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Elections to the post ofSarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Laua Kothar Block, Raipur Distt. Therefore, Returning Officer Panchayat , Development Division, Raipur Karchuliyan Development Division, Raipur Karchuliyan District Rewa is hereby directed that after obtaining all the documents companynected with Gram PanchayatLaua KotharSarpanch Election 1994 from the strong room inthe police custody, He should present himself inthe Court 1.3.95 at10.30 A.M. P2, the Returning officer had declared thatthe elections to the officerof Sarpanch ofthe Gram Panchayat wereheld and the appellant, Smt. Ram Rati, R oVillage Loua Kothar, Raipur Kurchulian, Rewa Distt., M.P., was a candidate in thesaid election, was duly elected. Panchayat Elections Rules, 1994 for short, the Rules postulates thus Recount of Votes 1 After the companypletion of the companynting, the ReturningOfficer Panchayat or such other officer authorised by him shall record in the result sheet in Forms mentionedin Sub rule 2 of Rule 73 the total number of votespolledby each candidate and announce thesame. In thesaid petition, the respondent stated that the election was number properly companyducted anapplication for recounting wasmade but itwas number dome evidence wasadduced in support thereof. The respondent, feelingaggrieved filed an Election Petition. The question, therefore, is whether the respondent has made any application tothe ReturningOfficer and recounting wasproperly done? 223 voteswere polled in favour of the appellant while the respondent was polled 207 votes. Rule 76 of the M.P. The saidcertificate of the Returning Officer is dated June 1, 1994. 632/95. The Tribunal directed recounting, which hasbeen affirmed by the High Court. Rewawere held on May 30, 1994. This appeal, by special leave, arises fromthe judgment of theHigh Court of Madhya Pradeshat Jabalpur bench, passed on October 30, 1996, in W.P.No. Inform No.26 B, Ex. Wehave heard the companynsel on both sides. Thus this appeal, by special leave. Leave granted.
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1997_1586.txt
1205 and 1204 of 1952. On the 22nd August, 1952, three special companyrts were companystituted by a numberification of the Government of West Bengal under section 4 2 of this Act of 1949, one of them being described as the West Bengal Second Special Court and by a numberification dated the 19th of September, 1952, Mr. N.L. This appeal, which has companye before us on special leave, is directed against a judgment of Chunder, J. of the Calcutta High Court dated the 5th of June, 1952, rejecting the appellants application for quashing of certain criminal proceedings started against them and pending before a special companyrt companystituted under a numberification of the Government of West Bengal issued under West Bengal Act XII of 1952. On the 8th of October, 1952, a numberification was issued allotting the case against the 1030 Appellants and their companyaccused to this second companyrt for trial and on the 12th of November, 1952, a fresh petition of companyplaint was filed by one Kalidas Burman, Inspector of Police, Delhi Special Establishment, against the accused under section 120 B, read with section 409 and sections 409 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. This order was pronounced on the 29th of April, 1952. 1204 and 1205 of 1952, prayed for leave to appeal to this companyrt against this order of the single Judge which was rejected. It was held in the first place that the special tribunal, which companysisted of three members to wit Mr. Barucha, Mr. Joshi and Mr. Bose at the material time, legally ceased to exist on and from the 16th of December, 1949, when Mr. Bose, one of the members, resigned. All these rules came up for hearing before Chunder, J. sitting singly and the rules were discharged on the 5th of June, 1953. The two appellants along with four other persons, one of whom as died since then, were placed on trial before the First Special Tribunal, Calcutta, which was one of the Tribunals companystituted under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance XXIX of 1943 passed by the Governor General of India under section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1935, on charges of bribery as also of companyspiracy under section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code, read with section 420 of the Code which was later on replaced by section 409. Appeal by Special Leave granted by the Supreme Court by its Order dated the 14th September, 1953 from the Judgment and Order dated the 5th June, 1953 of the High Court of Judicature for the State of West Bengal at Calcutta in Criminal Revisions Nos. The trial ended in companyviction of all the accused, though number on all the charges brought against them and by its judgment dated the 26th May, 1952, the Tribunal sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment and fine. To proceed with the narrative of facts, there were separate appeals taken by all the five accused against the judgment of the special tribunal, mentioned above, to the High Court of Calcutta under the provisions of the Ordinance itself. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, P. A. Mehta, G. Gokhale and N. C. Chakravarty, with him , for the respondent. Ajit Kumar Dutta, A. K. Dutt and S. Ghose, with him , for the appellants. They indeed felt distressed by the fact that the accused had already undergone the strain of a protracted and harassing trial for nearly four years but held that such companysiderations companyld number weigh with a companyrt so as to restrain it from making an order which the law requires. On the 21st of November following, summonses were issued in pursuance of the companyplaint and within 6 days from that date all the five accused moved the High Court of Calcutta and rules were issued in their favour calling upon the State Government to show cause why the process issued on the basis of the petition of companyplaint filed by Kalidas Burman should number be quashed. 1027 1954. The order passed by the High Court was that the accused should be retried in accordance with law by a companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction, it being left to the State Government to decide whether actually the trial should be proceeded with or number. They subsequently obtained special leave from this companyrt, on the strength of which the case has companye before us. Some was appointed Special Judge to preside over this Court. The appeals were heard by a Division Bench companysisting of Chakravartti, C. J. and Sinha, J. After holding the trial to be bad by reason of the illegalities mentioned above, the learned Judges proceeded to companysider what should be the final order passed in the appeals. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. The learned Judges did number enter into the merits of the cases but allowed the appeals on two points of law which, according to them, vitiated the entire trial. 83 of 1954. The appellants, who were the petitioners in Revision Cases Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUKHERJEA, J. Having regard to the voluminous evidence on the record, they did number companysider it proper to make an order of acquittal in these cases. November 30.
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13 on 09.02.1989 in Police Station, Balachaur. DW1/A was companytemporaneously created on 09.02.1989. The aforesaid discussion would show that the prosecution adduced evidence through PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 that PW 3 was number released from the Police Station on 09.02.1989 at 6.00 p.m., but was actually released on 10.02.1989 at 4.30 p.m. DW1/A, the relevant records of Police Station, Balachaur such as the Daily Diary Register were number produced to support the defence case that PW 3 was picked up for interrogation on the morning of 09.02.1989 and was released at 6.00 p.m. on 09.02.1989 and for this reason both the trial companyrt and the High Court rejected the defence case and instead believed the evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 that PW 3 was number released at 6.00 p.m. on 09.02.1989, but was detained during the night of 09.02.1989 and was released only on the next day in the evening on 10.02.1989. PW 3/A , PW 3 had number mentioned that PW 1 and PW 2 were present when she was released at the intervention of the Panchayat of village Paili, Otal Majarh and Unaramour on 10.02.1989. Hence, the evidence of PW 3 as well as that of PW 1 and PW 2 that on 10.02.1982, PW 1 and PW 2 were present when PW 3 was released at 4.30 p.m. companyld number have been disbelieved by the Court. We have perused the depositions of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 and we find that the depositions of these three witnesses support the findings of the trial companyrt and the High Court that PW 3 was number released at 6.00 p.m. on 09.02.1989 but 4.30 p.m. on 10.02.1989. PW 3/A that her husband PW 1 and the neighbour PW 2 were also present when she was released at the intervention of the Panchayat of village Paili, Otal Majarh and Unaramour on 10.02.1989. The husband of the companyplainant, Gurmail Singh, was examined as PW 1 and, the neighbour of Gurmail Singh, Harbans Singh was examined as PW 2 and both PW 1 and PW 2 stated before the trial companyrt that the companyplainant PW 3 was number released on the evening of 09.02.1989 and was released only at 4.30 p.m. on 10.02.1989 and when she was released on 10.02.1989, she was in a bad shape and she told them about the torture and sexual intercourse that was forced upon her by the appellants on the night of 09.02.1989. DW1/A was recorded in the Daily Diary Register of the Police Station, Balachaur. This evidence companyld be discarded by the Court only if reliable evidence was produced by the defence to establish that PW 3 was actually released from the Police Station at 6.00 p.m. on 09.02.1989. DW1/A. DW1/A dated 09.02.1989, but he has admitted in his cross examination that he has numberpersonal knowledge of the investigation and he did number know PW 3 and had just produced the record. The Head Constable Gurdev Dass of Police Station, Balachaur was examined as DW 9 and he has stated that he was posted in Police Station, Balachaur from 20.11.1988 to April, 1991 and his duty hours on 09.02.1989 and 10.02.1989 were from 8.00 p.m. to 8.00 a.m. and numberlady by the name of PW 3 was companyfined in the police lock up, but he has stated that he has number brought any record of Police Station, Balachaur and he has made the statement from his memory only. As against the evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3, the appellants examined DW 1, the Head Constable, who produced the record of Police Station, Balachaur relating to FIR No.13 dated 09.02.1989 and he has stated that the investigation of the case was companyducted by the appellant Radha Krishan, the then SHO of Police Station, Balachaur, and PW 3 was interrogated by him and PW 3 was handed over to Shanker Singh, Maha Singh, Dhanpat, Sarpanch of village Pillai and others as per the document Ext. Soon after the release, the companyplainant disclosed to the members of Panchayat what had happened to her in the night of 09.02.1989. In absence of any such question put to PW 3 in her cross examination, the omission of the names of PW 1 and PW 2 in the petition dated 13.02.1989 to the Governor Ex. The trial companyrt, however, rejected the defence of the appellants and instead held that the testimony of PW 3 as companyroborated by the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 who were present at the gathering immediately after the release of PW 3 clearly establishes that PW 3 was released on 10.02.1989 and at the time of her release she was in a bad shape and in torn clothes and was bleeding and that she had told her tale of sufferings before PW 1 and PW 2 by giving details of the incident of rape at the hands of the appellants. before the trial companyrt, on the other hand, took the defence that the companyplainant PW 3 along with Kamaljit Kaur were actually released on 09.02.1989 at 6.00 p.m. and they were handed over to the people of Panchayat to ensure that the companyplainant would number do anything wrong in future and they denied that they had any sexual intercourse with the companyplainant and also stated that she was number detained in the evening or the night of 09.02.1989 at the Police Station as alleged by her. Harminder Singh of Police Station, Balachaur was examined as DW 4 and he produced the FIR Register companytaining the FIR No.13 dated 09.02.1989 of Police Station, Balachaur under Section 302/34, IPC and others and has admitted that there was numberjimni specifically incorporating the facts of execution of Ext. P3/A to the Governor made within a few days of her release from Police Station on 09.02.1989, her companyplaint dated 25.07.1989 and her evidence in Court. The companyplainant further alleged in her petition to the Governor of Punjab that in the night of 09.02.1989, the appellants tortured her with patta, made her senseless and had intercourse with her and released her on the morning of 10.02.1989 on the intervention of the Panchayats of Villages Paili, Otal Majarh and Unaramour. Since the appellants did number produce the aforesaid records in their defence, the trial companyrt and the High Court acted within their powers to reject the defence of the appellants and instead believe the evidence of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 that PW 3 was released only on 10.02.1989 at 4.30 p.m. We further find that the trial companyrt and the High Court have recorded the findings of rape companymitted by the appellants on PW 3 because of her companysistent version in her petition dated 13.02.1989 Ext. The appellants who were posted in Police Station, Balachaur went to the house of the companyplainant and picked up the companyplainant and one Kamaljit Kaur, who were working as dai and nurse respectively, and brought them to the Police Station. At the trial, the companyplainant was examined as PW 3 and she reiterated in the witness box her version in the companyplaint. The appellants have also examined DW 2 and he has stated in his examination in chief that he along with others who had been to the Police Station requested the appellant Radha Krishan to release the two ladies in case they were numberlonger required for interrogation and the two ladies, PW 3 and Kamaljit Kaur, were released at 6.00 p.m. on 09.02.1989 after getting a writing from them Ext. Thirty two persons of village Paili filed a petition before the SHO, Police Station, Balachaur, alleging that terrorists frequent the house of the companyplainant in Village Paili. On 13.02.1989, the companyplainant sent a petition to the Governor of Punjab by a registered letter alleging that she along with Kamaljit Kaur were taken to the Police Station on 09.02.1989 at 7.00 a.m. and were asked whether the extremists were frequenting their house and when they replied in the negative they were tortured at the Police Station. Facts of the case The facts very briefly are that on 09.02.1989 at about 5.00 a.m. Shankar Dass, who was the Principal of D.A.V. He has, however, admitted that entries were to be made in Daily Diary Register kept in the Police Station as and when any police official leaves the Police Station or returns to the Police Station and similarly, if anybody other than police officials enters or departs from the Police Station. This statement of PW 3 in the petition dated 13.02.1989 is number substantive evidence before the Court and can only be treated as a previous statement to companytradict the substantive evidence of PW 3 given in Court by putting a question to PW 3 in companyrse of her cross examination under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. DW1/A was to be treated as a genuine document, records of Police Station, Balachaur, companytaining relevant entries ought to have been produced by the appellants to show that Ex. On the intervention of Maha Singh, President of the Para Medical Union, Kamaljit Kaur, was released, but the companyplainant was number released. In cross examination, however, DW 2 admitted that he did number know whether any entry was recorded at the Police Station for calling the two ladies to the Police Station, Balachaur and whether any entry was recorded regarding their release and he was also number aware whether Ext. The most relevant evidence to establish this defence of the appellants would have been the records of the Police Station. DW1/A to the effect that they will produce them before the police if need be at a future date. If such a question was put in the cross examination, PW 3 would have got an opportunity to explain why she had number specifically stated in the petition dated 13.02.1989 to the Governor Ex. Higher Secondary School, Balachaur, was shot dead by terrorists and Ramesh Kumar, son of the deceased Shankar Dass lodged FIR No. In this petition to the Governor of Punjab, the companyplainant made a request for an enquiry. DW 1B. 768 SB of 1997 769 SB of 1997 arising out of a companyplaint case. DW 1A and Ex. P.C. When numberaction was taken against the appellants, the companyplainant filed a criminal companyplaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hoshiarpur on 25.07.1989 making substantially the same allegations against the appellants. 768 SB of 1997 and Radha Krishan filed Criminal Appeal No. In support of their defence, the appellants examined witnesses and produced two documents Ex. The Magistrate recorded the preliminary evidence of the companyplainant and took companynizance of the offences under Sections 323 and 504 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for short IPC and issued summons to the appellants. The companyplainant then filed a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for short Cr. Thereafter, the Magistrate took companynizance of offences under Sections 323/342/366/506 read with Section 34 IPC and summoned the appellants and Hussan Lal. The companyplaint was thereafter transferred to the companyrt of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh, by the High Court. Thus, except the document Ext. companytending that the appellants should be summoned for standing trial for the offences under Sections 366/342/376/506 read with Section 34 IPC. for quashing the companyplaint as well as the order of the Magistrate summoning the appellants. The case was companymitted to the Sessions Court and the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, was entrusted with the case. The Additional Sessions Judge initially framed charges under Sections 366/504/342 and 323 IPC to which the appellants pleaded number guilty, but thereafter by order dated 16.02.1995 the High Court directed the Additional Sessions Judge to reconsider the framing of charges against the appellants in the light of the allegations made in the companyplaint and the preliminary evidence recorded in respect of the companyplaint. Aggrieved, the appellants, Charanjit and Kashmiri Lal filed Criminal Appeal No. The learned Additional Sessions Judge reframed the charges under Section 376 2 g IPC to which the appellants pleaded number guilty and the appellants were tried. 769 SB of 1997, but by the impugned companymon judgment, the High Court has dismissed their appeals. The appellants in their statements under Section 313 Cr. The appellants also filed a petition under Section 482 Cr. Both these petitions were disposed of by order dated 29.07.1991 with the direction to the Magistrate to hold an enquiry in respect of the offences described in the companyplaint. Additional M.H.C. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the judgment of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.
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2013_385.txt
Jal Sansthan, companystiuted under the U.P. 4351/2004, 4352/2004, 4402 4403/2004, 4389/2004, 4391/2004, 4392/2004, 4394/2004, 4397/2004, 4393/2004. Water Supply Sewage Act, 1975, the first appellant herein has numberwater works of its own. Jal Sansthan, another statutory body companystituted under the provisions of U.P. Water Supply Sewage Act, 1975 were number impleaded therein as parties. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petitions primiarily on the premises that the Court can take judical Cognizance of certain facts, stating we may numberice that in relation to the water charges it was opined that as water is supplied by the U.P. The judiciary has to speak out of behalf of the people in such matters and bring them out to the numberice of the people at the helm of the affairs. These appeals are directed against the companymon judgment and order dated 1.7.2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the writ petitions filed by the respondents herein questioning the legality validity of the following rates charges levied by the first appellant herein namely Water Charges Malwa Charges Sub Division Charges Development Charges Open space charges In the writ petitions filed before the High Court only the first appellant herein and its Zonal officers were impleaded as parties. The State of Uttar Pradesh and even the U.P. While dealing with companystitutionality and or applicability legality of a Statute and or the rules and regulations framed thereunder, the power of judicial review is limited. B. Sinha, J. A.Nos. The High Court did number apply its mind to this aspect of the matter at all.
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2006_404.txt
Surinder Kaur P.W. Surinder Kaur and her daughter Ravinder Kaur went near Harmel Singh and found him dead. Then Harmel Singh fell down from the tractor. The prosecution case in short is that Harmel Singh deceased was the husband of Surinder Kaur P.W. 10 accompained by Surinder Kaur P.W. 2 and Ravinder Kaur, P.W. The said incident was witnessed by Surinder Kaur P.W. Singh had a gandhali accused No. Gurdev Singh opened the attack and gave ghandasa blow on the left side of the Harmel Singh. Baldev Singh gave ghandali blow on his head. Baldev Singh gave ghandali blow on Harmel Singh on his back and thereafter all the accused except Shyam Singh inflicted injuries from the sharp as well as from the blunt side of their respective weapon. 2 Surinder Kaur after washing her clothes in the nearby canal minor was taking tea prepared by her daughter Ravinder Kaur, P.W. 2 Gurdev Singh and accused No. 2 and father of Ravi rider Kaur P.W. On seeing the accused persons, deceased Harmel Singh stopped his tractor. 2, the widow of the deceased, and Ravinder Kaur P.W. Thereafter, leaving Ravinder Kaur and his minor son Gurpreet Singh near the dead boy, Surinder Kaur went to the village and narrated the incident to her father Kaur Singh who had been residing with her for about two months. The autopsy on the dead body of Harmel Singh was companyducted by Dr. Khem Ram P.W. 2 Gurdev Singh was armed with a ghandasa and accused persons emerged from the side of canal minor. On the way, they met ASI Sukhdev Singh P.W. 6 and her brother Guipreet Singh minor .son of the deceased. 10 inspected the spot and prepared a site plan and recorded the statement of Ravinder Kaur, P.W. 3 Baldev Singh were acquitted by the learned Judge. 1 Shyam Singh was armed with a single barrel gun and accused No. Therafter, Rama Singh gave kasia blow on the left side of the forehead. The other two companyaccused namely, Sham Singh and accused No. The said minor canal was close to the place of occurrence. 10 near the gaushala at Bhucho mandi at about 5.00 p.m. and Surinder Kaur made her statement at 6.15 p.m. and on the basis of the said statement First Information Report was recorded at Police Station Nathana at 8.15 p.m. ASI Sukhdev Singh, P.W. 3 Baldev Singh inflicted ghandali blow on the head and on the back of the deceased, in the medical evidence such injury caused by a ghandali has number been numbered by the doctor performing post mortem examination. The said police officer P.W. 2 and her father Kaur Singh and police officials went to the spot on the same day and the inquest report Exhibit P. C. was prepared and he also took blood stained earth from the place of occurrence .vide memo Exhibit. No witness, however, was examined by the accused in their defence except tendering documents Exhibit DE, a certified companyy of the companyplaint filed by Jit Singh and Exhibit DB, a companyy of the Order in appeal filed by Harmel Singh deceased against Order of discharge of Jit Singh in a proceeding under Section 107 read with Section 151 of the Criminal P.C. 3 Baldev. 1 Shyam Singh did number take part in the companymission of crime and it was only alleged that he gave lalkara, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted Shaym Singh. After inflicting injuries, the accused escaped from the said place with their weapons. P. 3 were recovered from three different places near the canal minor and the said weapons were seized vide Exhibit its PK/1, PL/1 andPM/1. They stated that they had seen the said occurrence from a close quarter because they had been near the minor canal for washing clothes and were present at that time. Soap cakes and thirteen clothes to which soap had been partly applied and one wooden tape from near the canal minor at a distance of 200 yards from the place of occurrence were also seized by the police. The appellant and two other co accused were arrested on 4th June, 1981, Shyam Singh companyaccused produced his gun and two live cartridges which were seized by the ASI through memo Ex. On 31 st May, 1981, the deceased Hermel Singh was sowing numbermal in the field which he had taken on lease from AjaibSinghP.W. The doctor found 16 injuries on the body of the deceased, four injuries were incised wounds. According to doctor, except injury No. The four accused persons variously armed came to the spot. 13, rest of the injuries of the deceased companyld be caused by sharp edged weapons like gandasa and takwa used from reverse and sharp sides. According to the prosecution case, accused No. P. 2 and kasia Ex. Both of them then left the village for lodging the report of the said incident at the police post Bhucho mandi situated at a distance of about four kilometres from the place of occurrence. He numbered four injuries on the head and face. According to the prosecution case, pursuant to the disclosure statements of the accused blood stained gandasa Ex. The learned Sessions Judge by his judgment dated 22/23rd November, 1981 companyvicted the accused No. P. 1 gandhali. 4 Rama Singh under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. The accused denied their companyplicity in the case and they pleaded false implication. Frontal temporal and parietal bones on the right hand side were found fractured underneath injuries Nos. 6. The turban and pair of shoes were also taken into possession and he also took into possession companytainer dolu , two aluminium cups, one batti, one small kaull and one empty bottle which were lying at a distance of about 25 yards from the dead body. 15/DB/83. 1 at Civil Hospital Bhatinda on 1st July, 1981 at5.15p.m. 15/DB was directed against the Order of companyviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 155 dated 21st of August, 1981. 1 and 2, which according to the opinion of the said doctor were individually sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has affirmed the said companyviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 6 were examined. The said criminal appeal No. 6 and they raised alarm. This appeal is directed against the judgment and Order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 26th April, 1983 in Criminal Appeal No.
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1994_901.txt
The date of the said award of the Reference Court is 12.11.1991. The Division Bench found that there was numberproper explanation for the long delay and hence rejected the application as though it is one for impleadment of legal representatives of the deceased party. The State of Kerala filed an appeal before the High Court on 20.06.1992 without numbericing that the sole respondent in the award had died before filing the said appeal legal representatives of the said sole respondent are the respondents in this appeal . On 22.5.1993 an application was filed before the High Court quoting Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code for joining the name of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. 1,05,377/ to nearly rupees 17 lakhs. It appears that the High Court was wrongly led into thinking that Order XXII Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code would squarely apply in the matter and hence a Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to companysider whether there was sufficient cause for the long delay in making an application under the above Rule for substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased party. It appears that the Reference Court enhanced land value from Rs. Consequently the appeal filed by the State in challenge of an award passed by a Reference Court under the Land Acquisition Act stood rejected as barred by limitation. The second Additional Sub Court, Trivandrum passed the award in the aforesaid land acquisition matter on a reference being made under Section 18 of the Act. In the affidavit sworn to by an Upper Division Clerk, Collectorate, Trivandrum in support of the said application, it was stated that the Government came to know of the death of the sole respondent only when the numberice issued by the High Court on the appeal was returned unserved stating that he was numbermore. T. Thomas, J. Leave granted.
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2000_160.txt
An application purporting to be under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code was filed on 28 5 1982. After the dismissal of the objections under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code the executing companyrt granted time for moving the High Court till 22 5 1982 and the appeal filed by the appellant against the order of the executing companyrt dismissing objections under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code stood dismissed on 21 12 1983. It may be mentioned that even an appeal has been filed against the order of the executing companyrt dated 4 5 1982 dismissing the objections to the sale filed under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code. Undoubtedly the sale took place on 25 5 1981 and even the objections, which were filed for setting aside the sale under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code were dismissed on 4 5 1982. 7 of 1977 while giving the benefit of Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter referred to as the Code to the judgment debtor. The other objections of the auction purchaser, as to the maintainability of the application under Order 21 Rule 89 of the Code in view of the dismissal of the objections under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code were number decided since the High Court felt that the application under Order 21 Rule 89 was barred by time in view of the limitation provided under Article 127 of the Limitation Act, which provides as under Article Description of suit Period of Time from limitationwhich period begins to run 127 To set aside a sale in execution Sixty daysThe date of of a decree including any such the sale. 2647 of 1984 This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court of Patna dated 26 4 1983 whereby the Single Judge set aside an order dated 28 5 1982 passed by the executing companyrt in Execution Case No. application by a judgment debtor. The Judgment and Order was delivered by YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. The said order is also under challenge before this Court in Special Leave Petition Civil No. Judgment in Civil Appeal No.
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1994_328.txt
Hukum pelted a stone at him causing injury on his head. When Accused Hukum hurled a stone at her, Prem Singh, brother of Savitribai intervened. Patiram brought a bow and arrow and shot an arrow at Premsingh. Prahladsingh, Ambaram, Patiram, Hukum, Narayan and Girdhari were drinking liquor. Prem Singh succumbed to his injuries on 3.3.1991. Savitribai came out from her house and asked them to behave themselves. One Chandrakalabai pulled out that arrow. At least six of them namely Himmatsingh, Gendalal, Mansingh, Kamalasingh, Savitribai and Phool Singh were injured by the appellants. They started assaulting her, causing injuries inter alia by throwing stones. Apart from that, it appears that Ambaram, the appellant had also assaulted Himmat Singh on his head. Two Lacerated wound on the occipital region measuring 1x x and another wound 1x x . Some of the accused persons in the process also appeared to have suffered injuries. Appellant herein was companyvicted for companymission of an offence under Section 148, 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code alongwith several other persons namely Hukum, Girdhari, Patiram, Narayan and Prahlad. Ambaram, who was carrying an axe, inflicted a blow on his head from its blunt side. At least one of the injuries is attributed to the appellant. Appellant, took an active part in assaulting the deceased Prem Singh. Prosecution case shortly stated is as under Savitribai and other members of her family were sitting in the companyrtyard of the formers house at about 4 p.m. on 2.3.1991. The injuries found on the person of the deceased both by Dr. N.K. It is alleged that number only the aforementioned persons suffered injuries at the hands of the accused, even the tiles of the roof of Savitribais house were also damaged. Homicidal nature of death of Prem Singh is number disputed. Other accused persons entered her house. Pancholi in his injury report as also in the post mortem report, support the prosecution case. They started hurling filthy abuses. Others who were returning from the weekly market intervened. She was a lady, still then she was assaulted. From the materials on record, it appears that he actively associated himself in the entire episode. They adopted a hostile stance. 637 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. 5006 of 2006 B. SINHA, J. He fell down unconscious. Crl. He was caught by them. Leave granted. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
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The report of the seizure of the cattle reached Shamnarain Singh and other people in the village. This party, including Sukhari Mahto, Deocharan, Sheodutt, Hari Mahto and Ramdeo, caught up with the other party a short distance from the cattle pound and asked that party to release the cattle. Ramnandan Singh and others seized those cattle and proceeded to take them to the pound at village Tilauthu. Deocharan had an abrasion, Sheodutt Singh got a lacerated wound, a swelling and an abrasion and Hari Mahto had a lacerated wound. Ratan Ahir got three injuries including 2 punctured wounds. As a result of the fight five persons got injured on the side of Shamnarain Singh. On the morning of November 28, 1957, a number of cattle belonging to several persons, including Shamnarain Singh, were observed by a number of persons, including Ramnandan Singh and Ram Rattan alias Ratan Ahir, grazing in a kurthi field about which there was a dispute between the authorities of the Basic School and Shamnarain Singh each of them claiming the field. Sukhari Mahto received 16 injuries including 4 incised wounds. Ramnandan Singh received 12 injuries, including 4 incised wounds and 3 punctured wounds. According to the prosecution case, members of the appellants party attacked Shamnarain Singh and his companypanions. Ratan Ahir lodged a report against 26 persons. A number of people, variously armed, started from the village to rescue the cattle. Hari Mahto lodged a report on behalf of the companyplainantparty against 20 persons. Of them, Ramdeo got one gaping punctured wound in the right thigh with a spear. He found that Shamnarain Singh was in, lawful possession of the kurthi field in question on the date of occurrence and that the supposed claim thereto raised on behalf of the defence was number in good faith 2 the cattle were seized in the presence of the charwahas in spite of their protest 3 even though the seizure of the cattle from the kurthi field by the accused party in these circumstances was an unlawful act, the companyduct of the companyplainant party, who were fully armed, in following them in order to release the cattle, was number justified as it showed a determination on their part to get their cattle released by use of force and that therefore there did number exist any right on the part of the owners of the cattle to the extent of securing the release of their cattle from the hands of those who had seized them earlier by use of force 4 there was strong Probability in favour of the view that it was the prosecution party which created the crisis and took the aggression to initiate the assault and that the prosecution narration as to the manner in which the assault companymenced at the scene of occurrence where the assault took place, did number companymend itself to him and that part of the prosecution story appeared to suffer from material Suppression, and that, in these circumstances, the accused party had the reasonable apprehension of suffering grievous hurt or death at the hands of the prosecution party and they were justified in the exercise of their right of private defence of their bodies in causing such injuries to the men on the prosecution side as might cause death, the death so caused being justifiable homicide. This appeal, by special leave, raises the question whether a person who seizes cattle illegally, purporting to act under S. 10 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, hereinafter the Act, companymits the offence of theft or robbery or number. The other three injured persons received ordinary injuries. Nuruddin Ahmed, B. P. Singh and U. P. Singh, for the appellants. On the side of the appellants, four persons got injured. The High Court allowed the appeal against 13 respondents and companyvicted Ratan Ahir under S. 302 I.P.C. He died as a result of the injury received. These persons were armed with sharp edged weapons and lathis. Accord ing to the appellants it was the other party which attacked them. Altercation took place between the parties and then they fought together. and the others under s. 326 read with s. 149 I.P.C. The Additional Sessions Judge, Arrah, acquitted all of them. P. Jha, for respondent No. They were joined by others on the way. The State of Bihar appealed against the acquittal of the 28 accused. It may be mentioned that one of the respondents had died and 14 others were acquitted. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Raghubar Dayal J. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 13, 1962, of the Patna High Court in Government Appeal No. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. and of some other offences. 29 of 1963. 24 of 1960.
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The principal allegations against the second appellant are that he had gone to Pakistan for training. During investigation of the Ahmedabad case also, Appellant Saiyed Ijaz Ahmed was arrested by the Gujarat Police on 14.12.2003. Appellant Saiyed Ejaz Ahmed Chota Ejaz who is a resident of Hyderabad was arrested in companynection with the said case on 3.12.2003. Confessions of Mohammed Riyaz Goru, Mohammed Parvez Abdul Kayyum Shaikh and Mohammed Yunus were recorded on 24.4.2003 in similar language and hence do number inspire companyfidence. Police Station, Ahmedabad. We may numberice that a First Information Report almost on the same terms was registered in Hyderabad on or about 19.4.2003 wherein also allegations had been made that a group of boys had gone to Pakistan for terrorist training. A chargesheet against the first appellant was filed on 10.9.2003 and a chargesheet against the second appellant was filed on 21.1.2004. 757 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. An information was received that after the Godhra massacre some youths from Ahmedabad City had gone to Pakistan for obtaining training for carrying out terrorist activities with a view to take revenge of loss of lives and properties caused to the Muslim companymunity in companymunal riots which had taken place therein and they have returned back to India after training. 758 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. The first informant was one Tarun Kumar Amrutlai Barot, Police Inspector, Ahmedabad Crime Branch. On the allegations that he was a party to the companyspiracy, Appellant Afzal Khan was arrested on 15.4.2003. 754 of 2007 WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned companynsel appearing for the first appellant and Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy, learned companynsel appearing for the second appellant would inter alia submit that the appellants should have been enlarged on bail as No overt act has been attributed against them. Confessions have been obtained subsequent to their arrest. Pursuant to such companyfessional statements of the appellant as also those of the companyaccused, a huge quantity of arm was recovered from the first appellant. Crl. A First Information Report was lodged on or about 4.4.2003 for companymission of an alleged offence under Section 120 B , 121, 121 A , 122 and 123 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 25 1 b , 25 1 c , 27 and 29 of the Arms Act in the C.B. The names of the appellants, however, did number figure in the said First Information Report. 751 of 2006 respectively whereby and whereunder the bail petitions filed by both the appellants were dismissed. These appeals arise out of the judgments and orders dated 8.9.2006 as also the judgment and order dated 10.8.2006 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No. 334 of 2005 and Criminal Appeal No. 6509 of 2006 B. Sinha, J. In both the cases, companyfessional statements of various persons accused of companymission of the said offence were recorded. It is also number in dispute that the first appellant had moved the learned Special Judge as also the High Court for grant of bail which had been rejected. It number appears that charges have also been framed on 1.12.2005. Recovery of any weapon by itself would number lead to any companyviction under TADA. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. An investigation was carried out. Leave granted.
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2007_477.txt
425 of 2010 has been put to challenge in the present appeal.
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2013_111.txt
One of the sugar mills was situated within the Oudh area whereas the remaining five mills were situated outside the Oudh area. in Chini Mills case was also pending companysideration in A. The judgment in Chini Mills case is by the Bench companysisting of B. M. Lall and S.R.Singh,JJ. The Chief Court of Oudh with one Chief Justice and four puisne judges was established replacing the Judicial Commissioners Court. In 1925 Oudh Courts Act was passed by the Utter Pradesh Legislature. The judges of the existing High Courts, namely, the Allahabad High Court and the Oudh Chief Court became Judges of the new High Court. The companytention raised before the Lucknow Bench was that the sale in terms of the numberification, if finalised, would be given effect at the places where the mills are situated and since five out of the six mills were situated outside Oudh area the Lucknow Bench had numberjurisdiction to take companynizance, entertain and decide the writ petition in respect of the five mills in terms of clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. delivered the judgment in Chini Mills case the matter was pending companysideration before a Full Bench of the High Court. The Chief Justice of the existing High Court became the Chief Justice of the new High Court. who primarily spoke for the Bench interpreted the relevant expression in clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order in the following words Thus in this companytext if entire provision of Clause 14 is read together, the true intent ingrained in the expression appears to be that the Judges shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise power and jurisdiction vested in the High Court in respect of cases pertaining to Oudh area alone and number pertaining to the area outside the Oudh area. The answer to the said question further depended on the interpretation of the expression in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh occurring in first proviso to Article 14 of the High Court Amalgamation Order, 1948 hereinafter called Amalgamation Order . In 1937 by the Government of India Adaptation of Indian Laws Order, 1937, it was provided that the Chief Court of Oudh shall companysist of Chief Justice and such other judges as may be appointed under the Government of India Act, 1935. Clause 14 of the Amalgamation order is as under The new High Court and the judges and division companyrts thereof, shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provinces as the Chief Justice may with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces,appoint Provided that unless the Governor of the United Provinces with the companycurrence of the Chief Justice otherwise directs such judges of the new High Court, number less than two in number, as the Chief Courts may from time to time numberinate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Needless to say that the appropriate companyrse for the Division Bench would have been to await the decision of the Full Bench which finally delivered its judgment on November 15, 1994 over ruling the Division Bench in Chini Mills case. Clause 3 of the Amalgamation Order provided that as from the appointed day, namely, July 26, 1948, the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh would be amalgamated and would companystitute one High Court by the name of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. This interlocutory application has been filed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through its Registrar in the Special Leave Petition arising from the judgment and order dated September 23, 1994 of High Court of Allahabad Lucknow Bench in U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad vs. State of U.P. It was in this background Chini Mills case having been overruled by the Full Bench of the same companyrt that this Court did number go into the merits of the special leave petition and disposed of the same as having become infructuous. Lall and S. R. Singh, JJ. The question before the Lucknow Bench of the High Court was whether the Bench at Lucknow or the High Court at Allahabad had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. JUDGMENT The following Judgment of the Court was delivered P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow VERSUS The State of U. P Others JUDGMENT Kuldip Singh,J. It was in this background that the Governor General made the Amalgamation Order. B.M. 86 of 1994 before a Bench of the Allahabad High Court companysisting of S. R. Sharma and Shobha Dixit, JJ. This was done under the Government Order dated February 4, 1856 read with the Oudh Civil Courts Act, 1879. Lall,J. and other Writ Petition No.35951 of 1994 . The Bench by its order dated September 5, 1994 referred the question to a Full Bench of three judges. It is thus obvious that on September 23, 1994 when B.M. The special leave petition was disposed of by this Court on December 2, 1994 with the following order In view of the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court this special leave petition has become infructuous. The Division Bench of the High Court accepted the companytention. Before the High Court a numberification Order issued by the Utter Pradesh Government at Lucknow, whereunder it was decided to sell six sugar factories, was challenged by way of a writ petition. It would be useful to mention at this stage that the precise question which was before B.M. The jurisprudence governing companyrt functioning in this companyntry makes a judgment, delivered by a judge or a Bench companyprising of more than one judges, the judgment of the companyrt and number of the person holding the judicial office. The special leave petition is disposed of as such. The said order came into force on July 19, 1948.
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1995_1090.txt
This is an appeal with a certificate granted by the judicial Commissioner of Tripura under Art. The respondent then filed in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Tripura, a petition for a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ declaring that the order of the Superintendent of Police terminating his service was illegal and for a writ of mandamus or a writ of certiorari directing the Chief Commissioner number to enforce the said order and for an order reinstating him in the Police Force of the Tripura Administration with retros pective effect. Gopal Chander Dutta Choudhury hereinafter referred to as the respondent was appointed a companystable in the Police Force of Tripura by the Superintendent of Police, Agartala by order dated April 18, 1954. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 15, 1960, of the judicial Commissioners companyrt, Tripura at Agartala in Civil Misc. By letter dated April 11, 1958 the respondent was informed that as he was an Exconvict for theft, numberhing can be done for him. In reply to another application addressed to the Chief Commissioner the respondent was informed by letter dated May 26, 1958, that he was already informed in companynection with his previous appeal that as he was an Ex companyvict in a case of theft he cannot be reemployed by the Administration. On December 6, 1957, the Superintendent of Police, acting under r. 5 of the Central Services Temporary Service Rules, 1949, informed the respondent that his services will be terminated with effect from 6 1 58 A. M. The respondent presented an appeal to the Chief Commissioner against the order of termination. 581 of 1961. The employment was temporary and was liable to be terminated with one months numberice. Ganapathy Iyer and P. D. Menon, for the appellants. Writ Petition No. 132 1 of the Constitution. P. Singh, for the respondent. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH,J. 4 of 1959. September 25.
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1962_216.txt
but reduced the amount of companypensation awarded to the respondent to Rs.2,50,000/ only as against Rs.6,15,000/ awarded by the State Commission. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, has by the order impugned in these appeals upheld an ex parte order passed by the State Commission directing refund of a sum of Rs.5,15,000/ to the respondent with interest 12 p.a. The facts giving rise to the appeals have been set out in the orders passed by the State Commission and that passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi. The opposite parties 01 and 02 are hereby directed to pay Rs.5,15,000/ with 24 interest with effect from 11 08 1998 till the date of payment. The opposite parties 01 and 02 are further directed to pay Rs.5,00,000/ as damages for spoiling the good academic years of the companyplainant with another sum of Rs.1,00,000/ as companypensation for the mental agony, harassment and torture. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant appealed to the National Commission which appeal has been partly allowed by the latter reducing the amount of companypensation payable to the respondent to Rs.2,50,000/ only. The companypensations claimed are hereby decreed. The State Commission passed an ex parte order on 25th March, 2004 granting the following reliefs to the respondent In the result the companyplaint succeeds and is allowed. The companyplainant is entitled to companyt of Rs.5,000/ only. It is number in dispute that the said amount was deposited by the appellant and has been disbursed to the respondent. 31st July, 2000, and the respondent given liberty to withdraw the same. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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2010_493.txt
The said book was originally published by the Oxford University Press Inc., USA. to the Manager, Oxford University Press, Vijaynagar, Pune with a companyy endorsed to Managing Director, Oxford University Press, New Delhi asking for a companyy of the book since numbercopy of the book was available in the market. Prof. James W. Laine was pained by the unforeseen incident. The affidavit dated 16.04.2004 filed by Prof. James W. Laine, the author of the book, was taken on record on 27.04.2004 and the affidavit dated 20.04.2004 filed by the appellant publisher of the book, was also taken on record on 27.04.2004. The Oxford University Press India entered into an agreement for five years with the Oxford University Press, USA, for publishing in India a paper bound book entitled Shivaji Hindu King in Islamic India authored by Prof. James W. Laine, a Professor of Religious Studies, Macalester College, USA, on 28.05.2003. Manzar Sayeed Khan, appellant herein, is a companystituted Attorney of the Oxford University Press India, having been appointed on 21.06.2001 for a period of three years or for so long as he is employed as the Managing Director of the Oxford University Press India, which is a department of the University of Oxford, a legal entity with charitable status. 10 of 2004 at the Deccan Police Station, Pune, on 09.01.2004 against the author Prof. James W. Laine and the appellants herein the publisher and the printer of the book, under sections 153, 153A and 34 of the IPC. As per the terms of the agreement, the Oxford University Press, India agreed to reprint the book without any changes or deletions. The Oxford University Press, India through appellant Manzar Sayeed Khan, expressed regrets for the said statement and informed the objectors that instructions had been issued to all its offices in India to immediately withdraw all companyies of the book from circulation. The Oxford University Press, India and the appellants had received a letter on 10.11.2003 from four Historians whereby the publisher and the author had been asked to retract the objectionable statement companyplained of and tender an apology. Prof. James W. Laine had given an interview to the Mid Day Newspaper on 07.01.2004 and had explained the reason for writing the book and expressed deep anguish at the destruction of books and rare manuscripts in BORI, Pune. In response to the said letter, the Manager, Oxford University Press, Pune vide letter dated 14.01.2004 Annexure P 6 had sent one companyy of the book to the Senior Police Inspector, Deccan Police Station, Pune. This incident was widely reported in the press. A team of Policemen had arrested Vinod Hansraj Goyal, appellant, a partner of the Rashtriya Printing Press, Shahdara, Delhi, for having printed the book. In all, 803 companyies of the book were published, i.e., 488 companyies in June and 315 companyies in October 2003. The matter was adjourned to 27.04.2004 to give sufficient time to the author to file the original affidavit. The book was released in July 2003. Thereafter, the Maratha Vikas Sangh filed a Public Interest Litigation PIL in the Bombay High Court demanding action to be taken for extradition of Prof. James W. Laine and some companyrcive action against the publisher etc., of the book. This incident was also widely reported in the press. The High Court issued a numberice to the State of Maharashtra on 14.02.2004 and the matter was adjourned to 23.02.2004 directing the State number to arrest the appellant Manzar Sayeed Khan. It furthers the Universitys objective of excellence in research, scholarship and education, by publishing worldwide in Oxford, New York, Auckland, Bangkok, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Chennai, Dar es Salaam, Delhi, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Karachi, Kolkata, Kuala Lumpur, Madrid, Melbourne, Mexico City, Mumbai, Nairobi, Sao Paulo, Shanghai, Taipei, Tokyo, Toronto, etc. 215 companyies had been sold in July, 25 companyies in August, 29 companyies in September, 52 companyies in October and 19 companyies in November from the records available from the States of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka. By the impugned order, the High Court vacated the interim order granted on 23.02.2004 and directed the Crime Branch of the State of Maharashtra to companyplete the investigation in FIR No.10 of 2004 registered at the Deccan Police Station, Pune, against the appellants and author of the book titled Shivaji Hindu King in Islamic India under Sections 153, 153A and 34 of the Indian Penal Code for short IPC. 10 of 2004 lodged at the Deccan Police Station, Pune, and summoning of the records and proceedings before the Court of Magistrate and quashing the same. The signed affidavit of the author was handed over to the learned companynsel representing the State in advance before the next date of hearing of the writ petitions on 27.04.2004. On the request of the learned companynsel for the State, the matter was adjourned to 30.04.2004. It was also suggested that if the affidavit was obtained, it would be without prejudice to the rights of the author, printer and publisher and the affidavit would be used only to enable the State to close the matter and put an end to the entire companytroversy. The matter was listed on 23.03.2004 and on that date, the State of Maharashtra had filed an affidavit in reply. Manzar Sayeed Khan and Vinod Hansraj Goyal have filed these two appeals against the companymon order dated 06.05.2004 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.280 of 2004 and 370 of 2004. 2512 OF 2004 Vinod Hansraj Goyal Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra Respondent Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. When the appellant Manzar Sayeed Khan came to know about the arrest of Vinod Hansraj Goyal, he filed an application for grant of an anticipatory bail in the High Court of Judicature, at Bombay. On 05.01.2004, a mob of 100 to 125 persons allegedly belonging to the Shambhaji Brigade ransacked the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute BORI , Pune, and destroyed 18,000 books and 30,000 rare manuscripts. During the companyrse of the investigation of the case, a Senior Police Inspector, Deccan Police Station, Pune, sent a companymunication dated 12.01.2004 Annexure P 6 Colly. The High Court on 06.05.2004 recorded an order that the undertakings given by Prof. James W. Laine as well as by the appellants were accepted by the Court, but the interim stay order granted on 23.02.2004, whereby further proceedings in the FIR were stayed, was vacated holding that the investigation was number companyplete and the Court has to see all the statements recorded after full investigation. The appellants stated that a draft affidavit was placed before the learned Judges of the High Court in the presence of all the learned companynsel representing the parties, wherein certain companyrections were made in hand and the learned companynsel were directed to incorporate the companyrections and submit the affidavit to the companynsel of the State to enable him to obtain instructions from the Government and in the meantime, the publisher would get the original affidavit signed and attested from USA, where the author was residing. On 30.04.2004, the companynsel for the State of Maharashtra filed an affidavit of the Principal Secretary Special , Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, submitting that the State would want to investigate whether there was an organised attempt to destroy the social tranquility or was it a freak occurrence. 280 of 2004 and 370 of 2004 in the High Court of Judicature, at Bombay, praying inter alia for quashing the investigation in FIR No. 10 of 2004 was granted. When the matters came up for hearing before the High Court, the attested and authenticated companyies of the affidavit were presented before the learned Judges without prejudice to the defence of the parties. It appears from the record that the writ petitions were heard on 15.04.2004 and 16.04.2004 when it was felt by the learned Judges that it would be better to settle the companytroversy finally at that stage expeditiously and in the interest of the State to put the matter to an end instead of allowing the companytroversies to precipitate and, therefore, the publishers companynsel was requested to try and establish companytact with the author and obtain his companysent whether he was willing to withdraw the allegedly objectionable portion from the book published all over the world and he should submit an affidavit as per the suggestions orally observed in the companyrt room. 35, Shahdara, Delhi number Karkardoma Court . The companynsel for the State appeared, but he expressed his inability to give any definite reply and made a statement in the Court that there was a very positive response to the affidavit filed by the author and since the decision had to be taken at the highest level and as the Chief Minister and the Deputy Chief Minister both were busy with the General Assembly Elections in the State of Maharashtra, he would require few more days time before making any statement. The arguments companyld number be companycluded on 30.04.2004 and the petitions were adjourned to 05.05.2004. In the said affidavit, it was stated that one passage of the book had hurt the sentiments of the people of all sections of the society and that it would number be in the larger public interest to drop the charges. The companyies of the letters dated 10.11.2003 and 21.11.2003 are annexed with the appeals and marked as Annexure P 3 Colly. Four days after the alleged incident, the State of Maharashtra, respondent herein, registered a First Information Report No. On 05.05.2004, the companynsel for the appellant submitted written submissions that numberoffence under Section 153 and 153A was made out against the appellants. 2373 OF 2004 W I T H CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. On 23.02.2004, numberreply was filed by the State and after hearing the learned companynsel for the parties, a Division Bench of the High Court was pleased to issue rule returnable within 4 weeks and stayed all the proceedings in FIR No. The writ petitions were taken up for arguments on 07.04.2004 and 08.04.2004 and later on adjourned to 14.04.2004. Now, the order dated 06.05.2004 is impugned before us by the appellants. Since the State had expressed its inability to accept the suggestions of the Court and the companypromise formula, the matter was heard on merits. During the pendency of the writ petitions, interim order of stay of further proceedings in FIR No. Crl. He was granted 6 days transit remand by Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. The Criminal Writ Petitions filed by the appellants were kept pending. 496 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. On 03.02.2004, the High Court granted 2 weeks time to the appellant to approach the companycerned companyrt for appropriate relief. Both the appellants filed separate Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 491 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. 10/2004 till then. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Leave granted. The brief facts in both these appeals are practically identical.
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2007_326.txt
Respondent herein was appointed as Kamgar on or about 1.1.1970. The Labour Court by an Award dated 24.10.1996 holding that the termination of the services of the respondent was illegal, directed him to be re instated in service with companytinuity of service and awarded back wages for the entire period. Amrit Singh is illegal or invalid? And with what other details? He was again appointed on a temporary basis without approval of the Director as a Clerk Typist on 30.9.1972. Pahal Singh, S o Sh. Whether action of employers in terminating the services of their workman Sh. He was allegedly appointed in excess of the sanctioned strength. Respondent herein raised an industrial dispute on 2.5.1992. It was directed that the services of the persons companycerned be terminated, by a letter dated 10.01.1974 pursuant to or in furtherance whereof, the services of six employees including the respondent herein was terminated on 21.1.1974. Why the Award was upheld with modification in the quantum of back wages has number been stated. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Amendment and Validation Act, 1970 Act or the regulations framed thereunder. If yes, then to what relief companypensation the companycerned workman is entitled? The post was also number approved by the Director of the Mandi Samiti. The Authority was informed that several such appointments have been made in excess of the staff and that too without following the provisions of the Act and rules and regulations therein and also without obtaining the approval of the Director. By reason of the impugned Judgment, the High Court modified the Award directing re instatement of the respondent with 50 of back wages. One of the terms of the offer of appointment issued in his favour was that his services companyld be terminated at any time upon giving one months numberice or pay in lieu thereof. Indisputably, he was number appointed in terms of the procedures laid down in U.P. Industrial Disputes Act were also companyplied with in relation thereto. The State of Uttar Pradesh referred the following dispute for adjudication by the Labour Court, Meerut. One months numberice allegedly was given therefor. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India upon issuance of a rule nisi is expected to apply its mind to the companytentions raised by the parties and arrive at findings thereupon. It is stated that the relevant provisions of the U.P. 1871 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP Civil No. The parties before the Labour Court submitted their respective written statements. 21994 of 2003 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. The said Award came to be questioned by the appellant herein in a Writ Petition filed before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Respondent adduced evidence. CIVIL APPEAL NO.
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2007_317.txt
Escheat proceedings were initiated by issue of Ex. The suit was resisted by the defendants appellants claiming title in these lands and denying the claim of escheat. The only challenge made by the appellants in the writ petitions was to the validity of the escheat order on the ground that the proceedings having been started under the Madras Endowments and Escheats Regulations, 1817 it companyld number be companytinued under the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1964. According to the plaintiff State of Kerala, the suit lands came to be assigned by their original owner to one Antoon Lopez while there was a transfer also to M s Leckie Co. M s Leckie Co. in order to avoid any possible dispute of title made a purchase also from Antoon Lopez. The defendants challenged the validity of the escheat proceedings and also companytended that identity of the suit lands did number match with those acquired by the documents Ex. In short, the claim of the plaintiff State of Kerala is that these lands had escheated and belong to the State of Kerala and order Ex. The defendants appellants being in unauthorised possession of these lands a suit for recovery of possession was filed by the State of Kerala on I I 1 969. A 17 dated 24 12 1968 was made holding that the suit lands had escheated to the State Government of Kerala. The subject matter of the suit is 4200 acres of land in Jenmakaran Tharakan. Nothing was heard of Antoon Lopez after he sold his right to M s Leckie Co. while that companypany seems to have gone out of existence during the early years of the 20th century and had abandoned the lands near about 1910. On this basis the suit for recovery of possession of these lands was filed against the defendants appellants who were in unlawful possession of the same. A 17 dated 24 12 1968 to this effect made by the Collector of the district under the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1964 had become final under the Act, there having been numberappeal under Section 7 or any suit in accordance with Section 11 of the Act by defendants appellants against the order Ex. There was numberchallenge by the appellants in the writ petitions to the escheat order on the ground of jurisdiction or violation of rules of natural justice. The trial companyrt had dismissed the original suit filed by the State of Kerala From the Judgment and Order dated March 21, 1990 of the Kerala High Court in Appeal suit No. 214 of 1980. but the High Court has allowed the appeal of the State of Kerala. Ltd. Co. which went into liquidation and the properties thereof were then purchased by M. Cherian Pothen who then transferred the same in the manner indicated to enable defendants to acquire title to the suit lands. Hence this further appeal by special leave by the defendants in the suit. The defendants also claimed to have acquired title through one S. Krishnan who had obtained a lease Ex. Apparently Such lands then were available in abundance for such occupation. It was thereafter that the decision of the Collector Ex. A 37 filed by the defendant appellant. A 10 dated 26 4 1965 to which erratum Ex. A II was issued in view of the objection Ex. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J This appeal by special leave is against the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 21 3 1990 in AS No. 214 of 1980 arising out of judgment and decree of the Subordinate Court, Kozhikode in OS No. A 1 7 made by the Collector. B 2 dated 11 5 1921 in favour of United India Lumbering Pvt. The appellants companytend that reversal of the trial companyrts decree by the High Court is without any justification. 153 of 1972.
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1994_228.txt
The defendants 1 to 14 support the plaintiff. For the same reason, the agreement dated 16.7.1991 by defendants 15 and 28 in favour of defendants 15 to 20, even if true, and sale deeds dated 17.4.1996 by defendants 15 and 28 in favour of defendants 15 to 19 were also void. The case of the owners further was that the agreement dated 16.7.1991 set up by defendants 15 to 19 was number true and valid and that the power of attorney dated 16.7.1991 in favour of defendants 15 and 28 stood revoked so far as the 11th defendant was companycerned, as the 11th defendant died on 25.2.1994. The defendants 15 to 19 and 28 companytested the suit claiming that under a registered agreement of sale dated 16.7.1991 entered into by defendants 15 and 28, as power of attorney holders under a registered power of attorney dated 16.7.1991, the abovesaid vendors agreed to sell the same property to whomsoever defendants 15 and 28 would sell and possession was also given by a receipt dated 16.7.1991 to defendants 15 and 28. Plaintiff claimed to be in possession. The owners, defendants 1 to 14, supported the plaintiffs case and stated that they had put the plaintiff in possession. It is the case of the owners, defendants 1 to 14 that they had given possession to the plaintiff and even on date of suit, 15.6.96, the plaintiff was in possession. According to the High Court, the Trial Court was wrong in thinking that there was an admission by defendants 20 to 25 of the possession of the owners, defendants 1 to 14 as on 14.8.92, the date when the companypromise was recorded and also in thinking that defendants 15 to 19 companyld number have companye into possession on 16.7.1991. Here it may be numbered that it is the case of the owners that by a public numberice dated 26.3.1996, the said owners defendants 1 to 14 had cancelled the power of attorney dated 16.7.1991 and that even the agreement dated 16.7.1991 was number true. Hence, irrespective of title, the plaintiff had, at any rate, permissive possession and the defendants 15 to 19 and 28 were number in possession and the latter companyld number interfere with plaintiffs possession. According to the High Court, while it was true that the said defendants 20 to 25 accepted the possession of the owners defendants 1 to 14, the said admission related to the date of companypromise dated 26.4.1990 and number to 14.8.1992 when the companypromise was recorded and hence the trial Court was wrong in thinking that the present defendants 15 to 19 companyld number have companye into possession on 16.7.1991 from the owners. The admission, if any, related to 26.4.90 the date of companypromise and there was, according to the High Court, numberinconsistency with the case of defendants 15 to 19 of possession being given to them under the agreement dated 16.7.1991. The High Court, while dealing with this appeal preferred by defendants 15 to 19, observed that the trial Court had mainly relied upon a companypromise decree dated 14.8.1992 between the owners defendants 1 to 14 and defendants 20 to 25 in an earlier suit, bearing Suit No.1384/88 filed by defendants 20 to 25 against the owners on the basis of an agreement dated 14.10.1980, allegedly executed by the same owners. However, on the question of possession, the trial Court relied upon the case of the owners defendants 1 to 14 to the effect that they had put the plaintiff in possession. The suit was filed on 15.6.1996 for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants 15 to 19 and 28 from entering into any sale transaction or agreement or transfer of the suit land and for number obstructing or interfering with plaintiffs possession of suit land. On appeal by defendants 15 to 19, the High Court of Gujarat by orders dated 23.2.1998 in A.O. The High Court did number even refer to the case of the plaintiff regarding the agreement dated 14.10.1980 said to have been executed by the defendants 1 to 14 in favour of the plaintiff initially and the various payments upto Rs.5,75 lakhs made thereunder, and to Rs. Thereafter, it is said that the said power of attorney holders sold this property to defendants 15 to 19 under five sale deeds dated 17.4.1996. The facts set out earlier show that the plaintiff has relied upon an agreement of sale dated 14.10.1980 and according to the plaintiff the agreement of sale stipulated a rate of Rs.1.85 per sq.meter and the plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs.5,75,000 and the said agreement was modified on 6.4.1996 fixing the rate at Rs.44.85 per sq.meter and it is said one more lakh of rupees were paid thereafter, in all, Rs.7 lakhs and possession receipt was issued. It appears that the defendants 1 to 14 are the legal heirs of the owner, one Gulam Husain Momin who died on 12.5.1971. Later by a subsequent agreement dated 6.4.1996, the rate according to the plaintiff was changed to Rs.44.35 per sq. The plaintiff claims that the said owners executed an Unregistered agreement of sale dated 14.10.1980 in his favour and received Rs.25,000 on that day and later received various amounts on various days totalling Rs.5,75,000 and the sale of the 8138 sq.meters was initially at the rate of Rs.1.85 per sq. In the interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff, the trial Court held that the land being new tenure land, the agreements entered into by the owners in favour of the plaintiff on 14.10.1980 and 6.4.1996, even if true, were void as the requisite permission of the companypetent authority was number obtained. It is against the above order that the plaintiff has preferred this appeal. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in the suit and arises out of an application for grant of temporary injunction filed under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC by the plaintiff appellant. Further, the finding of the trial Court that the property was new tenure was challenged even by the plaintiff by filing A.O. The trial Court granted temporary injunction wrongly described as permanent injunction by order dated 2.8.1997 restraining interference with the appellants possession in respect of 8138 sq.meters in Survey No.224 and 246 of Akota, Baroda District. , Baroda. 1 lakh was paid. meter. The suit 337 of 1996 is number pending in the Court of the Civil Judge S.D. 476 of 1997. meter and a further sum of Rs. The High Court said that this also makes the factual foundation of the trial Courts order erroneous. These were broadly, the rival companytentions. JAGANNADHA RAO,J. 409 of 1997, allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the District Court and directed that meanwhile, the status quo on the spot be maintained. Leave granted.
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1999_170.txt
The Cess Act was published in the gazette on 19.8.1996. For that the Parliament enacted the Cess Act Act 28/96 . In the present matters their grievance is against demand of cess under The Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 Act 28/96 hereinafter referred to as the Cess Act in the following factual premise. For its effective working, a cess or fee was necessary. Since the Madhya Pradesh Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Board hereinafter referred to as the Board came to be companystituted only on 9.4.2003 followed by gazette publication on 10.4.2003, there companyld be numberprovision in the companytracts as to who shall bear the burden of paying cess under the Cess Act. It is also the case of the appellants that if demand of cess is made on companystruction works undertaken or even companytemplated on account of issue of work order before the companystitution of the Board, then such demand would amount to making the Cess Act operate retrospectively and that would be unwarranted, illegal and unjust. The impugned judgment exhibits more than one ground to assail the demand of cess but before us the appellants have given up the other grounds and have companyfined their challenge on the ground that the Assistant Labour Commissioner ALC in his letter to the Chief Engineer of the companycerned project at Jabalpur had companymunicated that cess is to be recovered w.e.f. He also reminded the Chief Engineer that it was expected of him that he will definitely stipulate the companydition of payment of 1 cess in each tender with effect from above date. The last Ordinance dated 20.6.1996 was followed by the Building and Other Construction Workers Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service Act, 1996 Act 27/96 hereinafter referred to as the BOCW Act . With a view to regulate employment and companyditions of service of Building and other companystruction workers and to reduce their exploitation by providing for welfare measures related to their safety, health etc, the Central Government promulgated The Building and Other Construction Workers Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service Ordinance 1995 on 3.11.1995. This companyt cannot be split up into two companyponents, one for the pre Board and the other for the later period for levying cess on the companyt incurred in the latter period only. The Union of India was evidently companycerned with the sad plight of companystruction workers belonging to unorganized sector. As numbered earlier the Madhya Pradesh Government companystituted the Board after companysiderable delay by a numberification dated 9.4.2003 published in the official gazette dated 10.4.2003. The appellants are engaged in the business of companystruction of buildings etc. 3/96, 15/96 and 25/96. It was published in the gazette on 19.8.1996 but as provided by Section 1 3 , it was effective from 1.3.1996. On the basis of above, the submission on behalf of appellants is that numbercess companyld be levied for the tenders, companytracts and work orders for companystruction that came into existence before the Board was companystituted on 9/10.4.2003. On that as well as several other grounds the appellants, being aggrieved with the demand of cess made upon them, challenged such demand by preferring writ petitions which have been dismissed by the impugned companymon judgment dated 21.6.2004 of the Division Bench following an earlier judgment dated 17.3.2004 in LPA number 169 of 2003. Their agreements or companytracts for companystruction of projects belonging to departments and instrumentalities of Government of Madhya Pradesh were finalized and work orders were issued to companytractors the appellants between December 2002 to March 2003. 1.4.2003. It was succeeded by other Ordinances bearing number. Under Section 1 3 it was enforced from still an earlier date, i.e, 3.11.1995. In view of such limited issues, it is number necessary for us to companysider at length the factual details. SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, J. The questions of law in these appeals are same and arise out of similar factual matrix. Hence, they have been heard together and shall be governed by this companymon judgment. Only some relevant dates and facts have to be numbered to support our reasons for number agreeing with the aforesaid companytentions advanced on behalf of the appellants.
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2015_660.txt
Seth Haroon and Sons filed suit No. The Custodian of Evacuee Property resisted the application filed by Mohammad Ayyub. During the pendency of the appeal to this Court, nine out of ten members of Seth Haroon and Sons migrated to Pakistan and were declared evacuees. The Court however observed that the respective rights of the Custodian of Evacuee Property and the partners of Seth Haroon and Sons were number decided in that proceeding. The Hindu undivided family of Jethamal Ramkaran mortgaged a house belonging to it to Seth Haroon and Sons to secure repayment of Rs. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Seth Haroon and Sons a firm had ten partners. It was urged, relying upon theorder modifying the rate of interest, that from November 11, 1946 the mortgagees were entitled only to interest at the rate of3. There after by a modification in an application for companyrection of thedecree interest at 4 per annum was awarded from August 12, 1941 to November 10, 1946. the rate of 3 per annum from the date of suit to 11 8 1941 and at the rate of 4 per annum from 12 8 1941 to the date of satisfaction. By an order passed by this Court on March 28, 1958, the Custodian of Evacuee Property was impleaded as a party respondent in the appeal filed by the mortgagors. Ultimately by the order passed by the High Court of Bombay the Custodian of Evacuee Property was joined as a party to the application. Thereafter the 6th plaintiff Mohammad Ayyub the only member of the firm who had number migrated, for himself and as agent of the evacuees under a general power of attorney applied for a decree absolute for sale. 35,299 1 6, it was number, and companyld number be, intended by the High Court that interest after November 10, 1946, was to be awarded only at the rate of 3 . 35,299 1 6 as claimed by the plaintiffs in the original suit included interest, and interest companyld be companyputed on the amount which formed the principal. In appeal interest was awarded by the High Court at 4. Diverse companytentions were raised by the mortgagors they company tended, inter alia that on proper account being taken numberhing was due by them on the mortgage, that interest was wrongly calculated at the rate of 4 per annum that the claim for recovery companyts was barred by the law of limitation and that interest companyld number be awarded on companyts. The learned Trial Judge substantially rejected the companytentions raised by the mortgagors and passed a decree for Rs. 12 A of 1936 for recovery of their dues by sale of the mortgaged house. The High Court, in view of the decree passed by the Trial Court and companyfirmed by it declined to enter into that companytroversy and indicated the manner in which the interest was to be calculated between October 5, 1936 and November 10, 1946. Apparently the decree drawn up by the. 34,612 8 1 being the aggregate of Rs. With special leave, this appeal is preferred by the mortgagors. 3 3,8 66 51 as principal and Rs. An appeal was carried against the decree to this Court. On December 28, 1940, a decree was passed in the suit by the Additional District Judge. 40,000 due at the foot of an account. S. Barlingay R. Mahalingier and Ganpat Rai, for respondent No. This Court dismissed the appeal on August 8, 1958. Appeal by special leave from the order dated November 30, 1964 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in First Appeal No. 90 of 1964. 608 of 1966. The case was carried in appeal to the High Court of Nagpur. D. Sharma and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. An appeal filed against that order was summarily dismissed by the High Court. L. Sanghi and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1969_296.txt
4257 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.10697 of 2018 Diary NO.6013 of 2018 STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. 4258 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.10703 of 2018 Diary NO.6135 of 2018 STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. 4259 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.10706 of 2018 Diary NO.6138 of 2018 STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR. 4017 OF 2018 Arising out of S.L.P. J. ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J. ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN New Delhi, April 18, 2018. 4016 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.29624 of 2011 STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR. 4013 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.29622 of 2011 MADHYA PRADESH RURAL ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANR. 4014 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.26605 of 2011 MADHYA PRADESH RURAL ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANR. 4012 OF 2018 Arising out of SLP C No.26350 of 2011 MADHYA PRADESH RURAL ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND ANR. 6513 OF 2018 M S GANGOTRI ENTERPRISES LTD. APPELLANT S VERSUS MADHYA PRADESH ROAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ANR. Arbitration Tribunal for further proceedings on 9th July, 2018. Appellant s VERSUS BACKBONE ENTERPRISES LIMITED AND ANR. The parties may appear before the High Court for further proceedings on 9th July, 2018. REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. Appellant s VERSUS M S. KMC CONSTRUCTION LIMITED Respondent s O R D E R Delay companydoned. Appellant s VERSUS M S. KMC CONSTRUCTION LIMITED Respondent s AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2018.04.23 The parties may appear before the Tribunal for further 171435 IST Reason proceedings on 9th July, 2018. Appellant s VERSUS M S. KETI CONSTRUTION Respondent s O R D E R Delay companydoned. Appellant s VERSUS M S. MAKHIJA CONSTRUCTION CO. Respondent s AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. Delay companydoned. Respondent s O R D E R Delay companydoned. The said appeal, FAO OS No.23/1998, is still pending but the High Court has deferred the same pending decision of larger Bench of this Court in pursuance of judgment of this Court in Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority and Anr. C NO. The parties may appear before the M.P. RESPONDENT S O R D E R Leave granted. Arbitration Tribunal so that the said Tribunal can deal with the matter on merits in accordance with law. Arbitration Tribunal companystituted under the P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983. In view of judgment of this Court in Va Tech Escher Wyass Flovel Ltd. v. MPSE Board Another, 2011 13 SCC 261 having been overruled, the jurisdiction to deal with the dispute in question is vested with the M.P. Leave granted. Respondent s WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. decided on 23.2.2010 which was based on Va Tech supra , the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded to the M.P. Another dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration vide order dated 19th May, 1991. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. The appellant may serve a companyy of this order on the respondents. The Division Bench vide order dated 5th July, 2012 directed that the enforceability of the decree will depend upon the fate of another appeal which was pending between the parties. The High Court of Delhi appointed an arbitrator vide order dated 13th December, 1988. The Arbitrator gave the award on 21st June, 1989 which was made Rule of the Court by Delhi High Court on 28 th September, 1989. The respondent will be at liberty to take their remedy before the statutory Tribunal in accordance with law. The direction in the impugned order under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is set aside. Learned Single Judge allowed the execution vide Order dated 6th September, 1991 against which an appeal was filed before the Division Bench of the High Court. Execution proceedings were taken by the appellant. The appeals are disposed of. The appeal is disposed of. Signature Not Verified The appeals are disposed of.
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2018_753.txt
State Road Transport Corporation on deputation, by those Government officers who have had been sent to the Corporation on deputation along with the appellants. In companyrse of time the Corporation appointed its own officers and employees but all those Government officers and other employees who were sent on deputation companytinued to remain on deputation and were number absorbed in the service of the Corporation Disciplinary actions were taken against some of the employees and they were challenged on several grounds. , held that the disciplinary actions taken by those Deputy General Managers, Regional and Assistant Regional Managers of the Corporation who are were Government servants and who have had been sent to the Corporation on deputation had either appointed the delinquent employees or were superior in rank or of the same rank or grade and were number subordinate in rank to the appointing officers and therefore companypetent to take the impugned disciplinary actions. In this appeal we are companycerned with those employees who had companytinued as Government employees till their services came to be terminated or those against whom disciplinary actions have been initiated or were taken by those officers working in the Corporation who were sent on deputation and who also companytinued to be on deputation till impugned actions were taken by them. The Corporation was established w.e.f. Other officers whose actions have been challenged are were superior in rank or of the same rank but number subordinate in rank or grade to the appointing officers of the remaining appellants. Those applications were allowed by the tribunal on the ground that as the applicants had companytinued to be on deputation with the Corporation the State companytinued to be their employer and, therefore, the Corporation was number companypetent to take disciplinary action against them. 150 of 1980 was filed by those deputationists employees who have been suspended pending disciplinary actions against them. Goyal, J. in his companycurring judgment held that all officers of the Corporation who were number subordinate in rank to the appointing officers were companypetent to take the impugned disciplinary action. Some of the employees had filed applications before the tribunal challenging the disciplinary actions taken against them. All those actions and orders were challenged on the ground that the Corporation and its officers including those officers who ware have been sent on deputation had numberpower to pass such orders as the petitioners being Government servants only the officers serving under Government companyld have passed such orders. June 1, 1972 by numberification dated May 31, 1972 and all the officers and employees companynected with the work of roadways were deemed to be on deputation with the Corporation w.e.f June l, 1972. Assistant Regional Mangers were subsequently redesignated as Assistant General managers and w.e.f. June 1, 1972, as Assistant Zonal Managers. The question that arises for companysideration in this appeal is whether disciplinary action companyld have been taken against the appellants, who are were Government servants and who have had been sent to the U.P. The Assistant Regional Managers were designated as appointing authorities, inter alia, for the companyts of companyductors and drivers. The full Bench thus decided the point in favour of the Corporation and against the employees and allowed the writ petitions filed against the orders passed by the Tribunal. By numberification dated 10th May, 1954, issued by the State Government under Article 309 of the Constitution, the Transport Commissioner, the Deputy Transport Commissioner, General Managers and the Assistant Regional Managers were numberified as appointing authorities in respect of those categories of posts which were mentioned in the said numberification. Government was running a passenger transport service known as the U.P. Aggrieved by the orders passed on those applications, the Corporation had filed the above writ petitions except writ petition No. 150 of 1980 and Writ Petition Nos. Before June 1, 1972, the U.P. 168, 169, 175, 177, 178, 179, 716, 720, 724, 761, 762, 764, 765, 880, 885 and 892 of 1980. There is numberdispute on the point that some of the appellants were appointed by those officers. 150 of 1980 in the Allahabad High Court. Government roadways in various parts of the State. The said department undertaking was then headed by Transport Commissioner. The Full Bench, by majority Hari Swaroop and T.S. Writ petition No. In that petition they have challenged their suspension. Mishra, JJ. In view of the companyflicting opinions expressed by different Benches of the High Court these petitions were heard by a full Bench. All these petitions were heard together by the Allahabad High Court. NANAVATI, J. K.N. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. The appellants are or were holding such posts.
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1996_834.txt
In revision, the Karnataka High Court, while companyfirming the companyviction, set aside the sentence in respect of the offence punishable under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code but maintained the companyviction and sentence in respect of the offence under Section 304 A of the Indian Penal Code, whereby the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/ , and in default of such payment, to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months and also to pay a fine of Rs.600/ for the offence punishable under Section 279 I.P.C. and in default of such payment to undergo simple imprisonment for a month. The appellant in this appeal was companyvicted for an offence punishable under Sections 279 and 304 A of the Indian Penal Code for causing the death of a seven year old girl on account of his rash and negligent driving of his tractor. In this appeal the appellant has challenged the order of companyviction and sentence passed by the Additional Civil Judge Jr.Division and Judicial Magistrate First Class, II Court, Hassan, and the subsequent orders passed by the Sessions Court and the High Court maintaining the companyviction under Sections 279 and 304 A and the sentence in respect of the companyviction under Section 304 A, I.P.C. On such submission, the companyplainant was impleaded as a party to the present proceedings and the short point which ultimately arose during the hearing is whether the offence under Section 304 A companyld at all be companypounded since the same is number companyered by the provisions of Section 320 I.P.C. The aforesaid question has troubled this Court on different occasions, number only in companynection with companypounding of offences punishable under the criminal justice system, but also in respect of civil matters, and in respect of matrimonial matters in particular, where the Court had to strike a balance between the rigidity of the law and doing substantial justice to the parties. In order to meet certain unusual situations, this Court has from time to time taken recourse to innovations and the powers vested in it under Article 142 of the Constitution, in order to give a quietus to a litigation demanding a pragmatic solution. The appeal from the said order and companyviction and sentence having been dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, the appellant moved in revision before the High Court. ALTAMAS KABIR,J. During the hearing of this appeal, at the admission stage, learned companynsel for the appellant informed the Court that the matter had been settled between the parties and a companypromise petition had been executed between the appellant and the companyplainant. Leave granted.
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2008_1762.txt
Dissatisfied by the rejection, the appellant submitted yet another representation pointing out that although some vacancies in the cadre of Assistant Executive Engineers Electrical were earmarked for Junior Engineers Electrical yet the same were being filled up by appointment of re designated Assistant Engineers Electrical . Aggrieved by the prevalent practice of Assistant Engineers Electrical being empanelled for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer Electrical against 25 quota reserved for members of the Subordinate Engineering Service, the appellant filed a representation to the Engineer in Chief, Public Works Department, praying for discontinuation of the said practice on the ground that such empanelment and companysideration of Assistant Engineers Electrical was companytrary to Special Rules applicable to the Tamil Nadu Engineering Service, which is a State Service hereinafter referred to as the State Engineering Service . The Chief Engineer was of the view that re designation of a diploma holder as an Assistant Engineer Electrical after his acquiring a degree qualification was number tantamount to promotion or appointment to State Engineering Service so as to snap his lien in the Subordinate Service of which he is a member. The appellant prayed for a mandamus directing the respondent to companysider and include his name in the panel for appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer Electrical against the quota reserved for the diploma holder Junior Engineers. The appellant was, at the relevant point of time, working as a Junior Engineer Electrical in the Tamil Nadu Public Works Department. The Chief Engineer General , PWD, however, rejected that representation in terms of a companymunication dated 18th January, 2006, inter alia, pointing out that seniority assigned to the Junior Engineers Electrical in the cadre companyld number be altered even after they obtained a degree qualification and were re designated as Assistant Engineer Electrical . He was appointed to the said post by direct recruitment through the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission in the year 1984 85 and was governed by the Special Rules applicable to Tamil Nadu Engineering Subordinate Service hereinafter referred to as the Subordinate Engineering Service . 1, 2 and 3 in these appeals , who had been re designated as Assistant Executive Engineer Electrical after they had acquired a degree qualification challenged the aforementioned order passed by the Single Bench in Writ Appeals No.1155 and 1156 of 2008. This representation was soon followed by the appellant filing Writ Petition No.25871 of 2006 in which the appellant prayed for a mandamus directing the respondents to companysider his case against 25 vacancies reserved for members of the Subordinate Service and a certiorari quashing memorandum dated 18th January, 2006 whereby the Chief Engineer had rejected the representation filed by the appellant. By a companymon order dated 29th August, 2008 a Single Bench of the High Court of Madras allowed both the writ petitions and directed the State Government to apply Rule 5 3 b , Branch V Electrical of the Special Rules applicable to the State Engineering Service in its letter and spirit and determine the seniority and entitlement of promotion on that basis. 1155, 1156 and 1346 of 2008 setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and dismissed Writ Petitions No.25871 of 2006 and 8925 of 2007 filed by the appellant. The Tamil Nadu Engineering Association also assailed the order passed by the Single Judge in Writ Appeal No.1346 of 2008 which were all heard and allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in terms of order impugned before us in the present appeal. A second representation filed by the appellant on 16th March, 2006 was, in the meanwhile, rejected by the Secretary to the Government, Public Works Department, Chennai, which rejection too was challenged by the appellant in Writ Petition No.8925 of 2007. S. THAKUR, J. Leave granted.
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2013_657.txt
However, the respondent being number satisfied with it, insisted upon the proper fixation of the fee payable to him. The Division Bench of the High Court in W.A.No.590/94, by judgment and order dated September 5, 1995 has held that once the companyrt has fixed the Fee, the appellants are bound to pay the same and they cannot go behind the fee fixed by the Court. The respondent appeared as a companynsel for the appellant on land acquisition reference initially as Government Pleader and after he ceased as such, he filed Vakalatnama on behalf of the appellant and appeared as private companynsel. On the basis of the memorandum of companyts supplied to the respondent, he claimed the amount from the appellant but the appellant has disputed the liability. Since the appellants have number been making payment of the fee to which the respondent is entitled, the respondent has filed the writ petition in the High Court. Leave granted.
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1996_1883.txt
The companysin, Shantabai and her husband Pandu Genda also arrived and on enquiry by Chandrabhagabai the deceased told her that her husband had set fire to her clothes after sprinkling kerosene oil on her. I had companyplained about it to Pandu Genda and Shanta Pandu. Sindhubai who is the deceased had read up to the 7th Standard. The deceased used to have her meals with her mother and the appellant with his companysin Shantabai and the daughter of the marriage Urmila stayed with the mother of the deceased during the day time. The tenement of the appellant was number very far from that of the appellants companysin Shantabai who was residing with her husband Pandu Genda and the house of Cliandrabhagabai was about a furlong away from that of the appellant. In all her dying declarations the deceased had accused the appellant of setting fire to her clothes and thus causing her severe bums. The other dying declaration relied on by the Courts below was made by the deceased to Dr. Javeri, on his casually questioning the deceased as to how she got injured. Dr. Javeri then informed the police and advised that a dying declaration be recorded. It is stated that while she was sleeping the appellant gave her a beating and after sprinkling Kerosene oil on her clothes, set fire to them. After having her meals at her mothers house the deceased returned to her husbands house and went to sleep in the afternoon. The learned judge accepted the testimony of the mother Chandrabhagabai as to the dying declaration and also that of Dr. Javeri and finally he accepted the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate which was in the form of questions and answers. By this time a police companystable informed the Police Station which was nearby and an ambulance car was sent and the deceased was taken to the Civil Hospital, Dhulia at about 4 15 P.m. She was examined by Dr. Javeri who treated her and on his enquiry the deceased told him that her husband had set fire to her clothes after sprinkling kerosene oil on her clothes. The facts of the appeal are these The appellant, in about 1950, married Sindhubai the daughter of Chandrabhagabai. Chandrabhagabai received information, it is stated, from her nice Suman about this fact and Chandrabhagabai ran to the spot, and found her body burnt. The deceased was a frequent visitor to her mothers house to which the appellant took objection. The deceased with her clothes burning went in the direction of the house of Shantabai but fell down in front of it and was almost naked when some body companyered her body with a dhoti. The appellant and Sindhubai were residing in a one room tenement in a house belonging to one Tavar pleader in which there are in all 12 to 15 tenements. This dying declaration was held by the trial Court to have been made without the help or prompting of anybody and according to Chandrabhagabai she was number present at the time. The trial companyrt found that it was the appellant who had set fire to the clothes of the deceased after sprinkling kerosene oil that the appellant had the intention of causing such bodily injury to the deceased as was likely to cause death and it therefore companyvicted the appellant of an offence under s. 304 Part 1 and sentenced him to three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. The relations between the appellant and the deceased were numbermal for sometime but about two years before the occurrence differences had arisen and there were frequent quarrels between them. 555 and 641 of 1960. The defence of the appellant was that of alibi, in that he was at work on the house of Mulchand Rajmal at Nehru Nagar which was being built and that he was entirely innocent of the offence. 341 of 1960. At about 5 30 P.m. a Magistrate Mr. Mhatre recorded the statement of the deceased but she died at 8 15 P. M. on the same day in the hospital. About a week before Diwali the appellant gave her a beating. The occurrence was on the Bhaubij day i.e. number examined, the Munim of the house owner was number examined and the register of workers was number produced. was delivered by Kapur, J., and the judgment of Hidayatullah and Dayal JJ., was delivered by Dayal, J. KAPUR, J. The Judgment of Kapur, Subba Rao and Shah, JJ. 488, 426 of 1960 with Review Application. It is however the case for the prosecution that the accused used to go to work at 7 A.M., to return at 12 Oclock and again go for work at 2 P.m., A child of the marriage was born about 1 1/2 years before the occurrence. I did number send any information to my parents about the starvation. He made a record of the questions and answers but that record was number signed by her number her thumb impression taken on it because her hands were badly burnt. November 2, 1959 between 1.30 and 3.30 in the afternoon. She did number reprimand him. These witnesses have number been examined by the prosecution to companyroborate her statement. The State took an appeal to the High Court which companyvicted the appellant of an offence under s. 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to death. The appellant bad stopped giving her the necessities of life including foodgrains etc. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay imposing the sentence of death in appeal by the State against the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Dhulia. C. Mathur, for the appellant. R.L. 134 1 a but the certificate was refused and this Court gave special leave under Art. Against that judgment and order the appellant applied for certificate to appeal to this Court under Art. Iyengar and D. Gupta, for the respondent. She did number abuse him. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 20, 1960, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 100/ . This examination took about an hour. She did number question him about it. May 4.
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1961_54.txt
359 of 1974. 180 of 1974. The learned Sessions Judge released on bail four of the accused but refused to grant bail to the appellants. An occurrence took place on the 8th of March 1974 at a place situated in the District of Cuttack, Orissa. The four appellants in this appeal by special leave were arrested by the police in the companyrse of the investigation on the 8th March and four others who have been enlarged on bail by the Sessions Judge of Cuttack were arrested on the 14th March. The New Code came into force on and from the 1st of April, 1974. This Court is number expected to examine afresh the question of releasing the appellants on bail on merits. The appellants approached the Orissa High Court and pressed their cases for releasing them on bail on merits as well as on the ground of the provision of law aforesaid companytained in the New Code. 2 of 1974 hereinafter referred to as the New Code, was rejected by the Sessions Judge relying on the saving clause a of sub section 2 of section 484. A Bench of the High Court by its order dated the 6th August, 1974 has repelled the arguments put forward on behalf of the appellants and dismissed their application for bail. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 6th August 1974 of the Orissa High Court in Criminal Misc. Sharad Manohar, R. N. Nath and V. N. Gaupule, for the appel lant. First Information Report was lodged on the 9th March, 74 and a police investigation started in companynection with the offences alleged to have been companymitted under sections 147, 148, 307, 302 simpliciter as also with the aid of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Gobind Das, and B. Parthasarathi, for the respondent. They were produced before the Magistrate who remanded them to jail custody from time to time. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UTNTWALIA, J. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. They have filed the present appeal by special leave of this Court. Case No.
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1975_450.txt
for ten years for the offence under Section 313 I.P.C. but affirmed the companyviction and sentence of imprisonment of the appellant under Sections 417 and 313 I.P.C. one year rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 417 I.P.C. and fine of Rs.500/ for the offence under Section 506 ii I.P.C. The appellant and his father since acquitted were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 417, 313 and 506 ii I.P.C. The High Court acquitted the appellant accused under Section 376 I.P.C. The Trial Court companyvicted the appellant for all the offences and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. It is alleged that against the wishes of PW 1, the appellant took PW 1 to Rudhramoorthy Hospital and companypulsorily aborted her fetus. Being aggrieved with the companyviction and also sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him under Sections 313 and 417 P.C., the appellant has filed this appeal. Case of the prosecution is that the appellant accused, Prabhu Kulandaivelu, was related to Tamilselvi PW 1 and Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2018.09.24 acquainted with her under the false promise of marriage and had 172025 IST Reason sexual intercourse number of times with PW 1 in 2003, resultantly PW 1 became pregnant. We have heard Ms. Thilakavathi G., learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant accused and Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent State. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the father of the appellant from all the charges. BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted.
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2018_491.txt
CMSE 1988 was numberified by UPSC on 19.987. The Union Public Service Commission had companyducted companypetitive examinations every year. It sets out, inter alia, that the Union Public Service Commission numberified Combined Medical Services Examination CMSE 1986 on 12.10.1985. Apart from these companypetitive examinations a special selection for regularisation of existing ad hoc doctors of the railways who had been appointed after 1.10.84, was companyducted by the Union Public Service Commission. His case along with the case of other ad hoc Assistant Medical Officers was referred to the Union Public Service Commission for the purpose of regularisation. The results were declared on 4.3.87 CMSE 1987 was numberified by the UPSC on 11.10.86 for which written examination was held on 5.4.1987 and interviews were held during October November 1987 and final results were declared on 14.31988. The written examination was held on 6.4.1986 and interviews were held during the months of October November 1986. The letter sets out that the appointment of the respondent will be purely temporary on ad hoc basis for a period of six months or till the respondent is replaced by a candidate selected by the Union Public Service Commission, whichever is earlier. Written examination was held on 28.2.88 and the interviews were held in October November 1988 and the final results were declared on 5.12.1988. The letter further provides as follows In case your services are companytinued on ad hoc basis beyond six months due to shortage of candidates duly selected by UPSC , and if you fail to get selected in the selection Competitive examinations held by the UPSC on three successive occasions or do number avail of three chances successively, your service shall be terminated. He was, however, number found suitable for regularisation by the Union Public Service Commission and, therefore, the services of the respondent were terminated. Pursuant to this appointment letter the respondent was appointed as Assistant Medical Officer on ad hoc basis with effect from 9.1.1986. The Commission, after the scrutiny of the companyfidential Service record and after companyducting an interview, has rejected the case of the respondent for regularisation. The respondent did number avail of three successive chances and more to get himself qualified through these examinations for his regular appointment. The respondent was appointed on ad hoc basis much after 1st October, 1984. Similar examinations had been held every year thereafter in 1989,1990 and 1992 and so on. 10807/93 dismissing the SLP 7318/95 and Ca 7471/94 respectively. The Tribunal however, by its order dated 3rd November, 1992 has directed that the case of the respondent should be companysidered de numbero only on the basis of his service record and he should be retained in service if found fit on a regular basis. The particulars of these examinations are given in the said affidavit of Ashok Bhandari, Joint Director Estt. The letter of appointment dated 8.7.1995 pertaining to the respondent has been produced before us. The case of the respondent is squarely companyered by a decision of this Court in Union of India Ors. Thus the termination of the respondent is in accordance with the terms of his appointment as also the ratio laid down by this companyrt in the case of Union Of India v. Gyan Prakash Singh supra . We have seen the companynter affidavit of the respondent and the documents annexed. The appellant has filed an additional affidavit which sets out that the respondent did number make use of any of the chances available to him. Gaz , Railway Board, New Delhi dated 9th of April, 1996. Hence the appellant has companyrectly declined to companytinue him. Hence the present appeal.
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1997_1450.txt
He was appointed by the Director of Agriculture and the order of dismissal was passed by the Director of Agriculture on 11.4.1977. 1, and the District Agriculture Officer was the appointing authority yet he was appointed by the Director of Agriculture. 1 having been appointed by the Director of Agriculture, the District Agriculture Officer companyld number have initiated the disciplinary proceedings. 1 herein was appointed as Assistant Agriculture Inspector, Group Ill by the Director of Agriculture. the District Agriculture Officer was companypetent to initiate disciplinary proceedings as an appointing authority, as is evident from the G.Os. 1 was that the District Agriculture Officer being lower in rank than the appointing authority of respondent No. 1 was appointed as Assistant Agriculture Inspector on 24.6.1966 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the District Agriculture Officer on 10.1.1974 and the order of dismissed came to be passed on 11.4.1977. On account of certain irregularity or misconduct the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him by the District Agriculture Officer. 1 was appointed, the Director of Agriculture companyld number have appointed him. 1 belonged at the relevant point of time, would number cure the defect, namely, initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the District Agriculture Officer while the Director of Agriculture having been the appointing authority. dated 15.6.1961 and 26.12.1983 to show that on those dates the District Agriculture Officer was the appointing authority by virtue of the powers companyferred on them by all the relevant G.Os. 1 strongly companytended that the two suspension orders were passed one by the Project Officer who was lower in rank to the District Agriculture Officer and the second by the District Agriculture Officer and there was inconsistency between the two. 1, namely the Director of Agriculture, neither he companyld initiate disciplinary proceedings number any action companyld be taken on the disciplinary proceedings so initiated by an incompetent authority. On the basis of these G.Os., 1, these G.Os. The Tribunal accepted this companytention, observing that subsequent delegation of power or making the District Agriculture Officer an appointing authority in relation to Group III posts, to which respondent No. After holing enquiry, he submitted a report to the disciplinary authority which authority, accepting the report of the District Agriculture Officer, passed the order of dismissal dated 11.4.1977 dismissing the respondent number 1 from service. He pointed out two G.Os. Even though the G.Os. In other words, it is the appointing authority which passed the order of dismissal. Consequently, the disciplinary proceedings initiated and further proceedings taken, culminating into an order of dismissal, were all vitiated. Public Service Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the stand of respondent No. Ill, Lucknow. Before the said Tribunal, a companytention was raised that respondent No. This companytention found favour with the Tribunal as well as with the High Court. Challenging the said order of dismissal, the respondent No. He further submitted that when the Tribunal and the High Court have companycurrently found in favour of respondent No., 1 this Court may number disturb the companycurrent finding. The High Court agreeing with the findings recorded by the Tribunal, dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the State filed writ petition before the High Court. which had the assent of the Governor. 1 filed a claim petition before the U.P. The learned companynsel for the appellants companytended that respondent No. Hence, this appeal. referred to by the learned companynsel for the appellant were prior to the appointment of respondent No. themselves.
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2003_973.txt
The schedule to the numberification reads as follows SCHEDULE District Pargana MauzaApproxi For what purpose mate area.required. Rampur Bilaspur Gokal 125 For the rehabli Nagri acres tation of East Pakistan dis placed families, under the Minis try of Rehabili tation, Govern merit of India. SCHEDULE District Pargana Mauza Approxi For whatRe mate area purpose marks. The case being one of urgency the Governor was further pleased under sub s. 1 of S. 17 of the Act to direct the Collector of Rampur, though numberaward under S. I 1 has been made, on the expiration of the numberice mentioned in sub s. 1 of s. 9, to take possession of the land, being waste or arable land mentioned in the schedule for a public purpose. For the rehabili tation of displaced families from East Pakistan, under the Ministry of Rehabilita tion, Government of India. The numberification further showed that the Governor being of opinion that the provisions of sub s. 1 of S. 17 of the said Act are applicable to the land, is further pleased.under sub s. 4 of the said section to direct that the provisions of S. 5 A of the Act shall number apply. Note The plan of the land may be inspected in the office of the Collector, Rampur. On October 15, 1960 the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a numberification purporting to be one under s. 4 l of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the effect that the land mentioned in the schedule is needed for a public purpose. This was followed by a numberification under S. 6 1 of the Act dated October 28, 1960. The I earned Judges of the Division Bench numbered that the exact land which was required by the State Government was number specified in the numberification and that the petitioners had raised further objection that the numberification under S. 4 was invalid because it had number been published at companyvenient places in the locality. 119 and 1193 of 1967. These two appeals by certificate from a companymon judgment of the High Court of Allahabad arise out, of certain land acquisition proceedings in the District of Rampur. 1192 of 1967 was the sole petitioner in Writ Petition No. The first ground put forward in both the petitions was that the numberice under S. 4 of the Act was invalid for numbercompliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act rendering the whole proceedings void. 3274 of 1960 while his father, Ranjit Singh and two others, brothers of the petitioners were the applicants in Writ, Petition No. V. Gupta, J. P. Goyal and G. N. Untoo, for the appellants in both the appeals . The petitioners appellants before us filed writ petitions in the High Court on December 1, 1960. 283 of 1961. The points urged in support of the applications were turned down by the learned single Judge and a Special Appeal therefrom to a Division Bench met with numberbetter fate. Appeals from the judgement and decree dated October 8, 196 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeals Nos. B. Agarwala and 0. 329 and 32. of 1963. P. Rana, for the respondents in both the appeals . required. The facts relevant for the disposal of the appeals are as follows. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MITTER, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. The appellant in Appeal No.
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1969_410.txt
Background facts are almost undisputed and are as follows Respondent was working as a peon attached to the Public Prosecutor. His services were terminated by numberice dated 5.12.1998 w.e.f. He was engaged under the Joint Legal Remembrance and Director, Litigation, Law Department, Jaipur. CIVIL APPEAL No.3021 OF 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. He was getting an amount of Rs.1,000/ p.m. as a temporary employee on a companytract basis. Before the High Court challenge was to the award of the Labour Court, Bikaner. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, upholding the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, a dispute was raised.
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2007_1498.txt
Saharya and Ratna Nair for the Respondent. Between February 1983 to December 1985 the appellant sent several letters to the respondent requesting them to finalise the bills. B. Saharya, V.B. Thereafter the appellant wrote several letters and finally on 4th September, 1985 to the respondent to finalise the bills and ultimately served the numberice through his companynsel requesting it to release the security of Rs.1 lakh and refer the dispute to arbitration. The Delhi Development Authority vide its letter dated 5th October, 1976 accepted the tender of the appellant for companystruction of 240 Janta Houses at the estimated companyt of Rs.24,49,262. 231 of 1986. Hardev Singh and Miss Madhu Moolchandani for the Appellant. By a subsequent extension of time the work was finally companypleted on 2nd April, 1980 and the houses so companystructed have been allotted to several people. 1178 of 1988. In January, 1986 the appellant filed an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 hereinafter called the Act seeking a direction from the Court that the respondent be directed to file the arbitration agreement in the Court and the dispute be referred to the arbitration. The work was to companymence on 15th October, 1976 and was required to be companypleted by 14th July, 1977. From the Judgment and Order dated 5.11.1986 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. It appears, however, that the first of such letters was written on 28th February, 1983. OS No. The learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi dismissed the application as barred by time. There was an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. The respondent failed to do so. Hence this appeal to this Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special Leave granted.
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1988_89.txt
He was allotted a plot No. The Company was allotted an industrial plot. Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment dated 29.8.2001 at IMT, Manesar. m. size plot in IMT, Manesar. Physical possession of the plot was offered on 21.5.02. The Allotment Committee of the Corporation having found the respondent to be eligible for allotment, allotted plot No. Precision Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment RLA dated 13.3.02 at IMT, Manesar. Physical possession of the plot was taken over on 28.2.2003. Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot at Manesar, Gurgaon by the Appellant Corporation. Vide its letter dated 3.5.01 the appellant offered the respondent the physical possession of the plot. On 18.11.2003, the respondent took physical possession of the plot. 2343 of 2007 HSIDC v. RMDK Projects Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment RLA dated 23.1.01 at IMT, Manesar. Polysteel Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot in Industrial Estate IMT, Manesar, by the Appellant Corporation. 16708 of 2006 HSIDC v. M s. Dulari Exports Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its allotment letter dated 14.6.2000 at IMT, Manesar. 16711 of 2006 HSIDC v. Gopal Chand Kapoor Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment dated 26.6.2000 at IMT, Manesar. 2702 of 2007 HSIDC v. At Home India P. Ltd. Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment RLA dated 24.5.04 at IMT, Manesar. On 19.12.01, the appellant issued a letter thereby offering the respondent physical possession of the plot. Allegedly, the respondent by its letter dated 4.2.04 requested the appellant to hand over the possession of the plot. On 12.7.05, the appellant issued a letter to the respondent intimating the withdrawal of the possession of the plot. A proceeding for resumption was initiated and by an order dated 1.06.2004, the said plot was resumed. 2891 of 2007 HSIDC v. Trikuta Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment RLA dated 30.6.99 at Industrial Estate, EPIP, Kundli. 2331 of 2007 HSIDC v. Matesh Kumar Katyal Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment RLA dated 9.4.01 at Kundli Industrial Estate. On being unsatisfied by the reply of the respondent vide its letter dated 15.2.05 to the show cause numberice, the appellant passed an order of resumption of the plot on 7.7.05. Allegedly, on 19.8.04, the respondent met the appellant for the change of plot who were then informed that the plot companyld number be changed. An additional facility was granted to the industrial undertakings for allotment of residential plots for their directors. However, before resumption, an opportunity was given to the respondent to retain the plot at the current price of Rs. Vide its letter dated 18.1.05 the appellant passed an order of resumption of the plot against the respondent and refunded his cheque after making the necessary deductions. Indisputably, the appellant offered the respondent possession of the plot and asked to companymence companystruction by its letters dated 19.12.2001, 9.8.2002 and 11.11.2003. On 23.8.04, the respondent remitted 15 of the companyt of the plot. 6,00,000/ towards 15 of the total price of the plot. On the other hand, on 24.2.03, the appellant issued a numberice to the respondent to show cause why the plot should number be resumed on account of its failure to companyply with the terms and companyditions of the allotment letter. On 17.1.2005, the appellant issued a show cause numberice to the respondent for delay in taking the physical possession of the plot and for number commencement of companystruction. Thereafter by its letter dated 15.2.05, the respondent gave an undertaking to the appellant to companymence companystruction immediately, if it delivered the possession of the plot. On 27.6.2005, the objections were dismissed by the appellant on the ground that the said plot had become liable for resumption. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP C No. A prayer was made to change the plot which was accepted by the appellant Corporation. 17426 of 2006 HSIDC v. Prateek Industries Respondent applied for and was allotted an industrial plot vide its Regular Letter of Allotment dated 22.10.1998 at Growth Centre Investate Bawal, District Rewari. The respondents in their rejoinder averred Upon cancellation of the allotment of plot in question, the said plot was included in the list of plots available for allotment and pursuant to invitation of applications for allotment of plots by way of advertisement in Newspapers, a draw of lots was held on 1.6.2004, wherein 215 residential plots including the plot in question were further allotted and the plot in question stands allotted to Shri Suresh Chand Jain s o Shri Hussan Lal Jain, resident of E 12, Bahubali Enclave, Near Geetanjli Apartments, Karkardooma, New Delhi. After giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the respondent, the said plot was resumed on 7.7.05. On 18.1.00, on a request made by the respondent, the allotment of the said plot was changed due to a change in the companystitution of the respondents companypany. They were, however, number satisfied with the said allotment and made another representation for change of plot. The allotment of the said plot was cancelled on the premise that payment has number been made in terms of Clauses 4 and 5 of the offer of allotment dated 18.07.2003. m. wherefor a letter of allotment was issued on 10.01.2001. On the failure of the respondent to satisfy the companycerned authority with regard to the delay in companymencement of the companystruction, the plot was ordered to be resumed vide letter dated 28.2.05. Subsequently, the appellant by its letter dated 14.5.03, asked the respondent to attend its office to take over the possession of the plot. Due to unsatisfactory reply of the respondent by his letter dated 14.12.04, the appellant resumed the plot by its order dated 18.2.05. The High Court while allowing the petition quashed the resumption order and directed the respondent to companyplete the companystruction of the industrial building within a period of six months from the date of offer of the possession of the plot. Allegedly, a dispute arose as regards handing over of the actual possession of the said plot. 8,91,000/ of the above price of the plot can be paid in lumpsum without interest within 60 days from the date of issue of the allotment letter or in half yearly installments. The Corporation was asked to withdraw the said numberice of resumption. Respondent vide its letter dated 24.2.03 requested the appellant for handing over the possession. Being dissatisfied by the reply so rendered by the respondent, the appellant gave the respondent an opportunity of retaining the plot by allowing him to companyvey his acceptance to buy the plot at the current price of Rs. A show cause numberice for resumption of the plot, however, was issued on or about 21.9.2004 alleging that companystruction work had number been started within a period of one and a half year of the handing over of the possession and some amount was outstanding. On receipt of the entire payment, the actual physical possession of the plot in question shall be handed over to the petitioner. It applied for allotment of 1000 sq. On 1.1.04, a show cause numberice was issued to the Respondent as to why the said plot should number be resumed in view of number commencement of companystruction and number payment of the 4th and 5th installments. After being given a personal opportunity of hearing on 18.6.03, the appellant vide its letter dated 27.8.03 resumed the plot and requested the respondent to companylect the cheque of the amount deposited by him. On 29.10.03, a show cause numberice was issued to the respondent for failure to companymence companystruction. Allegedly, the respondent made various requests to the appellant for delivering the physical possession of the plot after making necessary developments. It by a letter dated 30.11.2004 categorically stated We companyld number start the companystruction on the above mentioned plot, due to some financial companystraints. Appellant took a stand that the letter of allotment elapsed automatically. 3,96,000/ being 10 per cent of the total companyt of the said plot. Vide its letter dated 12.1.05, the appellant cancelled the allotment and refunded the amount paid by the respondent on the ground that he had failed to companyply with clause 3 of the Allotment letter providing for the payment and thus the RLA had lapsed automatically. The interim order was passed directing the appellant to re allot the plot, however the same was number allotted. By an order dated 7.3.2005, an order of resumption was issued. 10,69,200/ of the tentative price of the plot can be paid in lumpsum without interest within 60 days from the date of issue of the allotment letter or in six 6 half yearly installments. Vide its letter dated 31.1.05 the respondent informed the appellant that due to loss in its business, they were unable to companytinue industrial activity and had decided to surrender the plot. The High Court was of the opinion that although respondent was required to deposit 15 of the price of plot on or before 22.7.2004, but by clause 3 of the Letter of Allotment, the said amount companyld be deposited by him within 60 days. Allegedly, an authorization letter dated 10.2.04 was issued to the respondent for taking over the physical possession. The petitioner shall, however, remain bound by all the terms and companyditions of the letter of allotment. Aggrieved by the order of resumption, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Industries on 9.2.04. On 12.4.02, a final Agreement was entered into between the parties incorporating the terms and companyditions of the allotment letter. On 11.04.01, a final agreement was entered into between the parties incorporating the terms and companyditions of the allotment letter. Allegedly, the petitioner requested the appellant vide its letters dated 15.6.04 and 05.7.04 to change the site of the plot on the ground that the area where it was so situated was number developed. Thereafter, on 7.10.2004, a show cause numberice was issued to the respondent as to why an order of resumption should number be passed against him. Steps for companystruction had been intimated to the Corporation together with a letter for extension of time. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said policy decision to grant additional benefit, the respondents were allotted residential plot No. Allegedly, the order of resumption was passed against the respondent without a personal hearing. It, however, was number satisfied with the said allotment. After hearing the respondent in person, the appellant passed an order of resumption. Respondent vide its letter dated 7.11.2003, requested for six months extension. Vide its letter dated 7.11.01, the respondent sought extension of time to start companystruction and companymercial production. Respondent No. 269, Sector 7, Manesar to the petitioner as per original terms of allotment. 1,78,200/ in order to make the 25 price of the said plot within 30 days upto 17.08.09 from the date of issue of this letter. The resumption order was challenged before the Commissioner of Industries, who, vide its order dated 13.1.2006, dismissed the same. On 14.8.2000, a Regular Letter of Allotment was issued to the respondent which inter alia required it to companymence companystruction of the building within a period of one year and companymercial production within a period of three years from the date of offer of possession. By an order dated 3.03.2005, however, the plot was said to have been resumed inter alia on the premise that Respondent number 1 had violated Clause 4 of the said Agreement. Appellant issued two show cause numberices to the respondent dated 14.8.00 and 26.2.01 for its failure to companymence companystruction. In exercise of its functions, it also allots industrial plots to entrepreneurs for setting up their industries on numberprofit numberloss basis. Vide its letter dated 28.8.06, the appellant informed the respondent that the companymissioner had dismissed his appeal by an order dated 1.8.06 on the ground that it was devoid of any merit. Indisputably, again the permission for companystruction of the buildings was to be granted only by the Corporation. On 5.12.06, the High Court set aside the order of resumption. On 16.7.02, the appellant issued a show cause numberice to the respondent for its failure to take possession and set up the industrial unit. Vide its letter dated 21.3.05 the appellant informed the respondent that his request had been rejected and refunded the amount so paid. On 2.11.04, a show cause numberice was issued to the respondent on account of its failure to companymence companystruction and default in making the payment of the 4th and 5th installments. Respondent, however, was asked to take physical possession of the land and also to apply for extension for the purpose of starting companystruction by the Estate Manager of the appellant Corporation by a letter dated 24.4.2003. Being aggrieved by the order of resumption and the order dismissing the appeal, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. Indisputably, Respondent No. As per the terms of the new Agreement, the respondent was to companymence companystruction within a period of six months. Respondent had already appointed an architect for companystruction of the building. On 24.12.03, the appellant issued a show cause numberice to the respondent for failure to companymence companystruction as well as companymercial production within the stipulated time. Respondent on grounds of illness of his mother and other financial companystraints requested for an extension to companymence companystruction. On 4.11.01, physical possession was offered to the respondent, which was number taken. Being aggrieved by the order of resumption and the order dismissing the appeal, on 25.6.06, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. Being aggrieved by the order of resumption and the order dismissing the appeal, on 9.10.06, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. On 22.1.03, a show cause numberice was issued by the appellant to the respondent to explain why a resumption order should number be passed for number erection of the building within the stipulated time. The said appeal was rejected by the Commissioner on the ground that the order of resumption was number final. 177 in Sector 6, IMT, Manesar measuring 1012.50 sq. By an order dated 7.8.06, the High Court set aside the order of resumption. Feeling aggrieved by the order of resumption and the order dismissing the appeal, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. By its order dated 25.8.06, the High Court set aside the Resumption order. The High Court by its order dated 5.12.06 while allowing the Writ Petition, quashed the letter dated 12.1.05 and the appellate order on the premise that the respondent had always showed his eagerness to initiate companystruction and the delay in making the payment had been on account of a genuine belief by the respondent that the request for an alternative plot was pending before the appellant. On 8.1.03, a show cause numberice was issued by the appellant to the respondent regarding the failure to set up the industrial unit. 331 in Sector 1, Manesar. On 22.7.04, the RLA lapsed. The Corporation, however, by a letter dated 13.07.2004 asked the firm as to what steps had been taken by it for companystructions of the plot in question with documentary proof as also need to apply for extension on the premise that offer of possession was issued on 1.01.2002 and the companystruction activity, thus, was required to be started within one year therefrom and production of the Unit should have been started from the date of offer of possession. However, the respondent failed to take over the possession. The High Court directed Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, as numbericed in the above portion of the judgment, we allow the present petition and restore the allotment of plot No. Vide its letter dated 19.4.06, the appellant informed the respondent that the companymissioner had dismissed his appeal by an order dated 13.1.06 on the ground that it was devoid of any merit. The High Court by its order dated 28.7.2006, allowed the said Writ Petition and quashed the order of resumption. On 21.4.04, the appellant issued a show cause numberice to the respondent directing him to start companymence companystruction within a period of two years and to implement the project on or before 21.5.05. This clears our account as mentioned in your letter. The High Court, by its judgment and final order dated 27.11.06, set aside the order of resumption. The High Court, by its judgment and final order dated 12.12.06, set aside the order of resumption. However, despite the same, letters were written by the appellant companymunicating the respondent in respect of certain errors in the building plans as would appear from the letters dated 8.4.2005 and 10.11.2005. An Agreement companytaining the terms and companyditions of the allotment was executed between the two parties on 12.9.2000. Respondents companytend that though a request was made to hand over possession by its letter dated 2.8.02 however, the same was number granted. A Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment while setting aside the order of resumption as also the order of the appellate authority dated 27.05.2005, directed The plot in question stands restored back to the petitioner. 18011 of 2006 HSIDC v. G.M. Allegedly, numberconstruction was started by the respondent. The respondent intimated the appellant that the companystruction would start immediately and requested for a three year extension period. Pursuant thereto physical possession was said to have been handed over on 6.5.2003. 16541 of 2006 HSIDC v. S.R. An assurance was given to start companystruction on clearance of building plan and ownership status. 25 of the companystruction had been companypleted and despite the same the land was said to have been resumed without issuing any show cause numberice although the respondent had already deposited the said sum. The Corporation itself granted permission only on 20.03.2004 whereafter the companystruction started. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner. On 25.2.06, the respondent requested for a personal hearing. Despite being handed the possession on 17.6.03, numberconstruction was companymenced by the respondent. Two show cause numberices dated 1.3.05 and 19.5.05 were issued by the appellant to the respondent. The respondent filed a Writ Petition. Pursuant to the show cause numberice dated 2.11.2004, a sum of Rs. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent on 5.08.05 preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Industries. Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondent on 28.9.03 preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Industries. The High Court while dismissing the Writ Petition on the ground that an appeal was pending before an appropriate authority, however allowed the respondent to file its objections against the order of resumption. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Industries which by its order dated 13.1.06, dismissed the appeal. The first installment will fall due after the expiry of six months of the date of issue of this letter. By a letter dated 23.8.2004, respondent informed the companycerned authority that the request of clearance of ownership status was being pursued with the authorities of the appellant. Indisputably, on 24.12.01, the appellant issued a receipt for acceptance of three demand drafts to the respondent towards payment of the installments. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent on 14.1.05 filed an appeal before the Financial Commissioner Industries. Thereafter, a formal Agreement was entered into between the parties incorporating the terms and companyditions of the RLA. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent on 11.11.1999 filed an appeal before the Financial Commissioner Industries. In case of failure to deposit the said amount within the above specified period, the allotment shall be cancelled and the 10 earnest money deposited alongwith the application shall stand forfeited to the HSIDC against which you shall have numberclaim for damage. On the premise that respondent has number companyplied with the terms and companyditions of the agreement, a numberice was issued on 17.4.2003. Aggrieved by the order of the companymissioner, on 4.9.06, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. Despite the same, as numberaction was taken, a legal numberice was issued by the Respondent No. Each installment would be recoverable together with the interest on the balance price at 15 interest on the remaining amount the interest shall, however, accrue from the date of offer of possession. The first installment will fall due after the expiry 6 six months of the date of issue of this letter. On or about 21.9.2004, the appellant deposited an amount of Rs. The bank draft sent by the respondent for an amount of Rs. The same having number being accepted by the respondent, the objections were rejected by the appellant and the amount was refunded as per the terms of the Agreement. Allegedly, the respondent made several requests by its various letters dated 26.2.03, 07.5.03, 18.5.03, 20.6.03 and 29.8.03 for extension of time which was purportedly rejected or number companysidered by the appellant. 1 herein filed an application for companystruction of the building on 19.12.2003. On 26.2.04, the respondent filed its objections. On 19.1.05, the respondent requested the appellant to reconsider his case. Subsequently, two more show cause numberices dated 13.10.03 and 8.12.03 were issued. Aggrieved by the two orders, the respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court. Respondents in their show cause, brought the aforementioned fact to the numberice of the companycerned authority of the appelalnt. 1 through its lawyer dated 1.03.2005 inter alia drawing its attention to Actual physical possession had been handed over on 9.12.2003 and the building plans were approved by the Corporation on or about 20.03.2004. The payment shall be made by the Bank Draft payable to the HSIDC, Panchkula and drawn on any scheduled bank at Panchkula. Since the petitioner was required to pay the entire amount, even by way of instalments upto January 16, 2007, therefore, the petitioner is directed to make the total payment of the entire amount towards the companyt of the plot in question within a period of three months from the date a certified companyy of this order is received. Indisputably, it deposited a sum of Rs. In response thereto, the respondent was asked to clear the outstanding dues in regard to the second installment. Feeling aggrieved by the order, the respondent herein filed a Writ petition before the High Court. The amount refunded by the Corporation to the petitioner shall be repaid to the Corporation within a period of two weeks from the date a certified companyy of this order is received. Respondent then filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The amount of Rs. Aggrieved by the order and during the pendency of the appeal before the companymissioner, the respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court on 18.7.2005. Respondents were number only aware of the terms of companytract, they acted thereupon and as such they are estopped and precluded from companytending that the date of actual handing over of physical possession would be the relevant date. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, a writ petition was filed. It was requested that the excess period for starting companystruction may be waived by imposing some penalty. From an internal companymunication dated 21.7.2004, however, it appears that building plans were number processed on the premise that ownership clearance had number companye from the Corporation. The respondent Corporation would be at liberty to inform the petitioner through a written companymunication, if there are still any outstanding dues against the petitioner firm. He submitted his building plan on 10.7.2004. Respondent filed a further reply on 22.12.2004. Respondent, thereafter applied for grant of water companynection on 1.7.2004. He was, however, required to deposit the said amount by 22.7.2004 which was extendable by another 30 days on interest at 11 per annum after 22.7.2004, but he failed to do so. Building plans were re submitted by the respondent on 14.12.2005 whereto again some defects were pointed out therein. At the time of handing over of possession, the area of the land, measurement thereof as also the boundaries were delineated. Subsequently, on 20.1.00, a supplementary agreement was entered into between the parties. Each installments would be recoverable together with interest 15 interest per annum on the remaining amount as mentioned in clause No. You are requested to remit Rs. The Town Planner of the appellant asked the Senior Manager of the Corporation to ascertain ownership status before the building plans companyld be cleared. In the meantime, the appellant preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Commissioner by an Order dated 16.2.2006. Respondents companytend that the entire 1st installment along with interest was duly paid within the stipulated time except for delay of 22 days. Thereafter, a final Agreement was entered into between the parties on 24.9.01. 6,83,349/ towards the refundable amount as also the demand draft for the said sum of Rs. 2200/ per sq. 3,96,000/ was directed to be refunded. The said appeal was dismissed by the companymissioner on the basis that it was devoid of any merit. The writ petition was filed in July, 2005. A demand draft of Rs. The terms and companyditions provided for a schedule of payment, the relevant clauses whereof read as under The balance amount of Rs. On receipt of the aforesaid companymunication, the petitioner firm shall be required to clear all the aforesaid outstanding dues also, within a further period of two weeks thereof. The said clause was also incorporated in an Agreement dated 8.9.00 entered into between the two parties. The SLP preferred thereagainst has been dismissed. Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High Court which was disposed of on 8.08.2006 directing the allottee to appear before the Appellate Authority. Alleging that the ownership is in dispute, the plan was number sanctioned. 9,08,461/ was number accepted and a cheque for a sum of Rs. On 8.5.2006, the High Court without going into the merits of the case, allowed the Writ Petition. 9,08,461/ had been remitted. Regarding the balance amount, enclosed please find Demand Draft No. However, the said subsequent allottee was number impleaded as a party. Thereafter, the appellate authority dismissed the said appeal. On 23.11.2004, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition directing the appellant to companysider and dispose off the objections. Rs. In the Writ Petition inter alia a companytention was raised that the appellant had regularized the delay by extending the period of companystruction even for a period of four years in favour of the parties named therein which was number denied or disputed. 9,08,461/ were returned. Copy of the approval of the building plan is attached herewith for your reference. Admittedly, an appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed. 1 aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith filed a writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. It thus requested for a refund. 1 intimated about the change of the companystitution of its firm. Upon the new Industrial Infrastructure Development Policy companying into force, the appellant extended the time for implementation of the project to three years i.e. The balance 75 amount i.e. 000433 for Rs. It was companypleted in May, 2005. 14,30,940/ had already been deposited. Hence, the present petition is liable to be dismissed on account of this score alone. It was pointed out that the sum of Rs. No opportunity of personal hearing was granted. A Writ Petition was filed which by reason of the impugned judgment has been allowed. The High Court accepted that there had been a delay on the part of the appellant. 269 in Sector 7 on or about 9.7.2004. 908461/ drawn on HDFC Bank. meter. B. SINHA, J Leave granted. It was previously known as M s. Dysa International Firm . 6,00,000/ was also returned. 1 is a partnership firm. The High Court companyld number have re written the companytract. 4530 of 2005. up to 29.6.02. Ltd. Company .
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2008_816.txt
The companypany acquired a large block of shares in the managing agency companypany. M s. Greaves Cotton Co. Ltd. was companyverted into a public companypany. M s. Greaves Cotton Co. released their managing agency rights in favour of the companypany on receiving Rs. 18 lakhs to the companypany as companypensation. On February 28, 1951, the Directors of the managed companypany appointed a sub committee to enquire into the question whether the managing agency of the companypany should be terminated leaving the management of the managed companypany to the Board of DirectOrs. 18 lakhs in the total income of the companypany. It was functioning as the managing agents of 27 companypanies including M s. Greaves Cotton Co. Ltd. M s. Greaves Cotton Co. Ltd., was incorporated as a private companypany in about 1922 and its managing agents was the firm styled Messrs Greaves Cotton Co. The sub committee reported on March 16, 1951 that the managing agency of the companypany should be terminated. On March 17, 1951 the Board of Directors of the managed companypany approved the recommendations. It held that the transactions whereby the managing agency of the companypany was terminated were genuine and real business transactions. On May 8, 1950, the managed companypany viz. On appeal by the companypany the Appellate Assistant Commissioner differed from the view taken by the Income tax Officer and held that the amount in question represented companypensation received by the companypany for the termination of its managing agency. An extraordinary General Meeting of the shareholders of the managed companypany approved the resolution of the Board of Directors on March 31, 1951. Hence a fresh agreement was entered into between the companypany and the managed companyripany, on May 10, 1950, under which the companypany was entitled to an office allowance of Rs. The assessee is a private limited Company which will herein after be referred to as the companypany. He took the view that the payment of 18 lakhs by the managed companypany was an advance remuneration and number a companypensation on account of loss of employment. That resolution was companymunicated to the companypany on April 3, 1951 and the latter accepted it on April 10, 1951. The new managing agency agreement was to subsist for a period of 20 years with effect from May 8, 1950. In the assessment for the assessment year 1952 53, the Income tax Officer included a sum of Rs. Thereafter the companypany was number entitled to any company mission on sales etc., in view of the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 as amended in 1939. 27.34,325/ . The Income tax Officer took the matter in appeal to the tribunal. The companycerned assessment year is 1952 53 and the relevant accounting year is the year ended on 31st March, 1952. From the statement of the case submitted by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal A Bench, Calcutta to the High Court of Calcutta under Section 66 2 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 in short the Act , the following facts are available. That meeting also recommended a payment of Rs. 5,000 per month and a companymission of 10 per cent, of the net profits. S. Hegde, J. This is an assesses appeal by certificate.
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1971_628.txt
PW 1 heard the cries of her deceased daughter, Nageswari from the backyard. Seelam Apparao, PW 7 also deposed that the police had recorded the statement of injured Nageswari in his presence which was attested by him. They poured water on Nageswari and extinguished the fire. Raman PW 16 came to the place of occurrence and recorded the statement Ext P 5 of injured Nageswari. Seelam Venkateswari, PW 2 is the elder sister of the deceased. Dr. Ramalingeswara Rao, PW 13 is also said to have recorded the state0ment of Nageswari which was marked as Ext. Seelam Narasayamma, PW 1 W o Venkateshwarlu, PW 9, the mother of the deceased girl sent Rs. P 5 according to the narration of facts as stated by the injured girl Nageswari. P 5 which was attested by Seelam Apparao, PW 7 and Palika Apparao, PW 8 who were present there at the time of recording the statement Ext. Raman, PW 16 who recorded the dying declaration deposed that he recorded Ext. The injured Nageswari died in the hospital next day in the morning. P 5 was recorded by the Head Constable, PW 16. P 5 of injured Nageswari and obtained her thumb impression on the same which was attested by the witnesses present there. As Nageswari was number in a position to sign due to bum injuries the Head Constable, PW 16 obtained her thumb impression on Ext. As discussed earlier Pullarao, PW 4, Seelam Apparao, PW 7, Palika Apparao, PW 8 and the father of the girl Seelam Venkateswarlu, PW 9 who had also returned home in the mean while have all deposed the same way. P 5 as was stated by the injured girl Nageswari which was read over to her and thereafter obtained her thumb impression. He admitted that injured Nageswari was lying on a company and talking in a low voice. The Head Constable, PW 16 then sent the injured Nageswari to the Government Hospital Rajahmundry for treatment and register ing the crime against the appellant. P. 5 recorded by the Head Constable, PW 16. He also examined Seelam Narasayamma, PW 1 Venkateswari, PW 2 and Srinivasarao, PW 3 as well as PWs 4 to 9 under Section 161, Cr. 150/ even without waiting the return of the husband of Seelam Narasayamma, PW 1. At that point of time the deceased Nageswari was stitching fall to a saree sitting in the backyard of the tenanted house. Dr. K. Ramalingeswara Rao, PW 13 admitted the injured Nageswari in the hospital and gave the treatment for her burn injuries. Similar is the statement of Balika Apparao, PW 8 who had also attested the statement of the de ceased recorded by the Head Constable, PW 16. She stated that soon after the occurrence she went to the police station and informed about the incident and immediately thereafter police came to the house and recorded the statement of the deceased Nageswari in the presence of family members and others and that the injured Nageswari had put her thumb impression on her statement recorded by the police. The prosecution case was that the deceased girl Seelam Nageswari aged about 16 years was residing with her parents in the eastern portion of the house situated in Kondawari Lane belonging to Smt. On hearing her cries, PW 1, Seelam Narasayamma , PW 2 Venkateswari, another daughter elder to the deceased as well as her son Srinivasarao, PW 3 rushed to the backyard through eastern lane which is said to be more companyvenient to reach to the backyard and found the deceased in flames. Sastry, Nageswari died of circulatory failure and shock due to burns. Venkateshwarlu PW 2 the elder sister of the deceased and her brother Srinivasarao, PW 3 went to the Police Station to report the incident. He stated that he had recorded the statement Ext. Raman, PW 16 police Head Constable deposed that he was present in the police station when Venkateswari, PW 2 came on 4.2.1984 at about 11.30 PM and informed about the incident. None of these witnesses were cross examined on behalf of the appellant on the allegations that the injured Nageswari was tutored at any point of time by any one before her statement Ext. In the aftemoon when Venkateswarlu, PW 9, the husband of PW 1 came home he was informed that the land lady had number accepted Rs. He stated that when he went to the house of PW 1 and 9 he found that PW 1 was abusing his wife and mother in law and the deceased was in flames and, therefore he returned back to his house. It was submitted that the dying declaration Ext. He stated that he had learnt that Nageswari had set fire to herself but in order to save themselves from the penal companysequences for the offence of attempt to companymit suicide by the deceased and with a view to companyceal the family scandal PW 1 to 3 as well as PW 7 to 9 after mutual deliberations implicated the appellant falsely. 150/ and both of them are said to have abused the family members of PW 1, Seelam Narasayamma who requested them number to abuse and wait till the return of her husband to the house as she was number having the money to pay. K. Pullarao, PW 4 and Palika Apparao, PW 8 are independent witnesses and PW 4 to some extent had become hostile and, therefore, it companyld number be expected that in case the deceased was tutored by the family members or the close relatives these persons would number have raised their voice and protested the same. Head Constable, G.V. Saying so the appellant went to the backyard of the house through the eastern lane while the land lady and her daughter inlaw companytinued to abuse PW 1 and her family members standing in front of the house. She requested them to wait till the arrival of her husband and when they were so talking, her daughter Nageswari was sitting in the backyard The accused appellant also came there abusing in loud voice and demanded immediate payment of rent at the rate of Rs. The same day at about 8.00 PM the land lady Guramma and her daughter Sitalakshmi, the wife of the accused appellant came to the house of PW 1 and demanded the rent at the rate of Rs. He then proceeded to the place of occurrence and recorded the statement Ext. P 5 said to have been recorded by the Head Constable, PW 16 is neither recorded by a doctor number any Magistrate was requisitioned to record the same number it is in the question answer form. K. Pullarao, PW 4 is also a tenant of the same land lady in the eastern portion of the same house who though turned hostile yet admitted that the police had recorded the statement of the deceased girl to the effect that the appellant had poured kerosene on her and lit her clothes. 150/ . On receiving the First Information Report the Assistant Sub Inspector, M.Koteswararao, PW 17 also reached the hospital where he recorded the Statement Ext. The said portion of the house was obtained by the parents of the deceased girl on a monthly rent of Rs. 120/ towards the house rent for the month of January, 1984 through her son Srinivasarao, PW 3 to the land lady , the mother in law of the appellant but she declined to receive the same saying that the rent was enhanced to Rs. He stated that after recording the statement it was read over to the injured girl who had affixed her thumb impression on the same. He took plea that he had learnt that the deceased had become pregnant and her parents, PW1 and PW 9 managed her abortion secretly and when her mother in law learnt about it she asked them to vacate the portion of the house occupied by them as a result of which there was an altercation between his mother in law and the deceased regarding the bad character of the deceased. P 16 of the injured Nageswarl under Section 161 of the Cr. They questioned Nageswari who was companyscious as to what had happened, to which she stated that the appellant came there abusing and when he was about to remove the articles to throw them away, she obstructed him to do so and then the appellant went into the kitchen, brought a kerosene tin, and poured it on her body and set fire to her with a match stick. P 5 recorded by the Head Constable, PW 16 and on that basis recorded the finding that there was sufficient reliable evidence establishing the guilt of the accused appellant, and, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal and companyvicted the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. Sastry, PW 15, the Deputy Civil Surgeon performed autopsy over the dead body of Nageswasri and as per his post mortem report, Ext. Learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the alleged dying declaration Ext. On receiving the information, Head Constable, G.V. However, the High Court on analysing the entire prosecution evidence and on overall companysideration of the facts of the case accepted the evidence on record of PW 1 to 9 as well as the declaration, Ext. 150/ and, therefore, Rs. 150/ per month. Satnibabu, PW 18, the Sub Inspector held inquest over the dead body and sent the dead body for postmortem examination. P 5 we find that the reasons given by the High Court in ac cepting the evidence with regard to the dying declaration Ext. He Submitted that in the dying declaration there is numbermention that the deceased had obstructed the appellant from throwing the articles and removing the tiles of the house before she was set on fire and the dying declaration is against the natural companyduct in as much as the deceased would have escaped by running away when kerosene was poured on her and before the match stick was lit to set fire on her. P 5 was number worthy of reliance as the same was made after deliberations and tutoring the deceased. She further stated that on the same night the land lady Guramma and her daughter in law Sitalakshmi, the wife of the appellant came to her, abused her and demanded Rs. Learned companynsel for the appellant assailed the findings of the High Court with regard to the dying declaration Ext. Mathineni Guramma, the mother in law of the accused appellant. 120/ as rent for January, 1984 and was demanding enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. When her husband came home in the afternoon she informed him that the land lady was demanding Rs. 120/ about four months prior to the occurrence and the land lady was demanding higher rent at the rate of Rs. After giving a serious companysideration to the submissions made above and on a close analysis of the evidence on record companycerning the dying declaration Ext. It was urged by him that in fact the deceased was an unmarried girl but became pregnant and her parents PW1 and 9 arranged her abortion secretly which became known to the mother in law of the appellant and, therefore, she asked them to vacate the portion for which there was an exchange of hot words between them by reason of which the deceased made a bid to end her life by companymitting suicide by setting fire to herself to avoid the family scandal and to save themselves from penal companysequences, the family members of the deceased foisted the blame falsely on the appellant after due deliberations. G.V. P 16 the doctor found 90 per cent bum injuries all over the body. After evaluation of the entire prosecution evidence the learned Trial Judge rejected all the dying declarations made by the deceased and also rejected the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution and recorded the finding that the appellant was innocent and, therefore, passed the order of acquittal. P 5 are quite reasonable and weighty as companypared to the companyclusions recorded by the learned Trial Judge which is totally against the weight of the evidence. In the mean while the appellant also arrived there and started showering abuses in raised voice and demanded the immediate payment of rent at Rs. The appellant also threatened to remove their household articles and threw them in the Bazar and remove the tiles of the portion of the house occupied by him. 324/1985 setting aside the order of acquittal of the appellant dated 31.10.84 for an offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C., recorded by the Session Judge, East Godawari Division at Rajahmundry in Session Case No. It is said that in the morning of 4.2.1984 Smt. At the trial the appellant pleaded to be innocent and stated that he was falsely implicated. In the mean while the appellant rushed back and pushing them aside and went away. 30/ more. There is numberhing in their statements which may discredit their testimony. Dr. B.N. In the opinion of doctor B.N. P.C. 50/1984. 30/ more should be paid. This Criminal Appeal under Section 2 A of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970 has been directed against the reversing judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh passed in Criminal Appeal No. and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment against which this appeal has been preferred.
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1995_60.txt
It appears that the Charity Commissioner learnt about certain companystructions having been made by the respondent trustee without permission from him. 3 was addressed from his office to the respondent the material part of which may be reproduced An information is received of the Charity Commissioner that opposite the temple near the New Narnarayan building the blocks are being companystructed in which shops are companystructed on the ground floor of that building. The respondent is one of the trustees of a trust known as Shri Swami Narayan Mandir at Ahmedabad which is registered as a public trust in the office of the Charity Commissioner. According to him 8 shops had been companystructed adjoining the Narnarayan building opposite the Swammarayan temple, the estimated companyt of which was more than Rs. 98A shops were being built in four blocks. 98A 2 opposite the railway crossing. On May 30, 1962 the Charity Commissioner instituted a companyplaint in the companyrt of the City Magistrate at Ahmedabad giving most of these facts and stating inter alia that under the provisions of the Act a trustee who desired to invest trust funds in companystruction of buildings was bound to obtain permission of the Charity Commissioner which had number been done in the present case. A reply was sent by the respondent giving the particulars of the buildings which had been companystructed. As numberreply was received from the respondent reminders were sent to him on April 20, 1962 and May 10, 1962 followed by a telegram dispatched on May 23, 1962. Queries on similar lines were made regarding the companystructions near the respondents bungalow in Girdharnagar. All these necessary information may please be sent before 15th April, 1962. On March 22, 1962 a letter Ext. According to him the respondent had deliberately companymittee a breach of the relevant provisions of the Act and had omitted to companyply with the numberice dated May 22, 1962. Reference was made to the resolutions of the Committee relating to these companystructions together with the ,amount spent on them. 906 of 1963. The Inspector appointed under the Act made a report dated May 4, 1963 giving the result of the enquiry made by him relating to the aforesaid companystructions. The trust is managed under a scheme prepared by the High Court of Bombay. This is an appeal by certificate against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat setting aside an order of a Magistrate by which the respondent was companyvicted of an offence under s. 67 read with s. 37 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act 1950 as adapted and applied to the State of Gujarat , hereinafter referred to as the Act, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. M Nanavati, B. Datta and O.C. The gravamen of the charge was companytained in paragraph 7 according to which the respondent had, without reasonable cause, failed to companyply with the order and the directions issued to him under the provisions of s. 37 of the Act. On plot No. Construction was also being made on another plot No. Mathur, for the respondent. R. Khanna and R.N. The respondent filed an application Ext. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal. 300, in default of payment of which he was to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months. 150 of 1966. Appeal from the judgment and order, dated June 21, 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. Sachthey, for the appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. Appeal No.
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1968_140.txt
This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 11th September 2001 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal CEGAT for short , South Zonal Bench at Chennai in Appeal No.
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2003_59.txt
It is the case of the respondents that on the reopening of the mills, most of the workmen who were working previously in the erstwhile companypany were provided employment. Therefore, the parties companycerned sought for moulding the prayers appropriately and the validity of the settlement arrived at between the workmen and the management as aforesaid was also challenged and it was brought to the numberice of the High Court that several workmen who were already working in the mills after reopening have been kept out of employment. The validity of the lock out was challenged in a writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, the order declaring lock out was withdrawn pursuant to a memorandum of settlement arrived at between the workmen and the management on February 27, 1993. As the mills had been newly set up, the management was number in a position to revise the pay scales on account of certain financial difficulties. On August 5, 1992, a numberice of lock out was issued by the then Manager of the mills on account of certain reasons, with which we are number companycerned in these proceedings. The appellant mills was purchased by the State of West Bengal in the year 1990 in the companyrse of liquidation proceedings initiated pursuant to orders made by the BIFR. The learned Single Judge of the High Court felt that the nature of dispute sought to be resolved partakes the character of an industrial dispute and, therefore, relegated the parties to work out their respective rights in an industrial dispute and disposed of the matter. RAJENDRA BABU, J. This fact was brought to the numberice of the High Court.
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2000_278.txt
The accused had produced his Pakistani passport Ex. It had also held that the appellant was a minor when he visited Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the prosecution was handicapped in producing evidence to show when and how and with what intention the appellant had gone to Pakistan. The above mentioned charge was supported by the statement of Mahmadmiya, P. W. 2, Sub Inspector, Special Emergency Branch, Ahmedabad, showing that the appellant was working in Baroda Central State Transport Workshop when he was arrested as a companysequence of the information that he was a Pakistani national who had companye to India in 1955 on a Pakistani passport. The prosecution had also relied upon an application for a visa made by the accused to the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan on 10th October, 1955, in which he had, inter alia, stated that he had migrated from India to Pakistan in 1950. It companyld only show how and when and on what passport he returned to this companyntry. 19904 dated 6 12 1967 before the date 20th September 1958 and remained in India and thereby you companytravened the previsions of clause 7 iii of Foreigners Order 1948 and thereby companymitted an offence punishab le under Section 14 of Foreigners Act 1946 and within my companynizance. This is an appeal, by special leave, against the acquittal of the appellant, from a charge framed on 21 9 1967 as follows That you on or about the 31st day of March 1967 at about 9.30 p.m. were found in State Transport Corporation Workshop at Naroda in Ahmedabad, and you are a foreigner and you had companye from Pakistan and you had been permitted to stay in India till 20th September, 1958, by Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bombay and did number depart from India before expiring of that permit issued to you by No. It had found it unnecessary to record a finding en the question whether the appellants visit to Pakistan companyld be held to be one made under companypulsion or for a specific purpose so as to companye within the class of those exceptional cases mentioned in Kulathil Mammu. v. The State of Kerala 1 in which a migration would number take place even if the wider test of the term migration were adopted. S. Qureshi, Vimal Dave and Kailash Mehta for the respondent. 11 dated 8th September, 1955. 295 of 1966. H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant. 164 of 1970. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 3rd 4th December, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J.
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1973_353.txt
m. In yet another award, in LAC No.417 of 1981, made on the same day, companypensation was awarded for another plot at the rate of Rs.10 per sq. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded companypensation for the acquired lands at rates ranging from Rs.0.75 to Rs.2.50 per sq.m. m. However in another award made in LAC No.406 of 1981 on 14th October, 1985, companypensation was allowed for a different plot at Rs.9 per sq. for different plots companyprising the land under acquisition. A reference was sought and made to the learned District Judge, LAC No.420 of 1931, which was disposed of on 24th June, 1985 whereby the rate for determination of companypensation was revised to Rs.5 per sq. m. Thereafter, the appellant in Civil Appeal arising from S.L.P.No.24435 of 1995, applied, on 13th May, 1987, under Section 28 A of the Act, for redetermination of companypensation for his plot of land. m. In appeal, the High Court, by its judgment dated 24th February, 1987, reduced the rate to Rs.5/ per sq. This award was made on 2nd August, 1972. By a numberification issued under Section 4 of the Act, dated 3rd October, 1969, and gazetted on the same day, a certain parcel of land at Cavelossim village, Salcete Taluka in the State of Goa was proposed to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, for companystruction of an air to ground range for the Indian Navy. So also, the appellant Civil Appeal arising from S.L.P.No.24584 of 1995 made a similar application under Section 28 A of the Act on 28th April, 1987. The possession of the land was taken by the Government on 2nd April, 1970. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made and published in the gazette on 10th June, 1971. Both these applications were dismissed by the Deputy Collector on 3rd september, 1988 as time barred, having been preferred after the expiry of the period of three months prescribed by the status. Feeling aggrieved, both the appellants questioned the decision by filling separate writ petitions on 11th February 1989. The factual matrix in which the question has to be answered may number be briefly numbericed. Hence these appeals by special leave. Special leave granted.
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1996_1572.txt
The State of Gujarat initiated acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act for companystruction of a school in the land in question under the Surat Municipal Corporation. On the other hand, it is the stand of the State Government that the land is required for establishing a primary school by the Surat Municipal Corporation. 2190/P, Ward No.4 of Surat City. There are vacant open lands adjoining to the land in question. Within a radius of 1 km., number of schools are available particularly being run by the Surat Municipal Corporation. The appellants objected to the said acquisition on the ground that this is the only land for them for carrying on the business of washermen and they are using this land for the purpose of their livelihood. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior companynsel for the appellants and Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned senior companynsel for the Surat Municipal Corporation and Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned companynsel for the State of Gujarat. Brief facts According to the appellants, they are owners of the land in question measuring 848.66 sq.m., Nandh No. Award under Section 11A has been passed within the statutory period. They fully companyplied with the statutory numberices and other requirements. Since the establishment of school is for a public purpose and in view of companypliance of all the statutory formalities, there is numbermerit in the appeal and prayed for dismissal of the same. While acquiring the land, the respondents have number followed the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6 and 11A of the Act. 5663 of 1990 with Civil Application No. The appellants did number avail the opportunity of participating in the 5A enquiry by filing objections. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 12.01.2009 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. The declaration made under Section 6 of the Act is within time. Sathasivam, J. 3458 of 2006 whereby the High Court dismissed the petition preferred by the appellants herein. Leave granted.
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2010_1083.txt
The Balmiki Caste is one of the castes declared to be a Scheduled Caste under the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order, 1950. One Jai Ram Sarup, a member of the Chamar caste, which is one of the Scheduled Castes, was also a candidate for the seat, and he raised the objection that the appellant was number a Balmiki by caste, and that he was therefore number qualified to stand for election to the reserved Constituency. On 5 11 1951 the appellant signed two numberination papers each companytaining the following declaration I hereby declare that I am a member of the Balmiki Caste which has been declared to be a Scheduled Caste in the State of Punjab. The proviso to section 33 3 of the Representation of the People Act XLIII of 1951 , omitting what is number material, enacts that in a companystituency where any seat is reserved for the Scheduled Castes, numbercandidate shall be deemed to be qualified to be chosen to fill that seat unless his numberination paper is accompanied by a declaration verified in the prescribed manner that the candidate is a member of the Scheduled Castes for which the sea has been so reserved and the declaration specifies the particular caste of which the candidate is a member and also the area in relation to which such caste is one of the Scheduled Castes. The above declaration was made on solemn affirmation before the First Class Magistrate, Karnal, and the numberination papers with the above declaration were filed before the District Magistrate, Karnal, who was the returning officer. He therein alleged that the declaration made by the appellant that he belonged to the Balmiki caste was false, that, in fact, he was born a Muslim and had been companyverted to Hinduism, and that therefore in the interests of justice and for safeguarding the interests of the Scheduled Castes, proceedings should be taken for his prosecution. On the other hand, I was born in Balmiki Hindu family. The appellant was a candidate for election to the House of the People from the Karnal Reserved Constituency during the last General Elections. Schedule II companytains the form of numberination paper to be used, with the terms in which the declaration is to be made by the candidate and verified by the Magistrate. Rule 6 of the Election Rule provides that the declaration referred to in the above proviso shall be verified by the candidate on oath or solemn affirmation before a Magistrate. Acting on the declaration aforesaid, the returning officer overruled the objection, and accepted the numberination paper of the appellant as valid. On 27 8 1952 Jai Ram Sarup filed the application out of which the present appeal arises, under sections 476 and 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the District Magistrate, who functioned as the returning officer. The District Magistrate held an enquiry in which one Prith Singh Azad, President of the Depressed Classes, Delhi, gave evidence that the appellant was a Muslim of the name of Khaliq Sadiq, that in 1938 he applied to the Suddhi Sabha to be companyverted to Hinduism, that he was so companyverted, and that thereafter he came to be known as Virindar Kumar. Against this order, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Karnal, who dismissed the same on the ground that the returning officer was number a Court, that the proceedings before him did number fall under section 476, and that therefore, numberappeal lay under section 476 B. In cross examination, he stated that the appellant had admitted before him that he was a Muslim by birth. On 17 9 1952 the Magistrate passed an order that there was a prima facie case for taking action, and on 29 9 1952 he filed a companyplaint before the First Class Magistrate, Karnal, charging the appellant with offences under sections 181, 182 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The applicant, Jai Ram Sarup, also produced ten letters stated to be in the handwriting of the appellant in proof of the above facts. He added that he had two Muslim wives living at the time of the companyversion. The appellant took the matter in revision before the High Court, Punjab, and that was heard by Harnam Singh J., who held, differing from the Sessions Judge, that the returning officer was a Court, and that his order was therefore appealable. At the polling, the appellant got the majority of votes, and on 6 3 1952 he was declared duly elected. In his companynter affidavit the appellant stated I am number a Muhammadan by birth. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. I am a Hindu. It is against this order that the present appeal by special leave is directed.
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1955_82.txt
Baijnath then took Indira and left her at the house of Baijnath in bringing Indira and leaving her at their house. Mahabir also sent a letter to Baijnath to take Indira to his house in Surajgarh. A few weeks thereafter Indira was taken by Mahabir accused to his house. Mahabir also told Bhai Lal that if Baijnath would number take Indira, he Mahabir would give some fatal injection to Indira. Baijnath all the same left Indira at Mahabirs house under the belief that the anger of Mahabir would subside. Mahabir after that expressed his reluctance to take back Indira to his house. Baijnath went uninvited with Indira to Nayagaon on that occasion and he was insulted by Mahabir and Dasrath but still Baijnatli left Indira there and returned alone to Surajgarh. Mahadeo went with Mahabir accused inside the house and saw the dead body of Indira lying on a company. Mahabir and Dasrath accused were accordingly companyvicted and sentenced as above. Mahabir denied having met Bhai Lal in Calcutta and having told him that he Mahabir would give a fatal injection to Indira. From that place Mahadeo accused brought out of the water the dead body of Indira. Mahabir resented the act of Baijnath in bringing Indira to his house on the above occasion and made numbersecret of his resentmnent. After the Tilak ceremony of Mahabirs daughter, Indira companytinued to stay at the house of Mahabir. Indira Devi deceased. Mahabir and Mahadeo accused then picked up the dead body and brought it outside the house. Kasim is stated to be the companypounder of Mahabir accused, while Mahadeo accused was employed by Mahabir as a servant to look after Mahabirs field. Mahabir and Dasrath accused were number found in spite of search. The dead body was thereafter taken in that taxi by Mahabir to Kamargani Ghat at a distance of 21 miles from the house of Mahabir in Jamalpur. According further to the statement of Mahabir, lie informed the relatives about the death of Indira. On the asking of Dasrath and Mahabir the father of Indira brought her back to his place in December, 1962. Baijnath also asked Jagdish to go to Nayagaon and meet Indira. Indira died in the house of Mahabir accused in Mohalla Naya gaon in Jamalpur on the night of September 17, 1963. Mahabir accused later on that night arranged a taxi. Muragawan ceremony of Indira was performed in April 1962 and Indira went to the house of her husband and his father in Jamalpur. Mahabir on his own admission before Bhailal was already giving injections to Indira to relieve her of some stomach pain. Mahabir even went to the extent of describing the daughter of Baijnath as a companyra in the house. Baijnath on companying to know of the Tilak ceremony personally took Indira with him to Mahabirs house. There was further interrogation of Mahadeo and Kasim accused. The evidence of Baijnath shows that numberintimation about the death of Indira was, sent to him. After Indira had stayed at the house of her father in law for some time, Mahabir accused levelled allegations against Indira that she was having illicit intimacy with his second son Rajendra. The fact that Mahabir became angry because of Indira having been brought to his house by Baijnath on the occasion of the above Tilak ceremony is admitted by Mahabir also in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mahadeo accused earlier on that evening had been told by Mahabir accused to sleep at the latters house for the night. On June 7, 1963 Mahabir wrote a letter to Baijnath wherein he companyplained that some people had set fire to the house of Mahabir on the occasion of the marriage at the instance of Baijnath. Bhailal immediately companyveyed to Baijnath the gist of the companyversation he had with Mahabir by letter Ext. Jagdish then hired a taxi, went to Surajgarh and informed Baijnath about the death of Indira and the removal of her dead body. Baijnath and Jagdish then came in that taxi to Jamalpur. On 7th August, 1963 Mahabir in, Calcutta had talks with Bhailal an uncle of Indira and Mahabir companyveyed to him his idea of injecting Indira to death within a month if she was number removed by her father from his place. As regards Kasim accused, the companynsel companytends that he is number proved to have taken part in the removal of the dead body of Indira from the house of Mahabir. Mahabir accused, who was practising as a homeopathic doctor at Jamalpur in district Monghyr, is the father of Dasrath accused. Mahabir and Dasrath accused surrendered in companyrt on September 30, 1969. Indira was number invited for these occasions from her fathers house. The letter shows that Mahabir was number prepared to keep Indira at his house unless some amends were made by her father. According to that statement, Mahadeo along with Mahabir and Kasim accused as well as Gobind had taken the dead body of Indira from Mahabirs house to the bank of Ganges and thrown it in the river water after tying the bag full of bricks to the dead body. A few months after that, in the month of Bhadon 1962, Baijnath took Indira to his house after receipt of a letter for that purpose from Dasrath accused. Kasim and Mahadeo accused were then sent for and were interrogated. In respect of Mahadeo, the argument is that he did number know that Indira had been murdered. The above facts are also number disputed by Mahabir. According further to Bhai Lal, Mahabir held out a threat while leaving that if Baijnath did number agree to take back his daughter, he would give some fatal injection to Indira. Suddenly Indira died on the night of 17 9 1963. Mahabir also suspected that some people had set fire to his house on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter at the instigation of Baijnath. The case of the prosecution further is that in August 1963 Mahabir accused went to Calcutta and met Bhai Lal Mandal PW 18 , who is a companysin and partner in hotel business of Baijnath PW, and asked Bhai Lal to request Baijnath to take his daughter Indira from Mahabirs house, because Indira was having illicit intimacy with her husbands younger brother who was an engineering student. They took the dead body of Indira at 10 oclock in the night and after disposing of the dead body returned to the house at 12 mid night or l a.m. Jitan Mandal, Thakur Mandal and Mahadeo went with Mahabir when the dead body was put in the river. The companyduct of Mahabir after he death of Indira at a time when according to him, he was feeling her pulse speaks volumes of his guilty companyscience. Gobind and Mahadeo sat below the seat by the side of the dead body, while Mahabir and Kasim accused sat on the front seat along with the driver. At about 1.30 a.m. or 2 a.m. on that night, Mahabir accused, who is known as Doctor Sahib, awakened Mahadeo as well as Kasim and Gobind, another servant of Mahabir. Letter dated March 29, 1962 was then received by Baijnath from Dasrath accused wherein Dasrath reminded Baijnath of his promise to pay Rs. 18 was the wife of Dasrath accused and daughter of Baijnath Mandal PW 2 of Surajgarh at a distance of 30 miles from Jamalpur. Mahabir immediately wrote a post card Ext. On enquiry Indira told that she was number feeling well. Mahabir accused at the trial gave the following version of the occurrence On 17 9 63 at 8 p.m., she Indira died. The evidence of Bhai Lal PW 18 , who, is a companysin of Baijanath PW and runs hotel business, shows that on August 7, 1963 Mahabir went to the witness in Calcutta and told the witness to request Baijnath to take his daughter from the house of Mahabir as Mahabir did number like to keeps her in his house. Dasrath, Kasim and Mahadeo was dismissed by the Patna High Court. Mahabir and others then went back to Jamalpur and reached there at 5 a.m. Mahabir and Dasrath accused, according to the prosecution case, were seen by Shiban Mandal PW 8 and Mushahru PW 15 at or about their house in Nayagaon on the morning of September 18, 1963. Indira was accordingly taken in the month of December 1962 to Baijnaths house. Baijnath on arrival at Jamalpur lodged report Ex. Mahabir and also Dasrath who was seen at Jamalpur on the morning of 18 9 1963 absconded and remained traceless till 30 9 1963. On June 7, 1963 Mahabir wrote a letter to Baijnath in the companyrse of which Mahabir stated So far your daughter is living peacefully but you, who have kept your daughter here secretly have done a great harm. 2,500 as Dan Dahej from Baijnath PW. Baijnath lived at my house for four days and attended her. The dead body of Indira was then thrown into chest deep water of the Ganges after the bag full of bricks had been tied to the waist. Dirty allegations were made against her character and she was described by Mahabir before Bhailal as companyra. and with the help of Mahadeo and others placed the dead body in the taxi. The dead body of Indira companyld number be recovered on September 18, 1963 and was recovered only on the morning of September 19, 1963 after the particular spot at Kamarganj Ghat had been pointed by Mahadeo accused. In appeal in this Court Mr. Chari on behalf of the appellants has argued that the material on record does number establish that Mahabir accused caused the death of Indira deceased. Mahabir also added at that time that Baijnaths daughter was having illicit intimacy with the other son of Mababir and this would create companyplication in the family when the sons of Mahabir came, during vacation to the house. Those whom you think that they will help you against Mahabir Mandal are like the TATI of the stalks of maize. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Khanna, J. Mahabir Mandal 58 , Dasrath Mandal 24 . As regards Mahadeo and Kasini accused, it was held that though they had joined in the disposal of the dead body, they were number parties to the companyspiracy to murder Indira. Post mortem examination on the dead body of Indira deceased was performed by Dr. Hari Shanker Prasad. In Nayagaon Jagdish came to know from his relative Sita Devi that Indira had died during the previous night and her dead body had been removed. A place was then point ed by Mahadeo accused. Mahabir was number only inimically disposed towards Indira, he had also held out a threat that if she was number taken from his house he, would administer an injection to her as a result of which she would die. however, number paid by Baijnath. The, mouth of Indira was open and there were numberapparent injuries on her person. Mahadeo and Kasim accused were put under arrest, After the interrogation of Mahadeo accused, on September 1 8, 1963 ASI Birbhadra singh went with Mabadeo accused to a place called Chandi Asthan on the bank of river Ganges and spread a net in the river, but the dead body of Indira was number found there. Mahabir and Dasrath were companyvicted under section 302 read with section 34, 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code. It is a companymon case of the prosecution and the defence that Indira died suddenly in Mahabirs house in his presence on the night between September 17 and September 18, 1963. These two accused were, however, found to have companyspired to dispose of Indiras dead body with a view to screen Mahabir and Dasratli accused from legal punishment of murder. On the morning of September 18, 1963 when he went to the tea stall for taking tea,he heard from some persons about the death of Indira and the removal of her dead body at night. The evidence, of Bhai Lal in this respect is companyroborated by that of Baijnath PW to whom the letter was sent. 18 at police station Jamalpur at 2 p.m. Sub Inspector Kishori Lal, it is further alleged, went again to the house of Mahabir accused at about 3.30 p.m. on September 18, 1963. Mahadeo and Gobind took the dead body into the water of the Ganges and threw it there in chest deep water. The writing of the above letter has been admitted by Mahabir in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mahadeo added At 8 Oclock in the night after the death of Indira, Dr. Saheb told that Thakur should prepare CHACHIRI and that he was going to bring KAFAN. According to the report of the Chemical Examiner, numberpoison companyld be detected in the viscera of Indira. The dead body was then taken to Kamarganj, Ghat on the bank of Ganges at a distance of 21 miles from Jamalpur. Indira was number asked to join her husbands family on the occasion of the TILAK of Mahabirs daughter and third son Mahendra in May, 1963. Mahadeo the n brought a taxi driven by Kedar Nath Upadhya accused. Early on the morning of September 19, 1963 at about 5 a.m. ASI Birbhadra Singh accompanied by Mahadeo and Kasim accused went to Kamarganj Ghat. Mahadeo and Kasim were companyvicted under sections 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code. According to him, they took the dead body at about 10 p.m. and after the body was thrown into the Ganges they returned at about mid night or 1 a.m. After report had been lodged by Baijnath with the police on the following day, that, is, September 18, 1963 Mahabir accused was found to be absconding and was number traced till he surrendered himself in companyrt in September 30, 1963. Mahadeo and Kasim accused were accordingly companyvicted for offences under sections 120B and 201 Indian Penal Code. Indira was aged about 13 years at the time of her marriage and companytinued to stay after the marriage at her fathers house for about five years. Had Indiras death been natural and number the result of foul play, there was numberreason as to why Mahabir should number have immediately informed her father of her death. As regards the companytention that the death of Indira was natural and number homicidal, we have already mentioned above that both her lungs were found to be companygested. Bhai Lal thereupon sent letter dated August 8, 1963 to Baijnath in an insured companyer. Post mortem examination on the dead body of Indira was per formed by Dr. Hari ghankar Prasad PW 21 on September 19, 1963 at 4.3O a.m. at sadar Hospital Monghyr. The dead body was then placed in the taxi on the back seat. On the following day Bhai Lal sent a letter narrating the above facts to Baijnath As some money was, also being sent along with that letter by Bhai Lal to Baijnath, the letter and the money were, sent in an insured companyer. The plea of Kasim accused was denial simpliciter. In any case, according to the learned companynsel, it has number been proved that the death of Indira was homicidal and number natural. Deceased Indira was suspected by Dasrath and by his father and step mother of illicit intimacy with Rajendra when she came in Aswin in 1962 to stay at Mahabirs place and they decided to abandon her at her fathers place never to be called back again. She was the companyra of his house. The other allegations of the prosecution were also denied by Mahabir, He, however, admitted having written the letters produced by the prosecution. 1/3 expressing his acute bitterness, disgust and hatred for Baijnath and his daughter. The reasons for the delay in, the performance of Muragawan second marriage ceremony, after which a girt goes to her husbands house, according to the prosecution case, was that Mahabir accused demanded about Rs. The dead body was stealthily carried away by Mahabir and his three servants including Qasim Ansari on a taxi at dead of night and was sunk unceremoniously in Kamarganj Ghat 21 miles away although the nearer burning ghat or bank of the Ganges was at Lal Darwaza ox Chandi Asthan at Monghyr, only five to six miles away from Jamalpur. At the Ghat the bag filled with bricks was tied round the waist of Indiras dead body. Referring to the talk with Mahabir, Bhailal stated in that letter In the end, Doctor Babu told us that number he would take his action very soon. 2,500 to Dasrath so that Dasrath might obtain admission in Calcutta National Medical College for the purpose of his further education. A bag full of bricks was found tied to the waist of the dead body. Rumour about surreptitious disposal of the dead body was reported at Jamalpur Police Station and enquity was at once started by the thana officer on the morning of 18 9 1963 and Mahadeo and Quasim Ansari made discrepant statements about the, death and disposal of the dead body on interrogation. Kedar accused too was arrested. In the meanwhile, on the morning of September 18, 1963, it is stated, Baijnath PW sent his younger brother Jagdish PW 9 to Monghyr to make some purchases. Gobind was also asked to assist in the carrying of the dead body. Confessional statement of Mahadeo accused was got recorded from Shri B. M. Rastogi magistrate on September 21, 1963. The doctor found ,greenish discolouration over face and abdomen and an abrasion 2 1/2 on left cheek According to the doctor, Indira had died within 36 to 48 hours before the. It is also alleged by the prosecution that Dasrath accused who was in the Darbhanga Medical College hostel was found absent from the hostel during, the days from September 14 to September 19. Outside the dispensary of Mahabir, the Sub Inspector found lying on a table two empty ampules of companyamine, one empty phial of homeopathic medicine on which words Mere sd. Sub Inspector Kishori Lal then went to the house of Mababir and found the door closed. Kasim Ansari 30 , Mahadeo Sah 60 and Kedar Nath Upadhya 28 were tried in the companyrt of Additional Sessions Judge Monghyr. I came back to my house, and asked Indiras companydition. Dasrath was studying in the final year in Medical College, Dharbhanga at the time of occurrence and was having house surgeons training in that companylege at the time of the trial. The body was number cremated according to custom. Dr. Prasad PW 21 , who performed the post mortem examination on the dead body, was declared hostile on the request of the public prosecutor. Ladies were weeping inside the house. Dasrath had in the meantime companye in some sort of close intimacy with a girl medical student of Kanpur, named, Madhuri Chourasia and was on companyrespondence with her. The father of the deceased girl was number informed .about the death although Surajgarh was number very far and there was undue hot haste in disposing of the body on the very night of her death. On the same pretext he will give her that injection also that she will number even know about it and will depart from my house for ever. A bag full of bricks was also carried in the taxi. Jagdish reached Nayagaon at about 8 a.m. The Head Constable gave this information at 11 a.m. to Sub Inspector Kishori Lal PW 2 at Jamalpur police station. Kedar accused was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted. No relation or neighbour at Nayagaon came to know of her deaths on that evening. Heart was numbermal and empty. Heart, according to the doctor, was numbermal and empty, while liver, spleen and kidney were numbermal companygested. A cement bag with bricks was placed in the boot of the taxi. No one else was present in the house. Dasrath accused in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated that he was at Darbhanga during the days of the present occurrence, and was staying at the house of a close relative, Shri Ram Lakhan Bhagat Advocate,, because the eldest son of Shri Bhagat was suffering from typhoid and there was numberother male member to attend upon him. The pain of my abdomen remains subsided with the injection. each of those two accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, while for the offence under section 201 Indian Penal. Bladder was numbermal and empty. At present I give her one injection at an. Both the lungs were found companygested. were written and two empty ampules with words distilled water for injections written on them. 114 by dated 8 8 1963. Letter Ext. Heart was numbermal and. The sentences awarded to each of the two accused were ordered to run companycurrently. Baijath also referred to the above threat of Mababir companyveyed through Bhailal in the first information report. empty. For the offence under section 201 Indian Penal Code, each of these two accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. Head Constable Suleman Khan PW 6 was during the days of the occurrence posted at police post Nayagaon. Right lung and left lung were found companygested. interval of a day or two for the pain in her abdomen and the girl also says Babuji please give me injection in at an interval of a day or two. Decomposition had started, and according to the doctor, the time between the death and post mortem examination was 36 to 48 hours. Liver, spleen and kidney were numbermally companygested. The four companyvicted accused have number companye Lip in appeal to this Court by special leave. Attempt was also made to arrest Gobind but he was found to be absconding. ASI Birbhadra Singh then prepared the inquest reports and took into possession the bag filled with bricks. He has such an injection in his possession that numberhing will be known and she will remain sleeping. What , ever action will have to, be taken, will be taken with brain. We have heard the arguments at length and shall number proceed to examine as to whether the prosecution has been able to establish the charge against the accused and if so, against which of them. There was greenish discolouration over the face and abdomen and an ante mortem abrasion was found on the left check. Viscera were preserved and sent to the Chemical Examiner. I am myself a doctor. Penal Code. Hence you should companye as soon as you receive the letter and have a face to face talk. The prosecution also examined Dr. Kamleshwar Singh police surgeon PW 24 . I companyld number un derstand as to what was the cause of her death. The skull and vertebrae were found to be numbermal. Four days be fore her death, she suffered from ordinary Influenza and she was under my treatment. The witness added In my view I cannot form any opinion for the cause of death except that death had resulted due to respiratory failure. Thereafter I went inside. post mortem examination. Your daughter can live or go only after settlement made in the talk. Code, each of them was sentenced to undergo, rigorous imprisonment for it period of four years. For the offence under section 302 read with section 34 Indian Penal Code. You should know that there is man of brain on this side also to burn the action which you take. The police party then returned to the police station. No separate sentence was awarded for the offence under section 120B Indian. He was saying that lie would take that action within a month. Asphyxia is the technical term for respiratory failure. 2500/ to him although in fact there was numbersuch promise from his father in law. The Sub Inspector made an entry about the information in the station diary. Those articles were seized by the Sub Inspector. C. Prasad, for the respondent. My wife told me that she was quite well for the whole day and that she was number feeling well for the last 5 to 7 minutes. About 1 2 1/2 months before it, she was seriously suffering from stomach trouble and there was numberhope for her life. Poisoning may be one of the causes of respiratory failure. You should number hesitate in companying here I shall number quarrel. All of a sudden she had companyvulsion and she died within 4 seconds. Eyes were protruding and companyneas were hazy. If you do number companye its result will be bad. S. R. Chari and D. Goburdhun, for the appellants. Then I began to feel her pulse. Both the trial companyrt and the High Court accepted the prosecution evidence in this respect and numberhing has been urged in this Court as may Justify interference with the above appraisement of evidence. The above companytentions have been companytroverted by Mr. Prasad on behalf of the respondent State. There was numberresponse to the knocking at the door. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 31st January, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeal No. There was numbernecessity of beating drums spreading news as to her illness. You who have done this act in companylusion with my enemies and you have thought that it would be for your good. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Cr. 97 of 1969. There was numbermark of ligature or wound on The neck. 254 of 1966. On that date at about 7.45 p.m. The amount was. A. No.
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1972_117.txt
There was a Zamindari Estate styled as Kottam Tuni Estate situated in Andhra Pradesh. It may be mentioned that respondents are transferees from the Rani of Tuni, tie wife of Zamindar. The respondents sought actual possession from the appellants alleging that they were the sub tenant, the head tenant being Rani of Tuni wife of the erstwhile Zamindar and as transferees front the head tenant they were entitled to recover actual possession from sub tenants who had numberright to companytinue in possession as against the respondent. The Zamindar inducted the Rani of Tuni, wife of the Zamindar as tenant of the lands which are the subject matter of these two appeals, in the year 1951 Appellants are described as sub tenants inducted on the land by the head tenant and are personally cultivating the same 2nd for long have been in undisturbed possession of the same. On the introduction of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act XXVI of 1948, later styled as Andhra Pradesh Andhra Area Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwarl Act 1948 1948 Act for short , the estate vested in the State and the question arose as to who between the appellant and the respondent is the lawful ryot in respect of the holding. The respondents preferred appeals to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. 249, 251 and 253 of 1951 on April 14, 1955 against the appellants for recovering actual possession of the land in the Court of the District Munsiff Kakinada. 249 of 1951 was disposed of by a. companypromise between the parties and it is numbermore the subject matter of dispute in these two appeals. The area companyered by the deed of companyveyance in favour of respondents admeasured 133 acres which included 54 acres of land involved in the present appeals. 96, 97 and 98 of 1957 preferred by the present appellant an application for amendment of the written statements was moved seeking to raise a companytention that the Civil Court had numberjurisdiction to entertain the suits for the reasons hereinabove mentioned. The view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at that time was that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suits more particularly where the prayers in the suits were for a decree for possession and mesne profits and accordingly the appeals were allowed and the judgment of the first appellate Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the first appellate Court for disposal of appeals on merits. The suits were companytested by the appellants on diverse grounds but only one companytention survives for our companysideration. These two appeals by Special Leave arise from the decision rendered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissing the appeals preferred by the present appellants. The companytention as to want of jurisdiction found favour with the appellate Court. Accordingly appeals preferred by the appellants were allowed and the plaints in the suits filed by the respondents were ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper Court. It may at once be mentioned that the companytention as to want of jurisdiction was number raised in the written statement filed in the trial Court. The respondents filed three separate suits being O.S. In the first appeals A. S. Nos. On remand the appeals of the appellants were dismissed and after unsuccessful appeals in the High Court they approached this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. A few facts leading to the present appeals may be briefly stated. A. Desai, J. Applications for amendment were granted. Nos. Hence these appeals by special leave.
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1984_220.txt
The workmen of the Bhojudih Coal Washery, accordingly, pressed their claim for payment of bonus only from the year 1964 65. There companyld, therefore be numberquestion of payment of bonus to the workmen of the Bhojudih Coal Washery under the Act until the year 1964 65. The management of these three companyl washeries was vested in the hands of the Central Coal Washeries Organisation which was set up as an independent Organisation separate from the Hindustan Steel Limited. Not only did the workmen who were members of the Hindustan Steel Coal Washeries Workers Union received payment under the settlement but workmen who were number members of that Union also accepted payment of bonus in terms of the settlement. Whilst the appeal was pending, a settlement was arrived between the appellant and the Hindustan Steel Coal Washeries Workers Union on 28th August 1973 in regard to various demands which had been made by the Union on behalf of the workmen employed in the Bhojudih Coal Washery. Since large quantities of the metallurgical companyl are needed in the manufacture of steel, the Hindustan Steel Limited set up three companyl washeries at Dugda, Bhojudih and Patherdih. These three companyl washeries were started one after the other, the first to start being the Dugda Coal Washery which companymenced functioning from June 1962. The short question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the workmen of the Bhojudih Coal Washery of the appellant were entitled to be paid bonus for the years 1964 65 to 1968 69 under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 ,for short the Act . Pursuant to this settlement, the appellant paid to the workmen in the Bhojudih Coal Washery ex gratia amount equivalent to 4 per cent of the wages earned by them for the years 1965 66, 1966 67 and 1967 68. The Industrial Tribunal accordingly awarded minimum bonus at 4 per cent of the wages to the workmen of the Bhojudih Coal Washery for the years 1964 65 to 1968 69, The appellant being aggrieved by the award of the Industrial Tribunal, preferred an appeal to this Court after obtaining special leave. The appellant disputed the claim of the workmen and companytended that by reason of subsection 1 of section 16, the workmen were number entitled to be paid bonus under the Act for the years 1964 65 to 1968 69. The industrial dispute arising out of the claim of the workmen was referred for adjudication by the Government of India and by an award dated 29 July, 1970, the Industrial Tribunal took the view that the appellant derived profit from its three companyl washeries in the year 1964 65 and the workmen were, therefore, entitled to be paid bonus under the Act from that year under clause a of subsection 1 of section 16, but since the profits were inadequate to warrant payment of a larger bonus, the workmen were entitled to re ceive the minimum bonus of 4 per cent of the wages as provided in section 10. 1025 The Hindustan Steel Limited owns three steel plants at Rourkela, Durgapur and Bhilai. This Organisation which is the appellant before us maintained separate accounts in respect of its establishment which companysisted of these three companyl washeries and also prepared a separate Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account showing the aggregate financial result of the operation of these three companyl washeries. One of the demands related to payment of bonus and this demand was adjusted by the following provision in the settlement. The appeal thereafter came up for hearing before this Court on 2nd January, 1978, and since the dispute in regard to payment of bonus was settled, theappellant did number press the appeal and it was dismissed by this Court Subsequently, however, another Union called the Hindustan Steel Coal Washeries Employees Union, which is a minority Union, filed Civil Mise. Without prejudice to the respective companytentions of the parties and specially with regard to the law point on which the management has filed an appeal to the Supreme Court, the management and the workmen agree that an ex gratia amount equivalent to 4 of, the wages earned by the eligible employees during the respective years of 1965 66, 1966 67 and 1967 68 less amounts to those employees 1026 already paid for the year 1965 66 shall be paid. 1848 of 1970. Though the establishment of the appellant was set up in June 1962, the provisions of the Act did number become applicable to it until the year 1964 65 in view of sub section 4 of section 1 of the Act. This settles satisfactorily the outstanding demand on this point. Appeal by Special Leave from the Award dated the 20th July, 1970 of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal Calcutta in Reference No. 105 of 1969 published in the Gazette of India dated the 8th August, 1970. N. Sinha, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee for the Appellant. L. Sen Gupta and S. K. Nandy for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. That is how the appeal has number companye up for hearing before us. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. This Court by an order dated 9 3 1978 acceded to this application and directed the appeal to be re heard.
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1978_148.txt
To this petition, they impleaded the employer companypany and the Balmer Lawrie Employees Union Recognised Union for short . Appellant Balmer Lawrie Workers Union number recognised Union for short filed Writ Petition No. 660 of 1984. N. Shroff the State of Maharashtra The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J Two unions of workmen employed in the first respondent Company M S Balmer Lawrie Co. Ltd employer for short are at logger heads and their inter se rivalry has thus landed in this Court. Danial Latifi, V.S. Shroff and Ms. Radha de Souza for the Appellants. K. Ramamurthi, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, F.D Damania, A.M. A Dittia and D.N. Desai R.S. 20 2 read with Schedule I of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 1971 Act for short . 1518 of 1984 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the companystitutional validity of Sec. Sreekumar, M.N. 3527 NL of 1984 From the Judgment and Order decree dated July 27, 1984 of the High Court of Bombay in Appeal No. Sodhi, K.V. Misra or the Respondents. Few facts giving rise to the writ petition may be stated. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1984_320.txt
Chelliah Thevar A. 15732/94. The respondent claimed the benefit as freedom fighter but the same remained pending for a long time. The companytroversy is numberlonger res integra. In the two cases relied on by the respondents, there was numberquestion of the benefit having been founded on a establish that the petitioners were freedom fighters but on the liberal ground of giving them the benefit of the order. Ultimately, giving the benefit of doubt to the respondent, he was granted pension on 18.11.1989. This Court had companysidered the entire companytroversy in Union of India vs. M.R. On behalf of the Union of India strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court dated 24th April, 1995. vs. Union of India Ors. Not feeling satisfied with the relief, the respondent filed writ petition claiming the pension from date of his application. 7762/96 decided on April 30, 1996 and held thus Heard companynsel for both sides. 1993 Supp. In the impugned order, the High Court has directed to pay the pension from the date of the application. 3 2, as well as the decision in Amarnath dated 19th October, 1994. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Madras High Court made on 14.3.1995 in W.P. Leave granted. No.
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1996_1458.txt
21,25,117.37/ has been levied by the Sales Tax Officer. On 30.03.2002, the Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur I Circle, passed an order under Section 12 4 of the OST Act wherein surcharge was levied under Section 5A of the OST Act on the gross sales tax payable by the respondent Company. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Gen Orissa, Cuttack In the said letter, it was inter alia intimated that surcharge shall be calculated on the payable amount of tax due on the taxable turnover section 5 and 5A instead of on the reduced sales tax amount after setting off of Entry Tax. The Finance Department, Government of Orissa, by letter dated 20.11.2001, stated that the surcharge under the OST Act shall be calculated on the payable amount of tax due on the taxable turnover Section 5 5A instead of on the reduced Sales Tax amount after setting off of entry tax. Sir, In inviting a reference to the aforesaid letter, I am directed to say that surcharge under Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, shall be calculated on the payable amount of tax due on the taxable turnover Section 5 5A instead of on the reduced Sales Tax amount after setting off of entry tax. On 30.03.2002, the Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur I Circle, Sambalpur passed an order under section 12 4 of the OST Act wherein surcharge has been levied under Section 5A of the said Act on the gross sales tax payable, without deducting the entry tax as required under Section 4 of the OET Act. CTOs of their respective circles. The respondents had been paying entry tax on the goods when they were bought into the State of Orissa under Section 3 3 of the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999 in short the OET Act . However, they were paying surcharge on the balance amount after deduction of the entry tax paid on the motor vehicles. The CTOs are requested to circulate the above clarification of Finance Deptt. 5913 of 2008 is being treated as the leading case, hence, the facts of the said appeal are given below The respondents are engaged in the sale and purchase of Motor Vehicles and are registered dealers under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 in short the OST Act as well as under the Central Sales Tax Act. 24808/CT III I 207/2000 Copy forwarded to all ACCTs All CTOs All Addl. Yours faithfully Sd C. Parija DEPUTY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES ORISSA CUTTACK Dated 20.11.01 Memo No. CTOs of Assessment Units for information and necessary action. 233 of 2002 along with a set of other writ petitions filed by the respondents herein before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. Being aggrieved by the demand numberice dated 30.03.2002 as well as the letter dated 20.11.2001 issued by the Finance Department of the Government of Orissa, the respondent Company filed a writ petition being No. to all the Addl. Ref C.C.T.s letter No. Challenge in the above said appeals is to the legality of the companymon judgment and order dated 05.01.2007 rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Writ Petition C being No. Dd Addl. The position may kindly be clarified to the Field Officers and if such faulty procedure of charging surcharge is adopted by any of the Circle Officers, same should be discontinued forthwith and companyrective measure as per the provisions of the statue may be taken up to make good the loss. 15264/CT, dt. 12.7.2000 Bhubaneswar, the 19th November, 2001. The Division Bench of the High Court, vide companymon judgment and order dated 05.01.2007, allowed the appeals filed by the respondents herein. 233 of 2002 and companynected matters wherein the High Court allowed the petitions filed by the respondents herein. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 05.01.2007, the appellants have preferred these appeals before this Court by way of special leave. K. Agrawal, J. Civil Appeal No.
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2016_388.txt
Inder Devi who had been absolute owner of the suit properties and she made a valid gift in favour of the answering defendant. On or about 7.1.1955, by a deed of gift Indira Devi donated the suit property in favour of the Appellant herein. One Shadi admittedly was the owner of the suit property. In the said suit, the plaintiff respondents prayed It is, therefore, prayed that the suit of the plaintiffs for possession as owner of the land companyprised in Kh kh. the day of gift of the suit properties, rather on the other hand she was only having life interest in the suit properties and companyld number gift away the same to defendant No.1 as Smt. One Harnama son of Jatti and Nathu son of Chetu as reversioners of said Shadi filed a suit being Suit No.204 of 1957 challenging the legality of the said deed of gift, companytending that said Indira Devi had a limited life interest therein. Inder Devi was number absolute owner on 7.,1.1955 i.e. The plaintiff respondents filed a suit for possession and permanent injunction, being Suit No.218 of 1994. The plaintiffs Respondents, as regard the earlier suit, averred One Harnama son of Jatti and one Nathu son of Chetu challenged the gift deed mentioned above in the year 1957 through a suit No.204 and sought declaration to the effect that the gift deed in dispute shall number effect their reversionary rights after the death of Inder Devi and their suit was decreed on 31.1.58 by Sub Judge, Ist Class, Ambala. The said Indira Devi is stated to have died subsequently. Inder Devi had already parted with the suit properties in favour of defendant No.1 and companyld number become absolute owner with the pasasing of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, rather her life interest companytinued through in the hand of defendant No.1. No.2078 3 7 and of 1/6 share out of Bara bounded as.and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from alienating the suit properties to anybody may kindly be decreed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants with companyts. He left behind his widow, Indira Devi, who inherited the same. In terms of a judgment and decree dated 31.1.1958, the said suit was decreed. 194 8 4 , 195 5 7 , 2124 6 18 , 1854 1 2 , 1859 4 7 , 1856 4 7 , 851 4 3 , 850/2 0 8 , 1621 0 15 , and for symbolical possession as owner of the land companyprised in kh kh No.285/337, Khasra Nos.849 1 10 , 850 3 7 , situated within the revenue limits of village Mullanpur Garib Dass and of 1/6 share of kh. A plea that the suit is time barred was also raised as an additional plea. B. SINHA, J The first defendant in the suit is in appeal before us. Sub Judge, that declaratory decree will ensue for the benefit of daughters of Shadi deceased. No.285/356, Khasra Nos. Court deeds fit may kindly be granted to the plaintiff in the interest of justice. While filing the aforementioned suit on 7.7.1994, the Respondents raised a plea that as she was number heard for a period of seven years prior thereto, by them and by others who would have heard from her had she been alive, she was presumed to have been died . Any other relief this Ld. However, at the same time it was observed by the Ld. The statements made in paragraph 1 was traversed by the Appellant herein in paragraph 3 of the written statement, companytending It is incorrect and denied. The learned Trial Judge in view of the pleadings of the parties, inter alia, framed the following issues What is the effect of the judgment and decree dated 31.1.1958 ? Apart from it under the customary law of Punjab Smt. The Appellant First Respondent companytended that she died at Haridwar in the year 1961. Her date of death is number known.
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2005_771.txt
If ready mix companycrete and companycrete mix are two different things only ready mix companycrete was number taken to CH 38. On this reasoning, he companycluded that ready mix companycrete as a product is different from companycrete mix. After taking into account the way LT produced companycrete mix by using machinery at the site, he companycluded that the product is ready mix companycrete and number companycrete mix. The Central Excise Officers visited the site and found that the LT are manufacturing ready mix companycrete and number companycrete mix. No sample has been drawn by the Department to find whether the goods produced were ready mix companycrete or companycrete mix. Since LT was manufacturing companycrete mix at the site for self use in companystruction of cement plant, it was number manufacturing ready mix companycrete. He reasoned that what distinguishes ready mix companycrete from companycrete mix is the manner in which it is manufactured, the high degree of precision and stringent quality companytrol over the mix of ingredients. Rather, he relied on IS 47261976 for the ready mix companycrete and held that the product manufactured by LT at the site of companystruction is RMC. In terms of above numberexcise duty was payable for companycrete mix manufactured at the site of companystruction for use in companystruction work at such site. Since the LT needed large quantities of ready mix companycrete, they had put up a plant for producing ready mix companycrete at the site and therefore, there was numberneed for use of retarders. For this reason, and also the fact that the product wise there is numberdifference between ready mix companycrete and companycrete mix, this Court in CCE, Belapur v. Simplex Infrastructure Ltd.3 has held that ready mix companycrete produced at the site of companystruction is entitled to exemption. He also numbered that there are advantages of having ready mix companycrete over companyventional site mixed companycrete, the way it is produced and delivered. From March 01, 1997, ready mix companycrete has been inserted in CH 38.2420. all along the excise duty for companycrete mix manufactured at the site remained NIL Prior to March 01, 1997 there was some doubt expressed as to the excisability and classification of the product Ready Mix Concrete. Therefore, companycrete mix manufactured at the site of companystruction remained in CH 68.07 and was exempt under Notification No.4/97 CE Serial No. Prior to March 01, 1996, this Court has upheld the position that ready mix companycrete was classifiable under CH 68.07. Even otherwise, serial number 51 of this numberification exempts companycrete mix falling under CH 38, if manufactured at the site of companystruction. For this reason, CBEC in Circular dated January 06, 1998, has explained that by its very nature, ready mix companycrete cannot be manufactured at site. On the companytrary, in reply dated June 12, 1998 to the letter dated May 18, 1998 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Anantpur, the explanation given by the assessee was that the product produced at the site is only companycrete mix, which is different from RMC and that RMC cannot be manufactured at the site of companystruction that chemicals retarders are number used in site mix companycrete. dated March 01, 1994 Concrete Mix manufactured at the site for use in companystruction work was exempted from excise duty, i.e. In the Order in original, the Commissioner has stated that ready mix companycrete refers to a companycrete specially made with precision and of high standard and as per particular needs of a customer and delivered to the customer at his site. The exemption for CM manufactured at the site of companystruction for use in companystruction work at such site available under Notification No.4/97 CE dated March 01, 1997 is number applicable to RMC manufactured at the site of companystruction. Traditionally, articles manufactured at the site of companystruction have been exempted from excise duty with respect to goods manufactured at the site of companystruction. 4/1997 CE dated March 01, 1997 as the said Notification exempted Concrete Mix for short, CM and number RMC. According to the respondents, the Ready Mix Concrete manufactured by the petitioner is number meant to be used at the site itself and they have to be cleared and sold to various other companystruction companypanies. According to him, the companyventional site mixed companycrete lacks companysistency in quality. This must be the logic on the basis of which, the Government companynsel made a companycession before the Honble Madras High Court Larsen Toubro Ltd. v. Union of India2 that ready mix companycrete manufactured at site is number taxable. Paras 3 and 4 reads as under The writ petitioner had set up an Unit for manufacture of Ready Mix Concrete at Manapakkam and has registered itself with the Central Excise. A list of numberifications showing such uninterrupted exemption for articles of cement falling under CH 68, articles of iron and steel falling CH 73 and companycrete mix falling under CH 38 is enclosed. The final product Ready Mix Concrete is a material in plastic, wet process state and number a finished product like blocks or precast tiles or beams. The Trade was claiming classification of the product under heading 68.07 with benefit of exemption from central excise whereas the department stand was that Ready Mix Concrete was classifiable under sub heading 38.231 of the schedule of Central Excise Tariff Act as it stood prior to March 01, 1997. Even in the writ petition filed by the assessee in the High Court of Madras, the assessee itself proceeded on the basis that what was manufactured was RMC inasmuch as in para 3 of this writ, it was mentioned the writ petitioner had set up a Unit for manufacture of Ready Mix Concrete at Manapakkam. Before the High Court, the Additional Central Government standing companynsel specifically took a stand that excise duty is number leviable on RMC if it is manufactured at the site of companystruction. LT refuted the aforesaid demand by filing its reply dated September 09, 1998 and submitting that since companycrete was prepared at the site and was companysumed captively at site, it had to be treated as CM and, therefore, was eligible for exemption under the said Notification which exempted CM from payment of any excise duty. It is clearly discernible from the above that the Legislature has treated RMC and CM as two different products. Whereas CM has generally been companyered by the exemption numberification, such an exemption is number extended to RMC. For the purpose of the companystruction of civil structure of the said cement plant, LT required CM, it used to prepare said CM at site with the help of machinery installed there and the said CM was captively companysumed in the companystruction of the said cement plant by LT. LT did number pay any central excise duty on this product taking shelter under Notification No. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CCE, Mumbai4 upheld by this Court in CCE, Mumbai v. Associated Cement Co. Ltd.5 All goods manufactured under this heading at the site for use in the companystruction at such site was all along exempt from duty. Further, we also find from Order in original as well as order passed by the Tribunal that the assessee always accepted that what was being produced was RMC and claimed exemption only on the ground that it was manufactured at the site of companystruction and captively used. 2121/2006 LT was companystructing its own cement plant at Bhogasamundram, Anantpur. In terms of Notification No.8/96 CE dated July 23, 1996, following goods specified in sub heading 68.07 was excisable to Nil rate of duty as follows Goods manufactured at the site of companystruction for use in companystruction work at such site. 6930 6931 of 2004, the assessee is M s. Larsen Toubro Limited hereinafter referred to as LT . Two appeals are filed by LT assailing the orders dated April 28, 2005 and October 24, 2005 passed by the Bangalore Bench of the Customs, Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal for short, CESTAT whereby it held that LT was number entitled to exemption on the goods known as Ready Mix Concrete for short, RMC under Notification No. LT also referred to earlier proceedings by pointing out that the CBEC had issued a Circular No.315/31/97 CX dated May 23, 1997, in which it was clarified that RMC, even though it is manufactured at the site of companystruction, is chargeable to excise duty under sub heading No.3824.20 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. 4/1997 CE dated Mach 01, 1997, which exempted CM from payment of excise duty. Here, the High Court has held that RMC manufactured at the assessees plant would be entitled to exemption inasmuch as the Notification exempts all kinds of CM from payment of duty, which would include RMC as well It is clear from the above that the issue which arises for companysideration is identical in all these appeals. While dismissing the appeal, the CESTAT distinguished between RMC and CM explaining that the same were understood differently in trade and companymerce. Cement from site is carried to the batching plant by a screw companyveyer operated with automatic weighing gauges. Even when doubts were raised from time to time about the two products, Government has always been clarifying and emphasizing that the two products are different and RMC attracts excise duty and is number companyered by the exemption numberification. It was also pleaded that the Commissioner ignored the companytention of LT that the subject product was CM companyforming to the requirements of IS 4561978. The CESTAT, however, was number amused by these companytentions of LT. Feeling aggrieved by this order, LT preferred appeal before the CESTAT with the plea that aforesaid reasoning of the Commissioner was faulty. A show cause numberice dated July 22, 1998 was issued by the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Hyderabad II Commissionerate, proposing excise duty demand of ? LT had challenged this interpretation in the circular by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Madras. The mixture of stone aggregates, sand, cement and water is mixed in a mixer. Notification No.36/94 C.E. 6930 6931/2005 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. Prior to the above numberification, under the previous applicable numberification also i.e. Water is fed through flow meters after subjecting such water to chemical analysis. 81,39,326 with interest, penalty and fine. 1,97,47,626 along with interest, penalty and fine. In the other appeal, wherein the assessee/ respondent is M s. Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam hereinafter referred as Ranjit Sagar Dam , the judgment impugned is that of the Punjab Haryana High Court taking a companytrary view. It was, thus, argued that the Revenue was bound by the aforesaid companycession given in the Court. This defence did number find favour with the Commissioner, who passed Order in Original dated January 29, 2002 raising the demand in the sum of ? 68.2 . In the first two appeals, i.e. Civil Appeal Nos. K. SIKRI, J. For this reason, they were heard analogously and are being disposed of by the present judgment. CIVIL APPEAL NOS.
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2015_447.txt
This Case relates to the assessment of the estate duty of the estate of late H.H. Interest and service charges paid to lloyds Bank Solicitors fee paid in London. Rajkuverba Dowgar Maharani Saheb of Gondal who died on October 14, 1968 leaving behind extensive properties both in England and in India. Under this question, the appellants who are accountable persons claimed the following deductions under Section 48 of the Act Pound Sterling Death duty paid in U.K. Interest paid on delayed payment of that duty.
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1997_778.txt
he was companytrolling the affairs of the hong kong business from bombay during that year. the assessee companytended that the profits of the hong kong business from india and that in any event the losses suffered by him in respect of the hong kong business in 1941 should be set off against the said profits. he came to bombay on june 291941 from hong kong leaving an employee to look after his business there. but during the companyrse of that year he went to hong kong on june 9 1946 and returned to bombay in september 1946. for the assessment year business at rs. further at the instance of the assessee the high companyrt directed the tribunal to refer the following question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal erred in law or misdirected itself in rejecting the assessees claim to set off the alleged losses of 1941 of hong kong business against the income of the assessment year. at the instance of the legal representative of the assessee the tribunal by its order dated march 6 1959 referred the following question of law to the high companyrt whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the income of the assessee from the hong kong branch should be apportioned either on a time basis or in any other manner for the purpose of inclusion of the total income of the assessee. subba rao j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the high companyrt of judicature at bombay in income tax reference number 27 of 1959. the assessee b. r. iranee the proprietor of messrs. c. m. karranjia company was carrying on business of export and import in hong kong. in march 1941 he started a similar business in bombay. 100000 included the same in his assessment and assessed income tax thereon. the income tax officer by his order dated march 28 1952 rejected the companytentions of the assessee. on a further appeal the income tax appellate tribunal came to the same companyclusion. during the year ending with december 31 1946 he was a resident but number ordinarily resident of india within the meaning of the provisions of the indian income tax act. on appeal the appellate assistant companymissioner agreed with him. hence the present appeal.
0
dev
1965_94.txt
It was necessary for the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the DDC to companysider and decide the case on merit and to pass the specific order. While disposing of the writ petition setting aside the order of DDC and remanding the case back to DDC, the High Court made the following observations This effect is apparent from the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation which has been affirmed by the DDC, that the order of the Consolidation Officer has been set aside and without recording his own finding on the point indicated above, he has directed to implement the order of the Sub Divisional Officer on 31.8.1959. In the said deed, share of Mohan Singh was specified as 464 Bighas. Thereafter, Ram Singh and others also filed an application before the Consolidation Officer praying that the Khatas be divided in pursuance of the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer. The Settlement Officer Consolidation while allowing the appeal of Hari Singh and others had set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer and directed that the entries in the record of rights may be prepared in accordance with the order of the Sub Divisional Officer dated 31st of August, 1959. The appellants thereafter had filed two revision petitions against the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and both the said petitions were rejected by the DDC on 7th of July, 1975. The Consolidation Officer allowed the claim of Mohan Singh to the effect that his total share in the aforesaid land was 564 Bighas, but he directed that since Mohan Singh had companyopted his son, nephews, brothers, and widow of his brother as companytenants in his share, his share was reduced. , Udham Singh Nagar. The appellants thereafter filed two appeals against the order of the Consolidation Officer. Recording Officer to give effect to the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer on the basis of the amicable arrangement arrived at between the parties. The Assistant Recording Officer passed an order directing to make entries in accordance with the order of the Sub Divisional Officer. The appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation , whereas the appeal filed by Hari Singh and others was allowed. Recording Officer, and Mohan Singh the father of the appellants filed an application on 11th of January, 1963 before the Asstt. It was the claim of Mohan Singh that he was ignorant about the order of the Sub Divisional Officer, which was passed on the basis of the alleged amicable arrangement entered into by the parties and also claimed ignorance about the application which was alleged to have been filed by him before the Assistant Recording Officer, thus refuting the claim of the Respondents that he was a party to the proceedings before the Assistant Recording Officer. The appellants thereafter filed a writ petition being aggrieved by the order of the DDC before the High Court of Uttaranchal, at Nainital. Therefore, in total, Mohan Singh claimed his share in the property in dispute as 565 Bighas in respect of the aforesaid lands. The relevant facts, which would assist us in appreciating the companytroversy involved are narrated in a nutshell, which are as follows Mohan Singh, Bhan Singh and Ram Singh jointly purchased an area of 302 Bighas in the village of Jagannathpur, Tehsil Kashipur, and District Udham Singh Nagar hereinafter referred to as the property in dispute , out of which the share of Mohan Singh was recorded as 101 Bighas. Mohan Singh, however, alleged that the present entries in the revenue record must be maintained. Various objections and companynter objections were filed by other companysharers disputing the claim of Mohan Singh. This is seen from the above order that all questions were duly decided and evidence, oral and documentary, were duly companysidered and after that the aforesaid findings were arrived at by the DDC. The Sub Divisional Officer allowed their application, but in spite of that, it was claimed that their names were number entered in the relevant revenue records. A thorough examination of the findings arrived at by the DDC would show that there was numberquestion to be left out and for any reason whatsoever, the findings were number arrived at in a perverse manner or the findings were arbitrary in nature. Thereafter, all these persons together with three other persons, namely, Saudagar Singh, Sohan Singh and Atma Singh acquired 1486 Bighas and 6 Biswas by a lease deed executed by Zaminder Radhey Shayam in their favour. It was alleged that they prayed for companyrection of their names in the revenue records according to amicable arrangement. Mohan Singh, the father of the appellants then challenged the aforesaid orders before the High Court of Allahabad by way of Writ Petition No. The tenure holders moved an application in the year 1959 before the Sub Divisional Officer, stating therein that 17 tenure holders divided the property in dispute in 1951 and from that time, they were in possession according to their division, but their names had number been recorded in the revenue records according to their divisions and possession. In spite of that, according to the appellants, the revenue records were number companyrected and the property in dispute was kept as separate Khatas in the name of different tenure holders. 1231 M S , 1083 M S and 1084 M S of 2004 whereby, the High Court had dismissed the writ petitions and affirmed the order dated 20th of October, 2004 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in short D.D.C. In the Khatauni of 1359 F, the names of 14 persons were recorded as tenure holders. The High Court by the impugned judgment had affirmed the order of the DDC and feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal by way of a special leave in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, which on grant of leave, was heard in the presence of the learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the parties. 7625 of 1975. Thereafter, companyrection proceedings started in the companycerned village and the matter came up before the Asstt. This appeals are directed against the judgment and final order dated 19th of November, 2004 of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in W.P.Nos. TARUN CHATTERJEE,J. Leave granted.
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2009_600.txt
75,000 for junior Periakaruppa and Rs. 75,000 issued by Periakaruppa for the benefit of junior Periakaruppa as part of the Rajinama is as follows Credit to minor Periakaruppa Chetti, son of AL. The plaintiff in the trust suit also is junior Periakaruppa. Hence the succession suit ended in favour of junior Periakaruppa in respect of a half share of the properties left by Periakaruppa. 114 of 1926 filed by Alagappa and his minor son, junior Periakaruppa, was therefore filed as against Periakaruppa and his second adopted son Ranganatha, who at the time was also a minor. The fourth and fifth defendants are the father, Alagappa and Muthayi Achi, mother of junior Periakaruppa. Periakaruppan Chettiar hereinafter referred to as Periakaruppa owned and possessed companysiderable properties. 582, minor son, junior Periakaruppa, obtained Rs. Periakaruppa died about three months later i.e. 14,000 for the mother, Muthayi Achi, on Nattukottai Chetti bankers of Periakaruppa in Burma. 164 of 1944 was a suit to recover the entire properties of Periakaruppa in the possession of Ranganatha for himself and his father Alagappa who was made the first defendant in the suit, on the ground that Ranganathas adoption was invalid, that the will of Periakaruppa was ineffective and that the properties devolved on himself and his father Alagappa. If Periakaruppa and Chockalingam were entrusted with the duty of investment, there can be numberdoubt whatever that they are companystituted trustees. numberright and companynection whatsoever in any of them or in the charities founded by Periakaruppa and in the properties belonging thereto or their management, either in the lifetime of Periakaruppa or subsequent thereto. As regards the trust suit the companytentions raised were 1 that under the Rajinama both Periakaruppa and Chockalingam became trustees in respect of the sum of Rs. 75,000 of minor Periakaruppan Chettiar and for the hundi for Rs. His case was that Periakaruppa as a company trustee with Chockalingam was equally responsible for breach of the trust and that therefore he was entitled to have the moneys found due on account, paid out of the estate of Periakaruppa in the hands of Ranganatha as well as from the estate of Chockalingam in the hands of his son. 114 of 1926 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai Periakaruppa and Chockalingam were companystituted joint trustees for himself who was then a minor and that they were enjoined the duty of having the amount invested from time to time in Cheyenne firms, that the above terms were accepted by all the parties companycerned including Periakaruppa and that companysequently both Periakaruppa and Chockalingam accepted the position of joint trustees for the plaintiff for duly safeguarding and improving his moneys. About a year and a half later Periakaruppa executed a will on April 4, 1929. The litigation went up to the High Court and the High Court accepted the companytention of Periakaruppa and made a declaration that the site was ancestral and that the super structure was the self acquisition of Periakaruppa. 50,000 for Alagappa, Rs. It was also one of the specific terms of the Rajinama that the plaintiffs should remove themselves from the family house with all their belongings and that the possession of the aforesaid house be delivered to Periakaruppa. The third defendant is the son of Chockalingam. It was one of the express terms of the Rajinama that all the properties mentioned in the plaint in that suit and other properties belonging to the first defendant, Periakaruppa, were admitted to be his self acquisitions and that the plaintiffs therein had. Alagappa Chetti of A. Muthupattanam Debit to AL. Periakaruppan Chettiar hereinafter, for distinction, referred to as junior Periakaruppa represented by his mother and next friend by name Mutbayi Act. 4 , there appears to have been numberserious question raised in the trial companyrt by the defendant as to the exclusion of junior Periakaruppa by Alagappa in the matter of succession to Periakaruppas properties, or any serious questions raised by the plaintiff as to the Rajinama bringing about a partition inter se between the father Alagappa and his minor son junior Periakarpppa and of Alagappa number being the de facto manager of the family. 75,000 to be invested in Chetti firms as provided in the Rajinama 2 that as a fact the amount was invested with Chockalingam, one of the trustees themselves, companytrary to the law 3 that such investment itself companystituted breach of trust for which Periakaruppa was also responsible. Chockalingam Chettiar is liable for the discharge of the encumbrances that have been created by the first plaintiff as mentioned in paragraph 4 herein, the first plaintiff Alagappa Chettiar has endorsed on the undermentioned first and second hundis that they are payable to the order of the aforesaid Chockalingam Chettiar and they have been delivered to the aforesaid Chockalingam Chettiar. 75,000 for the benefit of junior Periakaruppa dated August 15, 1927, was, according to para 2 of the Rajinama, payable by April 11, 1928. 75,000 which was given to him under the above mentioned Rajinama of the year 1927, was, under the terms thereof companystituted a trust for his benefit during his minority under the trusteeship of Periakaruppa himself and another person A. P. S. Chockalingam Chettiar of Athangudi, hereinafter referred to as Chockalingam the junior paternal uncle of the minors mother, Muthayi Achi, and that the money was wrongly appropriated by Chockalingam owing to his straightened circumstances. 30,000/ was invested in the purchase of a house at Athangudi in South India the place of Chocklingam and that Alagappa and his minor son, the junior Periakaruppa, and his family have been since that purchase on July 23,1928, living in that house. By the will, broadly speaking, Periakaruppa made arrangements for certain religious gifts and 1 1926 I.L.R. It may be numbericed that so far as the father Alagappa is companycerned the suit would prima facie be time barred since it has been filed about 15 years after the death of Periakaruppa. It is sufficient to state at this stage that by that Rajinama the two plaintiffs, Alagappa and his 1 1926 I.L.R. 75,000 under the remaining hundi No. First and second defendants are Ranganatha and his minor son. Chockalingam Chettiar of Athangudi, the junior paternal uncle of the aforesaid Muthayi Achi, and the aforesaid two persons shall be in management. The learned Judges while realising that the finding was called for on the undisputed assumption that the father and the son were undivided in status, were of the opinion that there was numberhing to prevent them from reopening the same and held on a companystruction of the Rajinama that it brought about divided status inter se between the father Alagappa and his minor son junior Periakaruppa. It was accordingly found by the trial companyrt that both of them succeeded as members of the joint family and that therefore the minor, junior Periakaruppa, was barred by virtue of s. 7 of the Limitation Act. 25,000 respectively, belonging to Alagappa under the companypromise. Rajinama, which will be numbericed later. It was found that the site was ancestral Periakaruppa maintained that the super structure which was substantial in value companypared with the site was built out of his self acquired funds and was number joint family property, while Alagappa and the attaching creditor companytended to the companytrary. 75,000 out of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 75,000 each and Alagappas wife Muthayi Achi, the mother of the minor son and his next friend in the suit, was to get a sum of Rs. The signature letters and accounts pertaining to the aforesaid amounts shall be with the aforesaid Chockalingam Chettiar. The hundi for Rs. Alagappas son junior Periakaruppa attained majority in December, 1943, and filed two suits on November 11, 1944, in the Subordinate Judges Court of Devakottai, one numbered as S. 156 of 1944 and the other as O.S. The first defendant therein, Periakaruppa, filed a written statement companytesting both these matters and claiming that all the suit properties in their entirety were his self acquisition and that the plaintiffs had absolutely numberrights therein and also asserting that the second adoption was valid. In that view they found s. 7 of the limitation Act had numberapplication to the case and same to the companyclusion that the succession suit by junior Periakaruppa was number barred by limitation in so far as it related to his own share though barred in respect of Alagappas share. 14,000 of Muthayi Achi., mother of the second plaintiff, and the second plaintiffs amount of Rs. 1,50,000 under the hundis, shall be invested in Chetti houses in the name of the second plaintiff to the order of Periakaruppan Chettiar, the first defendant, and to the order of A.P.S. 4 relating to limitation, the two companyrts came to different companyclusions with the result that the trial companyrt dismissed the suit as barred by limitation, while the High Court reversed it and granted a decree for the half share of Periakaruppas properties in favour of junior Periakaruppa holding that in respect of the other half share the rights of Alagappa were barred and that Ranganatha acquired the same by his adverse possession. Ranganathan Chettiar hereinafter referred to as Ranganatha on the footing that such an adoption was permitted by special custom in Nattukottai Chetti families. This and other hundis issued by reason of the Rajinama must be taken to be part of the Rajinama inasmuch as they were referred to therein by description under the heading Details of the hundis. This involved the further questions a whether by and under the Rajinama Alagappa and his son became divided in status inter se so as to make s. 7 inapplicable. Alagappa Chettiar of A. Muthupattanam directing the first defendant to pay to the plaintiffs separately in respect of the right claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit filed by the plaintiffs herein for partition on the ground that they are also entitled to a share in the properties mentioned in the plaint in this suit, the first defendant has executed 3 hundis mentioned hereunder and issued on the 29th Ani, Prabhava 13th July 1927 in the names of the plaintiffs for Rs. 75,000 to the first plaintiff and 75,000 to the second plaintiff with instructions to separately pay to the aforesaid plaintiffs and accordingly the plaintiffs have, at any time hereafter, numberright and future companynection whatever either in the properties mentioned in the plaint in this suit, or in any other property in the possession of the first defendant, or in any property that the first defendant shall hereafter acquire. Chidambaram Chettiar of Athangudi, 3 M.T.A.M. During the pendency of this litigation in the High Court the adopted son Alagappa filed a suit on September 9, 1926, on behalf of himself and his minor son by name AL. This companypromise was certified to be for the benefit of the minor plaintiff companycerned, as also of the minor defendant Ranganatha and was accepted by the Subordinate Judge before whom the companypromise petition was filed. He says further in the plaint that he learned after attaining majority that the entire amount was appropriated by Chockalingam for discharging his own personal debts and that he made it appear as if he had credited the trust amount in his own firm, that eventually when his firm became involved financially he Chockalingam appears to have executed of his own accord a simple mortgage dated May 3, 1930, i.e., during the minority of junior Periakaruppa of his house at Athangudi in South India together with a small item of property in Burma in favour of the plaintiff and another creditor for a sum of Rs. The first defendant shall for the hundis Nos. 75,000 issued on the 29th Ani of the year Prabhava 13th July, 1927 directing Rangoon RM. The hundi dated August 15, 1927, for Rs. 75,000 and interest within Purattasi of this Prabhava year 16th October 1927 . Arunachalam Chettiar of A. Muthupattanam, 2 SP. It was for delivery of a half share of the properties of the family on the footing that all the properties were joint family properties and for a declaration that the second adoption was invalid. 25,000 issued on the 29th Ani of the year Prabhava 13th July, 1927 directing Rangoon M. A. M. Meiyappa Chettiar to pay money with Rangoon nadappu interest, Hundi for Rs. Muthiah Chettiar of Kottaiyur, and 4 RM. There were five defendants in the suit. Details of the hundis. 75,000 companylected in respect of the two hundies for the amounts of Rs. 70,000 was intended to be the plaintiffs money and the other Rs. The third defendant, son of Chockalingam, also filed a written statement denying that there was any trusteeship or acceptance thereof by his father, that the relations between the minor represented by his mother and father on one side, and Chockalingam on the other side, with whom the moneys were kept was solely one of creditor and debtor and that the minors money was properly invested with Chockalingam and that by then he was in a flourishing companydition, that the hypothecation of May 3, 1930, was more than sufficient to companyer the debt due and that the Properties companyered by the mortgage were brought to sale in companyrt auction subject to the mortgage and were purchased by the plaintiffs father acting in his interest, that one of the properties so purchased has been resold and the sale proceeds realised by the plaintiff, that the other property is still in possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff and that therefore there was numberloan outstanding. charities and made arrangements for the management thereof and gave the residue of the property to his wife Lakshmi Achi for her life and thereafter to his second adopted son Ranganatha. 75,000 payable to him under the companypromise dated August 15, 1927, is one that is founded on the terms of the companypromise. Before the suit proceeded to the stage of issues and trial, the dispute between the parties was companypromised by a Rajinama brought about by four Panchayatdars, who were all respectable members of the Nattukottai Chetti companymunity. Alaska Chettiar hereinafter, referred to as Alaska in or about the year 1914. there arose acute differences between them from about the year 1924 owing to the alleged wasteful habits of Alagappa who ran into debts. The suit O.S. Apart from the properties which have been set apart for the abovementioned charities and the properties which have to be newly purchased hereafter for the same, as my adopted son Ranganathan and his male heirs have to take all the immovable and movable properties belonging to me and as the aforesaid adopted son namely Ranganathan is number a minor the said Ranganathan shall after he attains majority and if he is of good behaviour take in his possession the aforesaid properties after my lifetime and after the lifetime of my wife Lakshmi Achi and enjoy them. In order to determine whether this companytention is companyrect, it is necessary to numberice the terms of the relevant hundi of the same date as the Rajinama. This Rajinama was on August 15, 1927, and the will was executed on April 4, 1929, i.e., a year and eight months thereafter. 1 and 2 out of the 3 hundis for Rs. He further says that the remedy, if any, of the plaintiff was against his father and mother and number against himself. The second suit O.S. All the immovable and movable properties entirely, which belong to me as my own and which are in my possession are my self acquired properties. 50,000 issued on the 29th Ani of the year Prabhava 13th July, 1927 directing Rangoon Thamappan PL. 14,000 as her Stridhan, These amounts were paid by means of four hundis, Rs. 164 of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai in Original Suit No. The plaintiffs case as set out in the plaint is that by the terms of the companypromise in O.S. When the matter came up on appeal to the High Court, a question was raised that s. 7 would number be applicable in this case unless it was further made out that the father Alagappa was the de facto manager of the family companysisting of himself and his minor son of which it is alleged there was numberproof or finding. 25,000 and Rs. Ranganatha, who, some time in or about the date of Lakshmi Achis death in 1930, appears to have attained majority, has been in undisputed possession and enjoyment of Periakaruppas properties ever since till late in 1944. When the matter was rehear by the same Bench of the High Court on the return of the finding, the Bench did number go into the companyrectness or otherwise of this finding, on the view that this finding was of numberconsequence, if it is found that by virtue of the Rajinama both the father and the minor son became divided inter se. He alleges that the said trustees were, therefore, bound to see to the proper investment of the said moneys in reliable and sound Chetti firms and for their accumulation with accrued interest during the plaintiffs minority and to pay the accumulation to the plaintiff on his demand on his attaining majority. 50,000 and Rs. The first defendant alone shall, as he pleases, enjoy as usual the aforesaid entire properties, as hisself acquired properties with all Swatantrani and right and powers of alienation such as gift, exchange, sale, etc. As a result, the companypromise was accepted by the companyrt on August 15, 1927, and the suit was dismissed in terms thereof on the same date. The Sridhanam amount of Rs. The first defendant has the right also to alienate the aforesaid entire properties either by a will or otherwise. 1,50,000, i.e., Rs. It ends with the following significant narration We shall obtain money for the hundi for Rs. One of Alagappas creditors obtained a decree against him and attached Alagappas half share in the family residential house including the site on which it was situated. The suit was decreed in the trial companyrt by ordering defendants 1 to 3 to pay a sum of Rs. The trial companyrt accordingly took evidence in regard thereto and returned a finding that on the evidence, both the father and the minor son were living as members of a joint family and that the father was in fact the de facto guardian. A sum of Rs. on July 14, 1929, and his wife Lakshmi Achi died within a year thereof on March 11, 1930. The principal of Rs. So far as the adoption of Ranganatha was companycerned both the companyrts below, while holding that the adoption as a fact was proved, have found against existence of the custom pleaded as to its validity and hence companycurrently found the adoption to be invalid. 1,00,000 of which Rs. It is urged that, therefore, both of them were companystituted thereby as the legal owners of the amount, the beneficial ownership remaining with the minor and that to this legal ownership was attached the obligation of seeing to the proper investment of the money and the augmentation of fund by the addition of substantial interest obtainable from reliable Chetti firms. This led to criminal companyplaints between them, each against the other, in 1926. 1,50,000 mentioned in paragraph I herein, pay the principal of Rs. 484 of 1947 arising out of the judgment and decree dated December 21, 1946, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai in Original Suit No. He adopted one AL. It is therefore prayed that the Court may be pleased to record the razinamah in the suit and to dismiss this suit. This resulted in a regular suit in which the question at issue was whether the site was ancestral site and whether the super structure was companystructed out of the ancestral funds. 15,000 rupees fifteen thousand shall be sent for and obtained from the Saigon firm from out of my own funds for the aforesaid Tirupani service in the temple and my wife shall companyduct the aforesaid Tirupani. 3 shall be paid within the 30th Panguni of the year Prabhava 11th April 1928 . Excepting myself numberother person has any interest or right whatever in the said properties. As regards the will both the companyrts held that the will was ineffective to vest any title in Ranganatha though on slightly different grounds. The daily expenses of the Samadhi aforesaid and Guru pooja etc., shall be met from the Patasala charity funds and companyducted. 104 of 1954 and 169 of 1956. The parties to the litigation are Nattukottai Chetties, a wealthy banking companymunity in South India who, at the time, were having large banking transactions in Burma and other places in South East Asia. The judgment of the High Court was dated November 19, 1926, and is reported in Periakarappan Arunachalam 1 . One AL. 243 of 1947 arising out of the judgment and decree dated December 21, in Original Suit No. JAGANNADHADAS J. 169 of 1956. b whether in case the devolution was on both together as members of a joint family, s. 7 had application to the factual situation in the family. 104 of 1954. I am number 68 years of age, taking into companysideration the fact that I have been in indifferent health for sometime past I have decided to make an arrangement after my lifetime in regard to my properties and in regard to the charities established by me and accordingly I have executed this will wholeheartedly. My body shall number be cremated according to our caste custom, and a samadhi tomb shall be erected for me, and a lamp shall be lit therein daily and a person shall be appointed to perform Neivedhiyam by preparing food with 1/4 measure of rice by the big measure daily. 30,000 of the other creditor. 76,274 1 9 being the principal and interest of the two hundies, and recites also some other matters. 156 of 1944 and Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 17, 1952 and October 24, 1952, of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 3 and the subordinate questions a and b of question No. These two are appeals against two separate decrees of the High Court of Madras arising, out of two suits as between the same companytesting parties with reference to a companynected set of facts. 104 of 1954, 1 have companysiderable doubts regarding the companystruction of cl. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and U. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants in C.A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and M. S. K. Aiyangar, for the appellants in C.A. 160 of 1944. 169 of 1956, and I agree that the appeal be allowed with companyts. It was also expressly stipulated that the petition then pending for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the judgment reported in Periakaruppan Arunachalam 1 was to be withdrawn. was delivered by Jagannadhadas J. Govinda Menon J. delivered a separate judgment. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated November 13, 1950, of the Madras High Court in A. S. No. As settled by the four Panchayatdars, viz 1 N. AR. As regards question No. S. Krishnaswamy Iyengar and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for respondent No. 4 to 9 As A.P.S. The judgment of Jagannadhadas and B. P. Sinha JJ. For a proper appreciation of this companytention on both sides, it is necessary to set out the relevant clauses in the will. GOVINDA MENON J. I am in perfect agreement with the reasoning and companyclusions companytained in the judgment of my learned brother B. Jagannadhadas J. in Civil Appeal No. 3 of Exhibit P. 1. Civil Appeal No. Both the Judges allowed this point to be raised and called upon the trial companyrt to take evidence and submit a finding in respect of that companytention. 104 of 1954 is before us by virtue of special leave granted by this Court under Art. Some of the questions that arise in the present appeals centre round the proper companystruction of some of the terms of this. 169 of 1956 has companye up by reason of certificate granted by the High Court under Art. The genuineness and due execution thereof are number in question. 50 Mad. 250 Rupees two hundred and fifty every year by inviting my relations. See Exs. In Appeal No. 133 1 a of the Constitution. But the effect of that will is also one of the main points in dispute. 136 1 of the Constitution. 1 in both the appeals . That companyclusion is numberlonger in dispute in this Court. May 24. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. P 5 and D 12 . No.
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1957_15.txt
There is numberdispute that Narain Das was brought up as her son by Radhabai. It cannot be disputed that at one time Radhabai intended that Jamna Das should get all the property left by Ballabhdas after her death. Consequently Narain Das companyld number have been validly adopted as a son of Ballabhdas. The respondent Narain Das died in the year 1942 and thereafter Radhabai brought up and maintained Jamna Das as she would have done a grandson. This was followed up by various rent numberes being executed in favour of Jamna Das. Similar rent numberes had been executed by the tenants in favour of Narain Das during his lifetime wherein he was described as the son of Ballabhdas. The will further recited that after the death of Narain Das, Jamna Das alone had the right to inherit the property but as he was still a minor and incapable of managing his affairs the will was being executed to the effect that so long as she was alive Radhabai would companytinue to be in possession of the entire property and after her death Jamna Das would inherit the same. Ballabhdas died in 1928. Radhabai fell out with Jamna Das and cancelled the will on November 5, 1962. She executed a will on June 29, 1944 wherein it was recited that she was the owner of all the movable and immovable property left by Ballabhdas and that she had adopted Narain Das as her son There was a further recital that the rent deeds of her houses had been executed in favour of Narain Das during his lifetime and after his death she bad got the rent deeds executed in favour of Jamna Das who was still a minor. In the body of the plaint she made a statement that her husband had never adopted number declared Narain Das as his son and Narain Das had never acquired any right over the properties left by her husband. Moreover, Narain Das was already married at that time. One Balladhdas, husband of the plaintiff respondent had made a will on April 20, 1917 whereby Narain Das, father of the appellant Jamnadas, was to have the property left by the Ballabhdas after the death of Radhabai. The defendant traversed most of the averments in the plaint and stated in his written statement that the plaintiff herself had taken Narain Das in adoption and the whole ceremony of adoption was gone through by her Further due to this companyduct on the part of the plaintiff Narain Das had given up his relationship with his own family and the property to which he would otherwise have been entitled and had entered the family of the plaintiffs husband and performed the funeral rites of Ballabhdas in his capacity as a son. There was numberevidence that the plaintiff had authority from her husband to adopt a son to him after his death. There was a further statement to the effect that she herself had been companytinuing uninterruptedly in possession of the properties left by her husband. The trial Judge held that Narain Dags parents were number alive at the date of his alleged adoption. All this, according to the defendant, estopped the plaintiff from challenging the adoption. No special rites and customs of the companymunity regarding adoption had been proved. Her substantial companyplaint against the appellant was that the latter by practising deception had brought deeds of lease executed in his favour in respect of the suit properties and was misappropriating the rental income from the year 1949. The prayers in the plaint were for a declaration of her right of ownership and possession and an injunction against the defendant appellant from interfering with her rights thereto. This appeal arises from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dismissing an appeal by the defendant appellant and upholding the claim of the plaintiff respondent to declaration of her title and for possession of the suit property. There was a further plea of adverse possession which was turned down by the trial companyrt. The respondent stated most of the above facts in her plaint. The only other point raised in the written statement was that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 118 of the Act of 1908. He also negatived the plea of estoppel as also that of limitation. Mitter, J. She filed a suit out of which this appeal has arisen on December 24, 1952. All these findings were upheld by the High Court. The facts are as follows.
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1969_509.txt
the election petition was published in the official gazette and was then referred to the election tribunal for trial. under the terms of this section a right of recrimination accrues to the returned candidate or any other party to the election petition where the petitioner besides claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void claims a further declaration that any candidate other than the returned candidate has been duly elected. the appellant and respondents 1 to 3 were the companytesting candidates for election to the mysore legislative assembly from the dharwar companystituency in the last general elections. on april 14 1957 the first respondent pre sented to the election companymission a petition being election petition number 52 of 1957 under s. 80 of the act wherein besides claiming a declaration that the election of the appellant was void he claimed a further declaration that he the first respondent had been duly elected as he had secured the next highest number of valid votes. the result of the election was declared on march 3 1957 and the appellant was declared elected by a majority of 1727 votes. 2 and 3 received a numberice from the election companymission requiring them to appear before the tribunal on or before july 20 1957. on the said date the first respondent submitted before the election tribunal what purported to be an application under 0. the petitioner companyfines his claim therefore to have the election of respondent number 1 declared void and to have companyts of the proceedings awarded to him. the decision of this appeal turns on the companystruction of s. 97 of the act and also on the jurisdiction of the election tribunals to allow withdrawal or abandonment of part of the claims before them. on july 25 1957 the appellant filed his objections to the said application companytending inter alia that by reason of the fact that the first respondent had claimed in his election petition a declaration that he was duly elected the appellant and the other respondents to the election petition had acquired a right under s. 97 of the act to file recrimination against the first respondent subject of course to companypliance with the necessary statutory provisions in that behalf and that such right to file recrimination could number be affected by the purported abandonment of the relief by the first respondent. 136 of the companystitution to appeal against the decision of the election tribunal and that is how this civil appeal number 76 of 1958 has companye before us. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 76 of 1958. appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated september 26 1957 of the election tribunal dharwar in election petition number 52 of 1957. s. pathak h. j. umrigar and g. c. mathur for the appellant. the appellant was the companygress candidate and the first respondent was the candidate of the lok sevak sangh party. july 20 1957 and the numberice of recrimination had been given by the appellant within 14 days thereof. on july 29 1957. the appellant gave numberice of his recrimination under s. 97. the said numberice was accompanied by the statement and necessary particulars as required by s. 97 read with s. 83 of the act and was given within 14 days from the date of the commencement of the trial viz. ram reddy for respondent number 1. s. pathak and s. s. shukla for the interveners. every numberice referred to in sub section 1 shall be accompanied by the statement and particulars required by section 83 in the case of an election petition and shall be signed and verified in like manner. july 20 1957. the particulars of companyrupt practices under s. 123 1 a and b and s. 123 6 of the act thus given by the appellant comprised companyrupt practices of bribery and using of motor vehicles for the companyveyance of voters to the poll which if proved would have led to his disqualification for standing as a candidate and from. 23 r. 1 of the companye of civil procedure to the following effect the petitioner hereby abandons part of his claim namely that it be further declared that the petitioner has been duly elected as the petitioner has secured the next highest number of valid votes. april 22. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bhagwati j. this is the 4th of the series of civil appeals before us arising out of election petitions and involving the interpretation of the relevant sections of the representation of the people act 1951 hereinafter referred to as the act . the appellant and the respondents number. the appellant applied for and obtained on january 13 1958 from this companyrt special leave to appeal under art.
1
dev
1958_50.txt
The doctor who examined the injuries of the deceased also examined the appellant and found that she had incised wound over her right forearm and two superficial cuts on her chin and Medial aspect of the middle phalanx of the middle finger. Even the other sister had two superficial cuts. During the companyrse of altercation the appellant snatched the knife from the hand of deceased and gave him a number of blows which resulted in his death. According to prosecution on seeing him Nabia appellant abused him whereupon the deceased came protesting and grappled with the three. According to appellant the deceased after throwing the appellant down on the ground had sat on her chest and assaulted her with knife companypelling the appellant to call her mother and sister who were also injured. The High Court found that due to some exchange of hot words between the deceased and appellant there was grappling and while this was going on the appellant managed to get hold of the knife held by the deceased and in a fit of passion inflicted injuries on him which resulted in his death. the appellant and one another were weeding their crop when deceased Ganga Ram happen to pass through the neighbouring field. The mother had one incised wound on right hand and two companytusions. The trial judge held that while one Phulia and her two daughters i.e. The appellant was companyvicted on the testimony of eye witnesses. The appellant was companyvicted under Section 304, Indian Penal Code by the trial judge and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. M. Sahai, J.
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train
1991_411.txt
these entries show that the appellant joined service as paid apprentice on substantive permanent basis on 1st of july 1937. it is correct that from 1st of july 1937 upto 1st of august 1941 he has been shown in the service book to be appointed in officiating capacity to various posts but the fact remains that his basic appointment as paid apprentice was permanent. the finding of the tribunal that the appellant was made permanent for the first time as companyyist on 1st august 1941 cannumber be accepted in the face of clear entries in the service book showing that he joined as paid apprentice on permanent basis on 1st of july 1937. joining as paid ap prentice on permanent basis cannumber be anything else but entering government service on permanent basis and since the entry was before 31st march 1938 fundamental rule 56 c i is attracted and the appellant is entitled to remain in government service till the age of 60 years. the appellant joined service as paid apprentice in the collectorate of etawah government of uttar pradesh on 1st july 1937. on the same day he was asked to officiate in the post of arranger. he was sent back to the post of paid apprentice on 24th december 1937 but was again appointed as arranger in officiating capacity on 3rd of january 1938. while holding the post of paid apprentice he had been ap pointed in various posts on officiating basis. according to the tribu nal the appellant was appointed to the government service on permanent basis to the post of companyyist on 1st of august 1941 and as such he did number companye within the purview of fundamental rule 56 c i . we have examined the admitted entries in the service book of the appellant which are on the record. he was final ly promoted and appointed to a permanent post of companyyist in a substantive capacity on 1st of august 1941. he came to the government of india on deputa tion in march 1943 and thereafter retired from service on attaining the age of 58 years in february 1976. the appellant claimed that having entered government service on permanent basis before 31st march 1938 he was entitled to companytinue in service till the age of 60 years under fundamental rule 56 c i and his retirement on attaining the age of 58 years was illegal. fundamental rule 56 c i is reproduced as under a ministerial government servant who entered government service on or before the 31st march 1958 and held on that date a lien or a suspended lien on a permanent post or shall retire from service on the afternumbern of the 1st day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years. the central administrative tribunal principal bench new delhi dis missed the application of the appellant holding that the appellant was only an apprentice under training prior to 1st of august 1941 and as such was number holding any employment under the state on permanent basis. shankar vaidyalingam and ms. seita vaidyalingam for the appellant. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kuldip singh j. the question for our companysideration in this appeal is whether the appellant is governed by funda mental rule 56 c i and as such entitled to superannuation at the age of 60 years. number t 322/ 85 cw 293/77 . dutta govind das mrs. sushma suri and ms. indra sawhney for the respondents. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1899 of 1989. from the judgment and order dated 20.2.87 of the central administrative tribunal principal bench new delhi in t.a.
1
dev
1990_78.txt
Sardar Raghbir Singh claimed the whole of Bunga Sarkar and its appurtenant shops as well as 1/3rd of the Bunga Mai Mallan and of the appurtenant shops. These properties companyprised two items called Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Mallan and the shops appurtenant to each of them. Sardar Balwant Singhs claim was companyfined to 1/3rd share in Bunga Mai Mallan and in the appurtenant shops. The Tribunal by its decision dated the 4th November, 1935, decided that the properties which had been declared as the properties of Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh respectively, should be declared to be their personal properties and that the rest of the properties claimed to belong to Bunga Sarkar and Bunga Mai Mallan should be declared to be Sikh Gurdwaras and as properties appurtenant thereto. It was also declared that these two Gurdwaras and the properties held to be appurtenant to them should vest in the management of Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh by virtue of and as per terms of the companypromises. The petition under section 8 filed by the Granthis was companytested by the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee Statutory and after recording some evidence, the Tribunal came to the companyclusion that Bunga Sarkar was a Sikh Gurdwara and declared it as such on the 28th August, 1935. This resulted in 1 an objection under section 8 by the Granthis objecting that this was number a Sikh Gurdwara, and 2 two other objections by Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh, already previously above referred to, under section 10 of the Act claiming the properties as their own and objecting to the claim made that they were Sikh Gurdwaras. The case of the plaintiff Committee is that these properties were, and were determined to be, a Sikh Gurdwara, by name Gurdwara Bunga Sarkar, by the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal by its decree dated the 4th November, 1935 and companyfirmed on appeal therefrom by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, on the 16th June, 1936 and that accordingly the Committee was entitled to possession of the properties. The plaintiff in the appeal is the Committee of Management of Sikh Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar except the Gurdwara Sri Akal Takhat Sahib, Amritsar . The other 1/3rd share in Bunga Mai Mallan was apparently treated by these claimants as belong ing to some other person who was number a party to these proceedings. One was by Sardar Balwant Singh dated the 8th March., 1928 and the other was by Sardar Raghbir Singh dated the 10th March, 1928. As against these decrees two appeals were presented by the Sikh worshippers to the High Court and the only question that ultimately appears to have been raised was that the direction given by the Tribunal to the effect that the properties should remain in the management of the claimants, Sardar Raghbir Singh and Sardar Balwant Singh, was illegal. On the objections under section 10 numberices were given to the Committee of Manaaement as well as to the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee but they declined to become parties to it. The companytest under section 10 of the Act was only as between the claimants and some of the Sikhs who filed the petition under section 7. The plaint was filed under section 25 A of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, Punjab Act VIII of 1925 hereinafter referred to as the Act for possession of certain properties situated in Amritsar, marked and bounded as specified in the plaint and purporting to have been declared as a Sikh Gurdwara by the Government of Punjab under section 17 of the Act by means of the numberification No. This is an appeal on leave granted by the High Court of Punjab against its judgment affirming the decree of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal dated the 19th December, 1940, dismissing the plaintiffs suit. 73 of 1941 arising out of the Decree dated the 19th day of December 1940 of the Sikh Gurudaras Tribunal, Lahore in Suit No. The net effect of the companypromises was that some out of the items claimed were admitted to be the private property of the respective claimants and the rest as wakf bungas for the Yatries to Sri Darbar Sahib, that the number personal properties were to remain in the management of the claimants, their heirs and representatives as such wakf with certain stipulations as to how that management was to be carried on. The facts that have led up to the present appeal are as follows After the Act was passed and within one year of its companymencement the then existing number statutory Shiromani Gur dwara Parbandhak Committee filed a list under section 3 of the Act claiming the suit properties and certain other items attached thereto as belonging to the Gurdwara Harmandir Sahib. There were two companypromises one relating to each of the applications. Objections were filed to this list by way of two applications under section 8 of the Act claiming these as private properties. At the hearing before the Tribunal both sides relied upon the previous companypromises in support of their respective claims. These objections under sections 8 and 10 and presumably also the petition under section 7 were forwarded to the Tribunal for its decision under section 14 of the Act. It may be numbericed that the numberification under section 7 3 of the Act was within a few days after the companypromise decrees in the proceedings under section 5 of the Act and it does number appear whether the companypromises were brought to the numberice of the Government or number. Gurbachan Singh and R. S. Narula, for the appellant. These objections were filed on the 5th April, 1930. The parties to these proceedings entered into a companypromise on the 6th february, 1930. Appeal from the judgment and Decree dated the 20th day of June 1950 of the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla in Regular First Appeal No. Achhru Ram, Naunit Lal with him , for the respondents Nos. 9 G dated the 3rd March, 1937. March 24. 11 of 1938. On these facts a number of companytentions were raised by both sides before the High Court as well as before us. L. Mehta, for the respondents Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNADHADAS J. 11 of 1954. 3 to 5. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. I and 2.
0
train
1955_116.txt
They exhorted him to strike at Kailash. The gravamen of the charge against them was that the said three persons came on a motor cycle Ganeshi and the other caught hold of Kailash Soni and exhorted Daljeet Singh to strike him. reads as follows At this both Pappu appellant and Ganeshi said strike at his Daljit. On that Daljeet Singh gave 2 3 blows with his kripan to kailash Soni which resulted in his instantaneous death hereinafter referred to as the deceased . The appellant and two others, namely, Daljeet Singh and Ganeshi were tried for offences, under Section 302 and Section 302 r w Section 34 I.P.C. On companysidering the evidence produced by the prosecution, the learned Additional Session Judge companyvicted Daljeet Singh under Section 302 appellant and Ganesh under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. JUDGEMENT QYADRI, J. by the learned Additional Session Judge No.1, Sri Ganganagar. To examine the companytention of the learned companynsel, we have perused the First Information Report and the statement of Mohan Mujral pw 1 . and sentenced each one of them to life imprisonment and fine of Rupees five hundred, in default thereof to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The relevant allegation in the F.I.R. Against their companyviction and sentence, they filed appeal in the High Court. By judgment and order of March 17, 1992, the High Court upheld the companyviction and order of the High Court, by special leave the appellant has filed this appeal.
0
train
1998_723.txt
The Advisory Board approved the detention. Along with detention order detenu was served with grounds of detention and other relevant documents on 21.2.1997. The detenu did number produce any witness for examination and did number state before the Advisory Board that he wanted to examine witnesses. He was heard against the detention order. Order of detention was passed on 20.2.1997. Both the representations were duly companysidered by the Advisory Board. underlined for emphasis The undisputed position, therefore, is that the detenu did number produce any witness for examination and even did number state before the Advisory Board that he wanted to examine the witness or that the witness was present. The High Court was of the view that it was number necessary to deal with the other aspects, and only on the ground that the detenu was denied opportunity to produce witnesses quashed the order of detention. Pursuant to the said mittimus, the detenu was lodged in the Nasik Road, Central Prison. The order of detention was passed on the ground that detention of respondent hereinafter referred to as the detenu was necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The High Court was of the view that since there was numbermaterial to show that Advisory Board had enquired from the detenu whether his witnesses were present, opportunity of examining witnesses when he was interviewed by the Advisory Committee on 5th April, 1997, was denied. The major ground of challenge was that the detenu was number granted opportunity of producing witnesses before the Advisory Board to prove his innocence, though a representation was made in this regard on 1.3.1997. The order of detention was challenged before the High Court on several grounds. The said detenu has submitted two representations dated the 1st March, 1997 and 21st March, 1997 through the Superintendent, Nasik Road Central Prison, Nasik. State of Maharashtra in this appeal questions legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court quashing order of detention passed by the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai in purported exercise of powers under Section 3 2 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities Bootleggers Slumlords and Drug Offenders Act, 1981 in short the Act . The High Court quashed the order only on the ground that there was violation of the principles of natural justice as well as the fundamental rights protected under Article 22 5 of the Constitution of India, 1950 in short the Constitution . 2004 3 SCR 295 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1
train
2004_238.txt
A witness was sought to be treated as hostile by a public prosecutor on the ground that he gave answers in favour of the defence during cross examination. The trial judge declined to permit the public prosecutor to cross examine the witness as per an order passed by him. The C.B.I. By the impugned judgment, the High Court declined to interfere. which was prosecuting the case took up the matter before the High Court. Hence, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
0
train
2001_565.txt
First Information Report of the occurrence was lodged at 3.30 p.m. at Police Station Gunnore on February 23, 1984 by Ram Lakhan PW 1. Injuries were also caused to Ram Lakhan PW 1 and Sahodara Bai PW 7. That apart, the lodging of the report at the police station at 3.30 p.m. in respect of occurrence which took place at about 11 a.m. cannot be said to be delayed lodging of the report. In brief, the prosecution case is that on March 23, 1983 at about 11 a.m. at Village Chhigamma Police Station Gunnore, the appellants along with Ram Sahai and Uma Shankar on account of previous enmity, attacked deceased Halke who was sitting in the house of Khajju causing him several injuries to which he succumbed later on. The anxiety of their relations was naturally to provide first aid to them, rather than to rush to the police station to lodge the report. Ten accused, including the eight appellants Ram Saha has number filled any appeal and Uma Shankar has since died in jail were tried for offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and Sections 148 and 147 IPC. This appeal under Section 2 of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act,1970, is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No.1326 of 1985, vide which the judgment of acquittal recorded in favour of the appellants and two others by the Additional Sessions Judge was set aside. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR ANAND, J.
1
train
1994_940.txt
As regards the entitlement for proportionate pension from the State of U.P. A dispute arose as regards his entitlement for pension and proportionate distribution of pension between the State of U.P. In view of the circular of the Government of India referred to earlier, the Government servant will be entitled to proportionate pension for the service rendered as a temporary Government servant under the State Government. companytended that prior to 1.7.1989 the temporary Government servants were number eligible for any pension under the provisions of Rule 368 of the Civil Service Pension Rules, The Government have companysidered and decided on the said date that proportionate pension would be granted if the Government servant has put in qualifying temporary service of at least 10 years. When the interest was number paid on pension quantified, the appellant filed the present writ petition in the High Court claiming proportionate pension from U.P. and the Government of Bihar. Since the appellant had number put in the qualifying service, he is number eligible for the pension. The next question is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of interest on the delayed fixation of pension by the State of Bihar? The payment of the pension of the appellant and the revised pension and arrears were detailed in paragraph 10 of SLP filed by the appellant himself at pages 16 17 as under That the pension of petitioner was fixed or revised and the arrears thereof paid as per details given below No. Having companysidered the respective companytentions, the question arises whether a Government servant who was on temporary service is entitled to the proportionate pension, after his regular employment in another State Government service in terms of the circular dated March 31, 1982? The State of Bihar in their companynter affidavit has mentioned that the pension was in companyrespondence between various departments etc. Under those circumstances, since the appellant has number rendered 10 years of qualifying service, he is number eligible for proportionate pension from the State of P. even if we assume, without deciding whether Central rule would apply to a Government servant under two State Governments, one on temporary basis and the other as permanent employee. He was appointed, thereafter, in the services of the Government of Bihar. Service w.e.f. Government and also for interest. for the period he served between December 9, 1955 to January 7, 1959, Shri K. Jain learned Senior companynsel for the appellant, placing reliance on the letter written by the Union of India dated March 31, 1982 at page 39 of the paper book , companytended that the appellant is entitled to the proportionate pension even for temporary service rendered by him. December 1, 1982 while working in the workshop as Superintendent of the Government Polytechnic at Patna. He wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of Patna High Court on November 28, 1993 on the basis of a judgment rendered by that Court on August 4, 1992 stating that he would be entitled to interest on the delayed payment of pension and gratuity. After working for four years he was selected by Bihar Public Service Commission by direct recruitment and was ap pointed in the Government Polytechnic under the Department of Science and Technology on January 6, 1959 and he resigned from the U.P. Rohtagi, learned Senior companynsel for the respondent State of U.P. We have heard learned companynsel on both sides, The appellant was appointed on temporary basis as Assistant Master on December 9. and was posted at Kanpur. The High Court instead of treating that letter as a writ petition directed the appellant to make a representation to the Government and the Government would companysider and dispose of the claim for payment in that behalf. Shri A.B. Shri Jain companytends that this rule has numberapplication for the reason that it has companye into force with effect from 1.7.89. January 7, 1959. 1581 dated 30.11.90 Rs. 466.00 May, 1985 P.P. In CWJC. The State of P. was a party to the above resolution and, therefore, they are bound by the same. He retired w.e.f. 11563/93 by judgment dated July 11, 1995 the High Court dismissed the writ petition. 1996 SCR 4 SUPP 566 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted. Thus this appeal by special leave. No.
0
train
1996_1965.txt
3941 of 2008. The appellant was appointed as a sub staff by the respondent Bank on 8.11.1989 on daily wage basis and subsequently his services were terminated on 12.9.1992. 50,000/ by way of companypensation in lieu of reinstatement into service. In his claim statement, he had asserted, that, the termination of his services by the respondents is illegal, irregular and invalid, and therefore, had requested the Labour Court to pass an award for a direction to the respondents to reinstate him into service with all companysequential monetary and service benefits. The Labour Court vide its order dated 31.12.2007, while allowing the claim in part, has directed the respondents to pay a sum of Rupees Fifty Thousand only Rs. Leave granted and heard companynsel for the parties insofar as the award of back wages is companycerned. The award passed by the Labour Court was the subject matter of the writ petition before the High Court at the instance of the workman. Aggrieved by the order of termination, the appellant had raised an Industrial Dispute in the year 1996. This is an appeal by Special Leave against the judgment and order dated 23.5.2008 of the Delhi High Court in W.P. C No.
1
train
2009_1766.txt
On this, the appellant appears to have filed O.S.No.37 of 1985 after a period of seven years of agreement against Kalli Raja Rao for specific performance of companytract, before the Subordinate Judge, Eluru. The said agreement discloses that respondent Kalli Raja Rao had taken a loan of Rs.20,000/ Rupees twenty thousand only from the State Bank of India, Eluru Branch, in the year 1969 and he companyld number repay the loan, as such, he intended to sell his land, and the present appellant Telikicherla Sesibhushan agreed to repay the loan amount with interest due from Kalli Raja Rao, to the Bank. Consequently, the Bank instituted a suit being O.S.No.208 of 1981 against the debtor for recovery of the amount before the Subordinate Judge, Eluru. Since the companymitment made by the appellant was number fulfilled by him regarding the repayment of the loan amount, as such, Kalli Raja Rao filed suit being O.S. The factual matrix of the case is that respondent Kalli Raja Rao since dead agreed to sell the property measuring an area of Ac.19.96 cents situated at Pulla village of Eluru Taluk for an amount of Rs.80,000/ Rupees eighty thousand only under the agreement of sale Ex. No.28 of 1985 before the Subordinate Judge, Eluru against the appellant for recovery of possession of land which he had delivered to him at the time of aforesaid agreement of sale. The suit filed by the Bank for recovery of Rs.46,408.85 was decreed with interest on 31st December, 1986 and the same attained finality. A.1 and further companysidering the fact that number only the suit being O.S.No.208 of 1981 filed by the creditor Bank was decreed against the debtor but it attained finality, the Courts below have companymitted numbererror of law in refusing to decree the suit of the appellant for specific performance of companytract. It appears that the appellant though made certain payments but failed to repay the entire loan amount with interest. S.No.28 of 1985 and O.S.No.37 of 1985 were disposed of vide companymon judgment and order dated 12th June, 1996. Both the suits i.e. In the present case, as discussed above, due to the failure on the part of the appellant to repay the loan in terms of the agreement dated 10th May, 1980 Ex. 37 of 1985 of the trial Court. On finding inaction on his part, the suit was filed in September 1978. PRAFULLA C.PANT,J. A/1 dated 10th May, 1980. Later, in the said suit the present appellant got himself impleaded as a party. These two appeals are directed against the companymon judgment and order dated 15th June, 2007 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Appeal Suit Nos.2652 and 2052 of 1996. It appears that both the parties preferred appeals against the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial companyrt, and the same were disposed of together by the High Court with the following companycluding paragraph In the result, A.S. 2052 of 1996 is dismissed companyfirming the decree and judgment in O.S. The vendors are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited by the vendee pursuant to the orders of this Court. This factual position has been highlighted in the plaint itself. However, while evaluating mesne profits the amounts deposited by virtue of this Courts order namely Rs.50,000/ per year should be given effect to. In the said paragraph it has also been described as to how after the lawyers numberice was issued the plaintiff met the defendant. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the papers on record.
0
train
2014_404.txt
This appeal arises out of the following facts Four persons, A 1 Anisetti Veerabhadra Rao, A 2 Anisetti Venkata Ramana, A 3 Anisetti Ramulu and A 4 Anisetti Sesharatnam were put on trial for offences punishable under Section 448 read with Section 34, 302 and 302 read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. The houses of the accused and that of Yanamandra Subba Rao since deceased were separated by a path. The accused were however slighted and aggrieved as they felt that a personal dispute had been made public by the deceased and as a companysequence of this ill will, A 1 and A 2 had often threatened him with dire companysequences. A 3 had hired the tractor belonging to the deceased about 5 or 6 years prior to the date of occurrence and he was to pay him a sum of Rs.3000/ towards the hire charges but as this amount had number been paid over a period of time, PW 10 Kona Bapiraju intervened in the dispute and pursuant to a settlement, A 3 had paid the hire charges. At about 600 p.m. on the 12th August, 2001 the deceased was sitting in front of his house when A 1 and A 2 attacked him. A 1 and A 2 thereafter caused several other injuries to the deceased. As per the prosecution story the four accused were closely related to each other A 1 and A 2 being the sons of A 3 and A 4. He attempted to ward off the blows but his right hand got severed in that process.
0
train
2011_72.txt
On February 11, 1981 the appellant was offered a temporary post of Chowkidar in the National Cooperative Development Corporation Respondent No. By an order dated June 30, 1983 the appellant was informed that companysequent on the abolition of 5 temporary posts of Chowkidar his services as well as those of 4 other Chowkidars have been terminated under Regulation 12 of the National Cooperative Development Corporation Service Regulations hereinafter referred to as the Service Regulations . After the formalities of acceptance were over the appellant was issued an order of appointment extracted below on March 7, 1981 and he assumed charge on the same day The General Manager, National Cooperative Development Corporation, is pleased to appoint Shri Bachi Ram as a temporary Chowkidar in the National Coop. After some more time had lapsed, the appellant was again offered service and was appointed on February 20, 1984 as a Peon on temporary basis by the second respondent. The appellant then laid a claim that he is entitled to permanency of service as well as companytinuity of service together with attendant benefits from the date of termination of service till his re employment as Peon on February 20, 1984. The representation did number meet with success, but after a short interval of time the appellant was offered a temporary post of Chowkidar in the Regional Office of the second respondent at Bangalore, but he declined the offer for reasons of his own. Corporation w.e.f. The power to terminate the Services of an employee may be exercised by the appointing authority. We may also appositely extract the order of termination of service issued to the appellant on June 30, 1983. 3.3.81 FN at a basic pay of Rs. The terms of the appointment were that the appointee would be on probation for a period of two years from the date of assuming charge of the post and the period of probation would be subject to extension at the discretion of the appointing authority and furthermore the appointment was liable to be terminated at any time without numberice during the period of probation and thereafter on one months numberice or on payment of one months salary in lieu thereof on either side. Shri Mohan Singh Negi 3. 690/85 filed by him before the Delhi High Court, required companysideration as to its companyrectness. 690/85 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Delhi. 196 3 220 EB 3 232/ , and until further orders. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed the petition on August 7, 1985 holding that as the posts of Chowkidar had been abolished there was numbermerit in the Writ Petition and that if the appellant had number been paid one months salary he can move the appropriate Court. The appellant made a representation to the second respondent that he may be given appointment in some other capacity in view of the fact that he is an ex serviceman and the sole bread winner for a family of 10 members. Shri Mohan Singh 2. 196/ p.m. in the scale of pay of Rs. sd S. Pathania Deputy Director Admn. Special leave has been granted for this appeal on the sole ground that a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Textile Committee v. K.A Malani 1983 1 S.L.R. P. 416, heavily relied on by the appellant to challenge the dismissal of Civil Writ Petition No. The appellants claims were rejected by the second respondent and hence he filed Civil Writ Petition No. Natarajan, J. It is the companyrectness of this order which is sought to be challenged in the present appeal. The limited facts which call for mention for the purposes of this appeal are as under. 2 herein . Name 1.
0
train
1986_141.txt
4,15,000 and the sale proceeds have since been lying with the Chief Presidency Magistrate. The respondent, the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, started proceedings for companyfiscation of these goods tinder s.167 8 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. It was stated in the numberice that the special licence was issued on the express companydition that the goods companyered by the said licence should be utilised for companysumption as raw material or assessories in the factory of the licence holder and that numberpart thereof should be sold or permitted to be utilities by any other party, that the appellants sold a portion of the goods imported under the said licence to others in Breach of the said companydition and that, as the appellants infringed the said companydition, the goods, or the money substituted in its place, were liable to be companyfiscated. But in a revision against that order, the High Court on January 16,1953, directed the goods to be sold by the Presidency Magistrate and the sale proceeds to be kept in his custody. While these proceedings were pending an order was made by the High Court on January 16, 1953, directing the seized goods to be sold and the sale proceeds kept with the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta. 4,15,000. 3,33,333, together with the customs duty paid on the said goods. On October 8, 1948, a licence was granted to the appellant to import from the U.S.A. a large quantity of electrical instruments, namely fluorescent tubes and fluorescent fixtures. On June 8, 1952, the appellants filed an application before the Chief presidency Magistrate for the release of seized goods on the ground that they were deteriorating, but that was dismissed. The appellants companytend that the proceedings are entirely without jurisdiction as the Collector can companyfiscate only when there is an import in companytravention of an order prohibiting or restricting it and in the present case the Collector was proceeding to companyfiscate on the ground that a companydition of the licence under which the goods had been imported had been disobeyed. On December 9, 1950, the appellants filed an application before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, for the return of the seized goods, whereupon the learned Magistrate called for a report from the Special Police Establishment, New Delhi. The licence was issued subject to the companydition that the goods would be utilised only for companysumption as raw material or accessories in the licence holders factory and that numberportion thereof would be sold to any party. After the aforesaid proceedings had companye to an end, the Collector of Customs, Calcutta on August 28, 1955, served a numberice on the appellant to show cause why the moneys lying with the Chief presidency Magistrate representing the imported goods should number be companyfiscated under s. 167 8 of the Sea Customs Act, read with s. 3 2 of the Act of 1947 and why further penalty should number be imposed on them under these provisions. On the same day, the Assistant Collector of Customs filed a companyplaint before the said Magistrate against appellant No. On March 24, 1955, the appellants filed an application before the Chief Presidency Magistrate for making over the sale proceeds to them and the said Magistrate issued a numberice to the Assistant Collector of Customs and also to the Delhi Special Police Establishment to show cause on or before April 19, 1955. The goods were sold accordingly and they fetched a sum of Rs. Pursuant to this order the goods were sold for a sum of Rs. On August 31, 1949, the said Police establishment obtained a search warrant from the Chief presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, and seized, among others, from the appellants godown a large stock of fluorescent tubes and fixtures, and left them with the appellants on their executing a bond. Soon thereafter, the authorities companycerned are said to have got information that the goods were being sold in the market in breach of the companydition of the licence. The numberice stated that a prohibition on the import of the goods except under a special licence and subject to the companyditions stated in it was imposed under s. 3 1 of the Act of 1947 and that by virtue of this prohibition the importation of the goods would be deemed to be illegal unless I at the time of importation of goods were companyered by a valid special licence which had number been caused to be issued by fraudulent misrepresentation, 2 after importation the goods or any part of them were number sold or permitted to be utilised by any other party, except the importers for companysumption as raw material. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondent, the Collector of Customs, Calcutta, from taking any proceeding pursuant to the numberice under ss. On September 27, 1948, the appellant Company filed an application with the Chief Controller of Imports, New Delhi for the grant of a licence to import 20, 000 fluorescent tubes and 2,000 fluorescent fixtures from the United States of America. 2 and others for companymitting an offence under s. 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act,, 1947 hereinafter called the Act, for having sold a portion of the stock of fluorescent tubes and fixtures in companytravention of the terms of the licence and the same was registered as Case No. In the application for the licence it was stated that the goods were number required for sale but for modernising the lighting system of the appellants factory at Ellore in Madras. Thereupon the police took steps and after obtaining a search warrant from a Magistrate in Calcutta on August 12, 1949, seized a large stock of the goods from the godown of the appellants. But numberrevision was filed against the order of the Presidency Magistrate discharging appellant No 2 of the offence under s. 420, Indian Penal Code. The goods duly arrived in India and were cleared out of the customs sometime about the end of February, 1949. The Assistant Collector of Customs filed a revision to the High Court against the order of discharge of appellant No. After certain proceedings to which it is unnecessary to refer, the accused persons were discharged by a Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta on July 27, 1953, under s. 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the prosecution under so. His argument may be summarized thus 1 The Collector of Customs has jurisdiction to companysider under s. 167 8 if the Sea Customs Act whether the goods are imported companytrary to the restrictions imposed under the Act, and, therefore, the High Court companyld number issue a writ of prohibition against the said authority from proceeding with the inquiry. The appellants had brought into India from the S.A. a large quantity of electrical instruments under a licence. On June 3, 1955, the appellant filed an application in the High Court at Calcutta under Art. The appellants, therefore, ask for a writ of prohibition directing the Collector to stop the proceedings. Chunder, J., who heard the revisions, set aside the orders of discharge made by the Presidency Magistrate and remanded the cases for fresh disposal. On April 19, 1955, the Superintendent, Special Police Establishment, did number show cause, but the Assistant Collector of Customs asked for an adjournment and the same was granted till May 7, 1955 and again on May 7, 1955, he took another adjournment of the hearing of the application on the ground that departmental proceedings were pending against the appellants. It also stated that investigation had revealed that portion of the goods were sold by the appellants to other people. On May 9, 1955, the appellants filed a revision in the High Court, presumably, against the order adjourning the application and the said revision was numbered as Revision Case No. On June 28, 1951, the learned Presidency Magistrate discharged all the accused in both the cases under s. 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure after holding that numberprima facie case had been made out against any of them. 5 of the Act and held that the said section penalised only a companytravention of an order made or deemed to have been made under the said Act, but did number penalise the companytravention of the companyditions of licence issued under the Act or issued under a statutory order made under that Act, and dismissed the revision. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ, including a writ in the nature of prohibition, against the Collector of Customs from companytinuing with the proceedings initiated by him. 2 was neither guilty of the offence under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code, as, in his view, there was numberfraudulent or dishonest inducement at the time the appli cation for licence was made, number of any companytravention of the provisions of the Act. On May 28, 1955, the respondent started a proceeding purported to be under s. 167 8 of the Sea Customs Act, read with s. 3 2 of the Act and called upon the appellants by numberice to show cause within seven days from the date thereof why the said proceeds, namely, Rs. After remand, the Presidency Magistrate took the evidence of innumerable witnesses for the prosecution and for the defence, companysidered a number of documents and discharged appellant No. On information alleged to have been received by the Chief companytroller of imports that the appellant Company was selling the goods to various parties, the matter was placed before the Special Police Esta blishment Government, of India, Now Delhi. The application, in the first instance, came up before Sinha, J., who by his order dated March 18, 1957, dismissed the application as premature but, in the companyrse of his judgment, the learned Judge agreed with the earlier division Bench, which disposed of the revision against the order of discharge, that a breach of a companydition alone would number be a violation of the order passed by the Central Government, but he observed that the learned Judges on the earlier occasion did number decide the question as to what was permitted to be imported he drew a distinction between a licensee who imported goods perfectly bona fide for his own companysumption but who later changed his mind and a licensee who, even from the inception, knew that he did number require the goods for his own use, but entered into the transaction fraudulently in the second situation, he learned Judge proceeded to state, the goods imported were never goods required for the petitioners companypany for its own use. One of them was a prosecution of various officers of the appellant companypany including the second appellant under s. 420 read with s. 120 of the Indian Penal Code on the allegation that the licence bid been obtained on false and fraudulent representations as there was numberintention at any time to use the goods for any factory. Sen J., who delivered the judgment of the High Court said that it was difficult to hold that a companydition of the licence amounted to an order under the Act and unless the penal section included the companytravention of the companydition as an offence it companyld number be held that such a companytravention amounted to an offence under the section. 1124 of 1953 came up before a division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, Consisting of Mitter and Sen, JJ., and the learned Judges, by their judgment dated March 3, 1955, dismissed the revision holding that there had been numbercontravention of the order made or deemed to be made under the Act. On January 9 12, 1951, the said Police Establishment submitted a Challan against appellant No. 167 and 182 of the Sea Cus toms Act against the appellants. though the said appellant filed an application for payment of the same the learned Magistrate adjourned the said application till August 29, 1953. This proceeding resulted in a acquittal by the trial Court which was companyfirmed by the High Court at Calcutta on March 3, 1955. 23 I.T.C./43 issued under r. 84 of the Defence of India Rules which by virtue of s. 4 of the Act of 1947 is to be deemed to have been issued under that Act, it was ordered that DO electrical instrument companyld be brought into India except under a licence. The Criminal Revision No. C. 120 of 1951 and the same was registered as Criminal Revision No. The learned Judges dismissed the appeal solely on the ground that it was within the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs to ascertain whether there had been a companytravention of the relevant provisions of the Act as would entail an order of companyfiscation and that, therefore, Sinha, J., was right in refusing to issue a writ but they made it clear that all the questions raised in the case were left open for decision by the Chief Controller of Imports. 4,15,000 and the money has since then been in the custody of the said companyrt. Two revisions were filed against that order in the High Court one by the State and the other by the Customs Authorities. Thereafter on January 12, 1951, two proceed. The application was first heard by Sinha, J, and was dismissed. The appellants are Messrs. East India Commercial Co., Ltd., a companypany having its registered office in Calcutta and the Director of that Company. Sarkar J. delivered his own Judgment and the judgment of Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J. SARKAR, J. After receipt of the numberice the appellants moved the High Court at Calcutta under Art. 4,15,000 should number be companyfiscated and also why Penal action should number be taken against them. In the sale subsequently made at the instance of the High Court, the stock seized fetched a sum of Rs. SUBBA RAO, J. It may be mentioned at this stage that the value of the stock imported was about Rs. he did number make over the sale proceeds to him. C. 120 of 1951. 2 and others for alleged offences under s. 4201120B of the Indian Penal Code and the same was registered as Case No. 383 of 1960, Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 5, 1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. The appellants preferred an appeal to a division Bench of of the High Court, companysisting of Das Gupta, C.J., and Bachhwat, J. V. Vishvanatha Sastri, E. R. Mayer, Noni Kumar Chakravarti and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellants. The first appellant is a companypany and the second appellant, one of its directors. 23 ITC/43, dated the 1st July, 1943, incorporating all amendments upto the 25th November 1951. Though he discharged appellant No. 582 of 1955 and it was adjourned from time to time at the request of the respondent. C. 121 of 1951. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of a division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta dated January 5, 1957, companyfirming the order of a single Judge of that Court dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under Art. 1124 of 1953 he also obtained an interim stay of the return of the money to appellant No. It is this numberice which gave rise to the proceedings with which we are companycerned. 4,66,000 i.e., the purchase price of Rs. Daulat Ram Prem and D. Gupta, for the respondent. He held that appellant No. The application was accompanied by a companyering letter. The learned Judges companystrued a. 2 in both the cases. The appellants have number approached this Court in further appeal by special leave. ings were started. An appeal by the appellants to an appellate bench of the High Court also failed. 54 of 1957. 2 passed in case No. May 4. By Notification No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Hence the present appeal.
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1962_436.txt
This led to an exchange of hot words between the accused and his father following which the accused slapped his father and the father also slapped the accused. The deceased agreed to this arrangement and went out of the house and the accused, his friend and the deceased sat outside the companyplainants house where the accused and his friend then companysumed liquor. The deceased intervened at that stage and asked the accused as to why he was abusing his father and remonstrated with him on that account. The accused nevertheless insisted that the deceased should at least companye out of the house and sit with them. At that moment, the accused accompanied by his friend, who was a neighbour and also a friend of the deceased, came to the house of the deceased and asked him to join him for a drink. The father of the deceased also intervened in the quarrel and tried to separate them but he was pushed aside. The accused, however, turned on the deceased and told him that he was numberody to interfere in a dispute between him and his father and a quarrel ensued between the two. The accused then took out a knife from his pocket and stabbed the deceased in his chest causing him a serious injury leading to his death. It appears that after short time the accused started talking in an incoherent manner on which his father came out and seeing his companydition got annoyed and asked the accused to leave the place and to stop drinking. While the quarrel was going on Leena, P.W.5, the sister of the deceased and several others also came to the spot. The deceased, however, replied that as he had already had his dinner he was number inclined to take any liquor. and after having dinner with his family members was sitting in the house companyversing with them. On 5th November, 1988, the deceased had gone to his duty at 800a.m. This appeal by way of special leave exemplifies the companysequences of uncontrolled drinking and the dangers that go with it. and returned at 730p.m. A case under Section 302 of the IPC was accordingly, registered against the accused and on companypletion of investigation he was put to trial.
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2010_1179.txt
The trial Judge acquitted the Respondents number on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove its case, but upon holding that the sanction which had been accorded for the prosecution of the accused, was improper and had been given without application of mind. Though, the learned Special Judge found the trap to have been proved, he acquitted the Respondents on the ground that the sanction to prosecute the accused had been granted without application of mind. At that time, Ghanshyamdas G.D. Sharma had been serving as Special Inspector, Excise and the sole Respondent herein, Harishankar Bhagwan Pd. Tripathi, was serving as a Clerk in the said establishment. Aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge, the prosecuting agencies filed Criminal Appeal No.294 of 1994 before the Jabalpur Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which, by its judgment and order dated 31st March, 2008, reiterated the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal upon holding that the sanction accorded by the State Government under Section 6 of the Act suffered from number application of mind, since in the sanction order only the facts of the prosecution case had been mentioned and numberreason had been given for according sanction in regard thereto. ALTAMAS KABIR, J. Leave granted.
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2010_1110.txt
The interview was companyducted by the PSCU from 18th December, 2003 to 22nd December, 2003. The 2003 Rules were numberified on 31st July, 2003. The candidates who had cleared the written examination were called for interview from 18th December, 2003 to 22nd December, 2003. The interviews were companyducted between 18th December, 2003 to 22nd December, 2003. Under the 2001 Rules, there was numberprovision for adding 10 marks to the total marks of written test and interview in the category of trained apprentices. The result of the written examination was declared on 10th July, 2003. In the numberification dated 31st July, 2003, Rule 5 4 provided that for the purpose of selection, the marks obtained in the written examination would be added in the marks obtained in the interview, but for preparing the final merit list, the candidates who had companypleted apprenticeship would be given extra 10 marks in addition to the marks obtained by them in the written examination and interview. Under the 2001 Rules, the marks to be given for the interview companyld number be more than 12.5 of the written examination. This was sought to be introduced by the 2003 Rules which came into force on 31st July, 2003. The written examination had to be companyducted by IIT, Roorkee as the PSCU did number have the necessary infrastructure. However, by letter dated 29th April, 2004, it was clarified that 10 marks were to be added to the total marks obtained by the candidates who had companypleted apprenticeship, only where the direct recruit candidate and the apprentice candidate stood on equal footing. The written examination was held by the IIT Roorkee on 12th January, 2002. By the aforesaid judgment, the High Court has given a direction to the appellant to give weightage of 10 bonus marks to the trained apprentice candidates as per the Uttaranchal Subordinate Service Emergency Direct Recruitment First Amendment Rules, 2003 in the selection held by UPSC and after adding 10 marks, merit list of the selected candidates be prepared and recommended for the appointment to the Government. Written examination in respect of aforesaid advertisement was held by IIT, Roorkee on 12th January, 2002. Aggrieved by the number grant of additional 10 marks, large number of unsuccessful candidates in the apprenticeship category filed a number of petitions, seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the appellant to make a selection after giving benefit of 10 additional marks to all the candidates who had companypleted apprenticeship. Thereafter, only the result was to be declared and the appointments were to be made on the basis of merit obtained by the candidates in the selection process. It appears that a numberification was issued on 31st July, 2003, superseding all the existing rules and regulations of selection process in regard to direct recruitment of Junior Engineer in various departments. Thereafter, the selected candidates shall be governed by the Service Rules and the Government Orders applicable in the Government. Thereafter, the selected list of the successful candidates was prepared and forwarded to the State Government on 15th May, 2004. The terms and companyditions of the advertisement were strictly in companyformity with the 2001 rules. of Uttaranchal Department of Personnel Notification Misc. 149, 129, 135, 136, 137, 147, 148, 162, 169, 255, 302, 186, and 300 of 2004. These appeals have been filed by the Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal, Haridwar hereinafter referred to as PSCU challenging the judgment dated 2nd March, 2006 of the High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital rendered in Writ Petition Nos. On 27th November, 2001, the State issued an advertisement for filling up the vacancies of Junior Engineers, which was accompanied by a prescribed format of the application form. In the writ petition filed before the High Court, the petitioners had claimed that the preference had to be given to the trained apprentices in view of the directions by this Court in the case of U.P. SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. The numberification reads as under Govt. State Road Transport Corporation Anr. It has been further directed that the aforesaid order shall survive for one year from the date of its publication.
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1947_391.txt
She was named Nivedita. Since then Nivedita is in the custody of respondent No. 1 to retain the custody of Nivedita, the childs step mother Maureen applied for permission to adopt Nivedita who had by then been companyverted to Christianty. Nivedita companytinued to remain in the care and custody of the appellant. 1 filed an application for rescinding the order appointing the appellant as the guardian of the person of Nivedita. the appellant, expressing her desire that Nivedita should be brought up under her care in India. The Court, however, appointed the appellant as the guardian of the person of Nivedita. On the appellant expressing her willingness to look after the child, Nivedita was sent to India via Bombay where the appellant received her. The child then remained in the custody of the appellant. Leter, he returned to India on December 14, 1984, After reaching India he obtained a duplicate passportfor Nivedita and thereafter with the help of his associates picked up Nivedita fromher school ignoring the protests of the Head Mistress of the School. 1 sent the Child to a Christian school. 1 forcibly took the child to S.A via Singapore. After thus removing the child from the lawful custody of the appellant, respondent No. 1 and his three companypanions who had assisted him in procuring the child at the Madras Airport. In April 1979, the companyple along with the child moved to the United States of America, the Child travelling on an Irish passport. 203 of 1984, for appointing her as the guardian of the person of the minor child under the provisions of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, Respondent No. 1 to retain the custody of the child on the ground that the Indian Courts had violated the due process clause. 1 and his newly married wife Maureen. 1s Advocate sought permission to be examined in place of respondent No. The Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, ultimately dismissed the fathers application for rescinding the earlier order by which the appellant was appointed the guardian of the person of the child. In October 1979 Geetha wrote to her mother. 1s Advocate withdrew from the guardianship proceedings. 1 was thus represented in the said companyplaint through his Advocate. In March 1980 Geetha returned to India presumbly because her husband had developer intimacy with an American girl and had started to ill treat her. 1 and his associates. 234 of 1985. 1 and the other respondents and on companypletion of the evidence respondent No. 1 and his three companypanions who had aided and abetted him in the Court of the IVth Metropolitan Magistrate. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.3.1992 of the IVth Metropolitan Megistrate, Hyderabad in Crl. In the companyplaint lodged against respondent No. 1 under section 313 of the Code. The first respondent married the American girl, with whom he had developed intimacy, sometime in the year 1983 84 and embraced Christianity. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that the appellants daughter Geetha married respondent No. As staed earlier the Superior Court, New Jersey, having permitted respondent No. On that permission being granted the adopted mother and respondent No. Hyderabad, which came to be numbered as C.C.No. 1 sometime in October 1976 according to Hindu rites and thereafter left for Ireland. The appellant also filed a companyplaint alleging kidnapping against respondent No. This permission was granted and he was examined under section 313 of the Code. A daughter was born to the companyple on July 27, 1978 in Ireland. However, the child was number produced before the Court and the Court ultimately dismissed the application against which a Special Leave Petition was filed in this Court. In the said criminal companyplaint after framing the charge for kidnapping evidence of the prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the Advocate for respondent No. 92/92 in C.C. On companypletion of the examination the appellant number being satisfied with some of the replies given by the Advocate filed an application prayino that respondent No. In the meantime, the Supreme Court in New Jersey U.S.A., was moved which companyrt passed an order permitting respondent No.1 to retain No. 1 entered an appearance in the said proceedings through his Advocate and sought time to file a companynter. Despite his entreaties, respondent No. Thereupon the appellant filed an application in the Court of the Chief judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, being O.P. 1 original accused No. 623 of 1993. respondent No. Respondent No. 1 should be directed to personally appear in Court and be examined under section 3 13 of the Code. Solicitor General and Ms. A. Subhashni for the Respondents. On the other hand while the application under Section 482 of the Code was pending in the High Court, the father of respondent No. 1 applied for exemption from personal attendance which was granted on companydition that he will appear whenever called upon to do so by the companyrt. 398 of 1993. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India K. Venugopal, L.K. The HeadMistress immediately filed a companyplaint with the companymissioner of police and informed the appellant about the same who in turn lodged a First Information Report in that behalf. Within a week after her arrival in India she companymitted suicide by setting herself on fire. On enquiry the appellants son traced respon dent No. Process was issued in the said proceedings land the accused persons were duly served. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J. Pandey and S. Anand for the Petitioner. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. No. This Court also rejected the Special Leave Petition. M.P. Special leave granted. WITH Writ Petition No. P. Gupta.
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1993_266.txt
They have appointed the respondents as teachers in the Secondary School. Their honorarium is paid out of fees from the children and other donations received by the school. To cater to the educational needs of children of persons employed in the ordnances factory at Ambazari the Central Government has sanctioned and is running a Primary School from classes I to V. In the same premises, the employees of the ordance factory, by their own arrangement are also having a Secondary School with classes VI to X. the applicants who have worked as teachers in past should be first companysidered for the posts and only if they are found unsuitable should candidates from sources like the Employment Exchange be companysidered Once the procedure outlined above is companypleted all persons selected should be appointed on a regular basis and on remuneration admissible to the regular teachers of the primary school v Similar procedure should also be followed in respect of posts of peon giving Shri Tadas an opportunity of companypeting for regular appontment vi Till the exercise outlined above is companypleted which we hope will be done before the academic year 1989 90 companymences the present procedure may companytinue and such of the applicants as are selected for appointment will be subject to the same companyditions of service as before. 480/1989. The directions issued by the Tribunal are as follows The respondents will immediately take up an assessment of the needs of the school to carry on its activities at their present level and the number of additional teachers required for this purpose ii After assessing the number of teachers needed, the respondents will proceed to create a sufficient number of posts to be filled up on a regular basis iii After companypleting the above exercise respondents will take steps to fill up the newly created posts in accordance with recruitment rules to be framed for the purpose. The Union of India and the officers of the ordnance factory have challenged the validity of these directions in Civil Appeal No. They are paid honorarium and number full salary. the respondents, however, approached the Central Administrative Tribunal seeking regularisation of their services and demanding equal pay for equal work. Terdal, A.K. Gambhir, Dr. B. L. Wadhera, Sudarshan Menon, P. Parameshwaran and G.D. Gupta for the appearing parties. Srivastava, C.V, Subba Rao, S.K. From the Judgment and Order dated 21.6.1988 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench in O.A. The respondents who have number been recruited as per the directions of the Tribunal have preferred Civil Appeal No. The Tribunal has allowed their claim with certain directions to the appellants including the Union of India. 233 of 1991 etc. C. Mahajan, S.N. 58 of 1988. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1991_180.txt
He also denied that Asaram had taken out the knife and assaulted the accused number1. On 28.08.1993, when the accused appellants were proceeding to report the incident at the police station, Asaram allegedly tried to prevent them from doing the same and as a result a scuffle broke between the accused No.1 and the deceased Asaram. 2 numbericed that Asaram had over powered her husband appellant No.1, she therefore caught hold of the genitals of Asaram and tried to rescue appellant No.1. They have been charged with the murder of one Asaram, as a result of a scuffle that took place between the accused and the deceased. Andhale P.W.8 and also lodged an F.I.R against the deceased Asaram for companymitting rape on his wife appellant No. Thereafter, Asaram took out a knife from his pocket and made an attempt to stab appellant No.1. On the other hand, it has been companytended by the prosecution that the accused appellant No.2, numbericing that the deceased Asaram had over powered the accused appellant No.1, caught hold of his genitals and facilitated accused appellant No. It is further companytended by the learned companynsel, that the deceased Asaram during the companyrse of the scuffle, fell on the knife, thus causing injuries to himself. 2, murdered Asaram and whether the accused are entitled to the benefit under Exception 4 of Section 300, IPC? The accused appellant No. It was companytended that this evidence clearly supports the findings recorded by the Trial Court that Asaram died homicidal death on account of the injuries sustained by him by means of a sharp weapon like a knife. In the scuffle, the wife, accused appellant No. It is further companytended by the prosecution that Madhav, the companyplainant filed his companyplaint which came to be registered as F.I.R for an offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC, which after the death of the deceased Asaram was companyverted to Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. It has been companytended by the learned companynsel on behalf of the appellants that on 27.08.1993 at about 6.00 p.m. when it was raining, Asaram entered the house of the appellants and raped appellant No.2, in the absence of her husband appellant No. The evidence of PW 4 and PW 5 further supported the description of the incident as narrated by PW 3. The blood stained clothes of the deceased were sent for chemical analysis along with the weapon knife and the blood samples of the accused and the deceased. The deceased was taken to the hospital at Jalna in a tractor. 2 by holding the genitals of the deceased had virtually disarmed him, giving accused appellant No. The incidence was witnessed originally by the companyplainant, Madhav Gore who died during the pendency of the trial as well as Kishan Mohite PW 2 , Pandurang PW 3 and Prahlad Mohite PW 4 . The accused No.1 removed the knife and proceeded towards the police station where he produced the kife before the P.S.I. The possession of the deadly weapon by accused number 1 and the injuries inflicted on the deceased that were caused on his vital parts were attributed to accused number1. Further, as companytended by the prosecution that the High Court has rightly held that the defence plea raised by the accused number1 has been falsified by the ocular evidence of PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4. Charges were framed against both the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, which the accused companysequently denied and claimed to be tried. On the basis of the aforesaid rival legal companytentions, evidence of the prosecution witnesses on record and the reasoning taken by the companyrts below, the following points would arise for companysideration of this Court Whether the death of Asaram was homicidal in the light of the evidence produced by Prosecution Witnesses? 1 to give blows with knife. The body was sent for post mortem to Dr. Anil Digambarrao Jinturkar PW 5 on 28.08.1993. It is further companytended by the prosecution that during the cross examination of PW 3, he has stated that there was numberrain during the night of the incident alleged rape . The doctor at Jalna hospital directed that the deceased be taken to the Government Medical College Hospital at Aurangabad as he was in serious companydition. 1 the opportunity to catch hold of his companylar and inflict him with blows with the knife. An FIR was originally lodged by Madhav Gore, the companyplainant, who had witnessed the incident. Dr. Anil Jinturkar PW 5 , in his disposition has stated before the Trial Court that the injuries had been caused within 6 to 12 hours before the post mortem and in his cross examination, he specifically denied the suggestion that injuries 1 and 2 were possible my means of fall over the knife or during the scuffle. In addition to 3 eye witnesses, panch witness Fakir Mohite PW 1, was examined to prove spot punchnama. The deceased was therefore, brought by the police to the Ghati Hospital at Aurangabad, where, the doctor on examination of the injured, declared him dead. Whether the appellants in furtherance of their companymon intention, to take revenge of the alleged rape on accused No. Hence, it was a premeditated act to attack the deceased. 255 of 1999 by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, whereby the High Court upheld the Trial Courts decision of companyvicting the appellants under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code in short IPC on the charge of murder of one Asaram and sentencing them to life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.1,000/ and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for one year. 2 under Section 376 of the IPC. Initially, the crime was registered under Section 307 read with Section 34 of IPC. The evidence of the three eyewitnesses is number impaired in any manner and the accused number2 had companytradicted her statement made in the companyplaint. In justification of failure to lodge a companyplaint on the very same day, it is companytended by the learned companynsel on behalf of the accused appellants that it was raining heavily on the date of occurrence of the crime therefore, they companyld number approach any villagers or the police station. The necessary relevant facts are briefly stated hereunder The accused appellant Nos. The accused came to be arrested on the very same day and charge sheet was filed on companypletion of the investigation. The Head Constable Babula Labhange PW 7 , while proceeding towards the said village met the injured and recorded his dying declaration at about 10.45 a.m. on the same day. The cause of death as described by the doctor was hemorrhagic shock due to stab injury over the chest and abdomen involving liver and lung. Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Trial Court, the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court of Bombay, pleading provocation on the part of the deceased and lack of evidence and prayed for reversal of the companyviction and sentence. 1 and 2 are husband and wife respectively, who are the residents of Village Motigavan in Jalgaon District in Maharashtra. The Judicial Magistrate, 1ST Class companymitted the case to the Sessions Court at Jalna on 19.02.1994. What order? GOPALA GOWDA, J. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the verdict of the Trial Court. Hence, the present appeal. A seizure Panchanama was made. The present appeal is filed by the appellants praying to set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court, urging various grounds. 1 and children. This appeal is filed by the appellants against the judgment and order dated 20.01.2004 passed in Criminal Appeal No.
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2 was forwarded for verification to Scheduled Tribe Caste Scrutiny Committee the Scrutiny Committee for short . The Scrutiny Committee, after giving the respondent No. 2 requested for more time, which was granted by the Scrutiny Committee. 2 was number interested in prosecuting the inquiry before the Scrutiny Committee. 2 to appear before the Scrutiny Committee on January 29, 1999 along with all necessary documents. Therefore, the Scrutiny Committee adjourned the hearing to June 26, 2000. 2 appeared before the Scrutiny Committee on April 24, 2000, but prayed to grant time. 2 was subject to verification of his tribe claim. 2 and directed the Scrutiny Committee to decide the matter afresh after affording necessary opportunity of hearing to him. 2 did number appear before the said Committee at all and, therefore, the Scrutiny Committee decided to close the matter of verification of tribe claim of the respondent No.2, by order dated November 13, 2000. 2 was number interested in proceeding further with the inquiry before the Scrutiny Committee and was delaying the entire proceedings on some or the other pretext. The tribe Certificate produced by the respondent No. He challenged the order terminating his services as well as order dated November 6, 1997, passed by the Scrutiny Committee. 2 was holding the post of Assistant Teacher temporarily, which was specifically reserved for Scheduled Tribe. 2 appeared before the Scrutiny Committee on January 29, 1999, but requested for grant of time and, therefore, he was called upon to appear on December 30, 1999. 2 an opportunity of hearing, invalidated the tribe Certificate by decision dated November 6, 1997. It was pointed out to the Division Bench of the High Court, hearing the said matter, that interview was fixed by the Scrutiny Committee on November 6, 1997, but the respondent No. 2 appeared before the said Committee on December 30, 1999 and prayed to grant time. 2 was appointed as Assistant Teacher by order dated October 6, 1992 companyrect date of the appointment is January 16, 1993 by the appellant on the post reserved for Scheduled Tribe and even if the certificate indicating that he belongs to Scheduled Tribes was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee, he would be entitled to get protection in service in view of Government Resolution dated June 15, 1995 because he has submitted a validity certificate indicating that he belongs to Special Backward Class. 2 was selected by the Subordinate Selection Board from the Scheduled Tribes category and was appointed as Assistant Teacher temporarily on January 16, 1993. Briefly stated the facts of the case are as follows Claiming that he belongs to Scheduled Tribe, the respondent No. 879 of 1999, the respondent No.2 applied to the Government to reinstate him in service claiming that he belongs to S.B.C. 2 applied to the appellant to appoint him as an Assistant Teacher. 2 was number reinstated in service. 2 by order dated May 4, 1998. 2 filed Writ Petition No. 879 of 1999 challenging the order dated May 4, 1998 by which his services were terminated by the appellant. 1660 of 1998 before the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court. 1764 of 2003 challenging the order dated May 4, 1998 terminating his services. 2 filed writ petition No. 2 received numberice in that behalf on November 12, 1997. Therefore, the appellant terminated services of the respondent No. 2 indicated that he was a Hindu Koli. Again, the respondent No. After dismissal of the writ petition, the respondent No. 2, i.e., Gajanan Sadashiv Ghule, was allowed by setting aside the order of termination of his services dated May 4, 1998. The said Resolution dated June 15, 1995, inter alia, specifies as to which Caste should be companysidered as Special Backward Class. The Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, by judgment dated April 17, 2000, dismissed the said writ petition with the observation that the respondent No. category and should be granted protection of Government Resolution dated June 15, 1995. The High Court set aside the order dated November 6, 1997 invalidating caste claim of the respondent No. 1764 of 2003 whereby writ petition filed by respondent No. Thereupon, the respondent No. In spite of the protection given by the Government, the respondent No. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment dated August 31, 2004, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in Writ Petition No. Therefore, he filed Writ Petition No. Thereafter, the respondent No. The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, has allowed the same by judgment dated August 31, 2004, giving rise to the instant appeal. 2 was accepted by the High Court. The respondent No. The appointment of the respondent No. Some of the documents submitted by respondent No. The Rural Development and Water Conservation Department of the Government of Maharashtra, therefore, addressed a letter dated February 6, 2002 to the appellant stating that the respondent No. On the said date also the respondent No. The Court further directed respondent No. After a lapse of about three years from the date of dismissal of Writ Petition No. The said submission made on behalf of respondent No. M. PANCHAL, J. The record shows that thereafter the respondent No. By the said letter the appellant was directed to take necessary action in the matter. This Court has heard the learned companynsel for the parties and companysidered the documents forming part of the appeal.
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After disposal of the revision application on 11.12.2003, an application was filed stating that the matter has been companypromised between the victims and the accused persons and, therefore, the order should be modified. The said application was rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that there is numberscope for modification of the order after disposal of the revision application. It is vehemently companytended by the learned companynsel for the appellants that as the dispute was amicably settled and the matter was companypromised, the High Court ought to have granted permission to companypound the offences and ought number to have companyvicted the appellants and imposed the sentence. Though in support of the appeals, many points were urged on the factual aspects, we find that the Courts below have companycurrently found that the accused persons were responsible for injuries on the victims Ratnabai and Manik and, therefore, in view of the evidence of the eye witnesses, more particularly, the injured witnesses there is numberscope for interference with the companyclusions arrived at. The benefit of Bombay Probation of Offenders Act in short the Probation Act was number extended to the appellants looking into the nature of the offence companymitted. In other words, the companyviction was maintained for all the four accused persons but different sentences were imposed. It was next submitted by learned companynsel for the appellants that occurrence took place on 1.3.1993 and more than a decade has elapsed and in the meantime the parties have sorted out their differences, entered into companypromise and, therefore, the High Court should have accepted the prayer for modification of the order.
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2004_683.txt
4093 of 1991 and A. The industrial alcohol manufactured by the distillery at Captainganj was captively companysumed. The State was held to be entitled to realise the vend fee for the period prior to 25th October, 1989. On 9th October, 1979, the State of P. withdrew the exemption from payment of vend fee purchase tax on industrial alcohol. It held that once the levy for the period prior to 25th October, 1989 was saved further steps companysequent upon such levy were equally saved and recovery in respect of the dues prior to 25th October, 1989 companyld be effected by the State. On 8th October, 1970 the appellant had been exempted from paying vend fee which was leviable under the P. Excise Act, 1910. 4093 of 1991 Somaiya Organics India Ltd. vs. State of U.P. Subsequently, on the matter being referred to a Bench of Seven Judges, by the second Synthetics case decision in 1989, the validity of the provisions of the said Acts permitting levy of excise duty in the form of vend fee was struck down prospectively. The said companypany had established a plant at Barabanki for manufacture of intermediaries out of industrial alcohol. Its promoter companypany had sold and transferred to the appellant industry distillery located at Captainganj. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 29th August, 1990 in Somaiyas case interpreted the direction in the second Synthetics case relating to prospective declaration to mean that for the period prior to 25th October, 1989 the amount payable in respect thereto companyld be recovered. 20018 of 1991 Civil Appeal No. As numbericed hereinabove, vide decision of a Division Bench of this Court in first Synthetics Chemicals case rendered on 19th December, 1979 the validity of the impost was upheld. DELIVERED BY N.KIRPAL, J. RUMA PAL, J. 2853 of 2001 arising out of SLP C No. In view of this apparent companyflict these appeals were referred to a larger Bench. Anr. It is in pursuance thereto that these appeals have been heard. During the pendency of the writ petitions interim orders were passed by the High Court whereby the petitioners before it were required to give a bank guarantee and or pay to the State the amounts directed by the Court which, in an earlier order, the High Court had directed that it should be kept by the State in a separate account. With C.A. This was challenged by the appellant by filing writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court. No.
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2001_307.txt
IPAL, cannot claim to be employees of AIDC which was only a Promoter Company. The role of AIDC was merely to assist IPAL as its promoter for setting up its project. Paper Project for sake, called as ESKPP under IPAL, raised a dispute for number payment of salaries of its members by AIDC after October 1998 on the plea that the members of the appellant were number the employees of AIDC but of the IPAL. In support of its claim, AIDC mentioned that the Govt. of Assam vide Notification dated 23.2.88 re constituted the Board of Directors of IPAL Insofar as issue No.2 is companycerned, it was stated that since the ESKPP of IPAL was number owned by AIDC, the appellants were the employees of IPAL, and AIDC being a numberal agency of the State Government for implementation of various projects as promoter only, cannot be saddled with any responsibility of the employees of IPAL and the appellants members were number the employees of AIDC Besides IPAL, the AIDC promoted several other companypanies like Fertichem Ltd., Assam Syntex Ltd. Assam Petrochemical Ltd. etc. Whether the Assam Industrial Development Corporation AIDC is justified to deny to take the responsibility of the Industrial Papers Assam Ltd. employees, though the employees were appointed by the AIDC through the advertisement published in the News Paper. As regards issue No.3, the companytention of AIDC was that they were already overstaffed for which Voluntary Retirement Scheme had already been introduced to reduce excess manpower and as such absorption of employees of IPAL in AIDC did number arise. AIDC claimed that under numbercircumstances AIDC companyld be called as owner of the project because IPAL was a separate Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 with an independent Board of Directors having its separate Memorandum and Articles of Association. The appellant claims to be the Union of employees of M s Industrial Papers Assam Ltd. in short the IPAL . Regarding issue No.1, it was stated that AIDC, being a promotional organization, had also promoted the IPAL by signing various documents and agreements with IPAL since it was in the nascent stage for the project for protection of ESKPP at Dhing. The employees who were claimed by the appellant to be the employees of AIDC, on being appointed in pursuance of the advertisement, were number the workmen as defined under the Act. Management of Assam Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. in short the AIDC was allowed while dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. While the writ petitions filed by the AIDC was allowed and one filed by the appellant was dismissed. Apart from the preliminary objection so raised as mentioned above, AIDC gave its reply in respect of all other issues. Whether The management of AIDC is justified by number absorbing or engaging the employees of the IPAL, in their other Promoted industries or give them salary regularly though they have failed to install or run the proposed Paper Mill in Dhing, Nagaon. In pursuance of the numberice, both the AIDC and the appellant filed their respective written statements and additional written statements. The issues are quoted below Whether the management of Assam Industrial Development Corporation is justified to deny as owner of the Sack Kraft Paper Project of M s Industrial Papers Assam Ltd. IPAL , though they have signed an agreement with a companytractor as owner of the Sack Kraft Paper Project, Dhing District Nagaon, Assam. Learned Single Judge held that since workmen were number employees of the AIDC, the question of giving them benefit as done by the Labour Court did number arise. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows The appellant, being the registered Trade Union, looking after the welfare of its members employed by AIDC in its Extensible Sack Kraft. Such dispute had only been raised by the IPAL Employees Union, the appellant, which did number represent the persons appointed as per the advertisement. AIDC, in their written statement, raised preliminary objection, specifically with the issues under reference, inter alia, questioning the maintainability of the reference stating that the purported dispute referred to by the Notification is number an industrial dispute within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter called as the Act and the Notification issued by the Government cannot companystitute an industrial dispute because AIDC was number a proper or necessary party and the members of the appellant, being employees of a separate companypany i.e. Learned Single Judge held that there is a clear cut finding in the Award to the effect that workmen were number employees of AIDC, and therefore, the question of giving them benefit as was done by the Labour Court did number arose and companysequently that part of the Award was quashed. And the AIOC should number recruit or appoint new employees to say other their Promoted Industries until and unless the employees of the Industrial paper are engaged or absorbed by the Management. If number, then the said affected employees are entitled for either regular monthly salary from the management or absorption in the other Industrial Units promoted by the Assam Industrial Development Corporation, Guwahati. Both the writ petitions were directed against the Award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Assam, at Guwahati hereinafter referred to as the Labour Court . The Labour Court issued numberice dated 22.5.1999 to the respective parties to the alleged disputes. and those are managed by their independent Board of Directors. vide numberification dated 20.2.1999 referred the following issues to the Labour Court for adjudication. According to them, numbere of 11 categories of posts advertised, mentioned in the reference itself, were workmen as defined under the Act arid the persons appointed against those posts had number raised dispute. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The writ appeal was directed against the companymon judgment and order dated 7.5.2002 passed by learned Single Judge wherein the writ petition filed by the respondent No.2 i.e. Accordingly the appropriate Govt.
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2007_1043.txt
the mills should companypulsorily purchase raw jutes only from the Jute Corporation of India. A writ of and or order and or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued companymanding the respondents to allocate and supply companysignment of raw jute as per productivity numberms of Jute Manufacturers Development Council for manufacture of B Twill Jute bags of 665 gms. First Appellant is owner of a jute mill. Indisputably, the Jute Commissioner sent the particulars of the said Production Control Order to the Jute Corporation of India Ltd. for the purpose of issuing necessary sale companytract in order to enable the Jute manufacturers to take delivery of the requisite quantities of raw jute specified in the production companytrol Order which the jute manufacturers were required to companypulsorily purchase from the Corporation. In exercise of the power companyferred upon him under the said Order, the Jute Commissioner issued Production Control Orders PCO to various jute mill owners directing them to manufacture BTwill Gunny Bags of specified quality upon companypulsory purchase of raw jute from the Corporation. By reason of the said order, powers were companyferred on the Jute Commissioner to regulate stock of raw jute, fix price and companytrol production thereof. The quality of raw jute supplied by the respondent under the companytract of sale was said to be of much inferior quality. For fulfilling its undertakings, allegedly, they had to purchase raw jute on credit from the open market. The price for the said bags was arrived at upon taking into account hundred percent JCI in raw jute linkage i.e. A writ of and or order and or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued companymanding the respondents number to force the petitioners to companypulsorily purchase raw jute from the respondent No. Admittedly, Appellants did number purchase raw jute from the respondent No.1 for the period of October 2003 to April, 2004. 1 for effecting supply of B Twill gunny bags of 665 gms under the various production companytrol orders. In exercise of power companyferred upon it under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, Government of India made an Order in the year 2000 known as Jute and Jute Textile Control Order, 2000. Indisputably, again the Commissioner in exercise of its power companyferred under Section 3 3 of the Control Order fixed the price of 50 kg B Twill jute bags for the delivery in the month of December 2002 provisionally at Rs. 1566 of 2004 and A.P.O.T. 1712.77p per hundred bags. Apprehending that numberfurther raw material would be allotted to it, and or punitive action will be taken against them, a writ petition was filed by the appellant before the Calcutta High Court inter alia praying for the following reliefs A declaration be passed that the respondent number 2 does number have any power, companypetence and or authority to direct and or order the petitioners to companypulsorily purchase raw jute from the respondent number 1 for effecting supply of B Twill gunny bags of 665 gms. A writ of and or order and or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued companymanding the respondent number 2 to desist from forcing the petitioners to supply B Twill gunny bags at the lower of the price prevailing for the period month as mentioned in the individual Production Control Orders and that prevailing for the period subsequent thereto in the event your petitioners are otherwise unable to supply B Twill gunny bags within the period as mentioned in the individual purchase order. 291 of 2006, A.P.O.T. 962, 966, 967, 969, 970, 971 972 of 2004 and A.P.O.T. 973 of 2004 respectively. 962 966 to 973 of 2004 Dear Sirs, With reference to your letter number. 212 of 2004 WP No. 4878 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP C No. 4879 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP C No. On or about 6.7.2004, the Corporation issued a letter to the which reads as under Re T.No. 399 of 2006 in W.P. nil dated 30.06.2004 and 02.07.2004 on the above subject we would like to advise you to make payment arrangement of the 1/6 one sixth quantity of pending companytracts along with the carrying companyt within 7 seven days from the date of receipt of this letter, as per Clause 5.0 of the Sale Contracts which has already been intimated to you vide our letters dated 7.1.03, 17.11.03, 8.10.03, 4.12.03, 16.12.03, 26.12.03, 13.1.04, 16.1.04, 6.2.04, 19.2.04, 04.03.04, 19.3.04, 22.3.04 and 12.4.03. 400 of 2006 in W.P. Arising out of SLP C No. 401 to 406 of 2006 in WP Nos. 1343 of 2007 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 862 OF 2007 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. However, factum of entering into a sale companytract by the appellant with respondent No.1 is number in dispute. 1602 of 2007 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. It may please be numbered that since the relevant Sale Contracts have already been sent to you, the question of issuance of fresh companytract does number arise. Despite, making the aforementioned prayers, the appellant however, made an offer before a learned Single Judge of the High Court that the backlog would be cleared within six months in six equal installments after opening a letter of credit and if any payment is to be made by them, they will take necessary steps therefor. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said interim order, the appellant deposited the amount, in question. Factual matrix being in narrow companypass, we will numberice the relevant facts. Non compliance of the directions was to result in application of penal provisions. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 15.12.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in APO No. No.
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On post mortem it was found that the deceased had injuries on her person including the ligature mark 20 cm x 2 cm on the front, right and left side of neck, reddish brown in companyour starting from left side of neck, 2 cm below the left angle of jaw passing just above the thyroid cartil age and going upto a point 2 cm below the right angle of jaw. Noticing ligature marks on the neck of her sister, Ram Kishan PW5 telephonically informed his parents about the death and himself went to the police station to lodge a report Exh. After investigation the prosecution presented the charge sheet against Rakesh Kumar, husband of the deceased and Ram Piari, the mother in law of the deceased. Ramesh Kumar, brother in law and Bharti, sister in law of the deceased were originally shown in Column No.2 of the report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He also found them guilty for the companymission of offence under Section 306 and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years besides paying a fine of Rs.250/ each. It was a shocking occasion for Ram Kishan, PW5 when he came to deliver some customary presents to her sister on the occasion of Karva Chauth, a fast observed by married women for the safety and long life of their husbands, when he found the dead body of his sister Sunita lying at the entrance room and the respondents were making preparations for her cremation. The parents of the deceased were allegedly number informed about her death. The respondents were also found guilty for the companymission of offence punishable under Section 498A IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.250/ each. The revision petition filed by the father of the deceased was dismissed holding that the same had numbermerits. The appellant, the father of the deceased, filed a separate companyplaint under Section 302 and 304B of the Indian Penal Code against all the respondents. After recording some evidence, Ramesh Kumar and Bharti were also summoned as accused. LITTTTTTTJ Sunita Kumari married on 9th July, 1985 was found dead on 23rd October, 1988 at the residence of her in laws at Batala in Punjab. The respondents herein filed an appeal in the High Court against the judgment of companyviction and sentence passed against them by the Trial Court and the appellant, father of the deceased, filed a revision petition against the said judgment praying for enhancement of the sentence to imprisonment for life on proof of the charge under Section 304B of the IPC. The criminal case filed by the appellant was also companymitted to the Sessions Court and both the appellants companyplaint and the police case were heard and decided together by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur who, vide his judgment dated 28th August, 1990, companyvicted the respondents under Section 304B IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo 10 year Rigorous Imprisonment. The death was found to have occurred number under the ordinary circumstances but was the result of the asphyxia. All these sentences were to run companycurrently. Both the appeals and the revision were heard together by a learned Single Judge of the High Court who vide her judgment impugned in this appeal acquitted the respondents of all the charges. SETHI,J.
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2000_342.txt
Soman PW 3 was the brother in law of the deceased who was informed about the quarrel between deceased and the accused persons. The deceased allegedly made a dying declaration before them implicating the accused persons. Only one injury was inflicted on the head which was the fatal injury. Since the accused persons were attacked, they exercised their right of private defence and tried to protect themselves and if on account of that the deceased sustained injuries there was numberoffence involved. Though the deceased was taken to the hospital he breathed his last at about 2.25 a.m. on 17.6.1994. The injuries were caused mostly on the hands, legs and ribs. The four appellants faced trial for allegedly having caused homicidal death of one Kuttappan hereinafter referred to as the deceased on 16.6.1994. They pleaded that the actual occurrence was suppressed by the prosecution and, in fact, the deceased attacked them and caused injuries on A 1 and A 2. The accused persons pleaded innocence. Rajan PW 2 was said to be an eyewitness. 3634/2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. The information was lodged with the police by Anil Kumar PW 1 . Trial Court after analyzing the evidence on record came to hold that the plea of right of private defence was number established. A 1 to A 4 were the authors of the crime. It also did number accept the companytention of A 4 that numberovert act was attributed to him and there was numbermaterial to bring him within the field of Section 34 IPC. 10 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. In support of the appeal, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court and the High Court have lost sight of relevant factors. Leave granted.
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2004_17.txt
670 of 1965 however, the Governor had promulgated the Madhya Pradesh Age of Compulsory Retirement Rules, 1965 under Art. 1 The Madhya Pradesh Age of Compulsory Retirement Rules, 1965 replacing the provisions of the , Government of Madhya Pradesh General Administration Department Memorandum No. But prior to that on February 28, 1963, by a memorandum No. During the pendency of that appeal Saksena attained the age of 58 years. Thereafter, by Government Notification dated November 29, 1963, F. R. 56 was amended on December 6, 1963 in exercise of the power under the Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, raising the age of companypulsory retirement of the State Civil Servants to 58 years with effect from March 1, 1963 but the clause in the aforesaid Memorandum, empowering the Government to retire servants above the age of 55 years by giving them three months numberice was number incorporated in the Rule. By r. 8, the aforesaid memorandum, dated February 28, 1963, was cancelled, and it was provided that numberwithstanding the cancellation of that memorandum anything done or any action taken in pursuance of the directions companytained in that memorandum shall be and shall always be deemed to have been done or to have been taken under the relevant provisions of these Rules. The appellant attained the age of 55 years on August 22, 1965 which was the age of superannuation according to Fundamental Rule 56 Ch IX governing the Civil Services of the State. By a deeming clause, these Rules were made effective from March 1, 1963. These orders will have effect from the 1st March 1963 . 1433 258 l iii /63, dated the 28th February 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum shall be deemed to have companye into force with effect from the 1st March 1963. The age of retirement was thereby raised to 58 years and under r. 6 thereof, the appointing authority was empowered to retire a Government Servant on his attaining the age of 55 years on 3 months numberice without assigning any reason. Anything done or any action taken in pursuance of the directions companytained in the memorandum shall be and shall always be deemed to have been done or taken under companyresponding provisions of the aforesaid rules as if the aforesaid rules were in force on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken and shall number be called into question in any companyrt on the ground that the provisions of the A memorandum were number issued in the form of rules made by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh under Art. On September 11, 1963, the respondent passed an order retiring the appellant from service with effect from December 31, 1963. On February 10, 1967, after the judgment by this Court, the State promulgated an ordinance which was replaced on April 20, 1963 by the Madhya Pradesh Shaskiya Sevak Anivarya Sevanivitrika Vidhi manyatakaran Vidyayaktakaran Vidyeyak Adhiniyam 1967 Act 5 of 1967 validating the retirement of certain Government servants, including that of the appellant, despite the judgment of this Court. These Rules were published in the Government Gazette of July 17, 1965. As, how ever, the appellant attained the age of 58 years, in August, 1966 it is number possible number to direct that he should be put back in service. Hence, the order, dated September 11, 1963, of Saksenas companypulsory retirement became valid as the basis of this Courts judgment dated January 30, 1967 was removed. By virtue of this Act, the State is vested with a right number to pay the dues of the appellant from the date of his retirement December 3, 1963 onwards. to a large number of officers who had been retired under the said memorandum which was treated to be a rule and which the Supreme Court held was number an effective rule but merely an executive instruction 3 that the matter having once been decided by the Supreme Court, was barred by the principle of res judicata and 4 that the Rules give naked power to the authorities to retire any employee after he has attained the age of 55 years by giving him three months numberice, and provide numberguidelines for the exercise of this power. By its judgment dated January 23, 1967, this Court quashed the impugned order of retirement holding that The appellant will be deemed to have companytinued in the service of the Government in spite of that order. L. Sanghi, Bishamber Lal and M. Iyngar for the Appe llant In CA 131/71 . 504 and 92 of 1967 respectively . This appeal on certificate is directed against a judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the Appellants writ petition under Art. At the hearing of the earlier appeal, these Rules were number brought to the numberice of this Court. The appellant joined the service of the State Government as a A subordinate Judge in the year 1936. 309 of the Constitution. N. Phadke, S. S. Khanduja for the Appellant In CA 350/71 . The High Court negatived these companytentions, dismissed the writ ,, petition but granted a certificate under Art. From the Judgments and orders dated 2 5 1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. To impugn this order, the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court under Art. 131 of 1971 and 350 of 1971. On promotion, he was companyfirmed as District and Sessions Judge with effect from December 2, 1957. Necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations will be issued in due companyrse. But he will be entitled to such benefits as may accrue number to him by virtue of the success of the writ petition. The High Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment dated April 30, 1964. The appellant will get his companyts from the State throughout. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. 226 of the Constitution. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Petitions Nos. Before the decision of that appeal Civil Appeal No. N. Shroff for the Respondent In both appeals . The appellant came up in appeal to this Court.
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1976_4.txt
On 10.10.1975, the respondent called upon the appellant to re let the shop in the new building as he was a tenant in the old building to which numberreply was given by the appellant. In 1969, the trustees expressed their desire to demolish the old building and to companystruct a new building. Respondent herein surrendered his shop in the old building on 27.8.1969 after receiving numberice from the appellant indicating its intention to demolish the old building and to companystruct a new building. He further pointed out that on 10.10.1975, he had called upon the trustees to re let the shop in the new building to him as a tenant, to which numberreply was received. The old building was demolished in 1969 and the companystruction of the new building was companypleted by 1975. By judgment and order dated 6.2.1993, the lower appellate Court companycluded that the respondent was a tenant of the shop in the old building from 1950 and in 1969 the respondent vacated the shop in the old building when he was assured by the appellant that the shop in the new building would be re let to him after companystruction. By his written statement, the respondent pleaded that he was a tenant from 1950 of the shop in the old building. He did number resist the eviction as he belonged to the same companymunity as the trustees and as he was orally assured by the trustees that the shop in the new building would be re let to him. In the year 1969, the appellant companyveyed to the respondent and other tenants of the old building its desire to demolish the old building and in its place to erect modern shops so that higher rent companyld be fetched. PW2 was the managing trustee. The lower appellate Court believed the case of the respondent as the respondent had categorically called upon the trustees to re let the shop in the new building vide numberice dated 10.10.1975 to which numberreply was given by the trustees. The trial Court found that the respondent was a tenant of the shop in the old building from 1950 that in 1969 the respondent was asked to vacate the premises as the trustees desired to demolish the old building that the respondent had voluntarily vacated the premises and companysequently, the relationship of landlord and tenant ended on 27.8.1969, as there was numberintention to companytinue the tenancy or to re let the premises in the new building. In 1950 one of the shops was let out to the respondent defendant as a tenant. On the companytrary, after reconstruction, the respondent had specifically called upon the appellant to re let the shop in the new building to him. The evidence brought on record further shows that the old building was demolished around 1969 and by 1975 the new building stood companystructed. The respondent, therefore, submitted in his written statement that he had taken the possession of the shop in the new building as a tenant and number as a mortgagee. On 4.10.1976, the respondent paid Rs.16,200/ to the appellant against delivery of possession. P5, the said sum of Rs.16,200/ was to be repaid in full by virtue of respondent being in possession and enjoyment of the shop for three years. According to the written statement, Rs.16,200/ represented advance rent for three years Rs.450/ per month. The lower appellate Court also came to the companyclusion that Rs.16,200/ represented advance rent calculated Rs.450/ per month. On the same day, the respondent paid Rs.16,200/ to the appellant against delivery of possession. Thirdly, as found by the Courts below, Rs.16,200/ represented three years advance rent calculated Rs.450/ per month. In this companynection, PW2 has admitted, in his evidence, receipt of the letter dated 10.10.1975 from the respondent calling upon the trustees to re let the premises. According to the written statement, in 1976, a suggestion came from the trustees that they were ready and willing to companysider his offer if he was ready to advance Rs.16,200/ and if he was ready to pay increased rent of Rs.450/ to the appellant. On 1.10.1976, Ex. The undisputed facts are as follows AppellantKaveripatnam Subbaraya Setty Annaiah Setty Charities Trust was the owner of an old building in which there were 8 to 9 shops situated in Rave Beedi. P5 was entered into between the appellant and the respondent. Respondent herein and the trustees belonged to the same companymunity and, therefore, he surrendered possession of his shop pursuant to the above mentioned numberice. The respondent pleaded his inability to raise Rs.16,200/ upon which he was assured by PW2 that one Anjaneya Gupta father in law of PW2 would advance a loan of Rs.10,000/ against the promissory numbere. P5, it was recited that the appellant was in need of money and, therefore, a redeemable mortgage for three years had to be executed for Rs.16,200/ in favour of respondent. The trial Court further found that after 1.10.1976, the respondent did number pay rent that numberrent was fixed and, therefore, the respondent was in occupation of the shop as a mortgagee and number as a tenant. P5 was only a device to defeat the provisions of the said Act, 1961. However, numberreply was given by the appellant to his letter dated 10.10.1975. In this companynection the lower appellate Court placed reliance on the evidence of PW2. P5 dated 1.10.1976 was only a device to get over the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Act, 1961 . P5 violated the provisions of the said Act, 1961 and companysequently, it was void. Some of the tenants refused to surrender. Further, in his evidence, PW2, has admitted that the respondent herein had raised a loan of Rs.10,000/ from his father in law as suggested by him PW2 . The appellant as plaintiff has number brought on record the circumstances under which they claim that the original shop was voluntarily surrendered by the respondent. Appellant filed eviction petitions against those tenants under the said Act, 1961. The lower appellate Court on going through the entire evidence on record, both oral and documentary, companycluded that the respondent had taken the premises after the companystruction as a tenant and number as a mortgagee. In Ex. On 4.10.1976, Anjaneya Gupta advanced the said amount to the respondent. He further alleged that he had offered to pay Rs.6000/ and that he had also offered to pay rent Rs.335/ per month, to which numberreply was given. In the written statement, the respondent submitted that he was entitled to protection under the said Act, 1961. Under Ex. P5 in the light of the above mentioned circumstances, including the companyduct of the parties, the High Court held that the Ex. The trial Court companycluded that the respondent was number entitled to protection under the said Act, 1961. In the alternative, it was pleaded that Ex. On 12.3.1980, suit number41 of 1980 was instituted by the appellant in the companyrt of Principal Civil Judge, Mysore for possession, damages and mesne profits. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the respondent preferred Regular Appeal No.15 of 1985 before the District Judge, Mysore hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the lower appellate Court . Consequently, the trial Court decreed the suit filed by the appellant. In the circumstances, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit instituted by the appellant. At the time of admission, the following question of law was framed Whether the finding of the appellate Court that the self redeeming mortgage deed executed by respondent in favour of the appellant, as a void document, as being opposed to the provisions of Rent Control Act, is sustainable without a plea and an issue in that behalf? Being aggrieved by the decision of the lower appellate Court dated 6.2.1993, the appellant carried the matter in the second appeal to the High Court under section 100 CPC. The trial Court in this companynection placed reliance on the returns filed by the respondent under the Income Tax Act for the years 1977 78 up to 1980 81. On reading the terms and companyditions mentioned in Ex. The mortgage period expired on 1.10.1979. KAPADIA, J. This is an appeal by special leave filed by appellant plaintiff against the judgment dated 4th August, 1998 of the High Court of Karnataka companyfirming the judgment and order dated 6th February, 1993 passed by the District Judge, Mysore dismissing the suit filed by the appellantplaintiff holding inter alia that Ex. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. Hence, this civil appeal. They were evicted under the orders of the Court. The above facts were stated in the plaint.
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2004_937.txt
The Income tax Officer failed to include in the total income the share of profit from the Madras firm. In his return which he filed before the Income tax Officer at Calcutta he specifically disclosed his share in the income of the Madras firm. The Income tax Officer, however, companypleted the assessment for the aforesaid year as also the subsequent assessment year in which also the share of the income from the Madras firm had number been included. The profit allocation report of the share of profit from the Madras firm had been received in the office of the Income tax Officer In September 1955 and an order was recorded on the order sheet of the proceedings to that effect. had a share of profit from the Mysore Premier Metal Factory Madras of which he was 9 partner. On March 22, 1960 the Income tax Officer issued a numberice under Section 34 1 b of the Income tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called the Act, calling upon the assessee to show cause why the profits from the Madras Arm which had escaped assessment should number be included in the income. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in an Income tax Reference. 1685 of 1968. The assessee wrote a letter saying that he had fully disclosed the details of his income from all sources in his original return and numberhing had escaped assessment. In fact he had indicated that he had a share in the profits of the Madras firm and was also entitled to interest on the capital invested therein. The assessee went up in appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner which was allowed on the ground that the Income tax Officer had numberadditional information either externally or internally which came Into his possession subsequent to the making of the assessment to justify the action taken under Section 34 1 b . The Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal moved this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave and the same has been granted. 1685 of 1968 as numberreasons had been given in the order granting the certificate. H. K. Shah deceased, hereinafter referred to as the assessee. The Revenue appealed to the Appellate Tribunal which reversed the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in respect of the assessment year 1955 56. The assessment for the year in question was companypleted some time in November 1958. The assessee was H. K. Shah who is number dead and is represented by the present respondents. He was also carrying on other business and was being assessed at Calcutta. in C. A. 1080 of 1971 will be disposed of by his judgment and for doing so we shall refer to the printed record in C. A. Originally it has been brought by certificate but the same had to be revoked i.e. This appeal C. A. N. Grover, J.
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1971_294.txt
When the appeal was taken up for final disposal, the learned companynsel appearing for the parties stated that the parties have amicably settled the matter and the agreed terms of companypromise have been placed on record which have been signed by the learned companynsel for the parties. Order dated 5th September, 2008 of this Court indicates that the appellants had already paid a sum of Rs.1.26 crores, as directed, as part of one time settlement, therefore, the Court directed the parties to maintain status quo until the next date. Dalveer Bhandari, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay passed in Writ Petition No.2361 of 2007 on dated 21st August, 2008. The interim order was later on directed to be companytinued till further orders. Leave granted.
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2009_610.txt
Kha 75 of Gaya Charan. Kha 75. Kha 75 of Gaya Charan, deceased. Kha 5 and Kha 8 of Ram Shankar and jageshwar and the dying declaration Ex. Kha 75 does number say so. Gaya Charan left the hospital. Kha 75 of Gaya Charan and companysidered it to be a companyplete account of the occurrence and the assailants as seen by him. Kha 5 and Kha 8 respectively, recorded by a Magistrate at the hospital. Kha 5 and Kha 8 were made by Ram Shankar and jageshwar, who were examined as Court witnesses 1 and 2 respectively. Now, the evidence relied on by the High Court for the companyviction of Jagdamba Prasad companysists of the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the statement of jageshwar I, K. Kha 8 and the alleged dying declaration of Gaya Charan Ex. Kha 5 and Kha 8 which, as already stated, companyld number be used as substantive evidence, and the statement ex. Kha 75 of Gaya Charan and, presumably, also of the statements of the I prosecution witnesses, as the High Court has number specifically stated so. The view of the High Court about this statement of Gaya Charan may be quoted The dying declaration Ex. Statement ex. Statements exs. jageshwar identified the accused Jagdamba among the assailants. Ka 75 Kha 75 of Gaya Charan appears to be a companyplete account of the occurrence and the assailants as seen by him, for he stated Lallan, Chandu, Raj Narain, Sardar, Sri Prakash were going to the bazar. The evidence relied on for the companyviction of Moti Singh companysists of the dying declaration Ex. It is therefore number possible to hold that any accused number mentioned in the dying declaration of Gaya Charan had also fired shots. What he says in this companynection is Gaya Charan had a gunshot wound of entry on the left hypochondrium region and one gunshot wound of entry on the right lumbar region. Gaya Charans injuries were examined by Dr. Bhatnagar the same day. Shots were fired from front, jagdamba, Phunnar, Moti and one man whom I know by face fired gunshots on us. The evidence of the eye witnesses has therefore to be judged in the light of the statements Exs. It however seems to have relied on their statements exs. The High Court fully relied on the alleged dying declaration ex. Those statements companyld have been used only in either companyroborating or companytradicting the statements of these Witnesses in Court. He found two gun shot wounds of entry 1/4 x 1/4 up to the depth of abdomen and companysidered those injuries to be caused by gun shot and to be dangerous to life. It also companysidered it necessary to refer to the statements exs. In companysidering the companyplicity of individual accused in the firing from the room and later from the chabutra, the High Court said that Raj Kumar, P. W. 1 1 and Chandra Kumar, P. W. 15, were partisan witnesses whose evidence had to be examined with caution, that Shyam Lal, P. W. 12 and Gopi Singh, P. W. 14, were number quite independent witnesses, and that there was numberhing particular against Lal Singh, P. W. 17, and Sardar W. 16 who had received gun shot injuries. It says that firing took place from the front and that these people fired shots with guns. Moti Singh and jagdamba Prasad have preferred these appeals respectively, after obtaining special leave from this Court. The judgment of the Court was delivered by RAGHUBAR DAYAL, J. Moti Singh and jagdamba Prasad, appellants, together with five other persons, were companyvicted by the Sessions judge of Unnao of offences under s. 148, 302 read with 149 and 307 read with 149 I. P. C. Each of them was sentenced to life imprisonment under s. 302 read with s. 149 1. 302 and 307 read with s. 149 were altered to companyviction for offences under ss. If those witnesses were number to be believed, their previous statements companyld number be used as independent evidence in support of the other prosecution evidence. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent. It further said While companysidering the evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have to bear in mind the rule that the evidence has to be examined with caution. He was either discharged on the injuries healding up or he left the hospital before they healed up. P. C., was also set aside, but their companyviction for the offences under ss. Ram Shankar and jageshwar have been disbelieved by the Sessions judge and it appears that the High Court did number take any more favourable view of their deposition in Court. Both the injuries were dangerous to life, according to the Doctor. The companyviction of the appellants under s. 148 1. P. C. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the other five persons of the various offences. S. R. Chari, Ravinder Narain, J. It is number necessary to detail the facts of the incident in which several persons lost their lives and for participation in which incident the appellants were companyvicted, as we are of opinion that the companyviction cannot be maintained on the basis of the evidence on record as appreciated by the High Court. There is numberhing on record to show in what circumstances he left the hospital. Mathur, for the appellants. CRIMINAL APPFLLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. 157 and 158 of 1961 and Criminal Revision No. B. Daduchanji and 0. It also took into companysideration the fact that he remained absconding till his arrest on September 30, 1960, the incident having taken place on February 9, 1960. 384 of 1961. 146 and 147 of 1962. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 2, 1962, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. He died on March 1. In this it was in error. January 23.
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1963_9.txt
The delay was only of 71 days and, in our opinion, a liberal view should have been taken by the High Court and delay of 71 days in filing the review petition should have been companydoned and the review petition should have been decided on merits. By that order, the review petition as well as the application for companydonation of delay in filing the review petition have been dismissed. This Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment order dated 28th January, 2005 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
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2011_211.txt
land to be allotted to the Housing Society. In response to the letter of the Society, further, letter dated 09.12.2005 was issued to the Society informing allotment of land to the Society admeasuring 10,700 sq.mtr. Copy of Government Resolution dated 09.07.1999 was forwarded to the Society to companymunicate its willingness as per terms and companyditions given in Government Resolution dated 09.07.1999. The Authority in its meeting dated 01.09.2003 resolved to allot the land to the Society as per the terms and companyditions dated 09.07.1999. In pursuance of Resolution dated 01.09.2003, letter dated 11.12.2003 was issued by the Authority to the Society. The Society vide letter dated 10.05.2001 companymunicated its willingness to abide by the Resolution dated 09.07.1999 and thereafter Resolution dated 01.09.2003 was passed for allotment of land. as per Resolution dated 01.09.2003. The Authority vide its letter dated 03.05.2001 wrote to the Society where the Authority requested the Society to go through the terms and companyditions given in the Resolution dated 09.07.1999 and companymunicate its willingness so that further action be taken in the matter. A letter dated 11.12.2003 was issued by the Authority to the Society relating to grant of land area 13,700 sq.mtr. Again letter dated 26.02.2001 was sent by the Society to the Authority requesting to put up a proposal for companysideration of the Authority in the forthcoming meeting for allotment of land to Society on similar terms as that of the allotment of land to the MMRDA ClassIV Employees Cooperative Housing Society. Letter dated 05.11.1998 was issued to the proposed Society informing about the Resolution dated 07.06.1997 and the terms and companyditions thereof. The Resolution by companydition No.3 provided that Housing Society will have to pay an amount at the rate of Rs.1400/ per sq. Reminder dated 27.04.2001 was again sent by the Society. In the Resolution it was further stated that the allotment will be made at the rate of Rs.2500/ per sq.mtr. The letter dated 09.12.1999 of the Society was number favourably responded by the Authority. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd/ V. Ghangurde Chairman In response to letter dated 27.04.2001, the Authority wrote a letter dated 03.05.2001 to the Society forwarding the Resolution dated 09.07.1999 and requesting the Society to go through the terms and companyditions and companymunicate Societys willingness so that further action be taken. A Co operative Housing Society of the employees of the Authority was registered on 25.06.1999 under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. As numbered above the Resolution dated 07.06.1997 itself was number honoured by the Society and it lapsed as per statutory Regulations numbered above. The document companytained various terms and companyditions under which Government land can be allotted to the Cooperative Housing Society. In the meantime the Government of Maharashtra has issued Resolution dated 09.07.1999 providing various terms and companyditions for allotment. On 09.07.1999, the Government of Maharashtra had issued Government Resolution pertaining to the Govt. The Resolution dated 01.09.2003 modifies the said amount as Rs.2500/ per sq. The provision of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Disposal of Land Regulations will be applicable to this allotment of land. Prayer to strike down companydition No.8 of AnnexureA of the Government Resolution dated 09.07.1999 was also made. The Society vide letter dated 10.06.2004 submitted final list of eligible members as requested by the Authority as on 11.12.2003. c companytained in the Resolution dated 07.06.1997 was modified. The Authority vide letter dated 11.12.2003 informed that lease premium may be charged at Rs.2500/ per sq.mtr. which was Rs.1400/. The Resolution dated 07.06.1997 and companysequent allotment dated 05.11.1998 did number fructify into allotment of land and lapsed as per Disposal of Land Regulations as amended in 1997, Regulation iA . The letter dated 05.11.1998 refers to Disposal of Land Regulations. The Resolution dated 07.06.1997 was passed by the Authority granting permission to allot the land of Authority situated at Chitalsar Manpada Village, District Thane admeasuring about 13,700 sq.mtr. which was subsequently made as Rs.2500/ per sq.mtr. The Society requested for relaxation of various companyditions which were number granted by the Authority at any point of time. to the proposed Cooperative Housing Society of the employees of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority for the purpose of companystruction of houses on lease hold basis for a period of 80 years. instead of Rs.1400/ per sq. AnnexureA is Eligibility for approval to the members of the Cooperative Housing Societies who intend to obtain Government land by paying companycessional occupancy charges/ lease rent. The appellants were employees of Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority hereinafter referred to as Authority . c was with regard to amount of premium per sq.mtr. The Society in reference to the above wrote letters dated 23.07.1999, 19.11.1999 and further dated 09.12.1999 wherein it made three requests, namely The rate of Rs.1400/ per sq. area on the terms prescribed in the above referred Government of Maharashtra Resolution. Pending the final decision, advance possession of the plot of land be given to the Society by charging a token amount 2 of the estimated companyt of the land. Brief facts of the case giving rise to this appeal are The Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority has been companystituted under the Mumbai Metropolitan Signature Not Verified Region Development Authority Act, 1974. The modification of above companydition has been specifically mentioned since earlier the Authority has offered the plot on Rs.1400/ per sq. Instead of insisting on payment of the premium in one or two instalments, the Society may be permitted to pay the land companyt in yearly instalments spread over 10 to 15 years. The Authority has Digitally signed by NIDHI AHUJA Date 2018.04.09 171036 IST Reason framed Regulations, namely, Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority Disposal of Land Regulations, 1977 which were also amended vide Notification dated 29.04.1997. for a period of 80 years as premium. In the present case, we are companycerned with one of the companyditions which is companydition No.8 of AnnexureA. as per the market rate fixed by the Town Planning Department, Thane for a period of 80 years as a premium. The letter further stated that the list of eligible members may be approved by submitting proposal with necessary proofs in that respect and verifying the eligibility of members, the built up area will be allotted to the members and thereafter possession of land will be given by executing lease. The appellants aggrieved by the aforesaid companymunication dated 09.12.2005 filed Writ Petition No.8224 of 2011 praying for quashing the companymunication dated 09.12.2005 holding the appellants as numbereligible. with total premium to be paid, along with the letter list of numbereligible members with remarks number in the service on the date of LOI including the names of the appellants was also furnished. is the rate of developed plots and, therefore, the land falling under road and companypulsory open spaces should be made available free of companyt. In the above respect, the companydition No. This appeal has been filed against judgment dated 19.06.2012 of the High Court of Bombay by which Writ Petition No.8224 of 2011 filed by the appellants has been dismissed. Further, to issue mandamus, directing the respondents to include the names of the present appellants as persons being eligible to receive tenements flats. ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Challenging the said judgment this appeal has been filed.
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2018_179.txt
The finding is therefore that the dining hall and kitchen etc. and other Bed rooms 1,2 which were vacated by other paying guests were in the companytrol of the respondent and that the respondent did number dispossess the appellant from the hall as alleged. 200 as distinct from one by other in ground floor as paying guest at Rs. According to the owner, the appellant was a paying Guest from February march 1971 of Bed Room No. The respondent gave a numberice dated 2.11.1978 revoking the permission granted to the appellant to occupy as paying guest. In December 1973, the appellant was married at Allahabad and before his wife joined him, executed a letter dated dated 31.1.1974 admitting that he was a paying guest and seeking permission to bring his wife, He was so permitted to use the dining hall also. 200/ P.M., and that the dining hall was in occupation or companytrol of the respondent for otherwise the respondent would number have been able to enter Bedroom No.2 on the leftside or the kitchen on the numberth, beyond the Bedroom No.3 that was being used by the appellant. The plan shows that the front close verandah opens into the dining Hall, and on the left, there are Bed Room 1,2 and 3 one after the other and beyond Bedroom 3 is the kitchen etc. The appellate Court has found on a companysideration of the letter dated 31.1.1974 and other evidence adduced by parties that the appellant, to start with was a paying guest of bedroom No.3 even after appellants wife joined, that the appellants wife was permitted on companypassionate grounds to companyk in the pantry, that the hall was number given to the appellant when the charges were increased to Rs. Learned senior companynsel for the appellant companytended that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the bed room No.3 and the dining hall, bathroom and pantry as a tenant, that the letter dated 31.11974 wherein appellant admitted he was a paying guest was obtained by the respondent by pressure, and that the respondent had admitted in his evidence that in 1978 79 he had informed the Bombay Municipal Corporation, in tax assessment proceedings that the appellant was a tenant to whom part of the ground floor was let at Rs. 5105 and 5106 of 1994. The Trial Judge by judgment dated 27/28 6 1989 disposed of both suits by a companymon judgment holding that appellant was number a paying guest but was a tenant from the beginning. 86/116 of 1979 for possession against the appellant of one room adjoining the kitchen on the ground floor of the bungalow known as Carmel View situated at 63, Mount carmel Road, Bandra W , Bombay and for arrears of paying quest charges of Rs. According to the appellant the respondent forcibly entered in the hall in October 1978. The respondent sent a rejoinder on 19.12.1978 and claimed he was licensee and did number claim that he was a tenant. the appellant sent a reply on 19.12.1978 and claimed he was licensee and did number claim that he was a tenant. So far as the statement of the appellant that he informed the Corporation that the portion was let to appellant was companycerned, it was observed by the first appellate Court that the appellant was number asked in Cross examination as to why he had so informed the Corporation and that, in any event, the letter dated 31.1.1974 executed by the appellant and other evidence showed that the real relationship of the appellant in respect of the room was as paying guest. The occupation charges were increased to Rs. The appellant filed R.A.D Suit number 2041 of 1979, Small Causes Court, Bombay for a declaration that he was tenant in respect of the Bathroom. 200/ per month. The respondent sent a rejoinder on 19.12.78. 5105 and 51.6 of 1994 and they were dismissed by the High Court on 22.4.1997. The appellants suit was decreed and the respondents suit was dismissed. Th Respondent filed an eviction case on 28.2.1979 as stated above and the appellant filed the other suit on 12.4.1979 for declaration that he was tenant. 2500/ till 31.12.1978 at Rs. with her for the appellant A. Bobde, Sr. S.D.Mudaliar, U.U. 2 on an occupation charge of Rs. Bharat Sangal, P. Midha, Advs. 200/ per month and for mesne profits from 1.1.1979 till vacant possession is granted. The respondent filed L.E. 120/ per month. C. Suit No. The appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Bandra however allowed both appeals preferred by the respondent, by judgment dated 25.61994. Lalit, Advs., with him for the Respondent J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court wad delivered JAGANNADHA RAO. 20/ and this admission was number explained. These two Civil appeals have been failed by the appellant against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in P. No. These findings arrived at by the appellate Court are findings of fact and were and liable to be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the companystitution of India. These two appeals are filed by the appellant against the said judgments. The appellant filed two writ petitions Nos. Leave granted. J.
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1997_1095.txt
Petition No.506 of 1978. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Misc. However, Sri Jain, for reasons which we need number go into here, has been discharged from the brief at his request.
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1978_381.txt
The West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1953 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976 to provide for primary education throughout the State and to provide employment in rural areas respectively. Section 1 of the 1976 Act levies rural employment cess on all immovable properties on which road or public work cess is assessed or liable to be assessed according to the provisions, of the Cess Act, 1980. Since the relevant provisions of both the enactments are similar, it would be sufficient to numberice the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. By virtue of the West Bengal Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1981, tea estates were carved out as a separate category and a separate rate prescribed therefore. c 1215 and 1221 of 1989 with Nos. For raising funds for the said purposes, the State Legislature imposed two cesses upon certain lands and buildings in the State. Section 4 2 , as originally enacted, prescribed different rates in respect of lands, companyl mines and other mines on an annual basis. with W.P.
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1994_1169.txt
What was urged there was that the Industrial Tribunal was wrong in holding that the principle of last companye first go had been followed in this case. his case was that there was numberreason to make Any retrenchment on account of the closure of the ration shop and that he was at any rate longer in service than others who had been retained and therefore the principle of last companye first go had number been followed. The reason for the lay off was that the ration shop was closed following the end of rationing. The Appellate Tribunal came to the companyclusion that the respondent had been in service much longer than others who had been retained and therefore the principle of last companye first go had been violated. The appellant also applied under s. 33 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to retrench the respondent along with others. The respondent appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. He did number urge there that there was numbernecessity for retrenchment at all. Shortly before the application under s. 33, the respondent had applied under s. 33 A of the Act and. Consequently, nine persons were selected for retrenchment on the principle of last companye first go, and the respondent was one of them. There was a dispute pending before an Industrial Tribunal between a number of jute mills in West Bengal and their employees, and the appellant was a party to that dispute. Sukumr Ghosh, for the respondent. The appellant is a Jute Mill. 310 of 1954. During the pendency of that dispute, the appellant laid off the respondent who was an employee in the ration shop maintained by the appellant from July 19, 1954, as rationing of food stuff came to an end from July 10, 1954. This appeal by special leave against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India is limited to the question whether an order of reinstatement can be made on an application under s. 33 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter called the Act . In companysequence, the appeal was allowed and the permission to retrench the respondent was refused. C. Chatterjee, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh for the appellant. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 22, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta in Appeal No. 183 of 1955. It was also said that the respondent had been laid off as he was an active worker of the union and as such was number in the good books of the appellant. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The brief facts necessary for the decision of this question are these. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO J. May 21.
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1959_168.txt
However, the period of exemption remained unaltered. Be it numbered, the assessee was granted the full benefit of exemption for the entire period. After the expiry of the period of exemption, the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner Gurgaon , the 2nd appellant herein, while monitoring the production level of the respondent unit, numbericed that it was number maintaining the level of production of the preceding five years and, accordingly, initiated a proceeding against it on the foundation that it had violated the companyditions enumerated under Rule 28A 11 a i and was thereby liable to make full payment of tax exemption benefit already availed by it along with interest. On an appeal being filed, the Commissioner of Industries accepted the same and remitted the matter to the High Level Screening Committee to revise the eligibility certificate allowing the benefit of sales tax exemption by inclusion of additional items.
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2014_29.txt
whether the life insurance money of the deceased is to be deducted from the claimants companypensation receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939? The claimants were entitled to get an amount of Rs.4,40193.65p, out of which an amount of Rs.l,52,125.70p was deducted by way of estate duty and the remaining amount of Rs.3,15,067.95p was paid to the aforesaid heirs. The drivers of the two buses were number able to companytrol their buses resulting into companylision between the two, seriously injuring the deceased clemant Rebello and Mr. Vincy John Pereira, in which Rebello received multiple fractures and died on the spot. It was averred in the plaint that the deceased was aged about 40 years and was the sole bread winner of the family. Many Jerome Dsouza and others AIR 1978 Bombay 239 , the Trial companyrt deducted the amount of life insurance received by the appellants to the tune of Rs.3,15,067.95p from the aforesaid companypensation calculated and held that only the balance amount of Rs.74,939.05p with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum is payable by the respondent No.2 to the claimants. 24 of 1975 against the aforesaid two State Road Transport Corporations. Being the sole bread winner, he used to provide the family with the support of Rs.25,000/per year. It is this amount, as aforesaid, which was deducted in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court referred to above. How arc damages for his financial loss to be assessed? 89/4, Karnataka State Transport bus was seen companying from the opposite direction, i.e., from Satara side towards Kolhapur. Through the witness Shashikant Dattatraya Kale, Exhibit 67, who was serving in LIC at Bombay, it was elicited that the deceased clement had insured his life under the said policy. The minimum matrix of the facts to appreciate the companytroversy is stated hereunder The husband of appellant No.1, father of appellants Nos.2 to 6, was travelling in the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation bus from Rathare Badruk to Pune on 12th April, 1973 at about 4.00 P.M. when this bus passed the village Umbraj and came near village Kotri near milestone No. The claim of the appellants was allowed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Satara, holding that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of respondent No.2, namely, Karnataka Road Transport Coloration. By the negligent driving of the respondent he was disabled from companytinuing in that employment. It was found that as the deceased was of 40 years old at the time of his death and his father had lived upto the age of 85 years, the numbermal longevity of his life would have been 25 years from the date of death, but since the claimants had claimed a companypensation only taking a period of 20 years, the Trial companyrt held that the appellants were entitled to a companypensation of Rs3,80,000/by way of pecuniary loss and Rs.l0,000/ on account of pain and suffering, in total Rs.3,90,000/ However, in view of the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Jaikumar Chhaganlal Patni and Others vs. The claim made by the appellants for damages companypensation under the various admissible heads of damages was for Rs. He was a person of robust health and sober habits. On the other hand, learned companynsel for the respondents restricted the argument as was advanced before the High Court and submitted, the High Court, after companysidering all aspects including English decisions and the decisions of this Court, rightly companycluded to deduct the life insurance money out of the companypensation payable to the claimant. On appeal, preferred both by the appellants and also the respondents, the High Court rejected the cross appeal of respondent No .2, namely, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. He was assessed for an income of about Rs.43,000/ by the Income Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 1971 72. He was a well known boat builder and businessman of the Bassein. His income from the business and other activities was about Rs 40,000/ per annum. The appellant was in pensionable employment. So he received a disablement pension. However, the appeal No 209/81 of the appellants was dismissed as it companyld number be pressed in view of the decision of the Bombay High Court, as aforesaid. He was a person of great skill and hard worker. He was doing business in partnership under the name and style of Marine Engineering Works. The appellants filed a Specie Civil Suit No. It is against this judgment, this appeal has been preferred by the appellants. 4 lacs. The question is.
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train
1998_779.txt
while in respect of all other suits appeals and proceedings an upper limit of companyrt fee of rs. the rajasthan companyrt fees and suits valuation act 1961 act 23 of 19f rajasthan act for short and the bombay companyrt fees act 1959 bombay act for short . the point in these appeals is the recurring and vexed theme of the policy and legality of the levy of companyrt fees ad valorem on the value or amount of the subject matter of suits and appeals without the prescription of any upper limit under the provisions of the karnataka court fees and suits valuation act 1958 karnataka act for short . this ceiling was done away with under the present rajasthan act and companyrt fee ad valorem at 5 without any upper limit was imposed under the impugned provisions. special leave petitions 832 of 1988 and 833 of 1988 which are representative of the karnataka cases arise out of and are directed against the companymon order dated 6.1.1988 of the division bench of the karnataka high companyrt upholding the validity of the companyresponding provisions of the karnataka companyrt fees and suit valuation act 1958 karnataka act for short which similarly impose an ad valorem companyrt fee on the plaints written statements pleading set of or companynter claims or memoranda of appeals presented to any companyrt an at valorem companyrt fee at the uniform rate of re.1 for every rs.10 of the amount. so far as the bombay act is companycerned the point raised in the companycerned appeals is a limited one companyfined to the question of the validity of section 29 1 read with entry 10 of the first schedule to the bombay act which without reference to the upper limit of companyrt fee of rs.15000 prescribed for all other suits and proceedings requires payment of ad valorem companyrt fee on proceedings for grants of probate and letters of administration. appellant bank had brought in one of the civil companyrts in karnataka a suit for recovery of rs.1697811.57 from the defendants therein and was called upon to pay a companyrt fees of rs.169792 on the plaint. one of the grounds of challenge so far as this provision in the bombay act is companycerned is the companystitutional impermissibility of an unlimited exaction by way of companyrt fee which is companymon to other appeals as well. or value of the subject matter in dispute without prescribing any upper limit. in civil appeal number 1511 of 1988 the state of maharashtra has companye up in appeal against the judgment dated 1.2.1988 of the division bench of the bombay high companyrt affirming the order dated 20.11.1987 of the learned single judge striking down the provisions of section 29 1 read with entry 10 of schedule 1 of the bombay act in so far as pg number164 they purport to prescribe an ad valorem companyrt fee without any upper limit on grants of probate letters of administration etc. in the companyrt pg number163 of district judge jaipur city a suit for recovery of a sum of rs.50475826 from the defendant in the suit viz. the other companytention against the pg number162 validity of section 29 1 read with entry 10 of the first schedule to the bombay act is based on article 14 of the constitution on the ground of discrimination as between the proceedings for grant of probate and letters of administration on the one hand and all other suits and proceedings respecting which an upper limit of rs.15000 is fixed under the statute on the other. nariman learned senior advocate for the appellant that the court fee payable on this plaint alone would amount approximately to 1/7th of the total estimated companylection of court fee for the year 1983 84 which was estimated at rs.176.41 lakhs in the state. the bank of baroda the petitioner in the special leave petition 832 of 1988 questions the companyrectness of the view taken by the karnataka high companyrt in the large batch of cases disposed of by it upholding the companystitutionality of the provisions in the karnataka act . the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkatachaliah .j. bhat r. dhanuka anil mehta p.r. bhat r.p. ramasesh badri das sharma r. dhanuka r.c. gupta sudhir gupta inderbit singh r. singh rakesh khanna r.p. vidvasagar r.b. parekh sanjay bhartary s.s. sharma p. mahale s.k. mehrotra d.n.n. sucharita mohan katarki mrs. kiran suri k.m.k. rawal s.c. birla miss c.k. lalit s. nesargi s.k. dholakia a.5. incidently it was pointed out by shri f.s. venugopal soli j. sorabjee dr. chitale u.r. on 25.4.1984 the appellant bank instituted. reddy n. nettar kailash vasdev g.l. singh p.h. bobde adv. kuldip singh additional solicitor general k.n. prior to 1.11.1961 at the law the stood. nair s.n. the present batch of appeals and special leave petitions companyprise of a large number of cases arising under the said three statutes. misra and dr. meera agarwal for the respondents.
0
dev
1988_295.txt
The respondent submitted a medical certificate dated 26.5.1984 that he was suffering from viral infection from 6.2.1984 to 26.5.1984 and that he was fit to resume his duties on the date of his certificate. The respondent joined duty on 15.12.1980 and his period of probation companymenced from that dated. The respondent remained unauthorisedly absent from duty from 2.4.1981 for a long period and the last date of his presence on duty was in the first week of August 1983. The maximum permissible period of probation under the Service Rules was three years which expired in his case on 14.12.1983, when he was admittedly absent from duty. In these circumstances, the Bank issued an order dated 4.10.1988 terminating his service. The respondent joined Phil. The respondent, Bijoy Kumar Mishra was appointed as a Probationary Officer in the State Bank of India and posted at Jharsuguda Branch in Bhubaneswar circle by an order dated 24.10.1980. Even then he did number report for duty. On this basis, by the impugned order dated 19.11.1991, the termination order dated 4.10.1988 has been quashed and a direction given to reinstate the respondent in service with all companysequential benefits with permission to the bank to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law. Thereafter, he was absent till the year 1988. From May 1984 to 1988, he was number even in touch with the Bank. Course in the Punjab University at Chandigarh in 1986 87 without permission. Verma, CJI. The respondent filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the Orissa High Court challenging the termination order. Hence this appeal by special leave.
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1997_902.txt
The first respondent being aggrieved by the refusal of the Regional Transport Authority to grant a stage carriage permit to him preferred an appeal to the Additional State Transport Appellate Tribunal under Section 64 1 a of the Act. The Tribunal allowed this companytention to be raised, though it had number been taken before the Regional Transport Authority, and taking the view that it was well founded, held that numbervalid order limiting the number of stage carriages for which permits might be granted on the route had been made by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 47 3 before companysidering the applications and representations in companynection therewith and the order made by the Regional Transport Authority granting stage carriage permit to the appellant was, therefore, without jurisdiction. This Court, speaking through Ray, J., as he then was, after referring to the earlier decisions of the Court, stated the law on the subject in the following terms This Court in Abdul Mateens 1973 3 SCR 523 case said that the general Older by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 47 3 of the Act in regard to the limit of number of stage carriage permits can be modified only by the Regional Transport Authority when exercising the jurisdiction under Section 47 3 of the Act The Regional Transport Authority while acting under Section 48 of the Act in regard to the grant of permits has numberjurisdiction and Authority under Section 47 3 of the Act In other words, the limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 47 3 of the Act cannot be altered by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of grant of permits, it is, therefore, established that the determination of limit of number of permits is to be made before the grant of permits That is why subject to the provisions of Section 47 of the Act meaning there by that the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits is subject to the determination of the limit of number of permits under Section 47 3 of the Act This Court stated the legal position in M s. Jayaram Motor Services case CA. This led to the filing of a letters patent appeal before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court The Division Bench companysidered various decisions of this Court and held that it was number companypetent to the Regional Transport Authority to exercise the power to grant stage carriage permit under Section 48 1 read with Section 57 3 without first fixing the limit of the number of stage carriages for which permits might be granted on the route under Section 47 3 and since in the present case there was numberorder Under Section 47 3 the Regional Transport Authority bad numberpower to grant stage carriage permit under Section 48 1 read with Section 57 3 and the order granting stage carriage permit to the appellant was had a rightly held by the Tribunal. This decision was given in a bunch of appeals against the judgments of the Madras High Court in similar cases where the same Division Bench, which decided the appeal in the present case, took the view that since there was numbervalid order made by the Regional Transport Authority under Section 47 3 prior to the grant of stage carriage permits, the orders of the Regional Transport Authority granting such stage carriage permits to one or the other applicants were invalid. The Regional Transport Authority accordingly issued a numberification under Section 57, Sub section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 inviting applications for the grant of a stage carriage permit for one additional bus on this route. The Regional Transport Authority companysidered these applications as also the representations received in companynection with them and by an order dated 4th November, 1967 granted a stage carriage permit to the appellant to ply an additional bus on the route. This appeal, brought by special leave, relates to grant of a stage carriage permit for the route Pollachi to Tiruppur via Kamaoaickenopalayam and Palladam in Coimbatore District. At the hearing of the appeal, the first respondent raised, for the first time, a companytention that the Regional Transport Authority had numberjurisdiction to proceed with companysideration of the applications under Section 48 1 read with Section 57 3 since numberprior order limiting the number of stage carriages for which permits might be granted on the route was made under Section 47 3 . On this view, the Tribunal by an order dated 11th June, 1968 allowed the appeal of the first respondent and setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting stage carriage permit to the appellant, remitted the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for being proceeded with in accordance with Law The appellant challenged the validity of this order made by the Tribunal by a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Madras. Ibrahim v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras . 95 of 1965, decided on 27 10 1967 and said it is therefore clear that the authority has first to fix the limit and after having done so companysider the application or the representations in companynection therewith in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 57 of the Act Again in the case of R. Obliswami Naidu 1969 1 SCR 730 this Court companysidered the submission in that case as whether the Regional Transport Authority companyld decide the number of permits while companysidering applications for permits. It appears that a traffic survey had been companyducted during the period from 1st June, 1966 to 15th July, 1966 on various routes in Coimbatore District and it was found as a result of this traffic survey that the load on the route Pollachi to Tiruppur via Kamanaickenpalayam and Paladam was heavy and it was, therefore, decided to introduce one more bus on this route. The Division Bench accordingly upheld the order passed by the Tribunal and dismissed the appeal. There were forty two applications received in response to this invitation. The question arising in this appeal lies in a narrow companypass and stands companycluded by a recent decision of this Court in Mohd. The petition came up for admission before a single Judge of the Madras High Court who summarily rejected the petition. N. Bhagwati, J. The appellant thereafter preferred the present appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court.
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1974_375.txt
Under this decree, these remaining defendants were also entitled to companytinue in, possession for a period of five years from the date of the decree, but were required to pay mesne profits for this period. After the property was released by the Custodian of Evacuee Property, an application was filed by the decree holders on 26th March, 1953 for execution of the companysent decree dated 8th July, 1946 and, in that execution, possession was sought against the appellants of the property which was in .their possession. Similar terms were included in the companysent decree against other defendants who joined the companypromise on the basis of which the decree was passed on 8th July, 1946. The suit was decreed on 8th July, 1946 on the basis of a companysent decree as against some of the occupants including the four defendant appellants. All the defendants governed by the two decrees dated 8th July, 1946 and28th January, 1949, had to pay between them mesne profits monthly which worked out to an amount of Rs. In the agreement, on the basis of which the decree was passed, it was agreed that the defendant appellants will companytinue in possession of the property for a period of five years and will hand over possession after the expiry of this period of five years. Before, the expiry of the period of five years prescribed by either of the two decrees, the Custodian of Evacuee Property, in 1950, took possession of all the properties, as one of the decreeholders had become an evacuee. For this period, they undertook to pay mesne profits every month at various rates on the lands in their possession. The remaining defendants in the suit entered into a later companypromise and,, as a result, another companysent decree was passed on 28th January, 1949 against those defendants. 227 10 0 per mensem making up an annual amount of mesne profits of Rs. In 1945, the lessors, after serving numberice on the occupants to give vacant possession, filed a suit for recovery of possession. Subsequently, a number of suits were filed for recovery of mesne profits also. 199/ , to three persons, Shri Ramchandra Ambaram, Pardesi Sukhlal Anandram and Mehta Bogha Mugatram. 2,731 8 0. The Execution Court directed eviction of the appellants after over ruling the various objections raised by them in the execution proceedings. All the Courts rejected the objectic raised by the appellants and upheld the order of the Execution Court directing delivery of possession. 503 and 506 of Asarva within the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, on lease for a period of 49 years at an annual rent of Rs. 7,314 8 0 per annum. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated January 16, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1460 of 1969. Between them, the four appellants were required to pay Rs. T. Desai, M. H. Chhatrapati, P. N. Tiwari and O. C. Mathur, for the appellants. It is against the judgment of the Division Bench in Letters Patent appeal in this execution that the appellants have companye up to this Court in this appeal by special leave. H. Dhebar, B. Datta and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. The decision of the Execution Court on the objections taken by the appellants was challenged in appeal before the District Judge, in second appeal before a single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat, and by a Letters Patent appeal before a Division Bench. These original lessees, during the currency of the lease, made transfers of their rights and also granted sub leases. The predecessors in interest of plaintiff respondents 1 to 3 gave, in 1895, land, bearing Serial Nos. A number of chawls and some other buildings were companystructed on the land and some of them were let out on rent. Y. Patel and I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. 31 of 1966. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1 and 3.
0
train
1970_318.txt