges that this caused a wrongful loss to the companyplainants companypany by robbing its due chance to get a companytract for the Boiler Plant Units at Korba. The appellants who were arrayed as accused Nos.3, 4, 5 and 6 challenged the said summoning orders and sought quashment of the companyplaint by filing petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short the Cr. number submission of documentary evidence of past performance and experience of the respondent. It is, thereafter, that the respondent filed the said Criminal Complaint under Sections 120 B, 468, 420 500 IPC before the trial Court, which was registered as C.C. The respondent herein then filed a Writ Petition No.2951 of 2006 before the Chhattisgarh High Court which was dismissed on 25.06.2007. After recording preliminary evidence, the Magistrate took companynizance of the companyplaint which order was challenged in the High Court. It was also pleaded that the said companyplaint has been lodged as an afterthought, having failed in the civil suit for injunction which was dismissed and likewise, after unsuccessful attempt to challenge the award of companytract in favour of accused No.1 as the writ petition of the respondent was dismissed by the High Court. Nagar P.S., Thirucharapalli, Tamil Nadu. Even, Shri B.M. inasmuch as according to them the allegations in the companyplaint did number make out any offence under the aforesaid provisions of the IPC the companyplainant had neither any locus standi number any legal status to prefer any such companyplaint the appellants being public servants and Gazetted officers of the State Government of Chhattisgarh, numbersuch criminal proceedings companyld be initiated against them without prior sanction from the appointing authority as per Section 197 of the Cr. The application was rejected on the ground that it was accompanied by incomplete documents i.e. However, the respondent moved an application seeking to withdraw the said suit. Thereafter, SLP No.15897 of 2007 was preferred by the respondent which also came to be dismissed vide order dated 14.09.2007. Still, in order to verify the claim of the respondent and to companysider his bid on merits, though number strictly required, the appellant R.C. Even companyts of Rs.25,000/ was imposed while dismissing the writ petition with the observations that it was abuse of the process of Court. In any case he did number appear on the date fixed and accordingly the suit was dismissed for number prosecution on 12.09.2006. P.C. 2 was demoted from his post. K. SIKRI, J. The police authorities refused to register the same on the ground that it is a civil dispute. No.
| 1 |
train
|
2014_432.txt
|
Learned CJM directed the police to register and investigate the case. By order dated 13.7.1998 learned CJM had directed the police to register and investigate the case. The orders passed by the Additional District Magistrate on September 16, 1952, September 19, 1952, November 19, 1952, and January 2, 1953, were orders passed while the investigation by the police into a number cognizable offence was in progress. On 19.11.952, on perusal of the police report the Magistrate allowed further time for investigation until January 2, 1953, and on that date time was further extended to February 2, 1953. On 19.7.1998 on the basis of the order passed by learned CJM police registered FIR No. It is clear from these orders that on 19.91952, the Additional District Magistrate had number taken companynizance of the offence because he had allowed the police time till November 19, 1952, for companypleting the investigation. After investigation charge sheet was filed by the police on 13.9.1999. By his subsequent orders time for investigation was further extended until February 2, 1953. The argument that he took companynizance of the offence on September 16, 1952, is without foundation. As numbered above, on the basis of order of learned CJM the FIR was registered. It was, however, argued that when Mitra applied for a search warrant on September, 16, 1952, the Additional District Magistrate had recorded an order thereon, Permitted. On 13.7.1998 an application was filed before learned CJM alleging companymission of offences by the named accused persons. The appellant had appeared before the Magistrate on February 2, 1953, and the question of issuing summons to him did number arise. 1 filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code to quash the direction given to register F.I.R., charge sheet filed after investigation as well as the companynizance taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in short CJM Raebareli. As already stated, the order of the Additional District Magistrate of September 19, 1952, makes it quite clear that he was still regarding the matter as one under investigation. On 24.5.2000 respondent number1 filed the application under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the FIR, the charge sheet and the order of learned magistrate by which he had taken companynizance, and the order directing the police to register the case under Section 156 3 of the Code. Accordingly, a companyplaint was filed on February 2, 1953. If at the end of the investigation numbercomplaint had been filed against the appellant the police companyld have under the provisions of s. 169 of the Code released him on his executing a bond with or without sureties to appear if and when so required before the Additional District Magistrate empowered to take companynizance of the offence on a police report and to try the accused or companymit him for trial. It would also appear from the order of Mr. Sinha that if the Additional District Magistrate did number take companynizance, he certainly did because he companysidered whether the bail should be reduced and fixed the 26th and 27th of March, for evidence. It companyld number be said with any good reason that the Additional District Magistrate had either on September 16, or at any subsequent date upto February 2, 1953, applied his mind to the case with a view to issuing a process against the appellant. To Sri M. N. Sinha, S. M. Sadar , Magistrate 1st class spl. Appellant was shown to be a guarantor for the loan taken by respondent number1 on 30.12.1994. The Magistrate would number be required to pass any further orders in the matter. Appellant was surprised to receive the numberice as he had never stood as guarantor for any loan. In the meantime, on January 27, 1953, Inspector Mitra had been authorized under s.23 3 b of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act to file a companyplaint. An affidavit purported to have been signed by the appellant was filed with the bank to make him the second guarantor. 105/51 dated the 27th February, 1951, as amended, issued by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 8 2 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. By the impugned order the High Court quashed the charge sheet on the ground that the magistrate had numberpower to order registration of the case. To 26.3.1952 and 27.3.1952 for evidence. Accused to appear before him. 830 of 1998 for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC . Background facts as projected by the appellant are as follows Appellant received a numberice dated 18.1.1996 from the Union Bank of India, Raebareli asking him to pay back the loan amount with interest amounting to Rs.1,25,421/ . 1 had forged some documents in companyspiracy with her husband Zahirul Islam. Petition filed for reduction of bail. F.E.R.A. Accordingly, on the same date Mr. Sinha then recorded the following order Accused present. Issue search warrant. Appellant had never signed the document and his signature was forged. 25,000 with 5 sureties. Considering all facts, bail granted for Rs. A writ petition was filed before the Allahabad High Court to quash the numberice issued by the Bank. 2305 of 2004 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. He made enquiry from the Bank and came to know that the respondent No. Challenge in this Appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench. empowered for favour of disposal according to law. Arising out of SLP Crl. Seen the letter of authority. Leave granted. The respondent No.
| 1 |
train
|
2006_2.txt
|
The assessee is a leading manufacturer of pagers. The assessee was called upon to submit the list of such unutilized items, which are imported under the said numberification and lying unutilized. 30/1997 Customs dated 01.04.1997 hereinafter referred as the said numberification by which the materials imported into India for the manufacturing of the pagers were exempted from whole of the customs duty leviable in the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and further whole of the additional duty leviable thereon under Section 3 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Not satisfied with the companytention of the assessee, the Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore, issued a Notice to the assessee, calling upon it to show cause as to why the customs duty amounting to Rs. Being aggrieved thereby, the assessee preferred an appeal before the CESTAT. It was further informed by the assessee that they have ceased to manufacture pagers and as such materials have become obsolete insofar as they are companycerned. 96,17,498/ along with interest and penalty. The assessee submitted a list of such unutilized items with requisite details and sought for further time to link unutilized items to the bill of entry at the relevant assessable value. Being aggrieved thereby, the Commissioner of Customs, Bangalore preferred an appeal before the Karnataka High Court under the provisions of Section 130 of the Customs Act. The assessee is entitled to the benefit of Notification No. A specific intelligence was received by the Director of Revenue Intelligence to the effect that the assessee had stopped manufacturing of pagers and hence a certain portion of the duty free material imported under the Scheme had been written off in their books of accounts. After following the procedure prescribed, the Commissioner of Customs passed an Order in Original on 30.04.2002 thereby, holding that the assessee was liable to pay the aforesaid amount of Rs. At the stage of final hearing of the appeal, the assessee raised a preliminary objection companytending therein, that the order impugned before the High Court amongst other things, also relates to the rate of duty of customs and as such the appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act was number tenable before the High Court and the appeal will have to be preferred before this Court under the provisions of Section 130E of the Customs Act. The Division Bench of the High Court held that it was called upon to decide whether the terms and companyditions of the said numberification have been companyplied with by the assessee or number and whether the levy of duty, interest and penalty were legal or number and whether the CESTAT was justified in setting aside the levy of duty, interest and penalty and all these questions were related to determination of the rate of duty. 96,17,498/ along with interest at the rate of 24 per annum and the penalty should number be recovered from it. The CESTAT allowed the appeal. 2/2007. As per the scheme framed under the said numberification, the goods imported under the actual user companydition were required to be used only for the manufacture of the declared final product. Being aggrieved thereby, the Revenue is in appeal before this Court. 10083/2011, inasmuch as the impugned judgment and order s in all other companynected appeals are passed following the judgment and order passed by the Karnataka High Court in CS TA No. The officers of the DRI, therefore, took up further investigation in the matter.
| 1 |
train
|
2019_599.txt
|
A brick kiln meant J any kiln in which bricks were manufactured with the aid of companyl and the premises appurtenant thereto. It defined bricks to mean bricks or tiles produced with the aid of slack companyl but did number include firebricks or refractory bricks and tiles. The order was passed on writ petitions filed p by the manufacturers of bricks who used slack companyl in their brick kilns. companyld number be made applicable to brick kiln owners as bricks were number an essential companymodity. Form in the said Order prescribed the form of the licence for running a brick kiln. Sub para iv of paragraph 8 and the Note thereunder read thus A licensee in Form D or a person running a brick kiln with companyl a shall number utilise or cause to be utilised companyl allotted to him or in stock with him for a purpose other than burning bricks and shall number divert or transfer any such companyl to any other person or any other brick kiln, even though owned by him except under a written authority from the District Magistrate b shall sell the whole or a specified part of his stock of bricks produced with the aid of slack companyl to a person as may be specified in a permit issued in that behalf of the District Magistrate and addressed to him c shall manufacture with the aid of slack companyl bricks of such sizes as may be fixed by the District Magistrate and shall further sell them at such prices as may be fixed by the District Magistrate for different sizes and classes of bricks. Para 12 of the said Order dealt with the export of companyl and bricks and stated that numberperson companyld export, cause to be exported or offer for export companyl or bricks produced with the aid of slack companyl from within the State without obtaining the prior written permission of the State Coal Controller. Paragraph 4 of the said Order dealt with licensing thereunder it said that numberperson companyld import companyl or carry on business as a companyl agent or companyl depot holder or run a brick kiln with companyl except under and in accordance with the terms and companyditions of a licence issued under the said Order. For the purpose of this sub clause, the District Magistrate may, subject to any direction of the State Government by general or special order fix a the sizes of which bricks with the aid of slack companyl are to be manufactured and b the maximum price at which different classes of such bricks may be sold to the public in general and in bulk to companystruction agencies in the public section particular by any person, such price, being based on the estimated companyt of, manufacture of such bricks plus reasonable margin of profit thereon Provided that different prices may be fixed in respect of different classes and sizes of such bricks for different localities in the district having regard to different circumstances pertaining thereto. Paragraph 8 of the said Order dealt with directions regarding import, purchase, sale, storage and distributions it required the licensee of a brick kiln under the said Order to companyply with any direction that might be issued to him from time to time by the State Coal Controller or the District Magistrate, inter alia in respect of the sale and distribution of bricks. Paragraph 5 dealt with the issue of licences and sub paragraph b thereof said that every licence granted or renewed under the said Order, inter alia, in Form for running a brick kiln with slack companyl would be subject to the companyditions specified therein and such other companyditions as the State Coal Controller or District Magistrate might prescribe from time to time. Clause 4 of the companyditions thereof required the licensee to companyply with general or special directions issued by the State Coal Controller or the licensing authority from time to time with regard to, inter alia, the disposal and sale of any stock of bricks. v. Janta In. In the case of Janta In. Coal Control Order the said Order was issued in exercise of powers companyferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The U.P. The appeal has been referred to a Bench of three Judges because the two learned Judges who earlier heard it were of the opinion that the decision of this Court in State of U.P. and Ors.
| 1 |
train
|
1999_894.txt
|
The dying declaration made by the deceased to Dr. Doshi at the dispensary, Another dying declaration which was recorded by the Head Constable at the Hospital and last dying declaration which was recorded by Honorary Magistrate, P.W. The Sessions Judge appears to hive discarded the evidence of P.Ws. Evidence fin cubed by the oral dying declaration alleged to have been made by the deceased before P.Ws 2 and 6 the moment they arrived at the scene as also to P.W. The main evidence against the accused companysisted of the following facts The evidence of the two eye witnesses P.Ws. 13 at the General Hospital at about 2.10 p.m The High Court as also the Sessions Judge disbelieved the evidence relating to the recovery of the tin companytaining Kerosne Oil which may be left out of companysideration. 2 and 6 on most trivial grounds and unconvincing reasons, bordering on pure speculation as rightly pointed out by the High Court. 5 Pandurang. Hence this appeal before us.
| 0 |
train
|
1978_368.txt
|
out of which the building area is 1,05,683 sq. 35,717.20 as tax on vacant land. The premises of the hotel companyprises a total extent of 19.43 acres or 11,19,168 sq. Pursuant to the powers companyferred upon the Municipal Corporation of Bangalore under the Corporation Act, as amended by the 1964 Act, to levy tax on the basis of estimated market value of lands, a numberice was issued to the appellant on March 30, 1966 demanding a sum of Rs. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri C. J This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Mysore dismissing the prayer for a declaration of the invalidity of s. 99 2 b of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Corporation Act as amended by the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Amendment Act, 1964 hereinafter referred to as the 1964 Act. It was stated in the numberice that the vacant land, over and above the limit, measuring 89,293 sq. and the appellant was 1 1970 1 S. C. R. 268.
left to pursue his numbermal remedies under the Corporation Act regarding the property tax on buildings. The entire vacant land, excluding the built area and appurtenant thereof is being made use of for the beneficial enjoyment of the building in the area as garden and lawns. 226 of the Constitution challenging s. 99 2 b of the Corporation Act, as amended by the 1964 Act, as unconstitutional and void and prayed for other companysequential reliefs. 1852 of 1967. Property tax was also demanded on the building of the hotel but numberquestion arises in this case as to its validity. 704 of 1966. The appellant companypany are the proprietors of the West End Hotel, Race Course Road, Bangalore. is assessed at 0.4 of the market value, plus Education Cess, plus Health Cess with effect from April 1, 1965. 31, 1966 issued by the Assistant Revenue Officer, Corporation of Benglore, to the appellant and quashed it to the extent it related to the period anterior to, the date of numberice. The High Court expressly stated that they were excluding from companysideration in this case all companytentions of the appellant relating to property tax on buildings. 4606 dated March. R. Somnath Iyer and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. By its judgment dated March 28, 1967 the High Court gave a limited relief to the appellant in respect of the numberice No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 28, 1967 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. B. Datar, for the appellant. Rameshwar Nath, for respondent No. Objections were filed on behalf of the appellant before the Commissioner. The appellant also filed a writ petition under art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 0 |
train
|
1971_566.txt
|
and freezing it for the purpose of avoiding decomposition and decay, the said frog legs were exported. The assessee respondent herein had purchased fresh frog legs and after removing the skin, washing and removing dirt etc. 904 NT of 1988 From the Judgment and Order dated 10.11.1986 of the Kerala High Court in T.R.C. 162 of 1986 J. Francis for the Appellant. By the impugned judgment the High Court has dismissed the Tax Revision Case filed at the instance of the Sales tax authority. The assessee claimed that they were entitled to the benefit of section 5 3 of the Central Sales tax Act, 1956. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala dated 10th of November, 1986. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. In order to appreciate the question it is necessary to refer to the findings of the Tribunal. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special leave granted. No.
| 0 |
train
|
1988_106.txt
|
Under Paragraph 6 of the Decision the appointing authority was empowered to require a Government servant to retire after he had attained the age of 55 years on three months numberice without assigning any reason. The purpose of the provision was to weed out unsuitable employees after they attained the age of 55 years. Francis, for the Appel lant. He joined the erstwhile State of Manipur as a junior clerk in 1935. On the enactment of Manipur Courts Act 1955 the Court of Subordinate Judge was estab lished .on 1 March 1956. After the Government of India took over the administration of Manipur the appellant was appointed as a Subordinate Judge with effect from 25 Janu ary 1950 on a temporary basis. The representation of the appel lant was rejected. The appellant on receiving the numberice for retirement prayed for his being retained in service after the age of 55 years in public interest. The new rule provided that 1024 if the appropriate authority is of, opinion that it is in public interest to do so, he has the absolute right to retire any Government servant after he attained the age of 55 years with numberice of number less than three months. Appeal,from the Judgment and Order dated 26.10.1968 of the Judicial Commissioner for Manipur in Civil Appln. This appeal is by certificate from the judg ment dated 26 October 1968 of the Judicial Commissioner for Manipur. The principal companytention of the ,appellant was that the impugned order of companypulsory retirement was null and void ab initio because the Fundamental Rule 56 at the material time companytained numberreservation, of any powers in the appointing authority to retire him without any reason on three months numberice after the age of 55 years. 23 numbered below Fundamental Rule 56. This provision was really intended to retire an officer who had companypleted 30 years qualifying service. Government of India Decision No. The appellant was served with a numberice dated 30 June 1966 that he was required to retire from Government service with effect from 1 October 1966 in pursuance of the direc tions of the President in Paragraph 6 of the. It is in this background that the appel lant filed the writ petition. 56 which came into force on 1 December 1962 as aforesaid was substituted by new Rule .on 21 July 1965. He was reverted to the post of subordinate Judge. Though he was number a Law Graduate, he rose to become a permanent Puisne Judge in Manipur State Chief Court with effect from 5 October 1949. 23 was companytained in the Memoran dum of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs dated 30 November 1962. The Decision came into force on 1 December 1962. The above Decision No. 23/67 K. Garg, S.C. Agarwal V.J. Emphasis was placed by companynsel on the fact that the impugned order was made ex pressly under the authority of Government of India Decision No. The appellant was appointed as the Judge of that Subordinate Court from that date. 2022 of 1969. The Judicial Commissioner dismissed the writ petition of the appellant. 1 by which the appellant was companypulsorily retired. The appellant was born on 1 January 1911. C. Mahajan R.N. The appellant did number earn good reports from superior officers. 1 3 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAy,C.J. The appellant by a writ petition challenged the order of respondent No. Sachthey, for Respondent Nos. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Case No.
| 0 |
train
|
1976_379.txt
|
The private respondents further pleaded that even though they had requested the companycerned officers of the Bank to disclose the reasons for extension of probation and termination of their services but numberresponse was received from them. While quashing orders dated 25.9.1980, this Court observed When the master servant relation was governed by the archaic law of hire and fire, the companycept of probation in service jurisprudence was practically absent. One of the several grounds on which the appellants challenged the termination of their services was that the action of the employer was wholly arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of equality clause companytained in the Constitution. They pleaded that during the period of probation, numberone had informed them about any shortcoming, deficiency or defect in their work and yet their services were terminated without giving them numberice and opportunity of hearing. The private respondents challenged the termination of their services by filing writ petitions mainly on the grounds that the action taken by the companycerned authorities of the Bank was arbitrary and violative of the rules of natural justice. Vide letter dated 22.12.2010 of Deputy Managing Director and Corporate Development Officer of the Bank, the Probationary Officers of 2009 10 batch were informed that they are due for companyfirmation on 15.5.2011 and, therefore, they may appear in the test proposed to be companyducted on 27.2.2011. Thereafter, his service was terminated by a number stigmatic order.
| 0 |
train
|
2012_756.txt
|
Alladi valued at Rs. Alladi Venkatakshmamma to be referred in short as Smt. Sri Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer hereafter to be referred to as Shri Alladi was a member of the Hindu companyarcenary companysisting of himself, his wife and three sons. 2,02,271/ . Alladi and he had also declared certain other properties to from part of the joint family properties. In the instant case we are only companycerned with the joint family properties left by Shri Alladi. The Revenue assessed the estate duty on the footing that as Smt. Alladi was a member of the Hindu companyarcenary her interest in the joint family proper ties passed on her death to the other three sons and the value of this interest being 1/4th the heirs would be liable to pay estate duty on the value of the 1/4th share assessed at Rs. Sri Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer died some time.before the passing of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, but during his life time he had settled certain properties absolutely on his wife Smt. Alladi was number a companyarcenary interest which companyld have passed under s. 7 1 of the Act and as the said interest was incapable of valuation was number exigible to estate duty. Alladi died on January 5, 1956 a few months before the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty valued her estate at a total amount ot Rs. 2,02,271 being the value of her the share in the joint family properties. This appeal by certificate is directed against a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court dated December 5, 1969 Alladi Kuppuswami v. Controller of Estate Duty, Madras 1 by which the reference made to the High Court by the Central Board of Revenue was answered in favour of the accountable person and against the Revenue. The Board ac companydingly referred the following questions to the High Court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, one fourth share of the deceased in the joint family properties, to which she was entitled under section 3 of the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, was companyrectly included in her estate as property deemed to pass on her death under section 7 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ? The dispute in the present case centres round the inclusion of the aforesaid sum of Rs 2,02,271/ . It appears, however, that before the High Court the respondent pressed only the question relating to the inclusion of the value of 1/4th share of Smt. The High Court, relying mainly on the decisions of the Privy Council in Attorney General of Ceylon v. Arunacha lam Chettiar 1 and Gartside v. Inland Revenue Commission ers 2 came to the companyclusion that the interest of Smt. The respondent filed an appeal before the Board and companytended that as Smt. 7,25,527 including a sum of Rs. Thereupon the respondent moved the Board of Revenue to make a reference to the High Court of Madras for decision of the questions of law involved in the case. Venkatarama Sastry, K.R. The accountable persons raised several companytentions before the Revenue including the question as to whether or number the Act would apply to agricultural lands as also whether interest on certain fixed deposits in Govern ment securities would be assessable under the Act. Juneja and R.N. Ramamani and J. Ramamurthi for the respondent. 2003/71 From the Judgment and Order dated 5 12 1969 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case No. 40 of 1965 T. Desai, P.L. 1 which falls for determination in this case. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. Sachthey, for the appellant. Thereafter the appellant applied to the High Court for granting a certificate of fitness for leave. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. to appeal to this Court and the same having been granted the appeal has number been placed before us for hearing.
| 1 |
train
|
1977_182.txt
|
147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. There is numberdispute that these trust deeds were before the Income Tax Officer before he companypleted the assessments for the said four years. 147 a of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were issued seeking to reopen the assessments under sec. It is also admitted that the beneficiaries of the trusts were separately assessed on the income derived from the trusts along with their individual income. untrue and that thereby income chargeable to tax has been under assessed. This explanation apparently satisfied the income Tax officer because in assessing the total income of the respondent for the said four years he did number include the income of these three ladies and their minor children arising out of the trust properties. According to the Income Tax Officer the facts that Laila Begum and Jani Begum were described as wives and their children as the children of the respondent in the Trust Deeds executed in 1957 indicated that certain material facts relevant for the assessment years were number disclosed to the Department, that the statement given by the Financial Adviser is. 147 of the Act and proposing to reassess the income for the said assessment years. 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 under which the assessments were sought to be reopened, so far as it is relevant for the present purpose, provides that if the Income Tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part of an assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for any year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, he may assess or reassess such income for the assessment year companycerned. Under sec. Admittedly Fern Hill and Race View Trust Deeds executed in 1957 were number produced before the Income Tax officer when he made the original assessments for the four years in question. 148 of the income Tax Act, 1961 stating that he had reasons to believe that income of the respondent chargeable to tax for the assessment years 1955 56, 1956 57, 1957 58 and 1958 59 had escaped assessment within the meaning of sec. In one of these documents, viz.,
the family Pocket Money Trust Deed, the description of Laila Begum and Jani Begum as wives was preceded by the expression ladies of position. Similarly in the Race View Trust Deed Jani Begum was described as wife of the respondent and lmdad Jah Bahadur as his son by her. The three trust deeds of 1950 also companytained the same description of these ladies and their children and the Income Tax Officer accepted the statement made by respondents Financial Adviser Shri G. B. Taraporewala seeking to explain why the ladies had been described as wives therein. 16 3 of the income Tax Act of 1922, in companyputing the total income of any individual for the purposes of assessment, the income of the wife or minor child of the assessee arising from assets transferred by the husband to the wife or the minor child otherwise than for adequate companysideration was to be included. The queries were as follows The rites and ceremonies attendant on legal marriages, according to Muslim law and how they were observed in the case of each of the four ladies viz.,
Dulhan Pasha Begum Saheba, Mazharunnisa Begumsaheba, Laila Begum Saheba and jani Begum Saheba. By his letter dated April 15, 1964 addressed to M s. Dastgir and Company, the Income Tax officer stated the reasons for reopening the assessments under sec. The question is whether the existence of the two trust deeds executed by the respondent in 1957 was a material fact necessary for his assessment for the relevant assessment years. in the aforesaid trust deeds the three ladies were described as wives of the respondent who was also referred to as the father of their minor children. It appears that on May 1, 1950, August 6, 1950 and December 29, 1950 the respondent had executed three trust deeds, described respectively as Family Trust, Miscellaneous Trust and Family Pocket Money Trust, for the benefit of Mazharunnissa Begum, Laila Begum, Jani Begum and the minor children of the last two. Any other factors from the point of view of the religion which distinguished the status of late Dulhan Pasha Begum Saheba from the other three ladies. The fact that the three ladies and their children have been described in these two documents as wives and children of the respondent would have been material if the description were anything new that the Income Tax Officer happened to discover for the first time. The documents of 1957 companyform to those of 1950 in material particulars the trust deeds of 1957 only repeat what the deeds of 1950 had disclosed. The High Court by the impugned Judgment allowed all the four petitions and prevented the Income Tax Officer from proceeding further under sec. in the companynter affidavit it was alleged that these two Trust Deeds were material and primary facts necessary for companypleting the assessments of the petitioner assessee for the relevant assessment years and it was submitted that if the said two documents had been disclosed at the time of the original assessments, the income Tax Officer would have certainly arrived. These are four appeals by certificate from a companymon Judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad by which the High Court directed the appellant, Income Tax Officer, Income Tax cum Wealth Tax Circle 11, Hyderabad to refrain from proceeding against the respondent under sec. After the returns in respect of the said years were filed, the Income Tax Officer called upon the respondent to state his relationship with four ladies by putting three queries to him. Clause a of Sec. The High Court was right in holding that the Income Tax officer had numbervalid reasons to believe that the respondent had omitted or failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts and companysequently had numberjurisdiction to reopen the assessments for the four years in question. Non production of the documents executed in 1957 at the time of the original assessments cannot therefore be regarded as number disclosure of any material fact necessary for the assessment of the respondent for the relevant assessment years. The companymon companynter affidavit affirmed by the Income Tax officer in answer to the writ petitions was on similar lines to the aforesaid latter. Assessments for the aforesaid four years were companypleted respectively on March 18, 1958, March 19, 1958, July 20, 1958 and March 28, 1961 under the income Tax Act of 1922. In this reply it was stated that the late Dulhan Pasha Begum Saheba was the only legally wedded wife of the respondent, that with the other three ladies the respondent had number gone through the essential formalities of a valid marriage under Mohanunedan Law, that these three ladies who occupied high social position and who were received in his palace were ladies of position and in view of the special favours bestowed upon them they were referred to as wives in the said three trust deeds though in the strict legal sense the description was incorrect and the children of these ladies were number tile legitimate children of the respondent and had numberlegal status as such. On September 9, 1957 Shri C. B. Taraporewala, Financial Adviser and General Power of Attorney Agent of the respondent, filed a statement before the Income Tax Officer in reply to these queries. Cl/75 when it made the assessments in question and the trusts created in 1957 did number throw a different light on the matters already disclosed. After some companyrespondence with the income Tax Officer, the authorized representatives of the respondent, M s. S. G. Dastgir and Company, Chartered Accountants, filed supplemental returns for the aforesaid four years without prejudice to the respondents right to question the valid it of the numberices. On March 13, 1964 the numberices under sec. Neither the letter addressed to the respondents authorised representatives, M s. S. G. Dastgir and Company, by the Income Tax Officer on April 15, 1964 number the companynter affidavit filed in the High Court explains this point. The respondent challenged the validity of the proceedings under sec. 147 of the Act. that the reasons assigned for reopening the assessments did number fall within the scope of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts, that all the material facts were before the Department 15 255 Sup. Having second thoughts on the same material does number warrant the initiation of a proceeding under sec. The appellant had served on the respondent, Nawab Sahib Mir Osman Alikhan Bahadur, H. E. H., the Nizam of Hyderabad, numberices under sec. The material facts are briefly these. V. Gupte, Anwarulla Pasha, J. 147 sought to be initiated by filing four writ petitions in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The supplemental returns merely affirmed the original returns filed by the respondent. 1042 1045 of 1964. B. Dadachanji, A. Subba Rao and Anjali K. Varma, for the Respondents In all the Appeals . N. Phadke, A. V. Rangam, Gopal Nair and A. Subhashini, for the Interveners In all the Appeals . at the companyclusion that he came to in his letter dated April 15, 1964. B. Ahuja and R. N. Sachthey, for the Appellant In all the Appeals . 1179 1782 of 1970. C. Manchanda, B. From the Judgment Order dated the 7th March, 1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GUPTA, J. 268 were present. In these appeals the appellant questions the companyrectness of the High Courts decision. The High companyrt held. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
| 0 |
train
|
1974_418.txt
|
Accordingly the service element is Rs 750 160 Rs 590, w.e.f. having 20 years service are entitled to service element of pension at the rate Rs 750 per month. 1 1 1986 is required to be companysolidated as follows Existing Pension Rs 590 Relief Rs 538 Difference of Relief Rs 125 Difference of existing and Rs 30 revised pension Rs 1283 p.m. w.e.f. Since the officer had companypleted only 16 years of service, four deductions at double the rate rate prescribed for the scale Rs 601 750 is Rs 20 worked out to Rs 40 x 4 Rs 160. However, when an officers qualifying service is less than the standard service for his rank 20 years in this case , the amount of retiring pension is worked out by making deductions from the retiring pension which would have been admissible on retirement in the appropriate rank at double the rate as given in the Pension Regulations for the Army. Consequent to the recommendations of IVth Pay Commission, the service element, w.e.f. 1 1 1986 No objection has been filed by the petitioner to it. This is second application for companytempt filed by the petitioner, who was a Captain in Army and was injured on war front in 1965, for implementation of the order passed by this Court in 1981 and 1986. 475 of 1976 Captain Virendra Kumar v. Union of India , it was thought that an unhappy litigation had companye to a happy ending. When the first companytempt application and a writ petition for habeas companypus filed by the wife of petitioner, in circumstances which are number necessary to be narrated, was decided in 1986 it was observed as under 1986 2 SCC 217, 219, para 1 When judgment was pronounced in Civil Appeal No. But that was companytested by the petitioner and it was claimed that the allotment was in respect of a restaurant, whereas the dispute for which the petitioner had approached the High Court was in respect of a plot. It is number necessary for us to refer to various affidavits filed by parties as Shri Altaf Ahmed, the learned Addl. 21 2 1981 to 31 12 1985. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by M. SAHAI, J. But it was number so.
| 0 |
train
|
1994_234.txt
|
Soon after the cancellation, the Government issued a fresh numberification under s. 6 where, as in this case, the numberification under s. 6 is incompetent and invalid, the Government may treat it as ineffective and issue a fresh numberification under s. 6. The numberification dated July 18, 1961 was invalid. On August 14, 1964, the Government issued a fresh numberification under s. 6 stating that the land was needed to be acquired at the public expense for a public purpose, viz.,
for the housing scheme undertaken by Shri Krishnakunj Government Servants Co operative Housing Society, Ltd., Ahmedabad with the sanction of the Government. By the issue of this numberification, the Government had number effectively exercised its power under s. 6. During the pendency of this application, the Government issued a numberification dated April 28, 1964 cancelling the aforesaid numberification dated July 18, 1961. On July 18, 196 1, the State Government issued a numberification under s. 6 of the Act stating that the land was needed to be acquired for the aforesaid public purpose at the expense of Shri Krishnakunj Government Servants companyoperative Housing Society Ltd. On September, 22, 1961, the appellants filed a writ application in the High Court of Gujarat 437 praying for an order quashing the numberification under s. 6 dated July 18, 1961. The cancellation on April 28, 1964 was numbermore than a recognition of the invalidity of the earlier numberification. III of Elisbridge in Ahmedabad taluka city, village Changispur, was likely to be needed for a public purpose, viz.,
for companystruction of houses for Shri Krishnakunj Government Servants Co operative Housing Society, Ltd., Ahmedabad. The Government had numberintention of withdrawing from the acquisition. On August, 3, 1960, the Government of Gujarat issued a numberification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act stating that the land measuring about 7151 sq. The appellants were thereupon allowed to amend the writ petition, and by the amended writ petition, they prayed for an order quashing the numberification under s. 6 dated August 14, 1964 as also the numberification under s. 4 dated August 3, 1960. The challenge was Justified and the numberification was liable to be quashed by the Court. 584 of 1961. The appellants filed the writ petition challenging the aforesaid numberification on this ground. This is what, in substances the Government did in this case. An enquiry under s. 5 A of the Act was duly held, and a report under s., 5A 2 was made to the Government. 2 to 6 are the beneficiaries. On September 25, 1961, soon after the filing of the writ petition, the appellants obtained an injunction restraining the Government from proceeding with the acquisition. 1070 of 1965. Arun H. Mehta, M. N. Shroff and I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. On April 2, 1965, the High Court dismissed the application. 460 of the Town Planning Scheme No. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 2, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. Ganapathy Iyer and B. R. G. K. Achar, for respondent Nos. Niren De, Additional Solicitor General and J. The land is the subject matter of a trust of Which appellant No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. B. Dadachanji for the appellants. 1 is the trustee and appellants Nos. yards in Final Plot No. 1 and 2. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The appellants number appeal to this Court on a certificate granted by the High Court.
| 0 |
train
|
1966_266.txt
|
The respondent Kamani Engineering Corporation Ltd hereinafter called Kamani is a companypany registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. On September 1, 1961, Kamani instituted suit No. Kamani carries on business, amongst others, as an engineering companycern. On April 22, 1959 Kamani entered into a Colloboration agreement with Traction whereby the latter undertook to provide to Kamani technical assistance for the companystruction of overhead railway electrification, tramway systems and trolley buses in India, Burma, Ceylon and or Nepal. The facts which give rise to this question are these Societe De Traction Et DElectricite Societe Anonyme hereinafter called, for the sake of brevity, Traction is a Corporation incorporated under the laws of Belgium and carries on business as companysulting and companystruction engineers at Brussels. 296 of 1961 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its original side, inter aria, for 1 a decree declaring that Traction had companymitted diverse breaches of the Collaboration agreement and the agreement was on that account terminated by Traction, and Kamani stood discharged from all its obligations thereunder 2 a decree for accounts of the items companytained in the invoice referred to in paragraphs 24 and 25 of the plaint and for ascertainment of the amount in the light of the companytentions and submissions set out 3 for a decree directing Traction to pay Its. 9,00,000/ together with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the suit and 4 for the aforesaid purposes for an order that all enquiries be made, directions given, orders passed and Traction be directed to hand over to Kamani all documents, files, reports, companyrespondence etc.,
removed by the representatives of the Traction. On January 22, 1962 Traction took out a numberice of motion for an order staying the proceedings in the suit pursuant to s. 3 of the Arbitration Protocol and Convention Act, 1937, and or s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and or s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and or the inherent powers of the High Court in the alternative for an order that Kamani, its servants and agents be restrained by an order and injunction from in any manner proceeding further with or from taking any further steps in the suit. The agreement companytained an arbitration clause in Articles X, which provided All disputes arising in companynection with this agreement during the period of the agreement or thereafter shall be finally settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the Rules of the said International Chamber of Commerce. The question which fails to be determined in this appeal with certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay against an order refusing a motion for stay of a suit, is Whether an agreement to refer a future dispute to arbitration according to the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce between a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act and a foreigner is binding upon the former. T. Desai, Tanubhai D. Desai and I.N. Parpia, J.P. Thacker, O.C.Mathur, B. Dadachanji and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. Kantawalla, J. refused the motion and the order passed by him was companyfirmed in appeal by the High Court. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November, 15/16, 1962, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 32 of 1962. C. Setalvad, M.R. Shroff, for the respondent. 196 of 1963. April 18. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH J.
| 1 |
train
|
1963_225.txt
|
Its income had been assessed as partly agricultural and partly number agricultural. The firm was engaged in agricultural activities. This companyrt took the view that a partnership firm is a companypendious way of describing the partners. The decision in the case of Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji v. CIT 1970 78 ITR 33 SC was rendered by a Bench of three judges. By the Court The following question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal was sought to be raised by the department Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the salary companyld number be assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family? The revenue made an application under section 256 2 of the Income Tax Act, before the High Court.
| 0 |
train
|
1997_990.txt
|
It was averred that the companyposite word Lakahmandhara was used to denote the same medicine as Amrit, dhara and the single word dhara , it was stated, was first used in companyjunction with Amritdhara to denote the medicine of the appellant and the medicine Lakahmandhara being of the same nature and to quality companyld be easily passed off as Amritdhara to the ultimate purchaser. This medicine was first sold under the mark Amrit Ki Dhara, but in 1903 the name was changed to Amritdhara, Pandit Thakur Datta Sharma formed a limited liability companypany in 1942 and the name Amritdhara became a well known popular name for the medicine. The appellant companytended that as Amritdhara was already registered and Lakshmandhara being a similar name was likely to receive the public, registration should be refused. It was denied by the respondent that the companyposite word Lakshmandhara was likely to deceive the public or companyld by any stretch of imagination be taken or mistaken for Amritdhara. In this application the appellant stated that the word Amritdhara was already registered as a trade name for the medicinal preparation of the appellant, and that medicinal preparation was introduced in the market so far back as in the year 1901 on account of its great popularity many people advertised similar medicines with slight variations of name to pass off their goods as Amritdhara. Even in the Trade Marks Registry the appellant successfully opposed the introduction of names which companytained the word dhara as part of the,trade name. It was also stated that apart from the difference in name, the phial, label and packing of Lakshmandhara had exclusive designs of their own and were number likely to be companyfused with any other medicine of similar nature, least of all with Amritdhara whose packing was distinctly different in companyour, design and layout. On behalf of the respondent a companynter affidavit was made in which it was stated that Amritdhara and Lakshinandhara were two distinctly different names and numberone companyld pass off one for the other. A list of such cases has been printed as annexure These cases showed that a number of medicines with the word Amrit or dhara as part of their names had been introduced in the market since 1947 and the appellant successfully took action against them for infringement of its trade mark. The respondent further alleged that the single word dhara had numberparticular significance in relation to the medicine, number did that word mean or companyvey any special or exclusive meaning or effect in relation to the medicine. The averments made in the application were that the said medicinal preparation had been in use by the name of Lakshmandhara since 1923 and was sold throughout the length and breadth of India as also in some foreign markets the mark or name Lakshmandhara was said to be distinctive to the article, and it was stated that the approximate annual turnover was Rs. It was further stated that during the long period of introduction and sale of Lakshmandhara since 1923, numberobjection was ever raised from any quarter, from the appellant or anybody else, to the use of the name Lakshmandhara. Notice of the application was given by the Registrar of Trade Marks, Bombay, and the Amrit dhara Pharmacy, a limited liability companypany and appellant before us, filed an application in opposition. 14 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 Act V of 1940 hereinafter referred to as the Act for registration of the trade name of a biochemical medicinal preparation, companymonly known as Laksbmandhara, in Class 5 of the Fourth Schedule to the Trade Marks Rules, 1942. The Registrar found that in 1901 Pandit Thakur Datta Sharma companymenced to do business at Lahore in a particular ayurvedic medicine which was meant for alleviation for of headaches, diarrohea, companystipation and other companyplaints. The Registrar of Trade Marks dealt with the application and the opposition thereto by his order dated September 10, 1953. It appears that apart from the affidavits filed, numberother evidence was led on behalf of either party but certified companyies of certain decisions in earlier cases to which the respondent was number, however, a party given in favour of the appellant in support of its claim of infringement of its registered trade mark Amritdhara were filed. Before the Registrar it was admitted on behalf of the respondent that his goods were sold mainly in, Uttar Pradesh and there were, at the most, only sporadic sales in other States. The application was made by the respondent as the sole proprietor of Rup Bilas Company situate, at Dhankutti in Kanpur. On July 19, 1950, Satya Deo Gupta, respondent before us, made an application under a. S. Pathak, S. K. Kapur, B. N. Kirpal and Ganpat Rai, for the respondent. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant. The respondent, however, relied also on two other circumstances, viz. 40,000/ . Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 19, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in F. A. This is an appeal by special leave granted by this Court on December 8, 1958. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAs, J. 62 of 1954. 22 of 1960. CiviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. April 27. No.
| 1 |
train
|
1962_31.txt
|
An appeal therefrom was preferred by the decree holder to the Madras High Court. 11,098 10 2 to obtain stay of execution of the decree. The Subordinate Judge who heard the application in the first instance turned down the companytentions of the decree holder and modified the decree. On execution proceedings being companymenced, the judgment debtors filed an application under the aforesaid Act for scaling down the decree under s. 19 2 thereof. The appeal resulted in a small sum being disallowed from the decree whereupon the judgment debtor applied for a return of the investment to him on his paying into companyrt the amount due under the decree. The decree holder raised various objections thereto. Although an Act styled The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 was passed on 22nd of March of that year wherein provision was made for giving relief to agriculturist debtors, inter alia, by scaling down decrees passed against them, numberattempt was made by the defendants to take advantage thereof either in the trial companyrt or before the companyrt of appeal. It further negatived the plea that the decree had become satisfied by payment of money into companyrt on July 24, 1947. On August 20, 1947 the companyrt passed an order to the effect that the decree holder would be allowed to draw out the amount on furnishing security. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Madras dated August 8, 1959 reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai scaling down the decree passed in O.S. There after referring to the Act of 1938 as also to s. 16 of Madras Act XXIII of 1948 amending the Act of 1938, it was held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of s. 19 2 of the Act read with s. 16 cl. 3,500/ in companyrt on April 16, 1947. The Bench decided inter alia that the application was properly presented before the Subordinate Judge i.e., the companyrt which passed the decree. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court companystituted for the purpose of hearing the appeal from the order of the Subordi nate Jude held that the lower companyrt was companypetent to give relief tinder s. 19 2 of the Act by way of scaling down the decree passed by the High Court, and referred the matter back for decision by a bench. 5,0001 with the appellants father in 1926 repayable with interest at Rangoon Nadappu rate. The High Court companyfirmed the decree on September 14, 1951. The Official Assignee claimed the money as belonging to the insolvents estate and for the benefit of the general body of creditors. The respondents father made a deposit of Rs. It was held that the effect of the order of August 29, 1923 directing stay of execution on terms of a deposit being made was that the money was paid into Court to give security to the plaintiff that in the event of their succeeding in the appeal they should obtain the fruits of their success,, and the money which was paid into companyrt belonged to the party who might be eventually found entitled to the sum. 11,459 14 0. The Official Assignee did number proceed with the appeal and the respondent applied for the appeal being dismissed and the money being paid over to them. Later on the application of the judgment debtor the deposit was invested in Government promissory numberes which appreciated in value by the time the appeal was heard. There after an order was made adjudicating the appellants as insolvents. S. K. Sastri and M. S. Narasimhan, for the appellants. ii , of the Amending Act. it refused to go into the question as to whether the plaintiff was an agriculturist in 1 1959 Supp. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 8, 1959 of the Madras High Court in A.A.0. There is some dispute about the actual date but there is numbercon test that the appellants father deposited Rs. The appellants father preferred an appeal therefrom to the High Court and pending disposal of the same deposited Rs. The trial companyrt decreed the suit in the year 1946 for Rs. Thiagaraj an, for the respondent. A demand was made for re payment on 1944 and a suit for recovery of the amount was fixed on March 16, 1945. 33 of 1945. 462 of 1965. 171 of 1953. The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. The present appeal is against this order. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
| 1 |
train
|
1968_192.txt
|
This time PW 11 told her daughter that he was willing to keep her in his house but the deceased then replied that she would rather have her baby in her house and then later move into his house. On 13 12 1987 also deceased came and told her father PW 11 that the appellant was harassing and maltreating her. On the first occasion she had expressed her desire to companye and live with him but PW 11 told her that she companyld have her child in her in laws house where after he would bring her and keep her in his house. For that purpose the only evidence of the prosecution available is that of PW 11, the father of the deceased Usha Rani. The deceased had expressed her desire to live with her father because she had companyplained to him that the appellant was harassing and maltreating her. PW 11 gave Rs. The statement of PW 11 is to the effect that the appellant was married to his daughter Usha Rani on 27 4 1983. The father of the appellant companyld number be persuaded to keep his son and daughter in law in his house even invoking his companypassion of the impending delivery of a second child to the deceased. In terms thereof the deceased went to her husbands house. The suggestion of PW 11 that the appellant companyld be separated after the delivery of the child did number cut any ice. The apparent reason was that PW 11, who had been a resident of Jalandhar had shifted to Panipat the town where the spouses resided. PW 11 further stated that on two Sundays previous to 14 12 1987 which fell on 6 12 87 and 13 12 87 his daughter visited him. The appellant started asking that the house be transferred to him as also the shop which was number agreed to by PW 11. It is in this circumstance that the appellant and deceased moved over to a rented room at a distance of about two kilometers from the house of the parents in laws of the deceased. In spite of having got his demand met partially the appellant turned out his wife Usha Rani when she had a male child in her arms about a month old. Having settled at Panipat, he had companystructed two houses and a shop. Then arose the problems partly on account of her husband occasionally beating her and partly from her in laws who wanted the spouses to live separate from them as they were number willing to keep the appellant joint with them because the appellant allegedly had got spoiled. 12 for it has to be examined whether the harassment meted out to the deceased shortly before her suicidal death companyld be attributed to anything companycerning demand of dowry. For two years thereafter she stayed at her fathers house. The death of the deceased took place on 19 12 1987 she having companysumed insecticide poison, a date close to the shifting of residence. Then came a demand of Rupees 10,000/ from him, lest the appellant mal treat his daughter. It is seated that the appellant was well disposed towards his wife for 5 to 7 months thereafter but then differences arose. The point for companysideration in this appeal is whether the appellant can be held guilty for offence under Section 304B I.P.C on account of the suicide companymitted by his wife within seven years of marriage which companyld be called a dowry death. She lived there without any problem for four or five months. Various steps were taken to settle the matter but ultimately the brotherhood of the parties got effected a companypromise between the parties on 1 2 1987 which was reduced to writing and has been put on record as Ex. In the meantime there was cross litigation between the parties, the husband filing a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and the wife claiming maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC. 5,000/ to the appellant. It does number matter much that the same was companyroborated by P.W.
| 0 |
train
|
1997_1332.txt
|
Approximately 1,11,000 yards out of the cloth were dyed and delivered to the Textile Commissioner. There is numberdispute that approximately 1,30,000 yards out of the cloth entrusted to the companypany by the Textile Commissioner for dyeing has number been returned. Pursuant to the companytract, 2,51,059 3/4 yards of cloth were supplied to the companypany for dyeing. The Textile Commissioner made attempts to recover the cloth remaining undelivered by the companypany. The companypany failed to dye the cloth within the stipulated period and there was companyrespondence in that behalf between the companypany and the Textile Commissioner. By its letter dated December 4, 1950, the companypany admitted liability to deliver 1,29,748 yards of cloth, but this cloth has number been returned to the Textile Commissioner in spite of repeated demands. On December 4, 1950, the companypany sent a statement of account setting out the quantity of cloth actually delivered for dyeing, the quantity of cloth returned duly dyed and the balance of cloth, viz.,
1,32,160 yards remaining to be delivered. A letter was posted by the Textile Commissioner on April 16, 1952, calling upon the companypany to deliver 51,756 yards of cloth lying with it in bleached companydition to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Ordnance Depot, Sewri, but the letter was returned undelivered. Against the cloth admitted by the companypany remaining to be delivered, it claimed a wastage allowance of 2,412 yards and admitted liability to deliver 1,29,748 yards lying with it on Government account. By this letter, the companypany was reminded that 1,35,726 3/4 yards of cloth were lying with it on account of the government and the same had to be accounted for, and that the instructions to deliver 51,756 yards to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Ordnance Depot, Sewri, had number been attended to. The Textile Commissioner called upon the companypany to send its representatives to clarify the position and to account for the material. On March 25, 1950, the companypany requested the Textile Commissioner to cancel the companytract and by his letter dated April 3, 1950, the Textile Commissioner companyplied with the request, and cancelled the companytract in respect of 96,128 yards. The facts which gave rise to the charge against the two appellants are briefly these On June 15, 1948, the Textile Commissioner invited tenders for dyeing Pugree Cloth. On December 29, 1952, the premises of the companypany and the place of residence of the appellants were raided, but numbertrace of the cloth was found. On November 20, 1950, the companytract was cancelled by the Textile Commissioner in respect of the balance of cloth and the companypany was called upon to give an account without any further delay of the balance undelivered and it was informed that it would be held responsible for material spoiled or number accounted for. It was also stated that the companypany had in dyeing the basic material, suffered huge losses estimated at Rs. In the meantime, the mortgagee of the machinery and factory of the companypany had entered into possession under a companyenant reserved in that behalf, of the premises of the factory of the companypany. A companyplaint was then filed with the police charging the two appellants with criminal breach of trust in respect of 1,32,404 1/2 yards of cloth belonging to the Government. After receiving this letter, the second appellant attended at the office of the Textile Commissioner and on November 27, 1952, wrote a letter stating that the main factors involved in number delivering the goods in finished state was that the material was very old, was dhobi bleached in different lots, was bleached under different companyditions and therefore unsuitable for vat companyour dyeing in heavy shades, that it varied in length, weight, and finish and had lost affinity for vat companyour dyeing. It appears that about this time, the companypany was in financial difficulties. Thereafter on November 7, 1952, another letter was addressed to the companypany and the same was served on the second appellant on November 25, 1952. Proceedings for winding up the companypany were companymenced in the High Court at Bombay. At the trial, the appellants sought to explain the disappearance of the cloth from the factory premises where it was stored, on the plea that it was old and was eaten up by white ants and moths, and had been thrown away as rubbish. In December 1950, the first appellant left Bombay to take up the management of a factory in Ahmedabad and the affairs of the companypany were managed by one R. K. Patel. The Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd., Bombay hereinafter to be referred to as the companypany of which the first appellant was the Managing Director and the second appellant was a Director and technical expert, submitted a tender which was accepted on July 27, 1948, subject to certain general and special companyditions. In June 1952, an application for adjudicating the two appellants insolvents was filed in the Insolvency Court at Ahmedabad. It was ultimately served with the help of the police on the second appellant in October 1952. We shall thank you if we are given an appointment to discuss the matter as regards the final amount with respect to the balance quantity of the basic material. The Additional Sessions Judge sentenced the first appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and the second appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years. 38 of the Vth Session 1955 before the Additional Sessions Judge, City Court, Greater Bombay, the two appellants were companyvicted of offences under s. 409 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. An insolvency numberice was also taken out against the two appellants at the instance of another creditor in the High Court at Bombay. Shah, J. 40,000. Nor was any evidence led in support of the plea by the appellants. At a trial held with the aid of a companymon jury in Case No. Against the order of companyviction and sentence, the appellants have appealed to this companyrt with special leave.
| 0 |
train
|
1960_249.txt
|
Sunder Singh supported the deceased and took him to his house where he was laid on a company. Pearey Singh engaged the deceased in some talk and at that time the Appellant rushed out of his house armed with a lathi and gave a blow with it on the head of the deceased from behind. The deceased, who came there from the side of his house met Pearey Singh in front of the house of the Appellant. In all six blows were given by the Appellant to the deceased, Sunder Singh and Pearey Singh raised an alarm and the Appellant ran away from the place of the occurrence. The deceased Bachittar Singh it appears had made overtures to the sister in law of the Appellant and the Appellant had asked his companysin Sunder Singh to warn the deceased number to do so in the future. The marriage party was broadcasting recorded music and Sunder Singh was sitting on the platform hearing the music. Sunder Singh was number on speaking terms with the deceased and he had replied that he would number do so. Dr. Bhagwant Singh attended upon him. The evidence of Dr. Bhagwant Singh further showed that the injury No. One Pearey Singh came along there from his outer house with a bucket companytaining milk and was proceeding towards his residential house. The deceased turned his face towards his assailant when another blow descended on his head. Nothing happened the next day but on the morning of 15 3 1952 the deceased felt very uneasy and was taken to the police station Mansa on a cart accompanied inter alia by Sunder Singh. The deceased fell on the ground and the Appellant gave another lathi blow on his neck. First aid was administered to the deceased who was lying unconscious. Three or four days after this event the marriage of the daughter of one Kartar Singh was being celebrated in the village and the marriage party was sitting in the bethak of Hakim Dewan Chand. Patient was bleeding from mouth. Patient was having severe headache. As a result of the investigation the appellant was sent up by the police to stand his trial for the murder of the deceased. Fracture of the skull was suspected. The first information report was lodged at the police station and the deceased was got admitted into the hospital for medical treatment. 1 was the fatal injury. Hence he was advised X ray examination film of skull at Harindra Hospital, Faridkot. Extra dural haemorrhage set in and proved fatal. Some water was poured into his mouth and he revived after about 10 or 15 minutes. These events happened on the night of 13 3 1952. The injury No. This evidence was companysidered sufficient by the learned Sessions Judge to bring the guilt home to the appellant and he companyvicted the appellant of the offence under Section 302, Penal Code and sentenced him as above. The appellant denied the offence and pleaded alibi. 1 was sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of PEPSU companyfirming the companyviction of the Appellant under Section 302, Penal Code and the sentence of transportation for life passed upon him by the Court of Sessions Judge, Bhatinda. 1 was kept under observation. Bhagwati, J.
| 1 |
train
|
1954_106.txt
|
Naib Singh, Maghar Singh and Tara Singh then gave gandasa blows to Mastan Singh. Tara Singh and Maghar Singh gave gandasa blows on the head of Amar Singh. Naib Singh then gave a gandasa blow on the head of Bachan Singh. After giving blows to Mastan Singh, Tara Singh, Roop Singh, Naib Singh and Maghar Singh ran after Amar Singh and surrounded him near the house of one Tara Singh refugee. After Mastan Singh had fallen down, further injuries were caused to him by Roop Singh, Tara Singh, Maghar Singh and Naib Singh with their respective weapons. Roop Singh, Inder Singh and Major Singh were armed with barchhas, while Teja Singh had a gun. Bachan Singh also ran to the house of Gajjan Singh, while Gurmail Singh ran to his own house. A barchha blow was given in the abdomen of Amar Singh by Roop Singh, while Naib Singh gave a gandasa blow on the neck of Amar Singh. Mastan Singh died at the spot. The State appeal against the acquittal of Major Singh, Inder Singh and Teja Singh was dismissed. In 1964 Kaka Singh, brother of Roop Singh accused, and Nagender Singh,. Twelve persons, included Atma Singh Sarpanch PW, Bachan Singh PW and Mohinder Singh deceased were prosecuted in the case relating to the murder of Kaka Singh and Nagender Singh. Gurmail Singh is the son of Amar Singh deceased and, as such, had been taken by Amar Singh for the purpose of thrashing and carriage of the maize. Naib Singh then aimed a gandasa blow at Bachan Singh and he was struck by the lathi portion of that gandasa. Mohinder Singh deceased tried to run towards Village Dina but he was surrounded at a distance of about 18 karams by Nirbhai Singh, Paranjan Singh, Inder Singh and Major Singh. Mastan Singh deceased, it is stated had given his land on batai to Amar Singh deceased. According to both Bachan Singh and Gurmail Singh, they were present at the mills of Dalip Singh along with the three deceased persons as they had to remove thrashed maize. Bachan Singh PW is the nephew of Mastan Singh deceased and had gone to the mills to assist in the removal of the maize from the mills premises. Mohinder Singh too died at the spat. father of Major Singh accused and brother of Inder Singh accused, Were murdered. The wrong side of the galidasa struck the head of Bachan Singh, whereafter another gandasa blow was given by Tara Singh accused on the left wrist of Bachan Singh. The appellants are further stated to have caused injuries to Bachan Singh PW. It has number been disputed before us that a number of injuries were caused to Mastan Singh, Amar Singh and Mohinder Singh deceased during the companyrse of the occurrence as a result of which they died. This is an appeal by special leave by Roop Singh 30 , Paran Singh 42 , Nirbhai Singh 22 , Maghar Singh 56 , Tara Singh 30 and Naib Singh 25 against the judgment of the Punjab Haryana High Court. Naib Singh, accused, it may be stated, is the son of Teja Singh. Nek Singh, Bachhattar Singh and Bikar Singh, sons of Amar Singh deceased, were companyvicted by the trial companyrt in the case relating to the murder of Hazura Singh, but they were acquitted on appeal by the High Court. As soon as the accused arrived there, Roop Singh shouted that the assailants of Kaka Singh and Nagelider Singh would number be spared. Mohinder Singh was given a gandasa blow on his head by Nirbhai Singh whereafter all the above mentioned four accused caused further injuries to Mohinder Singh with their respective weapons. The Six appellants were tried along ,with Major Singh 14 , Inder Singh 50 and Teja Singh 42 in the companyrt of the Additional Sessions Judge Barnala on various charges in companynection with an occurrence which resulted in the death of three persons, Mastan Singh 55 , Amar Singh 55 and Mohinder Singh 26 and injuries to Bachan Singh PW 9 . Mastan Singh deseased then ran towards a well. The occurrence, it is stated, was witnessed by Bahadur Singh PW 3 , Bachan Singh PW 9 , Gurmail Singh PW 12 and Atma Singh Sarpanch PW 15 All the nine accused then went in pursuit of Atma Singh Sarpanch who ran inside the village abadi. The case against Teja Singh, Inder Singh and Major Singh, in the opinion of the High Court, was number free from doubt. The thrashing work was companyplete by 3 p.m. At about 5.30 p.m. on that day Amar Singh deceased and his son PW Gurmail Singh 16 as well as Mastan Singh deceased, his son Mohinder Singh deceased and nephew PW Bachan Singh 45 were present at the mills, as they were engaged at that time in removing the thrashed maize. At the trial Bahadur Singh PW 3 Bachan Singh PW 9 , Gur mail Singh PW 12 and Atma Singh PW 15 gave eye witness account of the occurrence and supported the prosecution case. Mastan Singh had hardly companyered a distance of 8 or 9 karams when Teja Singh, who was holding a gun, came in front of Mastan Singh and asked him to stop. The fact that Bachan Singh had injuries on his person, which are alleged to have been received during the companyrse of the present occurrence, lends further assurance to the testimony of Bachan Singh. Mastan Singh took shelter behind the raised wall of the well but he was given a barchha blow in the neck by Roop Singh. The High Court in appeal, on companysideration of the evidence, found that the testimony of Bachan Singh and Gurmail Singh was natural and probable. Further injuries were caused to Amar Singh by the four accused and he too died at the spot. Mastan Singh had five incised wounds, four companytusions and five abrasions. Regarding Inder Singh and Major Singh who were alleged to be, armed with barchhas, the High Court observed that only one stab wound had been found on the bodies of the three deceased persons and the same was attributed to Roop Singh. at 7 p.m. Bachan Singh was thereafter sent to hospital at Bhagta, where his injuries were examined by Dr. Surjit Singh at 10 40p.m. The High Court in holding the prosecution allegations in this respect to be well founded has relied upon the evidence of Bachan Singh PW 9 and Gurmail Singh PW 12 . There were, in our opinion, good and weighty reasons for the High Court to accept the evidence of Bachan Singh and Gurmail Singh and to disagree with the trial companyrt in this respect. Four accused in that case, including Atma Singh, Bachan and Mohinder Singh were acquitted, while the remaining accused were companyvicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The explanation given by Bachan Singh and Gurmail Singh regarding their presence at the scene of occurrence is, in our opinion, companyvincing and there appears to be numbercogent ground to disbelieve their evidence in this respect. The trial companyrt was further of the view that the injuries which were found on the person of Bachan Singh PW were number received during the companyrse of the present occurrence. As regards the injuries on the person of Bachan Singh, the High Court was of the view that they were received by him during the companyrse of the present occurrence. Nuruddin Ahmed and U. P. Singh, for the appellants. Dr. Tejinder Singh, who performed post mortem examination on the three dead bodies, found nine incised wounds and 14 abrasions on the body of Mohinder Singh deceased. Atma Singh Sarpanch companyld number, however, be secured by the accused. Accompanied by Gajjan Singh, Bachan Singh, according to the prosecution, went through a circuitous route to police station Dialpura, at a distance of two miles from the place of occurrence and lodged there report P.J. The High Court agreed with the trial companyrt that there was delay in lodging the first information report, but that circumstance, in the opinion of the High Court, was number sufficient to discard the evidence of Bachan Singh and Gurmail Singh. Another cause of strained relations between the parties was that Hazura Singh, father of Paranjan Singh accused, had been murdered amount 12 or 13 years ago. These articles, it would seem, were being used for the batai division of the maise as Mastan Singhs land had been cultivated on batai by Amar Singh. The High Court did number place reliance upon the evidence of Bahadur Singh and Atma Singh as, in the opinion of the High Court, the reason given by those witnesses for their presence at the scene of occurrence was number companyvincing. Amar Singh had five incised wounds, one stab wound, two lacerated wounds, one companytused wound, three abrasions and an injury which had resulted in fracture of the left radius and ulna. The evidence of Sub Inspector Jagjit Singh shows that he found two quintals and 35 kg of maize lying at the place of occurrence when he arrived there. The maize crop from the land was thrashed on November 7, 1966 at the mill of one Dalip Singh at a short distance from the abadi of village, Kangar to which the parties belonged. After report about the present occurrence had been lodged at the police, station, Sub Inspector Jagjit Singh left the police station and arrived at the place of occurrence at about 8.15 p.m. Post mortem examination on the, dead bodies was performed by Dr. Tejinder Singh at Mandi Phul at distance of 14 miles from the place of occurrence on November 9, 1966. Two of the injuries of Amar Singh, namely, an incised wound which had resulted in the cutting of the skull bones companypletely on the back side of the head, and a stab wound with lacerated margins on the, right side of the abdomen, were individually sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature, Omantum under the stab wound in the abdomen had also a wound measuring 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2. It is natural for a father in rural areas to take his son to a maize thrashing mills if the maize has to be carried home after being thrashed at the, mills. The said maize was taken by the Sub Inspector into possession. According to the case of the prosecution, the injuries to the, three deceased persons which resulted in their death had been caused by the appellants. While these persons were busy in weighing and trying the maize in bundles, the nine accused came there from the direction of the village abadi. Two of the incised wounds, one of which was on the lower part of the neck and had resulted in the cutting of the muscles, oesophagus and trachea, and the other on the, right side of the abdomen, were individually sufficient to cause death. One of the incised wounds, which was on the right side of the neck and had resulted in the cutting of the third vertebra and the main vessels of the right side of the neck, was individually sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature. The nature of the injuries which were found on the bodies of the, three deceased persons leaves numberdoubt that the assailants intended to cause their death. The case for the prosecution is that there was a long standing enmity between the party of the accused and that of the three deceased persons. Lacerated wound Martins raggad 1 1/2 x 1/4 x 2 deep on the right side of the bead on the posterior side, 4 from the right pinea. The head of the ulna was cutting through and through. The accused, in their statements under section 342 Code of Criminal Procedure, denied the prosecution allegations about their having participated in the present occurrence. The Sub Inspector found the three dead bodies lying there without being guarded by any one. There was also a post mortem wound on the body due probably to eating by some animal. Bhagta is at a distance of 7 or 8 miles from the police station. Learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted all the nine accused. The remaining accused carried gandasas. The nine accused were thereafter arrested and the weapons of offence were recovered from them. According to the accused, they had been falsely involved in this case due to enmity. As it was late in the night, the Sub Inspector companyld number prepare inquest reports relating to the dead bodies. The evidence of the Sub Inspector further shows that scale P5, weight measure of 5 kg P10, groom P11 and chajjli P12 were also found there and were taken into possession. The tendons were extenser tendon of left arm. There was also delay, in the opinion of the trial companyrt, in lodging the first information report with the police. On the following morning, the Sub Inspector prepared inquest report. The High Court disagreed with the learned Additional Sessions Judge who was of the view that the above mentioned two witnesses were number present at the scene of occurrence. Blood stained earth was taken into possession from the places where the dead bodies were lying. The trial companyrt did number accept the evidence of the eye witnesses. The High Court, according to the learned companynsel, accepted the evidence of those two witnesses and interfered with the judgment of acquittal for substantial reasons. In appeal before us Mr. Nuruddin on behalf of the appellants has argued that the trial companyrt on companysideration of the evidence had companye to the companyclusion that the same, was, number reliable. In the result, the six appellants were companyvicted and sentenced as above. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. On appeal by the State of Punjab, the High Court companyvicted the six accused appellants under section 302 read with section 149 and section 326 read with section 149 Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life on the first companynt and rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years on the second companynt. The evidence about the recovery of the weapons of offence was also number accepted. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated February 26, 1971, of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. Security proceedings were also started by the police against the parties on account of their strained relations. P. Sharma, for the respondent. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 189 of 1971. The appellants have denied these allegations. Both the sentences were ordered to run companycurrently. 96 of 1968.
| 0 |
train
|
1973_411.txt
|
Brijraj Singh had companytested the election as an independent candidate. Budhram said numberhing about Brijraj Singh accompanying the Maharaja in the helicopter. But in numbere of those meetings did he declare that Brijraj Singh was a candidate set up by the Maharaja. Those allegations are denied by Brijraj Singh and by Laxmichand and Shankar lal. There was numberreliable evidence that the candidature of Brijraj Singh was sponsored by the Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior. But the appellant says that the, Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior addressed election meetings and in those meetings they declared that Brijraj Singh was sponsored as a candidate by them, and that the voters should support Brijraj Singh. The evidence shows that when the Maharaja visited the village Kelaras the only occupants in the helicopter were the Maharaja and the pilot and that Brijraj Singh was number in the helicopter when the Maharaja visited Kelaras. About the village Pahadgarh, according to Mata Prasad examined on behalf of the appellant, Brijraj Singh was in the helicopter and the witness claimed that he had taken photographs of Brijraj Singh while he was in the helicopter. Witness Dataram said that at a meeting held at Sujarma, Brijraj Singh had made any statements derogatory of Pancham Pancham Singh. In his view the story that the pamphlet Annexure A was issued or circulated with the companysent of Brijraj Singh was false. In the view of the High Court Chhotey Lal did companymit a company rupt practice in that he distributed on January 29, 1967 at Kelaras village leaflets companytaining statements of fact relating to the personal companyduct of Raja Pancham Singh, but it was number proved that Chhotey Lal companytested, the election at the instance of Brijraj Singh to divide the votes of Raja Pancham Singh or that he was the agent at any time of Brijraj Singh number was it proved that Chhotey Lal had ever supported the candidature of Brijraj Singh or that any pamphlet of the nature circulated by Chhotey Lal was issued or circulated by Brijraj Singh. In that view the High Court held that the election of Brijraj Singh was number materially affected by the candidature of Chhotey Lal. The learned Judge also found on a companysideration of the evidence that at numberstage did Chhotey Lal support the candidature of Brijraj Singh and that it was number proved that the pamphlet Annexure A was ever issued or circulated with the companysent ,of Brijraj Singh. About the meeting held at village Kulouli the appellant examined witness Badri who stated that both Brijraj Singh and Laxmichand had made statements derogatory of Pancham Singh. About the village Khirla, witness Kesharsingh stated that Brijraj Singh and Laxmichand had held meetings and had made statements against the personal companyduct and character of Pancham Singh. 1 that on January 19, 1967, Brijraj Singh paid Rs. 4 was made to companytest the election by Brijraj Singh to divide the votes of Raja Pancham Singh and that Chhotey Lal who supported the candidature of Brijraj Singh made statements between January 20, 1967 and February 19, 1967 and distributed leaflets companytaining statements of fact relating to the personal character and companyduct of Raja Pancham Singh which were false to the knowledge of Chhotey Lal or who did number believe them to be true, and that the leaflets were issued and circulated with the companysent of Brijraj Singh, and 3 that the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior accompanied by Brijraj Singh visited several villages in a helicopter and addressed election meetings in support of the candidature of Brijraj Singh and the Maharaja acted as his agent and incurred expenditure for carrying on election propaganda if the expenditure incurred for the purpose of obtaining the use of the helicopter and a fleet of motor cars used by him were taken into account, such expenses being incurred or authorised by Brijraj Singh would companysiderably exceed the limit prescribed by the statute. Me High Court rejected the companytention of the appellant that Brijraj Singh companymitted other companyrupt practices alleged. Brijraj Singh in his evidence stated that the Maharaja had the Central Election office of Maharaja Gwalior representing the alliance of various political parties and individuals opposed to the Congress candidate and in propagating its views and policy during the election this Organisation also supported the candidates who ,opposed Pancham Singh. It was claimed that the, Maharaja and the Rajmata of Gwalior as agents of Brijraj Singh took a leading part in canvassing votes in different villages .and in doing so used a helicopter and a fleet of motor cars and spent large sums of money which were number disclosed in the account ,of election expenses filed by the St respondent Brijraj Singh. In his view Brijraj Singh had numberconnection with the printing and publication of the pamphlet and on that account the plea of companyrupt practice set out and founded on the ,circulation of the pamphlet was number proved. Not a word was said that the expenses incurred by Chhotey Lal for getting the pamphlets printed were reimbursed, number was the evidence of the witnesses Sanwaldas Gupta, Kalyansingh Tyagi examined on behalf of the appellant hat Brijraj Singh and his agents circulated the Pamphlets true. 2 that Brijraj Singh and his agents toured the companystituency in a jeep fitted with a microphone and visited many villages and delivered speeches reflecting upon the character and companyduct of Raja Pancham Singh a candidate sponsored by the Congress Party. At the general elections held in February 1967, Brijraj Singh first respondent in this appeal was declared elected to a seat in the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Sabalgarh Constituency defeating his rival candidate Raja Pancham Singh by 1706 votes. The High Court accord ingly passed an order declaring that the appellant had failed to establish that Brijraj Singh had companymitted any companyrupt practice with which he was charged. witnesses said numberhing about any statement made about the personal character of Raja Pancham Singh at the meeting. Sanwaldas Gupta and Kalyansingh Tyagi stated that they had requested the Maharaja to adopt Chhotey Lal as his candidate for election but they were told by the Maharaja that he had already decided to set up Brijral Singh as his candidate and that they also should actively support him. Witness Ghansu stated that a meeting was held at the village Narhela and the same was addressed by Brijraj Singh and Laxmichand and that these two persons stated that Pancham Singh was associating with dacoits and had misappropriated money belonging to a school and had got the school closed and that whenever any member of the legislative assembly sought to visit him be set his dogs at him. The learned Judge observed that the story that out of the 2,500 companyies of the pamphlets printed, 2,000 companyies of the pamphlet had been handed over by Chhotey Lal to Brijraj Singh on the night on January 19, 1967, was a clumsy and crude invention of these wo witnesses, and was utterly false and unreliable. One Chhotey Lal respondent No. No witness from Khirla was examined. The appellant Ram Dayal who is a voter in the companystituency moved an election petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for an order setting aside the election on two grounds 1 that the numberination paper of one Dhani Ram was illegally rejected by the Returning Officer and 2 that Brijraj Singh and his agents companymitted several companyrupt practices in relation to the election. Chhotey Lal has number appealed against the order recorded against him. Phoolsingh the only witness examined on behalf of the appellant did number support his case that Singh at Budhreta. Similarly about the visit to Sabalgarh village two of the witnesses examined were Budhram and Sanwaldas Gupta. He further stated that the Maharaja had visited on Feb., 11 or 12, 1967, five villages, Kelaras, Pahadgarh, Budhreta, Jhundpura and Sabalgarh in a helicopter and addressed meetings in those villages. But the witness did number belong to the village Khirla he is a resident of Pahadgarh village which is at a distance of fifteen miles from Khirla. The witness Ghansu did number belong to Narhela, and numberwitness from village Narhela was examined. About the meeting held at Village Kelaras the appellant examined three witnesses Narayan, Kanhaiyalal and Sardarsingh. After company sidering the various improbabilities and the discrepancies relating to the testimony of the witnesses Sanwaldas Gupta and Kalyansingh Tyagi, the learned Judge observed that these witnesses invented lies and did their best to introduce clumsy and crude improvements at the stage of evidence with the object of bolstering up the appellants case and through him that of Raja Pancham Singh. The testimony of Phoolsingh was inconsistent with the testimony of Ramcharanlal Sarpanch of the village. The evidence of these witnesses was found to be unreliable by the High Court. The Returning Officer rejected the numberination papers. The High Court held that an application for amendment which sought to be set up by an application for amendment of the election peticribed for filling an election petition cannot be entertained. But the testimony of the witness who is said to be companystantly under police surveillance is unreliable. The numberination papers of Dhani Ram were filed on the last day fixed for receiving the numberination papers. His explanation about his presence at the village Kulouli was apparently untrue and his testimony was otherwise unreliable. Several companyrupt practices were set up in the petition. Evidence of witnesses for the appellant who deposed that that at the date of scrutiny. Sardarsingh supported the case, of the appellant, but the testimony of the witness was inconsistent with the case of the appellant. The Returning officer companyld number allow Dhani Ram or his proposer to rectify the defect in the numberination papers after the last date of numberination. The learned Judge summarised the evidence of the witnesses. But from the cross examination of the witness it appears that his testimony was worthless. The opinion expressed by the witness Dataram cannot do duty for evidence in support of the case of the appellant. The witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant were, in view of their general tenor, found unreliable. The High Court dismissed the election petition filed by the appellant with companyts, but declared that the 4th respondent Chhotey Lal was guilty of the companyrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123 4 of the Act and was on that account disqualified for a period of six years from the date of the order under s. 8A of the Act. Sanwaldas Gupta supported the case of the appellant, but having regard to his interest in the appellant and the general unreliability of his testimony, he companyld number be believed. A third ground that Dataram third respondent in this appeal when his numberination was accepted was below the age of 25 and was on that account incompetent to stand for election, was sought to set up a new ground made after the expiry of the period prestion. The attestation and the satisfaction must exist at the stage of presentation and omission of such an essential feature may number be subsequently validated at the stage of scrutiny any more than the omission of a candidate to sign at all companyld have been Rattan Anmol Singh and Another v. Atma Ram Others. By the amendment a new ground for setting aside the election was sought to be introduced, and the High Court was right in rejecting the application for amendment. Gokla was present outside the office of the Returning Officer and that Dhani Ram brought to the numberice of the Returning Officer that Gokla was present and that his signature may be attested, and that the Returning officer declined to accede to the request need number be companysidered. 39 of 1967. 5 at Morena and successfully persuaded him number to file his numberination paper. Appeal under S. 116 A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 from the judgment and order dated May 4, 1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. The companyrupt practices relied upon by the appellant in this appeal may be broadly classified under three heads 1 1955 1 S.C.R. 250 to Sone Ram respondent No. On a companysideration of the evidence the High Court rejected the other grounds, and dismissed the petition. L. Sanghi, Sobhag Mal Jain and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant. R. Gokhale, P. L. Dubey, Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondent No. Not being attested as required by law on the date of filing, the defect companyld number be rectified at the time of scrutiny. 1526 of 1968. C. Parashar, for respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The appellant has appealed to this Court. The application was disallowed by the High Court. 481. Against that order this appeal has been preferred by the appellant. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The first two.
| 0 |
train
|
1969_375.txt
|
2 as also Jagdam Pandey. Jagdam Pandey like appellant No. The state did number challenge the acquittal of Jagdam Pandey and Doman Mahto. The acquittal of Jagdam Pandey was number challenged by the state. In that statement besides naming the appellants the other person that has been named was Jagdam Pandey. As earlier numbericed, Jagdam Pandey was acquitted by the companyrt of sessions. He too was charged for an offence with aid of Section 149, IPC but was acquitted on finding that numberovert act has been established and that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge against Jagdam Pandey. The companyrt of sessions acquitted two of the accused, namely Jagdam Pandey and Doman Mahto holding that there is numberspecific allegation against them about any overt act and that the prosecution had failed to establish charge against them beyond the reasonable doubt. The statement of the deceased was recorded at 7.45 p.m. The FIR was recorded on the statement of the deceased himself. It also records that Jiblal Mahto, appellant No. 2 was named in the fard beyan. 2, namely Jiblal Mahto was companyvicted under Sections 302/149 and 452 and 147, IPC. 2 were also charged for offence under Sections 149/302, IPC for being members of unlawful assembly in prosecution of companymon object of companymitting murder of Jagdish Ram by burning him. 1, was further charged for offence under Section 302, IPC for companymitting the murder of Jagdish Ram. Four accused were charged for offence under Sections 147/452 of IPC for being the members of an unlawful assembly along with others and having companymitted house trespassing by entering into the house of the deceased Jagdish Ram and for having made preparation for causing hurt to him. Soon after making the statement Jagdish Ram died. He was pushed into his house, kerosene oil was sprinkled on him and he was set on fire. The formal FIR was recorded at 9.30 p.m. 1 who sprinkled kerosene oil on him and set him ablaze. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by the medical officer in charge Shri Jai Prakash PW 8 at 8.10 p.m. 1 was companyvicted for offence under Sections 302/452 and 147, IPC. The trial companyrt on appreciation of evidence, in particular the dying declaration, the testimony of PW8 Dr. Jai Prakash and the fard beyan of Jagdish Ram found the appellants guilty as numbericed hereinbefore. He was also named in the dying declaration. There was dispute between the deceased and the appellant No. The statement of the deceased on basis whereof the FIR was registered, was recorded after about three hours of the incident of burning. It may be numbericed that these witnesses were resident of the same village as the appellants and the deceased hailed from a different village. The unlawful assembly also included appellant No. In his statement the deceased, inter alia, stated that both the appellants accompanied by 10 15 persons had companye to his residence when he was pushed inside the house and after sprinkling about four litres kerosene oil he was burnt. The prosecution, besides PW8, examined other witnesses being PW1, PW3 to PW6. The incident took place at 4.20 p.m. The eye witnesses PW1 and PWs3 to 6 were all declared hostile. One of them Khirodhar Nayak, who is appellant No. He has stated that he was a teacher in government primary school at village Kheto. He is alleged to have said that the deceased should number be left alive. After about five minutes of his reaching his house at about 4.00 p.m. appellant No. The two companyvicted accused challenged the judgment of companyrt of sessions by preferring a companymon appeal before the High Court. The other three accused including appellant No. The prosecution, however, did number examine the investigating officer. 1 along with 10 15 persons came there. It further records that it was only appellant No. 1 over the distribution of some money. As a result of which he sustained burn injuries all over the body. The companyviction was maintained in appeal by the High Court. Appellant No. Their companyviction and sentence having been maintained, they have filed this appeal on grant of leave. 2 was also present.
| 0 |
train
|
2002_801.txt
|
1.5.99. The petitioner has number produced the original agreements. The originals of the agreements are with the respondent. 1.5.99 besides other amounts. The claim of the petitioner is that the respondent companypany is liable to pay the petitioner a sum of Rs.96,21,137/ with interest at 24 with quarterly rests w.e.f. The petitioner cannot file attested companyies of the two agreements. 1.5.99 till payment. These are the broad companytentions of the petitioner. 1.5.99 and hence there is numberarbitration clause. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent has been appointed as General Sales Agent passenger for various companyntries and that under agreements dated 15.9.86 and 11.1.89, the respondent has been so appointed, the former agreement relating to passengers and the latter relating to cargo. Nor companyld respondent deny the existence of the arbitration agreements. It is stated that the petitioner established its office for North India w.e.f. The numberice dated 25.8.99 of the petitioner is bad in law. Respondent filed a companynter companytending that the agreements dated 15.9.86 and 11.1.89 ceased to exist w.e.f. The facts set out in the petition by the petitioner as follows The petitioner companypany has its Principal place of business at Kaulalumpur, Malaysia. The petitioner is put to strict proof. It is further stated that the petitioner terminated the aforesaid agreements by numberice dated 1.3.99 delivered to respondent on the same date . The agreements were to be performed in India and the cause of action arose in India. According to the petitioner, the respondent had, in its letter dated 15.6.99 admitted liability upto Rs.83,54,655.79 and failed to pay the same and had fraudulently attempted to arbitrarily and illegally adjust the same against false claims with a view to defraud petitioner. It is pointed out that the respondent, companyld number have denied that the original agreements were with him. Petitioner gave registered numberice on 25.8.99 to respondent to companycur in the appointment of a retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India or any other person of equivalent status. It is stated that its Senior Vice President, South Asian Region, Mr. Noor Amiruddin holds a general power of attorney to act for and on behalf of the petitioner and that the said person is the Principal Officer of the petitioner companypany in India. It has an office at New Delhi and it is carrying on business of air transportation, operation of air flights in and from India under a bilateral agreement between Malaysia and India. The respondent is number liable to refund any amounts to passengers number is it responsible to pay any companymissions. This is an application under Section 11 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and relates to dispute under an agreement between a foreign companypany and an Indian companypany. It is in these circumstances that petitioner is seeking appointment of a retired Judge of the Supreme Court as an arbitrator. This was done on the ground that the respondent failed to remit and pay to the petitioner, all the sums and monies received by it in the companyrse of agency on account of sale of passenger tickets and airway bills. A rejoinder was filed by the petitioner refuting the various allegations made in the companynter. Nothing has been admitted in letter dated 15.6.99. The application is filed by the foreign companypany against the Indian companypany seeking reference of the disputes to an arbitrator. The original of power of attorney is number placed on record The original has since been produced, impounded and stamp duty companylected and returned after substitution of a companyy . There are numberdisputes or differences which can be referred to arbitration. The respondent, it is said, is further declining illegally to refund clams of passengers and directing them to the appellants. At present, it is said, the respondent has to pay a sum of Rs.96,21,137/ besides such further sums as may be ascertained after rendition of accounts by respondent. The petitioner, it was said, had enforced Bank guarantee for 13 lakhs of rupees one day before the expiry of the guarantees. Original power of attorney dated 15.12.97 has been produced and by order dated 3.11.2000, it was impounded for companylection of stamp duty and penalty and, after overruling objections by an order dated 21.11.2000, the original power of attorney was treated as evidence under Section 42 1 of the Indian Stamp Act. It is stated that the aforesaid agreements companyld be terminated by either side by giving to the other, written numberice 60 days in advance as per Article 3 of the agreements. There are disputes and differences which are to be referred to arbitration. Respondent, in his reply dated 16.9.99, refused to companycur. Interest at 24 is also claimed with quarterly rests w.e.f. 1710/99 for injunction against the Bank. The respondent is also number restoring the companymissions received. The petitioner filed an application under Section 8 in that suit but has number taken any other step in the said proceedings. All the amounts unilaterally adjusted by respondent were false claims. But the American Express Bank, it is said, did number immediately honour the same and companytacted the respondent allowing adequate time to the respondent to file a suit No. It is said that, in fact, respondent had admitted its existence and also the various clauses. There is numberliability to account for any money companylected and numberinterest is payable. They are number with the respondent. The learned Chief Justice of India has numberinated me to deal with the application. This was number tenable. LITTTTTTJ J U D G M E N T JAGANNADHA RAO J.
| 0 |
train
|
2000_1471.txt
|
When I went to Jetpur, I have signed in the Will at Jetpur. I was called at Jetpur. The Will admittedly was executed at Jetpur. Purshottam Manji Thakrar died on 30.11.1984. Jayantilal died issueless. Kasturben died on 19.12.1995. On that day I went Jetpur after putting my report for leave. He purported to have executed two Wills one on 31.1.1995 propounded by the appellant and the other on 18.6.1995 propounded by respondents. One Purshottam Manji Thakrar was the owner of the property. He left behind his two sons Jamnadas and Jayantilal and two daughters Kasturben and Lalita appellants herein . Respondents filed an application for grant of probate of the Will dated 18.6.1995. Further an application dated 4th March, 1996 was filed for impleadment in the proceeding filed by deceased Testator against the tenant for eviction, it was reiterated that Jayantilal Kataria had number left any Will. In the said proceedings, on 1st January, 1996, in the application for deletion of deceased, Respondents categorically averred that such Jayantilal Kataria had number executed any Will. Testator had opposed the suit amongst other grounds and in the written statement of the testator, it was averred that Parshottam Kataria had in fact made last Will dated 19th November, 1983. Lalitaben Popat. Jamnadas died leaving behind his wife, Jasumati Respondent No.3 and two daughters, Pragna and Bina Respondent Nos.1 and 2 respectively . On the other hand, appellant filed an application for grant of probate in respect of the Will dated 31.1.1995. I directly went to Jayantibhai. He purported to have executed a Will on or about 15.4.1978 in favour of the respondents. In the examination in chief, in the Petition for probate under Section 276 filed on 8th July, 1996, numberexplanation about the statement made in the earlier proceedings to the effect that Testator had died intestate. On 9.5.1996, I was at Gondal. Deceased is resident of Rajkot whereas Respondents were residing at Mumbai. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 26.6.2006 passed in FA No.110 of 2000 and FA No.124 of 2000 by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dismissing appeals filed against a companymon judgment and order dated 23.2.2000 passed by the learned Civil Judge SD Rajkot allowing the Civil Miscellaneous Application No.25 of 1996 and dismissing the Civil Miscellaneous Application 26 of 2006. He was a divorcee. His wife had predeceased him. In the reply dated 10th January, 2006, to Public Notice, numbermention of Will. By the alleged Will, the entire property has been bequeathed to Respondents who are number Class I legal heirs to the exclusion of Petitioner, Smt. First I was informed therefore I went prior to the week of the execution of Will. It is true that this original Will was already prepared in that Will I signed. Two appeals were preferred thereagainst. B. Sinha, J. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the said appeals. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2008_2447.txt
|
Experience of guiding research at doctoral level. About 10 years experience of teaching and or research. The essential qualification prescribed in the advertisement included 10 years experience of teaching and or research. Under the changed guidelines, for the post of a Professor, 10 years experience of teaching, number prescribed was, in Post Graduate Teaching and or Research at the University National Level Institutions including experience or guiding research at doctoral level. The Committee selected the present appellant for appointment to the post of Professor in the Post Graduate. It was only thereafter, on 19 9 91 that the new qualification regarding ten years teaching experience at the post graduate level came into effect. This was in accordance with the then existing guidelines of the University Grants Commission prescribing minimum qualifications for appointment to the post of Professor. In the advertisement the essential qualifications for the post of Professor were An eminent scholar, actively engaged in research with published work of high quality. On 1 6 91 an advertisement was issued for the post, inter alia, of a Professor in the Post Graduate Department of Law, University of Sambalpur. The companytention of the original respondent that the appellant did number possess 10 years experience of teaching at the Post Graduate level was accepted by the High Court which set aside the appointment. Therefore, the advertisement also prescribed the same qualification. The appellant possessed that qualification. On 25 7 91 the Syndicate prepared an assessment chart of the candidates who had submitted their applications pursuant to the advertisement. Department of Law, University of Sambalpur. 1 challenged the selection and appointment of the appellant on the ground that the guidelines prescribed by the University Grants Commission were changed with effect from 19 9 91. He was one of the candidate for the post and had submitted that since he was at No. On 11 5 92 interviews were field for the post by the specially companystituted Selection Committee. The last date of submitting applications was 15 7 91. Even on the date when the Syndicate prepared an assessment chart, the position was the same. OR An outstanding scholar with established reputation who has made significant companytribution to knowledge. The appellant has, however, companytinued in the post pursuant to the directions originally given by the High Court and thereafter on account of the interim order of this Court. 2 in the select list, he should have been selected in place of the appellant. The original respondent No. The original 1st respondent is number dead.
| 0 |
train
|
1998_711.txt
|
This appeal is directed against order dated 30th October, 2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Second Bail Application No. By the impugned order, second application filed by the appellant for grant of bail has been dismissed. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2009_825.txt
|
Among the eye witnesses examined by the prosecution the evidence of PW5 Sipehi Yadav, PW6 Harilal Yadav and PW8 Gajendra Yadav was found reliable by the Sessions Court. Facts are Simple Deceased Ram deo Yadav and his son Gajendra Yadav PW 8 after their dinner at home went to a nearby field presumably for watching the crop thereon. Gajendra Yadav PW 8 on hearing the sound of a companymotion woke up and rushed to the scene with his torchlight and saw the assailants attacking his father. There is numberdispute that Ram deo Yadav was murdered at the time and place mentioned by the prosecution. But High Court did number act on the evidence of Harilal Yadav PW 6 . Ramdeo Yadav who sustained extensive wounds died on the spot. Gajendra Yadav went to the local Police Station and lodged the companyplaint on the basis of which FIR was registered. Some time after midnight these appellants and few others came to this place armed with lethal weapons such as spears bhala and gupti and surrounded Ram deo Yadav, dragged him out and showered bloody assault on him with the weapons. The six appellants before us were among the 14 accused arrayed in the Sessions companyrt indicted for the murder of one Ram deo Yadav during the wee hours on 30th October, 1975. Deceased went to sleep on a wooden plank in one field while his son PW 8 slept in the adjoining field. He made a hue and cry, but somebody among the assailants snatched away his torchlight. By then a few of the neighbouring cultivators rushed to the scene. However, the evidence of PW 8 was found quite reliable, yet the High Court chose to companyfirm the companyviction only as against the appellants since the version of PW 8 was companyroborated by PW 5 only in respect of them. The assailants who succeeded in inflicting large number of injuries on the deceased fled from the place with the weapons. Although the Sessions Court companyvicted all the thirteen accused of the offences of rioting and murder with the aid of section 149 IPC the High Court companyfirmed the companyviction only in respect of the seven appellants before us. They have been sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offence of murder and to rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under section 148, Indian Penal Code. After companypleting investigation the case was charge sheeted against the fourteen accused. Thomas, J.
| 0 |
train
|
1997_500.txt
|
The accountable persons raised objections to the reopening of the assessment under s. 59. The Assistant Controller rejected the companytentions of the accountable persons and reopened the assessment. The accountable persons filed returns under the provisions of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 and an assessment was made by the Deputy Controller of Estate Duty on 26 February, 1960. On 21 February, 1962 a numberice under the new s. 59 of the Act was issued to the accountable person companycerned for reopening the assessment on the ground that some property had escaped the levy of estate duty. Against the order of reassessment the accountable persons filed three different appeals before the Appellate Controller. The Appellate Controller allowed the appeals and set aside the reassess ment orders holding that s. 59 under which action had been taken by the Assistant Controller was number retrospective in operation. Section 59, which substituted for the original s. 62, made provision for reassessment. Thereafter three references were made to the High Court at the instance of the Revenue raising the identical question Whether Section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 is retrospective in operation and if so, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the reopening of the assessment under s. 59 of the said Act was bad in law? The Estate Duty Amendment Act, 1958, repealed the original sections 56 to 65. One Abdulhussein Gulamhussein Merchant died on 8 February, 1959. Verma and Joel Peres for the Respondents. From the Judgment and Order dated 8th 9th November 1973 of the Gujarat High Court in Estate Duty Reference Nos. Dr. V. Gauri Shankar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appel lant. S. Desai, Mrs. A.K. The facts in these appeals lie within a narrow companypass. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, CJ. It came into force with effect from 1 July 1960. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 2 4 of 1975. 2, 3 and 4 of 1971.
| 0 |
train
|
1989_198.txt
|
The question involved is whether the crude PVC film is dutiable. A submission was made that the Appellate Collector had held that the crude PVC sheets were number marketable and had number acquired the character and status of PVC films as known to the market. and is much higher than the crude PVC sheets manufac tured by them as an intermediate product for further manufacture of leather cloth. The appellant is, inter alia, a manufacturer of crude PVC films for the purpose of use in final products such as leather cloth and laminate jute mattings and PVC tapes both insula tion and adhesive. The said crude PVC films are manufactured by the appellant in a companytinuous process in the factory premises of the appellant which are licensed premises under the Act. XIV/75 dated 20th November, 1975 in respect of crude PVC films used for lamination with jute and for tapes claiming that the said PVC films were number excisable on the ground that the same were numbermarketable intermediate products used exclu sively for captive companysumption. The Tribunal was of the view that the tariff entry did number spell out whether it companyered only finished film sheet or whether it companyered also crude film sheet. The same crude PVC films which have been manufactured by the appellant and used in the manufacture of some other end product were subject matter of adjudication by the companycerned authorities in the period 1.3.1970 to 29.5.1971. The Tribunal in the order has set out the companytentions and observed that the question for determination was whether crude PVC film fell for classification under Item 15A 2 of the Central Excise Tariff or number. There was an order passed by the Appellate Collector on 14th June, 1974 holding that crude PVC films were number mar ketable and were number liable to excise duty. The Appellate Collector, Central Excise in his order numbered the companytentions of the appellant that the appellant had produced sufficient evidence to prove that the crude PVC sheets which were the subject matter of the Show Cause Notice in that case and which are also the subject matter of the present show cause numberice were number known in the market as PVC sheets number were these marketable as PVC sheets. The Tribunal came to the companyclusion that the tariff item companyered all types of films sheets. After reference to the rival companytentions, the said Appellate Collector in his order held, inter alia, as follows PVC films sheets for the clearance of which demand letters are issued are number marketable as the same are neither embossed number printed number any finishing Work is done when companypared to PVC films sheets which are marketed by them. The Appel late Collector of Central Excise in an order dated 14th January, 1974 held that the said PVC films manufactured by the appellant are number marketable intermediate products and hence number liable to duty. It was further stated that the tensile strength of PVC sheets which is marketed by the appellants is as per the international standards laid down by A.S.T.M. The Tribunal also came to the companyclusion that the companycept of marketability was number relevant and all sorts of crude films would be companyered by the entry. As such, it was companytended that the product manufactured by the appellants is number liable to central excise duty. The said classification was approved by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise on 9th December, 1977. From the Order dated 25.4.84/4.5.84 of the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. Tariff Item 15 A 2 of the Central Excise Tariff reads as follows Articles made of plastics, all sorts includ ing tubes, rods, sheets, foils, sticks, other rectangular or profile shapes. On 10th October, 1979 an appeal was preferred by the appellant against the order of the Assistant Collector dated 16th February, 1978 which was rejected by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise. This is an appeal under Section 35L of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 hereinafter referred to as the Act from the order passed and judgment delivered on 25th April, 1984/4th May, 1984 by the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal . Shroff, J.M. That was transferred to the Tribunal and by the impugned order, the Tribunal has rejected the appeal under challenge. 223/84. Dutta, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Indu Malho tra and C.V.S. 2820 of 1984. Patel and S.A. Shroff for the appellant. I.S.I. The appellant filed classification list No. F.D. Harish N. Salve, Mrs. P.S. 999/80 C in Order No. On 6th February, 1980 a revision applica tion was preferred, by the appellant to the Joint Secretary, Government of India. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. SB T A. Rao for the respondent.
| 1 |
train
|
1989_1.txt
|
There is numberdispute that the Upper Division Clerks of the Labour Ministry, companystitute a cadre. On 30th July, 1982, two Lower Division Clerks from the Ministry of Commerce, including one Shri Y.N.Sota had been numberinated for being promoted to the Upper Division Clerk in the Labour Ministry under the Zoning Scheme. It is the case of the appellant that respondents 3 to 30, who had been recruited to the post of Lower Division Clerk in the Labour Ministry itself, were allowed to officiate in the post of Upper Division clerk, on ad hoc basis, since posts in the Upper Division Clerks were lying vacant and they companyld be reverted to their post of Lower Division Clerk, as and when regular select list candidates are available for being posted as Upper Division Clerk. While she was so companytinuing, in November 1969, the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, introduced a Zoning Scheme for promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk from that of the Lower Division Clerk. On 2.11.1982, the appellant on the basis of seniority in the Commerce Ministry was numberinated and appointed to the Post of UDC in the Labour Ministry under the aforesaid zoning scheme on long term basis. The appellant companytinued in the Labour Ministry with effect from that date. The appellant, therefore, made a representation to the employer and after due companysideration, a fresh seniority list of the Upper Division Clerks in the Department of Labour was issued in 1989. The appellant, on the basis of a companypetitive examination held by the Union Public Service Commission was selected in the year 1966 under Rule 12 of the Central Secretariat Clerical Service Rules, 1962 hereinafter referred to as the Rules and joined in the Ministry of Commerce as Lower Division Clerk on 7.3.1967. Being aggrieved by the seniority list re drawn up in the year 1991, the appellant approached the Tribunal. Against the order of the Tribunal a Review Application had been filed and Review Application also was dismissed, hence the appellant has approached this Court. PATTANAIK, J.
| 1 |
train
|
2001_495.txt
|
B11 series to ext. B11 to B25 series. PW3 is the advocate companymissioner who had inspected the petition schedule building RCP No.38/03 and filed Ext. C1 assuming that Ext. But ext. B11 series and written in another handwriting in Ext. The eastern wall of the petition scheduled building in RCP 109/02 had to rusted shutters which was seen closed. C2 that the front shutters and the shutters provided at the eastern side are full of dust and the same were rusted due to number use, and the entire companypound around the petition schedule building are full of bush and the bushes are seen at some places grown on to the petition schedule building and some other places grown to the roof of petition schedule building. B11 series and B12 series after the Chennai address of the Respondent companypany it is seen typed in another machine in Ext. The calendars for the year 2001 numbered by PW3 inside the petition schedule building in RCP No.38/03 and the numberice dated 01.10.2001 affixed at the front shutter of the same building clearly shows that both the petition schedule buildings were number been opening from 1.10.2001 towards till the inspection date. Whether the Respondent ceased to occupy the petition schedule buildings companytinuously for six months? The companymissioner has also numbered the numberice fixed in the front shutter of the petition schedule building by Sri A.K. The companymissioner has also numbered five calendars for year 2001 seen inside the rooms in the petition schedule building. B25 series cannot be relied on to show that business was being companyducted in scheduled buildings. According to RW1 even though there were such proceedings respondent was functioning in the schedule buildings with minimum staff. B11 to B25 series produced are having 4 to 6 companyies of each invoices. The wild growth perceived by the companymissioner and reported in Ext. PW3 also has numbered that the switchboard provided at the eastern and western wall of the petition schedule building were number having electricity supply. Some wild growth as indicated in Ext. Though the service line of electric companynection to the petition schedule building was there companymissioner verified and found that the electric companynection being disconnected. The land surrounding the side petition schedule building is fully companyered with grass and shrubs and PW2 the companymission even found it difficult to walk through the premises. It is also reported that the companymissioner companyld number enter into the buildings as it was closed. Even though the companydition of the petition schedule buildings happened to be as numbered by PW2 and PW3 to a limited extent to number maintenance and repairs it cannot be found that it happened only due to number maintenance and repairs. B12 series, through Kaloor Office Cochin. C1 report filed by PW2 it can be seen that the two entrance gates on the numberthern side of the petition schedule property in O.S. C1 a that inspite of the extreme financial crunch, the management had till 2.8.1999 kept the unit open and alive for operation and that Ext. had number been produced showing payment of the dues since September, 2001 and observed The specific case of RW1 is that due to the proceedings under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions Act, the staff strength of the Respondent companypany was reduced to bare minimum at the petition schedule buildings. The Rent Control Court referred to the evidence produced by the parties including the reports Exhibits C1 and C2 produced by Advocate Commissioners PW2 and PW3 and recorded the following observations From Ext. Had these documents for the relevant period companye in illegible the details regarding the strength of the staff and the business being carried on is the petition schedule buildings would have been revealed. Since the petition schedule buildings were number opened since September, 2001 the inability of the Petitioner to carry out the repairs and maintenance also is to be looked into. 109/02 is found rusted and closed. By an order dated 11.4.2001, the Rent Control Court allowed both the petitions and directed the appellant to vacate the premises. It was also averred that due to financial crisis, the staff strength was reduced to bare minimum but there was numbercessation of occupation of the suit premises. In the light of the very specific statement in Ext. The rent companytrol petitions were filed during the years 2002 and 2003. Whether there is any reasonable cause for the cessation of occupation if any? On looking through the glass window PW2 companyld see some furniture inside the building which are full of dust, damaged and unfit for use. Agarwal Company Secretary on 1.10.2001 stating that the Respondent companypany is a sick industrial companypany under the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions Act and operations at Kochi has been suspended w.e.f. These appeals are directed against judgment dated 27.7.2009 of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court whereby the revisions filed by the appellant against the order passed by District Judge, Ernakulam hereinafter referred to as, the Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, 1965 for short, the 1965 Act were dismissed and the direction given by IIIrd Additional Munsiff and Rent Control Court, Ernakulam for short, the Rent Control Court for vacating the suit premises was companyfirmed. The Rent Control Court then companysidered the question whether the appellant had ceased to occupy the suit premises since September, 2001 without reasonable cause and answered the same in affirmative. After remand, the appellant filed written statement and claimed that the petitions filed by the respondents were liable to be dismissed as barred by res judicata because Rent Control Petition Nos. The learned companynsel for the Petitioner has pointed out that in ext. On merits, it was pleaded that due to financial companystraints, the appellant companyld number run its business effectively and profitably and it was declared sick under the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions Act, 1985 for short, the 1985 Act by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction BIFR in Case No.14 of 1998 and the appeal filed against the order of BIFR was pending before Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction AAIFR . C1 a numberice was being issued on 2.8.1999 as management was companyvinced that there is numberprospect of running the companypany immediately must definitely companyvey to the companyrt that there was numbercessation of occupation prior to 2.8.1999 at any rate. A.B. Both the petitions were allowed by the Rent Control Court vide order dated 11.2.2004, which was companyfirmed by the Appellate Authority by dismissing the appeals preferred by the appellant. C1 can be legally taken companynizance of , is number, according to me, sufficient to establish cessation of occupation. 1.10.2001 onwards. After companysidering the pleadings and evidence of the parties, the Rent Control Court held that the petitions filed by the respondents were number barred by res judicata and Section 15 of the 1965 Act cannot be invoked for denying relief to them because two sets of rent companytrol petitions were based on different causes. The appellant was declared a sick industrial companypany on 22.6.1998 and IDBI was appointed as the Operating Agency under Section 17 3 of the 1985 Act to examine the viability of the companypany. Abdul Khader, respondent No. meteres together with the buildings and structures erected thereon more particularly described in the Schedule hereunder written together with all the fixtures, fittings, pathways, passages, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto TO HOLD the same unto the Lessee for a term of ten years from 1st December 1966 paying therefore during the companytinuance of the lease a monthly rent of Rs.4,000/ Rupees Four Thousand only on the days and in the manner and subject as hereunder provided. While reversing the finding recorded by the Rent Control Court that the appellant had ceased to occupy the suit premises companytinuously for six months without reasonable cause, the Appellate Authority observed as under I find merit in the submission of the learned companynsel for the appellant that suspension of business activity on account of extreme financial crunch, at the same time keeping the unit open and alive for operation cannot amount to cessation of occupation without valid reasons. ABDUL KHADER son of Alumkaparambli Bava, Indian National, Businessman, aged Forty five years, residing at Alumkaparampil, Chittor Road, Ernakulam in the City of Cochin in Ernakulam District in Kerala State hereinafter called the Lessor which expression shall unless excluded by or repugnant to the companytext include his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the One Part AND DUNLOP INDIA LIMITED, formerly THE DUNLOP RUBBER COMPANY INDIA LIMITED, a Company duly incorporated in India having its Registered office at Dunlop House, 57 B Free School Street, Calcutta, herein represented by its duly companystituted attorney G.S. However, Civil Revision Petition No.368 of 2005 filed by the appellant was allowed by the High Court vide order dated 18.12.2006 and the matter was remitted to the Rent Control Court for fresh adjudication of the rent companytrol petitions after giving opportunity to the appellant to file companynter statement and adduce evidence. emphasis supplied The Rent Control Court then companysidered the plea of the appellant that on account of pendency of the proceedings under the 1985 Act, the staff strength was reduced to bare minimum but discarded the same on the ground that staff attendance register, muster roll, wages register maintained in the office as also the document showing purchase and sale of the goods, payment of electricity charges etc. Thereupon, the BIFR passed order dated 16.3.2007. The sheds in the said property were seen in dilapidated companydition and the companymissioner companyld number go near to the shed as it was companyered with tall bushes and shrubs. It is also numbered that the four iron gates provided for the companypound were companyered with dust and rust due to number use. Abdul Khader predecessor of the respondents leased out the suit premises companyprised in Survey Nos.341/1 and 2 situated at Ernakulam village to the appellant for its godown and office for a period of 10 years with effect from 1.12.1966. The same and address of the purchasing dealer in all these documents are the Chennai address of the Respondent companypany. However, the respondents plea that the appellant was in arrears of rent was rejected on the ground that numberevidence had been produced by them to prove the same. Hedge Road, Nangumbakkam in the City of Madras hereinafter called the Lessee which expression shall unless excluded by or repugnant to the companytext include its successors and assigns of the Other Part. WITNESSES as follows In companysideration of the rent hereinafter reserved and of the companyenants on the part of the Lessee hereinafter stipulated, the Lessor hereby demises unto the Lessee all those pieces of parcels of land situate in Ernakulam Town companyprised in Survey Number 341 Sub Division 1 part admeasuring 83 cents equivalent to 33 acres 58.844 sq. Krishna son of Govindarajapuram Subramaniam, Indian National, Business, Executive, aged Forty four years, residing at 26, Dr. If while passing the sales tax check post companyy of invoices were given as stated there would number have been such number of companyies at in ext. It is also admitted by RW1 that companyy of invoice are to be given at the check post. After the death of A.B. After several hearings, the BIFR passed order dated 19.10.2001 and directed the appellant to sort out all pending issues with secured creditors, Central State Governments, TIIC, KSIIDC and TNSEP and submit a revised companyprehensive and fully tied up rehabilitation scheme to the Operating Agency. For the sake of reference, the relevant portions of the lease deed executed in respect of Survey No.341/1 measuring 83 cents are extracted below THIS DEED OF LEASE made on the Third day of February One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty Nine companyresponding to the Fourteenth day of Magha One thousand Eight Hundred and Ninety One of the Sakha Era BETWEEN A.B. The boundary fencing on the numberthern side is found damaged. Relief and companyts? After 2 years and about 2 months, the parties executed two lease deeds dated 3.2.1969, which were duly registered. The appellant exercised the option for extension of the term of lease but did number vacate the premises at the end of extended period. Subsequently, State Bank of India was appointed as the Operating Agency. For the next about five years, numbertangible step is shown to have taken by the appellant for revival of its business activities. 1 became owner of the property companyprised in Survey No. In August and November, 2006, the appellant filed applications before the BIFR seeking its permission for issue of two crore equity shares of Rs. 10/ each fully paid up at par to the companypanys promoters and or its associates on private placement basis against full companysideration to be utilized for rehabilitation. 24422 of 2006, order dated 25.4.2007 passed by the Orissa High Court in W.P C No. 344 of 2008, order dated 5.2.2008 passed by this Court in SLP C CC Nos. Whether the Petitioners are entitled for an order of eviction u s 11 4 v of the Act? The appeals preferred against that order were allowed by the Appellate Authority and the order of eviction was set aside. 45 and 146 of 1999 filed by them on similar grounds were dismissed by the Appellate Authority and the High Court. S. Singhvi, J. Three appeals were filed against that order. Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
2011_395.txt
|
The Sales Tax Officer companysidered that the respondent was liable to pay tax. Sales Tax Tribunal, is legally companyrect to hold that the assessee is number a dealer as per Section 2 c of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 in respect of the sale turnover of unutilised new spare parts? at companyt the assessee is number a dealer as per Section 2 c of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947? Kirpal Honble Mr. Justice K.T. Sales Tax Tribunal is companyrect to hold that purchases of new spare parts and accessories of such vehicles as Ford, Chevrolet, Despot, Dodge, etc. Second appeal was then preferred to the Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, Cuttack. In these appeals by special leave what arises for companysideration is whether the respondent is liable to pay sales tax and to be registered as a dealer under the relevant provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the said Act . THE 28TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1997 Present Honble Mr. Justice S.C. Sen Honble Mr. Justice B.N. 6579 80 of 1995 AND Civil Appeal No.6582 of 1995 KIRPAL, J. The respondent filed an appeal against the aforesaid decision before the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, but was number successful. Thomas Raj Kumar Mehta, Adv. The Tribunal accepted the companytention of the respondent and came to the companyclusion that the respondent companyld number be regarded as a dealer within the scope of the said Act for the purpose of levying tax. Chatterjee, Raj Kumar Mehta, P.N. Misra, Mrs. Kirti Mishra, Advs. c Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Member, Addl. These parts used to be disposed of at yearly intervals. were number made with an intention to carry on business of selling the same? On an application being filed the Tribunal referred the following three questions of law to the High Court a Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Member, Addl. for G.S. J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NOS. for the appearing Parties.
| 1 |
train
|
1997_828.txt
|
The pamphlet was stated to have been distributed by the respondent, his election agent and Radhey Shyam Sharma at an election meeting at Bhudara on March 2, 1972. 1 false, and did the respondent or his election agent or Mr. Radhey Shyam Sharma believe them to be false. The respondent denied that he had anything to do with the publication by Radhey Shyam Sharma of the different issues of Kronch and pamphlet . Were those statements reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the petitioners election ? Copies of the aforesaid issue of Kronch were also stated to have been distributed in that meeting in the presence of the respondent and his election agent. Have the respondent and his election agent deliberately failed to maintain a regular and companyrect return of the expenses incurred by them in companynection with the election of the respondent ? It was also denied that the issues of Kronch or the pamphlet in question were distributed in the meetings of the respondent. Radhey Shyam Sharma was further alleged to have published another issue Ex. According further to the appellant, Radhey Shyam Sharma got published pamphlet Ex. Was Mr. Radhey Shyam Sharma engaged by the respondent to carry on his propaganda and was he in charge of the respondents publicity and did he publish the news item in Kronch and read them out and the petition ? As regards the election expresses, it was stated. 2 printed at the instance of and with the companysent of the respondent and his election agent. Radhey Shyam Sharma was also stated to have addressed an election meeting of the respondent on February 27, 1972 at Chogan in Karauli city and read out news item Ex. The allegation that the issues of Kronch and the pamphlet in question companytained statements of fact which were false and which the respondent believed to be false or did number believe to be true and that those statements were calculated to prejudice the prospect of the appellants election was likewise denied. The appellant challenged the election of the respondent on the ground that the respondent and his election agent Jagdish Pal published and got published statements of fact in relation to the personal character and companyduct of the appellant which were false and which they believed to be false or did number believe to be true and which statements were reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the appellants election. This pamphlet was also as objectionable as news item Ex. As regards the first ground, it was stated that the respondent and his election agent got published news item Ex. Have the respondent and his election agent incurred or authorised expenditure in companytravention of section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as alleged in the election petition ? The second ground on which the election of the respondent was assailed was that the respondent and his election agent deliberately failed to maintain regular and companyrect account of expresses incurred by them in companynection with the election and that they incurred or authorised expenditure in companytraction of section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. I in Kronch,a Hindi weekly dated February 25, 1972 published and printed in Jaipur Radhey Shyam Sharma was the editor of that weekly. The appellant and the respondent were the main candidates in the election to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the Karauli companystituency. 3 of Kronch companytaining defamatory statements of fact against the appellant. distribute the news items and the pamphlet as stated 3.
a Were the statements referred to in issue No. Did the respondent and his election agent Mr. Jagdish Pal publish the statement of fact in relation to the personal character or companyduct of the petitioner as alleged in paragraphs 14? According to the respondent, Radhey Shyam Sharma was hostile to the appellant and had as long ago as October 15, 1970 bitterly criticised the activities of the appellant in an issue of Kronch. This is an appeal by Shiv Charan Singh against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court whereby election petition filed by the appellant to question the election of Brijendra Pal respondent from the Karauli companystituency to the Rajasthan Assembly was dismiss cd. The result of the election was declared on March 12, 1972 and the respondent was declared elected. Or did number believe them to be true? These statements were also stated to be objectionable in the same manner as those companytained in news item Ex. The aforesaid news item was stated to companytain false defamatory statements of fact in relation to the personal character and companyduct of the appellant. From the Judgment and order date the 9th March, 1973 of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in Election Petition No. It has also been urged that the appellant engaged certain vehicles is for a number of days but the expenses incurred on that account were number companyrectly shown. During the pendency of the trial on application filed by the appellants the High Court directed that the account books maintained by the respondent as well as the account books, cash book and the credit and cash vouchers of Karauli Auto Stores might be shown to the appellants companynsel. As against that, the case of the respondent is that only those vehicles were hired by him which were shown in the documents filed by him. the respondent had number shown the expanses actually incurred by him in the matter of hiring of vehicles, purchase of petrol, arrangement of a procession and employment and entertainment of his workers. According further to him, the number of days for which those vehicles were hired was also companyrectly shown. issues 1 and 2 were decided against the appellant. 1 and 2, issue No. K Sen, Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga and Miss Yash Bagga, for the Respondent The Judgement of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. Issues 4 and 5 too were decided against the appellant. 10 of 1972. 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the petition ? P. Singh, Subhagmal Jain and R. K. Jain, for the Appellant. Nothing was companysequently brought on record to question the companyrectness of the entries in the account books. The view of the findings on issue Nos. The petition was resisted by the respondent and he denied the various allegations made by the appellant. In spite of that order the appellant or his companynsel companyld number examine those account books and documents. 767 of 1973. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION civil Appeal No. 3 was held number to arise.
| 0 |
train
|
1975_251.txt
|
The workmen were working under the companytractor whose services as terminated in the year 1990 1991 and thereafter on their demand, the workmen were engaged as casual workmen under the Corporation in June, 1991. SCHEDULE Whether the demand of Durgapur Casual Workers Union for absorption of 49 casual workmen as per list enclosed by the management of FCI, Durgapur is justified? The factual matrix of the case is as follows The Corporation had long back setup a rice mill in the name and style of Modern Rice Mill at Durgapur and it had been handed to successive companytractors for running the same. The companycerned workmen, forty nine in numbers, had been working as companytract labours under the companytractors in the rice mill. Thereafter, the companycerned workmen were directly employed by the Corporation in June, 1991 as casual employees on daily wage basis in the Food Storage Depot at Durgapur for performing the jobs of sweeping godown and wagon floors, putting companyers on infested stocks for fumigation purpose, cutting grass, companylections and bagging of spillage from godowns wagons etc. The companytract system was terminated and the rice mill was closed in the year 1990 1991. One of the grounds taken was that the appointments of the workmen were backdoor appointments. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant Durgapur Casual Workers Union and others hereinafter referred to as, the workmen for short against the judgment and order dated 25th February, 2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in F.M.A. The Corporation being aggrieved preferred a Writ Petition being P.No.21368 W of 1999 before the High Court at Calcutta. There being an industrial dispute between the workmen and the Corporation regarding the regularisation of services of the workmen, the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in exercise of powers companyferred on them by clause d of sub Section 1 and Sub Section 2A of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as, the Act for short referred the following dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication vide Ministrys order No. No.2345 of 2005 A.N. The last companytractor was M s Civicon. 8685 of 2007 and C.A.N.4726 of 2008 . L 22012/348/95 IR C.II dated 18th July, 1996. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent Food Corporation of India hereinafter referred to as, the Corporation for short and set aside the Award dated 9th June, 1999 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal hereinafter referred to as, the Tribunal for short as affirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court at Calcutta. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Corporation preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of High Court at Calcutta. The said reference was registered as Reference No.21 of 1996 before the Tribunal. SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. The learned Single Judge of the High Court on hearing the parties and taking into companysideration the evidence on record, dismissed the writ petition by judgment and order dated 18th February, 2005 and affirmed the Award passed by the Tribunal. If number, what relief they are entitled to? Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2014_510.txt
|
Nem Kumar in his statement denied any knowledge about the gold. Both Ratanbai and Nem Kumar showed cause against the proposed companyfiscation and penalty. Both Shantabai and Nem Kumar had each a son at the time of death of Kesharimal. Hence this appeal by special leave by the sons of Nem Kumar, Shantabai and Nem Kumar himself. It is number disputed that the seized gold was primary gold. After the death of Kesharimal, Nem Kumar had four more sons. Nem Kumar was acquitted of the charges levelled against him. Ratanbai preferred an appeal against the same to the Admin istrator under the Gold Control Act, 1968. On July 10, 1968, the officials of the Central Excise separately recorded the statements of Ratanbai and Nem Kumar. A declaration in respect of seized gold was filed by Ratanbai to the Central Excise, Nagpur, on July 29, 1968. The Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur, served two separate numberices on Ratanbai and Nem Kumar calling upon them to show cause why the seized gold should number be companyfiscated and a penalty imposed for the violation of the provision of paragraph 9 1 i of the Gold Control Ordinance, 1968. Accordingly, by his order dated May 15, 1970, the Collector came to the companyclusion that it was only Ratanbai who had violated the provision of para graph 9 1 i of the Gold Control Ordinance, 1968 and di rected companyfiscation of the gold and imposition of penalty of Rs.38,000 on Ratanbai under paragraph 75 of the 1121 Gold Control Ordinance, 1968. The Collector came to the findings that Ratanbai had full knowledge of the gold and was in companyscious possession of it for at least 8 9 years. One Kesharimal Porwal, who had two flourishing business es a bidi factory at Kamptee and a gold and silver shop at Mandsaur died on October 7, 1952 leaving behind him surviv ing a widow Ratanbai, a daughter Shantabai and a son Nem Kumar. It was stated by Ratanbai that the seized gold was the self earned property of her late husband, and that the same had been kept in the iron safe about 8/9 years ago. So far as Nem Kumar was company cerned, the Collector held that it was difficult to sustain the charge of possession, custody and companytrol of the gold against him in view of the vagueness of the evidence and lacunae in investigation. 1 Sushil Kumar, son of Nem Kumar, who had by number attained majority, also filed a revisional application before the Central Government. On July, 9, 1968 the officers of the Central Excise, Nagpur, searched the residential premises of Nem Kumar and seized 10 slabs and 9 pieces of gold and 230 gold companyns, weighing about 42,404 grams having at that time a market value of Rs.7,63,000, which were kept in a cupboard inside a big Godrej iron safe. It was provided in the will that each grandson would receive 500 tolas of gold at the time of marriage and the remaining gold would be equally divided among them. Ratanbai filed an application for revision before the Central Government challenging the propriety of the order of the Administrator. The Ordinance was replaced by the GoAd Control Act, 1968. 1120 The said Kesharimal also left a will dated February 10, 1952 whereby he bequeathed certain gold and silver to his grandsons. This appeal by special leave involves an inter pretation of the proviso to section 71 of the Gold Control Act. He said that he had companye to know of the existence of the gold for the first time when it was found out during the search. Thereafter, by Gold Control Amend ment Act, 197 1, a new section 71 1 was enacted with retro spective effect from 1 9 1968. 1 to 5 and Surendra Kumar, since deceased, son of Shantabai, filed a writ peti tion in the Delhi High Court. Under rule 126 I of the Defence of India Rules 1962, every person other than a dealer was required to make a declaration as to the quantity, description and other pre scribed particulars of gold other than ornaments owned by him within thirty days from January 9, 1963, the date on which the Defence of India Amendment Rules, 1963 came into force. Both the revisional applications were dismissed by the Central Government. Soli J. Sorabjee, Harish N. Salve, P.H. The Administra tor, however, dismissed the appeal by his order dated Febru ary 23, 1972. Govind Das, Girish Chandra and C.V. Subba Rao for the Respondents. 5807 of 1983. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Collector. She admitted that the keys of the shelf had all along remained in her possession. Parekh and Dr. Y. Chandrachud for the Appellants. It may be stated here that at numberstage the genuineness and validity of the will was questioned, number have they been challenged before us. From the Judgment and Order dated 10.12.1982 of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J. Thereafter, the appellants Nos. The respondents companyld number accept the decision of the learned Judge and accordingly, preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. 28 of 1982. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The appellant No. No.
| 1 |
train
|
1987_307.txt
|
the appellants along with the other sons of maharaja bhupinder singh had an interest by virtue of their being coparceners in all the properties of maharaja bhupinder singh. on the demise of the late maharaja bhupinder singh his eldest son maharaja yadavindra singh succeeded to the gaddi of the erstwhile state of punjab which subsequently merged with the state of punjab. it was an ancestral property in the hands of maharaja bhupinder singh and they were residing as members of the family in the said property. maharaja bhupinder singh along with his sons including the appellants companystituted a joint hindu family. the appellants along with their brothers were in occupation of a property knumbern as companyonel mistrys house moti bagh palace patiala in their own right as the sons of maharaja bhupinder singh. the companynter affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 was filed by sri s. p. jain deputy secretary to the government of punjab and it stated that there was numberproof that the appellants were the sons of maharaja bhupinder singh that bhupinder and his sons were number members of a hindu undivided family that the maharaja and his progeny being jats did number companystitute a joint hindu family and that the appellants never acquired any interest by birth in the property. on march 10 1958 maharaja yadavindra singh sold moti bagh palace to the government of punjab as property belonging to him and delivered actual possession of certain portion and agreed to deliver possession of the rest subsequently. the appeal as originally filed challenged the companyrectness of the order of the high companyrt on the basis of the decision of this companyrt in numberthern india caterers private limited and anumberher v. state of punjab and anumberher 1 .
but the punjab legislature amended the act by passing the punjab public premises and land eviction and rent recovery amendment act 1969.
there was numberdenial of the allegation that the appellants were in possession of the property in their own right as sons of maharaja bhupinder singh. the counter affidavit did number admit the allegation of the appellants that they were in possession of the property as coparceners. it is difficult to understand how a deputy secretary to the government of punjab companyld have personal knumberledge about the actual possession of the property in question before the sale deed was executed in favour of the government. c. majumdar for the intervener megalal chhaganlal p ltd.
vinumber kumar krishan lal mehta and veneet kumar for the intervener. 226 and that even if the appellants were in possession before the date of the sale of the property to the government they were in unauthorised occupation of public premises since the appellants were number holding the property under any allotment lease or grant from the government after the date of the sale deed and dismissed the writ petition. 1 to 3.
ramamurthi company for the intervener state of jammu and kashmir . the state government was number companypetent to evict them under the provisions of the act as they were number in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and that the impugned numberice was issued without jurisdiction. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mathew j. the appellants filed a writ petition before the high companyrt of punjab for the issue of an appropriate writ or order quashing a numberice dated june 21 1961 issued under s. 4 1 of the punjab public premises and land eviction and rent recovery act 1959 hereinafter called the act directing the 2nd appellant to show cause why an order of eviction should number be passed against him in respect of the premises in question. number 330 of 1963.
subba rao bhuvansesh kumari j. b. dadachanji o. c. mathur and ravinder narain for the appellant. a letters detent appeal was preferred against this decision and that was dismissed in liming. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 69 of 1967.
appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated october 15 1963 of the punjab high companyrt at chandigarh in p.a. this appeal by certificate is against the decision of the high companyrt in the letters patent appeal. c. mahajan and r. n. sachthey for respondents number. the learned single judge came to the companyclusion that since the case raised companyplicated questions of law and fact it was number meet that they should be resolved in a petition under act. the appellants case was as follows.
| 1 |
test
|
1972_388.txt
|
5/ per day in the Index bracket 621 630. 5/ per day. 5/ per day or less and an increase of 50 paise per day in the wages of the workers getting more than Rs. 5/ per day as a reasonable and fair minimum wage to the Stretch on employees of the lowest category in the Consumers Price Index bracket 621 630. The Sabha demanded revised basic wages for the time rated workmen of several categories and also a rise of 50 in the wage of the piece rated workers in the Consumers Price Index bracket 621 636 old series . 8.50 per day in the aforesaid bracket. 1/ per day ill the wages of the workers getting Rs. 5.50 per day in the same bracket, serial Nos. 4.60 per day and Rs. With regard to the claim for 50 rise in piece rates, the Tribunal only granted 30 in the Index bracket 621 630 and the same dearness allowance as above. The Sabha, therefore, claimed I, revision of the wages of both the categories. The appellant also submitted that the Tribunal ought number to have ignored the settlement with regard to wage arrived at by the Hindustan Hosiery Mills with the Sabha. 7.50 per day and serial No. The Tribunal also granted for every rise of 10 points or part thereof, above the index bracket 621 630, dearness allowance at the rate of 10 paise per day. 2,28,000/ in 1967 and Rs. 5/ per day, another statement Ext. 7/ per day, serial No. The Tribunal also observed that the wages paid to the employees on the piece rate and the timerate are very low and require revision, The appellant wanted the Tribunal to follow the wage scale of William Industries submitted by the appellant as per Ext. By that settlement, the said partnership firm companystituted by the other group of partners of Hindustan Hosiery factory agreed with the Sabha to give an increase of Re. 10120 per day and are adequate. C 3 with regard to the other employees and also the books filed by the appellant and observed that many of the piece rated and time rated employees got as low a wage as Rs. The Sabha also demanded dearness allowance of 10 paise per day for every rise of 10 points or part thereof above the said siab. Prior to April 1967, all the partners of the appellant were partners of a firm known as M s. Hindustan Hosiery Factory. The Tribunal had before it a statement Ext. In the written statement filed before the Court the Sabha stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows The present wages of both the piece rated and time rated workers are excessively low and are much lower than those companysidered to be the absolute minimum payable by any employer to his workers in the Bombay Region. The Sabha submitted its statement of claim on 14th February, 1969. The appellant emphasises that the Tribunal absolutely ignored the aspect of the capacity of the appellant to bear the burden of the additional rise in wages on account of this award. The appellant submitted from certain Gazette Notifications the minimum rates of wages prescribed by the State Government in case of some eight different industries between the years 1969 and 1972 where the monthly wages have been fixed between Rs. 128/ per month. C 2 filed by the appellant showing the number of employees receiving wages below Rs. The Tribunal found that during the period of 20 months since April, 1967, the appellant has earned a profit of Rs.1,51,000/ in eight months of 1967 and Rs. The appellant submits that there is numberjustification whatsoever for allowing the present increase of wages without following any principle and even higher than the statutory minimum wage fixed in respect of other industries in the, State. The Sabha, on the other hand, companytended that the appellant was more prosperous than Stretchlon Private Ltd. and produced an award of the Industrial Court in the case of Stretchlon Private Ltd. dated 10th April, 1967, published in the Maharashtra Gazette of 11th May, 1967. The Tribunal found from the statement, Ext. U 1, filed by the Sabha regarding its financial position that the appellant earned substantial profits in the period of 8 months In 1967 and in 1968. 90/ and Rs. There was a .reference by the Mill Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay briefly the Sabha under section 73A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, in pursuance of a numberice of change dated 22nd August, 1968. 6/ to Rs. 2.50 per fay respectively. 3,42,000/ in 1968 was prosperous and its financial position was sound. It appears that the appellant is a partnership firm which was companystituted and companymenced production in April 1967. The firm manufactures and sells nylon and hosiery goods such as socks, undergarments, and the like. That firm again was companystituted and companymenced business on and from 15th December, 1963, after the dissolution of India Hosiery Factory on 14th December, 1963, due to differences amongst the partners. 1,88,000/ in 1968. 23 Rs. 22 Rs. The appellant has in its employment about 250 workers. The appellant started its business on 17th April, 1967. It is registered with the Maharashtra State Directorate of Industries as a small scale industry. The appellant was prepared to allow this increase which would have imposed an additional burden of Rs. Award dated the 29th January, 1970 of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay, in reference IC No. The Tribunal also granted the benefits retorspectively with effect from 1St February, 1969. But the Tribunal in the absence of any details with regard to the financial position of that companypany or its profit making capacity, did number companysider it appropriate to companysider that as a companyparable unit. The next group serial Nos. This appeal by special leave is directed against an award of the Industrial Court, Maharashtra hereinafter referred to for brevity as the Tribunal of 29th January,. 20 21 were given Rs. The demands are excessive and the appellant cannot bear the additional burden arising out of these demands. These profits are after deduction of depreciation, interest and bonus. 14 to 19 were given Rs. They also claimed the benefits retrospectively from 1st June, 1968. Ltd. was made in 1966 within three years of its functioning from 15th December, 1963, and before the Industrial Court in that case profit and loss accounts for the years 1963 64 and 1964 65 were made available. B. Pai, Prakash Mehta, O. C. Mathur and P. C. Bhartari, for the appellant. 56,022/per year. K. Swami, P. H. Parekh and S. Bhandare, for the respon dent. 2 of 1969. 548 of 1970. The appellant resisted the claim. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Appeal by Special Leave from the.
| 0 |
train
|
1974_64.txt
|
temple and its properties. and binding on the temple. The 1st defendant reiterated his plea that the temple was number a public temple. Both the respondent companytested the petition on the ground that the temple was a public temple and that the properties mentioned in the schedule were the properties of the temple and number the personal properties of the 1st defendant. 17 of the Act, 2 for a declaration that the temple was a private temple and 3 for a declaration that the properties set out in the schedule annexed to the petition were the personal properties of his family and they did number companystitute the temple properties. The temple was built in the middle of the last century by one Burla Rangareddi who managed the affairs of the temple and its properties during his life time. The plaintiff filed a petition before the Assistant Commissioner , for Hindu Religious Endowments, Nellore, alleging mismanagement of the temple and its properties by the first defendant. Notice was issued to the 1st defendant to show cause why the temple properties ghould number be leased out in public auction and the first, defendant companytested the application alleging that the properties were number the properties of the temple but they belonged to his family. In the village of Varagali, in the district of Nellore, there is a temple in which is enshrined the idol of Sri Kodandaramaswami. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras was impleaded as the sole respondent in the petition. By reason of these changes the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments in the State of Andhra Pradesh was impleaded as the 1st respondent to the petition. the Hindu Religious and, Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 was a bar to the institution of the suit. number 3 of 1950 on the file of the District Judge Nellore 1 for setting aside the order of the Board dated October 5, 1949 declaring the temple of Sri Kodandaramaswamiwari as a temple defined in s. 6, cl. The Board held an enquiry and by its order dated October S. 1949 held that the temple was a public one. number6422 of 1962 praying for amendment of the plaint the effect that the companypromise decree in O. P. number 3 of 1950 was number valid and binding on the temple. In the meantime Madras Act II of 1927 was repealed and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act of 1951 was enacted. After enquiry, the Assistant Commissioner submitted a report to the Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, recommending that a scheme of Management may be framed for the administration of the. 312 of 1957. By a deed dated August 19 1898 Venkata Subbareddi relinquished his interest in the properties in favour of one Vemareddi Rangareddi whose family members are defendants 1 to 5. 312 of 57. After his death his son, Venkata Subbareddi is in management. Defendants 1 to 5 objected, to the suit on the ground that it was number open to the plaintiff to seek a declaration that a Part of the decree was number binding but the plaintiff should have directed his attack against the ,entirety of the decree. Against the decree of the trial companyrt the plaintiff preferred an appeal A S, 312 of 1957 to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The Board thereafter companymenced I proceedings for settling a scheme and issued numberice to the 1st defendant to state his objections. The District Judge, Nellore recorded the companypromise and passed a decree in terms thereof by his order dated October 28, 1954, The material clauses of the companypromise decree, Ex. Then came the formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Thereafter, there was a companypromise between the petitioners 1 to 5 on the one, hand and the Commissioner, the 1st respondent on the other. Babula Reddy, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants. On January 18, 1950 the 1 st defendant filed O.P. Originally, the Commissioner. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J This appeal is brought by certificate on behalf of the defendants against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra pradesh dated August 7, 1962 in Appeal Suit No. Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 7, 1962 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. Rama Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondent No. The present plaintiff later on got himself impleaded as the 2nd respondent therein. plaintiff also filed M.P. V. R. Tatachari, for respondent No. In the result, the High Court owed the appeal and remanded the suit to the trial companyrt for disposing the same on the remaining issues. 265 of 1964. For reasons which are number apparent on the record the petition was number disposed of for a number of years. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 0 |
train
|
1966_157.txt
|
They were transferred from Agartala Division to Meghalaya Division by order of transfer dated 10.9.2002. Posts Letter No.20 12/90 SPBI dated 23.8.1990 b the transfer is in violation of Rule 15 of the Fundamental Rules in short FR 15 and c the inter Divisional transfer would effect the seniority and promotional prospects of the writ petitioners and d the transfer order was passed as a measure of penalty. The grounds on which the writ petitions were filed were a the transfer orders of the two respondents were in violation of the provisions of Rule 37 of the Posts and Telegraphs Manual, Volume IV in short the Manual read with D.G. She was abused in filthy language and was physically manhandled. In these two appeals, the Union of India questions legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court, Agartala Bench, Agartala whereby two writ petitions filed by the respondents were allowed and the companymon order of transfer dated 10.9.2002 in respect of four employees was quashed so far as it relates to the respondents. The Union of India took the stand that the transfer was done in public interest and on account of exigencies of administration. This companyduct was certainly unbecoming of an employee and with a view to enforce discipline and to avoid recurrence of such unfortunate incident, they were transferred. Feeling aggrieved by the order, the respondents writ petitioners along with two others moved the Central Administrative Tribunal at Guwahati in short the Tribunal . Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows The respondents were working in the Postal Services Department. 20002 20003/2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT,J Leave granted. It was pointed out that the respondents number only misbehaved with the Director Postal Services , a senior lady officer, she was companyfined and dragged from one room to another and this was done with a view to force her to withdraw the charge sheet against the Deputy Post Master. The Tribunal after hearing the parties directed the authorities to companysider the representations made by the two lady applicants who were companyapplicants along with the respondents within one month. So far as the present respondents are companycerned, numberinterference was made by the Tribunal with the order. Challenging the decision of the Tribunal, the writ petitions were filed. Arising out of SLP C Nos.
| 1 |
train
|
2004_78.txt
|
the petitioner was arrested by the customs authorities on march 2 1990 for smuggling silver ingots in india through the port of companyhin which forms the sole basis for the impugned order of detention and produced before the additional chief judicial magistrate econumberic offences ernakulam. on january 11 1993 the customs authorities filed a companyplaint in the companyrt of the additional chief judicial magistrate econumberic offences ernakulam against the petitioner and two others for smuggling the silver ingots referred in the grounds of detention being case number c.c.m. 2/93 and they were summoned to appear on march 51993 on the date so fixed the petitioner made a prayer for exemption from personal appearance which was allowed. the petitioner however did number appear on any of the adjourned dates and his application for exemption from appearance on each such occasion was allowed. after the order of detention was made on july 11 1990 the government of kerala issued an order on august 3 1990 under section 7 1 b of the act directing the petitioner to appear before the companymissioner of police trivandrum city within 30 days as according to it he was absconding. the case was lastly fixed on july 27 1994 for appearance of the petitioner and the other two accused but before that the petitioner was arrested at the sahar international airport bombay on july 3 1994.
as regards the proclamation dated august 8 1990 annexure v the detaining authority states in his affidavit that the same was affixed on september 21 1990 at the conspicuous part of the house where the warrantee was residing and a report to that effect was forwarded to the magistrate. requiring the appearance of the petitioner before him on october 31 1990 and also ordered the attachment of his properties in terms of section 83 cr. on the same day the government also made a report in writing to the chief judicial magistrate trivandrum in accordance with section 7 1 a of the act. on march 5 1990 an application for bail was moved on his behalf and on the following day it was allowed by the learned magistrate with a direction that he would appear before the assistant companylector preventive department companyhin on any two days within a fortnight. he first companytended that the unreasonable and unexplained delay of about four years in executing the order of detention clearly demonstrated that the detaining authority had number properly applied his mind and arrived at a real and genuine satisfaction about the necessity of detaining the petitioner. scr 301 the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by k. mukherjee j. pursuant to an order of detention dated july 111990 made by the secretary home and vigilance department government of kerala under section 3 1 of the companyservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities act 1974 hereinafter referred to as the act m. hari kumar the petitioner herein has been kept under detention since july 31994 with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods. the high companyrt however did number feel inclined to cancel the bail but directed by its order dated march 21 1990 that the petitioner shall number leave trivandrum and ernakulam without permission of the companyrt and also made it clear that such direction was in addition to the companydition imposed by the additional chief judicial magistrate. he next contended that the grounds on which the order had been made were stale as the alleged smuggling activity of the petitioner referred to therein took place about four months earlier. companysequent upon a declaration subsequently made on august 1 1994 by an additional secretary ministry of finance department of revenue government of india under section 9 1 of the act the petitioners detention is to companytinue for a period of two years. on receipt of the report the magistrate issued a number bailable warrant of arrest and a proclamation in accordance with section 82 cr. sibal the learned companynsel appearing for the petitioner canvassed three grounds in support of the petition. aggrieved by such grant of bail the customs authorities preferred and application before the high companyrt for its cancellation. 26 1993 but the interim order was allowed to companytinue for a week more. 1995 3 suppl. as the companyrect addresses of the other two accused were number furnished by the prosecution the case was adjourned from time to time. assailing the above order and declaration the present petition has been moved on his behalf by his brother in law v. rajan for a writ of habeas companypus. for a proper appreciation of that companytention it will be necessary to refer to certain relevant and undisputed facts.
| 1 |
test
|
1995_623.txt
|
In 1982 he was selected as an Assistant Research Officer Homeopathic Science . He also has a Bachelors Degree in Homeopathic Science from Bihar University at Muzaffarpur. The appellant, a science graduate from Meerut University, subsequently obtained Diploma in Homeopathic Science DHMS from Delhi University in 1976. While the appellant was posted at Bombay, he applied for the post of Assistant Director, Homeopathic pursuant to an advertisement which is attached as Annexure B to this appeal. The petitioner was, thereafter, posted at Bombay in the institute directly under the companytrol of CCRH at Vile Parle, Bombay. The representation of the appellant for his appointment on the ground that he had been duly selected pursuant to the selection held by the Committee keeping in view the terms of the advertisement issued in 1989, yielded numberresult. In 1983 he was transferred to Bahadurgarh in Haryana and then to Brindavan in U.P. It is the case of the appellant that from 1989 93 numberinterviews took place and on 18 6 1993 the Selection Committee after companysidering the case of the appellant selected him. in 1984 where he worked till 1989. The impugned order dated 30 7 1996 reads thus The petitioner was recommended for the post of Assistant Director, Homeopathy. 552 of 1996 in the High Court. The writ petition was, however, dismissed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on 30 7 1996. However, numberappointment letter was issued. The appellant, thereupon filed Writ Petition No. This order has been put in issue in this appeal by special leave. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. Special leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
1997_1613.txt
|
404 of 1972 challenging the validity of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972 etc. 10,12,778.87 together with interest from September 5,1973 up to the date of payment at the rate at which the Bank charged the same to the petitioners. Interest shall be payable at the rate at which the Bank will charge the same to the petitioners. It is apparent from the order extracted above that the petitioners, Raneegunj Coal Association and another, had a cash credit account in the Punjab National Bank, Calcutta. The said Commissioner will make disbursement of the amount so received by him in accordance with the provisions of Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972. 10,12,778.87 which was deposited in the cash receipt account of the petitioners on September 5,1973, under the order dated July 6, 1973 of this Court together with interest calculated at the rate at which the Bank charged the same to the petitioners from September 5, 1973 up to the date of payment to the Commissioner of Payment for Coking Coal Mines. The said Writ Petition along with a batch of other Writ Petitions was dismissed by this Court by its order dated September 18, 1986 upholding the companystitutional validity of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1972 and the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 as amended by the Coal Mines Nationalisation Laws Amendment Act, 1978. Although the direction of this Court was that the amount should be deposited by the respondents in the Punjab National Bank, Calcutta, in the cash credit account of the petitioners, the Bank credited the amount being Rs. sundry debtors of the petitioners towards realisation of these debts shall be deposited by the respondents in the Punjab National Bank Calcutta in the cash credit account of the petitioners. was filed in this Court by the writ petitioners, Raneegunj Coal Association and another. Copy of the order to be sent to the Punjab National Bank, Calcutta. By the said order dated September 24, 1987, this Court directed the Bank to hand over to the Commissioner of Payment for Coking Coal Mines, Camac Street, Calcutta, the said sum of Rs. It appears that after the disposal of the Writ Petition, this Court passed the following order on September 24, 1987 on the agreement of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and the Petitioners Punjab National Bank, Lyons Range Branch, Calcutta, is hereby directed to hand over to the Commissioner of Payment for Coking Coal Mines Camac Street, Calcutta, the sum of Rs. This Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed by the Punjab National Bank for direction. This amount will be kept and earmarked separately and shall number be withdrawn by the petitioners number adjusted by the Bank as against the amount due to the Bank from the petitioners, until the decision of the writ petition. After the said order was passed by this Court to the prejudice of the Bank, the Bank had to make the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition for direction. In the event of the respondents failing to make good their companytention in regard to the amount due to the petitioners from the sundry debtors the respondents shall pay to the petitioners the interest on the amount to be deposited in the Bank under this order with effect from today until the disposal of the writ petition. The Bank did number get any opportunity of being heard before the said order dated September 24, 1987 was passed directing the Bank to hand over the principal amount together with interest at the rate mentioned in the said order with effect from September 5, 1973 up to the date of payment. 404 of 1972 was withdrawn and another writ petition was filed by the petitioners in this Court being Writ Petition No. After the Bank came to know of the said order of this Court directing it to pay interest on the said sum of Rs. It is the case of the Bank that as directed by this Court by its earlier order dated July 6, 1973, it deposited the said amount of Rs. A Writ Petition being Writ Petition Civil No. 640 on September 5, 1973. The said Writ Petition No. The respondents have placed strong reliance on the subsequent order dated September 24,1987 whereby this Court specifically directed the Bank to pay interest and also specified the rate of interest. 10,12,778.87, it made the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition for direction. In that Writ Petition, on July 6,1973 the following order was passed by this Court The amounts which have been recovered up to 31 3 1973 by the respondents from the. The audit shall number be companypleted or certified until such a statement is given to the petitioners. The respondents shall give to the petitioners within four weeks from today a companyy of the statement of accounts as required under Section 22 b . 954 of 1977.
| 1 |
train
|
1989_281.txt
|
During evidence, a companyy of the insurance policy was marked as Exh. The insurance companypany disputed the claim, inter alia, on the ground that the vehicle was number insured and the driver has numbervalid licence. They produced some other policy which did number companytain the clause restricting liability. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the vehicle was insured and passed an award against the insurance companypany. The High Court allowed that appeal on the basis of the policy marked as Exh. The insurance companypany filed an appeal, inter alia, on the ground that as per the terms of the policy, the liability is limited to Rs. The claimants filed a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The appellant herein also companysented to that companyy being so marked. Briefly stated the facts are On 6.11.1986 an accident took place. N. Variava and H.K. Sema, JJ. The High Court has companyrectly dismissed the review petition. 50,000. This appeal is against an order passed by the High Court of Karnataka dismissing the review petition. Thereafter, appellant filed a review before the High Court. R 1 by companysent of the parties. The Special Leave Petition, filed against the order of the High Court, was dismissed by this companyrt. Hence this appeal.
| 0 |
train
|
2003_647.txt
|
Kolleru Lake extends over 901 sq. At plus 7 companytour the capacity of the lake is 30 tmc. At plus 3 companytour level the lake spreads over 70 sq. No.1514 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. No.1523 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. No.1525 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. No.1515 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. No.1524 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. In the numbermal monsoon, the lake extends from plus 7 companytour to plus 10 companytour. NATURE OF KOLLERU LAKE Kolleru Lake is one of the largest shallow fresh water lake in Asia located between the delta of Krishna and Godavari rivers in the State of Andhra Pradesh. No.1497 1498 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. No.1509 1511 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. No.1508 in WP C No.202/95, WP C No.95/2006, WP C No.111/2006, I.A. The area of the lake at various companytour levels is as under Contour level at Mean Sea Level MSL Area At 10 MSL 901 sq. The water surface area in the companytours of the lake vary, depending upon the seasonal flow of water into the lake. At plus 10 companytour the capacity of the lake is 54 tmc, companyering an area of 348 sq. The peak level inflow into the lake is of the order of 1,10,000 cusecs. In its mean season, the lake has mean water level of 3 feet above the mean sea level, popularly known as plus 3 companytour. Notification dated 4.10.1999 does number companyer the entire area of the lake. Submersion of delta facility in the upstream area on account of blockage of free flow of water into the lake caused by encroachers. Lakes were formed by the encroachers over areas ranging from 30 to 400 acres by raising bunds upto the height of 20 to 25 feet above the ground levels and thereby diminishing the retention capacity of the lake. There are 122 villages in the lake area out of which 46 are bed villages and 76 are belt villages. 4 rivers, 18 drains and 22 irrigation channels empty out into the lake and the drain Uppteru is the only outlet to the sea. No.1531 in WP C No.202/1995, WP C No.155/2006 KAPADIA, J. A. Nos.1486 87 in Writ Petition C No.202 of 1995 With A. No.1492 in WP C No.202/95, I.A. Further, thousands of land stood companyverted into fish tanks resulting in the blockage of the drain system of Krishna and West Godavari districts which chooses the said lake as a natural route to sea. The lake supports bio diversity and high biomass of fish plankton which companystitute the source of food for birds. This has been done in order to strike a balance between the rights of the people living in and around the lake on one hand and to protect the ecosystem on the other hand. 0.77 lakh acres It is found between the alluvial planes of river Godavari and river Krishna due to natural geological formation companyering 2 mandals in West Godavari district and 7 mandals in Krishna district. 2.25 lakh acres At 7 feet MSL 675 sq. 1.69 lakh acres At 5 feet MSL 308 sq. In the belt villages, above plus 5 companytour, cultivation is being done both in the patta lands as well as in the government lands on payment of cist. Ecologically it is a wet land ecosystem. It receives water from 67 inflowing drains and channels. E6/1236/97, Dated 01 09 1998 and by the District Collector, West Godavari, Eluru in Rc. It serves as a natural flood balancing reservoir for the two rivers. 118 Revenue Q Dept.,
Dated 24 01 1976 in West Godavari District wherein they were permitted to companystruct fish tanks on the said lands are liable to be cancelled and these lands will be resumed under the provisions of Wild Life Protection Act, 1972. The said companyvention is also known as Wet Land Convention. REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE NOTIFICATION DATED 4.10.1999 The above numberification came to be issued under following circumstances. miles. It sustains flora and fauna and people living around it. The claimants are number entitled to any companypensation under Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 as they were assigned the lands by the Government on free of land value. CEC has also issued directions prohibiting use or transportation of inputs for pisciculture in the said sanctuary. After companyducting an inquiry under section 22 and after companysidering all the objections, final numberification as required under section 26A of the Act was issued on 4.10.1999 which was published in government gazette on 5.10.1999 determining the rights of the parties in terms of section 24 in the following terms The existence, nature and extent of rights as determined by District Collector, Krishna vide proceedings No. Pursuant to the said directions, proclamation under section 21 of the said Act was issued by the respective district companylectors of the above mentioned two districts calling for objections. The preliminary numberification issued under section 18 and the companysequential action taken by the district companylectors came up for companysideration before a learned single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Kunapuraju Rangaraju vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others reported in 1998 3 ALT 215. D Farm pattas to the extent of Ac. 2882.00 cts issued to the individuals as per O.Ms. Accordingly, directions were given to the State government to take steps for issuance of such numberification. Development needs of the present without companypromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs is called sustainable development, a companycept based on the principle of inter generational equity. These D Farm patta holders are number entitled for any companypensation except ex gratia as provided by the Government. By order dated 5.3.1998, the learned single judge held that numberinterference with the rights of the petitioners companyld take place without a numberification under section 26A. The details of the inputs are given in the report.
| 0 |
train
|
2006_211.txt
|
execute the sale deed by 18th May and latest by 24th May, 1964. get the sale deed registered by 25th May, 1964 as 24th May is Sunday. The High Court found that the respond ents were always ready and willing to perform their part of the companytract in terms of the agreement dated 24th March, 1964 and it was the appellant who companymitted the breach of the companytract by number getting the sale deed executed by 25th May, 1964 in terms of the agreement dated 24th March, 1964. appellant that the draft sale deed has been put in the companyer. As the period stipulated was 24th May, 1964 the appellant started prepara tions for getting the sale deed executed. The plaintiff prayed for a decree of specific performance of the companytract of sale dated 24th March, 1964 against the respondents and for direction to the respondents to execute the sale deed of the property and get it registered and in default the sale deed may be executed by the companyrt according to law. The respond ents plea that the draft sale deed was number received does number show that they were willing or companyperating in the execu tion of the sale deed. From the 5th May, 1964 letters and telegrams were exchanged between the parties but the sale deed was number executed on or before the 24th or on the 25th May as the parties had agreed. 2000 was to be spent on getting the sale deed executed. Along with the lawyers numberice a draft sale deed was endorsed. The numberice companyplains that the draft sale deed has number been enclosed. May, 1964 calling upon the respondents to companye to Agra on the 18th May, 1964 for exe cuting and making registration in pursuance of the companytract and to companyplete the sale deed. 3 it found that even though the time for getting the sale deed executed expired after the 24th May, 1964 the appellant would number be disentitled to the relief of specific performance of the companytract for sale on the. 122 of 1964, in the companyrt of Civil Judge, Agra, on 2nd September, 1964 alleging that the appellant has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract and he did all that he was bound to do under the agreement but the respond ents failed to execute the sale deed as agreed and therefore companymitted breach of the companytract. It also companyplained that the draft sale deed has number been sent. The trial companyrt found that it was proved beyond a shadow of any doubt that the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his pan of the companytract and the respondents were number at all anxious to execute the sale deed in his favour and that the respondents were guilty of breach of companytract. The agreement provided that the appellant must get the sale deed executed within two, months after 24th March, 1964 and, if the appellant failed to get the sale deed registered within two months the earnest money of Rs. In this reply of 22nd May, 1964 the advocate of the respondents denied the allegation in the numberice dated 20th May, 1964 of the. upto 24th May, 1964 and in case the appellant did number get the sale registered within two months the earnest money of Rs. Whether the companytract did number subsist on the date the to perform his part of the companytract as alleged in the plaint ? On a companysideration of the letters and telegrams that passed between the parties the trial companyrt held that it was proved beyond a shadow of doubt that the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract and that the respondents were number anxious to execute the sale deed. Whether the companytract did number subsist on the. Further without the companyperation of the respondents it is difficult to prepare a draft sale deed as the date.of sale by Aditya Narain in favour of the respondents would number have been available to. P 35 and P 36, dated 13th May and 22nd May, 1964 would show great anxiety on the part of the appellant to companyplete the sale deed. The respondents stated that they were ready to execute the sale deed but the appellant was wanting postponement for reasons best known to him. The background to the suit agreement dated 24th March, 1964 is that there was litigation between the parties. 36, on 20th May, 1964 by registered post companyplaining that the respondents had number replied to his letter dated 5th May, 1964 and to his law yers numberice dated 13th May, 1964 and called upon them to. perform his part of the companytract while the respondents were always ready and willing with which finding we are unable to agree we will discuss the evidence at some length. It has been proved that in one of the numberices sent to the son and which was opened in the companyrt the draft sale deed was found enclosed. According to the reply by the advocate on behalf of the respondents the two letters of the 13th and 20th May were received by the respondents only on the 22nil May, 1964. 35, on 13th May, 1964 in which he stated that he was ready to pay the balance of the companysider ation of Rs. This appeal is filed by the plaintiff against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court on a cer tificate dismissing the suit for specific performance of a companytract of sale dated 24th March, 1964. On 22nd May, 1964 the appellant received a reply from the respondents acknowledging the registered numberices given on 13th and 20th May by the appellants companyn sel. These three letters were followed by tele grams which were sent by the appellant to both the respond ents on 20th May, 1964, Ex. They are 1 whether the appellant or the respondents companymitted the breach of company tract entered into between the parties on 24th March, 1964 and 2 whether the time was of the essence of the companytract. P.W.2, Manira of M s. Chhitar Mal Ram Dayal and the trial companyrt accepted the evidence and found that the appellant had sufficient funds for getting the sale deed executed. 19,000 from Aditya Narain and the appellant became tenant of the respondents. sell the property for which the appellant was willing and. 20,000 towards the balance of sale companysideration. 19,000 to the appellant for Rs. 24,000 the tenant paid Rs. Of this Rs. referred to the letter of the 5th May. The respond ents filed a written statement denying the various allega tions made in the plaint and pleaded that the appellant did number perform his part of the companytract within the stipulated time and the companytract thereafter did number subsist and there fore the suit was misconceived. The decision on this issue would be sufficient to allow this appeal and to grant the appellant the decree for spe cific performance which he has prayed for but as on the question whether the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the companytract the companyrts below have given companytrary finding and the High Court ,has recorded a finding that the appellant was number ready and willing to. The appellant was a tenant under the previous owner, Aditya Narain, from 1942. The letter of the 5th May the receipt of which was number denied by the reply of the advocate for the respondents and the lawyers numberices on behalf of the appellant, Ex. had purchased the property in 1961 were anxious to. The terms of the agreement will be set out in due companyrse but suffice it at this stage to state that it provided that the appellant should get the sale deed execut ed within two months i.e. The facts of the case are briefly as follows The suit property was owned by one Shri Aditya Narain and the plaintiff appellant became a tenant of the suit property under Aditya Narain in the year 1942. The appellant resisted and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the petition holding that the respondents require ment of the premises was number genuine On the mediation of Sri Chand Doneria the parties entered into the suit agree ment on 24th March, 1964. 4000 he had to pay them only Rs. The High Court on the issue as to whether time was of the essence of the companytract held that in the circumstances of the ease and in view of the companyduct of the parties of serv ing on each other numberices, companynter numberices and telegrams they expressed their intention to treat time as of the essence of the companytract and that once the time is held to be the essence of the. 24,000. 4,000 as earnest money to the respondents. In all a sum of Rs. In pursuance of the agreement the appellant handed over Rs. On 2nd January, 1961 the respondents, the two defendants in the suit purchased the suit property for Rs. The arrears of Rs. The trial companyrt also accepted the evidence that the appellant had Rs. 4000 in cash as earnest money. The appellant having been a tenant of the premises from 1942 would have been naturally anxious to, companytinue in possession while the respondents who. It may be numbered that the two companyplaints that are made in the advocates numberice on behalf of the respondents. The appellant filed a suit, Civil Suit No. According to the appellant numberreply was received to this letter and he sent a numberice through his advocate, Ex. The trial companyrt accepted the evidence on behalf of the appellant that the appellant was possessed of suffi cient funds and in fact he withdrew a sum of Rs. The lawyers numberice ,,iso. 20,500 from the Central Bank of India Ltd. As the appellant had paid the respondents Rs. He had withdrawn Rs. This part of the testimony on behalf of the appellant was proved by the evidence of Kailash Nath. 956 due towards rent and a sum of Rs. The trial companyrt accepted the evidence adduced by the appellant. 24,000 along with the entire arrears of rent and requested the respondents to. 5,000 with him at home and about Rs. which they had purchased on 2 1 1961 for Rs. Another lawyers numberice. The respondents purchased the property in 1961 and in 1963 filed. was sent, Ex. Juneja for the Appellant. This would indicate that the tenant was keen on purchasing the property in which he was living since 1942. Further the appellant examined Kailash Nath, P.W.2, of M s. Chhitar Mal Ram Dayal who stated that a sum of Rs.30,000 belonging to the appellant was lying in deposit with them. the appellant. date the suit was field ? According to the appellant he wrote Ex. Issue No. 4000 shall stand forfeited. May the appel lant attended the office of the Sub Registrar, Agra and presented an application to the Registrar to the effect that he was at the Registrars office between the hours 3 and 4 p.m. on that day. get into possession. On the 22nd. Goswami for Respondents. a petition to evict the appel lant. Normally one would number expect the appellant to. Rent and Eviction Act. That petition was resisted and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dismissed the petition of the respondents. 4,000 shall stand forfeited. 20,500 from the Central Bank of India Ltd. They are as under Issue No. On issue No. Soon after the purchase of the property by the respondents they sought to evict the appellant by filing a petition under section 3 of the U.P. 24 on 5th. On these pleadings the trial companyrt framed five issues of which it is relevant to numbere only two which are issues 1 and 3. As they wanted to settle their dispute the respondents agreed to. V.Gupte and M.V. This companyclusion which we companysider is irresistible was number accepted by the High Court. If number, its effect. The respondents preferred an appeal to the Allahabad High Court and a Bench of the companyrt on the arguments set out two points for determination in the appeal. ground of delay as the respondents themselves were responsible for it. 22,956 was required. K. Sen, S.T. 30,000 in deposit with a firm. do number bear scrutiny. Desai and P.P. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM, J. 696 of 1971. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 20 4 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No.15 of 1966. While the matters stood thus the companypromise was entered into. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 1 |
train
|
1977_4.txt
|
the total income for the year 1947 48 was rs. 15975 shown as admission fees was deducted and the income returned was rs. the income tax officer who made the assessment for the year 1947 48 disallowed this deduction. 9000 and on account of authorised assistants admission fees rs. 13388.
in the profit and loss account of that year members admission fees were shown as rs. briefly stated the facts of the case are that the appellant companypany was incorporated in the year 1947.
its objects inter alia were to acquire as a going companycern activities functions and business of the delhi stock share exchange limited and the delhi stock and share brokers association limited and to promote and regulate the business of exchange of stocks and shares debentures and debenture stocks government securities bonds and equities of any description and with a view thereto to establish and conduct stock exchange in delhi and or elsewhere. 500000 divided into 250 shares of rs. for the years 1947 48 and 1948 49 were made on the appellant as successor to the two limited companypanies hereinafter mentioned. against these orders appeals were taken to the appellate assistant companymissioner who set aside the additional assessments made under s. 34 in regard to the assessment years 1947 48 1948 49 and 1949 50 and the 4th appeal in regard to the year 1950 51 was decided against the appellant. the income tax officer however disallowed and added back the amount so received to the income returned by the appellant. its capital is rs. the return for the following year also was made on a similar basis but the return for the years 1949 50 and 1950 51 did number take into account the admission fees received but in the directors report the amounts so received were shown as having been taken directly into the balance sheet. numberember 30.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kapur j. these appeals are brought by the assessee companypany against a companymon judgment and order of the punjab high companyrt by which four appeals were decided in civil reference number 6 of 1953.
the appeals relate to four assessment years 1947 48 1948 49 1949 50 and 1950 51.
two of these assessments i.e. 29363 out of which a sum of rs. it was held by one of the members of the tribunal that the amounts received as entrance fees were intended to be and were in fact treated as capital receipts and were therefore excluded from assessment and by the other that as there was numberrequisite periodicity those amounts were number taxable. the appellant companypany also made rules for the companyduct of business of sale and purchase of shares in the exchange premises. both sides appealed to the income tax appellate tribunal against the respective orders of the appellate assistant companymissioner and the tribunal decided all the appeals in favour of the appellant. 187 and 190 of 1960.
appeals from the judgment dated 22nd january 1957 of the punjab high companyrt circuit bench delhi in civil reference number 6 of 1953.
veda vyasa s. k. kapur and k. k. jain for the appellant. the appellant company provided a building and a hall wherein the business was to be transacted under the supervision and companytrol of the appellant. that was the only matter in companytroversy requiring the decision of the companyrt and was properly referred by the tribunal. ganapathi iyer and d. gupta for the respondent. 2000 each on which dividend companyld be earned. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
| 0 |
dev
|
1960_55.txt
|
After hearing arguments learned Magistrate issued process by order dated 15.9.1994.
| 1 |
train
|
2006_392.txt
|
519590/ of the year 1948 49 is liable to be set off against the assessees business income for the assess ment years 1950 51 and 1951 52 ? in the assessments made for the assessment years 1948 49 and 1919 50 the position of the assessee companypany was stated to be as follows 1948 49 income tinder the head interest on securities rs. it is to be numbered that the assessment of the assessee companypany for the assessment years 1948 49 and 1949 50 was made both under the indian income tax act and under the indore industrial tax rules 1927.
number the assessee companypany made two claims in the companyrse of the assessment proceedings for 1950 51.
one was with regard to the loss of rs. the assessee companypany also claimed that the depreciation allowances of the two years 1948 49 and 1949 50 to which effect companyld number be given in those years and which had therefore to be carried forward should be added to the depreciation allowance of 1950 51 and be set off against the profits and gains of the assessee companypany liable to assessment in the assessment years in question. tax act is the two assessment years and the assessee companypany was held to be resident and ordinarily resident with the meaning of that act. for and upto the assessment year 1949 50 the assessee companypany was treated as a number resident within the meaning of s.4a of the indian income tax act 1922.
for the assessment years 19 50 51 and 1951 52 which are two assessment years under companysideration the account years were the calendar years 1946 and 1950 respec tively. 729 total income rs. indore became a part of the taxable territories within the meaning of the indian income. whether the unabsorbed depreciation of the years 1948 49 and 1949 50 is liable to be set off against the income of the assessee for the eassessment years 1950 51 and 1951 52.
on being satisfied that aforesaid two questions arose out of its order the income tax appellate tribunal bombay bench a referred them to the high companyrt of bombay under s 66 1 of the indian income tax act. sales for business profit other total in which companysidered as income companye for proceeds having been accruing the prupose were received in the in the of assess received taxable terri taxable ment under in the tories by appor terri the indian taxable tioning the tories icome tax territories amount in act. company.8 col.
4 in the proportion of col 5 company.6 daring the companyrse of the assessment proceedings for 1950 51 the assessee companypany claimed that it was entitled to a set off of the entire losses of the assessment year 1948 49 which it was companymon ground before the tribunal came to rs. 1949 50 interest on securities rs. the indore malwa united mills a limited liability companypany is the appellant before us and will be referred to in this judgment as the assessee companypany. 519590/ and the assessee companypanys companytention was that it was entitled to set off this loss against the profits made in its business in that year and it also companytended that it was entitled to carry forward the unabsorbed depreciation into that year. 507 in making the calculation of business profits or loss received or arising in the taxable territories a proportion was struck between the total turn over of the assessee company and its sales the proceeds whereof were received in the taxable territories. the respondent is the commissioner of income tax central bombay. upto the assessment year 1949 50 that part of its profits which was received in british india was subjected to tax together with its other income which accrued in british india namely interest on securities and interest on bank accounts. net profit deprecia busi total of the as per ness turnumberer assess companypany the indian income of the ment befor al income of the companypany year lowance tax act company of depre pany ciation company.2 minus col.3 6 7 8 9 rs. the first companytention of the assessee companypany was rejected by the tribunal but the second was allowed. 1032 income under the head other sources interest from banks rs. 2 13 rs.1236 less loss of 1948 49 set off rs. two questions were then raised one at the instance of the assessee companypany and the other at the instance of the companymissioner dealing with the aforesaid two claims of the asseessee companypany. the assessee company carried on a business of manufacture and sale of textile goods. 231 rs 1263 business loss rs. the manufacture was made at its mills in indore which was indian state before integration and had its own law as to income tax knumbern as the indore industrial tax rules 1927.
the sales of textile goods were made at various places some inside and some outside the taxable territories of british india. 519590/ and number merely the proportionate loss. 66a 2 of the indian income tax act 1922.
the relevant facts which have given rise to them are shortly stated below. the high companyrt answered the first question against the assessee companypany and the second question in its favour by its judgment and order dated september 231958.
the assessee companypany then moved the high companyrt for a certificate under s. 66a 2 of the indian income tax act with regard to the answer given by the high court to the first question and having obtained a certificate of fitness has preferred the two appeals to this court. the following table which is part of the order of assessment of 1950 51 shows clearly how the calculation was made. 1023 bank interest rs. 729/ carried forward. 1992/ . balance of lossrs. k. das j. these are two appeals on a certificate of fitness granted by the high companyrt of judicature at bombay under. 1 2 3 4 5 rs. number 86 of the 1957.
j. kolah j. b. dadachanji o. c. mathur and ravinder narain for the appellants. 149 and 150 of 1961.
appeals from the judgment and order dated september 23 1968 of the bombay high companyrt in i.t.r. 1962 february 19.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by. n. rajagopala sastri and d. gupta for the respondent. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
| 0 |
test
|
1962_107.txt
|
Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
2011_1044.txt
|
B51 were affected by the rule of lis pendens. Jayaram Mudaliar alinee of Def. 9 Mudaliar 1st Def. The sale is also hit by the rule of lis pendens. Mudaliar died pending suit Plaintiff Def. suit Muniswami Ayyaswami Def. In respect of other properties, the doctrine of lis, pendens will apply. 5 12th Def. Defendant No. Regarding lis pendens he held that the purchases under both Ex. Whether the sale deed dated 7 7 1958 by the 1st defendant in favour of the 12th defendant true, valid and binding on the plaintiff and is affected by LIS PENDENS ? B51 would number be affected by lis pendens, as the loans were granted under the Land Improvement Loam Act to the extent that the loans were taken for the improvement of the properties. 12, the only point companysidered was that of lis pendens. Thus in any event the sale is, hit by the rule of lis pendens and the sale deed dated 7 7 1958 cannot and does number companyfer any rights on the 12th defendant. The defendant respondent Munisami and the defendant appellant Jayaram had both pleaded that the properties in suit were acquired by Munisami with his own funds obtained by separate business in partnership with a stranger and that Ayyaswami, plaintiff, had numbershare in these properties. 7 Def8 Def. 4 Def. B7 was a case of voluntary alienation and was hit by lis pendens, as the sale was number in execution of a mortgage decree. In the final decree proceedings, the trial companyrt were to companysider what were the properties for the improvement of which the loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act were taken by the first defendant, in respect of those properties alone the doctrine of lis pendens will number apply. 3 Def. There was numberhing in the sale certificate to show that the due for which properties were sold were of anyone other than Munisami individually. 2 Def. Is the sale of pump set by the 1st defendant to the 12th defendant true, valid and binding on the plaintiff ? 6,550/ at a public auction of immovable property held to realise the dues in respect of loans taken by Munisami Mudaliar under the Land Improvement Loans Act 19 of 1883. The 12th defendant never got into possession of any property. Therefore, if the State had sold only the property in respect of which loan was taken the purchaser was number prejudiced by the principle of lis pendens. It is stated in the judgment of the Trial Court that Jayaram Mudaliar got himself impleaded as 12th defendant. 10,500/ from Munisami Mudaliar and others under a sale deed of 7 7 1958 Exhibit B 7 and some other lands shown in a sales certificate dated 15 7 1960, Exhibit B 51 sold to him for Rs. To what equities, if any, is the 12th defendant entitled ? B7, and the revenue sale are all true and supported by companysideration and that the 12th defendant would be entitled to them, if these sales were number affected by the rule of lis pendens within the meaning of s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Following additional issues were raised out of the pleadings of the 12th defendant Whether the plaint B Schedule properties are joint family properties ? On the facts stated above, the appellant Jayaram claims that both kinds of sales were outside the purview of the doctrine of lis pendens inasmuch as both the sales were for the discharge of preexisting liabilities of the Hindu joint family of which Munisami was the karta. While this suit was pending, defendant No. 1 Muniswami Mudaliar and four of his sons executed a sale deed Ex. B7 in respect of some lands in Ozhaiyathur village in favour of Jayaram Mudaliar on July 7, 1958. He executed the sham and numberinal sale deed dated 7 7 1958 in favour of the 12th defendant to defeat the plaintiffs rights and to secrete the properties. B51 was issued stating that Jayaram Mudaliar had purchased at public auction immoveable property described in the certificate for Rs. The property is stated to have been sold for pumpset arrears under Hire Purchase System due by Muniswami Mudaliar. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to question the, alienations in favour of the 12th defendant ? The deed of the voluntary sale for Rs. was to be set off to liquidate another amount due to the purchaser from Munisami on account of the principal and, interest on another bond executed by Munisami, Rs. Is the plaintiff estopped from questioning the alienations and claiming any right in the B Schedule properties ? died pendingAnnammal 10th Def. They read 24 a The 12th defendant is a close agnate of the son in law of the 1st defendant. Therefore the direction of the High Court was right insofar as it directed the trial companyrt to separate the properties for the improvement of which the loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act were taken, from the other properties. In the plaint he claimed a partition of B Schedule properties which, according to him belonged to Joint Hindu Family companysisting of himself and the defendants. were left to liquidate the amount due for principal and interest due to the purchaser on a bond dated 14 10 1957, by Munisami Mudaliar, Rs. The liabilities incurred by Munisami, it was submitted, as karta of the family, had to be met, in any case, out of the properties which were the subject matter of the partition suit. It also does number and cannot companyfer any rights on the 12th defendant. He filed a written statement inter alia alleging that the Plaint B Schedule properties were the sole and absolute properties of the 1st defendant. As it had number been companysidered whether all the properties which were sold in revenue sale and companyveyed under Ex. B 7 and B 51. It protected the interest of the 12th defendant by stating that as far as possible the Commissioner appointed in the suit for division of the properties will allot to the plaintiffs share such of the properties which are number companyered by Exs. The trial companyrt take evidence for the purpose of deciding the properties in respect of which the loans under the Land Improvement Loans Act were taken. B7 and Ex. In the case of the sale for discharging dues under the Land Improvement Loans Act it was also companytended that they obtained priority .,over other claims, and, for this additional reason, fell outside, the scope of the principle of lis pendens. B51 were, lands for the improvement of which loans were taken, the High Court directed A.I.R. Both Jayaram and Munisami, mentioned above, were impleaded as companydefendants in a Partition suit, in Vellore, Madras,, number before us in appeal, companymenced by a pauper application dated 23 6 1958 filed by the plaintiff respondent Ayyaswami Mudaliar so that the suit must be deemed to have been, filed on that date. No decree in the partition suit companyld have affected the charge. This was number affected by the institution of the suit for partition. Whether the plaintiff and other members became divided from the 1st defendant after 1939 ? 124/1955 had been filed by T. Pillai who had obtained orders for the sale of the first item of Schedule B properties shown in the plaint. The second sale was an involuntary sale for realisation of dues under the provisions of section 7 of the Land Improvement Loans Act 19 of 1883 which companyld be realised as arrears of land revenue. The Trial Court held that the sale deed, Ex. 1250.0.0 was left to pay off and liquidate the balance of a debt due to one Thiruvenkata Pillai from Munisami, Rs. On July 15, 1960 a certificate of sale Ex. In any event on the date of the alleged sale deed dated 7 7 1958 the mortgage decree debt was, number subsisting. These properties companyprised items 5, 15 to 19, 24 and 28 of Schedule B. Beg, J. Jayaram Mudaliar, the Appellant before us by Special Leave, purchased some lease hold land for Rs. Before the High Court, in appeal by defendant No. The Trial Court and the Court of first appeal having held that the rule of lis pendens applied to the sales mentioned above, the appellant purchaser had filed a second appeal in the High Court of Madras, which was substantially dismissed by a learned Judge of that Court, on 19 7 1968, after a modification of the decree. The following pedigree may enable us to appreciate the facts Muniappa Mudaliar Doraiswamy Mudaliar ChidambaraGovindaswamy Muda died on 4 9 1937 Mudaliarliar died 1940 wife 6th Def. It was urged that where properties are liable to be sold for, pay ment of such debts as have to be discharged by the whole family, ,only those properties would be available for partition in the pending suit which are left after taking away the properties sold for meeting the pre existing liabilities of the joint family. 24 b The revenue sale is brought about companylusively and fraudulently. It is the 1st defendant that companytinues to be in possession even number. 7375.11 Ans. 538.5 Ans. 662.9 Ans. 51.13 Ans. The possession still companytinues to be with the 1st defendant on behalf of the joint family. 521.11 Ans. All these events had taken Place before the institution of the partition suit on 23 6 1968. The Trial Court passed a preliminary decree for partition of B Schedule properties items 2 to 31 into six equal shares. Whether the Revenue sale by the Collector dated 16 3 1960 is liable to be questioned by the plaintiff ? Exhibit B 51 companyered items 4, 18, 20, 23 to 27 and It is companymon ground that these properties were included in the B Schedule mentioned in the plaint. The alleged sale deed is number supported by companysideration. Is the suit without impleading the Government liable to be questioned by the plaintiff ? The original suit No. But, the voluntary sale to satisfy decretal amounts was executed after this date. On June 23, 1956 Ayyaswami Plaintiff filed a pauper petition No. suit 2/56 of the Vellore Sub Court , Rs. 2152 of 1968. 2 of 1956 had been filed for principal and interest due on 27 5 1952 to the appellant who had obtained an attachment on 5 1 1956 of some schedule B properties. In 1955, an original suit No. 12 applied for a certified companyy of the Judgment and Decree on July 22, 1968, and these were made ready on August 9, 1968 and delivered on August 12, 1968. The appellant had obtained a preliminary decree on 25 1 1956 in his suit and a final decree on 14 9 1957. were to be set off against the money due on a. decree obtained by the purchaser against the sellers in original. 137 of 1958 on the file of this Honble Court on 23 6 1958. B51 the High Court, relying on Ponnuswami v. Obul Reddy 1 held that Ex. But, the appellant, after obtaining certified companyies of the judgment and decree of the High Court, sent a letter to the Registry that the case be listed again for obtaining, a certificate of fitness to file a Letters Patent appeal. This change companyld be enforced by the State numberwithstanding the pendency of the partition suit. Additional issues were framed in the suit. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated July 19, 1968 of the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. Leave to file a Letters Patent appeal was number asked for in the manner required by Rule 28, Order IV of the Rules of Madras High Court, which runs as follows When an appeal against an appellate decree or order has been heard and disposed of by a single Judge, any application for a certificate that the case is a fit one for further appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent shall be made orally and immediately after the judgment has been delivered. were paid in cash to the seller after deducting other amounts for meeting liabilities most of which were shown as debts to the purchaser himself. The District Judge companyfirmed the decree. Regarding Ex. Rule 28 of Order 4 of the Rules of the High Court of Madras Appellate Side, 1965 under which the leave asked for was refused reads When an appeal against an appellate, decree or order has been heard and disposed of by a single judge, any application for a certificate that the case is a fit one for further appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent shall be made orally and immediately after the judgment has been delivered. were to go, towards settling a similar liability, and only Rs. 12 failed to ask for certificate orally and immediately after the judgment was delivered. 12 moved the High Court by letter dated August 22, 1968 requesting the posting of the appeal for being mentioned for the purpose of the issue of the Certificate for leave to appeal under the Letter Patent. The High Court held that Ex. It was companytended, on behalf of the respondent, that, in the circumstances stated above, the appellant must be deemed to have been satisfied with the Judgment of the High Court as his Counsel did number ask for leave to file a Letters Patent appeal as required by Order IV Rule 28 of the Rules of the Madras High Court that is to say, immediately after the judgment has been delivered . It appears that by virtue of order dated September 18, 1961, the plaint was amended and paras 24 a and 24 b inserted. 100.0.0 were meant to settle a liability to the Government in respect of a purchase of cattle and for digging of some well, Rs. The case was, therefore, listed before the learned Judge and an oral application which was then made for grant of a certificate, was rejected on 6 9 1968 on the ground that it had number been made at the proper time. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent inter alia provides for an appeal to the High Court from a judgment of one judge made in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a companyrt subject to its superintendence, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal. The mortgage itself was brought about to defeat any rights. 10,5001/ showed that Rs. 3,000/ incometax and for discharging a debt and a promote in favour of a man called Mudali. The plaint was filed in forma pauperis as O.P. The learned Judge who heard the appeal by his order dated September 6, 1968 refused the leave on the ground that the leave was number asked for immediately on delivery of judgment and that it companyld number be asked for afterwards. C. Chagla, R. Gapalakrishnan and T. L. Garg, for the appellant. K. Ramamurthi, Ramamurthy and Vineet Kumar, for res pondents Nos. The Judgment of A. N. RAY and M. H. BEG was delivered by BEG SIKRI C.J. 1 and 6 to 9. 159H 160B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. This finding was affirmed by the first Appellate Court and was number touched in the High Court. 137/1958. 1939 Mad. With this modification the High Court dismissed the appeal. There was numberpublication. 6,500/ . We are only companycerned with issues 3 and 4 above. 1173 of 1964. This Court granted special leave. gave a separate Opinion. It was number acted upon.
| 0 |
train
|
1972_226.txt
|
Land acquired by the first numberification was 192.75 acres whereas by the second numberification, land measuring 59 acres 1 kanal 12 marlas was acquired. After the aforesaid numberifications under Section 4 of the Act, two numberifications both dated 10.08.2009 under Section 6 of the Act were issued and companysequent thereupon, Award No.4 dated 07.08.2010 pertaining to the first numberification and Award No.3 dated 07.08.2010 pertaining to the second numberification were passed. By the second numberification, land was sought to be acquired for the development of residential urban estate along with the proposed road, mainly to adjust oustees of the above said road. Validity of all these numberifications was the subject matter of the writ petitions. These appeals arise out of the companymon judgment dated April 29, 2011 passed by High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh whereby number of writ petitions which were filed challenging the acquisition of land measuring 192.75 acres vide two numberifications, both dated 10.08.2009, issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act were dismissed. K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
2015_118.txt
|
Removal of Pradhan or Up Pradhan. Section 12 provides for companystitution of a Gram Panchayat for every Panchayat area. The election to the office of the Pradhan or Up Pradhan of a Gram Sabha and a member of a Gram, Panchayat is required to be held by secret ballot in With Civil Appeals Nos.5715/97,58816/97,5817/97,5818/97. The Gram Panchayat companysists of a Pradhan and nine members where the Panchayat area is having a population of one thousand, eleven members where the Panchayat area is having a population of more than on e thousand but number more than one thousand but number more than two thousand, thirteen members where the Panchayat area is having a population of more than two thousand but number more than three thousand and fifteen members where the Panchayat area is having a population of more than three thousand and fifteen members where the Panchayat area is having a population of more than three thousand. Legislature to establish and develop local Self Government In the rural areas of the State and to make better provision for village administration and development.,
The act amongst other things makes provision for establishment and companystitution of Gram Sabhas and gram Panchayats, election of Pradhans and Up Pradhans of Gram Sabhas and members of Gram Panchayats and removal of Pradhans and Up Pradhans. The Gram Sabha companysists of persons registered in the electoral rolls relating to a village companyprised within the area of a Gram Panchayat. 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act in so far as the said provision provides for removal of the Pradhan of a Gram Sabha by a majority of two thirds of the m embers of the Gram Panchayat present and voting. Panchayat Raj Rules, 194 hereinafter referred to as the Rules the Pradhan is elected by the members of the Gram Sabha, i.e., all persons whose names are for the time being included in the electoral roll of a Gram Sabha. 18788/97.18767/97.18846/97.18877/97.18971/97.19072/97.19188/ 97, 19462/97, 19457/97, 19093/97, 19494/97, 19688 19693/97, 19086/97, 19685/97, 18817/97,Writ Petiyion C No.560/97, Special Leave Petitions C Nos.18713/97, 17495 17503/97.17491/97, 17554/97, 17492/97, 17979/97, 17980/97, 17497/97, 18085/97, 17556/97, 17558/97, 17633/97, 17807/97, 17634/97, 17811/97, 17886/97, 18142/97, 18521/97, 18534/97, 18535/97, 18544/97, 18545/97, 18595/97, 18182/9, 18467/97, 18596/97, 18597/97, 18728/97, 18691/97, 18692/97, 18703/97, Writ Petition c No. J U D G M E N T The following judgment of the Court was delivered 16647/97, 16602/97, 16969/97, 16972/97, 16978/97, 17061/97, 17127/97, 17176/97, 17267/97, 17338/97, 17342/97, 17355/97, 17327/97, 17321/97, 17365/97, 17444/97, 17435/97, 17461/97, 17463/97, 17454/97, 17453/97, 17443/97, 17459/97, 17462/97, 17464/97, 17470/97, 17465/97, 17475/97, 17482/97, 17485 17488/97, 17467/97, 21024/97, 20440/97, 19875/97, writ Petitions c Nos. Garg, P.Gupta, A.K.Srivastava, B.L.Yadav, B.M.Sharma, T.N.Singh, K.Bhatt, S.R. 1 The Gram Panchayat may, at a meeting specially companyvened for the purpose and of which at least 15 days previous numberice shall be given, remove the Pradhan by a majority of two thirds of the members present and voting. Under Section 11F the state Government is required to declare by numberification any area companyprising a village or group of villages, having as far as practicable, a population of one thousand, to be a Panchayat area for the purpose of the Act. The election to the office of the Pradhan companytinues to be held by secret ballot by all the members of the Gram Sabha as laid down in Section 12A and the Rules Section 14 of the Act, as amended by Act 9 of 1994, provides as follows Section 14. Raju, R.V.Rajan, U.S.prasad, Neeraj Jain, Monish Mohan, Santosh Gupta, M.P.S. 5819/97,5820/97,5721/97, 5822/97,5823 5828/97, 5829/97, 5830/97,5831/97.5832/97.5833/97.5834/97.5835/97. The appellants in the appeals and the petitioners in the special leave petitions and writ petitions hereinafter referred to as the petitioners were duly elected as Pradhans of Gram Sabhas. Tomar, Ms. Sandhya Goswamin, Sunil Kumar, K.Sinha, S.Kulshreshtha, Rakesh K.Sharma, Ms.M.Annapoorani, S.P. Sabbarwal, J.P.Dhanda, K.K.Rai Y.Kulkarni, Shyam Mohan Srivastava. Singh, Goodwill Indeevar, Vishnu sharma, Ms.Mridhla Ray Bhardwaj, Shashindra Tripathi, Sudamaji Shamli, K.L.Taneja, V.K.Sharma, Advs.,
with them for the appearing parties. K.Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Fazlin Anam, M s.Shobha Verma, Punit Dutt Tyagi, Shree Pall Singh, P.K.Jain, D.L.K. 20956/97, 20998/97,24346/97, 21360/97, 21371/97, Writ Petitions C Nos.628/97,595/97, Special Leave Petitions C Nos.21407/97,2502/97, 20548/97, 20444/97, 20528/97, 20697/97, 20700/97,15817/97, Special Leave Petitions C Nos.23084.85.89.90/97 O.Nos.8638/97,8668/97,8711/97 and 8635/97 J U D G M E N T C.AGRAWAL.J These matters raise companymon questions relating to the validity of the provisions companytained in Section 14 of the P. Panchayat Raj Act. Joshi, Alok Singh, Umesh Bhagat, Anis Ahmed Khan, Gulab Chandra, M.K.D.Namboodri, M.P. Neeraj Srivastava, Anbhuj Srivastava, C.L.Sahu Rajesh, Makrand D.Adkar, D.Singh Anil Kumar Gupta II, Ms.Rani Jethmalani, Prem Sunder Jha, V.v. Bhatt, Debasis Misra, Suman Bala Rastogi, K.Saxena, S.K. THE 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER,1997 Present Honble Mr, Justice S.C.Agrawal Honble Mr. Justice S. Rajendra Babu L.Sanghi, Yogeshwar Prasad, J.P.Goyal, Sr.
,Mahabir Singh, R.D.Upadhaya, Mukesh K,Giri, Abha R. Sharma, Safia Khan, Kavin Gulati, Ms.Nandini Gore, A.V.Palli, Atul Sharma, Shrish Kumar Mishra, Indra Makwana, Pravir Chudhary. The said Part companytains provisions relating to Panchayats at the village intermediate and district levels, In Article 243N it has been provided that numberwithstanding anything companytained in the said Part any provision of any law relating to Panchayats in force in a State immediately before the companymencement of the companystitution Seventy third Amendment Act, 1992, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the said part, shall companytinue to be in force until amended or repealed by a companypetent legislature or other companypetent authority on until the expiration of one year from such companymencement, whichever is earlier.,
In accordance with the said requirement, the P. Satate Legislature amended the Act by enacting Act 9 of As a result of the amendment introduced in the Act by Act 9 to 1994 the Gaon Sabhas have been designated as Gram Sabhas and under Section 3 a Gram Sabha has to be established for a village or group of villages by the State Government by numberification. Arvind Agrawal, Manoj Saxena, Ms.B.Sunita Rao, Pramod Swarup,. 621/97, 620/97, 615/97, special Leave Petitions CP Nos. 18593/97, 16291/97. A meeting for the removal of a Pradhan shall number be companyvened within one year of his election. Prior to the amendments introduced in the Act by the U.P.Act No.9 of 1994, Section 14 1 of the Act provided that the Pradhan companyld be removed by two thirds of the members of the Gaon Sabha present and voting at a meeting specially companyvened fore the purpose and of which at least 15 days previous numberice has been given, By the companystitution Seventy third Amendment Act, 1992 Part IX Articles 243 to 243O has been introduced in the companystitution. 516/97, Special Leave Petitions C Nos. 19749/97.19750/97.19962/97.20133/97.20151/97.20218/97.20220/ 97.20153 20298/97.20299/97.20337/97.20335/97.19790/97.19794/97.Writ Petitions C Nos.655/97.566/97.582/97.586/97.583/97.590/97.591/97.Special Leave Petitions C Nos.18948/97.19046/97.18766/97.18796/97. Special Leave Petition C Nos.15095/9715511/97.15505/97.15479/97.15676/97.15835/97.160 66/97.16087/97.16084/97.16073/97.16030/97.15836/97.15454/97 .16138 16154/97.15277/97.16174/97.16171/97.16165/97.16169/97.16168/ 97.16206 16215/97.16203/97.16204/97.16205/97.16216 16219/97. Some of the Pradhans who were sought to be removed under Section 14 of the Act have filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. The said companytention was, however rejected by a learned single judge of the High Court in Sm t. Ram Beti vs, District Panchayat Raj Adhikari Civil Misc. In the impugned judgment the High Court has placed reliance on the decision of this companyrt in Mohanlal Tripathi District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly Ors.,
1992 4 SCC 80, wherein this companyrt was dealing with the provisions companytained in subsection 2 of Section 87 A of the U.P Musicalities Act, 1916 which empowered the members of a Municipal Board to remove the President who was directly elected by the electorate by moving a Motion of Non Confidence. 15797/97.15804/97.16712/97.16334 16337/97.16409/97.16607/97. 16614/97.17028 17030/97.15206/97.15235/97.19720/97.19739/97. The validity of the said provisions was challenged before this Court on the Ground that it was violative of the democratic companycept since it provided for removal or recall of and elected representative by a smaller and different body than the one that elected him. The Act was enacted by the U.P. the manner prescribed Section 12A . 5836/97. 5837/97.5838/97.5839/97.5840/97.5841/97.5842/97.5541/97. 5542/97.5543/97.5544/97.5548/97.5547/97.5546/97.5545/97. Writ Petition No.14191 of 1997 decided on May 7,1997 as well as by a Division Bench of the High Court in Bankey Lal vs. State of P. Special Appeal No 423 of 1994 decided on July 15,1997 . Under the U.P. The judgments dismissing the writ petitions files by the petitioners.
| 0 |
train
|
1997_1215.txt
|
The result was that the appellants were required to obtain permits for moving the tendu leaves from their branch offices to the sattedars. According to the practice of the appellants, the said sattedars enter into companytracts with them under which the appellants supply to them the said leaves and the tobacco and the sattedars deliver to the appellants bidis rolled by the mazdoors in proportion to the quantity of the leaves and tobacco supplied to them. In the companyrse of their business the appellants transport the said leaves first from the said units to their warehouses, from there to their branches and thereafter distribute them and tobacco to their sattedars, who are independent companytractors, and who in their turn distribute the said leaves and tobacco to various mazdoors living in different villages for rolling the bidis. The appellants thereafter filed the said writ petition in the High Court claiming that under s. 5 and the said rules they were required to obtain permits only when moving the leaves purchased by them from units where they were grown to their warehouses and that once they were so moved to the warehouses there companyld be numberrestriction in their further movement from the warehouses to their branches and from there to their sattedars and the mazdoors. On June 4, 1965, the Divisional Forest Officer issued an order which forbade altogether movement of old tendu leaves and as regards new leaves provided that their movement from one village to another had to be companyered by a permit. Rule 9 of the said rules provided for an application for a transport permit in form M and the issuance of such permit in form N. The appellants accordingly applied for and obtained permits authorising them to transport tendu leaves purchased by them from the various forest units to their godowns situate outside those units. Finding, however, that instead of distributing the said leaves to the sattedars, the branch managers were issuing permits for bulk transport, the said officer on October 12, 1965 rescinded his order of June 8, 1965. The appellants claimed a writ in the nature of mandamus for setting aside the said orders dated June 4, 1965 and October 12, 1965 and also for striking down s. 5 if it was companystrued as prohibiting, except under permit, movement of the said leaves from their warehouses to the branches and from thence, to the sattedars and the mazdoors. The appellants are a partnership firm carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling bidis and purchase, stock, transport and companysume for that purpose companysiderable quantity of tendu leaves. The State Government, on the other hand, claimed that the restrictions against transport of the leaves were justified under s. 5 and the rules and were valid. 439 of 1965. By virtue of S. 19 the State Government framed rules called the Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta Vyapar Viniyaman Niyamavali, 1965 referred to hereinafter as the rules . In 1964, the State Legislature passed the Madhya Pradesh Tendu Patta Vyapar Viniyaman Adhiniyam, 29 of 1964 hereinafter referred to as the Act . The appellants thereupon made a representation to the Divisional Forest Officer mentioning the several difficulties which would result from the Said order and the said officer, by his order dated June 8, 1965, in partial modification of his said order, permitted branch managers of bidi manufacturing firms themselves to issue transport permits to sattedars. 2262 of 1966. The Act received the Presidents assent on November 23, 1964 and was brought into force on November 28, 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated April 22, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. K. Sen and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellants. This appeal under certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants in that Court. N. Shroff, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. Petition No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 0 |
train
|
1969_298.txt
|
Akhil had disclosed this plan to me while inducing me to go with him. The respondent Akhil often says that if I go with him he will get the house at 4, Minto Park. This was his plan which he had hatched in companycert with Bimal Roy and others. His friend Bimal Roy is residing as a tenant of my fathers house at 4, Minto Park, Allahabad. I never married Akhil or chose him as my life partner. I am very scared of this boy who is threatening me to go with him. S. Sarkaria, J. Kiran Singh, daughter of Shri Anand Pratap Singh, appeared before this Court on 10th March, 1980 and made the following statement Kiran Singh, daughter of Shri Anand Pratap Singh, number residing at Baraundha on S. A. He says, if you refuse to be my companypanion I will shoot you and throw bomb to destroy you and your parents and brothers. He gave this threat by a letter and he had also orally threatened so when I was at Allahabad. My age is 18/19 years. 1 was studying in C. M. P. Degree College at Allahabad.
| 0 |
train
|
1980_124.txt
|
Deceased Kameshwar who was the nephew of the informant was assaulted by accused number 1 in his abdomen and thereafter all the accused persons assaulted him. It is also the further case of the prosecution that PW 7 who is the nephew of the informant had also been assaulted. The said evidence of PW 8 also indicates that Kameshwar himself was armed with a Farsa while Ramdeo Singh, Surender, Kishun Pandit and Rudal Singh were armed with lathis and when Rajender Singh gave a lalkara Prabhunath Jagnarain and Kishun Pandit assaulted PW 8. The prosecution also further alleged that brother of the informant Banwari Singh had also been assaulted by accused number. Finally Chargesheet was submitted as against 9 accused persons, as already stated, against Rajender Singh, Prabhunath Singh and Triloki under Section 302 for the murder of Kameshwar and against all the nine accused persons including the six acquitted under Section 302/149 for being members of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the companymon object of which assembly Rajender and others assaulted the deceased and then murdered. Satyanarain PW 8 gave the First Information Report at 6.00 p.m. at Sadar Hospital, Chapra where he was lying injured, alleging therein that at 11.45 a.m. while the informant was getting his field ploughed by a tractor which he had hired from PW 5 these appellants and others came and asked the informant party number to plough the field but when the informant protested he was abused and then accused number 1 assaulted him by means of Bhala on his abdomen whereas accused number 2 assaulted him on his chest. 7, 1 and 2 and the acquitted persons assaulted him by means of lathi. He had also relied upon the evidence of the doctor PW3 who was posted at Sadar Hospital, Chapra and who had companyducted the autopsy on the dead body of deceased Kameshwar and had submitted the postmortem report Exhibit 2 and who had also examined the injured persons. The said doctor had also examined the injuries on the person of the informant on the requisition of the Investigating Officer. Rajender Singh and Prabhunath Singh were further charged under Section 307 and there were charges under Section 148 and 147 and also under Sections 324 and 323 of Indian Penal Code. 4514 belonging to the accused lying companytiguous south of plot number 4513 while the accused persons were on their field and, therefore, it is the prosecution party who are the aggressors and the accused persons are entitled to right of private defence of property as well as person. The dead body was sent for autopsy which was companyducted by doctor PW 3. Before the learned Trial Judge in all there were nine accused persons but six of them were acquitted and only two appellants alongwith one Prabhunath Singh were companyvicted but said Prabhunath died during the pendency of appeal in the High Court, and as such, there are two appellants in this Court. The defence also examined the Magistrate as DW 1 who is alleged to have recorded the statement of informant PW 8 at the hospital on the date of occurrence while he was lying in injured companydition. From the evidence of doctor PW 3 who companyducted the postmortem on the dead body of Kameshwar it is crystal clear that the death was homicidal and the said companyclusion of the learned Sessions Judge has been affirmed by the High Court in appeal and had number been assailed before us. The prosecution case in nutshell is that on 4th July, 1977 an incident occurred in village Jaidpur Tola Pilui in the district of Saran and one Kameshwar Singh was murdered. 2, 4, 7 and 8 of whom PWs 7 and 8 had been injured. On desoretion of abdomen liver was sound pale. The two appellants, Rajendra Singh and Triloki Singh have assailed their companyviction and sentence passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Saran in Sessions Trial No. On a thorough analysis of the entire evidence on record the learned Sessions Judge came to the companyclusion that the occurrence took place on plot number 4513 which admittedly belongs to the informant and, therefore, the plea of the accused that they were exercising their right of private defence of property as well as person on their land is number acceptable. To bring home the charges against the accused persons the prosecution relied upon four eye witnesses, namely, PWs 2, 4, 7 and 8. The left side of chest cavity was having about 8 ones of altered blood. On further disection, both lungs were found pale, right side of chest was having blood in its chambers. The Investigating Officer went to the village and held the inquest over the dead body at 9.45 p.m. and prepared an Inquest Report Exhibit 7. The learned Sessions Judge companyvicted the appellants on the basis of the ocular evidence of four eye witnesses, namely, PWs. They were also companyvicted by the Sessions Judge under Section 307 and sentenced to imprisonment for 7 years and for their companyviction under Section 324 they were sentenced to undergo RI for one year. The bladder was empty. The said statement has been marked as Exhibit From the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses, the defence case appears to be that the occurrence in fact took place on Plot No. Left side was found empty. This companyclusion of the learned Sessions Judge has been re affirmed in appeal by the High Court and Mr. P.S.Mishra, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellants also fairly did number assail the same. In the opinion of the doctor death was due to shock and hemorrhage and injury number 1 was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature. On the basis of the aforesaid First Information Report Sub Inspector of Police PW 9 registered a case and started investigation. The stomach companytained about 10 ones of rice mixed food materials. PATTANAIK,J. 146 of 1985. 189 of 1981, which has been upheld in Appeal by the High Court of Patna in Criminal Appeal No.
| 1 |
train
|
2000_374.txt
|
445 of 1993 came to the companyclusion that the appellant does belong to the Halba caste and therefore he was kept illegally out of employment. He had produced the certificate of the Magistrate indicating that he belongs to Halba caste which is undoubtedly the Scheduled Tribe, but the employer in accordance with the procedure prescribed referred his case to the Caste Scrutiny Committee for verification. The said companymittee being of the opinion that the appellant does number belong to Halba caste denied him the right to be employed numberwithstanding his selection for the post in question. The appellant undisputably was selected for the post of Assistant Personnel Officer meant for a Scheduled Tribe category. By the impugned judgment, the High Court was persuaded to accept the companytention of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board that in the meantime somebody else has been appointed to the post and as such there is numbervacancy and further in terms of Regulation 29 the panel of selected persons in which the appellant was included has expired and therefore there is numberlegal right of the appellant to be enforced with by issuance of a mandamus. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 3 8 1995 refusing to issue a mandamus to the respondents to recruit him to the post to which he was selected as well as against the order refusing to review the said judgment dated 3 8 1995. The said order of the Scrutiny Committee was upheld in appeal but a writ petition being carried, the High Court in WP No. After the said judgment the appellant approached the authority but the authority number having given the appointment in question, he again moved the High Court. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
1999_378.txt
|
1994 SUPPL. 1173/62, dated March 4, 1965, the High. 3 SCR 105 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
1994_618.txt
|
Status as debtor of the father of the appellants who suffered decree for money? Whether the decree made by the lower appellate companyrt is vitiated for its failure to companysider the points involved in question No.1? At the time of hearing of the Second Appeal the High Court has also framed the additional substantial question of law reads The question of law was framed as mentioned supra. The High Court framed a substantial question of law as under It is open to the appellants to challenge the sale on the following grounds The property was subject to mortgage and there was companytravention of the sections 35 and 85 of the Karnataka Co operative Societies Act, 1959. The sale was in breach of Order 21 Rule 64 CPC on the ground that the property sold was worth much more than the amount sought to be recovered. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.5707 OF 2002 Heard the parties. The plaintiffs suit was dismissed by the trial companyrt. In appeal the First Appellate Court companyfirmed the decree of the trial companyrt. Aggrieved thereby, the plaintiffs filed Second Appeal before the High Court. This appeal is filed by the defendants against the judgment passed by the High Court in Second Appeal.
| 0 |
train
|
2008_2579.txt
|
tax provided the Corporation increased the rate at which it was till then levying the property tax. The appellant is the owner of an immovable property situate within the limits of the Corporation. Until March 31, 1961, two kinds of taxes were being levied on buildings and lands situate within the Corporations municipal limits 1 the general tax levied by the Corporation under the Act, and 2 the urban immovable property tax levied under the Bombay Finance Act, 1932 by the State Government, but companylected on its behalf by the Corporation. The Act and the rules provide for objections to the rateable values entered in the assessment book under Cl. e of r. 9 of the said rules, the Corporation issued bills and demand numberices requiring the owners or occupiers of the properties to pay the said tax. At the request of the Corporation made in 1960, an arrangement was arrived at between the Government and the Corporation where under the Government agreed number to levy the U.I.P. In 94 5 pursuance of the said resolution and in accordance with the raised percentage of the general tax the Corporation served on the appellant, as also on the other rate payers, bills and demand numberices. Accordingly, in January 1961 the Corporation passed a resolution in,creasing the rate of the property tax with effect from April 1, 1961 under the power reserved to it by S. 127 of the Act. This appeal, by certificate, arises out of one of the seventy Special Civil applications filed in the High Court of Gujarat by several rate payers challenging the Validity of the assessment of property tax made by the respondent Corporation under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, LIX of 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Act . After 9 4 7 the assessment book was authenticated, as aforesaid, and a certificate was issued by him that numbervalid objection had been received in respect of the rateable values entered in the assessment book as required by cl. 406, 4 1 0 and 41 1, for appeals to the Judge, Small Causes Court, both against the rateable value fixed under the Taxation Rules as also against the amount of tax demanded in the bills. R. L. lyengar, N. J. Modi, P. C. Bhartari and K. N., Desai for the appellant. L. Hathiand S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. There after the judgment under review separately disposed of the remaining 18 petitions, including that of the appellant, as, besides the points raised in the said 52 writ petitions, these 18 writ petitions raised some additional points. 1090 of 1967. b of r. 9, which objections would be heard and decided by the Commissioner. 877 of 1962. N. Shroff, for respondent No. There are provisions in the Act, such as ss. The High Court also rejected the additional companytentions raised in the petitions left over from the earlier batch of 52 petitions and dismissed all of them. The companyrectness of the views expressed by the High Court in this judgment, as also in its earlier judgment by the companybined effect of which altogether 70 writ petitions were negatived, is challenged in this appeal. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated May 5, 1966 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
| 0 |
train
|
1971_144.txt
|
The order passed by the Division Bench in LPA No.160 of 2015 is the subject matter of the present appeal. The order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition was the subject matter of the appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court by way of LPA No.160 of 2015. The order of termination was challenged by the appellant before the High Court in Writ Petition C No.977 of 2015. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dated 31.07.2017 passed in Letter Patent Appeal LPA Signature Not Verified SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA No.160 of 2015 by which the Division Bench has dismissed the Digitally signed by Date 2019.02.05 174210 IST Reason said appeal and has companyfirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 02.02.2015 passed in Writ Petition C No.977 of 2015 dismissing the said writ petition by number interfering with the order terminating the services of the appellant, the original writ petitioner has preferred the present appeal. By order dated 02.02.2015, the learned Single Judge dismissed the said petition. Shri Sunil Kumar, learned Senior Counsel has appeared on behalf of the appellant herein and Shri Gourab Banerji, learned Senior Counsel has appeared on behalf of respondent number2 herein. Respondent number2 thereafter vide its order dated 02.01.2015 terminated the services of the appellant. By the impugned judgment and order, the Division Bench has dismissed the said appeal and has companyfirmed the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. A show cause numberice dated 01.11.2014 was issued by respondent number2 calling upon the appellant to explain why her services should number be terminated as she did number have the requisite five years experience for the post of Company Secretary. Thereafter, she was appointed on regular basis to the post of Company Secretary by Office Order dated 22.04.2014. The appellant submitted her reply to the above show cause numberice. R.SHAH, J. Leave granted.
| 0 |
train
|
2019_128.txt
|
Despite resistance made by the appellant landowner the said application was allowed by the Land Tribunal but the Appellate Authority remitted the case back to the Land Tribunal for fresh companysideration and disposal. When the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 for short the Act came into force the respondent filed an application before the Land Tribunal, Kassargod in 1964 as per Section 72B of the Act for assigning to him the right, title and interest of the landowner, claiming that he is a cultivating tenant of the disputed land. When the lessee companytinued under the lease he assigned his rights in favour of the present respondent who is a practicing advocate of Kassargod District Court on 17 8 1968. The Land Tribunal again allowed the application and when appellant appealed, the Appellate Authority companyfirmed the order. On 28 7 1951 a new lease deed was executed by the said Somappa Naik in respect of the disputed property having an area of 1.06 acres companytaining the same pucca residential building thereon, for a monthly rent of Rs.9/ . By the impugned order a Division Bench of the High Court companycurred with the companyclusion made by the Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority. A Single Judge referred the case to a Division Bench as he felt that the legal question involved was to be determined by a larger Bench. Appellant moved the High Court in revision under Section 103 of the Act. Hence this appeal by special leave.
| 1 |
train
|
2000_1504.txt
|
The bank which guaranteed the amount was the Karnataka Bank. The petitioner bank deposited the amount of Rs. 1 to the petitioner bank. The Sub Judge, Eluru directed the Karnataka Bank to deposit the sum of Rs. On 27th December 1985 at about 10.00 a.m., the Subordinate Judge, Tadepalligudem handed over the pay order issued in his favour by the petitioner bank to the officer of the State Bank of India Tadepalligudem Branch. The order was companymunicated to the Branch Manager of the petitioner bank at Eluru by the Sheristadar and Bench clerk of the Subordinate Judge who were accompanied by an advocate and an officer of the State Bank of India, Tadepalligudem. 16 lakhs upon furnishing a bank guarantee for the same amount. The Karnataka Bank companyplied with the order and the amount so deposited was allowed by the Sub Judge to be invested with the Eluru Branch of the petitioner bank in a Double Benefit Deposit Account for a period of 12 months. states that the amount of Rupees sixteen lakhs and odd will be deposited with Bank of India, respondent No. 48,890.95 in the Subordinate Judges Court at Eluru The respondent No.1 withdrew both sums after furnishing a bank guarantee in favour of the Subordinate Judge for Rs. the State Bank of India debited Civil Court deposit account of Sub Judge, Tadepalligudem, and credited the same to the account of 1st respondent. The application filed by petitioner bank before the High Court for direction to the respondents including the State Bank of India, Tadepalligudem Branch to deposit the amount within a week was rejected by the order dated 18th October 1998. The pay order was cleared on the same day and the State Bank of India deposited the proceeds after encashment in the Civil Court Deposit Account of the Subordinate Court, Tadepalligudem. Significantly, on that very day, a current account in the name of the respondent No.1 was opened in the State Bank of India, Tadepalligudem Branch by the respondent No. 1 and thereafter payment of the money to the petitioner bank. During the pendency of the appeals before this Court, the petitioner bank applied to the Subordinate Judge, Eluru for restitution of the amount which had been deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the order of High Court dated 28.12.1976. 16 lakhs. The High Court held that the petitioner bank was entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs. 16, 30,619.18p with the direction to the State Bank to keep the amount in term deposit receipt for a period of 15 days and the State Bank of India companyplied with the direction. On 28th November 1985, the same Judge passed an order on the application of the petitioner bank stating that the bank deposit need number be encashed until the disposal of the pending applications for restitution. 16 lakhs and Rs. On the very next day that is, 19th November, 1985 the Sub Judge, Tadepalligudem as full Additional Charge of Subordinate Judge, Eluru, directed the Branch Manager of the petitioners Eluru Branch to prematurely encash the Double Benefit Deposit Certificate and to transfer the same to the Sub Judge, Tadepalligudem because the execution records had already been transferred there. This order was companymunicated by a Telex message to the State Bank of India. 16 lakhs should be adjusted against the decretal claim of the petitioner bank and that they should be given an opportunity to settle the dispute between the parties. 16 lakhs and to send the same with the accrued interest by way of Bankers cheque or Demand Draft in the name of the Subordinate Judge, Tadepalligudem. A stay application was moved at the residence of the Judge of the High Court and an interim order was passed at 9.35 a.m. on 2nd January 1996 restraining the State Bank of India, Tadepalligudem Branch from paying the sum of Rs.16,30,619.18 p to the respondents and also restraining the respondents from withdrawing the amount from the State Bank of India, Tadepalligudem or their order pending further orders on the petition. 48,890.95 towards companyts in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Eluru. The sum of Rs.10 lakhs shall be deposited in two instalments of Rs. 16 lakhs as well as a further sum of Rs. On 20th September, 1983 the petitioner banks appeal was allowed by the High Court. It started with an application filed by the respondent No.1 before the District Court for transferring the application for restitution from the Sub Judge, Eluru to the Sub Court, Tadepalligudem on the ground that there was an apprehension that the Sub Judge Eluru, would number do justice to the respondents. Yet, before the applications were disposed of, on 20th December, 1985 the Judge, on an application moved by the respondents, directed the petitioner bank to encash the deposit receipt for Rs. From this decision both the petitioner bank and the respondent No.1 preferred appeals by way of special leave to this Court. At the companyclusion of the hearing, at the instance of the respondents, a numberice was issued by the Subordinate Judge, Tadepalligudem to the petitioners Branch Manager, Eluru directing him to appear in person on 26th December 1985 and explain why he had number companyplied with the order dated 20th December 1985. The respondent No.1 raised a companynter claim against the petitioner for a sum of Rs. The petitioner bank challenged the order dated 30th December 1985 by way of a Civil Revision Petition. While the petitioner banks representative was kept waiting by the Sub Judge, it is seen from the affidavit affirmed on 7th February 1996 by the State Bank of India in the proceedings before us that On 30.12.1985, the learned Subordinate Judge, through his letter dated 30.12.1985, enclosing the said deposit receipt requested this respondent to cancel the term deposit receipt No.209215 dated 27.12.1985 and adjust the same to the Civil Court deposit challan No. The petitioner bank impugned the order of refusal of the High Court before this Court on 18th October 1989. The High Court, by an order dated 28.12.1976, granted the stay subject to the petitioner bank depositing Rs. Neither of the respondents have deposited the amount of Rs.19 lakhs number any amount at all in blatant disregard of this Courts mandate and the respondents resiled from their unconditional offer wholly. 157 dated 30.12.1985. They refused to leave until the Branch Manager agreed to send one of his officials to the Tadepalligudem Court. The petitioner bank unsuccessfully filed a review petition before the High Court against the exparte order of transfer. This amount was directed to be deposited by 11th August 1999. The petitioner bank was, therefore, in a situation where the claim filed by them in 1975 was ultimately decreed in 1987. On 30.12.1985 itself, the learned Sub Judge issued a Civil Court cheque favouring the 1st Respondent for a sum of Rs.16,30,61918. 2 came forward with two bank drafts totalling Rs.3,50,000/ only. The litigation out of which this proceeding arises companymenced in 1975 when the petitioner bank filed a suit against respondent number 1 interalia for recovery of a sum of Rs. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Sub Judge, Eluru in the State of Andhra Pradesh. This order was also number companyplied with within the time specified and ultimately the amount of Rs.16 lakhs was deposited by 22nd October 1999. 5 lakhs each, the first deposit to be made on or before 10.3.1999 The undertaking was number companyplied with and on 24th March 1999, the time to deposit Rs. Needless to say, the amount was number deposited. The petitioner bank preferred an appeal before the High Court and prayed for stay of the execution of the decree as far as the companynter claim was companycerned. On the same day, the Subordinate Judge issued a cheque on the said current account for a sum of Rs. On 24th December 1985, the petitioners applications for restitution were taken up for hearing. The respondent No.1 was also given the liberty to withdraw the amount deposited on account of companyts unconditionally. The respondent No.1 was given the liberty to withdraw the sum of Rs. But in the process it had number only number recovered any amount from the judgment debtor, but on the other hand, because of the machinations of the respondents, it had been deprived of a further sum of over Rs.16 lakhs which had been deposited by it in the custody of the Court. On 11th November 1987, the petitioner banks appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court dated 20th September 1983 was allowed and the bank was given the right to recover the entire amount decreed without any scaling down under the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Areas Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938. The respondent No. It was made clear that the payment agreed to be made was exclusive of the sum already obtained by the petitioner bank, namely Rs.16,92,977/ and that regardless of whether or number the appellant has companymunicated to the respondents its willingness to accept this offer, the respondent shall deposit in this companyrt the sum of Rs.19 lakhs on or before 15th March 2000, which, if the offer is accepted, will be credited towards the first instalment payable to the appellant. But the respondents withdrew the amount on 30th December, 1985 itself and the interim order of injunction was successfully thwarted by the respondents. 2 and 3, on 3rd December 1998 this Court issued a suo motu numberice of companytempt to respondent No. 16 lakhs in his Court in the form of a pay order. Thereupon, this respondent SBI issued two demand drafts for Rs.8,00,00000 each bearing No.168997 and 168998 dated 30.12.1985 favouring 3rd respondent. It was during these proceedings that this Court issued the suo motu numberice to the respondent No. 248178 dated 30.12.1985 for Rs.16,00,00000 requesting this respondent to issue a demand draft on its Guindy Branch, Madras in favour of 3rd respondent on debiting companymission to this account. The first instalment approximately of Rs.19 lakhs was to be paid on or before 15th March 2000 and the subsequent three instalments on or before 15th June 2000, 15th September 2000 and 15th December 2000. To enable the second respondent to make the deposit, the appeal is adjourned for eight weeks Despite the express assurance given to and acted on by the Court, the amount was number deposited. Another cheque was issued bearing No.248179 dated 30.12.1985 for Rs.25,00000 demanding the respondent to pay cash. On 27th October 1999, the second and third respondent submitted that the amount of Rs. Despite this order, the respondents did number repay the amount. She placed the blame for number deposit of the money on her husband, respondent No. The Court also recorded Learned companynsel, on instructions, undertakes to Court that the 2nd respondent shall deposit in Court a further sum of Rs.10 lakhs within six months, without prejudice to all her rights and companytentions. On 6th July 1976, the petitioners claim was decreed only to the extent of a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs was extended till 3rd June 1999. Issue suo moto companytempt numberice to the 2nd respondent returnable in August 1998. On 10th June 1999, the respondent No. The High Court directed proceedings to be initiated for recovery of the amount from respondent No. In her answer to the numberice, the respondent No. On 3rd March 1986, this Court in the petitioners pending appeal directed the sale of vehicles which had been hypothecated by respondent No. On the same day, the 1st respondent presented a cheque bearing No. The respondents offered to pay the decretal amount and interest 12 p.a. As recorded in this Courts order Mr. Ganguli, learned companynsel for the second respondent states that the second respondent is present in Court and has instructed him to state that the sum of Rs.16 lacs shall be deposited by her in Court within eight weeks without prejudice to all other rights and companytentions. If the amount is number deposited within the aforesaid period this appeal will stand dismissed. The facts as subsequently revealed show that it was at this point that the respondents companyceived a plan to whisk away this amount of Rs.16 lakhs a plan which was cunningly and carefully forged, link by link. The petition was dismissed by the District Judge on 30th September, 1985. On 15th February 2000, the respondents made an unconditional offer of settlement through their companynsel. 2 was directed by this Court to hand over the draft of Rs.6 lakhs which she said was with her to the Registrar of the Supreme Court. All of them insisted on the immediate encashment and payment of the proceeds of the fixed deposit. The companynter claim of the respondent No.1 was however allowed in its entirety with companyts. 16 lakhs guaranteed by it together with the interest accumulated thereon within one month. No vehicles were handed over by the respondent No. RUMA PAL, J LITTTTTTJ This proceeding in companytempt was initiated by this Court suo motu, on a prima facie finding that the respondents 2 and 3 were guilty of companytempt number only by dealing with property which was custodia legis but also by disobeying orders of Court. The Advocate for the Vijay Transport was number present in the companyrt between 10.50 a.m. to 4.15 p.m. on 30.12.1985. There was numbersettlement number did the respondents appear on the adjourned date. According to the High Court, the petitioners claim would have to be scaled down because of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Andhra Areas Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938. Hence accordingly, this respondent i.e. This is recorded in this Courts order dated 9th December 1986 in the following words Since the amount has number been deposited as ordered by this Court, the appeal stands dismissed in terms of the order dated the 22nd September 1986. 2 describes herself as the sole surviving partner of the respondent No.1. The companynter claim of the respondent number1 was dismissed in toto. When the matter came up after eight weeks the respondent No.2 asked for an opportunity to file an answer to the suo motu numberice. The respondents appeared before the Court on the returnable date, i.e., 14th December 1999, and again stated that they wished to settle the matter. Allowing the prayer of the companynsel for respondent No. An appeal was preferred before the High Court on 7th October, 1985. 3 as the Power of Attorney holder of respondent No. The Court recorded this as well as the further submission of the respondents Learned companynsel for the respondents 2 and 3 states that land outside Chennai belonging to respondents 2 and 3 has been mortgaged to the appellant as security in the transaction in appeal and that land shall be security for payment of the said amount in the manner aforestated. From time to time, the matter appeared before this Court and it was adjourned to give the respondents every opportunity to companyply with the orders of this Court. Towards the companymission, he issued another cheque bearing No. The review petition was rejected on 18th November 1985. 18,49,209.70 together with Rs. 2 on 29th April 1998 as under We have heard learned companynsel for the appellant and learned companynsel for 2nd respondent. 3 is the husband and power of attorney holder of respondent No. On 22nd September 1986, the following order was passed by this Court in the appeal filed by respondents Shri U.R. 2 for the first time made out, what has subsequently transpired to be, a wholly sham dispute with the respondent No. The Civil Appeal is adjourned to be placed on board along with the companytempt numberice. This order was also number companyplied with. 2, the balance was directed to be paid within six weeks. 1 on or before 30th November 1986. Quite apart from whether or number the appellant succeeds in this civil appeal, the facts of the civil appeal reveal a prima facie case of companytempt of companyrt in that there appears to have been flagrant disobedience by the 2nd respondent of companyrt orders and dealings by her in monies which were custodia legis. The matter was accordingly adjourned. Both of them sent fax messages stating that they were ill.
By our order dated 24th November 1999 we directed number bailable warrants to be issued. 2 appeared in Court on 12th August 1998 pursuant to the numberice. She feigned ignorance of the position as far as assets and liabilities of respondent No. Without going into the question of the actuality of the alleged dispute between the respondent No. Lalit, learned companynsel for appellants M s Vijay Transport Ors. By an ex parte order the High Court of Andhra Pradesh allowed the transfer. At the companyclusion of the arguments we are of the companyfirmed view that the prima facie companyclusion arrived at by us was companyrect, and that the respondents 2 and 3 are liable to be punished for their companytumacious companyduct. Accordingly, cash was paid. in four equal instalments. 248180 dated 30.12.85 for Rs.80000. 8,15,324.92 as interest 12 p.a. Accordingly, it was done on the same date. It was presented on the same day. No stay was obtained of the High Courts decision in either of the appeals. 18,14,817.91. 34,48,799. 1,00,418.55. 3, from whom she said she had been living separately with her son since the last few years. 3 for the same reasons. The appeal is dismissed. Affidavits were filed. 1 were companycerned.
| 0 |
train
|
2000_1296.txt
|
The First Appellate Court held that the plaintiff had successfully established that the suit premises was occupied by Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar on gratuitous and humanitarian grounds. The defendants did number vacate the premises thereby forcing the plaintiff to file a suit for possession against them on the ground that they were licensees occupying the premises gratuitously and out of humanitarian companysiderations. In the written statement filed by the defendants they stuck to their version that the suit property was occupied by Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar as a tenant and upon his demise the defendants too were in occupation of the same as tenants. Upon the demise of Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar in February 1978, the defendants who stepped into his shoes as legal heirs started abusing the companyfidence reposed by the plaintiff in the said Ghosalkar and creating nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff with the result that the plaintiff was forced to terminate the licence granted by him in terms of a numberice assuring for delivery of vacant possession of the premises w.e.f. Issues regarding the defendants causing nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff and damage to the property were also held against the plaintiff by the Trial Court while declining relief to the plaintiff. The Trial Court also held that the defendants had proved that they were occupying the premises as tenants on a monthly rent of Rs.13/ and that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he required the premises for his bona fide personal use and occupation. Upon receipt of the numberice, the defendants instead of companyplying with the same sent a reply refusing to vacate the premises on the false plea that they were occupying the same as tenants since the time of Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar and were paying rent although the plaintiff had never issued any receipt acknowledging such payment. In RCS No.87 of 1984 filed by the said Shri Rele before the Civil Judge Junior Division , Alibag, the plaintiff prayed for a decree for possession of the suit premises companyprising a part of the house mentioned above on the ground that the defendants who happened to be the legal heirs of one Shri Narayan Keshav Ghosalkar, a Goldsmith by profession, residing in Bombay was allowed to occupy the suit premises as a gratuitous licensee on humanitarian companysiderations without any return, companypensation, fee or charges for such occupation. It was alternatively urged that the plaintiff was entitled to vacation of the premises on the ground of bona fide personal need, nuisance, annoyance and damage allegedly caused to the premise and to the adjoining garden land belonging to him. On the pleadings of the parties the Trial Court framed as many as eight issues and eventually dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendants were gratuitous licensees. In a rejoinder sent to the defendants, the plaintiff denied the allegations made by the defendants and by way of abundant caution claimed possession of the suit premises even on the grounds permitted under the Rent Control Act of companyrse without prejudice to his companytention that the defendants companyld number seek protection under the Rent Act. It also held that the defendants respondents had failed to prove the existence of any tenancy in their favour and that since the license granted to the defendants had been validly terminated, the legal heirs substituted in place of the original plaintiff were entitled to a decree. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the plaintiff preferred Civil Appeal No.33 of 1987 before the Additional District Judge, Alibag who formulated six points for determination and while allowing the appeal filed by the plaintiff decreed the suit in favour of his legal representatives as the original plaintiff had passed away in the meantime. Time for vacation of the premises was also extended by the said rejoinder upto the end of April, 1984. The factual backdrop in which the dispute arose may be summarized as under Manohar Narayan Rele owned a house bearing Panchayat No.105 situate in village Ravdanda, Taluka Alibag, District Raigad, in the State of Maharashtra. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 16th October, 2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the High Court has allowed Civil Second Appeal No.90 of 1992 set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge in Civil Appeal No.33 of 1987 and restored that passed by the Trial Court dismissing Regular Civil Suit No.87 of 1984. 1st February, 1984. Second appeal No.90 of 1992 was then filed by the respondent against the judgment of the First Appellate Court before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which was allowed by a Single Judge of that Court in terms of its judgment impugned in the present appeal. Significantly, the decision rendered by the High Court rests entirely on the fourth question extracted above. S. THAKUR, J. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties at length. Leave granted.
| 1 |
train
|
1947_223.txt
|
Arising out of SLP C Nos.7237 7239 of 2003 With CA Nos. The Tribunal, while determining the issue as to whether the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the first respondent driver of lorry AEW 5199, held The lorry was overturned and caused the instantaneous death of four passengers. Indisputably, the respondent was travelling as a passenger.
| 1 |
train
|
2007_772.txt
|
Calcutta. The suit was companysequently stayed and the matter was referred to the arbitration of the Superintending Engineer, Calcutta Aviation Circle, C.P.W.D. 5,09,164. Pending the suit of the respondent in the Calcutta High Court, the Union of India filed an application under s. 20 of the Act in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi for getting the agreement of reference filed in the Court and for making the reference of the disputes between the parties to the arbitration of the Superintending Engineer, Central Circle No. By its judgment dated January 29, 1963 the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi allowed the application of the appellant and ordered that the disputes between the parties be referred to the Superintending Engineer, Calcutta Circle No. Clause 25 of the agreement provided for the settlement of the disputes by reference to the arbitration of the Superintending Engineer of thek Circle for the time being, according to law. 1, C.P.W.D. The Union of India made an application under s. 34 of the Act for the stay of the suit. It was companytended that the appellant had filed an application under s. 34 of the Act for stay of the suit filed in the Calcutta High Court, and, therefore any subsequent application relating to arbitration under the agreement should be filed in the Calcutta High Court. Ignoring the arbitration clause respondent filed a suit on the original side of the Calcutta High Court for the recovery of Rs. The said appeal was filed under s. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 hereinafter referred to as the Act against the order of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi dated January 29, 1963 passed on an application under s. 20 of the Act by the Union of India for filing the arbitration agreement in companyrt and to make a reference of the dispute to the officer mentioned in the agreement. The stay of the suit which was granted by the Calcutta High Court was later on vacated. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the companytract of the parties was companycluded at Delhi and it was signed at Delhi on behalf of the respondent and, therefore, the Delhi companyrt had jurisdiction to try the suit. 82 D of 1963. The respondent opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the companyrt of Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi had numberjurisdiction to entertain the application. 5,09,164 on the ground that the amount had been overpaid to the respondent. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, First Class that respondent filed an appeal under s. 39 of the in the Punjab High Court. 50,000, being suit number 531 of 1951. In the year 1942 tenders were invited by the Union of India for companystruction of certain runways and roads in an aerodrome at Dalbhumgarh. Before, the arbitrator the Union of India made its companynter claim for a sum of Rs. On the other hand the Union of India made a demand against the companytractor for a sum of Rs. The companytractor objected to the entertainment of the companynter claim. The tender of the respondent, Surjeet Singh Atwal, was accepted and the agreement was executed on August 19, 1944. C. Chagla, C. B. Agarwala, Rameshwar Nath, Mahinder Narain and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 11, 1965 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in F.A.0. 50,000 on the basis of his last bill. This appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated March 20, 1965 in FAO number 82 D of 1963. The respondent alleged that he had companypleted the work entrusted to him under the companytract and made a claim of Rs. 760 of 1966. M. Singhvi and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
| 1 |
train
|
1969_54.txt
|
Again the appellant had Research experience and was guiding research work for Ph. The appellant had 4 years teaching experience in P.G. The formate speaks of teaching experience for Honours and P.G. It was number sufficient for the chancellor to just go by the proforma inasmuch as the advertisement did refer to research experience also apart from the teaching experience. On the other hand, the advertisement stated that one should have about 10 years teaching and or research experience. about ten years experience of teaching and or research and experience of guiding research at doctoral leave OR An outstanding scholar with established requtation who has made significant companytribution to knowledge. If the research experience of 1 year and 5 months and 14 days were added, the total teaching research experience of the appellant would companye to 9 years 1 month. He had Honours teaching experience of about 4 years in Spat College, Rourkela. It was number stated in the advertisement that a candidate for the post of professor should possess a minimum of 10 years teaching experience. The total Research experience by date of application was 1 year, 5 months and 14 days and teaching experience by that date was 7 years, 7 months and 14 days in all 9 years and 28 days, which came within the word about 10 years teaching and or research experience as mentioned in the advertisement. On the other hand, the 5th respondent had given on details of her teaching experience in the application form. The 5th respondent got 10 out of 10 for teaching experience whereas appellant got 4 marks only. He held that the 5th respondent had enough teaching experience and the Chancellor was number right in holding her ineligible and that too without giving numberice to her. The Syndicate pointed out that the companytention of the 5th respondent that the appellant should have been awarded zero marks for teaching experience was based on a misinterpretation of the companyditions of the advertisement. 1982 which stipulates the minimum qualification for appointment to the post of Professor as follows An eminent scholar with published work of high quality, activity engaged in research, About ten years of experience of teaching and or research and experience of guiding research at doctoral level or An outstanding scholar with established reputation who has made significant companytribution to knowledge. On the companytrary, at the most, it companyld be said that he had about 9 years of teaching experience on the date of application but number about 10 years. The appellant was admittedly doing research as Junior Research Fellow in Presidency College, Calcutta from June 1978 to Nov. 1979 for one year, 5 months and 14 days and adding the same to the teaching experience of 7 years 7 months and 14 days, the total experience in teaching and research would companye to 9 years 1 month and this the experts opined was about 10 years. Having held that the appellant was number eligible, the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to go into the teaching experience of the 5th respondent. The selection Committees proceedings dated 29.12.1989 stated that Taking into companysideration the academic record, teaching experience, research activities, teaching experience of the candidates and their performance at the interview, the Committee recommends in order of preference Dr. Kumar Bar Das Dr. Mrs. Bedabati Mohanty. The award of 4 marks to the appellant was right inasmuch as the appellant had research experience at the pre doctoral stage as Junior research scholar from June 1978 to November 1979, teaching experience from November 1979 to September, 1984, and as Reader from September 1984 till date of application, 30.6.1987. Thereafter, it appears that the 5th respondent filed a representation before the Chancellor of the University in February, 1990 stating that the appellant was number eligible to be companysidered for the post of Professor as he had only 7 years and 7 months of teaching experience on the date of his application though the required period was 10 years. The Division Bench of the High Court held that assuming that the appellant had experience of 9 years and 1 month, which assertion was disputed by the University and the 5th respondent it companyld number be said that the appellant had about ten years of experience. She had merely stated she had experience of about 23 years under the Government of orissa in Education Department. All candidates were awarded 10 marks out of twelve for research degree. The Syndicate pointed out in its reply that so far as this Chair was companycerned, the emphasis was more on research. The Chancellor, after setting aside the appointment of the appellant further directed that the Vice Chancellor Syndicate shall re advertise the post and companyduct the selection afresh to fill up the vacancy to the post of Professor SBI Chair . Questioning the above order of the Chancellor, the appellant filed OJC No. Consequently the Chancellor set aside the appointment of the appellant and directed fresh advertisement. The 5th respondent, being aggrieved by the order of the Vice Chancellor dated 21.5.1990 in so far as it directed re advertisement, filed OJC No. The appellant companytended in the High Court that his experience was in fact 9 years and 1 month and number 7 years and 8 months as stated in the show cause numberice. On that a show cause numberice was issued in April, 1990 by the chancellor to the appellant stating that on a preliminary enquiry and on scrutiny of the papers, it was found that the appellant had only 7 years and 8 months of teaching experience by the last date of application and numberoutstanding academic career and, as such, the appellant companyld number be said to be eligible for companysideration to the post of professor as per qualification prescribed in the advertisement for the post and in the UGC qualification requires of a person to be appointed to the teaching staff of a University and other institutions affiliated to it Regulations. Consequently the appellant was appointed as Professor SBI Chair on 3.2.1990. The High Court further held that there is numbermaterial in support of Kumar Bars plea that he had acquired 9 years and 1 month experience. In the reply of the Syndicate, the basis of the eligibility and reasons which must have prompted the selection Committee to select the appellant have been explained, namely that the experience of the appellant was number 7 years and 8 months but was about 10 years i.e.9 years and 1 month. 1910 of 1990 while the 5th respondent filed OJC No. He stated that the appellant was number eligible to be companysidered for the post inasmuch as by the date of application as per the essential qualifications mentioned in the advertisement and the minimum qualifications set out in UGC Regulations 1982.
that in companytravention of the provisions mentioned in the Schedule A prescribed under Statute 5 of the Orissa Universities Employees Conditions of Service Statutes, 1988 then in force , the appellant had been awarded 4 marks under the heading teaching experience. The said order was passed by the Chancellor on a representation filed by the 5th respondent, Dr. Mrs. Bedabati Mohanty. The show cause numberice further stated that the appellant was awarded 4 marks under the heading teaching experience which was number in companyformity with the provisions companytained in Schedule A of the Orissa Universities Employees Conditions of Service Statutes, 1988 and had he number been awarded such marks deviating from the principles of marking provided in the Statute above stated, the merit list of the candidates would have been materially affected. The appellant and the 5th respondent were among them. 1 while the 5th respondent was placed at NO. ON the companytrary, materials companysidered by the Selection companymittee and the Chancellor would show that it was 7 years and 8 months and hence appellant was number eligible. The Chancellor rejected these replies and passed orders on 21.5.1990 annulling the appellants appointment on the ground that the appellant was ineligible. Now the Selection Committee companysisted of eminent persons, namely, Dr. T.Pradhan, Vice Chancellor Dr. S.Das, director Higher Education, who is an eminent Economist Dr. Mrs. Shiela Balla, Expert Chancellors numberinee J.N.U. The Syndicate pointed out that the Selection Committee awarded to the appellant, 16 out of 19.5 marks in General career, 8 out of 10 in Research publications, 18 out of 25 in Viva voce. classes at Ravishankar University, Raipur and thereafter in the Department of Economics, Utkal University. The Chancellor, by the said order, had set aside the appointment of the appellant dated 3.2.1990 as Porfessor of Economics State Bank of India chair hereinafter called SBI Chair , holidng that the recommendation of the Selection Committee dated 29.2.1984 was invalid. Thereafter, the Syndicate of the University approved the same on 2.2.1990 and directed appointment of the appellant. Consequently, the High Court held that the 5th respondent was eligible and her writ petition OJC No. D degree while the 5th respondent had left company. c For the post of Professor SBI Chair , 14 candidates applied, 13 candidates were called for interview and 8 of them appeared at the interview. They read as follows Clause 8 Appointment of Professor to the Chair The University shall take steps to ensure that the Chair does number remain vacant ordinarily for more than six months at a time. The appellant, therefore, filed a separate SLP Civil No CC 7855 of 1998 questioning the judgment of the High Court dated 30.9.1993 in OJC No.2144 of 1990 to the extent it set aside the orders of the Chancellor directing re advertisement and directing the appointment of the 5th respondent. By that judgment, the High Court dismissed the said writ petition filed by the appellant challenging the orders of the Chancellor of the Utkal University dated 21.5.1990. The 5th respondent was awarded only 15,6 and 12 in respect of these items. The 5th respondent had number indicated her specialisation number the subject of her Ph. It may be numbericed that the Chancellor did number companyclude that, in addition, the appellant did number have an outstanding career, though such a reason was mentioned in the earlier show cause numberice. 2144 of 1990 of 1990. University Prof. P.Kumar Export and Former V.C. The appellant had specialised in international and Regional Economics and did his Ph. Further, the 5th respondent gave only a list of 5 publications in local papers and she published only and paper in the Indian Cooperative Review. 2144/90 in so far as the direction for fresh advertisement was companycerned. As already stated, the High Court by judgment dated 30.9.1993, dismissed the appellants writ petition and allowed the one filed by the 5th respondent. The appellants application is dated 30.6.1987. of Calcutta Unitersity and Mr. N.Muranjan, Representative of S.B.I., Bombay, Obviously it was their view that the appellant was eligible and that he satisfied all the requirements for selection and that he should be placed at Serial No. D in Economics of Indian Cement Industry. The appellant, Dr.Kumar Bar Das has filed this appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 30.9.1993 in O.J.C. In other words, the appellant was placed at No. She had number specifically stated the names of institutions in which she had taught or whether, during this period, she had thought only at the Intermediate level or at the Honours and Post Graduate Stages. On the other hand, the appellant had given a list of 28 publications most of which were published in Standard All India Journals. 14 blank. The appellant gave his joining report on 10.4.1990. Jagannadha Rao. There is also an application for companydonation of delay. classes. The facts of the case are as follows. There was a difference of opinion between the two Judges. The matter was then referred to the third Judge. J. No.
| 1 |
train
|
1998_964.txt
|
Though the case was placed under the heading Incomplete After Notice Matters, but learned companynsel for the parties agreed that both the petitions may be finally disposed of. The High Court further directed that the unsuccessful party shall restore back the possession. On 11.3.2008, numberice of special leave petition was issued and it was directed that the petitioners shall number be dispossessed from the premises in question. By the order impugned in the special leave petition, the High Court admitted the writ petition and directed that the status quo shall stand vacated automatically without any further reference to the Bench in case the petition is number disposed of finally within one month. Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
| 0 |
train
|
2009_2194.txt
|
In December 1971, an extent of 2519 bighas 03 biswas, equivalent to 1801.1875acres of land companyprised in Chak Nos. While the Land Acquisition Officer the LAO determined the amount of companypensation payable for the acquired lands, by his award dated 31 3 1980, observed in para 20 thereof, that the ceiling proceedings were since pending either in the High Court or in this Court, it was number possible to decide the amounts of companypensation payable to respondents, in that, what were the surplus lands were yet to be identified.
| 0 |
train
|
1994_289.txt
|
That prohibition in the view of the Tribunal applied to teak trees as well. C. Shah, J. Kumar Shri Ranjit Singhji Bhavan Singhji hereinafter called the respondent was the holder of a Jagir of four villages Saloz, Vaurkhan, Kambalad and Thambla in Taluka, Jambegam, District Baroda These villages were granted by a Sanad dated August 18, 1885, to the father of the respondent by the then Ruler of Chhota Udaipur. The High Court held that there was evidence on the record that the State of Chhota Udaipur had treated and dealt with the forest as absolute property of the grantee, and it was number proved that the teak trees were reserved trees. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal companyfirmed the order of the Jagir Abolition Officer The Tribunal held that the Sanad granted to the respondents father related merely to the right of usufruct of the villages and the grantee was expressly prohibited from mortgaging, selling or disposing of the same in any manner. By the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas Jagirs Abolition Act 39 of 1954 with effect from August 1, 1954, the Jagir of the respondent stood abolished. The respondent moved a petition in the High Court of Gujarat for a writ quashing the order of the Tribunal.
| 0 |
train
|
1970_103.txt
|
The latter informed them that Tunu Chanda and Montu Chanda had assaulted him in front of a jewellery shop belonging to Makhan Chanda PW2. He found his younger brother Sushendra PW3, Babul Chanda and deceased Moti Suklabaidya in front of his shop. Tapan Chanda was also assaulted by them. Gauaranga s o Makhan Chanda PW2 in the meantime came and informed his father that the said Tunu Chanda and Montu Chanda had quarrelled and broke a glass pane of his showroom. Bhuttu, however, came again and scolded Moti, whereupon Nirmal Chanda PW 4 again intervened. They met with one Tapan Chanda near Chandranathpur Railway Station. The deceased went to join Durga Puja festival along with Sushendra Chandra PW3 and Babul Chanda. However, on the intervention of the owner of the tea stall the boys left the shop and went to the watch repairing shop belonging to Nirmal Chanda PW4. They asked Moti deceased and others to companye out of the shop whereupon Nirmal PW4 intervened and impressed upon Moti and others to seek their apology. Thereafter the deceased Moti, Sushendra PW3, Babul and Makhan Lal PW2 entered into a tea stall belonging to Siba Prasad Shome PW7 to have tea. When Moti deceased in a bid to apologize touched the feet of accused Bhuttu, Ratan Das asked him to catch hold of him and they started assaulting him. PW 2 had further stated before him that from inside the shop he had felt that some people were chasing the deceased. According to the prosecution case, accused Bhuttu came again with Ratan Das, Billu and Kartik and some other persons. Bhuttu Raju Singh, who is admittedly the younger brother of one Ganesh was employed in the said shop as a servant. The brother of the deceased PW1 lodged a first information report wherein he named Bhuttu describing him as a younger brother of Ganesh , Ratan Das Gupta s o unknown, Billo Deb s o unknown, Kartik Deb s o unknown and 20/25 others. Thereafter, they went to the house of Moti deceased and inquired from his brother PW1 as to whether he had returned. He further stated that he saw the accused persons chasing the deceased towards Chandranathpur Railway Station. He was the owner of a hotel at Chandranathpur Bazar. The aforementioned persons were taking tea in a cabin of the tea stall. Makhan Lal PW 2 immediately came to the Bazar. The appellant Bhuttu came there and wanted to know as to why he made companyplaint to his employer about the earlier incident. He found the following anti mortem injuries on the dead body of Moti deceased Lacerated injury right ear 2 x cm. In the meantime, some ladies walked therein and asked for separate seats whereupon Bhuttu asked the abovementioned four boys to vacate the cabin which led to an altercation. He had also asked him to companye out of the shop. On the next morning on receiving an information that a dead body was lying near a canal, they went to the spot and found the same to be that of Moti deceased . On the intervention of the owner of the said watch repairing shop the matter subsided. The prosecution witnesses and others in the meantime, bolted themselves inside the shop. He was the Station Master of Railway Station. Cut injury left lobule of ear 1 x x cm. PW 10 Swapan Chakraborty is an Asstt. 840/2005, 841/2005, 842/2005 and 251/2005. Station Master. Apart from supporting the statements made in the first information report, he stated that appellant Ratanlal Chanda took his signature on a written paper which companytained an assurance on their behalf that numbercase would be filed in relation to the incident. PW 1 is the informant. PW 11 Fazlur Rahman is the Investigating Officer. Having asked the reason of quarrel and companysequent breaking of the glass of the show room, he was informed that the dispute has been settled by Ambika Sahu PW6. 3.10.1995 was the NAVMI. Subdwal hermonage on left side on left side of brain present. The materials which were brought on record to prove circumstantial evidence in the case by the prosecution were That some of the appellants were chasing the deceased with others 2 So called Sulahanama was prepared which had been signed inter alia by PW 2, PW 3 and others representing that they would number file any companyplaint against the appellants. On being informed that he had number, they went to the house of Ambika Prasad PW6 who advised them to search for him. x whole thickness blood drop are ardent to tissue. He further alleged that the appellant Ujjal had escorted them from the market. In the First Information Report or in the evidence, appellants Munna and Ujjal were number named. He merely stated that in the night a boy came to him and wanted a torch light which was given and the same was returned to him after 15 20 minutes. They came out about half an hour thereafter and found the market area deserted. 1 which was seized by the police from near the place where the dead body was found. According to him injury Nos. He stated that later on the matter was settled amicably. A skull was healthy. There was numberdirect evidence. He allegedly heard cries of a quarrel. It was a root of a tree. The prosecution in support of its case examined 11 witnesses. 1 and 2 companyld be caused by material Ex. He was declared hostile. With Criminal Appeal Nos. The appellants were put on trial.
| 1 |
train
|
2006_122.txt
|
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai on the same date. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai for companynter signature on the production warrant issued by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Then again accused moved the bail application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai further directed production of the accused before the Court at Calcutta. Thereafter on 11.3.2006 on the request of Calcutta Police accused was handed over to Calcutta Police to be escorted to Calcutta for production before the Magistrate at Calcutta. On 13th March, 2006 pursuant to the order of the learned Magistrate at Calcutta the accused respondent was produced in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai observed that the matter of Calcutta Police would be companysidered after the period of CBI custody was over. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, he voluntarily surrendered before the learned Magistrate, Chennai as he was wanted in companynection with the two cases of Calcutta Police. Then again on 12.6.2006 a bail application was filed before the Vth Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. On 14th February, 2006, the order dated 13th February, 2006 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta was brought to the numberice of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai by the CBI in their further remand application. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta by order dated 13th February, 2006 allowed such prayer of the Investigating Officer and directed that the accused respondent be produced before the the Learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta on or before 22nd February, 2006. But the Learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Egmore, Chennai remanded the accused respondent to the judicial custody till 13th March, 2006. A companyy of the said order was sent to the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai. Chief Metropolitan magistrate, Chennai companynter signed the production warrant and served upon the Jail Superintendent, Egmore, Chennai. The final report under Section 173 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was submitted before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and the case was transferred to Vth Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. On 23rd February, 2006, the Investigating Officer in the present case filed an application before the Magistrate at Egmore, Chennai regarding production of the accused respondent being in the present case before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Calcutta. In the mean time, the Investigation Officer of the present case also prayed for issuance of production warrant against the respondent before the Court of learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Calcutta, as the respondent was arrested and detained in the aforesaid CBI case pending before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai. An intimation in this regard was also forwarded to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta along with surrender papers of both the cases. The learned Single Judge has taken the view that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has number companyrectly approached the matter and has wrongly taken the view that the accused did number surrender before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai on 24.2.2006. The Investigating Officer of the instant case requested the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta to hand over the accused for 15 days for police remand for investigation. On 17th February, 2006 the Investigating Officer of the present case filed an application before the learned Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta intimating that the accused respondent was in the custody of CBI till 24th February, 2006 in companynection with the aforesaid CBI cases and sought direction for production of the accused respondent in Calcutta on or by 8th March, 2006. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta after companysidering the submission took the view that the custody of the petitioner cannot be companysidered unless and until he is physically produced before the Court and since in the present case it was done on March 13, 2006 on the strength of the production warrant issued by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, the period of police custody was to be companysidered from the date of his physical production. On transit remand, the respondent was produced before the learned Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai on 14th February, 2006. No.570 of 2006 by the Calcutta High Court whereby the learned single Judge of the High Court has set aside the order dated 16.6.2006 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and directed the 5th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta to companysider the matter afresh and pass necessary order in the light of observation made by the Court. 2001 of 2002 being investigated by Detective Department Special Cell Lalbazar pending before the 5th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta rejected the bail application holding that statutory period of 90 days has number expired by his order dated 27.5.2006. The Court at Calcutta by order dated 17th February, 2006 observed that looking to the gravity of the offences companyplained against the accused respondent in the cases pending in Calcutta, he should number be released in the CBI cases at Chennai. When the accused respondent was in custody on 27thFebruary, 2006 in companynection with the CBI case pending before the Addl. He was produced before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tis Hazari. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the Respondent, Dinesh Dalmia filed a petition under Section 397/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the High Court of Calcutta for setting aside the order of 27th May, 2006 and 16th June, 2006 passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and the learned 5th Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta respectively in companynection with GDD 476 dated 24.9.2002 companyresponding to G.R.No. Therefore, the matter should be companysidered by the Metropolitan Magistrate again in the light of observation made by the Court, by order dated 27.9.2006. As against this, it was submitted that he was arrested by CBI and the accused was produced before the Calcutta Court in this case on 13th March, 2006 so the period of 15 days was number over. It was companytended that the accused respondent had surrendered on 27th February, 2006 before the Magistrate at Chennai and the period of 15 days was over and Police had number filed the challan, therefore accused be enlarged on bail. On 3rd March, 2006 in response to the prayer made by the CBI, the learned Magistrate at Chennai directed for companyducting of Polygraph, Brain Mapping and Nacro Analysis tests on the accused respondent. The learned Magistrate directed the Superintendent, Central Jail, Chennai to hand over the accused for the aforesaid test to Inspector, CBI and produce him before the Court on 9.3.2006. The accused respondent surrendered on 27th February, 2006 and that was accepted by the Addl. The accused respondent was remanded to the police custody till 28th March, 2006. Therefore, on the request made by the CBI , the accused respondent was handed over to the CBI team for the above tests. By that time, the accused respondent came to know that he was wanted in two more cases pending against him in Calcutta. Aggrieved against the order of the Calcutta High Court, dated 27.9.2006 the present appeal was filed. The Addl. The case was fixed for 16th March, 2006 for further hearing and on that date the bail application was rejected and the accused was remanded to police custody up to 24.3.2006 and the Court directed to produce the accused on the fixed date. Hence aggrieved against this order the respondent approached the Calcutta High Court in revision. An intimation dated 28th February, 2006 was also forwarded to the Hare Street Police Station and Park Street Police Station where those two cases were pending. During the companyrse of the investigation, Investigating Officer prayed for issuance of warrant of arrest against the respondent on 12th February, 2006. However, the accused was given liberty to file application before the said Court afresh and the Magistrate was directed to companysider the same in the light of the aforesaid judgment. The Investigation Officer requested the learned Addl. The revision petition of the accused was allowed. An application was moved by the defence praying for bail on behalf of the accused respondent before the Court of Addl. Prior to that the respondent was arrested in New Delhi by the Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell, New Delhi in companynection with CBI Case No. Aggrieved against this order dated 27.9.2006 passed by learned Single Judge, the present S.L.P. The Secretary of the Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Limited lodged a written companyplaint with the Hare Street Police Station on 9th September, 2002 alleging a companymission of offences under Sections 120B/4 20/409/467/468/471/477A of the Indian Penal Code against Harish Chandra Biyani and others. Case No. RC 4 E /200 3 BS F C CBI. 476 dated 24.9.2002 under the aforesaid Sections of the I.P.C Thereafter, the investigation of the case was taken up by the Detective Department. This appeal is directed against the order dated 27.9.2006 passed in A.S.T. The Police still did number file the final report. It was also mentioned that still 8 more days from 19.5.2005 to 27.5.2006 were left to the Police to file final report. case No. 300/2002 and 476/2002. The companyplaint was treated as First Information Report and was registered at Park Street P.S. 5124/06 K. MATHUR, J. Aggrieved against that order the present revision petition was filed before the High Court. We heard learned companynsel for both the parties and perused the record. was preferred by the State of West Bengal. Leave granted. i.e.
| 1 |
train
|
2007_324.txt
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.