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7985/82. 570 of 1983. Soli J. Sorabjee, Harish N. Salve, Ravinder Narain and Mrs. A.K. 914, was doubted and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. From the Judgment and Order dated 6.12.1982 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. Verma for the Appellant. When leave was granted by a Division Bench of this Court to appeal against the Judgment of the High Court, the companyrectness of the decision in appellants case reported in 1977 1 S.C.R. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. That is how the appeal came to be heard by us.
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1985_97.txt
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Vig who was companyopted as numberinee of the school was number a member of the Managing Committee the record and proceedings of the Enquiry Committee were number properly maintained the Secretary was number always present at the meetings of the Enquiry Committee and Shri Inder Raj Sudan, the Principal of the School had a strong bias against the delinquent and, therefore, he companyld number and ought number to have acted as a member of the Enquiry Committee. An Enquiry Committee was appointed as per the provisions of the Secondary School Code which found him guilty by majority on all companynts and removed him from service. On these grounds the Deputy Director of Education set aside the order of removal against which the Management preferred an appeal which was allowed by the Joint Director of Education by his order dated 14 2 1979. The Deputy Director came to the companyclusion that the rules of natural justice had been violated inasmuch as Shri S.K. The delinquent filed an appeal which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Education, Greater Bombay, by his order dated 31 5 1977. He was suspended from service on 20 12 1975 and was charge sheeted on 23 12 1975 on as many as 16 companynts. Shukla was appointed as a teacher on 14 6 1968 and was companyfirmed in the year 1970. Against the said decision of the Joint Director a writ petition came to be filed in the High Court at Bombay which was heard and decided by Pendse, J. on 25 3 1981. The respondent K.P. It is against the said order of the Division Bench that the present appeal is preferred by the Management.
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1994_329.txt
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P.W. Pws 1 2 raised alarm and appealed unsuccessfully to the accused to spare Sulochana. 4 gave information through telephone to the Cochin Cusba Police Station about the murder of Sulochana. The murder was companymitted because Sulochana was proving to be a stumbling block to the accused marrying P.W.2 as his second wife and would number give her companysent. By then PW 4 had telephoned the Police Station and informed them about the death of Sulochana. We have been taken through the evidence of P.W. The employment of P.W. After cutting the throat of Sulochana the accused went out to the varandah and washed his hands and chest PWs 1 and 2 felt afraid to remain in the room and they too came out and stood in front of the house. Sulochana was of a poor health and it would appear that she was also subjected to epileptic fits. The respondent accused was charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having companymitted the murder of his wife Sulochana on the night of August 24, 1975, when she was sleeping in the house, by cutting her neck with a knife M.O.I . Likewise the testimony of the neighbours, who had companye out and seen the accused washing his hands and dressing himself up, was also accepted by the Sessions Judge. By then the neighbours PWs 3, 4, 9 and others had companye out and they saw PWs 1 and 2 as well as the accused standing there. 1 but accepted the evidence of P.W.2 in full and the evidence of the neighbours and found the accused guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and awarded him death sentence as in his view the murder was very heinous. Within a few minutes P.W. The evidence of the witnesses relied on by the Sessions Judge establishes beyond doubt that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime and numberody else would have had any motive to companymit the crime or gained access to the house and murdered Sulochana. The accused admitted his presence as well as that of PWs 1 and 2 in the house on the night of the murder but companytended that he had number wanted to marry PW 2 or quarrelled with his wife or cut her neck with a knife. It is in the light of these factors the guilt of the accused has to be determined. The prosecution had examined PWs 1 and 2 who had actually seen the companymission of the murder and some of the neighbours viz. On receipt of the phone message P.W. The Sessions Judge did number deem it safe to place reliance on the evidence of P.W. 16, the Deputy Superintendent of Police took over the investigation of the case, arrested the accused, held inquest over the dead body of Sulochana and seized blood stained knife M.O. The accused dressed himself and went to the house of one Peethambaran Master, a Corporation Councillor, and returned back. 2 was secured through her elder sister Ratnamma who was residing in a shed immediately adjoining the house of the accused. 3 Methew P.W.4 and Pavithran P.W.9 who had companye out of their houses on hearing the companymotion and seeing the accused washing his hands and dressing himself up and going to the house of one Peethambaran Master for seeking his advice regarding his future companyrse of action. 2 and the neighbours P. Ws 3, 4 and 9 and the doctors P.W. The occurrence was witnessed by the 13 year old daughter of the accused P.W.I and a servant maid by name Ornana P.W.2 . Karthyayani PiW. in spite of the evidence being of a very telling nature the High Court has entertained imaginary doubts and companycluded that the evidence did number companyclusively prove the guilt of the accused. 2s testimony was accepted in full because she had given clear and companyent evidence about the appellant companymitting the murder. To challenge the companyrectness of the acquittal of the accused, the State has filed this Appeal. 1 as well as the blood stained clothes of the deceased and the frozen blood found on the flooring. Besides the reference under Section 366 Criminal Procedure Code by the Sessions Judge, the accused also preferred two appeals, one through companynsel and one from the prison. 1s evidence was number taken into account by the Sessions Judge because in her cross examination she had numberded her head meekly to whatever questions that were put to her by the de fence companynsel. The reference and the appeals were heard together by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court and the Bench allowed the appeals and dismissed the reference and acquitted the accused of the charge of murder and set him at liberty. 15 Sub Inspector of Police came to the scene house and recorded a statement Exhibit P1 from P.W.I. 8 and D.W. 1 as well as the relevant portions of the judgment of the Sessions Judge and the High Court by Mr. K.R. While allowing this Appeal by Special Leave by the State of Kerala and restoring the companyviction awarded to the respondent by the Sessions Judge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life, we have, in our Judgment dated July 31, 1986, stated that the reasons will follow and accordingly we are giving the reasons for allowing the appeal against acquittal by the State. Nambiar, learned Counsel for the appellant. Natarajan, J.
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1986_202.txt
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Oubegaranadin and Simon. Under the said deed of partition, Oubegaranadin was allotted certain properties. 1 and 2 to whom Oubegaranadin had sold part of the property. 1 and 2 by Oubegaranadin was illegal. 3 to 5 and father of Oubegaranadin since deceased . Thereafter, claiming himself to be the companyplete and exclusive owner of the property, Oubegaranadin sold part of those properties Nos. 3227 of 2017 Page 2 of 23 Partition Deed dated March 15, 1971 be nullified. Oubegaranadin claiming himself to be the absolute owner of the suit property, sold of the portions thereof, namely, Nos. On getting the suit property under the said exchange and in respect of the other properties got under the partition dated March 23, 1959, Oubegaranadin and his sons, namely, respondent number. 3 to 5 were entitled to be declared owners of the suit property subject to sale deeds executed by them. 3 to 5 sought decree for declaration of title in respect of number only the suit property but also other properties. 3227 of 2017 Page 3 of 23 through respondent number 6 as his guardian in respect of his 1/3 rd share in the suit property. The answer to this number hinges upon the validity of the decree dated June 24, 1974 vide which the partition deed dated March 15, 1971 was nullified and Oubegaranadin was declared as the absolute owner of the suit property. The property with which this appeal is companycerned is described in the suit as B Schedule Property henceforth, referred to as the suit property . 3 to 5 vide Partition Deed dated March 15, 1971. 1 and 2 have purchased the same suit property. 70 of 1974 was valid decree which was number obtained by fraud or misrepresentation and since Oubegaranadin was the absolute owner of the properties in question he had right to sell the same and, therefore, sale deed executed in their favour in respect of property number. 3 to 5 entered into a Deed of Partition dated March 15, 1971. 3227 of 2017 Page 1 of 23 March 23, 1959. 3227 of 2017 Page 5 of 23 In the plaint it was averred by respondent number. 3227 of 2017 Page 4 of 23 issue. 3227 of 2017 Page 7 of 23 Madras. 1 of 1983 before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Puducherry against their father Oubegaranadin, their mother Defendant No. In this suit, respondent number. From the facts numbered uptill number, it gets revealed that in respect of the property which had fallen in the share of Oubegaranadin, partition was effected between him and his sons respondent number. Nearly after three years from the date of having entered into a partition with his sons, Oubegaranadin filed a suit on February 02, 1974 being O.S. 3 to 5 would take the suit property as allotted to them, absolutely. The High Court numbered that the family of Oubegaranadin, and his children i.e. 3 to 5 that they were children of Oubegaranadin and respondent number 6 herein and their succession was governed by French Civil Law. 4 and 5 under the Partition Deed dated March 15, 1971, sold his 1/3 rd share in the suit property to the appellant herein vide registered Sale Deed dated December 11, 1980. Thereafter, on December 11, 1980, respondent number 4 also sold his 1/3rd share in the suit property to the appellant on the basis of the joint allotment of the suit property under the deed of partition dated March 15, 1971. 3 to 5 were entitled to claim any right under the partition deed dated March 15, 1971. 3227 of 2017 Page 8 of 23 High Court. 3 to 5, still claiming themselves to be the owner of the properties, on the basis Partition Deed dated March 15, 1971, sold their respective portions to the appellant herein. Under the Exchange Agreement dated March 15, 1971, the suit property came to be allotted to Oubegaranadi. However, in the suit for declaration filed by him thereafter, he got the decree vide which the said partition suit was nullified. The said suit property originally belonged to Mr. Mariasusai Mudaliar who was grandfather of respondent number. The appellant, therefore, pleaded that sale deed in his favour was valid and sale deed in favour of respondent number. 70 of 1974 filed by Oubegaranadin is companycerned, he had obtained the decree therein by fraudulent misrepresentation of facts and that their mother respondent number 6 , who represented them in the said suit, was companyrced to submit to the decree and, therefore, such a decree was number binding on them. 3 to 5 and that respondent number. 3 to 5 have been left without any property, the learned Subordinate Judge, opined that an additional 10 of the sale companysideration for the suit property and 5 of the sale companysideration for the land be paid over by the appellant and respondent number. Under the said deed, respondent number. 3 to 5 were the absolute owners and Oubergaranadin had numberright over the same property, it was companycluded that the judgment and decree passed in O.S. The appellant also resisted the suit by companytending that he had purchased the property from respondent number. 76C and 76D at Mahatma Gandhi Road, Puducherry to respondent number. 76C and 76D, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Puducherry to respondent number. 3 to 5 herein. 76C and 76D was valid. 3227 of 2017 Page 6 of 23 valuable companysideration and had also paid the full companysideration. 1 and 2 under sale deed dated March 29, 1980. On the other hand, respondent number 3, on the strength of having allotted the suit property along with his two younger brothers respondent number. 3 to 5 and another, on the file of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry number known as Puducherry , praying that he be declared the absolute owner of the suit property and the Civil Appeal No. He also held that three sale deeds executed by respondent number. After the partition between the two brothers, as aforesaid, some difficulties in the enjoyment of the allotted properties arose which necessitated the two brothers to exchange between themselves certain properties. 3 to 5 are allowed, respondent number. 3 to 5 were minors when the suit was instituted and they were sought to be represented through their mother and guardian, respondent number 6 herein. 70 of 1974 against respondent number. 1 and 2 resisted the suit by companytending that decree passed in O.S. In 1959, the suit property and other properties which were Signature Not Verified inherited by the two sons of Mr. Mariasusai Mudaliar, came to be Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR Date 2018.01.18 171119 IST Reason partitioned between them by a registered deed of partition dated Civil Appeal No. Even respondent number 5, while he was still minor, executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant, acting Civil Appeal No. Likewise, insofar as three sale deeds executed by them in favour of the appellant are companycerned, it was alleged that their father companyrced them to sell the property to the appellant which were voidable. As a companysequence, they also sought declaration that sale deed dated March 29, 1980 executed by their father in favour of respondent number. However, as would be numbericed hereinafter, validity of the Partition Deed dated March 15, 1971 itself is in Civil Appeal No. 3 to 5 preferred the appeal A.S. No. 70 of 1974 was fraudulent and number binding on respondent number. Aggrieved by the partial decree of suit, as full relief prayed for number having been granted, respondent number. Based on the statement of the guardian respondent number 6 who submitted to the decree thereupon, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Puducherry, decreed the suit as prayed for, vide judgment and decree dated June 24, 1974. 3 to 5 for a Civil Appeal No. 3 to 5 instituted a suit, as indigent persons on January 03, 1983 O.P. After purchasing the same he had leased out the property and was companylecting rents. Respondent number. 3 to 5, belong to Christianity in religion. It was companytended that as far as suit for declaration, i.e. 3 to 5, the appellant preferred an independent appeal in A.S. No. Since, respondent number. 3 to 5 were number under companyrcion but were executed to meet the family debts and out of necessity. They went to the extent of seeking cancellation of three sale deeds dated December 11, 1980, December 11, 1980 and April 29, 1981 executed by them in favour of appellant herein. On the other hand, respondent number. 3 to 5 and on the said basis, quantified the sum to be paid. 1 and 2 to respondent number. 70 of 1974 was valid since numberprejudice had been caused to the interest of the then minors, i.e., respondent number. 3 to 5 were allotted larger share jointly, since they were minors, and to expend money towards education and maintenance. 1052 of 1986 and A.S. No. No. Further, it was also recited that respondent number. 6 as well as the respondent number. They also sought declaration to the effect that decree dated June 24, 1974 passed in the favour of their father was number binding and be set aside. Insofar as the direction to pay an additional 10 of the sale companysideration for the building to respondent number. O.S. Holding that respondent number. Which sale is to be recognised is the question. Aggrieved by the said judgment, respondent number. Respondent Nos. respondent Nos. Thus, the appellant as well as respondent number. Mariasusai Mudaliar died intestate on October 23, 1953 leaving behind two sons viz. Vaithilingam since deceased whose legal heirs are respondent number. 6 to 9 as well as appellant, Selvanathan since deceased whose legal heirs are respondent number. Though the appellants have challenged the judgment and decree made in A.S. No. Parties led their evidence and after hearing the arguments, the trial companyrt passed the judgment and decree dated January 17, 1986 holding that decree passed in O.S. 1 and 2 preferred cross objection insofar as the sale companysideration in respect of the land it is number the subject matter of the present appeal . Proceeding further to companyplete the factual narration, it so happened that respondent number. 1 and 2 are number liable to pay any companypensation and, ultimately, dismissed the cross objection. 1 Respondent No.3 John Kennedy Plaintiff No. Though, the learned Single Judge held that in view of the fact that the appeal preferred by respondent number. The learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated March 19, 1988 reversed the judgment of the Trial Court on certain companynts and allowed A.S. Nos. Equally the dismissal of Cross Objection filed by the Appellant regarding the levy of companypensation cannot be sustained, as the Learned Judge himself found that such a decree for damage by the trial companyrt cannot be sustain. 1 and 2 filed LPA Nos. 14 to 16 herein , were also impleaded as defendants. 1 and 2 therein. 335/1987 filed by the 10 th defendant, the appellants are number aggrieved persons and hence we are inclined to dismiss the appeal in L.P.A. 335 of 1987. 10 to 13 herein and one Mr. M.B. 1052 of 1986 on the file of the High Court of Civil Appeal No. On the basis of pleadings, issues were drawn by the trial companyrt. 1 and 2 be set aside. K. SIKRI, J. 335 of 1987 in the High Court of Madras. Civil Appeal No. They also traced the history of events which have already been numbered above . 113 to 115 of 1999 before the Division Bench of the Civil Appeal No.
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2018_10.txt
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The accused was repatriated on the same day to his parent organization by the State Government of Uttarakhand. Consequent upon reorganization of the State of Uttar Pradesh, he was taken on deputation on 23rd January, 2003 and posted as Deputy General Manager of the State Industrial Development Corporation, hereinafter referred to as SIDCUL , a Government undertaking of the State of Uttarakhand. While working as the Deputy General Manager of SIDCUL, a trap was laid on 30th of June, 2004 and he was arrested while accepting an illegal gratification of Rs.30,000/ . Industrial Consultants, an undertaking of the State of Uttar Pradesh. PRASAD, J. Yogendra Nath Arora hereinafter referred to as the Accused was earlier employed as Deputy General Manager in U.P. It also granted sanction for his prosecution on 23rd of August, 2004 and the charge sheet was submitted on 25th of August, 2004 in the Court of Special Judge, Anti Corruption II, Nainital. Thus, the question of sanction being incident to the trial of the case and on perusal of the record, there is a sufficient material on record to charge the accused, the accused shall be charged under Section 7 read with Section 13 a d and 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. CHANDRAMAULI KR. The Special Judge, by his order dated 18th of August, 2005 rejected his companytention, inter alia, observing that there is sufficient material on record for framing of the charge. Accused prayed for discharge, inter alia companytending that the materials on record are number sufficient for framing of the charge and further, in the absence of valid sanction from the companypetent authority, as required under Section 19 1 c of the Act, the trial can number legally proceed. Accordingly, the Special Judge rejected the prayer of the accused. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the State of Uttarakhand has filed the present special leave petition. Aggrieved by the same, the accused preferred an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court challenging the aforesaid order. This submission found favour with the High Court. Leave granted.
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2013_157.txt
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in making the assessments of the allahabad woollen mills the income tax officer therefore made an addition of rs. the allahabad woollen mills limited thereafter sent to the respondent company a debit numbere for a sum of rs. the allahabad woollen mills supplied yarn to the respondent for three years ending march 31 1947 march 31 1948 and march 31 1949.
while making the assessment of the allahabad woollen mills for the assessment years 1947 48 1948 49 and 1949 50 the income tax officer held that the goods were supplied by the allahabad woollen mills to the respondent at a lower rate and profit to that extent had been diverted. the respondent used to obtain yarn from a firm knumbern as allahabad woollen mills at allahabad for the purpose of its business viz. 46582 as a deduction in the assessment year 1954 55.
the claim was disallowed by the income tax officer by his order dated december 30 1957 and it was held that the alleged payment was an ex gratia payment and companyld number be companysidered to be a payment arising out of the business transaction with the allahabad woollen mills. 30577 for the assessment year 1948 49 and a sum of rs. 32213 on march 23 1954.
these amounts were claimed by the allahabad woollen mills as extra price of mill yarn supplied by them to the respondent for the accounting period from april 1 1946 to march 31 1949.
the respondent admitted the liability and after amending its profit and loss account for 1949 50 the respondent claimed a sum of rs. in the companyrse of its order the tribunal stated as follows the claim was disallowed by the income tax officer as an ex gratia payment made by the appellant to the allahabad woollen mills limited and the appellate assistant companymissioner was of the opinion that passing of the debit numbere was number a bona fide business transaction prompted by companymercial expediency. 32213 for the assessment year 1949 50.
these additions were made under section 42 2 of the act as the income tax officer found that the shareholders of the respondent company were partners in the allahabad woollen mills which functioned as a firm till march 31 1948 and thereafter companyverted itself into a limited companypany of the same name in which also the said partners were the main shareholders. the income tax officer therefore disallowed the amount of rs. 46582 on august 22 1953 and anumberher debit numbere for a sum of rs. the respondent preferred a further appeal to the income tax appellate tribunal which allowed the appeal and held that the debit numbere was accepted for reasons of companymercial expediency. 78795 as a deduction under section 10 2 xv of the act in its assessment for the assessment year 1950 51.
the claim was finally rejected by the appellate tribunal on the ground that the liability was accepted by the respondent long after the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1950 51.
the respondent thereafter amended its profit and loss account for the accounting years 1952 53 and 1953 54 companyresponding to the assessment years 1954 55 and 1955 56 and claimed the sum of rs. the respondent is a private limited companypany carrying on the business of manufacture and export of carpets having their head office at bhadohi which was formerly in the state of banaras. the manufacture and export of carpets. the respondent was then a number resident companypany as it was carrying on business at bhadohi in the state of banaras. the companymissioner of income tax thereafter made an application under section 66 2 of the act to the allahabad high companyrt which dismissed the application by its judgment dated april 4 1962. i. t. application number 453 of 1960 holding that numberquestion of law arises out of the order of the income tax tribunal and dismissing the application of the appellant under section 66 2 of the income tax act 1922 hereinafter called the act . ramaswami j. this appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the allahabad high companyrt dated april 4 1963 in misc.
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1966_61.txt
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258 of 2004. 258 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NO. Konda Reddi is numberified as a Scheduled Tribe in the Presidential order for the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Her forefathers admittedly migrated to the State of Kerala. 256 OF 2004 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. On or about 11.12.1980, a show cause numberice was issued to her to show cause as to why her certificate shall number be cancelled. 257 OF 2004 B. SINHA, J These appeals involve interpretation and or application of the provisions of the Kerala Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996 for short the Act . Appellant originally hails from the State of Tamil Nadu. Notices were served on them to show cause as to why their appointments shall number be cancelled. Her appointment was made on the basis of the caste certificate granted in her favour. Disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against her. Disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against them. She was appointed as Quality Supervisor in the Marine Products Export Development Authority Respondent No. In other civil appeals also, relying on or on the basis of the purported certificates issued in their favour, the appellants obtained their appointments in the Central Government or public sector undertakings. Their services were terminated but the same were set aside by the Tribunal. W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1 herein, which is a statutory body companytrolled by the Central Government. Her service was terminated but the said order was set aside by a Division Bench of the High Court. The fact of the matter is being numbericed from Civil Appeal No.
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2007_1422.txt
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It was also observed by this Court that the State Government of Haryana followed the principle of parity between the teachers working in Government schools and aided schools until 1979 and that in 1979, the pay scale of teachers in Government schools was revised by the State after the report of the Pay Commission, but in the case of the teachers of aided schools, the revision was effected two years later and as a result the salary and other emoluments paid to the teachers of aided schools had fallen far behind the emoluments paid to the teachers in Government schools. House Rent Allowance, City Compensatory Allowance, Medical Reimbursement and Rctiral Benefits claimed by the applicants in the aforesaid appeal. This Court also took numbere of the readiness expressed by the State Government to reimburse the payment of ten instalments of the Additional Dearness Allowance but number the twenty five Additional Dearness Allowance instalments released after April 1, 1981 and that the grant in aid given by the State Government to these aided schools companyers the deficit to the extent of seventy five per cent of the approved expenditure and that the approved expenditure extends to the salaries paid to the teaching and number teaching staff, which includes the Pay and Dearness Allowance and Interim Relief before April 1, 1981 and the Pay and Additional Dearness Allowance beyond April 1, 1981 but does number include House Rent Allowance, City Compensatory Allowance, Medical Allowance and the other heads claimed by the petitioners in these matters. In the said judgment of this Court, it is stated that there was general agreement between the parties that there is numberreason for discrimination between the teachers employed in the aided schools and those employed in Government schools so far as the salaries and Additional Dearness Allowance are companycerned and that the State Government was number accepting the claim to parity in respect of other heads of allowance put forward by the petitioners in these matters before this Court. 91 92 and 551 561 of 1986. 2366 67 of 1988 and Writ Petitions No. Notice was issued to the respondents on this petition and in response to the said numberice Counter Affidavits have been filed wherein it has been claimed that the respondents have fully implemented the directions given by this Court in its judgment dated July 28, 1988. By this application, the applicants are seeking implementation of the directions given by this Court in judgment dated July 28, 1988 in Civil Appeals Nos. C. Agrawal, J.
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1990_45.txt
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The Income tax Officer initiated penalty proceedings again and levied a penalty with reference to the difference between the income originally returned and the income finally re assessed. CIT v. Jiwanlal Shah, 1977 109 ITR 474 AII CIT v. Onkar Saran, number under appeal 1979 116 ITR 317 AII ADDI. CIT v. Mewalal Sankatha Prasad, 1979 116 ITR 356 AII CIT v. Rahman, 1979 119 ITR 475 pat C.W.T. The view that the penalty in such cases will be with reference to the original return for the year has been accepted in the following cases CIT v. Gopal Krishna Singhania, 1973 89 ITR 27 AII CIT V. Ram Achal Ram Sewak,1977 106 ITR 144 AII CIT v. Krishna Subhakaran, 1977 108 ITR 271 AII ADDL. Penalty proceedings had also been initiated and a penalty had been imposed. the return. CIT V. Joginder Singh, 1985 151 ITR 93 Del CIT v. Antony 1985 155 ITR 467 Ker F.B. It will be numbered that the difference between the income returned in the original returns and income finally assessed was Rs. Assessments were made on the assessee determining its total income at Rs. For the assessment years 1961 62 and 1962 63, it filed returns of income showing total incomes of Rs, 18,935 and Rs 24,943 respectively. CIT v. Arthanaiswami Chettirar, 1982 136 ITR 145 Mad CIT v. Sucha Singh Anand, 1984 149 ITR 143 Del Addl. CIT v. Brijmohan Jaiswal, 1983 139 ITR 568 M.P. CIT v. Atma Singh Steel Rolling Mills, 1979 120 ITR 590 AII CIT v. Ram Singh Harmohan Singh, 1980 121 ITR 381 P H F.B. It may be mentioned here that originally the Income tax Officer was of the opinion that the income from the lands companystituted business income but subsequently, it has been held that the above income was chargeable only under the head Capital Gains. The minimum penalty was number to be 100 per cent of the income companycealed and the maximum penalty companyld go upto 200 per cent of the income companycealed. The Tribunal agreed with the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax that there was a case for the levy of penalty. CIT v. Bihar Cotton Mills Ltd., 1988 170 ITR 290 Pat. 28,513 for the assessment year 1961 62 and Rs, 28,463 for the assessment year 1962 63. Section 271 1 C of the Income tax, 1961 provides for the levy of penalty in the case of persons who companyceal or furnish inaccurate particulars of the income chargeable under the Act for any assessment year. The assessee preferred appeals to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. The total income number determined was Rs. Having made the above additions in the reassessment, the Income tax Officer initiated proceedings under Section 271 1 C for the failure on the part of the assessee to return the income from the sale of lands. It changed the measure of the penalty. 44,017 for the assessment year 1962 63. 9,604 for the assessment year 1962 63. 41,923 for the assessment year 1961 62 and Rs. 22,988/ for the assessment year 1961 62 and Rs. 34,547 for the assessment year 1962 63 and these assessments have become final. The penalty was number made dependent upon the amount of income companycealed and number on the amount of the tax sought to be avoided. The assessee filed a return which showed a larger income from the Bangkok business than had been estimated before and this was accepted. v.Rajamma, 1979 120 ITR 132 Mad Addl. In doing this the High Court followed its earlier decision in the case of Commissioner of Income tax v. Ram Achal Ram Sewak, 1977 106 ITR 144 All. However, the assessee chose to file its returns only on 27th February, 1969 disclosing the same income as in the original returns viz. Subsequently, re assessment proceedings were initiated. Admittedly, in these returns filed after 1.4.68,the assessee had failed to disclose the income from the sale of lands which was clearly taxable, if number as income from business, certainly, as income by way of capital gains, It is number settled that the law applicable regarding penalty for companycealment is the law in force as on the date of the offence i.e. 52, 185 for the assessment year 1961 62 and Rs. The returns filed by the assessee were in response to numberices under section 148 which are to be treated, in all respects, as the original returns of income filed under section 139 2 . It may be mentioned that on further appeals the total income has been reduced to Rs. It therefore, directed that the amounts of penalty should be reduced to 20 per cent of the tax payable on the amount of Capital Gains included in the assessments and number disclosed in the returns. It was, however, of opinion that since the penalty proceedings related to the assessment years 1961 62 and 1962 63, the provisions of the Income tax Act as they stood respectively on 1.4.1961 and 1.4.1962 would be applicable to determine the amount of penalty and number the amended provisions which came into force w.e.f 1st April, 1968. Subsequently, it came to the knowledge of the Income tax Officer that the assessee had failed to disclose in its returns certain profits arising from the sale of certain lands. The penalty proceedings were companytinued as companytemplated by the Act by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who, by his orders dated 4.3.1971, imposed penalties of Rs 24,000 And Rs. If the arguments of Sri Ahuja were companyrect there companyld have been numberpenalty at all imposed on such re assessment as there was numberconcealment in the re assessment proceedings. From the Judgement and Order dated 21.3.1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Income Tax Reference No. He, therefore, issued numberices under Section 148 of the Income tax Act, 1961 for both the years on the 9th March, 1965. The Act, as it stood on 1.4.1962, provided that the amount of penalty so imposable was to be measured with reference to the tax sought to be evaded by such an act of the assessee, broadly described hereinafter as companycealment. 10,000 respectively for the two assessment years in question. The assessment orders are dated 30.3.1962 and 28.11.1963 respectively. The argument addressed by Sri B.B.Ahuja, learned companynsel appearing for the Revenue, is very simple and runs thus The original returns filed in this case had culminated in the original assessments and are irrelevant for the present purposes, The present penalty proceedings were initiated in companyrse of reassessment proceedings initiated under s.148 of the Act. The High Court took the view that the law applicable in regard to the imposition of penalty would be number the law as on the 1st April of the relevant assessment year as held by the Tribunal but the law prevailing on the dates when the original returns were filed. The amount of penalty companyld number be less than 20 per cent of more than 150 per cent of the tax which would have been avoided as a result of the companycealment, The Finance Act, 1968 amended Section 271 1 c w.e.f.1.4.1968. The relevant returns in these cases, having been filed after 1.4.68, clearly attract the provisions of section 271 1 c as amended in 1968. In this case, as mentioned earlier, the returns originally had been filed sometime in 1962 and 1963. The exact dates of these returns are number available on record. If the assessee had been prompt in filing returns in response to these numberices, the problem that it number faces may number have arisen. 18,395 and Rs. The High Court having refused to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court, the companymissioner of Income tax preferred special leave petitions which were granted by this Court on the 9th March, 1977. Addl. 24,943 respectively and the reassessments were companypleted on 6th March, 1969. 678 679 of 1977. Aggarwal, Vinay Vaish, B.V. Desai and Vinita Ghanpade for the Respondents. Santhos Kr. The respondent, M s. Onkar Saran sons, is a Hindu Undivided family. B. Ahuja, S.Rajappa, P. Parmeswaran and Ms. A. Subhashini for the appellants. 492 of 1973. This companyclusion of the Tribunal was upheld by the High Court on a reference but on a slightly different line of reasoning . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATHAN, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. The question at issue has been raised before several High Courts. That is how these appeals companye before us.
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1992_133.txt
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By order dated 19.02.2008, the State Government appointed Shri Vijay Shanker Pandey, the Commissioner, Lucknow Division, as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges. The respondent submitted his reply to the charge sheet to the new Enquiry Officer, Shri Alok Ranjan on 11.06.2009 and after companysidering the reply of the respondent and the material available on record, the Enquiry Officer submitted his enquiry report on 30.11.2009 to the State Government holding that the charges against the respondent were proved. As Shri Vijay Shanker Pandey declined to companyduct the enquiry afresh, the State Government by its order dated 01.06.2009 appointed Shri Alok Ranjan, Principal Secretary, Urban Development, as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges against the respondent. In the meanwhile, as the respondent did number submit his reply to the charge sheet, the Enquiry Officer companyducted the enquiry ex parte and submitted an enquiry report dated 15.07.2008 holding the respondent guilty of the charges. The respondent then filed his reply to the charge sheet on 28.05.2009 to the Enquiry Officer, Shri Vijay Shanker Pandey and endorsed a companyy of the reply to the Principal Secretary Appointment Section II , Government of U.P. While the enquiry report was pending companysideration before the State Government, the State Government first companysidered the request of the respondent in his representation dated 05.10.2009 for voluntary retirement and by order dated 16.12.2009 intimated the respondent that his request for voluntary retirement has number been accepted by the State Government. 256 SB of 2008 was disposed of by the High Court on 15.05.2009 directing the Enquiry Officer to companymence the proceedings afresh from the stage of charge sheet. 5 SB of 2010 in the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench for quashing the order dated 16.12.2009 of the State Government and for directing the State Government to pay all his retirement benefits admissible under FR 56. 1386 SB of 2010, before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench. On 01.05.2009, having found that the ex parte enquiry was violative of principles of natural justice, the disciplinary authority passed an order directing the Enquiry Officer, Shri Vijay Shanker Pandey, to hold the enquiry afresh after giving sufficient opportunity of hearing to the respondent in accordance with the rules. requesting him to exonerate him from the charges against him and instead grant voluntary retirement from service under Rule 56 of the U.P. 256 SB of 2008 before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, and by an interim order dated 14.03.2008 the High Court stayed the operation of the order of suspension as well as the order appointing the Enquiry Officer. On 19.02.2008, a charge sheet companytaining 16 charges was served on him. 1386 SB of 2010 on 14.09.2010 before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, against the order of dismissal and this Writ Petition is pending companysideration before the High Court. On 16.09.2010, the Division Bench of the High Court, by the impugned judgment, quashed the order dated 16.12.2009 of the State Government and rejected his request to accept voluntary retirement under FR 56 and directed the State Government to reconsider the respondents request afresh keeping in view the observations made in the impugned judgment. Ambedkar, the State Government issued a letter dated 11.09.2007 to the respondent when he was posted as Special Secretary, Dharmarth Karya Department, Government of U.P., requesting him to furnish to the Government a companyy of the book. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. The disciplinary authority issued numberice dated 05.08.2008 to the respondent to show cause why the enquiry report should number be accepted. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 16.09.2010 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. During the pendency of the Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. Writ Petition No. When he was posted as Special Secretary, Samaj Kalyan Department, Government of U.P. The State Government challenged the order dated 14.03.2008 of the High Court before this Court in Special Leave Petition Civil No. in 2006, he authored a book titled Jati Raj. Personal hearing was granted to the respondent on 04.06.2010 and the respondent was dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority by order dated 07.09.2010. Fundamental Rules, 1942 for short FR 56 . Aggrieved, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. The respondent instead of furnishing a companyy of the book proceeded on leave and on 12.02.2008 he was placed under suspension in companytemplation of the disciplinary proceedings. 256 S B of 2008 expeditiously and with the direction that pending such disposal of the writ petition, the State Government was number to take any final decision imposing any penalty on the respondent. 12749 of 2008 and this Court, while issuing numberice in Special Leave Petition, stayed the operation of the order dated 14.03.2008 passed by the High Court. By the impugned judgment, however, the High Court did number in any way interfere with the subsequent order dated 07.09.2010 of the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent from service as the order of dismissal was subject matter of challenge in a separate writ petition, Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. The charges against the respondent were that certain passages in the book Jati Raj written by him were defamatory and derogatory to national leaders and he had hurt the religious sentiments of the people and created hatred amongst various sections of the society. Thereafter, this Court by order dated 14.11.2008 disposed of the Special Leave Petition with a request to the High Court to dispose of the Writ Petition No. The facts very briefly are that the respondent is a member of the Provincial Civil Services of the State of U.P. The respondent filed a Review Petition No. The respondent submitted his reply dated 02.03.2010 to the show cause numberice and also made a request for being given an opportunity of personal hearing. 115 of 2009, but the High Court dismissed the Review Petition on 26.05.2009. As the book companytained some remarks against national leaders like late Dr. B.R. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted.
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2011_588.txt
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After the first IPL season, the BCCI terminated the agreement dated 21.01.2008 between BCCI and the respondent for the Indian sub continent and companymenced negotiations with WSG India. BCCI and WSG India, however, were to companytinue with the Rest of the World media rights. Pursuant to the negotiations between BCCI and WSG India, BCCI entered into an agreement with the appellant whereunder the media rights for the Indian sub continent for the period 2009 to 2017 was awarded to the appellant for a value of Rs.4,791.08 crores. On 25.03.2009, the appellant and the respondent also executed the Deed for Provision of Facilitation Services hereinafter referred to as the Facilitation Deed whereunder the respondent was to pay a sum of Rs.425 crores to the appellant as facilitation fees. Accordingly, on 21.01.2008 BCCI and the respondent entered into a Media Rights License Agreement for the period from 2008 to 2012 for a sum of US274.50 million. Amongst the tenders submitted, the bid of World Sports Group India for short WSG India was accepted by BCCI. On 28.06.2010, the appellant acting under Clause 9 of the Facilitation Deed sent a request for arbitration to ICC Singapore and the ICC issued a numberice to the respondent to file its answer to the request for arbitration. On 14.03.2009, the respondent filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for short the Act against the BCCI before the Bombay High Court praying for injunction against the BCCI from acting on the termination letter dated 14.03.2009 and for preventing BCCI from granting the rights under the agreement dated 21.01.2008 to any third party. Thereafter, the appellant claimed to have allowed media rights in India to have lapsed and then facilitated on 25.03.2009, a new Media Rights License Agreement between the BCCI and the respondent for the Indian sub companytinent for the same companytract value of Rs.4,791.08 crores. In the meanwhile, on 30.06.2010, the respondent filed a second suit, Suit No.1828 of 2010, before the Bombay High Court against the appellant for inter alia a declaration that as the Facilitation Deed stood rescinded, the appellant was number entitled to invoke the arbitration clause in the Facilitation Deed. Facts The facts very briefly are that on 30.11.2007 the Board of Control for Cricket in India for short BCCI invited tenders for IPL Indian Premier League Media Rights for a period of ten years from 2008 to 2017 on a worldwide basis. On 25.06.2010, the respondent also filed Suit No.1869 of 2010 for inter alia a declaration that the Facilitation Deed was void and for recovery of Rs.125 crores already paid to the appellant. By a pre bid arrangement, however, the respondent was to get the media rights for the sub continent for the period from 2008 to 2010. Clause 9 of the Facilitation Deed dated 25.03.2009 between the appellant and the respondent was titled Governing Law and read as follows GOVERNING LAW This Deed shall be governed by and companystrued in accordance with the laws of England and Wales, without regard to choice of law principles. In this companytext, he referred to Clause 9 of the Facilitation Deed which stipulated that any party may seek equitable relief in a companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction in Singapore, or such other companyrt that may have jurisdiction over the parties. The respondent also filed an application for temporary injunction against the appellant from companytinuing with the arbitration proceedings companymenced by the appellant under the aegis of ICC. On 09.08.2010, the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dismissed the application for temporary injunction of the respondent saying that it would be for the arbitrator to companysider whether the Facilitation Deed was void on account of fraud and misrepresentation and that the arbitration must, therefore, proceed and the Court companyld number intervene in matters governed by the arbitration clause. To operate the media rights in India, the appellant was required to seek a sub licensee within seventy two hours. Venugopal, learned senior companynsel for the appellant, submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court failed to appreciate that the Bombay High Court had numberjurisdiction to pass an order of injunction restraining a foreign seated international arbitration at Singapore between the parties, who were number residents of India. The respondent challenged the order of the learned Single Judge before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and by the impugned order, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and passed an order of temporary injunction restraining the arbitration by ICC. This is an appeal against the order dated 17.09.2010 of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Appeal Lodging No.534 of 2010. Though, this time period was extended twice, the appellant was number able to get a sub licensee. Contentions on behalf of the appellant Mr. K.K. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed this appeal. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted.
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1947_27.txt
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This Rs.10,00,000/ Rupees Ten Lacs represents the companyts awarded by this Court in Civil Appeal No.2374/2010. The limited grievance of the appellant is with regard to the directions granted by the High Court to recover an amount of Rs.10,00,000/ Rupees Ten Lacs from the appellant. While companysidering the application, the High Court went into various other aspects and also came to the companyclusion that the appellant should be made liable for the companyts awarded by this Court in Civil Appeal No.2374/2010. The appellant had approached the High Court for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr. KURIAN, J. P.C. Leave granted.
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2017_808.txt
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Joseph Vellapally and D.N. N. Sachthey, Anip Sachthey and Ms. Rashmi Dhariwal for the Respondents. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by M. SAHAI, J. Validity of demand, under Section 58A of the Bombay Prohibition Act, for maintenance of excise staff for supervision of the manufacture of industrial alcohol was assailed on lack of legiislative companypetence of the State. 503 of 1974. 129 of 1973. From the Judgement and order dated 29/30.8.1973 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No. Mishra for the Appellants. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1992_17.txt
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on every Sunday at 11.00 a.m. The appellants shall fully companyperate with the Trial Court. The appellants shall remain present in Court on each date of hearing and in case the appellants are absent, the Trial Court would be at liberty to cancel the bail granted to the accused appellants. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and the appellants are granted bail on the following companyditions The appellants shall report to the police station companycerned once a week i.e. Leave granted. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties.
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2012_142.txt
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4268 of 2003. 4269 of 2003 and A. 14.25 lakhs was advanced as loan to the Appellant by the Respondent No. 14.25 lakhs from the numberified party during the period 1.4.1991 to 6.6.1992 as specified in the said Act. 34,98,967.04/ . A numberification was issued on 2.7.1992 by the Custodian numberifying the Respondent No. The Custodian called upon the Appellant herein to furnish particulars of the said loans pursuant to or in furtherance whereof the Appellant herein accepted the same to be outstanding as on 30.6.1992 in the books of Respondent No. The Appellant herein obtained short term loans amounting to Rs. On the said amount of loan, interest at the rate of 21 per annum was payable. The Appellant herein was directed to deposit the principal amount by the Custodian which was number companyplied with. 1 with interest at 21 per annum and that the total sum outstanding was Rs. 4270 of 2003 B. SINHA, J These appeals arising out of the judgments and orders dated 21st March 2003 passed by the Special Court at Bombay in Miscellaneous Petition Nos. The companycerned Chartered Accountant, however, gave a certificate to the effect that a sum of Rs. 1 payable to him. 1 as a numberified party in terms of the provisions of the Special Courts Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992 for short the said Act . 71, 72 and 99 of 1999 involving similar questions of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. with C.A. FACTS The fact of the matter, however, is being numbericed from Civil Appeal No. The Respondent No. No.
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2004_983.txt
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The assessee is a society registered under the Assam Co operative Societies Act, 1949. The objects of the Society are to arrange for the sale of produce of the members of affiliated societies and other members to the best advantage. The membership of the assessee society is divided into three classes as follows A Class companysisting of companyoperative institutions B Class companysisting of individual cultivators and sympathisers C Class companysisting of traders companymission agent etc. The Assam Co operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd., Assam was appoint ed as the procuring agent for paddy by the Government under a scheme evolved by the Government of Assam and companytained in its proceeding dated 23rd November, 1962. This one rupee companymission was divided between the three companyoperative societies. to act as agent of members for the disposal of their produce and to act as a central purchasing agency for agricultural as well as Consumers Society and for other members. The question referred is Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee i.e., Assam Cooperative Apex Marketing Society Ltd., is entitled to exemption under Section 81 1 c in respect of their income arising out of procurement of paddy and other agriculture produce?. to purchase and sell agricultural produce and farm and farmers requisites including seeds, manures, fertilizers and machinery etc. The assessment year companycerned herein is 1962 63, the first assessment year under the Income tax Act, 1961. This plea was negatived by the Income tax Officer but on appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the assessee. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Gauhati High Court answering the question referred to it against the assessee. During the accounting year relevant to the said assessment year, the appellant. The State Government. The revenue went up in appeal to the Tribunal.
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1993_765.txt
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By judgment and order dated 3rd February, 2012, the order passed by the Trial Court acquitting the appellant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, has been reversed and she has been companyvicted and sentenced to undergo six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/ under Section 7 and to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.5,000/ under Section 13 1 d read with Section 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It appears that the appellant did number have proper representation when Criminal Appeal No.1200 of 2005 came to be allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court on 3rd February, 2012. Having numbered that the appellant did number have representation before the High Court under the circumstances which have been explained by the appellant, we accept the explanation. The judgment and order rendered by the High Court is, therefore, set aside only on this point. Leave granted.
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2013_891.txt
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For a, short period thereafter Nathu lived with Inder Singh. The suit was companytested by Gujar Singh who alleged inter alia that Inder Singh was number validly adopted by Nathu in accordance with the custom prevalent amongst the Jats of Ludhiana. Inder Singh then preferred an appeal. On Nathus death Gujar Singh got the property of Nathu mutated in his name in the revenue records. Inder Singh then brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for possession of the property of Nathu Singh, which companysisted of about 16 bighas odd of land and a house, on the footing that he was the adopted soil of Nathu. Then Gujar Singh, defendant in the suit , who was a nearer companylateral of Nathu, gained influence over the, latter. They hold that the short period of about six weeks during which Nathu lived with the appellant after the execution of the deed of adoption was number sufficient to prove that Nathu treated Inder Singh as his future heir there was, therefore, numbersuch association as would make, the adoption valid according to the customary rules prevalentamongst the Jats of Ludhiana district. Nathu, the last male holder of the property in dispute, was a Jat of Ludhiana, district. He further found that according to the customary rules of adoption the deed of adoption companyld number have any effect unless after its execution there was a companytinuous companyrse of companyduct showing that Nathu treated Inder Singh as his son and inasmuch as there was numberevidence to show such association, Inder Singh had failed to make out his case. Inder Singhs case was that he looked after Nathu since his childhood and on March 24, 1946, Nathu adopted him, according to the custom prevalent amongst them, before the village Panchayat by distributing gur jaggery and on the next day, that is, March 25, 1946, Nathu executed a deed of adoption in his favour and got it registered on the same day. Nathu left lnder Singh and on September 6, 1946, cancelled the deed of gift. The only question which falls for decision is whether Inder Singh, plaintiff in the companyrt of first instance and appellant herein, was validly adopted by one Nathu in accordance with the rules of customary adoption prevalent amongst Jats of the Ludhiana district in the State of Punjab. Nathu died three years after, that is on October 27, 1949. Inder Singh, a resident of the same village, was his nephew by companylateral relation of the fifth degree. The trial Judge held that the story of the alleged adoption before the village Panchayat was number substantiated and the recitals in the deed of adoption were incorrect. Gujar Singh died sometime after the appellate decision, and the present respondents as heirs and legal representatives of Gujar Singh carried a second appeal to the Punjab High Court. which was heard by the District Judge of Ludhiana. The learned Judges of the High Court held that the rules of customary adoption prevalent amongst the parties required two essential elements a an intention to appoint an heir and b an act of association between the two as father and son. He was a resident, of village Mohanpur. Achhru Ram, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the Appellant. He was blind, number married and had numberissue. The suit was, accordingly, dismissed. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab on March 7, 1955. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated September 2, 1954, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Civil Regular Second Appeal No. The judgment being a judgment of reversal and the value of the property in dispute more than Rs. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION,.,
Civil Appeal No. 337 of 1952. 20,000 the High Court gave a certificate under Art. 141 of 1956. P. Sinha and V. N. Sethi, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAS, J. April 10. The relevant facts are these.
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1961_49.txt
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Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007. Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007 shall number be disturbed in pursuance of the Rules. Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007 shall number be disturbed in pursuance of the Rules by way of the aforesaid impugned order. Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007 made effective from 17th of June, 1995. 1389 SB of 2007 directing that the seniority of the respondents as existing prior to the enforcement of the U.P. Jal Nigam, aggrieved by the aforesaid Seniority List, filed a Writ Petition assailing the validity of the U. P. Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007, by which Rule 8 A has been inserted in the U. P. Government Servants Seniority Rules, 1991 and by virtue of the aforesaid Rules, the Government Servants belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes would be entitled to companysequential seniority on accelerated promotion given to them through roster rule of reservation. On 6th of November, 2007, the validity of the aforesaid Rule 8 A of Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007 was challenged by the Engineers of the Irrigation Department by way of a Writ Petition No. On 17th of October, 2007, the State Government issued another order, wherein it was directed that as a result of the aforesaid Amendment in the Seniority Rules 1991, necessary amendments should be made in the Seniority List by adopting the procedure in accordance with the seniority Rules. Jal Nigam dated 3rd of November, 2007 in furtherance of the aforesaid numberification dated 14th of September, 2007. The respondents also challenged the aforesaid tentative Seniority List dated 3rd of November, 2007 issued by the U.P. 1389 S B of 2007, by an interim order, directed that the seniority of the respondents as existing prior to the enforcement of the U.P. Government Servants Seniority 2nd Amendment Rules, 2005 were introduced by which Rule 8 A referred to above was omitted. 1389 of 2007 before the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. 1389 SB of 2007 pending in the High Court. The High Court, in the meantime, passed an interim order by which the seniority of the petitioners in that writ Petition and other Promoted officers, as was existing prior to the enforcement of the aforesaid Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007 shall number be disturbed in pursuance of these Rules and numberreversion shall be effected. Government Servants Seniority 1st Amendment Rules, 2002, were issued by which Rule 8 A was inserted in the Seniority Rules, 1991 providing companysequential Seniority to the scheduled Castes and scheduled tribes from the date of their promotion and in the meantime the validity of Article 16 4 A of the Constitution as also the Rules and Enactments of various states granting companysequential seniority to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the matter of promotion was assailed in a bunch of writ petitions which were filed before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the said matters were referred to a Constitution Bench. The aforesaid Writ Petition No. In the aforesaid Writ Petition, the respondents further assailed the validity of the Notification dated 14th of September, 2007 of the U.P. They also challenged the order dated 19th of October, 2007 by which the aforesaid Notification dated 14th of September, 2007 was adopted. In the present writ petition, the Division Bench of the High Court, relying upon the order passed by the High Court in the earlier writ petition No.1389 SB of 2007, issued numberice and granted relief and provided that the seniority of the appellants therein as existing prior to the enforcement of the P. Government Servants Seniority 3rd Amendment Rules, 2007, shall number be disturbed in pursuance of these rules. 1389 SB of 2007 pending in the High Court, following the interim order passed in the aforesaid Writ Petition No. Thereafter, the U.P.Jal Nigam issued the tentative joint seniority list of Chief Engineer Level 1, Chief Engineer Level II Civil and Superintending Engineer Civil and the tentative Seniority List of the Executive Engineers of U.P. The aforesaid Notification dated 14th of September, 2007 was adopted vide order dated 19th October, 2007 by the Chairman of Jal Nigam and was given immediate effect thereto. Jal Nigam in furtherance of the Notification. 1496 S B of 2007 by a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow whereby the High Court directed the aforesaid writ petition to be tagged with Writ Petition No. 1496 S B of 2007 came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The High Court directed the aforesaid Writ Petition to be tagged with Writ Petition No. Further in the meantime, some of the Executive Engineers also filed a Writ Petition No.81/2008 thereby challenging the companysequential validity of Rule 8 A of the U.P. Respondents who were working on the post of Superintending Engineers, Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas parishad, Lucknow, which was a party in the aforesaid writ petition, aggrieved by the aforesaid interim order dated 17th of January, 2008, filed a Special Leave Petition c No. Subsequently, the U.P. These two appeals are directed against an interim order dated 4th of December, 2007 passed in Writ Petition No. Article 16 4 A was introduced by an amendment of the Constitution on 17th of June, 1995, which reads as under Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in the matters of promotion, with companysequential seniority, to any class or class of posts in the services under the State in favour of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes which in the opinion of the State are number adequately represented in the services under the State Article 16 4 A of the Constitution, which was inserted in the Constitution on 17th of June, 1995, as numbered herein earlier, was incorporated by the Constitution 77th Amendment Act, 1995, thereby introducing an enabling provision for providing reservation in the matter of promotion. The relevant facts leading to the filing of these appeals may be summarized as under In the year 1973, the Government Orders providing reservation in the matter of promotion for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were issued. In the said writ petition, the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench after hearing the Parties, has issued a numberice to the Advocate General of the State vide order dated 6th of November, 2007. Further in the year 2002, the U.P. Further in the year 2005, the U.P. The aforesaid regulations were made in exercise of power companyferred on the U.P. On 19th of October, 2006, the aforesaid reference was decided by the Constitution Bench in M.Nagaraj Ors. After the issuance of the aforesaid numberification, the State Government vide letter dated 3rd of October, 2007 directed the various Development Authorities including the appellants to take necessary action in accordance with the Notification dated 14th of September, 2007 and according to Section 92 of the U. P. Avas Evam Vikas parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, the State Government will have companytrol over the Board and other Local authorities and the State Government may give the board such directions which in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purpose of the Act, and it shall be the duty of the Board to companyply with such directions. 3097 of 2008 before this Court challenging the aforesaid interim order of the High Court. Further, on 10th of October, 1994 the percentage of reservation in the matter of Schedule Castes was enhanced from 18 to 21 by means of Government order referring to section 3 7 of the aforesaid Act of 1994. Hence, on 3rd of April, 2008, the present special leave petition was filed. Subsequently, in the year 1994, the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Reservation for Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribes and other Backward Classes Act, 1994 was promulgated and Section 3 7 of the said Act of 1994 says that if on the date of the companymencement of this Act, reservation was in force under Government orders for appointment to posts to be filled up by promotion, such Government orders shall companytinue to be applicable till they are modified or revoked. Jal Nigam under Sections 97 2 and 98 1 of the P. Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1975 with the prior approval of the State Government. The appellants, on companying to know about the passing of the aforesaid order, filed an application for impleadment and the said application was numbered as C.M.Application No.189180 of 2008. However, the Division Bench, following the reasons mentioned in the order passed in Writ Petition No. It was also companytended that any order passed in the aforesaid writ petition was going to affect the rights of the present appellants. However, this Court in its Judgment dated 16th of November, 1992, in the case of Indira Sawhney vs. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 447, observed that reservation of appointments or posts under Article 16 of the Constitution is companyfined to the initial appointment and cannot extend to reservation in the matter of promotion. In the said application, it was companytended that the appellants were necessary and affected parties and yet they were number arrayed as respondents in the aforesaid writ petition. Further on 5th of March, 2008, the aforesaid impleadment application came up for hearing before the High Court and the High Court on that date allowed the impleadment application filed by the appellants. But before making any such provision, it was the Constitutional obligation and duty of the State Government to see in each case the existence of the companypelling reason, namely, backwardness, inadequacy of representation and overall administrative inefficiency on the basis of qualified data companylected but in the present case, numbersuch exercise has been undertaken by the State of U.P. This Court, vide order dated 22nd of February, 2008, granted leave and allowed the aforesaid appeal filed by the Parishad to the extent that the interim order passed by the High Court was set aside and requested the High Court to dispose of the writ petition preferably within two months from the date of the companymunication of the order. TARUN CHATERJEE, J. 4 to 8 in the array of the parties. Union of India Ors. Accordingly, they prayed to be impleaded as respondent Nos. Leave granted.
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2008_2326.txt
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48 lacs floating in the share market in september 1939 the assessee purchased shares and debentures of the value of rs. regarding the purchase and sale of shares the tribunal stated that the assessee purchased shares of the value of rs. from shares and securities to gold because of the worsening of the war situation after the fall of france in 1940 b that when the war situation improved in 1944 and with that the price of gold began to fail he once again companyverted his investment from gold to shares i.e. 13 lacs and odd and rs. between june 28 1940 and numberember 9 1940 the assessee purchased 68109 tolas of gold for rs. rejecting the assessees case that the gold was purchased by him owing to the war crisis and sold by him on account of the pressing necessities alleged by him and the change in the war situation then. 88522/ realised by the assessee as a receipt as a result of sale of certain shares. the tribunal accordingly sent a supplementary statement of case on april 23 1960.
after setting out the assessees transactions of the sale of government securities in 1938 39 the purchase of shares from their sale proceeds their sale in 1939 40 and 1940 41 the purchase of gold and its sale the tribunal once again rejected the assessees claim that those transactions were conversions of one investment to anumberher made for a better return or that the gold was sold in october 1944 for pressing necessities alleged by the assessee. 33481/ arising out of the sale of some more gold and the second relates to the receipt of rs. 46 lacs which included the said sale proceeds of rs. he however sold certain shares for rs. 2.60 lacs. 44 lacs and odd and to which on march 27 1939 he added rs. 575723/ in october 1939 and then the rest of them in 1940 and 1941 realising rs. 2958677/ and rs. from an unproductive investment into one which companyld give him an adequate yield and c that he had sold gold because of pressing necessities. the first companytention was held unsustainable because even after purchasing gold the assessee had retained companysiderable cash the second was rejected on the ground that the assessee had sold gold number because of the allied victory in sight but because he found the gold unprofitabie by reason of the fall in its price and the third was rejected as the assessee had failed to makegood the pressing necessities alleged by him. it rejected the assessees case a that he had companyverted one investment into anumberher i.e. on march 23 1939 the assessee opened an account in the imperial bank of india initially with rs. the first sale fetched a profit of rs. 37 lacs and odd in1945 46 that those were shares of two companycerns only bokaro and ramgur company limited and karanpura development company ltd.
and that as the latter companypanys shares were of the value of rs. lot of these securities and realised rs. 117064/ the second a profit of rs. 4425088/ the sale thus resulting in an excess of rs. the income tax officer brought to tax the two surpluses in the assessments for the assessment years 1940 41 and 1941 42.
but the department was again unsuccessful as the tribunal once again held on the strength of the companyrespondence which had passed between the assessee his bankers axed his brokers in calcutta that the only possible companyclusion emerging from that correspondence was that the assessees intention was number to deal in shares and debentures and that the said transactions were a mere change in investment carried out of a single scheme of earning a better yield from investments. 34.14 lacs from out of the funds in the said account. as regards the gold also the tribunal companyfirmed the orders of the i.t.o. 25133 and the third a loss of rs. on attaining majority the estate which included government securities of the value of about rs. 40 lacs was handed over to him on august 19 1937.
during the account year 1938 39 he sold the whole. 33 thousand and odd as liable to assessment. the assessee was at all material times a landholder deriving large income from agriculture royalties of minerals and income from forests forming part of his estate. the tribunals orders in respect of these assessments for the assessment years 1939 40 to 1941 42 were made part of the statement of case filed by the tribunal before the high court in the present references. this excess amount was assessed as profit by the income tax officer for the assessment year 1939 40.
but on appeal against the assessment order the appellate tribunal set side that order on a finding that the said sale was by way of a change in investment and therefore was number a transaction in the nature of trade or business. the account was opened in the name of his wife and was called account of rs. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shelat j. these two appeals under special leave arise from two references to the high companyrt of patna under s. 66 2 of the income tax act 1922 and relate to the assessment years 1.945 46 and 1947.
in the 2nd appeal two questions arise for determination one relates to the surplus receipt of rs. the high companyrt further held that the findings given by the appellate tribunal were all findings of fact and as they companyld number be said to have been arrived at without any evidence they could number be interfered with in a reference under s. 66 2 and answered the questions as to the two surplus amounts of rs. 455305/ . prior to 1937 when he was a minumber his estate was under the management of a companyrt of wards. 1642/ . by an order dated april 2 1959 the high companyrt referred that statement of case back to the tribunal under s. 66 4 directing it to companysider further all the materials before it and file a supplementary statement of case as the high companyrt found the statement factually incorrect in certain respects. 64201/ respectively. 342 and 346 of 1954.
t. desai and d.n. jagadish swarup solicitor general s.k. aiyar r.n. 481 and 482 of 1966.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated april 15 1963 of the patna high companyrt in misc. sachthey and b.d. judicial cases number. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number. mukherjee for the appellant in both the appeals . sharma for the respondent in both the appeals .
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1969_317.txt
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Sahoo, N.D.B. Shroff, Randeep Singh, Shrjawala, R. Sasiprab hu, S.S. Shroff, S.A. Shroff, Arun Madan, R.K. Sahoo, J.D.B. Sanghi, Aspi Chimoi, A.L. Pandiya, Rajan Karanjawala, S.C. Sharma, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Manik Karanjawala, N. Nettar, G.S. Raju, Aruneshwar Gupta, P.P. Milan Banerjee, P.P. Narayana, R.K. Mehta, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain, D.P. Chari, T. Sridharan, Ms. Mridula Ray, S.K. Baig, Raja Ram Agar walla, P.A. Raju, M.M. Juneja, S.K. Choudhary, A.K. Nayar, K. Chakravorty, Mrs. J. Wad. Kshatriya, T.V.S.N. Soli J. Sorabjee, A.K. Mishra, H.J. Mohanty, Ashok Kumar Panda, K. Patri and Jatinder Sethi for the Appellants. Rao, A. Mariarputham, C.M. Ganguli, M.C. Bagga, P.N. Bhandare, S. Ganesh, P.S. Sen, M.H. Zaveri and B.S. Mrs. Aruna. S. Nariman, G.L. Chau han for the Respondents. 176 to 178 of 1983. Mathur for the Intervener. 3 137 39 of 1985 etc. 178G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. From the Judgment and Order dated 10.4.1985 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Appeal Nos.
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1989_172.txt
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TO The Collector of Customs, Customs House, Cochin 3. ,
Enquiry Officer, Custom House, Cochin 3. Cochin 3. 9th December 1963 From L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, Custom House, Cochin 3. II, Customs House, Cochin 3. Sir, Sub Enquiry into the work and companyduct of Shri C. L. Subramaniam, Preventive Officer, Custom House Cochin. Collector of Customs Apprg. Sri H. T. Soares, Assistant Collector, Customs House, Cochin was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. Hence Abraham Kurian did number get the permission sought before the date of enquiry. The Enquiry Officer recommended appellants removal from service. From L., Subramaniam, Preventive Officer Gr. Therefore he was unable to assist the appellant in the enquiry. It appears that on December 30, 1963 the Enquiry Officer fixed January 8, 1964 as the date of enquiry. After he was appointed to present the case in support of the allegations made against the appellant, the appellant wrote to the Collector of Customs, Cochin, the Disciplinary Authority on October 4, 1963 as follows From C. L. Subramanlam, Preventive Officer, Customs House, Cochin 3. After learning that fact from Abraham Kurian, the appellant wrote the following letter to the Collector of Customs on December 4, 1963. On the date of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer adjourned the case sine die after obtaining an undertaking from the appellant that on the next date of the enquiry he would go on with the case even if he was unable to get the assistance of Abraham Kurian on that date. The appellant was a Preventive Officer, Grade, 11, Customs Office, Cochin from June 16, 1962 to January 31, 1963. On December 9, 1963, the appellant wrote to the Enquiry Officer as follows Sec. Yours faithfully, Sd 9 12 63 L. Subramaniam Even after getting this letter, the Enquiry Officer did number fix the date of the enquiry. It is number known when that letter was received by the Superintendent of Post Offices but Abraham Kurian did number get the permission sought, before the date of enquiry. Hence the enquiry went on without the appellant having anybodys assistance. With reference to your letter dated 3rd December, 1963 wish to submit as follows Shri Abraham Kurian, Clerk, Cochin Head Post Office who is to assist me in the enquiry from 5 12 1963 in companynection with certain allegations pending against me has urgently applied to his superior yesterday itself and is awaiting permission. It is only thereafter he wrote to the Superintendent of Post Offices requesting him to permit Abraham Kurian to assist the appellant. He was told that an enquiry will be held against him on the basis of that charge. 4th December 1963. In April 1962, he applied to the Assistant Collector of Customs, seeking permission to allow his wife to run a taxi service. 16 Customs Quarters Willingdon island, P.O. Thereafter on March 25, 1963 the appellant was served with a memorandum stating that while functioning as Preventive Officer, Grade II, Cochin Customs House, during the period June 1962 to January 31, 1963 he had companytravened the provisions of rule 12 1 of the Central Civil Services Conduct Rules, 1955. After enquiry the Enquiry Officer came to the, companyclusion that the allegations made against the appellant were established and companysequently he was guilty of companytravening rule 12 1 of the Central Civil Service Conduct Rules, 1955. Thanking you, I remain Sir, Yours faithfully, Sd C. L. Subramaniam. As I cannot appear for the enquiry without assistance I re quest you Sir, to adjourn the hearing by 10 days. During the pendency of the enquiry an additional ground in support of the charge was served on the appellant to the effect that he himself was running the taxi service. He was informed that numberpermission was necessary for his wife to operate a taxi service but he should number canvass any business for his wife. The factual allegation made against the appellant was that he canvassed business for his wife. Thereafter, it is said that the appellant acting on behalf of his wife purchased some cars which were used as taxis. It appears that there were several ,complaints against the appellant to the effect that he was canvassing business for his wife. 1/1/63 Estt. In the result the appellant was ordered to be removed from service. 1/1/63/Estt Cus. On the basis of that recommendation the Disciplinary Authority served on the appellant a numberice to show cause why he should number be removed from service. But the same was number accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant submitted his explana tion. The said Shivaraman was a trained police prosecutor. He challenged the validity of the order removing him from service on various grounds. Gobind Dass and S. P. Nayar, for the Respondent. To The Asstt. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hedge, J., This is an appeal by special leave. The appellant personally argued his appeal. Appellant appeared in person. Those companyplaints were enquired into. The appellant challenged that order by means of a petition under Art. 197 of 1968. Appeal by Special Leave from the judgment and order dated March 26, 1970 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. Hence this appeal. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Kerala. 11 of 1971. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. His writ petition was first heard by a single judge who dismissed the same and the order of the single judge was affirmed by a Division Bench of that High Court.
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1972_65.txt
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Bhagirathi Das deceased was an employee of Gua Ores Mines, Gua, District Singhbhum West belonging to appellant. 1 herein is son through his second wife, Mulgi Devi and one Goverdan Dass is the son through his first wife Savitri Devi. 1 for his appointment on companypassionate ground. He was asked to companytinue in the morning duty on 11.02.1996. On 10.02.1996, he was on C 3 Shift duty. 507 of 2002. He left behind his two wives, two married daughters, one unmarried daughter and three sons. Interpretation of terms of a tripartite settlement providing for appointment on companypassionate ground is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 20.09.2006 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No. While working, he suddenly companylapsed and declared dead at the spot. 373 of 2006 allowing an appeal preferred by respondent No. 1 from the judgment and order dated 4.07.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said High Court in W.P. He filed a writ petition marked as Writ Petition S No. B. SINHA, J Leave granted. A representation was made by respondent No. The same was rejected. Respondent No. S No.
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2008_2653.txt
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originally jivabhai was shown in the electoral roll as christian soloman jivabhai and by the correction shown in the companyrigendum the name of soloman was substituted by the name suleman. along with the numberination form jivabhai had enclosed a certified companyy of the companyrigeridum to the electoral roll issued by the registration officer who was officer incharge of preparation of the electoral rolls. what was produced was only the certified companyy of the companyrigendum issued by the electoral registration officer which showed the companyrect ion in the name of jivabhai. livabhai was number an elector in the mahudha constituency of the legislative assembly. the appellant challenged the election of the respondent who had been declared duty elected to the state legislative assembly from this particular companystituency in the general elections to the legislative assembly held in march 1972.
the apellants principal ground of challenge was that at the time of the scrutiny of the numberination papers on february 9 1972 the returning officer improperly rejected the numberination paper of one christian suleman jivabhai hereinafter to be described for brevity as jivabhai . the high companyrt accepted the objection with regard to the number compliance of section 33 5 of the act and rejected the numberination paper of jivabhai. on objection being raised by the respondent the numberination paper of jivabhai was rejected on the ground that the provisions of section 33 5 of the act were number companyplied with inasmuch as he had number produced a certified companyy of all the relevant entries in the electoral ron before the returning officer at the time of scrutiny of the numberination papers. he was an elector from shahpur companystituency in ahmedabad city. b. patel and h.s parihar for the respondent the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by goswami j. this appeal under section 11 6 a of the representation of the people act 1951 briefly the act is directed against the judgment of the high companyrt of gujarat dismissing the election petition of the appellant who is an elector from mahudha companystituency for the gujarat state legislative assembly. high court in election petition number 7 of 1972.
rajendra chaudhuri and p. c. kapur for the appellant. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 297 of 1973.
appeal from the judgment and order of the gujarat.
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1974_45.txt
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jain was the registrar. jain for two reasons in the first place the apex bank being an appointee of the registrar had numberauthority to divest itself of the power companyferred upon it by the registrar and to invest p. jain with that power. jain mehfooz khan and yashpal dhingra for the respondents. respondent 1 was appointed as an agent of the appellant bank which is a companyoperative society registered under and governed by the provisions of the madhya pradesh companyoperative societies act. jain who held the enquiry against respondent 1 and passed the order terminating his services had numberpower to do so. the registrar referred the matter to the deputy register who by an order dated february 27 1972 allowed the claim of respondent 1 on the ground that the order terminating the services was number in accordance with rules 44 and 45 of companyoperative bank employees service rules. in an appeal filed by the bank the addl. jain the services of respondent 1 were terminated on the ground that he had over stayed the leave granted to him. aggrieved by that order respondent 1 raised a dispute under section ss 2 of the act before the registrar of the co operative societies. the board of revenue set aside the order of termination and remanded the matter to the bank for disposal in accordance with law. registrar took the view that the only remedy which was open to respondent 1 was to claim damages for wrongful termination of his services and that therefore he companyld number be reinstated in service respondent 1 than filed an appeal before the board of revenue which held by an order dated august 28 1974 that s.p. u. mehta s.s.
khanduja r.d. the writ petition filed by the bank in the high companyrt of madhya pradesh was dismissed on october 26 1973.
aggrieved by the judgment of the high court the bank has filed this appeal. the only authority which could have companyferred the necessary power. ghambir and ashok mahajan for the appellant. petition number 176/74. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 996 of 1979 from the judgment and order dated 26.10.78 of the madhya pradesh high companyrt in misc. he also ordered the reinstatement of respondent 1 with full back salary and allowances. n. kacker s.k. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chandrachud c.j. by an order dated june 5 1968 passed by one s.p.
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1984_252.txt
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It was alleged that after the registration of the companypany aforesaid as a Public Limited Company, the appellants as managing director and directors issued prospectus inviting public subscriptions of 42,000 equity shares and 3,000 preference shares. It was given out by the appellants to the investors that application was being made to the Calcutta Stock Exchange for enlisting the shares of the companypany for official quotation. In spite of the rejection the share money companylected from different investors was held by the appellants and numbere of the share holders were either informed or were repaid. The appellants on the relevant date, were managing director and directors of a Public Limited Company registered as M s. Bihar Cable and Wire Industries Limited hereinafter referred to as the Company . Such application which was made on behalf of the companypany was rejected by the stock exchange. A case was instituted by the Central Bureau of Investigation hereinafter referred to as the CBI against the appellants and others on basis of a companyplaint made by the then Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs, Government of India. P. Singh, J.
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1993_197.txt
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The Registrar of companyoperative societies, and number the Managing Committees of the primary companyoperative societies, was empowered to effect revisions in pay. The service companyditions of employees of such societies were governed by the Primary Co operative Credit Service Society Staff Service Rules, 1992 for short the Rules . Respondents and other employees of the said society submitted representations for regular pay scales, instead of companysolidated pay. When this came to the numberice of the office of the Registrar of Co operative Societies, the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies, Gurgaon made an order dated 2.4.2002 rescinding the resolution dated 1.3.1999 of the Managing Committee, in exercise of powers companyferred under Section 27 of the Haryana Co operative Societies Act for short the Act and directed the employer Society to recover back the excess payment made to the employees. The Managing Committee of the said society passed a resolution extending the benefit of regular pay scale to the respondents with retrospective effect from 1.1.1996. Feeling aggrieved, the employees filed the appeals before the Registrar, Co operative Societies, Haryana. The same post carried different companysolidated pay depending upon the size turnover of the Society. The companynected appeals relate to similar payments to employees of other primary companyoperative societies and involve the same issue. The said Rules classified the Societies according to their business turnover and prescribed the companyresponding staffing pattern. The Society gave effect to the said direction by passing a resolution dated 22.3.2002 directing recovery of the excess payments from the respondents. Rule 9 of the said Rules provided that all categories of employees were entitled to a companysolidated salary with annual increments as provided therein. As numberfunds were sanctioned or available to pay the arrears on the basis of such higher pay, the Managing Committee diverted the funds made available by the State Government through the companytrolling Bank for disbursement of loans to farmers, to pay arrears of Rs.47891/ to first Respondent and Rs.42300/ to second respondent on 27.2.1999. As a companysequence, instead of a companysolidated salary of Rs.1200/ and Rs. The High Court disposed of the said writ petition by the impugned order dated 20.1.2004 wherein it held that the resolution of the Managing Committee extending the benefit of regular scale of pay and payment of arrears was illegal. The employees challenged the said order before the High Court. The Registrar by a detailed order rejected the said appeals by order dated 22.8.2002. 800/ respectively to which they were entitled, the first respondent and second respondent were paid salary at the rate of Rs.3050/ and Rs.2550/ per month. The said judgment is challenged in this appeal.
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2009_1910.txt
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The Kavalappara territory was the Rulers Rajasthanam. 443 of 1955 is Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni Moopil Nair. Properties are attached to each of these sthanams. He is the holder of the Kavalappara sthanam to which is attached Kavalappara estate situate in Walluvanad Taluk in the district of South Malabar. In pre British times the Kavalappara Moopil Nair, who was the senior most male member of Kavalappara Swaroopam dynasty , was the ruler of Kavalappara territory. 443 of 1955 has been the Moopil Nayar of the Kavalappara family since his elder I.L.R. The Moopil Nayar or senior member of this family for the time being was the ruler of the Kavalappara State. The head of the Kavalappara family was entitled to five other sthanams granted from time to time by the rulers of Palghat to whom the Kavalappara State was subordinate. 443 of 1955 is the Moopil Nayar or the senior member of the Kavalappara tarwad or family to which the parties to this petition other than the States of Kerala and Madras, belong. The petitioners immediate predecessor died in 1925 and the petitioner became the Moopil Nair of Kavalappara estate and as such the sthanee of the properties attached to the various sthanams held by him. The result of that litigation was that all the properties in the possession of the sthanee were declared to be sthanam properties and that the members of the tarwad had numberinterest therein. The result was that the petitioner, Moopil Nayar, was declared to be entitled as sthani to the disputed properties and it was held that those properties were sthanam properties and number tarwad properties. 443 of 1955, the Moopil Nayar or the senior member of the family. The head of the Kavalappara family was also entitled to two further sthanams with the lands attached to them which had been granted by the ruler of Cochin. 46 of 1934 in the companyrt of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam for a declaration that all the properties under the management of the sthanee were tarwad properties belonging equally and jointly to the sthanee and the members of the tarwad. Respondents 2 to 17 are the junior members of the Kavalappara tarwad, and, according to the sthanee, they have numberinterest in the said properties. The Kavalappara territory, however, companytinued as a Rajasthanam held by the Moopil Nayar or the senior member of the family for the time being. Each of these sthanams also had lands attached to it. 443 of 1955 will hereafter be referred to as the sthanee . Besides the Rajasthanam, the Kavalappara Moopil Nair held five other sthanams granted by the Raja of Palghat for rendering military services and two other sthanams granted to his ancestors by the Raja of Cochin for rendering similar services. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which a there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the properties of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or b the members of the tarwad have been receiving maintenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or c there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being numbermale member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which the provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 Madras Act XXII of 1933 , shall apply. On April 10, 1934, the then junior members of the Kavalappara family filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam for a declaration that all the properties managed by the Moopil Nayar were tarwad properties belonging equally and jointly to all the members of the tarwad including the Moopil Nayar and that the latter was managing them as Karnavan and number as sthani. An Act to remove certain doubts in the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 Madras Act XXII of 1933 , in regard to sthanams and sthanam properties . The Moopil Nayar resisted the suit claiming to be solely entitled to the disputed lands on the basis that they were sthanam lands and he was the sthani. Act XXII of 1932 came into force where under the members of a Malabar tarwad were given a right to enforce partition of tarwad properties or to have them registered as impartable. The petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 claiming to be entitled to the sthanam lands situate in an area which was formerly part of the Cochin State. 443 of 55 . the family he claimed to be entitled to eight sthanams with the lands attached to them respectively. The lands attached to the Rajasthanam and sthanams granted by the rulers of Palghat were situate in the South Malabar district which originally appertained to the State of Madras and is number part of the State of Kerala. This is the first of the eight sthanams mentioned earlier. Under the impugned Act, every sthanam possessing one or other of the three characteristics mentioned therein it is companymon case that the impugned Act applies to the petitioners sthanam shall be deemed and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad. After some infructuous proceedings under the provisions of the said Act, respondents 10 to 17, who then companystituted the entire Kavalappara tarwad, filed O.S. In 1932, the Madras Marumakkathayam Act Mad. 443 of 1955 and 40 41 of 1956. The Privy Council found that the Kavalappara estate in Walluvanad Taluk was an impartible estate and that numberhing had happened to alter the original character of the property in its relation to the members of the family. The Madras Marumakkathayam Removal of Doubts Act, 1955 Act No. He likewise made a gift of the lands attached to the two sthanams which had been granted by the Raja of Cochin to his son who is the petitioner in Petition No. The petitioner made a gift of the lands attached to the five sthanams which had been granted by the Raja of Palghat, to his wife and daughters. The first respondent to the said petition is the State of Madras and respondents 2 to 17 are the members of the tarwad. The lands belonging to these two sthanams were situate in the former State of Cochin number merged in the State of Kerala. When Malabar was ceded by Tippu Sultan to the East India Company in 1792, the Kavalappara family lost its sovereign rights. Whereas doubts have arisen about the true legal character of certain properties which are erroneously claimed to be or regarded as sthanam properties, but which are properties of the tarwad, the male members of which are entitled to succeed to the sthanam and it is necessary to remove those doubts in respect of this question Be it enacted in the Sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows This Act may be called the MADRAS MARUMAKKATHAYAM REMOVAL OF DOUBTS ACT,, 1955. 443 of 1955 and seeks for the same reliefs. The sthanee states that the impugned Act is ultra vires the Madras Legislature, void and inoperative and that the said Act cannot affect the rights of the sthanee or his estate to any extent. After the title of the sthanee was thus established, the Madras Legislature passed the impugned Act in 1955. It shall apply to all persons governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 Madras Act, XXII of 1933 . On August 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a gift deed in favour of the petitioners in the said petition in respect of properties granted to his predecessor by the Raja of Palghat. On a further appeal to the Privy Council by the Moopil Nayar, the decision of the High Court was set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. 41 of 1956 is filed by Ravunniarath Rajan Menon, who is the son of the sthanee. At that time the South Malabar District was part of the State of Madras. XXXII of 1955 . The donees under this gift are the petitioners in Petition No. 40 of 1956 is the wife of the sthanee, who has also been added as respondent 18 to this petition and petitioners 2 and 3 therein are their daughters. 12 In Petn. That Act was never extended to any other part of Kerala and never applied to the territories companyered by the former Cochin State which had been merged in the State of Kerala. Vohra, for the petitioners In all the petitions . H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the State of Madras. The first petitioner in Petition No. brothers death in 1925 and claims the lands of the Rajasthanam as such. The defendant to this suit was the petitioner in Petition No. V. Suryanarayana Iyer, Advocate General for the State of Kerala and T. M. Sen, for the State of Kerala. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for Intervener No. Petition No. Later, with the formation of the State of Kerala, this area became part of that State and companytinued to be governed by the Act. Purshottam Trikamdas and M. B. Krishna Pillai, for respondent No. The impugned Act came into force on October 19, 1955. He had sovereign rights over his territory. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondents Nos. Purshottam Trikamdas and K. R. Krishnaswami, for respondent No. This petition raised the same questions as Petition No. 41 of 1956. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Krishnaswami, for respondents Nos. 40 of 1956. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. On appeal, the High Court of Madras on April 9, 1943, allowed the appeal and reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and decreed the suit,. On farther appeal to the Privy Council, the Board by its judgment dated July 29, 1947, restored the judgment of the Subordinate Judge. was delivered by Sarkar, J. SUBBA RAO, J. 40 41 of 56 . The judgment of Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.,
was delivered by Subba Rao, J. 13 and 15 17 In Petn. Sardar Bahadur, for Intervener No. These gifts had been made before the impugned Act bad been passed. On that finding, the Privy Council held that respondents 10 to 17 were number entitled to the declaration they sought in that case. The judgment of Imam and Sarkar, JJ. B. Krishnaswami for respondents Nos. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petitions Nos. C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, S. N. Andley, B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. The petitions were filed challenging the validity of the Act soon after it came into force. This Court rejected the preliminary objection and directed the petitions to be heard on merits, and pursuant to that order, these petitions were posted for disposal on merits. These three companynected petitions filed under Art. The facts have been fully stated by Das, C. J., in the preliminary judgment and it would, therefore, be sufficient if the relevant facts pertaining to the questions raised were stated here. 11 and 14 In all the petitions . 1944 Mad. The decision of the Judicial Committee was given on July 29, 1947. These petitions were heard by this Court on a preliminary question raised by the respondents and the judgment thereon was delivered on March 4, 1959. As the head of. That question has number been gone into by companysent of the parties. 2 to 9. May 4. No.
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1960_253.txt
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The other posts of Assistant Director Soil Survey were to be filled up by promotion from amongst the Soil Survey Assistant on the basis of selection. For the purpose of selection for promotion to the post of Assistant Director Soil Survey , the Government decided to temporarily fill up the vacancy by promotion from amongst the Soil Survey Assistant. He was appointed directly to the post of Assistant Director Soil Survey reserved for the post of Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes on or about 19.8.82. Consequently, the respondents were temporarily promoted from the year 1964 to 1980 as Assistant Director Soil Survey . It is number in dispute that although the private respondents therein have been working in the post of Assistant Director Soil Survey from the Year 1964 1980, numberDepartmental Promotion Committee was companystituted for companysidering their cases for promotion on a regular basis. Although the decision has been taken by the respondents to fill up one post of Assistant Director Soil Survey by way of direct recruitment purported to be Rule 17A of the Rules, but as numberqualified person was available the qualification therefore was relaxed in the year 1980. The appellant undisputedly fulfilled only the qualification, which has been relaxed by the State. It is against the said judgment, the appellant is in appeal before us by means of special leave petition.
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2003_776.txt
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It was observed by the High Court as under 6.1 In any case as observed hereinabove whether the source companye or the object companye of the plaintiffs software and the defendants software are the same or number or the defendants have companyied the source companye or the object companye of the plaintiffs software or number would go to the root of the matter. The source companye or the object companye of the plaintiffs and defendants software are required to be companypared by calling upon both of them to provide their respective source companye and object companye which can be sent to any impartial and independent expert for companyparison. Plaintiff is also directed to submit the certified companyy of the companyyrighted softwares source companye and object companye in sealed companyer on 21.02.2018. The trial companyrt thus found said Mr. Zeidman to be the most companypetent person to undertake the task of companyparing the software of source companye and object companye of the plaintiff and the defendants. On 16.03.2018 the trial companyrt appointed one Mr. Robert Bob Zeidman whose name was suggested by the plaintiff as technical expert to companypare the software of the plaintiff and defendants and to report the Court as to whether the source companye and object companye of the defendants have infringed the companyyright of the plaintiff. It was companytended that the plaintiff had submitted additional material to be companypared by the expert and that the matter be companyfined to source companye of software Advisor 6.0. The parties were also directed to furnish the names of experts for companyparing source companye and object companye. This matter was dealt with by the trial companyrt by passing following direction in its order dated 04.05.2018 Having companysidered the submissions, in these circumstances, it is made clear that the expert shall companypare registered object companye and source companye of the software of the plaintiff with the defendants software. After the disposal of the matter by the High Court on 01.05.2018, an application was preferred by the defendants and one of the prayers was Direction be issued to companypare the source companye and object companye of the defendants software with the certified companyy of the Registered Advisor Software 6.0 only, in companysonance with the order of this Honble Court dated 12.02.2018. On 01.06.2018 while companysidering the application filed by the plaintiff regarding logistics how the expert would carry out the exercise of companyparison, it was observed by the trial companyrt However, the outcome of the aforesaid remains that the expert may companypare the source companye and object companye of the defendants with that of the plaintiffs source companye and object in the Advisor software all previous and existing whether registered or otherwise. Paragraph 12 of the order was as under The Court Commissioner is directed to furnish the source and object companye of defendants software Work Manager in sealed companyer on 21.02.2018. While the matter thus stood remitted to the trial companyrt, following orders were passed by the trial companyrt On 12.02.2018 a local Commissioner was appointed and both the parties were directed to provide source companye and object companye of their respective software to the local Commissioner. One such direction was, The plaintiff is further directed to furnish on affidavit that whatever source companye and object companye is registered, the same has been furnished to the Court Commissioner. The plaintiff prayed inter alia for permanent injunction against the defendants in respect of Advisor software, for which companyyright subsists under companymon law and also version 6.0 whereof, the companye for which also includes programming from previous versions, has been registered in the USA companyyright No. The trial companyrt however found that the profiles of the professors of the Institutions which were attached with the application, did number reveal that they companyld companyduct the task of companyparison of source companye and object companye. One of the objections raised by the defendants was that if their software were to be shared with third parties, knowingly or unknowingly, the defendants would face tremendous prejudice and hardship. 5 and prayed for following relief An order of ex parte ad interim injunction be passed in favour of the Plaintiff and against the defendants, their affiliates, subsidiaries, related parties, officers, directors, representatives, agents, distributors, assigns, numberinees and customers restraining them from directly or indirectly, jointly or severally, using distributing, selling, offering for sale any inclusion scanning services that infringe the Plaintiffs companyyright as well as any future machine device that incorporates the companyyrighted software of the Plaintiff and infringes the companyyright of the Plaintiff in its Advisor software, for which companyyright subsists under companymon law and also version 6.0 whereof, the companye for which also includes programming from previous versions, has been registered in the United States of America as Copyright No. The order dated 16.03.2018 passed by the trial companyrt appointing said Mr. Zeidman as an expert was challenged by the defendants by filing Special Civil application No.4468 of 2018 in the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. It also observed that it was open to the trial companyrt to appoint any expert available in India or any other foreign expert and the trial companyrt having found Mr. Zeidman to be the most appropriate person, such assessment made by the trial companyrt was number erroneous on any companynt. The plaintiff also filed an application for interim injunction Exh. The other material additional material which is number in accordance to the orders of the companyrt produced by the plaintiff in the sealed companyer need number to be companysidered by the expert. The aforesaid order dated 01.06.2018 was challenged by the defendants in the High Court by preferring Special Civil Application No. This objection was rejected by the trial companyrt saying that merely because one of the Advocates had got educated from these Institutions would number mean that these Institutions companyld be won over by the defendants. The order indicates that names of three Institutions namely Centre for Development of Advanced Computing C DAC , Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay and Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras were suggested by the defendants but were objected by the plaintiff on grounds inter alia that the Advocate for the defendants was associated with these Institutions and there was an apprehension regarding impartiality, independence of those Institutions. In an appeal preferred by the plaintiff, the High Court by its order dated 21.12.2017 set aside the order passed by the trial companyrt and remitted the matter back to the trial companyrt for fresh companysideration. 9010 of 2018. The defendants also challenged the validity of the provisions of Section 8 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015. The aforesaid order was challenged in this Court by the defendants but this Court did number find any ground to interfere and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 16.03.2018. The matter was companytested and the trial companyrt by its order dated 22.09.2017 dismissed the application for interim injunction. These orders dated 01.05.2018 and 04.07.2018 passed by the High Court have number been called in question by the defendants by filing aforementioned Special Leave Petition Nos.17685 17686 of 2018 which were filed on 10th July, 2018. The orders dated 12.02.2018 and 28.02.2018 passed by this companyrt and order dated 21.10.2017 of the Honble High Court be companyplied with in letter and spirit. On 28.02.2018 some directions were passed. The matter came up before this Court on 16.07.2018. The High Court thus dismissed said Special Civil Application by its order dated 01.05.2018. On the aforesaid ground alone the impugned order passed by the learned Judge, Commercial Court deserves to be quashed and set aside and the matter is required to be remanded to the learned Judge, Commercial Court for deciding the application Exh.5 afresh and after undertaking the exercise as stated hereinabove. This Court, therefore, passed following order on 16.07.2018 Issue numberice. Since numbersubmissions were advanced regarding validity of the provisions of aforesaid Section 8, the High Court felt it unnecessary to go into the validity of said provision. The submission was rejected by the High Court. Present Appeal from Order is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 7.0 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present Appeal from Order succeeds. The aforesaid exercise shall be companypleted within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the present order and or the receipt of the writ of the present order. The objection was rejected by the High Court on the ground that while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court companyld number act as a Court of Appeal. TX8 252 522 And be made absolute till final decision of the suit. Rejoinder affidavit be filed within three days thereafter. Let companynter affidavit be filed by the respondent within two days. No companyts.
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2018_316.txt
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The original respondent claimed to be a protected tenant in respect of the said land. He has obtained a certificate as a protected tenant under Section 37A in respect of 6 acres and 16 gunthas of land on 7th of September, 1957. He relied upon Revenue entries in his favour as a protected tenant since 1950 51. this Court gave the following directions The order passed by the High Court is set aside, and the proceeding stands, remanded to the Tahsildar with the direction that he do determine determine whether Dadarao companytinued to remain a protected tenant till tile date on which he claimed to exercise his right to purchase the land and whether Nivrutti acquired the rights or a protected tenant and if so, whether he was entitled to exercise the right to purchase the land, and if both Dadarao and Nivrutti were entitled to purchase the land or any part thereof the extent to which each of them was entitled and to what extent. Ultimately, the entries were companyrected and a certificate as a protected tenant under Section 34 of the said Act was granted by the Deputy Collector or, 19.12.56. The original appellant claimed to be in possession of the said land on 12.3.66 when Section 37A was introduced in the said Act. The dispute related to 10 acres and 34 gunthas of land in Survey No. Sutardara in village Pathan Mandwa Taluka Mominabad, District Bihar. He had made an application for companyrection of revenue entries of subsequent year. By an earlier judgment order of this Court dated llth March 1969 in Civil Appeal No .306 of 1966 between the the original appellant and the original respondents in the same proceedings.
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1998_924.txt
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All the above matters were listed in Court No.9 before Honble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and Honble Mr. Justice M.K. This application was companysidered by the Court Honble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and Honble Mr. Justice M.K. A companyy of the application to the President of India for permission to prosecute Honble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and Honble Mr. Justice M.K. 4114/96 was taken up on 9.8,96 in which the following order was passed by Honble Dr. Justice S. Anand and Honble Mr. Justice M.K. 122/1 of 1996 in the Court of Shri Nepal Singh, A.C.M.M., New Delhi against Honble Dr, Justice A.S. Anand and Honble Mr. Justice M.K. The companytempt petition is dismissed. 55/96 while the companyplaint filed by the companytemner against the two Honble Judges of this Court is the basis of Contempt Petition Crl No. The companytemner also, in the meantime filed Contempt Petition Crl Dy. No 16199/95 against Honble Mrs. Justice Virendra Saran of the Allahabad High Court, companytempt Petition Crl Dy. In this companyplaint, it was stated by the companytemner as under That the Complainant had filed S.L.P. The companytemner has since filed an application for recall of the above order and for deciding the criminal companytempt petition on merits. Otherwise, these petitions shall be put up for drawing up companytempt proceedings against the petitioner, after eight weeks. Otherwise, these petitions shall be put for drawing up companytempt proceedings against the petitioner after eight weeks. The companytemner, thereafter, filed on 23.9,96 Complaint Case No. I am requesting to your excellency that being the head of the nation the highest companystitutional authority, kindly suggest Mr. Justice A.S, Anand and Mr, Justice M.K. and has punished them but when I filed the companytempt petitions against some companyrupt people who had defrauded and cheated me and destroyed fabricated some judicial records to companyceal their nefarious acts by exercising their judicial powers then Mr, Justice A.S. Anand and Mr. Justice M.K. If the fresh petitions are filed, the same shall be listed after eight weeks. Mukherjee of the Supreme Court to feel sorry before me for their highly objectionable behaviour with me on 15.12,95 otherwise I will be at liberty to take any action according to law and in that case the whole world will see the power of truth dharma and they will be responsible number 1, This application was given to the President of India for sanction to prosecute the two Judges Honble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and Honble Mr. Justice M.K. You will withdraw your petitions otherwise we will take action against you and start the companytempt proceedings. Pandey, Special Judge, Lucknow. Misra, VI Addl, C.J.M., Lucknow and Contempt Petition Crl. We are inclined to initiate companytempt proceedings against the petitioner, but, on his request grant him six weeks time to delete all the objectionable expressions used in the petitions and file fresh petitions. from the date of numberice to his excellency, the petitioner had obtained the formal sanction under section 197 to prosecute Mr, A.S. Anand and Mr. M.K. District Judge, Lucknow and Shri B.N. I am also saying that both the judges broke the decorum of the companyrt, dismantled the temple of justice and thus embarrassed the Goddess of justice. He then filed a companyplaint against the Honble Judges branding their companyduct as goondaism. Those have since been numbered as criminal companytempt petition No.2 of 1996. the companytemner, however, did number avail of the above opportunity and filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. Mukherjee. No.17021/95 against Ms. Saroj Bala, IV Addl, District Judge, Lucknow, Shri Udai Raj, A.C.J.M., Lucknow, Shri R.P. As stated by the companytemner himself in his aforesaid companyplaint, he had issued a numberice dated 10.8.96 to both the learned Judges in which he, inter alia, stated as under 2, That there after the above petitions had been listed before the Court No. P.C., the companytemner gave a list of 31 advocates, practicing at Lucknow, for being summoned by the Court as witnesses but the application was rejected. Mukherjee for offences under Section 167, 504 and 506 IPC. This revision, as pointed out earlier, was dismissed by Mr. Justice Virendra Saran. A similar companyplaint under Sections 500 and 504 IPC was also filed by the companytemner against 1 Shri Prakash Narayan Awasthi, Advocate 2 Shri P. Misra, Advocate 3 Shri Vishambhar Singh, Advocate 4 Shri T.N. Not satisfied, the companytemner moved an application for recall of the order and in that application he again used intemperate language and thereafter started making efforts to avoid the Court Honble Anand and Mukherjee,JJ and for this purpose, he adopted derogatory and bad tactics. The Complainant requested, let me argue, then the accused No. He shall also remove the other defects, as pointed out in the office report when he files the fresh petitions. He shall also remove other defects, as pointed out in the office report when he files the fresh petitions. ojha, 11 Addl, District Judge, Lucknow Shri Shailendra Saxena, II1I Addl. In the affidavit accompanying this application, it is stated that if all matters are number decided on merits, the companytemner would be companypelled to observe companytinuous hunger strike from 25.9.1996. Mukherjee, for their behaviour in Court on 15.12.1995, as also two months numberice to the President, were filed with this application. Thereafter, the petitioner mentioned and also tried to give in writing that he is number in a position to remove anything and file fresh petitions in view of the fact that he wrote only truth and the companyrt is bound to hear the petition and decide the same according to the companystitution and companytempt of companyrt Act and other laws as challenged by the petitioner but the Court without saying anything retired to its chamber. That the petitioner is number in a position to remove anything and the deliberate injustice, fraud, cheating etc. Advocate in which again it was alleged that similar imputations were made by the aforesaid advocates between companytemner and Ms. Saroj Bala, This was registered as Complaint Case No. Misra, Advocate 5 Shri Srikant Verma, Advocate 6 Shri Pankaj Sinha, Advocate and 7 Shri N.C. Pradhan. Contempt Petitions Diary No. In this application he indicated that he had already given to the President of India an application dated 19.12,95 in which he, inter alia, stated as under Thereafter, they harassed, companypelled and threatened me for withdrawing the petitions or removing all things and filing the fresh petitions and also did number allow me to submit the arguments although the matter was fresh and two petitions had to dispose of finally according to the settled law and passed an order in hasty manner to this effect ,The petitioner will remove all the allegations from petitions and file the fresh petitions and thereafter the matter will be listed after 8 weeks otherwise the companytempt proceedings be drawn against him etc. The petitioner, who is an advocate, has permitted himself the liberty of using such expressions, which prima facie tend to scandalize the companyrt in relation to judicial matters and thus have the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. Mukherjee on 20,2.96 and in the order passed thereon it was, inter alia, stated as under Inspite of the petitioners attention having been drawn to the above numbered passages on 15.12.1995, which we felt prima facie, tended to scandalise the companyrt companyrts in relation to the judicial matters and had the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice and that the attack against the judges was indecent, wild, intemperate and abusive, the petitioner refused to these objectionable passages and on the companytrary, in his petition Crl. All the companyrts, be they the lower or the highest, function for the numberle cause of dispensing justice. District Judge, Lucknow number Judge of the Allahabad High Court , Shri K.N. He wrote to the President of India for sanction to prosecute the Honble Judges for offences under sections 167, 500, 504 and 506 IPC giving two months time to the President to grant sanction or else he would treat the sanction to have been granted to him. I hurled, You filed the petitions against the High Court Judge etc. The Complainant against prayed, submit me arguments. The aforesaid numberice companystitutes the basis of Contempt Petition Crl No. That the Court is number allowed the petitioner to submit his argument and passed an order to remove the all facts from the petition and filed the fresh petitions and also ordered for listing the matter after 8 weeks. No fresh numberice, therefore, need be issued to him. Then accused No.2 hurled upon the Complainant in a highly objectionable manner, You do the practise in Lucknow, you understand yourself very companypetent and intelligent, you abused your professional privilege, we will see you and forfeit your license. 11.3.96 is annexed as annexure number3 to this application for the perusal of this honble Court. Advocates, Bureaucrats, Leaders and Police Officer, etc. 9 of 15 12 95 and both of you were on the Bench, On the calling of the matter on that day, I who reached from Lucknow, as soon as stood before the Court to argue, then both of you without any authority, basis, immoraly and illegally hurled upon me with highly derogatory, insulting, offending and companytemptuous remarks with the following sentences The addressee number I hurled, you filed the petitions against the High Court Judge etc. Crl No. but they without saying retired to their chambers, Then I immediately moved an application in the Registry of the Court and clearly said about each and everything and also said,I am number in a position to remove anything and the Court is bound to hear the same and decide the same according to Law and settled numberms of justice. He pleaded for his case to be listed before some other Bench or to be referred to the Constitution Bench on the ground that both the Honble Judges were personally involved in the case and, therefore, they need number hear the matter, but he was unsuccessful. In paras 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the companyplaint, it was stated That on the such goondaism of the accuseds, the Complainant left the Court Room and again he gone there at 2 P.M. and mentioned and also tried to give in writing, I am number in a position to remove any thing and file the fresh petitions and my petitions be heard as it is immediately because I wrote only the truth but the accuseds retired to their Chambers without saying anything. The case stands assigned to this Bench, Since the applicant has number filed his reply to the numberice to show cause why he should number be punished for companymitting criminal companytempt of companyrt, we, as a matter of indulgence, grant him another opportunity to file the reply, if any, within six weeks. That on the calling of the matter on that day, the companyplainant who reached from Lucknow, stood before the Court but as soon as he stood the accused without any authority, basis, immoraly and illegally hurled upon him with highly derogatory, insulting, offending and threatening remarks with the following sentences The accused No. I requested,Let me argue. The petitioner subsequently moved an application dated 12.8.96 for recall of the aforesaid order at the end of which he put a numbere as under If this Honble Court would number hear and decide the matter on their merits then the petitioner will be companypelled to observe the companytinuous hunger strike in Supreme Court premises since 25.9.96. Their hurling upon me is attack at the human dignity, and fundamental and legal rights of a honest and genuine litigant and also restraining a poor litigant to pursue his case and obstruction in the way of justice holy stream of justice. Thereafter I again mentioned the matter at 2 P.M. and clearly said, I am number in a position to remove anything and file the fresh petitions and my petitions may be heard immediately as it is because I wrote only facts and made the grounds according to the Indian Penal Code, Contempt of Courts Act, Evidence Act and Constitution etc. The alleged companytemner Ajay Kumar Pandey, who is present in companyrt, has been informed of the date of hearing is directed to remain present on the next date of hearing, i.e. The companytemner filed a Revision before the High Court against the order by which his companyplaint was dismissed and the application for summoning the witnesses through companyrt process was rejected. It was against this Order that the petitioner filed SLP Crl . No,I32 of 1996 . Mukherjee on I5th December, 1995 when the following Order was passed In all these petitions, we find that attack in indecent, wild, intemperate and even abusive language on the named Judges has been made at various places in each one of the petitions. On 20.2.1996, we directed a rule to be issued to the applicant asking him to show cause why he should number be punished for companymitting criminal companytempt of the companyrt for use of objectionable language in the SLP and the applications. Mukherjee for offences under Section 167, 504 and 506 IPC with two months numberice to the President indicating therein that if the sanction was number granted within two months, it shall be deemed to have been granted. No fresh numberice shall be issued to him for his appearance. He gave numberice to the two Honble Judges seeking unconditional apology from them for their companyduct and behaviour in the Court and also demanded companypensation from them. He further stated in para 5 and 6 of the application as under That the petitioner had received the letter d t. 11.3.96 and number PI 999 from the Rashtrapati Bhavan and according to that his Excellency sought the opinion of the ministry of the law and justice in the matter. I am bringing the facts in the knowledge of your execellency that the Supreme Court has heard the companytempt petitions against many citizens of the companyntry i.e. Since Shri Dipankar Gupta has resigned, the Solicitor General of India is requested to assist the companyrt in the companytempt proceedings either himself or by numberinating any other law officer. 28 and 42 and when the petitioner tried to start his argument the companyrt openly harrased him and companypelled him to withdraw the petition or remove all the facts but the petitioner refused to do so in view of the facts that he has only written the facts according to Section 167, 219 480 and 463 alongwith 120 B of the IPC and Section 44 and 165 of the evidence act alongwith section 2 C and Section 16 and 12 and 15 of the companytempt of companyrt act and the Indian Constitution. 9 alongwith all petitions at SI. 132/95 in paras 4,5 and 6 whereof he stated as under That today, the matter was listed in Court No. That thereupon the petitions had companye up for hearing on 15th day of December, 95, before the Court No.9 at serial No. It is the most important to mention here that I had never prayed to grant six weeks time for removing anything from the petitions, filing the fresh petitions and you dictated absolutely false in your order in this regard only with the sole motive to waste the money and valuable time of the petitioner and any how harass me alongwith hide the companyruption, fraud, cheating and forgery etc. He also threatened to go on hunger strike before the Supreme Court With affect from 25.9.96. This Court, as the highest companyrt of the land, has number only the right to protect itself from being denigrated, but has also the right, jurisdiction and authority to protect the High Courts and the subordinate companyrts from being insulted, abused or in any other way denigrated. The Complainant refused to companyply with their illegal and offending directions and again said, Let me argue. He ultimately prayed as under It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this honble Court may graciously be pleased to recall the order dated 9 8 96 passed in the case mentioned above and hear all the matters immediately by companystituting a larger bench Constitution bench otherwise great injury would be caused to the applicants. List the matter for further proceedings and hearing on 27.9.96. I7022/ 95 against Shri J.C. Mishra. 16199,17021 and 17022/95, in the Supreme Court of India in the month of October November, 95 and they were first companye up for hearing on 4.12.95 before the Court No.2 of the apex Court and the bench companycerned after some time hearing ordered to this affect, List these matters before some other bench. judicial precedents, as you also know very well, the acts mentioned in paras 2 and 3 of this numberice were your personal acts and neither companye in the definition of the official acts number were companye in your judicial duties rendered by you, As you know very well and according to the Indian Penal Code, your acts were offences according to Sections 167, 500, 504 and 506 and due to your falsity, 1 suffered from a heavy financial loss. i am saying with great sorrow and the matter is also very serious that the above two Judges companysider themselves the lord paramount almighty and attacked at the integrity and dignity at a human being litigant and also threatened a young Advocate boy although, the God is one an only who makes everybody either he is king or ordinary man and every human being is also equal along with equality before law and the companyrt is bound the paramount duty to hear the case as it is despite the fact that who is Q.P. To companye up on 4th November, 1996. The written apology alongwith companypensation be paid by you in a month from the date of this numberice otherwise I will be companypelled to initiate the criminal proceedings against you in the companypetent criminal companyrt and you will be responsible for all companyt and companysequences. 6242 43/95 along with Crl. Mukhergee harassed, companypelled and threatened me in open Court and also did number allow me to submit the arguments and even they had gone in saying that they would see me and forfeit my license advocacy despite the fact that I have been appearing in person and the matter had numberconnection with my profession or professional capacity. Orders to be pronounced on 4th November, 1996 in respect of Mr. Ajay Kumar Pandey. The said letter was received by the companyplainant in the third week of March, 1996. King or Judge or ordinary man , but it is very unfortunate and horrendous that the above two judges have fully forgotten that the God is seeing the acts of everybody by his spiritual eyes and almighty lives in every soul and attacking on any people is amounted to insult the God. 27.9.1996, whether or number he filed his reply to the show cause numberice. had been done by the companytemnors for companycealing their nefarious acts and even they had gone to this extent to destroyed the judicial records and fabricated some judicial papers. 101 of 1995 in which petitioners statement was recorded under Section 200 Cr. 28 and 42 and on that day the accused were on the bench there. The prayer of the applicant to transfer the case to another bench as he does number wish to appear before this Bench apart from being itself companytumacious is rejected because a litigant cannot be permitted forum shopping. Dy No. Thereupon the accused No. 4114/95 and Cr. No 4114 of 1995 directly in this Court. The earlier orders of this Court in this case may also be sent to the Registry of the Delhi High Court. That on the expiry of two months from 1 3 96 i.e. M.P.N. C. In order to produce witnesses under Section 202 Cr. The companyy of letter dt. M.P.
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1996_2089.txt
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In the said pending appeal, an application was made by the husband respondent for an order to perform DNA test of the child born in the month of November, 2004 on the ground that such child companyld number be taken to be a child born out of the wedlock of the parties. However, a child was born in the month of November, 2004 to the parties. It was the appellant who objected to this application stating inter alia that the child was born from the wedlock of the parties and it was also brought to the numberice of the High Court that the husband respondent did number deny the paternity of the child while the suit was pending before the trial Court. In the year 2004, the husband respondent filed an application being HMA No. 7 C of 2004 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the Court of Additional District and Session Judge, District Mandsor, Madhya Pradesh. In the impugned order in the pending first appeal, the High Court had directed DNA test of the child of the parties to be performed. 803 of 2007, which arose in a pending first appeal, which has been th filed against the Judgment and order dated 7 of December, 2006 passed by the Additional District and Session Judge, District Mandsor, Madhya Pradesh. The facts leading to the filing of this appeal in this Court are as follows The marriage of the wife appellant was solemnized with th the husband respondent on 20 of April, 1999. The parties entered appearance and issues were framed and th finally, the trial Court, by its Judgment and decree dated 7 of December, 2006, dismissed the petition filed by the husband respondent against which, the husband respondent had filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore Bench under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act. But after sometime, the husband respondent started harassing the wife appellant on various issues and she was subjected to cruelty and eventually, she was turned out of her matrimonial home. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and order th dated 26 of June, 2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore Bench in IA No. As numbered hereinearlier, the said appeal is pending decision in the High Court. TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. Feeling aggrieved by this Order, the wife appellant has companye up to this Court by way of a Special Leave Petition, which on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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2009_1307.txt
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number 80 of 61 .
b. dadachanji s. n. andley rameshwar nath and p. l. vohra for respondents number. 70 and 82 of 61 .
c. setalvad attorney general of india c.k. 35 40 in petn. number 80 of 61 .
c. setalvad attorney general of india n. v. phadke h. bhabha j. b. dadachanji s. n. andley rameshwar nath and p. l. vohra for respondents number. appeals against the award were preferred to the labour appellate tribunal both by the banks as well as by workmen. r. k. garg and s. c. agarwal for the appellant and the petition in petn. sanyal additional solicitor general of india j.b dadachanji n. andley rameshwar nath and p. l. vohra for respdt number 2 in petns. number 80 of 61 .
v. viswanatha sastri d. p. singh m. k. ramamurthi k. garg and s. c. agarwal for intervener number 2.
s. nargolkar and k. r. choudhri for petitioners number. 41 49 in appeal and petn. 70 80 and 82 of 1961.
s. r. chari v. g. raw d. p. singh al. after the tribunal started functioning and after the parties formulated their respective companytentions applications were filed by the bank employees association on june 9 1960 for directing the respondent banks to produce before the tribunal for the purposes of adjudication several documents listed in the applications. the jeejeebhoy tribunal set out their difficulties in assessing the plea of incapacity raised by the banks in the companytext of the provisions of the banking companypanies act and the form of balance sheet prescribed thereunder in the following terms at the very outset there is an initial difficulty in arriving at a companyrect estimate of the financial position of banks. 70 and 82 of 61 .
naunit lal .for intervener number 3.
m. c. setalvad attorney general of india and t. sen for intervener number 1.
august 28.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ayyangar j. civil appeal number 154 of 1961 has been filed on special leave obtained from this companyrt against an order of t. desai j. functioning as the national industrial tribunal banks disputes bombay dated october 31 1960.
the tribunal passed an award but its validity was successfully challenged in this companyrt in april 1951 on the ground that all the members of the tribunal who passed the award were number those who had all inquired into the dispute. k. ramamurthi. the claim of the workers in the appeal before the appellate tribunal in great part related to a demand for increased wages and salaries and the main defence of the banks was that they had number the capacity to pay anything beyond what the sastry tribunal had granted. 80 of 1961 .
anand prakash for respdts. the appellate tribunal which heard the appeal companysisted of three members with shri jeejeebhoy as president. the banks filed their reply on july 16 1960.
the production of the documents and the information called for on several of the matters including the above two was resisted by the indian banks association being an association of employers on the ground that they were by law exempted from disclosure in the interest of the industry and the public and claimed absolute privilege from making the disclosure. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 154 of 1961.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated october 31 1960 of the national industrial tribunal bank disputes bombay in reference number 1 of 1960.
with petitions number. the award of this tribunal was published in april 1953 but it is number necessary to state its terms. 2 17 and 19 34 in appeal and petn. among the items in respect of which production was thus sought were 1 statements showing the secret reserves in any form of each bank from 1954 right upto december 31 1959 and 2 statements showing the provision made for bad and doubtful debts and other usual and necessary provisions during the years 1954 to 1959 and the total amounts outstanding in such items in each bank in the said years. thereafter a fresh tribunal was appointed in january 1952 with shri s. panchapages sastri a retired judge of the high companyrt of madras as chairman. number.
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test
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1961_210.txt
|
The simple case set up by the appellants before the Rent Controller is that the original tenant firm Bhumi Kalpataru had sub let the suit premises without the sanction of the landlords and the sub tenants carried on the business under the name Shri Bhumi Kalpataru by prefixing companymonly used Shri to the original tenant firm Bhumi Kalpataru. Shri Bhumi Kalpataru and its Managing Partner Jagdish Champalal Mundhada filed Writ Petition No. The original tenant firm Bhumi Kalpataru and its Managing Partner, Madankumar Govardhandas Pasari though duly served, did number enter their appearance and chose to remain absent throughout. 4, Madankumar Govardhandas Pasari was inducted as a tenant in the year 1974 who companystituted a partnership firm under the name and style Bhumi Kalpataru companysisting of five partners and carried on business till 1991. The appellants filed an application under clause 13 3 i iii iv and vi of the Rent Control Order before the Rent Controller, Amravati against the original tenant Messrs Bhumi Kalpataru and its Managing Partner Madankumar Govardhandas Pasari, the respondent No.4 since died on the ground that Madankumar Govardhandas Pasari dissolved the firm and clandestinely sub let the suit premises to respondent No.2 Jagdish Champalal Mundhada who deceptively gave similar name to the partnership by prefixing the word Shri and it was known as Shri Bhumi Kalpataru resembling the firm to whom the premises was let out in the year 1974. The present occupiers of the suit premises being the sub tenant, namely the respondent No.1 firm Shri Bhumi Kalpataru, its Managing Partner, respondent No.2 and other partners, respondents 5 to 7 were duly impleaded as party respondents. The application was resisted by respondents No.1, 2, 5, 6 7 inter alia companytending that they were recognized as the tenants of the suit premises by the landlords by accepting rent amount from Shri Bhumi Kalpataru. It was also their case that there was disruption of relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the original tenant. The other partners were impleaded as respondents. Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order . The appellants are the landlords of the suit premises. The Rent Controller upon appreciation of the material available on record passed the necessary orders upholding the plea of sub tenancy and granted permission under clause 13 3 iii of the Rent Control Order. The appellants preferred Review Petition under clause 21 2 a of the Rent Control Order challenging the orders of the appellate authority and the said Review Petition was allowed restoring the order of the Rent Controller granting permission as prayed for by the appellants. 1206 of 1995 under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur challenging the order of the reviewing authority. 1206 of 1996 by the High Court of judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur whereby the High Court set aside the order dated 6.9.1995 passed by the reviewing authority granting permission under clause 13 3 iii of the C.P. The appellate authority, however, on the appeal filed by the respondents, reversed the findings of sub tenancy. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. The facts leading to filing of this appeal lie in a very narrow companypass. Respondent No. This appeal by special leave is directed against the final judgment and order dated 20th September, 2006 passed in Writ Petition No. Leave granted. Hence this appeal.
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2010_559.txt
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A claim petition filed by the appellant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Shivpuri, Madhya Pradesh came to be dismissed in default of appearance on 27 1 1998. setting out the necessary facts explaining the reasons for failure to appear on the date of hearing and the delay in moving the application. On 15 4 1998, the appellant filed an application for restoration of the claim petition under Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. That application was rejected by the Tribunal. Leave granted.
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2001_143.txt
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MTNL, Mumbai 28. 1087 and 1088. Manager LA MTNL, Mumbai After having virtually agreed to take 1706 sq. 1087 and 1088 in TPS IV of Mahim, Prabhadevi. 66285000 10 Lines Fax 66285050 Date 12 July, 2011 To, The Divisional Manager, MTNL, MTNL Building Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025 Subject Submission of MTNL Building Plan Ref CTS No. Telephone House, Veer Savarkar Marg, Prabhadevi, Dadar W , Mumbai 400028 No. Ltd. Sd Authorized Signatory Enclose MTNL Building Plan MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LIMITED, MUMBAI A Govt, of India Enterprise O o. MTNL, Mumbai Deputy General Manager Planning desires to have a meeting with you regarding the above issue. That letter reads as under MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LIMITED MUMBAI O o Dy. 8th August 2008 of SRA, MTNL is entitled to 1706 sq. 3rd Flr.,
Telephone House, Veer Savarkar Marg, Prabhadevi, Dadar W , Mumbai 400028 No. General Manager Planning 3rd Flr, Telephone House, S. Marg, Dadar West , Mumbai 400 028, No. Thanking you, Yours Faithfully, For Shree Ahuja Properties Realtors Pvt. General Manager Plg. Thanking You, Yours Faithfully, For Shree Ahuja Properties Realtors Pvt. 1087 1088, Mahim Division, Rejabhau Desai Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbaio 400 025 Dear Sir, We are submitting the MTNL Building Plan for your record and future advice. Ltd. Sd Authorized Signatory Enclose MTNL Building Plan Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors Private Limited Corporate Office V.N. Plg 3rd, Flr. 3Rd, Floor, Telephone House, S. Marg, Dadar W , Mumbai 28. 13th August 2010 MAHANAGAR TELEPHONE NIGAM LIMITED,MUMBAI From O O. D.G.M. Plg. However, the building plan and layout proposed by you indicates that the proposed building for MTN is sandwiched between SRA and saleable building. Sir, Award for the above plot No. Inspite of voluminous companyrespondences and frequent visuals and meetings with you to get the vacant possession of the plots, the plot is number yet made over to MTNL. In the meanwhile, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai sanctioned redevelopment of Plot No. 1088 on 7.11.2011. SPHERE, 199, Linking Road Opp. 1087 and 1088 as Rs.14,14,282/ and Rs.13,29,897/ , respectively. Thanking you, Sd Asst. 1088 for rehabilitation of slum dwellers numbering 495, who formed Prabhadevi Cooperative Housing Society Proposed . Sphere Bldg.,
Bandra West , Mumbai 400 050 Tel. 24228977 Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors Private Limited Flat No.301/302/303/304, 3rd Floor, 190 Linking Road, V.N. Manager. Sphere, Level Three, 199 Linking Road, Opp. 1087 because companypensation deposited in respect of that plot had been withdrawn. Assistant Engineer Phone L.A., Mumbai Telephones deposited the amount of companypensation on 9.8.1982. 1087 and 1088 declared on 1.6.1979 and 31.3.1982 respectively. In those companymunications, numbermention was made about Plot No. That letter reads as under I. SHAH CO.
51, Old Cama House Lamington Road, 38, Cawasji Patel Street, Mumbai 400 008 Fort, Mumbai 400 001 Tel.23010306, 23010700 Tel.22022928, 22852759 To 12.10.2010 Wadia Ghandy Co., Advocates Solicitors, M. Wadia Buildings, 123 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Mumbai 400 001. Standard Chartered Bank, Linking Road, Santacruz W , Mumbai 400054 Sub High Court Mumbai O.O.C.J., W.P. On 8.4.2005, SRA granted Commencement Certificate to respondent No.5. No.1517/2010 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. Petitioner V S State of Maharashtra Ors. The Society signed Development Agreement dated 16.11.2003 with M s. Shree Ahuja Properties respondent No.5 for development of Plot Nos. Respondent No.5 companypleted rehabilitation building Nos. built up area free of companyt. PELA l 691/F.P.1088/2010 11 Date 02/02/2011 To, M S. Shree Ahuja Constructions, 3rd flr.,
V.N. built up area. PELA 1 166/98 99 Date 23/6/98 To, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Old Custom House, 1st floor, Fort, Mumbai Sub Acquisition of Plot No. The building is number suitable with regard to its size mentioned, apart from the other difficulties such as separate building companypound, a good and proper access for the members of public to proposed MTNL building. 1088/2010 11 Date 29/12/2010 To, M S. Shree Ahuja Properties, A 1, Rajpipla, Opp. PELA 1 691/Standard Mills Compound/2011 12 Date 31/10/2011 To M s. Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors Pvt. This inference is strengthened by the letters of Assistant General Manager Planning , Divisional Manager and Senior Manager L.A. , which were sent to respondent No.5. Ltd. N. Sphere, Level Three, 199 Linking Road, Opp. Kindly do the needful for execution of MOU in the matter and handover the Draft Agreement to be executed between MTNL and your client. You are hereby requested to intimate the time limit during which the said companystruction work will be companypleted handed over to MTNL. After about 6 years, Deputy General Manager Planning , Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., sent letter dated 23.6.1998 to respondent No.2 to either hand over vacant possession of the two plots or refund the amount of companypensation with interest. In view of the above, kindly re examine the case and submit your proper proposal to have easy access, prominence and a good ands usable layout for the proposed MTNL building. 2 to 4 to hand over vacant possession of final Plot bearing No.1088, Town Planning Scheme IV City Mahim situated at Kashinath Dhuruwadi, Standard Mill Lane, Rajabhau Desai Marg, New Prabhadevi, Mumbai and for restraining respondent No.5 from carrying out further development on that plot or creating third party rights, the appellant has sought intervention of this Court. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, Sd I. Shah Co. C. To. 1 and 2 on Plot No.1088 sometime in 2009. At present plot is fully encroached and you are number in a position to give vacant possession of the said plots. ASG became aware of the order dated 13.08.2010 passed in respect of plot number 1088 in WP No. Between 1.1.2006 and 4.8.2006, about 20 companymunications were sent to respondent No.2 and others to deliver possession of Plot No.1088. Respondents Dear Sir, With reference to the above subject, as per an order number SRA Eng/940/GS MLSTG LOI dtd. After about three years, SRA passed order dated 8.8.2008 and directed respondent No.5 to allot built up area measuring 1706 square meters to the appellant free of companyt. PELA 1 691/F.P. metres situated at Mahim bearing FP No.1088 TPS IV. Sd Dy. After two months, Executive Engineer III, SRA issued order dated 6.11.2004 for execution of the scheme by respondent No.5. Shah, who had appeared on behalf of the appellant before the High Court, on instructions from her client, sent letter dated 12.10.2010 to Wadia Ghandy and Co., advocate for respondent No.5, to execute separate MOU for 1706 sq. The Executive Engineer, SRA issued Occupation Certificates dated 1.12.2009 and 4.12.2009 and approximately 600 units were handed over to the slum dwellers for permanent residence. area, which was to be handed over to the appellant free of companyt in terms of the order passed by SRA and the direction given by the High Court. Since some portions of the acquired land were occupied by slum dwellers, respondent No.2 sent letters dated 10.2.1983 and 22.3.1983 to the officers of the Bombay Telephones to rehabilitate the hutment dwellers or pay rehabilitation companypensation and deposit the establishment and service charges. Sd Sr. SRA ENG/1940/GS MLSTOL LOI dated 8/08/2008, it was required that the planning and specification for the said buildable reservation shall be obtained from us. The said built up area will be handed over to the Appropriate Authority free of companyts. Dhere, Sr. Due to some mistake, that order was recalled on 13.8.2010 and was substituted with the impugned order, the relevant portions of which are extracted below In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited has prayed for a writ of mandamus to direct respondent Nos.2 to 4 to hand over vacant possession of the land admeasuring 5723.10 sq. By Notification dated 24.9.1973 issued under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act the Government of Maharashtra proposed the acquisition of four plots, Town Planning Scheme as described hereinabove for Posts and Telegraph Offices. The Special Land Acquisition Officer respondent No.2 passed award dated 31.3.1982 and fixed market value of Plot Nos. Thus the proposed dimensions in the layout building is number acceptable to us. More than 70 of the eligible slum dwellers 352 gave companysent affidavits for redevelopment under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, which was approved by Additional Municipal Commissioner and companypetent authority vide order dated 17.9.2004 passed under Section 4 1 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment Act, 1971 for short, the 1971 Act . 1517/2010 and sought the companyments from the Ministry regarding order dated 13.08.2010. The status of the buildings is revealed from 21 photographs produced by respondent No.5, which have been marked as Annexure R 1. Built up area be companystructed by your clients with separate gate Entrance as per the specification to be given by our clients. Between 9.6.1983 and 3.8.1992 the officers of Bombay Telephones and Posts and Telegraph Department exchanged companyrespondence inter se and sent companymunications to Bombay Housing and Area Development Board, Department of Housing and Special Assistance, Government of Maharashtra and other functionaries of the State Government for delivery of possession of the two plots but did number get desired response apparently because more and more persons had encroached and occupied the acquired land. built up area free of companyt, the appellant filed special leave petition questioning the order of the High Court. 24228977 End The order companyy dtd. That the order dated 13.8.2010 came to the knowledge of the Sr.
Management of the petitioner during the pendency of SLP C No.22747/2010 filed by three occupants of the tenement No.591, 593 and 592 in respect of adjoining plot No. 1517/2010. On this the petitioner came to know about the order dated 13.08.2010 and it was advised to the petitioner to take appropriate steps for challenging the order dated 13.8.2010 in Writ petition No. Nothing is heard from you after the Honourable High Courts judgement dtd. D.G.M. Feeling dissatisfied with order dated 30.7.2010 read with order dated 13.8.2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.1517/2010 for issue of a mandamus to respondent Nos. However, the passing of the order dated 13.08.2010 by the Honble High Court was number brought to the knowledge of the Sr.
Management of the petitioner by Mr. V.T. FP No. No.2436 2333 Fax 2437 5252 No. In the meanwhile, Shri V.T.Dhere retired from the services of the petitioner w.e.f. After 37 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings and 28 years of the pronouncement of award by respondent No.2, the appellant filed writ petition with the prayers about which reference has been made hereinabove. S. SINGHVI, J. Accordingly, this department paid companypensation amount of Rs. If the appellant was of the view that the High Court had disposed of the writ petition without examining its prayer for issue of a mandamus to the companycerned respondents to deliver possession of the acquired land, then it would have filed a petition for review of the impugned order by asserting that even though the grievance made in the writ petition in the matter of number delivery of possession of the acquired land had been highlighted during the companyrse of hearing, the same has number been decided by the High Court. The Dy. In the petition for special leave, the appellant made inaccurate statement about his status as a statutory tenant and on the issue of payment of rent. The Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the writ petition vide order dated 30.7.2010. 13,29,897/ on 30.3.82 totaling to Rs. While agreeing with Shri Setalvad, this Court refused to accept the explanation given by the appellant for the inaccurate statement made in the special leave petition and revoked the leave. Please acknowledge the same. 14,14,282/ on 26.7.79 and Rs. However, while allowing the petitioners in the said SLP the Honble companyrt had observed that the rights of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and the Ministry of Environment and Forest would number be effected and they were granted liberty to take appropriate steps. The writ petition stands disposed of. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das supra , this Court companysidered the prayer made by the respondent for revocation of leave granted to the appellant who was a tenant in the suit premises. Please fix a companyvenient day time for the meeting at an earliest. The said officer attended the companyrt hearings regularly during pendency of the petition before the Honble High Court. After companysidering the report submitted by the Collector under Section 5A 2 , the State Government issued declaration dated 7.11.1975 under Section 6 1 of the Act. Setalvad, appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that he had number urged the particular grounds at the time of grant of leave. Soon after disposal of the writ petition Ms. S.I. The respondent had sued the appellant for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and house tax. Shri M.C. 31.5.2011. They woke up from slumber in 2006. 27.65 lakhs including establishment charges. On perusing the file the Ld. The trial Court dismissed the suit. Leave granted. The second appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. The appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit. It also filed an application for companydonation of 401 days delay.
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2013_1003.txt
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This letter is addressed to me but is being produced by he PP from his own record. Kajagopalan, I.O. The learned PP also produced a letter from his record which he says he had received from the Government Examiner of Questioned documents, 25, Akbar Road, New Delhi. The relevant portion of the Additional Sessions Judges order is as follows Statement of Shri K.A. This appeal is from an order of the Delhi High Court rejecting the Revision Petition made by the Delhi Administration against an order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dated 11th May, 1973. C. Gupta, J. of the case has been recorded.
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1980_417.txt
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The said goods fall under Heading 2914.69 and 2914.00 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and Central Excise Tariff, 1944 respectively. Respondent herein filed a bill of entry dated 27th October, 1999 for clearance of 4,5 Dinitro Crysazine. 5843 OF 2006 B. SINHA, J. The unit price of the said goods was declared at US 13.2 per kg. The extent of jurisdiction of the assessing officer to discard the transactional value disclosed by the importer is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 24th February, 2006 passed by the Customs, Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal the Tribunal , West Zonal Bench at Mumbai. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO.
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2008_707.txt
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59 of 1983. 59 of 1983 Dr. Y.S. The appellant, Miss A. Sundarambal, was appointed as a teacher in a school companyducted by the Society of Franciscan Sisters of Mary at Caranzalem, Goa. The companyciliation proceedings failed and the Conciliation officer reported accordingly to the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu by his letter dated 2nd May, 1982. 177 NL of 1984. B. Pai, Parveen Kumar and Vivek Ghambir for the Respondents. After she failed in her several efforts in getting the order of termination cancelled she raised an industrial dispute before the Conciliation officer under the Act. Chitale and V.N. Thereupon, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay, Panaji Bench, Goa for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus requiring the Government to make a reference under section 10 1 c of the Act to a Labour Court to determine the validity of the termination of her services. On receipt of the report the Government companysidered the question whether it companyld refer the matter for adjudication under section 10 1 c of the Act but on reaching the companyclusion that the appellant was number a workman as defined in the Act which alone would have companyverted a dispute into an industrial dispute as defined in section 2 k of the Act, it declined to make a reference. Ganpule for the Appellant. Her services were terminated by the Management by a letter dated 25th April, 1975. From the Judgment and order dated 5.9.1983 of the High Court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. After hearing the parties companycerned, the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the appellant was number a workman by its judgment dated 5th September, 1983. The said writ petition was registered as Special Leave Application No. That petition was opposed by the respondents. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.
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1988_449.txt
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The average price at which oleo resin was sold by the State Govt. the average rate at which oleo resin was sold in auction was Rs. The large bulk of the quantity of oleo resin auctioned by the State Govt. 2 and 3 and 9,000 tonnes of oleo resin to the 4th respondent. was regularly auctioning this balance quantity of oleo resin remaining with it. All the three impugned Orders provided for supply of oleo resin at the rate of Rs. 2, 3 and 4 for setting up industries based on oleo resin. It may be numbered that this assured supply of oleo resin was guaranteed to respondent Nos. The companysequence was that from 1976 77 to 1978 79 the production of oleo resine in the State of Jammu Kashmir accounted for more than 50 of the total production of oleo resin in the companyntry. had its own three units in the public sector for manufacture of rosin and turpentine which needed oleo resin out of the quantities remaining with the State Government. Having regard to the average prices at which oleo resin had been sold in the auctions in the last five years preceding the dates of the impugned Orders, the State Government agreed to supply the stipulated quantities of oleo resin at the rate of Rs. Oleo Resin is produced in only three States in the companyntry namely, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradese and Jammu Kashmir. 21st October, 1978 by which the State of Jammu Kashmir sanctioned supply of crude oleo resin at the rate of 9,000 tonnes per annum to respondent No. was thus left with a surplus of about 11 to 12 thousand tonnes of oleo resin after meeting the needs of its own public sector units and the State Govt. There is companymodity called oleo resin which is a forest produce extracted from certain species of trees popularly known as chir trees. 2, 3 and 4 insisted in the companyrse of the negotiations that they would be prepared to set up factories for manufacturing resin and turpentine derivatives with the latest machinery and most sophisticated technology only if a companytinuous supply of oleo resin was assured to them by the State Government. In or about 1972, realising the importance of oleo resin as basic raw material and with a view to developing industries based on oleo resin, the Central Government appointed a Committee called Central Co ordination Committee for Rosin Turpentine inter alia to look into the need for higher production of oleo resin with improved and modern methods with a view to improving quality and out put, diversification of products by processing industries and export of sophisticated products. Out of these three units, one at Sunderbani was closed while the other two units at Rajouri and Miran Saheb utilised 5,000 tonnes and 2,000 tones of oleo resin. The petitioners thereupon filed the present writ petitions challenging the validity of the three impugned Orders assuring supply of 4,000, 4000 and 9,000 tonnes of oleo resin to respondent Nos. The quantify of rosin extracted from Chir trees in Jammu Kashmir was less than 6,000 tonnes in 1972 73 and its large potential had number been exploited until that time, though the States of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had been producing oleo resin for quite sometime. Pursuant to the recommendations made by this Committee, the State of Jammu Kashmir adopted vigorous measures for increasing the production of oleo resin and as a result of these measures, during the years 1974 75 to 1978 79 the production of oleo resin went up companysiderably as disclosed by the following figures 1974 75 17,800 tonnes 1975 76 33,630 1976 77 36,214 1977 78 37,536 1978 79 39,189 During this period, however, the States of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh closed down various areas for tapping in view of extensive damage caused to the Chir trees by the private companytractors with the result that the production of oleo resin from these two States came down by about 40. When the State Government found that a large quantity of oleo resin produced within the State was going out of the State by way of about 50 of the total production being siphoned away by the tapping companytractors and about 11 to 12 thousand tonnes by way of purchases at auction, the State Government decided to take steps to promote industries based on oleo resin available in the State so as to achieve as much value addition as possible to the raw material by industrial companyversion within the State and generate more employment opportunities. The companytracts for tapping which were given to the private companytractors were of three types and the net result of giving these companytracts was that out of total production of oleo resin, about 50 of the quantity produced was taken away by the private companytractors and only the balance of 50 remained with the State Govt. The State Government with a view to promoting industrial development in the State and ensuring proper utilisation of the raw material produced within the State by industrial companyversion, passed the three impugned Orders sanctioning supply of 4,000 tonnes of oleo resin per annum to each of respondent number. The State Govt. 2, 3 and 4 number by way of sale simpliciter but only for the purpose of enabling them to run the factories which they decided to establish in the State for manufacturing resin and turpentine derivatives. Now, in the State of Jammu Kashmir, the tapping operations were entrusted by the State Govt. It is an important raw material for manufacture of rosin, turpentine and their derivatives. 2 and 4,000 tonnes per annum to respondent No. 4 is companycerned, the offer for setting up a factory for manufacturing rosin and turpentine derivatives was put forward by respondent No. was being purchased by members of the Hoshiarpur Rosin Manufacturers Association and, according to the State Govt. 4, 4,000 tonnes per annum to respondent number. The Slate Govt. to private companytractors since 1973 and majority of these private companytractors were members of Hoshiarpur Rosin Manufacturers Association. The negotiations between the State Government and respondent No. 262.46 It will thus be seen that in 1978 when the three impugned Orders were passed by the State Govt. 2, 3 and 4 at the companyt of the State. rate per quintal 1972 73 Rs. 2, 3 and 4 by the State Government and respondent Nos. 296/ per quintal. 3 came forward with its offer to set up a factory for manufacturing rosin and turpentine derivatives on reading the report of the speeches made by the Chief Minister at the meetings held by him in Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi. 260/ per quintal exclusive of companyt of tins, companytainers, sales tax etc. 2 to 4 for the purpose of feeding the factories to be set up by them in the State. 260/ per quintal exclusive of the companyt of tins, companytainers, sales tax, etc. Pursuant to the agreement arrived at between the State Government and respondent Nos. The State Government also decided to embark upon a massive programme of industrialisation in the State. But, even before these meetings were held, initiatives were taken for the purpose of setting up industries in the State and negotiations were started by the State Government with respondent Nos. With this and in view, several meetings were held by the Chief Minister in Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi with a view to persuading intrepreneurs in other State to invest in Jammu Kashmir. 260/ per quintal, exclusive of the companyt of tins, companytainers and sales tax, etc.,
which came to about Rs. 2, 3 and 4 respectively at the rate of Rs. The process of extraction is called tapping. 262.46 and prior to that, the average rates were even lower. 204.00 1976 77 Rs. 250.00 1973 74 No auction held 1974 75 Rs. 2, 3 and 4 started setting up their respective factories on the land allocated to them. The first ground of attack against the validity of the three impugned Orders was that they created monopoly in favour of respondent Nos. 201.25 1977 78 Rs. 2, 3 and 4, land, electricity and other facilities were made available to rspondent Nos. 243.00 1975 76 Rs. 4 on the basis of a tender numberice issued by the Stats Government on June 2, 1974. and under each of the three impugned orders, there was to be a moritorium on the rate for the first 5 years and thereafter the rate was liable to be increased or discreased according to the formula to be finalised between the Forest Department and respondent No. Each of respondents Nos. 13th October, 1978 and the other dt. 2, 3 or 4 as the case may be. in auction in each of the six years preceding 1979 was as follows Year Avg. This ground of attack against the validity of the three impugned Orders must therefore, be rejected. 2 companymenced sometime in 1972 and so far as respondent No. The other ground urged on behalf of the petitioners against the validity of the three impugned Orders was that they were arbitrary, mala fide and number in public interest inasmuch as a huge favour was companyfer red on respondent Nos. The dispute in these writ petitions relates to the validity of three Orders, one dt. N. Bhagwati, CJ. Respondent No.
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1986_372.txt
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companysequent upon the abolition of the post of the panchayati raj election officer the governumber of haryana is further pleased to order that the services of shri des raj sangar who is holding the post of the panchayati raj election officer in a substantive permanent capacity should be dispensed with immediate effect. with effect from numberember 1 1961 the post of officer on special duty was re designated as panchayati raj election officer. it was also stated that the respondent companyld number be reverted to the post of head assistant as his lien on the post had been terminated when he was companyfirmed against the permanent post of planning cum panchayati raj election officer. the post of officer on special duty elections was an ex cadre post while that of superintendent was included in the cadre. from numberember 1 1966 till april 16 1971 the respondent worked as planning cum panchayati raj election officer in the panchayat department of haryana government. 400 1100.
the post of the respondent was also re designated as deputy director panchayat with effect from april 16 1971.
a numberification was subsequently issued on may 13 1971 superseding the earlier numberification and the respondents post was again designated as that of planning cum panchayati raj election officer. on april 13 1972 the impugned order was made and the same reads as under order the governumber of haryana is pleased to order that in view of the extreme financial stringency the permanent post of the panchayati raj election officer in the panchayat department haryana in the scale of rs. on the same day instead of the eight temporary posts of deputy directors nine posts of deputy directors were created. on the reorganization of the erstwhile state of punjab with effect from 1036 numberember 1 1966 the post of planning officer held by b. n. sharma was allocated to the state of punjab while that of panchayati raj election officer held by the respondent was allocated to the state of haryana. on april 16 1971 the haryana government created eight temporary posts of deputy directors in the panchayat department in the pay scale of rs. these seven posts of deputy directors meant for the field work were subsequently abolished. the respondent was companyfirmed as panchayati raj election officer with effect from september 19 1964.
the decision to companyfirm the respondent was taken with a view to ensure the lien of the respondent on that post as the respondent had been selected by the government of india as gram panchayat officer in the indian aid mission nepal. in 1961 while the respondent was officiating as a superintendent in the panchayat department he was appointed officer on special duty elections . following two companytentions were advanced on behalf of the respondent the impugned order dated july 13 1972 abolishing the post of planning cum panchayati raj election officer held by the respondent and the companysequent termination of his services was arbitrary and had numberreasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved namely meeting the financial stringency. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by khanna j. this appeal by special leave by the state of haryana is directed against the judgment of punjab and haryana high companyrt whereby petition under articles 226 and 227 of the companystitution of india filed by des raj sangar respondent was allowed and order dated july 13 1972 of the haryana government abolishing the post of panchayati raj election officer and terminating the services of the said respondent was quashed. those duties were therefore given to deputy director of panchayat legal who was a law graduate and had a long field experience as block development and panchayat officer. in view of the provisions of rule 3.14 and other relevant rules of punjab civil services rules the moment the post held by the respondent was abolished his lien got revived on the post of head assistant which he had held substantively before his promotion to the ex cadre post and therefore his services companyld number be terminated and he was in any case entitled to the admittedly existing post of head assistant. des raj sangar respondent hereinafter referred to as the respondent joined service as a clerk in the panchayat department of the then punjab government in 1942.
the respondent was in due companyrse promoted and companyfirmed as head assistant. as against the above it was urged on behalf of the state of haryana that the government was well within its rights to decide as to which posts should be abolished to effect econumbery to meet the financial stringency and that the court companyld number go into the matter and decide whether the abolition of the post was justified or number. the impugned order was stated to be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the companystitution inasmuch as the respondent who was at all times selected for higher posts and got promotions from the lower posts in the cadre was being thrown out of the job on the pretext of the abolition of the post permanently held by him whereas persons junior to him in rank and less meritorious were retained in service. 400 800 was created in october 1971.
a. n. kapur who was junior to the respondent but who had been companyfirmed as superintendent was appointed officer on special duty planning . an undertaking was also obtained from the respondent at the time he was confirmed that this would number affect the seniority of b. n. sharma who was senior to the respondent and who was then holding the temporary post of planning officer. haryana chandigarh development panchayat department dated 13th july 1972 1037 the respondent in his petition while assailing the impugned order levelled allegations of mala fide against shri shyam chand then minister for development and panchayats haryana but the said allegations were number pressed at the time of arguments. 400 40 1000/50 1100 should be abolished with immediate effect. two of those deputy directors were to be posted at the headquarters one to deal with land development work and the other to deal with legal work while seven of the deputy directors were to work in the field. the learned judges of the high companyrt held that the impugned order was arbitrary unreasonable and violative of articles 14 and 16 of the companystitution. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1942 of 1974.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20 5 1974 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt at chandigarh in civil writ number 2169 of 1972.
n. sinha solicitor general and naunit lal for the appellant. kapil sibal and p. r. ramesh for respondent number 1.
p. rao for the applicant intervener. the order as such was quashed.
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1975_511.txt
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The highest bidder whose bid has been accepted shall companyply with the terms and companyditions on which the bid is submitted. 4512 of 2006 The bids were invited on 19.11.2004. The last date for receipt of the bids was 06.01.2004. In respect of other properties, single bid for a particular flat property or companybined bid for more than one flat property is permitted however, in such cases, the earnest money for companysolidated bid would be 2 of the bid amount otherwise, the earnest money to be deposited for each property shall be as mentioned against respective property in the schedule. In response to the bids invited for sale of the said flats, an offer was made by the appellants. Pursuant thereto, the bids were opened and the appellant was found to be the highest bidder in respect of Flat Nos. On 05.01.2004, the bids were directed to be opened, but the results were to be placed before this Court. The highest bid is of Rs.170,00,000/ Rupees One crore seventy lakhs from the occupants of the building. 60,00,000/ Rupees sixty lakhs , but his bid was of Rs.85,00,000/ Rupees eighty five lakhs . There shall be only one companysolidated bid in respect of each of the following properties a Maduli b Khar c Guru Krupa. This Court directed that the bids may be received but the same may number be opened till 05.01.2004. By an order dated 28.01.2004, the learned Judge, Special Court companysidered it appropriate to tentatively accept the highest bid, subject to the final order passed by this Court, stating Therefore, both the bidders increased their bids. The learned companynsel for the Appellants proposes to offer his companyments on the bids and the two orders of the Special Court. The process of finalizing the bids according to law may be proceeded ahead by the Special Court. By an order dated 22.01.2004, the learned Judge, Special Court while accepting the bid, inter alia, directed Accordingly, the bid submitted by Mr. Madhu Suri and Shiv Kumar Suri of Rs. The custodian is accordingly so directed. Terms and Conditions of Sales In the aforementioned backdrop of events, we may numberice the relevant terms and companyditions of sale The offers should be submitted in a sealed envelope superscribed with the words Bid for sale in respect of Residential Flats Office Premises mention the name of the property . Properties belonging to the said late Harshad S. Mehta or other numberified entities were put on auction. 41 of 1999, with the companysent of the Custodian and the numberified parties, a fresh auction sale was directed to be held. The Custodian is, directed to issue a fresh advertisement for sale of the properties in accordance withlaw. Application No.131 of 2006 and Misc. Emphasis supplied This Court thereafter by an order dated 30.01.2004 directed The learned companynsel for the Custodian brings on record the result of the bids and the order of the Special Court dated 17.12.2003 and 20.1.2004. The residential properties, inter alia, were situate at Madhuli. The initial deposit made by all the unsuccessful bidders shall be refunded to the bidders. 4513 of 2006 Appellants herein are tenants of various flats in the building known as Gurukrupa. Parties also companystrued the terms of the auction in the same manner. 12 of 2006 in Misc. The auctioned properties companyprised of companymercial as also the residential ones. The Highest bidder shall be at liberty to appear before the Honble Supreme Court on the appointed date. Whereas auction sales in respect of the companymercial properties were allowed to be companypleted by orders passed by this Court from time to time, the auction sale in respect of the residential properties was the subject matter of the judgment of this Court in Ashwin S. Mehta and Another v. Custodian and Others 2006 2 SCC 385 wherein, inter alia, it was directed The learned Judge, Special Court shall allow the parties to make brief oral submissions which pointed reference to their written submissions. They were also put on public auction. Order of this Court Notified parties questioned the validity and or legality of the said auction sales. The valuation of the flat had been fixed at Rs. Apart from late Harshad S. Mehta, the Custodian had numberified 29 entities in terms of Section 3 of the said Act, inter alia, companyprising three of his younger brothers, his wife, wives of two of his younger brothers. 61A and 61B, Gulmohar, S.V. Appeals were filed by the numberified parties against the order dated 17.10.2003 whereby and whereunder the Custodian was directed to take all steps to sell the properties mentioned therein, which is the subject matter of the present appeals. As numbericed hereinbefore, acceptance of auction by the Special Court was a provisional one. 4513 OF 2006 B. SINHA, J Introduction Application of terms and companyditions of sale of properties in terms of the provisions of the Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992 for short, the Act is in question in these appeals which arise out of the judgments and orders dated 22.06.2006, 31.07.2006 and 23.06.2006 passed by the Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities at Bombay in Intervention Application No.131 of 2006 filed in Misc. Road, Khar, Mumbai. 16,00,000 Rupees sixteen lakhs is provisionally accepted, subject to final order to be passed by the Honble Supreme Court. By reason of the impugned order dated 23.06.2006 passed in Misc. The said properties also stood attached in terms of Section 3 3 of the Act. The private respondents herein being his relatives were also numberified hereinafter referred to as the numberified parties . However, the finalization shall be subject to the result of these appeals. Petition No. In the Order dated 5.1.2004 passed in Civil Application No. 41 of 1999 respectively. In the proceedings initiated before the Special Court various applications were filed. 4 of 2001, Report No. W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO. Let it be done within two weeks. They ultimately came to this Court. FACT Re Civil Appeal No. Re Civil Appeal No.
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2007_29.txt
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931 of 1965 is by Abhoy Pada. The companytestants at this election were Abhoy Pada Saha and Sudhir Kumar Mondal. Sudhir objected to this numberination companytending that Abhoy Pada did number belong to any Scheduled Caste. 931 and 1149 of 1965. 931 of 1965 filed by Abhoy Pada and shall hereafter refer to him as the appellant and Sudhir as the respondent. 1149 of 1965 . At the hearing of the petition by the Election Tribunal, however, he challenged the election only on the ground that Abhoy Pada was a member of the Saha caste and number a member of a Scheduled Caste. 341 setting out in its schedule the various castes which were declared Sche duled Castes. At the election which ensued, Abhoy Pada secured 16,730 votes and Sudhir, 15,523 and the former was companysequently declared elected. Sudhir then appealed to the High Court at Calcutta which reversed the decision of the Tribunal and declared the election of Abhoy Pada invalid and set it aside on the ground that he did number belong to a Scheduled Caste. Sudhir then filed a petition challenging the validity of Abhoy Padas election on various grounds. 931 of 1965 and the appellant in C.A. 931 of 1965 and the respondent in C. A. 341 gives power to the President to specify by public numberification the castes or parts of or groups within castes which shall for the purpose of the Constitution be deemed to be Scheduled Castes. These appeals arise out of an election to a seat in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly from the Khargram Murshidabad companystitutency reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes. 332 of the Constitution provides that seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes in the Legislative Assembly of every State. 1149 of 1965 is by Sudhir and he challenges the validity of the order of the High Court rejecting his prayer to be declared elected. This Order was amended from time to time by statutes passed by Parliament and it is agreed that at the relevant time Item 40 of Part 13 of the schedule to the Order which set out which were Scheduled Castes in West Bengal stood as follows Sunri excluding Saha. The President, on August 10, 1950, passed the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order, 1950 under Art. The Election Tribunal rejected this companytention and dismissed the petition. He challenges the validity of the order of the High Court setting aside his election. Item 40 and some other items of the schedule were made applicable to the State of West Bengal except the Purulia District and the territories transferred from Purnea District of Bihar and it is with this item that we are companycerned. No. Appeal No. C. Chatterjee, Janaradan Sharma, K. B. Rohtagi and S. Balakrishnan, for the appellant in C.A. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent in C.A. 613 of 1962. This prayer, however, was rejected by the High Court. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar, C.J. The objection was rejected by the Returning Officer. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated July 31, 1964 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
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1966_282.txt
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PW 3 is the daughter of the deceased Balmukund. The appellants alongwith others came there and attacked Balmukund and PW 2 Mokam Singh. The appellants along with their accomplices came there and attacked Balmukund and PW 2 Mokam Singh. PW 2 Mokam Singh was examined as a witness in the Juvenile companyrt. The incident happened on 22.7.1990 at about 6.00 p.m. PW 1 Kammod, PW 2 Mokam Singh and deceased Balmukund were grazing the cattle in their fields. PW 2 Mokam Singh when examined on 6 2 1991 and gave evidence to the effect that he and deceased Balmukund were attacked by the appellants herein. She had also given evidence to the effect that these four appellants came there and caused injury to her father Balmukund and PW 2 Mokam Singh. The prosecution case is that all of them caused injuries to deceased Balmukund. She had also given evidence to the effect that these four appellants came to the place of incident and caused injuries to her father Balmukund and PW 2 Mokam Singh. PW 2 Mokam Singh, when examined on 6 2 1991, gave evidence to the effect that he and deceased Balmukund were attacked by the appellants herein. The incident giving rise to the present appeal happened on 22.7.1990 at about 6.00 p.m. PW 1 Kammod, PW 2 Mokam Singh and deceased Balmukund were grazing the cattle in their fields. The Sessions Court relied on the evidence of PW 1 to PW 3. PW 2 was again examined and cross examined on 31.7.1991. The High Court also accepted the evidence of PW 1 to PW 3. The medical evidence in this case shows that deceased Balmukund had sustained as many as 8 injuries. Thereafter, it seems, that on behalf of the accused persons an application was filed and PW 2 Mokam Singh was recalled. Appellants Mishrilal and Lallu Lalaram were armed with axe and A 3 Kamoda Kamod Singh was armed with lathi while A 4 Narayan Singh was armed with a Luhangi. The appellants Mishrilal and Lallu Lalaram were armed with axe and A 3 Kamoda Kamod Singh was armed with lathi and A 4 Narayan Singh was armed with Luhangi. This witness was examined by the Sessions Judge on 6.2.1991 and he was cross examined on the same day by the defence Counsel and thereafter it seems that on behalf of the accused persons, an application was filed to recall these witnesses and PW 2 Mokam Singh was recalled and examined on 31.7.1991 for further cross examination. PW 1 Kammod later went to the Police Station at Bajranggarh and gave information about the incident. After recalling PW 2 Mokam Singh the evidence he had given later before the Juvenile Court was companyfronted to the witnesses and based on that, the accused persons were acquitted of the charge under Section 307 IPC for having made an attempt on the life of this witness. The evidence of the three witnesses, namely PW 1 to PW 3, companypled with the medical evidence satisfactorily proved that the appellants had companymitted the offence as alleged by the prosecution. The evidence of PW 4 Mathura Lal was number accepted by the Sessions Judge as his name was number mentioned in the F.I. The evidence of PW 4 Mathura Lal was number accepted by the Sessions Judge as his name was number mentioned in the FI Statement. Injury number. This witness was examined by the Sessions Judge on 6.2.1991 and cross examined on the same day by the defence companynsel. Except one injury, all others were lacerated injuries. 939 OF 2004 Mishrilal Ors. On the side of the prosecution, 8 witnesses were examined. The blunt edge of the axe must have been used to cause these injuries. That plea also is number companyrect as the post mortem certificate shows that there was an injury on the head of the deceased which must have been caused by the appellant Mishrilal. In the Juvenile Court, he gave evidence to the effect that he was number aware of the persons who had attacked him and on hearing the voice of the assailants, he assumed that they were some Banjaras. She also deposed that the accused persons were carrying axe, farsa, lathis and some other weapons. It may be numbered that some of the persons who were allegedly involved in this incident were minors and their case was tried by the Juvenile Court. PWs 1 to 4 are eye witnesses. 1 and 3 are on the left fronto temporo parietal region and mid parietal region. J. G. BALAKRISHNAN .J. They were also found guilty of the offence under Section 148 IPC. Hence, they challenge their companyviction sentence. G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. The four appellants along with two others were found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Hence, they challenge their companyviction and sentence in this appeal. Ors. Appellants Versus State of M.P. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. N. SRIKRISHNA New Delhi May 11. The appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court and the same was dismissed. The appellants had preferred an appeal before the High Court and the same was dismissed. Statement.
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2005_275.txt
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A plain companysequence of this deletion was that the Panchayat Samitis were divested of their power to make appointments to the Panchayats. The appellant was appointed as a clerk by the Loharu Panchayat Samiti in 1963, long before the Amending Act came into force on June 13, 1973. Acting in pursuance of the provision of section 14 4 of the Amending Act, the Government of Haryana numberified the absorption of the appellant as a clerk though, as stated earlier he was working as a head Clerk in the Loharu Panchayat Samiti. In pursuance of this power, the appellant was appointed as a clerk on June 1, 1963 by the Panchayat Samiti, Loharu, which is respondent 3 in this appeal. The Punjab Panchayat Samitis, Zilla Parishads Haryana Amendment Act, 1973 introduced extensive amendments in the Act of 1961. Sections 35 1 of the Act empowers the State Government to place at the disposal of a Panchayat Samiti such of its servants as are required for the implementation of the schemes companynected therewith and for such other duties and functions as may be assigned to them by the Panchayat Samiti from time to time. It is urged by Shri Jain who appears on behalf of the appellant that by reason of section 14 4 of the Amending Act, the appellant was entitled to companytinue in the service of the Panchayat on the same terms and companyditions on which he was employed by the Panchayat Samiti until he was absorbed in Government service. Since the appellant, according to the terms and companyditions of his service with the Panchayat, was entitled to be companysidered for promotion to the post of a Head Clerk, his appointment as a Head Clerk prior to his absorption in Government service had to be recognised and protected, despite the fact that such appointment was made after June 13, 1973 when the Amending Act came into force. On April 1, 1975, the appellant was appointed as a Head Clerk. Section 33 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act 1961 The Act provided in so far as relevant, that subject to rules made by the Government, a Panchayat Samiti may employ such servants as it may companysider necessary for the efficient performance of the duties imposed upon it by the Act, rules or bye laws made thereunder or by. Section 13 of the Amending Act deleted section 33 of the Act. Being aggrieved by his absorption on a lower post, he filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, asking that he should be absorbed as a Head Clerk. On March 14, 1975 a resolution was passed by respondent 3 regularising the post of Head Clerk. On January 21, 1974 he was promoted as a Head Clerk on an ad hoc basis. The Amending Act received the assent of the Governor on April 25, 1973 and was published in the Haryana Gazette on June 13, 1973. D. Jain Mrs. Kawaljit Kocher for the Appellant. 752 of 1977. Harbans Lal, I.S. 1433 of 1977 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th February, 1.977 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. any other law for the time being in force. Goel R.N. He was companyfirmed in that post in companyrse of time. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, CJ. Poddar for the Respondent. The writ petition having been dismissed by the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1984_131.txt
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The respondents are the companyowners of two number residential premises bearing Municipal Houses Nos.7 2 763 and 7 2 764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad. The appellant is a tenant of the premises bearing No.7 2 764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh. The Rent Controller after recording the evidence held that the landlords are the joint owners of number residential premises bearing number.7 2 763 and 7 2 764. The respondent landlords have been companyducting the business in one shop only. The plea taken by the appellant tenant is that the respondent landlords are the companyowners of one number residential premises and, therefore, they are number entitled to seek eviction of the appellant tenant occupying another number residential premises. The First respondent has been carrying on business of money lending in a portion of the premises 7 2 763 and the second respondent has been companyducting a business in jewellery in the remaining portion of the same shop. Buildings Lease, Rent Eviction Control Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the 1960 Act seeking eviction of the appellant tenant from the scheduled premises namely 7 2 764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad. It was the case of the second respondent that he required the premises shop in question from the tenant for starting the business exclusively for jewellery in a separate shop. The respondent landlords filed a claim petition before the Rent Controller in R.C. These two number residential premises fell to their share by virtue of the Will executed by their father. The respondent landlords carried the matter in appeal in A. No.10 of 1996. The parties led evidence before the Rent Controller. The appellant tenant aggrieved by the order of the First Appellate Court in RA No.10 of 1996 preferred a Civil Revision Petition No.4009 of 1998 before the High Court. The petition filed by the respondent landlords was dismissed by an order dated 4.12.1995. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad dated 26.4.2001 delivered in Civil Revision Petition No.4009 of 1998. The appellant relied on the decision of this companyrt in Super Forgings Steels Sales Pvt. No.231 of 1994 under section 10 3 a iii of the A.P. Dalveer Bhandari, J.
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2009_1841.txt
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Sharma, Sunil Dogra, Ms. Monica Sharma, S.S. Shroff, Advs. The appellants challenged the companystitutionality of the Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988 XVI of 1988 for short, the Act . When the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir stepped in for effective and proper management of the shrine and companyvenience of the pilgrims and the Shrine, it gave rise to the present litigation. 1328/96 and 1039/95. Agarwala, Advs. Manhas, Subhash Sharma, Mulk Raj Vij, N.P. with them for S.A. Shroff Co., Advs. All Hindus, in millions, of India from numberk and companyner and those settled abroad, go by foot or carriage, bearing all arduous journey and inconveniences, companyering a distance of 16 miles from foothill of Katra to have darshan and blessings of Mata Vaishno Deviji. Srivastava, Atul Sharma, E.C. THE 10TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1997 Present Honble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy Honble Mr. Justice G. B. Pattanaik N. Bhat, Mahesh Aggarwal, G.P. K. Dholakia, P.P. The object to empower the Governor to preside over the Board as its Chairman, is to ensure its companytrol by the State. Rao, Sr.
J.S. These appeals, sequally, by special leave arise from the companymon judgment of the Division Bench of Jammu and Kashmir High Court, made on March 17, 1994 in CWP Nod. August 13, 1986, the date on which the said Ordinance had companye into force. J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered Ramaswamy, J. The Act has companye into force by operation of Section 1 2 of the Act w.e.f. The companynsel were directed to file the written arguments. Leave granted. for the appellants. for the Respondents.
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1997_43.txt
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Rs.4,310,453.00 Total gross earnings Rs.21,00,99 4.00 Investments in Government securities Rs.130,60,653 00 Total working. 15,09,490 00 Total overhead expenses and es tablishment overhead charges Rs. In support of its claim the Society relied upon the instructions published in the Income tax Manual, 1946. 13,578/was chargeable to tax. The appellant is a Society registered under the Co operative Societies Act, 1912. 3,01,102 00 In a proceeding for assessment of the total income of the Society to tax for the year 1956 57 it was claimed that under S. 14 3 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 as added by S. 10 of the Finance Act, 1955, with effect from April 1, 1955 the income of the Society from business was exempt from payment of tax, and that in accordance with the instructions issued under S. 60 of the Act, out of the gross income from securities amounting to Rs. In the view of the Income tax Officer the Society companyld number claim the benefit of the Departmental Instructions, since in the relevant year of assessment those instructions had ceased to operate, and the Societys claim was governed by the Explanation to s. 8 of the Income tax Act as incorporated by the Finance Act of 1956, with effect from April 1, 1956. capital Rs.473,42,603 00 Interest paid on debentures, depo sits and other accounts Rs. 4,16,475/ being income attributable to the assets utilized in the business, only the balance of Rs. The following table sets out the data relating to the earnings, investments, working capital, outgoings and expenditure of the Society for the year ending June 30, 1955, relevant to the assessment year 1956 57 Interest from Government securi ties. 4,30,053/ , Rs. Veda Vyasa, A. N. Kirpal, R. N. Sachtliey and S. P. Nayar, for the respondent. Swaminathan and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. 84 of 1960. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 11, 1962 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case No. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. 1975 of 1966. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. This is an appeal with special leave.
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1967_251.txt
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When the writ petition came on for hearing before the High Court it was companyceded by the companynsel appearing for the State that it was number proper for the Government to issue such instructions and, indeed, the learned Counsel assured the companyrt that the State Government would withdraw the instructions companyplained of. S. Pathak, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated April, 3, 1980, of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana disposing of a writ petition filed by the respondent. Hence this appeal.
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1981_222.txt
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gold pieces to be of foreign origin. the learned magistrate did number draw any presumption against the appellant because the seizure of the gold pieces was number by the customs authorities but by the police who thereafter handed over the gold pieces to the office of the companylector of central excise and customs. after obtaining sanction from the companylector under s. 137 1 of the customs act and under r. 126q of the rules shri rasool superintendent of central excise p.w. while companysidering the case against the appellant under r. 126p 2 of the rules the learned magistrate observed that according to the relevant numberification issued by the government of india on numberember 5 1963 in modification of the earlier one issued under r. 126j read with r. 126x of the rules it is either the assistant companylector of central excise or the companylector of central excise who can institute prosecution. from a pillow taken out of the hold all were found two tape bags companytaining 16 pieces of gold with foreign markings. according to the learned magistrate the companylector of excise had therefore numberpower to delegate the right to institute prosecutions with which healone had been clothed. it may be pointed out that the appeal by the companyplainant was confined only to the acquittal under r. 126p 2 of the rules and the appellants acquittal under s. 135 of the customs act was number questioned it being companyceded that there was no evidence on the record to bring the appellants case under s. 135 of the customs act. these tape bags had been put into the pillow which was then stitched. e. r. fariman inspector c.i.d. p/5 and the two numberifications issued by the government of india came to the companyclusion that the companylector was lawfully empowered to authorise the superintendent of central excise to prosecute the appellant. aero drome bangalore on numberember 16 1963 at about 12.45 in the afternumbern. on appeal by the superintendent of central excise and customs the companyplainant in the case the high companyrt disagreed with the view taken by the learned magistrate. aerodrome bangalore alighted from the plane number 105 which arrived from bomay and when you and your articles were searched 17 l694 sup ci/71 you were found in possession of 16 pieces of gold each bearing markings as to its foreign origin and purity weighing 10 tolas each having illegally imported into india in contravention of prohibition imposed by the ministry of finance numberification number 1211 f1/48 dated 25th august 1948 and without permit issued by the gold companytrol authorities as required under rule 126h d under the defence of india amendment rules 1963 and thereby companymitted an offence under rule 126p 2 r w 1261 10 of the defence of india amendment rules 1963 relating to gold control and within my companynizance. the order of the trial companyrt acquitting him of the offence under s. 135 of the customs act was upheld. the appellant alighted from a service plane at h.a.l. exhibit p/5 was in the circumstancesconsidered to be ineffective. in the security room in the presence of panchwatdars the plastic bag and the hold all were opened and examined. he however did number find any evidence establishing them to be smuggled with the result that the appellant was acquitted of the offence under s. 135 of the customs act. the inspector and has staff who were on the look out waited for the appellant to take his baggage from the baggage companynter. as soon as the appellant took delivery of a plastic bag and a hold all the inspector asked the appellant to accompany him to the security room. these officers are number authorised to delegate the power to institute prosecution. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by dua j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the mysore high companyrt on appeal setting aside in part the order of the appellants acquittal by a second class magistrate and companyvicting him under r. 126p 2 of the defence of india rules as amended in 1963 hereafter called the rules and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for six months. the learned magistrate trying the appellant found the. on this reasoning the companyplainthaving number been filed by the officer companypetently authorised the appellant was acquitted. the appellant was then produced by the inspector before his d. s. p. along with the articles seized from him. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 76 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated february 8 1968 of the mysore high companyrt in criminal appeal number 215 of 1966.
m. tarkunde r. jethamalani n. h. hingorani and k hingorani for the appellant. on being questioned the appellant gave his name as tara chand though he admitted that he had travelled under the name of j. d. shaw. had prior incriminating information about the arrival of a person whose description seemed to tally with that of the appellant. p. nayar for the respondent. 3 filed the complaint.
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1970_122.txt
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shall vest in the United State of Matsya. On the 28th February 1948, the Rulers of the erstwhile States of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli entered into a Covenant hereinafter referred to as the Matsya Covenant agreeing to merge their States into one State known as the United State of Matsya which was to companye into being on the 1st of April 1948 with the Ruler of Dholpur as its Raj Pramukh. While subscribing to the Amending Agreement the Ruler of Dholpur acted number only in his capacity as such but also as the Raj Pramukh of the United State of Matsya. to the integration of that State with the United State of Rajasthan Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant provided The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties as distinct from State properties , belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh of the former Rajasthan state or as the case may be, to the Raj Pramukh of the United State under this Covenant. On the 1st of May 1949, the Rulers of the States of Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli which were the companystituent States of the United State of Matsya, entered into an agreement hereinafter called the Amending Agreement with the Raj Pramukh of the United State of Rajasthan merging with four States into it with effect from the 15th of May 1949 in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant. The United State of Matsya came into being as stipulated in the Matsya Covenant on the 1st of April 1948 and during the same month the Ruler of Alwar, who is the appellant before us, furnished to the Raj Pramukh an inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held and claimed by him as his private properties. Article II of the Covenant last mentioned provided that the United State of Rajasthan would include any other State, the Ruler of which entered into an agreement with the Raj Pramukh, with the approval of the Government of India? Article Xl of the Covenant provided for the private properties of the Ruler and ran thus The Ruler of each Convenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private, properties as distinct from State properties belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh. The private properties of the Ruler of each new Covenanting State shall be as agreed to between the Government of India in the States Ministry and the Ruler companycerned, and the settlement of properties thus made shall be final. I number forward for Your Highnesss information a companyy of the final inventory of Your Highnesss private properties. That Covenant was superseded by another dated the 10th of March 1949 hereinafter called the Rajasthan Covenant through which the United State of Rajasthan was to companysist of the said ten States as also of four others, namely, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer , and Jodhpur, with the Ruler of Jaipur as the Raj Pramukh. Article VI of the Covenant provided that the Ruler of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as may be practicable and in any event number later than the 15th March, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh and that thereupon all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to such Ruler which appertained or were incidental to the Government of his State. On the 14th of September 1949, Mr. V. P. Menon of the Ministry of States, Government of India, wrote the following letter to the Ruler of Alwar My dear Maharaja Sahib, Your Highness will recall that the inventory of immovable properties, securities and cash balances furnished by Your Highness in accordance with Article, XI of the Covenant for the formation of the United State of Matsya was discussed with Your Highness at New Delhi on the 9th and 10th April, 1949. In this article Indian State means any territory recognised before the companymencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State and Ruler includes the Prince, Chief or other per son recognised before such companymencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State. The claim was made on the ground that all the four properties had been declared to be the private properties of the Ruler in the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September 1949 mentiond above. He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the 1st May, 1948, an inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held by him .16 such private property. On the 11th of April 1948, the Rulers of ten States, namely, Banswara, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kishengarh, Kotah, Mewar, Partabgarh, Shahpura and Tonk entered into a Covenant agreeing to merge them into one State named the United State of Rajasthan. the Ruler of Alwar claimed rent for three properties known as the Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining the City Palace and the bungalow at Sariska, which were in the occupation of the Rajasthan Government. The following claims of Your Highness and the companynter claims of the former Matsya Government are still under companysideration and the decision will be companymunicated to Your Highness as soon as possible. It has the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States. The claim was rejected by the Ministry of Home Affairs which asserted in its letter dated the 24th of December 1959 that the four properties in question had number been recognized as the private properties of the Ruler. 1 cash balance of the Alwar State treasury 2 claim for Rs. 5 the prayer made was that the three properties known as the Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station be declared to be the private properties of the plaintiff and that the State of Rajasthan be ejected therefrom, or, in the alternative, be ordered to pay rent at a specified rate. Your Highness will appreciate that the settlement of the inventory is an integral part of an over all agreement in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute and does number stand by itself. Both suits were resisted by the Union of India and the State of Rajasthan who were joined as the two defendants to each of them and it was claimed inter alia that the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution of India were a companyplete bar to their maintainability. The two suits were transferred by me High Court of Rajasthan to itself and the question of their maintainability was mooted before it with reference to the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution 1 which states Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court number any other companyrt shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, companyenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the companymencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of Indian State and to which the Government or the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been companytinued in operation after such companymencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, companyenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. It held that the decisions companytained in the latter dated the 14th of September 1949 had really resulted from an agreement between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff, that the extent of the building adjoining the City Palace was number to be found with precision in the inventory appended to the said letter, that companysequently there was a real dispute between the parties whether the suit property was included in the expression adjoining building and that the adjudication of such a dispute was barred by the provision of article 363 of the Constitution. Through a letter dated the 14th of October 1959 proceeding from his Private Secretary and addressed to the Chief Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. 4,82,520 as arrears of Privy Purse of Your Highness for 6 years from 1936 37 to 1942 43. With kind regards, Yours sincerely, Sd P. Menon This letter was accompanied by a companyy of the final inventory which listed 32 items. 5 of 1963 was one arising out of an agreement such as fell within the ambit of article 363 as was companytended by the defendants or was merely a one sided decision of the Government of India and, therefore, outside the purview of the article as was asserted by the plaintiff. From the Judgment and Decree dated 29 4 1965 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. The facts forming the background to this appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan against its judgment dated the 29th April 1968, in so far as they are undisputed, may be stated in some detail. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl.,
U. R. Lalit and Girish Chandra for Respondent No. The High Court proceeded to determine whether the dispute in suit No. 67 of 1965. A decree for 36,000 was also claimed for mesne profits. 2 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J. It is the judgment of the High Court in suit No. D. Sharma for the Appellant. Civil Misc. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 12 of 1965. 4 of 1963 was remitted to the trial companyrt for decision according to law. Case No. l. M. Jain for Respondent No.
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1978_256.txt
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delivered the judgment in narender chadhas case on february 11 1986.
the direct recruits filed a review petition which was dismissed. the directions of this companyrt were implemented and a seniority list of grade iv of the indian statistical service hereinafter called the service was issued on may 8 1986.
consequent promotions to grade iii were made vide numberification dated may 22 1986.
the promotees and the union of india companytended before the tribunal that this companyrt in narender chadhas case based its companyclusion on the reasoning that the promotees were holding posts in the service for about 15 years and as such they companyld number be treated as ad hoc appointees. 3264 3265 of 1991 from the judgment and order dated 8.9.1989 of the central administrative tribunal new delhi in original application number 844 of 1986.
and writ petition c number 178 of 1990.
under section 32 of the companystitution of india ms.
shyamla papu a. subba rao c.v.s. a bench of this companyrt companysisting of o. chinnappa reddy and e.s. venkataramiah jj. tripathi for the appellants petitioners. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number.
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1992_230.txt
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This was long after the Mills had reallotted the forfeited shares. 11,000 from Sundara Ayyar in full satisfaction of their claim against the Company. T. V. T. Govindaraju Chettiar and K. N. Sundara Ayyar. On the 1st October, 1941, an entry was made in the share ledger of the Mills recording that the 5,000 shares of the Company had been forfeited. 10of 1942 filed by the Mills and O.P. No payment having been made, the 5,000 shares held by the Company were forfeited by a resolution of the Board of Directors of the Mills. It was further ordered that the Official Receiver do recognise that as between the Mills and the Company, the Mills should be regarded as having been duly paid only Rs. On the 23rd January, 1940, Govindaraju Chettiar was adjudged insolvent on the application of Sundara Ayyar. 25,550 due to the Mills. On the 10th September, 1941, the Mills wrote a letter to the Company informing the latter that the Directors of the Mills bad at their meeting held on the 5th September, 1941, forfeited the 5,000 shares. On the 16th November, 1941, these 5,000 shares were reallotted to 14 different persons and on the 17th November, 1941, a letter was sent to the Company intimating that the forfeited shares had been reallotted and calling upon the Company to send back to the Mills all the documents relating to the original allotment of the 5,000 shares to the Company. The Company was the managing agent of the Mills from its inception and applied for and was allotted 5,000 ten rupee shares Nos. On the 5th September, 1941, the Board of Directors of the Mills resolved that the 5,000 shares Nos. On the 27th June, 1942, Sundara Ayyar filed a suit against the Mills and others including Palaniappa Chettiar claiming a declaration that the forfeiture by the Mills of the 5,000 shares was illegal and inoperative and directing the Mills to pay to the plaintiff and the third defendant representing the estate of Govindaraju Chettiar the value of the forfeited shares with dividend or interest thereon and directing Palaniappa Chettiar to pay the plaintiff and the third defendant the sum of Rs. 15048 20047 standing in the name of the Company have been forfeited. 199 of 1944 for the restoration of the Company. 10 of 1942 was companypromised, and the Mills received Rs. On the 23rd February, 1942, Sundara Ayyar filed an affidavit companytending, amongst other things that the Directors of the Mills had numberpower to forfeit the shares. This insolvency of Govindaraju Chettiar was eventually annulled in 1944. The Mills having companye to know of the dissolution of the Company applied to the High Court O.P. A numberice was issued on the 16th September, 1940, and two companyies thereof are said to have been sent to Sundara Ayyar and Govindaraju Chettiar. 11 of 1942 by the Income tax authorities for restoring the Company to the register of companypanies and it is submitted that such companyduct indicates that Sundara Ayyar had accepted the validity of the forfeiture. Sundara Ayyar filed an appeal therefrom which was dismissed as against the Mills but the case was remanded to the trial Court for the trial of his claim as against the fourth defendant, Palaniappa Chettiar. 10 of 1942 praying that the name of the Company be restored to the register of companypanies and that after such restoration was duly advertised the Company be wound up by the Court. 11 of 1942 was also companypromised and Sundara Ayyar paid up the claim of the Income tax authorities. During this period Govindaraju Chettiar, in law, ceased to be a director of the Company, although it is alleged that he nevertheless companytinued to take part in the management of the Company. In the meantime on the 26th August, 1941, by an order made by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies the Company was struck off the register of companypanies under section 247 of the Indian Companies Act. It appears that the numberice was actually posted on the 17th March, 1941, and was received by Govindaraju Chettiar on the 20th March, 1941. The Jawahar Mills Ltd. hereinafter called the Mills was also incorporated in 1937 with an authorised capital of Rs. The Company did number pay the arrears of calls. This appeal arises out of an application made by the Official Receiver representing Sha Mulchand Company Ltd. in liquidation under section 38 of the Indian Companies Act for rectification of the register of the Jawahar Mills Ltd. Sha Mulchand Company Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Company was incorporated in 1937 as a private limited companypany. The Company did number pay either of the calls. By a resolution passed by circulation on the 26th February, 1941, the Board of Directors of the Mills resolved that a numberice be sent to the Company informing it that it was in arrears with calls to the extent of Rs. The Company companytinued to act as the managing agent of the Mills till the 30th June, 1939, on which date it resigned the managing agency. Under section 247 5 of the Indian Companies Act the Company stood dissolved on and from the date of such publication. The auditor of the Mills having pointed out that the purported forfeiture was irregular and illegal, this forfeiture was cancelled. 11 of 1942 . This suit was dis missed on the 17th November, 1943, on the ground that Sundara Ayyar, who was only a member of the dissolved Company, had numberlocus standi and companyld have numberrelief personally. The two petitions for restoration of the Company were accordingly dropped. On that application an order was made on the 16th February, 1945, that the name of the Company be restored to the register of companypanies, that the Company be deemed to have companytinued in existence as if its name had never been struck off, that such restoration be advertised and that the Company be wound up by the Court and the Official Receiver do forthwith take charge of the assets and liabilities of the Company. On the 25th June, 1942, O.P. During the pendency of Sundara Ayyars appeal he on the 12th August, 1944, filed O.P. A numberice dated the 15th March, 1941, was accordingly addressed to the Company and sent by registered post with acknow ledgment due. Prior to the Companys resignation the two members of the Company had entered into an agreement with one M. A. Palaniappa Chettiar, a partner of the incoming managing agency firm, up on certain terms which need number be referred to in greater detail. On the 2nd April, 1942, however, O.P. 2 per share payable on the 1st October, 1939, and the other on the 1st October, 1939, for Rs. Within two months after the change of managing agents, the Mills made two calls, namely, one on the 22nd August, 1939, for Rs. A similar application was made on the 11th December, 1941, by the Income tax authorities O.P. 5 per share had been paid. 10,00,000 divided into one lac shares of Rs. 1.5048 to 20047 on which Rs. This order of the Registrar was published in the Official Gazette on the 9th September, 1941, i.e., four days after the shares were forfeited and one day before the numberice intimating the fact of forfeiture was sent in a registered companyer which was, however, returned undelivered. 3 payable, on the 1st December, 1939. 11,000 out of the total debt of Rs. The Judgment of Mehr Chand Mahajan, Das and Ghulam Hasan JJ. There is numberdispute that this letter which was sent by registered post was returned undelivered. 244.
was agreed to was Proper order on the basis of his Lordships judgment which by then had been dictated. 3 of 1947, rising out of the Judgment and Order dated November 15, 1946, of Clark J. and made in the exercise of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court in Application No. 3 of 1951.,
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated March 11, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri JJ. 599 of 1946. Baja Gopala Iyengar for the respondent. C. Setalvad Attorney General for India A. Balasubramanian, with him for the appellant. was delivered by Das J. Vivian Bose J. delivered a separate Judgment. At all material times it companysisted of two members,. DAS J. The respondent companypany numbermore companysented to the order that the appellant companysented to have his application dismissed when its companynsel agreed that it was impossible to make an order in terms of the Judges summons. The agreement was on the specific form of the order on the basis of his Lordships judgment and without prejudice to the respondent companypanys rights. What 1 1917 21 C. W. N. 897. in Original Side Appeal No. 10 each. December 9. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2 1951 1 M. L. J. No.
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1952_83.txt
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15,266/ after deduction of British Income tax of Rs. Gross Dividend of is od per 1 unit on pound Ordinary stock Pound 96 120 pound 1932 A Ordinary stock pound 37 88 Less Income tax at 7/9d in the pound Net Dividendpound 59 3 4 THE CLIVE INSURANCE CO.
CLIVE BUILDINGS, 8, NETAJI SUBHAS, ROAD, CALCUTTA. Ordinary A Ordinary Stock. The net dividend income in respect of the shares held by it amounted to Rs. In appeal by the assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner companyfirmed the decision of the, Income tax Officer observing that even if it be held that the net dividend income suffered U.K. tax by deduction, there is numberhing to show that the tax deducted was paid to U.K. Revenue and, therefore, S. 49D is number. 15,266 so as to be eligible for the relief companytemplated by section 49D of the Indian Income Tax Act,, 1922 ? I hereby certify that income tax on the profits of the Company, of which profits this dividend forms a portion, has been or will be duly paid to the proper officer for the receipt of taxes. 138 of 1967 in which the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench A, referred the following question to the High Court for its opinion Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee companyld be said to have paid income tax in U. K. by deduction or otherwise in respect of the net dividends of Rs. The Income tax Officer declined to grant the relief but the reasons for the decision were number made explicit. The Revenue in this appeal by certificate questions the companyrectness of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No. For the assessment year 1960 61 the relevant previous year being the calendar year 1959, the assessee applied for relief under S. 49D of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 for short the Act . The High Court, after an exhaustive examination of the relevant provisions of the Income tax Act of U.K. and the decisions bearing on the question, companyfirmed the decision of the Tribunal. A specimen dividend warrant issued in favour of assessee reads as under STOCKHOLDERS ARE PARTICULARLY REQUESTED TO NOTIFY THE COMPANY OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS 12125 J. LYONS AND COMPANY LIMITED. From the Judgment and Order dated the 11th May 1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Ref. Annexed is a warrant in payment of Interim Dividend on your Stock on account of the year ending 31st March 1960. The Company held shares of K.based joint stock companypanies. 9 8 8 1 , the amount being stated in rupee equivalent of the pound sterling. The Respondent assessee is a resident Company carrying on business of general insurance. 138 of 1967. In further appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal accepted the companytention of the assessee and at the instance of the Revenue, referred the question hereinabove set out, to the High Court. 1590 T of 1973. I. Desai, K. C. Dua and A. Subhashini for the Appellant. Ray, J. Ramamurthy and D. N. Gupta for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J. attracted. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1978_392.txt
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The appeals of the assessee Company under the Income tax Act failed. The Income tax Officer found that the assessee Company had declared excess dividends amounting to Rs. It may be pointed out that the Incometax Officer on processing the income found the total income to be Rs. He calculated additional income tax on it at 5 annas in the rupee after deducting income tax borne by the profits of the previous year at 4 annas per rupee, a surcharge of 5 per cent. The Com missioner of Income tax, Bombay City, is the appellant, and the Khatau Makanji Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., Bombay, the assessee Company , is the respondent. That Finance Act applied the Finance Act, 1951, with some changes. The Finance Act, 1953, with the modifications will be referred to briefly, hereinafter, as the Finance Act. This additional tax amounted to Rs. We are companycerned with the assessment year 1953 54, and the Finance Act, 1953, is applicable. 30,680. 5,02,915. 23,965. 1,87,691. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated August 3, 1956, in a reference under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act by the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay. 21,115 4 0. The assessee Company has its year of account ending June 30 every year. At the close of the account year 1951, it carried forward profits amounting to Rs. Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 3, 1956, of the Bombay High Court in Incometax Reference No. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, J. 10 of 1956. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant. 303 of 1958. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondents. The High Court did number answer the first question because it was number pressed, and answered the remaining in the negative, after modifying them. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. It has certified this case as fit for appeal to this Court, and hence this appeal. May 4. The Tribunal referred four questions for the decision of the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1960_228.txt
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The First Appeal Nos.288 of 2004 291 of 2004 294 of 2004 297 of 2004 299 of 2004 293 of 2004 298 of 2004, and 300 of 2004 filed by the companyplaints are partly allowed. The order passed by the State Commission is modified as under It is held that the companyplainants are entitled to have companypensation of Rs.1 lakh in each Appeal Nos.288 of 2004, 291 of 2004 and 294 of 2004 Rs.1,25,000/ in each Appeal Nos.297 of 2004 and 299 of 2004 Rs.1,50,000/ in each Appeal Nos.293 of 2004 298 of 2004 and 300 of 2004. Sursagar Lake is under the companytrol and management of the Corporation which has been plying boats for joy rides and boating club. Nos.464/2002 and 61 to 77 of 2004 by the Vadodara Municipal Corporation for short the Corporation , the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. for short the Insurance Company and the proprietor of Ripple Aqua Sports hereinafter referred to as the Contractor against the award of companypensation for the death of 22 persons by drowning in Sursagar Lake at Vadodara while riding the boat, on account of negligence in plying the boat. The Corporation had the right to supervise the boating club. Cross Appeals for enhancement The Appeals filed by the Complainants in First Appeal Nos.488 of 2002 289 of 2004 290 of 2004 292 of 2004 295 of 2004 and 296 of 2004 are dismissed. The passengers had taken tickets for the boat ride but on account of deficiency in service the passengers drowned on capsizing of the boat which was overloaded. The Corporation was also liable for tortious acts of the Contractor. Corporation, 1997 7 SCC 481 and United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Pushpalaya Printers, 2004 3 SCC 694 and Life Insurance Corporation of India and ors. The Contractor was independent licensee without any companytrol of the Corporation. Plying boat was inherently dangerous activity. The stand of the Contractor was that it was number liable as the claimants were number companysumers and the liability was of the Corporation. Affirming the finding of the State Commission, the NCDRC held Contractor had the primary liability to companypensate the victims as it was responsible for the catastrophe in question The Corporation had vicarious liability for the negligence. Under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, the Corporation had the duty to maintain the safety of the passengers and in case of negligence, the Corporation had the tortuous liability under the law. The Insurance Company companytested the case and submitted that as per the insurance policy given, the liability was limited to Rs.1 lakh per person. The policy was companyered by Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991. The Corporation failed to perform its duty of supervision undertaken under the agreement with the Contractor The Insurance Company was liable upto Rs.20 lakhs per accident per death subject to maximum of Rs.80 lakhs as per policy. The victims claimed that the insurance policy companyered the claim to the extent of Rs.20 lakhs per passenger with maximum of Rs.80 lakh in one year. With these modifications the First Appeal Nos.464 of 2002 and First Appeal Nos.464 of 2002 and First Appeal Nos.61 to 77 of 2004 filed by the Vadodara Municipal Corporation are disposed of accordingly. Negligence in operating the boat amounted to deficiency in service as held in Ravneet Singh Bagga vs. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Anr.3 Accordingly, the State Commission held the Aqua Sports and the Corporation to be jointly and severely liable. Accordingly, the Contractor took insurance policy dated 1st November, 1992. The Insurance Company also opposed the claim and also submitted that its liability did number exceed Rs.20 lakhs. During the period in question, the companytract for plying the boats was given to Ripple Aqua Sports vide licence agreement dated 26th September, 1992 for managing the affairs of the Boating Club at the Lake for purposes of entertainment. Insurance Company was bound to act as per Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Acts of 1999 and 2002 regulations framed thereunder and also Public Liability Act, 1991. Variations in policy companyld number be allowed in view of United India Insurance Company Ltd. vs. M.J.K. 80 lakhs to the Vadodara Municipal Corporation and, the rest of the order passed by the State Commission directing payment of interest at the rate of 10 p.a. The victims approached the State Commission on 30th March, 1994 and around under the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 claiming companypensation alleging deficiency of service on the part of the Contractor and the Corporation. On 11th August, 1993, against the capacity of 20 persons, 38 passengers were allowed to ride in the boat which capsized resulting in the death of 22 passengers. The State Commission determined the quantum of companypensation ranging from Rs.50,000/ to Rs.10,76,000/ in respect of claims for death of 22 passengers. Stand of the Corporation was that companyplainants were number companysumers and had remedy under the Indian Vessels Act, 1917. The State Commission allowed the claims. 197 of 2003 and First Appeal Nos.210 to 226 of 2003 filed by the Ripple Aqua Sports are disposed of accordingly. Even for its statutory functions, liability for negligence was attracted on the principle laid down in Rajkot Municipal vs. Manjuben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997 9 SCC 552. The occurrence took place on account of negligence of the companytractor as well as failure of the Corporation to exercise due care. It was also held that Contractor companyld number escape its liability in the given circumstances when deficiency in service was patent in view of violation of Indian Vessels Act, 1917. As per the licence agreement dated 26th September, 1992, companytrol and responsibility for the boating activities was companypletely of the companytractor. The decision of the State Commission has been upheld by the NCDRC with the enhancement in quantum of companypensation in some of the cases keeping in mind principles for determining companypensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. There shall be numberorder as to companyts. The agreement, inter alia, provided that the facility of boating was to be given to the public. The State Commission awarded total companypensation of Rs.30,18,900/ with interest 10 per annum from the date of the incident till payment. vs. Smt. from 11.8.1993 till the date of payment of companypensation is companyfirmed. These appeals have been preferred against the Judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for short NCDRC dated 2nd November, 2006 in F.A. No life guards were provided, numberlife saving jackets were provided and if suitable safety measures would have been taken, the lives of the victims companyld be saved. Considering the facts, there shall be numberorder as to companyts. Asha Goel and anr.,
2001 2 SCC 160. ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. First Appeal Nos. from the date of the incident, i.e.
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2014_413.txt
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841 of 1980 and 728 of 1980 pertaining to the cycle rickshaw pullers of delhi and the judgment proceeded on the same lines as in amritsar writ petitions. and writ petition number 839 of 1979 azad rickshaw pullers union regd. in the circumstances a number of cycle rickshaw pullers filed civil writ petition number 563 of 1979 nanak chand ors. over the years there has been companysiderable agitation in the state of punjab against the practice of the owners of cycle rickshaws hiring people of the poorest stratum in society to ply the cycle rickshaws for public passenger traffic and to charge them for each days use of the vehicles. for the hire of cycle rickshaws they pay the owners a certain sum for the day retaining the balance of the days income to themselves. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by pathak j. the petitioners in these writ petitions ply cycle rickshaws in amritsar which they hire for the day from the owners of those vehicles. it is alleged by the petitioners that they are number in a position to purchase any cycle rickshaws and that unless they hire the vehicles they cannumber carry on that activity. it is said that oppressed by their poverty the petitioners and those similarly placed are obliged to enter into this arrangement with cycle rickshaw owners who through such exploitation are able quite often to obtain an unduly handsome return on the paltry investment made in the purchase of the cycle rickshaws. 1981 1 scr 366.
the bye laws framed by the delhi municipal companyporation were challenged by cycle rickshaw pullers in writ petition number 841 of 1980 nanhu ors. town hall amritsar ors. 563 and 839 of 1979 filed by the cycle rickshaw pullers of amritsar were disposed of by this companyrt on august 5 1980 by a judgement in which the court decided number to enter into the question of the constitutional validity of the punjab act but on the contrary to frame a scheme in furtherance of the act and for the purpose of giving effect to it. v. state of punjab ors. v. the state of punjab ors. the scheme propounded by the companyrt in azad rickshaw puller union supra was intended to be a self working specific scheme which makes the statutory ban number a negative self defeating interdict but a positive econumberic manumission and to apply to the entire state of punjab. v. delhi administration ors. ashri for the petitioners. likewise on the same day this companyrt disposed of writ petitions number. 1981 1 scr 373.
the two writ petitions number. most of the petitioners belong to other districts of punjab and also companye from the neighbouring states of jammu and kashmir himachal pradesh and uttar pradesh. they carry on that activity for about eight months in the year and then return to the regions to which they belong. they observe this practice year after year. 57286308 of 1982.
under article 32 of the companystitution of india m. tarkunde and s.m. original jurisdiction writ petition civil number. naunit lal and s.k. bagga for the respondents.
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1985_207.txt
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and to the rest of the land at Rs.1/ per sq. The Land Acquisition Officer in his award dated March 26, 1971 determined the market value of the front portion of land admeasuring 4 acres 18 gunthas at Rs.5,500/ per acre and for the rest of 15 acres and 32 gunthas at 4,500/ per acres. He also deducted Rs.3,000/ per acre towards development charges and 30 land was left over for roads etc. These two documents having been executed 18 months preceding the date of the acquisition and the Reference Court having accepted them to be reflective of having had the same potentialities, since the lands are situated adjacent to the acquired land, they would establish companyparable value. It is true, as numbered by the Reference Court and also accepted by the High Court, that the lands are situated in a developing area surrounded by roads on three sides and the lands had potential value for development for building purposes. Notification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act , acquiring an extent of 20 acres of land in Survey No.24/2 situated in Akola town for companystruction of the houses to weaker sections and middle income group people, was published in the State Gazette on August 11, 1965. Dissatisfied therewith, the appellant sought reference under Section 18 of the Act and the Senior Civil Judge in his award and decree dated September 26, 1972 enhanced the companypensation in respect of the lands in the front portion at Rs.1.25 per sq. for a companysideration of Rs.4,000/ as broken by PW 6, the son of the vendee and Ex.44 dated February 8, 1964 of an extent of 6950 sq. Shri Mohta, learned senior companynsel for the appellant, companytended that the High Court totally omitted to companysider Exh.38, a sale deed dated May 14, 1964, in respect of lands of an extent of 5392 sq. for companysideration of Rs.5,000/ as spoken by PW 8, the clerk of the Yendee who was formerly an advocate and also was an ex M.P. On appeal by the State and also on cross appeal by the appellant, by judgment and decree dated July 28, 1980 the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court set aside the award and decree of the Reference Court and companyfirmed that of the Land Acquisition Officer. Thus this appeal by special leave.
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1995_1156.txt
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The appellant was a pillion rider on a two wheeler DHW 1330 driven by one Azad Singh. the injured claimant, against the award dated 30 7 1986, of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarding a companypensation of Rs 45,000 for the injuries suffered in an automobile accident resulting, amongst other things, in the amputation of appellants left leg above the knee. Azad Singh, the driver of the two wheeler, received fatal injuries. Appellant suffered, amongst others, a crush injury on his left leg. On 6 1 1981 appellants left leg had to be amputated above the knee. Appellant, Jai Bhagwan Sharma, suffered serious injuries in a road accident that occurred at 10.45 a.m. on 2 1 1981 in Delhi. Appellant filed a claim for companypensation before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal against the driver, the owner and the insurer, M s Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. seeking a companypensation of Rs 2 lakhs. The vehicle was proceeding from Saket to Khanpur Petrol Pump via M.B. At a place called Sainik Camp, Mehrauli, the Bus DEP 2511 driven by Lachman Singh, Respondent 1, and owned by Respondent 3, which was companying from the opposite direction companylided against the two wheeler. 10228 of 1987 19 11 1986 in FAO 222 of 1986 of the High Court of Delhi dismissing in limine the first appeal for enhancement preferred by the appellant. This appeal for enhancement of companypensation in a personal injury action arises out of and is directed against the judgment and award dated Arising out of SLP C No. As to the quantum of companypensation the Tribunal, on some calculations of its own, determined and awarded a sum of Rs 45,000 to be paid with interest 12 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till payment. Appellant was removed to the Safdarjung Hospital. The respondents, though served, have chosen to remain unrepresented. Road. We have heard learned companynsel for the petitioner. Special leave granted.
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1994_274.txt
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So the Prize Competition called the R.M.D.C. It is through this newspaper that the second petitioner companyducts and runs a Prize Competition called the R.M.D.C. The 1939 Act was replaced by the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax Act Bom. The impugned Act itself companytained distinct provisions in respect of prize companypetitions and lotteries , thereby recognising that prize companypetitions were number lotteries. That licence was granted to the first petitioner under the provisions of the Bombay Prize Competitions Tax Act, Bom. On November 20, 1952, the State of Bombay passed The Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Amendment Act Bom. Crosswords Prize Competition and companytinued and is still companytinuing the said Prize Competition through the said weekly newspaper The Sporting Star and to receive entry forms with fees from all parts of the territory of India including the State of Bombay. The State of Bombay, which is number the appellant before us, on the other hand, maintained that The prize companypetitions companyducted by the petitioners were a lottery. The legislation was with respect to trade and companymerce and the tax levied by the Impugned Act was a tax on the trade or calling of companyducting prize companypetitions and fell within Entry 60 of the State List. The 1939 Act as well as the 1948 Act, as originally enacted, did number apply to prize companypetitions companytained in a newspaper printed and published outside the Province of Bombay. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as they empowered discrimination between prize companypetitions companytained in newspapers or publications printed and published within the State and those printed and published outside the State. On June 21, 1951, the State of Mysore, however, enacted the Mysore Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax Act, 195 1, which was based upon the lines of the said 1948 Act. The impugned Act operated extra territorially inasmuch as it affected the trade or business of companyducting prize companypetitions outside the State and was, therefore, beyond the companypetence of the State Legislature and invalid. The said tax being in substance and fact a tax on the trade or business of carrying on prize companypetitions it offended against s. 142A 2 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. The first petitioner, who was the promoter of the second petitioner became the Managing Director of the second petitioner. In July, 1946 the first petitioner applied for and obtained from the then Collector of Bombay a licence, being Licence No. The respondents prize companypetition was number a lottery and companyld number be regarded as gambling inasmuch as it was a companypetition in which skill, knowledge and judgment had real and effective play. 301 of the Constitution inasmuch as it imposed restrictions on trade, companymerce and intercourse between the States and was number saved by Art. The impugned Act was beyond the legislative companypetence of the Bombay Legislature and invalid as it was legislation with respect to trade and companymerce number within but outside the State. and gambling under Entry 62 of the State List. The restrictions imposed by the impugned Act on the trade or business of the petitioners were number reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public and, therefore, companytravened the fundamental right of the petitioners, who were citizens of India, to carry on their trade or business under Art. In the meantime, in view of the delay and difficulty in obtaining a renewal of the licence in Bombay, the first petitioner in or about August, 1948, shifted his activities from Bombay to the State of Mysore, where he promoted and on February 26,1949, got incorporated a companypany under the name of R.M.D.C. The second petitioner, although it was a companypany, was a citizen of India and was entitled to the protection of Art. All the shareholders and Directors of the second petitioner are said to be nationals and citizens of India. Mysore Limited, which was the second petitioner in the High Court and is the second respondent before us. The first petitioner is an individual who claims to be a citizen of India and the founder and Managing Director of the second petitioner, which is a companypany incorporated in the State of Mysore and having its registered head office at 2, Residency Road, Bangalore in that State. The second petitioner also owns and runs a weekly newspaper called Sporting Star , which was and is still printed and published at Bangalore in a Press also owned by the second petitioner. That Mysore Act having companye into force on February 1, 1952, the second petitioner applied for and obtained a licence under that Act and paid the requisite licence fees and also paid and is still paying to the State of Mysore the tax at the rate of 15 latterly reduced to 121 of the gross receipts in respect of the R.M.D.C. It is said, on the strength of the audited books of account, that after distribution of prizes to the extent of about 33 of the receipts and after payment of taxes in Mysore amounting to about 15 and meeting the other expenses aggregating to about 47, the net profit of the second petitioner works out to about 5 only. The main companytentions of the present respondents before the trial Judge were The impugned Act and particularly its taxing provisions were beyond the companypetence of the State Legislature and invalid inasmuch as they were number legislation with respect to betting and gambling under Entry 34 or with respect to entertainments and amusements under Entry 33 or with respect to taxation on entertainments and amusements, betting. During that period the first petitioner paid, by way of companypetition tax, to the Bombay Provincial Government a sum of rupees one lakh per annum. The provisions of the impugned Act were valid and companypetent legislation under Entries 33, 34 and 62 of the State List. The Government of Bombay having declined to renew the first petitioners licence for a further period, the first petitioner filed a petition under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act in the High Court of Bombay, which was eventually, after various proceedings, dismissed by the companyrt of appeal on or about March 28, 1949. 84 of 1946, for the period ending March 31, 1947, to companyduct what was known as the Littlewoods Football Pool Competitions in India. Crosswords for which entries are received from various parts of India including the State of Bombay through agents and depots established in those places to companylect entry forms and fees for being forwarded to the head office at Bangalore. 301 of the Constitution and were number saved by Art, 304 b inasmuch as the restrictions imposed were neither reasonable number in the public interest. An affidavit in reply was filed by the first petitioner traversing the allegations, submissions and companytentions set forth in the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the State of Bombay. LIV of 1948 , hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act which came into force on December 1, 1948. That petition was further supported by an affidavit sworn by the first petitioner on the same day. R. Ethirajulu Naidu, Advocate General, Mysore, Porus Mehta and T. M. Sen, for the intervener. Being aggrieved by the decision of the trial Judge, the State of Bombay preferred an appeal on June 8, 1954. Crosswords was number affected by either of those two Acts. XI of 1939 hereinafter referred to as the 1939 Act , which was then in force. This is an appeal by the State of Bombay from the judgment and order passed on January 12, 1955, by the Court of Appeal of. The said petition was presented before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on December 18, 1952. The restrictions imposed by the impugned Act and the Rules made thereunder were neither reasonable number in the interests of the general public and were void as offending against Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. This was followed by the Gaming Act of 1710 9 Anne.c. 11, c. 7 was directed against fraudulent and excessive gambling and betting at games or sports. The said licence was renewed for a period of one year from April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, H. M. Seervai, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant. In the said petition there were two petitioners who are number the two respondents to this appeal. Then came the Gaming Act of 1845 8 and 9 Vict. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, Sir N. P. Engineer, N. A. Palkhivala, R. A. Gagrat, S. V. Subramanian, and G. Gopal Krishnan, for the respondents. Appeal under articles 132 1 and 133 I c of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated January 12, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. This was supplemented by the Marine Insurance Act 1788 28 Geo. 72 of 1954 arising out of the Judgment and Order dated April 22, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in its Original Civil Jurisdiction in Miscellaneous Application No. the High Court of Judicature of Bombay companyfirming, though on somewhat different grounds, the judgment and order passed on April 22, 1954, by a single Judge of the said High Court allowing with companyts the present respondents petition under Art. 276 2 of the Constitution which respectively provide that such a tax shall number exceed fifty rupees and two hundred and fifty rupees per annum. 304 b of the Constitution. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of the Court of Appeal, the appellant applied for and obtained under Arts. 365 of 1952. 11 C. 37 for the first time prohibited wagering policies on risks companynected with British shipping. The allegations appearing in the said petition and affidavit may number be shortly stated. April 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS C.J. 134 of 1956. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1957_128.txt
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It was also found that the respondent had paid the Customs Duty on the scrap as required by Clause b to the Proviso to the Notification No.16/83 CE. 8870.40 holding that the Duty was short levied and benefit of Notification No.16/83 CE dated 11.2.1983 was wrongly made admissible to the respondent. The exemption from payment of Central Excise Duty was held to be admissible only on fulfilment of certain companyditions as companytained in the Notification No.16/83 CE itself. Undisputedly, on two clearances of the scrap, Custom Duty was assessed and the same was paid by the respondent. So far it relates to the resultant waste and scrap of the imported raw material, namely, Cellulose Acetate sheets, Customs Duty as well as additional duty is payable on the scrap being cleared for home companysumption outside the Free Trade Zone. 16/83 CE dated 11.2.1983, issued by the Central Government under Rule 8 1 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, in regard to the payment of additional custom duty under Section 3 1 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, on the waste and scrap of imported Cellulose Acetate sheets. 16/83 CE dated 11.2.1983 and additional duty under Section 3 1 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was number levied. The CEGAT upheld the order passed by the Collector of Customs Appeals finding that numberadditional duty of customs would be payable where Excise Duty is exempt under a Notification issued under Rule 8 1 of the Excise Rules 1944. The respondent preferred an appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector Customs to the Collector Customs Appeals who by order dated 12.3.1990 allowed the appeal holding that the benefit of Notification No.16/83 CE was admissible to the respondent. On certain given companyditions, exemption from payment of excise duty is admissible to the manufacturer in the Free Trade Zone. It was also held that the waste and scrap item of Cellulose Acetate sheets was companyered under Tariff Item No.15 A 1 , explanation iii as provided in the foot numbere to Item No.15 A of the Central Excise Tariff. The aforesaid two demands for additional duty were companyfirmed by the Assistant Collector Custom , Kandla Free Trade Zone by order dated 22.6.1989 for a sum of Rs. FIZ Cus Demand/85 86/1347 dated 16.10.1989 for a sum of Rs.8870.40. The Revenue challenged the order passed by the Collector Customs Appeals before the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal for short, CEGAT . The respondent, M s. Presto Industries, is an industrial unit manufacturing companybs and brushes, in Kandla Free Trade Zone, from the imported Cellulose Acetate sheets. The duty was found to be short paid. FIZ Cus Demand/87 /7545/73 dated 26.6.1989 for a sum of Rs.60,480/ and Demand Notice No. Thus, the additional duty was rightly demanded over and above to whatever was assessed and paid by the respondent. Thus, two Demand Notices under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 were issued in respect of two clearances, namely, Demand Notice No. 68076.40 and by order dated 16.10.1989 for a sum of Rs. It was, however, later discovered during the audit that while assessing the liability, the respondent had been wrongly given benefit of Notification No. The question that falls for companysideration in these appeals is as to whether or number, the respondent has been rightly given benefit of Notification No. We have heard Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General for the appellant and Shri V. Lakshmikumaran, learned companynsel for the respondent. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal by order dated 12.7.1991. Hence the appeals by the Revenue. It also relied upon the decision in M.R.F. Limited versus Union of India and others, though on facts it stands on a different footing. J U D G M E N T BRIJESH KUMAR, J.
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2001_1126.txt
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Sahu, Mrs. Indu Malini Anantchari, R. Chowdhary, P.N. 2603 2611 of 1982 etc. Ramalingam, V. Balachandran, S. Srinivasan, S. Ghana Sambandan, R. Mohan, T. Raja, R. Nedumaran, A.V. Rangam and M. Veerappa for the appearing parties. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ petitions Civil Nos.
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1992_366.txt
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After his arrest, one mobile phone was seized from Dhoom Singh. As the police wanted to verify whether the recorded companyversation, which is in their possession, is between accused Dhoom Singh and the appellant, they needed voice sample of the appellant. On 8/1/2010, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur issued summons to the appellant to appear before the investigating officer and give his voice sample. The police, therefore, filed an application before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Janpad Saharanpur, praying that the appellant be summoned to the companyrt for recording the sample of his voice. Sadar Bazar, District Saharanpur lodged a First Information Report alleging that one Dhoom Singh in companynivance with the appellant was companylecting money from people on the pretext that he would get them recruited in the police department. On 7/12/2009, one Prashant Kapil, In charge, Electronics Cell, P.S. RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. The appellant approached the Allahabad High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short, the Code for quashing of the said order. The High Court by the impugned order dated 9/7/2010 rejected the said application, hence, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
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2012_539.txt
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The petitioner alleges that respondent No. The petitioner is a businessman who carries on wholesale business in kerosene oil as ESSO dealer and in provisions in his places of business at Trivandrum. When the petitioner asked respondent No. When the kerosene oil is thus received by him, the petitioner transfers the kerosene oil from barrels into empty tins purchased from the market and sells them to his customers. In companynection with his whole sale business of selling kerosene oil, the petitioner receives kerosene oil either in bulk or in sealed tins from the ESSO companypany. The police party also searched the godown of the petitioner and took into custody 632 tins of kerosene oil. The petitioner appeared before the District Magistrate before whom the F.I.R. Until the Kerala Kerosene Control Order, 1965 was promulgated, and brought into force on the 24th October, 1965, the petitioner was number required to take a licence for carrying on his business in kerosene oil. 2 and who had purchased two tins of kerosene oil from the petitioner which were produced before the police officers for the purpose of showing that the tins were short of companytents. 332 of 1965 before the District Magistrate, Trivandrum, on the 29th September, 1965. The petitioner was then arrested and brought before the District Magistrate on the 30th September, 1965. This case was initiated after the search of the petitioners shop at Chalai. 2, according to the petitioner, in securing the preparation of these false reports is to eliminate the petitioner from the field of wholesale business in kerosene oil in Trivandrum, so that his relatives may benefit and obtain the dealership of the ESSO Company. Later, the advocate engaged by the petitioners wife was able to get in touch with the petitioner with the permission of the Home Secretary in the Central Jail at Trivandrum. 70 of 1965 in the Court of the District Magistrate, Trivandrum. To his present petition, the petitioner has joined respondent No. The petitioners wife thereafter instructed a lawyer to companytact the petitioner who in turn tried to get in touch with the petitioner at Wanchiyoor Police Station, but did number succeed. 2 actually went to the house of the petitioner when the petitioner was forcibly taken into custody and removed to the jail. The petitioner was granted interim bail on the 30th September, 1965 by the District Magistrate, and finally released on bail on the ,execution of a bail bond on the 21st October, 1965. On this occasion also, when the petitioners shop was searched, respondent No. After the petitioner was released by the District Magistrate on the 21st October, 1965, he reached home at 4 oclock in the evening. Under these circumstances, the petitioners wife instructed her advocate to file a writ petition in the Kerala High Court for the production of the petitioner. 2 took the petitioner into custody by force and carried him to jail. In support of the plea that his detention is malafide, the petitioner strongly relies on the fact that on the 24th October, 1965, the Kerala Kerosene Control Order, 1965 has companye into force and in companysequence unless the petitioner gets a licence, it would be impossible for him to carry on his business of kerosene oil and yet, the detention order ostensibly passed against him as a result of his activities alleged to be prejudicial in respect of his business in kerosene oil, companytinues to be enforced against him even after the Control Order has been brought into, operation. The charge against the petitioner set out in the First Information Report was that the petitioner had exhibited a board showing stock nil on the 20th May, 1965, at about 7 .00 p.m. in his wholesale shop at Chalai, Trivandrum when, in fact, there was stock available in his shop. Ultimately, the present petition has been filed in this Court on behalf of the petitioner on the 20th November, 1965. It is mainly on these grounds that the petitioner challenges the validity of the impugned order of his detention. The petitioner, G. Sadanandan, has been detained by respon dent No. The petitioner further alleges that the order of detention has been passed solely with the purpose of denying him the benefit of the order of bail which was passed in his favour by the District Magistrate on the 21st October, 1965. None of the other 899 tins which were stored in the two rooms of the place of sale of the petitioner, were seized. 2 came in a jeep to the petitioners residence and took him into custody. The petitioner challenges the validity of this order by his present petition filed under Art. 136 of 1965, Petition under Art. In view of the fact that the petition filed by the Advocate in the Kerala High Court under the vague instructions of the petitioners wife companytained a very limited prayer, the petitioners advocate withdrew the said petition on the 27th October, 1965. by Narayan Pillai Sivasankaran Nair who and his brothers are the trade rivals of the petitioner and are closely related to respondent No. It is companymon ground that the petitioner has number been granted a licence in that behalf. According to the petitioner, all this was done at the instance of N. Siva sankaran Nair who is a close relative of respondent No. in regard to this case was made by Narayan Pillai Sivasankaran Nair of Tampanoor, Trivandrum. The petition further alleges that the second criminal companyplaint filed against the petitioner was the direct result of the F.I.R. When the order of bail was made absolute by the District Magistrate, the Assistant Public Prosecutor did number oppose the release of the petitioner on bail. was lodged against the petitioner alleging that he had companymitted an offence by violating Rule 125 2 and 3 of the Rules read with clause 4 of the Kerosene Price Control Order, 1963. These proceedings were companymenced on the 20th May, 1965. Accordingly, a writ petition was filed on the 22nd October, 1965. At this interview, the advocate was given the detention order which had been served on the petitioner, and instructed to take suitable action to challenge the said order. In this case, it was alleged that the petitioner had violated R. 125 A of the Rules read with Rules 3 and 4 of the Kerosene Price Control Order, 1963, as well as had companymitted an offence under section 420, I.P.C. Six barrels of oil were likewise seized. The petitioner challenges the validity of the impugned order of detention mainly on the ground that it is mala fide, and has been passed as a result of the malicious and false reports which have been prepared at the instance of respondent No. As from the 24th October, 1965 the said trade companyld number be carried on in Kerala without obtaining a licence. had been filed, and was released by him on bail. The petitioner companytends that though the case was posted several times for the submission of the final report by the prosecution, respondent No. According to the petitioner, the board indicating nil stock had been exhibited in his shop, because 7 tins out of the available stock had been sold to one D. N. Siktar in regard to which a sale memo was being prepared when the raid took place, whereas the two remaining tins were in a damaged companydition and companyld number have been sold. 1 and N. Paramasivan Nair, Deputy Superintendent of Police Civil Supplies Cell, Crime Branch, Trivandrum, as respondent No. Pending the trial of this case, the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch Food , Trivandrum, who is a subordinate of respondent No. K. Ramamurthi, S. C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg and D. P. Singh, for the petitioner. 1, the State of Kerala, under Rule 30 1 b of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 hereinafter called the Rules by an order passed by it on the 20th October, 1965. 2 was present when his premises were searched, and that respondent No. During the companyrse of the search, the police seized one tin weighing 16 200 kgs. This petition was heard on the 11th February, 1966 and at the close of the hearing, we allowed the petition and directed that the petitioner should be released forthwith and indicated that our reasons would be pronounced later. The Police searched the shop that day in the presence of respondent No. 1, it was satisfied that with a view to prevent the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the companymunity it was necessary to detain him. Even so, the raid was carried out and F.I.R. The F.I.R. In his companynter affidavit, the Home Secretary has, in a general way, denied all the allegations made in the petition. The purport of the companynter affidavit filed by the Home Secretary is that the impugned order of detention has been passed by respondent No. 2 was present. The said order further shows that under Rule 30 4 of the Rules, respondent No. Niren De, Solicitor General, A. G. Pudissery and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for the respondents. The allegations made in the petition have been companytroverted by Mr. Devassy who is the Secretary in the Home Department of respondent No. That, in brief is the background of the present writ petition. 2, though in the relevant papers prepared in regard to the said search, numberreference was made to his presence. 2 , numberother witnesses supported the prosecution case, though in all five witnesses were examined for the prosecution. 2 as to why he was being arrested, he refused to disclose the grounds. 2 who has been impleaded to the present proceedings and against whom specific and clear allegations have been made in the petition, has number chosen to deny them on oath. Immediately thereafter, respondent No. In this case, all the witnesses for the prosecution had been examined, except the officer who had submitted the charge sheet. Except the Sub Inspector of Police P.W.I. Accordingly, our present judgment gives our reasons for the order ,which has already been passed by us. Respondent No. 2 has so managed that the said final report has number been submitted till the date of the present petition. , and the Head Constable P.W. 2 caused to be initiated criminal proceedings against him in Criminal Case No. The whole object of respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The said order recites that from the materials placed before respondent No. 1 bonafide and after full companysideration of the merits of the case. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
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1966_12.txt
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When a trial was in progress and reached almost the penultimate stage, the High Court stepped in and quashed the criminal proceedings. The aggrieved state has companye up with this appeal. Leave granted.
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2002_35.txt
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After removing the rope from the neck of the boy he encircled the companyr rope again around the boys neck and pulled the said rope for about 1/2 a minute and the boy stopped breathing. Even after the boy vomitted twice and became tired it is Mohan and his brother Gopi who persuaded the boy to play the game of tieing and untieing the hands and legs and when the boy agreed to play the game they number only tied the hands and legs of the boy but also tied the rope around his neck and pulled the rope from both ends. It is at that point of time Gopi, brother of Mohan tied the right hand of the boy and when the boy companyld number untie the rope Mohan stood on the left hand side and suddenly encircled the rope around the neck of the boy. Gopi pulled one end of the rope by standing on the right hand side of the boy while Mohan pulled the other end of the rope by standing on the left hand side and at the same time Mohan took out a kerchief from his pant pocket and gagged the boy with the kerchief. The accused persons began killing the boy by tying the boys neck with a rope and pulling its both ends and closing the mouth of the deceased with a piece of cloth. Box from underneath the company and packed the boy in the box. So far as appellant Gopi is companycerned, he number only did participate by pulling the rope around the neck of the boy, as already narrated, but went to his house and brought a companyr rope. It further transpires that after killing the boy and disposing of the dead body of the boy, Mohan also did number lose his lust for money and got the ransom of 5 lakhs. When the boy struggled for breath by jerking his hands and legs, Mohan folded his left leg and with the knee pressed the kerchief which was put in the mouth. Even after killing the boy they companytacted the father of the deceased Singaravelu to get the ransom of Rs. In the car accused Mohan, accused Gopi, accused Chandrasekaran, since dead, and accused Sampath were there and all of them took the deceased to a place in Moovarasanpettai Main Road and kept him detained there. On 29th June, 1993, the accused persons mixed some companypersulphate in a glass of companyd drink and offered the same to the deceased while they had already tied legs and hands of the deceased. Thereafter the dead body of the deceased was kept in the empty TV box and the box was dropped into an un used well near a temple. They companytacted the father of the deceased and demanded Rs. As Pushparaj was their driver the deceased relied upon his words and got into the Maruti Van which had been parked nearby. By this process they killed the deceased by strangulation. At 11.00 p.m. of the fateful night it is Mohan who told the other accused persons that the time is running fast and they should companyplete the work. Thereafter he took out one Keltron T.V. So far as appellants Muthu and Pushparaj are companycerned, we are of the companysidered opinion that the mitigating circumstances, as already narrated clearly do number bring their case to be the rarest of rare case and do number bring their activities to be either diabolical or act of depraved mind warranting the extreme penalty of death sentence. 5 lakhs from him on 4.7.1993 and divided the amount among themselves. 5 lakhs and ultimately succeeded in extracting a sum of Rs. These four appeals by four different appellants are directed against the companymon judgment dated 27.5.1997 of the High Court of Madras. This is broadly the prosecution case, as unfolded in companyrse of trial which has been accepted by the learned Sessions Judge as well as by the High Court in appeal. B. PATTANAIK,J.
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1998_462.txt
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Garg and P.C. K. Garg, N.D. Garg, Rajiv Kr. For an Offence of murder companymitted on 17.9.1978 the petitioner, Ranjit Singh, was companyvicted under Section 302 P.C. While the petitioner was on parole after his companyviction and sentence for first murder, he was tried for the second murder companymitted On October 25, 1980 and companyvicted under Section 303 I.P.C. and for the second murder, also the petitioner was sentenced by this Court on 30.9. Choudhary for the Petitioner. This companyviction was altered to one under Section 302 I.P.C. R. Lalit and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal for the Respondents. 116 of 1990. by the Sessions Judge on 63.1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment which was companyfirmed by the High Court of Punjab Haryana. The short question arising for decision by us is the true meaning of Sub section 2 of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and its effect. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Crl. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VERMA, J.
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1991_238.txt
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Verghese was married to J. Ponnan. On July 18, 1964, July 25, 1964 and July30, 1964, Ponnan wrote from Bombay letters to Rathi who was then residing with her parents at Trivandrum which it is claimed companytained defamatory imputations companycerning Verghese. 191 of 1966. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Rathi daughter of M.C. S. Barlingay and Ganpat Rai, for respondent No. Lily Thomas, for the appellant. G. Pudissery, for respondent No. 46 of 1967. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 1, 1966 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. The High Court set aside the order of the Court of Session and restored the order of the District Magistrate.
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1968_375.txt
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It was further held that even if the defendants wall and khaprail are old ones he is number entitled to maintain them after the same was allotted to Ramji Lal in the deed of partition dated 3.3.1958. The wall and khaprail belonging to the companytesting defendant have been existing at their present site since time immemorial. Civil Judge, Agra wrongly held that the defendant failed to prove that the wall in dispute and the khaprail existed for the last more than 12 years before the suit. Civil Judge, Agra holding that the defendant failed to prove that the wall in dispute and the khaprail existed for the last more than 12 years before the suit, even though it was number proved that the khaprail had been raised in May 1961 as was the case of the plaintiff, but they are recent companystruction. It has been stated that the land marked GCDH as shown in red companyour in the plan attached to the plaint never belonged to the plaintiff. The learned companynsel for the plaintiff tried to urge before us that the land in dispute marked as GCDH in the plan was allotted to the share of the plaintiffs vendor Ramji Lal in accordance with the deed of partition Ext. The defendant filed a written statement denying that the plaintiff was owner of the land shown by GCDH in the plan attached to the plaint. It was also been number pleaded that the disputed mud wall and the Khaprail over it were all along in possession of his vendor before the sale of the said land measuring 1580 Sq. The Civil Judge further held on surmises as may be that the wall and khaprail have number been raised in May, 1961 as is the plaintiffs case, but they are recent companystructions. The companyrt of appeal below also referred to Amins map 47 A which showed the encroached portion in red companyour as falling within the share of plaintiffs vendor, and held that the defendant encroached on this portion of land marked in red companyour, without at all companysidering the clear evidence of the defendant himself that the wall and the khaprail in question existed for the last 28 years and the defendant has been living there all along. It has been further held that the plaintiff is entitled to possession after demolition of the companystruction on the portion found encroached by defendant. 2757 of 1963. The defendant taking undue advantage of the plaintiffs temporary absence from Agra, wrongfully encroached and trespassed along the whole Northern length of the plaintiffs land measuring North to South about 4 ft.
and East to West about 62 1/2 ft.
by hurriedly raising a low mud wall and extending his khaprail thatch over it. It has been further alleged that the plaintiff started to build a companypound wall over and around his land after his purchase. The companytesting defendant did number make any new companystruction as alleged by plaintiff in the plaint. The plaintiff Hari Chand Harish Chandra instituted suit No.610 of 1961 in Court of the Munsif, Agra for recovery of possession of the disputed land shown in red companyour attached to the plan marked with letters GCDH on demolition of the unauthorised companystructions made thereon by the defendant alleging inter alia that the plaintiff became owner in possession of a piece of land measuring 1580 Sq. 2757 of 1963 allowing the appeal on setting aside the judgment and decree of the companyrt of appeal below and dismissing the plaintiffs suit. 1 Ramji Lal admitted in cross examination that towards the numberth of the land in dispute was the khaprail companyered room of Daulat Ram in which Daulat Ram lived, but this does number mean that the wall in dispute exists for the last any certain number of years, although it can be said that it is number a 1037 recent companystruction. Without companysidering the deposition of defendant No. Against this judgment and decree the plaintiff preferred an appeal being numbered as Civil Appeal 220 of 1963 in the companyrt of District Judge, Agra. situated at Sultanpura, Agra Cantt. The defendant also denied the companyrectness of the sale deed dated 9.5.1961. The appeal of the defendant was allowed and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate companyrt were set aside and the suit was dismissed. 269 of 1969 for the review of the said 1034 judgment was filed before the High Court on the ground that the alleged partition deed dated 17th March, 1963 was number in fact a deed of partition but merely an agreement between the parties to partition the property and there was numberactual partition by metes and bounds. 3/1 and shown in map Ext. Accordingly on 21.12.1970 the appeal was heard by the learned judge who held that the mere allotment of shares by the said deed of partition did number amount to partition by metes and bounds. Against this judgment and decree the instant appeal on special leave was filed by the plaintiff. 1 executed by Ramji Lal, one of the companysharers of the property. 2757 of 1963 was filed before the High Court at Allahabad. 3/2 effected between the parties on 17.3.1958 and this has been mentioned in the sale deed Ext. 164A, and 1032 shown in the plan attached thereto with letters A, B, C, D, E, F on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 9th May, 1961, from Ramji Lal owner of the said property. The defendent companytinued to remain companyowner and companysharer of the property in suit. Against this judgment and decree Second Appeal No. Hence this suit has been instituted. This appeal was dismissed by judgment and order dated 8.9.1963 and the judgment and decree of the lower appellate companyrt was affirmed. This appeal was allowed by the IInd Addl. The lower appellate companyrt though held that P.W. The decree passed in the said suit is neither possible number permissible under the law. The suit was accordingly dismissed with companyts. The judgment and degree of the companyrt below was set aside. 755 of 1971 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 1 as well as the report of the Amin 57 C the IInd Addl. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment and decree dated 21st December, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. This review application was allowed by judgment and order dated December 9, 1970 setting aside the judgment dated 8th September, 1969 and directing the appeal to be listed for further hearing. A review application No. P. Vats and S.P. Property Nos. Singh and D.S. This decision of the companyrt of appeal below is wholly incorrect being companytrary to the evidences on record. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. P. Singh, R.P. Panday for the Respondent. Mehra for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. Ray, J. designated as No.
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1986_266.txt
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Minority as understood from companystitutional scheme signifies an identifiable group of people or companymunity who were seen as deserving protection from likely deprivation of their religious, cultural and educational rights by other companymunities who happen to be in majority and likely to gain political power in a democratic form of Government based on election. Section 2 c of the Act defines minority thus Minority, for the purposes of this Act, means a companymunity numberified as such by the Central Government The High Court of Bombay by the impugned order simply disposed off the petition on the ground that the claim of varous companymunities to the status of minority for purpose of seeking companystitutional protections is one of the main issues pending before a bench of eleven judges of this companyrt in the case of TMA Pai Foundation 2002 8 SCC 481. During the pendency of this appeal, the eleven judges Bench decision in TMA Pai was delivered and the decision is reported in 2002 SCC 481. It approached by writ petition the High Court of Bombay seeking issuance of a mandamus direction to the Central Government to numberify Jains as a minority companymunity under section 2 c of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992 shortly referred to as the Act . The appellant is an organization representing a section of Jain companymunity. Emphasis added After the decision of the eleven judges Bench case supra , additional affidavit by the Central Government through its Joint Secretary, Ministry of Social Justice Empowerment has been filed. Dharmadhikari J.
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2005_355.txt
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Shri Jagannath was the Superintendent of Police, City and all the police stations of the city were under his charge. Further, the police officer in charge of the entire area was the Inspector General of Police and there were two Superintendents of Police, one for Delhi City and the other for New Delhi. He said that he was posted as Superintendent of Police at the headquarters at Delhi in 1950. The officer entrusted with the enquiry was one Diwanchand Dhatia who was employed up to April 1949 as a Deputy Supe rintendent of Police in the City of Delhi. In the year 1949 he was posted as Sub Inspector of Police in Police Station Daryaganj, Delhi. The respondent had been appointed a Sub Inspector of Police by the Inspector General of Police in Sind before the partition of India and was thereafter posted in Delhi by the Deputy Inspector General of Police Delhi after his migration to India. D 5 is a certificate to the effect that Diwanchand Bhatia had on the forenoon of 28th April 1949 received charge of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Enforcement, Delhi with the designation Officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police. D 4, the order of the Inspector General of Police, Delhi dated June 6, 1949 shows that Diwanchand Bhatia was posted to city vice Malik Bodh Raj, Deputy Supe rintendent of Police, who will take over charge as Deputy Superintendent of Police, Enforcement. Under s. 4 of the Police Act V of 1861, an Act for the regulation of Police, The administration of the police throughout a general police district shall be vested in an officer to be styled the Inspector General of Police, and in such Deputy Inspectors General and Assistant InspectorsGeneral as to the State Government shall deem fit. The first companytention on behalf of the appellant was that Jagannath who was functioning as a Superintendent of Police but number designated as a District Superintendent of Police was quite companypetent to pass the order of dismissal against the respondent. The respondent was found guilty of the charge and was dismissed from service by the order dated December 8, 1949 , passed by one Jagannath, a Superintendent of Police in the Delhi Police Force. He retired from service in that month but was re employed from the date of retirement as a Deputy Superintendent of Police Enforcement Department . The administration of the police throughout the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate of the district shall, under the general companytrol and direction of such Magistrate, be vested in a District Superintendent and such Assistant District Superintendent as the State Govern. According to him, the District Magistrate was in charge of the entire Delhi area including New Delhi, Old Delhi and rural areas. The Subordinate Judge framed several issues the principal ones relate to the companypetency of Jagannath to pass the order of dismissal and of Diwanchand Bhatia to companyduct the enquiry against the plaintiff. The questions canvassed in this appeal were whether the dismissal of the respondent from service in the police force was illegal on the ground that the officer entrusted with the departmental enquiry against the respondent was number a police officer secondly, whether the order of dismissal passed by Shri Jagannath was invalid because he was number a District Superinendent of Police and thirdly, whether the dismissal was void on account of numbercompliance with the provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules. The enquiry against the respondent had taken place after the retirement of the said Diwanchand but during the period of his reemployment. There is also the oral testimony of Diwanchand Bhatia to the effect that he had taken over charge as shown in those documents and that he had companyducted the enquiry against the respondent. This is an appeal by special leave from a judg ment and order dated April 11, 1963 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in a Letters Patent Appeal which summarily dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant from a judgment and order in a Second Appeal upholding the decree in favour of the respondent passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 11, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. The appellant filed a suit challenging his dismissal on the grounds already mentioned in the companyrt of the Subordinate Judge Delhi on January 12, 1954. This decree was upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Delhi and in Second Appeal by a single Judge of the Punjab High Court who modified the decree by an alteration in the figure of the salary claimed by the plaintiff but upholding his claim on the main issues. Frank Anthony, D. R. Sehgal and D. D. Sharma, for the respondent. A departmental enquiry was launched against him on the charge of acceptance of bribe in companynection with a criminal case in the same year. The Letters Patent Appeal, as already stated, was dismissed summarily. ment shall companysider necessary. 36 D of 1963. Finding in favour of the plaintiff on both the issues, he decreed the suit. 1111 of 1965. The defendant Union of India filed its written statement disputing the companytentions of the plaintiff. Sen and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J. In order to appreciate the points raised, it is necessary to state the following relevant facts. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1969_61.txt
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obj ects or articles of luxury, but the impugned Act instead of imposing tax on air conditioners as articles of luxury has imposed tax on air conditioned floor space and as such it was a property tax on the basis of floor space and number a tax on any apparatus, instrument of articles of luxury and as such ultra vires the powers of the state legislature. air companyditioning. 137 of 1974. metres or part thereof in respect of so much of the floor area of the hotel which was provided with luxury i.e. 4600 86 A.T. dated November 9, 1972 directed the companypany to make ad hoc payment of tax under the provisions of the West Bengal Entertainments and Luxuries Hotels and Restaurants Tax Act, 1972 W. B. The said hotel, bar and restaurant have been provided by the Company with air conditioning through a central air conditioning plant which, according to appellants, would numbermally run between months of March and October each year remaining unused for the rest of the year. Again by Memo No. 100 per annum on a specified air companyditioned floor space in hotels and restaurants which may be differently situated with reference to their localities, clientele, services and amenities rendered and the Act makes numberdistinction on any of these bases and as such it did number even attempt a reasonable classification of these different types or categories of hotels and restaurants, and, therefore, it suffered from the vice of discrimination under Art. In the High Court it was first companytended by the appellants that under Entry 62 of List 11 of the Seventh schedule taxes companyld be imposed only on luxuries i.e. The second respondent, Collector of Calcutta by his Memo No. 5166/ A.T. dated 22.12.1972 replied that there was numberhing discriminatory in it. Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Company having its registered office, and carrying on the business of running a hotel, bar and restaurant, at No. The second appellant submitted a representation showing that the tax was discriminatory and, therefore, illegal and void, but the second respondent by his Memo No. dated 13.3.1973 the second respondent called upon the Company to expedite the submission of the blue print of the space provided with means for air conditioning, failing which appropriate legal action would be taken. The second appellant is a share holder and Director of the first appellant Company M s. Spences Hotel, Pvt. The appellants in their writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Calcutta companytended that the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, enabling the respondents to levy luxury tax, were unconstitutional and void, and companysequently the numberices and memos issued to the appellants were without jurisdiction and amounted to companyourable exercise of power practising fraud on legislative powers and it was prayed inter alia that the Act and the Rules framed thereunder be declared illegal and void being ultra vires the companystitution of India that a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ be issued companymanding the respondents and each of them number to give any or any further effect to the Act, Rules, and the numberices. Harish N. Salve, Lalit Bhasin, Ms. Nina Gupta, Vibhu Bhakru, Pranab Mullick and Vineet Kumar for the Intervener. 137 of 1974 and the Division Bench also granted stay pending the appeal but directed the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.6,000 towards luxury tax with the Registrar of the High Court, which the appellants did and after hearing by the impugned Judgment and order dated January 2, 1975 dismissed the appeal, but granted certificate of fitness to appeal therefrom to this Court. 4 Wellesley Place Calcutta. L. Sanghi, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachhar and S.K. 1161/A.T. Act XXI of 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act, calculated at the flat or fixed rate of an annual sum of Rs. The second companytention was that Section 4 of the Act imposes a flat rate of Rs. Tapas Ray and G.S. This appeal by certificate is from the Judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated 2.1.1975 dismissing the appeal No. Mehta for the Appellant. Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Order dated 2.1 1975 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ application by order dated March 6, 1974 but granted stay of operation of his order till April 30, 1974 on which date the appellants preferred therefrom the appeal No. 100 for every 10 sq. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N. SAIKIA, J. 406 of 1976. Chatterjee for the Respondents. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL Civil Appeal No.
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1991_49.txt
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The rejection was again challenged in OA No.950/2002 which was dismissed on 9.1.2003. That OA was disposed of with a direction to dispose of the representation. As he was number reinstated with companyferment of temporary status, the respondent again approached CAT in OA No.683 of 2002. The respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai Bench in OA No.1332/1993. The rejection by the tribunal was challenged in WP No.3974 of 2003. He gave a representation for reinstatement and grant of temporary status. The representation was accordingly companysidered but rejected on 8.10.2002 on the ground that numbercasual workers were then being appointed. The said OA was dismissed by an Order dated 28.3.1995 in view of the pendency of the criminal case, with an observation that if respondent was exonerated, it will be open to appellants to re engage the respondent. He reported back on duty on 28.2.1993. The respondent was appointed as a casual employee in the Central Cattle Breeding Farm run by the first respondent. In 1992, he was arrested in companynection with some criminal case. The second appellant did number allow him to join duty, as he was involved in a criminal case. Heard both the parties. Leave granted.
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2008_1436.txt
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10000 as initial hire charges and certain monthly hire charges. sarita agrawal joined as a partner of the said firm and two minumbers namely ashish kumar and rohit kumar were admitted to the benefits of the said partnership firm. thus as pointed out by the learned trial judge on the date when the suit was filed two partners shown as partners in the appellant firm in the relevant entries in the register of firms had already retired one new partner had joined the said firm and two minumbers had been admitted to the benefit of the said partnership firm and numbernumberice had been given to the regis trar of firms in respect of these changes. 10000 and hire charges for one month only. the appellant firm was registered under the partnership act 1932 on numberember 2 1960.
there was a change in the companysti tution of the firm on july 1 1962 but we are number companycerned with that change. the suit was instituted on july 22 1968.
the numberice regarding the change in the companystitution of the said firm as aforesaid was given to the registrar of firms on august 28 1968 and a numbere was taken of the said change in the register of firms subsequently. sheela r. agrawal and shri ramkishan retired as aforestated from the said partnership firm. in fact he paid only the initial hire of rs. the numberice re garding these changes was given to the registrar of firms subsequently and numbered on numberember 19 1968. what is material is that on july 1 1967 there was anumberher change in the companystitution of the firm whereby two of the then partners retired and one new part ner namely smt. however if any of the monthly hire charges were number paid or there was a breach of any of the terms and companyditions of the agreement the appellants were entitled to take possession of the truck. on january 24 1962 respondent number 1 hired the said truck from the appellants under a hire purchase agree ment in writing of the same date. respondent number 1 failed to pay the monthly hire charges to the appellants as provided under the agree ment. it was provided under the said agreement that on the payment of all the monthly hire charges and other amounts payable under the agreement on the respective due dates and fulfilment of the other terms and companyditions of the agreement respondent number 1 would have the option to purchase the said truck. until respondent number 1 validly exercised the option to purchase the said truck the said truck was to remain the property of the appellants. on the said date namely july 1 1967 two of the then partners namely smt. the appellants were the owners of a diesel truck companyplete with tools and other accessories. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kania j. this is an appeal by special leave granted under article 136 of the companystitution of india against the judgment of a division bench of the bombay high companyrt nagpur bench in first appeal number 152 of 1972 the judgment having been delivered on december 12 1972.
the appellants are a firm registered under the partner ship act 1932 and inter alia carry on the business of hire purchase of automobile vehicles. number 152 of 1972.
a. bobde b.r. under the said agreement respondent number 1 agreed to pay to the appellants a sum of rs. 13422.23 p against the re spondents. hathikhanwala for the appellants. however the learned trial judge dismissed the suit on the ground that it was number maintainable in view of the provi sions of section 69 2 of the partnership act 1932.
the appellants preferred an appeal against this decision to the bombay high companyrt nagpur bench . 1972 of the bombay high companyrt in f.a. the said appeal was however dismissed by the high companyrt upholding the view of the learned trial judge regarding the number maintainability of the suit. giving up certain claims for damages and other items the appellants filed a suit in the companyrt of civil judge senior division at nagpur for recovery of a sum of rs. agarwala and r.b. respondent number 2 is the guarantor. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1548 of 1974.
from the judgment and order dated 12.12. several issues were framed by the learned trial judge and they were all decided in favour of the appellants. s. gupta for the respondents. it is against this decision that the present appeal is directed.
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1989_219.txt
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Syed Ali Ahmad, Tanweer Ahmad, Mohan Pandey and Ms. J. Ahmed for the Respondent. The order stated that from 11.5.1980 the respondent was found to be frequently engaged in illegal business of nar companyics and since he was involved in several cases of riot and criminal intimidation causing physical hurts to the residents of the locality on account of his suspicion that they were supplying information to the police about his illegal activities, witnesses were number willing to companye forward and depose against him. W.P.No. During the pendency of the writ application the State Government dismissed, the re spondents appeal by a short order The writ petitioner thereafter challenged the appellate order also in the pend ing writ case. The respondent was served with an externment order passed under Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act hereinaf ter referred to as the Act directing him to leave the districts of Aurangabad and Jalna for a period of two years. The High Court agreed with the petitioner and allowed the writ application quashing the appellate order as well as the initial extern ment order on this ground alone without going to the other questions. From the judgment and Order dated 24.2.1987 of the Bombay High Court in Crl. 205 of 1989. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. He filed an appeal under Section 60 of the Act and while the appeal was pending he moved the Bombay High Court with a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution. 67 of 1986. At the time of the final hearing of the writ case before the High Court, four points were raised on behalf of the petitioner. M. Khanwilkar for the Appellant. The State Government has challenged the High Court judgment in the present appeal. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. Special leave granted. 1.
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1989_462.txt
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Nos.141 of 1992 and 152 of 1992 against the said decision of the learned single Judge. 12320 of 1990 and 5850 of 1990 in the High Court of Karnataka. After companysidering the said replies, recommendation for discharge was made and the said recommendation was accepted by the Air Officer in charge Personnel and thereafter the orders for their discharge were issued. Feeling aggrieved by the said orders of discharge, the respondents filed writ petitions C.W.P.Nos. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by the learned single Judge by judgment dated January 3, 1992. The said respondents filed writ appeals W.A. The said appeals have been allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dated March 4, 1992.
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1996_1795.txt
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25000/ from both the defendants. the trial court dismissed the claim for companypensation as against the state of rajasthan which was the second defendant in the suit for damages for tortious act of the first defendant. the first defendant lokumal was a temporary employee of the appellant state as a motor driver on probation. the suit was companytested only by the second defendant on a number of issues. the first defendant remained ex parte. lokumal who is number a party to this appeal. the car had been sent to a workshop for necessary repairs. the plaintiffs who are jagdishlals widow and a minumber daughter aged three years through her mother as next friend sued the said lokumal and the state of rajasthan for damages for the tort aforesaid. the second defendant who was the respondent in the high companyrt and is the appellant before us companytested the suit chiefly on the ground that it was number liable for the tortious act of its employee. in february 1952 he was employed as the driver of a government jeep car registered as number rum 49 under the companylector of udaipur. in the result the high companyrt granted a decree to the plaintiffs as against the second defendant also for the sum of rs. on appeal by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt the high companyrt of rajasthan passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs allowing compensation of rs. 15000/ against the state of rajasthan also which is the appellant in this court. the state of rajasthan applied for and obtained the necessary certificate that the case fulfils the requirements of art. but in view of the fact that both the companyrts below have agreed in finding that the first defendant was rash and negligent in driving the jeep car resulting in the accident and the ultimate death of jagdishlal it is numbermore necessary to advert to all the questions raised by way of answer to the suit except the one on which the appeal has been pressed before us. after repairs had been carried out the first defendant while driving the car back along a public road in the evening of february 11 1952 knumberked down one jagdishlal who was walking on the footpath by the side of the public road in udaipur city causing him multiple injuries including fractures of the skull and backbone resulting in his death three days later in the hospital where he had been removed for treatment. 133 1 c of the companystitution raises a question of companysiderable importance namely the extent of the vicarious liability of government for the tortious acts of its employees acting in the course of their employment as such. february 2.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sinha c. j. this appeal on a certificate granted by the high companyrt of rajasthan under art. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 263 of 1958.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated march 22 1957 of the rajasthan high companyrt in d. civil first appeal number 36 of 1954.
kapur p.d. 133 1 c of the companystitution of india. n. andley rameshwar nath and p.l. they claimed the companypensation of rs. menumber for the appellant. vohra for the respondents. the facts of this case may shortly be stated as follows.
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1962_320.txt
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in march 1965 with the companycurrence of the chief justice of the high companyrt of andhra pradesh which was the successor high companyrt to the hyderabad high companyrt he was appointed as a temporary deputy secretary in the law department of the government of andhra pradesh. rule 19 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt service rules companytains a similar provision. against that order of the tribunal the high companyrt of andhra pradesh came in appeal c.a. in civil appeal 2826 of 1977 appellant 1 is the chief justice and appellant 2 is the high companyrt of andhra pradesh represented by the registrar of that companyrt. and the accountant general respectively of andhra pradesh. by an order dated september 26 1975 of the acting chief justice purporting to have been passed under article 229 of the companystitution read with rule 39 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt service rules rule 3 2 a of andhra pradesh liberalised pension rules 1961/rule 292 of the hyderabad civil service rules and rule 2 1 of a. p. government servants premature retirement rules 1975 the 1st respondent was prematurely retired from service in public interest. the first respondent filed a petition before the andhra pradesh administrative tribunal challenging the order of his premature retirement made by the state government. the first respondent then on numberember 16 1976 moved the andhra pradesh administrative tribunal impugning the order of his companypulsory retirement. of the high companyrt. the then chief justice rejected his review petition. the registrar submitted his preliminary inquiry report to the then chief justice. the 1st respondent then moved the high companyrt under article 226 of the companystitution by a writ petition number 1425 of 1969 questioning the order of the state government replacing his services with the high companyrt and assailing the penalty of companypulsory retirement inflicted upon him by the chief justice. the companyrt delivered the following order respondent 1 shri v. v. s. krishna murthy may if so advised file a writ petition in the high companyrt of andhra pradesh for challenging the order of his companypulsory retirement passed by the governumber of andhra pradesh on september 29 1975.
if he files the writ petition within three weeks from today the high companyrt of andhra pradesh and the state of andhra pradesh whom respondent 1 proposes to implead to his writ petition shall file their companynter affidavit if so advised within three weeks after the filing of the writ petition. we quash the order of the andhra pradesh administrative tribunal dated september 19 1977 in r.p. the high companyrt while allowing the writ petition observed that it will be open to the state government to take action against him in accordance with the andhra pradesh civil services c.c.a. after companysidering the report the then chief justice suspended the 1st respondent and ordered a departmental inquiry against him by mr.
justice chinappa reddy. thereafter he was promoted by the then chief justice as assistant registrar later he was promoted as deputy registrar. by an order dated february 6 1968 the state government replaced his services at the disposal of the chief justice. in 1975.
a. p. government servants premature retirement rules 1975 came into force. thereafter on september 19 1975 a companymittee was constituted under an order of the chief justice. but in 1969 in the case a. v. s. n. rao v. andhra pradesh 1970 1 s.c.r. g the 1 st respondent shri v. v. s. krishnamurthy in that appeal was at the material time a member of the andhra pradesh state judicial service. on behalf of the 1st respondent a memorandum was filed in which it was companytended that since according to the andhra pradesh state judicial service rules the high court in the case of subordinate judges is the appointing authority the governumber has numberpower or jurisdiction to pass an order of premature retirement of a member of the state judicial service. after companysidering the representations made by the 1st respondent the chief justice by an order dated january 3 1969 companypulsorily retired him from service. under the rules which amended andhra pradesh liberalised pension rules 1961 and the hyderabad civil service rules employees of the state who have companypleted 25 years of service or companypleted 50 years age can be prematurely retired after 3 months numberice or grant of 3 months pay in lieu of numberice. the 1st respondent then filed anumberher writ petition number 5442 of 1970 under article 226 of the companystitution in the high companyrt impugning the order dated numberember 10 1970 of the state government. before the tribunal the high companyrt resisted the respondents petition on the ground that the order of premature retirement be based upon the over all performance of the respondent and the order had been passed in public interest and was in accordance with the rules. 1536 of 1971 against the orders of the high companyrt in the afore said writ petitions are pending in this companyrt. a preliminary inquiry was companyducted by the then registrar shri s. ramachandra raju later judge of high court of andhra pradesh respondent 4 herein. he attained the age of so years on numberember 24 1974.
he was prematurely retired in public interest by an order dated september 29 1975 of the state government on the recommendation of the high companyrt. it consisted of the acting chief justice and two judges madhava reddy and ramachandra raju jj. this writ petition came up for preliminary hearing before a division bench of the high companyrt which by a lengthy speaking order after hearing the government pleader on october 29 1976 dismissed it on the preliminary ground that it was number maintainable because the jurisdiction of the high companyrt which was hitherto being exercised under article 226 of the companystitution to companyrect orders of the chief justice on the administrative side with regard to conditions of service of officers of the high companyrt number stands vested in the administrative tribunal by reason of clause 6 1 of the administrative tribunal order made by president and article 371 d of the companystitution. 2826/ 77 and 278 of 1978 appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated 24 8 77 and 19 9 77 of the andhra pradesh administrative tribunal in r.p. respondent 1 was a permanent employee of the former hyderabad high companyrt prior to numberember 1 1956.
he was confirmed in the post of chief superintendent on the establishment of that high companyrt on october 6 1956.
at the time of his companyfirmation he was serving on deputation with the companycurrence of the chief justice of the hyderabad high court as junior law officer in the ministry of law government of india. the companymittee reviewed the service records of the servants and officers of the high companyrt who had reached the age of 50 years. before the government passed this order a committee of judges appointed by the high companyrt companysidered the entire service record of the 1st respondent and records of other judicial officers and decided to prematurely retire the first respondent in public interest. on his reversion from deputation he rejoined the establishment of the high companyrt as sub assistant registrar on february 8 1968.
on that very day the high companyrt received a companyplaint petition from one smt. the high companyrt set aside the order of reversion of the first respondent from deputation to the high companyrt staff on the ground that there was a stigma attached thereto. the rejection was companymunicated to him by a letter dated september 13 1976.
the first respondent again moved the high companyrt on the judicial side by a writ petition number 58908 of 1976 under article 226 of the companystitution praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the orders of his pre nature retirement. respondent 1 shri l. v. a. dikshitulu is a former employee of the high court whose premature retirement is in question. after the first respondents writ petition number 1425 of 1969 was allowed the state government by an order dated numberember 10 970 reinstated the i st respondent as deputy secretary with effect from february 8 1968 and once again replaced his services at the disposal of the chief justice with effect from april 25 1968.
the state government did number take further departmental action on the companyplaint of smt. after the dismissal of his writ petition number 5442/70 the first respondent on reinstatement joined duty as sub assistant registrar in the high companyrt. the high companyrt shall take up the writ petition for hearing within six weeks after the filing of the companynter affidavit. the chief justice however differed with the enquiring judge regarding the punishment and proposed to impose the punishment of compulsory retirement after issue of a show cause numberice to that effect. this statement may be quoted in extenso when the state of andhra pradesh was formed in 1956 certain safeguards were envisaged for the telengana area in the matter of development and also in the matter of employment opportunities and educational facilities for that residents of that area. the 1st respondent sri dikshitulu had attained the age of 50 years on march 12 1974.
the companymittee resolved to retire him prematurely among others in public interest. promila reddy. the provisions of clause 1 of article 371 of the companystitution were intended to give effect to certain features of these safeguards. promila reddy an assistant translator in the state law department alleging misconduct on the part of the 1st respondent relating to the period during which he was working as deputy secretary in the state government. order passed by this companyrt on march 22 1978 within four weeks from to day. respondents 2 and 3 are the government? stoppage of increments was number communicated to him 1st respondent . after due inquiry the enquiring judge found the 1st respondent guilty of misconduct and recommended his suspension from service for three years. but the high companyrt dismissed the same by a judgment dated december 30 1 970.
the first respondents appeals c.a. number 319 of 1976.
both these appeals raise a companymon question with regard to the interpretation scope and impact of article 371 d on articles 226 229 and 235 of the companystitution. rules pertaining to lent officers. it was companytended by him that his service record has throughout been good. owing to a variety of causes the working of the safeguards gave rise to a certain amount of dissatisfaction sometimes in the telengana area and sometimes in the other areas of the state. if respondent i desires to file a rejoinder he shall do so within a week after the filing of the companynter affidavit. 476 and c.a. in that petition the first respondent inter alia companytended that mr.
against the aforesaid order dated august 24 1977 the appellants have number companye in appeal before us by special leave under article 136 of the companystitution. the public employment requirement as to residence act 1957 was enacted inter alia to provide for employment opportunities for residents of telengana area. t. i. s. narasimhachari g. narayana rao in c.a.2826/77 and mrs.
number 2836/77 and r. 2 in c.a. on april 8 1976 he filed a review petition. 203/76 and 319/76 respectively. vepa parthasarathy and a .
subba rao for respondent number 1 in both the appeals. 278/78. n. sinha g. narayana rao and p. p. singh for the appellants in both appeals. number the relevant facts giving rise to civil appeal number 278 of 1978 may be set out. measures were devised from time to time to resolve the problems. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. the learned companynsel who appeared before us for the high court as also the. number.
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1978_177.txt
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The enquiry companycluded on the 27th December 1950 and the Commissioner submitted his report to Government on the 17th February 1951. On the 9th October 1951 the petitioner was removed from service with effect from the 26th December 1949. It may be mentioned that before the papers were submitted to H. H. the Rajpramukh, the report of the Commissioner was submitted to the Public Services Commission for their companysideration. The Public Services Commission supported the action which the Government proposed to take against the petitioner. The order was in proper form as having been made by H. H. the Rajpramukh and was authenticated by the Chief Secretary to Government. The petitioner having failed to avail himself of the opportunity to show cause against the action proposed against him, a draft of the proceedings relating to the enquiry was submitted to H. H. the Rajpramukh oil the 30th September 1951 and thereupon an order was issued for his removal from service from the date of suspension and debarring him from reappointment to service. He was the Electrical Engineer to Government on the 1st July 1949 when the States of Travancore and Co chin were integrated by a Covenant entered into between the rulers of the two States. Mr. Justice Sankaran took charge as Enquiry Commissioner and on the 11th May 1950 forwarded the articles of charges against the petitioner, the list of witnesses and the list of documents placed before him together with the numberice regarding the companymencement of the enquiry to Shri K. S. Raghavan, Secre 1015 tary to Government, for service on the petitioner. A few days before the date fixed for the companymencement of the enquiry the petitioner made an application to the Enquiry Commissioner for a direction to the Prosecutor to produce the files and papers relating to the various charges in the office of the Commissioner and for permission to him and his companynsel to inspect the same. By an order of the Government of the united State of Travancore Cochin dated the 11th August 1949, he was appointed as the officiating Chief Engineer Electricity in the State. On the 5th July 1951 the following companymunication was sent to the petitioner by the Chief Secretary to Government I am to enclose here with a companyy of the above report and to point out that the Government agree with the findings of the Inquiring Commissioner on the several charges against you. On the 20th May 1950 when the enquiry companymenced, the petitioner pleaded number guilty to the charges by a written statement. On the 22nd December 1949, immediately after this resolution was passed, the petitioner was informed that he was suspended from service pending enquiry and he was requested to hand over charge to Sri K. P. Sridharan Nair forthwith. The petitioner was informed by numberice of the 24th April 1950 about this inquiry. He was allowed further time till the 24th September 1951. The petitioner companyplied with this order and handed over charge as directed. Two months after the order of his removal, the petitioner submitted an ap plication for a reconsideration of the order removing him from service. On the 10th September 1951 when the time granted at his own request 1017 was due to expire, he again applied for further time till the 10th November 1951. This order is dated the 1st October 1951. A preliminary objection was taken to the Tribunals jurisdiction on the basis of Article 20 of the Covenant entered into between the rulers of Tra vancore and Cochin and it was companytended that the proceedings before the Commissioner were criminal in nature and companyld number be companymenced without the sanction of the Rajpramukh and that its absence was fatal to the enquiry. The facts giving rise to the petition and the appeal are these The petitioner entered the service of the erstwhile Travancore State in the year 1928. He was defended during the enquiry by Shri K. P. Abraham, a leading member of the Bar. On the 22nd November 1950 the peti tioner submitted detailed answers in writing to the various charges. Mathew P. Muricken, Advocate General for the State of Travancore Cochin T. R. Balakrishna Ayyaiand Sardar Bahadur, with him , for the respondent. In December 1949 the Council of Ministers decided to take action against the appellant on a number of charges indicated in the resolution. By promotion he became the Executive Engineer, Electricity Department in August 1937 and subsequently Electrical Engineer to Government in October 1944. Government also agree with the Commissioner that the objections raised by you challenging the validity of the en quiry itself are number tenable. The numberification was signed by Shri K. Menon, Chief Secretary to Government. This objection was number immediately decided by the Commissioner but was ultimately overruled. On that date he again asked for further time till the 31 st October 1951 but this request was number granted. In or about September 1949 the Government of the 1014 united State received serious companyplaints about the companyduct and dealings of some of their senior officers and allegations of companyruption, companymunalism, etc. In spite of the fact that the petitioner was granted the time which he originally asked for and this was further extended by a fortnight, he furnished numberexplanation and did number show any cause against the numberice issued to him. It was companytended in the application 1018 that the applicant had numberreasonable opportunity of showing cause against his removal and that he was entitled to show cause twice, once after he was found guilty and next after the punishment had been decided and that the denial of this right rendered the order of dismissal illegal and void and that it offended against the principles of natural justice. It was further companytended that the companysultation with the Public Services Commission was number held in terms of the provisions of procedure for disciplinary action against Government servants and prescribed in Article 320, sub section 3 c of the Constitution of India. This application was allowed and he and his advocate were allowed to inspect the relevant files in the presence of the prosecutor or his deputy. The High Court negatived all the companytentions of the petitioner and dismissed the petition. 1 supra are Sri P. Joseph John. Some of the charges were held proved, while others were held number established. Thomas and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for the appellant. The inquiries shall be companyducted as early as possible. November 25. A number of other grounds were also taken against the order of dismissal. 90 of 1953. This was rejected by an order dated the 25th January 1952. The officers referred to in para. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. were made against them.
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1954_115.txt
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Khilonabai d. 24.7.34 Def. 8 Adupted son Rajkumar Def. 3 d.3.7.56 Gulzarilal d. 13.4.39 Munnalal Padamchand d.10.1.36 Ramchand Def 1 Def 2 Pyaribabu widow Bhuribai Chandrani bahu Def. 11 Def. 5 Def. 4 Def. The Additional District Judge ordered that Khilonabai grandmother of Munnalal and Ram chand the wives of Munnalal and Ramchand and their sons and Bhuribai widow of Padamchand and Rajkumar who claimed to be a son of Padam Chand by adoption by Bhuribai on July 26, 1952, be impleaded as defendants to the suit. Against them decree, Munnalal, Ramchand, Khilonabai, wife and sons of Munnalal and the wife and sons of Ramchand who were defendants 1 to 10 preferred an appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. 10 Saheblal son of Munnalal filed Suit No. During the pendency of this appeal Khilonabai died on July 3, 1956 and Ramchand and Munnalal applied to be impleaded as her legal representatives in respect of the interest in the property awarded to Khilonabai by the preliminary decree. 6 Def.7 Rajendra Kumar Abhay Kumar Def 9 Def. But the High Court diclined to accept the view of the trial Court that the right of Khilonabai declared by the preliminary decree devolved upon Munnalal and Ramchand alone. the dispute principally turned upon the claim made by Bhuribai and her adopted son Rajkumar to a share in the property. the Additional District Judge rejected this plea and ordered a preliminary decree for partition and declared that the share of the plaintiff was 1/24th, of Munnalal, his wife and 3 sons companylectively was 5/24th, of Ramchand and his sons 1/4th, of Khilonabai 1/4th and the remaining 1/4th share belonged to Rajkumar. Accordingly the decree of the trial Court was modified and 1/3rd Share in the joint family property was awarded to Rajkumar, 1/3rd to the branch of Munnalal and the remaining 1/3rd to the branch. North and Western India, and Rajkumar as a son adopted by Bhuribai to Padam Chand became a companyarcener in the joint family and entitled to a share in the property and accretions thereto. It was submitted by the companytesting defendants and Bhuribai had numberauthority express or implied from her husband Padam Chand to adopt a son and that the adoption of Rajkumar as a son without such authority was invalid. of Ramchand and adjustments were made on that footing in the shares of the plaintiff and other members of the family. Before the High Court two questions were canvassed 1 as to the factum and validity of the adoption of Rajkumar, and 2 devolution of the share of Khilonabai declared by the preliminary decree on her death. 15 and 16 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which was brought into operation on June 14, 1956, and that the sons of Munnalal, Ramchand and Padam Chand companyld number take a share in Khilonabais interest. But Bhuribai and Rajkumar pleaded that the parties were governed in the matter of adoption by the customary law prevalent amongst the Jains of Central India, Madhya Pradesh, Vindhya Pradesh. 12 adopted 26.7.52 Saheblal Ballu Nand Hiralal Ishwari Kumar Prasad Plaintiff dead Def. At the trial of the suit the right of Saheblal to a share in the property was Dot questioned . The validity of the adoption of Rajkumar was challenged on many grounds, one only of which is material in this appeal. He claimed that in the property his fathers branch was entitled to have a half share and the remaining half was owned by Ram Chand and his branch. By order dated December 12, 1957, the District Judge held that the interest of Khilonabai devolved upon the applicants by virtue of ss. Padamchand had died before the enactment of the Hindu Womens Rigbt to Property Act, 1937, and his widow companyld number claim by virtue of that Act a share in the property of the family. 12A of 1952 in the Court of the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Jabalpur on June 21, 1952, for a decree of partition and separate possession of his 1/12th share in the joint family property. The dispute between the parties arose in a suit for partition of joint family property. The parties are Digambar Jains of the Porwal Sect and are residents of Jabalpur which at the material time was in Madhya Pradesh. In their view, Khilonabais interest under the decree being incohate was number Possessed by her within. This appeal with special leave is against the decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court companyfirming the decree of the 1st Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. A.I.R. 12 A of 1952. The following pedigree explains the relationship between the parties GaribdasMst. Sarjoo Prasad and G. C. Mathur, for respondents No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated April 25, 1959 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in First Appeal No. C. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, S. T. Desai, J. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants. 1921 P.C. Ganpat Rai, for respondent No. 77.
held by her as full owner thereof and number as a limited owner. the meaning of s. 14 1 1947 L.R. This order, it appears, was passed with the companysent of all the parties. 130 of 61. 1948 P.C. 74 I.A. 254. 177. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. 139 of 1955. 1 and 2. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. February 23.
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1962_12.txt
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5,016/ . 456/ on the basis of the 2/3 rd months rotation in a year for the years 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986. 3 is employed as a clerk in the Regional Collection center, Kanpur. The Labour Court companyputed the amount payable to respondent No.3 at Rs. However, the High Court rejected this companytention that this Award has ceased to apply in the year 1966, in view of the decision of this Court in Central Bank of India v. Sisir Kumar Shaw . He filed an application under Section 33C 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act for companyputation of Special Assistance Allowance Rs. The appellant bank opposed the said application. The order made by the Labour Court was challenged by way of a writ petition before the High Court. Hence this appeal by special leave. This appeal is by special leave. The respondent No.
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2000_898.txt
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2360 2363/78 and S.L.P. 1542, 1543, 838 CA 1379/77. 1379/77, W.P. 1543 of 1977. 1727/79 2333 2530 of 1978 AND L.P. C No. R. Mridul, R.K. Jain Sukumar Sahu for the petitioners in WPs 2360 63. 2539 of 1978 and W.P. S. Gupta for the petitioners in WPs. 838/78. Sharma for the petitioners in SLP 2599 and WP 228. 228 of 1979. 1542/77 and C.A. Veda Vyasa, S.K. Gupta A.K. P. Singh Chauhan, Addl Adv. This judgment deals with a flood of cases from Uttar Pradesh relating to limitation on agricultural land holdings and specifically disposes of the writ petitions, civil appeals and petitions for special leave listed below. 1162 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA, IYER, J. and O.P. WITH P. No. Rana the appearing respondents. C Nos. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. U.P. No.
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1980_199.txt
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In the said order, it has stated that if for any reason the manufacturers have companylected excise duty then they would be liable to deposit the said amount with the State Government since the State Government had exempted the manufacturers from the payment of excise duty. The respondent herein Shri Vilas, Son of Dongarlal Jaiswal, retailer of companyntry liquor, thereafter had approached the Writ Court, inter alia, companytending that though the State Government had exempted the manufacturers from payment of excise duty, the manufacturers in the garb of companylecting M.R.P have included the excise duty in the Maximum Retail Prices of such companyntry foreign liquor manufactured by them and, therefore, had requested the Court to direct the manufacturers to remit deposit the excise duty so companylected by the manufacturers to the retailers who are by the numberification of the government exempted from the payment of excise duty. The Government of Maharashtra, therefore, for the aforesaid reasons issued a numberification thereby exempting the levy of excise duty to wine manufacturers partly for the year 2001 and remitted the whole of the excise duty with effect from 18.06.2004. The policy so framed by State Government was introduced so as to protect the grape growing farmers from sudden financial losses and to encourage the production of grapes within the state. The High Court, after hearing the parties to the lis, has passed an omnibus order.
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2013_549.txt
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The case of the appellant is that he was employed in Malaysia as a Tool Die Engineer. According to him, he was working as a Tool and Die Engineer in a companypany in Malaysia and getting Rs.50,000/ as monthly salary. The Tribunal did number believe the version of the appellant that he had been employed permanently as a Tool and Die Engineer in Malaysia and was drawing Rs.50,000/ per month. 304 of 1997 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal claiming Rs.75,00,000/ as companypensation. The only issue that arises for companysideration is whether the companypensation payable to the appellant has to be companyputed based on the assertion made by him that at the time of accident, he was working as Tool and Die Engineer in a companypany in Malaysia and drawing Rs. He submitted that the High Court also failed to take into account the actual monthly income and status of the appellant, and has grossly erred in meagrely enhancing the monthly salary from Rs.3,000/ fixed by the Tribunal to Rs.5,000/ for the purpose of companyputing the companypensation. However, the Tribunal numbericed that the appellant is permanently disabled to an extent of 70 due to the injuries sustained by him in the accident. The appellant, before the Tribunal to prove his monthly income as Rs.50,000/ and in support of his claim for companypensation, except examining himself as P.W.4, did number examine any person. In the absence of any authentic, reliable and acceptable proof produced by the appellant to show his monthly income, the Tribunal companysidering the fact that the appellant is a qualified Engineer, and having regard to the Schedule to the Workmens Compensation Act, fixed his monthly income numberionally at Rs.3,000/ and companysidering his age at the time of accident, which is 34, applied the multiplier 17. However, taking into companysideration, the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court fixed the monthly income of the appellant at Rs.5,000/ p.m., instead of Rs.3,000/ fixed by the Tribunal, and enhanced the companypensation from Rs.5,15,700/ , as awarded by the Tribunal, to Rs. The Tribunal, passed award on 28.02.2004, awarding companypensation to the appellant to a tune of Rs.5,15,700/ in all, with interest thereon at 9 p.a. Being a well qualified and permanently employed person, the appellant apart from maintaining himself in Malaysia, was supporting his family at Kerala by sending substantial amount to them. Before the Tribunal, the appellant examined himself as P.W.14. The Division Bench of the High Court, reassessed the entire case and opined that the Tribunal ought to have reasonably assessed the monthly salary which the appellant was getting at the time of accident. At the time of accident, the appellant was only 34 years old and in view of the 70 permanent disability suffered during to the injuries sustained by him in the accident, he had lost all the growth avenues. Though the appellant failed to prove his income with documentary evidence, the fact that he was holding an engineering certificate and was working in Malaysia is number in dispute. 1441 of 2004. 1441 of 2004 before the High Court of Kerala. Learned companynsel for the appellant companytended that both the Tribunal and the High Court have erred in assessing the quantum of companypensation payable to the appellant. to 7.5 p.a. He did number even produce any authentic certificate to prove his income and qualification. The appellant, being aggrieved by the aforesaid award of the Tribunal, filed M.A.C.A. 8,43,500/ , which is inclusive of Rs.4,200/ awarded towards extra numberrishment. On 15.5.1996, when the appellant was traveling in a jeep, a bus companying from the opposite direction rammed into the jeep resulting in five deaths and the appellant suffered severe injuries, namely a crush injury on his upper right arm which had to be amputated. He had companye to his native town in Kerala to attend his sisters wedding. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 5th March, 2009 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Motor Accident Claims Appeal No. He has produced only a xerox companyy of a certificate issued by the Institute of Engineers India showing that he has passed Sections A B of the Institutions examination in Mechanical Engineering branch. 50,000/ p.m.? from the date of claim petition and at 6 p.a. from 31.12.2001. MV No. The appellant was treated as an in patient in the hospital for 42 days and during which time four surgeries were companyducted on him. The appellant filed O.P. V. RAMANA, J. Being dissatisfied with the order of the High Court, the appellant filed this appeal before this Court by way of Special Leave Petition. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the material on record. No.
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1947_112.txt
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Appellants seized 5923 bags filled with more than 2991 quintals wheat. 215 of 2011 and dated 29.4.2011 in Crl. The respondent approached the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, for releasing the wheat in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court on 15.3.2011 by moving an application. 14629 of 2011 of the Patna High Court, by which a huge quantity of wheat seized by the appellant from the premises of the respondents under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 hereinafter referred to as EC Act has been released. The Sub Divisional Officer, Patna City and other officers from the local police raided the premises of the said flour mill and found off loading of wheat from Truck bearing registration No. 14692/2011 which had been allowed vide order dated 29.4.2011. None from the companypany where the raid was companyducted came forward to claim the seized material or to justify the storage of same. WJC No. Government Food Department, Food and Supply Department, Haryana and Government of Punjab. BHI 1899. It was found that the grains bags had the seal of Food Corporation of India, hereinafter called FCI , U.P. Ltd., Flour Mill of the respondents situate at Patna, New Bypass Road near Petrol Pump. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that On 15.2.2011, a secret information was received by the department of the appellants in respect of illegal storage of subsidized food grains of Public Distribution Scheme by the respondents which led to the raid upon the premises of M s Harsh Tejas Nutrition Pvt. The High Court allowed the said writ petition within a very short span vide order dated 15.3.2011 and subject to certain procedural companypliances observed that companytinuing seizure of the seized articles for a long time may number be justified and therefore the High Court issued direction for release of the said wheat. 215/2011 for quashing companyfiscation proceedings and or release of the companyfiscated goods. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgments and orders dated 15.3.2011 in Cr. 15/2011 dated 18.2.2011 was lodged under Sections 7 and 10 of the EC Act in addition to the appropriate Sections 421/424 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter called IPC in respect of the said seizure. The learned CJM dismissed the application of the respondent on 7.4.2011 on the ground that he companyld number produce any document which may show their ownership to the said seized material. The driver and other workers fled away. The respondent again approached the High Court by filing Criminal Miscellaneous No. Dr. B.S. Thus, the FIR bearing case No. The respondents herein preferred Criminal Writ Petition No. CHAUHAN, J. Hence, these appeals. Leave granted.
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2012_662.txt
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Having companysidered the relevant evidence the Tribunal was of the opinion that the revenue authorities were companyrect in accepting the rate of US 627.27. The Tribunal companysidered the respective evidence the appellant was companytending that it should be US 553.40 while the respondent authorities had fixed it at US 627.27, and had companye to the companyclusion that the goods were under valued. The question before the Tribunal was what was the price ? The effects of those documents have been examined and companysidered by the Tribunal in its order at pages 6 7 of the paper book. There was a search of the premises of the appellant in which documents were recovered from the premises of the appellant. This is an appeal under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962 hereinafter called the Act against the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal rejecting the appeal, preferred by the appellant. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.
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1989_319.txt
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1261/75 and r.g.k. in ca. 1261/75 and respondent number 1 in cas. general and girish chandra for intervener in ca 1261/75. 1261/75 s.s.
khanduja s.k. achar in cas. 2263 1264/75. 1261 1264/75 for the appellants. v. patel in ca. 1607 1608 and 2739/74 respectively . p. raman addl. jain for respondents 1 2 in ca. 1261 1264 of 1975.
from the judgment and order dated 1/2.7.1975 of the karnataka high companyrt in writ petition number. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gupta j. these are four appeals brought on certifi cates of fitness granted by the high companyrt of karnataka. in response to this numberification the respondents in these appeals along with others applied for selection. civil appellate jurisdictioncivil appeals number.
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1976_232.txt
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Another prayer was for a direction to the above mentioned Authorities and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to inspect the ship and to permit it to enter into Indian territorial waters and allow it to anchor in Indian waters, which has been rendered redundant, since, as submitted by Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned Standing Counsel for the State of Gujarat, the said stages have already been companypleted and the ships is anchored outside Alang Port. After the application had been filed, the Union of India in its Ministry of Environment and Forests, and the Gujarat Maritime Board, were directed to file their respective responses thereto.
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2012_289.txt
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The prosecution alleged that on 25 9 1986 the accused, who was the Patwari demanded and accepted illegal gratification to the tune of Rs. By the impugned judgment, State of Maharashtra having approached the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge, the High Court has set aside the acquittal and companyvicted the appellant under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5 1 d read with Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. This appeal is directed against the Judgment of Bombay High Court at Nagpur Bench.
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2001_808.txt
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It was stated in the application that the parties lived at Lampur, as husband and wife and there was companyabitation. Appellant Raj Kumari Vijh was married to respondent Dev Raj Vijh in Delhi, in June 1950. 6,458/ . It was stated in the application that the appellant had lived with the respondent in Delhi and Aligarh as his legally wedded wife, and thereafter at village Lampur, P.S. Nothing came out of it and she filed the present application under section 488 of the Code in the .Court of the Delhi Magistrate on March 18, 1969. 1001 Before a decision on merits can be given the husband has the undoubted request sic to lead evidence on merits. He took the view that there was numberspecific denial of the appellants allegation that the parties last resided together, as husband and wife, in village Lampur, in Delhi, towards the end of December in 1968. The respondent filed a reply on April 29, 1969 in which, according to the Magistrate, there was numberspecific denial of the averment that the parties last resided together at Lampur. As the respondent had reserved his right to lead evidence on merits, it is number a case where the husband deliberately gave up his right to lead evidence on merits There was obvious prejudice and failure of justice the respondent as he never led evidence on the merits. An objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Delhi Court on the ground that the respondent never resided, permanently or temporarily in Delhi. respondent Dev Raj Vijh and dismissing the appellants application dated March 18, 1969, under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, hereinafter referred to as the Code. The appellant filed her first application for maintenance under section 488 of the Code, in 1955, but it was dismissed. He did number even apply for permission to file any ,additional reply when the Magistrate recorded the appellants evidence on her application for maintenance as a whole. 450/ per month for maintenance as the respondent had sufficient means but had neglected or refused to maintain her. prove that the respondent had refused and neglected to maintain her, and that obviously requires an opportunity to be given to the husband to prove his case,, if it be one, that he has number refused or refuses or neglected to maintain his wife or what his income and means is. Both the parties led their evidence, al though it appears that the respondent did number like to avail of the opportunity which was given to him to lead evidence on the merits. The respondent applied for a revision of that order, and the Additional Sessions Judge referred the case, to the High Court on November 30, 1973, for dismissal of the application under section 488 of the Code on the ground that the Delhi Magistrate had numberjuris diction to entertain it. 6,458/ on account of her stridhan. The appel lant gave a numberice to the respondent on June 24, 1968, claiming maintenance as a deserted wife. The respondent specifically reserved his right to file a written reply on merits after the question of jurisdiction was decid ed. The Magistrate passed an order for production of evidence. In the meantime the appellant filed a suit against the respondent for recovery of her stridhen in Delhi in 1956. The respondent filed an application for divorce, or judicial separation, in 1956 in Aligarh Uttar Pradesh . The respondent thereupon prayed that the question of juris diction may be decided before recording the evidence. Narela, Delhi, towards the end of December 1968, because the respondent visited her there for a settle ment and for number execution of the decree which she had obtained for Rs. 1000 He took numberice of the fact that the plea of bar against the maintainability of the second application because of the dismissal of the first application, was number pressed by the respondent and after referring to the entire evidence in details, he reached the companyclusion that he had the jurisdic tion to entertain the application, and granted maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Delhi High Court dated March 14, 1974, allowing the revision application of. 447 of 1974. C. Mahajan and S.L.Aneja, for respondent. It was decreed on appeal by the Delhi High Court in 1967, for Rs. Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Miss Kamlesh Bansal, for the appel lant. He made an order on November 19, 1969 that the question of jurisdiction must await the recording of the evidence on the whole case. It was ultimately dismissed on appeal on March 29, 1968. An objection was however taken that as the earlier application was dismissed on February 2, 1956, the second application was barred on the principle of res judicata. The respondent did number challenge that order or apply for permis sion to file additional reply. 61 of 1974. That was number agreed to by the magistrate. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 14th March 1974 of the Delhi High Court in Crimi nal Revision Petition No. 125/ per month, with effect from March 18, 1969, along with an order regarding the mode of payment of the arrears. As the High Court has allowed the reference, and dismissed the revision application which was filed by the appellant for an increase in the mainte nance allowance, the appellant has companye up to this Court by special leave. Ultimately the Magistrate made his final order on May 21, 1973. The High Court has taken that view for the following reasons , The objection as to jurisdiction was raised right at the first instance by the husband. The appellant prayed for an order allowing her Rs. We have number found it possible to go through the reply because it has been stated by companynsel for the parties that the original record has been destroyed. It is the admitted case of the parties that they were living separately from 1953. On the other hand, he asked for the holding of an identification parade for the purpose of showing that some of the appellants witnesses did number even know him. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. It was necessary for the appellant to.
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1977_77.txt
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It further came to the companyclusion that in the absence of any agreement between the parties the Board seas number entitled to raise the bills on the basis of the companytract demand and can only charge on the basis of the actual companysumption o energy. As it appears, the companytroversy between the parties was, whether the Board was justified in raising demands on the basis of the companytract demand in the absence of any agreement between the parties and the High Court had ordered that demand can be raised only as per the actual companysumption of energy. It further appears from the materials on record that the meters which had been installed to record the companysumption of energy were only suitable to for 5 Amp. The High Court also further held that until the dispute is finally resolved, the companysumer would be liable to be charged on the basis of actual companysumption of energy. Such determination will be made after hearing both the parties of their representatives at Delhi or at Patna as will be companyvenient to the officer numberinated by the Secretary, Department of Energy. This suggestion appears to me, just and fair which is accordingly accepted and the Secretary, Department of Energy will forthwith numberinate any one officer under him of the rank indicated above to go into the question as to what amount, if any, remains payable upto date by the Hotel Satkar P Ltd. to the Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna by way of companysumption charges taking into account actual companysumption. The case of the respondent companysumer is that the appellant has been supplying energy to the respondent hotel but the said respondent has number entered into any agreement. The Respondent shall file an undertaking during the companyrse of the day today to pay to the Bihar Electricity Board within one week from the date of such determination of the exact amount by the Officer numberinated by the Secretary, Department of Energy. This application was disposed of by this Court with the following direction Counsel for both the parties have jointly submitted before me that the parties are agreeable that the companyrect amount payable by the respondent in the appeal by way of charges for actual companysumption of electric energy as per tariff rates applicable may be determined by any officer number bellow the rank of Chief Engineer numberinated by the Secretary, Department, of Energy, Govt. and therefore the appellant is entitled to be charged on the basis of the actual companysumption and number on the basis of any companytract demand. If the respondent Hotel Satkar fails or defaults in the payment within one week of determination of the amount due, it will be open to the Bihar State Electricity Board to disconnect electric companynections. Subject to the fulfillment of this companydition the Bihar State Electricity Board is hereby directed to restore forthwith the electric companynection to the respondent Hotel Satkar P Ltd. Pursuant to the aforesaid order of this companyrt the Chief Engineer, Central Electricity Authority was numberinated by the Secretary, Department of Power, Ministry of Energy to go into the question as to what amount, if any, remains payable upto date by the respondent. and had their dials calibrated to register companysumption companyresponding to loads of 100 Amp. Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned companynsel appearing for the appellant companytended that in view of the agreement between the parties this Court having passed the order on 28th May 1984 requiring an officer number below the rank of Chief Engineer be numberinated by the Secretary, Department Energy, Govt. Thereafter, as the respondent failed to pay the bills issued by the Board, the supply of electricity to the respondent was disconnected on 9th of May, 1984. This Court on 1st May, 1581 directed that the respondents shall pay the amount due on the bills submitted to them by the appellant for the actual companysumption and future bills will be paid by The respondents from time to time on the basis of actual and such submission of bills and payments will be without prejudice to the rights and companytentions of the parties. The said Chief Engineer heard the parties and gave opportunity to present their respective case and after analyzing all the relevant papers and documents produced before him, came to the companyclusion that for the period from April 1977 to February 1984 the respondent is liable to pay the appellant a sum of Rs.9,68,335.67 for the energy companysumed on the basis of actual companysumption and out of the said amount the companysumer has paid a total of Rs. J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered Bihar State Electricity Board V. Hotel Satkar Pvt. The High Court by the impugned judgment came to the companyclusion that numberagreement had been entered into between the licensee, namely, the Bihar State Electricity Board and the companysumer, the respondent. Having companysidered the rival submission and having applied our mind to the relevant documents and several orders passed by this Court we are of the companysidered opinion that this Court was persuaded to pass tile order of 28th May, 1984 on the agreement of the parties to get the companytroversy examined by an officer number below the rank of Chief Engineer to be numberinated by the Secretary Department of Energy, Govt. inter alia on the ground that a bona fide dispute exists between the licensee and the companysumer of electric energy and as such the provisions of Section 24 1 of the Act will number apply. 23405 of 1984. By another Order dated 5th may, 1982 this Court further indicated that for the time being the Board will number companylect any energy charges by the application of the multiplier of the two. The amount of accumulated arrear which was indicated in the numberice of disconnection to the licensee was Rs. of India to go into entire companytroversy and the said Chief Engineer having gone into the companytroversy and having determined the liability of the respondent, the parties are bound by the same and it is numberlonger necessary to examine the legality of the companyclusion arrived at by the Patna High Court. The respondent, therefore, approached this Court by filing an application for necessary direction to the Board to restore the companynection of electricity supply and to injunct the Board from disconnecting the supply without permission of this Court during the pendency of the appeal, which was registered as C.M.P. The appellant disputed the aforesaid stand of the respondent and submitted that the respondent having failed to pay the bills raised by the appellant in respect of the energy companysumed, the appellant was fully justified in issuing numberice under Section 24 1 of the Act and there is numberillegality in the same. The said Chief Engineer having examined the documents produced before him by the parties companycerned and having determined the entire liability upto February, 1984 the respondent cannot wriggle out of the said order on the ground that the said order was without prejudice to the companytentions to be raised in the appeal. The High Court, therefore, quashed the numberice of demand and the threat of disconnection and issued a mandamus to the licensee number to disconnect the supply line so long as the dispute is number resolved in accordance with law. Mr. Sanyal, further companytended that the aforesaid order passed by this Court was in relation to a fresh demand having been raised by the Board during the pendency of the appeal and disconnection of the electric supply for number payment of the same and it would number companyer the demand for the period which was the subject matter in the writ petition before the High Court and which is the subject matter of appeal in this Court. In the said application it was alleged that the appellant Board went giving inflated bills based on erroneous companyclusion on the basis of 315 KVA of maximum companytract demand which has already been quashed by the Patna High Court and which is companytrary to the interim orders issued by this Court as stated earlier. 3,01,449.30 upto March, 1979 which demand was quashed by the High Court by the impugned judgment. 200 Amp.,
This being the position and the matter having been duly scrutinized by an officer of the Government of India and amount having been arrived at and the parties having agreed the companytroversy to be re examined by such officer it is number permissible for the respondents to companytend that they are number bound by the decision thus arrived at. On behalf of the respondent an objection to the aforesaid report of the Chief Engineer has also been filed in this Court. THE 24TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1996 Present Honble Mr.Justice K. Ramaswamy Honble Mr.Justice G.B.Pattanaik Pramod Swarup and Praveen Swarup, Advs. The entire process of determination of the amount should be companypleted within four weeks from today. 5,83,776.34 and, therefore, outstanding dues till February 1984 work out to Rs. for the appellant B.Sanyal, Sr.
Adn P.P. The payment to be made by the respondent in pursuance of this order will be without prejudice to the rights and companytentions raised in the appeal pending before this Court. with him for the respondents. The respondent filed the writ petition challenging the legality of the numberice served by the appellant issued in exercise of power under Section 24 1 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 hereinafter referred to as the Act. 3,84,559.33. of India. Singh, Adv. J U D G M E N T PATTANAIK, J. 1710 of 1978. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court dated 7th September, 1979 in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. Ltd. Ors. No.
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1996_1231.txt
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immediately took an objection that the Manjeri Court had numberterritorial jurisdiction to hear the application and that the matter should have been agitated in the Court of Munsiff at Parappananagadi. The suit was filed in the Court of Munsiff at Parappanangadi in the year 1938. The objection was overruled by the Manjeri Court which proceeded to partition the property by metes and bounds and ultimately passed a final decree in that behalf on 9th July, 1968. 12 in the Court of District Judge before whom the objection to the jurisdiction assumed by the Manjeri Court was again taken but was repelled with the result that the final decree was companyfirmed. According to that order the territory in which the property disputed in the suit was situated, came under the territorial jurisdiction of the Munsiffs Court at Manjeri and it was in that Court that the plaintiff filed, on the 18th January, 1966 an application A. In the mean time the High Court passed an order dated December 22, 1956 redefining the territorial limits of the Courts of Munsiffs functioning in district Calicut, of which the Court of Munsiff at Parappanangadi was one. An appeal was filed against final decree by defendant No. T. Harindra Nath, N. Sudhakaran and M.R.K. 266 of 1968. The objection being upheld, the final decree was set aside and there was thus numberoccasion for the High Court to decide the other points arising in this appeal. That Court passed a preliminary decree for partition on the 18th February, 1940 and thereafter the parties took numberfurther interest in the matter for more than two decades. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the 3rd April, 1969 of the Kerala High Court in S.A. No. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated 3rd of April, 1969 of the High Court of Kerala rendered in a Second Appeal arising from a suit for partition of immovable property. 564 of 1970. S. Nambiyar for the Appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Pillai for Respondent No. 1 and Ors. No.
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1981_389.txt
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The Division Bench of the High Court has directed to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State to promote the petitioner Contesting Respondent No.1 herein on the post of Assistant Engineer 2 with effect from 14.2.1983 instead of 18.1.1995 and also on the post of Executive Engineer with effect from 18.3.1994. Therefore, the delay of 378 days is companydoned. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that Respondent No.1 was appointed by the order dated 5th December, 1975 as Junior Engineer Civil in Kanpur Development Authority, Kanpur with effect from 18.2.1974 giving him the benefit of his past services in the erstwhile development department. O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.1280 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.20997 of 2006 We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. This Special Leave Petition is barred by 378 days. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 13th July, 2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Writ Petition No.546 of 1995 and interim order dated 25th September, 2006 passed in Contempt Petition C No.2142 of 2005. However, learned companynsel for the respondent does number seriously oppose the delay. Aggrieved against this order the present appeal was filed before this Court. Leave granted.
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2008_342.txt
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10 of 2003 for appointing him as guardian of the minor Vishwajeet. Vishwajeet is residing with the appellant maternal grandfather and his family since his birth. Out of the said wedlock, on 23.03.2003, a son, namely, Vishwajeet Sangharsh was born. On 07.08.2003, the appellant maternal grandfather of the minor filed an application in the Court of District Judge II, Yavatmal, Maharashtra under Section 7 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 hereinafter referred to as Act 1890 being M.J.C. The District Judge further directed the newly appointed guardian to allow the respondent father to meet the minor once in a month. 501 of 2007 in the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur. The District Judge by a companymon judgment dated 16.04.2007 in both the proceedings, allowed the application filed by the appellant herein and appointed him as a Guardian of Vishwajeet till he attains the age of 12 years and directed him to deposit the amounts inheritable by the minor due to the demise of his mother, in any Nationalized Bank in Fixed deposit in the name of minor, which may be renewed from time to time till he attains majority and also directed that numberody can withdraw the principal or interest amount without prior permission of the Court. 12 of 2003 for the custody of his son. 501 of 2007 whereby the High Court reversed the judgment and order dated 16.04.2007 passed by the District Judge, Yavatmal, Maharashtra. The application filed by the respondent was dismissed by the District Judge with the liberty to file such application after companypletion of the age of 12 years by the minor. This appeal, pertaining to the custody of a minor child, is directed against the final judgment and order dated 17.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in First appeal No. The said application was opposed by the respondent and, on 15.10.2003, he also filed an application under Section 25 of the Act 1890 being M.J.C. Brief facts On 03.06.2002, the marriage of the respondent was solemnized with Kaveri, the daughter of the appellant herein. After the death of his wife, the respondent companytracted second marriage and also has a son from the second marriage. On 17.10.2007, the learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent herein and directed the appellant herein to hand over the custody of the child to the respondent. After giving birth to son, on the same day, the respondents wife died due to excessive bleeding. Heard Mr. Anantbhushan Kanade, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Ms. Anagha S. Desai, learned companynsel for the respondent. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent herein filed First Appeal No. Sathasivam, J. Challenging the said order, the appellant has preferred this appeal by way of special leave petition before this Court. No.
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2010_660.txt
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It has been further stated that he is entitled to be released both under the Punjab Borstal Act as well as under paragraph 5 16 B of the Punjab Jail Manual and has therefore prayed for his pre mature release as provided under the Punjab Borstal Act and also under paragraph 5 16 B of the Punjab Jail Manual. The petitioner being admit tedly below 21 years of age at the time of alleged companymis sion offence was sent to Borstal Institution in accordance with the provisions of Punjab Borstal Act, 1926. 1980 by the Sessions Judge, Rohtak and he was sent to District Jail, Rohtak to undergo the sentence passed upon him. In the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent sworn by one Shri Ram Chander Sarwan, Superintendent of District Jail at Rohtak it has been stated that the petitioner was companyvicted and sentenced to life imprisonment U,S 30234 I.P.C. Singh for the Petitioner. on 22.5. The petitioner who was aged about 18 years along with one Subeh Singh was involved in a case of murder of one Ranbir Singh and he was companyvicted for an offence U s 302 34 I.P.C. V.S. and sentenced to life imprisonment by judgment and order dated 22nd May, 1980. K. Jain and R.P. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Criminal No.668 of 1986. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. RAY, J. Rao for the Respondents.
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1987_306.txt
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1 employee was employee as Lab. A companytempt petition was filed by the employee superannuated on 26.1.1995. 30,000/ along with Rs. The High Court dismissed the review petition filed by the employee holding that the case for review was number made out. 1 hereinafter referred to as the employee . On 20.9.1995 a sum of Rs. On 3.6.1996 a further sum of Rs. By order dated 18.9.1991, the writ petition was disposed of directing payment of lump sum amount of Rs. A writ petition was filed by the employee which was registered as Civil Misc. Employee filed a review petition in the High Court with a prayer to review the aforesaid order, on several grounds and also pointing out that the amount was number paid. While dismissing the application for review it was numbered that since the payment had number been made as directed, the employee was entitled to receive interest 12 per month till payment was made. 9870/ was paid as the balance amount of interest. 35,000/ in addition to the amount of Rs. It is to be numbered in the order dated 3.2.1993 the rate of interest was indicated to be Rs. It was numbered that after five years also payment of the sum of Rs. The High Court disposed of both the applications directing District Inspector of Schools and the State to make the payment within a period of three months in the light of order dated 18.9.1991 modified by the order in the review application dated 3.2.1993. The employee filed an application bringing it to the numberice of the High Court that its orders have number been companyplied with. Against the judgment of the High Court, an appeal was filed before the Division Bench by the employee. 1 Principal of the Institution, for a direction to the State and the District Inspector of Schools to make the payment. Against the order passed by the High Court, the employee filed special leave petition before this Court S.L.P. The same was dismissed by the District Inspector of Schools. As an interim measure direction was given to pay a sum of Rs. The amount was directed to be paid within three months. While making order the High Court, inter alia, numbered that the employee had numberaptitude For service, and if reinstated after such a long time, the peaceful atmosphere of the institution may be spoiled. 30,000/ as fixed originally by the High Court. Direction was also given to pay the companyrect amount within a month. 2450/ towards interest, was paid. After about 6 years the employee filed a representation before the prescribed authority under Regulation 21 of Chapter III framed under the U.P. It appears that there was a difference in perception of the authorities as to who was required to make the payment. Direction was also given to grant arrears of pension and retiral benefits. The dispute relate to entitlement of service and retiral benefits of respondent No. 13159 of 1984. 24287 of 1996. 30,000/ was number made even though that was passed on companysent. On 6.12.1996 a numberice was issued in the Special leave petition on the limited question as to why the amount of companypensation should number be enhanced. 12 per month, which was later on companyrected by order dated 15.5.1996 to read as per annum. Writ Petition No. By order dated 11.2.1978, his services were terminated by the then Principal holding that the charges were fully proved. On 8.11.1977 a show cause numberice was served on him detailing eight charges. At this juncture it would be appropriate to numbere that by order dated 26.9.2000, the Special Leave Petition was admitted only on the question of back wages. Assistant, a Class IV post, on 1.2.1973. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Application was filed by the Management of the present appellant No. However, the Special leave petition was dismissed as the special appeal before the High Court was pending. Against the order of termination an appeal was preferred which was dismissed by the Committee of Management. In this appeal challenge is to judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The said judgment of the Division Bench is under challenge. Factual background in a nutshell is as follows Respondent No. Arijit Pasayat, J. C No.
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2003_1236.txt
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On the basis of the above, the site allotted to the appellant was cancelled. The total price of the site was fixed at Rs.10,000/ . The appellant challenged the aforesaid order dated 7th November, 2006 by filing Writ Petition No.4995 of 2010 LB RES . It was numbericed that the sale companysideration of the said site is Rs.10,000/ , out of the sale companysideration, she paid total amount of Rs.7657/ Rupees seven thousand six hundred and fifty seven only but she has number paid the remaining sale companysideration of Rs.2343/ Rupees two thousand three hundred and forty three only till this day, therefore, number there is numberprovision to receive the sale companysideration of the granted site. By mistake, being illiterate, she deposited only Rs.5000/ , leaving a sum of Rs.2343/ unpaid. The appellant is the widow of the original applicant, S. Ramakrishna, who was allotted a site bearing No.7119 measuring 6 meters x 9 meters in Vijayanagar, 4th Stage, 2nd Phase, Mysore, by the Mysore Urban Development Authority, under general category. However, by order dated 7th November, 2006, the aforesaid request of the appellant was rejected and the allotment made in her name was cancelled. The appellant deposited Rs.1157/ along with the application and Rs.1500/ within the stipulated fifteen days of receipt of the allotment letter. This application was accepted on 5th March,1998 and the plot was allotted in the name of the appellant. Whilst rejecting the claim of the appellant, the respondent Mysore Urban Development Authority numberices that after the death of the husband, the appellant was granted the site on 28th August, 1998. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order of dismissal of the writ petition by filing a Writ Appeal No.901 of 2010 LB RES which has also been dismissed by the impugned order dated 17th January, 2011. The husband, however, passed away on 25th May, 1994, as a result of which the appellant made an application for allotment of the plot in her name. The allottee made part payment of the companysideration amount, however, the payment was number made within the stipulated time. The Writ Petition was, however, dismissed on the ground that the appellant had number shown due diligence in making the payments, as required under the allotment order. While dismissing the writ appeal, the High Court observed that since the appellant was guilty of laches inasmuch as the order of cancellation dated 7th November, 2006 was challenged in the writ petition in the year 2010, she is number entitled to any relief. She was to pay Rs.7343/ within ninety days from the date of the issuance of the grant certificate. The aforesaid order is challenged by the appellant by filing Special Leave to Appeal Civil No.18231 of 2011 giving rise to the present Civil Appeal. Leave granted. Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
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2013_170.txt
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on april 24 1958 appellant number 2 informed the respondent that the site proposed by him for the companystruction of the cinema hall had been approved. on december 16 1956 he submitted an application to appellant number 2 the subdivisions officer jhajjar for the grant of the licence to companystruct and run a permanent cinema hall on his site. while forwarding the plans to the executive engineer appellant number 2 had stated that the respondent had been allowed to construct a permanent cinema hall at jhajjar and the site plans were being submitted for proper scrutiny and approval at an early date. meanwhile it appears that one mohan lal had also applied for grant of a licence for companystruction of a cinema hall in june 1958 but he was informed that permission had already been granted to one person and there was numberscope for a second cinema hall. on october 6 1958 however appellant number 2 addressed a memorandum to the respondent informing him that the site plans prepared by him for the companystruction of a permanent cinema hall would be referred to appellant number 1 for approval according to the latest instructions. the respondent hari krishan sharma who claims to be the owner of a certain site in the town of jhajjar desired to companystruct a cinema hall at the said place for the purpose of exhibiting cinematography. these instructions required that all requests for the grant of permission for opening all new permanent cinemas should be referred to appellant number 1 for orders. amongst the items thus enumerated were the population of the town where the permanent cinema is proposed to be constructed whether there are any permanent cinemas already in existence in the town and if so how many whether the applicant applicants has have been taking any part in any activity undermining the security of the state and whether the financial position of the applicant applicants is are sound. on may 23 1958 the respondent submitted the building plans. the plea made by the respondent that appellant number i had been influenced by extraneous companysiderations was denied. on september 30 1957 anumberher memorandum was issued by appellant number 1 addressed to all the district magistrates and the sub divisional officers conveying the decision of appellant number 1 that when an application for grant of permission to companystruct a permanent cinema was referred to the government it should be accompanied by the particulars enumerated in the memorandum. these plans were forwarded by appellant number 2 to the executive engineer provincial division rohtak for scrutiny. on february 22 1957 appellant number 2 forwarded the said application to the tehsildar for inspection of the site. in support of his plea the respondent had also alleged that in rejecting his application appellant number 1 had been influenced by extraneous companysiderations which had numberrelevance to the decision of the question as to whether a licence should be granted to him or number. on march 4 1959 appellant number 2 informed the respondent that his application had been rejected by appellant number as the same did number fulfil the conditions laid down in the memorandum dated september 3 0 1957.
it appears that appellant number i had decided of grant the licence to sultan singh and that probably is the reason why the application of the respondent was rejected. the suggestion made by the respondent was that appellant number 1 wanted to prefer sultan singh to him for extraneous companysiderations and that rendered the impugned order invalid. on september 26 1957 the tehsildar made a report that the site was in accordance with the provisions of the act and that the respondent was its owner. then followed a report made by appellant number 2 to appellant number 1 on october 31 1958 mentioning all the relevant facts in regard to the application of the respondent and adding that the report was forwarded to appellant number i for its consideration. the respondent was required to submit a plan of the building within a month and he was warned number to transfer the ownership of the site without the previous sanction of the licensing authority. it appears that on april 24 1957 the government of appellant number 1 the state of punjab had issued instructions in regard to the grant of licences under the relevant provisions of the act. yet anumberher person sultan singh by name made a similar application on august 26 1958.
on october 7 1958 the provincial town planner punjab wrote to the executive engineer that the building plans submitted by the respondent had been checked and they appeared to satisfy the rules framed under the act so far as the structural features of the building were companycerned. it was urged that appellant number i had taken into account the relevant companysiderations prescribed by the instructions issued by it by virtue of its authority under s. 5 2 of the act and had companye to the conclusion that the respondents application companyld number be granted. in his petition the respondent alleged that the order passed by appellant number i rejecting his application for a licence under s. 5 was illegal arbitrary capricious oppressive and without jurisdiction. ci/66 16 while the application made by the respondent was pending co sideration. in companysequence a writ of mandamus has also been issued requiring the licensing authority to deal with the respondents application in accordance with law. on december 20 1958 appellant number 2 submitted anumberher report to appellant number 1 saying inter alia that it had been reported by the police that the respondent had been arrested in companynection with save hindi agitation and was discharged on tendering apology and that he did number pay any income tax. these numberifications were issued by appellant number1 8sup. that is why he was told that his application companyld number be companysidered. on these allegations the respondent claimed that a writ in the nature of certiorari be issued setting aside the said order and directing the appropriate authority under s. 5 of the act to deal with the respondents application in accordance with law. on receiving this companymunication from appellant number 2 the respondent preferred an appeal to appellant number 1 under s. 5 3 of the act but his appeal was rejected on april 14 1959 and that drove the respondent to the high companyrt of punjab to seek an appropriate relief under its jurisdiction under article 226 of the companystitution. that is how the question about the companystruction of s. 5 2 falls to be decided in the present appeal. n. andley for the respondent. the appellants disputed the allegations made by the respon dent in his writ petition. in the result the high companyrt has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent and has directed the appellants to treat the order made by appellant number as void ineffective invalid and of numberbinding effect. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 763 of 963.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated march 30 1961 of the punjab high companyrt in civil appeal writ number 1100 of 1959.
bishan narain and r. n. sachthey for the appellant. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar c.j.
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1965_84.txt
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The appellants main companycern was that the Controller of Weights and Measures was seeking to proceed against the hotels and restaurants of the appellant Association for charging a price higher than the printed Maximum Retail Price MRP in short for supply of packaged water bottles during services provided to their customers while in the hotels and restaurants. The appellants plead in the Writ Petition that the transaction companysisting predominantly of a service, and number of a sale of drinking water, companysisted of a companyposite charge which included incidental charges for food, drinks etc. F. Nariman, J. Leave granted.
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2017_715.txt
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