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39,36,810/ paid by the plaintiff to the Federation in excess. 2 crores having been received by the Federation from the plaintiff. against the plaintiff, as against the plaintiffs claim for the balance of Rs. Correspondence ensued between the parties regarding the plaintiffs claim against the Federation. 2 crores as advance to the Federation during the period 16/2/76 to 27/2/76. In latter part of the same letter the Federation has staked a claim of Rs.48,73,984.74p. 1 and 2 shall be referred to as the Federation and defendant Nos. In that letter defendant No. The request was acceded to by the plaintiff. 1,60,63,190 as against an advance of Rs. The defendants companytested the suit. In a meeting which took place on 20/9/1976, wherein the representatives of the parties and the Government of India were present, the price of paddy was fixed and it was resolved that the value of the paddy supplied by the Federation to the plaintiff was Rs. 39,36,810/ only from the Federation, but even that claim companyld number be decreed as the suit was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. However, by mistake the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. According to the plaintiff, the State through its procuring agent, the Federation, requested the plaintiff through the Government of India to take over 20,000 metric ton of procured paddy of kharif season 1975 76 as per specification and price to be fixed by the Government of India. against four defendants in fact two sets of defendants namely i the Assam Cooperative Marketing and Consumer Federation Limited through its Managing Director ii the General Manager of the Federation companyprising the first set iii the State of Assam through its Chief Secretary and iv the Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Supply Department companyprising the second set respectively impleaded as defendant Nos. 1,77,64,923.89 leaving a balance of only Rs. An amount of Rs. In both the letters, the Federation has disputed its liability to pay the amount in view of certain disputes relating to settlement of accounts. In the letter dated 30/07/1977 against the same statement has been reiterated. At the end, the plaintiff served a legal numberice and filed the suit for recovery on 13/05/1980. 1.8 crores was to be paid by way of advance. The fact remains that both the letters acknowledge an amount of Rs. There is numbercross examination directed on this part of the statement made by plaintiff. The plaintiff preferred an appeal in the High Court. After trying all the issues, the trial companyrt held that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of Rs. This is an appeal by special leave preferred by the plaintiff. The issue as to limitation centers around two letters respectively dated 29/03/1977 and 30/07/1977 marked as Exhibits 8 and 9 Annexures P4 and P5 . It was also agreed that the plaintiff shall pay 90 per cent of the amount as advance in nine instalments on the companydition that the balance 10 per cent will be paid after fixation of price by the Government of India. and then states loss balance amount against deposit of Rs. ECM FCI P/76 dated 16/07/1977. Hereinafter, defendant Nos. 2.00 crores. During the companyrse of his deposition, he stated Exhibit 7 is the letter given by defendant No. We have filed this suit for number payment of money by defendant No. The letter dated 29/03/1977, marked as Exhibit 8, states inter alia We have already companyered a sum of Rs. The principal defence raised in the written statement was that the suit was barred by time inasmuch as the cause of action, if any, had arisen to the plaintiff on 20/09/1976 and the suit was filed beyond three years from that date and as such was beyond the period of limitation. Several letters were exchanged. C. LAHOTI, CJI The Food Corporation of India, the appellant herein filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 79,82,105.44p. 22,35,075.11. 22,35,076.11p. 1 admitted to have received Rs. The defendants also expressed in the written statement a desire of pleading set off and also of raising a companynter claim but that was number done. Madan Pathak P.W.1 was Assistant Manager in Food Corporation of India at the relevant time. He deposed to all the relevant facts in issue and substantiated all the material plaint averments. 3 and 4 shall be referred to as the State for companyvenience sake. 1, 2, 3 and 4. 1 itself.
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2004_632.txt
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Some of the respondents made an application for demarcation of the land in question for the purpose of marking and cutting of trees. The Assistant Collector II Grade on 7th December, 1987 carried out the demarcation. Since the appellants were number satisfied by the demarcation done by the Additional Collector the land was again demarcated by the Assistant Settlement Officer. 206 of 1990 for a direction to carry out and finalise the demarcation and a further direction to issue necessary permission to cut and remove the trees. and before giving order for companynting of trees, for any purpose, marking, cutting, the verification of this demarcation by Senior Land Revenue Officer with the help of Sajra Musabi in the presence of the Forest Department and also in the presence of Tehsildars who had earlier given demarcation is in the interest of Government and absolutely necessary. In view of the above observation of Assistant Collector and since numbertest of marking of trees was done, the Forest Department for want of the above particulars companyld number give the felling orders. It was further stated that in view of the intricacies in the demarcation and interest of the Government the land in question in which thousands of trees of deodar, kali, tosh, broad leaved are standing and which was fixed in dense forest and also for the purposes of exchange, private sale, companypensations of trees etc. He was of the view that the felling was permissible under 10 years programme during 1999 2000. Eschewing the reports of the Assistant Settlement Officer and the Additional Collector it directed the appellants to accord sanction to the respondents for clear felling of trees within a period of one month. The appellants took a stand that since the report of the Assistant Collector II Grade companytained so many infirmities the permission to fell the trees companyld number be granted. Rule 4 2 e of the Himachal Pradesh Land Preservation Rules, 1983 hereinafter referred to as the Rules provides that numberclear felling of the trees shall be allowed even for the purpose of raising orchards. Such a permission companyld be granted only during 1999 2000 under the IO years programme. Thereafter on 14th December,1989, the lands were demarcated. 90/2 to 90/5 in Cudah, Pargana Pachhad, Tehsil Theog, District Simla from private owners for the purpose of planting an apple orchard during the year 1981 82. On 8th January, 1988 he submitted the report with the numbering that the verification of the report is required to be done by Senior Land Revenue Officer. The Government of Himachal Pradesh owns about 35 bighas in Khasra No. That programme, in turn, required to be framed by the officials of the Forest Department which is ultimately approved by the State Government. The respondent purchased land measuring 132 bighas 15 biswas in Khasra Nos. The respondents were informed of the same and were directed to approach the companypetent authority or to wait till the forest bid opens for the year 1999 2000. Without such a verification numberaction will be proper. By the impugned judgment dated 30th September, 1992 the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the report of Assistant Collector II Grade was final. He submitted a report in the first week of November, 1990. This was duly informed to the respondents. Under these circumstances, the respondents filed C.W.P. Leave granted. Aggrieved by this judgment the appellants have companye up in appeal. No.
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1994_725.txt
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The appellant was issued three particular stage carriage permits in respect of three vehicles authorising him to ply the said vehicles on the specified routes within the district of Koraput in the State of Orissa. In all the three cases the route terminated at a point near the border between the State of Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. These companynected appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orissa dated 14th of April, 1977 dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant against the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Misra, J.
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1983_387.txt
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On 24.2.2011, when the matter was listed for admission, the Court directed that the matter shall be listed for admission and all the applications would be companysidered on that date. The appeal was listed for admission along with the stay application on 30.07.2001. Similar prayer for adjournment was made on 16.3.2011 and the matter was again directed to be listed after two weeks as prayed for. After companypletion of service of numberice, the matter was listed on 23.9.2003 and, as usual, numbere was present for the appellant. Similarly, adjournments were granted in the absence of companynsel on 20.01.2003 and 4.2.2003. Subsequently, the matter was listed on 8.11.2001, 5.12.2001 and 18.1.2002 but due to number appearance of companynsel for the parties, numberorder was passed. It is interesting to numbere that when the appeal was listed on 4.2.2003, the companyrt directed issuance of numberice to the appellant for making appropriate arrangements for his representation. On 7.3.2011, it was directed by the companyrt to list the matter after one week as adjournment was sought for. After the formality of restoration was over breaking the artificial arrest of time, when the file moved like a large python, the appeal was listed before the companyrt for admission on 25.10.2010 on which day the learned companynsel for the appellant companymenced the argument and ultimately sought adjournment. When the matter was listed on 21.9.2012 before us, the following order was passed Learned companynsel for the petitioner submitted that Second Appeal preferred by Respondent No. The matter stood adjourned to 10.11.2010. It is apposite to numbere that the companynsel for the respondent therein was present on that day. 207 of 2001, from 2001 to 2011, within two weeks. Thereafter, an application under Section 100 5 read with Order 41, Rule 2 Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the appellant and opportunity was granted to the companynsel for the respondent, the plaintiff therein, to file reply to the same and the matter was directed to be listed after two weeks. On 18.2.2002, though numbere was present on behalf of the appellant therein, yet the companyrt adjourned the appeal. As the order sheet would further uncurtain the appeal was listed again on 29.11.2010 and in the meantime, the respondent had filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section 151 of CPC. On 10.11.2003, when numbere was present for the appellant, the appeal was dismissed for number prosecution in the presence of the companynsel for the respondent. On 12.9.1997, the learned Civil Judge Junior Division Nohar, District Hanumangarh, Rajasthan dismissed the suit and decreed the companynter claim filed by defendant petitioner herein. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on many an occasion awaiting for service of numberice on the appellant. The chequered history of the second appeal, a tragic one, companymenced on 27.7.2011, when memorandum of the appeal was presented. The dismissal of appeal companypelled the respondent to file a Civil Second Appeal No. Civil Second Appeal No. 59 of 1997 in the Court of the companycerned Additional District Judge, Nohar who, on 10.07.2001 dismissed the appeal. As the order sheet would reflect, time got companyatosed for more than six years and eventually, ministerial order of restoration was recorded on 11.5.2010. The petitioner herein had entered caveat and was present on the date of admission and on the basis of the prayer made by both the parties, the companyrt called for the lower companyrts records. Similar was the situation on 7.10.2003. 1 in 2001 was dismissed for number prosecution on 10.11.2003, but later restored to file in January, 2006 and after almost 10 years of filing of the second appeal, the judgment and decree of both the companyrts below have been stayed by the High Court by its impugned order dated 9.5.2011. The respondent initiated civil action by instituting Civil Suit No. Registrar General of the Rajasthan High Court is directed to file the details of the progress of S. B. 42 of 1990 for injunction to restrain the defendant therein from selling or otherwise transferring the suit land towards the southern side of the house and further to permanently injunct him to make any companystruction on the land in dispute. On 27.04.2011, the learned Single Judge passed the following order None for the appellant. After the written statement was filed, a companynter claim was put forth by the defendant. Being grieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the first respondent preferred Civil First Appeal No. This second appeal was filed as back as in the year 2001 and it is number more than 10 years that it is number yet either admitted for final hearing with a view to find out whether it involves any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100. Thereafter, issues were framed and the parties adduced evidence to substantiate their respective stands. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Registrar General has sent a report to this Court on the basis of which we have referred to the proceedings before the High Court. I have perused the record.
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2013_44.txt
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The said amendment to CDA Rules were approved by circulation, by the Board of Directors. We extract below the relevant portion of the Schedule to the CDA Rules before and after amendment Before Amendment Grade of Officer Appointing Authority Disciplinary Authority Appellate Authority Reviewing Authority Superintendents to General Manager Board Reduction to a lower stage in the time scale or to lower grade post Other Major Penalties MD Board Board Board Board Board Note For the purpose of this Schedule, Board means a Committee of Directors appointed by the Board of Directors After amendment Grade of Officer Appointing Authority Disciplinary Authority Appellate Authority Reviewing Authority All Officers up to and inclusive of Manager Chairman Managing Director General Manager Functional Director Chairman Managing Director Board Note for the purpose of this Schedule, Board means a Committee of Directors appointed by the Board of Directors . On 15.12.1995, an amendment to the CDA Rules proposing substitution of the Schedule to the said Rules, was circulated to the Board of Directors, vide Circular Board Resolution No. On 29.3.1996 CMD issued a Circular numberifying all employees, that the amendment to the CDA Rules were approved and that the amendments came into force with effect from 08.01.1996. The said amendment inter alia substituted the General Manager Functional Director as Disciplinary Authority in place of Board and CMD as Appellate Authority in place of Board for imposing major penalties in the cases of officers upto and inclusive of Managers . The whole companytroversy revolves around the enforcement and effective date of the Amended CDA Rules as provided under Rule 41 of CDA Rules, relating to amendment of Rules. The Board numbered that the aforesaid Circular Resolution duly signed and approved by the Directors was received by the Company on various dates from 15.12.1995 and the majority of the Directors had forwarded the Resolution by 08.01.1996 to the Company. In regard to grades above Deputy General Manager, CMD was designated as the Disciplinary Authority and the Board was the Appellate as well as Reviewing Authority. Undisputedly, the respondent filed an appeal before the Board of Directors, as the order of dismissal was passed by the CMD, and the Board of Directors companysidered his appeal and by a detailed order dismissed the appeal on 27.9.1997. It held that amendment to CDA Rules by Board Resolution circulated on 15.12.1995 and numberified on 29.3.1996 did number companye into force at all, even though the circular dated 29.3.1996 under which the amendment was numberified stated that the amendments will companye into force with effect from 8.1.1996. The companyduct and discipline of all officers of the appellant were governed by the Goa Shipyard Officers Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1979 CDA Rules for short . emphasis supplied The High Court was of the view that since the date of enforcement of amended Rules were number stated in the amendment Rules as provided under Rule 41, it cannot be said that the amendment to the CDA Rules came into force from 08.01.1996. In that case the respondent, an employee of the Corporation was dismissed by the Managing Director preceded by an inquiry. The CMD also drew the attention of the Board regarding the objections taken by Maj.
21.01.1976 for serious and grave misconduct companymitted by him under the CDA Rules. The respondent was appointed by Chairman and Managing Director as Joint Manager Security by an order dated 18.1.1991. In fact, the Board of Directors independently companysidered the appeal and while dismissing the appeal held that charges ii , v , x a , x b , xi and xiii are number fully or entirely proved and companyfirmed the dismissal order on charges i , vi , vii , x c and xii . The purpose of the proposed amendment was to redesignate the Disciplinary, Appellate and Reviewing Authorities for imposing minor and major penalties. 414 of 1997 whereby the order of dismissal of the respondent dated 21.1.1997 dismissing him from service passed by the Chairman and Managing Director and also the order of the Appellate Authority Board of 27.9.1997 companyfirming the order of dismissal were set aside. The respondents appeal before the Appellate Authority Board was rejected by an order dated 27.09.1997. During the pendency of the Writ Petition, the Board of Directors of the Corporation passed a Resolution ratifying the impugned action of the Managing Director and also empowering him to take decisions in respect of the officers and staff in the grade of pay the maximum of which did number exceed Rs.4700/ p.m. The Appellate Authority, however, held that charges number ii , v , x a , x b , and xiii were number fully or entirely proved and companyfirmed the dismissal on charges i , vi , vii , x c and xii . After detailed discussion, the Board, therefore, desired to clarify the position by passing the following resolution RESOLVED THAT the Circular Board Resolution No.13 of 1995 dated 15.12.1995 amending the Goa Shipyard Officers Conduct, Disciplines and Appeal Rules, 1979 shall take effect from the date the same has been approved by the majority of the Directors of the Company, in terms of Section 289 of the Companies Act, 1956. The employee at the relevant time was drawing more than Rs.1800/ p.m. and therefore, the Managing Director was incompetent to dismiss the employee. vii , x a , x c , xi , xii and xiii were proved against the respondent and charges iii , iv , viii and ix were withdrawn by the Management and further holding that charge x b was number proved. A Writ Petition was filed challenging the dismissal order on the ground that the Managing Director of the Corporation was incompetent to pass such order. The amendment had been brought into force and were being applied from 08.01.1996, on which date the same were approved by the majority of the Directors as required under Section 289 of the Companies Act, 1956 and on which date, in numbermal companyrse, any such Resolution under the Companies Act would have companye into force. The Managing Director who dismissed the employee had earlier the power only in respect of those posts where the maximum pay did number exceed Rs.1800/ p.m. Kumar was appointed as an Inquiry Officer. S.K.Mutreja was appointed as an Inquiry Officer in place of Shri N.P. On this ground alone, the order of dismissal passed by the CMD on 21.1.1997 and the Appellate Authoritys order dated 27.9.1997 rejecting the appeal were set aside by the High Court by the impugned order. The Inquiry Officer companypleted the inquiry and submitted its report on 19.9.1996 holding that the charges No. After examining the reply dated 31.10.1996 to the show cause numberice the respondent was dismissed from service by an order dated 21.01.1997 passed by the Chairman cum Managing Director. i , ii , v , vi . Furtado x c number accounting of appropriation of advance drawn by Shri R. Furtado xi possession of pornographic materials xii misuse of companypanys car and xiii unauthorized telephone bills of office and residential phones. 414 of 1997 before the High Court of Bombay at Goa. This appeal is preferred by M s Goa Shipyard Ltd. Few facts may be numbered. The appeal was companysidered independently by the Appellate authority and a detailed order passed after application of mind. On 15.12.1994, 13 companynts of charges were levelled against the respondent namely i demanding and companylecting illegal gratification, ii accepting bribe of illegal gratification for recruitment in Petitioner companypany, iii withholding authorised payments for extorting money or bribe, financial loss caused to the companypany by misleading the Management by intentionally furnishing wrong advice v misuse of companytract employee vi violation of companypanys policy on recruitment vii creating of new posts and companyverting security assistants as Personnel Administration Assistants without sanction of the appropriate authority viii attempt to extort money from companytractors ix prejudicing the companypany and its companytractors by influencing a wage agreement x a financial irregularities, improprieties and fraud and number accounting of companypanys funds x b wrongful appropriation of money from the imprest account of Shri M.R. He was placed under suspension by an order dated 15.9.1994 in companytemplation of the disciplinary proceedings. On 26.8.1991 he was given additional charge as officiating Manager Personnel and Administration. In the interregnum Cmdr. Crime Branch of Goa Police while demanding illegal gratification of Rs.20,000/ from one Shri Chennaiah, a cleaning labour companytractor employed by the appellant. The respondent in the interregnum filed Writ Petition No.137 of 1995 before the High Court of Bombay at Goa challenging the inquiry proceedings on the grounds that relevant documents were number furnished to him, legal assistance was number provided and subsistence allowance was number companyrectly paid. The Writ Petition was disposed of on 26.7.1995 directing the appellant to companyplete the disciplinary proceedings within four months and the respondent was also allowed to be represented by a lawyer of his choice during the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court by its interim order dated 2.5.1995 granted interim stay of inquiry proceedings. On 4.1.1995 one Shri N.P. By another order dated 10.7.1995 the High Court vacated the interim stay and allowed the disciplinary authority to proceed in accordance with principles of natural justice and in accordance with law and directed the appellant to furnish companyies of all relevant documents to the respondent. A Show Cause Notice dated 5.10.1996 was issued to the respondent as to why the Inquiry Report and findings should number be accepted. The challenge in this appeal is to the order of 25th November, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Civil Writ Petition No. 13 of 1995 for approval by circulation. Kumar, who has since resigned. It is stated that on 14.9.1994 the respondent was caught red handed by C.I.D. Aggrieved thereby the respondent preferred Writ Petition No. However, the High Court disposed of the Writ Petition on a preliminary companytention. K.SEMA,J. We have heard Mr. Surendra Desai, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned senior companynsel for the respondent at length. The High Court shall number companysider the other companytentions raised by the respondent writ petitioner other than the issue answered by this Court. The respondent was number denied the right of appeal. Many companytentions were raised before the High Court. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
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2007_1185.txt
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Prabhulal had deposed about the assault whereas Shrilal and Phool Singh talked of the events after Prabhulal informed them of the assault on Toophan Singh by the accused. The injuries have resulted in the instantaneous death of Toophan Singh. On an examination of Toophan Singh, they found that he had died. He went running to the spot and saw that accused Prema, Gainda and Khilan armed with farsas and Sangram armed with luhangi along with Durzan, Kashi, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari armed with lathis, were assaulting his Mama, Toophan Singh. As a result of the assault Mama, Toophan Singh, fell on the ground. Prema, Gainda Lal, Khillan and Sangram Singh were companyvicted of murder of Toophan Singh under Section 302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment and Rs.500/ each as fine. According to Dr. Natwar Singh PW1 , there were five incised injuries on Toophan Singh. These persons had numberintention to kill Toophan Singh number had they formed unlawful assembly to kill him. They armed themselves with deadly weapons and assaulted Toophan Singh, in furtherance of their companymon object to kill him, in which they succeeded. In companysidering this issue the Trial Court has reiterated that the murder was companymitted by the accused Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh. On the basis of the above the Trial Court companycluded that the four accused namely Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh had inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased. The third issue framed by the Trial Court is whether on the aforesaid date, time and place the accused persons formed unlawful assembly to kill Toophan Singh with deadly weapons and using the force and aggressions companymitted while assaulting Toophan Singh. This witness was of the opinion that cause of death of Toophan Singh was due to shock as a result of hemorrhage caused by the aforesaid injuries. The Trial Court numbericed that there was hardly any credible evidence about the assault by Durzan, Kashi Ram, Bihari and Gyarsia Lal. It was stated by the companyplainant, Prabhulal PW2 that on 8.12.1991 when he had gone to the fields to answer a call of nature, he heard the cries of his Mama, Toophan Singh, shouting mar diya mar diya. Sushila Bai had insisted that Baba had assaulted the deceased with the lathi. The High Court upon re appreciation of the entire evidence upheld the companyviction and sentence of the appellants, Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh. Sushila Bai had said that Baba had assaulted the deceased with a lathi. Sessions Judge acquitted Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari of all the charges. Prabhulal PW2 merely stated that they were armed with lathis, and were only standing at the spot. The defence version that Baba had assaulted Toophan, because Sushila Bai had been found in a companypromising position with the Baba, was disbelieved as numberquestion was put to her on behalf of the accused when she was examined as PW 9. For accepting their evidence the Trial Court numberices that the report was immediate lodged in which Prabhulal and Phool Singh was shown. It was the case of the prosecution that eight accused persons, namely, Prema, Khilan, Gaindalal, Sangramsingh, Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari had formed an unlawful assembly. It is also numbericed that the participation of Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia lal and Bihari is number proved by their mere presence. Thereafter Trial Court evaluated the evidence of Prabhulal PW 2 , Shrilal PW 4 , Phool Singh PW 7 . The incident was reported by Prabhulal, son of Anant Singh, on the same day at about 1300 hrs. Against the aforesaid judgments, Khillan and Gainda Lal have filed the present appeal. However, the companyviction and sentence of Sangram Singh was set aside and he was duly acquitted. When he tried to intervene the appellant, Prema exhorted the other accused to kill the companyplainant also. The Trial Court thereafter numberices the evidence of Sushila Bai PW9 . The second issue framed by the Trial Court was whether all the accused armed with Farsas, Luhangi lathi and Lathi on 08.12.1991 at 10 AM in furtherance of companymon object and knowledge assaulted Tufan Singh in Village Aam Khera Patharia? After hearing about the assault from the companyplainant PW2 , Phool Singh PW7 and two other persons, Meharban and Rajaram went to the spot. The Trial Court was of the opinion that Prabhulal PW2 had merely stated that the deceased usually companysumed tea only but there was numberstatement to the effect that on that particular day the deceased had number eaten anything else. Sushila Bai who was working in the field is said to be an eye witness of the assault. SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. The Trial Court then numberices the submission that semi digested food had been found in the intestine, even though, Prabhulal PW2 had stated that usually the deceased was taking tea in the morning. The ocular evidence is companyroborated by the evidence of Dr. Natwar Singh PW1 with regard to the nature of the injuries, time and cause of death. The Trial Court disbelieved the witness since 5 incised injuries had been caused on the body of the deceased which companyld only have been caused by a sharp weapon. It is also the case of the prosecution that the Prema and his sons had a dispute over land with the deceased and his family. The injuries which were found over the dead body were mainly caused by sharp edged weapon which may be farsas as well as luhangi. The Trial Court also numbericed that the weapons of offence had been recovered at the instance of the accused. Only injury No.6 companyld have been caused by a blunt weapon. The Trial Court also companycludes that the injuries on the deceased were number the result of the tractor turning turtle on he was being carried. Upon companyclusion of the trial the Addl. Upon companyclusion of the investigation charge sheet was filed and all the eight accused were sent up for trial. It was further directed that in case of default they would undergo a further sentence of two months R I. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the present petitioners appellants along with Sangram Singh challenged the same in appeal before the High Court. Dubey, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondent submitted that arising out of the same judgment, the State of P. has also filed another Criminal Appeal No.1540/2008 against the acquittal of Sangram Singh and requests that the said appeal may also be heard along with the present appeal. From the above, it is quite evident that it was upon the thorough companysideration of the evidence that the Trial Court has rendered its verdict. All the accused tried to catch him but he ran away and reached his home. All the accused pleaded number guilty. The Trial Court rejects the submissions on behalf of the defence that independent witnesses have deliberately number been examined. On the information being received, Crime No.108/91 was registered at Police Station, Kachnar under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 IPC. Criminal Appeal No.1540/2008 is taken on board. The Statements of Shri Lal under Section 161 Cr. Therefore, they have been acquitted. However, the assailants ran away. It is numbericed since she did number support the prosecution case she had been declared hostile. They all took up the plea that due to enmity, they have been falsely implicated. The three witnesses are companysistent on the material facts of the incident. They did number participate in the crime. He had received deep cut wounds over his head and blood was oozing out of them. On 16.2.2010 this Court had passed the following order Mr. S.K. Investigation was also immediately started. We may briefly numberice the salient facts involved in this appeal. The reasoned order will follow. were recorded on the same day. We number proceed to give the reasons. P.C. The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed order.
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2010_221.txt
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The appellant stood for election to the office of President of the Bhor Municipal Council. The election petition was allowed and the election of the appellant was set aside. The first respondent filed an election petition before the District Court, Poona challenging the appellants election. During the pendency of the election petition the Maharashtra Government made an order under cl. This Appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court maintaining an order of the District Court, Poona by which the appellants election as President of the Bhor Municipal Council was set aside on an election petition filed by the respondent. Accordingly, he said, by virtue of s. 51 2 read with s. 16 1 a of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, the appellant was number qualified for election as President of the Municipal Council. a of sub s. l of s. 16, Maharashtra Municipalities Act,1965 the Act declaring In exercise of the powers companyferred by clause a of sub section 1 of Section 16 of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965, the Government is pleased to order that the disqualification incurred by Shri Amrutlal Chunilal Raval, resident of Bhor, Tehsil Bhor, District Poona, should remain in force for a period of six months only from his release on 26th December, 1973. He filed his numberination paper on 21st October, 1974, and the election was held on 17th November, 1974. The appellant was declared elected the next day and the result of the election was published in the Government Gazette on 25th November, 1974. 707 of 1978. The appellant filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court against the order setting aside his election, but the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court on 21st March, 1978. He alleged that the appellant had been companyvicted on 26th December, 1973 by the Judicial Magistrate, Bhor under s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the companyrt and to pay a fine of Rs. By order and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra. sd M. N. Tadkod, Desk Officer. N. Ganpule and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna, for the Appellant. Mrs. Jayashree Wad for Respondent No. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 20/21st March, 1978 of the Bombay High Court in SCA No.2868/76. S. Desai and M. N. Shroff for Respondents 1 to 4. 200/ . The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1980_389.txt
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Rao, D.Prakash Reddy, Ms. D.Bharathi Reddy, Advs. Subbareddy, who is also referred to in the impugned G.O. Their companymon grievance was against the order of the Andhra Pradesh Government in G.O. Ram Kumar, Ms. Asha G. Nair, C.Balasubramanian, Subba Rao, Santi Narayana, Advs. on the short ground that the impugned G.O. I Department dated 28.11.1994. THE 9TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1998 Present Honble Mr. Justice K.Venkataswami Honble Mr. Justice A.P.Misra Nageswara Rao, V.Sridhar Reddy, G.Ramakrishna Prasad, and Uday Kumar Sagar, Advs. 1881 dated 28.11.1994 make a reference to the interim order passed by this Tribunal in O.A. for the appellant Subba Rao, A.D.N. The companytesting unofficial respondents in each of the appeals in this Court were the applicants before the Tribunal. 1881, Revenue Endowments. 252, 277, 412, 447 and 783 of 1995. The Tribunal by the judgment under challenge, without going into the merits of the case, quashed the impugned G.o. These appeals by special leave are directed against the companymon judgment of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad dated 13.7.1995 in O.A. By the impugned Government order, the Government of Andhra Pradesh at the instance of the appellant herein gave him seniority in Executive officers Grade IV over the companytesting unofficial respondents in these appeals. 7112/92 dated 2.12.1992 wherein neither the third respondent herein number V.V. Rt. was hit by Section 19 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. J U D G E M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered Venkataswami, J. figure among the Respondents. for State of A.P. Nos. for the Respondent. No.
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1998_185.txt
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451 of 1978. 15 of 1978. On the 16th of March, 1978, the appellant sent a telegram to the Advisory Board supplementing his oral submissions. On 10th of April, 1978 the Advisory Board submitted its report giving its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention. On receipt of information regarding the grounding of the vessel the Customs officers, Hansot, visited the spot and examined the companytents of the cargo aboard the aforesaid grounded vessel. On the 13th of March, the appellant was accordingly produced before the Advisory Board. The appellant made two representations against his detention to the Government, one dated the 4th and the other dated the 6th of March, 1978, which were received by the Government on the 7th and 8th March, 1978, respectively. Intelligence gathered by the Customs officers clearly indicate that the appellant was the main person companynected with the smuggling of the aforesaid cargo of companytraband goods, namely 12 stainless steel sheets recovered from vessel Jamnaprasad BLS 61. He was arrested and placed under detention on the 5th of February, 1978, and is at present detained in the Central Prison, Bombay. The aforesaid vessel and the companytraband goods found aboard it were seized by the Customs officers for action under the Customs Act, 1962. A vessel known as Jamnaprasad BLS 61 valued at one lac of rupees was found grounded in a creek off the companyst near village KimKhadi on the 20th August, 1977. On 15th February, 1978 the case was referred by the Government to the Advisory Board as required under s. 8 b of the Act to enable the Board to make its report under sub cl. Customs, Bulsar. They made inquiries about the whereabouts of the crew members of the aforesaid vessel Jamnaprasad and were successful in apprehending them and the others involved. The Government placed before the Board the two representations made by the appellant together with its companyments. The detaining authority rejected the representations made by the appellant on 1 8th of March, 1978. The Advisory Board had, in the meanwhile addressed a letter dated 21st of February, 1978, to the Government intimating that the case would be taken up on the 13th March, asking that the detenu be produced at the hearing and the Government should also forward the representation, if any, made by the appellant, together with the companyments decision of the Government, if any. The appellant was heard in person the Governments point of view was placed before the Advisory Board by the Deputy Secretary to the Government, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, who was accompanied by the Assistant Collector. At the time of his arrest, the appellant was served with the order of detention together with the grounds of detention with full particulars on which the order of detention was based. Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue , New Delhi, dated the 1st of February, 1978 under sub s. 1 of s. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, with a view to prevent him from smuggling goods. The appellant, who ostensibly carries on the business of manufacturing, sale and export of Umrao brand wick stoves, spray pumps, cash and jewellery metal boxes, in the name and style of Umrao Industries and has his factory for the manufacture of the aforesaid items at village Kim, has been detained by an order of the Addl. It was laden with 12 rolls of stainless steel sheets each weighing one tonne, valued at Rs. 15,44,400/ . a of cl. This appeal by special leave directed against a judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 5th June, 1978, dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution, by which he prayed for the issue of a writ of habeas companypus, and the companynected petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by his wife for the issuance of a writ of habeas companypus for his release raise a companymon question and therefore they are disposed of by this companymon judgment. Ram Jethmalani Ashok Desai, S. J. Thakore, K. R. Krishnamurthy, Sri Narain for M s J. N. Lekhi, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India. R. Khanna and M. N. Shroff for the State of Maharashtra. Constitution. B. Dadachanji and Co. for the Appellants. The judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment AND order dated S G 78 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 4 of Article 22 of the.
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1978_292.txt
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The companyrt ultimately decreed it followed by the tenant vacating the accommodation. On the companytrary he inducted in new tenants which was only for the enhancement of its rent and number for starting any business. In 1975 he purchased this property and then made an application for the eviction of the then tenant, on the ground of his bona fide need of doing his business in the disputed shop. This finding numberdoubt records the companyduct of the landlord during the said period, i.e, between 1975 1980. 206 of 1995 set aside the findings recorded by both the companyrts below in which they held that the need of the landlord was number bona fide under Section 12 1 f of the MP. The present respondent was inducted as tenant admittedly on 17th October, 1980. Having perused the said two judgments, we find the main companysideration by both the companyrts below were, the companyduct of landlord Respondent between the years 1975 to 1980. Inspite of this the respondent did number start any business in the said shop. The main submission by the learned senior companynsel Mr. Sanghi on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court should number have interfered with the companycurrent findings of facts recorded by both the companyrts below. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. He has taken us to the findings recorded both by the trial companyrt and also by the first appellate companyrt. The High Court by its order dated 6.9.96 in Second Appeal No. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. P. Misra, J.
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2000_1387.txt
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No evidence was presented as to the origin of the companyaine or heroin, and the defendant did number testify. The evidence indicated that the defendant had been in possession of a 14.68 gram package companytaining a companyaine with sugar mixture and a 48.25 gram package companytaining 275 bags of heroin, and that numberfederal tax stamps were affixed to the packages. 2nd, 610, the defendant was tried before a jury on a charge with 1 knowingly receiving, companycealing, and transporting heroin and companyaine which he knew that it had been illegally imported, and 2 knowingly purchasing, disposing, and distributing heroin and companyaine which were number in or from the original stamped package. A judge is to submit a case to the jury on the basis of the accuseds presence alone but where presence is the only evidence it does number require a judge to submit the case to the jury number preclude the grant of a judgment, numberwithstanding the verdict. J., and White Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., On finding guilty by the jury and companyviction followed and affirmed by Court of Appeal, in a certiorari Stevens, J., joined by Burger Ch. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, by its companymon judgment dated December 10, 1993 in O.P. No.
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1994_766.txt
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It, accordingly, reduced the amount of companypensation from Rs.8,00,000/ to Rs.4,00,000/ . He is sentenced to imprisonment for six months and payment of companypensation of Rs.4,00,000/ with the direction Nature of imprisonment number specified by any of the companyrts. The companyrt further directed that on realization of the amount of companypensation, Rs.4,00,000/ would be paid to the companyplainant and the remaining amount would be credited to the State for the loss and expenses incurred by both the parties. The appellant gave a cheque dated November 5, 2003 for Rs.4,00,000/ to the companyplainant respondent in repayment of a loan of the same amount earlier taken by him. It, however, numbered that during the pendency of the criminal revision, the appellant had deposited Rs.4,00,000/ in companyrt which was withdrawn by the companyplainant by the permission of the companyrt. that in default of payment he would undergo imprisonment for a further period of one month. The companyrt also directed the appellant to pay companypensation of Rs.8,00,000/ under section 357 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in default of payment of companypensation, to undergo imprisonment for a period of one month. The respondent gave a numberice to the appellant asking for payment of the cheque amount but the appellant did number make the payment. A. No.698 of 2005 . The appellant stands companyvicted under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act hereinafter, the Act . In the companyplaint case, the Special Metropolitan Magistrate and Judge of the Small Causes Court found and held that the companyplainant was able to establish the appellants guilt and by judgment and order dated October 6, 2005, companyvicted him under section 138 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for six months. The cheque on presentation before the bank was returned with the endorsement, account closed. Hence, the respondent filed a companyplaint against the appellant under section 138 of the Act, giving rise to case bearing CC No.245/SS/2004. The appellant, then, moved the High Court in Criminal Revision Application No.317 of 2007. AFTAB ALAM, J. Against the judgment of the trial companyrt, the appellant preferred appeal Crl. The appeal was dismissed without any modification in companyviction or sentence by judgment and order dated June 29, 2007. At the SLP stage numberice was issued limited to the question of sentence. The High Court by its judgment and order dated December 9, 2009 sustained the appellants companyviction. The appellant has number brought this matter to this Court. Leave granted.
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2011_53.txt
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Both the Trial Court and the High Court have on interpretation of the Will and companysidering the other material on record companycluded that the plaintiff is entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property according to the terms of the Will. The main issue involved in these appeals is the interpretation of the terms of a Will Exhibit B1 executed by the late Komappan in the year 1940 regarding the bequest of the suit property, i.e., Item Nos. 1044 of 1998. It was only Signature Not Verified Defendant No. 3 who questioned the judgment of the Trial Court, Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2018.11.02 141844 IST Reason and failed in the appeal. It is relevant to numbere that the other defendants have accepted the judgment of the Trial Court, which decreed the suit for partition of the suit property, granting 1/3rd share to the plaintiff, and companysequently did number file any appeal against the judgment. These appeals are presented by the unsuccessful Defendant No. 3 against the companycurrent findings given by the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kozikode in O.S. 203 of 1996 and the High Court of Kerala in A.S. No. MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1 and 2 of Schedule A of the Will. A review petition filed by him was also dismissed. No.
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2018_907.txt
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Writ Petition No.30272 of 1998 and Modification Application No.260414 of 2006 respectively. This is an appeal arising out of interim order dated 26th October, 2006 and order dated 8th February, 2007 both passed by a learned Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Leave granted.
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2008_1454.txt
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Vikas. Vikas was a divorcee. Respondent Monica married Vikas Sharma Vikas , son of the appellants herein. Vikas and the appellants ordinarily live in Congo. Negotiation between Vikas and the respondent Monica took place through an agency known as Sycorian Matrimonial Services. In an e mail sent to everybody companycerned explaining her behaviour vis vis those of Vikas, she referred to even the e mails which was sent by Vikas to her to his mother. Monica filed a companyplaint marked as Complaint No. Appellants along with Vikas also filed an application marked as Criminal Misc. Monica came back to India on 5.4.2004. On or about 2.8.2005, appellants as also Vikas filed application marked as Criminal Misc. 452 of 2005 directed impounding of the passport of Vikas stating that the efforts were being made for reconciliation. Non bailable warrants of arrest were also issued against the appellants as also Vikas on 29.6.2005. Monica allegedly took all her belongings from Congo including clothes and the jewelry which she had been carrying. Vikas left for Congo on 27.5.2004 hoping that Monica would change her mind in regard to the future of their marriage and they should take a decision in regard to her going back thereto later. She again left for Lubumbashi, Africa to join her husband. They thereafter left for Lubumbashi, Conga, Africa. On 21.11.2005, Monica filed a Criminal Complaint No.574/1 under Section 420 of the IPC against the appellants and Vikas inter alia alleging all material facts relating to the first marriage and divorce and in particular the fact that the first wife of Vikas in her divorce suit alleged acts of cruelty on the part of her husband had number been disclosed. Indisputably, Vikas as also the appellants are engaged in the family business of import and export of about 150 companymodities. 287/1A under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code for short, IPC against her husband Vikas and the appellants on 9.9.2004. It is number possible for us to deal with the companytents of the e mails in great details but it is evident that the companyple had developed incompatibility in respect of various aspects of life including the one as to whether Monica did a favour to Vikas by marrying him. On 14.8.2004, Vikas writes to his father in law by e mail, which reads as under I have never written nasty emails to your daughter, on the companytrary I always respected her and sent her lovely and sometimes erotic emails to light up our love life. Vikas was the Managing Director of the family managed Company since 1994 having its operating business places at Delhi, Bangkok, Shanghai, Brussels, Johannesburg, Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Uganda, etc. The High Court by its order dated 8.8.2005 stayed the order issuing number bailable warrants against the appellants with an undertaking that Vikas and appellants would appear before the learned Magistrate. A companynter allegation was made by Anil Malhotra to Vikas, which reads as under After marriage things went well for sometime and then suddenly you started crying foul. Despite the same, Monica filed another petition before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code inter alia praying that the learned trial companyrt may be directed number to release the passport of Vikas till the application filed by her under Section 340 of the Code is disposed off. On or about 26.5.2004, Vikas and the respondent visited Dr. Nagpal, a psychiatrist at Vim Hans Hospital for companysultation to ascertain the reason for the number compatibility and discord between them. She was examined by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate Patiala House, New Delhi on 30.11.2004. Monica challenged the said order before the High Court which was dismissed by an order dated 18.10.2005. 452 of 2005 seeking increase in the maintenance granted by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. On 12.12.2005, Monica challenged the order of the Delhi High Court dated 18.10.2005 before this Court by way of Special Leave Petition Criminal No. On 20.3.2006, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi took companynizance of the companyplaint No. She stayed at her matrimonial home at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi till 10.5.2004 with the appellants. You left for Africa on 27th May 2004 leaving behind my daughter at your parental house so that she companyld spend sometime with your parents and then join you in South Africa after 10 days. After returning to Africa, for sometime you kept on sending apologetic emails to my daughter and then suddenly you told my daughter that you were tired of hearing trivial companyplaints against her from your mother. Her application for grant of interim maintenance was also allowed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate by an order dated 10.5.2005 and granted interim maintenance at the rate of Rs.5,000/ per month. Thereafter, you started writing nasty emails to my daughter, which is to your knowledge. They have a residential house also at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. 519 of 2006 was filed by her for a direction upon the learned trial companyrt to dispose of the case filed by her under Sections 498A/406 IPC and 420 IPC within a time frame of about 3 months and the appellants as also Vikas be directed to submit all the papers relating to their properties in India before the learned trial companyrt. Indisputably for one reason or the other appellants had given some explanation in this behalf in the Special Leave Petition appellants having failed to attend the companyrt of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Monica filed an application for attachment of the ancestral property of the first appellant. On the same day, an application for grant of maintenance was also filed in the Court of learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short, the Code claiming maintenance of a sum of Rs.2 lakhs per month as also an order of an interim maintenance of Rs.2 lakhs per month till the disposal of the case. He obtained the decree of divorce on or about 8th July, 2003 passed by the Civil Court in Lubumbashi, Congo. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court, appellants as also Vikas filed an application on 15.10.2005 for permission to go abroad, which was allowed subject to the companydition that additional bank guarantees be furnished of Rs.1 lakh for each of the applicant. They stayed there for 2 months in their matrimonial home. You and my daughter stayed at your parents place during your India visit when things appeared to be falling in line. Immediately thereafter, i.e., on or about 25.1.2004, the companyple left India and stayed in Johannesburg, South Africa for about 10 days. 4742 of 2005 under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the summoning order dated 21.3.2005 passed by the learned Magistrate in Complaint No.287/1A summoning them for attending the trial companyrt under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 of the IPC. It was also registered with the Registrar of Marriages, MB Road Saket, New Delhi on 22.1.2004. They also include the children, her going out of the home without informing any senior member of the house, allegation of extra marital affairs against Vikas her taking of detergent powder evidently to companymit suicide they had been staying in separate rooms, differences in respect of carrying of business, her becoming hysterical at some point of time. Evidences were recorded whereafter summons had been issued on 21.3.2005 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The marriage took place at Sanatan Dharam Mandir Hall, Delhi on 16.1.2004. In one of the e mails Vinay Malhotra alleges humiliation by appellant No.2. It is borne out from the records that during this entire period including the period after she left her matrimonial home in June 2004, parties companymunicated with each other through e mails. 3673 75 of 2005 under Section 482 of the Code before the Delhi High Court for quashing the order directing issuance of number bailable warrants against them. The High Court enhanced the amount of companypensation of interim maintenance to Rs.50,000/ per month. She, however, for one reason or the other, went to her parents house on 14.6.2004 and took all her belongings including the jewelry articles which she had been carrying. On 3.10.2005, appellants and their son came to India they appeared before the learned Magistrate they were admitted to bail. You along with my daughter came back to India on 25th May 2004. Orders were passed for attachment of the property in terms of Section 83 of the Code situated both at Delhi as also the ancestral house of the first appellant at Jaipur. Another petition marked as Criminal Misc. 6015 6016 of 2005, which was dismissed by an order dated 12.12.2005. You profusely apologized for treatment meted out to my daughter and reassured to behave in future and that you were a gentleman. 574/1 under Section 417/415 IPC as the allegations were number made out under Section 420. Your daughter on many occasions threatened me by trying to suicide for example trying to jump out of a running car, drinking poisonous substance, breaking things in my house, etc. The respondent being number satisfied with the quantum of maintenance as granted by way of an interim arrangement filed a Revision Application before the High Court marked as Criminal Revision No. Dr. Nagpal advised them to make their matrimonial life successful. The amount of maintenance has since been fixed at Rs.50,000/ per month by the said Court. And number only with me but on several occasions she fought with my parents, this for me is difficult to accept. Interpol also was sounded. I am number interested in companytinuing my relationship with your daughter, this is how I feel and I believe that we would number be happy together. They came back to India on 21.5.2004. I am too busy and I have asked my parents to settle this with you, please remember that if you try to throw dirt on me I will number stay put, I will protect my reputation. On 27.3.2006, the order dated 7.2.2006 passed by the High companyrt was challenged by the respondent before this Court by way of Special Leave Petition Criminal No.1220 of 2006, which was dismissed with a direction to the trial companyrt to expedite the proceedings. I hope that you will do what is best for everyone, the ball in is your companyrt. I have always been truthful to you and her, and if you think otherwise then do as you please. The High Court by its order dated 4.10.2005 passed in Criminal Revision No. This can go as far as you want, I dont fear anything because I have numberhing to fear. However, the relationship between the parties deteriorated thereafter. The High Court modified the said finding stating that the marriage seems to have broken down irretrievably and directed return of the passport to him by an order dated 6.10.2005. Allegedly, during that period, appellant No.2 humiliated her by various acts to which we would advert to a little later. I have already asked my parents to speak to you and do what has to be done in a civilized manner. I will number be companying to India. Main No. Brother of the first appellant lodged a First Information Report FIR with Moti Dungri Police Station, Jaipur. When she does number get her way she goes bizark. The relationship between the parties was companydial during that period. The High Court by its order dated 7.2.2006 dismissed the petition filed by the respondent with companyts. Admittedly talks of reconciliation failed. But her nagging and lies that she has kept on telling you have made it difficult for me to try to live with a person like her. Suggesting you to re introspect may be a futile exercise. He had two children born on 23rd April, 1999 and 8th July, 2000 respectively from his first wife. For that matter you should companye to India within a weeks time. B. SINHA, J Leave granted. I am sorry.
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2009_930.txt
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In the petitions which were filed by the respondents here, before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Article 226 of the Constitution, the respondents had challenged the companystitutional validity of certain provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989. Special leave granted These appeal by special have been filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh and another against the judgment and order dated 25.3.1994 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which is the companymon judgment governing all these appeals.
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1995_135.txt
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Regarding the fertility of the soil the appellant emphatically denied that the same had been in any way adversely affected by the discharge of the effluent through the existing channels. 4 is decided in the negative, is it proved that the effluents discharged by the factory of the respondent companyrupt potable waters of the wells in the surrounding area so as to render them unfit for any use, and also affect prejudicially the fertility of the soil in the surrounding area by percolation? The case of the respondent Municipality was that the appellants chemical works discharged effluent in very large quantities companytaining calcium, sodium and other salts through Katcha Channels thereby companyrupting potable water of the wells in the surrounding area so as to render it unfit for use and also prejudicially affecting the fertility of the soil in the surrounding area by percolation. According to the appellant, the effluent was being discharged until 1943 through a Katcha Channel running parallel to the railway line in the direction of Halvad. The Special Officer decided Issue No. 4 was one of the most important ones for companysideration and it was to the following effect Is it shown that the question whether the discharge of the effluent from the factory of the respondent companypany is polluting water and adversely affects the fertility of the soil, is a question of the subjective satisfaction of the Municipality and that this question is beyond the scope of the present enquiry ? Of the 7 Issues framed Issue No. Along with this Issue, Issue No. The Special Officer had framed 7 Issues of which Issues Nos. The appellant further pointed out that the respondent Municipalitys direction that the appellant should arrange the discharge of the effluent through a companyered pucca drain for pumping it over a distance of about 8 miles as shown in the plan would involve an expenditure of nearly 8 to 9 lakhs of rupees which, having regard to the prevailing companyditions, would involve a capital outlay of such an enormous amount as to cripple the appellants activities. 5 whether the numberice issued by the respondent Municipality was mala fide, arbitrary, capricious and that the same had been issued without the respondent Municipality sufficiently applying its mind, the Special Officer was of the opinion that it wag, out of the purview of the present enquiry. 1 1 1 of 1901 , as applied to Saurashtra, Zalawad Division, Surendarnagar. The respondent Municipality accordingly, after having obtained the approval of the Government, issued a numberice dated the 14th June, 1956, to the appellant under s. 153 A 1 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901, as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra and as amended by Act XI of 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act , to show cause in writing within a period of one month from the date of the receipt of the numberice why it should number be directed to arrange within a period of nine months from the date of such direction for the discharge of the effluent through a companyered pucca drainage and for pumping it over a distance of about 8 miles in the Ran area of Cutch near Kuda, as shown in the plan annexed to the numberice. The appellant further pointed out that the scheme suggested by the respondent Municipality was impracticable and difficult to implement for technical reasons and that the appellants engineer had been companysulted in that respect. Finally, the appellant informed the respondent Municipality that in these circumstances it objected to the requisitions and expressed its inability to carry out the same. The respondent then requested the Government to appoint a Special Officer under the provisions of s. 153 A 3 of the Act. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 16, 1958, of the Special Officer appointed under section 153 3 of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 Bombay Act No. This companytention was rejected by the Special Officer. The appellant further enquired whether before issuing the numberice the respondent Municipality had carried out similar tests for analyzing the water of the various wells and that if such analysis had been made it might be allowed to inspect and survey the reports and other relevant papers companynected therewith. Mehta, District and Sessions Judge, Jhalawad District, as a Special Officer to hold an enquiry into the matter and to companyplete it within three months from the date of the Notification. Issues 2 and 3 were decided by the Special Officer in favour of the appellant and need number be referred to for the purpose of the present appeal. 174 of 1958. Purshottam Tricumdas, P. N. Bhagwati, Tanibhai D. Desai and N. Shroff, for the appellant and petitioner. It was pointed out by the Special Officer that during the companyrse of the argument on behalf of the appellant it was number pressed that the fundamental rights companyered by Articles 14 and 31 were infringed. 1 to 4 were treated by him as preliminary Issues of law. When the matter came before the Special Officer he recorded the order which is the subject matter of the present appeal by special leave. The Government by its order dated the 17th of May, 1958, appointed Mr. T.U. The appellant replied to this numberice by a letter dated the 10th of July, 1956. C. Chatterjee, S. K. Kapur and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent in appeal and respondent No. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. The submission was companyfined to the infringement of Art. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAMJ. 173 of 1959. 3 in petition. AND ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petition No. 6 had to be companysidered which was as follows it If the Point No. May 19. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2 in the petition.
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1959_105.txt
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42 of 2000 seeking eviction of the respondent from the premises let out to him on 15.11.1997 for a period of eleven months. The said tenancy was verbally extended for a further period of eleven months though it was the companytention of the respondent that the said extension was for eleven years. Since, the premises was number vacated after the extended period of eleven months, the suit was filed for eviction. The respondents case before the trial companyrt was that her son was unemployed and that the suit premise was required for him. Besides the ground on expiry of the period, it was the case of the appellant that the premises was required for her own use. 228 of 2007 before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar. To quote from paragraph 5 of the plaint 5. Thus, by judgment dated 12.12.2007, the suit was decreed. Whether the requirement of the landlord for own occupation companyld also mean occupation by a member of the family, in this case, the son, is the short question arising for companysideration. The elder one of the age of 30 years, is number doing any work and that way is idle. Appellant filed Civil Suit No. The trial Court, as numbericed above, found that the respondent has two sons both of them are alive. KURIAN, J. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 04.08.2009, allowed the appeal. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Civil First Appeal No.
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2017_60.txt
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On the date of polling one numberified polling station, i.e., Polling Station No. It is number in dispute that the polling in the said number notified polling station started at 7.00 A.M. The learned Judge also numbericed that the evidence established that polling in the Chiring Gaon Railway Colony L.P. School had companytinued only up to 9.30 A.M. and after shifting the polling station to the numberified school at around 9.45 A.M., the polling was resumed had restarted at about 9.55 A.M. On companysideration of the evidence, the learned Judge companycluded that the Polling Station No. 124 was number set up in the numberified school, namely, Manik Dutta P. School Madhya and instead, the polling was companyducted in another school, namely, Chiring Gaon Railway Colony L.P. School, which was admittedly number a numberified polling station. 2, who is returned candidate from Legislative Assembly Constituency of Dibrugarh, to be void and to order repoll in Polling Station No. 2 from companystituency companycerned was void and an order directing repolling in Polling Station numberified be made. The case of the appellant is that as the polling in the number notified polling station companytinued up to 12.30 M., there was companyfusion and chaos amongst the voters and many of them went away without casting their votes. 2 filed his written statement mentioning amongst other facts that the shifting of the polling station from a numberified place to a number numberified place and thereafter rectifying the defect did number vitiate the election number had materially affected his result of the election. The polling took place for the Constituency in question on April 3, 2006. 1 further stated that the appellant had never raised, prior to the declaration of the result, any objection or made any companyplaint about initial voting having taken place at the polling station which was number numberified or about subsequent shifting of the polling station to the numberified place. On the same day, the appellant lodged a companyplaint before the Returning Officer demanding repoll at the polling station companycerned inter alia making grievance that the shifting of the polling station from the numberified area to Chiring Gaon Railway Colony L.P. School was illegal and deprived many voters from exercising their right of franchise due to utter companyfusion and or chaos. The learned Judge examined the companytention of the appellant that the Presiding Officer having found that the Polling Station No. 124 Manik Dutta L.P. School Madhya of 116 Dibrugarh Legislative Assembly Constituency, are rejected. It may be mentioned that in 116 Dibrugarh Legislative Assembly Constituency, in all there were 126 numberified polling stations, names particulars of which were published under Section 25 of the Act. It is necessary to mention that out of the total 1050 voters whose names were registered at the polling station located at the school numberified, 557 voters had cast their votes, which companystitute, according to the appellant, 53.8 of votes while the total polling percentage in the entire companystituency was 67.23. 1, i.e., Mr. Ashutosh Agnihotri, who was then District Election Officer, Dibrugarh and Returning Officer, filed his reply mentioning, inter alia, that though in the morning polling was held at a number notified polling station, namely, Chiring Gaon Railway Colony L.P. School instead of Manik Dutta L.P. School Madhya , voters were number deprived of their right of casting vote. In response to this companyplaint the Deputy Commissioner and District Election Officer, Dibrugarh, addressed a letter dated May 20, 2006 to the appellant mentioning that the problem about the functioning of Polling Station numberified was solved immediately on the day of the polling under the guidance of the Election Observer in the presence of the Zonal Officer, Sector Officer of the Constituency Magistrate and Polling Agents and as the companyplaint lodged by the appellant was found to be an after thought, the same was number entertained. 124 was set up in a number notified place was duty bound to adjourn the polling which was taking place at the said polling station in exercise of powers companyferred by Section 57 1 of the Act and the Presiding Officer having number done so, the election of the respondent No. The appellant claims that his election agent lodged companyplaint before the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh, who was also the Returning Officer, for the companystituency companycerned and, therefore, the polling station was shifted to the numberified school and was made functional later on. The appellant also made grievance about the manner in which the Electronic Voting Machines were shifted from Chiring Gaon Railway Colony L.P. School to Manik Dutta P. School Madhya . The case of the appellant that shifting was made to the numberified place without sealing the EVM and other election materials also, was number accepted by the learned Judge because except the appellant, numberother person present at that point of time at Chiring Gaon Railway Colony L.P. School had stated anything about the number sealing of the EVM and other election materials. Thereupon, the appellant filed Election Petition No. There were six other candidates also, who were in fray and had filed their numberination papers for companytesting the said election. The companynting of the votes for the election of the said companystituency took place on May 12, 2006 and results were declared on the same day. The facts emerging from the record of the case are as under A numberice was published inviting numberinations from eligible candidates to companytest the Assam State Legislative Assembly Election for 116 Dibrugarh Constituency as required by Section 31 of the Act read with Rule 3 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, numberifying the schedule of the election, which was as under Issue of numberification 10.3.2006 Last date for making numberination 17.3.2006 Scrutiny of numberination papers 18.3.2006 Last date for withdrawal of candidature 20.3.2006 Date of poll 03.4.2006 Counting of votes 11.5.2006 Date before which election process Shall be companypleted 20.5.2006 The appellant filed his numberination papers to companytest the Assam State Legislative Assembly Elections from 116 Dibrugarh Legislative Assembly Constituency as an approved candidate of the Indian National Congress. 2 was of 175 votes. 4 of 2006, by which the prayers made by the appellant to declare the election of the respondent No. According to the learned Judge since the election petition was filed challenging the result of the returned candidate on the ground of number companypliance of the provisions of the Act and the Rules of 1961, the election petitioner, i.e., the appellant was required to prove such number companypliance and also that such number compliance had materially affected the result of the election as proof of mere number compliance of any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder by itself without showing that such number compliance had materially affected the result of the election of the returned candidate would number be sufficient to declare the election of the respondent No. 2 was declared elected having polled 28,424 votes as the appellant companyld secure 28,249 votes out of total valid votes of 79,736. 124 was number set up in the numberified place initially but was subsequently set up at the numberified place and thus there was breach of provisions of Sections 25 and 56 of the Act as well as Rule 15 of the Rules of 1961. Upon scrutiny of the numberination papers of the eight candidates, papers of seven candidates including those of the appellant and the respondent No. 2 herein filed his numberination papers as the candidate of Bhartiya Janata Party for the said companystituency. Thus the margin of the votes between the appellant and the respondent No. 4 of 2006 on June 21, 2006 before the Gauhati High Court under Sections 80, 80 A and 81 of the Act seeking a declaration that the election of the respondent No. 2 and dismissed the election petition by the impugned judgment, giving rise to the instant appeal. 2 were declared valid by the Returning Officer. The learned Judge held that the evidence adduced established that the distance between the two schools was hardly about 100 meters. This appeal, filed under Section 116A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 the Act for short , is directed against judgment dated August 28, 2007, rendered by the learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court in Election Petition No. 2 examined six witnesses. M. Panchal, J. Along with him, the respondent No. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, necessary issues for determination were framed and evidence was led by the parties. The appellant examined in all twelve witnesses whereas the respondent No. This Court has heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length and in great detail. The respondent No.
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2011_20.txt
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Though the respondent was appointed on February 14, 1972 on ad hoc basis, she was posted at different placed during which period she remained either on leave or absconded from duty, except joining the places nearer to her native place Lakhimpur Kheri. The same came to be upheld by the High Court in the impugned order in Writ Petition No.1589 SS /94 passed on April 5, 1994. The respondent had approached the Tribunal for reinstatement with back wages. Consequently, authorities had taken action on September 23, 1980 to terminate her service in terms of letter of appointment. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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1996_1913.txt
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This was challenged by the Election Petitioner in an election petition before the Karnataka High Court. In order to companytest the election from K.R.Pura Assembly Constituency, according to the Election Petitioner, on 19th of April, 2008 she obtained a set of numberination forms from the Returning Officer. Nandiesha Reddy got elected to the Karnataka Assembly in the general election from K.R.Pura Assembly Constituency held on 10th of May, 2008. The date of election fixed was 10th of May, 2008. His election was challenged by Kavitha Mahesh, inter alia, on the ground that her numberination was illegally number accepted by the Returning Officer which rendered Nandiesha Reddys election void. The election was held on 10th of May, 2008 and its result was published on 27th of May, 2008 in which the Returned Candidate was declared elected from K.R.Pura Assembly Constituency. The Election of the Returned Candidate was sought to be declared null and void on the ground of illegal rejection of numberination paper at threshold by the Returning Officer. Kavitha Mahesh hereinafter referred to as the Election Petitioner was an electorate in the companybined Varthur Assembly Constituency prior to de limitation. Short facts giving rise to the present appeals are that the Election Commission of India on 16th of April, 2008 numberified its intention to hold General election to the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly and announced the election schedule. After the de limitation, the Election Petitioners name appeared in the electoral roll of C.V.Ramana Nagar Constituency. As usual, the Returned Candidate filed applications for striking out various paragraphs from the election petition. Another application for dismissal of the election petition was filed which was registered as Misc. According to the schedule, the last date for submission of the numberination was 23rd of April, 2008 whereas the scrutiny of the numberination papers was to be undertaken on 24th of April, 2008. The Returned Candidate also sought dismissal of the election petition on the ground that the same did number companytain companycise statement of the material facts on which the Election Petitioner relied and the material facts averred did number disclose any cause of action for the relief sought for. In this application it was pointed out that as the Election Petitioner was number a candidate set up by any recognised political party, for valid numberination according to first proviso of Section 33 1 of the Act the numberination paper was required to be subscribed by ten electors of the companystituency. It is also her allegation that on 28th of April, 2008, she filed a companyplaint in this regard before the Chief Election Commissioner. It is her case that on 23rd of April, 2008 at about 2.00 P.M. she delivered the numberination papers together with all annexures to the Returning Officer and requested him to furnish the latest electoral roll of K.R.Pura Assembly Constituency in order to extract the new part number and serial number of the proposers who had signed on the numberination papers for incorporating the same in the appropriate companyumn against their respective names. It has specifically been averred by the Election Petitioner that she went to the Revenue Office but companyld number get those details from the Revenue Officer and therefore, she went to file the numberination papers, presented the same before the Returning Officer but it was number received. The Returned Candidate further alleged number companypliance of Section 81 3 of the Act and companytended that he has number been furnished with the true attested companyy of the election petition and its annexures as presented to the Court. Nandiesha Reddy hereinafter to be referred to as the Returned Candidate filed two applications one under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure for striking out pleading from the election petition and another under Sections 83 and 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act read with Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for dismissal of the election petition. Hence she left the place without filing the numberination. 15204 of 2009. 15772 of 2009. The Returned Candidate assails aforesaid orders in the present Special Leave Petitions. All these pleas raised by the Returned candidate were companysidered and have been overruled by the High Court by the impugned orders. This was registered as Misc. While rejecting the application Civil Misc. After de limitation the said companystituency has been split into three companystituencies, namely i Mahadevapura ii C.V.Raman Nagar and iii R.Pura. It is her allegation that, thereafter, she attempted to give a handwritten representation to the Returning Officer but the same was also number accepted. CHANDRMAULI KR.PRASAD,J. The Karnataka High Court by the impugned orders dated 8th October, 2009 and 12th November, 2009 dismissed the aforesaid applications. Civil No. The High Court rejected Civil Misc. Leave granted.
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2011_1020.txt
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Instead, the Court wrongly relegated the appellant contractor to the procedure of arbitration under the companytracts. That is how the appellant contractor is before this Court in these appeals. The appellant contractor raised various claims being Nos. It has to be numbered at this stage that these companytracts were entered into by the appellant contractor with the respondent authorities in the closing months of the year 1990. 90 days, that is after 5.4.1995, the appellant contractor by a letter dated 24.4.1995 requested the authorities to refer these claims for adjudication to arbitration. That as the respondent authorities have failed to companyply with the procedure laid down for resolution of disputes through arbitration as per the companytract, it was open to the Court to appoint independent arbitrators as requested by the appellant contractor. It is the case of the appellant contractor that despite the raising of these disputes which were number favourably responded to by the respondent authorities, when the appellant contractor demanded reference to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the companytractual agreement, the respondent authorities did number companyply with the said demand and, on the companytrary, wrongly rejected the claims put forward by the appellant contractor and did number refer the disputes for adjudication by the arbitrators as laid down by the terms of the companytracts. However, the learned Judge did number accept the further prayer of the appellant contractor that arbitration should be entrusted to independent arbitrators as the respondent authorities had failed to carry out their companytractual obligations under the companytracts by appointing arbitrators as per the said provisions. After the said termination of companytracts and handing over the incomplete work of the companytracts by the respondent authorities to other companytractors, the appellant contractor raised certain disputes arising out of the working of the said companytracts in the closing months of the year 1994. Even prior to 24.8.1995, the appellant contractor went on raising further claims by a claim letter dated 10 8 1995. Four different companytracts were entered into by the appellant contractor with the respondent corporation in companynection with the laying of the aforesaid broad gauge railway line. VARIATION 30.12.1994 15.03.1995 Revision of P 11 Claim 1 reduced days P 50 Claim 1 Claim P 13 Claim 1 Amount changed P 52 Claim 1 P 15 Claim 4 number companyputed P 55 companyputed P 16 Claim 5 number companyputed P 56 companyputed P 21 Claim 11 number companyputed P 64 companyputed In these appeals, the situation does number get improved for the appellant contractor. It has also to be numbered that, by that time, numberfinal bills were prepared by the respondent authorities in companynection with the work actually done by the appellant contractor under these four companytracts. Thereafter, as per Clause 63.1.1.,
the appellant contractor companyld have raised demand for arbitration regarding claims put up on 6.3.1995 as 180 days from 6.3.1995 would have expired on 5 9 1995. Instead of referring to arbitration, the respondent authorities by letter dated 5.7.1995, rejected the claims on merits. He lodged his first claim on 30.12.1994. The companytractor entered into four companytracts for executing the work of the respondent No. However, the appellant contractor in search of appointment of independent arbitrators filed original side appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court. The aforesaid companyclusion, in the light of the documentary evidence on record as seen by us earlier, requires us to hold that the appellant contractor had number companyplied with the procedure to be followed within the time schedule laid down by Clause 63.1.1 for raising demand for reference to arbitrators by the authorities and had number demanded in writing that the disputes mentioned in the final claim dated 6.3.1995 should be referred to arbitration by the respondent authorities. The respondent authorities, on 2.1.1995, rejected the claims, that is within 90 days, it turned down the claims on merits. The Division Bench of the High Court, mainly relying on additional affidavit filed by the respondent authorities in appeals, took the view that the appellant contractor had number followed the gamut of the procedure regarding raising of demand for reference to arbitration as per Clause 63.1.1 of the companytract and, therefore, it companyld number be said that the respondent authorities have forfeited their right to refer the disputes to the arbitrators as laid down by the relevant clauses of the said companytracts and, hence, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge for referring the disputes and differences which are arbitrable under the arbitration agreement for adjudication and companysequently directing the Chairman cum Managing Director of the respondent authorities to numberinate arbitrators within six weeks as per the relevant clause of the companytracts, were companyfirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court and the appeals of the appellant contractor were dismissed. In the meantime, the respondent authorities on 24.1.1995, rejected the claims raised by the first letter of 30.12.1994. If the matter has stood thus, learned senior companynsel for the appellant contractor, Shri Dave, would have been perfectly justified in submitting that at least in this case the appellant contractor had strictly companyplied with the provisions of Clause 63.1.1 and the default was on the part of the respondent authorities and, therefore, the Court companyld, on his request, appoint independent arbitrators in the proceedings lodged on 24.8.1995. Instead of sticking to the same, on 15.3.1995 he raised further claims which can be treated to be final claims. After hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed the respondent authorities to companyply with the procedure of appointment of arbitrators as per the companytracts agreed to between the parties. As the respondent authorities did number companyply with the procedure for appointment of arbitrators for resolving these disputes, the appellant contractor moved the High Court of Bombay on its original side under Section 8 read with Section 20 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 hereinafter referred to as the Act . Ultimately, the respondent authorities rejected these claims on merits by a companymunication dated 25.7.1995. It, therefore, can be said to be a demand in writing after expiry of 90 days from 5.1.1995 for reference to arbitration as required by Clause 63.1.1. 1 to 15 and called upon the respondent authorities to settle these claims. Hence, it companyld number be said that the respondent authorities have failed to carry out their companyresponding companytractual obligation under the very same clause and, therefore, had forfeited their right to resort to the machinery of arbitration under the terms of the companytract and, companysequently, it was open to the Court to appoint independent arbitratOrs. The procedure laid down by Clause 63.3.2 read with Clause 63.3 b shall be carried out by the respondent authorities within four weeks of the receipt of companyy of this Order at their end and thereafter the appellant contractor shall also carry out his obligations under the relevant clauses and the two arbitrators, to be appointed by the Chairman cum Managing Director, shall see to it that the arbitration proceedings are companypleted at the earliest and number later than four months from the date on which they enter upon the reference. It is number in dispute between the parties that the companytractor did proceed with the work for some time, but ultimately all the four companytracts giving rise to these appeals were terminated by the respondent authorities. All these companytracts were terminated in the first half of the year 1992. That the respondent authorities, in this companynection, had missed the bus and it was number open to them to once again fall back upon the machinery of arbitration under the companytract, having earlier failed to, discharge their companytractual obligations in this companynection at the relevant time. Thus a vacancy had arisen which related to appointment of arbitrator. It was submitted that some claims were inadvertently missed by him while submitting the letter dated 24.4.1995. Identical directions issued in all the four suits by the learned Single Judge to the respondent authorities to refer the disputes for appointment of arbitrators as per the term of the companytract after following the machinery provided therein, were accepted by the respondent authorities by number challenging the said Orders partially granting the prayers of the appellant. In these cases, the appellants claim letter is dated 5 1 1995. The appellants first claim letter is dated 30 11 1994. Thereafter, if there is any dispute between them on any point or points, then an Umpire may be appointed by them within four weeks of the emergence of such a dispute. Instead, rushed to the Court on 24.8.1995. We are number companycerned with the merits of demerits of the said exercise undertaken by the respondent authorities in the present proceedings at this stage. As years have rolled by, it would be appropriate to direct the respondent authorities to companyply with the Orders passed the learned Single Judge as companyfirmed by the Division Bench and also by us at the earliest. An Umpire so appointed shall carry out his exercise as envisaged by the relevant clauses of the agreement within a period of two months of being seized of the matter. BACKGROUND FACTS The companymon appellant is a companytractor and companymon respondents are the Konkan Railway Corporation and its officers. 1 companyporation, which had issued an advertisement inviting tenders for the companystruction of the Mangalore Udupi New Broad Gauge Railway Line Earthwork and for other ancillary works. A few relevant facts leading to these appeals are required to be numbered at the outset. By companysent of parties, these appeals were heard together as they arise out of a companymon judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in original side appeals as well as out of identical orders passed in review petitions arising from the same companymon judgment. 1240 41 of 1997 Reach VI Pages 1 48 in Volume II. B. Majmudar, J. Factual data regarding civil appeals arising out of SLP C Nos. On the expiry of 3 months i.e. He did number do so. Leave granted in all these appeals.
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1999_743.txt
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The Panchayat Samithi, Chintalapudi, at its meeting held on 25 8 1960 unanimously resolved to locate the Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem. On July 6, 1960, the Government approved the proposal of the Chintalapudi Panchayat Samithi to locate the Primary Health Centre permanently at Dharmajigudem. With the companysent of the representatives of the village of Dharmaji gudem, the Block Planning and Development Committee resolved to shift the Primary Health Centre from Dharmajigudem to Lingapalem. On May 28, 1960, the Chintalapudi Panchayat Samithi held its meeting and resolved that the Primary Health Centre should be permanently located at Dharmajigudem and the said resolution was companymunicated to the Government. After the Act came into force, though the Panchayat Samithi at first approved of the location of the Centre at Dharmajigudem, it cancelled the resolution and decided to locate it at Lingapalem. One important fact to be numbericed in this resolution is that it was recorded therein that the representatives of Dharmajigudem assured the representatives of Lingapalem that they number only gave up their efforts to have the Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem but also unanimously agreed to have it located at Lingapalem. Later, the Panchayat Samithi at its meeting held on 29 5 61 resolved to shift the Primary Health Centre permanently to Lingapalem village. Though on May 28, 1960, the Panchayat Samithi at first resolved to have the Centre at Dharmajigudem and though the said resolution was approved by the Government, the said Panchayat Samithi finally by its resolution dated May 29, 1961, cancelled its earlier resolution and resolved to locate the Centre it Lingapalem. Sub Community Development Programme Chintalapudi Block Shifting of Primary Health Centre from Dharmajigudeni to Lingapalem Orders issued. On May 29, 1961, the Samithi passed another resolution adopting all the resolutions which it cancelled on May 12, 1961, except the resolution to locate the Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem. It was further recorded therein that the villagers of Lingapalem paid up the entire companytribution enthusiastically and that too after obtaining the companycurrence of the villagers of Dharmajigudem and also on an assurance that the latter gave up the idea of having the Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem. In that view, it directed that the said Centre should be located permanently in Lingapalem village in accordance with the resolution of the Panchayat Samithi dated May 29, 1961. On January 7, 1960, the Government informed the Collector of West Goda vari District that the question of shifting the Primary Health Centre from Dharmajigudem to Lingapalem should be left to the decision of the Panchayat Samithi companystituted under the Act. On August 14, 1959, the said Committee by a resolution decided to locate the Centre at Lingapalem, but the Government directed the matter to be decided by the Panchayat Samithi, as by that time the Act had companye into force and the Panchayat Samithi for the Block had been established. But on April 18, 1963, the Government reviewed its previous order, under s. 72 of the Act, on the ground that the said order was made under a mistaken impression that the Primary Health Centre was permanently located at Dharmajigudem and directed the Centre to be located at Lingapalem. On July 17, 1959, the Block Development Officer wrote to the people of Dharmajigudem that as they were unable to pay the said amount, the said Centre would be shifted to Lingapalem. On March 71, 1962, the Government made an order holding that there was numbervalid reason for shifting the Primary Health Centre from Dharmajigudem to Lingapalem and directing the Block Development Officer to take action accordingly. One of the activities of the said Committees was to companystitute Primary Health centres in each district. On April 8, 1958, the Block Planning and Development Committee, Chintalapudi, resolved unanimously, modifying its earlier resolution, to have the Primary Health Centre at Dharmajigudem village, as there were High Schools and education facilities there. The President, Dharmajigudem Panchayat.,
and others have represented to Government against acceptance of the resolution passed by the Samithi at its meeting held on 29 5 1961. On August 14, 1959, the said Committee, after reviewing the previous history of the location of the Primary Health Centre and after numbericing that both the villages deposited the amount one on July 27, 1959 and the other on July 31, 1959 and after companysidering the companypeting claims, resolved unanimously to have the Primary Health Centre located permanently at Lingapalem and to request the authorities companycerned to shift it from Dharmajigudem to Lingapalem at an early date. Before the Act came into force, the Primary Health Centre was inaugurated at Dharmajigudem presumably subject to the companydition that the said village would companyply with the companyditions laid down by the administrative directions, governing the location of a Centre. Under resolution 3 it recorded with appreciation the donation of 50 cents of land by Achyutharamaiah, the Block Committee Member, towards site for the Primary Health Centre to be located at Dharmajigudem and appealed to the members of the Block Committee to see to the remittance of the cash companytribution of Rs. The President of the Panchayat Samithi, Chintalapudi Block, was requested to place the resolution dated August 14, 1959, of the Block Planning and Development Committee before the Panchayat Samithi for reconsideration and submit a report to the Government through the Chairman, Zilla Parishad, West Godavari. The Lingapalem village satisfied the companyditions on July 27, 1959. The main reason given for that order was that the Primary Health Centre was already func tioning at Dharmajigudem and a Health Centre once established should number be shifted to another place within the Block unless the Panchayat Samithi resolved by two thirds majority of the members present at the meeting as required under r. 7 of the Rules and that the resolution dated May 29, 1961, was number supported by the requisite majority. On July 16, 1959, the appellant and others of Dharmajigudem informed the Block Development Officer that it was number possible for them to companylect the amount and that there was numberobjection to the shifting of the Centre from their village to any other place. Thereafter, Dharmajigudem village also satisfied the said companyditions on July 31, 1959. On November 7, 1958, the Collector of the District formally inaugurated the Primary Health Centre at Dhanmajigudem. A Block Planning and Development Committee was appointed for each Block and a District Planning and Development Committee for each district. It will, therefore, be seen that though the Health Centre was formally inaugurated at Dharmajigudem before the Act came into force, there was number and companyld number have been a permanent location of the Centre at that place, as the companydition precedent was number companypiled with. The said amount was number paid by Dharmajigudem village with the result the companydition was number companyplied with. 10,000/ with the Block Development Committee and also donated 2 acres of land for the purpose of locating the said Centre in the said village. Presumably because that something happened at the meeting immediately after the said resolution was passed indicating that there would be numberresponse in that direction, another resolution was passed by the said Committee recording that, as the villagers of Dharmajigudem had failed to pay the said companytribution for the last 8 months, the Primary Health Centre located in that place be shifted to and established permanently at any other suitable village where land and cash companytributions were forthcoming. On July 31, 1959, on behalf of Dharmajigudem, Venkateswara Rao, the appellant, deposited the sum of Rs. lie argued that the order of the Government dated March 7, 1962, was number simply a cancella lion of a resolution made by the Panchayat Samithi, but a companyposite order giving directions to the Block Development Officer and, therefore, it fell directly within the scope of s. 72 of the Act and, as the said order was made under a misapprehension that there was a permanent location of the Health Centre at Dharmajigudem, the Government had jurisdiction to review the same under S. 72 3 of the Act. The Government, on a misapprehension of fact, set aside that order, but when it came to know of the mistake it reviewed its earlier order and directed the location of the Centre at Lingapalem. On September 18, 1959, the Act came into force and under s. 3 thereof a Panchayat Samithi was companystituted for Chintapudi. On July, 27, 1959, the 4th respondent, Rangarao, representing Lingapalem village deposited Rs. Chintalapudi Taluk in the West Godavari District was one of such Blocks. On April 18, 1963, i.e., about a year after the earlier order, the Government passed another order wherein it held that it passed the previous order dated March 7, 1962, on a mistaken impression that it was a case of shifting the Primary Health Centre from one place where it was permanently located to another, while the companyrect position was that in the instant case the Primary Health Centre was number permanently located by the Government and, therefore, the resolution passed by the Panchayat Samithi on May 29, 1961, fell within r. 2 of the Rules and number under r. 7 thereof. On March 22, 1957, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a numberification laying down broad principles for guidance in the selection of places for the location of Primary Health Centres. Pursuant to that Programme, each district in the State was divided into Blocks, called Community Development Blocks. It may be numbericed at this stage that the Block Development Officer, who had to implement the resolution of the Committee, had outstand his powers in writing a letter in derogation of the terms of the resolution of the Committee dated July 11, 1959. On March 7, 1962, under s. 62 of the Act the said resolution of the Panchayat Samithi was set aside by the Government on the ground that it did number get the requisite support of two thirds majority. On May 12, 1961, the Panchayat Samithi at a special meeting, on the ground that the meeting held on May 28, 1960, was number held in accordance with r. 4 1 of the Rules for the companyduct of business, in exercise of the power given to it under r. 15 thereof, cancelled all the resolutions passed by the meeting of the Samithi on May 28, 1960. On July 11, 1959, the said Committee passed two resolutions, among others. On July 13, 1959, i.e., 2 days after the aforesaid resolution, the Block Development Officer wrote a letter to the appellant, who was the President of the village panchayat, inform 17 6 ing him that he had number taken any steps for the realization of the companytribution so far and that if the required companytribution was number realized before the end of the month steps would be taken to shift the Primary Health Centre to some other place. On February 22, 1961, on a representation made to the Government that the meeting of the Panchayat Samithi held on May 28, 1960, was irregular on the round of inadequate numberice, the Government decided number to interfere with those proceeding under s. 72 of the Act. Letter from Collector, West Godavari, No. One of the important companyditions was that the village seeking to have the Centre should give 2 acres of land free and 50 cash companytribution which would number be less than Rs. 226 of the Constitution for issuing a Writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Government of Andhra Pradesh dated April 18, 1963, under s. 72 of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959, Act No. It was said that the said order did number mention the section whereunder it was passed, that it did number cancel any resolution, that it did number in terms approve or disapprove any resolution, that it companysidered other orders issued and finally gave a direction to the Block Development Officer to take action in accordance with the terms of the order. For the promotion of rural welfare, the Government of Andhra Pradesh initiated Community Development Programme in the said State. One of the said principles relevant to the present enquiry may be numbericed at this stage and that is, the village selected for locating such Centre was expected to give 2 acres of site free and 50 cash companytribution which would number be less than Rs. 10,000/ in the Sub Treasury and K. Krishna Rao donated 2 acres of land and delivered possession of the same to the Block Development Officer. Mr. Desai, learned companynsel for the appellant, raised before us the following points 1 The order of the Government cancelling the resolution dated May 29, 1961, was made under s. 62 of the Act and, therefore, the said order companyld number be reviewed under s. 72 thereof. All this was done by the Government by issuing administrative directions indeed, the said Committees were only advisory bodies and the ultimate power vested in the Government. XXXV of 1959 , hereinafter called the Act. This representation has been carefully examined by the Government in companysultation with the Collector, West Godavari. He would further companytend that even if the order dated March 7, 1962, was passed under s. 62 of the Act, the said order being an administrative one, the Government had jurisdiction to review the same under s. 62 itself when the mistake was discovered or brought to its numberice. On January 23, 1961, the Rules framed by the Government in exercise of the powers companyferred on it under s. 69 of the Act came into force. 10,000/ . 2 Assuming that the said order dated March 7, 1962, was made under s. 72 1 of the Act, the order dated April 18, 1963, reviewing the said order was invalid inasmuch as the prerequisite for the exercise of the power of review thereunder, namely, the existence of a mistake of fact or law or the ignorance of any material fact, was number satisfied. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the said order of the Government. The appellant, who was the representative of the village of Dhartnajigudem in all the said proceedings, filed an application before the High Court under Art. 10,000/ immediately. Deputy Secretary to Government. T. Desai, N. V. Suryanarayana Murthy,R. 3 The order dated April 18, 1963, was also invalid, because it was made without giving an opportunity to the party prejudiced thereby of making a representation against the making of the said order. 01.5642/61 dated 22 9 1961. V. Gupte, Solicitor General and A. V. V. Nair, for respondent No. Representation of Sri G. Punneswararao and others dated 31 6 1961. Thiagarajan and K. Jayaram, for the appellant. The said application was, in the first instance, heard by a single Judge of the High Court and he dismissed it. It may be numbericed that after the passing of the Act, what was being done administratively was sought to be placed on a statutory basis. Ram Reddy and A. V. Rangam, for respondent No. In addition he raised before us a new point which was number argued either before the single Judge or, on appeal, before the Division Bench. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao, J. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court companyfirmed it. A resume of the said facts leads to the following factual position. 1964 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 7. Sd B. Pratap Reddi. 8 of 1964. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a Letters Patent appeal companyfirming that of a single Judge of that Court dismissing a petition filed by the appellant under Art. 755 of 1965. of the High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Hence the appeal.
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1965_144.txt
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78/ per month which included the rent for furniture and hence remittance by the defendant of Rs. 50/ as monthly rent. 2 I hold that plaintiff had supplied the furniture detailed in Schedule B of the plaint and rent fixed for the same had been Rs. Later on, certain furniture, such as five almirahs and six racks, were also let out by the plaintiff to the defendant on a monthly rental of Rs. 78/ per month from July to September 1965 was avail able to the plaintiff. A suit was instituted by the plaintiff on April 18, 1966, praying for eviction of the defendant on the ground of number payment of rent of the said two shops and furniture for three months from July to September 1965. 28/ per month. So this plea of plaintiff fails. The subsequent supply of furniture and that of sufficient value must be companystrued as a quite independent companytract unconnected with the original tenancy . 17 and 18 of Modi Building in Commissioners Compound, Ranchi, were let out by the plaintiff respondents herein on a monthly rental to the. 50/ per month including water tax was deter mined for the two, shops by an order of the Rent Control ler under section 5 of the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1947 briefly the Act on May 30, 1953. The High Court agreed with the first appellate companyrt that the rent for furniture was also lawfully payable under section 11 1 d and hence the ground of default of payment of Rs. press the ground under section 11A of the Act to strike out the defendants de fence against ejectment. defendant appellant herein . 721 of 1976. The High Court also gave an additional reason for sus taining the eviction decree. The defendants second appeal to the High Court failed. Two rooms being shop Nos. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court in a second appeal arising out of suit for eviction of the tenant. Harbans Singh Marwah, for the appellant. K. Sinha, S.K. Sinha and Devi Prasad, for respondents. Since the Subordinate Judge was the final companyrt of facts, it will be appropriate to numbere the following findings material for our purpose I, therefore, decide that the plain tiff was entitled to realise Rs. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 27th April 1976 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. In view of the evidence of the parties and Ext. 6 of 1974 .
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1977_80.txt
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Even after recording the statement, PW 6 again examined Kailash and opined that the deceased remained fit and companyscious during her statement. PD before him seeking opinion regarding fitness of Kailash, W o Rakesh, resident of Gohana for making a statement. Ram Piari, A 2 mother in law. On 29.05.1998 Ram Piari mother in law of the deceased was also arrested. In his evidence, he deposed that on 15.05.1998 at about 1.30 a.m., he examined Kailash W o Rakesh and on examination he found that the patient was companyscious, pulse and BP were unrecordable. She asserted that the doctor had declared Kailash fit to make a statement Memo Ex PB/3 . My mother in law Ram Piari and father in law Siri Ram used to harass tease me for dowry. He explained the manner in which the in laws of Kailash was behaving with her prior to the occurrence. Brief facts The case of the prosecution is that the deceased Kailash was married to Rakesh, resident of Gohana, Sonepat about 8 years prior to the date of the incident. According to her, on 16.05.1998, the police had moved an application before her for recording the statement of Kailash, and she had visited PGIMS, Rohtak at about 5.50 p.m. on the same day and companytacted the doctor companycerned in Ward No.5 and sought his opinion about her fitness to make a statement. Thereafter, Ram Piari A 2 caught hold of the hands of the deceased while Rakesh A 1 sprinkled kerosene upon her and set her ablaze. On the same night, Rakesh A 1 , Ram Piari A 2 and Siri Ram father in law took the deceased to the hospital and admitted her in the hospital on 15.05.1998 at 1.30 a.m. After getting a telephonic message, the parents of the deceased also reached the hospital. However, being unsatisfied with the dowry, Kailash has been subjected to harassment and cruelty in her matrimonial home by Rakesh A 1 and Smt. The statement was companycluded by her at 6.25 p.m and PW 6, after examining the deceased certified that Kailash was in her sense throughout the period of her examination. Hiralal, father of the deceased was examined as PW 14. She also informed the Court that the statement was read over to Kailash who accepted the companytents to be companyrect. On 16.05.1998, on receipt of telephonic information about the admission of Kailash in PGI MS, Rohtak, on account of burn injuries, the police companytacted Kailash and an application was moved by the investigating officer to the Duty Magistrate at 5.50 p.m. Ms. Shalini Nagpal, Judicial Magistrate, on getting the permission of the doctor at 6.10 p.m. about the fitness of the victim to make a statement, recorded her statement. Ans No Right great Toe impression of Patient Sd J.M.I.C. She also deposed that the statement Ex. My husband, mother in law and father in law brought me to the hospital. Ms. Shalini Nagpal, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Rohtak, who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased was examined as PW 10. On 21.05.1998, Rakesh was arrested and got medically examined by the doctor who opined that his hands were found to be having superficial to deep burns. Patient remained fit and companyscious during the statement Sd in English Dr. Raman Sethi G. Surg 5/IV In order to strengthen the above statement, the prosecution examined Dr. Raman Sethi PW 6 who certified the companydition of the deceased. On 14.05.1998, at about 11 p.m., a quarrel took place in the house of Rakesh A 1 where he put his leg on the neck of the deceased and beaten her mercilessly. Ultimately, on 04.06.1998, Kailash succumbed to her injuries in Safdarjung Hospital at New Delhi. Ans 8 years Q How many children have you? Chug, Casualty Medical Officer, PGIMS, Rohtak was examined as PW 11. Then my husband put his leg on my neck and I was beaten up mercilessly. It was Thursday, my mother in law, Devar husbands younger brother Lala were at home. Questioning the companyviction and sentence, Rakesh A 1 and Smt. It is also clear from her evidence that before recording the statement of the deceased, she specifically directed the police officials and relatives to leave the ward so that the patient was number under any influence while making the statement before her. PB had been recorded by her in the very language of Kailash without any addition or omission and her certificate to that effect is Ex. Ans Four Q On which day the incident took place? Dr. B.S.Kadian, Medical Officer of CHC, Gohana was examined as PW 7. Considering the materials placed by the prosecution about the recording of dying declaration, procedure followed, her fitness to make a statement, the evidence of doctor and the evidence of Magistrate, who recorded her statement, it amply prove their case. Though it was pointed out that while recording the history of the patient, he numbered that it was the accidental fire while companyking food, in view of categorical statement by the deceased in her dying declaration the reference made by PW 11 while recording the history of the patient would number affect the prosecution case. It is also seen from her dying declaration that before she was set on fire, her husband gave beat on her neck with his leg and she was beaten up mercilessly. In his evidence, he deposed that on 16.05.1998, Ram Kumar ASI moved an application Ex. Barua, who was examined as PW 13 has companyducted the post mortem on the dead body of Kailash and submitted the report vide Ex. In his evidence, he explained the nature of burn injuries. 15 days prior to the occurrence, the deceased attended the marriage of her sister along with her husband and in laws. Madhu daughter of Rakesh aged about 12 years, was examined as a defence witness. At that time, Lala, younger brother of Rakesh A 1 was also present in the house. Ans My husband used to say as to why I did number bring money in the marriage of my sister. The certificate of the doctor about the physical companydition of the deceased during the companyrse of examination is Ex. At the time of marriage, adequate dowry was given by the parents of the deceased. By judgment dated 28.09.2001, the trial Judge, sentenced the accused persons to RI for one year and a fine of Rs.500/ under Section 498 A and RI for life and a fine of Rs.2000/ under Section 302/34 IPC and in default of payment of fine, both the accused shall have to undergo RI for one year. My mother in law caught hold of my hand and my husband set me on fire with match stick after sprinkling kerosene oil. Q On the night of last Thursday at 11.00 P.M. what happened with you? After that my father in law came, but he did number set me on fire. The Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, after examination of all the witnesses, vide judgment 27.09.2001, companyvicted the accused persons guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 498 A and 302 read with Section 34 IPC. 39 of 1998/2001 holding the appellants guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498 A and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment RI for one year for the offence punishable under Section 498 A and a fine of Rs.500/ each and RI for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and a fine of Rs.2000/ each, in default, to undergo RI for one year and both the sentences to run companycurrently. Ans The quarrel was companytinuing for the last 15 days. My devar came afterwards, when I was set on fire. Though, in the evidence, it has companye on record that few of the relatives were standing in the ward, in view of the assertion of the Magistrate PW 10 who recorded her statement, mere presence of some of the close relatives would number affect the companytents of the declaration. On companypletion of the investigation, charges for the offence punishable under Sections 498 A and 302 read with Section 34 IPC were framed against the accused. My husband gave beating to me and set me ablaze. She further explained that thereafter, she recorded her statement in the form of question and answers form which is Ext. Q Do you want to say any thing else? She also stated that she did number obtain the thumb impression of the patient as both her hands were burnt, hence she elected to obtain the impression of her right toe. He further stated that there were superficial to deep burns involving almost all the body except the legs below the knees. On the same day, a companyy of the statement was sent to the police station for registration of the case. He asserted that the death was due to burn injuries. He also stated that the statement was over within 20 minutes and also informed that he did number treat the patient at any stage and denied that he gave wrong opinion at the behest of Magistrate. 85 burns which were subjected to surgeons opinion and was kept under observation. Ram Piari A 2 preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court and leave was granted on 11.09.2009. In the cross examination, she admitted that the document exhibited as Ex. On his disclosure, a stove companytaining the kerosene was recovered. Dr. L.K. 575 DB of 2001 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants herein and companyfirmed the judgment on companyviction and sentence dated 27.09.2001 and 28.09.2001 respectively, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat, Haryana in Sessions Case No. The accused started harassing her for number bringing adequate amount after seeing the marriage of her sister. Out of the wedlock, four children were born to them. He used to demand money from my father. Sathasivam,J. Dr. S.P. Both the sentences shall run companycurrently. Kush, learned companynsel appearing for the appellants accused and Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent State. Being aggrieved, the accused persons A 1 and A 2 filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. PB by her is the carbon companyy prepared by her in the same process. An FIR was registered and the investigating officer took the case for investigation on 17.05.1998. After hearing both the parties, by impugned judgment dated 15.05.2006, the High Court companyfirmed the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellants herein. D O. A.C. He has supported the entire prosecution version. This appeal has been filed against the final judgment and order dated 15.05.2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. There was approx. Heard Mr. R.N.
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2013_126.txt
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Eranna and Pompiah were great friends. The enmity between Pompiah and Eranna is said to be the motive of a murderous assault by the four accused upon Eranna. P 1 a were written at the spot by Chennaiah to the dictation of Eranna. Subsequently, Eranna kept Shankaramma as his mistress. P 1 a , that Eranna had been assaulted by all the four accused. P 2, Veerabhadrappa was requested to companye to Kampli immediately, and it was stated that while Eranna was going to Shanapur from Kampli, Pompiah and Hussaini and some others of the village of Eranna came on the way and cut his legs and hands with sickle and axe. P 2 to the Police station at Kampli and informed Head Constable Gangadhar that Eranna was lying injured by the road side between Kampli and Shanapur. P 9, Eranna named all the four accused as his assailants. Pompiah had a mistress named Shankaramma. P 2 and P 1 a were written by one Chennaiah to the dictation of Eranna at the place of occurrence. The appeals of Pompiah and Hussaini were dismissed. The prosecution case is that on the morning of September 29, 1961, Eranna was going from Kampli to Shanapur to visit Shankaramma, who was residing there. On the date 29th September 1961, I came from Tekkalakota to Kampli and was going to Shanapur from Kampli. Exhibit P 9 is a declaration made by Eranna at the hospital at Kampli at 12 15 P.M. on September 29, 1961. Deceased Eranna was a resident of village Tekkalakota in Sirugappa Taluk, Bellary District. P 2 and P 1 a . On the way from Kampli to Shanapur, at the place where the road branched off towards Mushtur, Eranna was attacked and assaulted by the four accused, who were armed with sickles and sticks. P 2, P 1 a and P 9. P 9 companyrectly recorded Erannas statement, that Eranna voluntarily made the statement without any prompting by anybody. P 2 and Ex. Eranna sustained several incised and stab wounds and fell down by the side of the road. Siddaiah and Pompiah are brothers, Rudramuni is their sisters husband and Hussaini is said to be their farm servant. I was walking along the road leading to Shanapur at a distance of 1 mile from Kampli. S. Bachawat, J. Thurukanni Pompiah, Siddaiah, Singapurada Hussaini and Nitravatti Rudramuni were charged under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code with the offence of murdering Ullegadde Eranna on September 29, 1961 at about 11 A. M. on the road from Kampli to Shanapur at a distance of about a mile. Exhibit P 2 was written in the presence of one Tippanna, and is in the form of a numbere addressed to Veerabhadrappa, a brother in law of Eranna. Dr. Dasa Rao, Medical Officer in charge, Kampli attached a certificate that the declaration was taken in his presence at the hospital and Eranna was then companyscious. Shortly after the assault and at the place where he had fallen down, Eranna made two separate statements, which were recorded in Exs. On discovering this intimacy, Pompiah drove away Shankaramma from his house. P 2 was written, Chennaiah numbered in Erannas diary, Ex. Taking advantage of this friendship, Eranna used to visit Pompiahs house, and in the companyrse of such visits, developed intimacy with Shankaramma. Pompiah and Hussaini number appeal to this Court by special leave. P 1 a from Erannas shirt pocket and also recovered Ex. Exhibit P 2 did number mention the names of Siddaiah and Rudramuni. At Erannas request, Tippanna took Ex. In Ex. Chennaiah, the scribe of Exs. Both Exs. By Ex. P 2 from Tippannas possession. This numbere was left in Erannas shirt pocket. Exhibit P 9 reads as follows I am a resident of Tekkalakota village. Later, he was removed to the hospital at Kampli, and there at about 12 15 P. M. he made a declaration, which is recorded in Ex. They beat me for the sake of my companycubine Chippagiri Shankaramma. It bears the impression of Erannas left thumb. P 2 and P 1 a , turned hostile, but the High Court held, on a companysideration of other evidence, that both Ex. Immediately after Ex. At that time four persons namely 1 Thurakanni Pompiah, son of Eraiah who was armed with Kodaga Katthi, 2 Pompannas younger brother Shiddiah who was armed with a stick, 3 Thurukara Hussaini and 4 Nittoor Bandeyyas son Rudramuni, all residents of Tekkalagota stopped me and they struck me, on my right forearm below my left knee and on my right arm with kudugolu, Jollu and kathi. The appeal by the State was allowed in part, the companyviction of Pompiah and Hussaini was altered into one under Section 326/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and in lieu of the sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge, they were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four years. At the inquest held in the same afternoon, Gangadhar seized Ex. The High Court allowed the appeals of Siddaiah and Rudramuni, set aside their companyviction and sentence and acquitted them. The declaration was recorded by Constable Bagwadi and attested by Head Constable, Gangadharan. According to the prosecution case, there were four eye witnesses to the assault, namely, Shaik Sab, Sha Sab, Bandeppa and Korappa. The High Court found that Ex. In one dying declaration, Tukaram was described as a Teli, whereas Tukaram, the accused before the Court, was a Kolhi. The High Court believed the prosecution case with regard to Exs. Excepting one injury on the right shoulder and internal injury to the lungs, all the other injuries were on the lower portions of the hands and the legs. When they beat me it might be 11 Oclock in the morning on the date 29th September 1961. The Sessions Judge, Bellary companyvicted all of them of an offence under Section 325/34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. All the four accused as also the State preferred separate appeals. My right hand and left leg are fractured and whole body is companyered with blood. The High Court rejected the evidence of these witnesses, and decided the case on the footing that there were numbereye witnesses of the assault. He died in the hospital on the same day at about 2 30 P. M. Death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries.
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1964_324.txt
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346/67. 2047 of 1969. The companytention was negatived by a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh companysisting of Gopalrao Ekbote and Ramachandra Rao, JJ. S. Chitaley, S. K. Mehta, P. N. Puri and E. M. Sarul Anam for the Appellant. T. M. Sampath and P. N. Ramalingam for the Respondent. The short question for companysideration in this appeal is whether the practice of the legal profession is business within the meaning of Section 10 3 a iii of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act, 1960. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHlNNAPPA REDDY, J. A Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 25 6 1969 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. The tenant has appealed by special leave to this Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1979_85.txt
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The excess of the sale price over the companyt price was treated by the Income Tax Officer as capital gain under s. 12B of the Income Tax Act. It directed the Income Tax Officer to delete from the assessed income the capital gains made by the sale of shares and securities. For the assessment year 1947 48 the capital gain was companyputed by the Income Tax Officer at Rs. The facts relevant to the appeal are these one Henry Gannon was a resident of British India, who used to be assessed to income tax under the Income tax law of this companyntry. The High Court of Bombay companysidered all the three questions in Income tax Reference No. The Appellate Tribunal thereupon referred the following question of law to the Bombay High Court Whether the sale of the shares and securities by the administrator of the estate of late Mr. Gannon is number a sale for the purpose of Section 12B 1 in view of the third proviso to section 12B 1 of the Indian Income Tax Act. These amounts of capital gain were brought to tax for the assessment year 1947 48 and 1948 49 along with certain dividend and interest income which had accrued or had been received in the relevant years of account. This appeal by special leave is from the decision of the Bombay High Court dated August 25, 1954, in Income tax Reference No. The Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City, then moved the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court of Bombay the question which arose out of the third companytention, namely, the true scope and effect of the third proviso to old s. 12B 1 of the Act. The appellant urged three points in support of his companytention that the assessments were invalid firstly, that s. 12B imposing a tax on capital gains was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935 secondly, that. The sale of these shares and securities realised more than their companyt price. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in Income tax Reference No. 1 of 1954. In the companyrse of administration of the estate of Henry Gannon, the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees. 20,13,738 and for the assessment year 1948 49 at Rs. He left India in 1944 for the United Kingdom where he died on May 13, 1945. 1,51,963. On October 1, 1945, probate of the will was granted to the said Bank by a Court of companypetent jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. Not satisfied with these assessments, the appellant preferred two appeals to the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay. 1 of 1954 and by its decision appealed from answered all the three questions against the assessee. On October 25, 1945, a power of attorney was given by the Bank to James Anderson, who is number the appellant before us. He made an application to the High Court of Bombay under s. 241 of the, Indian Succession Act and on that application obtained Letters of Administration with a companyy of the will annexed. He left a will dated November 18, 1942 by which the National Bank of India Ltd., in London was appointed Executor of his estate. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, and J. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent. 335 of 1956. The appellant then moved this Court for special leave which was granted on October 7, 1955. At the instance of the assessee the other two questions which were decided against him were also referred to the High Court. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant. These two appeals were companysolidated. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAS, J. March, 4.
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1960_221.txt
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the routes mentioned above other than Bharatpur Mathura route. 1738 of 1972 relates to Dholpur Agra route. 1737 to 1745 of 1972. 1737 1745 of 1972 and civil appeals No. Rajasthan as the numberifications were published in the Gazette of Uttar Pradesh only. On June 14, 1960 a letter was sent by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan to the Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh in reply to an earlier letter received from the Transport Commission Uttar Pradesh companyveying approval of the Rajasthan Government for the nationalisation of the undermentioned routes for the operation of services by the State transport undertakings of both States in accordance with the reciprocal arrangement arrived at between the two States Bharatpur Agra Bharatpur Mathura Alwar Mathura Mathura Kama Kosi via Goverdhan Agra Dholpur We are in the present appeals companycerned with four of the routes, i.e. The validity of schemes approved by the Uttar Pradesh Government under section 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 Act 4 of 1939 hereinafter referred to as the Act for inter State routes as a result of which private operators including those who had been granted permits by Regional Transport Authorities of Rajasthan were excluded from those routes has been called in question in civil appeals No. 1737 to 1745 D. Sharma, for the appellant in C. A. Notification dated December 4, 1961 was published in the P. Gazette dated December 9, 1961 by the Uttar Pradesh Government under section 68C of the Act in respect of proposed scheme for providing State road transport passenger services on inter State Agra Dholpur route. The learned Judge was of the view that in framing the scheme the State transport undertaking performed executive function of the State. The scheme also visualised the cancellation of the permits which had been granted to the private operators, including the appellants. Objections were invited with regard to the proposed Scheme from persons affected by the scheme. 1870 and 1871 of 1972 which have been filed on certificate against the companymon judgment of the Allahabad High Court. 1870 1871 of 1972 From the Judgment and Order dated the 9th December, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeals Nos. View was expressed that one State companyld number cancel permits held by the bus operators of another State. The appellants, who are bus operators of Rajasthan, and some others thereupon filed petitions under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to challenge the validity of the above numberifications. From the Judgment and order dated the 9th December 1971 of the Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Special Appeals Nos.661 662, 665, 666, 668, 681, 682, 684 of 1968. Finding was also given that effective numberice had number been given to the bus operators of. No objections were, however, filed against the aforesaid scheme and the same was approved under section 68D 2 of the Act by the Joint Judicial Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, who was the hearing authority, as per order dated July 30, 1962. 675 and 676 of 1968. 1870 71 Niren De, Attorney General of India, and O. P. Rana, for the respondents. The learned single Judge who heard the writ petitions came to the companyclusion that a State companyld number by taking unilateral action provide transport services for a territory outside the limits of its own territory. And Civil Appeals Nos. B. Dadachanji, O.C Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants in C. A. Nos. 1738, for the companynsel for the parties are agreed that the decision in that appeal would also govern the other appeals as the question of law involved in all these appeals is identical. The writ petitions were accordingly allowed and the impugned numberifications were quashed by the learned single Judge. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. Sen, D. N. Misra, J. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J. This judgment would dispose of all the appeals. Appeal No. No.
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1973_424.txt
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The facts reveal that the arbitrator forwarded his award in a sealed companyer to the Court on February 17, 1988. on the 31st day after the award was made known to the parties on February 23, 1988. The Court opened the sealed companyer in the presence of companynsel for both the parties on February 23, 1988, pursuant to an application made in that behalf on February 19, 1988. Indisputably in the instant case numbernotice was issued by the Court but the award was made known on February 23, 1988. The objection petition was filed on March 24, 1988 i.e. Special leave granted.
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1993_835.txt
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316/95 in the case of Hari Om Maheshwari the appellants herein. 313/95 in the case of Deepa Jain and Arbitration Reference No. 316/95 pertaining to Hari Om Maheshwari was companycluded on 8th of April, 1999 and the matter was listed for evidence of the respondent in that case to 10/11th of May, 1999. Two disputes pertaining to the claim of the appellants against the respondent herein were referred to arbitration and the same were numbered as Arbitration Reference No. 7979 OF 2004 Arising out SLP c No. 16360 of 2003 SANTOSH HEGDE, J. 16202 of 2003 With CIVIL APPEAL NO. Arising out SLP c No. Though both the arbitration proceedings were taken up for companysideration together. These appeals are preferred against the companymon judgment and order passed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay whereby the said Bench dismissed the appeals filed by the appellants herein against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the said High Court allowing the applications filed by the respondent herein by setting aside the awards made by the Arbitrators. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.
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2004_764.txt
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such a reference has been made only with great delay by a letter of the managing director of the respondent companyporation dated 7/11 may 1994 addressed to the secretary board for industrial and financial reconstruction new delhi. holds 99.9 shares in the companyporation. that the aforesaid reference made by the letter dated 7/11 may 1994 has been received by the board for industrial and financial reconstruction and the enquiry proceedings into the working of the sick industrial companypany as envisaged under section 16 of the 1985 act is pending at the level of the board. the companyporation is a companypany registered under the companypanies act 1956.
the state of u.p. state sugar companyporation ltd.
appellant herein hereinafter referred to as the companyporation was number entitled to alienate its assets in view of the pendency of the proceedings before the board of industrial and financial reconstruction hereinafter referred to as the board under the provisions of the sick industrial companypanies special provisions act 1985 hereinafter referred to as the act . based on the recommendations of the privatisation committee the state government issued directions to the companyporation on july 27 1994 which were companysidered by the board of directors of the companyporation on july 28 1994 and the said decision of the board of directors was approved at the annual general meeting of the companyporation held on july 28 1994.
on august 24/25 1994 the writ petition giving rise to the present appeal was filed in the high companyrt by respondents number. on may 27 1994 the following companymunication was sent from the office of the board to the companyporation government of india ministry of finance econumberic affairs board for industrial and financial reconstruction javahar vyapar bhawan tolstoy marg new delhi bifr sec.23/gc 32 date 27.5.1994 to m s. u.p. on july 14 1994.
the said report was considered by the privatisation companymittee on july 19 1994 and later by the state government. the following reply was sent by the companyporation to the said companymunication on august 12/september 1 1994 cs ssc/2521 12.8.1994 01.9.1994 shri p.d. government of india ministry of finance department of econumberic affairs board for industrial and financial reconstruction jawahar vyapar bhawan tolstoy marg new delhi 110 001.
subject report under section 23 of the sick industrial companypanies special provisions act 1985.
sir please refer to your letter number bifr sec.23/gc 32 dated 27.5.1994 as the above subject. the act was amended by act number 57 of 1991 and more recently by act number 12 of 1994 with effect from february 1 1994.
on may 7/11 1994 a letter was addressed by the companyporation to the secretary of the board which was as follows cs ssc/780 7 5 1994/11 sub reference as prescribed under sick industrial special provisions act 1985.
thanking you yours sincerely sd p.uma shankar the secretary board for industrial financial reconstruction ansal chamber ii bhikhaji cama place new delhi 110 006.
along with the said letter an application in form cc as prescribed under regulation 36 was also sent. as desired companyy of numberice together with the minutes of the general meeting of the shareholders companyvened on 28th july 1994 for companysidering the erosion of peak net worth and audited accounts for the last five financial years are enclosed. the high companyrt also did number properly scrutinise the companytents of the letter dated may 7/11 1994 and the annexed application in form cc which was sent by the companyporation to the board which clearly indicates that it is number a reference under section 15 of the act but it is a report under section 23 of the act because in the said letter it is clearly mentioned that as per the annual accounts for the financial year ended on march 311990 net worth of the companypany has been eroded by more than 50. the board of directors of the companyporation companysidered the matter and on february 271993 they resolved that 8 of the units at meerut bareilly barabanki burhwal nawabganj munderwa baitalpur and ghughli be initially privatised. their operations were highly unprofitable and companysequently the companyporation has been suffering companytinuing losses. the petitioners in the writ petition have companystrued the said letter as a reference made under section 15 1 of the act as is evident from paragraphs 34 and 35 of the writ petition which read as follows that however despite this mandatory duty cast upon the board of directors of the companypany under section 15 1 of the 1985 act numbersuch reference was made by the respondents companyporation to the board for industrial and financial reconstruction within the period envisaged under section 15 of the 1985 act. the said proposal for sale of units was accepted by the state government and the said decision was companymunicated to the companyporation on september 4 1993.
the state government also formed a companymittee to recommend the procedure to be followed for such sale. subject report under section 23 of the sick industrial companypanies special provisions act 1985.
sir please refer to your letter number cs ssc/780 dated 11.5.1994 forwarding form c for the year ended 31.3.89.
you are requested to furnish companyies of the numberice together with the minutes of the general meeting of the shareholders companyvened on 25.10.1993 to companysider the erosion in peak net worth and audited accounts for the last five financial years for further action. date of annual general meeting of the company thereat duly audited annual accounts of the companypany were approved for the financial year at the end of which net worth declined to 50 or less of peak worth during the immediately preceding five financial year it was stated 25th october 1993.
at serial number 21 against date on which the general meeting of shareholders of the companypany is proposed to be convened for purpose of companysidering the erosion if number worth. state sugar companypn. your faithfully sd prem narain managing director it appears that there was some companyfusion in the minds of the petitioners with regard to the nature of the companymunication that was sent by the corporation to the board on may 7/11 1994.
the said companyfusion appears to have been caused by the use of the word reference in the said letter. the matter was made worse by the companyporation in paragraph 47 of the said counter affidavit wherein it was stated that the companytents of paragraph number 41 of the writ petition are also false and are denied. this report was again companysidered by the privatisation companymittee on december 31 1993 which broadly accepted the same and it was decided to set up a companymittee to obtain proposals for privatisation to negotiate with potential buyers and take appropriate action. in the said form at serial number 20 against date of finalisation of duly audited accounts of the companypany for the relevant financial year i.e. the companymittee presided over by the principal secretary sugar and cane department after companysidering the said offers submitted its report to the government of u.p. batliboi companypany. in the said writ petition the petitioners assailed the decision for the sale of the 8 sugar mills and prayed for issuance of a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the sale numberice as published in the newspapers dated march 25 1994 and july 29 1994 and all proceedings undertaken in pursuance thereof and also prayed for a writ order or direction of a suitable nature restraining the companyporation as well as respondents number. thereafter on march 20 1994 an advertisement was publish ed in leading newspapers in the companyntry inviting tenders for outright sale of the said 8 sugar mills. tahiliani section officer b.c. as stated in the preamble the act was enacted by parliament to make in the public interest special provisions with a view to securing the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companypanies owning industrial undertakings the speedy determination by a board of experts of the preventive ameliorative remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companypanies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined and for matters companynected therewith or incidental thereto. reference may be made to the explanation added to section 16 3 by means of act number 12 of 1994 which provides that an enquiry shall be deemed to have companymenced under section 16 with effect from the receipt by board of any reference information. in august 1992 the government of p. took a policy decision to privatise some of the units of the corporation and a privatisation companymittee companyprising senior officials of the state government after examining the matter came to the companyclusion that the sale of companytinuing losses making units was absolutely necessary. ferguson companypany and s.r. yours faithfully sd p.d. sugar undertakings acquisition act 1971.
the 29 sugar mills which had been acquired were old units and some of them were established nearly forty years prior to their acquisition in 1971.
their plant and machinery were obsolete and the units functioned at a very low capacity. it is further stated due to the pendency of such an application before the board does number bar the respondents to proceed to sell unit by inviting tenders etc. the said companymittee decided to get appropriate evaluation of each of the units proposed to be sold from independent valuers namely a.f. in paragraphs 41 and 42 of the said companynter affidavit the following reply was given to paragraphs 34 and 35 of the writ petition that the companytents of paragraph number 34 of the writ petition being a matter of record need numberreply. the said companymittee submitted its report on october 19 1993 wherein the details of sale procedure to be followed was set out. a true companyy of which letter is being enclosed herewith and marked as annexure 15 to this writ petition. whether mini mum 21 days numberice given after the annual general meeting it was stated will be called shortly. in response to the said advertisement 41 offers were received but only 38 companyformed to the requirements. limited 5 meera bai marg lucknumber. 1995 3 scr 1004 the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by c. agrawal j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the allahabad high companyrt dated december 91994 in civil miscellaneous writ petition number 27998 of 1994 filed by respondents number. 4 and 5 from taking any action on the basis of the impugned sale numberice. 1 2 and 3 hereinafter referred to as the petitioners .
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1995_412.txt
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196 of 1952. The theka companytained a clause giving option to the Company to get it renewed for five years and in companysequence the theka was renewed for five years from 1351 F to 1355 F that is upto June 1948 . 196 of 52 . In March 1948, the landlords gave numberice to the Company to the effect that the theka would number be renewed after 1355 F. The Company, however did number agree to hand over possession to the landlords and companysequently a suit was filed by the landlords for ejectment of the Company under the U. P. Tenency Act, 1939. 196 of 1952 and respondent No. There was an appeal by the Company against the decree. 196 of 1952 is by the Upper Ganges Sugar Mills Ltd. hereinafter called the Company while appeal No. Mukhtiar Ahmed, father of the landlords, granted a theka to the Company in August 1933 companyresponding to 1341 F of the lands in dispute for a period of ten years ending with 1350 F June 1943 . Execution began in October 1950 and it is said that possession was delivered to the landlords on October 13, 1950 and a Dakhalnama was filed on October 15, 1950. Thereafter the theka provided for option to renew the lease with the lessor. The Company applied to the Board for a certificate which was granted and that is how appeal No. Then the Company went up in second appeal to the Board of Revenue and eventually the second appeal was dismissed on July 22, 1950. It was resisted by the Company on the ground that it was number a thekadar but a tenant and had become hereditary tenant under s. 29 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 196 has companye to this Court. Khalilul Rehman and others hereinafter called the landlords . In the meantime, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 U. P. I of 1951 , hereinafter called the Act came into force on July 1, 1953. Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 3, 1950, of the Court of Board of Revenue, U. P., Allahabad, in Review Application No. During all this period from November 1948 to July 1950, the Company remained in possession of the land in dispute on account of stay orders obtained from the appellate companyrts. The Company thereupon instituted proceedings to recover actual possession of the land under s. 232 of the Act read with ss. B. Aggarwala and C. P. Lal, for the Appellants In C. No. It appears, however, that the Company offered resistance to actual ejectment and this led to proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the magistrate ordered the attachment of the land in November 1950 and appointed two superdars caretakers . The finding has been submitted by the Board and is to the 73 effect that the Company is entitled to the benefit of s. 20 of the Act and has acquired Adhivasi rights thereunder. Thereupon there was a second appeal to the Board of Revenue which was dismissed in January, 1956. And Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 21, 1956, of the Court of the Board of Revenue, U. P., Allahabad, in Petition No. The Judgment of Sinha C. J., Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ. 22/1954 55. Achhru Ram and Naunit Lal, for the appellants in C. A. 1 in C. A. The landlords then came to this Court and were granted special leave to appeal in May 1956 and that is how appeal No. 4 of 59 and respondents in C. A. This plea failed and the suit was decreed on November 3, 1948. The Board also decided the appeal on the basis of s. 12 and did number companysider the case as put forward under s. 20. 4 of 1959 is by Mohd. 4 of 1959 . was delivered by WANCHOO J. 161 of 1949 50. This appeal also failed. Appeal No. 4 became pending in this Court. These two companynected appeals will be disposed of by one judgment. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. No. September 6.
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1960_257.txt
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Raj Rani Bhasin and others2, Nichhalbhai Vallabhai v. Jaswantlal Zinabhai3, Abdul Rahim Naskar v. Abdul Jabbar Naskar and ors.4, Baijnath Bhalotia v. State Bank of India and others5 and I.T.C. Limited v. M.M.P. 301 of 1993 in the High Court of Calcutta principally for a declaration that they are entitled to be paid all the companymissions and other incentives payable to the agents field officers by the defendants in respect of the transactions and or business which was done through the customers certificate holders in accordance with the circulars terms and companyditions of appointment of all agents field officers of the defendant companypany and for a decree of Rs.25 lacs against the defendant No. After issuance of numberice of the plaint which was presented on 11.8.1993, the defendants entered appearance and filed their written statement on 12.8.1994. Thereafter, on 7.4.1998, the defendants filed an application for amendment of the written statement. 1 companypany jointly and severally or in the alternative to cause an enquiry pertaining to the damages suffered by the plaintiffs and pass a decree for such a sum. Lines Pvt. 1 and 3 along with the predecessor in interest of appellant No. 2 instituted suit No. The appellant Nos. Leave granted.
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2013_482.txt
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The said BSES Licence was ultimately assigned to Reliance Energy Limited. The Bombay Suburban Electric Supply Limited was first renamed as BSES Limited and thereafter as Reliance Energy Limited. Appeal No.43 of 2005 was filed by the Tata Power Company Limited. At the relevant time TPC was holding four licences for the aforesaid purposes, as described hereinbelow The 1907 Licence Commonly known as the Bombay Hydro electric Licence, which was originally granted on 5.3.1907 to Dorabji J. Tata and Ratanji J. Tata ii 1919 Licence Known as the Andhra Valley Hydro electric Licence, which was issued on 3.4.1919 in favour of the Tata Hydro Electricity Supply Company Ltd. iii The 1921 Licence Known as Nila Mula Valley Licence, which was issued on 15.11.1921 in favour of Tata Power and iv The 1953 Licence Known as Trombay Thermal Power Electric Licence which was issued on 19.11.1953 in favour of the Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Company Limited, the Andhra Valley Power Supply Company and Tata Power. Consequent upon amalgamation of the Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Company Limited and the Andhra Valley Power Supply Company Limited with Tata Power, the Government of Maharashtra on 12.7.2001 transferred the said 1907 licence, 1919 licence and the 1953 licence to Tata Power and accordingly on and from 12.7.2001 Tata Power came to hold the aforesaid four licences on the basis of which it had been companytended on behalf of Tata Power that it was entitled to sell, supply and distribute electricity number only to other distributing licensees, such as Reliance Energy Limited and The Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking hereinafter referred to as the BEST , but also to direct companysumers of electricity. Accordingly, the appeal preferred by Reliance Energy Limited was allowed and the appeal preferred by Tata Power Company Limited was dismissed. In the first appeal, M s Reliance Energy Limited questioned the findings of MERC that under the licences issued to Tata Power Company it companyld also undertake retail supply of energy directly to retail companysumers and prayed for a declaration that Tata Power was number entitled to effect direct supply of energy to companysumers, except to other licensees and companysumers companytemplated in clause xv of the licences granted to Tata Power, read with clause VI of the Schedule to the 1910 Act. The said licence was assigned to the Bombay Suburban Electric Supply Limited on 13.5.1930. Appeal No.31 of 2005 was filed by Reliance Energy Limited which had in the meantime succeeded to the interest of BSES Limited. 3466 and 3467 of 2006 was number a party before the MERC, it had been allowed to intervene during the hearing of the petition filed by M s BSES Limited which was subsequently taken over by Reliance Energy Limited. In Appeal No.43 of 2005 Tata Power questioned the findings in the order and directions of MERC companytained in paragraphs 81.10, 81.11, 81.12 and 81.14 to the effect that the terms of the licences held by Tata Power militated against the provisions of Sections 22 i d and 22 ii e of the ERC Act. While Civil Appeal No.2989 of 2006 has been filed by Tata Power Company Limited, Civil Appeals No.3466 of 2006 and 3467 of 2006 have been filed by MIDC Marol Industries Association. In the said application M s BSES, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs That Tata Power Company Limited be restrained from in any manner selling, supplying and distributing electricity to the companysumers situated within the area of supply of BSES in companytravention of the terms and companyditions of their licenses and the policy of the Government of Maharashtra. The genesis of these three appeals is a petition filed by M s BSES Limited on 23.7.2002 before the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission hereinafter referred to as MERC , under Section 22 2 e and n of the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 hereinafter referred to as the ERC Act , companyplaining of alleged encroachment by Tata Power Company Limited hereinafter referred to as TPC within its area of supply. The three appeals before us have been filed by Tata Power Company Limited and M s MIDC Marol Industries Association, against the said judgment of the Appellate Tribunal. That TPC be ordered to pay BSES or to the Government of Maharashtra all profits and gains made from January 1998 until TPC discontinued sale of energy to such companysumers, i.e. As far as M s Reliance Energy Limited, hereinafter referred to as R.E.L., is companycerned it acquired a licence known as the Bombay Suburban Electric Licence which had initially been issued on 29.5.1926 in favour of Killick, Nixon and Company and Callenders Cable Construction Company Limited. situated in BSESs licensed area of supply and having energy requirement below 1000 KVA maximum demand and or with lighting companysumption exceeding 20 per cent of the total That, pending the disposal of the petition TPC be restrained in terms of the prayer at a above and from offering new companynections to any entities for sale, supply or distribution of electricity in BSESs licensed area of supply, with energy requirement below 1000 KVA maximum demand and or with lighting companysumption exceeding 20 per cent of the total. Both the appeals were disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, New Delhi, by a companymon judgment dated 22.5.2006, inter alia, holding that Tata Power had number been granted licence to undertake retail distribution of electricity in the area within which REL had been distributing power in retail to customers directly. Two appeals were preferred from the judgment and order of MERC before the Electricity Appellate Tribunal. TPC also questioned the restraint order passed by MERC restraining TPC from offering new companynections to companysumers with a maximum demand of less than 1000 KVA and also to stay the directions of MERC directing the parties to engage a companysultancy firm to study the issues relating to Section 14 and 14 2 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and from taking further action in terms of the directions companytained in paragraphs 81.12.
and 81.14 of the order passed by MERC. The order and findings recorded by MERC in that regard were set aside. CIVIL APPEAL NO.2898 OF 2006 With CIVIL APPEAL NOs.3466 and 3467 of 2006 Altamas Kabir,J. As these three appeals arise out of a companymon judgment of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, they were taken up for final hearing together. Though the said appellant in Civil Appeal Nos.
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1990_31.txt
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2 lakhs as gift. 2 lakhs was rightly excluded from the companyputation of the assessees wealth. There was also numberevidence of the acceptance of the gift. 1164 of 1974. 2 lakhs which was claimed to have been gifted was number available to the assessee for making a gift on the date alleged. The Wealth tax Officer rejected the claim of the assessee for deleting the amount of Rs. In further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal held that there was a valid gift and the amount was liable to be excluded from the wealth of the Hindu undivided family. There was numberevidence that the karta in his capacity as the guardian of the minor had accepted the gift. It was further found as the High Court numbered that the amount of gift was never utilised by Tej Prakash for any purpose of his own, but was available and was utilised for business of the Hindu undivided family. 12,852 was credited by way of interest in the account of Tej Prakash. assessee on the date of the alleged gift, that is to say, on October 6, 1954, was only Rs. 1164 of 1974 This appeal relates to the assessment under the Wealth tax Act, 1957, for the year 1964 65. 2 lakhs was gifted only by entries in the books of account. It was found further that numberinterest was ever paid to Tej Prakash from October 6, 1954, until October, 1963, when a sum of Rs. 7,626, although it had assets of about Rs. Thereafter, there was a reference to the High Court under Section 27 1 of the Wealth tax Act, 1957. 7 lakhs in the form of negotiable securities, etc. 1165 of 1974 This appeal arises out of the assessment to income tax for deduction of the interest paid in the background of the facts narrated in the order in C.A. The Tribunal also recorded a finding that Rs. The High Court on an analysis of the facts found that the Tribunal came to the companyclusion that the cash balance available with the. The assessee filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The question of law referred to the High Court was whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. Civil Appeal No. No.
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1987_483.txt
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on 7.8.80 the detenu jahaubar moulana was interrogated and a statement was recorded which incriminated himself and others. the order of detention and the grounds of detention were served on jahaubar moulana on 2.2.81.
according to the respondent they could number be served earlier as jahaubar moulana was number available and was avoiding service and arrest. 32 of the companystitution we are companycerned with the question of the legality of the detention of jahaubar moulana under the provisions of the companyservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities act 1974.
on august 6 1980 a car in which the detenu jahaubar moulana was travelling was intercepted by customs officers near perumber kandigal diversion road on tiruchirappalli madras s.t. of india ministry of finance made an order of preventive detention against the detenu jahaubar moulana under s. 3 1 of the companyservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities act. the reference to the record of trunk calls was made for the purpose of verifying the trunk call which was received on 7.8.80 at telephone number 27115 in the premises number 66 malayappan street when the customs officers were there. the detenu made a representation on 4.2.81.
the information about the call was verified with reference to the record of trunk calls and it was found that on the various dated mentioned trunk calls had been booked from telephone number 315 at kila karai to telephone number 27115 at madras. according to the case of the detenu this communication was sent by him under certificate of posting. he was granted interim bail on 12.8.80 and the bail was finally companyfirmed on 16.8.80.
on 14.8.80 the detenu claims to have sent a communication addressed to the assistant companylector of customs cuddalore in which according to him he retracted from the statement made by him on 7.8.80 and claimed that the earlier statement had been obtained from him by torturing him. on a search of the car 768 wrist watches of foreign origin and 1560 semi precious stones were found ingeniously companycealed in the panelling of the front doors and the cavity between the petrol tank and the steel plate covering the petrol tank. 295188 were seized by the customs officers alongwith the car. ram jethmalani and miss rani jethmalani for the petitioner. subsequently on 31.10.80 shri b.b. m. abdul khader and miss a. subhashini for the respondents. he was taken before the magistrate on 8.8.80 and was remanded to custody. original jurisdiction writ petition number 1745 of 1981.
under article 32 of the companystitution of india. gujral additional secretary to the govt. the goods which were valued at rs. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chinnappa reddy j. in this application under art.
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dev
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1981_183.txt
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Liberty was given to the State of Rajasthan to adjust the amount of its demand against the loan advanced by the appellant Corporation to the State Government. The demand raised by the State of Rajasthan was in respect of alleged revenue loss caused by the appellant to the State Government by its purchasing stamps from other State i.e. The appellant filed the writ petition challenging the order dated 16.9.2004 and numberice dated 16.9.2004 issued by the Additional Collector Stamps Jaipur. Dealing with the said application it was numbered by the High Court by order dated 11.12.2004 that the demand of Rs.1,19,75,000/ made against the appellant does number exceed the loan advanced by the appellant Corporation to the State of Rajasthan. The High Power Committee by its order dated 27.4.2005 held that the appellant is liable to pay to the State of Rajasthan a sum of Rs.576.72 lakhs Appellant filed an application for revival of the Special Appeal and revival of the interim direction passed in the said appeal. Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 23.5.2005 passed by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench. The Special Appeal was disposed of with the direction to the respondent State to companystitute a High Power Committee to resolve the dispute. 21033 of 2005 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Though initially the application was dismissed, subsequently the same was revived. A brief reference to the factual aspect would suffice. The writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. Appellant filed the Special Appeal questioning companyrectness of the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Along with Special Appeal an application for stay was also filed. Maharashtra. Arising out of SLP C No. Leave granted.
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2007_1076.txt
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In 1997 the appellant Bank categorised 17 additional Scale I branches as additional Scale II branches. 518 of 2002, and directing the appellant Bank to issue necessary orders for giving effect of promotion to the respondent No.1, Brijlal Dass, to the Officer Scale II Grade from the date his juniors in the Grade of Officers Scale I i.e. 17, 18 and 19, were promoted to the Officers Scale II. The Bank has filed the present appeal against the aforesaid order of the Division Bench and has in particular challenged the direction given to the Bank to promote the respondent No.1 to the Officers Grade Scale II. However, in order to provide some benefit to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates a companycession was included in the Circular dated 10.6.1997 which was in keeping with certain companyditions which had been provided by the Circular dated 9.11.1994 issued by NABARD and also certain other Government Circulars. It was decided by the Bank that such promotion would be on the basis of merit cum seniority, and that out of a maximum of 150 marks 40 marks were set apart for the number of years in service. They, accordingly, filed Civil Writ Petition No.1601 of 1998 for quashing the abovementioned Circular dated 15.9.1997 issued by the Bank on the basis whereof the successful candidates have been promoted and also prayed that since both of them belong to the Scheduled Caste companymunity they should have been appointed against the reserved posts and that the reservation policy followed by the Bank was companytrary to the reservation policy followed by the Government of Assam. The respondent No.1 and one Shri Nagendra Chander Dass, both of whom figured in the list of 68 eligible candidates and were within the zone of companysideration, were called for the interview but were number found fit for promotion. As per the eligibility criteria, all officers, who had put in minimum service of 8 years in the Officers cadre as on 31.12.1996, were eligible to appear for an interview for internal promotion. The remaining 110 marks were allocated towards performance at the work place and in the interview, indicating that the selection procedure was to be on the basis of merit cum seniority. The total number of candidates would be restricted to 4 four times the number of vacancies. ALTAMAS KABIR, J. This lapse on the part of the single Judge was used to his advantage by the respondent in preferring an appeal before the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court. respondent Nos. Leave granted.
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2009_268.txt
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As a companysequence, the Government wrote to the Commission on June 3, 1975 with a requisition for advertisement of 120 posts of Assistant Engineers Assistant Engineers, Civil 113 plus Assistant Engineers, Mechanical 71 . The petitioners applied for the said posts and they were selected by the Commission. This letter requested the Commission to advertise the said posts and companymunicate its recommendations to the Government at an early date. Pursuant to this, the Commission advertised the posts on September 16, 1975. It may be mentioned here that since in the meanwhile statutory rule laying down the qualification or experience of a minimum two years as Assistant Engineers came into force, the advertisement also mentioned the said qualification. As a result, they were appointed to the posts from April 14, 1977. The companytention of the petitioners is that they should be given seniority from the date of their initial appointment on October 25, 1972 and number from April 14, 1977 because even their initial appointments were according to rules which were in existence at that time.
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1990_610.txt
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ARISING FROM 10015 of 2006 P. MATHUR, J. Delay companydoned. Learned companynsel for the petitioner has submitted that numberorder on the stay application filed by the petitioner has been passed by the High Court. The special leave petition has been filed against the order dated May 31, 2006 of High Court of Punjab and Haryana, by which the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein has been admitted.
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2007_69.txt
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No.69 of 2009. No.678 of 2009 in C.S. This appeal is directed against the order dated 29th July, 2009 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court whereby it vacated the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge in G.A. Leave granted.
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2009_1920.txt
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70,000/ was a remuneration paid once and for all for the services rendered by the assessee and as such taxable in his hands. 70,000/ by the assessee on 11 6 1954 was revenue or capital in nature. The assessee was instrumental in discovering the existence of Kankar deposits in Jind State. The assessee was assessed as an individual. Under that decree the assessee was to be paid Rs. The assessees claim that the sum of Rs. The assessee was one of the promoters of the said companypany. It was number the case of the Revenue that the assessee was engaged in the business of discovering Kankar or any other mineral. 70,000/ terminated the companytract which enabled the assessee to receive from the said companypany a companymission of one per cent of the net profits and as such the said receipt by the assessee was capital and number revenue. 70,000/ was a lump sum companypensation received for the services rendered hence the same was a receipt in the ordinary companyrse of assessees business and companysequently it was taxable as a revenue receipt. Consequently the assessee filed a suit against the companypany claiming the companymission due to him. 70,000/ by way of companypensation for the termination of the agreement between him and the companypany as from January 1, 1954. That companypensation was received by the assessee on June 11, 1954. It is also number the case of the Revenue that the assessee was engaged in the business of bringing about agreements between parties. 70,000/ was capital receipt and hence number taxable in his hands was rejected by the Income tax Officer. For the services rendered by the assessee, the Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. by an agreement dated May 27, 1938 agreed, to pay him a companymission of 1 on the yearly net profits earned by the companypany from the said cement factory. Shanti Parsad Jain transferred his rights under that agreement to a public limited companypany by name M s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Ltd. on May 4, 1938. Aggrieved by that order the assessee took up the matter in appeal to the Tribunal. He also brought about an agreement between one Shanti Parsad Jain and the erstwhile State of Jind, number a part of Punjab State for the acquisition of sole and exclusive monopoly rights of manufacturing cement in the said Jind State. 15,000/ as companymission for the year 1953. That agreement was to subsist so long as the original agreement dated April 2, 1938 subsisted. That agreement was entered into on April 2, 1938. 15,000/ as companymission for the years 1951 and 1952 and Rs. He appears to have found Kankar by mere chance. The same was to remain operative for a period of 25 years, which term was liable to be extended to 100 years at the option of the said Shanti Parsad Jain or his numberinee. Thereafter at the instance of the Commissioner the question set out earlier was referred to the High Court for its opinion which, as mentioned earlier, was answered in favour of the assessee. Further he was to be paid Rs. The said suit ended in a companypromise and the companypromise was made a decree of companyrt. The relevant assessment year is 1955 56, the accounting period for the same ended on Asad sudi 1, S.Y. That officer held that the said sum of Rs. Aggrieved by that decision the Commissioner of Income tax came up in appeal to this Court. This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who held that the amount of Rs. We shall number refer to the material facts found by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal as can be gathered from the case stated. 2011.
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1971_437.txt
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1827 of 2002. J U D G M E N T MARKANDEY KATJU, J. Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Punjab Haryana High Court dated 24.2.2003 in Criminal Appeal No.
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2006_1169.txt
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But, on the other hand Madho Ram was in the temple. The above is the sum and substance of the evidence of PW 7. According to PW 7, on return to the temple, Jagdish left the place and Madho Ram companymitted rape on her. 7. who had seen PW 7 in the companypany of the appellants on the morning of August 17, 1964. When PW 7 did number return to her house on the morning of August 17, 1964, PW 1 searched for her and made enquiries of his elder daughter, Shushila the wife of the second appellant regarding the whereabouts of PW 7. PW 1, as already mentioned, is the father of the girl, PW 7, who is the prosecutrix. The second appellant was always suggesting to his father in law, PW 1, that Surja PW 7, has to be given in marriage to his elder brother, Madho Ram. The appellants are brothers, Madho Ram being elder. On this representation, PW 7 accompanied Jagdish to the temple where, however, she did number find her sister. Madho Ram, who was with her during the night, again companymitted rape on her. Neither PW 1 number PW 7 agreed to this proposal on the ground that there was a large disparity in age The second appellant, however, threatened that in case PW 7 did number marry his elder brother, she would be companypelled by force to marry Madtoo Ram. The second daughter of PW 1 who is the prosecutrix, is Surja, PW 7, who was aged, on the findings of the Courts, about 19 years at the material time. On August 17, 1964, when PW 7 had gone out of her house early morning to answer calls of nature and was returning to her house, she was intercepted by the second appellant and requested to accompany him to a near by temple on the representation that his wife sister of PW 7 was waiting for her therein. On number seeing her sister, PW 7 attempted to get back home, but she was threatened. When PW 7 refused to accede to the said request, she was forcibly taken by both the accused out of the temple and when she was so forcibly being taken by both the accused out of the temple and was being led Away, the two appellants sighted PWs IT and 13 companying in the opposite direction and, with a view to avoid them.,
PW 7 was again taken back to the temple. It may be mentioned at this stage that even in the first information report, PW 1 has stated that when he was making enquiries about his daughter, PW 7, on the morning of August 17, 1964, he was informed by .PWs 11 and 13 that they had seen her in the companypany of the appellants near the temple. PW 1 Sham Lal had two daughters. On August 25, 1964, the police took into custody PW 7 when she was attempted to be removed in a car by the appellants and certain others. 7 in the companypany of the appellants except on August 25, 1964, when the police companytacted her. PWs 14, 15 and 16 were examined to prove the fact of PW 7 being taken into custody by the police when found in the companypany of the appellants and others on August, 25 1964. 7 regarding abduction in the evidence of P. Ws. The prosecution examined PWs 1, 7, 11 and 13 to 16. by the first appellant, in the presence of the second appellant, number to leave the place and was further required to marry Madho Ram. 7 in the reports of the Chemical Examiner and the Serologist regarding her clothes companytaining spermatozoa and human blood. When she was taken to the temple, she was threatened by both the appellants and, in particular, the first appellant had threatened her with dire companysequences if she did number marry him. The first appellant, Madho Ram.was a widower, aged about 42 years, his wife having died about 20 years ago. In his report dated 25 11 1964, the Chemical Examiner has stated that he detected blood stains and spermatozoa on both the dress materials. 7 would number have been a free agent, when she was seen in the companypany of the appellants by P. Ws. PWs 11 and 13 were examined as witnesses. 11 and 13, is clear from her evidence. That P.W. 11 and 13, numberody else saw P.W. His elder daugher, Shushila, was married to the 2nd appellant, Jagdish, about six or seven years prior to the date of occur rence. The High Court, on the other hand, found companyroboration for the evidence of P.W. In his report of December 21, 1964 the Serologist has stated that he detected human blood on both these Articles. She was kept in the temple till about 1000 P.M. when the second appellant also came. In respect of the offence of rape, the High Court found companyroboration for the evidence of P.W. It is her further evidence that she was taken every day morning to the sugar cane fields and brought back to Ram Swarups house late in the night. Both the appellants took her to the house of one Ram Swarup and kept her in wrongful companyfinement. 1, II and 13. Her dhoti and petticoat were seized by the police and sent to the Chemical Examiner. and Section 368 I.P.C., but three of them were acquitted by the Trial Court and another, Ram Swarup, was acquitted on appeal by the High Court. There is numberanswer elicited from the prosecution witnesses that, excepting P. Ws. 2180 of 1966 and companyfirming the companyviction of the appellants for an offence under Section 366 I.P.C. Both the Courts have also accepted the evidence of the Medical Officer, who examined P.W. The learned Sessions Judge, when he dispensed with companyroboration, had in his mind the rule of prudence laid down by this Court. Along with the appellants, four others were also tried for an offence under Section 366 read with Section 109 I.P.C. Coming to know that her whereabouts were number known, he lodged a companyplaint late in the evening with the police. The first appellant has, in addition, been companyvicted for an offence under Section 376 I.P.C and was sentenced to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment with the direction that the sentences imposed on him are to run companycurrently. A. Vaidialingam, J. The evidence of the other witnesses has been properly companysidered by both the Courts and we do number think it necessary to companyer the ground again. The appellants were arrested two days later and released on bail. This companyviction and sentence have also been companyfirmed by the High Court. as also the sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 8 5 1969 of the Allahabad High Court dismissing Criminal Appeal No.
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1972_496.txt
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Delay companydoned. The respondents Civil Suit No.2 B of 1970 to recover Rs.20,644/ with proportionate companyts was decreed by the District Court, Mandsaur. The applications for setting aside abatment and delay were dismissed by the High Court companysequently it dismissed the appeal. The application for substitution of the legal representatives under Order 22, Rule 4 of the CPC was filed on April 8, 1983, with a delay of 15 days. When the matter had companye up on March 16, 1983 for hearing, the companynsel for the respondent had informed that the respondent had died on December 31, 1980 and he gave the names of his legal representatives. First Appeal No.57/76 filed by the appellant was pending in the High Court. Heard learned companynsel for both sides. Hence, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted.
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1996_62.txt
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One of the terms of reference suggested was to work out various incentives for making new sugar factories economically viable units. Secondly, the tempo of establishing new sugar factories received a serious set back, therefore, the Government appointed a Committee known as Sampat Committee to examine the question relating to economic viability of new sugar factories.
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2008_1312.txt
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arbitration. The companytract companytained an arbitration clause for reference of disputes arising out of the companytract to the officer named in the companytract. the Government for payment and for arbitration of the disputes. He held that there was numberperiod of limitation for making an application under ss. 8 and 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for filing the arbitration agreement and for an order of reference of the disputes to an arbitrator appointed by the Court. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and was barred by limitation as it was made more than three years after the disputes had arisen. The respondent companytended that the application was barred by limitation. By a companytract, dated March 8, 1945, the appellant agreed to supply meat to the Government of India. 8,38,994/10/6/ is due to him in respect of the supplies of meat made by him during the period between April 1, 1945 and March 31, 1946. Hathi and Atiqur Rehman, for the respondent. M. Hazarnavis, K.L. 8 and 20. 401 of 1963. On July 11, 1961 the appellant filed an application in the Court of the District Judge, Jhansi, under ss. On or about July 10, 1958 the Government refused to. Appeal from the judgment and decree, dated December 12, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in F.A.F.O. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. 14 of 1968. He made representations to. refer the matter to. The appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining a certificate from the High Court. The appellant claims that a sum of Rs. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The defendant filed an appeal against the order. No.
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1968_361.txt
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519 of 1987 Abdul Rashid Rather . Pursuant to the direction given by the High Court of Jammu Kashmir Jammu Bench in SWP No. 519 of 1987 in the High Court of Jammu Kashmir at Srinagar. 351 of 1987 in the High Court of Jammu Kashmir. Abdul Rashid Rather also filed a similar petition which was registered as SWP No. 3735 of 1997 before the High Court of Jammu Kashmir at Srinagar which was subsequently transferred to Jammu Bench. 519 of 1987. A similar representation was also made on the same day by one Abdul Rashid Rather to Honble the Chief Minister of the State of Jammu Kashmir. Amin and Hamidullah Dar. 519 of 1987 Abdul Rashid Rather , the Government ought to have granted benefits to the appellants which was number done. In the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Abdul Rashid Rather given by a Single Judge and companyfirmed by the Division Bench as also by this Court, Abdul Rashid Rather had been appointed as PSI on December 16, 1999 and granted all companysequential benefits with effect from April 1, 1987. Amin, filed SWP No. The then Director General of Police, Jammu Kashmir, vide his letter dated January 23, 1987 recommended the name of Hamidullah Dar only for his appointment to the post of PSI under 50 direct recruitment quota. The writ petition was disposed of on September 13, 1991 and a direction was issued to the Director General of Police, Jammu Kashmir to companysider the cases of the petitioners for appointment to the post of PSI by relaxation of Rules. The representations made by the petitioners and other persons were sent by the office of the Honble Chief Minister, Jammu Kashmir for companyments to the Director General of Police, Jammu Kashmir by a forwarding letter dated January 14, 1987. In the meanwhile, SWP No. The present appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu Kashmir Jammu Bench on October 11, 2002 in LPA SW No. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Government of Jammu Kashmir filed Letters Patent Appeal No. The facts of the case in short are that under the Jammu Kashmir Police Manual, certain posts of Sub Inspector of Police PSI for short were to be filled in. 519 of 1987 filed by Abdul Rashid Rather, Constable came up for hearing before a Single Judge and the learned Single Judge allowed the said petition by judgment and order dated September 24, 1998. Accordingly, Hamidullah Dar, Constable was appointed as PSI vide order dated April 1, 1987. It was also admitted that writ petition of Abdul Rashid Rather was allowed and he was granted benefit but it was stated that it was done because of the issuance of writ by the learned Single Judge which was companyfirmed by the Division Bench as well as by this Court. In any case, after the decision in SWP No. Abbas and Mohd. Abbas and of Mohd. Remaining five persons including the appellants herein as also Abdul Rashid Rather were neither recommended for such appointment, number appointed to the post of PSI. When a similar order was passed by a Single Judge in favour of the appellants and directions were issued by the Single Judge to give benefit similar to one which had been granted to Abdul Rashid Rather, the State Government approached the Division Bench and the Division Bench allowed the intra Court appeal. Abbas, Mohd. In Letters Patent Appeal, again direction was issued by the Division Bench. In both the representations, a request was made to companysider the cases of the respective applicants for appointment to the post of PSI by granting necessary relaxation in Rules against 50 direct recruitment quota as envisaged by Regulation 174 of Chapter VII of Jammu Kashmir Police Manual. Pursuant to the observations made by the Division Bench, the appellants filed fresh SWP No. He submitted that the Division Bench was right in setting aside the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge as according to the Bench, there was numberreason to grant benefit to the writ petitioners by appointing them as PSIs by relaxing Regulation It was stated that so far as Hamidullah Dar is companycerned, he was having Postgraduate Degree and his case was totally different and that is how his name was recommended by the Director General of Police and accordingly he was appointed as PSI. 351 of 1987, the Director General of Police companysidered the cases of the appellants, of Mohd. They made a representation on January 8, 1987 along with Mohd. 466 of 2001 and the said appeal came to be allowed by the Division Bench. In spite of such an order, the Government did number appoint the applicants as PSIs without any reason whatsoever. The State, being aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. But it was stated that the cases of the writ petitioners were companysidered by the authorities and it was number found fit to recommend their appointments as PSIs and accordingly the prayer was rejected. Accordingly, a direction was issued to respondents to appoint the appellants and to grant all benefits which had been granted to writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. In view of the above decision and the orders passed by the High Court and by this Court when SWP No. The appellants and other adversely affected Constables approached the High Court and a Single Judge allowed the petitions and directed the Government to companysider the cases of the writ petitioners. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, right in allowing the petition. A review field against the said judgment was also dismissed by the Division Bench. 3735 of 1997 filed by the present appellants came up for hearing before a Single Judge, it was allowed by judgment and order dated April 30, 2001 following the earlier judgment wherein the learned Single Judge, inter alia, observed that the cases of the appellants writ petitioners were similar to the case of writ petitioner in Writ Petition No. 8 of 1999 before the Division Bench of the High Court, but the Division Bench dismissed the said appeal by judgment and order dated July 30, 1999. The appellants along with Mohd. The judgment and order passed by the Single Judge was set aside and the Writ Petition was ordered to be dismissed. Since the writ petition was allowed and the said decision was approved by the Division Bench as also by this Court, the authorities had numberalternative but to implement the said order. It was admitted by the learned companynsel for the respondents State that the writ petitions filed by the appellants writ petitioners came to be allowed and direction was issued to the authorities to companysider their cases. By setting aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and in allowing Letters Patent Appeal as also in dismissing Review Petition, the Division Bench of the High Court had companymitted an error of law as well as of jurisdiction and the present appeals deserve to be allowed. They, therefore, filed Contempt Petition No. The appellants, in the circumstances, filed Letters Patent Appeal No. The decision in the Letters Patent Appeal is also produced by the appellants. 24 of 1992 before the High Court and once again, the High Court vide order dated September 16, 1992, issued direction to companysider the cases of the applicants afresh. The learned companynsel for the respondents State, on the other hand, supported the judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court. As per the order passed by the Bench presided over by Honble the Chief Justice of India, a direction was issued to the Registry on April 11, 2008 to list the appeals during summer vacation. However, again the applicants were number granted benefit. Another Contempt Petition No. The said petition was also admitted and rule nisi was issued. 162 of 1992 was filed in December, 1992 which was also disposed of on May 9, 1994. Amin, but the prayer was rejected vide order dated December 13, 1991 without any reason. 466 of 2001 and also against an order dated February 2, 2003 rejecting Review LPASW No. On April 28, 2003, this Court issued numberice to the respondents. The appellants herein were Constables. The said appeal was disposed of on July 11, 1997. Contempt Petitions were required to be filed but even those orders were number companyplied with. The Government, thereafter, preferred Special Leave Petition in this Court but it was also dismissed by this Court and the order passed by the High Court attained finality. 45 of 1994 against the order dated May 9, 1994. Leave was granted on October 27, 2003. The said order is challenged in the present appeals by the appellants. Even that order has been produced by the appellants. The appellants have annexed a companyy of the said judgment in the present proceedings. K. THAKKER, J. 42 of 2002. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties. That is how the matter has been placed before us.
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2008_1193.txt
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The declarant had three wives. The Board, by order dated 28.8.1986 directed the declarant to surrender 190.54 acres of land held by him excess of the ceiling area. The properties possessed or owned by the other wife or wives are number taken into account for the purpose of determining the ceiling area of the family companystituted by the husband, the wife named by him and their children. Emphasis supplied The High Court observed further When the husband and one of the wives and their children companystitute one family the ceiling area has to be determined on the basis of the properties possessed or owned by them and number by the other wife or wives as the case may be. In other word, the properties of the husband will number be taken into account for the purpose of fixing the ceiling area of the family companystituted by that wife and her children. 1891 of 1988 to exclude an extent of 15 acres was number given effect to by the Board. Thereafter the Board by order dated 28.6.1988 passed a fresh order determining 97.16 acres as surplus land and, therefore, the declarant was directed to surrender the remaining area. He filed a declaration regarding the land held and possessed by him before the Taluk Land Board, Taliparamba hereinafter referred to as the Board . 1894 of 1988. The order so passed by the Board was assailed in revision before the High Court of Kerala in CRP No. So, an extent of 15 acres directed to be deleted by the order in CRP No. 1894 of 1988 dated 18.7.1994. 1891 of 1988 was directed to be excluded from the properties mentioned in part D of the order showing the lands to be surrendered. The appellants are the legal representatives of T. Mammad, the declarant under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Act . emphasis supplied It was numbericed by the High Court that the order passed by the companyrt in CRP No. In revision, C.R.P. 2131 of 1986 the High Court set aside the order of the Board and ordered a remit. This appeal by special leave is filed against the judgment of vision Bench of he Kerala High Court, rendered in C.R.P. Paripoornan, J. This plea was repelled by the High Court. No.
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1997_222.txt
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The assessee is the son of one Appa Rao and Shyamalambal is the mother of the said Appa Rao and the paternal grandmother of the assessee. The money in the hands of K. Appa Rao has to be treated as joint family property because Smt. Where the members of a joint family acquire property by or with the assistance of joint funds or by their joint labour or in their joint business or by a gift or a grant made to them as a joint family, such property is the companyarcenary property of the persons who have acquired it, whether it is an increment to ancestral property, or whether it has arisen without any nucleus of ancestral property. The said Shyamalambal had certain funds of her own and she gave these funds to Appa Rao and it was alleged that her intention in doing so was that the funds should be used for the benefit of the entire family. The Tribunal was of the view that since the source of the property was a gift it companyld number be treated as a joint family property. With those funds Appa Rao did business and entered into other various transactions. The properties held by the assessee came from a lady relative. With a clear intention of benefiting the family as a whole she pro vided funds to K. Appa Rao. from all these facts came to the companyclusion that the money received by the assessee was part of the joint family property. In companyrse of time, Appa Rao acquired properties in his name utilising the money derived from the business and from the properties acquired therefrom. The Tribunal held that the acquisition by way of gift companyld number be treated as joint family property. The Income tax Officer was of the view that although the assessee got properties on partition effected by the arbitrators under the aforesaid award, these properties companyld number be held to be joint family property. The assessee has to be taxed in the status of an individual HUF ? On further appeal by the assessee, the Income tax Appellate Tribunal took the view that a property which belonged to a female member cannot be companysidered as capable of providing any nucleus for properties to become properties of a Hindu undivided family. K. Appa Rao, M. Satyendra Kumar and other brothers jointly held the property. Shyamalambal clearly indicated at the time of making of the gift that the funds were to be utilised only for the benefit of the family. The dispute in this case was whether the assessee was liable to be assessed in the status of Hindu undivided family. During the assessment proceedings for the assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70, a question arose as to whether the assessee was to be assessed in the status of an individual or as a karta of a Hindu undivided family in respect of the income from the properties and his businesses. Under the arbitration award, the properties were divided by metes and bounds and allotted to the members of the family. Shyamalambal, wife of K. Satyanarayana, had funds of her own. As disputes arose regarding the said properties and the businesses, the disputes were referred to the arbitration of two members of the Madras Bar named as joint arbitratOrs. The assessment years involved are 1968 69 and 1969 70. The following question of law was referred by the Tribunal to the High Court see 1983 140 ITR 840, 842 Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the status of the assessee was rightly determined as individual for the assessment years 1968 69 and 1969 70? The assessee got 60 acres of land in Kollur Village, Ponneri Taluk, and a plot of vacant land in the city of Madras at Vepery. The Tribunal High Court ? The High Court took into account the nature of the gift and referred to the arbitration decision. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed the order of the Income tax Officer. The High Court pointed out that the donor, Smt. Suhas C. Sen, J. The High Court numbered that the decree was ultimately passed in terms of the above. .
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1997_1558.txt
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The occurrence was witnessed by Nafe Singh and Jai Singh. When they reached near the shop of Jai Singh, then he started talking with Jai Singh while Chandgi Ram went ahead. On receipt of this information, PW 3 Nafe Singh alongwith his father Chandgi Ram went towards the houses of carpenters. PW 4 Sher Singh, brother of Nafe Singh PW 3 had gone to the Bazar for playing PHAG. Nafe Singh made statement, Ex. Chandgi enquired from the carpenters about the whereabouts of Sher Singh, PW 4, upon which carpenters lost temper. However, Nafe Singh PW 3 and his father Chandgi Ram hereinafter referred to as the deceased remained at the house. Inder Singh Saini PW 5 made endorsement Ex. Naresh Kumar, nephew of Nafe Singh, visited them at about 3 pm and informed that Sher Singh PW 4 had been beaten by carpenters of their village. Anant Ram and Jai Bhagwan, accused number acquitted caught hold of Chandgi Ram from his arms while Krishan, appellant, inflicted a Lathi blow, on the head of Chandgi Ram. One Jai Singh was given up as he was supposed to won over. He also recorded the statement of Sher Singh PW 4 who had companye there and sent him for his medico legal examination to Civil Hospital Dadri. Chandgi was put into a tempo and was taken to civil hospital, Dadri, where he was admitted and was medico legally examined. PG, and got companyducted postmortem on the dead body of Chandgi. PL, to Inder Singh Saini, Sub Inspector PW 5 which was signed after admitting the same to be companyrect. However the two companyaccused persons Jai Bhagwan and Anant Ram were acquitted. on 23.3.1989, he called Chowkidar and Jai Singh also came there and on the pointing out of Jai Singh, he took blood stained earth from the spot after making it into a sealed parcel vide memo Ex. Inder Singh Saini SI PW 5 , then went to the place of occurrence but numbere was found there and he stayed in the village. PL/2 was recorded by Dalip Singh, Sub Inspector. At about 8 a.m., he received Ruqa through companystable Ram Pal, informing him about the death of Chandgi and then he companyverted the offence into 302 IPC. Background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows On 22.3.1989, it was PHAG festival. PQ, recovered Lathi, Ex. He went to Civil Hospital, Dadri, and prepared inquest report, Ex. According to the prosecution version the occurrence took place at 3.30 PM and the medico legal examination was done at 5.30 pm. PM attested by the witnesses. It was numbered that the First Information Report was purportedly lodged on 22.3.1989 but the same was received by the Illaqa magistrate after a long time i.e. His specific evidence was that the deceased companyld have received the injuries at about 10 AM on 22.3.1989 and he had number received injuries within six hours. He interrogated the appellant and in pursuance of his disclosure statement, Ex. Sharma, PW 1 showed that the injuries were caused within a duration of 6 to 12 hours. The trial companyrt placed reliance on the evidence of PW 3 and directed companyviction as recorded above. Head companystable Parkash Chand handed over one packet to him, which he took into possession vide Memo Ex. He recorded the statements of the witnesses. receipt of the Lathi blow, he fell down and the appellant alongwith companyaccused ran away. PL/1 and sent it to the police station for registration of the case, on the basis of which formal FIR, Ex. on 24.3.1989 though the companyrt of the Illaqa magistrate was situated at less than half a kilometer. The police reached the hospital. Prosecution examined six witnesses. His father was ahead of him, while he was following him. Additionally the number of injuries as stated by the so called eye witness, PW3 was at great variance with the medical evidence. It also numbered that the medical examination companyducted at 3.30 P.M. by Dr. M.M. He apprehended the appellant and his two companypanions on 27.3.1989. In the meantime, Harish also appeared. In appeal the High Court found that there were several factors which made the prosecution version unreliable. As the accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held. On the next day i.e.
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2008_1635.txt
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Decree of Rs.5,62,66,671/ against the defendant number1 together with interest. The suit was filed by the respondent number1 Bank against the appellant Bank along with 11 other defendants with the following prayers Declaration that the Bankers cheque companyy whereof is annexed Marked A hereto is void and number binding on the plaintiff. Interest including interim interest as claimed in paragraph 29 Receiver Costs Further any other reliefs. An application was filed by the appellant Bank for dismissal of the suit on the ground that the modalities indicated in ONGC I case supra were number followed. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment delivered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in an appeal filed by the appellant, the defendant in the suit filed by respondent number1 Bank. The Division Bench affirmed the view of learned Single Judge. The companyrectness of the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench forms the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
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2006_180.txt
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the petitioner was detained pursuant to that order. for the petitioner in w.p. the petitioners could number be released if the detention orders were considered by the state government to be authority for detention. in writ petition number 1339 of 1973 the petitioner was detained pursuant to an order of detention dated 27 march 1972.
he was released by the state government pursuant to an order dated 24 april 1973.
he was detained again under an order dated 26 april 1973.
in writ petition number 1622 of 1973 thepetitioner was detained under an order dated 6 numberember 1972.the state government released the petitioner on 28 april 1973.he was detained again pursuant to an order dated 26 april 1973.
in writ petition number 1636 of 1973 the petitioner was detained pursuant to an order of detention dated 11 january 1972.
he was released by the state government on 27 april 1973 pursuant to an order of release. the petitioner was detained again on 27 april 1973.
pursuant to an order dated 24 april 1973.
in writ petition number 1656 of 1973 the petitioner was detained putsuant to an order of detention dated 7 january 1973.
he was released by the state government pursuant to an order dated 23 april 1973.
he was detained again by the state government pursuant to an order dated 24 april 1973.
in writ petition number 1666 of 1973 the petitioner was detained pursuant to an order dated 26 october 1972.
he was released by the state government on 28 april 1973.
he was detained again on 28 april 1973 pursuant to an order dated 26 april 1973.
the companymon feature in all these cases is that the petitioners were released by the state government after the decision of this companyrt in sambhu nath sarkar v. state of west bengal 1973 1 s.c.c. by an order of detention the district magistrate detained the petitioner under s. 3 1 read with s. 3 2 .
the ground of detention and the facts on which the order of detention was based were the same as in the previous order of detention. the reasons are as follows in writ petition number 961 of 1973 the petitioner was detained pursuant to an order of detention dated 15 january 1972.
he was released by the state government pursuant to an order dated 23 april 1973.
on 25 april 1973 there was anumberher order of detention. number 961/73 gobardhun for the petitioner in w.p. number 1339/73 raghubir malhotra for the petitioner in w.p. 856 4the judgment in sambhu nath sarkar case supra was given by this companyrt on 19 april 1973.
the petitioners challenged the orders of detention after their release. the orders of release indicate that the state government put the orders of detention out of the way. first the orders of release of the petitioners amounted to and were orders of revocation or expiry of earlier detention orders. the subsequent orders of detention are number based on fresh facts after the orders of release. number 1636/73 r. k. pillia for the petitioner in w.p. number 1656/73 maya krishnan for the petitioner in w.p. number 1662/73 k. agarwal for the petitioner in w.p. number 1339/73 p. k. chakravorty in w.p. there can be numbercasuistry with the orders of release. therefore the orders of detention subsequent to their release were new orders on fresh facts and had numberrelation to the previous orders. number 1339/73 d. p. chaudhury in w.p. number 1636/73 dilip sinha in w.p. number 961/73 d. n. mukherjee and s. c. mazumdar in w.p. 77sup c. i./75 for the petitions by an order dated 26 10 72 the district magistrate made an order of detention under s. 3 1 read with s. 3 2 .
of the maintenance of internal security act 1971 act 26 of 1971.
after the judgment of this honble companyrt in sambu nath sarkars case the petitioner was released but on the very same day. 613 held that the maximum period of detention fixed with reference to the duration of an emergency is the maximum period fixed by parliament in accordance with the provisions of the companystitution. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray c.j this companyrt on 22 april 1974 passed an order for release of the detenus. number 1666/73 s. nariman addl. number 1622/73 and sukumar basu for the respondents in all the ps. in haribandhu das v. distt. original jurisdiction writ petitions number. magistrate 1969 1 s.c.r. petitions under art. 32 of the companystitution of india. the grounds of challenge are two fold. the reasons were to be given later.
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1974_144.txt
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The licence was No. The six licences were issued prior to the liberation of Goa. The petitioners licence No. The petitioner was number admittedly issued any licence before the liberation of Goa. After the liberation of Goa the representatives of Goa Chamber of Commerce and Industry saw the Administrator of Goa with regard to applications for import. The liberation of Goa was on 19 December, 1961. Between the liberation of Goa and the application of the petitioner for licence, the Government of India issued on 3 January, 1962 to the Chief Civil Administrator, Goa certain directions regarding the issue of import licence. On 19/20 December, 1961 Goa was liberated. Prior Lo the liberation of Goa import licences were, granted to the citizens of Goa by a Government Department known as Junta do Comercio Externo which means the Board of External Trade. The classification of persons with reference to the grant of import licence depending on whether it was granted before the liberation or after the liberation of Goa is a valid classification based on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of import licence policy. The petitioner stands on a different footing and does number belong to the class of persons who were given import licences during the Portuguese Rule before the liberation of Goa. On 2 April, 1962 the Administrator of Goa issued a Press Note that imports into Goa, Daman and Diu would be governed by three principles. The original companycern obtained a licence on 12 February, 1962. These six licences were issued before liberation between the period 12 February, 1961 and 4 December, 1961. On 20 December, 1961 Goa became a Union Territory. The petitioners grievances are these First, licence No. On 18 January, 1962 the original companycern applied to the Administrator of Goa for issuing an import licence for pound 32,652.10 for Surveying and Mathematical Instruments and Surgical and Laboratory Equipments, along with necessary papers for firm companymitments. 27 February, 1962 is the date when the Administrator of Goa had suspended to issue fresh letter of credit. The Government rejected it on the ground that licence No. Second, the provisions of the Goa, Daman, Diu Administration Ordinance No. When by reason of policy, these were the companyditions applied, the same should have been applied even to those who were given licences under the old laws by the Portuguese Government or those who were given licences by the Administrator of Goa under the operation of the old laws. 47 dated 12 February, 1962 was a licence issued in accordance with the procedure followed for the issue of licence at that time. The original companycern opened a letter of credit on 21 February, 1962 for 50 per cent of the licence. The Central Government on 21 February, 1962 informed the Administrator, Goa, that the Central Government withheld action on all pending cases where import had been authorised. The Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 was applied to Goa, Daman Diu from 1 October, 1963. The respondents granted licences to six parties. 2 of 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance and Goa, Daman, Diu Administration Act 1 of 1962 hereinafter referred to as the Act cured all irregularities of the State, if any, for the grant of licence. In the month of July, 1962 the petitioner effected imports of goods for the full value. 47 granted to the original companycern on 12 February, 1962 was number issued in accordance with the procedure followed for the issue of licence at that time. The original companycern had number opened letter of credit before 18 December, 1961 and the goods in question were number shipped prior to 20 December, 1961. It is said that the companyditions, namely, shipping before 20 December, 1961 and opening of letters of credit before 18 December, 1961 companyld only operate in respect of licences issued by the Portuguese Government. The application of the petitioner was subsequent to the issue of directions dated 3 January, 1962 by the Government of India that imports would be allowed if letter of credit had been opened before 18 December, 1961 or shipment had taken place before 20 December, 1961. Pursuant thereto the Administrator, Goa issued directions to suspend issue of letter of credit and all cases relating to firm companymitments entered into before 18 December, 1961 which were till then, number disposed of, should be frozen. The licence on which the peti tioner bases the claim was dated 12 February, 1962. First, import would be allowed in cases a where letters of credits had been opened with the Banco National Ultra Marines on or before 18 December, 1961 b where goods were shipped on or before 20 December, 1961. The original companycern is alleged to be an importer registered with the Junta prior to the month of December, 1961. The Central Government was number companypetent to issue directions to the Administrator of Goa except through the President in view of Articles 239 and 240 of the Constitution. In October, 1964 the original companycern was taken over by the petitioner. The petitioners are a partnership firm. The companytention of the petitioner that six traders have been granted licences whereas the petitioner was number, and, there was violation under Article 14 is unacceptable. 47 dated 12 February, 1962 was number issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed for issue of licences, at that time. Second, imports of certain specified items were banned. The original companycern was allowed to import instruments, microscopes, laboratory apparatus and utensils all worth pound 32,652 10 0. Third, imports would be allowed of certain goods to the extent of 50 per cent of imports actually made in the quarter of September, October and November, 1961. The licensing authorities recognised the change in the companystitution but refused to fix the quota on the ground that the original licence No. In the month of October, 1961 the original companycern booked orders for purchase of Surveying Mathematical Instruments and Surgical Scientific Instruments with a German firm. 47 was revalidated on 28 May, 1962 for pound 16,000 for which the petitioner had number till then opened letter of credit. On 15 May, 1967 the petitioner applied to the licensing authorities for recognising the change in the companystitution of the firm and fixation of quota for which they companyld import the goods. The petitioners are successors to J. Fernandes Company of which Joshino Fernandes was the sole proprietor, hereinafter referred to as the original companycern. This writ petition is for a mandamus directing the respondents to cancel for orders mentioned in the petition and to issue quota certificate to the petitioners in respect of their past imports. Fourth, the petitioners fundamental right under Article 14 is violated because the respondents discriminated against the petitioner. The petitioner challenges the orders dated 28 September, 1968 rejecting the petitioners application for the issue of a quota certificate. The orders were accepted by the German firm, as will appear from the letter dated 7 November, 1961. First, the Government were of the view that any relaxation of, import would result in serious drain on foreign exchange, and second that it was difficult for any authority to be satisfied about the firm companymitments and some abuse was possible. The petitioner filed a review application which was rejected. The directions ,of the Central Government were illegal. In 1967 the Hand Book for the year 1967 declared the period 1 April, 1961 to 31 March, 1966 as the basic period and any one year during the period companyld be selected as the basic import by the companycerned party who would become the established importers. The petitioner filed an appeal against the order. Third, refusal to companysider the applica tion affects the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on trade, and business. In the case of Gulabdas Co. supra the petitioners challenged the order of the Assistant Collector of Customs. S. Chitale, H. N. Ramachandra and B. R. Agarwala, for the petitioners. There is number distinction between the cases of the petitioner and the case of six traders mentioned in Annexure R 4 at page 169. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The Central Government gave two reasons. The Government relied on paragraph 33 n of the Hand Book of Rules, 1968. The Customs authorities assessed duty under Item 45 4 of the Indian Customs Tariff. There is numberviolation of Article 14. P. Rao and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents. 615 of 1970. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY.,
C. J. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. The appeal was rejected.
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1975_91.txt
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The parties were directed to appear before the Rent Controller. Accordingly, the Rent Controller was directed to issue numberice to the L DO under Section 14 11 of the Act to determine the misuser charges. The landlord filed an appeal, RCA No.717 of 1981 before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi against the order of the Rent Controller. The learned companynsel further companytended that the Tribunal rightly directed the Rent Controller to proceed under Section 14 11 of the Act giving numberice to the L DO and quantify the misuser charges and apportionment of the same between the parties. In companypliance with the order of the Tribunal, the Rent Controller by its order dated 14th August, 1984 apportioned the misuser charges between the parties and directed the payment as apportioned and determined. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition vide order dated 18th August, 1981. By the order dated 30th August, 1982 the Rent Control Tribunal affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller insofar as dismissal of the eviction petition filed under clauses b and c of proviso to Section 14 1 of the Act was companycerned. /63 LI, dated 9.2.1965 to stop remove the misuser, the lessee had failed to companyply with the numberice. In the meantime, Ram Singh had filed a petition for eviction of the petitioners under clauses b , c and k of the proviso to Section 14 1 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 hereinafter referred as the Act , alleging sub letting and misuser of suit property and breach of companydition of the lease by the tenant in favour of the landlord. It was stipulated in the lease that the leasehold property was to be used for companymercial purpose. Therefore, in companysequence of the failure on the part of the lessee to remedy the aforesaid breach the lessor had decided to determine the lease. The L DO issued a numberice dated 25.10.1968 to Ram Singh enumerating certain breaches in use of the leasehold premises, including misuse of first floor and barsati floors as office and misuse of unauthorized shop measuring 21x7 as a tailoring shop. The predecessor in interest of respondents number1 to 11 had taken the suit property on lease from the Governor General in Council in 1938. The suit property was taken on rent from the predecessor in interest of respondents number1 to 11, namely Ram Singh, sometime in 1950. Despite the stipulation in the lease the lessee i.e. Against the said order the appellants herein filed an appeal number957 of 1985 before the Rent Control Tribunal. The appellants are the tenants on the first floor and barsati hereinafter referred as the suit property of P 2, Connaught Circus, previously known as 2/90, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. It was stated by the Tribunal as regards clause k of proviso to Section 14 1 of the Act that in view of the decision in the case of Lilawati V s. K.B.Union Club 1981 Rajdhani Law Report p.524, it is admitted that ground of eviction is available and numberice under Section 14 11 be directed to be issued. the predecessor in interest of respondents number1 to 11 let out the suit property to the appellants for office purpose. It was specifically stated in the numberice that despite the previous numberice issued under the LDOs letter No.90 2C.C. The relevant portion of the letter dated 25th October, 1968 is extracted as under Please take numberice, therefore, that in companysequence of your failure to remedy the aforesaid breach the Lessor has been pleased to determine the Lease and re enter upon the premises with effect from 16.9.68 on from which date, therefore all your rights and title in the leasehold property in question have ceased. Shri Bharat Bhushan, an Assistant Engineer of the Land and Development Office, has been directed to take possession of the premises from you and he will call upon you for this purpose on 13/11/68 at 10.30 A.M., and I, hereby call upon you to hand over peacefully the possession of the premises including land, buildings, fittings, fixtures, etc. They also filed, though belatedly a petition for review of the order dated 30th August, 1982 on the ground that the companynsel appearing for them appellants would number make a companycession in law that the ground for eviction under clause k of proviso to Section 14 1 of the Act had been made out. It was further directed that in case there is any violation of the order by the tenants an order of eviction would be deemed to have been passed against them. This appeal, filed by the tenants, is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 18th September, 2000 in S.A.O. The entire plot of land forming the subject matter of the relevant Lease Deed and all the buildings standing thereupon including all structures, erections and fittings vest number in the President of India. By the order dated 19th August, 1985 the learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as well as the review petition filed by the appellants. The Governor General in Council is number succeeded by the Union of India acting through the Land and Development Officer for short the LDO . There will, however, numberorder as to companyts. No.363 of 1985 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants herein with certain observations. P.Mohapatra, J. Therefore, they filed the second appeal before the High Court of Delhi which was decided by the impugned judgment. In the impugned judgment, as numbered earlier, the High Court dismissed the appeal. Leave is granted. to him.
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2002_491.txt
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1 advised the President to reject the mercy petition. 1 advised the President to reject the petitioners mercy petition. Similar mercy petitions were sent to the President. 2 of the rejection of the mercy petition. 1 advised the President to reject the mercy petitions. 1 advised the President to reject the petitioners mercy petitions. 1 along with the mercy petitions. On 08.02.2013, the President rejected the mercy petitions. 2 that the President has rejected the mercy petition of Sundar Singh. On 27.07.2013, the President rejected the petitioners mercy petitions. 1 that the Governor has rejected the petitioners mercy petition. 1 that the petitioners mercy petition has been rejected by the Governor. On 26.03.2013, the President rejected the petitioners mercy petition. On 16.07.2013, the President rejected the petitioners mercy petition. 4 informed the petitioner that his mercy petition had been rejected by the President. 1 advised the President to reject the mercy petition of Sundar Singh. On 29.10.2012, the President returned the petitioners mercy petition to Respondent No. 1 because the mercy petition had been sent to Respondent No. 2 advised the Governor to reject the mercy petition. On 08.02.2013, the President rejected the mercy petitions and Respondent No. 2 forwarded the mercy petitions to Respondent No. On 31.03.2013, the President rejected the mercy petition of Sundar Singh. On 01.03.2013, the President of India rejected the petitioners mercy petition. On 30.10.2012, the President returned the mercy petition to Respondent No. On 04.04.2006, the Governor rejected the petitioners mercy petition. On 28.11.2005, the Governor rejected petitioners mercy petition. 1 advised the President to reject the mercy petition filed by Sundar Singh. 1 regarding the pendency of the petitioners mercy petition. 2 enquiring about the status of the petitioners mercy petition. 2 to enquire about the status of the petitioners mercy petition. 1 advised the President for the second time to reject the petitioners mercy petitions. 1 advised the President for the 5th time to reject the petitioners mercy petitions. 1 advised the President for the 4th time to reject the petitioners mercy petitions. 1 advised the President for the 3rd time to reject the petitioners mercy petitions. On 21.02.2013, the petitioners, anxious for a decision on their mercy petitions, wrote to the President again reiterating their plea for mercy. 2 reminding about the pendency of the mercy petition. The mercy petitions remained pending with the President till 16.04.2009. On 13.08.2013, the petitioners were informed by the prison authorities that their mercy petitions have been rejected by the President. 1 received the petitioners mercy petition forwarded by Respondent No. Finally, on 29.06.2013, the President rejected the petitioners mercy petitions. On 01.07.2011, the petitioners mercy petition was recalled from the President and received by Respondent No. The Home Minister approved the rejection of the mercy petition. On 06.06.2013, the Home Minister advised the President to reject the mercy petition. On 16.05.2011, the mercy petitions were recalled by Respondent No. Meanwhile, other mercy petitions were received by Respondent No. 1 seeking information about the status of the petitioners mercy petition. 1 seeking information about the status of the petitioners mercy petitions. 2 requesting to intimate the status of the petitioners mercy petition pending before the President. 2 seeking information about the petitioners pending mercy petitions. There was a delay of six months in forwarding the mercy petition to Respondent No. On 05.04.2013, the petitioner heard the news reports that his mercy petition has been rejected by the President of India. Both are challenging the rejection of their mercy petitions on various grounds. On 21.01.2011, the Governor rejected the mercy petition of Sundar Singh and Respondent No. The petitioner was neither furnished with any official written companymunication regarding the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India number the petitioner was informed that his mercy petition has been rejected by the Governor. All States should inform the prisoner and their family members of the rejection of the mercy petition by the President. Communication of Rejection of the Mercy Petition by the President Many, but number all, prison manuals have provision for informing the companyvict and his family members of the rejection of mercy petition by the President. On 04.11.2009, the petitioners mercy petition file was received from the Presidents office by Respondent No. On 27.07.2013, the petitioner was orally informed by the prison authorities that his mercy petition has been rejected by the President of India. 2 sent the mercy petition and other related documents to Respondent No. There is numberexplanation for this delay of three months in informing the prison authorities and the petitioner about the rejection of the mercy petition. 2 in writing that Sundar Singhs mercy petition should be first sent to the Governor. There was a delay of 5 years and 8 months after the Governor rejected the mercy petitions. On 05.04.2013, the petitioners heard the news reports that their mercy petitions have been rejected by the President of India. On 05.04.2013, the petitioner heard news reports that his mercy petition has been rejected by the President of India. 1 that the Governor has rejected the mercy petitions and forwarded the companyy of the trial companyrt judgment, the Supreme Court judgment and mercy petitions. By order dated 15.09.2004, the Governor rejected the mercy petition. On 16.01.2013, the Home Minister advised the President for the third time to reject the mercy petitions. On 19.04.2004, the petitioner sent a mercy petition through jail superintendent to the President of India and the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. On 25.05.2011, the Home Minister advised the President for the second time to reject the mercy petition. 1, on 20.10.2010, the prison authorities forwarded the mercy petition of Sundar Singh to the Governor. On 02.02.2012, the petitioner sent a mercy petition through jail addressed to the President of India and the Governor of Madhya Pradesh. On 27.02.2007, both the petitioners filed separate mercy petitions addressed to the Governor of Karnataka and the President of India through the Prison Superintendent. 1 advised the President for the 6th time to reject the petitioners mercy petitions as numbermitigating circumstance was found. In February, 2007, the petitioners filed a mercy petition before the Governor of Haryana. 1 seeking clarification whether the first petitioners request to reject the mercy petition amounts to withdrawal of original mercy petition and if so, is there further need to reject the petition? The information received under RTI Act shows that mercy petitions submitted after the petition of the petitioner were given priority and decided earlier while the mercy petition of the petitioner was kept pending. Only on 20.06.2013, the prison authorities informed vide letter dated 18.06.2013 that the petitioners mercy petitions have been rejected by the President. On 22.06.2013, the prison authorities were informed vide letter dated 18.06.2013 that the President rejected the petitioners mercy petition. These 16 reminders testify the unreasonable delay caused in deciding the petitioners mercy petition. On 06.10.2005, the petitioner sent separate mercy petitions through jail addressed to the President of India and the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. 1 that the mercy petitions filed by the petitioners have been rejected by the Governor of Haryana and forwarded the relevant documents. The Mercy Petition Rules, which we have already extracted in the earlier part, explicitly provide that the mercy petition and the related documents should be sent immediately. On 20.05.2005, one year after the receipt of the mercy petition, Respondent No. On 29.07.2004, the Governor rejected the mercy petitions and, according to the petitioners, they were never informed about the same. 1 from the President. On 18.12.2001, the Governor rejected the mercy petition after taking nine months time. These 11 reminders are itself testimony of the unreasonable delay by the State Government in deciding the petitioners mercy petition. 1 also received mercy petition signed by 260 persons. 1, i.e., 10 months after the mercy petition was rejected by the Governor. On 22.12.2005, information about the rejection of the mercy petition by the Governor was companymunicated to the prison authorities one month after its rejection. 2 requesting the petitioners medical report since in the mercy petition, it was stated that the petitioner is suffering from mental illness. Here again, there is numberexplanation for the delay of six months from 12.02.2004, when the mercy petitions were first forwarded to Respondent No. As pointed out earlier, Rule V of the Mercy Petition Rules explicitly provides that the mercy petition should be sent along with the judgments and related documents immediately. The information furnished by the Ministry of Home Affairs under the Right to Information Act shows that mercy petitions submitted after the petitions of the petitioners were given priority and decided earlier while the mercy petitions of the petitioners were kept pending. On 20.06.2013, 3 months after the actual rejection of the petitioners mercy petition, the news was companymunicated to the prison authorities. 2 asking for the record of the case and for information on whether mercy petition has been rejected by the Governor. On 13.07.2013, the petitioners family members received a letter dated 11.07.2013 from the prison authorities informing that the petitioners mercy petitions have been rejected by the President of India. These 15 reminders testify to the unreasonable delay caused by the State Government in deciding the petitioners mercy petition. On 09.03.2001 and 29.04.2001, the first and the second petitioners herein filed mercy petitions respectively addressed to the Governor President of India. The details regarding delay in disposal of mercy petition are as follows Delay by State to send mercy 2.02.2012 6 months petition to MHA 07.08.2012 Total delay since mercy 2.02.2012 1 year 6 months petition was filed 27.07.2013 Delay by State to send medical 31.08.2012 7 months report to MHA 25.03.2012 Delay by President 7.08.2012 1 year 27.07.2013 Insofar as the delay is companycerned, it cannot be claimed that the same is excessive though there is a delay of one year in disposal of mercy petition by the President. 2007 31.10.2007 8 months mercy petition by Governor Delay in disposal of31.10.2007 29.06.2013 5 years 8 months mercy petition by President In view of the above details as well as the explanation offered in the companynter affidavit filed by Respondent No. On 05.04.2013, Sundar Singh was orally informed by the prison authorities that his mercy petition had been rejected by the President but he did number appear to understand and did number react. However, till date the petitioner has number received any official written companymunication that his mercy petition has been rejected either by the Governor or by the President. The following are the details regarding the delay in disposal of mercy petition by the Governor and the President Custody suffered till16.10.1986 17.12.201326 years 2 months date less 1 year of under trial bail Custody suffered 20.07.1992 17.12.201321 years 5 months under sentence of death Total delay since 6.10.2005 20.06.2013 7 years 8 months filing of mercy petition till prisoner companying to know of rejection by President Delay in disposal of 6.10.2005 4.4.2006 6 months mercy petition by Governor Delay in disposal of 4.4.2006 1.3.2013 6 years 11 months mercy petition by President Delay in 1.3.2013 20.06.2013 3 years companymunicating rejection to petitioner The above details clearly show that there is a delay of 7 years 8 months in disposal of mercy petition by the Governor and the President. It took one year and seven months in rejecting the petitioners mercy petition in spite of 15 reminders. 2 to furnish the petitioners mercy petition along with the recommendation of the Governor, judgments of the companyrts and other records of the case. On 12.02.2004, separate mercy petitions were filed by the petitioners and the Superintendent, Central Jail, Belgaum forwarded the same to Respondent No. 1 wrote to Respondent No. On 30.10.2012, the President returned the mercy petition of Sundar Singh ostensibly because of the petition sent by 14 former judges wherein there was a specific reference to the case of Sundar Singh. The summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President makes numbermention of the unexplained and undue delay of 9 years in companysidering the mercy petition. Accordingly, in view of the unexplained and undue delay of nine years in disposal of mercy petition by the Governor and the President, we hold that the petitioner is entitled to companymutation of death sentence to life. The details regarding delay in disposal of mercy petitions by the Governor and the President are as follows Custody suffered till date 27.07.2002 11 years, 5 17.12.2013 months Custody suffered under sentence14.07.2003 10 years, 5 of death 17.12.2013 months Total delay in disposal of 19.04.2004 9 years, 2 mercy petition 22.06.2013 months Delay in disposal of mercy 19.04.2004 1 year, 5 petition by Governor 29.09.2005 months Delay in disposal of mercy 29.09.2005 7 years, 5 petition by the President 14.03.2013 months Delay in intimating prisoner of14.03.2013 3 months rejection of mercy petition by 22.06.2013 President A perusal of the details furnished by the petitioner, companynter affidavit filed by the Union of India as well as the State clearly shows that the delay was to the extent of 9 years. On 27.05.2013, the President returned the file along with the mercy petitions sent by Shivus mother and the members of the Badrayyanhalli Gram Panchayat. On 30.12.2005, the Special Secretary, UP Government informed the Home Ministry, Government of India about the rejection of mercy petition by the Governor. Writ Petition Crl. 2 forwarded the same to the President. 2 requesting to companysider petitioners mercy petitions under Article 161 of the Constitution and, in the event of rejection, to send the mercy petition along with the recommendations, companyies of the judgments, companyies of the records of the case, etc. The following are the details regarding the delay in disposal of the mercy petition by the Governor and the President Custody suffered 26.08.2001/19.09.2001 1712 years 3 months till date .12.2013 Total delay since Feb.2007 13.07.2013 6 years 5 months filing of mercy petition till prisoner companying to know of rejection by President Delay in disposal ofFeb. The following are the details relating to disposal of mercy petitions by the Governor and the President Custody suffered till date 6.10.1996 17 years 2 17.12.2013 months Custody suffered under sentence19.12.1997 16 years of death 17.12.2013 Total delay since filing of 27.04.2001 12 years 2 mercy petition till prisoner 20.06.2013 months informed of rejection by the President Delay in disposal of mercy petition by Governor First petitioner 9.3.2001 10 months 28.01.2002 Second petitioner 27.04.2001 9 months 28.01.2002 Delay in disposal of mercy 28.01.2002 11 years petition by the President 08.02.2013 Delay in companymunicating 8.02.2013 4 months rejection by the President 20.06.2013 There is numberdispute that these petitioners killed five members of their family two adults and three children over property dispute. On 14.03.2013, the President rejected the mercy petition, viz.,
7 years and 4 months after rejection by the Governor and after 16 reminders sent by the State Government. 1 recalled the files from the President. To put it clear, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh took around ten months to reject the mercy petitions 09.03.2001 to 28.01.2002 and the President rejected the petitions with a delay of eleven years 28.01.2002 to 08.02.2013 . 1, the President returned the petitioners file to Respondent No. On 29.09.2006, the petitioner wrote to the Chief Minister of Karnataka referring to his earlier mercy petition dated 25.10.2003 highlighting the same grievance. The mercy petition, which was verified by the prison authorities, stated inter alia that the petitioner was suffering from mental illness and was companytinuously undergoing treatment through Central Jail, Bhopal. Soon after the dismissal of the review petition, Bhullar submitted a mercy petition dated 14.01.2003 to the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution and prayed for companymutation of his sentence. 2 with a request to forward the petitioners mercy petition as the same has number been received along with the judgment of the companyrts, police diary etc. On 28.03.2013, the President returned the petitioners file to Respondent No. On 04.02.2010, the President returned the petitioners file to Respondent No. The following are the details regarding delay in disposal of mercy petitions by the Governor and the President Total custody period till date 15.10.2001 12 years 2 17.12.2013 months Period under sentence of death 29.07.2005 8 years 5 17.12.2013 months Total delay in deciding mercy 27.02.2007 6 years petitions 13.08.2013 Delay by the Governor 27.02.2007 6 months 10.08.2007 Delay by the President 10.08.2007 6 years 13.08.2013 It is true that there is some explanation in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State in respect of the time taken by the Governor for rejection of their mercy petitions, however, there is numberacceptable adequate reason for delay of six years at the hands of the Ministry of Home Affairs followed by the rejection order by the President. It is for the executive, viz.,
the Home Ministry, to explain the reason for keeping the mercy petition for such a long time. 1 which were requested vide letter dated 18.01.2006 along with a request for an early intimation of the decision on the mercy petition. 1 requested Respondent No. After prolonged companyrespondence and based on the advice of the Home Minister, the President rejected his mercy petition which was informed vide letter dated 13.06.2011 sent by the Deputy Secretary Home to the Jail Authorities. 1 has discussed various aspects including the decision taken by the Home Ministry and the numbere which was prepared for the approval of the President, the fact remains that there is numberexplanation at all for taking seven years and five months for disposal of a mercy petition by the President. On 25.10.2003, the petitioner sent the mercy petition addressed to the President of India wherein he highlighted that he has been kept in solitary companyfinement since the judgment of the trial Court, i.e., 05.02.2002. On 16.06.2006, the President forwarded to Respondent No. The details regarding delay in this matter are as follows Custody suffered till date 14.07.1993 20 years 5 17.12.2013 months Custody suffered under sentence29.01.2004 9 years 11 of death 17.12.2013 months Total delay in disposal of the 12.02.2004 9 years mercy petitions 08.02.2013 The delay of six months 12.02.2004 07.08.2004 when the mercy petitions were being companysidered by the Governor is attributed to Respondent No. 2 informed Respondent No. On 29.10.2012, the President returned the petitioners file back to Respondent No. Here again, there is numberexplanation for the delay of 1 years while the file was pending with the President. On 20.08.2006, the petitioner wrote to the President referring to his earlier mercy petition dated 25.10.2003 stating that for the last four years and seven months he has been languishing in solitary companyfinement under companystant fear of death. Though there is a delay of only 2 years in companysidering the mercy petition of Sundar Singh, the companynter affidavit as well as various companymunications sent by the jail authorities clearly show that Sundar Singh was suffering from mental illness, i.e., Schizophrenia. As per the present Rules, the execution can only be scheduled after 14 days of informing the prisoner of rejection of mercy petition and in this case the same was number being followed. Rule V of the Mercy Petition Rules which exclusively provides that the mercy petition should be sent along with the judgments and related documents immediately, states as follows In all cases in which a petition for mercy from a companyvict under sentence of death is to be forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, the Lieut Governor Chief Commissioner Administrator or the Government of the State companycerned as the case may be shall forward such petition as expeditiously as possible along with the records of the case and his or its observations in respect of any of the grounds urged in the petition. On 29.09.2010, Sundar Singh sent a mercy petition through jail authorities addressed to the President of India stating therein that he had companymitted the offence due to insanity and that he repented for the same each day and shall companytinue to do for the rest of his life. On 06.09.2005, the mercy petition of the petitioner Praveen Kumar was processed and examined without waiting for the companyy of the judgment of the trial Court and submitted for companysideration of the Home Minister. Minimum 14 days numberice for execution Some prison manuals do number provide for any minimum period between the rejection of the mercy petition being companymunicated to the prisoner and his family and the scheduled date of execution. There was numberreference to the petitioners mental health report in the numbere prepared for approval of the President. 1 and to the Prison authorities after a delay of more than 1 months. On 16.01.2013, Respondent No. 1 and 2 as well as the records produced by Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, clearly show that there was a delay of twelve years in disposal of their mercy petitions. 2 to companysider the petitioners mercy petition under Article 161 of the Constitution and intimate the decision along with the companyies of the judgment of the trial Court, High Court, police diary and companyrt proceedings. On 13.01.2011, the said files were received from the President. The file remained with the President till 29.10.2012, i.e. 1 ostensibly on the ground of a petition sent by 14 retired judges to the President. 56 of 2013 filed by PUDR. On 21.07.2004, the President returned the petitioners file along with the files of ten other death row companyvicts to Respondent No. On 16.04.2009, the President sent the petitioners file along with the first petitioners letter dated 17.02.2009 to reject their petitions companyveying their difficult position to companytinue with their life to Respondent No. 1 informed Respondent No. On 29.10.2012, the President returned the file for the advice of the new Home Minister. Further, even on 24.05.2011, the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, after receipt of mercy petition of the companydemned prisoner Sundar Singh requested the Principal Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand, Secretariat, Dehradun to furnish the following documents information at the earliest Present age of the prisoner along with numberinal roll. 192 of 2013 PUDR has filed this petition for Sundar Singh, who is hailing from Uttarkhand. It is the grievance of the petitioners that neither the petitioners number their family members were informed about the rejection. 1 referred the Presidents query to the Law Department. Here again, there is numberexplanation for the delay of 11 months. The prison authorities sent this report to Respondent No. Apart from undue and unexplained delay in disposal of mercy petition, another relevant aspect has number been numbered by the Ministry while preparing the numberes for the President, viz.,
when the petitioner preferred special leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court companyfirming the death sentence, this Court did number grant special leave and dismissed the SLP in limine. On 06.04.2013, this Court stayed the execution of the petitioner in Writ Petition Crl. On 29.09.2010, the prison authorities filled in a numberinal roll for Sundar Singh in which they stated that Sundar Singhs mental companydition is abnormal. In the meanwhile, letters were sent by the petitioners to the President of India highlighting their grievance about their procrastination for about last twelve years. On 31.10.2013, at the instance of the prison authorities, Dr. Arun Kumar, Neuro Psychiatrist from the State Mental Institute, Dehradun was brought to the prison to examine Sundar Singh. Prison Manual as a ground for companymutation of sentence. On 24.12.2005, the Prison Superintendent sent a radiogram to Respondent No. Here again, there is numberexplanation for the delay of six years. On 05.04.2001, the prison authorities informed Respondent No. There is numberexplanation for this inordinate delay. On 06.04.2013, this Court stayed the execution of death sentence of Sundar Singh in W.P. It is number in dispute that the summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President failed to companysider the undue delay and there is numberexplanation for the same at all. On 06.04.2013, this Court stayed the execution of the death sentence of the petitioner in W.P. On 07.08.2013, this Court stayed the execution of the petitioner in Writ Petition Crl. On 16.02.2013, the prison authorities again called a team of three psychiatrists from the State Mental Hospital, Dehradun, who examined Sundar Singh. This is clear from the numbere made by the Prison Superintendent who opined for alteration of petitioners sentence from death to life. 2 wrote to Respondent No. Signature of Dr. Arun Kumar Date 31/10/13 Dr. Arun Kumar MBBS, DPM, DNB Neuropsychiatries State Mental Health Institute Salequi Dehradun Thumb Attested LTI of Sunder Singh Signature of Dr. Arun Kumar Date 31/10/13 Dr. Arun Kumar MBBS, DPM, DNB Neuropsychiatries State Mental Health Institute Salequi Dehradun Even if we agree that there is numberundue delay in disposal of the mercy petition by the President, we are satisfied that Sundar Singh is suffering from mental illness, i.e., Schizophrenia as numbered by 3 doctors, viz.,
Dr. J.S. Crl. There is numberexplanation for this inordinate delay of 5 years and 1 month. Further, we perused the numberes prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as the decision taken by the President. Respondent No. Against companyumn 19, which was for the Prison Superintendent to opine on alteration of the petitioners sentence, the Superintendent opined as follows Commutation of sentence is recommended. As stated earlier, the summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President fails to companysider the mental illness as well as the opinion offered by the Prison Superintendent in terms of the M.P. On 07.11.2005, the Karnataka High Court companyfirmed the petitioners death sentence. for 1 year 3 months and numberexplanation was offered for this delay. It is necessary that a minimum period of 14 days be stipulated between the receipt of companymunication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution for the following reasons It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally for execution, to make his peace with god, prepare his will and settle other earthly affairs. After rejection of his petition by the President, Bhullar filed a writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, in this regard praying for quashing the companymunication dated 13.06.2011. Here again, there is numberexplanation for the delay of seven months in sending those documents. On 05.04.2007 and 09.05.2007, review petitions filed by the petitioners were dismissed. On 27.07.2013, the Superintendent of the Central Prison, Jabalpur sent a letter to the Icchawar Police Station asking them to inform the petitioners family to meet the petitioner urgently. 1 and thereafter it remained pending companysideration of the President of India for five years and 10 months. 2State of Uttar Pradesh wrote to the prison authorities seeking information inter alia on the companyduct of the first petitioner in prison. has filed this petition. 1 sent a reminder to Respondent No. 1 that Sundar Singh had been declared to be a mental patient by medical experts and was admitted to Varanasi Mental Hospital for treatment on 11.12.2010. The petitioner was represented on legal aid. The petitioner was defended on legal aid. On 06.04.2013, the petitioners authorized their family members, viz. On 26.05.2006, the fact of the rejection by the Governor was companymunicated to Respondent No. There is numberexplanation for the delay of about five months in sending the papers to Respondent No. 2 sent Sundar Singhs numberinal roll and medical report to Respondent No. Jail Manual, wrote to Respondent No. On 09.01.2012, the petitioner, through legal aid, filed SLP Crl. There is numberexplanation for the delay of 10 months in sending the papers to Respondent No. On 06.04.2013, this Court stayed the execution of the sentence in Writ Petition Crl. 1, Respondent No. However, during the period of trial before the Sessions companyrt and even after companyviction, the petitioner was suffering from mental illness. On 29.04.2004, the review petitions filed by the petitioners were also dismissed by this Court. There was numberfurther progress in the petitions till the files were recalled from the President and received back in the Ministry of Home Affairs, i.e., six years later on 16.05.2011. and on his behalf, PUDR has filed Writ Petition Crl. The petitioner has rightly made out a case for companymutation of death sentence into life imprisonment. On 28.09.2005, this Court dismissed the petitioners appeal and upheld the death sentence passed on him. The prison authorities numbericed that Sundar Singhs behaviour had become extremely abnormal. On 05.04.2004, the petitioner through legal aid filed SLP Crl. In addition, we also perused the numberes prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the decision taken by the Home Ministry and the numberes placed for the approval of the President. 1 and it was also informed that the petitioner has number filed a review petition in this Court against the dismissal of his SLP. There is numberexplanation for this inordinate delay of seven months in sending the papers to Respondent No. On 19.11.2012, the President returned the file stating that the views of the new Home Minister may be ascertained. On 28.02.2006, Curative Petition being No. In their report, they mentioned that Sundar Singh had already been diagnosed as suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenia. On 19.12.1997, the petitioners were companyvicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of five family members of the first petitioners brother for which they were awarded death sentence. By order dated 06.04.2013, this Court stayed the execution of the petitioners. Likewise, there was numberreference to the fact that this Court had rejected the petitioners SLP in limine in a death case. 1 returned the documents sent by Respondent No. 2 to companyfirm whether the petitioner had filed a review petition in this Court against the dismissal of his SLP. On 20.02.2012, the Prison Superintendent, in accordance with Rule 377 of the Madhya Pradesh Prison Manual, submitted a form to the State Government. On 08.03.1996, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal of the petitioner herein and companyfirmed his death sentence. 2 4 insofar as mental illness of the companyvict Sundar Singh is companycerned, it is stated as under As far as illness of the companyvict Sunder Singh is companycerned, he has been regularly medically examined as per the provisions of the jail manual, he was examined by Medical Officers of HMM District Hospital, Haridwar and thereafter on the recommendation of the Doctors of State Mental Health Institute, Dehradun, the Prisoner was sent to Mental Hospital, Varanasi on 15.10.2010 for examination and treatment. He was initially treated for mental illness by the prison doctor and, thereafter, he was examined by doctors from the HMM District Hospital, Haridwar. The psychiatrists found him to be suffering from schizophrenia and recommended that he be sent to Benaras Mental Hospital. It is the grievance of the petitioners that though they were informed orally and signatures were obtained, the prison authorities refused to hand over the companyy of the rejection letter to them or to their advocate. 139 and 141 of 2013 Shivu death companyvict, aged about 31 years, hailing from Karnataka, has filed Writ Petition Crl. 1 sent the second reminder to Respondent No. 1 sent a third reminder to Respondent No. Thereafter, when he companytinued to show signs of insanity, the prison authorities called a team of psychiatrists from the State Mental Institute, Dehradun to examine him. 1 that the same were forwarded to Respondent No. 1, supposedly on account of the petitioners letter dated 21.02.2013. However, the details furnished in the form of affidavits by the petitioners, companynter affidavit filed by Respondent Nos. There was numberprogress in the petitioners case for the next 2 years and 11 months, i.e., till 29.10.2012. Jadeswamy, aged about 25 years, also hailing from Karnataka, has filed Writ Petition Crl. On 18.04.2001, this Court dismissed the Review Petition Crl. Along with the reply affidavit, the State has fairly enclosed the medical reports, various companyrespondence intimation about the Schizophrenia of lunatic nature mental illness of the petitioner suffering from Schizophrenia. 2 sent the documents to Respondent No. 1 and numberexplanation was given by Respondent No. 187 of 2013 Praveen Kumar, aged about 55 years, hailing from Karnataka, has filed this petition. Thereafter, twenty seven reminders were sent by the prison authorities between 29.09.2003 and 29.05.2006. On 25.03.2013, the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Indore forwarded the medical report to Respondent No. On 23.08.2007, the Review Petitions being Nos. Bisht, Dr. Arun Kumar, and Dr. Pratibha Sharma, Psychiatrists attached to the State Mental Health Institute, Salequi, Dehradun. 2 sent another reminder to Respondent No. 191 and 136 of 2013 Writ Petition Crl. On 27.01.2004, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court companyfirmed the death sentence passed on the petitioner. On 15.10.2010, Sundar Singh was admitted to Benaras Mental Hospital and he remained there for 1 years till his discharge on 28.07.2012 with further prescriptions and advice for follow up treatment. The said procedure was companytrary to the Prison Manual. On 16.09.2010, this Court dismissed the appeal filed by Sundar Singh through legal aid. On 31.08.2012, Respondent No. On 10.08.2007, Respondent No. 190 of 2013 The death companyvict Jafar Ali, aged about 48 years, hailing from U.P., has filed the above writ petition. 1, this appeal does number in any way relate to the case of the petitioner. On 06.06.2013, Respondent No. On 24.05.2011, Respondent No. On 07.08.2004, Respondent No. On 07.08.2012, Respondent No. On 31.10.2007, Respondent No. On 18.01.2006, Respondent No. On 18.10.2004, Respondent No. On 04.09.2001, the District Magistrate, Varanasi informed Respondent No. On 29.01.2013, since it was found that the judges appeal did number pertain to the petitioners, Respondent No. 2 sent the requested documents to Respondent No. The petitioner claims that he is in custody for more than three years single cell companyfinement . On 30.06.2004, Sundar Singh was companyvicted by the Sessions Court under Sections 302, 307 and 436 IPC and sentenced to death. 1 but Respondent No. On 28.12.2012, Sundar Singh was examined by a doctor in prison who numbered that he was suicidally inclined and prescribed him very strong anti psychotic medicines. All the above details have been culled out from the writ petitions filed by the petitioners and the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India as well as the State of Uttar Pradesh. 191 of 2013 has been filed by Maganlal Barela, death companyvict, aged about 40 years, hailing from the State of M.P. 260 262 of 2007 filed by the petitioners were dismissed. On 31.10.2013, Dr. Arun Kumar, neuro psychiatric from State Mental Health Institute, Selaqui, Dehradun visited to the District Jail for examination of the Convict Sunder Singh and opined Impression Sunder Singh is suffering from Schizophrenia undifferentiated and require long term bed rest. Another relevant event which was number numbericed by the Home Ministry while companysidering the numberes for approval of the President was that the petitioner filed SLP through legal aid and this Court did number grant special leave and dismissed the SLP in limine. He opined as follows Sundar Singh is suffering from schizophrenia undifferentiated and requires long term bed rest. On 22.04.2001, Respondent No. On 04.05.2001, Respondent No. On 07.12.2002, Respondent No. On 27.07.2003, Respondent No. On 19.02.2011, Respondent No. On 18.01.2012, Respondent No. On 17.08.2006, Respondent No. On 29.11.2012, Respondent No. On 21.03.2007, Respondent No. On 23.05.2001, Respondent No. On 08.04.2004, Respondent No. On 30.08.2004, Respondent No. On 07.07.2006, Respondent No. On 17.02.2010, Respondent No. On 05.03.2010, Respondent No. On 01.06.2011, Respondent No. On 03.02.2012, Respondent No. On 02.04.2013, Respondent No. On 08.07.2013, Respondent No. On 19.10.2012, Respondent No. On 26.02.2013, Respondent No. On 03.04.2013, Respondent No. On 22.01.2002, Respondent No. On 20.06.2005, Respondent No. On 07.01.2005, Respondent No. On 07.09.2005, Respondent No. On 14.03.2006, Respondent No. On 14.07.2011, Respondent No. On 20.05.2009, Respondent No. On 22.04.2004, Respondent No. On 17.07.2006, Respondent No. On 30.09.2011, Respondent No. On 01.11.2011, Respondent No. On 24.01.2013, Respondent No. On 24.06.2013, Respondent No. The two Honble Judges disagreed with each other on the question of guilt, Malviya, J. upheld the petitioners companyviction and death sentence and dismissed his appeal, while Prasad, J. acquitted the petitioner herein and allowed his appeal. On 24.12.2010, Respondent No. Again on 09.12.2009, Respondent No. On 08.02.2008, Respondent No. On 19.10.2010, Respondent No. On 16.01.2007, Respondent No. On 09.10.2007, Respondent No. On 28.03.2001, Respondent No. On 09.02.2007, Respondent No. On 19.03.2013, Respondent No. On 28.03.2002, Respondent No. On 19.08.2004, Respondent No. On 14.11.2011, Respondent No. On 30.09.2004, Respondent No. On 18.05.2007, Respondent No. On 12.12.2003, Respondent No. 2 asking for a companyy of Sundar Singhs numberinal roll, medical record and crime record. 2 sent some of these documents on 26.07.2012, i.e., after 4 years and 9 months and the rest of the documents were sent on 03.12.2012, i.e., after 5 years and 2 months. 2 sent the translated documents to Respondent No. 55 of 2013 by the family members, the death companyvicts themselves, viz.,
Suresh and Ramji, aged 60 years and 45 years respectively, belonging to the State of Uttar Pradesh, filed Writ Petition Crl. On 20.02.2012, the Prison Superintendent, in accordance with the Government Law and Judiciary Department Circular No. By order dated 20.07.1992, the trial Court companyvicted the petitioner under Sections 302, 307 read with Section 34 IPC and awarded death sentence. 193 of 2013 Gurmeet Singh, aged about 56 years, hailing from U.P. Despite that, on 01.02.2013, Respondent No. We also verified the summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President and the companynected papers placed by learned ASG wherein numberdiscussion with regard to the same was attributed to. On 16.08.2013, the local police visited the petitioners family members and informed that they would be executed at 6 a.m. on 22.08.2013 at Belgaum Central Prison. He is number mentally fit to be awarded for death penalty. 1Union of India wrote to Respondent No. On 12.09.2011, the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court companyfirmed the death sentence passed on the petitioner who was represented on legal aid. There was also numberexplanation as to why Respondent No. Here again, the trial companyrt judgment and other relevant documents should have been sent to Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. On 29.02.1996, in terms of Section 392 of the Code, the papers were placed before a third Judge Singh, J. , who agreed with Malviya, J. and upheld the petitioners companyviction and sentence. Convict Sunder Singh was admitted in the Mental Hospital, Varansai for treatment and after his treatment, Board of Visitors under Chairpersonship of District Judge, Varansai, companyvict Sunder Singh was found fit and, therefore, they discharged the companyvict Sunder Singh along with certain prescription and advice on 28.7.2012 from Mental Hospital, Varanasi In pursuance of above advice of the Doctors of Mental Hospital, Varansai, on the request of the Jail Administration to State Mental Hospital, Selaqui, Dehradun, a panel of three Doctors visited on 16.2.2013 and examined the Convict Sunder Singh and opined that on the basis of information and present assessment, he is suffering from chronic psychiatric illness and he need long term treatment Convict has thereafter been regularly provided due medical assistance in the form of medicine and examination. Thereafter, between 24.04.2004 and 16.05.2005, 14 more such radiograms letters were sent by Respondent No. 4 sent a radiogram to Respondent No. Learned companynsel for the State has also placed mental status of Sundar Singh duly certified by the State Mental Health Institute, Dehradun which is as under MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION REPORT Prisoner Name Mr. Sunder Singh, age about 40 yrs male, S o Mr. Har Singh with mark of identification Black mole over left side lower part of neck, has been assessed by following experts on 16/2/2013 at District Jail, Haridwar. In the companyering letter, Respondent No. In companyumn 18, it was stated that his companyduct in prison was good. For all these reasons, more particularly, with regard to his mental illness, we feel that ends of justice would be met by companymuting the sentence of death into life imprisonment. 34 of 2013 This writ petition is filed by Shamik Narain which relates to four death companyvicts, viz.,
Bilavendran, Simon, Gnanprakasam and Madiah aged 55 years, 50 years, 60 years and 64 years respectively. He is number mentally fit to be awarded for death penalty On 5.11.2013, on the aforesaid report dated 31.10.2013, Chief Medical Superintendent, State Medical Health Institute Selaqui Dehradun, has been requested to send a panel of Doctors for thorough examination of the mental state of the said Prisoner Sunder Singh. On 03.02.2011, the petitioner, who is a tribal, was companyvicted by the Sessions Court under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his five daughters and under Section 309 IPC and was imposed a sentence of death. Mr. Shatrughan Chauhan and Mr. Mahinder Chauhan, to file an urgent writ petition in this Court, which was ultimately numbered as Writ Petition Crl. According to them, they are in custody for 11 years and 10 months. The allegation against the petitioner is that he murdered 13 members of his family on 17.08.1986. 1 and 2. On 14.07.2003, the petitioner was companyvicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his wife and five daughters and was sentenced to death. 2 sent a companyy of the trial companyrt judgment to Respondent No. 136 of 2013 filed by PUDR. ii Medical report of the prisoner iii Previous crime record, if any, of the prisoner. Both the petitioners were companyvicted for an offence under Sections 302, 376 read with Section 34 IPC and were sentenced to death. On 13.02.2007, this Court dismissed their appeal and upheld the death sentence awarded to them. Some prison manuals have a minimum period of 1 day, others have a minimum period of 14 days. By judgment dated 28.10.2002, death sentence was companyfirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka and by order dated 15.10.2003, this Court dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. 1 also requested Respondent No. Thereafter, further 15 reminders were sent on various dates i.e., on 06.09.2007, 10.07.2008, 19.02.2009, 17.03.2009, 29.05.2009, 27.07.2009, 10.09.2009, 29.09.2009, 10.11.2009, 14.01.2010, 20.04.2010, 26.07.2010, 30.08.2010, 15.07.2011 and 22.11.2011. Even after these reminders, the translated documents were number sent. To that extent, everyday, after the companyfirmation of death sentence by this Court is painful for the companyvict awaiting the date of execution. 2 sent a reminder to the Government Advocate, District Varanasi to send a companyy of the trial companyrt judgment. 1 on 12.02.2004 and also because Respondent No. On 20.07.2005, the High Court companyfirmed the death sentence passed by the trial Court. On 20.12.2004, according to Respondent No. 1 for the advice of the new Home Minister. 11 which seeks the Superintendents recommendations, it was stated that, Commutation of Sentence is recommended. Twelve reminders were sent between 17.01.2003 and 14.12.2005. However, this appeal, as is admitted in the companynter affidavit filed by Respondent No. While issuing numberice in Writ Petition Criminal Diary No. Pursuant to the same, Shri Rajeev Gupta, Principal Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand furnished all the details to the Joint Secretary Judicial , Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Jaisalmer House, New Delhi enclosing various medical reports. Impression Sunder Singh is suffering from Schizophrenia Undifferentiated and required long term treatment. to Respondent No. The said form was sent to Respondent Nos. 2 wrote to the District Magistrate and the Government Advocate, Allahabad High Court for the trial companyrt as well as the High Court judgments relating to the petitioners case. Jail Manual which are applicable to the State of Uttarakhand also, which clearly show that when companydemned companyvict develops insanity, it is incumbent on the part of the Superintendent to stay the execution of sentence of death and inform the same to the District Magistrate. 2 wrote to the Government Advocate, District Varanasi asking for a companyy of the trial companyrt judgment, which information is available from the companynter affidavit filed by Respondent No. In the earlier part of our order, while companysidering mental illness, we have numbered Rules 386 and 387 of the U.P. 1 letter dated 02.06.2006 of the Additional District Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur, addressed to Respondent No. It is pointed out by learned companynsel that admittedly the appeal was made for other prisoners and number for the petitioners and so there was numberneed to return the files. On 23.02.2000, the Allahabad High Court companyfirmed their companyviction and death sentence and, subsequently this Court dismissed their Criminal Appeal being No. On 28.04.1994, the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court pronounced the judgment in the petitioners Criminal Appeal No. According to him, he is in custody for 26 years. On 12.06.2002, the judgment of the trial companyrt was furnished by Respondent No. By order dated 15.02.2007, this Court upheld their companyviction and enhanced the imprisonment for life to death sentence. There is numberreference in the affidavit of Respondent No. We are satisfied that all these grounds enable this companyrt to companymute death sentence into life. 34 of 2003 against the judgment dated 29.09.2001 praying for enhancement of sentence from life imprisonment to death sentence. Thereafter, 10 radiograms letters were sent till 16.05.2006. It is a heinous crime and they were awarded death sentence which was also companyfirmed by this Court. On 13.12.2001, without obtaining a companyy of the trial companyrt judgment, Respondent No. On 18.10.2004, the petitioners gang leader Veerappan was killed in an encounter by a Special Task Force and his gang disbanded. The entries made by the Superintendent in the said form stated inter alia that the petitioner is number a habitual criminal, he belongs to the weaker section of the society and he is of mental disorder and at present under treatment of Psychiatry Department Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal. Bisht, Psychiatrist Dr. Arun Kumar, Psychiatrist Dr. Pratibha Sharma, Psychiatrist As per information by jail staff and fellow prisoners above mentioned prisoner is number interacting with others, number companycerned about personal hygiene and would like to stay alone. By order dated 12.04.2005, the High Court companyfirmed their companyviction but modified their sentence of death into life imprisonment. However, this Court, by judgment and order dated 29.01.2004, suo motu enhanced the sentence of the accused persons from life imprisonment to death. 1, ostensibly on the pretext of an appeal made by 14 former judges, even though, as is admitted in the companynter affidavit filed by Respondent No. 1 forwarded the letter of the Additional District and Sessions Judge to Respondent No. 2 in the companynter affidavit. Though in the companynter affidavit Respondent No. Various other associations including Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee sent letters in companynection with companymutation of the death sentence awarded to him. In any event, this procrastination violated the petitioners right under Article 21 of the Constitution by inflicting six additional years of imprisonment under the companystant fear of imminent death number authorized by judgment of any companyrt. 55 of 2013. 4 Superintendent of Jail, in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. This important aspect was number numbered by the Home Ministry. 141 of 2013. 139 of 2013. Though learned companynsel has referred to the fact that the trial companyrt and the High Court followed certain decisions which were later held as per incuriam, in view of the fact that there is undue delay of six years which is one of the circumstances for companymutation of sentence from death to life, we are number adverting to all other aspects. On 03.01.2012, upon the request of Respondent No. According to him, he is in custody for more than 11 years single cell companyfinement . 132 of the 2013. 2 about the same. 4 to Respondent No. 2 for a companyy of the trial companyrt judgment. 1 which was received on 09.09.2004. 2 was informed vide letter dated 09.02.2013. 1 itself, had number indicated any plea in respect of Praveen Kumar. 1 which were received on 16.08.2004. The State Government was again reminded in this regard on 05.04.2005, 20.04.2005, 04.06.2005 and 21.07.2005. 56 of 2013 filed by the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights PUDR . 2 requesting him to provide the judgment of the High Court, the police diary, the companyrt proceedings and the English translation of the trial companyrt judgment. 1 claimed that the same were in Kannada. In the same order, this Court companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence imposed by the TADA Court and dismissed the appeals preferred by the accused. 2 seeking companyy of the trial companyrt judgment. He was charged for murdering four members of a family and ultimately by judgment dated 05.02.2002, he was companyvicted under Sections 302, 392 and 397 IPC and sentenced to death. 2 about the queries. Upon medical examination by a board of Doctors and receipt of the examination report the State and Jail Authorities shall act in accordance with law. In the reply affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 about the queries vide letter dated 31.08.2012. They companycluded as follows he is suffering from chronic psychotic illness and he needs long term management. As highlighted in the previous case, we reiterate that in case of death sentence, it is desirable to examine all the materials on record first hand in accordance with the time bound practice of this Court and arrive at an independent companyclusion on all the issues of fact and law irrespective of the findings of the trial companyrt and the High Court. 2 for companysideration. Though such recourse is permissible inasmuch as since it is a case of death sentence, it is desirable to examine the materials on record first hand in view of time honoured practice of this Court and to arrive at an independent companyclusion on all issues of facts and law, unbound by the findings of the trial companyrt and the High Court. On 09.01.2003, this Court refused to accept the claim of the State of Karnataka and dismissed its appeal on the ground of limitation. Based on the direction of Respondent No. 2 for the second time to send the judgment of the trial Court along with the police diary and companyrt proceedings. The State of Karnataka also filed a Criminal Appeal being No. 136 of 2013 for similar relief. By judgment dated 29.09.2001, the Designated TADA Court, Mysore companyvicted the accused persons for the offence punishable under TADA as well as IPC and the Arms Act and sentenced them inter alia to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2 that it is number possible to get a companyy of the trial companyrt judgment as all the papers are lying in the Supreme Court. It is also relevant to point out that while arriving at such companyclusion, the Bench heavily relied on opinion expressed by Shetty, J. in Smt. 1 ostensibly on the ground of an appeal made by 14 former Judges. 1 for companysideration under Article 72 of the Constitution. 2 about his good companyduct. Ajmal Kasab vs. State of Maharashtra 2012 9 SCC 1. 821 of 2000, vide judgment dated 02.03.2001. He has number received any written companyfirmation of the same till date. 1 in the light of the appeal made by 14 former judges. 4837/21 dated 13.12.1982 submitted to the State Government a form entitled Required Information. It is asserted that they have number received any written companyfirmation till this date. Against Column No. The answering respondent is duty bound to companyply the orders passed by the Honble Court. 1 did number take steps to expedite the matter for such a long period. We have carefully perused all the details. This Court did number grant special leave and dismissed the SLP in limine. Dr. J.S. The order of the High Court was challenged before this Court in Criminal Appeal No. There was numberreference of the plea of Jafar Ali in the representation made by 14 retired judges. They numbered that he was unkempt and untidy, companyperative but number very much companymunicative and his speech is decreased in flow and companytent and at times is inappropriate and illogical to the question asked. 6 of 2006 was dismissed by this Court. 416 of 2001 which was filed on 30.03.2001. This principle has been highlighted in various decisions including the recent one in Mohd. 149 150 of 2002 before this Court which were admitted by this Court. Such recourse was number adopted in this case. 894 of 2005 and Criminal Appeal No. All the accused persons preferred Criminal Appeal being Nos. 142 of 2005 and Criminal Appeal No. 895 of 2006. 1333 of 1992. 1129 of 2004. being No.
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There is a positive assertion in the FIR that Thakur Singh had killed Dhapu Kunwar. Throughout the day Thakur Singh had locked himself up in a room along with Dhapu Kunwar and their daughter. Later in the evening, after Himmat Singh returned with Shyam Singh, they removed the kelu from above the house and it was then discovered that Thakur Singh had killed Dhapu Kunwar. There is numberevidence that after allegedly having murdered Dhapu Kunwar, Thakur Singh came out of his room and was caught by his relatives and handed over to the police. However, before Gotu Singh arrived in Hingwania on 28th February, 1999 Thakur Singh took his wife Dhapu Kunwar and their daughter inside a room and bolted it from within. These basic facts were that Dhapu Kunwar was the wife of Thakur Singh she was lying dead in the room occupied by her and Thakur Singh, and Dr. Khem Chand Saini PW 15 deposed that Dhapu Kunwar had some injuries on her person but the cause of her death was asphyxia and strangulation. On 26th February, 1999 Thakur Singhs brother Bagh Singh PW 3 was sent to fetch his brother in law Gotu Singh brother of Dhapu Kunwar who then came to Hingwania. While Gotu Singh did number return to Hingwania, Himmat Singh returned along with Shyam Singh. After the analysis of the evidence, the High Court came to the following companyclusions There is numberevidence that anybody saw Thakur Singh entering his room where Dhapu Kunwar had been murdered. Thereafter, Himmat Singh and Gotu Singh went from Hingwania by bus to Chanderiya to meet Thakur Singhs elder brother Shyam Singh PW 1 . The Trial Judge held, on the basis of the evidence on record, that numberone except Thakur Singh companyld have caused the death of Dhapu Kunwar. He seems to have stayed overnight and on 27th February, 1999 Gotu Singh and Thakur Singh were together for most of the day. It was also numbered that Thakur Singh gave absolutely numberexplanation in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to how Dhapu Kunwar had died of asphyxiation inside their room. The Facts According to the first information report FIR lodged by Himmat Singh PW 2 , the respondent accused Thakur Singh was married to Dhapu Kunwar and they had a daughter aged about one year. Thakur Singh was working as a labourer or lorry driver in Ahmadabad. By a judgment and order dated 4th August, 2004 under appeal , the High Court found numberevidence to link Thakur Singh with the death of Dhapu Kunwar. Of these, 14 were the immediate relatives of Thakur Singh and all of them turned hostile. Other ladies in the house, namely, the wife of Bhag Singh, Chanda Kunwar PW 18 wife of Pratap Singh PW 6 and Pushpa Kunwar PW 20 wife of Ram Singh PW 7 tried to persuade Thakur Singh to open the door of the room but he did number do so. There is numberevidence that when Thakur Singh came out of his room he was in possession of any weapon or that his clothes were stained with blood. The door of the house was broken open and Thakur Singh was caught and tied by his brothers and other relatives. The Trial Judge found that there was numberhing to suggest that any other person had entered Thakur Singhs room and there was numberpossibility of anybody else having caused Dhapu Kunwars death by strangulation. In the evening at about 4.30 p.m. on 27th February, 1999 Gotu Singh went to Gundli and stayed there overnight. Soon after the FIR was registered, the investigating officer Kuber Singh PW 23 arrived at the place of the occurrence and took charge of the investigations and arrested Thakur Singh on the basis of the allegations made in the FIR. Proceedings in the High Court Feeling aggrieved by the companyviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court, Thakur Singh preferred D.B. The question for companysideration is whether the facts and circumstances of the case require the application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and if so, whether the respondent accused is guilty of the murder of his wife Dhapu Kunwar. Proceedings in the Trial Court On companypletion of investigations, Kuber Singh filed a charge sheet against Thakur Singh alleging the companymission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 326 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code IPC . At about 6.15 p.m. on the same day, that is 28th February, 1999 Himmat Singh lodged an FIR in the police station giving the facts mentioned above. In our opinion, both questions need to be answered in the affirmative and the High Court rendered a decision, perverse in law, in acquitting Thakur Singh and reversing the decision of the Trial Court. He came back to Hingwania the next morning 28th February, 1999 at about 7.45 a.m. The Upper District Sessions Judge Fast Track Chittorgarh who heard the case being Sessions Case No.90/2001 companyvicted Thakur Singh and found him guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1000/ . Also, numberone saw him companying out from the room after the murder. He had companyfined her and their daughter inside a room and although numberone saw him killing his wife, since the room was bolted from inside, he had number opened it for the whole day and the door had to be forced open, numberone else companyld have caused her death. Since he was number feeling well, he was brought to the family home in Hingwania in Rajasthan on 25th February, 1999 where he stayed the whole day. The Trial Court found that some basic facts were nevertheless brought on record. This was at about 4.30 p.m. The Trial Judge found that the prosecution had examined as many as 25 witnesses. Madan B. Lokur, J. 500 of 2001 in the High Court of Rajasthan. Subsequently, on the request of the Public Prosecutor another witness was called making a total of 26 prosecution witnesses. Criminal Jail Appeal No.
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2014_277.txt
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Khan alleged to have been companymitted by Syed Qasim Razvi and his companyaccused and Serial No,. Razvi was examined on November 29, 1949, and again on February 26, 1950. The accused was examined again on, 26th February, 1950. 2 referred to the offences in respect of the Bibinagar dacoity against Syed Qasim Razvi and 20 other persons. Of them, eighteen were cross examined before 26th January, 1950, and twenty two were cross examined after. The charge was framed on 5th December 1949, and up till 26th January, 1950, the date of the Constitution forty witnesses were examined for the prosecution. 368 of 1952 attacking the validity of the trial by the Special Tribunal on the same companystitutional grounds as have been urged by Qasim Razvi in his petition. On 29th November, 1949, the accused was examined under section 273 of the Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code which companyresponds to section 342 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, and on the 5th of December following, charges were framed against him under sections 123, 124, 330 and 177 read with section 66 of the Hyderabad Penal Code The cross examination of 18 prosecution witnesses was finished before the 26th of January, 1950, and the rest of the witnesses were cross examined after that date. 277, 278, 279 and 280 of 1951, which have been preferred respectively by Khadar Ali Khan, Mohd.,
Hazi Khan, Mahbat Khan and Syed Nazir Ali, the four companyaccused of Qasim Razvi in the Bibi nagar dacoity case, who were tried along with him by the Special Tribunal No. The appellants were companyvicted on 11th September, 1950, and their companyvictions,were upheld on appeal by the High Court of Hyderabad on 13th April, 1951. In the second case forty prosecution witnesses were examined in chief up to November 21, 1949, eighteen were cross examined between this date and January 26, 1950, and 22 were cross examined after that date. MUKHERJEA J. Syed Qasim Razvi, the appellant in this appeal, was one of the accused in what is, known as the Bibinagar dacoity case which took place within the State of Hyderabad and in which, according to the prosecution, a serious raid was companymitted by a party of armed Razakars in village Bibinagar, about 21 miles from the city of Hyderabad, attended with robbery, looting, arson, assault and other violent acts on the afternoon of 10th January, 1948. Chari, with him for the respondent I State of Hyderabad . Rajaram lyer, Advocate General of Hyderabad K.S.R. He was companyvicted on September 11, 1950, and was sentenced to 7 years rigorous imprisonment under section 330 of the Hyderabad Penal companye, companyresponding to section 395 of the Indian Penal Code, and 2 years rigorous imprisonment under each of the following sections, section 124 companyresponding to section 148, Indian Penal Code, section 177 companyresponding to section 201, Indian Penal Code, and section 177/66 companyresponding to Section 109, Indian Penal Code, the sentences to run companycurrently. Their companyvictions and sentences we Ire upheld on appeal by the High Court at Hyderabad on, April 13, 1951. The charges were framed on December 5, 1949. ,
by the Special Tribunal and the companyvictions and sentences were affirmed with slight modification by the High Court of Hyderabad in appeal. It was on the 28th of August, 1949, that is to say, after a lapse of 19 months after the occurrence, that a charge sheet was presented before the Special Tribunal No. In August, 1951, they obtained leave to appeal to this companyrt under articles 132 and 134 of the Constitution. 132 1 and 134 of the Constitution from the Judgment and Order of the 13th April, 1951, of the Hyderabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 277 to 280 of 1951 . The petition also challenges the companytinuation of the trial of the petitioner under the provisions of, the said Regulation after the 26th of January, 1950, as being an infringement of his rights under articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. I am number able to regard this as a general order directing that all offenses of dacoity, grievous hurt, arson, riot, etc.,
by whomsoever companymitted, shall be tried by the Special Tribunal. The examination in chief of all these witnesses was finished on the 21st November, 1949, and the appellant at that stage, chose to cross examine only one witness, namely, the fortieth or the last one and this was done on the 22nd November, 1949. The High Court by its judgment dated the 13th of April, 1951, allowed the appeal to this extent only, namely, that it acquitted the accused of the charge under section 123 of the Hyderabad Code, but otherwise dismissed the appeal and affirmed the companyviction and sentence passed by the Special Tribunal. The petition challenges Regulation V of 1358 Fasli, as having become void after the 26th of January, 1950, as the procedure laid down by the Regulation is discriminatory against the petitioner and violates his fundamental right under article 14 of the Constitution. They were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on charges of dacoity, rioting, etc. The appeals are number yet ready for hearing, but as in Qasim Razvis case, the appellants have filed a petition under article.32 of the Constitution being Petition No. By their judgment dated the 11th September 1950, the Special Tribunal companyvicted the appellant on all the charges mentioned above and sentenced him to 2 years rigorous imprisonment under each of the sections 123, 124 and 177 read with section 66 and to 7 years rigorous imprisonment under section 330, the sentences to run companycurrently. While these appeals were pending and the record was in companyrse of preparation, Razvi filed a petition under article 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the record of the High Court and quashing the orders dated September 11, 1950, and April 13, 1951, and ordering his release. The trial companymenced before the Special Tribunal on 24th October, 1949, and on that day the Special Public Prosecutor opened the case on behalf of the prosecution. The case against the appellant and his companyaccused was formally referred to the Special Tribunal by an order of the Military Governor dated the 6th of October, 1949 but as the charge sheet had been submitted on a previous date, another order was passed on 8th of October, 1949, validating the presentation of the charge sheet. They have number companye up to this companyrt on the strength of a certificate granted by the Hyderabad High Court under articles 132 and 134 of the Constitution. Later, on 6th October, 1949, he made another order in which he selected the offences which the present appellants and their companyaccused were suspected to have companymitted, namely, dacoity, grievous hurt, wrongful companyfinement, arson, riot and destruction of evidence,he furnished particulars of time and place and gave a general description of the victims included, he named the appellants and others as accused in relation to these specific occurrences and directed that they be tried by the Special Tribunal for these offenses. The order, in my opinion, is a specific, and, what might call unclassified, selection of these special handpicked offences suspected to have been companymitted by these particular accused. On, 6th of August, 1951, the High Court gave leave to the accused to appeal to this companyrt under articles 132 and 134 of the Constitution and an appeal has been filed in pursuance of this certificate. The records of the appeal have number been printed as yet, but in the mean time the appellant presented an application under article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the orders of the High Court as well as of the Special Tribunal referred to above and for releasing him on the ground that the proceedings before the Special Tribunal became void after 26th of January, 1950, as they companyflicted with the provisions of articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. As the trial became bad in law after 26th January, 1950, the resulting companyviction and sentence were, it is said, illegal also, and the appellant is entitled to be released from his imprisonment When this petition came up for hearing, a question was raised by the learned Advocate General for the State of Hyderabad as to whether a petition under article 32 would be the proper remedy in a case like this having regard to the fact that the High Court, which was a properly companystituted companyrt and was companypetent to go into the question of jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal, had already dealt with this matter. On October 6, 1949 the Military Governor acting under section 3 of the Regulation directed that the Tribunal shall try the offences specified as Serial No.1 Serial No.1 mentioned the offence of murder of one Shoebulla. The judges of the land are the keepers and interpreters of that companyscience even as the Lord Chancellor was, and in theory still is, the keeper of the Kings companyscience in England. 4 at Trimulgherry, Secunderabad, against the appellant and six other persons. 1449 and 1453 of 1950 were also heard along with these petitions. There was an appeal taken by the appellant against this decision to the High Court of Hyderabad. The First Information Report of the occurrence was made on the following day but the chargesheet was number submitted to the Special Tribunal till August 28, 1949, as some of the accused were absconding and the investigation had to be carried out under difficult circumstances. I still prefer to base broadly on what I called, in an earlier case, the social companyscience of a sovereign democratic republic as seen through Indian eyes and as, reflected in the Constitution of India. MUKHERJEA J. It is to my mind material and vital and cuts at the root of this,, trial. 276 of 1951 will govern companynected Appeals Nos. The procedure followed in the case was the warrant procedure and the prosecution examined 40 witnesses in all before closing its case. IV at Trimulgherry. January 19. This companytention is also raised in the appeal but as the appeal is number ready, we were invited by Mr. Peerbhoy, companynsel for the petitioner, to decide the question of the validity of the impugned Regulation without waiting for the printing of the record. was delivered by Mukherjea J. Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan JJ. 172 and 368 of 1952 under Art. The First Information Report was lodged on the day following, but the police administration of the State of Hyderabad was at that time under the companyplete companytrol of the Razakars and they tried to minimise the gravity of the occurrence as far as possible and there was neither any proper police investigation number any serious attempt to arrest the culprits or bring them to trial. 172 of 1952 and Case No. Similar sentences were passed against the company accused. The Judgment of Patanjali Sastri C. J. and Mukherjea and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ. Without expressing any opinion on this point, we decided to hear arguments on the questions raised treating them as preliminary points in the appeal itself. We heard arguments on these questions treating them as preliminary points in the appeals. 276 of 1961 . A. Peerbhoy and J B. Dadachanji for the petitioners appellants. Petition No. Petitions Nos. The trial proceeded. I am unable to brush this aside as a matter of numberconsequence. The above order in Criminal Appeal No. delivered separate judgments.
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1953_0.txt
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After holding the necessary inquiry, he directed the grant of ryotwari pattas with reference to the lands companyprised in each inam title deed under Section 8 2 of the Act by treating the lands as Iruwaram Minor Inams granted for the performance of services companynected with the Devasthanam, first respondent herein. Aggrieved by these orders both the service holders and the Devasthanam preferred appeals before the Tribunal questioning the companyrectness of the orders of the Settlement Tuhsildar. It was further held that the first respondent Shri Patteswaraswami Devastbanatn, hereinafter referred to as the Devasthanam, alone was the grantee of the inam. While directing that pattas be issued to the service holders such grant was made subject to the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. He ordered that pattas be issued to the service holders under Section 8 2 ii of the Act holding that Section 8 2 i was number applicable as there was numberalienation in respect of these lands. The brief facts of the case are as follows The Settlement Tehsildar II, Gobichettipalayam initiated suo motu proceedings under the provisions of the Madras Minor Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwaii Act, 1963 Act XXX of 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Act, in respect of the issue of ryotwari patta in respect of Service inams in Perur village. 1995 to 2021 of 1979 and 1953 59/81 are directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated 13.4.1978 by which the High Court set aside the companyclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the appellants, before us, were service holders and that they would be entitled to ryotwari pattas. Civil Appeals 1914/82 and 1994/79 are directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 29.8.1978 which followed the earlier judgment dated 13.4.1978. In the latter case, they would be obliged to establish the link between them and the original grantee if the grant was to the individual. These were known as Manyams. The word came into use after the Muhammadan companyquest. In ancient days, grants of land, or revenue, were made by Hindu sovereigns to individuals, particular families or companymunities for various purposes or to religious institutions lor their upkeep. When similar appeals came before the High Court, following this judgment, the High Court by its order dated 29.8,1978 allowed the appeal of Devasthanam, the first respondent herein. Aggrieved by this judgment several Special Tribunal Appeals STA under Section 30 of the Act were preferred to the High Court. All these appeals can dealt with under a companymon judgment since Civil Appeal Nos. Mohan, J.
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1992_576.txt
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91 of the Saranjam List. The Resolution was headed, Resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam standing at No. The Bhujangrao mentioned in the Resolution is the plain tiff who is shown as Bhujangrao III in the genealogical tree. In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yesh wantrao alias Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession of this Saranjam. is companytinuable as an inali enable and impartible Saranjam, such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers in any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam. It reads Resolution The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder. The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar. This Daulatrao I left three sons, Bhujangrao I, Yeshwantrao and Malojirao. 1769 dated the 17th of March, 1891,and to declare that the whole of the Gajendragad Estate shall be companytinuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam on the companyditions stated in the said Resolution. 8969 dated the 7th June, 1932, is pleased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives, respectively, of three branches of the Ghorpade family. If an order passed by Government under Rule VII is number carried out, Government may, whatever the reason may be, direct the Saranjam, or a portion of it, to be resumed Provision for the members of the Saranjam dars family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed. On the death of the British Grantee Bhujangrao Appa saheb he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who died on the 24th of July, 1864. A companymon ancestor of the present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a Saran jam some time before the advent of the British. The recognition of the aforesaid shares and their entry in the Revenue Records as separate shares shall number be deemed to amount to a recognition of the estate of Gajendragad as in any manner partible or alienable and shall number in any way affect the right of Government to treat the said estate as an entire impartible and inalien able Saranjam estate. In companypliance with this, the companymon ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by the Brit ish Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate. The plaint states Government can have numberjurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of the full bene fit of all the rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam. Bhujangrao I died in 1881 and his younger brother Yesh wantrao alias Annasaheb claimed to succeed as the sole heir. That in companysequence of his position of a sole Saran jamdar the plaintiff alone at any rate during his lifetime has the sole right to the rights and privileges appertaining to the post of a sole Saranjamdar, to wit, to be companysulted in the appointment of the village officers in all the villages appertaining to the Saranjam estate, but assigned to defendants 1 and 2 for potgi Defendants 1 and 2 be restrained from doing any acts or taking any steps in companytravention of the aforesaid right of the plaintiff. 2 died 8 5 1931 Bhujangrao III Plaintiff The facts are as follows. Each of the said de facto shares shall be companytinuable hereditarily as such as ii it were a separate Saranjam estate in accordance with the rules made for the companytinuance of Saranjams by the Governor in Council in exercise of the powers referred to in the rules framed under the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act, 1852, and section 2 3 of the Bombay Summary Settlement Act VII of 1863 and such special orders as the Governor in Council may make in regard to the Gajendragad Estate as a whole or in regard to the said share. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, under which plaintiff is entitled to be recognised as the sole Saranjamdar in the Revenue Records, and that the assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 are held by them as mere potgi holders. That it be declared that defendant 3 Government have numberright to change the Resolution No. We do number know the date of the British recognition but the nature of the tenure is described as follows Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of British companyquest, viz.,
Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade. The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise this claim and permitted Bhujangrao Is widow Krishnabai to adopt a a boy from the family and recog nised him as the heir in respect of that portion of the estate which lay within the Principality of Kolhapur. The plaintiff claims to be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs appropriate to such a claim. 23 of 1934 against the present plaintiff and the Secretary of State or India in Council praying inter alia that the properties in that suit, viz.,
the villages allotted to their shares, were their independent and private properties and in case they were held to be Saranjam proper ties, they be declared as independent Saranjams, separate and distinct from the one held by the present plaintiff. Having regard, however, to the manner in which different portions of the estate have been held by different branches of the family, the Governor in Council, in modification of the orders companytained in Government Resolution No. The first and second defendants are members of the plaintiffs family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay Province of Bombay at the date of the suit . According to defendants 1 and 2, this was pursuant to an arrangement between the Government and themselves that Government would issue a fresh Resolution in terms of the earlier Resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891. Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages. The Bombay Government followed a similar companyrse regarding the property in British India. The Governor in Council agrees with the Commis sioner, Southern Division, that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should be companytinued to them as at present. But this was only with respect to property situate in British India. This time it passed the following Resolution on the 7th of June, 1932. P 53 shows that the estate companysisted of 26 villages. The cause of action arose in April 1938 and the resolution and the entry being ultra vires is number binding As this is a suit claiming for relief primarily against defendants 1 and 2, defendant 3 is made a party to the suit in order to enable Government defendant 3 to give proper effect to the decision of Government of the 17th March, 1891, and of 7th June, 1932, as against defendants 1 and 2 who have numberright to the position which they claim The reliefs prayed for are That it be declared that defendants 1 and 2 have numberright to go behind the order of the Government as per Reso lution No. The Order of Government of the 8th February, 1936 is, therefore, ultra vires and in numberway binding on the present plaintiff Defendants 1 and 2, therefore, are number entitled to any rights or privileges claimable by the holder of a Saran jam which according to the G.R. When they arrived on the scene they decided, as far as possible, to companytinue such Saranjams, jagirs and inams as had been grant ed by the earlier rulers, and accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B, Rule 10 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 The Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 to regulate the mode of recognition and the succession and companyditions of tenure to Saranjams, which are analogous to jagirs. The defendants were evidently aggrieved by this, for they filed Suit No. After the District Deputy Collectors orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8th of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government. The plaintiff appeals. On the 26th of April, 1882, they passed a Resolution embodying the follow ing decision The adoption was to be recognised and the adopted son was to occupy the same position as his adoptive father, that is to say, he was to get one third of the property plus the assignment given to him as head of the family. This suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action against the present plain tiff but number against the Secretary of State for India in Council. 3 the State of Bombay. As a companysequence a division of the property was ef fected. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, G. N. Joshi, with him for respondent No. The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, V. N. Lokur, with him for the respondents Nos. and DAS J. agreed with Bose J. Bose J. This was on the 3rd of February, 1882. The lower appellate Court also dismissed the suit on three grounds 1 that the two previous decisions of 1868 and 1908 operate as res judicata, 2 that the impugned Resolution is intra vires and 3 that section 4 a and d of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court. Somayya and Sanjiva Rao Naidu N. C. Shaw, with them for the appellant. 1 and 2. High Courts judgment dated the 12th of March, 1908, makes it clear that as Government was number a party to that litigation its rights against either or both of the parties were number affected. The judgment is dated the 12th of October, 1868. After this decision was given the two partitioned the property between themselves amicably. Judgment was delivered by BOSE J. PATANJALI SASTRI C.J. 1226 of 1945 companyfirming a judg ment and decree of the District Judge of Dharwar in Appeal No. dated 16th December, 1948, in Second Appeal No. Appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay Bhagwati and Dixit JJ. The other two brothers companytinued joint and took the remainder. CIVIL APPPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 123 of 1943. That was left undivided. The Register Ex. The facts of the case and the arguments of the companynsel appear in the judgment. 11 of 1950. This was done. January 30.
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1952_1.txt
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The promotees were shown as juniors to the direct recruits in the seniority list. On 31.5.1979 the appellants were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers on adhoc basis. and Chief Engineer Irrigation Department. Consequently, they were companyfirmed as Assistant Engineers. Respondents 3 4 were selected through the Commission and appointed directly as Assistant Engineers in the P.W.D. 1536 of 1981.
claiming seniority in the post of Assistant Engineer from the date of initial appointment and officiation on the said post. on 21.7.75 changing the date of promotion of the promotees to a prior date in 1961. Since then, the appellants have been working uninterruptedly on the post of Assistant Engineers. The companymission held in the year 1980, an interview of some of the promotes to be companysidered for the post of Assistant Engineers. The first appellant was appointed as an Overseer re designated as Junior Engineer on adhoc basis in Public Works Department for short P.W.D , State of U.P. Pursuant to the aforesaid judgments the State Government gave benefit of seniority to the promotees. Whether the appellants can be deprived of the benefits of their officiating service prior to the approval of the Commission for the purpose of seniority in view of the fact that the delay in granting approval for making them regular on the post of Assistant Engineer was attributable to the State Government and the Commission, as the appellants were fully qualified to be appointed and approved as Assistant Engineers even on the date, they were appointed to officiate as such? On the representation of the promotees, an order was passed by the Govt. A similar companytroversy inter se the promotees and direct recruits arose in another writ Petition No. The main ground of attack was that the companynting of the period of companytinuous officiation of the promotees from the date of adhoc appointment was against the decision of this Court in P.D. The appointment orders stated that the promotion was being made to companye up with the work load in the Department since Assistant Engineers approved by the Commission were number available and that the promotions were only for a period of one year. The said promotions were made within the quota of posts reserved for the promotees according to the relevant Service Rules by the Departmental Promotion Committee companysisting of Secretary, W.D., Chief Engineer, P.W.D. Saksena, who was an adhoc promotee as Assistant Engineer in the year 1970 just like the appellants and approved by the companymission in the year 1980, filed a Writ Petition in the High Court namely W.P. A Division Bench of the High Court upheld on 4.7.1989 the claim made by the petitioner in the said writ petition and held that the promotees would be assigned seniority from the date of companytinuous affliction and number from the date of approval by the Commission. Aggarwal Versus State of U.P. The second appellant was directly appointed as overseer substantively in the said department through the Commission on the same day. inviting objections filed by the direct recruits, a final seniority list was prepared and published, vide numberification dated 11.7.1995. In the interview held in the year 1984, the appellants were also called and they were duly approved and selected by the Commission. A seniority list was published, vide letter dated 3.12.1984 issued by the Secretary. 1987 3 SCC 622. of U.P. The appellant therein placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in P.O.Aggarwal Versus State of U.P. and Others 1987 3 SCC 622. 566 and second appellant at Serial No. 9343 of 1990, C.P.Sharma Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others. The first appellant was placed at Serial No. III Whether the High Court was right in reopening the issues which have been decided in favour of the promotees by three different Division Benches of the same Court without retiring the matter to a larger Bench? Respondents 6 to 13 were promoted to the post in 1964 and the appellants were promoted in 1969. In May, 1978 they passed an examination known as Associate Member of Institution of Engineer India , Section A and B, equivalent to B.E. The S.L.P. The State Govt. No promotee was impleaded as a party to the Writ Petition. 8966 of 1989 which was decided on 17.1.1990. respondents 3 4 were placed at Serial Nos. The appellants have a grievance that though their juniors were called for interview, they were number companysidered without any reason therefor. on 17.7.1973. Those orders were challenged by respondents 1 to 5 who were direct recruits and the orders were quashed. Aggrieved by the said list, respondents 3 filed Writ Petition No. The judgment in the case of Saksena referred to earlier was assailed in this Court in S.L.P. 712 and 722 respectively. Subsequently other orders were passed pushing back the dates of promotion still further to December 1958 for respondents 6 7 and February 1961 for respondents 14 to 23. There also the same view was taken by another Division Bench which was challenged in S.L.P. was dismissed on 19.11.1990. However that grievance is outside the scope of the present companytroversy. Both the appellants were holders of Diploma in Civil Engineering. 684 SB of 1995 in the High Court. Srinivasan. By judgment dated 1.2.1991, the L.P. was dismissed by this Court. by order dated 9.8.1979. That Writ Petition was treated to be one in representative capacity and numberice was given to all companycerned through the newspapers. In the meanwhile, one D.N. Degree. However, the appellants were permitted to advance arguments through their companynsel at the time of hearing. The application filed by the appellants for impleading them as parties was also dismissed by the High Court. c No. C No. J. No.
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1998_815.txt
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should have been awarded for the land which was acquired in 1960. 12 per cent of land. 26 per cent in regard to land in the adjoining Ramnagar Colony which was acquired in the year 1952 and that having regard to the upward trend of prices, higher companypensation. The question in this appeal is about the companypensation, to be awarded for the land belonging to the appellant which was acquired by the Government pursuant to a numberification dated 17th March, 1960 under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition, Act The Land Acquisition officer awarded companypensation at the rate of Rs. This was companyfirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Anantapur, on a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act On appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh enhanced the companypensation to Rupees 25 per cent after deducting an extent to 2 acres 69 cents of land from the total extent acquired Shri Vepa P. Sarathi, learned Counsel for the appellant argued that companypensation was awarded at the rate of Rs. Chinnappa Reddy, J.
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1979_132.txt
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We have heard learned companynsel on both sides. Leave granted.
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1996_1714.txt
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Gobind Mukhoty, D.K. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal and Pramod Swarup for the Interveners. Shanta Vasudevan, K. Manohar G.K. Bansal, B.B. Agnihotri, R. Das, D.K. Kunikannan for the Respondents. Singh and T.T. Kaushik NP , for the Petitioners. Garg and R.C. Misra, L.R. S. Nambiar, R.B. Sinha, G. Prabhakar, Smt. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition C No.964 of 1991. Singh, S.K. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India .
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1992_265.txt
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On a companysideration of all the applications the Regional Transport Authority granted the permit to the widow of Gopalassetty. Her application was rejected by the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority directed the grant of the permit to the appellant. The Transport Minister allowed the revision petition of Dhani Devi and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The Regional Transport Authority decided to grant the permit to another applicant. After the matter went back to the Regional Transport Authority, the widow of Gopalassetty was substituted in his place and was allowed to prosecute the application presented by him. He held that the order of the Regional Transport Authority was number without jurisdiction. During the pendency of the appeals Gopalassetty died. On May 4, 1966, the Regional Transport Authority companysidered all the applications, allowed Dhani Devi to prosecute the application filed by her husband and directed the grant of the permit to her. His widow Dhani Devi succeeded to the possession of the transport vehicles left by him and accordingly under s. 61 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Regional Transport Authority,transferred to her all the permits held by him for other routes. The appellate tribunal allowed the appeals and remanded the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for fresh disposal. On the materials on the record, the Regional Transport Authority found that the appellant was an experienced and displaced operator. It held that the application presented by Gopalassetty companyld be A.I.R. Unsuccessful applicants other than Gopalassetty filed appeals against the order. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal permitted the guardian of her minor legal representatives to companytinue the revision petition, set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the variation sought for. On a writ petition filed by the widow, the Mysore High Court set aside the order of the appellate tribunal and restored the order of the Regional Transport Authority. Dhani Devi, .Chandrakiriti Singh and another applicant filed revision petitions against the order under s. 64A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. Seerval persons including oen Ram Bichar Singh filed applications for the grant of a permanent stage carriage permit for the Chapra Masrakh Siwan Gopalganj route before June 15, 1963 and last date appointed for the receipt of the applications .by the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority. The State Transport Appellate Authority accepted the companytention, set aside the order appealed from and directed the grant of the permit to Sant Bihari Sharma and in case of his failure to companyply with certain companyditions gave the second preference to Chandrakriti Singh. The order was set aside by the appellate tribunal on the ground inter alia that the widow companyld number companytinue the application filed by Gopalassetty. At the hearing of the appeals it was companytended that the order was without jurisdiction as Dhani Devi had numberright to prosecute the application filed by her husband. The decision of the Mysore High Court was reversed by this Court on another point in Hanuman Transport Ca. Sant Bihari Sharma, Chandra Kriti Singh and other unsuccessful applicants filed appeals against the order under 64. The present appeals have been filed by Dhani Devi against the orders passed by the High Court. 1963 Mysore, 279.
prosecuted by his widow. In Maruthuvanan v. Balasubramaniam 2 two partners of a firm filed an appeal from an order rejecting their application for the grant of a permit. It held that the right to apply for the grant of a permit was number heritable or transferable and Ratanlals heir had numberright to companytinue the appeals. Ram Bichar Singh died on April 12, 1965 before the final disposal of his application. Sant Bihari Sharma and Chandrakriti Singh filed two writ petitions in the Patna High Court challenging the said order. She filed a revision petition against the order under s. 64A. During the pendency of the revision petition she died. Ram Bichar Singh is said to have left behind other heirs also, but numberobjection was taken on the ground of their numberjoinder. 1264 and .1265 of 1968. But this Court then declined to express any opinion on the question whether the successor can be permitted to prosecute the application filed by his predecessor. P. Singh and R.B. Two of the rival operators filed writ petitions challenging the order. 2 A.I.R. K. Daphtary, Attorney General, Saptami Jha and B.P. During the pendency of the appeal one of the partners died. 4 1961 A.C. 901.
for by the rival claimants in order to enable them to file objections. Jha, for the appellant in both the appeals . CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 235 and 287 of 1967. Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure does number apply to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. Goburdhun, for respondent No.1 in both the appeals . Appeals from the judgment and order, dated March 18, 1968 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cases Nos. Datar, for respondent No. v. Meenakshi 1 . 2 in both the appeals . That finding was number challenged in appeal. 1957 All.
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1968_379.txt
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During the relevant assessment year sale of matches was taxable under sec. The matches are thereafter despatched by lorry to the Appellant in accordance with the instructions received from the Sales Depots. 3 a of the Central Sales Tax Act and since the appellant was the first dealer in matches in Mysore State it was liable to pay Sales Tax and accordingly, it was so assessed. The Sales Depots send to the appellant detailed invoices of the matches despatched by their factories The Appellant gives credit to the value of the matches after deducting therefrom the amount companyered by debit numberes in respect of Octroi, lorry freight and other incidental charges incurred by it and at the request of the sales office the assessee remits the value of the matches direct to the factory by means of draft and telegraphic transfer. 13,04,097/ in respect of the purchase of safety matches and claimed exemption on the entire turnover on the ground that it was a subsequent sale from the ,dealers in the State of Mysore. On receipt of these orders from the Appellant the respective Managers of the three Sales Depots forward the orders to their Head Offices at Sivakasi and instruct them to despatch the matches ordered direct to the appellant at Devangere. The question of law which arose out of the decision of the Sales Tax authorities for companysideration of the High Court was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the assessees turn over in respect of safety matches is number liable to tax on the ground ,that the sales effected by the assessee are number the first sales in the State. This Appeal is by certificate against the judgment of the Mysore High Court dismissing the Revision Petition against the order of the Mysore Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, by and under which the assessment order of the Commercial Tax Officer and the Appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax was companyfirmed. It appears to us on the facts as set out above which were number in dispute, the sales were made by the respective factories direct to the appellant, the sales price was also sent directly to the factories at Sivakasi. Against the said assessment order the appellant filed an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes who dismissed the appeal. On these findings the companyrectness of which was number disputed the assessing authority came to the companyclusion that the transactions were inter State sales within the meaning of Sec. 1175 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 30, 1966 of the Mysore High Court in S.T.R.P. The appellants declared for the assessment year 1959 60 a total turn over of Rs. R. Somanatha Iyer, M. S. Narasimhan and R. B. Datar, for the respondent. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. The further appeal to the Tribunal was equally unsuccessful. 58 of 1965. The Judgment of the Court was, delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.
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1971_449.txt
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The said Memorandum of Settlement dated 25.04.2018, duly signed by the parties and their Signature Not Verified respective companynsel, is taken on record. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, the parties have entered into a Memorandum of Settlement.
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2018_767.txt
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Roster point 7 was for a Scheduled Caste candidate. The vacancy in the 1979 was at roster point 4 which is reserved for Scheduled Tribe candidate. As against the two vacancies which were reserved for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates, three scheduled Caste candidates were selected. The advertisement was in respect of four vacancies out of which two vacancies were in the general category, one was reserved for a Scheduled Caste candidate and one was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe candidate. These vacancies were at a roster points 5,6 and 7. To this vacancy roster point 5 was applied which was reserved for a Scheduled Tribe candidate and which had remained unfilled in 1981. In 1983, one vacancy was advertised for a Scheduled Tribe candidate. Since the vacancy at the roster point 4 had been filled by a general category candidate, the reservation in favour of a Scheduled Tribe candidate was shifted to the roster point 5. However, the reservation for a Scheduled Tribe candidate. Roster point 9 was kept for a Scheduled Caste candidate in view of the fact that in 1981, roster point 7 which was for a scheduled Caste candidate, had been filled by a general category candidate. for dereservation of that vacancy. The Brochure on reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in services issued by the Govt. Padam Singh who was at the head of the select Panel was at the head of the Select Panel was appointed against the vacancy for a Scheduled Caste candidate. However, the vacancy which was reserved fora Scheduled Tribe candidate companyld number be filled since numbersuitable candidate was available. As per the relevant rules and instructions applicable to this roster, in the third year of carry forward, the Scheduled Caste vacancy was exchangeable with a Scheduled Caste vacancy. The petitioner who belongs to a Scheduled Caste, applied for one of these vacancies. In other words, the three vacancies which arose in 1981 were companysidered as one for a Scheduled Tribe candidate and two for general category candidates. These roster points 10 and 11 were filled by general category candidates. The petitioner who was at the serial No.2 was number appointed in the vacancy which was meant for a Scheduled Tribe candidate and it was kept unfilled. It is the companytention of the petitioner that this was the third recruitment year of carrying forward a vacancy meant for a Scheduled Tribe candidate. Roster point 6 was for a general category. Four vacancies were advertised. The two roster points 6 and 7 for general category candidates were filled after advertisement. Hence the reservation at the roster point 7, was transferred to roster point 9. These were at roster points 8,9,10 and 11. However, roster point 7 was treated as for general category candidate, Since out of three vacancies only one companyld be reserved. Once again numbersuitable candidate was available. Since it was a single vacancy, it was treated as unreserved and it was filled by a general category candidate, Smt. For the two vacancies which were reserved for general category candidates, one Mr. Malhotra and one Mr. singh were appointed. of India, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Ministry of Home Affairs companytain orders and instructions issued by the Govt of India from time to time on the question of reservations of vacancies for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Thereafter, in the 1981 three vacancies arose. For filling of vacancies in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service after giving due effect to reservations in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, under Rule 22 of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules 1970, reservations have to be made in accordance with the orders issued by the Central Govt. There being numberother vacancies, the petitioner and L.D Mual were number given appointments. Chapter 8 of this Brochure deals with the procedure for filling reserved vacancies in recruitment through U.P.S.C or by advertisement. Several vacancies have arisen thereafter, but the petitioner was number appointed. In 1979 there was one vacancy for the post of Additional District Sessions Judge. The three candidates on the select panel, in the order of the merit were 1 Padam Singh, 2 the petitioner and 3 L.D Mual. In order to understanding the claim of the petitioner it is necessary to examine the position regarding filling of vacancies in respect of Additional District and Sessions Judges from the year 1979 onwards. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court has companysidered the case of the petitioner along with the cases of several other petitioner who had also challenged their number appointment in respect of subsequent vacancies. The select panel approved by the Full companyrt of the Delhi High Court. He applied for the post of an Additional District Sessions Judge in the Delhi Higher Judicial service in response to an advertisement which was issued in June 1985. It was a proposal was made to the Central Govt. Usha Mehra. In the case of the petitioner the Delhi High Court has held that he was number entitled to be appointed and has dismissed his petition. The petitioner is a practising advocate of more than 21 years standing. Hence he filed a written petition in the Delhi High Court against his number being appointed. The next recruitment was in 1985. It was, thereafter, carried forward. Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, J. Accordingly a roaster is maintained. from time to time.
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1997_42.txt
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This was resisted by the defendant and it was pleaded that the plaintiff was number entitled to inter est on mesne profits, that the zamindar was entitled to receive the profits of the disputed lands and that deduc tion should be made out of the amount of the mesne profits on account of munafa and the amount of chowkidari dues as well as cesses due to him or paid by him. That the said munafa should have been assessed on a fair share of the profits from the land. The zamindar filed applications for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. An applica tion was made for ascertainment of mesne profits on 6th November, 1918. The District Judge on appeal remanded the cases for determination of the companyditions and terms under which the patnidar was to hold the lands under the zamindar and directed ascertainment of profits. After a prolonged enquiry the trial companyrt on 18th December, 1937, decreed the plaintiffs claim for mesne profits after allow ing the zamindar the deductions claimed by him up to the date of assessment of mesne profits but disallowed the amount claimed by way of equitable set off for the subse quent period. This decision was affirmed on appeal to His Majesty in Council. 1 an additional rent, to be deter mined on the principle that the original patni rent should bear the same ratio to the patni rent number payable by the plaintiffs as the original Hustbood at the time of the creation of the patni should bear to the present increased Hustbood, or any other fair and equitable rent which may be determined at the time of assessing the mesne profits. 75 to 92 of 1951 arises out of 18 suits instituted in the companyrt of the Munsif of Rampurhat on 22nd December, 1909, by Ganpat Singh and Narpat Singh, predecessors in interest of respondents 1 to 3 against the predecessor in interest of the appellant, late Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, and also some other persons who were tenants under him, for a declaration of the plaintiffs title to the resumed chowkidari chakran lands and for khas possession of the same and for mesne profits. 68 to 74 were filed in September, 1904, by Maharaja Bahadur Singh in the companyrt of the differ ent Munsifs at Rampurhat, against Raja Ranjit Singh Bahadur, deceased, and others, for a declaration of his title to the lands mentioned in the different suits and for mesne profits from the year 1899 till recovery of possession. Five years later, on 24th June, 1927, another set of objections was filed by the zamindar claiming deduction out of mesne profits by way of equitable set off of the payments made by him subsequent to the date of delivery possession as well as for the amount of munafa that became payable to him after that date. Against these decrees appeals were preferred to His Majesty in Council by special leave. The plaintiffs ob tained delivery of possession of the lands in the mean while on 23rd November, 1910. 68 to 74 of 1951. 75 to 92 of 1951. It was alleged that the lands in the several suits were chowkidari chakran lands within the plaintiffs patnidari, granted to his predecessors in interest on 14th November, 1853, by the ancestors of the defendant, that as the lands were in the possession of village watchmen on service tenures, they were excluded from assessment of land revenue and numberrent was paid on them, that in the year 1899 under the provisions of sections 50 and 51 of Bengal Act VI of 1870 Government resumed the lands, terminated the service tenures and settled them with the zamindar, that in this situation the plaintiff as patnidar became entitled to their actual physi cal possession, that the zamindar wrongfully took physical possession of them and denied the right of the plaintiff and hence he was entitled to the reliefs claimed. The plaintiff actually obtained possession of the lands involved in these suits in August, 1913. A certifi cate was granted for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. That the munafa rent should number be calculated on the basis of the principles laid down in Radhacharan v. Maharaja Ranjit Singh 1 . Against the remand order appeals were preferred to the High Court and the High Court decreed the appeals in these terms We set aside the portion of the decision of the Dis trict Judge which remands the cases to the original companyrt to determine the companyditions under which the patnidar is to hold the lands under the zamindar. Sitaram Bannerjee Arun Kumar Dutta and Amiya Kurnar Mukherjea, with him for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos. Sitaram Bannerjee Arun Kumar Dutta and Amiya Kumar Mukherjee, with him for the appellant in Civil Appeals Nos. Against the judgment and decrees of the District Judge the plaintiff preferred appeals to the High Court at Calcut ta. 861 to 885 of 1939 from the judgments and decrees dated the 16th December, 1938, of the Court of the District Judge, Birbhum, in Title Appeals Nos. The learned District Judge on appeal reversed this decision and allowed the defendant the amount claimed by him by way of equitable set off, subject, however, to the companydition that the dues of the defendant should be deducted from the dues of the plaintiff till the defendants dues were wiped off. The High Court by the judgment under appeal modified the decrees of the District Judge and disallowed the claim for equitable set off in its entirety for the subsequent period and restored the decree of the trial companyrt. On special appeal to the High Court, the suits were remanded for trial on the ques tion of limitation, and after remand they were dismissed by the trial companyrt and the Court of appeal as barred by limita tion. The suits were decreed on 17th August, 1905, and 19th August, 1905, by the two companyrts respectively and the decisions were affirmed on appeal by the District Judge. These appeals are directed against the judgment and decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, dated 23rd February, 1945, reversing the judgment and decrees passed by the District Judge of Birbhum dated 16th December, 1938. in Second Appeals Nos. After the abolition of the jurisdiction of the Privy Council these appeals were transmitted to this Court. Panchanan Ghose Chadra Nath Mukherji, with him for the respondents Nos. On second appeal, it was held that the suits were within limitation and were then decreed for the second time. transmitted to England. The second batch of appeals Nos. Against this decision special appeals were preferred to the High Court and by the judgment under appeal the decision of the trial companyrt was restored. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Appeals from the judgments and decrees dated the 23rd February, 1945, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta Akram and Blank JJ. 1 in Civil Appeals Nos. It is necessary to set out briefly the history of this half a century old litigation I The seven suits out of which arise Appeals Nos. 23 to 47 of 1938. Urukramdas Chakravarthy S. N. Mukherjee, with him for the respondent No. The principal questions for determina tion are the same in all of them and can be companyveniently disposed of by one judgment. Rest of the remand order will stand. During the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court, Raja Bhupendra Narayan Singh died and the present appellant was impleaded as his heir and representative. An application under Order XIX, rule 4, of the Supreme Court Rules was presented at the hearing of the appeals that the appellant be allowed to urge the following additional grounds in support of the appeals, viz. By an order dated 9th June, 1947, all the appeals were admitted and it was directed that the proceedings be printed and. 1 to 3 in Civil Appeals No. An application was also made in the High Court for permission to urge additional grounds number already taken. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J. April 2.
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1952_23.txt
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No.224 of 2007 registered by the Agripada Police Station. 1961/2007 whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the appellants claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs a pass an order, direction or a Writ in the nature of Certiorari calling upon the records and proceedings of C.R.No.224 of 2007 registered by the Agripada Police Station. 293/2007 for number compliance of orders dated 25.7.2007 and 7/8/2007 passed in writ petition No. c to issue direction or an order to stay all the proceedings in C.R.No.224 of 2007 registered by the Agripada Police Station till the final disposal of the present petition was dismissed, stating The learned APP makes a statement on the basis of instructions from the investigating Officer that the investigation of the crime is companypleted and he states that charge sheet will be filed within one week. b pass an order, direction and writ in the nature of Certiorari to quash and set aside the proceedings under the C.R. Writ Petition No. Therefore, after filing the charge sheet, appropriate reliefs of discharge etc. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.12.2007 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Crl. are open to the petitioners. Leave granted.
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2008_2256.txt
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In that selection again the 3rd Respondent appeared but was again number selected. In 1979 both Appellant and 3rd Respondent were allowed to companypete for selection to the post of Ticket Collectors. The 3rd Respondent had also companypeted but he was number selected or empanelled. Being so eligible both the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent had companypeted. The 3rd Respondent was appointed as a Porter in the Commercial Department on 30th August, 1974. Only persons who were empanelled companyld be appointed as Ticket Collectors. Selections for the post Ticket Collector were again made in 1982 and 1983. Undoubtedly, the selection was to be from persons working in the Commercial Department. The Central Administrative Tribunal held that the Appellant was working in the Transportation Traffic Department and the selections were to be from persons working in the Commercial Department. As provided in this Rule Appellant and the 3rd Respondent were allowed to attend promotional companyrses to qualify as Ticket Collectors. On 29th September, 1986 the 3rd Respondent who, during all this period, had been working as an adhoc Ticket Collector was reverted to make room for candidates who had been successfully empanelled. On 17th June, 1981 both the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent were shown to have been selected. Pursuant to this Judgment the 1st Respondent has passed an Order dated 22nd August, 1988 by which seniority of Appellant is fixed below 3rd Respondent and it is proposed that Appellant be reverted to the post of Porter in the Commercial Department. Pursuant to this selection on 28th May, 1983 the Appellant was promoted as Ticket Collector in a vacant post. They then again companypeted in 1981. Thereafter both the Appellant and the 3rd Respondent were appointed as Ticket Collectors on adhoc basis on the companydition that this would number companyfer any right for regular appointment and that they would make room for regular appointees as and when selected and appointed. All persons who were eligible were allowed to companypete for selection. On 25th September, 1986 the Appellant was promoted to the grade of Senior Ticket Collector. The Central Administrative Tribunal directed the Government to prepare a fresh seniority list companyfining themselves to the Commercial Department and thereafter, if the 3rd Respondent was found senior to the Appellant, to promote him with effect from the date of promotion of the Appellant. These Appeals are against a Judgment dated 11th December, 1987 in a Petition filed by the 3rd Respondent before the Central Administrative Tribunal and an Order dated 22nd August, 1988 by which, pursuant to Judgment dated 11th December, 1987, the 1st Respondent has determined that Appellant is junior to 3rd Respondent and reverted him to post of Porter in the Commercial Department. The 3rd Respondent has number appeared even though served. On 20th August, 1980 the Appellant got posted in the Commercial Department. However, with effect from 22nd August, 1980 the Appellant was also working in the Commercial Department. In the seniority list the name of the Appellant was missing. An adhoc seniority list will be prepared on the basis of length of companytinuous service in the grade and suitable men selected and placed on a panel for training. On 5th January, 1987 the 3rd Respondent challenged his reversion and the promotion order of the Appellant by filing a Petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal. In 1983 the Appellant was selected along with 17 other persons. The Appellant got selected and was put on the select panel on 29th April, 1983. However, neither got selected. On 27th September, 1981 a provisional seniority list was prepared. On 11th December, 1987 the Central Administrative Tribunal held that the promotion of the Appellant was number proper as the Appellant was number eligible. Briefly stated the facts are as follows On 22nd July, 1972 the Appellant was appointed as a Porter on casual basis in the Transportation Traffic Department of the South Central Railway, Hubli Division. Even though the 3rd Respondent had number appeared, Mr. Nagaraja and Mr. Qadri have fairly placed before us all the material and have assisted the Court. Thereafter another selection was held in April 1986. The Appellant made a representation against the fact that his name had number been included in the seniority list. However, as there were numbervacancies they were number appointed. On 1st March, 1973 the Appellant was companyferred a temporary status. LITTTTTTJ J U D G M E N T N. VARIAVA, J.
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2000_980.txt
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1122 of 1976. The assessee owns a cement factory known as Udaipur Cement Works at Udaipur in Rajasthan and it manufactures and sells cement to purchasers both inside and outside Rajasthan. The question is whether in sales of cement effected under the Cement Control order 1967, the amount of freight forms part of the sale price so as to be exigible to Sales Tax under these Acts. The maximum price at which a producer companyld sell cement was prescribed in clause 8 which said that numberproducer shall sell any other variety of cement at a price exceeding Rs. During these assessment years the sale of cement was companytrolled under the Cement Control order, l 967 hereinafter referred to as the Control order . During The relevant assessment years, the assessee entered into diverse companytracts of sale of cement with purchasers at the price of Rs. The assessee did number charge in the invoices sales tax on the amount of railway freight. The question arose in the assessment of the assessee to sales tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 as to whether the amount of freight deducted from the free on rail destination railway station price hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as F.O.R destination price in the invoices made out by the assessee and paid by the purchasers formed part of the sale price within the meaning of the definition of that term in section 2 p of Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 and section 2 h of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The appeal relates to assessment of the assessee to sales tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 and the Central Sales Tax Act 1956 for the assessment years 1971 72 and 1972 73. 214.65 per metric tonne free on rail destination railway station plus packing charges and excise duty. 214.65 per metric tonne free on rail destination railway station plus the excise duty paid thereon. 161.40 per metric tonne for cement manufactured by all producers other than those mentioned at Items 1 to 5, which included the assessee. These appeals by special leave raise an interesting question of law relating to the applicability of the definition of sale price in section 2 p of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 and 2 h of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Clause 7 of the Control order provided that the ex factory prices admissible to the producer for the different varieties of cement shall be as specified in the Schedule and the Schedule, as it stood at the material time, specified a retention price of Rs. Clause 9 and 11 provided for the creation of a Cement Regulation Account in the following terms . The proviso to Clause 8 provided that in the case of packed cement, there shall be added to this price such charges as may be fixed by the Central Government in respect of packing in jute bags or in any other companytainers The Explanation to this clause clarified that for the purpose of the Control order, the expression free on rail destination railway station means the price including the companyt of transport by the cheapest mode except where any other mode of transport has been specified by the Central Government under Clause 4 at the destination point. 1080 of 1976. This would leave, with the producer the retention price together with the selling agency companymission, packing charges and excise duty and also reimburse him the actual freight paid by him. 1122 of 1976 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI, J. 1122 of 1976 which was argued as the main appeal before us The appellant in this appeal is Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the assessee . 1122 of 1976 J. Sorabjee, L. N. Sinha, S. M. Jain, S. C. Bhandari and B. These companytracts were on the terms and companyditions set out in the form of General terms and companyditions of supply adopted by the assessee. From the Judgment and order dated 10 9 1976 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. The Control order was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers companyferred by sections 18G and 25 of the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951. M. Tarkunde, V. K. Shinghal, N. N. Goswamy and Arvind Minocha for the appellant in C.A. Anantha Babu and A. Subba Rao for the intervener in A. S. Nariman, Y. S. Chitale A. K. Srivastava, V. Bhasin, C. V. Francis and Vineet Kumar for the appellant in A. CIVIL APPELLATE JUDRISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. Civil Writ Petition No. B. Singh for the respondents in both the appeals.
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1978_153.txt
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Narain Raja managed these properties from Ramnagar. From the year 1938 onwards Narain Raja lived in Ramnagar. In the companyrse of his statement Narain Raja deposed that his father had built a palace in Ramnagar between 1934 and 1941 and thereafter Narain Raja himself built a house at Ramnagar. The history of the family of Narain Raja is closely companynected with the history of Ramnagar estate. After the death of Mohan Raja the estate came into the possession of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi, the vidow of Mohan Raja, and after the death of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi, the estate came into the possession of Rama Raja alias Mohan Bikram Sah, the father of the respondent Narain Raja. After Rama Rajas death in 1947 Narain Raja companytinued to live in Ramnagar, being in possession of properties obtained by him under companypromise in 1944. Rama Raja in turn filed T.S. There is the partition suit between Narain Raja and his brothers in the year 1942. In view of this circumstance, the Judicial Committee held that though Rama Raja was the adopted son of Mohan Raja, Rama Raja was number entitled to the estate in view of the will executed by Mohan Raja in favour of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi in the year 1904. Union of Ramnagar. The story of Narain Rajas political activities is as follows There was a Union Board in Ramnagar before Gram Panchayats had companye into existence, of which Narain Raja was the Chairman or President. 8 produced on behalf the appellant to show that Narain Raja was born at Barewa. Mohan Raja died without any male issue but during his lifetime he had adopted Rama Raja, the father of the respondent and by virtue of a will executed by Mohan Raja in the year 1904 in favour of his wife Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi the Rani became entitled to the Ramnagar estate on the death of Mohan Raja which took place in 1912 , in preference to the adopted son Rama Raja since the properties belonged to Mohan Raja in his absolute right and number as ancestral properties. After the death of Rani L P D 5SCI 12 Chhatra Kumari Devi in 1937 Rama Raja came into the possession of the Ramnagar estate. Before he had built his house, Narain Raja lived in his fathers palace. 40 of 1942 for the partition of the properties of the Ramnagar estate among Rama Raja and his sons including the respondent. According the case of the appellant Narain Raja was born at a place called Barewa in Nepal. 4 of 1923 against Rama Raja the Court of Sub Judge, Motihari with regard to a village which Rama Raja held in Ramnagar estate on the basis of a Sadhwa Patwa lease. After the partition Narain Raja was looking after the properties which were left joint and was the manager thereof. It is also in evidence that during the lifetime of Rama Raja there was a partition suit in the year 1942 No. 9 G. S. Prasad was examined to prove that Narain Raja was born at Banaras. There is evidence that Rama Raja died in Bombay and his dead body was cremated in Banaras. Then, there are registered pattas excluded by Narain Raja of the year 1945, which are Exs. 34 of 1924 in the Court of Subordinate Judge of Motihari against Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi and others claiming title to Ramnagar estate and for possession of the same on the basis of his adoption by Mohan Raja. Narain Raja was a voter in the Gram Panchayat and he was elected as the Vice President of the Union called D.C.M. The appeal was decided in favour of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi and the result was that the Title Suit filed by Rama Raja was dismissed and Rent Suit filed by Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi was decreed. Narain Raja and his wife and children possessed 500 or 600 acres of land in the district of Champaran. In the companyrse of his evidence Narain Raja said that he had been to Barewa for the first time with his father when he was 10 or 12 years old. In 1950 or 1951 Narain Raja had established a Sanskrit Vidalya in Ramnagar in the name of his mother, called Prem Jananl Sanskrit Vidyalaya. Narain Raja used to make settlement of the forests on behalf of the Raj and pattas used to be executed by him. There are documents which prove acquisition of properties in the name of Narain Rajas wife F D, F 2 . The High Court in appeal set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and upheld the election of the respondent Narain Raja. Reverting to the history of Narain Rajas life from 1950 onwards, it appears that he had married his wife in 1950. Exhibit F 4 shows the purchase of 11 bighas and odd land at Patna by Narain Raja. The appellant Kedar Pandey and the respondent Narain Bikram Sah hereinafter called Narain Raja were the companytesting candidates in the year 1962 on behalf of the Congress and Swatantra Party respectively for the election to Bihar Legislative Assembly from Ramnagar Constituency in the district of Champaran. In the companyrse of judgment the Judicial Committee did number disturb the finding of the trial Court that Rama Raja was an adopted son of Shri Mohan Vikiram Sah alias Mohan Raja and accepted that finding as companyrect but the Judicial Committee held that Ramnagar estate was number the ancestral property of Mohan Raja, but he got that property by inheritance, he being the daughters son of Prahlad Sen, the original proprietor of that estate. After the poll the respondent, Narain Raja was declared elected as member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly by majority of valid votes. Shri Prahlad Sen after whose death the estate came into the possession of Shri Mohan Vikram Sah, popularly known as Mohan Raja. It appears that in the year 1927 Rama Raja had taken possession of Ramnagar estate and got his name registered in Register D and remained in possession till the year 1931 when he lost the suit in Privy Council. It is in evidence that the daughter of Prahlad Sen was married to Shri Birendra Vikram Sah, the father of Mobart Raja. On these findings the High Court took the view that Narain Raja was duly qualified for being elected to the Bihar Legislative Assembly and the election petition filed by the appellant Kedar Pandey should be dismissed. Taking all the events and circumstances of Narain Rajas life into account we are satisfied that long before the end of 1949 which is the material time under Art. Upon these rival companytentions it was held by the Tribunal that the respondent Narain Raja was number a citizen of India and, therefore, was number qualified under Art. After the decision of Privy Council, Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi again came into possession of Ramnagar estate and companytinued to remain in possession till she died in 1937. The main question arising for decision in this case is whether the High Court was right in its companyclusion that the respondent Narain Raja was a citizen of India under Art. The extensive forests of Ramnagar estate were number partitioned and they had been left joint. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Aggarwala put forward the argument that the High Court was number justified in holding that Narain Raja was born in Banaras in the year 1918. In the year 1923, Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi had filed R.S. According to Kedar Pandey the respondent was related to the royal family of Nepal and the father of the respondent Rama Raja owned about 43 bighas of land and a house at Barewa in Nepal in which the respondent had a share along with his three other brothers. The further case of the respondent was that he had lived in India since his birth and that he was a resident of Ramnagar in the district of Champaran and number of Barewa in Nepal. According to Kedar Pandey the respondent, his parents and grand parents were all born in Nepal and, therefore, on the date of the election, the respondent Narain Raja was number qualified to be chosen to fill the Assembly seat for which he had been declared to have been elected. The Title Suit and the Rent Suit were heard together by the Additional Sub Judge, Motihari who, by his judgment dated August 18, 1927 decreed the Title Suit filed by Rama Raja and dismissed the Rent Suit filed by Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi. It is also important to numberice that Narain Raja had obtained Indian Passport dated March 23, 1949 from Lucknow issued by the Governor General of India and he is described in that Passport as Indian by birth and nationality and his address is given as Ramnagar of Champaran district. The High Court further found that long before the year 1949 Narain Raja had acquired a domicile of choice, in Indian territory and, therefore, acquired the status of a citizen of India both under Art. The respondent claimed that he was born in Banaras and number at Barewa. The High Court found, on examination of the evidence, that Narain Raja, the respondent before us, was born in Banaras on October 10, 1918 and that the respondent was living in India from 1939 right upto 1949 and even thereafter. The place of birth of the respondent is mentioned in this plaint as Barewa Durbar. After partition, he and his wife acquired properties in the district of Champaran, in Patna and in other places. On April 11, 1962 Kedar Pandey filed an election petition challenging the election of the respondent. But the Tribunal refused to make a declaration that Kedar Pandey was entitled to be elected to Bihar Legislative Assembly for that Constituency. It was alleged by Kedar Pandey that the respondent was number duly qualified under Art. By the said partition the estate was divided among the company sharers but certain properties including forests in the estate were left joint. He also said that he had number gone to Barewa for ten years before 1963. 173 of the Constitution of India to be a candidate for election as he was number a citizen of India. The election petition was companytested by the respondent who said that he was an Indian citizen and there was numberdisqualification incurred under Art. Thereafter, he became the President of the Bettiah Sub divisional Swatantra Party and then Vice President of Champaran District Swatantra Party. 173 of the Constitution for being chosen to fill a seat in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. The marriage had taken place at Banaras. The Tribunal, therefore, declared that the election of the respondent was void. He had also his houses in Bettiah, Chapra, Patna and Benaras. 8 and 10 of 1963. This suit was filed on September 29, 1942 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Motihari. This plaint was apparently filed in a suit brought by the respondent for the realisation of money advanced by the respondents mother to one Babulal Sah. After Gram Panchayats were established, the Union Board was abolished. Both the appellant and the respondent preferred separate appeals against the judgment of the Election Tribunal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated March 26, 1964 of the Patna High Court in Election Appeals Nos. 1 2 was passed on April 16, 1943 on companypromise and the final decree Ex 1 1 in the suit was passed on May 22, 1944.
estate had an extensive area of Bakasht lands. The forest settlements are supported by Exhibits X series, companymencing from 1943, and by Ex. W/3, W/4, and W/5. Both these appeals are brought by certificate against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated March 26, 1964, pronounced in Election Appeals Nos. Against the judgment of the High Court appeals were taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Later on the two candidates Parmeshwar Prasad Roy and Suleman Khan withdrew their candidatures. F 3 and F 5 . His wife belonged to Darkoti in Himachal Pradesh near Patiala. B. Agarwala, Jagdish Panday, Chinta Subbarao, M. Rajagopalan and B.P. On behalf of the respondent R.W. A preliminary decree Ex. There was an appeal to the High Court of Patna which dismissed the appeal. Exhibits 1 2 and 1 1 are the preliminary and final decrees granted in that suit. The numberination papers of the appellant and the respondent and two others Parmeshwar Prasad Roy and Suleman Khan were accepted by the Returning Officer without any objection on January 22, 1962. P. Varma and D. Goburdhun, for the respondent In both the appeals . Jha, for the appellant, In both the appeals . 8 that it was number signed by the respondent but by one Subhan Mian Joiaha described as Agent. There was also a plaint Ex. W of the year 1947. 976 and 977 of 1964. The daughter prosecutes her studies in Dehradun. The High Court held that their evidence was acceptable. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. 1 1889 40 Oh. In order to prove his case the appellant examined two witnesses Sheonath Tewari W. 18 and N.D. Pathak P.W. 5 of the Constitution of India on the material date. The High Court companysidered that for the determination of the question of domicil of a person at a particular time, the companyrse of his companyduct and the facts and circumstances before and after that time are relevant. No. D. 216. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 15 .
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1965_124.txt
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He further replied that for the manufacture of T6 denier polyester crimped yarn as described in their invoices, they have used two yarns polyester yarn of 75 deniers and the other viscose yarn of 75 deniers and processed in the same way as described alone in respect of 20x30 quality yarn there is numberslub effect, but in the yarn of 75 deniers quality there is slub effect and added that they are using the yarns together in their crimping machine the base yarn is of 75 denier polyester filament and the slub effect yarn is 75 denier viscose, and that the ratio of quantity of base yarn to slub effect yarn is 1 1.5. He stated that they had purchased yarns only once from the appellant and that the yarn was of the description of 2000 Taspa yarn, which companysisted of 20 denier Nylon and 30 denier polyester yarn, that the said yarn had slub effect that the said yarn was used as weft in the manufacture of fabrics that these fabrics also had slub effect and that the said fabrics were known as Taspa fabrics or fancy fabrics. The officers further numbericed that the unit was manufacturing Taspa yarn, for which the yarns of the different deniers are taken on the aforesaid machine simultaneously one yarn which is running in lower speed is known as companye base yarn, while the other yarn which is running in higher speed is known as slub yarn, and that the quantity of companye yarn and the slub yarn is in the rario 1 1.5, and that in the manufacturing of the said Taspa yarn the unit had specially attached devices Tensor and ceramic guide in the said machine by importing them from Japan. and that the firm had carried out doubling of yarn on a simple crimping machine and that the simple process of doubling of yarn on crimping machine was companyered under Notification M.F. On scrutiny of records and invoices, it was revealed to the officers that the unit had manufactured and removed Taspa yarn of the category of the special yarns specified under Heading No. 416, which has got 144 spindles that mostly they are carrying out crimping process on Nylon yarn of different deniers, as also on polyester filament yarn of various deniers and that they have number done any crimping process on pay. E/2618/1990 D, whereby the Tribunal has held that Taspa yarn manufactured by the appellant was companyered under Heading No. From the invoices and the sale Register of the unit, it was numbericed by the officers that the unit manufactured and cleared Taspa yarn of the description as 20x30 Nylon x Polyester, 75x75 Polyester x Viscose, 90x75 Polyester Filament x Viscose. The appellant firm further stated that it was engaged in the business of processing yarns such as crimping, texturising, doubling multifolding etc. During the companyrse of their visit, the officers found that the unit was carrying out processes of texturising, crimping on man made filament yarn etc. The Tribunal rejected the application for rectification of mistake vide judgment and order dated 25.2.2000 and held that Taspa yarn manufactured by the appellant was companyered under Heading No. The officers have also recorded the statement of Shri Ishwarbhai Durlabhbhai Modi, Manager of M s. Ishwar Textiles of Surat, who had purchased 20x30 quality Taspa yarn from the unit. 56.06 of the Central Excise Tariff and, therefore, companyfirmed the demand of duty of central excise of Rs.5,63,066.40 and penalty of Rs.50,000/ . 56.06 of the Central Excise Tariff and, therefore, companyfirmed the demand of duty of central excise of Rs. The Collector of Central Excise issued a show cause numberice dated 15.7.1988 to the appellant firm calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why duty of excise amounting to Rs.5,63,066.40 be number recovered on the goods, i.e., Taspa yarn fancy yarn falling under erstwhile tariff item number 62 with effect from 1.3.1986 and under Chapter tariff sub heading 56.06 and penalty be number imposed on them under Rule 173 Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. A reply was sent to the show cause numberice that the appellant categorically averred that it bona fidely believed that the doubled filament yarn was exempted from payment of duty of Central Excise and there was numberintentional companytravention of Rule 173 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The officers have also recorded the statement of Shri Vipulbhai Vasantlal Merchant, Partner of the appellant under Section 14 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 in which he stated that they are engaged in processing of yarn such as crimping texturising for which they have got one machine of Lohia make Model Ht. 437, the latter judgment of the Tribunal particularly, with regard to yarns being run parallel, the manufacturing process being companymon and the machineries being the same. 5606.00 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The Department also sought the opinion of the Chemical Examiner, Central Excise, Baroda, who by his report submitted as follows The sample is in the form of two ply yarn having elongated strips knots at regular intervals. Central Excise and Custom, Baroda visited by surprise the factory premises of the unit on 29.9.1987 for checks and inquiry. The Collector of Central Excise, Vadodara passed an order on 29.3.1990 companyfirming the demand of duty of Central Excise amounting to Rs.5,63,066.40 for the period from February, 1986 to September 30,1987 and also imposed a penalty of Rs. for which the unit had installed one Lohia Magnetic Machine Model No. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara, 1997 73 ECR 383. Relying upon the aforesaid numberifications, the appellant did number pay any duty of excise on the same and neither did it recover such duty of excise from its customers. E ROM/125/99 D and pointed out that the facts of the appellant were closely companyparable to the facts of Pratik Crimpers vs. Collector of Central Excise, Mumbai, 1998 101 E.L.T. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the Central Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi. M/12/2000 D in E ROM/125/99 D in Application No. The appellant firm filed these appeals challenging, inter alia, the judgment and order dated 25.2.2000 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi being Miscellaneous Order No. The statement of Shri Maheshwari V. Mehra, partner of M s. Shreenath Silk Mills, Udhna, Surat was also recorded. In response to the summons dated 20.9.1987, the unit has produced the invoices and records of purchase and sale from 1983 to 1987 for scrutiny and examination. 5,63,066.40 and penalty of Rs. The Tribunal while rejecting the appeal relied upon its earlier judgment and order in the case of Dhamwala Silk Mills Surat Pvt. 487/98 D dated 15.6.1998 in Appeal No. Since the impugned judgment of the Tribunal suffered from error apparent on the face of the record, the appellant filed a Miscellaneous Application for rectification of mistake, being Application No. The Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 15.6.1998 rejected the appeal of the appellant. We have perused the numberifications and orders passed by the Commissioner and the Tribunal and other relevant records. 229/88 dated 25.11.1988. MT.466 in their factory premises. The present appeal was filed by the appellant in this Court on the basis that the Full Bench of the Tribunal has, by its final order dated 22.05.2000, upheld the view taken by it in the case of Pratik Crimpers supra , which facts and decision are same to the facts of the case of the appellant. 114/18/86 CX 3 dated 18.4.1986. C.D.R I. LAKSHMANAN, J. E/2618/90 D and final order No. J U D G M E N T AR. 50,000/ . 2 lakhs on the appellant. No.
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2003_1245.txt
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The Tribunal held that such a product, however, if it companytains other things such as anti oxidants, solvents, stabilisers and used as animal feed will number be classified under Chapter sub heading 2936, but will be companyrectly classified under Tariff heading 23.02. 23.02 or 29.36 or Chapter 30 Instructions Regarding. 34/1990 was issued by the Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Pune whereby it was clarified by the Department that the product having vitamins, stabilisers, anti oxidants and solvents merits classification under Chapter 29 Heading 29.36 and number under Heading 23.02 of the schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The show cause numberices added that these products are intermixture of vitamins and, therefore, companyrectly classifiable under C.S.H. The assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner Appeals who, by his order dated 27.07.1993, set aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner and held that Recovit was companyrectly classifiable under Chapter Sub heading 2302.00 as animal feed. The Tribunal has further held that the companytention of the revenue that Recovit is merely a mixture of vitamins alone is number borne out on facts. Chief Chemists report which stated that Recovit may be companysidered as an organic chemical intermixture of vitamins marked as Annexure P2. 188/22/96 CX Dated 26/3/96 Government of India Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue Central Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi Subject Classification of Animal Feed Supplements under Sub heading No. Four show cause numberices were issued alleging that they had mis classified their products under S.H. E/2546/93 D dated 11.03.1999 passed by the Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal for short the CEGAT at New Delhi. 2302.00 and cleared at nil rate of duty. It may number be out of place to mention that the companyposition of product was argued before the Tribunal. The revenue filed an appeal against the order of the Commissioner Appeals which has been decided by the CEGAT vide its order dated 11.03.1999. reported in 1999 82 ECR 98 dated 13.11.1998. 243/99 D in Appeal No. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the Revenue has companye up in appeal. The respondent is the manufacturer of Dailymix. 23 8 2/TC/90 Pune, the 30th June, 1990. The companyclusion of the Assistant Commissioner was arrived at on the basis of Dy. It is a finding of fact recorded by the Commissioner Appeals and also by the Tribunal. CCE, Bangalore Ors. Apparently based on the above trade numberice, a show cause numberice was issued which led to the present appeal. Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J. This civil appeal is directed against the judgment and final order No. No.
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2005_90.txt
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Vacancy declaration order was reconsidered by the RC EO but numberfresh order declaring or holding vacancy was passed by the RC EO. On 3rd of January, 1981, the respondent was directed to appear before the RC EO and accordingly, the respondent did appear before the RC EO but numberother person was present there. There were in all, thirteen applications for allotment of the disputed premises by various persons before the Rent Control Eviction Officer in short the RC EO . Accordingly, the respondent had brought to the numberice of the RC EO that he was occupying the disputed premises and the question of allotment of the disputed premises to anyone else companyld number arise at all. Consequent to the order dated 9th of September, 1980, the RCI, after inspecting the disputed premises, submitted his report to the RC EO regarding vacancy. According to the respondent, without companysidering the objections filed by him, the RC EO on 24th of January, 1981 declared the vacancy particularly when the respondent himself had appeared before the RC EO specifically bringing to his numberice that he was in physical occupation of the disputed premises and numberhing was vacant which companyld be said to be available for allotment. The RC EO passed an order dated 24th of January, 1981, on the question of vacancy and also directed the matter to be put up on 31st of January, 1981 for arguments on allotment and orders. On the said application of Parsuram Pandey for allotment of the disputed premises, an order was passed by the RC EO on 9th of September, 1980 directing the Rent Control Inspector in short the RCI to inquire and report on the issue of vacancy of the said disputed premises. The RC EO numbered the presence of the respondent and passed the following order Today the file was placed in presence of the landlord. A bare perusal of the aforesaid order of the RC EO passed on 24th of January, 1981 would make it clear that the said order was passed without companysidering the objection of the respondent and by even mentioning that the respondent had numberobjection when it was all through his case that the objections were submitted before the RC EO. From the orders dated 20.4.1981, 3.7.1981 and 7.8.1981 on the order sheet, it would be clear that the RC EO had heard the question of vacancy again. The finding of the RC EO that the building in dispute was vacant was a finding of fact number vitiated by any error of jurisdiction. On 26th of September, 1981, the respondent and the applicants were present and were heard and on 18th of November, 1981, the RC EO passed an order of allotment in favour of the appellant. It was the case of the respondent that by the aforesaid order dated 24th of January, 1981, he came to know that certain applications were filed before the RC EO for allotment of the disputed premises although he along with his family members was very much living in the disputed premises and there was numberoccasion for anyone to make any application for allotment. It was also the case of the respondent that the RC EO without companysidering the objection filed by him passed the order dated 24th of January, 1981 declaring vacancy in the following manner The file was put up. The High Court in the impugned judgment had also companysidered the validity of the order dated 24th of January, 1981, declaring vacancy passed by the RC EO and held the same to be invalid. We have heard the learned companynsel for the parties and examined the judgment of the High Court and the District judge as well as the order of allotment passed by the RC EO and the order declaring vacancy and other materials on record. Thereafter, the RC EO on 18th of September, 1980 passed an order issuing numberice to the landlord respondent calling upon him to appear on 6th of October, 1980 and directed that the matter of allotment of the disputed premises would be companysidered on that date. It was all along the case of the respondent that he had filed his objections with regard to the matter of allotment of the disputed premises on 24th of January, 1981 to the extent that the disputed premises which was occupied and possessed by the respondent was No. Therefore, all the applications for grant of allotment of the disputed premises must be dismissed. The report of RCI seen. There was numberobjection filed by the landlord as to the vacancy before passing the order dated 24.1.1981. There was numberhing in the report to show that there was vacancy in the house of the premises in question. in short the disputed premises which had allegedly fallen vacant. The RCI Report, even if it was companyrect, did number disclose existence of vacancy c Vacancy was declared without issuing numberice to the landlord. This by itself did number amount to vacancy. To be put up on 31st January for argument on allotment and orders. There was ample evidence on record to show that the landlord was residing at 103, Chowk Gangadas, Allahabad and the disputed premises was vacant. By a judgment and order dated 9th of November, 2004, the High Court had allowed the writ petition thereby setting aside the order dated 18th of November, 1981 passed by the RC EO allotting the disputed premises in favour of the appellant and the order dated 4th of March, 1982 passed by the District Judge, Allahabad dismissing the revision directed against the said allotment order. The order dated 24th of January, 1981 declaring vacancy did number show that on that date, either the landlord or any applicant was present. The vacancy declaration order was bad in law for the following reasons a Inspection was made by the RCI without numberice to the landlord. Before we companysider the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, we may, at this stage, record the findings of the High Court while allowing the writ petition which are as follows The report of RCI had only shown that the main gate of the disputed premises was locked and that if found appropriate, it was the duty of the RC EO to call the parties to ascertain the companyrect position. 21, Georgetown, Allahabad, with which the respondent had numberconcern and the allotment applications, if they related to No. At this stage, it would number be out of place to mention that the numberice received by the respondent was number indicative of the fact that the question of allotment of the disputed premises would be companysidered on 3rd of January, 1981. 21, Hamilton Road, Georgetown, Allahabad. It is clear that the disputed portion, which is western portion of the house is vacant because there is numberobjection from Sri N.Anand, hence vacancy is being numberified. Landlord has appeared. It is also an admitted position that the alleged report of the RCI would only show that the disputed premises was locked at the time of inspection and it did number indicate that numberbody was residing there. Thereafter, on 3rd of June, 1981, an order was passed directing the respondent to file evidence on that very date and the case was adjourned to 3rd of July, 1981 for arguments on vacancy. One Parsuram Pandey filed an application for allotment of a part of House No.21, George Town, Hamilton Road, Allahabad, U.P. All the persons who had applied for allotment had alleged that the disputed premises was formerly in occupation of one Sri S.K.Misra but even in the objection purported to have been filed on 24.1.1981, there was numberaverment that the building in dispute was number occupied by K.Misra or any other person. Against the order dated 24.1.1981, declaring vacancy, although numberchallenge was made independently but the same was challenged by an application for amendment subsequently filed. Prabha Shukla, wife of the appellant to the effect that the disputed premises was let out to different university students was number companytradicted by the landlord. b there was numbermaterial or evidence which companyld justify declaration of vacancy. The allotment order was in violation of Section 16 9 of the Act inasmuch as while making the allotment order, the allottee was number required to pay to the landlord advance presumptive rent of one month. Feeling aggrieved by the allotment order and the dismissal of the revision petition, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad wherein a challenge was made to the allotment order and a prayer was made for quashing the same. 21, Hamilton Road and number No. 21, Hamilton Road, Allahabad were liable to be rejected as numberpart of the same was lying vacant. In this companytext, it was brought to our numberice that during the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court, after almost 20 years, on 18th of February, 2002, an application praying for amendment of the writ petition for challenging the order dated 24th of January, 1981 by which the vacancy was declared was filed, which was allowed by the High Court by its order dated 22nd of May, 2002. On 20th of April, 1981, the respondent was heard and he was given time to file evidence. Against the aforesaid order of allotment, the respondent filed a revision petition under Section 18 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 before the District Judge, Allahabad, which was, however, dismissed by order dated 4th of March, 1982. It was also all along the case of the respondent that the numberice was served on him at his address although the numberice mentioned the address of the respondent as 103, Chowk Gangadas, Allahabad and on the back of the numberice, there was the process servers report that the respondent was residing at No. The landlord did number file any companyy of the release order of 1952. Notices dated 15th of November, 1980 and 1st of December, 1980 were again issued to the respondent for the aforesaid purpose. The name of the landlord had been entered in the electoral roll companysistently from the year 1966 to year 1980. He has made numberobjection. Against this order of the High Court, the appellant had filed an application for recall of the said order but the same was also rejected by the High Court by its order dated 14th of February, 2003. These were the findings made by the revisional companyrt while rejecting the revision petition filed by the respondent. Aggrieved by the orders of the High Court, the appellant had filed a special leave petition before this companyrt challenging the aforesaid orders. Writ Petition No. On the spot the house was locked. On that view of the matter, we are fully satisfied that the orders of the High Court under challenge are to be set aside and companyvinced that the interest of justice can be better served only if the orders dated 22.5.2002 and 14.02.2003 are set aside and the Civil Misc. This companyrt had allowed the special leave petition by setting aside the orders dated 22nd of May, 2002 and 14th of February, 2003 in the following manner On going through the materials on record and keeping in view the limited numberice we ordered when the special leave petition initially came up for orders relating to admission, the fact that has to be kept into companysideration is number even so much as is to what really transpired on that day in companyrt but how best the situation should be solved and the interests of justice companyld be served. TARUN CHATTERJEE,J. None else was present. Keeping in mind the findings arrived at by the revisional companyrt and the High Court, let us number deal with the submissions of the learned companynsel for the parties. 4621 of 1982 is restored to its file to be disposed of afresh on merits and in accordance with law, after hearing both the parties and giving them due opportunity. At the main gate a Board of Shri Prasidh Narain Anand was there. It is this judgment of the High Court, which is impugned in this appeal. No body was living. The affidavit of Smt.
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2008_928.txt
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The recovery memo of the school bag Ext. It is clear from the evidence of PW2 and PW3 that immediately after the dead body was taken out from the well and after the recovery of the school bag from the rooftop of the school at Dubehi, the recovery memos Ext. P7 and Ext. Thereafter, the accused appellant led the police and the witnesses to the school at Dubehi, on the rooftop of which he had hidden the victims school bag. PW4 gave the custody of the child to the accused appellant upon the assurance of the accused appellant that he would take the child to school safely. The deceased was last seen with the accused appellant by PW4 and PW5. The school bag and the dead body of the deceased were recovered at the instance of the accused appellant pursuant to the disclosure statement. The police took out the dead body of the deceased from the well, and after such recovery, recorded the recovery memo Ext. His daughter was also a student of the same school as the deceased. PW4, on the assurance of the accused appellant that he would go along with the victim child to her school, as he had to pay his own daughters fees, alighted from the vehicle near the Sabzi Mandi. The deceased was studying at New Horizon Public School, Maihar in L.K.G. The child went along with the accused appellant towards her school in the vehicle, but did number return home that day. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 23.02.2015, PW4 the elder brother of the victims father came over from his village to drop the victim child to school in a vehicle bearing Registration No. The evidence of PW3 is almost similar to the evidence of PW2. P8, which are the recovery memos duly signed by the witnesses. The accused appellant was the registered owner of the vehicle in which he was last seen with the victim, and was driving the vehicle on the day of the incident. These appeals are presented by the companyvicted accused. P8 was prepared at the spot and the signatures of the witnesses were taken. P8 were prepared on the spot and the signatures of the witnesses were taken. P7 and took the signatures of the witnesses. The dead body was found in a well situated alongside Paraswara Canal. He also submits that the evidence that led to the recovery of the dead body based on the companyfession of the accused appellant is liable to be rejected on the ground that the panchnama was drawn at the police station and number on the spot of recovery of the dead body and that the Investigating Officer deliberately tried to companyceal the main offender and framed the accused appellant, and such lapse in the companyrse of investigation would tilt the balance of justice in favour of the accused appellant. In his crossexamination, PW3 has deposed that the police had prepared the police papers at several places, such as village Paraswara, and at the police station. MP 19 T 2374, owned and driven by the accused appellant. It is also admitted by PW3 that the inquest panchnama was prepared at the police station. 2203 of 2015, except in respect of the offence under Section 363 IPC which means the accused was acquitted under Section 363 IPC by the High Court. The father of the deceased suspected that the accused appellant had left his daughter somewhere else, however, the first information report Ext. At this time, only an underwear was present on the dead body. However, these admissions of PW3 will number take away the effect of Ext. This is because grave suspicion arises against PW4 also, having regard to the evidence of PW5 Ramji Shukla. P1 came to be lodged against an unknown offender and the accused appellant was apprehended after two days. On the said basis, he submits that the evidence of PW4 cannot be believed, since his statement before the Court was only meant to shield himself. Despite a frantic search by her parents, relatives and the villagers, the victim child companyld number be traced. The evidence of PW2, in our companysidered opinion, has remained unshaken. In the alternative, he submits that the case on hand does number fall under the definition of the rarest of rare cases and, therefore, the accused appellant may number be punished with death. 41 of 2015 vide judgment dated 06.08.2015 companyvicted the accused appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376 A , 302 and 201 II of the Indian Penal Code in short the IPC and Section 5 i m read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2019.03.12 164710 IST Reason Sexual Offences Act, 2012 in short the POCSO Act and sentenced him to death. After the trial, as mentioned supra, the accused appellant was companyvicted by the Trial Court and the order of companyviction was companyfirmed by the High Court. The First Additional Sessions Judge, Maihar, District Satna, Madhya Pradesh in Special Sessions Trial No. Though certain suggestions were made to PW2, the same were denied. 5 of 2015 and in Criminal Appeal No. MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. The judgment of the Trial Court was companyfirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur vide its judgment and order dated 03.03.2016 in Criminal Reference No. and was aged about five years and two months at the time of occurrence of the offence. Leave granted.
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2019_894.txt
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The Tribunal has taken the view that since the respondent herein has been granted retrospective promotion from 27.8.1984 he must be paid arrears of pay and allowances for the higher post for the period 27th August, 1984 till 5th February, 1992. This appeal by Special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.5.2000 passed by the learned Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi whereby the learned Division Bench upheld the order dated 11th January, 2000 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench. Aggrieved against the order of the Tribunal dated 11th January, 2000 the Appellant herein filed a writ petition before the High Court and the High Court dismissed the writ petition affirming the order of the Tribunal. None appears for the appellant. ORDER Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Hence the present appeal.
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2007_1299.txt
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4177,4178 of 2008 Arising out of SLP C Nos. 1227 and 3596 of 2007 REPORTABLE B. SINHA, J. 201 vacancies were filled up. A requisition was made for filing up of 214 posts. 1826 of 2007 WITH Civil Appeal Nos. Arising out of SLP Civil No. Allegedly, the respondent No.2 approved only 208 posts. Contending inter alia that the Respondent Cooperative Bank companyld fill 16 more vacancies, a writ petition was filed. Appellants are before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied with a judgment and order dated 18.07.2006 passed by the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal Nos.2275, 2527 and 2622 of 2005 affirming the judgment and order dated 7.9.2005 passed by a learned single judge of the said Court. Recruitment to the posts is made by the respondent No. 4 Commission. Leave granted.
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2008_2157.txt
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Rani, wife of Krishan. Krishan and Sat Narain. Burns were of superficial and deep burns. Krishan was addicted to liquor and used to harass her. PW4 is the sister of Krishan and she stated that Krishan was number at home and the deceased caught fire while she was preparing the tea. According to Rani, accused Krishan used to give her beatings whenever he was under the influence of liquor. He denied that Krishan used to treat his daughter with cruelty. However, it maintained the acquittal of another accused Shardi, mother of the accused Krishan. His daughters, Rani and Ram Rati were married to Krishan and Sat Narain about 19 years back. PN, with regard to the dead body of Rani. She had 75 burns. PR/2 she was married to Krishan approximately 18 19 years ago. 325/98 I companyducted the autopsy of the dead body of Rani wife of Krishan Balmiki by Caste, resident of Sudkan Kalan, District Jind. In the dying declaration, the deceased did number unnecessarily involve the other family members of the accused Krishan. Baljit Singh, then SDJM Narwana for the purpose of recording the statement of Rani. Krishan also used to make demands for a car, and used to ask Rani to bring money to purchase the car from her father. Shardi, mother of the accused used to instigate him. The burns were on the whole body except as mentioned in the statement. When she served food to Krishan, he would throw away the thali on the ground. PWs 1 and 7 identified accused Somesh Das A 7 . On the request of the police, the said SDJM came to the hospital and proceeded to record the statement of Rani. Epidermal, Dermo epidermal and Deep. She was admitted to the hospital with burn injuries. On the fateful day, Rani herself took kerosene oil from the store at about 7 a.m. in the morning to burn the stove. Dead body after Post Mortem Examination. All the material witnesses examined by the prosecution namely, PW1 Ramdhari, PW3 Mamo, mother of deceased, PW4 Nirmala sister of accused Krishan have number supported the prosecution version in any manner and they were declared hostile on the request of the learned PP and were cross examined by him but numberhing favourable to the prosecution came out of them. companyld number be recorded because of burns. PWs 1 and 4 identified Mrinal Das A 4 . PWs 1, 4, 7 and 8 identified accused Pradip Das A 9 . Rani and Ram Rati were two sisters who were married to two real brothers, i.e. On the night previous to the occurrence, Krishan had companye with his friend Bedu, son of Teka and asked her to prepare tea which she prepared and served to both of them. Since Ranis companydition was serious, the Investigating Officer summoned Sh. The burns are classified of three types. The doctor, PW14, who performed the post mortem upon the body of the deceased and numbericed the companydition of the body and injuries upon the body of the deceased stated in his statement as follows On dated 3.4.98 vide PMR No. Statement of my daughter was recorded before my arrival. PWs 4 and 8 identified Anil Das A 1 . The doctor declared Rani fit to make the statement and also provided her medico legal report to the Investigating Officer. The truthfulness of the dying declaration can further be evaluated from the fact that the same was recorded on 30th March, 1998 while Rani died on 2nd April, 1998, i.e. 134 was registered against accused Shardi and Krishan under Sections 307, 498A, 109 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC on 30th March, 1998. But two vital pieces of information that clearly surfaced from his examination in chief are inferred by the following statement about two years ago, Krishan came to me and demanded money for purchase of vehicle, but I refused. The statement of the deceased was recorded on 30th March, 1998 at about 11.40 a.m. As per the dying declaration, Ext. Similarly, PW3, mother of the deceased stated that her daughter was never harassed by the accused for bringing less dowry and was declared hostile. Dead body was 160 cm. Bones were superficial to deep and approximately 75. Five eyewitnesses, namely, PW 1, PW 4, PW 6, PW 7 and PW 8 clearly identified two companyvicts, appellants Tapan Das A 5 and Gautam Das A 11 . Dead body was brought by H.C. Om Parkash 451 and Identified by Rajinder and Wazir. Maybe, it was number possible for the Court to companyvict the accused on the basis of the statements of PW1, PW3 and PW4 respectively. It was, thereafter, that the witness was declared hostile and cross examined. The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan, recorded statement of PWs and prepared the Inquest Report, Ext. PH, received by the Police Station Sadar Narwana, from Civil Hospital, Jind. There were superficial to deep bones over the whole body except lower parts of both thigh, both legs, and foot. PW1, father of the deceased, stated that he had four daughters and one son. After receiving the rukka ASI Umed Singh, PW9 along with police officers reached the Civil Hospital, Narwana. The material witnesses were declared hostile on the question of the learned PP and were cross examined by him but numberhing favourable to the prosecution came out them. she survived for another two three days after the statement was made from which it can reasonably be inferred that she was in a fit companydition to make statement at the relevant time, as stated by PW9 and PW11. Kayat, when examined as PW11, specifically stated that the patient was companyscious but the B.P. At that time, her husband poured the kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire. The cause of death was due to burns and its companyplications which were anti mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in ordinary companyrse of nature. It is clear that 6 accused persons including two companyvicts appellants had been identified by more than one eyewitnesses. She only attributed the acts of cruelty and beating to her husband and that too, when he was under the influence of liquor. PH/1, FIR No. This FIR was registered in furtherance of the rukka, Ex. She also stated that her father in law used to help her, but mother in law never helped. The proceedings to that effect were duly recorded as giving companyplete details as to how the dying declaration came to be recorded and the proceedings were submitted to the SDJM and the Area Magistrate. Copy of PMR 3. This appeal is directed against the judgment of companyviction and order of sentence dated 17th July, 2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh whereby the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court against the accused Krishan. I found the following on Post mortem examination. However, this Court can still rely on and refer to the statements of these three witnesses to the extent that they support the case of the prosecution. The doctor issued the endorsement, Ex. The probable time that elapse between the injury and death was between 3 4 day as per record and between death and post mortem was within 4 36 hours. There was a golden companyour nazle companya. From this wedlock, two sons were born aged 9 years and 7 years respectively. Dr.B.R. Rigour mortis was present in all the limbs. These witnesses support the case of the prosecution to a limited. Vesication was present. In brief, the facts are that Ex. 11 Police papers duly signed. The following were handed over to the police. Swatanter Kumar, J. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx by defence companynsel. This fact has duly been numbericed by the Trial Court in its judgment. That police officer obtained the evidence certificate in respect of Smt. It was naked.
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2012_821.txt
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The petitioners to appear before the Managing Officer and it will number be necessary for the Managing Officer to issue further numberices to the petitioners to appear before him. 4003 is rejected. The petitioners should, suo motu, appear before the Managing Officer on 3rd April, 2000. 6762/2002. 4003 in the District of Jalna, in lieu of his claim over the land that he owned and possessed in Pakistan. It is declared that the petitioner is entitled to get the property on Government approved rates as are prevalent today as per B C Department. letter dated 1.1.88 3.3.95. If the petitioners are number ready to purchase the said property than they may be evicted and the property be sold by auction as per rules laid in Govt. The numberice issued to the petitioners in the year 1995 for their eviction is withdrawn. Pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof the Managing Officer heard the parties. 20/ giving an undertaking that they are ready to purchase the house in question at price as may be determined by B C Department on approved Government rates. The petitioners are directed to execute a bond on a stamp paper of Rs. In case the respondent obtains an order from the companypetent authorities holding him entitled to receive amount of companypensation within a period of six month then he can withdraw the said amount deposited by the petitioner after assessment at the Government approved rates. Respondent No.4 indisputably was in possession of the said premises. A numberice dated 2.4.2005 was issued asking it to vacate the said premises in terms of Section 19 of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954. The appellant herein migrated to India from Pakistan in the year 1948. Considering the time taken in this matter, we expect that the Managing Officer will pass necessary orders within a period of two months form the date of receipt of this order. It was marked as Writ Petition No. However, despite the fact that limited numberice was issued to respondent No.4, their other companytentions were also entertained and it was ordered The representation made by the petitioner is allowed. The said writ petition was allowed directing In view of this position, the writ petition is disposed of. He was registered under Section 5 of Bombay Refugees Act, 1948. By an order dated 11.10.1994 passed by the Settlement Commissioner, he was allotted House No. The request of the respondent for allotment of house No. He questioned the validity of the said orders by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Rule is discharged. The respondent filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court. A certificate to that effect was issued in his favour. The appeal as well as a revision application preferred by the appellant thereagainst have been dismissed. Leave granted.
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2008_1260.txt
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47,276 as sales tax provisionally assessed. 49,633 being the amount of sales tax paid under a provisional assessment. 3,894 in adjustment of the liability for the previous year towards sales tax due. 1,537 received as rebate, the total sales tax liability under the provisional assessment was Rs. 49,633. The sales tax actually recovered by the tax authorities was debited when paid and amounts if any refunded were credited when received. The assessees had adopted the system which was permitted by the Act of paying tax calculated on the turnover of the previous year of account. 31 3 1942 2,679 1 872 807 31 3 1943 3,046 2,863 183 31 3 1944 14,509 18,402 3,893 31 3 1945 47,276 20,037 27,239 31 3 1946 45,315 13,379 31,936 For the assessment year 1946 47 companyresponding to the year of account October 18, 1944 to November 4,1945 , the assessees claimed in their assessment to income tax to deduct Rs. Under the Madras General Sales Tax Act IX of 1939, the assessees were entitled to a rebate of sales tax paid on goods purchased by them and used in the manufacturing process. The Income tax Officer accepted this claim, and debited it from the income in the assessment year 1946 47 in assessing the taxable income of the assessees. In the year ending 31 3 1945, the assessees had paid Rs. Under this system, tax was provisionally assessed by the Sales Tax Officer on the basis of the turnover of the previous year, and thereafter the liability was adjusted at the end of the year of account in the light of the actual turnover of that year, and of rebate allowed in respect of groundnuts pressed into oil. The assessees maintained their books of account according to the Samvat Year ending with Diwali. Official Provi Filial Adjustment Year sional Refund Addi ended. Purchases and sales of goods on credit were duly entered in the books of account. They also had paid in that year Rs. The assessees are a firm carrying on business at Kurnool, of manufacturing ground nut oil and cake. The system of accounting was a mixture of mercantile and cash. After giving credit for Rs. J. Umrigar, Thiyagaraja and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents. tional levy. demand. 270 of 1960. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D Gupta, for the appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J. Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 21, 1956, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Case Reference No. 4 of 1955. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. March 10.
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1961_319.txt
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He further testifies that he saw the respondent at the booth and that he also knew the appellant Ram Sharan Yadav . He further stated that Mukhlal Singh, Advocate, who was the polling agent of Ram Sharan Yadav, had led the mob of miscreants at the booth. He goes on to narrate that he saw one Ram Prasad Yadav of Ibrahimpur at the booth the 1095 appellant appeared on the scene and asked Ram Prasad Yadav as to how the polling was going on, to which he was informed that the polling did number appear to be favourable to him. As against the overwhelming evidence adduced by the respondent, the evidence of Ram Sharan Yadav appellant himself is one of a plea of alibi who stated that he did number go to Bhurkunda polling booth at all and that on the date of poll he was at his village 1096 Haspura in his partys election office. Among the persons who had acted in such a fashion, the witness identified, Babu Chand, Ram Chandra Mahto, Bisheshwar Yadav, Ram Prasad Yadav and Surajdeo Yadav. Thereupon, the appellant ordered Ram Prasad Yadav to capture the booth and after giving this instruction he left the place. The result was announced on 16.6.77 in which Ram Sharan Yadav appellant , a candidate sponsored by the Communist Party of India, was declared elected after polling 28,783 votes as against 16,458 votes polled by Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh the first respondent herein . As a sample, PW 39 Kamta Prasad Singh , who was a voter in the aforesaid election, has stated that he had gone to cast his vote at about 11.30 a.m. and was standing in the queue alongwith 20 25 other voters. The witness goes on to state that after the appellant had left the place, about 300 400 men of the appellant surrounded the booth and removed the voters, including the witness, from the queue and therefore they companyld number cast their votes. To the same effect is the evidence of PW 62, Ramdeo Singh, who has also stated that he was informed that men of Ram Sharan Yadav had snatched away the ballot papers and torn them and created all sorts of disturbance. R. Singh and A. Sharan for the Respondent. Their evidence stands companyroborated by the FIR lodged in the police station soon after the occurrence as a result of which the police reached the spot of occurrence and found that there was a lot of trouble in the Bhurkunda booth where the voters were pressurised and intimidated. After a close scrutiny of the evidence we are fully satisfied that the appellant was undoubtedly present at the Bhurkunda polling 1097 booth at the time when the voters were going to cast their votes and his agents or supporters indulged in acts of assault, hurling of bombs, etc.,
in his presence and he did number stop them from doing so from which a companyclusive inference can be drawn that the acts of assault, arson, etc. Another independent witness, PW 41, has also fully companyroborated the evidence of other independent witnesses indicated above. It is clear from the evidence of this independent witness that the threatening and obstructing of the voters was done at the orders of the appellant himself which amply proves the allegation of undue influence. The evidence led by the respondent companysists mainly of PWs 1, 27, 32, 35, 39 and Out of these witnesses, PWs 27, 32, 35, 39 and 41 are independent voters, number belonging to any party. The final finding arrived at by the High Court may be extrated thus Thus I have examined and discussed above the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties with regard to 79 Bhurkunda booth, from which it is clear that there is abundance of reliable evidence on the record to prove the petitioners case that on the date of poll at about 11.30.
a.m. Respondent No. Similar is the evidence of other witnesses who have number been in any way broken of shattered in cross examination. In cross examination, the witness clarified that he made an oral companyplaint to the Presiding Officer that he was number allowed to cast vote and a written companyplaint was given by the sarpanch of the village. The election appeal is directed against a judgment dated April 10, 1980 of the Patna High Court setting aside the appellant mainly on the ground that he had been found guilty of indulging in companyrupt practice in the election held on 10.6.77 to the Bihar Legislative Assembly from 241 Goh Assembly companystituency. The plea of the respondent found with the High Court which set aside the election of the appellant. An election petition was filed by the respondent in the High Court for setting aside the election of the appellant on the ground that he had indulged in companyrupt practices as envisaged in s. 123 2 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter referred to as the Act . 893 of 1980. From the Judgment and Order dated the 10th April, 1980 of the Patna High Court in Election Petition No. He companyld number inform the respondent because he was himself surrounded by the mob. were companymitted with the positive knowledge and companysent of the appellant himself or his agents. Francis for the Appellant. K. Garg and V.J. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. Hence, this appeal to this Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1984_343.txt
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In his statement Jitendra Dodia companyfirmed that he was working with Jatin Jhaveri and that he and Jatin Jhaveri had packed US dollars in bundles in the evening. 8 1 of the FERA 1973 against Shri Jatin Jhaveri and Shri Ajit Dodia and of Sec. The currency was seized and Ajit Dodia was questioned. He also imposed penalty of Rs.10 Lacs on Jatin Jhaveri and of Rs.3 lacs on Ajit Dodia and of Rs.2 lacs on Jitendra Dodia. Shri Jatin Jhaveri, Ajit Dodia and Jitendra K. Dodia have failed to produce any permission of the RBI as required under Sec. He disclosed that he was to accompany Jatin Jhaveri, a diamond trader, that his brother Jitendra Dodia was working with Jatin Jhaveri as a sorter, that his trip was finalized and arranged by Jatin Jhaveri who had driven him to the Airport. In his statement dated 12.10.1993, Jatin Jhaveri companyfirmed that he was to accompany Ajit Dodia to Hongkong on the relevant date and that he had handed over his suitcase to Ajit Dodia who in turn was to hand it over to the brother of Jatin Jhaveri at Hongkong. He found that the Immigration Embarkation Card of Ajit Dodia was admittedly filled in by Jatin Jhaveri which indicated that he was physically present at the Airport along with Ajit Dodia. Concluding thus, the Special Director imposed penalty of Rs.30 lacs each on Jatin Jhaveri and Ajit Dodia and of Rs.7.5 lacs on Jitendra Dodia. It is equally abundantly crystal clear that Shri Jitendra Dodia has in fact aided and abetted said Shri Jatin Jhaveri in transferring and his brother Shri Ajit K. Dodia in acquiring the aforesaid foreign exchange of US 403,550 from said Shri Jatin Jhaveri. Had these currency declaration forms been with Shri Jatin Jhaveri then in the numbermal companyrse, they should have been found along with the foreign currency only and these receipts should have been recovered during the search of the office residential premises of Shri Jatin Jhaveri. The companycerned Currency Declaration Forms according to CEGAT sufficiently proved that the currency was brought in by said Jatin Jhaveri. Thus, he had disowned the currency seized from the baggage of Shri Ajit Dodia. However Jatin Jhaveri was number available for next two months i.e. Commissioner of Customs by his order dated 30.08.1995 companycluded that the currency was being taken by Ajit Dodia illegally. This order of the Special Director was challenged in Appeal Nos.454, 462 and 463 of 1999 by Jatin Jhaveri, Jitendra Dodia and Ajit Dodia respectively before the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, which disposed of those appeals by its order dated 10.03.2004. As regards, appeal preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, the Currency Declaration Forms furnished by him were taken to be strong pieces of evidence. C/537/95 Bom, C/576/95 Bom and C/577/95 Bom preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, Ajit Dodia and Jitendra Dodia against the order of the Commissioner of Customs were disposed by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, for short , West Regional Bench, Mumbai. Had these currency been legally brought into India, Shri Jatin Jhaveri would have perhaps himself checked the baggage through Customs, but the fact that he left to be checked and cleared through Customs by Shri Ajit Dodia itself indicate that he did number have any honest design of flying abroad on that night and that he did number have any legal documents for possession of these currency. 64 2 of the FERA 1973 against Shri Jitendra K. Dodia are proved beyond any doubt. 2976 of 2004 preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, the Customs Department was permitted by the High Court to refund the amount of US 289,250 in Indian Rupees. In appeal preferred by Ajit Dodia, the companyfiscation of currency amounting to US 114,300 was affirmed but the penalty was reduced to Rs.1 lac. Allowing the appeal preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, the order of companyfiscation in respect of US 289,250 was quashed on the ground that the acquisition was duly explained. The Special Director companycluded as under From the evidence discussed above, only irresistible companyclusion forthcoming is that the entire foreign exchange of US 403, 550 seized from Shri Ajit Dodia by the Air Customs, Mumbai was in fact illegally acquired by the said Shri Jatin Jhaveri, as indicated in the impugned SCN and then transferred to Shri Ajit K. Dodia for its onward transfer to his Shri Jatins brother in Hongkong. By the same judgment the High Court allowed Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004 holding that Jatin Jhaveri was entitled to the currency amounting to US 289,250 but would number be entitled to any interest thereon. Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004 was also preferred by Jatin Jhaveri in the High Court companytending that he was entitled to the release of US 289,250 along with interest 18. Jatin Jhaveri, being aggrieved in so far as rejection of prayer for grant of interest was companycerned, preferred SLP C No.5788 of 2011. He observed that in his statement dated 12.10.1993 Jatin Jhaveri had emphatically denied having any companynection with the seized currency and there was numberwhisper in the statement that any part of that currency was brought by him from USA which represented advance payment towards export or that he was in possession of relevant Currency Declaration Form in support of his claim. It was his further case that while he was going towards the Airport he had received a message that his mother was ill and that Ajit Dodia was intercepted with currency and therefore he did number go to the Airport. As regards Currency Declaration Forms, it was observed Shri Jatin C. Jhaveri has companye forward with two Currency, Declaration Forms dated 25.6.93 and 28.6.93 to substantiate his claim that this currency was legally imported into India, when he had companye from USA on 25.6.93 with US 2,59,250/ and made this declaration before the Customs on his arrival. It held that though Jatin Jhaveri had disowned the currency in his statement dated 12.10.1993, it did number mean that he had forfeited the ownership and companyld number make a claim in respect thereof at a later stage. Accordingly amount of Rs.1,83,09,525 was refunded and credited to the account of Jatin Jhaveri subject to the undertaking to return the said sum with interest in case this Court were to accept the appeals preferred by Union of India. It accepted the appeal preferred by Jitendra Dodia and held that he companyld number be held guilty of the charge of abetment in acquiring and transferring of Foreign Exchange unlawfully. The challenge in Civil Appeal Nos.11128 11131 of 2011 at the instance of Union of India is to the decision of the High Court dismissing FERA Appeal Nos.64 66 of 2006 while Civil Appeal No.11127 of 2011 filed by one Jatin Jhaveri challenges the dismissal of his Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004. It was held that the currency in question was liable to companyfiscation under Section 63 of FERA and it was so ordered. The facts leading to these appeals are as under On the night intervening 27th and 28th July, 1993, one Ajit Dodia intending to board a flight to Hongkong from Mumbai, had checked in a grey suitcase and a black briefcase. In the premises, he ordered companyfiscation of foreign currency of US 403,550 US 289,250 recovered from the suitcase and US 143,300 from the Brief case . 8 1 of the FERA 1973 for acquiring transferring foreign exchange as indicated in acquiring transferring foreign exchange as indicated in the impugned Show Cause Notice. Thereafter an addendum dated 06.08.1999 was issued by the Directorate of Enforcement, Mumbai to the earlier Show Cause Notice dated 21.11.1997 as to why the currency in question be number companyfiscated under the provisions of FERA. As regards genuineness of the Currency Declaration Forms, he relied upon the observations made by Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai in adjudication order dated 30.08.1995 as quoted above. On suspicion, the Custom Officers searched the baggage and found the suitcase to be companytaining US 289,250 while the brief case companytained US 114,300. He was also specifically questioned in the statement on 12.10.93 and he had made a statement claiming that the seized foreign currency, did number belong to him. He however denied ownership of the currency in question and also stated that he had numberhing to do with the briefcase. The proceedings so initiated under FERA culminated in an order dated 04.10.1999 passed by the Special Director of Enforcement, Mumbai. On the other hand, Union of India preferred SLP C Nos.26671 26674 of 2011 challenging the dismissal of FERA Appeal Nos.64 66 of 2006. These appeals arise out of companymon judgment and order dated 19.10.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in FERA Appeal Nos.64 66 of 2006 in Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004. A Show Cause Notice dated 21.11.1997 was thereafter issued by Directorate of Enforcement, Mumbai for companytravention of provisions of Section 8 1 read with 64 2 of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 herein after referred to as FERA . The High Court affirmed the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal and dismissed FERA Appeal No.64 66 of 2006 by its judgment and order dated 19.10.2010. This decision rendered by CEGAT was number challenged and attained finality in respect of proceedings under the Customs Act. He ought to have companye forward before the Customs Officers on the night of 27th/28th July, 1993 after it was seized at the time of its smuggling out. It was observed as under Simply because of the fact that the custom authorities are number able to trace out office companyies of these forms, it will number render these forms as number being authentic and therefore inadmissible. It was observed that the order of CEGAT having attained finality, that order had definite bearing on the companytroversy in question and though the findings recorded in the Customs proceedings may number be binding on FERA proceedings, it was number possible for the High Court to take a different view in the matter. The aforesaid order of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged by Union of India represented by Director of Enforcement in the High Court of Bombay. Thus the charges of companytravention of Sec. It is for the respondent to prove that these forms were number genuine. Further numberplausible explanation or reason has been offered by him as to what prevented him from going abroad on 27th /28th July 1993. During the pendency of these appeals, by order dated 14.02.2014 passed in Notice of Motion No.225 of 2012 in Writ Petition No. 8 1 r w Sec. As regards the companyfirmatory evidence of overseas buyers, the respondents companyld have called them for cross examination, if they have any doubt the authenticity of their version. Accordingly, I hold them guilty of these respective companytraventions against them. Uday U. Lalit, J. till 27.09.1993. On 27.11.1998 Appeal Nos. Special Leave to Appeal in all the matters was granted by this Court vide order dated 09.12.2011. He did number do so. All the three numberices viz.
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2016_188.txt
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The incident as stated above, was witnessed by PWs.3 and 7. There was a dispute between Kanwar Singh A 1 and deceased Hari Om allegedly murdered by the accused . Thereafter, it is stated that the appellant shot with a single barrel gun at the deceased in the chest and Hari Om died because of the said shot. The prosecution case as against this appellant rests on the oral evidence of PWs.3 and 7. The post mortem examination companyducted by PW 1 has established that the deceased Hari Om died of gun shot injuries. It is the further case of the prosecution that the accused persons after killing Hari Om threatened PWs.3 and 7 that if they named them they would eliminate their entire family, and fled from the place of the incident. Apart from the general evidence given as to the motive of A 1 to eliminate deceased Hari Om. With the said intention, it is stated that the deceased Hari Om with PW 3 Raj Bala and PW 7 Gayatri on that day proceeded towards the Police Station at about 9 a.m. and on the way the four accused persons who were hiding in a Nullah waylaid the deceased Hari Om and A 1 shot at him first with a companyntrymade pistol but the same did number fire. It also came to the companyclusion that the evidence of PWs.3 and 7 that accused 2 and 3 held the deceased by his hands while the appellant shot him dead, was also highly improbable because there was numberneed to have held the deceased when he was available to be shot at point blank range by the appellant. Pursuant to the said dispute, it is stated that on the night before 16.3.1986 A 1 Kanwar Singh had misbehaved by abusing deceased Hari Om, therefore, deceased Hari Om had decided to lodge a police companyplaint on the next day i.e. The trial companyrt while discussing the evidence of the prosecution came to the companyclusion that the oral evidence of PWs.3 and 4 cannot be relied upon because of the inherent improbabilities found therein. The companyrt also took numbere of the fact that the apparent companyflict in the evidence of PW 5, the photographer and the evidence of PWs.3 and 7 in regard to the time of the incident and companyrelating the evidence with that of the post mortem report, the companyrt doubted the prosecution case as to the time of the incident. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that the accused, the deceased and the companyplainant were all closely related. On his companying, PWs.3 and 7 left him at the spot and proceeded to the Police Station to lodge a companyplaint which was done around 10.15 a.m. at the Police Station which is stated to be only 3 kms. 16.3.1986. It came to the companyclusion that factually if the appellants were hiding in a Nullah and did number want to be identified, there was numberneed for these accused persons to have companye in front of the witnesses so as to make themselves available for identification, because they companyld have very well shot the deceased from the place where they were hiding. The further case of the prosecution is that on hearing about the incident, PW 6, the brother of PW 3 came to the spot. On this basis, rejecting the prosecution case, it acquitted all the surviving accused persons. It also numbericed the fact that according to the evidence of the said eye witnesses, deceased was shot at when he was lying down and he was being held by A 2 and A 3. It is the further case of the prosecution that A 2 surrendered before the Police on 20.3.1986 while A 1 and A 3 were arrested on 24.3.1986 and A 4 who had by then joined duty in Tripura was allegedly arrested on 10.4.1986 and brought to the village on 17.4.1986. After trial, the learned Sessions Judge came to the companyclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against all the accused persons and acquitted all of them of the charges. The investigating officer after making the necessary diary entries and sending the special report proceeded to the place of the incident along with PWs.3 and 7 and held the inquest. On the basis of the above material gathered during the investigation the accused persons were charged as stated above, and the learned Sessions Judge having companye to the companyclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the accused persons acquitted them while the High Court in appeal has companyvicted the appellant herein and acquitted the other two accused persons, A 1 in the meanwhile had died. The said companyrt also took numbere of the fact of the defence pleaded by the appellant that on the date of the incident he had left the village by 6 a.m. to proceed to Tripura to join duty and had in fact joined duty there and it was from Tripura that the appellant was arrested. The learned Sessions Judge also doubted the veracity of the recovery of the single barrel gun at the instance of the appellant. The companyrt also came to the companyclusion that the appellant had absolutely numbermotive to assist A 1 in companymitting the crime in question because there was numberenmity between him and the deceased. The companyplaint in question was lodged by PW 3. The companyrt numbericed that knowing very well that the appellant was using .12 bore gun which sprays pellets, neither A 2 number A 3 would have dared to hold the deceased from such close range because of the possibility of they also being injured in the process. It also took numbere of the fact that both these witnesses were number permanent residents of Gochi village, having been married to persons away from the village and they were admittedly visiting the village. It is further stated that on a statement made by the appellant, a single barrel .12 bore gun was recovered from the house of A 3 who is the brother of the appellant herein which was kept companycealed in the South Western companyner of the Chabutra. On the companytrary, the blood was found all over the left thigh and the leg of the victim indicating that the victim must have been shot at when he was standing. 3 and 7, so far as other accused are companycerned and dismissed the State appeal as against them, while it allowed the same in regard to the present appellant. In the said trial, the appellant was arrayed as accused No.4 A 4 before the Sessions Judge, Rohtak. It is the further case of the prosecution, which, of companyrse, is number disputed, that the appellant in this appeal was serving the Central Reserve Police Force at Jammu was on orders of transfer to Tripura. So far as the present appellant is companycerned, the prosecution also relies upon the alleged recovery of the weapon made from the house of A 3 at the instance of the appellant. It is relevant to mention herein that during the trial A 1 Kanwar Singh died and the proceedings had abated as against him. En route to his place of posting, he had taken some leave to visit his ailing sister at the village, hence, he had companye to the village. Appeal No.238/DBA/89. The High Court also found the appellant guilty of an offence punishable under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act and imposed a sentence of RI for one year with a fine of Rs.1,000/ in default RI for 6 months on that companynt. He recorded the statement of witnesses and sent the body for post mortem examination. The High Court by its judgment dated 9.11.1995 allowed the appeal so far as the present appellant is companycerned, and companyvicted him of an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.5,000/ in default to further undergo RI for one year. The State appeal against the acquittal of A 2 and A 3 was dismissed by the High Court, therefore, the appellant is number before us in this appeal. away from the scene of the occurrence. Being aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the State preferred an appeal before the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. It directed both the sentences to run companycurrently. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the records.
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2002_829.txt
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Respondents were the landlords of the said lands. The Additional Mamlatdar, the Deputy Collector and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held in favor of the heirs of the tenant and ordered restoration of possession of the lands from the respondent landlords. After dispossessing the tenant the respondent landlords remained in possession of the said lands till 31st July 1969. Respondent landlords carried the matter in revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under Section ? ? The Additional Mamlatdar instituted suo motu proceedings under Section 32 1B of the Act of the ground that the tenant was in possession of the lands on the appointed day and he was dispossessed prior to the tillers day, that is, 1st April 1957 by the landlords without following due procedure of law and the lands in question were in possession of the landlords of their successors in interest on 31st July 1969 and, therefore, the respondents were liable to restore the possession of the lands to the heirs of the tenant even though the tenant in the meantime had died in 1959. One Savaliram Gotiram Teli was the tenant of three agricultural lands being Survey Nos. As all the requisite companydition for applicability of Section 32 1B of the Act were found to have been satisfied the Special Additional Tahsildar, Nasik by his order dated 20th August 1971 directed the respondent landlords to restore the lands to the heirs of the tenant under Section 32 1B of the Act for personal cultivation. He was dispossessed by the landlords prior to 1st April 1957 otherwise than under an appropriate order under Section 29 of the Act. On the appointed day, that is, 15th June 1955 the said tenant was in occupation of these lands. 88, 89 and 90 situated at Village Trimbak in Nasik Taluka in Maharashtra State. The said order was challenged by the landlords by filing Tenancy Appeal which came to be dismissed by Leave Reserve Deputy Collector, Nasik on 10th January 1972. The High Court of Bombay by the judgment under appeal took a companytrary view and held that such proceedings are maintainable only for the tenant companycerned and number for his heirs. 70 of the Act. It is thereafter, that the respondents, aggrieved by the order of the Revenue Tribunal dated 2nd March 1973, carried the matter in appeal under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to the High Court of Bombay. A few relevant facts may be numbered at the outset. It is the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court which is brought in challenge in the present proceedings as numbered earlier. That Revision Application was also dismissed.
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1996_1550.txt
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on reaching the spot and finding sheo ram companystructing a new jhuggi in front of his existing jhuggi shyam singh pleaded with the former and asked him to desist from companystructing the new jhuggi. shri shyam singh is an officer of the companypany and is senior to shri lalla ram. chemical works jhuggi area that it was clear that dharam singh a member of the watch and ward staff placed on duty to protect the property pt the companypany had numbericed sheo ram companystructing new walls in front of his jhuggi that on reaching the spot on the evening of march 2 1968 shyam singh saw the freshly constructed walls of the height of about 5 and some building material lying in front of sheo rams jhuggi and was accordingly justified in investigating into the matter that when shyam singh was telling sheo ram that he should number companystruct a new jhuggi or extend the jhuggi the appellant questioned the authority of shyam singh and abused and manhandled him and in so doing was guilty of misconduct within the meaning of standing order 27 1 .
it would be profitable to refer to the companycluding portion of the report which reads thus shri shyam singh is a member of the security staff and a responsible officer of the company. on the companypanys taking up companystruction of a boundary wall on the aforesaid plot in april or may 1967 the appellant who was the president pradhan of the jhuggi jhoupari sudhar sabha and a few other jhuggi dwellers brought a suit being suit number 418 of 1967 in the companyrt of the sub judge first class delhi for injunction restraining the companypany and respondent number 1 from constructing the boundary wall and from evicting them from the jhuggies. the learned trial companyrt it appears ordered the defendant to leave a cate of about 10 width for the passage of the jhuggi dwellers while companystructing the boundary wall in question. the action of shri lalla ram is certainly number justified in so far as he intervened and obstructed shri shyam and other security staff and in the process shri lalla ram questioned the authority of a superior officer security staff called him and his sepoys gondas caught hold of him by his hand and pushed him and threatened him. on the evening of march 2 1968 shyam singh assistant security officer of respondent number 1 received a report from sentry dharam singh alleging that one sheo ram had started making an unauthorised companystruction on the aforesaid plot. in the discharge of official duties of protecting the property of the companypany and preventing its misuse if shri shyam singh wanted to investigate into the matter reported to him by shri dharam singh he was perfectly within his rights. chemical works standing order 27 1 was number attracted in the present case which was really a case of civil dispute between the companypany and jhuggi dwellers who were long being pressurized to surrender possession of the area to the companypany and the machinery of security staff of d.c.m. while he was so engaged the appellant who was also an employee of respondent number 1 made his appearance alongwith eight to ten jhuggi dwellers and adopting a very aggressive attitude intervened on behalf of sheo ram and questioned the authority of shyam singh who was senior to him to make inquiries in regard to the companystruction during the pendency of the aforesaid litigation. under the circumstances we companyclude that shri lalla ram companymitted the acts alleged. security staff who are meant for safeguarding the property of the companypany and enforcing the discipline. shri lalla ram also said that they were number afraid of the uniform i.e. in the discharge of his official duties of preventing encroachment and unauthorised companystruction on the immovable property belonging to he companypany shyam singh proceeded to the spot accompanied by two members of his staff to investigate info the matter. he also manhandled shyam singh hurled highly provocative invectives at him and his companions and bade them to quit on pain of dire consequences. the learned companynsel for the appellant has contended before me that their passage from the jhuggis towards the najafgarh drain would be obstructed by the companystruction of this wall. aggrieved by the rejection of their player with regard to issue of injunction regarding companystruction of the boundary wall the appellant and his companyplaintiffs preferred an appeal to the senior sub judge by his order dated february 28 1968 observing the dispute between the parties is only regarding the companystruction of the boundary wall along the najafgarh drain. against him namely obstructing the assistant security officer in the discharge of official duties and threatening him and catching hold of him by hand and thereby companymitted acts subversive of discipline a misconduct under the standing order number 27 1 .
we find shri lalla ram guilty of the charge. the applicants had number claimed any right of easement or irrevocable licence against the construction of this wall and so they do number appear to have any right to companypel the defen dants respondents number to companystruct this wall. on the basis of the voluntary statement made on behalf of the companypany to the effect that it would number evict the appellant and his companyplaintiffs except by a due process of law the sub judge issued a temporary injunction restraining the companypany and respondent number 1 from evicting the appellant and his companyplaintiffs except by a due process of law but refused their prayer for injunction restraining the companypany and respondent number 1 from building the boundary wall. on companypletion of the inquiry in accordance with the standing orders the enquiry officers submitted a unanimous report observing therein that it was number the appellants case that either sheo ram or any other person was being evicted from any of the jhuggies standing on the area which was admittedly knumbern as d.c.m. unnerved by the threats held out by the appellant shyam singh left the place along with his security personnel and hastened to make a report of the incident to his immediate superior which led to the suspension of the appellant and issue to him of a numberice by general manager of respondent number 1 calling upon him to show cause as to why he should number be dismissed for his aforesaid misbehaviour towards and attempt to assault shyam singh who was discharging his official duties which were acts subver sive of discipline within the meaning of standing order 27 1 applicable to him. after taking over the watch and ward of the plot the management of respondent number 1 posted some sentries to prevent encroachment and unauthorised companystruction thereon. the learned trial companyrt exercised the discretion keeping in view the right of the defendants to companystruct the boundary wall in their own land as also the convenience of plaintiffs appellants. agreeing with the findings of the enquiry officers that the aforesaid acts companymitted by the appellant were subversive of discipline and companystituted misconduct as companytemplated by standing order 27 1 the general manager of respondent number 1.
passed an order on may 2 1968 dismissing the appellant from service. there are also some jhuggies hutments standing on the land in which live 172 families out of which 70 are of the employees of respondent number 1 and the rest are of some outsiders. while holding that the enquiry officers were number biased against the appellant that there was numberviolation of the principles of natural justice and that it companyld number be said that the findings of the enquiry officers were number based upon any evidence or that the same were perverse the additional industrial tribunal delhi refused by its order dated april 23 1969 to accord its approval to the appellants dismissal on the grounds that the disciplinary action taken against the appellant was misconceived that since there was numberrational companynection between the employment of the appellant and shyam singh in regard to the affairs of the d.c.m. the sub judge however directed the company and respondent number 1 to leave 10 feet wide gate for the passage of the appellant and his companyplaintiffs. aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the additional industrial tribunal respondent number 1 moved the high companyrt of delhi under article 226 of the companystitution. the facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are behind the premises situate on najafgarh road delhi of respondent number 1 which is a unit of the delhi cloth and general mills companypany limited hereinafter referred to as the company there is a plot of land admeasuring 181 acres ownership whereof was transferred in favour of the companypany by the erstwhile delhi improvement trust number companystituted as delhi development authority vide sale deed dated may 20 1964.
the plot being adjacent to the premises of respondent number 1 the same was being looked after by the management of the respondent which also companystructed some quarters thereon for the use of its employees. number satisfied with the explanation tendered by the appellant the management of respondent number 1 detailed two of its officers to inquire into the aforesaid charges against the appellant. anand prakash and m. k. d. namboodri for respondent number 1.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jaswant singh j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated numberember 19 1970 of the high companyrt of delhi rendered in civil writ petition number 373 of 1969 setting aside the order dated april 23 1969 of the additional industrial tribunal delhi rejecting respondent number 1s application under section 33 2 of the industrial disputes act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the act seeking approval of its order of the appellants dismissal from service passed during the pendency of an industrial dispute. number 373 of 1969 .
c. agarwala for the appellant. since however an industrial dispute was pending the general manager directed the appellant to take his final dues together with one months pay in lieu of numberice and made an application on the same day to the industrial tribunal delhi seeking its approval of the order of the appellants dismissal as required by section 3 3 2 b of the act. chemical works was pressed into service for that purpose. the appellant submitted his explanation denying the charges levelled against him and questioning the authority of tile respondent to charge sheet him in respect of an incident which was purely private. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 351 of 1971.
appeal by special leave from the judgment order the 19th numberember 1970 of the delhi high companyrt in c.w. there is hardly any justification to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned trial court.
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1978_371.txt
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The excess profits tax being companysequential upon the income tax assessment, the Excess Profits Tax Officer assessed the entire income of the two businesses at Kanpur and Farrukhabad in the hands of the assessee. The excess profits tax assessment being companysequential upon the income tax assessment, the Excess Profits Tax Officer assessed the entire income of the two businesses at Kanpur and at Farrukhabad, in the hands of the assessee firm. By order dated February 21, 1951 passed under s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act the Excess Profits Tax Officer modified the original excess profits tax assessment. In the revised assessment he included the income of the branch shop at Farrukhabad in the total income of the assessee for the purpose of assessment of Excess Profits tax. The Tribunal companyfirmed the order of the Excess Profits Tax Officer. The Income tax Officer directed that the income be assessed as the income of the assessee and number as the income of a separate firm. 741 743 of 1966 Gurbux Rai Harbux Rai v. The Commissioner of Income tax, U.P. In the revised assessment in pursuance of orders under s. 10 A he included the income of the branch shop at Farrukhabad in the total income of the assessee for purposes of excess profits tax assessment. Pursuant to this order the Income tax Officer modified the assessment with respect to the Income tax assessment of the assessee for the assessment years 1944 45 and 1945 46. Against the order passed by the Income Tax Officer in the income tax assessment 3 64 the assessee appealed to the Assistant Commissioner. It may be recalled that the Excess Profits Tax Officer at Kanpur had served a numberice under s. 10 A of the Excess Profits Tax Act requiring the assessee to show cause why appropriate adjustments as respects liability to excess profits tax should number be made so as to companynteract the avoidance or reduction of liability to excess profits tax by companyverting the business in the name of Pussulal Jangalal the Farrukhabad firm into a separate business. M s. Gurbux Rai Harbux Rai hereinafter referred to as the assessee is a registered firm carrying on business in piece goods. The assessee went up in appeal against the orders of the Excess Profits Tax Officer to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case there was any definite information within the meaning of s. 15 by virtue of which the Excess Profits Tax Officer was companypetent to reopen the excess profits tax assessments ? The numberice required the assessee to show cause why proper adjustment should number be made on the footing that the main purpose of the partial partition of the family of Gurbux Rai was the avoidance of the excess profits tax liability. The companytention of the assessee that disruption of the family was a genuine and bona fide transaction was rejected by the Excess Profits Tax Officer. It is abundantly clear from the annexures to the supplementary statement of the case that on February 3, 1951 the assessees companynsel and K. S. Kalra and Gurbux Rai were present before the Excess Profits Tax Officer. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal held that the Excess Profits Tax Officer had received definite information regarding the state of the law in pursuance of the appellate order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who had held that the family of Gurbux Rai was partially partitioned. The income tax assessments were companysequently modified for the two assessment years 1944 45 and 1945 46. The assessee also companytended that the Excess Profits Tax Officer was number companypetent to pass any order under s. 10 A merely to make an adjustment in the revised assessment under s. 15. The assessee companytended that all the materials in the case were before the Excess Profits Tax Officer at the time of his original assessment and numbernew information came into his possession thereafter. In the proceedings for assessment of tax under the Act for the above two chargeable accounting periods the assessee informed the Tax Officer that the joint family of Gurbux Rai bad been partitioned and ther had been a reconstitution of the business of partnership with effect from July 4, 1943. In proceedings for assessment of tax under the Excess Profits for Act 1940 for the two chargeable accounting periods the assessee informed the Tax Officer that the joint family of Gurbux Rai had been dissolved and there was a reconstitution of the business of the partnership with effect from July 4, 1943. ,
According to the assessee the companystitution of the firm after partition was that in the firm at Kanpur the former two partners were interested, their share being equal, but in the business of the firm at Farrukhabad there were three partners Harbux Rai with /8/ share, Chameli Devi with /4/ share and Gopaldas with /4/ share. The Excess Profits Tax Officer however started proceedings under s. 10 A by numberice dated February 6, 1951 calling upon the assessee to show cause why appropriate adjustments should number be made in the assessment, and passed orders in that behalf for both the chargeable accounting periods holding that the main purpose of the partial partition of the family business of Gurbux Rai was avoidance of excess profits tax liability. By an order dated February 21, 1951 passed under s. 15 of the Act the Excess Profits Tax Officer modified the original assessment for both the chargeable accounting periods. In assessing tax under the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 for the assessment year 1944 45 relevant to the account year ending June 21, 1944 the Income tax Officer held that the case set up by the assessee that there was partition amongst the members of the family of Gurbux Rai companyld number be accepted. The assessee appealed against the order of additional assessment companytending that the Excess Profits Tax Officer was number companypetent to reopen the case under s. 15 as he had numberdefinite information companying into his possession to enable him to discover that the profits of the chargeable accounting period had escaped assessment. The Excess Profits Tax Officer also started proceedings under s. 10 A of the Act by serving a numberice dated February 3, 1951 on the assessee. During the chargeable accounting periods July 4, 1943 to June 21, 1944 and June 22, 1944 to July 10, 1945 Gurbux Rai and Harbux Rai each representing his joint family were the two partners of the assessees with equal shares in the profit and loss. The case was therein taken to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal. He, therefore, assessed the income as that of the assessee and number as the income of a separate firm. that partial partition in respect of movable property of Gurbux Rai was effected on a date somewhere near Asadh Samwat at 2000, from which date Farrukhabad business was companyducted by a separate firm companysisting of Harbux Rai, Mst. During the chargeable accounting period July 4, 1943 to June 21, 1944 and June 22, 1944 to July 10, 1945 Gurbux Rai and Harbux Rai each representing his joint family were the two partners of the assessee with equal shares. In assessing tax under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 for the assessment year 1944 45 companyresponding to the accounting year from October 19, 1942 to October 7, 1943 the Income Tax Officer held that the partition set up by Gurbux Rai companyld number be accepted as the same had been made to avoid proper incidence of taxation. Whether in the circumstances of this case, the Excess Profits Tax Officer was companypetent to apply the provisions of s. 10 A and make necessary adjustments in pursuance thereto in the revised assessment under s. 15. On October 10, 1947, that Officer held that only partial partition had been effected in the joint family of Gurbux Rai. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, C. J. Gurbux Rai Harbux Rai hereinafter called the assessee is a registered firm carrying on a business in piece goods and companymission agents. Against the order passed by the Income Tax Officer the assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who by his order dated October 10, 1947 observed that partial partition in respect of movable property of Gurbux Rai was effected on a date somewhere near Asadh Samvat 2000, from which date Farrukhabad was companyducted by a separate firm companysisting of Harbux Rai, Mst. According to the assessee the companystit ution of the firm after the partition was that in the firm at Kanpur the former two partners were interested, their share being equal but in the business of the firm at Farrukhabad there were three partners, namely, Harbux Rai with a share of 8 annas. In the view of the Income tax Officer, an attempt was made to avoid proper incidence of taxation as an after thought to create evidence for camouflaging the Farrukhabad business as a separate unit of assessment. In these appeals this Court by an order dated January 21, 1971 directed the Income tax Appellate Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of the case on the question whether the proceedings under s. 10 A were started in the companyrse of assessment or reassessment proceedings companymenced under s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act 1940, hereinafter called the Ace. It has stated that the numberices under s. 15 of the Act were issued for both the chargeable accounting periods and they were served on the assessee on February 3, 1951. It has its head office at Kanpur and a branch office at Farrukhabad. Chameli and Gopaldas. Thereafter the Tribunal referred the following two questions of law to the Allahabad High Court under s. 21 of the Act read with s. 66 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1922. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated May 22, 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in Income tax Reference No. Chameli Devi with a share of 4 annas and Gopal Das with a share of 4 annas. The Tax Officer proceeded to record the following order Issue numberice u s 15 requiring the return to be filed within 60 days of the date of service. E.P.T.O. It has been added that the numberices under s. 15 and under s. 10 were issued on the same date, namely, February 3, 1951 but from the order sheet it was clear that numberice under s. 15 was issued first and the, numberice under s. 10A was issued thereafter. Chameli and Gopal Das. But at the instance of the assessee the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court of Allahabad Whether on the facts and circumstances of this case, the transaction in question was one which companyld be. Receipt of a numberice alleged to have been issued under s. 10A of the Act previously was denied by them. Against the order passed by the High Court numberfurther proceedings has been taken by the assessee challenging the companyclusion of the High Court and that order has become final. The order sheet further shows that on February 15, 1951 reply to the numberice was received along with the return and it was directed that the same be placed on the record. The following judgment was delivered after the Tribunal submitted the supplementary statement as directed. The Appellate Tribunal companyfirmed the order of the departmental authorities. Also issue numberice u s 10A as per draft. The facts set out in the supplementary statement of the case may be recapitulated. The High Court by order dated July 31, 1969 answered the question in the affirmative. Against the order passed by the High Court, these two appeals are preferred. Grover,J. 1225 and 1226 of 1967. A parallel proceeding which had companye before this Court in Civil Appeals Nos. The High Court accordingly answered the second question also in the negative. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. T. Desai, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the appellant in both the appeals . decided on August 2, 1968 may also be referred to. This is what he held. 189 of 1953. These appeals were dismissed.
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1971_311.txt
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The Borough owned several buildings in Dharwar. 36 dated 29th June, 1953, the Borough decided to recover house tax and other municipal taxes from the private individuals who were tenants of the municipal buildings leased out to them. The respondent, the Hubli Dharwar Municipal Corporation, was originally companystituted as a Borough under the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925 hereinafter referred to as the Act . These leases were executed in favour of the appellants by the Borough some time in March and April, 1953. In pursuance of this Resolution, a numberice was issued by the President of the Borough that all the citizens in occupation of the buildings owned by the Municipality must pay the taxes assessed on them in respect of the premises under their occupation. The main ground taken was that the Municipality companyld number impose a house tax on buildings owned by itself, so that the imposition of this house tax was invalid in law. Some of these buildings were given on leases, to the appellants. It may be mentioned that, neither in the original leases of 1953, number in the fresh leases of 1955, was there any mention about liability of the tenants to pay the house tax. buildings belonging the respondent which were on lease with the appellants. This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit challenging the validity of imposition of house tax and numberices issued for realisation of that tax from the appellants. On 9th September, 1954, the Government of Bombay sanctioned the amendment to the then existing Housetax Rules framed under the Act in respect of this Borough, and the General Committee passed a Resolution on the 19th February, 1955 sanctioning the levy of taxes on Municipal owned buildings, adopting the sanctioned taxes,.and bringing them into force with effect from 1st April, 1955 by giving necessary public numberice as required by law. On 9th September, 1953, the appellants preferred joint objections against the levy of the house tax and its realisation from them. Notice under section 77 was published on 25th February, 1955 and then the taxes came into forct on 1st April, 1955. Subsequent to the execution of these fresh leases, bills were received from the respondent by the appellants calling upon them to pay the house tax imposed in respect of the. At the relevant time, when the disputes leading to the suit arose, it was still a Borough, but it became a Corporation subsequently in the year 1962. The appellants thereafter filed the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen, challenging the legality of the imposition of the tax. Thereafter, fresh lease deeds were executed by the respondent in favour of the appellants on 11th May, 1955. Thereafter, by a General Committee Resolution No. 2206 of 1966. V. Gupte Naunit Lal S.S. Khanduja and Swaranjit Sodhi for the appellants. The suit was resisted on the plea that it was a valid taxation. 888 of 1961. was delivered by Bhargava, J. R Chaudhuri, for the respondent The Judgment of the Court. 1966 of the Mysore High Court in Second Appeal No. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 23. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
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1971_220.txt
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in august 1940 defendant number 1 married his third wife who is defendant number 3 in the suit. defendant number 1 admittedly married three wives. the plaintiff is admittedly the son of defendant number 2 who is one of the legally married wives of defendant number 1 but the latter denied that he was the father of the plaintiff and charged the plaintiffs mother with misconduct. her step son that is to say the son of defendant number 1 by his predeceased wife. p 6 the other document a residential house knumbern as the mud terraced house was given to defendant number 2 for the purpose of her residence during her lifetime. the defendant number 3 in the suit who is the other living wife of defendant number 1 and has numberissue of her own is alleged to have developed ill feeling and jealousy towards the plaintiff and his mother and poisoned her husbands mind against them so much so that the defendant number 1 had actually instituted a suit in the companyrt of the district munsif at ongole questioning the legitimacy of the plaintiff. the case of defendant number 2 is that her husband treated her well for about a year after he married the third defendant but later on grew companyd and indifferent and began to neglect her. the defence put forward by defendant number 1 to the claim of the plaintiff was a denial of his paternity and the whole companytroversy in the suit centered round the point as to whether the plaintiff was the legitimate son of defendant number 1 by defendant number 2 ms second wife. defendant number 1 definitely admits that his second wife was perfectly chaste at the time when the sum of rs. the defendant number 1 expressly stated in his deposition that his second wife was a perfectly chaste woman up to the time when the documents exs. it was because of such conduct on the part of defendant number 1 that the present suit had to be instituted. 100 from him in october 1942.
his specific case is that defendant number2 did never companye to reside with him in the mud terraced house after the companypromise was arrived at in the maintenance case. it is the case of defendant number 2 that after these documents were executed and registered at addanki she came back to the mud terraced house and lived there since then for several months along with her husband. 100 to his second wife as maintenance allowance for one year in terms of the maintenance deed ex. of defendant number 1 that the wife went to eddanapudi and lived there an immoral life is disbelieved as it has been disbelieved by the high companyrt the companyclusion becomes irresistible that she did reside at the mud terraced house as alleged by her and this is fully borne out by the terms of the document ex. 100 as maintenance allowance for one whole year from her husband. the only recitals in this document were that the executant married a third wife as numberson was born to him by the second wife that thereupon the second wife instituted a suit for maintenance against him and that under the advice of respectable friends the document was executed with the provisions companytained therein. the son of defendant number 1 came back to the house of his father but his illness grew worse and in june 1940 he died. p 5 and p 6 as amounting to a sort of separation arrangement under which the parties agreed to live separately from each other and this according to the learned judges fully bears out the story of the husband that defendant number 2 never came to reside in the mud terraced house. within a few days after the execution of his document defendant number 1 on 5th of october 1942 paid a sum of rs. the learned judges found therefore that there was numberopportunity for intercourse between defendant number 2 and her husband at the period when the boy must have been companyceived. the defendant number 1 in his answer to this application which was filed on 7th september 1942 denied that he neglected his wife or was in any manner indifferent to her health and comforts. the defendant number i then married the mother if the plaintiff and that was in or about the year 1930.
from the time of this marriage down to about 1940 the companyple seemed to have lived quite happily except that there was no issue of the marriage. as the plaintiff was admittedly born on the 16th of october 1943 he must have been companyceived sometime towards the latter part of december 1942 or the beginning of january 1943.
the material point for companysideration therefore is whether the defendant number 1 has succeeded in showing that there was numberopportunity of access between him and defendant number 2 during this period ? thereupon the defendant number 2 did go to her fathers place and on 19th march 1942 she filed an application in the companyrt of the district munsif at ongole praying for leave to use her husband in forma pauperis for separate maintenance. p 5 and the defendant number 2 acknumberledged payment of this money by putting her thumb impression on a receipt which has been marked ex. there were allegations in the plaint of abandonment and neglect by the husband. after about a month both of them returned and as defendant number 2 was medically advised to live separately from her husband for some time she went to her fathers place vide russel v. russel 1924 a.c.
vide re feniot 1952 1 all e.r. this part of the story of defendant number 1 has number been belived by either of the companyrts below and may be rejected as altogether untrustworthy. after delivery she resided with her child at her fathers house and her husband came there at times to visit them. while staying at her fathers house she received summons of a suit instituted by her husband being suit number 326 of 1944 in the companyrt of the district munsif at ongole against her praying for cancellation of the maintenance deed and the deed of settlement mentioned above on the ground that she was unchaste and had become pregnant by immoral ways and that the son born of her was number his son. when the infant was 7 months old she took him to her husbands place but her husband asked her to remain for some time more with her father. the material portion of the document stands as follows you are my wife. p 5 and p 6 were executed and even when she received the maintenance allowance of rs. p 5 and p 6 were executed by and between the parties both on the 28th september 1942.
exhibit p 5 purports to be a deed of maintenance and under it the husband agreed to pay a sum of rs. 100 was given to her on 5th of october 1942 and the receipt ex. on an appeal being taken against this decision by defendant number 1 to the madras high companyrt the learned judges who heard the appeal came to the opposite conclusion and held that from the facts and circumstances of the case an inference of number access between the husband and the wife companyld reasonably be drawn. 100 by defendant number 2 as advance payment of maintenance allowance for one year on 5th of october 1942 indicates according to the learned judges a final companyfirmation of the separation arrangement and from this time onwards there was a definite cessation of marital relations between the parties. it was expressly stated in the companynter affidavit that the second wife was living all along in what was described as the mud terraced house and was getting her supply of food and other necessary articles from her husband as a matter of fact after consuming all that she required for herself she was sending the surplus that remained to her parents. it was averred that as the petitioner did number bear him any child and the son by his first wife unfortunately died he had numberother alternative but to marry a third wife for the sake of progeny. the point for determination therefore was whether on the evidence adduced in the case the defendant number 1 upon whom the burden of proving number access admittedly lay had succeeded in discharging that burden. the first wife died leaving a son aged 2 or 3 years at the time of her death. by ex. 100 per annum for food and raiment to his second wife during the period of her natural life the payment to be made by the 30th of magha bahula every year. d 3 in the suit. in the first place the high companyrt takes the documents exs. she made a grievance of this to her husband but the latter told her that she might go away. it was after this numberice that the present suit was instituted. where she stayed was unknumbern to him and he heard that she went to eddanapudi where she was living an immoral life with her paramour one cherakuri venkanna. december 8.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mukherjea j. this appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of a division bench of the madras high companyrt dated the 31st january 1950 reversing on appeal those of the surbordinate judge bapatla passed in original suit number 96 of 1944.
the suit out of which the appeal arises was companymenced by the infant plaintiff number appellant before us represented by his maternal uncle as next friend for recovery of possession on partition of a half share in the properties described in the schedule to the plaint on the allegation that they were the joint family properties of himself and his father the defendant number 1 in which he had an equal share with the latter. during this period she became enceinte and when the time for companyfinement came she was taken to the bayer hospital at cherala where on the 16th of october 1943 she gave birth to the plaintiff. sometime before june 1940 the plaintiffs mother fell ill and was sent to the government hospital at guntur for treatment. in appeal number 409 of 1946 arising out of the judgment and decree dated the 31st january 1946 of the companyrt of the subordinate judge of bapatla in original suit number 96 of 1944. it appears that before this application for leave to sue as a pauper was heard by the companyrt there was an amicable settlement arrived at between the parties through the mediation of certain well wishers and two documents namely exs. certain properties specified in the schedule to this document were kept as security for due payment of these amounts. on the admitted facts of the case there companyld be numberquestion that the operation of section 112 of the indian evidence act would be attracted and the plaintiff being born during the companytinuance of a lawful wedlock between his mother and his alleged father a conclusive presumption of legitimacy would arise unless it was proved that the parties to the marriage had numberaccess to each other at any time when he companyld have been begotten. hence from number you shall live in the said house and without powers of gift and sale the schedule property shall after your lifetime pass to me and my heirs. 1 12 rang. as a matter of fact however he did number remove thereto the ostensible reason assigned being that certain religious ceremonies companynected with entering into a new house companyld number be performed. due to the affection i have towards you i have given to you the property mentioned in the schedule hereunder and this very day delivered possession of the same to you for your residential purposes for your lifetime. if the story. the receipt of a sum of rs. who was also suffering from certain ailments at the time accompanied her to the hospital. rao and nayudu jj. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 73 of 1953.
appeal by special leave against the judgment and decree dated the 31st january 1950 of the high companyrt of judicature at madras. munikaniah senior advocate k. r. choudhury with him for the respondent. somayya senior advocate m. krishna rao with him for the appellant. 243 p.c.
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test
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1953_122.txt
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It is companymonly known as levy sugar. Claims were lodged for the price of levy sugar both with the FCI as also the Directorate of Sugar, Ministry of Food. The Central Government sanctioned the claim of the respondent in respect of the sugar supplied to UPPCF. Respondents herein received allotment letters for supply of sugar both to FCI as also UPPCF. It raised other objections including weight and quality of the sugar in relation to the supplies made to the Central Government. It made similar claim in respect of the sugar supplied to the appellant. Price of levy sugar although is required to be numberified at that time, admittedly, there exists a practice to numberify the previous years price as a levy sugar on an adhoc basis price in October and final price therefor is numberified later on. Sugar year companymences from the month October of the year. Price of such levy sugar is fixed by the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 3 3C of the Act on yearly basis. The claim in terms of the said circulars was to be submitted to the Directorate of Sugar directly. Pursuant to or in furtherance of a numberification issued by the Central Government under the Act and the directions issued by the companypetent authority from time to time, levy sugar was supplied by the respondents to the agencies of Central Government as also the appellant. Admittedly, supplies were made to FCI and UPPCF in terms of the allotment orders received by the respondents. In terms of Section 3 2 f thereof, the Central Government is empowered to direct any manufacturer of sugar to sell the said companymodity to the Central Government or a State Government or to a body owned or companytrolled by them for the purpose of making it available to the public at a fair price. The Central Government verified the bills in terms of the circular letters issued by it from time to time. We may, however, numberice that withholding of payment was, inter alia, made by the appellant for the alleged shortages in supply of sugar during the period 1983 to 1995. A learned Single Judge of the said Court classified the cases into two categories 1 supplies made to the State Government, the Central Government and their other agencies in respect whereof the appellant only had the authority to make payment, and 2 supplies made to the appellant. So far as the supplies made to the Central Government and other agencies are companycerned, it was held that a direction for making the payment should be made but in respect of the supplies made to the appellant any resolution setting the companytroversy was held to be impermissible in a writ proceeding therefor and the respondents were relegated to the remedy of a civil suit for recovery of respect of the amount claimed by them. Respondents companytended that numbercomplaint having been made by the Central Government in this companynection, the action of the appellant was totally unjustified. 372 and 371 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.7316 and 7666 of 2006 B. Sinha, J. 370 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.5599 of 2006 With CIVIL APPEAL NOS. Parliament of India enacted Essential Commodities Act, 1955 The Act . Appellant, however, demanded for a numberdues certificate. A review petition was filed by the respondents pointing out that numberdirection has been made in regard to payment of interest and by a judgment and order dated 29th April, 2005 interest was directed to be paid. CIVIL APPEAL NOS. Respondents filed writ applications before the High Court of Delhi. Leave granted.
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2008_30.txt
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The only companysideration which the State Transport Commissioner took into account in preferring the appellant to other private operators for grant of two stage carriage permits was already being operated by the appellant under temporary stage carriage permits and that should number be disturbed. 1971 granted two stage carriage permits, each for a return trip to the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, in accordance with Clause 4 a of the scheme, which was of companyrse then in draft stage, and so far as the other two stage carriage permits were companycerned, the State Transport Commissioner granted them to the appellant as they belonged to the private sector under the scheme. The State Transport Commissioner, Punjab, therefore, decided to increase the number of return trips from two to six, and invited applications for the grant of four stage carriage permits with return trip on Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda route and in the meantime on 8th January, 1970 granted two temporary stage carriage permits, each with a return trip on this route in favour of the appellant. 80 of 1971 preferred by it that the grant of two stage carriage permits to the appellant was in companytravention of Section 68F 1 D and that all the four stage carriage permits should have been granted to it. The Pepsu Road Transport Corporation claimed in appeal No. The appellant, accordingly, started operating from 8th January 1970 two additional return trips on Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda route on the strength of the two temporary stage carriage permits issued to it. It was found that passenger traffic on Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda route was very heavy and two return trips, for which two stage carriage permits had been issued to the appellant, were number adequate to meet the need of the passenger traffic. Pursuant to the numberice issued by the State Transport Commissioner, Punjab thirty two applications were received for four stage carriage permits Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda route and out of these applications one was by the appellant and another by the third respondent. The dispute in the appeal relates to Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda route situate in the Pepsu territories of the State of Punjab. The appellant is a companypany engaged in the business of carrying passengers by motor vehicle for hire or reward and at all material times it held two stage carriage permits, by each for a return trip, on Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda route. Both Pepsu Road Transport Corporation and the third respondent were aggrieved by the order of the State Transport Commissioner and they, therefore, preferred appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The appellant thereupon preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the validity of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in so far as it reversed the order of the State Transport Commissioner granting two stage carriage permits to the appellant and directed the one stage carriage permit should be granted to the third respondent. Now, on the appointed day, i.e., 1st July, 1970, two additional return trips on Malerkotla Barnala Bhatinda were being operated by the appellant under the two temporary stage carriage permits held by it and the State Transport Commissioner, therefore, included the mileage of these two additional returns trips as part of the total mileage operated by private operators as on that day for the purpose of applying the proportion of 60 40 and treated only the mileage of the two remaining return trips as falling within Clause 4 a of the scheme. The main ground on which the appellant assailed the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal taking away one stage carriage permit and granting it to the third respondent was that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal failed to take into account various relevant companysiderations which must necessarily weigh with the authority in determining which out of several applicants should be granted stage carriage permit. The broad feature of the scheme was that the total mileage of routes was to be divided between the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation and the private operators in the proportion of 60 40 since as on 1st July, 1970, which was the appointed day under the scheme, the total mileage operated by private operators was much more than the proportion of 40, Clause 4 a of the scheme provided that all operators on new routes, on account of increase in the traffic on existing routes and on such operations of inter regional routes as are situate in the Pepsu territories, shall, until 1st July, 1973 or until such other earlier date when the total mileage operated by the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation reaches its proportion of 60, be undertaken exclusively by the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, however, ignored these companysiderations and gave one stage carriage permit each to the appellant and the third respondent as if it were a bounty to be divided equally between the two claimants. This claim was however, negatived by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on the ground that under the provisions of the scheme the mileage companyered by the two stage carnage permits granted to the appellant belonged to the private sector as that was already being operated by the appellant under temporary stage carriage permits on the appointed day, namely, 1st July, 1970, and appeal No. Before these various applications and objections companyld be taken up for hearing by the State Transport Commissioner, a scheme under Section 68 C was prepared and published by the Pepsu State Transport Corporation on 28th October, 1970 in terms of an agreement dated 20th August, 1970 arrived at between the State Government and the private operators of motor vehicles in the Pepsu territories. On this view the State Transport Commissioner, by an order dated 29th March. J, This appeal, by special leave, is directed against an order dated 28th May, 1973 passed by the High Court of Punjab Haryana summarily rejecting a writ petition tiled by the appellant for quashing and setting aside an order dated 19th May, 1973 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in appeal against an order dated 29th March, 1971 made by the State Transport Commissioner Punjab. The scheme was modified was approved by the State Government by a numberification dated 18th February, 1972 issued under Section 68D 2 . The particulars of these applications were published in the issue of Daily Ranjit, Patiala dated 21st March, 1970 as required under Section 57 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 80 of 1971 was rejected by an order dated 19th May, 1973. The third respondent, inter alia, filed objections against the application of the appellant within thirty days of the publication of the particulars. The writ petition was, however, summarily rejected by a division Bench of the High Court and an application for leave to appeal to this Court preferred before the High Court met with the same fate. Bhagwati. The appellant, thereupon, obtained special leave from this Court and hence the present appeal by special leave. Accordingly the impugned order is liable to be modified to that extent.
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1974_88.txt
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Sujatha Manohar as the Arbitrator. The appellant filed its reply to the respondents companynter claim denying the claim of the respondent and inter alia stated that the companynter claim filed by the respondent was beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The appellant averred that the respondent never asked for CENVAT invoices during the subsistence of the said agreement and that the companynter claim raised by the respondent was an afterthought. The learned Arbitrator vide order dated 18.04.2011 allowed the application filed by the appellant under Section 16 of the Act inter alia holding that the companynter claim relating to CENVAT invoices is beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and rejected that part of the companynter claim. Sujatha Manohar as the sole Arbitrator. By virtue of the second agreement dated 01.04.2009, another Aviation Fuel Supply Agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent for the period from 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2011. after the companymencement of the arbitration. Dispute arose between the parties when the appellant raised a claim for interest for the delayed payments of the fuel supplied during the period from 01.04.2009 to 31.03.2011. It was stated that there was numberdispute existing between the parties in respect of the alleged obligation to supply CENVAT invoices prior to companymencement of the arbitration as it was never asked for by the respondent Go Airlines. The appellant averred that the respondent had demanded CENVAT invoices from the appellant for the supplies made from the year 2005 onwards for the first time by its letter only on 05.05.2010 i.e. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 07.02.2011 allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent and set aside the order of the Arbitrator dated 18.04.2011 by holding that the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to entertain the companynter claim filed by the respondent relating to number furnishing of invoices for CENVAT credit. The appellant also filed an application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 inter alia submitting that the companynter claim filed by the respondent was beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and that the respondent demanded the CENVAT invoices from the appellant for the supplies made from the year 2005 onwards for the first time only by letter dated 05.05.2010 i.e. As the payments were number made, the appellant BPCL put the respondent Airlines on Cash and Carry terms on account of default in making payment for supply of fuel and interest on delayed payment. The respondent filed its statement of defence denying the claims made by the appellant and it also raised two companynter claims before the Arbitrator seeking an award directing the appellant to issue CENVAT invoices in favour of the respondent in respect of the Aviation fuel supplied under the agreement in the alternative prayed for an award for a sum of Rs.11,60,44,466/ plus Rs.4,31,45,967/ being interest, as well as further interest on the principal amount companyputed at the rate of 15 per annum with effect from 01.10.2009 till payment. In its second claim, the respondent demanded damages for alleged imposition of Cash and Credit terms by the appellant with effect from 04.07.2009 when the appellant refused to supply the Aviation fuel to the respondent except on Cash and Credit terms. The respondent filed its reply to the said application filed under Section 16 of the Act inter alia stating that the companynter claim filed by the respondent was well within the scope and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Brief facts which led to filing of this appeal are as under An Agreement for Aviation Fuel Supply dated 01.01.2007 was Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2019.10.23 entered into between the parties under which the appellant Bharat 173714 IST Reason Petroleum Corporation Limited BPCL was to supply and sale of Aviation fuel to the respondent Go Airlines India Limited. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 07.12.2011 passed by the High Court of Bombay in Arbitration Appeal Lodging No.14228 of 2011 in and by which the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent Go Airlines by holding that the Arbitrator has the jurisdiction to companysider the companynter claim relating to CENVAT credit thereby setting aside the order passed by the Arbitrator. after the companymencement of the present arbitration. In the said letter, respondent stated that they are sure that the learned Arbitrator would be able to adjudicate the issues appropriately companysidering the respondents various claims against appellant BPCL. In reply to the said letter, the respondent by its e mail dated 06.07.2009 stated inter alia that the outstanding interest was Rs.1.41 crores and number Rs.1.45 crores as mentioned in the said letter dated 06.07.2009. On 06.07.2009, the appellant issued letter to the respondent along with the statement giving details of invoices and requesting inter alia that the payment of outstanding dues as well as the interest amount of Rs.1.45 crores be released immediately. The High Court however held that the rejection of the companynter claim at the threshold, was number justified in view of the arbitration agreement between the parties. The appellant raised a claim for an aggregate sum of Rs.1,95,21,032/ with interest at the rate of 18 per annum from the date of presentation of the said claim till payment and or realization. Initially, the agreement was entered into for the period from 01.01.2007 to 31.03.2009. Clause No.12 of the agreement dated 01.01.2007 suggesting the name of Mrs. Justice Retd. The respondent vide its letter dated 27.04.2010 agreed to the dispute being referred for arbitration and accepted Mrs. Justice Retd. Being aggrieved, the appellant BPCL has filed this appeal. Since the dispute in respect of the liability and payment of interest on delayed payment companyld number be resolved through mutual companyrespondence between the parties, the appellant vide its numberice dated 25.03.2010 invoked arbitration clause i.e. The respondent did number accept any amount payable towards interest. BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted.
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2019_673.txt
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The money was deposited on 9.3.2005 but letter dated 30.3.2005 was written to M s. Everest Realtors Private Ltd. intimating them that the request for allotment of land in the Airoli, Navi, Knowledge Apparel Park cannot be companysidered. The writ petition was filed by the appellant questioning legality of the order passed by the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation in short the Corporation dated 30.3.2005. Learned companynsel for the appellant further submitted that numberreason has been indicated as to why the Corporation decided number to go ahead with the companytract. According to the appellant numberreason or basis has been indicated and the High Court misconstrued the prayer in the writ petition as if it was for enforcement of specific performance of companytract with the Corporation. The appellant has categorically stated that the subject matter of challenge was the impugned decision taken by the Corporation to repudiate the companytract. The pay orders submitted along with letter dated 9.3.2005 were returned. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows By Resolution dated 17.8.2004 a decision was taken for allotment of land at a particular price. The High Court erroneously, according to the appellant came to hold that it can be companysidered by a civil companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ petition filed. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
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2009_31.txt
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According to the appellant, the insurer is number liable to make the payment since the claimant is already companypensated by another Insurance Company by paying Rs.21,700/ for the same cause of action companysequent to the same accident. The award was passed in favour of the respondent allowing him to realize a sum of Rs.24,033/ with interest with proportionate companyt from the driver, owner and present appellant jointly and severally payable by the present appellant. The appellant had filed appeal before the Kerala High Court questioning the companyrectness of a judgment rendered by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Thalassery. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
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2009_394.txt
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On 19.10.1992, he was engaged by the Trust for the purpose of providing professional companysultancy services as an architect for various projects at different sites in Jammu. On 22.09.1999, the Trust filed their reply objecting to the maintainability of the application. 177 of 2005 whereby the High Court dismissed the revision filed by the Dharmarth Trust hereinafter referred to as the Trust appellants herein. Challenging the said order, the Trust filed Civil Revision No. On 14.12.1993, the appellants Trust telephonically companymunicated the respondent number to work further for their projects and terminated his services as an Architect. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Jammu Kashmir at Jammu in Civil Revision No. On 16.10.1996, the Respondent served a legal numberice to the Trust claiming companypensation amounting to Rs. After number getting any reply from the Trust, after a gap of four years, on 29.01.1998, a suit was filed by the Respondent in the Court of the Ist Additional District Judge, Jammu, claiming an amount of Rs, 43,30,797/ . Brief facts The Respondent, a qualified, registered and licensed Architect, is engaged in his professional business in the name of M s Nanda Designers Consortium having its office at 60 Purani Mandi, Jammu. The High Court, vide order dated 19.07.2001, disposed of the civil revision petition filed by the Trust and remanded the matter back to the trial Court to address the legal issue regarding maintainability limitation. 38,77,263.75 towards professional charges including interest thereon for various projects. Vide order dated 18.10.2007, the High Court dismissed the revision and upheld the order dated 27.09.2005, passed by the Ist Additional District Judge. Aggrieved by the said order, the Trust has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. Thereafter, on 27.09.2005, Ist Additional District Judge framed the issue and passed an order holding that the case is governed by Article 119 and number by Article 56 of the Jammu Kashmir Limitation Act, 1995 hereinafter referred to as the Act and companysequently, allowed the amendment to the Plaint. 162 of 1999 before the High Court praying that the trial Court had companymitted an error in law by allowing the amendment in the plaint without addressing the legal issue regarding its maintainability. A formal companymunication was also served on 16.01.1994 regarding the termination of his services. 177 of 2005 before the High Court. As per the terms of the said companytract, a fee of 2.5 of the total project companyt was fixed for providing such services. During the pendency of the suit, on 08.02.1999, the Respondent filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment in the Plaint. By order dated 08.10.1999, the trial Court allowed the application. Heard Mr. Ashok Mathur, learned companynsel for the appellants and Mr. V. Giri, learned senior companynsel for the respondent. Sathasivam, J. Leave granted.
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2010_1304.txt
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Since the case, companymonly known as the Ghaziabad P.F. All the named accused have objected to the transfer of the trial from Ghaziabad to any other place on diverse grounds. All these persons and their close associates have been working in the District Court, Ghaziabad for many years and have close companytacts with various Judges and Magistrates, who remained posted in Ghaziabad and other Districts of U.P. Subsequently, another affidavit was filed by the CBI, pointing out certain subsequent developments, warranting transfer of the trial from Ghaziabad. Rama Jain, former Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad is the companyplainant in the case and is currently serving as Additional District Judge, District Farrukhabad, U.P. The short question raised by the Central Bureau of Investigation for short the CBI , Anti Corruption Branch, Ghaziabad in their affidavit dated 15th July 2010, for our companysideration is whether or number the trial arising out of the chargesheet filed by the CBI in Case RC 1 A /2008/CBI ACB Ghaziabad and the local police, Ghaziabad in Case Crime No.152/2008 PS Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad deserves to be transferred from the Court of Special Judge, CBI at Ghaziabad to some other companyrt of companypetent jurisdiction, preferably at Delhi under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi, with a direction to the Trial Court to companyduct the trial of the case on a day to day basis, and to companyplete it within a period of two years. Rama Jain, Special Judge and Vigilance Officer, District Court, Ghaziabad on 15th February 2008 against one late Ashutosh Asthana, the then Central Nazir, District Court, Ghaziabad and 82 other accused persons which included 13 Class III employees, 30 Class IV employees of District Court, Ghaziabad and 39 outsiders. Subsequently, the present special leave petition was filed with a request to transfer the investigation of Case Crime No.152 of 2008, PS Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad to the CBI. In the affidavit under companysideration, filed by the CBI, it is stated that there is an immediate need to transfer the trial of the case to any other place outside the State of U.P., preferably Delhi, for the following reasons Chargesheet has been filed against 6 former District Judges of Ghaziabad, 3 of whom were later elevated as Judges of the Allahabad High Court and 48 Class III and Class IV employees of District Court, Ghaziabad. It was alleged that late Ashutosh Asthana in companylusion with other accused named in the FIR fraudulently withdrew huge sums of money in the name of GPF of Class IV employees of District Court, Ghaziabad. The companyrt of Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad is already over burdened with the trial of about 175 cases including the sensitive Nithari killings cases, which are being tried on a day to day basis on the directions of Allahabad High Court. Vide order dated 4th August 2010, numberice was issued to all the accused named in the chargesheet to show cause as to why the trial should number be transferred from the Court of Special Judge, CBI at Ghaziabad to some other companypetent companyrt, preferably under the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. 13 Judicial Officers and more than 25 employees of District Court, Ghaziabad have been cited as prosecution witnesses in the case, whose testimony would be crucial to establish the criminal cases against the chargesheeted accused persons. The Special Judge, CBI, in whose companyrt, chargesheet has been filed, had also worked with under some of the chargesheeted judicial officers in the past Smt. Ultimately, the final report was filed by the CBI on 30th July 2010. These are Pursuant to and in furtherance of the findings of the Vigilance Department of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and subsequent authorisation given by the High Court, Case Crime No.152/2008 under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477 A, 120 B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short the IPC and Sections 8, 9, 13 2 read with Sections 13 1 d and 14 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for short the Act was registered at PS Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad on the written companyplaint of Smt. In response, affidavits have been filed on behalf of accused Nos.1,4,5,6,8,15,19,20,55 and some other accused. During pendency of the proceedings, Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a Notification dated 10th September 2008, under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 for short the DSPE Act for the transfer of above mentioned case to the CBI, which was also placed before this Court for companysideration. Scam, giving rise to the afore stated prayer, involves violation of the standards of judicial behaviour, which is expected to be of the highest order, be it on or off the Bench, we feel companycerned by the alleged events and have given our anxious companysideration to the issue raised. K. JAIN, J. In order to appreciate the companytroversy, a few material facts may be numbericed.
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2010_830.txt
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degree in forensic medicine from the university of bihar muzaffarpur in 1970 and had been functioning as lecturer in forensic medicine in one of the government medical companyleges in rajasthan on a temporary and ad hoc basis from december 31 1970 on wards. on march 3 1972 the rajasthan public service commission for short the companymission issued advertisements inviting appli cations for the recruitment of two lecturers in forensic medicine for medical companyleges medical public health department in accordance with the rules. there were also other incidental prayers in the writ petition for the issuance of an appropriate writ or direction to the public service commission to refrain from finalising the selection without considering the case of the appellant and for a direction being issued to the state government of rajasthan number to accept the recommendations of the public service companymission in making appointments to the post of lecturer in forensic medicine to medical companyleges in rajasthan in case the appellant was number called for interview along with the other candidates. the appellant thereupon amended the writ petition by incorporating a further prayer that the high court should issue an appropriate writ or direction cancelling the interview and selection companyducted by the commission as well as the companysequential appointments given by the state government to respondents 3 and 4 as lecturers in forensic medicine. however by the impugned letter annexure iv dated july 21 1973 issued by the secretary of the commission the appellant was informed that his application for the post of lecturer in forensic medicine was rejected since he did number possess the necessary academic qualification. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by balakrishna eradi j. this appeal by special leave arises out of a writ petition filed by the appellant herein in the high companyrt of rajasthan challenging the legality of the action of the rajasthan public service companymission in issuing of the appellant the companymunication annexure iv dated july 21 1973 stating that the appellant was number eligible for being companysidered for recruitment to the post of lecturer in forensic medicine in the government medical companyleges in the state since he lacked the necessary academic qualifications specified in the advertisement and that companysequently the application of the appellant stood rejected. 3 and 4 for appointment to the two posts and on the basis of the said selection the state government appointed respondents 3 and 4 as lecturers. in response to the aforesaid advertisement published by the companymission the appellant applied for appointment to one of the two posts. during the pendency of the writ petition the companymission companyducted the interview of the remaining candidates and selected respondents number. a representation made by the appellant to the public service companymission for reconsideration of the matter did number meet with any favourable response and hence the appellant approached the high companyrt by filing the writ petition under article 226 of the companystitution out of which this appeal has arisen. the appellant secured the m.b.b.s. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 303 of 1976.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 30th october 1974 of the rajasthan high companyrt in b. civil special appeal number 247 of 1974.
s. chitale mrs.
sadhana ramachandran parveen kumar for the appellant. the appellant had by then obtained the m.d. badri das sharma for the respondents number. aggrieved by the said decision the appellant has preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave from this companyrt. that appeal was allowed by a division bench by its judgment dated october 30 1974 whereby the order passed by the learned single judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.
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1982_53.txt
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as jeet bahadur was injured sagar singh p.w. jeer bahadur p.w. the prosecution examined sagar singh w. 1 jeet bahadur p.w. the field of sagar singh p.w. i saw injuries on the body of jeet bahadur. on march 29 1965 at about 5.30 p.m. jeet bahadur p.w. jeet bahadur was admitted to the district hospital at unnao. bisram accused fired the pistol at sagar singh but sagar did number sustain any injury. after it we took jeer bahadur to hasanganj on a company. companyplained to bisram who along with some other persons went to the house of deo dutt and threatened him and the members of his family including jeet bahadur and sagar singh. 2 cried out whereupon sagar singh p.w. immediately thereafter they began to deal kanta blows on jeet bahadur. sagar singh was raising alarm. 3 and himachal and ram pal who were nearby also rushed to the aid of jeet bahadur. it was alleged that on june 14 1964 bisrams cattle strayed into the field and damaged the crop of deo dutt who is the nephew of sagar singh and jeer bahadur. 1 is situate just adjacent to the field of jeer bahadur with only a chak road between their fields. it is the prosecution case that on that day both the accused armed with kantas went to the field of jeet bahadur and challenged him. maya ram p.w. accused bisram is said to have fired a revolver at sagar singh but he did number receive any inquiry. because of this complaint relations between the parties became strained as a result of which the accused stopped working for jeet bahadur and sagar singh and even asked the other members of his beradari to follow suit. 1 and p.w. 2 and maya ram p.w. in respect of this damage deo dutt and his partner ram bharose. thereupon deo dutt lodged a companyplaint in the police station. ka 1 at about 9.55 p.m. on march 29 1965.
the investigation officer bhanu prakash sharma p.w. 2 along with his laborer sri pal deceased was reaping the harvest. srivastava examined him on march 30 1965 at 8.30 a.m. and found as many as 10 injuries of which injuries 2 to 7 were incised wounds injuries 1 and 9 companytusions and injuries 8 and 10 abrasions. incised wound 4 1/2x 1 bone on the left leg middle back and laterally cutting the underlying tibia bone shaft. who are the residents of bhitwa gadan khera are friends belonging to the same party. 1 hearing the shouts rushed to his aid. 3 as eye witnesses and since sri pal one of the eye witnesses died after his evidence was recorded by the companymitting magistrate his deposition was admitted and treated as evidence under s. 33 of the evidence act ex. and instead companyvicting them under s. 326 read with s. 34 i.p.c. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jaganmohan reddy j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the allahabad high companyrt setting aside the companyviction of hori lal and bisram under s. 307 read with s. 34 of the i.p.c. ka 11 .
believed the eye witnesses and relying upon ex. the defence of the accused is that they had been falsely implicated. 1 took him to the police station and there lodged a report ex. prepared site plan recorded statements of the witnesses and seized blood stained mud. thereafter the accused ran away towards the village. criminal appellat jurisdictioncriminal appeal number70 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated october 6 1967 of the allahabad high companyrt lucknumber bench in criminal appeal number 164 of 1966.
k. garg s.c.
agarwal and uma dutta for the appellants. 5 investigated the crime. and sentencing each of them to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. p. rana for the respondent. the appellants.
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1969_329.txt
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