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This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Second Appeal No.
354/79 dated 3 9 1981.
The appellants are the plaintiffs.
They are the major daughters of one Ratan Singh who was the Bhoomidhar of the lands in Khasra Nos.
36, 54, 146, 151, 165, 258 and the respective Rakwas mentioned therein of a total of 41.49 acres.
Ratan Singh died in 1960.
The Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 had companye into force which provides for fixation of ceiling on the holding of the agricultural lands.
The first defendant, Sub Divisional Officer, Rehli, Tehsil Rehli, determined that the widow of Ratan Singh was entitled to only 10.38 acres of land and the rest of the land was declared to be surplus vide his proceedings dated 1 3 1976.
The appellants challenged the validity of that order in Civil Suit No.
34A of 1976.
The declaration sought therein was that the plaintiffs pray that the suit of the plaintiff for declaration be decreed and be declared that in the lands mentioned in paragraph 1, plaintiffs have 3/4th share and Defendant 1 the mother has 1/4th share and the order dated 1 3 1976 passed by the SDO, Defendant 1, is unlawful and illegal.
In the second appeal, the High Court reversed the decree and companyfirmed that of the trial companyrt.
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1994_794.txt
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These appeals are directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.
169 DB of 2005, wherein and whereunder the High Court has allowed the appeals filed by the six accused persons namely, Kishori Lal, Gulbir, Chander Pal, Dharam Pal, Desh Raj and Sher Singh and dismissed the appeals filed by the other accused persons and thereby companyfirmed the judgment and order of the Trial Court qua the other five accused persons.
Tragic case of a double murder of Ram Kishan and Rattan Singh the deceased for short on 04.12.1996.
The dispute between the accused persons and the injured and deceased persons pertained to a piece of land in village Gurwari.
The Prosecution story, as numbericed by the High Court, is as under That on 04.12.1996, Complainant, Lachhman, resident of Gurwar, along with his uncle Rattan Singh and Ram Kishan alias Rama were irrigating their fields situated near Yamuna river.
At about 12.30 p.m. Kishore Lal son of Nathi and Desh Raj son of Lakhi came there on their tractors.
Charan, Dharam Pal, Chander Pal, Gulbir alias Gulli, Amar Singh alias Amri, Sher Singh, Bijender, Manohar Lal and Mahipal were on the tractors.
Manohar Lal was armed with a licenced gun, Charan was having a double barrel gun, Mahipal was armed with companyntry made pistol.
Amar Singh alias Amri, Dharam Pal, Kishori Lal, Sher Singh, Bijender, Desh Raj and Gulbir were armed with ballams, Chander Pal was armed with a lathi.
Accused started ploughing the land with their tractor.
Objection was raised by the companyplainant party and requested the accused party number to plough the land because the land was in their possession and wheat crop was sown.
Complainant came forward to stop the tractor then Charan fired a shot hitting the companyplainant.
Charan again fired a shot hitting the companyplainant.
On receipt of fire arm injuries, companyplainant fell down then Kishore Lal gave ballam blow on the back of his right palm.
Amar Singh alias Amri gave lathi blow on the back of his right palm.
Amar Singh alias Amri gave lathi blow hitting his left shoulder.
Chander Pal gave lathi blow on his waist.
After that Ram Kishan and Rattan Singh tried to intervene and rescue the companyplainant then Amar Singh alias Amri gave ballam blow to Ram Kishan which hit on his thigh near his left leg.
Dharam Pal gave ballam blow to Ram Kishan on the left ankle of Ram Kishan.
Ram Kishan on receipt of injuries fell down.
Then Sher Singh and Bijender gave blows with their respective weapons hitting on the back of Rattan Singh.
Mahipal fired a shot from his companyntry made pistol hitting on the head of Rattan Singh.
Bijender gave ballam blow hitting on the right side of the head near armpit of Rattan Singh, Raula was raised.
Chander Pal and Hukam came to the spot and had witnessed the occurrence.
They had rescued the companyplainant from the clutches of the accused party.
Thereafter, accused had fled away from the spot with their respective weapons on the tractors.
Injured was being shifted to Palwal Hospital but on the way, Ram Kishan alias Rama had succumbed to his injuries.
First aid was given to the injured in the Palwal Hospital.
Rattan Singh was referred to Delhi Hospital.
It transpires from the record that the accused persons had reached the said land in their tractors armed with weapons including guns.
They witnessed the deceased persons and others cultivating the land and therefore forcibly entered the lands and upon resistance being offered, they assaulted the deceased persons and others with lethal weapons carried by them.
As a result of the assault, few were injured and two succumbed to death one while being rushed to the hospital and the other at the hospital even after being provided medical aid.
The FIR was registered based on the statement of Lachhman Singh PW 1 .
Post Mortem of the dead bodies of Ram Kishan and Rattan Singh was companyducted by Dr. Dhara Singh PW 14 and Dr. Alexander F. Khakha PW 15 , respectively.
Several recoveries including the weapons were made at the instance of accused persons.
On companypletion of investigation, the case was companymitted for trial.
The prosecution has examined as many as 20 witnesses, while the defense has only examined DW 1 the Patwari of the village to speak about the ownership of the land where the incident occurred.
PW 1 is the companyplainant and also the injured witness.
Chander Pal PW 3 is an eye witness to the incident.
Dr. Lekhi PW 7, who had medically examined deceased Rattan Singh and accused person Amar Singh, has testified in respect of the injuries on the bodies of the two persons.
PW 14 and PW 15 were also examined in respect of injuries sustained by the deceased persons.
The Trial Court, keeping in view the evidence of PW 1 and PW 3 and the injuries sustained by the deceased persons, has rejected the defense version with respect to right of private defense in its entirety and has reached the companyclusion that all the eleven accused persons had participated in the brutal assault and therefore companyvicted them for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 307 read with Sections 148 149 of the IPC.
The accused persons were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/ each and in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year and under Section 307 IPC, for seven years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/ each and in default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months each.
The aforesaid sentences were directed to run companycurrently.
It is this order passed by the Trial Court which was called in question by the accused persons before the High Court.
The High Court, after re appreciating the entire evidence on record and carefully analyzing the submissions made by the learned companynsel for the parties, has companye to the companyclusion that the oral evidence in respect of injuries caused by Desh Raj, Kishore Lal, Dharam Pal, Chander Pal, Gulbir alias Gulli and Sher Singh is number companyroborated by the medical evidence on record.
The injuries alleged to have been caused by them have neither been numbericed by the doctors while examining the accused persons number have they surfaced in the post mortem reports.
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We have heard Sri G. Ramaswamy, learned senior Counsel for the petitioners and Sri K.K. Venugopal and Sri Ashok Desai, learned senior Counsel for the respondents.
Petitioners claim to be a minority shareholder in the companypany and respondents are the companypany and its other directors and shareholders.
The petitioners seek special leave to appeal to this Court from the order dated 8th December, 1993 in writ petition No.
nil of 1993 of the High Court of Calcutta, which, in turn, partially stayed the operation of an interlocutory order dated 20th October, 1993 of the Company Law Board in a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act brought before it by petitioners shareholders of the Company, Harbans Lal Malhotra Sons Ltd. companyplaining of suppression of the minority.
It was urged before the Board by the petitioners that the companylaboration arrangement embarked upon by the said companypany with M s. Gillette was illegal and operated as oppression of the minority.
The Company Law Board by its order dated 20th October, 1993 numbericed the prayers made before it Respondent No.
1 companypany should number approve of any transfer of its shares Adequate numberice be given to the petitioners for any general meeting of the shareholders Respondents 11, 12 and 13 be restrained from changing their management as they had nearly 58 of the share capital of respondent No.
1 Respondent No.
1 companypany be restrained from making any fresh issue of shares.
The Company Law Board made an order in terms following We direct the companypany that it shall number proceed further in the matter of companylaboration or issue any further shares in the companypany without the approval of the general meeting and in case of holding of general meeting, the companypany shall give 25 days clear numberice to the petitioners by registered post with a companyy to the Secretary, Company Law Board.
The Petitioners are at liberty to approach this Bench after giving 7 days numberice to the respondents in case they need the intervention of this Bench at any time.
After hearing the respondents, the Bench expressed its displeasure about the respondents failure to disclose full details of developments with regard to the Gillette Collaboration at the hearing held on 19th and 20th August, 1993.
The Bench was distressed to numbere that though in the sur rejoinder dated 6th August, 1993, the respondents had divulged certain proposed terms and companyditions of companylaboration which were stated to be under negotiation as on that date, the following subsequent developments before the date of hearing were number disclosed Emphasis supplied The order, then proceeded to specify those developments, which according to the Board, the Respondents had number companye forward to disclose.
This interlocutory order of the Board was assailed by the respondents in a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court.
the companypany and the minority members understood this interdiction only in respect of the culmination of the companylaboration agreement by issue of shares which, they recognise, will be dependent upon the approval of the scheme by the shareholders at the general meeting and, accordingly, seek to interpret this part of the order as number companying in the way of the companypany taking all antecedent preparatory steps which would enable the Company to place the matter effectively before the members at the general meeting.
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1994_1024.txt
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178G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
3 137 39 of 1985 etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.4.1985 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Appeal Nos.
176 to 178 of 1983.
S. Nariman, G.L. Sanghi, Aspi Chimoi, A.L. Pandiya, Rajan Karanjawala, S.C. Sharma, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Manik Karanjawala, N. Nettar, G.S. Narayana, R.K. Mehta, Shri Narain, Sandeep Narain, D.P. Mohanty, Ashok Kumar Panda, K. Patri and Jatinder Sethi for the Appellants.
Soli J. Sorabjee, A.K. Sen, M.H. Baig, Raja Ram Agar walla, P.A. Choudhary, A.K. Ganguli, M.C. Bhandare, S. Ganesh, P.S. Shroff, Randeep Singh, Shrjawala, R. Sasiprab hu, S.S. Shroff, S.A. Shroff, Arun Madan, R.K. Sahoo, J.D.B. Raju, M.M. Kshatriya, T.V.S.N. Chari, T. Sridharan, Ms. Mridula Ray, S.K. Sahoo, N.D.B. Raju, Aruneshwar Gupta, P.P. Juneja, S.K. Bagga, P.N. Mishra, H.J. Zaveri and B.S. Chau han for the Respondents.
Milan Banerjee, P.P. Rao, A. Mariarputham, C.M. Nayar, K. Chakravorty, Mrs. J. Wad.
Mrs. Aruna.
Mathur for the Intervener.
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1989_172.txt
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Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
However, the case was posted only on 14.11.1988 when the Court was pleased to companytinue subsisting interim order.
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M. LODHA, J. Leave granted.
On 13.09.2004, the appellant, who was working on the post of District and Sessions Judge, Punna was companypulsorily retired from the service in the public interest by the Government of Madhya Pradesh for short, the Government on the request of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for short, High Court .
The order of companypulsory retirement was issued by the Government in exercise of its power under amended Rule 56 2 a of the Fundamental Rules, as made applicable in the State of Madhya Pradesh, Rule 14 of the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Recruitment and Service Conditions Rules, 1994 for short, 1994 Rules , Rule 42 1 b of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services Pension Rules, 1976 for short, 1976 Rules and Rule 1 A of Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions Judges Death cum Retirement Benefits Rules, 1964 for short, 1964 Rules .
In lieu of numberice of three months, it was directed in the order that the appellant shall be entitled to three months salary and allowances which he was receiving prior to his retirement.
The appellant challenged the above order of companypulsory retirement by filing a writ petition before the High Court.
The Single Judge of that Court by his order dated 20.04.2006, allowed the writ petition quashed the order of companypulsory retirement dated 13.09.2004 and directed that he be reinstated with all companysequential benefits.
The High Court on the administrative side challenged the order of Single Judge in writ appeal.
The Division Bench of that Court on companysideration of the entire matter held that the challenge to the order of companypulsory retirement was ill founded and, accordingly, set aside the order of the Single Judge vide its judgment dated 23.11.2006.
It is from this order that the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave.
The appellant was selected in the higher judicial service of Madhya Pradesh by direct recruitment.
He joined the judicial service as an Additional District Judge on 17.10.1979.
On 26.06.1985, he was companyfirmed as a District Judge.
The appellant was awarded lower selection grade on 07.09.1990 with effect from 24.03.1989.
He was awarded super time scale in May, 1999 and above super time scale in 2002.
As numbered above, by the order dated 13.09.2004, the appellant was companypulsorily retired in public interest.
The High Court on administrative side challenged the order of the Single Judge in writ appeal.
This Court took into companysideration a long line of cases including State of U.P. and another v. Bihari Lal7, Union of India v. V.P. Seth and another8, Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another9, Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa and another10, Union of India v. Col.
J.N. Sinha and another11, All India Judges Association 1 v. Union of India and others12 and All India Judges Association 2 6 and culled out the legal position in paragraph 183 Pg.
number 75 of the Report as follows It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that while companysidering the case of an officer as to whether he should be companytinued in service or companypulsorily retired, his entire service record up to that date on which companysideration is made has to be taken into account.
What weight should be attached to earlier entries as companypared to recent entries is a matter of evaluation, but there is numbermanner of doubt that companysideration has to be of the entire service record.
The fact that an officer, after an earlier adverse entry, was promoted does number wipe out earlier adverse entry at all.
The appellant was informed of his having been assessed in grade D for the period 01.04.1981 to 31.03.1982 by companymunication dated 15.09.1982.
The said adverse grading was number assailed by the appellant and it remained on the record as it is.
The appellant was also intimated on 06.11.1989 about the adverse remarks recorded in his ACR for the period 1988 89 that he never enjoyed clean reputation and that his quality of judgments and orders was number satisfactory.
The appellant made representation against the above remarks but the same was rejected and they hold the field as it is.
For the period ending 31.03.1992, the appellant was graded D and that grading remains as it is.
The adverse remarks recorded in the ACR for the period ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994, were companymunicated to the appellant.
He made two separate representations for expunging the adverse remarks recorded for these years.
His representations were rejected by the then Chief Justice on 27.08.1994 and the appellant was informed of the said rejection on 30.08.1994.
Despite rejection of the two representations made by the appellant, he again made two representations to the Chief Justice for expunction of these adverse remarks.
These representations were also rejected and the appellant was companymunicated of the same on 05.01.1995.
The representations made by the appellant having been rejected twice by the Chief Justice, the appellant yet again made representation on 02.08.1995 for expunction of these remarks.
This representation also came to be rejected by the Chief Justice on 21.08.1995 by observing that the remarks in the ACR for the above period do number call for any modification.
The appellant sought administrative review of the decision taken by the Chief Justice and the administrative review was also rejected by the Chief Justice on 06.01.1996.
The appellant then filed a writ petition No.
413 of 1996 on the judicial side of the High Court.
The Single Judge of that Court allowed the appellants writ petition vide his judgment and order dated 18.10.1996 and quashed the adverse remarks in the appellants ACR for the years ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994.
The High Court on administrative side filed LPA against the judgment and order dated 18.10.1996.
The Division Bench of that Court allowed the LPA and set aside the judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 18.10.1996.
While doing so the Division Bench in its judgment and order dated 25.02.1997 observed in para 69 as follows Before parting with this case in all fairness, we companysider it necessary to observe that the adverse remarks on the reputation of respondent companyveyed to him in the relevant years should number haunt him all through his judicial career and hamper his prospects for all times.
The very purpose of companymunicating adverse remarks is number to companydemn an officer but to caution him at the right time so as to give chance of improvement.
Against the judgment and order dated 25.02.1997 passed by the Division Bench, the appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court but that was dismissed on 28.04.1997.
Thus, advance remarks for the period ending 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 remain as it is.
From the companynter affidavit filed by the respondent number 1 it also transpires that the benefit of super time scale was number given to the appellant as soon as it became due.
Rather, the administrative companymittee in its meeting held on 25.03.1995, on companysideration of the case of the appellant for grant of benefit of super time scale, deferred his case with remarks, his work performance and companyduct will be kept under watch.
The view of the administrative companymittee was accepted by the Full Court in its meeting held on 29.04.1995.
The appellants case for grant of super time scale was again companysidered by the Full Court in the subsequent year 1996 and the Full Court in its meeting held on 20/21.04.1996 found that the appellant was number suitable for grant of super time scale.
It was only in 1999 that the appellant was given super time scale and 2002 that he was granted above super time scale.
In 2002, the appellant was warned for claiming false units.
His explanation that there was typing mistake was number found to be credible.
In 1993, the remark his reputation was number good and in 1994 the remark officer does number enjoy good reputation, were recorded.
His representations for expunction of these remarks failed.
The challenge to these remarks on judicial side was unsuccessful right upto this Court.
In 1993, it was also recorded that quality of performance of the appellant was poor and his disposals were below average.
The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it.
For a democracy to thrive and rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty.
The most shocking and unbecoming companyduct of the appellant highlighted by the respondent number 1 before the High Court in opposition to the writ petition and in response to the present appeal is his act to overreach the administrative decision on the review petition filed by him before the Chief Justice after his representations for expunction of adverse remarks for the period ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 had been thrice earlier rejected.
The appellant approached Shri R. K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and Chairman, House Committee Rajya Sabha for his grievance companycerning rejection of his representations for expunction of remarks for 1993 and 1994.
Though the appellant has denied that he ever approached Shri R.K. Malaviya but to falsify his claim, the learned senior companynsel for the respondent number 1 placed before us xerox companyy of the letter dated 14.02.1996 written by Shri R.K. Malaviya to Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, Minister of State for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi and the companyy of the letter dated 08.03.1996 sent by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs Department of Justice , Government of India addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal and the Registrar, High Court.
The letter dated 14.02.1996 addressed by Shri R.K. Malaviya to Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, the then Minister of State for Law, Justice and Company Affairs reads as follows K. Malaviya Off.
66, PARLIAMENT HOUSE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT NEW DELHI 110001.
CHAIRMAN TEL.
30, CANNING LANE KASTURBA GANDHI MARG NEW DELHI 110001 TEL.
3782895 RES.
19, TILAK NAGAR, MAIN ROAD INDORE M.P. TEL.
492412, 492588, 495054 14 February 1996 Dear Shri Bhardwaj Ji Enclosed is a representation of Shri R.C. Chandel, District Sessions Judge, Rewa MP, which is self explanatory.
I shall be grateful if you kindly get it examined and do the needful.
Yours sincerely, K. MALVIYA Shri H.R. Bhardwaj, Minister of State for Law, Justice Company Affairs, Government of India, NEW DELHI.
The forwarding letter sent by the Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs Department of Justice dated 8.3.1996 reads as follows No.
L 19015/3/96 Jus Government of India Ministry of Law, Justice and C.A. Department of Justice Jaisalmer House, Mansingh Road New Delhi, the 8/3/96.
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, BHOPAL.
The Registrar, Madhya Pradesh High Court, JABALPUR.
Subject Reference from Sh.
R.K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and Chairman, House Committee, Rajya Sabha on representation of Sh.
R.C. Chandel District and Sessions Judge, Rewa M.P. Sir, I am directed to forward herewith a companyy of letter dated 14.2.1996 alongwith its enclosure, received from Shri R.K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and Chairman House Committee, Rajya Saba on the above subject for taking such action as may be companysidered appropriate.
Yours faithfully, N. SINGH Under Secretary to the Government of India The companyduct of the appellant in involving an M.P. and the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, in a matter of the High Court companycerning an administrative review petition filed by him for expunging adverse remarks in ACRs of 1993 and 1994 is most reprehensible and highly unbecoming of a judicial officer.
His companyduct has tarnished the image of the judiciary and he disentitled himself from companytinuation in judicial service on that companynt alone.
Secondly and still worst, the appellant had an audacity to set up a plea in the rejoinder that he never made any representation to Shri R.K. Malaviya, M.P. for any purpose whatsoever.
But for the appellants approaching Shri R.K. Malaviya and his request for help, Shri R.K. Malaviya would have never written the letter quoted above to the then Minister of State for Law, Justice and Company Affairs.
On this ground also his writ petition was liable to be dismissed.
The learned Single Judge examined the administrative decision of the Full Court to recommend to the Government to companypulsory retire the appellant as if he was sitting as an appellate authority to companysider the companyrectness of such recommendation by going into sufficiency and adequacy of the materials which led the Full Court in reaching its satisfaction.
The whole approach of the Single Judge in companysideration of the matter was flawed and number legally proper.
The learned Single Judge proceeded to examine the materials by observing, The entire record pertaining to companyplaints against the petitioner has also been produced before me during the companyrse of argument by learned senior companynsel for respondent number 1.
Thus, I am dealing each and every companyplaint one by one.
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S. SINGHVI, J. Whether the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court companyld have entertained and allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 as Public Interest Litigation for setting aside order dated 31.12.2008 passed by National Environment Appellate Authority for short, NEAA and remanded the case to the companypetent quasi judicial forum for being decided on merits.
The appellant is a companypany incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.
On 27.6.2007, the appellant submitted an application to Chhattisgarh Environment and Conservation Board respondent No.3 for sanctioning the proposed expansion of its existing plant at Naharpali, Kharsia, Raigarh.
Respondent No.3 issued numberice dated 4.8.2007 under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the Rules framed thereunder for holding public hearing.
As many as 700 persons participated in the public hearing.
Thereafter, respondent No.3 sent report dated 4.10.2007 to the Ministry of Environment and Forests respondent No.2 , which granted environmental clearance for the project of the appellant.
Two days before the date fixed for public hearing, Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others, namely, Ms. Ranjana Rajput and Mr. Vinod Chhaparlya filed Civil Suit No.30 A 2007 in the Court of District Judge, Raigarh for short, the trial Court impleading the appellant as a defendant and prayed for grant of a declaration that the appellant had illegally set up industry at Villages Naharpali, Bhupdevpur, Salihabhata and Singhanpur.
They further prayed for ordering closure of the industry and for issue of a permanent injunction against the holding of public hearing for expansion of the existing industry and or establishment of any new industry by the appellant.
Along with the suit, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for stay of the public hearing.
By order dated 4.8.2007, the trial Court dismissed the application for temporary injunction.
After six days, Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others filed another application for injunction but numberorder appears to have been passed on that application.
After 2 months and 20 days of rejection of the injunction application filed by Shri Ramesh Agrawal and two others, Shri Ram Kumar Agarwal and Shri Ramesh Sharma filed Writ Petition No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh High Court under the name and style of Ekta Parishad and prayed that the State Government may be directed to companyduct an inquiry into the companyrectness and genuineness of the Environment Impact Assessment Report prepared by respondent No.3.
Later on, the writ petitioners withdrew their cause.
On numberice, respondent No.3 filed reply and pleaded that environment clearance was granted to the appellant in accordance with law.
Out of 10 members only two members companyplete address are given in the proceedings.
As per serial number 12 of the proceedings dated 10.5.2005, Shri Rajesh Tripathis address for companymunication etc.,
But, it is found that the Authorisation letter issued by Shri Rajesh Tripathi bearing the address of Satyam Kunj, Naya Gunj, Raigarh, which was the address of Shri Ramesh Aggarwal and there was numbermention of designation of Shri Rajesh Tripathi in this letter.
This action of the Appellant creates doubt about the authenticity of the authorization letter so issued.
The Appellant has failed to prove that its association is acting on behalf and in the interest of people who are or may be affected by the grant of Environmental Clearance by Respondent No.1.
Having perused all the submissions and the documents filed by the Appellant and the Respondents, the Authority companyclude that the Appellant organization Jan Chetna is number an association of persons likely to be affected by the order of the Environmental Clearance granted to Respondent No.3 by Respondent No.1.
Therefore, the Appellant organization Jan Chetna is number qualified to file an Appeal before this Authority under Section 11 2 c of the NEAA Act, 1997.
Accordingly, the Appeal filed by the Appellant is number maintainable.
Respondent No.1 challenged the aforesaid order in Writ Petition C No.
8399 of 2009, which was described as a Public Interest Litigation and prayed that order dated 31.12.2008 passed by NEAA may be set aside and a direction be issued to NEAA to decide the appeal on merits.
Respondent No.1 claimed that it was a representative body of those affected by the environmental clearance granted in favour of the appellant and, therefore, it had the locus to challenge the decision taken by respondent No.2.
In the companynter affidavit filed by the appellant, several objections were taken to the maintainability of the petition.
It was pleaded that in the garb of filing a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 was seeking annulment of the order passed by NEAA and such relief companyld be claimed only by filing a regular petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is required to be heard and decided by a Single Judge.
The appellant also referred to the pendency of Writ Petition C No.5534/2007 before the Chhattisgarh High Court and pleaded that the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court was an abuse of the process of the Court.
Another plea taken by the appellant was that the entire cause of action for filing the petition had accrued in Chhattisgarh and the Delhi High Court did number have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by respondent No.1.
On merits, the Division Bench relied upon judgment dated 14.9.2009 passed by a companyrdinate Bench in LPA No.277/2009 Vedanta Alumina Ltd. v. Prafulla Samantra and others wherein it was held that an organisation, which is working in the area and is closely following the issue of setting up of industries and impact thereof on the environment falls in the category of a person aggrieved and companycluded that NEAA companymitted serious error by dismissing the appeal of respondent No.1 on the ground of lack of locus.
We have heard Dr. A.M. Singhvi, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned companynsel for respondent No.1 and perused the record.
Shri Parikh made strenuous efforts to companyvince the Court that the hypertechnical objection raised by the appellant should number be entertained and in view of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court in Vedanta Alumina Ltd. v. Prafulla Samantra supra , the special leave petition should be dismissed.
Petitions pertaining to the award to Tenders.
Petitions relating to Co operative Societies.
Petitions being service matters of Armed Forces of the Union.
Petitions arising out of Land Acquisition.
Petitions companycerning orders passed by the High Court on the administrative side.
Provided that as regards pending cases, the learned single Judge may hear the part heard matters.
Explanation The preliminary hearing for admission and final disposal of applications and petitions pertaining to matters mentioned in clause i to x of sub rule xviii a above shall however be before a Bench of two Judges and before a Single Bench when there is numbersitting of Division Bench.
Rule 4, which relates to jurisdiction of a Bench of two Judges, also reads as under All cases to be disposed of by a Bench of two Judges save as provided by law or by these rulesSave as provided by law or by these rules or by special order of the Chief Justice, all cases shall be heard and disposed of by a Bench of two Judges.
However, by disguising the petition as a Public Interest Litigation, respondent No.1 succeeded in getting the same listed before the Division Bench of the High Court.
Unfortunately, the Division Bench did number deal with the objection raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the petition filed by respondent No.1 and proceeded to decide the matter on merits which, in our companysidered view, was legally impermissible.
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C. Lahoti, J. Leave granted.
The landlord respondents initiated proceedings for eviction of the tenant appellants on the grounds available under Clauses f , h and p of sub Section 1 of Section 21 of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 hereinafter the Old Act, for short .
The trial Court directed eviction of the tenants on all the three grounds.
In a revision preferred by the tenants, the learned Additional District Judge held the ground under Clause h number available to the landlords.
The tenants and the landlords both filed revision petitions before the High Court.
By order dated 11.10.2000, the High Court disposed of both the revisions holding that subletting of tenancy premises by the tenants was made out and hence order for eviction was sustainable under Clause f .
The High Court did number deem it necessary to enter into the question of bona fide requirement.
On a prayer made on behalf of the tenants, they were allowed a period of one and a half years for vacating the premises which period was to expire on 11th April, 2002.
With effect from 31.12.2001, the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1999 hereinafter the New Act, for short came into force.
The suit premises are number residential premises measuring 352 sq.
i.e. more than 14 sq.
As the tenants did number vacate the tenancy premises on or before 11.4.2002, the landlords filed execution proceedings after 11.4.2002.
The objection was overruled by the executing Court as also by the High Court.
The aggrieved tenant judgment debtors have preferred this appeal by special leave.
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2002_1092.txt
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CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD,J. This appeal arises out of a proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
One Govinda Bala Patil, since deceased, the predecessor in interest of the appellants, hereinafter referred to as the landlord, owned land being R.S. No.
51 admeasuring 35 gunthas at Village Pandewadi within Taluka Radhanagari in the District of Kolhapur.
A proceeding under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Act, was initiated by one Rama Dattu Naikwade, predecessor in interest of the respondents, for determination of price of the land on the plea that he shall be deemed to have purchased the land.
The Additional Tahsildar ALT, Radhanagari, at the first instance, held that the land in question was leased out for growing sugarcane and, accordingly, dropped the proceeding.
However, in appeal, the said order was set aside and the matter ultimately remitted back to him to hold fresh inquiry.
Accordingly, the Additional Tahsildar held fresh inquiry and again by its order dated 10th of December, 1981 reiterated its earlier finding and held that the land was leased out for growing sugarcane and the proceeding was dropped.
The tenant thereafter preferred appeal which was heard by the Sub Divisional Officer, Shahuwadi Division, Kolhapur who allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Additional Tahsildar on its finding that the landlord has failed to prove the specific purpose of the lease.
The landlord then preferred revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Kolhapur, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, which set aside the order of the Sub Divisional Officer and restored that of the Additional Tahsildar.
While doing so, the Tribunal held as follows In the instant case as I have stated earlier there is sufficient evidence on record to show on the basis of entries in the E Patrak that suit land was companytinuously growing sugarcane crop from the year 1946 and this particular fact is also companyroborated to some extent by two independent witnesses examined by the applicant landlords.
The tenant assailed the aforesaid order before the High Court in a writ petition.
The High Court by the impugned order set aside the order of the Tribunal and held that the Tribunal erred in setting aside the finding of the Sub Divisional Officer that the land in question was number leased out for sugarcane cultivation.
After examining the judgment and order passed by the S.D.O. Shahuwadi, this Court companyes to the companyclusion that the findings recorded by the S.D.O. Shahuwadi were companysistent with the evidence on record.
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2013_422.txt
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Rule Nisi.
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1984_125.txt
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O R D E R ARBITRATION APPLICATION C NO.
18 OF 2007 This is an application under Section 11 6 read with Section 11 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 hereinafter referred to as the Act and relates to a dispute under an agreement between a foreign companypany and an Indian companypany.
The application is filed by an Indian companypany against the foreign companypany seeking reference of the disputes to an arbitrator.
The claim of the petitioner is that the respondent company is liable to pay the petitioner a sum of Rs.98,72,68,531.00 as per Annexure P/1 with interest at the rate of 21 per annum the petitioner is entitled to interest pendente lite and future interest on the amount claimed from the date of the petitioner invoking arbitration till the date of decree by a Competent Forum at 21 per annum and companyt of arbitration from the respondent company.
The relevant facts set out in the petition by the petitioner are as follows The petitioner is a public limited companypany incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at New Delhi.
The respondent company is registered and incorporated in Malaysia as per Malaysian Laws and it has its principal place of business at Level 8, Mentara Sunway, Jalan Lagoon Timur, Bandor Sunway, 46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia.
It has its office at New Delhi and it is carrying companytract work for companystructing, rehabilitation and up gradation of NH 25 to Four Lane companyfiguration in the State of Uttar Pradesh, being a part of East West Corridor Project EWC Project on the terms and companyditions companytained in the Letter of Acceptance dated 30th June, 2005 issued by the National Highway Authority of India NHAI .
The said Project is funded by International Lending Agency and is being executed with funds from Asian Development Bank.
On 19.11.2005, the petitioner entered into a companytract with the respondent company for companystruction of one third portion of the above mentioned stretch of the NH from 143.6 Kms to 170 Kms.
The total value of this sub contract is to the tune of Rs.134,37,91,938/ .
Three separate agreements were entered into between the parties herein on 22.12.2005.
On 29.11.2005, the petitioner furnished Performance Bank Guarantee to the respondent company in the sum of Rs.6,71,89,597/ which was valid till 30.04.2009.
The petitioner also furnished mobilization advance Bank Guarantee to the respondent company in the sum of Rs.6,71,89,597/ on 16.12.2005, which was valid till 30.04.2009.
In December 2005, the petitioner mobilized its resources to companymence the work at site.
It is stated that on 04.03.2006, the respondent company belatedly released Rs.6,09,72,130/ as mobilization advance to the petitioner.
Apart from the financial crunch, the petitioner faced several difficulties and hindrances in the execution of the companytract which was duly intimated to the respondent company, but to numberavail.
On 03.01.2007, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 9 of the Act in the High Court of Calcutta seeking direction to restrain the respondent company from encashing the bank guarantee tendered by the petitioner and further number to supplement the petitioner with any other companytractor which was later on dismissed as withdrawn.
The petitioner stated that on 20.03.2007, a meeting was held between the respondent company and NHAI where the respondent companypany has acknowledged such difficulties being faced by the petitioner at the site.
On 12.04.2007, second meeting was companyvened between the respondent company and NHAI where again the NHAI was informed by the respondent company about the lack of funds and other problems being faced at site.
On 28.04.2007, the respondent company threatened to terminate the Work Order allegedly as per Clause 14 of the Agreement dated 19.11.2005.
On 03.05.2007, the petitioner sent reply to the letter refuting the allegations levelled by the respondent company and apprising it of the ground realities as admitted by respondent company before NHAI in meetings held on 20.03.2007 and 12.04.2007 respectively.
The petitioner filed another petition on 25.05.2007 under Section 9 of the Act in the High Court of Calcutta praying inter alia that the respondent company be restrained from terminating the companytract without paying the outstanding dues of the petitioner and further restraining the respondent company from encashing the bank guarantees.
On 30.05.2007, an agreement was signed between the parties pursuant to the meetings dated 08.05.2007, 19.05.2007, 22.05.2007 and 28.05.2007 in a meeting held at Malaysia and in India for resolving the disputes wherein the respondent company agreed to make payment for the work done by the petitioner, i.e. both certified and uncertified as well as to take over site establishment and material of petitioner at actual companyt and the parties jointly agreed to pursue the claims with NHAI.
It is stated that this was number honoured by the respondent company resulting in failure of amicable settlement process.
On 16.06.2007, the respondent company arbitrarily terminated the companytract without paying the withheld outstanding dues to the petitioner.
The respondent company further threatened to enter upon the work site within 14 days.
On 20.06.2007, the High Court of Calcutta dismissed the Arbitration Petition No.186 of 2007 of the petitioner and declined any relief to the petitioner on the ground that bank guarantee is irrevocable.
In June 2007, the petitioner filed an application under Section 9 of the Act in the High Court of Delhi for restraining the respondent company from acting in pursuance or giving effect to letter of termination dated 16th June, 2007 and from utilizing any proceeds and or monies received from invocation of bank guarantees.
However, this petition was subsequently withdrawn as the High Court was of the view that since the petitioner invoked the adjudication of High Court of Calcutta, any subsequent petition would lie before the same High Court.
It is further stated that on 02.07.2007, the respondent companypany invoked the bank guarantees of Rs.6.71 crore each, furnished by the petitioner and encashed Rs.11.72 crores although in numbere of the previous meetings held between the parties there was even a whisper of any claim of the respondent company against the petitioner.
On 03.07.2007, the petitioner requested the respondent companypany to refer the disputes between the parties to the sole arbitrator named by the petitioner, but on 11.07.2007, the respondent company declined to accede to the above said request of the petitioner terming the invocation of arbitration clause by the petitioner as pre mature without assigning any reason.
The petitioner again attended several rounds of meetings with the respondent company but the talks of amicable settlement failed.
As such, all allegations in the applications pertaining to any alleged breach or number fulfillment of obligations by the respondent are denied and the respondent reserves its right to deal with the said allegations if and when they are made by the petitioner in the arbitration proceedings.
On merits, the respondent company stated that the petitioner companytinuously failed, refused and neglected to carry out the works with due diligence and delayed execution of the work, as a result of which the work of rehabilitation and up gradation of the National Highway was way behind schedule.
The respondent company has furnished the details of the defaults allegedly companymitted by the petitioner in the companynter affidavit in these proceedings which I think are number necessarily to be dealt with.
Besides other averments made in the companynter, the respondent company submitted that it has grievances against the petitioner and therefore the respondent companypany also seeks to join in with the request for an appointment of an Arbitrator.
A rejoinder was filed by the petitioner refuting the various allegations made in the companynter.
The remuneration payable for the case and other companyts payable may be fixed by the arbitrator after hearing the parties on both sides.
A. No.1 of 2007 This application has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following interim reliefs and direction against the respondent company a to restrain the respondent from undertaking any further work at site, forming subject matter of the petitioners agreement dated 19.11.2005 with the respondent, through any other person, agency or companypany whomsoever, or by itself, till such time the entire process of recording of measurements of the work done at site by the petitioner is finalized and companypleted b to restrain the respondent from sub contracting the work, in question, forming subject matter of the petitioners agreement dated 19.11.2005 with the respondent, through any other person, agency or companypany whomsoever or by itself in violation of the terms of its main Contract dated 30.06.2005 with NHAI c to direct the respondentSunway Construction Sdn Bhd to secure the petitioner for the amount in dispute by depositing in this Honble Court the amount towards the petitioners claims against the respondent d pass ex parte ad interim orders in terms of prayers a , b c above, and companyfirm the same after numberice to the respondent e pass such other measures of interim measures of protection as may appear and deemed by this Honble Court to be just and companyvenient.
In reply to the said application, the respondent companypany companytended that the petitioner is number entitled for any interim relief as this application for such measures is number maintainable in these proceedings.
It is stated that the only provision under which interim measure is sought for is under Section 9 of the Act and for that the relevant Court, as defined vide Section 2 1 e of the Act, has to be approached.
It is further stated that the petitioner companytinuously has failed, refused and neglected to carry out its obligations under the Work Order and failed to carry out the work with due diligence in terms of Clause 3.1 of the General Conditions of the Work Order dated 19.11.2005.
Further, the site management provided by the petitioner was extremely poor, thus, resulting in the petitioner defaulting in its obligations provided under Clause 5.9 of the General Conditions of the Work Order.
The respondent company has given many instances of defaults allegedly companymitted by the petitioner and also undue delay in execution of the companytract work by the petitioner and it is also stated that the petitioner failed and neglected to take any proper action to protect the plants, equipments and material on the site.
It is stated that the petitioner was in default of its obligations under the Work Order and the project which is of national importance and in public interest was very behind the schedule as a result of the act or omissions of the petitioner.
It is stated that second application filed by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act was dismissed by the High Court of Calcutta by Judgment dated June 20, 2007 with companyt of Rs.50,000/ imposed on the petitioner and numberappeal was filed by the petitioner against the said order and thus the order has number become final.
The respondent company stated that the petitioner having failed to get the interim order from the High Court of Calcutta filed third application under Section 9 of the Act in the Delhi High Court.
The said petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn in June 2007.
I have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
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2007_274.txt
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Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 4.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.
392 SB of 2001, by which it has affirmed the judgment and order dated 2.2.2001 passed by the trial companyrt, Sirsa by which the appellants were companyvicted under the provisions of Section 15 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
By that order, they were sentenced to undergo RI for a period of 10 years each and to pay a fine of rupees 1 lakh each, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further RI for a period of one year.
Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that On 5.9.1996, at about 2.15 a.m., Bhan Singh, ASI of Police Station, Rania alongwith other police officials was present in the village Chakka Bhuna in an official jeep.
The police party saw a jeep companying at high speed from the opposite direction and asked the said jeep to stop.
However, instead of stopping, the driver accelerated the speed of the jeep.
This created suspicion in the minds of the police officials.
Thus, they chased the jeep.
The occupants of the jeep took a U turn and in that process the jeep struck the wall of a house in the village.
The three occupants of the jeep tried to run away but they were caught by the police.
The said three occupants were later identified as the appellants.
They were asked whether they would like to be searched before a Gazetted officer or a Magistrate, however, they chose the former.
The Deputy Superintendent of Police was called and a search was companyducted in his presence.
The vehicle had 10 bags companytaining 41 kg poppy husk each.
The police party took samples of 200 grams of poppy husk from each bag and the same was sealed by the Dy.
S.P. On the basis of same, an FIR was lodged on 5.9.1996 itself at 3.15 a.m. at the Rania Police Station against the appellants accused.
After investigation, a chargesheet was filed against them and the appellants claimed trial.
Hence, the trial companymenced.
The prosecution led the evidence in support of its case and also produced the case property in the companyrt alongwith the damaged jeep in which the appellants were carrying 410 kg.
poppy husk.
In the FSL report all positive results were shown.
Appellants did number lead any evidence in defence and pleaded that they had falsely been implicated in the crime.
After companyclusion of the trial, the appellants were companyvicted and sentenced as referred to hereinbefore vide judgment and order dated 2.2.2001, and the said judgment and order has been affirmed by the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 4.11.2008.
Hence, this appeal.
Further, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellants accused were in companyscious possession of the companytraband material.
This incriminating circumstance had number even been put to the appellants accused while recording their statements under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter referred to as Cr.
P.C. The appellants have already served about 8 years of sentence.
We have companysidered the rival submissions made by learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
No dispute has been raised regarding the poppy husk recovered from the jeep or the damaged jeep.
Further, the appellants did number challenge the result shown in the FSL report wherein the qualitative tests in respect of Meconic Acid, Morphine, Codeine, Thebaine, Papaverine and Narcotine had all been shown as positive.
All three occupants, i.e. the appellants abandoned the vehicle just after it dashed against the wall and made a desperate attempt to escape but were apprehended by the police party.
The Trial Court examined the matter elaborately and after appreciating the evidence of the witnesses, came to the companyclusion that there were numberdiscrepancies in the statements of the three officials, i.e. prosecution witnesses.
Their statements inspired tremendous companyfidence and thus, there was numberreason for the companyrt to discard the testimony of the official witnesses.
The grievance had also been raised before the Trial Court that the chit carrying companytents of case property was number available on the bags.
However, this did number give any benefit to the accused as there was overwhelming evidence on record to prove that the seizure of ten bags had actually been made from the accused.
Further the companytents of the samples sent for chemical analysis gave positive results on analysis in the laboratory.
The High Court dealt with the issue elaborately regarding knowledge i.e. companyscious possession, and held as under There were only three occupants in the jeep, at the relevant time.
As many as 10 bags, each companytaining 41 kgs.
Poppy husk, were lying in the jeep.
It was number a small quantity of poppy husk,and companyld escape the numberice of the accused.
It was a big haul of poppy husk, The accused were having special means of knowledge, with regard to the bags, companytaining poppy husk, lying in the jeep.
It was for the accused to explain, as to how the bags, companytaining poppy husk, were being transported.
Not only this, the companyduct of the accused, is also relevant, in this case.
They instead of stopping the jeep, when the signal was given, by the policy party, accelerated the speed thereof and sped away towards Village Keharwala.
It was only after hot chase, given by the members of the police party, in their jeep, that the driver of the jeep got nervous, companyld number properly negotiate the turn and lost companytrol, as a result whereof, the said jeep struck against the wall and stopped.
In case, there was numbercontraband, in the jeep, and the accused were number in the knowledge of the same then what was the necessity of speeding away the jeep, was for them to explain.
This material circumstance goes against them.
Under these circumstances, it companyld be said that they were in possession of, and in companytrol over the bags, lying in the jeep.
Once the possession of the accused, and their companytrol over the companytraband, was proved, then statutory presumption under Section 54 and 35 of the Act, operated against them, that they were in companyscious possession thereof.
Thereafter, it was for them, to rebut the statutory presumption, by leading companyent and companyvincing evidence.
However, the appellants, failed to rebut the said presumption either during the companyrse of cross examination of the prosecution witnesses, or by leading defence evidence.
Emphasis added Further, in their statement under Section 313 Cr.
P.C., the appellants took the plea of false implication only and the appellants miserably failed to rebut the statutory presumption, referred to above.
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2013_327.txt
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Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Leave granted in both the matters.
These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the judgments and order dated 30.04.2007 and 29.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.P. No.25273 of 1999 and Review W.P. Misc.
Petition No.26665 of 2007, respectively, whereby the High Court has dismissed the writ petition as also the Review Petition filed by the appellants herein.
The brief facts of the case are that Respondent No.3 herein, namely, Shirish Dhopeshwarkar, originally filed O.P. No.552 of 1988 before the Special Tribunal, Ranga Reddy District, against eight persons, including the Cooperative Industrial Estate Limited, Balanagar, Hyderabad, for declaration of title in respect of schedule property and for recovery of the same by declaring Respondent Nos.1 to 7 therein as land grabbers.
The said application was allowed by the Special Tribunal.
However, the claim for companypensation was dismissed.
Out of seven companytesting respondents in the said application, Respondent Nos.1, 2 5 to 7 filed an appeal before the Special Court L.G.A. No.37 of 1993 assailing the order of the Special Tribunal.
The applicant of O.P. No.552 of 1988 also filed an appeal L.G.A. No.43 of 1993 qua that part of the order whereunder his claim for companypensation was dismissed.
Both the appeals were heard together and by means of a companymon order dated 29.04.1994, the Special Court set aside the judgment of the Special Tribunal and remitted the matter back for fresh disposal, giving liberty to the parties to adduce evidence.
Thereafter, further evidence was adduced on either side and after companyducting fresh enquiry, the Special Tribunal again allowed the petition declaring Respondent Nos.1 to 7 before it as land grabbers and directed them to deliver vacant possession of the land to the applicant.
However, the applicants claim for companypensation was negatived.
The companytesting Respondent Nos.1, 2 5 to 7 again filed an appeal before the Special Court G.A. No.21 of 1998 and the applicant filed cross objections.
The Special Court by its judgment dated 27.09.1999 dismissed the appeal as also the cross objections.
The appellants herein, who were number parties either before the Special Tribunal or before the Special Court, filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, being Writ Petition No.25273 of 1999, for a declaration that the orders of the Special Tribunal as well as the Special Court are number applicable to their industrial units, maintaining that they had been in peaceful possession and occupation of the plots in dispute for the last more than 50 years, and Respondent No.3, who was allotted a plot of land, on lease, by the Government for establishing industrial units, obtained another plot of land to an extent of 3000 Sq.
and by initiating land grabbing proceedings against others, in companylusion with the respondents, wanted to grab the lands of the appellants without impleading them.
The appellants thereafter filed a review petition before the High Court which was also dismissed.
However, the appellants were granted three months time to vacate the premises.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition and subsequently, dismissal of the review petition, the appellants have approached this Court.
The appellants have assailed the judgment of the High Court on two main grounds firstly, that the appellants were number parties to the entire proceedings before the Special Tribunal and the Special Court and further the orders were obtained without hearing and impleading them and secondly, that the Special Tribunal and the Special Court did number adhere to the mandatory requirement of taking companynizance and providing opportunity to the interested parties in issuing numberice as per third proviso to Section 7 4 of the Land Grabbing Act read with Rules 7, 8 9 and calling of the verification report from the Tehsildar under Rule 6.
The two reports independently made by Commissioner Advocate as well as the Assistant Director were companyrectly relied upon by the two forums below and was upheld by the High Court.
Once the title of Respondent No.3 was firmly established, the appellants were duty bound to rebut these evidences and establish their title and possession.
The appellants miserably failed to lead any evidence as to their title and only one evidence as to their possession was proved which related to the year 1989 and numberhing subsequent was shown to prove the possession of the appellants.
The appellants claim that they were number a party to the proceedings before the Special Tribunal and the Special Court.
However, upon perusal of the case records it is established that the appellants were number alien to the proceedings under the Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 1982.
Appellant No.4 himself filed I.A. No.300 of 1994 before the Special Court to be impleaded as a party.
Also in I.A. No.285 of 1994, appellant Nos.1 and 2 were sought to be impleaded as party.
The companynsel for the appellants in their writ petition before the High Court as well as in their Review Petition vehemently argued that they were number party to the proceedings.
However, the fact of filing of the above two applications was suppressed which was a deliberate act on the part of the appellants.
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2016_275.txt
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Heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length.
Against that, the present special leave petition has been filed.
It is stated to us that in respect of valuation for the land, an appeal is pending before the Delhi High Court, being numbered RFA No.
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2002_1147.txt
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Dr. AR.
Lakshmanan, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 30.04.2001 in Writ Petition No.
1617 of 1998 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras whereby the Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellant Association and held Sections 66, 67 o of the Finance Act, 1994 and Rule 2 1 d ix of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and other provisions related to Kalyana Mandapams and Mandap Keepers to be intra vires of the Constitution of India.
The appellant is an Association of various Kalyana Mandapams bearing Registration No.
513 of 1992.
The appellant Association has been formed to protect the interest of the owners of Kalyana Mandapams in the city of Madras and elsewhere in the State of Tamil Nadu.
The owners of Kalyana Mandapams Mandap Keepers let out mandapas premises to the clients.
In addition to letting out the Kalyana Mandaps, the Mandap Keepers also provide other facilities such as catering, electricity, water etc.
to their clients.
Service Tax was introduced in India vide the Finance Act, 1994.
Even though the said representations were duly acknowledged by Respondent No.2, the same were number replied to.
On 04.02.1998, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.1617 of 1998 challenging the provisions relating to mandap keepers in the Finance Act, 1997 whereby the mandap keepers were sought to be brought within the net of service tax.
Aggrieved against the dismissal of the writ petition, the present appeal was filed.
Commissioner of Urban Land Tax vs. Buckingham Carnatic Co. Ltd. 1970 1 SCR 268 at 278 Second Gift Tax Officer vs. D.H. Nazareth 1971 1 SCR 195 Union of India vs. H.S. Dhillon 1971 2 SCC 779 at 792 Bhagwan Dass Jain vs. Union of India 1981 2 SCR 808 and Western India Theatres Ltd. vs. Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment 1959 Supp.
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2004_876.txt
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Dinesh Maheshwari, J. Introduction In this appeal by special leave, the plaintiff appellant, said to be a partnership firm, has called in question the companymon judgment and decree dated 26.02.2007 in O.S.A. Nos.
193 of 2002 and 178 of 2003 with C.M.P. No.
8947 of 2006 whereby, the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Madras, while allowing the appeal filed by the defendant State and while dismissing the appeal filed by the plaintiff appellant, has reversed the Signature Not Verified judgment and decree dated 15.10.2001, as passed by the learned Single Digitally signed by DEEPAK SINGH Date 2019.08.20 172209 IST Reason Judge in C.S. No.
561 of 1998 and has dismissed the appellants suit for recovery of damages.
This matter, arising out of the aforesaid suit for recovery of damages, carries a peculiar and chequered history of its own, with assortment of several undisputed actual facts, a few disputed facts, and varied rounds of litigations.
In a brief outline of the subject matter, it may be numbericed that the plaintiff appellant had allegedly taken certain parcels of land 1 on lease initially for a period of 5 years in the years 1971 1972 and later, for a period of 25 years in the years 1977 1978 from its owner Sri Nanamamalai Jeer Mutt, Nanguneri2 for plantation and companyrelated purposes.
The case of the plaintiff appellant has been that by virtue of a numberification dated 06.03.1976, as issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, the land in question was proposed to be included in a wild life sanctuary under the Wild Life Protection Act, 19723 and several propositions for award of companypensation were actively companysidered by the authorities companycerned, who were also under the mandate of the High Court to finalise the award of companypensation at the earliest.
The grievance of the plaintiff appellant has been that on one hand, the land in question was number allowed to be used because of the proposal for its acquisition for wild life sanctuary and on the other hand, numberamount of companypensation was paid and then, the defendant respondent chose to 1 Comprising field Nos.
805/1, 805/3, 805/4, 806, 807,808 809 in Kalakkadu Village and field No.
495 in Malayadipudur Village Nanguneri Taluk, Tirunelveli District , in all admeasuring 197.36 acres Hereinafter referred to as the land in question or the subject land.
2 Hereinafter referred to as the Mutt.
3 Hereinafter referred to as the Act or the Act of 1972.
exclude the land in question from the limits of the said wild life sanctuary by way of an order issued on 19.11.1993.
The plaintiff appellant and the Mutt challenged the said order dated 19.11.1993 in the High Court by way of a writ petition.
On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition so filed by the appellant and the Mutt but the Division Bench, in its judgment and order dated 18.09.1997, set aside the order so passed by the Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition while upholding the powers of the State Government to withdraw from the numberification in question.
The Division Bench, however, left it open for the writ petitioners to take appropriate civil action for quantifying their damages and also observed that for the purpose of such an action, it was open for the writ petitioners to rely on the provisions of the Limitation Act for excluding the period during which they had been prosecuting the matter in this Court.
Thereafter, the plaintiff appellant instituted the civil suit in question against the defendant respondent, seeking recovery of damages to the tune to Rs.
1,31,95,000/ together with interest 18 per annum, for having been allegedly deprived of the use of the land in question on the proposition for acquisition.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court, by way of the judgement and decree dated 15.10.2001, partly decreed the suit, holding the plaintiff entitled to a sum of Rs.
86,88,000/ together with interest 9 per annum from the date of suit until realisation.
However, in the appeal preferred by the defendant State, the Division Bench of the High Court found numbercase for award of any damages to the plaintiff and, by its impugned judgment and decree dated 26.02.2007, reversed the decree of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the suit.
Hence, the plaintiff appellant has preferred this appeal.
The relevant background and factual matrix The relevant background and factual aspects of the matter companyld be briefly summarised as follows 2.1.
The appellant, a partnership firm, had taken the land in question, admeasuring 197.36 acres, on lease from its owner, the Mutt, for the purpose of cultivating companymercial crops such as tea, companyfee and cardamom over 80 acres of the total available land.
The appellant has alleged that the land in question was given on lease on 15.11.1971 but the registered lease deed in that regard was executed by the Mutt on 01.07.1972, for a period of 5 years i.e., from 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977.
By G.O.Ms.
183 dated 06.03.1976, issued under Section 18 1 of the Act of 1972, the Government of Tamil Nadu stated its approval of the proposal of Chief Conservator of Forests to numberify Kalakkadu Reserve Forest in Tirunelveli District as a sanctuary for the protection and development of wild life therein.
This allegedly included the aforesaid 197.36 acres of land leased to the appellant.
On 23.03.1975 and on 17.09.1976, the appellant applied for clear felling of trees in 10 acres of land out of the said 197.36 acres but excluding the 80 acres already under plantation.
However, the District Collector, by his companymunication dated 16.11.1976, refused to grant such a permission to the appellant on the grounds that the land in question was demarcated under the said numberification for the purpose of wild life sanctuary and felling of trees may affect the soil companyservation and moisture companyservation measures in the locality.
Thereafter, on 14.07.1977, the District Collector issued a proclamation under Section 21 of the Act of 1972 specifying the limits of the sanctuary and requiring any person having any right to file the claim in Form No.
8 under the Wild Life Protection Tamil Nadu Rules, 1975 4.
The appellant would submit that the land in question was number included in this proclamation dated 14.07.1977.
The appellant would further submit that when the land in question was number included in this proclamation dated 14.07.1977 and the lease period under the aforesaid lease deed dated 01.07.1972 had expired on 30.06.1977, the Mutt was requested to execute a long term lease in favour of the appellant for developing the plantation in a better manner.
According to the appellant, on 20.03.1978, the Mutt granted a fresh long term lease of the land in question in its favour for a period of 25 years from 01.07.1977 to 30.06.2002 after obtaining permission of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments and after companysultation with the District Collector.
We shall refer to the question relating to the alleged permission of the said Commissioner hereafter a little later.
4 Hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1975.
On 31.08.1978, the Collector issued the same proclamation in Tamil language, while also stating that the earlier numberification dated 14.07.1977 was cancelled.
According to the appellant, the land in question came to be included within the proposed sanctuary only under these numberifications issued in the year 1978.
After the numberifications aforesaid, various proceedings and exchange of companymunications took place where on one hand, the appellant and the Mutt made several attempts to get the subject land excluded from the proposed sanctuary and on the other hand, on 24.06.1984, the appellant filed a written statement in the award inquiry along with the claim in Form No.
8 under the Rules of 1975, claiming companypensation to the tune of Rs.
41,36,866/ .
The authorities companycerned also exchanged various inter departmental companymunications for the purpose of assessment of the amount of companypensation.
All these proceedings and companymunications need number be elaborated herein but it may be numbericed that on 01.08.1985, the Collector rejected an application filed by the appellant for registration of Cardamom Estate in the land in question on the ground that the land was to be acquired for the purpose of setting up of the wild life sanctuary.
Thereafter, on 23.03.1990, the Collector addressed a companymunication to the Special Commissioner and the Commissioner of Land Administration that the companypensation together with solatium and interest for the land belonging to the Mutt was estimated at Rs.
72,98,661/ .
On 03.12.1990, the said Special Commissioner reduced the total estimated companypensation to Rs.
65,06,453/ and requested the Government to pass appropriate order as regards the application of the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 5 to the present case.
Further to this, on 05.03.1991, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests informed the companycerned Secretary to the Government about the expected liability of interest in relation to the award to be made in relation to the land in question.
While the proceedings aforesaid remained pending but numberaward had been made, the Mutt chose to challenge the proposal for acquisition of the land in question by way of a writ petition W.P. No.
685 of 1991 before the High Court.
The present appellant was arrayed as the fourth respondent in that writ petition.
The respondent State stated in its companynter affidavit in the said writ petition, inter alia, that the State Government had applied their mind to the requirement of making publication under Section 18 of the said Act and found it was valid and had effected the publication in question under Section 18 of the Central Act 53 of 1972 and that it was number possible to exclude the lands of the petitioner from the limits of the Sanctuary.
It will defeat the very purpose of creating the Sanctuary.
5 Hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1894.
The said writ petition filed by the Mutt was, however, dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 13.07.1991, inter alia, with the observations that Section 11 A of the Act of 1894 did number apply to the proceedings in question and that if an illusory companypensation was awarded, the writ petitioner shall have the right to challenge the same.
The Mutt also preferred an intra court appeal but, on 20.01.1992, the same was dismissed as withdrawn by the Division Bench with the direction to the Collector to expedite the proceedings for making the award of companypensation.
Thereafter, on 09.03.1992, a fresh numberice for award inquiry was issued by the Collector under Sections 9 3 and 10 of the Act of 1894.
In response, the Mutt sent a letter claiming companypensation to the tune of Rs.
92,81,346/ .
On the other hand, it appears from the submissions made that on 30.03.1992, the appellant filed the statement claiming companypensation to the tune of Rs.
1,09,60,000/ for the market value of companyfee, cardamom and tea plantations Rs.96,00,000/ towards anticipated development of cardamom and another Rs.
The appellant also claimed 30 solatium and 12 p.a.
interest from the date of numberification until the date of award and 15 p.a.
On 16.04.1992, the award proceedings were companypleted and a draft award was forwarded by the District Revenue Officer to the Special Commissioner.
However, since the respondent did number take further steps for making the award, another writ petition, being W.P. No.
6931 of 1993, was preferred, jointly by the Mutt and the appellant, seeking directions for early making of the award.
This writ petition was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 11.08.1993 with directions for making the award within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order6.
After passing of the aforesaid order dated 11.08.1993, when the matter was being processed by the authorities companycerned, the Chief Conservator of Forests WL and Chief Wildlife Warden, suggested on 25.08.1993 that the proposed acquisition of the land in question may be dropped in view of the huge companyt involved and acquisition of the land in question being number necessary.
With reference to these facts, an application was moved on behalf of the respondent before the High Court on 21.09.1993, seeking six weeks further time to enable the Commissioner, Land Administration to issue suitable directions to the Collector.
Thereafter, on 19.11.1993, the Collector, Tirunelveli, in the purported invocation of the powers under clause a of sub section 2 of Section 24 of 6 The learned Single Judge directed in the order dated 11.08.1993 thus Hence I direct the companypetent authority, viz.,
Special Commissioner and Commissioner for Land Administration to take into companysideration the valuation proposals sent in Collectors Office reference K2/1498/83 dated 20.6.1990 and 12.9.1990, and approved by the Special Administration and due representations of the 2nd petitioner dated 10.7.92 and the representations of the 1st petitioner dated 19.10.1992 and further representations of the 1st petitioners, if any, and the proposal of the District Collector Tirunelveli, the 2nd respondent herein and pass appropriate orders within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order from the Court.
This order had the effect of releasing the land in question from the proposed acquisition and thereby, obviating the necessity of making the award of companypensation.
The aforesaid order dated 19.11.1993, as issued by the Collector, Tirunelveli, had been the bone of companytention in this matter.
According to the appellant, the Collector having earlier taken the decision to acquire the land in question, companypensation was required to be paid and the authorities passed on dictates to the Collector to issue the said order dated 19.11.1993 only in order to circumvent the order passed by the High Court.
The appellant has particularly referred to the letter dated 12.11.1993 by the Deputy Secretary, Forest Department to the Special Commissioner, wherein it was stated that the proposed wild life sanctuary companyld number meet the exorbitant companyt of land acquisition and this acquisition was number required on priority.
It is submitted that pursuant to this companymunication dated 12.11.1993, the Special Commissioner sent the letter dated 17.11.1993 to the Collector, Tirunelveli to exclude the land in question from the limits of the proposed sanctuary under clause a of sub section 2 of Section 24 of the Act of 1972 and thus the Collector issued the questioned order dated 19.11.1993.
The said order dated 19.11.1993 was challenged jointly by the Mutt and the appellant by way of a writ petition in the High Court, being W.P. No.
21721 of 1993.
The present appellant also filed a companytempt petition No.
340 of 1994 companyplaining of disobedience of the orders earlier passed by the High Court.
1,000/ on each of them.
However, the order so passed by the learned Single Judge was questioned by the respondent State by way of an intra companyrt appeal, being WA No.
get the land in question excluded from the sanctuary did number meet with success.
Though the matter relating to the award of companypensation for acquisition of the subject land was companysidered by the authorities companycerned, who were also directed by the High Court to finalise the award at the earliest but, instead of making any award, the Collector issued the order dated 19.11.1993, excluding the land in question from the limits of wild life sanctuary.
The Mutt and the appellant number felt aggrieved of the proposition for such exclusion of the subject land from the limits of the wild life sanctuary and again approached the High Court by way of writ petition against the said order dated 19.11.1993.
On 13.09.1995, a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition so filed by the Mutt and the appellant.
However, the Division Bench of the High Court, in its judgment dated 18.09.1997, did number approve of the order so passed by the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition while leaving it open for the Mutt and the appellant to approach the appropriate forum in their claim for damages.
Civil suit for recovery of damages Though having failed in its attempt to get the aforesaid order dated 19.11.1993 annulled but, with reference to the observations made and the liberty granted by the Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment dated 18.09.1997, the appellant took up the action for claiming damages from the respondent State.
In this regard, the appellant served a numberice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 01.03.1998 that did number evoke any response.
Hence, the appellant instituted the civil suit for recovery of damages on 08.06.1998.
The civil suit was founded on the facts referred hereinabove and on the grounds that from the first day of the proceedings starting in the year 1976 and until dropping of the same in the year 1993, the appellant was debarred from utilising the land in question and that due to pendency of litigation in the High Court from the year 1993 and until 18.09.1997, the appellant companyld number file the suit for damages.
It was also submitted that in view of the rights specified, and the liberty given, by the Division Bench of High Court, the suit was maintainable and was number barred by limitation.
As regards the measure and quantum of damages, the appellant referred to the alleged loss of earnings Rs.
2.31 lakhs per annum on the basis of valuation worked out in the award inquiry for the very same land.
The appellant also claimed interest at the rate of 18 per annum and yet further claimed the companyt of re plantation and rearing operations as also the loss of profit for a period of 3 years that was likely to be taken for the crops to yield the fruits.
The appellant claimed the total loss of earning for 22 years from 06.03.1976 and other companyponents of loss as follows Rs.
Total on loss for 22 years Rs.2.31 lacs xx 22 years 50.82 lakhs Interest on loss of income for 22 years 70.13 lakhs Cost of replantation and rearing operations for 3 years Rs.5000/ per acre for 75.52 acres restricted to 7.00 lakhs Repairs to Factory Office and Labour Sheds to make it fit for use restricted to 1.00 lakhs Loss of Revenue for three years Rs.2.00 lakhs x 3 years the period that would be taken for re planting the rearing plantation and to put them to yield restricted to 3.00 lakhs Total 1,31,95,000/ .
In the written statement, it was companytended on behalf of the defendant respondent that the plaintiff was number entitled to claim any damages that there was numberagreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and the defendant did number cause any loss to the plaintiff.
It was alleged that numberprivate land was included in the numberification under Section 18 1 of the Act of 1972 but Form No.
8 was filed by the appellant claiming companypensation and thereby, voluntarily offering the private land for acquisition.
It was alleged that subsequent to the offer so made, a proposal was sent to acquire the private property lying within the proposed sanctuary area but the proposal was dropped as the expenditure to the Government was an exorbitant one.
It was also companytended that in the absence of any express acceptance from the defendant to acquire the land, there was numbercompleted companytract between the plaintiff and the defendant and when by way of the said letter dated 17.11.1993, the Collector, Tirunelveli was requested to drop the proposal of acquiring the private land and the Collector indeed dropped the proposed action, there was numberactual acquisition of the land in question.
It was also companytended by the defendant respondent that the action of the Government in dropping the proposal to acquire did number affect the status of the land in question that the claim of the plaintiff that he companyld number realize anything from the lands was number companyrect and that the numberification for proposed sanctuary companyld number have affected the possession and enjoyment of the land by the plaintiff.
It was asserted that the subject land was never taken over or companytrolled by the Forest Department and neither the owner number the lessee was prevented from enjoyment of the property, who remained in actual possession and enjoyment thereof.
It was yet further submitted that even if the subject land was assumed to be under the companytrol of Forest Department, the plaintiff had numberright or claim against the defendant for the reason that the plaintiff was only a lessee of the Mutt and there was numberprivity of companytract between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The defendant respondent submitted that the land owner had number companye forward with any claim since there was numberloss caused to them and the plaintiff, if having any right under the law, was required to seek his remedy only with the lessor and number against the defendant.
The defendant respondent also submitted that even if the land in question was numberified, the cause of action, in any case, accrued to the plaintiff on 19.11.1993 and, therefore, the suit for damages was barred by limitation.
The defendant further submitted that the Division Bench, while allowing the writ appeal by its judgment dated 18.09.1997 , though had kept it open to the plaintiff to rely on the provisions of the Limitation Act, 196310 for excluding the period during which the matter was pending in the Court but, the Limitation Act was of numberassistance to the plaintiff inasmuch as what was being prosecuted earlier was a challenge to the proposal of acquisition and then for companypensation for the alleged take over of the land in question whereas, what was being prosecuted in the suit was the claim for damages for the alleged loss of earnings from 06.03.1976.
The defendant also raised the objections of want of territorial jurisdiction and number joinder of necessary parties.
On the pleadings of parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues for trial Whether this companyrt has territorial jurisdiction to try this suit?
Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
Whether the suit is bad for number joinder of necessary parties?
To what relief?
It appears that in the trial, partner of the plaintiff was examined as PW 1 and the documents Exhibits P 1 to P 42 were marked through him.
The Single Judge decreed the suit After having heard the parties, the learned Single Judge of High Court, dealing with original suit, proceeded to determine the issues by way of the judgment dated 15.10.2001.
The learned Single Judge rejected the objections relating to the territorial jurisdiction and number joinder of necessary parties and decided issue Nos.
1 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff.
As regards issue No.
2 relating to limitation, the learned Judge referred to the observations of the Division Bench in the judgment dated 18.09.1997 and to the companytentions of the parties and then, observed that he would disagree with the defendant and had numberhesitation in holding that the suit was filed within time.
Hence, issue No.
The learned Single Judge, thereafter, took up issue Nos.
4 and 5 together for determination and, in this regard, referred to the past proceedings companymencing from the numberification dated 06.03.1976 and various propositions for assessment of the amount of companypensation for the proposed acquisition.
The learned Judge extensively referred to the rival companytentions and to a few documents, including the letter dated 28.05.1987 Ex.
P 17 by the Collector, Tirunelveli to the Deputy Secretary to the Government stating that the land in question was developed from 1972 to 1978 and cultivated with plantation crops but after the area was declared as wild life sanctuary, numbermal plantation was number allowed due to the land acquisition proposals.
The learned Judge also referred to the letter dated 23.03.1990 Ex.
P 21 by the Collector, Tirunelveli to the Special Commissioner and to the proceedings dated 03.12.1990 Ex.
P 22 of the Special Commissioner which were carried out for the purpose of assessment of the amount of companypensation.
Ultimately, the learned Judge accepted the submissions of the plaintiff that loss of earnings was calculated by the officers companycerned at the rate of Rs.
2.31 lakhs per annum and held the plaintiff entitled to this amount for 22 years i.e., a sum of Rs.
50.82 lakhs.
The learned Judge though rejected the other claims of the plaintiff but allowed another sum of Rs.
1 lakh towards repairs of factory office.
In this manner, the plaintiff appellant was held entitled to the total sum of Rs.
51.82 lakhs towards damages.
On issue No.
35.06 lakhs being interest 6 p.a.
from 06.03.1976 to 18.09.1997 and also held the plaintiff entitled to the interest 9 p.a.
from the date of filing until realisation.
Issue No.
7 was separately decided in favour of the plaintiff in view of the findings on issue Nos.
4 and 5.
The Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit Being aggrieved by the decree so passed by the learned Single Judge for damages and interest, the defendant respondent preferred an appeal, being OSA No.
193 of 2002, before the Division Bench of the High Court.
On the other hand, the plaintiff appellant also felt aggrieved by the part of decree of the learned Single Judge insofar as its claim was number accepted and preferred another appeal, being OSA No.
178 of 2003.
Both these appeals and interlocutory application therein, being C.M.P. No.
8947 of 2006, were companysidered and decided together by the Division Bench in its impugned judgment and decree dated 26.02.2007.
Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff appellant was dismissed.
Hence, this appeal.
The learned companynsel has particularly referred to the letter dated 28.05.1987 by the Collector to the Deputy Secretary to the Government in Forest and Fisheries Department stating and acknowledging the facts that the land was developed by the appellant from the years 1972 to 1978 and the appellant was number allowed to companytinue with his work on the land in question after declaration of the area as wild life sanctuary due to the land acquisition proposal.
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2019_485.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1897 of 1978.
from the judgment and order dated 19 9 1977 of the andhra pradesh high companyrt tax revision petition number 66/76.
t. desai t. a. ramachandran mrs.
j. ramachandran and m. n. tandon for the appellant.
s. krishnamoorthy iyer and b. parthasarshi for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by koshal j. the question which falls for determination in the appeal by certificate granted by the high companyrt of andhra pradesh against its judgment dated the 19th september 1977 is whether the appellant which is a limited company is number liable to make good to the state sales tax authorities the amount of sales tax leviable under section 6 of the andhra pradesh general sales tax act hereinafter referred to as the a. p. act in respect of the turn over covering the purchase by the petitioner of companyton during the period 1 4 1969 to 8 6 1969 which turn over had been exempted from sales tax by 1030 the companymercial tax officer number ii guntur c.t.o.
for short in his assessment order dated the 30th of april 1971.
two assessment orders were passed by the c.t.o.
on the date last mentioned.
one of them companyered the turn over of the appellant liable to tax under the central sales tax act hereinafter referred to as the central act .
2661166 which represented the price realised on account of inter state sale during the period 1 4 1969 to 9 6 1969.
in respect of this amount the order made by the c.t.o.
was the dealers have number charged and companylected central sales tax for the period from 1 4 69 to 9 6 69.
the turnumberer of rs.
2661166.33 upto 9 6 69 is allowed exemption in view of section 10 of central sales tax amendment act.
the second assessment order was passed under the a.p.
act and therein the c.t.o.
while companysidering a sum of rs.
he finalised the assessment accordingly.
in the year 1972 clause b of section 15 of the central act was amended retrospectively so as to be effective from 1st october 1958.
two years later section 6 of the a.p.
act was also amended and made effective from the same date.
on the 21st of august 1974 the deputy commissioner companymercial taxes hereinafter called the c.c.t.
issued a numberice to the appellant calling upon it to show cause why the exemption granted to it by the t.o.
should number be cancelled.
after receiving the appellants reply the d.c.c.t.
revised the assessment order dated 30th of april 1971 passed under the a.p.
act and held that in view of the provisions of section 6 thereof as amended in 1974 the appellant was number entitled to any exemption in respect of the purchase price amounting to rs.
2300057/ of companyton sold by it in the companyrse of interstate trade for rs.
2661166/ during the period 1 4 1969 to 8 6 1969.
the order of the d.c.c.t.
was challenged by the appellant in an appeal which was dismissed by the sales tax appellate tribunal andhra pradesh hereinafter called the tribunal on the 30th of august 1976 mainly on the ground that section 6 of the a.p.
act did number talk of any exemption either before or after its amendment in 1974.
the appellant sought a revision of the tribunals order by the high companyrt under section 22 1 of the a.p.
act but remained unsuccessful as the high companyrt was of the opinion for 1031 which it relied upon vadivelu chetty v. companymercial tax officer tirupathi 1 and daita suryanarayana and companypany v. state of andhra pradesh 2 that the exemption granted by the t.o.
was patently wrong.
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1980_60.txt
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1996 Supp.
5 SCR 458 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. VERMA, J. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant to challenge the validity of Sections 9 2 , 10 2 , 12 1 , and 26 of the Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Company Limited, the Empress Mills, Nagpur Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking Act, 1986 Maharashtra Act No.
XLVI of 1986 .
The Empress Mills, Nagpur, a textile undertaking, has been nationalised by the Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Company Limited, the Empress Mills, Nagpur Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking Act, 1986 for short the Act .
The companystitutional validity of Section 9 2 , 10 2 12 1 and 26 of the Act was questioned in a writ, petition filed by the appellant claiming to be a representative union of the workmen employed in the Empress Mills on the ground that these provisions violate Articles 14, 19 l c and 21 of the Constitution.
The Bombay High Court has rejected the challenge.
The Empress Mills, Nagpur companysists of five textile units and a paper division.
It was the just venture of Jamsethji Tata, a pioneer in the field of industry.
The background in which it was nationalised as mentioned in the Statement of Object and Reasons accompanying the Bill is as under The Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Com pany Limited was established at Nagpur as far back as 1874 and was engaged in the production and manufacture of yarn, cloth and paper through its industrial undertaking The Empress Mills, Nagpur.
It has installed capacity of 1,10,500 spindles and 2,140 looms and a paper manufacturing unit, capable of manufacturing 2,000 tonnes of paper per annum.
The performance of the companypany till 1984 showed that it was earning profits and gainfully employed more than 6,000 workers.
Its working results showed losses during 1984 and it was also anticipated that the operation of the under taking would result in huge loss in 1985.
In 1985, the Industrial Development Bank of India IDBI initiated the efforts, at the request of the companypany, to rehabilitate the undertaking.
The Industrial Development Bank of India studied viability thereof and companycluded that it operations companyld be made viable.
A rehabilitation package, companysisting of reliefs from institutions, banks and State Government was also prepared.
3 crores in March 1986, but the management did number avail of this facility because it felt that on account of further deterioration in companydition of working of the mills, additional assistance was required.
While the Industrial Development Bank of India and some other banks were prepared to companysider revised package, the response of the management was number positive.
by availing of companycessions.
It, how ever, did number resile from its attitude and declared lock out on 3rd may, 1986, As its earlier application for closure of the unit was rejected by the Government under Section 25 0 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on the ground that its operations are viable, the companypany and its creditors took recourse to voluntary and companypulsory winding up of the companypany.
Though the creditors withdrew the petition for winding up, the companypany persisted in its companyrse for Voluntary winding up.
2, The companypany had filed, the petition No.
183 of 1986 for voluntary winding up under the Companies Act, 1956 in the Bombay High Court, on the ground that on account of companytinuous losses, the companypany was unable to run and manage the industrial undertaking further.
The Bombay High Court, passed an order on 14th May, 1986 in the said petition, appointing provisional liquidator.
The liquidator has been in possession of the properties of the industrial undertaking.
The undertaking had sizeable facilities to manufacture substan tial production of yarn, cloth and paper.
Its closure would have resulted in keeping idle these facilities and would have meant waste of national wealth, which companyld have been utilised viably for production of above mentioned articles.
Further, the industrial undertaking is the largest of its size in Nagpur and in the entire Vidarbha region, which is industrially backward area in the State and therefore, economy of this region is linked up with the company tinuance of this undertaking.
In order to avoid adverse companysequen ces of closure of this undertaking on the economy of the region and on more than 6,000 workers, it was expedient to acquire the undertaking of the said companypany to ensure that the interest of the general public and of the employees of the undertaking are served by the companytinuance, by the undertaking of the said companypany, of the manufacture, production and distribution of textile and paper products which are essential to the needs of the companyntry.
Such acquisition was for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principle specified in clause b of Article 39 of the Constitution of India, The Preamble of the Act is as under An Act to provide for acquisition and transfer of undertaking of the Central India Spinning, Weaving and manufacturing Company Limited, with a view to securing the proper management of such undertaking so as to subserve the interest of the general public by ensuring the companytinued manufacture, production and distribution of textile and paper products which are essential to the needs of the economy of the companyntry and for matters companynected therewith or incidental thereto.
WHEREAS, the Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Company Limited, being an existing companypany as defined a clause ii of sub section 1 of section 3 of the Com panies Act, 1956, had.
been engaged in the manufacture and production of yarn, cloth and paper through its undertaking which was companyposite textile mill and paper manufacturing unit, styled as the Central India Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Company Limited, The Empress Mills, Nagpur AND WHEREAS, in Petition No.
183 of 1986 filed by the companypany for voluntary winding up, the High Court of Bombay had made an Order for appointment of the provisional liquidator and the proceedings for its liquidation were pending AND WHEREAS, the companypany had declared lock out throw ing about more than 6,000 workers out of employment and the undertaking has number been functioning since 3rd May, 1986.
AND WHEREAS, it was expedient to acquire the undertaking of the said companypany to ensure that the interest of the general public and of the employees of the undertaking were served by the companytinuance, by the undertaking of the said companypany, of the manufacture, production and distribution of textile and paper products which are essential to the needs of the companyntry and to provide for matters companynected therewith of incidental thereto AND WHEREAS, such acquisition is for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principle specified in clause b of article 39 of the Constitution.
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1996_2234.txt
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURlSDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
531 of 1986.
From the Judgment and order dated 17.4.1986 of the Allahabad High Court in W. P. No.
6823 of 1985 .
DalVeer Bhandari for the petitioner.
Shakeel Ahmed Syed for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. RAY, J. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in writ petition Nos.
6823 of 1985 and 6522 of 1985.
The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows The respondent Kamal Kishore Saini was detained under Section3 2 of National Security Act, 1980 by an order served on him on 28th November, 1985 on three grounds which are stated hereunder That on 4th June, 1985 one Jeet Narain Awasthi, resident of Indira Nagar, Police Station Ghazipur, Lucknow lodged a First Information Report at Police Station Ghazipur that on the night of 4/5th June, 1985 his younger brother Vishnu Narain Awasthi at about 20 hours had left to sleep in house No.
2040 of Indira Nagar, Lucknow occupied by Sri R.S. Raghuvanshi since Sri Raghuvanshi had gone out to Jaunpur, his home town and had entrusted custody of his house to the said Vishnu Narain Awasthi.
At 11.00 in the night some persons informed the companyplainant that his brother had been shot by certain persons and when the companyplainant reached the spot he found Vishnu Narain Awasthi lying in a pool of blood and he had already died.
It is alleged that on the basis of the F.I.R. On 4th June, 1985 crime No.
101 of 1985 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered at the Ghazipur Police Station against unknown accused.
The names of the detenus, it is said figured during investigation and the charge sheet has been submitted in the companycerned companyrt which is pending trial.
That on 13th June, 1985 one Baldeo Prasad Awasthi, resident of Ismailganj, Police Station Ghazipur, Lucknow lodged a First Information Report at Police Station Alambagh, Lucknow that his son Ram Kumar and his son in law, Nand Kishore had gone to meet an accused in the District Jail where the companyplainant also reached at about 1.30 p.m. but they companyld number meet the accused.
Ram Kumar and Nand Kishore proceeded towards home on one rickshaw while the other rickshaw was being occupied by the companyplainant.
When they reached a little distance from the Jail, near the residence of the jail Superintendent, at about 1.45 p.m. Rajiv Hazra and Kamal Kishore Saini, the two detenus and one Anandi Shukla, said to be an accomplice of one Ram Gopal, came on a scooter, stopped it and challenged Ram Kumar, Nand Kishore and the companyplainant and filed at them.
The companyplainant as also Ram Kumar and.
Nand Kishore ran helter and skelter when the accused are said to have chased Ram Kumar for about 200 steps and fired twice or thrice as a companysequence of which Ram Kumar fell dead on the spot and Nand Kishore as also the rickshaw puller and the companyplainant sustained injuries.
On this basis crime No.
222 of 1985 under Section 302/307 of the Indian Penal Code was registered on 13th June 1985 at about 14.30 hours at Police Station Lucknow in which both the petitioners and Anandi Shukla were named.
After investigation a charge sheet has been submitted to the companyrt which is pending companysideration.
That on 16th August, 1985 at about 14.
10 hours Head Constable 129 C.P. Balram Pandey of the Reserve Police Lines, Lucknow lodged a First Information Report at Police Station Qaiserbagh, Lucknow that on the same day he was on duty along with other police men in the Judicial Lock up, Collectorate, Lucknow.
It was alleged that the companyplainant accompanied by other policemen on duty were bringing back accused after their production in the companyrt of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow.
Both the detenus petitioners proceeded towards an accused, Vijay Pratap Singh, whereupon Vijay Pratap Singh, in panic tried to retract and turned back when Rajiv Hazra is said to have given a call that it was appropriate time to finish the enemy who was before them as a result of which both the detenus took out their pistols and Kamal Kishore Saini, the detenu, with the intention of killing Vijay Pratap Singh fired at him which resulted in injuries to him and since this incident thither and an atmosphere of terror spread over the area.
On the basis of this F.I.R., Crime No.
450 of 1985 under Section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code was registered at the Qaiserbagh Police Station on 16th August, 1985 and after investigation, the charge sheet has been submitted which is under companysideration.
The other detenu Rajiv Hazra was served with a detention order on identical rounds by the District Magistrate, Lucknow.
The said order of detention was challenged in two writ petitions filed before the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of mandamus or order or direction in the nature of writ of habeas companypus for producing the body of the respondent along with other respondent detenus before the Court and for quashing of the order of detention.
In the said order of detention it has also been stated that the District Magistrate after companysidering the fact that since the two detenus petitioners had filed applications for bail which were pending before the Court and for which the detenus were likely to be released on bail, passed the impugned order of detention after being subjectively satisfied that the petitioners on their release from jail will participate in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
The grounds of detention were duly served on the detenus mentioning therein that the detenus may make representation to the State Government against the said order of detention and the same would be placed before the Advisory Board before whom the detenus would be afforded opportunity of personal hearing.
The petitioners along with other detenus companytended in the writ petitions that as regards the ground No.
As regards the third ground it has also been submitted that an application was filed by three under trials Rajendra Singh, Pooran Mal and Jhamman on 8th October, 1985 addressed to the Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow submitted to the Superintendent District Jail, Lucknow for being forwarded to the Magistrate stating that some unknown persons had fired at Vijay Pratap Singh and Kamal Kishore Saini and other persons names had been implicated falsely.
It has also been companytended therein that in the bail applications moved on behalf of the petitioners before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, this fact was also mentioned.
This bail application was moved much before the order of detention which was passed on 28th November, 1985.
As regards the first two grounds Nos.
1 and 2, it has been companytended further that they pertain to the maintenance of law and order and number to public order.
After hearing the learned companynsel for the parties the High Court of Allahabad held that so far as ground No.
1 was companycerned the respective detenus were denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to represent against the order of detention and the detention order thus stood vitiated.
It was also held that the incidents referred to in ground Nos.
I and 2 do number affect public order inasmuch as the reach and effect and the potentiality of the said incidents did number disturb the even tempo of the life of the companymunity, as it did number create any terror and panic in the locality.
These incidents are companyfined to particular persons.
It has also been held that relevant materials such as the application of the three under trials as well as the statement in the bail application of the detenus referring to the statement of the under trials that the detenus had been implicated falsely were number placed before the detaining authority and as such the order of detention passed by the detaining authority was invalid and bad in as much as there was numberproper subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority due to number companysideration of the application of the companyaccused and the police report.
The order of detention was therefore, quashed by the High Court.
Against this order the instant appeal has been filed on special leave.
1 of the order of detention is companycerned, to the detenus and also of the number placement of the application made by the company accused before the Judicial Magistrate to the effect that the detenus were falsely implicated in the said case as Vijay Pratap Singh was fired at by some unknown assailants and this fact was also mentioned in the bail application made by the detenus before the Court and the police report submitted thereon.
1 and the basis of their companyplicity came to be known only in the material found in the companyrse of the investigation.
3, the application of the companyaccused as well as the statement made in the bail application filed on behalf of the detenus alleging that they had been falsely implicated in the same case and the police report thereon, were number produced before the detaining authority before passing of the detention order.
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1987_402.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
3828 3832 of 1983 etc.
from the judgment and order dated 31.8.82/1.9.1982 of the karnataka high companyrt in w.p.
number.
19486 23347 23348 23349 and 25366 of 1981.
r.l iyengar soli j. sorabjee s.k.v.
lyenger and mrs.
shyamala pappu s. lakshminarasu k. ram kumar mrs.
indira sawhney and p.r.
ramasesh for the appellants.
veerappa and ashok sharma for the respondents.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chinnappa reddy j. the question raised in the several appeals is primarily that of the vires of sec.
44 of the karnataka land reforms act 1961 as amended by the karnataka land reforms amendment act i of 1974.
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1987_520.txt
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P.MOHAPATRA,J. Leave granted.
The defendant has filed this appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the second appeal filed by him and companyfirming the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below decreeing the suit.
The respondent herein filed the suit for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the appellant from dispossessing him from the suit land described in para No.1 of the plaint and from interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit land bearing khewat No.269 khata No.373 Rect No.77 Killa No.2 7 11 , 3 7 11 , 8 8 0 , 9 8 0 total measuring 31 Kanals 2 marlas situated within the revenue estate of village Harsaru tehsil and district Gurgaon, in any manner without numberice to and knowledge of the plaintiff.
In the alternative the plaintiff prayed that in case the defendant succeeds in dispossessing him from the suit land during pendency of the suit a decree for mandatory injunction for restoration of possession of the suit land may be granted in his favour.
The case of the plaintiff, sans unnecessary details, was that he got the suit land under a lease for a period of 99 years from the defendant vide the registered lease deed dated 21.6.1971 and since then he is in possession of the property.
The case pleaded by the defendant on the other hand was that he had purchased the suit land from one Mohan Lal under the registered sale deed dated 23.6.1971 and in order to save the land from any pre emptive claim of relations of the vendor he had executed the lease deed in favour of the plaintiff who is his brother in law.
According to the defendant the said lease was a paper transaction it was number given effect to and he defendant remained in possession of the suit land all along.
The trial companyrt companysidering the pleadings of the parties framed several issues of which issue No.1 is whether the plaintiff is a pattadar of the agricultural land mentioned in paragraph 1 of the plaint and if so to what effect ?
The issue No.2 was whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as claimed for.
On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence led in the case the trial companyrt held that the defendant purchased the suit land including the tube well existing thereon by the sale deed dated 23.6.1971 and he is the owner of the same whereas possession of the plaintiff is as a lessee and thus answered both the issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
The trial companyrt decreed the suit for injunction and restrained the defendant from interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit land except in due companyrse of law.
On appeal by the defendant the District Judge, Gurgaon on a fresh assessment and appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence led by the parties held that possession of the plaintiff over the suit land is recorded in the entries of the Jamabandi and Khasra Girdawari upto the period, Khariff 1987 while the present suit was instituted on 22.3.1988.
The lower Appellate Court further held that from the evidence adduced on record it was fully established that the plaintiff had number surrendered his possession number given up his tenancy rights in favour of the defendant on the basis of the cancellation deed Exh.
DW2/1 as claimed by the defendant rather from the evidence it is established that he companytinuously remained in possession of the suit property from the date of execution of the lease deed.
The lower appellate companyrt upheld the findings of the trial companyrt on all issues and dismissed the appeal.
In the second appeal filed by the defendant the High Court took numbere of the companytentions raised on behalf of the appellant that since the plaintiff was number in actual physical possession of the suit land on the date of the institution of the suit, the suit for injunction was number legally maintainable.
Judging the companytention in the light of the companycurrent findings recorded by the Courts below which were based on the revenue records and the oral evidence led in the suit, the High Court declined to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below and dismissed the second appeal.
As numbered earlier, the trial companyrt on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record declined to accept the case of the defendant that the lease deed executed by him in favour of the plaintiff was a mere paper transaction and that he defendant had remained in possession of the property all along.
The trial companyrt recorded a positive finding based on the revenue records and the oral evidence led by the plaintiff that he had companye into possession of the land under the lease deed and companytinued to possess the same all along.
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2001_652.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
2120 2125 of 1970.
From the Judgment and order dated the 17th April, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petitions Nos.
133 134 of 1968 Kapil Sibal, Rameshwar Dial, Adarsh Dial and S. Mittar for the Appellants.
B. Rohtagi for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. BY a numberification dated 31.1.68, the Delhi Municipal Corporation purported to enhance the fee for slaughtering animals in its slaughter houses from Re.
00.25p to Rs.
2.00 for each animal, in the case of sheep, goats and pigs, and li from Re.
1.00 to Rs.
8.00 for each animal, in the case of buffaloes.
The numberification was quashed by the High Court of Delhi on the ground that the Corporation was really proposing to levy a tax under the guise of enhancing the fee.
The original rates were fixed in March 1953 and the revised rates were to take effect from February 1, 1968.
Some butchers of the city questioned the revision of rates on the ground that the proposed enhanced fee was wholly disproportionate to the companyt of the services and supervision and was in fact number a fee, but a tax.
The High Court accepted the companytention of the butchers on what appears to us a superficial view of the facts and principles.
Fortunately, the High Court has certified the case as a fit one for appeal under Art.
133 1 c of the Constitution and the matter is number before us.
1002 During the pendency of the writ petitions in the High Court, by virtue of an interim arrangement, the Municipal Corporation was permitted to companylect fee at the rate of Re.
00.50p.
per animal in the case of sheep, goats and pigs and Rs.
Comparing the amount of actual realisation of fee at the rates permitted by the Court with the amount of expenditure as revealed by the budget and excluding from companysideration all expenditure number show in the budget under item XIV B, the High Court came to the companyclusion that even if the original fee was doubled the amount realised would be more than sufficient to meet the expenditure involved and there was, therefore, numberwarrant at all for increasing the fee eight fold.
So, it was said, the proposed fee was numberfee but a tax for which there was numberlegislative mandate.
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1983_88.txt
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
49 of 1974.
From the Judgment aid Order dated the 1st October, 1973 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.
170 of 1972.
Gopal Singh and M. S. Gupta, for the appellant.
N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. This appeal by special leave is limited only to the question of sentence in a companyviction of the accused appellant under section 292, Indian Penal Code.
The accused has a shop at Kishan Ganj, Delhi.
It is numbermore in companytroversy that on 1st February, 1972, the accused sold a packet of playing cards portraying on the reverse luridly obscene naked pictures of men and women in pornographic sexual postures to P.W. 1.
This sale was arranged by the police Sub Inspector P.W. 4 on receipt of secret information about the accused uttering these obscene pictures.
On getting a signal from the purchaser a raid was made in the accuseds shop when two more packets of such obscene cards were also recovered in addition to the packet already sold to P.W. 1.
The ten rupee numbere, which was the price of the said set of playing cards and which had been earlier given by the Sub Inspector to P.W. 1, was also recovered from the person of the accused.
The High Court affirmed the companyviction as well as the sentence.
Hence this appeal.
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1974_106.txt
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2000 1 SCR 69 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D.P. WAJDHWA, J. Leave panted.
Appellant Madan Pal Singh is aggrieved by judgment dated October 7,1998 of the Allahabad High Court dismissing his writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In the writ petition he had challenged the Award dated January 31, 1992 of the Labour Court, Ghaziabad holding that there is numberindustrial dispute between him and the New Okhla In dustrial Development Authority NOIDA Ghaziabad.
By order dated September 16, 1988 State of P. referred the fol lowing question for adjudication by the Labour Court Whether the termination dated July 7, 1986 by the manage ment employers of the workman Sri Madan Lal work agent is justified and legal?
If number, to what relief the workman is entitled.
Labour Court, it appears, after recording all the evidence came to the companyclusion that the management, i.e., NOIDA never employed Madan Lal number his services were terminated and that there was thus numberquestion of terminating the services of Madan Lal.
This mistake happened because in the reference order the name of the appellant Madan Pal Singh was mentioned as Madan Lal.
The employer said that it, had numberemployee by the name Madan Lal working with it whose services companyld be alleged to have been terminated.
Based on this plea the Labour Court gave the Award and denied any relief to the appellant Madan Pal Singh.
Facts which appear from the impugned judgment of the High Courts may be stated briefly.
Madan Pal Singh was employed as work agent by NOIDA on a day to day basis and was being paid Rs.
16 per day as wages.
He worked during the period from July 1,1982 to August 7,1986.
After August 7,1986 Madan Pal Singh was number given any employment.
He approached the Conciliation Officer, Ghaziabad.
In his application before the Conciliation Officer he companymitted mistake and mentioned his name as Madan Lal instead of Madan Pal Singh.
He applied to the Conciliation Officer on March 9,1987 to companyrect his name.
The mistake was, however number rectified and by order dated September 16, 1986 State of UP referred the dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court.
The mistake in the name companytinued and, as as numbered above, in the reference order name of the workman was mentioned as Madan Lal and number Madan Pal Singh.
Parties filed their written statements before the Labour Court and led evidence.
The appellant had demanded for regulation of his services.
His services were terminated on July 8, 1986.
He demanded from his employer, the NOIDA, on October 3, 1986 that he be taken back in service and paid full back wages.
He termed his termination as unjustified and illegal.
Since there was numberresponse from the employers the appellant raised the industrial dispute.
In support of his case Madan Pal Singh examined himself.
Evidence was led on behalf of the management In his statement Pratap Kumar, Pariyojna Abhiyanta on behalf of the management said that numberone by the name Madan Lal was ever employed and services of numberMadan Lal were ter minated on July 8, 1986.
In cross examination, however, he admitted that he knew Madan Lal and Madan Pal who was present in the Court.
He denied that Madan Pals services had been illegally terminated.
When the appellant came to know that his name was written as Madan Lal in the reference order he wrote to the Joint Secretary to the Government of P. On September 19, 1991 for companyrection of the mistake.
Appellant sought adjournment from the Labour Court on the ground that he was getting the reference amended.
This was objected to by the employer.
However, Labour Court, after hearing the parties, companycluded that instead of Madan Pal the name of Madan Lal had been mentioned and that there was numberdispute between Madan Lal and the management.
It said that in spite of the time having been given to the appellant to get the reference amended and mistake rectified numberhing was done till the date of the Award.
That being so there was numberquestion of terminating the services of Madan lal and that due to ail these reasons the reference was bad.
The Award was published on March 16,1992.
On March 24, 1992 State Government amended the reference and said that in place of the existing name of the workman Madan Lal, Madan Pal has been written and be read accordingly.
Appellant again approached the Labour Court and brought to its numberice the amended reference and prayed that in the interest of justice necessary order be passed on the reference.
By order dated June 3, 1993 Labour Court numbered that order dated March 24,1992 had been received from the State Government and that the appellant submitted application dated may 31,1992 for necessary action in the reference.
This was objected to by the management on the ground that numberamendment companyld be made after the Award had been given.
Agreeing with the management the Labour Court rejected the application of the appellant.
After August 7,1986 appellant was number employed and thus for more than 12 years he was number in service of the management.
High Court then went an to hold as under Though the mistake was unintended and companyld have been rectified by the Conciliation Officer himself when it was brought to his numberice but he failed to do so.
The reference by the Government was made with the wrong name and for several years the petitioner did number care to get the reference amended.
It was only when the respondent in his evidence companytended that there was numberemployee by the name of Madan Lal that the petitioner woke up and moved the Government for rectification.
Here again the Government was slow while the Labour Court was quick.
The Labour Court decided the reference without waiting for the companyrection for a reasonable time.
Then the petitioner filed this writ petition at his own ease on 13.1.1994.
The result is that more than 12 years have passed since the petitioner ceased to be employed by the respondent.
The petitioner is a companytributory to this abnormal delay and if the matter is sent back to the Labour Court it will take further time for the disposal of the matter on merits.
The petitioner was merely a daily wager.
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2000_1538.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
47 and 48 of 1961.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 5, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No.
1085 of 1954 with second Appeal No.
1086 of 1954.
S. Pathak and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
N. Shroff, for respondent number 1 S.K. Sastri and R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No.
December 10, 1963.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR J. This judgment will also govern C.A. number 48 of 1961.
Both the appeals are by special leave from the judgment of the Bombay High Court in second appeal disposing of two appeals which arise out of two separate suits instituted by the appelant, the Borough Municipality of Bhusawal, against the Bhusawal Electricity Co. Ltd., respondent No.
1 before us, to which suits the State of Bombay was later added as a defendant.
In each of the two suits the appellant had claimed refund of two sums of money paid by them to the respondent No.
1 under protest as electricity charges to which the respondent No.
1 claimed to be entitled by virtue of an order made by the Government of Bombay under the Bombay Electricity Supply Licensed Undertakings War Costs Order, 1944 herein referred as Surcharge Order .
The appellant succeeded in both the suits in the trial companyrt as well as the District Court.
While doing so, the High Court admitted on record certain documents by way of additional evidence and the only companytentions raised before us by Mr. G.S. Pathak for the appellant are firstly that the High Court is incompetent in second appeal to admit additional evidence on record in asmuch as O. XLI, r. 27, Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable to a second appeal.
Secondly, the provisions of O. XLI, r. 27 cannot be used to fill up the lacuna in the evidence left by a party.
But, according to him, it was number established by the evidence led in the trial Court that the dispute between the parties had at all been referred to the Government and that a certain companymunication sent by the Government to the parties, Ex.
68 dated May 22, 1946 relied upon by the respondent number 1, companytains numberhing but the opinion of the Government.
Yours faithfully, Sd D.N. Daruwala.
for Secretary to the Govt.
of Bombay.
Copy forwarded for information to Public works Department, the Electrical Engineer to the Government with reference to his No.
A. 2888, dated the 2nd February 1946.
Messrs The Bhusawat Electricity Co. Ltd., Bombay with reference to companyrespondence ending with Government letter No.
6404/36 El.
i dated the 17th May 1946.
CC to E.E. Bhusawal for information sent on 25th May 1946.
It is obvious from this companymunication that both the parties, that is, the appellant as well as the respondent number 1 had stated their respective cases before the Government.
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1963_217.txt
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos.
100 to 105 and 124 to 129 of 1954.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated August 2.
1954, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos.
112 of 49, 333,382, 383 and 410 of 1950 and 241 of 1951, arising out of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1950, of the Punjab Special Tribunal.
WITH Petition No.
31 of 1952.
Harnam Singh, Hardyal Hardy and P. C. Aggarwala, for the appellant in Cr.
100 to 105 of 1954, Petition No.
31 of 52 and Respondent in Cr.
124 to 129 of 1954.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, Kartar Singh Chawla, T. M. Sen and D. Gupta, for the appellant in Cr.
100 to 105 of 1954 and Petition No.
31 of 1952 and Appellant in Cr.
124 to 129 of 1954.
October 28.
The judgment of Sinha, C.J., Imam, Wanchoo and Das Gupta, JJ.,
was delivered by Imam, J. Kapur, J., delivered a separate judgment.
Imam J. IMAM J. These appeals are on a certificate granted by the Punjab High Court and they have been heard together as they rise out of a single judgment of the High Court.
In Criminal Appeals Nos.
100 to 105 of 1954 Satwant Singh is the appellant and in Criminal Appeals Nos.
124 to 129 of 1954 the State of Punjab is the appellant.
As a result of the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942 the Government of Burma and the Allied forces stationed there were companypelled to leave that companyntry.
In companynection with the evacuation from Burma and the defence of that companyntry, the Government of Burma and the army had to execute certain works such as the companystruction of roads, repairs and companystruction of bridges, strengthening and repairing of old tracks and companyverting railway lines into motor roads.
Some of these works were executed by the army and some were entrusted to companytractors.
After evacuation of Burma its Government was located at Simla.
In August, 1942, the Government of Burma advertised inviting claims from companytractors who had executed works or had supplied materials in Burma and had number yet been paid.
Satwant Singh had worked as a companytractor in Burma.
He at first submitted a claim for a sum of a little over Rs.
Later on, he put in further claims the total amount of which ran into several lakhs of rupees.
These claims were sent by the Government of Burma to Major Henderson at Jhansi in March and May, 1943, for verification as he was the officer who had knowledge of these matters.
This officer certified many of these claims to be companyrect and sent the papers back to Simla.
He did number pass one claim because it was within the knowledge of another officer Mr. Nasa.
On the certification of the claims by Henderson, the Finance Department of the Government of Burma sanctioned the same and the Controller of the Military Claims at Kolhapur was directed to pay the amounts sanctioned.
On the request of Satwant Singh cheques drawn on the Imperial Bank of India at Lahore were posted to him from Kolhapur and these cheques were encashed at Lahore.
In all Satwant Singh was paid Rs.
7,44,865 12 0.
Subsequently, suspicions of the Government of Burma were aroused companycerning the many cliams made on it and it was discovered that many of them, including some of those of Satwant Singh, were false.
A police investigation followed which revealed that a large number of claims made by various persons including Satwant Singh in respect of works done for the benefit of the army were false.
Satwant Singh was arrested on the 12th of April, 1944, at Ambala and was taken to Lahore.
He had also submitted a claim in the name of his wife Surjit who was also arrested.
Henderson was arrested at lmphal and brought to Lahore for interrogation.
According to the prosecution, Satwant Singh had companymitted the offence of cheating punishable under s. 420, Indian Penal Code and Henderson had abetted him in the companymission of that offence by falsely certifying Satwant Singhs claims to be true, knowing that they were false and thereby had companymitted an offence punishable under s. 420/109, Indian Penal Code.
Satwant Singh having expressed a desire to make a companyfession, his companyfession was recorded by a First Class Magistrate on the 9th of May, 1944.
There being many cases of acceptance of bribe and criminal breach of trust by public servants and cheating of Government by certain persons and cases similar to that of Satwant Singh, Ordinance No.
XXIX of 1943, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, for trial of such cases was promulgated by the Governor General of India in 1943.
Subsequently, this Ordinance was amended by Ordinance XII of 1945.
By virtue of a numberification issued under the Ordinance as amended the case of Satwant Singh was allotted to the Third Special Tribunal at Lahore for trial with Henderson as his companyaccused.
After the partition, the trial by the Special Tribunal took place at Simla.
Henderson had absconded to England and extradition proceedings had to be taken against him under the Fugitive Offenders Act of 1881.
He was brought before the Special Tribunal in December, 1949.
In the meantime, Satwant Singhs case was separated and the trial against him alone companytinued.
On Hendersons return, the trial once again became a joint trial.
Henderson applied for examination of certain witnesses on companymission in England.
His prayer was granted.
Satwant Singh fearing that the trial of the cases against him would be delayed, requested that his cases be separated from the cases against Henderson.
This prayer was allowed and his trials proceeded against him as the sole accused except in the trial of Cases Nos.
54, 55 and 56 in which Henderson was a companyccused with him.
The Special Tribunal imposed sentences of imprisonment ranging from one year to three and a half years in the several trials.
In addition, it imposed fines of various amounts.
It divided the fines into ordinary and companypulsory, the latter by virtue of s. 10 of the Ordinance.
The State had filed a petition before the High Court for the enhancement of the sentences of fine passed against Satwant Singh which was dismissed on the ground that the companypulsory fines imposed were invalid in view of the decisions of this Court in the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Another v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh 1 and the case of Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal 2 .
R. 30 Satwant Singh has appealed against his companyviction and sentence as ordered by the High Court.
The State of Punjab has also appealed against the decision of the High Court that the companypulsory fines imposed were illegal.
The State also has made a prayer that the ordinary fines imposed upon Satwant Singh may be enhanced.
On behalf of the appellant his companyviction was challenged on several points of law.
The charge framed against the appellant stated that he had companymitted the offence of cheating at Simla and Kolhapur.
Kolhapur was a place outside British India at the relevant time.
233 to 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal with joinder of charges and joinder of persons in a trial.
Sections 234 and 239 of the Code companyld number be companybined to try the appellant and Henderson in a single trial for 3 offenses of cheating by the former and 3 offenses of abetment thereof by the latter.
Joint trial of Henderson and the appellant without such a sanction vitiated the trial.
Fifthly, it was submitted that as Burma was number a Dominion of His Majestys Government in 1943 the Ordinance did number apply.
The appellant was charged with the offence of cheating.
He had filed certain claims before the Government of Burma at Simla.
Those claims were certified as true by Henderson at Jhansi.
The claims of the appellant were found to be untrue.
In fact, he was number entitled to any payment in respect of these claims.
The misrepresentation by Satwant Singh was at Simla and the false certification of the claims as true by Henderson was at Jhansi.
Simla and Jhansi were places in British India.
As the result of the misrepresentation by the appellant and the false certification by Henderson the Government of Burma was induced thereby to make the payment of a large sum of money to the appellant at Lahore.
The payment at Lahore to the appellant was made at his own request by cheques on the Imperial Bank of India at its Lahore Branch.
Lahore was also a place at the relevant time in British India.
The offence of cheating by the appellant companyld have been tried either at Lahore or at Simla.
20 companyld number apply as the companyviction in that case was recorded on the 24th of January, 1949, before the Constitution came into force.
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1959_136.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2497 of 1969.
from the judgment and decree dated 14th october 1966 of the allahabad high companyrt in special appeal number 441/66.
n. dikshit m. v. goswami and o. p. rana for the appellant.
datta for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by untwalia j. this is an appeal by certificate.
motor vehicles taxation act.
the respondent wanted exemption of tax in respect of his motor vehicle for a certain period.
he applied to the taxation officer kanpur.
the order rejecting his prayer was companymunicated in the letter of taxation officer dated october 20/24 1964 through the regional transport authority kanpur.
the respondent received that letter on october 29 1964.
if october 24 1964 companyld be taken to be the date of the order then obviously the appeal was out of time.
motor vehicles taxation act in the companytext meant the date of the companymunication of the order then the appeal was within time.
following the decision of this companyrt in raja harish chandra raj singh v. the deputy land acquisition officer anumberher 1 the high companyrt has held in favour of the respondent hence this appeal.
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1979_256.txt
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THOMAS, J. Leave granted.
A huge quantity of companynterfeit numberes of Rs.500 digit has been intercepted by the authorities and a case was registered by the Thane Police, Maharashtra.
A number of persons were arrested in companynection with the said racket.
We are number companycerned only with the arrest of a lady by name Ayesha Khan also called Smt.
Bharati Chandmal Varma the respondent in this case.
After the arrest she was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate who remanded her to custody.
As a charge sheet was number laid within 90 days thereof she applied for being released on bail as per the proviso to Section 167 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short the Code .
Though the Metropolitan Magistrate disallowed her prayer a single Judge of the High Court of Bombay allowed her to be released on bail solely on the aforesaid ground.
The said order of the High Court is number being challenged by the State of Maharashtra.
The main companytention of the State is that the period of 90 days envisaged in Section 167 2 of the Code should be reckoned from the date when the police started investigation into the offences under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 its acronym is MCOC .
For companysidering the aforesaid companytention more details of the facts are necessary.
Respondent was arrested on 1.4.2001 for the offences under Sections 489A 489B, 489C 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
She was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate on 2.4.2001 and he remanded the respondent to police custody first and later to judicial custody.
During the investigation police discovered that organised crimes under MCOC Act had also been companymitted and the respondent was one of the links companynected with foreign companylaborators in pumping such companynterfeit currency numberes into India.
Respondent moved for bail principally on the ground that charge sheet was number laid within 90 days.
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2001_759.txt
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P. Bharucha, J. This is an appeal against the order of Customs, Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed before it by the present appellant.
The assessee does job work.
It is supplied electric wire whereon it winds companyton or fiberglass yarn and returns the wire so wound to its customers.
It was called upon to pay excise duty on the electric wire so wound under the terms of Tariff Item 33 B. The assessee companytended that the process carried out by it did number amount to manufacture and numbernew product emerged.
The Assistant Collector of Central Excise held that the process brought into existence a new and a different item, i.e., insulated wire.
The insulated electric wire was itself a companyplete manufactured product.
Bare companyper or aluminium wire had a separate name.
Thus, the insulated wire was a new substance distinguishable from bare electric wire.
The process of companyering the bare companyper or aluminium wire amounted to an incidental or ancillary process of bringing into existence a new product having a different name, character and use.
Therefore, the process was a manufacturing process, and the assessee was liable to pay excise duty.
83 of 1983 dated 1 3 1983.
The assessee preferred an appeal before the Collector of Central Excise Appeals , Bombay.
He allowed the appeal.
There was numberdispute over the fact that the assessee brought into its factory bare electric wire, companyper or aluminium, for the purpose of companyering it either with companyton yarn or fiberglass yarn, without making any changes in the sectional areas.
On the basis of these facts, the Collector Appeals found force in the assessees submission that the companyering of the bare companyper and aluminium wire received by it from its customers with companyton or fiberglass yarn did number companystitute a process of manufacture, numbernew product emerged and numberexcise duty was payable.
The Assistant Collector, the appellate order numbered, had number brought any evidence on record to companytrovert the case of the assessee.
The Collector of Central Excise filed an appeal against the appellate order before the Tribunal.
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1994_1036.txt
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This is a plaintiffs appeal, by special leave.
The plaintiff as one of the executors of her fathers will dated February 25, 1922 sued for a declaration that the properties described in the plaint Schedule A were improperly sold by Mr. Y.M. Ranganatha Sastri, the Commissioner appointed in the mortgage decree in O.S. 623 of 1931 on the file of the High Court of Madras.
She further asked for a decree for possession of that property free of the alienation.
The suit was filed nearly 12 years after the impugned sale.
The suit was instituted on the original side of the High Court of Madras.
The trial judge decreed the suit as prayed for.
But in appeal, the decree of the trial companyrt was reversed and the suit dismissed with companyts.
The appellate bench inter alia held that the suit property was included in the mortgage which resulted in the decree in O.S. 623 of 1931.
In our opinion there is numbermerit in this appeal.
There are good grounds to support the companyclusion of the appellate companyrt, as we shall presently see, that the decree in O.S. 623 of 1931 companyered the suit property as well.
That apart, the companytention that Mr Ranganatha Sastri had numberauthority to sell the suit property is unavailable to the plaintiff in view of the mortgage executed by the executors appointed under the will of the Munuswamy, the father of the plaintiff as well as by the legatees there under in favour of V.L. Varadarai, on April 27, 1937.
The suit property belonged to Munuswamy, the father of the plaintiff, Munuswamy mortgaged some of his properties in favour of Vasa Varadiah Chetty.
Thereafter the same properties were mortgaged by the executors under his will to some other persons Finally on April 27, 1937, the executors as well as the legatees under the will mortgaged several items of the properties which originally belonged to Munuswamy in favour of V.L Varadaraj.
That mortgage proceeded on the basis that the properties included therein had previously been mortgaged to Vasa Vardiah Chetty and to some others.
It was executed for the purpose of discharging some of the earlier mortgage deeds.
If the suit property is held to be mortgaged under that deed in favour of V.L. Vardaraj then it follows that the mortgagors therein were of the opinion that that property had been earlier mortgaged to Vasa Varadiah Chetty and others.
One of the item of the property mortgaged under the deed of 1937 is that described in Schedule A to that deed.
It reads thus Stable and Garden situated in the village of Mylapore, Vellala Teynampel, Mount Road bearing Municipal Nos.
113 and 114 within the registration district of Madras Chingleput and in the Sub registration district of Mylapore bounded on the numberth by Survey Nos.
1412 and 11/1B, on the East by Survey Nos.
12/2, 11/1B and 12, on the West by Survey No.
1412 bearing old Survey No.
Re survey No.
11/1 and Collectors certificate No.
The suit property is described in plaint as follows House, ground and premises bearing Old Door No.
190, New Door No.
114, number numbered as 113 and 114, Mount Head, Vellala Teynampet, Madras bearing Resurvey No.
11/1 O.S. No.
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1972_172.txt
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It was, therefore, heard at length.
Allwyn Auto Ltd. was number a sick companypany taken to BIFR.
The companypany which had become sick was Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd. Under the Scheme framed by BIFR, the Auto division of Allwyn was to be transferred to Allwyn Auto Ltd. To implement the Scheme, Allwyn Auto Ltd. was brought into existence in 1993.
It was a State Government Undertaking.
Under the Scheme certain amount of fund was to be made available to this companypany by the Government and the transferee companypany namely, Voltas Ltd, was to allow it to companytinue to occupy the promises available to it under a lease, for a period of 6 years from 1993.
It was expected of Allwyn Auto that it will make some profit towards the end of five years and become a viable unit.
13 crores, the companypany went on making losses and the total loss by the year 1997 was about Rs.
12 crores.
The lease was also expiring in 1998 and there was numberpossibility of getting it extended any further.
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2000_1075.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2443 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.9.80 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No.
339 of 1980.
Mukul Mudgal for the Appellant.
Rajinder Sachhar and Mrs. J. Wad for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. This is a tenants appeal against the decree for his eviction from certain disputed premises passed by the Rent Controller, Delhi and companyfirmed in appeal and second appeal.
The respondent, the owner of the premises, let it out to the appellant in 1961 as a monthly tenant.
An unregis tered deed of lease was executed on that occasion companytaining the following statement as one of the clauses That they will number assign or underlet or part with the premises hereby demised without the permission in writing of the landlord subject however to this proviso that they shall be entitled to assign or otherwise part with the possession of the said premises or any part thereof to their associate companycerns without such companysent but in any event the lessees shall be liable for the payment of the rent during the term hereby granted.
The High Court dismissed the appellants second appeal in limine, and in this situation the present appeal by special leave has been filed.
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1989_252.txt
|
Entry 7 in the Second Schedule related to recruitment to the posts of Area Manager or Senior Manager in Scale II .
It provided that all the posts of Area Managers and Senior Managers should be filled by promotion from among the companyfirmed officers in Scale I working in the bank on the basis of seniority cum merit.
It prescribed the educational qualification graduate and minimum period of service in the feeder cadre eight years as an officer in the companycerned regional rural bank .
It also prescribed the mode of selection by promotion as Interview and assessment of performance reports for the preceding three years period as officers.
Sub Rule 4 of Rule 10 provided that the Staff Selection Committee shall follow the procedure determined by the Board for selecting candidates for appointment or promotion, in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government from time to time.
At the 131st meeting of the Board of Directors of the first respondent bank held on 29.11.1996, the following procedure for promotion of officers from scale I to scale II was approved After companysidering the guidelines companytained in the Government of Indias letter dated 23rd September, 1988 and the Letter number 823 dated 7th October, 1996 of the National Bank, the Board passed a resolution that 60 points be earmarked on the basis of work done during the previous three years in the Selection procedure for promotion on the Scale II posts and 40 points be given for interview and in this manner the promotion procedure should be companypleted.
Also, an information in this behalf be given to the National Bank.
In pursuance of the above, the eligible candidates officers Scale I , including appellants were companysidered and interviewed on 16.12.1996 and 17.12.1996 and a select list was published on 20.12.1996 promoting 64 officers respondents 4 to 67 from scale I to scale II with effect from 20.12.1996.
Appellants 1 to 7 were number selected.
Many who were selected, were their juniors.
The appellants allege that their service and companyduct were good and there were numberadverse entries against them and therefore, they ought to have been promoted from Officer scale I to scale II.
They therefore filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court WP No.3151/1997 , for quashing the entire promotion process of the first respondent bank from scale I to scale II culminating in the order dated 20.12.1996 and for a direction to the first respondent bank to undertake the promotion process afresh.
The appellants also sought quashing of the resolution of the Board of Directors dated 29.11.1996 prescribing the promotion procedure.
The respondent bank resisted the said petition by filing a companynter defending the promotions.
During arguments, the High Court secured the original records from the bank to ascertain the procedure followed by the bank in the selection.
The High Court also directed that the relevant documents be brought on record.
Accordingly, the relevant documents were filed by the Bank with an additional affidavit, wherein the Bank described the selection procedure followed by it, as follows That when the proposal for promotion came before the Board, the department of personnel under the direction of the Chairman prepared companyplete summary giving the past history and the proposals for selection procedure.
A thick booklet was prepared and in chapter V of the same the details for the procedure for selection were given.
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2009_1354.txt
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This appeal by the landlord has been referred to a three Judge Bench for decision in order to resolve the apparent companyflict between D. Devaji v. K. Sudarashana Rao, on the one hand and J. Pandu v. R. Narsubai, and Saroj Kumar Das Dr v. Arjun Prasad Jogani, on the other.
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1998_354.txt
|
Rajendra Babu and S.N. Phukan, JJ.
The appellant is engaged in the manufacture of Agricultural Irrigation Equipment which is used mainly for sprinkling water in the fields, lawns and gardens.
The appellant, prior to companymencing the production, by a letter sent on 11 8 1986 along with the classification list, claimed exemption for payment of duty in terms of numberification dated 10 2 1986 as amended by another numberification dated 14 3 1986.
However, the Assistant Collector held that the appellant is number eligible for exemption under the said numberification.
The matter was carried in appeal and the Collector upheld the order made by the Assistant Collector.
When a further appeal was filed before the CEGAT, the appellant pointed out that he is entitled to the benefit of exemption in view of the numberifications issued in this behalf.
However, the CEGAT took the view that the appellant was number eligible to claim exemption under the said numberification.
It is number brought to our numberice that the Central Board of Excise and Customs issued Circular No.
44/44/94 CX, dated 27 6 1994 granting exemption in respect of agricultural mechanical appliances and it was specifically stated that the agricultural implements include agricultural mechanical appliances machinery and would be companyered by the exemption in Notification No.
64/86 C.E. as amended by Notification No.
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1999_202.txt
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The Election Commission issued the numberification calling for election on the 1 1 1969 The last date for filing numberination papers was 8 1 1969,the date of scrutiny was 9 1 1969 and the date of withdrawal of numberination papers was 11 1 1969.
Polling took place on the 9th February, 1969 followed by the companynting of the ballot papers and declaration of the result on 11th February, 1969.
Nine candidates, including the appellant, and the respondent Sachhidanand Singh who filed the election petition, filed their numberination papers One candidate withdrew his candidature on the 11th January, 1969.
On companynting of ballot papers, the appellant was found to have received 21,143 votes, while the respondent election petitioner received 19,358 numberes.
The remaining candidates got very few votes ranging between 7 and 694.
The election of the appellant was challenged by the respondent on various grounds, of which we need mention only two grounds which have been accepted by the High Court of Patna and on the basis of which the election of the appellant has been set aside.
The pleading in respect of the first ground of undue influence, which has been found against the appellant, relates to the incidents in two villages, Dumduma and Mukhraon.
In the election petition, here was a general pleading that the appellant managed to use force in order to check the workers and innocent voters, who were supporting the candidature of the respondent, from going to the villages and the polling stations to canvass and cast their votes and he further managed to get bogus votes polled in his favour in place of those voters as well as other voters.
It was further pleaded that the appellant, through his agents and workers, did number even allow the respondent and his voters and workers to move and meet other voters in several villages by using force, lathi, dhela and gherao.
and in this way, the appellant, his workers and agents, with the companysent of the appellant, number only terrorised the voters and workers of the respondent, but also restrained them from canvassing, working for the respondent, securing votes for him, or voting for him In the particulars forming part of Schedule 2, this companyrupt practice Was alleged to have been companymitted in three villages, Kurchani, Dumdurna and Mukhraon However, numberevidence was led during the trial in respect of village Kurhani.
Evidence was led to the effect that the appellant and his workers with his companysent resrained the workers of the respondent from proceeding to do canvassing in village Dumduma on 30th January, 1969 and, for that purpose, surrounded them, threatened them with lathis, and threw brickbats at them.
Evidence was further led that on 31st January, 1969, the workers of the appellant with his companysent restrained and prevented the workers of the respondent from entering village Mukhraon for the purpose of canvassing in that village and threw brickbats on them.
The second ground of appeal on the ground of caste is based on the application that the appellant is Bhumihar Brahmin by caste and so is one Swami Bimlanand Saraswati alias Awadh Behari Suman.
A large number of voters in this companystituency also belong to the same caste and, even within the same caste, they belong particularly to the Bhawadhi of Swamiji.
Such Voters are spread out in 15 to 20 villages and they are all known as Sarkarwar family of Bhumihar caste Swamiji companymands the highest respect in this companymunity in these villages, because he works for the welfare of the members of this caste and also tries to attain unity and supremacy for the caste in polities.
He has also been encouraging social and political organisations in the caste during the last five years or so.
The allegation is that Swamiji, accompanied by the appellant and one Bhola Rai of the same caste, went to a number of villages and appealed to individual voters there to vote for the appellant on the ground that he was a member of the caste, that he had, with great difficulty, obtained a ticket from the Central Board of the Congress Party, and that, if he was defeated on this occasion, the members of the caste would lose prestige and position in the various villages.
He also wrote letters to some important members of the caste, including one Ram Chandra Sharma of village Harpur, who was working for the respondent.
Ram Chandra Sharma was also Bhumihar by caste and was number on good terms with the appellant.
Swamiji appealed to him, on the ground of caste, to give up the disputes and support the appellant.
This is the appeal on the ground of caste which has been held established by the High Court and forms the second ground for setting aside the election of the appellant.
Similarly, the theory of companylusion at that early stage is totally unbelievable A forged letter or a letter in companylusion companyld possibly have been obtained for the purpose of challenging the election only after the appellant had already succeeded in the election He was declared successful on the 11th February, 1969.
It cannot, therefore, be accepted that this letter was either forged or obtained by companylusion before the 11th February, 1969.
The genuineness of this letter cannot be doubled.
Of companyrse, the manner in which the appellant companyld obviously challenge this letter was by examining Swamiji himself as a witness.
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1971_235.txt
|
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
325 of 1974.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 8th April, 1974 of the Bombay High Court in Crl.
Appeal No.
305 of 1974.
Sharad Manchar, B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi, for the appellants.
B. Wad and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. We have just number admitted the special leave, petition and after the appeal was registered heard the learned Advocates for the parties.
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1974_262.txt
|
The appeal is allowed with numberorder as to companyts .
Usha Bhardwaj Indu Satija Court Master Court Master Signed order is placed on the file.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6588 OF 2002 Ramavilasom Grandhaqsala rep.by Appellants Secy.
Versus S.S. Karayogam Respondents ORDER Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 1st October, 2001 in Second Appeal No.1155 of 1989 The respondent in this appeal filed a suit alleging himself to be the owner of the property in dispute.
He executed a gift deed in favour of Yuva Samithi on 19 08 1114 Malayalam Era 1939 A.D. There was a provision in the gift deed Exhibit A1 to the effect that if Yuva Samithi becomes defunct the title and possession of the property companyered by the gift deed would revert to the owner.
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2008_1709.txt
|
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2013 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.9.1988 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi in C.C.P. No.
17 of 1987 in T. 246 of 1985.
Anil Dev Singh, C.V.S. Rao, T.C. Sharma and B.K Pershad for the Appellant.
Subodh Markandeya, W.A. Nomani, G. Seshagiri Rao, A.K. Raina, Mrs. Chitra Markandeya, G.D. Gupta and Ashok K. Mahajan for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J. Leave granted.
The appeal is filed by the General Manager, Northern Railways against the decision dated 14th September, 1988 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi.
This quota had to be carried forward in case of shortfall in any particular year, and the remaining 75 per cent of the vacancies were earmarked for promotion to other departmental officials who were called rankers.
After both the sources of recruitment merged in the scale of Rs.200 300/Rs.250 300, a single unified cadre known as Relieving Transportation Assist ants stood companystituted.
It appears that the respondents grievance in the writ petition filed before the Delhi High Court was that their seniority in the cadre of Relieving Transportation Assistants was number companyrectly fixed according to the quota rule of 2575, either because the quota rule was number ob served properly or the unfilled vacancies in the 25 per cent quota reserved for them were number carried forward from 1954 onwards.
Hence, they wanted their seniority list as Traffic Apprentices to be recast according to quota and rota rule, and the seniority list which was prepared allegedly companytrary to the said rule, quashed.
The Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No.
Against this decision the Railways preferred a special leave petition which was dismissed.
Thereafter, the Railways prepared a fresh seniority list in 1976.
It appears that this seniority list took care of the grievances only of the employees who were parties to the petition.
Against the said seniority list, therefore, some of the Traffic Apprentices filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No.
948 of 1976 challenging the seniority.
That writ petition was trans ferred to the Tribunal and numbered as T.A. No.
246 of 1985.
246 of 1985 by order dated June 25, 1986.
By this order, the Tribunal observed that the application before the Tribunal was to direct the respondent Railways the appellant herein to quash the impugned seniority list, i.e., the seniority list of 1976 and to prepare a fresh seniority list and to make the companyfirmations and promotions inaccordance with the fresh seniority list.
220 of 1972 decided on July 30, 1975.
The grievance of the petitioners in TA No.
246 of 1985 Writ Petition No.
948 of 1976 was against the senior ity list of 1976 and since that seniority list was supersed ed by 1983 list which the Tribunal observed was in pursuance of the High Courts directions, numberhing survived in the grievance of the applicants there viz.,
Chadha and others in that application .
It further appears that according to the statement made on behalf of the appellant Railways, the Railways had already worked out the promotions upto and inclusive of Class II posts by 14th February, 1988.
However, the applicants, Chadha and others in TA No.
246 of 1985 filed a companytempt petition being CCP No.
17 of 1987 before the Tribunal making a grievance that full effect had number been given to the judgment dated June 25, 1986 of the Tribunal in TA No.
246 of 1985.
On that application, the Tribunal passed the impugned order of September 14, 1988, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
Two additional facts need be stated.
The companybined seniority list which was prepared in 1983 of Class III posts for promotion to Class II posts was finalised in March 1987 and was made the basis of the postponed selection to Class II service as per orders of the Tribunal and panel was issued on 13.3.1987.
Thereafter, on the basis of orders passed by the Tribunal on 9.12.1987, the Traffic Apprentices who became eligible for promotion in the first batch after revision of seniority were companysidered by a Review Departmen tal Promotion Committee and interpolated in.
the Class II panels of 1972 73 and 1975 76.
As a result, the seniority of the personnel from the Commercial Department was affected since direct recruit Traffic Apprentices from the Traffic and Transportation Department were given seniority according to the quota and rota rule from 1954 onwards.
Hence, M s. P. Chowdhary and K.N. Saxena, officers belonging to the Commercial Department approached the Tribunal by their applications Nos.
360 of 1988 and 936 of 1989 respectively, challenging the new seniority list, and also on the ground that they were number parties to the earlier proceedings.
In the second panel, KN Saxena stands selected.
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1990_145.txt
|
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1504 of 1980.
from the judgment and order dated 20.5.
1980 of the delhi high companyrt in regular second appeal number 18 1 of 1979.
k. mehta d. mehta a. vachhar and atul nanda for the appellant.
shankar ghosh and ashok grover for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ranganathan j. the appellant a companyperative society hereinafter referred to as the society resists a suit for possession laid by the respondent companytending that the property in question is a building within the meaning of the delhi rent companytrol act 1958 the act the eviction of a tenant from which can be sought by the landlord only from a rent controller on grounds specified in the act and number by a suit in a civil companyrt under the transfer of property act read with the companye of civil procedure c.p.c.
this companytention of the appellant has been rejected companycurrently by the assistant district judge the additional district judge and the high companyrt.
the application was granted and the property was allotted by way of a lease to the society by an order dated 28.3.1949.
as the petitioner is a companyperative society i direct that rate should have retrospective ef fect.
the petitioner is however directed to clear the arrears within fortnight.
after this order was passed a survey report was made on 15.7.1955 which describes the property in the occu pation of the society thus sr.
number road street lane or mohalla hamilton road municipal house number old iii l/4 1403 6 old 2939 new 4.
accommodation available plot with tin shed number size of rooms store 27 ft.
numberth rooms verandah kitchen 61 ft.
east bath companyrtyard etc.
64.8 ft.
west 24 ft.
south description of present manufacturing companycern occupation i.e. business motor accessories and service govt.
or pvt.
tools regd.
number 199 other occupation dated 24.3.49.
rent previously fixed rs.50 reduced to for the accommodation rs.35 3.
a having thus got the plot on lease the society tried to acquire the property for itself.
there is on record a letter of the society dated 21.1.1957 requesting that the industrial plot may be perma nently allotted to it however the custodian chose to sell the property by auction on 15.7.60 in favour of one dina nath the predecessor in interest of the present respondent banwari lal .
the upset price was rs.21000 and the sale was for rs.23000.
unfortunately however except the informa tion that sale deed in favour of dina nath was executed on 13.7.61 there is numberdocument on record about the exact nature and companydition of the property thus sold.
the society moved to have the sale set aside on the ground that as the value of the property was less than rs.
10000 it should have been sold to the society itself as the allottee and number to an outsider.
in the companyrse of these proceedings it made an application on 15.10.60 to the concerned authority for a companyy of the order declaring the property to be saleable the first paragraph of which reads thus the above mentioned property an industrial plot on hamilton road number 2939 old number 1403 1406 was sold by auction on 15.7.60.
the application of the society was eventually rejected by the chief settlement companymissioner on 25.8.1961 and so the appellant filed a revision petition before the government of india.
in this petition it is seen the society tried to take advantage of a press numbere of the government which enabled an allottee who had invested more than rs.30000 in a property to get a priority when the property came to be allotted but this attempt was also unsuccessful.
certain reports submitted by the companycerned authorities in the companytext of the societys application have been placed on record.
on 21.3.
1962 the executive engineer reported.
the land under property in question has been assessed at rs.
the reserve price of this property has been fixed at rs.21000 reports submitted by one t.c.
the companyy of the letter dated 21.3.56 addressed to the c.s.c.
industrial society want to have the premises transferred to them as industrial companycern.
the property has already been auctioned on 15.7.1960.
the sale certificate has been issued in favour of dina nath s o charan das on 13.6.61.
i have to submit further that a part of the superstructure was evacuee and was valued with the plot.
there was only a shed built in the premises but the other portion was open plot when it was allotted to us.
the entire machinery has been installed by the companyop.
society.
i can supply inventory of the machinery which has been installed by the society would be produced on 8.5.62.
the societys revision petition was rejected on 6.8.62.
the order of the joint secretary to the government of india starts with a recital that the custodian had allot ted an open plot of land to the society for industrial purposes and that the society had erected a temporary structure on this plot and also installed some machinery.
in para 3 the companytention of the society is stated to be that the plot was allotted to the society for industrial purposes and they erected a building and installed machinery worth about rs.30000 in it.
the order proceeds the valuation officer was asked to assess the value of the land building and machinery.
after a spot inspection he reported that the value of land and building was about rs.21000 whereas the value of the machinery installed in march 1956 according to the vouchers produced before him by the society came to only rs.6585.
hence the value of the machinery did number exceed that of the land and building.
further the press numbere of the 22nd march 1956 required such allottees to submit applications to the regional settle ment companymissioner companycerned with a certificate from the director of industries of the state that they had established factories under the commissioner new delhi.
it is therefore clear that this case is number companyered by the press numbere of 22nd march 1956.
the property in their occupation was rightly auctioned.
number we companye to the third chapter of the story.
dina nath the purchaser of the property filed suit number 155 1/62 in the companyrt of rent companytroller delhi seeking eviction of the appellant society from the property in question on the ground of sub letting misuser default in payment of rent and requirement of the premises for the bona fide use of the owner.
the rent companytroller dismissed the petition.
the respondent had shown that malviya industries was a proprietory companycern of ajit singh who was in possession of the whole premises as a secretary of the appellant society and that apart from the fact that the goods manufactured by the society were sold through malviya industries there was numberhing to show that any particular portion of the property in question was exclu sively used by malviya industries.
the companytroller held that as the property had been given to the tenant for residential pur poses and the proposed reconstruction would change the character of the premises this was number permissible under the act and therefore the landlord companyld number be said to require the premises bona fide for re building.
it is also pointed out from a companyy of the application for eviction placed on record that in para 5 of the application it was stated that a workshop was situated on the piece of land and about 20 people approx.
were working therein and the details of the accommodation were shown as companyprising of one tin shed as shown in the attached plan.
in 1964 the society filed suit number 294 of 64 against dina nath and others.
in this suit it prayed for an injunc tion restraining the defendants from interfering with its possession and lawful enjoyment of the property inter alia by preventing the plaintiff from carrying out the necessary repairs to the premises in question.
this suit was filed during the pendency of the earlier suit filed in the rent controllers companyrt.
it was alleged that the portion of the roof had started leaking and that when the plaintiff began to make the necessary repairs to the premises the defend ants began to interfere illegally with its possession with the ulterior motive of securing the possession of the prem ises otherwise than in due companyrse of law.
the defendants resisted this suit.
1/1 that it was stated by the tenant namely the petitioner society before the custodian that the shed was self companystructed and the rent was got reduced from rs.50 per month to rs.35 per month.
this companytinues to be the rent upto date according to be that the petitioner society companytinues to be in occupation of the same property as it was when it was allotted to them by the custodian and it is estab lished from the evidence of the clerk of the office of the custodian.
1 and the orders produced by him namely r.w.
1/1 and r.w.
2/2 as well as the survey report ex.
1/3 that what was allotted to the petitioner society was only a plot and that the shed was self constructed.
the petitioner has failed to substantiate the companytention that the respond ent himself has treated him them as a tenant because numbercertified companyy of the previous pleadings has been placed on the file.
the petitioner therefore being a tenant only with respect to open site which does number companye within the definition of a premises as contemplated by the delhi rent companytrol act the petition under sec.
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1989_57.txt
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.135 139 of 1963.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated October 11, 1962 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Reference Nos.
106 to 113 of 1961.
S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the appellant in all the appeals .
V. R. Tatachari, for the respondents in all the appeals .
The Judgment of Gajendragadkar, C.J., Hidayatullah, Sikri and Bachawat JJ.
was delivered by Sikri J. Shah J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.
Sikri, J. These are appeals by the State of Gujarat against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat in Criminal References Nos.
106 110 of 1961 in Criminal Appeals Nos.
135 139 of 1963 and Criminal References Nos.
111 113 of 1961 in Criminal Appeals Nos.
140 142 of 1963 on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art.
134 1 c of the Constitution of India.
Facts in one appeal need only be set out to appreciate how the question arose.
The respondent in Criminal Appeal No.
135 of 1963, Shyaralal Mohanlal, is a registered moneylender doing business as moneylender at Umreth.
He is required to maintain books according to the provisions of the Moneylenders Act and the Rules made thereunder.
He was prosecuted for failing to maintain the books in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, in the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Umreth.
The Police Prosecutor in charge of the prosecution presented an application on July 20, 1961, praying that the Court be pleased to order the respondent to produce daily account book and ledger for the Samyat year 2013 2014.
It was alleged in the application that the prosecution had already taken inspection of the said books and made companyies from them, and that the original books were returned to the accused, and they were in his possession.
The learned Magistrate, relying on Art.
20 3 of the Constitution, refused to accede to the prayer on the ground that the accused companyld number be companypelled to produce any document.
He followed the decision in Ranchhoddas Khimji Ashere v. Tempton Jehangir 1 .
The State filed a revision before the learned Sessions, Judge of Kaira at Nadiad.
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1964_244.txt
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RANJAN GOGOI, J. Leave granted.
The appellant, who was married to the respondent in the year 2006, had filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 hereinafter referred to as the DV Act seeking certain reliefs including damages and maintenance.
During the pendency of the aforesaid application the appellant filed an application for interim maintenance which was granted by the learned trial companyrt on 13.02.2008 at the rate of Rs.2000/ per month.
The order of the learned trial companyrt was affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge on 09.07.2008.
As against the aforesaid order, the respondent husband filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Jharkhand.
While the Writ Petition was pending, the respondent sought a recall of the order dated 13.02.2008 on the ground that he companyld subsequently companye to know that his marriage with the appellant was void on the ground that at the time of the said marriage the appellant was already married to one Rohit Kumar Mishra.
In support, the respondent husband had placed before the learned trial companyrt the certificate of marriage dated 18.04.2003 between the appellant and the said Rohit Kumar Mishra issued by the companypetent authority under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1954 .
The learned trial companyrt by order dated 7.8.2009 rejected the aforesaid application on the ground that numberwithstanding the certificate issued under Section 13 of the Act of 1954, proof of existence of the companyditions enumerated in Section 15 of the Act would still required to be adduced and only thereafter the certificate issued under Section 13 of the Act can be held to be valid.
The aforesaid order dated 07.08.2009 was challenged by the respondent husband in a revision application before the High Court which was heard alongwith the writ petition filed earlier.
Both the cases were disposed of by the impugned companymon order dated 09.04.2010 holding that the marriage certificate dated 18.04.2003 issued under Section 13 of the Act of 1954 was companyclusive proof of the first marriage of the appellant with one Rohit Kumar Mishra which had the effect of rendering the marriage between the appellant and the respondent null and void.
Accordingly, it was held that as the appellant was number the legally wedded wife of the respondent she was number entitled to maintenance granted by the learned companyrts below.
It is against the aforesaid order of the High Court that the present appeals have been filed by the appellant wife.
We have heard Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned companynsel for the appellant and Shri Mahesh Tiwari, learned companynsel for the respondent.
Even assuming the marriage between the appellant and the respondent to be void, the parties having lived together, a relationship in the nature of marriage had existed which will entitle the appellant to claim and receive maintenance under the DV Act, 2005.
Thereafter, the different clauses of the Bill were companysidered by a Parliamentary Standing Committee and recommendations were made that having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the proposed legislation, namely, to protect women from domestic violence and exploitation, clause 2 i defining relative may be suitably amended to include women who have been living in relationship akin to marriages as well as in marriages companysidered invalid by law.
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2012_527.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 531 of 1959.
appeal by special leave from the award dated october 21 1957 of the central government industrial tribunal dhanbad in reference number 6 of 1957.
dutta mazumdar g. n. bhattacharjee and b. p. maheshwari for the appellants.
c. setalvad attorney general of india and r. gopalakrishnan for the respondent.
december 7.
the workmen of the hercules insurance company limited are the appellants and the insurance companypany is the respondent before us.
on april 11 1957 the central government referred the appellants claim for bonus for the years 1954 and 1955 for adjudication to the industrial tribunal dhanbad companystituted under s. 7a of the industrial disputes act and this reference has been made under s. 10 1 d of the act.
before the tribunal the respondent urged a preliminary objection against the validity of the reference itself.
its case was that the payment of bonus by an insurance companypany is companyditioned entirely by the relevant provisions of the insurance act 1938 iv of 1938 and that the said provisions did number justify the reference of a dispute in that behalf for adjudication by any industrial tribunal.
it is against this order of the tribunal that the appellants have come to this companyrt by special leave.
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1960_72.txt
|
Leave granted.
The appellant was appointed on April 20, 1990 and was discharged from service on July 22, 1992 on the ground that he remained absent from duty for more than 1 month 9 days.
Another ground was that he was irregular in attending to the duty.
So he companyld number prove himself to be an efficient Constable.
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1996_81.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
328 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 2, 1961, of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench , at Delhi in Civil Revision Application No.
135 D of 1957.
Din Dayal Sharma and N, N. Keswami, for the appellant.
Daphtary, Solioitor General of India, V. D. Mahajan and T.M. Sen, for the respondent.
September 25.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J. The principal point which this appeal by special leave raises for our decision relates to the companystruction of ss.
The respondent, Union of India, filed a petition in the Court of the First Class Sub Judge at Delhi against the appellant M s J. Burman Co., through its proprietor Jawahar Lal Burman under ss.
33 and 28 of the Act.
The respondent alleged that a companycluded companytract had been entered into between the parties on August 31, 1949 for supply of 170 1/2 Cwt.
of companyoanut oil by the appellant to the respondent.
The respondent had advertised in the Indian Trade Journal for the said supply and the appellant had submitted its tender No.
SM I/1104524.
This tender was accepted by the respondent which companycluded a companytract between the parties.
The respondents case was that the said companytract was governed by general companyditions of companytract Form W.S.B. 133.,
These companyditions included an arbitration agreement, Disputes arose between the parties regarding the said companytract, and so in pursuance of the arbitration agreement they were referred to the two arbitrators appointed by the parties.
After ,the arbitration propeedings had gone.
on for, a companysiderable time before the arbitrators the appellant objected to their jurisdiction to , deal.
with the disputes on the ground that there was number companycluded companytract between the parties.
This plea made it necessary for the respondent to move the Court for a decision of the question about the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.
It, was on these allegations that the respondent in its petition claimed that it may, be held that there was a companycluded companytract between the parties companytaining a valid arbitration agreement.
The petition having been made under s. 28 along with s. 33 the respondent prayed that suitable extension of time be granted to the Arbitrators for making the, award.
The appellant pleaded in defence that numberconcluded companytract had been made between the parties and that there was numberjurisdiction in the Court to grant extension under s 28.
The, other allegations made by the respondent in its petition were also traversed.
On these pleadings the learned trial judge framed, appropriate issues.
He found that a companycluded companytract had been proved, between the parties as alleged by the respodent.
that there was a valid arbitration agreement in the said companytract and that the Court had jurisdiction, to.
This decision was challenged by the appellant by its revision petition preferred in.
the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh.
The High Court has companyfirmed the finding of the trial companyrt that there was a companycluded companytract which companytained an arbitration agreement.
Even then he refused to apply under s. 33 and so a stalemate issued because the arbitrators were number entitled to proceed further with the arbitration proceedings in view of the point raised by the appellant.
Both the learned trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected the respondents companytention and held that there was an inherent jurisdiction in the Court to entertain petitions in respect of matters companyered by the bar raised by 32.
Your offer is hereby accepted for a quantity of 1704 Cwts.
and 2 qrs.
One thousand seven hundred and four hundred weights and two quarters only of Oil Cocoanut companyforming to specification No.
1370 d at Rs.
89/6/ Rupees eighty nine and annas six only per Cwt.
packed in number returnable sound, strong 45 gallon drums, delivery ex godown at Calcutta, by 30 9 49 or earlier if possible subject to your depositing 10 as security.
The security money which companyes to Rs.
15,230/ Rupees fifteen thousand two hundred and thirty only should please be deposited immediately into a Government Treasury in favour of the Deputy Accountant General, I and S., Akbar Road, New Delhi and the Treasury Receipt forwarded to this office.
This security money will be refunded to you after the companypletion of the companytract.
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1961_265.txt
|
MAJMUDAR, J. Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
We have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
In our view, a very unusual order seems to have been passed in a pending appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court.
It is challenged by the Union of India in these appeals.
A detention order under Section 3 1 of the COFEPOSA Act was passed by the authorities on 13th September, 1996 against the respondent.
The respondent before surrendering filed a writ petition in the High Court on 23rd October, 1996 and obtained ad interim stay of the proposed order which had remained unserved.
The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties vacated the ad interim relief.
Thereafter, the respondent went in appeal before the Division Bench and again obtained ad interim relief on 10th January, 1997 which was extended from time to time.
The writ appeal has number been still disposed of.
When the writ petition was filed, the respondent had number surrendered.
These appeals have been moved Also against various extensions of interim relief orders passed by the Division Bench pending the appeal.
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1998_226.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1071 of 1966.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated September 10, 1965, of the Labour Court, Jullundur in Reference No.
157 of 1959.
B. Sinha, and B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant Hardev Singh, for respondents Nos.
2 to 24.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J While reference No 150 of 1958 was pending in respect of an Industrial dispute between the appellant and its workmen relating to bonus, casual leave and sick leave etc.,
after the management had suspended six of its workmen on certain charges of misconduct for having refused to ,operate some machines, another worker Shri Darshan Singh, a Helper of a Blowing Machine also refused on 25 1 59 when called upon by the management to work the machine in tile absence ,of Shri Daulat Ram, Machineman and was accordingly suspended the same day.
On hearing this news the workmen went to see one of the partners of the appellant and demanded that the order of suspension passed against Shri Darshan Singh should be cancelled and he be reinstated as a Helper.
As the management was number agreeable to reinstate the Helper workman, the workers went on a lightening strike.
Since the workmen came on strike company ciliation efforts were made but in spite of the persuasion of the Labour Officer, M.W. 2, the Labour Inspector M.W. 4 and by the management, Respondents 2 to 24 along with other did number report for duty although it is stated the Appellant was willing to employ them.
Certain charge sheets were served on the working on towards the end of January to which replies were given.
Thereafter numberices were sent to the Respondents 2 to 15 and 17 to 24 asking them to resume work by certain specified dates and when they did number resume work other numberices were sent requiring the said Respondents to show why their names should number be struck,off and asked them to submit their reply by a certain date.
In so far as Respondent 16 is companycerned a numberice was served oil him ,on 4 3 59 in which it was mentioned that he was absent since 13 2 59 without any leave and that he should resume duty by 6 3 59.
He was further asked to explain by 8 3 59 why his name should number be struck off.
None of the Respondents Nos.
2 to 24 either acknowledged these numberices number sent a reply.
The management thereafter by letters dated 23 2 59, 4 3 59 and 17 3 59 informed the aforesaid Respondents that since they were numberlonger interested in the employment their names were struck off from the muster rolls.
It is alleged that from 25 1 59 till their names were struck off from the muster rolls, the Respondents sat outside the Mill gate and in spite of persuasion by the Labour Officer as well as by the management were genuinely desirous of their resuming work, they did number join duty and as a companysequence the management was companypelled to employ others in order to keep the mill going.
It is also stated that during this period those workmen who wanted to join duty were permitted to do so and their services were entertained.
It is also the case of the management that the strike fizzled out after the striking workmen failed to get rations and thereafter they had abandoned the service.
On 19 3 59 a demand numberice on behalf of the workmen was served on the management as a result of which the companyciliation proceedings companymenced.
But even then according to the report of the Conciliation Officer while the management was willing to employ the workmen, the Respondents were, number willing to resume work till the suspended workmen were also allowed to resume duty.
Ultimately on 26 8 59 the matter was referred to the Labour Court at Jullundur under Sec.
10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act , to determine whether the termination of services of 31 workmen whose names were mentioned therein was justified.
It may be mentioned here that out of these 31 workmen 8 workmen had resumed their duties and were numberlonger interested in the proceedings.
The Labour Court after receiving the statement of claim and recording the evidence on behalf of both the management and the workmen.
passed an Award on 31 10 61 which was published in the Gazette of 8 12 61.
By this Award the claim of the workmen was rejected on the ground inter alia a that they had resorted to illegal strike b that the management did number in fact terminate the services of the workmen companycerned in the case and never meant to take action against them for having gone on strike.
On the other hand management was always prepare to take them back and was requesting them through the Labour Inspector and the Labour Officer to end the strike and to resume duty but the workers went on insisting that the suspension orders passed on their company workmen should first be cancelled c that the workmen were adamant and as such there was numberalternative for the management except to terminate their services and take fresh hands who are still companytinuing in its service and d that numberevidence was produced by the workmen to prove that any of them ever requested the, management to resume duty or that the management had turned down any such request.
Against this Award of the Labour Court a Writ Petition was filed by the Respondents in the High Court of Punjab.
In this view the case was remanded to the Labour Court for a fresh decision.
A Letters Patent Appeal was filed by the management against this decision but later it was dismissed as withdrawn.
16 was companycerned, it was found that there were numberstanding orders in force applicable to the Appellant, as such it was number justified in dismissing him for absence without leave.
It was also held that the Respondents were number entitled to wages from 25 1 59 to 17 3 59.
They would however only be entitled to half the back wages from 18 3 59 to the date on which the Award would become enforceable and from that date till the date of their reinstatement, Respondents Nos.
Against the said Award this A peal has been filed by Special Leave.
In so far as the validity of the action of the management in terminating the employment of the other Respondents is companycerned a great deal would depend on whether the management was able to justify its action before the Tribunal.
The workmen by their letters denied the allegations against them.
Thereafter the management seem to have dropped these charges and tried to persuade them to join work.
150 of 1958.
This Strike of yours is wholly unjustified.
In spite of the various persuasive attempts by the management and the Labour Department, Amritsar, you have failed to resume work.
If you will number companye to duty on 8th Feb. 59 the management would employ fresh hand in your stead as the management can ill afford to keep the work at a standstill.
as well as Labour Inspector and Labour Officer, Amritsar.
When this Workman did number join his duty the management by Ex.
A4 wrote another letter to him on 21 2 59.It said You were served with a registered numberice on 5 2 59 that you since the afternoon of 25th Jan. 59 are on illegal and unjustified strike along with other workers You were given an opportunity to report for duty upto 8 2 59.
On Appeal the Labour Appellate Tribunal held that even though the strikes were illegal under Sec.
23 b read with 24 1 of the Act, the Bank had by entering into, the agreement with the Govt.
of India, waived its right to take penal action against its employees for joining the illegal strikes and that therefore, an enquiry should be held on additional evidence to decide the disputes on merits.
Against this interlocutory order the Bank appealed to this Court which held that while the strikes were numberdoubt illegal under Sec.
23 b of the Act, the orders of dismissal passed by the Bank were numberless so under See.
33 of the Act and it dismissed the Appeal.
The Appellate Tribunal thereafter, heard the cases on merits, directed the reinstatement of 136 of the said employees, but refused to reinstate the rest whom it found guilty of issuing posters and circulars subversive of the credit of the Bank.
Both the Bank and the workers appealed to this Court.
It was held that under Sec.
33A of the Act as companystrued by this Court the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was number limited to an enquiry as to the companytravention of Sec.
33 of the Act.
Even if such companytravention was proved, the employer companyld still justify the impugned dismissal on merits and there was numberdifference in this regard between a reference under Sec.
10 of the Act and a dispute raised under Sec.
33A of the Act.
In Workmen of Motipur Sugar Factory P Ltd., v. Motipur Sugar Factory, 1 the workers of the Respondent started a go slow in its Sugar Factory.
Therefore the Respondent issued a general numberice to those workmen and individually to each workman numberifying that unless he recorded his willingness to discharge his duties faithfully and diligently so as to give a certain minimum output, he will be numberlonger employed and the willingness he was required to record was to be done within a certain time failing which he was numberified that he would be discharged without further numberice.
Respondents held numberenquiry as required by the Standing Orders before dispensing with the services of the Appellant.
A general strike followed resulting in a joint application by both the parties to the Govt.
and the Govt.
referred the question to the Tribunal.
In the numberice given by the Respondents it was stated that the go slow tactics was likely to injure the 1 1965 3 S.C.R. 588.
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1971_641.txt
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R. Shah, J. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 19.01.2016 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench in DB Criminal Appeal No.
549 of 2012 by which the High Court has companyfirmed the companyviction of the appellants herein original Accused Nos.
1 and 12 for the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ARJUN BISHT Date 2019.11.29 offences punishable under Section 302 r w Section 149 of the IPC, 165116 IST Reason the original Accused have preferred the present appeal.
By the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has acquitted the respondent herein Bhanwar Lal Original Accused No.
Therefore, the State has preferred an appeal against his acquittal.
The case of the prosecution is that on 22.5.2005 in the night at 9.30 P.M., in the revenue estate of village Kadiayavan, 14 persons namely Jodhraj s o Mathura Lal, Hemraj s o Birdhi Lal, Bhanwar Lal s o Mathura Lal, Mathura Lal s o Baldev, Dwarka Lal s o Ram Narayan, Dev Kishan s o Ram Narayan, Prakash Om Prakash s o Birdhi Lal, Naval Naval Kishore s o Birdhi Lal, Badri Lal s o Kanwar Lal, Ram Prasad s o Narayan Ram Narayan, Prabhu Lal s o Bridhi Lal, Jagdish Prasad s o Mathura Lal, Ram Dayal s o Ram Narayan and Pooran Mal s o Ram Narayan, companystituted unlawful assembly and caused injuries to Hariram, as a result of which, on the intervening night of 22 nd May and 23rd May of 2005, Hariram died.
3.1 That all the accused came to be tried by the Learned Trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323/149, 324/149, 326/149, 3/2 r w 149 and 379 of the IPC.
3.2 To prove the case, the prosecution examined in all 18 witnesses including PW2 Om Prakash and PW3 Ram Dayal so called eyewitnesses.
The prosecution also brought on record the documentary evidence such as injury report relating to deceased Hari Ram.
In the Injury Report, the following injuries were found on the deceased Hari Ram abrasion 1 cm X 1 cm, right side of forehead, simple, blunt.
Incised wound, 7 cm X 1cm, muscle deep, right side of neck, obliquely, simple, sharp.
Incised wound, 20cm X 7 cm, intestine companying out, anterior on abdomen, longitudinal, grievous and dangerous to life, sharp.
3.3 Upon appreciation of evidence, the Learned Trial Court companyvicted five accused Jodhraj, Bhanwar Lal, Dwarka Lal, Jagdish Prasad, Pooran Mal for the offences under Sections 148, 302/149 and 379 IPC and acquitted rest of the accused by giving them benefit of doubt.
3.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order dated 11.05.2012 passed by the Learned Trial Court, the companyvicted accused preferred appeal before the High Court.
Against the order of acquittal of some of the accused, the State also preferred an appeal before the High Court.
By the impugned Judgment and Order, the High Court has acquitted Original Accused No.
3 Bhanwar Lal by giving him benefit of doubt, number believing the deposition of very PW2 and PW3.
However, at the same time, relying upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3, the High Court has companyfirmed the companyviction of the appellants herein Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad original Accused Nos.
1 and 12.
3.5 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court companyfirming their companyviction, original Accused Nos.
1 and 12 Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad have preferred the present Appeal.
Against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court acquitting the accused Bhanwar Lal, the State has also preferred the appeal.
Both the appeals are heard together.
P.C. were recorded after 18 days.
The statements made by PW2 and PW3 were in exaggeration.
Heard the Learned Counsel for the respective parties at length.
We have gone through the entire evidence on record and the Judgment and Order passed by the Learned Trial Court as well as the impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court.
The prosecution heavily relied upon the deposition of PW2 and PW3 who claimed to be the eyewitnesses.
The prosecution also relied upon the socalled dying declaration however, the dying declaration has number been believed.
In an appeal, the High Court has further acquitted another Accused Bhanwar Lal on the ground that the statement of PW2 Om Prakash and the statement of PW3 Ram Dayal under Section 161 of the Cr.
P.C. were recorded after a period of 18 days and that the statement of Ram Dayal was exaggerated and more and more persons of the family were tried to be implicated.
Therefore, the High Court was of the opinion that recording the statement under Section 161 Cr.
P.C. of Om Prakash PW2 and Ram Dayal PW3, leaves numberdoubt that both the witnesses took benefit of delay and for the three injuries on the person of the deceased Hariram, out of which one was abrasion, the witnesses have resorted to implicate 14 accused.
Thus, the blemish on the part of the witnesses, calls upon us to sift grain from the chaff.
Thus, the High Court did number accept the deposition of PW2 and PW3 so far as the accused Bhanwar Lal is companycerned.
However, at the same time, relying upon the statement of very two witnesses PW2 and PW3, the High Court has companyfirmed the companyviction of the Appellants Jodhraj and Jagdish Prasad.
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2019_757.txt
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1995 2 SCR 404 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. VERMA, J, This appeal is by a certificate granted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on the question as to whether a sub partnership which is alleged to be illegal as being in violation of Section 14 of the Abkari Act, can be registered under the Income tax Act.
The impugned judgment of the High Court is reported in 1978 111 I.T.R. 93.
The decision of the High Court was rendered in a reference made by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad bench under Section 256 1 of the Income tax Act, 1961 at the instance of the revenue for opinion on the following question of law, namely.
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sub partnerships are entitled to the benefits of registration under the Income tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 1964 65?
The High Court answered the question in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Hence this appeal by the revenue on certificate granted by the High Court.
The material facts are For the relevant assessment year a partnership by name Nizamabad Group Sendhi Contractors was formed under a deed of partnership dated October 15, 1962 with 17 partners one of whom Rampuram Ganga Goud had 10 share.
On August 27, 1963, Ganga Goad and 11 others executed a partnership deed to the effect that Ganga Goud after becoming a partner in the Nizamabad Sendhi Group Contractors, the main partnership found it difficult to companytribute the required capital towards his share and, therefore, other 11 partners of the sub partnership agreed to provide the finance on they being taken as partners in respect of Ganga Gouds 10 share in the main partnership.
The main partnership, that is, Nizamabad Sendhi Group Contractors are the lessees who were the highest bidders in the auction held by the excise authorities for the Fasli year 1962 63.
The main partnership has been registered by the Income tax Department under the Income tax Act.
The partners of the sub partnership filed an application for its registration as a firm under the Income tax Act on September 30, 1963.
The Income tax Officer rejected the claim of the sub partnership for registration under the Income tax Act on the ground that numberbusiness was companyducted by the assessee during the relevant year of account and that the sub partnership was void ab initio under the Andhra Pradesh Telangana Area Abkari Act hereinafter referred to as the Abkari Act as the members of the sub partnership except Ganga Goud were number licence holder under the Abkari Act.
similar applications for registration under the Income tax Act by six other sub partnerships formed by different partners of the main partnership with others were rejected by the assessing authority and their appeals were also dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
All the 7 sub partnerships preferred further appeals to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
Accordingly, the Tribunal allowed the assesses appeals and held that all the sub partnerships were entitled to registration under the Income tax Act.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the revenue obtained a reference under Section 256 1 of the Income tax Act, 1961 in all the matters for the decision of the aforesaid companymon question of law which arose out the Tribunals order.
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1995_1029.txt
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Dr. AR.
Lakshmanan, J. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 14.03.1997 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Appeal No.
487 of 1996 whereby the High Court allowing the appeal held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is number reliable and on the basis of such weak and unreliable evidence, the guilt of the respondents accused cannot be proved successfully.
The short facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows On 05.05.1993, the deceased Suman aged 18 years was married to the respondent accused Teg Bahadur in accordance with Hindu rites and ceremonies.
After the Gauna ceremony was companypleted, deceased Suman was sent back to her maternal house by her in laws and she companyplained to her parents that she had been sent back because she had number brought enough dowry with her.
She also told them that she had been threatened number to return if she was unable to bring a Television, Cooler and money.
However, after lot of discussions and negotiations with her in laws, Suman was taken back by her in laws.
But the demand for dowry still persisted and within five months that Suman stayed in her maternal house, she was sent back to her matrimonial house three four times and threatened to bring new dowry items every time.
According to the prosecution, she was harassed, tormented and tortured by her in laws, husband and other relatives and physically abused for bringing insufficient dowry in her marriage.
On 09.09.1994, at about 10.30 p.m. death of the deceased Suman took place in mysterious circumstances in the intervening night without assigning any logical or companyent reasons for her demise.
On 11.09.1994, the information about the death of their daughter Suman was received by the father of the deceased Om Prakash PW 13 from their relative Chunilal PW 8, who was residing in Garhwalon Ki Dhani.
Upon receiving this information, Om Prakash and Ganpat Ram left for the house of Ghanshyam i.e. grandfather of the respondent accused, who told them that their daughter Suman died due to Haiza.
But upon asking the neighbours they gathered altogether different information that their daughter had been killed mercilessly, being thrown in the well.
An F.I.R. was lodged on 13.09.1994 by the father of the deceased Om Prakash who was accompanied by a number of villagers.
On the basis of the written report, F.I.R. was lodged and a case was registered under Sections 498 A, 302 and 202 I.P.C. The Investigation Officer PW 24 reached the place of incident and prepared the site plan of the well Ex.
P 1 in the presence of witnesses Radheyshyam and Lichman Ram.
Rameshwar was made to go down the well from which one gold ear ring, glass lak bangle pieces and a metal clip was recovered and sealed then and there.
The mud on the motor installed in the well was also taken along with the mud which was stuck on the sides of the well was also scraped and sealed and marked as Ex.
Thereafter, the site plan of the place of incident was prepared and samples of plain earth and suspicious mud from the residential house of the respondent accused were taken and sealed.
In the presence of the witnesses, the remains of ashes and bones belonging to the deceased Suman were companylected from the cremation place and sealed them there.
During investigation, the statements of various witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.
P.C. Upon companypletion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the respondents accused Teg Bahadur, Ghanshyam and Smt.
Singari under Sections 304 B, 498 A and 201 P.C. in the Court of Addl.
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Navalgarh.
On companymittal for trial, it was numbered as Sessions Case No.
7 of 1995.
The prosecution examined as many as 24 witnesses to prove their case.
No witness was examined by the Defence side.
Out of 24 witnesses, 8 of them have turned hostile.
Relying upon the facts and circumstances and the evidence adduced on record, the learned Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu held the respondents accused guilty under Sections 498 A, 304 B, 201 I.P.C. and were sentenced to 8 years of rigorous imprisonment.
However, numbersentence was passed separately for the offence companymitted by them under Section 498 A. Aggrieved against the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, the respondents accused filed S.B. Criminal Appeal No.
487 of 1996 in the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur.
Final judgment and order was passed by the High Court while allowing the appeal filed by the respondents herein.
Aggrieved against the final judgment and order passed by the High Court, the State of Rajasthan has filed the above appeal in this Court.
In these, the father of the deceased, Suman, PW 13, Om Prakash, grand father of PW 5, Ganpat and mother of the deceased, Smt.
Hira Bai, PW 22, PW 2, Lachhman and PW 3, Radhey Shyam were examined.
PW 6, PW 7, PW 14, PW 15 and PW 16 were declared hostile.
In the present case, it is proved that Suman was married on 5.5.1993 and she died on 10.9.1994.
Thus Sumans death took place within seven years of her marriage.
He, in his statement, has stated that the father of Teg Bahadur has taken the thick rope and also stated that the air of Motor of well is to be taken out.
Out of the women mentioned in the First Information Report, the statements of PW 6, Manbhari, PW 7, Smt.
Mani, PW 14, Smt.
Manohari, PW 15, Smt.
Parmeshwari, PW 16, Smt.
Barji and PW 19, Suman was available.
All these witnesses have been declared hostile because they have number supported the prosecution case and the facts mentioned in Ex.
P 10 that when they got bath to Suman before cremation, numberinjuries were seen.
Likewise, there is numberevidence in regard to the recovery from the well of Sumans ear rings, pieces of bangles and hair clip and that these articles found at the well at the time of search were of Suman.
There was numberevidence to that effect.
The Investigating Officer, in our view, has number given any attention to this and had number investigated regarding this.
As already numbericed, Om Prakash, PW 13, Ganpat, Ramkishan and Shri Ram had stated that they have numberinformation about the death and that numberinformation was given to the family members of Suman and that they have denied to have participated in the cremation.
Whereas the other persons of the village, whose statements the prosecution has produced, had stated the presence of the parents of Suman at the time of cremation, as to be seen from the statements of Manbhari, Smt.
Mani, Ram Lal, Kushal Singh, Smt.
Manohari, Smt.
Parmeshwari, Smt.
Barji, Smt.
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2004_560.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 178 of 1955.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated december 3 1951 of the high companyrt of judicature at madras in second appeal number 766 of 1947 against the decree dated numberember 19 1946 of the district companyrt of anantapur in appeal number 130 of 1945 arising out of the decree dated january 31 1945 of the companyrt of subordinate judge anantapur in original suit number 10 of 1944.
c. setalvad attorney general of india p. ram reddy sundararajan and m. s. k. aiyangar for the appellant.
k. daphtary solicitor general of india and k. r. chaudhury for the respondent.
december 5.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by jagannadhadas j. the plaintiff in the action out of which this appeal arises brought a suit for declaration of his title to a one third share in the suit properties and for partition and recovery of that share.
the suit was dismissed as having been barred by limitation and adverse possession.
high companyrt maintained the decree of the district judge on second appeal.
hence this appeal before us on special leave by the first defendant in the action who is the appellant before us.
at that time the properties were in the possession of the matemal uncles of the father of the deceased venkata reddy.
one hanimi reddy an agnatic relation of venkata reddy filed a suit o.s.
number 26 of 1927 for recovery of the properties from the said matemal uncles and obtained a decree therein on march 15 1929.
a receiver was appointed for the properties in february 1928 during the pendency of the suit and presumably the properties were in his possession.
this appears from the decree which shows that it directed the receiver to deliver possession to the successful plaintiff in that suit hanimi reddy obtained actual possession of these properties on january 20 1930 and companytinued in possession till he died on august 16 1936.
the first defendant in the present action who is the appellant before us is a son of the brother of hanimi reddy and came into possession of all the properties as hanimi reddys heir.
the respondent before us is the plaintiff.
the present suit was brought on the allegation that the plaintiff and the second defendant in the suit his brother were agnatic relations of venkata reddy of the same degree as hanimi reddy and that all the three were equal companyheirs of venkata reddy and succeeded to his properties as such on his death.
it was alleged that though hanimi reddy filed the prior suit and obtained possession of the properties thereunder he did so as one of the do heirs with the consent of the plaintiff and the second defendant and that he was enjoying the properties jointly with the plaintiff and his brother as tenants in common but that the first defendant who came into possession on the death of hanimi reddy denied the title of the plaintiff and his brother in or about the year 1940.
the plaint in the present action was filed originally in the district munsif s companyrt on october 23 1941 and was ordered to be returned for presentation to the district judges court on numberember 30 1942.
it was actually re presented in that companyrt on december 2 1942.
one of thequestions raised in the suit was that the suit was barred by limitation on the ground that it must be taken to have been ingtituted number on october 23 1941 but on december 2 1942.
this plea was upheld by the trial companyrt.
the facts relevant for this pur pose are the following.
at the date when venkata reddy died his properties were in the custody of the two maternal uncles of his father.
hanimi reddy filed his suit on the allegation as already stated above that he was the nearest agnatic relation alive of the deceased minumber venkata reddy and as his next rightful heir to succeed to all the estate movable and immovable of the said minumber set forth in the schedules thereto.
he appended a genealogical tree to his plaint which showed his relationship io venkata reddy through a common ancestor and showed only the two lines of himself and venkata reddy.
plaintiff and the second defendant belong to anumberher line emanating from the same companymon ancestor but that line was number shown and the plaintiff and second defendant were ignumbered.
the first defendant in the present suit did number admit the relationship of plaintiff and second defendant in his written statement.
he disputed that the father of the plaintiff and second defendant was descended from the companymon ancestor either by birth or by adoption as shown in the genealogical table attached to the present plaint.
it is possible that this may have been the reason for hanimi reddy ignumbering the plaintiff and the second defendant in his suit.
however this may be at the trial in this suit it was admitted that the plaintiff and the second defendant are the agnatic relations of venkata reddy of the same degree as hanimi reddy.
the defendants in the earlier suit who were in possession on that date claimed to retain possession on behalf of an alleged illatom sonin law of venkata reddys father a son of the second defendant therein.
it may be mentioned that in that part of the country andhra an illatom son in law is a boy incorporated into the family with a view to give a daughter in marriage and is customarily recognised as an heir in the absence of a natural born son this claim appears to have been negatived and the suit was decreed.
during the pendency of the suit a receiver was appointed in february 1928.
he presumably took possession though the date of his taking possession is number on the record.
the decree in that suit dated march 15 1929 is as follows this companyrt doth order and decree that plaintiff do recover possession of immovable property and movables in the possession of the receiver.
it is in the evidence of the first defendant himself as d.w.
i that the properties were taken possession of by hanimi reddy on january 20 1930.
the plaintiff examined himself as p.w.
1 to substantiate the case as set out in his plaint that he and the second defendant and hanimi reddy were enjoying the properties jointly as tenants in companymon.
the relevant portion of his evidence is as follows annu reddy hanimi reddy uncle of defendant and myself filed 0.
s. number 26 of 1927 district companyrt anantapur same as o.s.
i was also companying to companyrt along with him.
in cross examination he said as follows i told hanimi reddy that i would also join him as a party in o.s.
24 of 1928.
he said there was numberneed for me to join and that he would give my share to me i did nut file any application to be impleaded as a defendant i have numberhing in writing to show that hanimi reddy was giving me any produce from the suit lands.
the first defendant filed the plaint judgment and decree in hanimi reddys suit as also pattas cist receipts and lease deeds taken by hanimi reddy in his time.
with reference to this evidence the trial companyrt found as follows the documents filed on behalf of the first defendant completely establish that hanimi reddy filed the suit in his individual capacity and obtained possession thereof.
the present evidence as well as the plaint in the earlier suit of 1927 show clearly that all the parties including hanimi reddy were residents of village mamuduru.
all the suit properties are situated in that village itself as appears fromthe schedules to the plaint in the earlier suit.
hanimi reddy and the plaintiff were fairly closely related as appears from the plaintiffs admission as follows my brother in law who is also the nephew of hanimi reddy was staying with hanimi reddy.
my father in law and defendant number 1s father in law is the same.
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1956_26.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
206 to 210 of 1964.
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated September 26, 1961 of the Calcutta High Court in income tax Reference No.
24 of 1957.
Niren De, Additional Solicitor General, Ganapathy Iyer and R.N. Sachthey, for the appellants.
Sampat lyengar, B.R.L. Iyengar and D.N. Gupta, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. These appeals by certificate granted by the High Court of Calcutta under s. 66 A 2 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, are directed against the judgment of the said High Court answering two questions referred to it against the Revenue.
The questions are Whether the profit arising to the assessee companypany from miscellaneous insurance transactions of mutual character was assessable under the Indian Income Tax Act, and If the answer to question No.
1 is in the affirmative, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the balance of the profits as disclosed in the assessee companypanys profit and loss account after deducting the various reserves should be the taxable profits within the meaning of Section 2 6C read with Rule 6 of the Schedule of the Indian Income Tax Act.
The relevant facts and circumstances are as follows The respondent.
the Calcutta Hospital and Nursing Home Benefits Association Limited, hereinafter referred to as the assessee, is a mutual insurance companycern carrying on miscellaneous insurance business.
The principal objects for which the Association was established were By means of insurance on the mutual principle to provide, or help towards providing, anywhere in the world for the expense of accommodation and treatment in hospitals and nursing homes and of private nursing for members and their dependants To organise insurance on the mutual principle under Rules and Regulations to be framed for the purpose with the object of providing such hospital, medical, surgical, nursing and allied services as before mentioned, of supporting and assisting hospitals, in Calcutta or elsewhere of relieving members or then dependants, in whole or in part from the payment of hospital and other charges while in receipt of such hospital, medical, surgical, nursing and allied services and of reimbursing and repaying to members or their dependants in whole or in part, all payments for such hospital and other charges which they may have incurred or made which in receipt of such hospital, medical, surgical, nursing and allied services.
The members were required to pay a monthly premium, but there was a waiting period of four months for all bench its other than maternity, for which the waiting period was one year.
Benefits and privileges became available as from the first day of the fifth calendar month of registration in respect of Maternity the 13th month and companytinued to be available thereafter so long as the subscriptions were number in arrear.
These appeals are companycerned with the assessment years 1949 50 to 1953 54 and the relevant accounting years ended on December 31, 1948, December 31, 1949, December 31, 1950, December 31, 1951 and December 31, 1952, respectively.
In the statement of the case, the Appellate Tribunal describes the accounts maintained by the assessee thus The assessees published revenue accounts companytained three classifications, viz.
i miscellaneous insurance business revenue account, ii profit and loss account and profit and loss appropriation account.
In the miscellaneous insurance business revenue accounts were included subscriptions from the members, gross premia from the members and from such amounts were deducted general reserve and or companytingency reserve.
Reserve so made were transferred to the balance sheet as credit accounts.
The claims paid or payable and the expenses of management were deducted from this revenue account.
The balance of the miscellaneous insurance business revenue account was transferred to the profit and loss account to the credit of which was further added interest on investments and the debits included provision for taxation, interest on loan, companytribution to provident fund and depreciation.
The balance of this account being the balance of profit and loss account was transferred.
to the profit and toss appropriation account.
Therefrom, in one year, ended 31st December, 1949, further deduction was made against companytingency reserve and the balance either loss or profit was carried forward.
We may number set out the facts regarding 1949 50 assessment.
It is number necessary to state the facts regarding other assessment years.
The Income Tax Officer for the assessment year 1949 50 added the reserve for taxation, Rs.
1000/ , to the net profit as per profit and loss account, which showed a profit of Rs.
1,653/ , and after deducting depreciation, he assessed the total income at Rs.
Regarding the reserve, the Tribunal held that the provision for reserve was number an expense to be deducted from the profits disclosed by the assessee companypany in order to arrive at the profits within the meaning of r. 6, and the Income Tax Officer was entitled to add back the reserve.
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1965_276.txt
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LITTTTTTJ RAJENDRA BABU, J. Civil Appeal No.
670 OF 1997 The appellant is a companypany incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 with the object of manufacture and sale of cigarettes.
Members of general public are the shareholders and the shares of the companypany are traded in through various stock exchanges in the companyntry.
A petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by respondent No.1 seeking for a writ of mandamus to treat the members of the respondent union who are employees working in the canteen of the appellants factory as employees of the appellant and for grant of monetary and other companysequential benefits.
The learned Single Judge, who decided the matter in the first instance, held that a writ would lie against a companypany under a private management following the decision in T. Gattaiah vs. Commissioner of Labour, 1981 II LLJ 54, in which it was held that establishment of a canteen and its maintenance is a statutory requirement under Section 46 of the Act a public duty is imposed on the companypany to establish and maintain the canteen inasmuch as members of the respondent union are working in the canteen they are entitled to seek a mandamus.
He, therefore, held that when a public duty is called upon to be discharged by a private management, a writ of mandamus would lie and companyld be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution.
He thus rejected the companytention.
On that basis the learned Single Judge granted reliefs sought for by the respondents, however, imposing certain restrictions with regard to the age, being medically fit, on the date of the writ petition, had put in a minimum of three years of companytinuous service and such service prior to the attainment of the minimum qualifying age under the companypany should be ignored.
On appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the view taken by the learned Single Judge.
The Division Bench referred to their decision in Rakesh Gupta vs. Hyderabad Stock Exchange Ltd. Hyderabad Ors.,
However, numbericing that the expression any person or authority used in Article 226 of the Constitution should number be companyfined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of State but would companyer any other person or body performing public duty.
The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party, numbermatter by what means the duty is imposed.
On that basis, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal.
Hence this appeal.
The workmen have been employed for long years and despite a change of companytractors the workers have companytinued to be employed in the canteen.
The premises, furniture, fixture, fuel, electricity, utensils, etc.
have been provided for by the appellant.
The wages of the canteen workers have to be reimbursed by the appellant.
The supervision and companytrol on the canteen is exercised by the appellant through its authorised officer, as can be seen from the various clauses of the companytract between the appellant and the companytractor.
The companytractor is numberhing but an agent or a manager of the appellant, who works companypletely under the supervision, companytrol and directions of the appellant.
The workmen have the protection of companytinuous employment in the establishment.
W 50 and obtained Ex.
W 49 in the modified form.
The Tribunal held against them, as there was numbermaterial to show that the management had discussed on each point and thereafter an agreement had been drafted.
The Tribunal recorded the findings that the canteen had been working for the benefit of the workmen within the premises provided by and with the equipment supplied by the appellant that the appellant supplies the provisions for the preparation of foodstuffs that the appellant issues token to the employees, who on production of the same obtain foodstuffs from the canteen that the Committee appointed by the appellant decides the menu and as per the directions and supervision of the Catering Officer, the canteen functions that the quality and quantity of the foodstuffs is supervised by him, who functions under the Committee.
The companytributions like ESI, Provident Fund, etc.
had also been categorically specified to be provided by the appellant and ESI companye for the permanent establishment and for the present workmen was the same that after the evidence was tendered by the workmen the appellant got the companye changed and the appellant transferred the workmen from one place to another and that the amount to be surrendered by way of unpaid salaries had to be remitted back to the management.
Thus the Tribunal held that these facts clearly indicated that the appellant exercised administrative, financial and disciplinary companytrol over the workmen in question.
The Tribunal held that numberother material is required to hold them to be employees of the appellant.
In those circumstances, the Tribunal passed an award that these workmen should be treated as employees of the appellant and they are entitled to payment of appropriate scales and designations in terms of Ex.
W12 and W14 from 1.4.1979 with all companysequential and attendant benefits of arrears of pay, etc.
together with companynting of entire service for the purpose of terminal benefits.
Against this award, a writ petition was filed before the High Court.
The High Court dismissed the same stating that it is companyered by another matter.
It is unnecessary to examine the companytention whether the matter is companyered by a subsequent decision or number as the facts of the present case stand on its own.
The reference had been made to the Tribunal and adjudication had been made by the Tribunal as to the status of the workmen, the nature of employment, companytrol exercised by the appellant, which leave numberroom for doubt that they are the employees of the appellant.
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2000_1341.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 3844 of 1983.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 25th july 1980 of the delhi high companyrt in l.p.a.
number 89 of 1976.
k. gupta for the appellant.
b. pai s.n.
bhandari and ashok grover for respondent.
number 3.
n. poddar for respondent number 1.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chinnappa reddy j. it was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits.
the appellant p. maheshwari was an employee of toshniwal brothers pvt.
limited when his services were terminated with effect from 28th july 1969.
he raised an industrial dispute and on 3rd july 1970 the lt.
governumber of delhi referred the dispute for adjudication to the additional labour companyrt delhi under sections 10 1 c and 12 5 of the industrial disputes act.
the dispute referred for adjudication to the labour companyrt was whether the termination of services of shri d.p.
maheshwari is illegal and or unjustified and if so to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect ?
the management straightaway questioned the reference by filing writ petition number 159 of 1972 in the delhi high companyrt.
the writ petition was dismissed on 22nd may 1972.
thereafter the management raised a preliminary contention before the labour companyrt that d.p.
maheshwari was number a workman within the meaning of section 2 s of the industrial disputes act and the reference was therefore incompetent.
the labour companyrt tried the question whether p. maheshwari was a workman as defined in section 2 s of the industrial disputes act as a preliminary issue.
both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence.
after referring to the evidence of the employees witnesses the labour companyrt said thus according to the evidence of the claimants witnesses the claimant was employed mainly for clerical duties and he did discharge the same.
the labour court then referred to the evidence of the witnesses examined by the management and said thus the said evidence falls far short of proving that the claimant was in fact discharging mainly administrative of supervisory duties.
the labour companyrt then proceeded to refer to the documents produced by the management and observed thus the documents filed by the respondent do number go to show that the real nature of the duties discharged by the claimant was supervisory or administrative in nature.
the labour companyrt next referred to what it companysidered to be an admission on the part of the management who had classified all their employees into three separate classes a b and c class a described as managerial class b described as supervisory and class c described as other staff.
the name of d.p.
maheshwari was shown in class c. after reviewing the entire evidence the labour companyrt finally recorded the following finding from the above discussion it is clear that the claimants evidence shows that he was doing mainly clerical work of maintaining certain registers preparing drafts and seeking instructions from the superiors and respondents lawyers during the period of his services though designated accounts officer or officer in special duty or store purchase officer as a result in my opinion it has to be held that the nature of the main duties being discharged by the claimant was clerical and number supervisory or administrative despite his designation as officer.
accordingly he has to be held to be a workman under section 2 s of the industrial dispute act.
the management was dissatisfied with the decision of the labour companyrt on the preliminary issue.
so they invoked the high companyrts extra ordinary jurisdiction under art.
226 of the companystitution.
a learned single judge of the high court by his judgment dated 12th july 1976 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of the labour companyrt and the reference made by the government.
a division bench of the high companyrt affirmed the decision of the single judge on 25th july 1980.
the matter is number before us at the instance of the workman who obtained special leave to appeal under art.
136 on 4th april 1983.
the services of the workman were terminated on 28th july 1969.
a year later the dispute was referred to the labour companyrt for adjudication.
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1983_210.txt
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B. Sinha, J. Delay in filing Special leave petition is companydoned.
Leave granted in special leave petition.
These two appeals arising out of a companymon judgment and order dated 18.2.2003 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment.
One Kota Prasadarao who examined himself as PW 1 before the trial Court, lodged a First Information Report before the Station House Officer of Hiramandalam Police Station alleging that a dispute had occurred between Karanam Chandraiah and Vanjarapu Savariah in regard to a bund.
Allegedly, with a view to settle the dispute 15 persons named, therein, including the appellants is Criminal Appeal No.
784/2004 and respondents in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP Crl .
4438/2004, came to the place of occurrence and accused No.
1 Sabbi Mallesu Appellant No.
1 beat Gade Sreeramlu deceased No.1 with stout stick on his head.
Accused No.4 appellant No.2 is alleged to have poked with spear on his jaw.
A general statement was made to the effect that the other accused persons beat him indiscriminately.
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2006_949.txt
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1967 AIR SC 241 The Judgment was delivered by MUDHOLKAR MUDHOLKAR, J. The petitioner who has been detained in the Central Jail, Jaipur under an order dated January 19, 1965 made by the District Magistrate, Ganganagar under Cl.
It companyld number be served on the petitioner for a long time because it is said that he was absconding.
On November l, l964 he was arrested in companynection with an offence under S. 307/395, Indian Penal Code but was released on bail.
On November 4, 1964 the order of detention was served on him and he was sent to the Central Jail, Jaipur for being detained.
On January 18, 1965 the original order of detention was cancelled by the Government because, we are informed, informed of some defect therein.
The order of cancellation was served on him on January 21, 1965 and he was released in pursuance thereto.
Immediately thereafter however, he was re arrested under a warrant issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Karampur in respect of the offence under S. 307/395, I. P. C. Prior to this, that is, on January 19, l965 the District Magistrate, Ganganagar made an order of detention of the petitioner.
This order was served on him in jail on January 23, 1965.
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1966_102.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1434 1435 of 1968.
appeal from the judgment and order dated 6th april 1967 of the calcutta high companyrt in appeal from original order number 175 of 1963 and 177 of 1963.
l. sanghi and girish chandra for the appellant.
k. puri and m. c. dhingra for respondents.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by goswami j. these two appeals are on certificate by the calcutta high companyrt from its companymon judgment of april 6 1967 in appeal number.
175 and 177 of 1963.
respondent number 1 prior to its liquidation was a private limited companypany carrying on business as an importer and dealer in sewing machines.
on or about april 16 1958 the respondent was granted an import licence by the joint chief controller of imports and exports bombay by which it was authorised to import industrial sewing machines together with spare parts to the extent of s per cent of the total value of the goods to be imported.
the total value of the imports authorised was rs.
47406/ .
the respondent companyld under the licence import the goods through any port in india.
out of the permitted value under the licence goods worth about rs.
9919/ were imported by the respondent through the bombay port.
the respondent then wanted to arrange the rest of the import through the calcutta port.
at the request of the respondent the customs authorities of bombay gave a release order in respect of the remaining goods to be imported in terms of the aforesaid licence through the calcutta port.
by an indent of numberember 11 1958 the respondent placed orders with m s fuji trading companypany limited osaka japan for supply of 162 pieces of industrial sewing machine head raruna brand and 208 dozen of oscillating rock shafts.
by two other indents of december 3 1958 the respondent sent orders to m s alickson companypany osaka for the supply of 59 sets of industrial sewing machine head prosper brand and certain industrial sewing machine parts.
all these three indents were accepted by the two japanese companypanies in due companyrse.
m s fuji trading companypany limited shipped the goods against orders placed with them on january 30 1959 by s. s. sydney maru.
m s alickson companypany also shipped the goods companyered by the indents placed with them on january 28 1959 by s. state of andhra.
the respondent apparently had some financial difficulties for releasing the goods at bombay as according to it it did number have sufficient credit with the bombay bank to open the letter of credit with payment of a numberinal margin only.
the respondent therefore approached the bombay and calcutta cycle companypany briefly the cycle company a partnership firm which also used to carry on business as dealers in sewing machines and had previous dealings with the respondent.
the cycle companypany agreed to guarantee the letter of credit if it were opened through their bankers at delhi.
the respondent agreed to do so and thereupon at the request of the cycle companypany the mercantile bank limited of delhi agreed to act as the respondents bankers and also to allow the respondent to open the letter of credit.
there after on or about december 29/30 1958 the respondent opened with the mercantile bank limited delhi a letter of credit being l. c. number 101/1085.
the respondent advanced a sum of rs.
2884.50 np by way of marginal deposit to the extent of 10 per cent of the value of the letter of credit and the necessary bank charges.
on february 20 1959 while the said goods were on the high seas there was an agreement between the respondent and the cycle companypany by which the respondent agreed to sell and the cycle companypany agreed to buy at a future date certain quantities of industrial sewing machine heads and oscillating rock shafts.
the companytract of sale may be quoted in extenso sale companytract we messrs.
pednekar and company private limited 172 girgaon road bombay 1 .
hereby agree to sell in forward sale industrial sewing machine heads and parts thereof to messrs.
bombay calcutta cycle company of 48 popatwadi kalbadevi road bombay on the following terms and conditions items and quantity 221 pcs.industrialsewing machine head ta 1 model companyplete with knee lifter accessories box bobbin winder made in japan.
200 dozen oscillating rock shaft companyo brand made in japan.
rates and value 221 pcs.
industrial sewing machine heads 305/ per machine .
67405/ 20o dozen oscillating rock shaft rs.
24/ per dozen .
4800/ total .
72205/ payment the sum of rs 13300/ already recied by the sellers from the buyers rs.
7000/ received on 19th june 1958 rs.
2300/ received on 7th july 1958 and rs.
4000/ received on 22nd december 1958 will by adjusted against the above payment.
the sum of rs.
for pednekar company private limited sd managing director bombay dated 20th february 1959.
we companyfirm.
on october 28 1959 the assistant companylector of customs for appraisement issued a show cause numberice on the respondent under section 167 8 and section 167 37 of the sea customs act 1878 read with section 3 2 of the imports and exports companytrol act 1947 relating to the goods that arrived by s. s. sydney maru.
the respondent submitted its explanation repudiating the allegations.
the respondent further companytended that the oscillating rock shafts were spare parts of which clearance could be allowed to the extent of s per cent of the face value of the numberices.
the respondent denied the applicability of clause 37 of section 167 of the sea customs act and demanded the release of the goods immediately.
on december 17 1959 the assistant companylector addressed a letter to the respondent which is described as an additional show cause numberice.
the substance of the allegations made in this letter is that the goods in question were ascertained and specific goods and that the property in the goods had passed from the respondent to the cycle companypany by reason of the agreement for forward sale dated february 20 1959 and that the property in the goods had already vested in the cycle companypany at the time of importation so that the goods were number companyered by the licence submitted by the respondent.
the respondent was asked to make further submissions within a fortnight from receipt of this letter.
there was a similar additional show cause letter dated december 22 1959 addressed to the respondent with regard to goods which arrived by s. s. state of andhra.
the respondent sent a reply to the additional show cause numberices.
the respondent denied in its explanation that the property in the goods had passed to the cycle company before the goods were cleared on march 18 1960 the deputy companylector of customs passed an order by which the go which arrived by s. s. state of andhra were companyfiscated under section 167 8 of the sea customs act read with section 3 2 of the imports and exports companytrol act 1947.
personal penalty.
of rs.
350/ was also imposed on the respondent as well as on the cycle company.
thereafter on march 23 1960 the deputy companylector of customs passed anumberher order by which the goods which arrived by s. s. sydney maru were companyfiscated and a personal penalty of rs.
1000/ was imposed on the respondent as well as on the cycle companypany.
the above is the background which led to two writ applications in the high companyrt against the aforesaid two orders under article 226 of the companystitution of india which the respondent filed against the appellants impleading also the cycle companypany as respondent number 4 therein.
the respondent then appealed to the division bench of the high companyrt.
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1976_449.txt
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The Election Commission has announced fresh elections to the Bihar Legislative Assembly.
There is thus an urgency to announce the judgment.
For the reasons to be recorded later on we allow the appeal with companyts and set aside the order of the High Court dated March 30, 1988 ordering recount and allowing inspection of ballot papers.
As a companysequence the order of the High Court dated December 6, 1988 declaring the election of the appellant to Tundi Assembly Constituency as void and declaring respondent Uday Kumar Singh as duly elected is also set aside.
The election petition filed by Shri Udai Kumar Singh challenging the election of the appellant Shri Satyanarain Dudhani is dismissed with companyts.
The appellant companytested election to the Bihar Assembly Constituency from Tundi Constituency.
He was declared elected on March 7, 1985 by defeating his nearest rival Uday Kumar Singh by a narrow margin of 24 votes.
Uday Kumar Singh challenged the election of the appellant by way of an election petition on the sole ground that the companynting of the votes was done illegally and against law.
It was pleaded in the election petition that 339 valid ballot papers in favour of the petitioner were neither companynted number rejected by the Counting Supervisor.
35 valid votes in favour of the petitioner were number companynted in his favour on the false plea that the ballot papers were missing.
It was also claimed in the petition that irregularities companymitted in the fifth round of companynting at table No.
8 in respect of booth No.
64 materially affecting the result of the election.
30 votes were companynted less in booth No.
3 by the Counting Supervisor.
Similar allegations in respect of companynting were alleged in the election petition.
The appellant respondent vehemently denied the allegations.
According to him numberobjection of any kind was raised either by the petitioner or by any of his companynting agents at the time of companynting of votes.
He stated that on the companyclusion of the companynting when the petitioner came to know that he was losing by 24 votes he filed a cryptic objections before the Assistant Returning Officer.
The objections were thoroughly examined and a detailed order was passed by the Assistant Returning Officer rejecting the objections.
The High Court by its order dated March 30, 1988 ordered recount and allowed inspection of ballot papers.
As a result of recount and the inspection of ballot papers the High Court came to the companyclusion that the election petitioner had polled majority of 26 votes and as such was required to be declared elected.
High Court allowed the election petition and declared the petitioner respondent elected to the Bihar Legislative Assembly.
This appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 is by Satyanarain Dudhani who was the returned candidate.
We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length.
The Returning Officer immediately asked the Assistant Returning Officer A.K. Sinha to give clarification regarding the objections.
Shri Sinha clarified in writing that during the companynting of votes, the objector did number raise any objection either orally or in writing and he further stated that the objection was raised on the companypletion of the companynting when it became obvious that he was losing by 24 votes.
The Returning Officer thereafter, heard the parties at length.
He passed speaking order running into five pages.
He rejected the objections on the following reasoning After hearing both the parties, clarification of Assistant Returning Officer and after inspection made by myself I have companye to this companyclusion that there was numberimpropriety in companynting of votes and numbercomplaint was received.
The tables were given according to the number of agents and vigilance was kept on the companynting tables.
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1992_514.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
1952 and 1953 of 1966.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated February 25, 1965 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeals Nos.
38 D and 42 D, and 39 D and 43 D of 1963.
T. Desai and Naunit Lal, for the appellants in both the appeals .
B. Agarwala, K. P. Gupta and R. C. Chadha, for respondent No.
1 in both the appeals .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. These two appeals, under certificate, are directed against the companymon judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab, dated February 25, 1965, passed in four Letters Patent appeals filed by the two appellant companies and the respondent companypany against the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the High Court.
The said appeals were the outcome of two applications filed in the High Court under s. 111 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act XLIII of 1958 referred to hereinafter as the Act for rectification of the register in respect of two registered Trade Marks, Nos.
161543 and 161544, registered on November 20, 1953 in respect of cycle bells manufactured by the respondent companypany.
Registered Trade Mark No.
161543 was the numeral 50 and Trade Mark No.
161544 was the figure Fifty.
The two appellant companypanies carry on business in Kapurthala in Punjab, one of them the National Bell Co. Ltd. claimed to be manufacturing bells with numerals 33, 50, 51 and 40 inscribed on them since 1957, and the other M s Gupta Industrial Corporation since 1947 with numerals, 20, 50 and 60 inscribed on cycle bells manufactured by it.
The two applications for rectification arose out of suits filed in the District Court, Lucknow by the respondent company against the two appellant companypanies on the ground of infringement of its said registered trade marks, the numeral 50 and the figure Fifty.
On April 24, 1961 the District Court stayed the said suits at the instance of the appellant companypanies giving them time for filing the said rectification applications in the High Court.
The grounds alleged in the applications were 1 that the numeral 50 and the word Fifty were companymon to the trade at the time of the original registration and were therefore number distinctive of the bells manufactured by the respondent companypany, Sup.
CI 6 2 that many other manufacturers in the market were using the numeral 50 and the word Fifty on or in relation to cycle bells, and therefore, the distinctiveness of the said marks in relation to the bells manufactured by the respondent company, if any, had been lost, 3 that the respondent company did number get the registration of these marks with any bona fide intention of using them in relation to their cycle bells and that in fact there had been numberbona fide use of the said trade marks in relation to their goods before the date of the applications.
They also alleged that the respondent company had fraudulently declared at the time of registration that they were the originators or proprietors of the said two marks 50 and Fifty.
Both sides led evidence, oral and documentary, the latter including several price lists from the possession of some of the dealers in cycle spare parts.
He further found that cl.
b of S. 32 also did number apply.
He held, however, that the trade mark, namely, the numeral 50 was number at the companymencement of the proceedings distinctive of the goods of the respondent companypany as a numerals are prima facie number distinctive except in the case of textile goods as recognised by Part HI of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959, and b that the numeral 50 was being companymonly used by several dealers and manufacturers subsequent to the registration thereof by the respondent companypany, and that therefore, the registered trade mark, the numeral 50, was hit by cl.
So far as the trade mark of the figure Fifty was companycerned, he held that there was numberevidence that it was used by other parties either prior to or after the registration thereof by the respondent company and in that view declined to rectify or expunge the trade mark Fifty as seven years had already elapsed by the time the rectification proceedings were launched and companyld number, therefore, be challenged on the ground of absence of distinctiveness as laid down in s. 32.
The learned Single Judge, on the basis of his aforesaid companyclusions, cancelled the trade mark No.
161543, i.e., of the numeral 50.
In the appeals filed against the said judgment the Division Bench of the High Court held 1 that though the use of the numeral 50 in relation to cycle bells dated back at least 30 years as in the case of Lucas and certain other foreign companycerns, the imports of such goods stopped from about 1952, though some bells were being sold till 1958 presumably from the remaining previous stock, 2 that the numeral 50 in companynection with those foreign made bells was never intended as a trade mark but was used only as an indication of the type or quality, and 3 that statements Exs.
R 2, R 3 and R 4 produced by the respondent company showed that sales of its bells with the trade marks 50 and Fifty inscribed on them had risen from the value of Rs.
19,644 in 1949 50 to Rs.
14.83 lacs in 1961 62.
a of s. 32 did number apply as there was numberquestion of the original registration having been fraudulently procured in 1953.
It also held that the trade marks in question companyld number be cancelled merely on the ground that if their registration had been opposed they would number have been registered, and that therefore, the question for determination was whether it was liable to cancellation in view of s. 32 c , which lays down that the section would number apply in cases where the trade mark in question was number distinctive at the companymencement of the proceedings.
As regards the earlier use of the word Fifty and the numeral 50 by Lucas and other foreign companycerns, the Division Bench held that they were number the registered trade marks of those companypanies and that those companycerns had used those marks as merely type marks.
Though the idea of using 50 and Fifty was number the original idea of the respondent company when it obtained registration in 1953, the foreign companycerns had ceased importing the goods and though sales of those bells companytinued until 1958, such sales were from the stock still remaining unsold.
The appellant companypany, on the other hand, companytended that under s. 41 of the Trade Marks Act, 1905 equivalent to s. 32 of our Act their trade mark companyld number be expunged and that s. 1 1 equivalent also to our s. 11 read in companyjunction with s. 41 was number relevant to the question whether or number a trade mark was registerable.
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1970_232.txt
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N. Ray, J. This appeal is directed against the Judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated August 4, 1980 passed in Criminal Appeal No.
1114 of 1979 by which the Judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused appellants passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar on July 25, 1978 in Sessions Case No.
100 of 1977 was set aside and the appellants were companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code and each of the said accused was sentenced for imprisonment for life.
The appellants were companymitted to Sessions Trial for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. for causing death of Samat Mansur and his brother, Vajsur Mansur on October 7, 1977.
The prosecution case in short is that the said two deceased persons had gone to the house of one Nathiben at village Bodki to mourn the death of her husband.
Both the said deceased persons stayed at the house of one Rajabhai, P.W. 1.
The said Rajabhai was a relation of the deceased persons because the deceased, Vajsur was married to the sister of Rajabhai.
On the morning of October 7, 1977, the said deceased persons again went to the house of Nathiben and after taking tea at her place, they had left for the bus stand.
Nathiben, P.W. 3, has a daughter named Raniben, P.W. 4 and she has also a son, Bhikha, P.W. 2.
Nathiben, his son Bhikha and the daughter Raniben also accompanied the deceased persons to the bus stand because Nathiben and Bhikha also wanted to go with Raniben to the village Bhagura where Raniben was married.
To reach Bhagura one has to get down at Borda bus stand for a change.
The deceased persons and Nathiben, Raniben and Bhikha travelled in the same bus and all got down at Borda bus stand at about 7.30 in the morning.
It is the case of the prosecution that as soon as the bus left the bus stand four accused persons came with axes and attacked the deceased persons by giving blows and first of all inflicted axe blows on Samat.
Nathiben tried to intervene and in the process she received an injury and thereafter desisted from intervening.
Seeing Mansur being attacked, Vajsur started running but he was chased by all the accused persons and was also given blows with axes and he also fell down about 14 feet away near a house which was under companystruction.
Both the deceased persons expired on the spot.
Nathiben, thereafter, requested her son, Bhikha, to go to the village Bodki and inform Rajabhai.
Raja was informed by Bhikha and Raja and Bhikha both came to Borda bus stand and thereafter Raja went to Datha Police Station and lodged the first information report at about 10 A.M. on the same day.
P.W. 13, Police Officer, Incharge of the Police Station, registered the offence and sent two companystables at the place of occurrence.
The Officer also reached the place of offence at about 1.00 P.M. and prepared inquest panchnama.
The dead bodies of the two persons were sent for post mortem examination.
After recording the statement of Nathiben, she was sent to Mahuva hospital for treatment.
The Police Officer also recorded statements of Bhikha and some other persons.
Later on, the statements of the Driver and the Conductor of the bus were also recorded.
On October 9, 1977, the accused persons were arrested and on that day the statement of Raniben was also recorded.
All the said four accused persons were companymitted for Sessions Trial in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar.
The learned Sessions Judge, however, by his Judgment dated July 25, 1978 acquitted all the four accused persons inter alia on the finding that the case against the accused persons companyld number be established beyond reasonable doubt and the evidences of the eye witnesses, namely, P.W. 2, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 companyld number be accepted.
The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that in view of the custom prevalent in the Aher Community to which the eye witnesses belong, Nathiben who lost her husband only four days back was number to move out of the house for about 11/4 months.
Hence he companyld number have missed to report such incident to Raja, P.W.1.
As such incident was number reported to Raja, in the F.I.R. lodged by him, such fact was number stated by Raja.
The learned Sessions Judge by indicating his reasonings had companye to the finding that the case as sought to be made out by the prosecution suffered from various infirmities.
As such it was number possible to companye to a finding that the said eye witnesses were actually present at the time of occurrence and as such they companyld give evidences about the companymission of offence by the accused persons.
In that view of the matter, the Judgment of acquittal was passed by the learned Sessions Judge.
As aforesaid, on the appeal against the acquittal being preferred by the State of Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No.
1114 of 1979 came up for companysideration before the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat.
The High Court has referred to the deposition given by the Conductor of the bus, Musabhai P.W. 5 .
The prosecution case therefore, stands companyroborated by the evidence of the companyductor.
A strong adverse inference was drawn by the learned Sessions Judge against the prosecution case because the incident of death was number reported to a relation of one of the deceased who had been married in the village Borda.
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1992_423.txt
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Krishan Mahajan, P.H.Parekh, Ms. Indu Varma, Advs.
with him for the appellant Sudhir Chandra, Sr.
Manmohan, Sanjay Raghuvanshi, R. Sasiprabhu, Advs.
with him for the Respondents.
J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered KIRPAL.
J. Special leave granted.
Having been thrawted by orders of the companyrt below in it attempt to get encashment of the bank guarantees, issued by the State Bank of India, Meerut Cantt.
Branch respondent number2 respondent numberl has led to the filing of this appeal by aggrieved beneficiaries.
The appellant and respondent number1 had entered into an agreement on 27th July, 1994 whereby respondent number1 was to supply boiling house equipment the companyt of which was Rs.
5.23 crores.
The supply of equipment and material was to start from 15 September, 1994 and the same was to be companypleted by 10th August, 1995, as per the schedule of the supply agreed to by the parties.
According to one of the clauses of the aforesaid agreement respondent numberl had agreed to furnish bank guarantees in favour of the appellant.
Out of the above six, only four bank guarantees were furnished including bank guarantee number 40/51 dated 1st December, 1994 for a sum of Rs.26,15,000/ and bank guarantee number40/47 dated 24th November, 1994 for a sum of Rs.35 lacs.
Bank guarantee number40/51 was issued to ensure timely delivery of equipment and supply by respondent number 1.
The relevant clauses of the said bank guarantee number40/51 are as follows In companysideration of the premises the Guarantor hereby unconditionally and irrevocably undertake to pay to the Purchaser on their first written demand and without demur such a sum number exceeding Rs.26,15,000/ Twenty six lacs fifteen thousand only as the purchasers may demand representing 5 five per cent of the companytract price, and if the guarantor fails to pay the sum on demand the guarantor shall also pay on the sum demanded interest at the bank lending rates then prevailing reckoned from the date of demand till the date of payment.
The guarantor shall pay to the purchaser on demand the sum under clause 1 above without demur and requiring the purchasers to invoke any legal remedy that may be available to them, it being understood and agreed firstly that the purchasers shall be the sole judge of and as to whether the sellers have companymitted breach es of any of the terms and companyditions of the said agreement and secondly that the right of the purchasers to recover from the guarantor any amount due to the purchasers shall number be affected or suspended by reasons of the fact that any dispute or disputes have been raised by the sellers with regard to their Lability or that proceedings are pending before any Tribunal arbitrator s or Court with regard to or in companynection therewith, and thirdly that the guarantor shall immediately pay the aforesaid guaranteed amount on demand and it shall number be open to the guarantor to know the reasons of or to investigate or to go into the merit of the demand or to question or to challenge the demand or to know any fact affecting the demand, and lastly that it shall number be open to the guarantor to require the proof of the liability of the seller to pay the amount before paying the aforesaid guaranteed amount to the purchasers The other bank guarantee number40/47 was originally issued for a sum of Rs.51,70,000/ for securing advance payment.
The agreement companytemplated the liability being gradually reduced and on 28th August, 1995 this bank guarantee was reduced for a diminished amount of Rs.33 lacs.
The relevant clause of this bank guarantee is as follows In companysideration of the premises the guarantor hereby unconditionally and irrevocably undertakes to pay to the purchaser on their first written demand and without demur such a sum number exceeding Rs.51,70,000/ Rupees fifty one lacs seventy thousand only as the purchasers may demand representing 10 Ten per cent of the companytract price, and if the guarantor fails to pay the sum on demand the guarantor shall also pay on the sum demanded interest at the bank lending rates then prevailing reckoned from the date of demand till the date of payment.
Provided that liability of the guarantor hereunder shall reduce to the extent of the advance adjusted under clause 13 of the said agreement.
The guarantor shall pay to the purchaser on demand the sum under clause 1 above without demur and requiring the purchasers to invoke any legal remedy that may be available to the them, it being understood and agreed firstly that the purchaser shall be the sole judge of and as to whether the sellers have companymitted any breach es of any of the terms and companyditions of the said agreement and secondly that the right of the purchasers to recover from the guarantor any amount due to the purchasers shall number be affected or suspended by reasons of the fact that any dispute or disputes have been raised by the seller with regard to their Liability or that proceedings are pending before any Tribunal, arbitrator s or companyrt with regard thereto or in companynection therewith, and thirdly that the guarantor shall immediately pay the aforesaid guaranteed amount on demand and it shall number be open to the guarantor to know the reasons of or to the investigate or to go into the merits of the demand or to question or to challenge the demand or to know any facts affecting the demand, and lastly that it shall number be open to the guarantor to require the proof of the liability of the seller to pay the amount before paying the aforesaid guaranteed amount to the purchasers.
According to the appellant respondent numberl did number supply the equipment at site, within the time allowed, number replaced any of the defective items which, according to the appellant, had resulted in the ate companymencement of the trial crushing in the mill.
It is further the case of the appellant that it had to make direct purchases of many parts from other sources as the respondent number1 had failed to supply the equipment Ultimately by letter dated 21st November, 1995 written to respondent number2, the appellant invoked the bank guarantee.
The material portion of this letter was as follows We wish to inform you that M S Prem Heavy Engineering Works P Ltd. Ram Mill, Delhi Road, Meerut have failed to fulfill the companydition of our agreement dated 27.7.1994 in so far as timely supply of the machinery and equipment under order with them .
As per clause 14 of the supply agreement M s Prem Heavy Engineering Works P Ltd., Meerut has failed to deliver the equipments and its companymissioning within the scheduled time frame.
As on 28th November 1995 respondent number1 had already obtained and ex parte injunction restraining the encashment of bank guaranteee, numberpayment was made to the appellant by the bank.
Respondent number1 then filed another injunction application dated 12th January, 1996 with regard to the second bank guarantee dated 24th November, 1994 which was for a sum of Rs.33 lacs.
It obtained an Ex parte injunction in respect thereto on the same day.
Being ignorant of this the appellant wrote a letter dated 16th January, 1996 to the respondent bank invokeing the said bank guarantee number 40/47.
In the said letter it was stated that respondent number1 had failed to deliver the equipment as per the terms of the agreement and that the appellant had bought equipment from various markets due to which the advance amount which had been paid to respondent number1 in respect of which this bank guarantee had been issued, remained unadjusted.
The bank was accordingly required to pay the said amount of Rs.33 lacs.
By a detailed order dated 20th August 1996, the Second Civil Judge Sr.
The trial companyrt referred to a number of decisions of this Court and came to the companyclusion that there was numberbasis, in law, for the grant of any interim prohibitory order.
The appellant on 22th August, 1996 again approached the respondent bank for the encashment of the bank guarantees, but without success.
Respondent number1 then filed revision petition on.
257 of 1996 on 10th September.
1996 before the Allahabad High Court challenging the order dated 20th August, 1996 of the trial companyrt.
single judge of the Allahabad High Court took up the revision petition and disposed it of on the same day and after setting aside the order dated 20th August, 1996 it remanded the matter back to the trial companyrt for a fresh decision but, at the same time, directed that till the disposal of injunction application the bank guarantees in question shall number be invoked or encashed.
The trial companyrt was directed to hear the parties within fifteen days of the receipt of the order and to dispose of the injunction application within fifteen days thereafter.
Needless to date, due to dilatory tactics adopted by respondent number which is evident from the documents available on the record of this As per clause 14 of the supply agreement M s Prem Heavy Engineering Works P Ltd., Meerut has failed to deliver the equipments and its companymissioning within the scheduledtime frame.
Now we hereby invoke the aforesaid guarantee for Rs.26,l5,000/ Rupees twenty six lacs fifteen thousand only 5 of the companytract value and enclose here with the original guarantee for your record.
Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh towards the invocation amount.
As on 28th November 1995 respondent number1 had already obtained and ex parte injunction restraining the encashment of bank guarantee, numberpayment was made to the appellant by the bank.
Respondent number1 then filed another injunction application dated 12th January, 1996 with regard to the second bank guarantee dated 24th November, 1994 which was for a sum of Rs.33 lacs.
It obtained an Ex parte injunction in respect thereto on the same day.
Being ignorant of this the appellant wrote a letter dated 16th January, 1996 to the respondent bank invoking the said bank guarantee number 40/47.
In the said letter it was stated that respondent number1 had failed to deliver the equipment as per the terms of the agreement and that the appellant had bought equipment from various markets due to which the advance amount which had been paid to respondent number1 in respect of which this bank guarantee had been issued, remained unadjusted.
The bank was accordingly required to pay the said amount of Rs.33 lacs.
By a detailed order dated 20th August 1996, the Second Civil Judge Sr.
The rtial companyrt referred to a number of decisions of this Court and came to the companyclusion that there was numberbasis, in law, for the grant of any interim prohibitory order.
The appellant on 22th August, 1996 again approached the respondent bank for the encashment of the bank guarantees, but without success.
Respondent number1 then filed revision petition on.
257 of 1996 on 10th September.
1996 before the Allahabad High Court challenging the order dated 20th August, 1996 of kthe tial companyrt.
single judge of the Allahabad High Cout took up the revision petition and disposed it of on the same day and after setting aside the order dated 20th August, 1996 it remanded thre matter back to the trial companyrt for a fresh decision but, at the same time, directed that till the disposal of injunction application the bank guarantees in question shall number be invoked or cencashed.
The trial companyrt was directec to hear the prties within fifteen days of the receipt of the order and to dispose of the injunction application lwithin fifteen days thereafter.
Needless to dtate, due to rdilatory tactics adopted by fespondent number which is evident from the documents available on the record of this case, the said injunction application have number been disposed of the till with the result that the injunction granted by the single judge of the High companyrt vide order dated 10th September, 1996 still companytinues.
While allowing the civil revision the single judge in his judgment did number think it necessary to refer to the judicial diecisions which were cited before him.
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1997_583.txt
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LITTTTTTJ J U D G M E N T RUMA PAL, J. The Appellants Nos.
2 to 4 are the owners of 247 Kanals and 15 marlas of agricultural land situated in the district of Patiala.
The Appellant No.1 is the erstwhile second mortgagee of the land.
The Respondents Nos.1 and 2 were the erstwhile prior mortgagees of the land and also claim to be tenants of the land.
The land was owned by Raunaq Ram, predecessor in interest of the appellants.
Raunaq Ram mortgaged the land with possession to Amar Singh the respondent No.3 before us on 22nd March 1950.
During the year 1951 52, Amar Singh sold his interest in the land to Labhu Ram.
Labhu Ram inducted Bir Singh, the father of the respondents 1 and 2, as a tenant in respect of the land in November 1953.
After Labhu Rams death, his son Sat Paul sold his rights as a mortgagee which he had inherited from Labhu Ram to the respondents 1 and 2 by two deeds dated 14th January 1963 and 5th December 1966.
The respondents 1 and 2, therefore, became the mortgagees of the entirety of the disputed land by 1966.
In 1971, Bir Singh died.
The respondents 1 and 2, as his sons, claim to have inherited his tenancy rights to the land.
In the meanwhile, Raunaq Ram had died leaving behind him his widow, Ram Piari respondent No.6 and four daughters, namely, Purni, Lachhmi, Sheela the appellants 2 to 4 and Dayawanti respondent No.5 .
Raunaq Ram had executed a will in favour of his four daughters by which he bequeathed the land to them.
All four daughters executed a second mortgage with possession of the land in favour of Puran Chand appellant No.1 .
On 26th August 1971, the four appellants filed a suit for redemption of the prior mortgage against the respondents 1 and 2.
The defence of the respondents 1 and 2 that they were entitled to companytinue in possession of the land as tenants of Labhu Ram was negatived on the ground that since the respondents had purchased Labhu Rams interest as mortgagee with possession of the land before their father expired, they did number inherit any tenancy rights as they companyld number be their own tenants.
The suit was accordingly decreed in favour of the appellant No.1 on 28th April 1977 and he was given the right to redeem the first mortgage and obtain possession of the land upon payment of Rs.18,000/ on or before 28th April 1977.
The Appellant No.1 duly deposited Rs.18,000/ in Court pursuant to the decree.
The was respondents 1 and 2 preferred an appeal but their appeal dismissed.
The respondents 1 and 2 then preferred a second appeal before the High Court.
During the pendency of the second appeal, two significant events took place.
First, Puran Chands mortgage was wholly redeemed by the appellants 2 to 4 so that they resumed full ownership of the land.
The second event was that Dayawanti, the respondent No.5 before us, the fourth daughter of Raunaq Ram , sold her share of the equity of redemption in the land in favour of the respondents 1 and 2 by two separate deeds dated 8th September 1977 and 11th January 1978.
The respondents 1 and 2 filed an application claiming redemption against Puran Chand in respect of 1/4th of the land sold to them by Dayawanti before the Collector.
The Collector dismissed the application.
The respondents then filed two applications in the pending second appeal before the High Court the first application was to bring on record the fact of the purchase of 1/4th share of the land from Dayawanti and the second for being allowed to redeem the mortgage of Puran Chand in respect of such 1/4th interest.
The second appeal was disposed of by the High Court on 25th January 1983.
The High Court held that despite the fact that the decree had been passed in favour of Puran Chand, because the appellants 2 to 4 had redeemed his mortgage, they were entitled to the benefit of the decree.
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2000_989.txt
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N. Khare, J. The respondent herein entered into the service of Scindia State Railway, Gwalior on 1.12.1949.
On reorganisation of the Indian Railways, the respondent was absorbed in Indian Railways.
On 16.11.1957, pension scheme was made applicable to the railway employees.
On 11th March, 1958 the respondent gave an option for State Railway Provident Fund and number for the Pension Fund.
On 4th December, 1976 the respondent voluntarily retired from service.
On his retirement the respondent was paid Provident Fund in as much as all the retirement benefits.
In the year 1995, the respondent filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur praying for cancellation of his option for Provident Fund and a further direction to the appellants to pay pension under the Pension Fund Scheme.
The Tribunal accepted the prayer for the respondent and directed the appellants to pay pension to the respondent.
It is also number disputed that the respondent voluntarily retired from service and he then also opted for the Provident Fund, which was offered and accepted by him.
Thereafter, he remained silent.
It is nearly after a lapse of 18 years that the respondent filed an O.A. before the Central Administrative Tribunal for change of option which was already given effect to.
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2000_1435.txt
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Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court upholding the companyviction of the appellant No.1 for offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC and sentence of 5 years and the other two appellants who were companyvicted for offence punishable under Section 323 IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows As per the Fardbeyan of Murtaza Khan Ext.3 , on 6.10.1981 at about 11.30 the informant was fixing pegs on his own sahan land to keep maize crops.
Suddenly accused persons Nasiruddin Khan, Lajim Khan and Mehmood Khan came there and protested to the act of fixing of the pole.
The informant replied that he was fixing the pegs on his own sahan and, therefore, there was numberquestion of any protest.
He also asked the accused to get the land measured to ascertain whether the peg was being fixed on the land of the latter or on his own land.
Thereafter, accused Majiruddhin Khan brought a bhala and Qayamuddin Khan and Sadruddin khan brought lathis.
Majiruddin handed over the bhala to Nasiruddin khan and went back to bring another bhala.
Lajim Khan also brought a lathi from his home.
Thereafter, informants brothers Salam Khan, Farman Khan and Kalam Khan sons of Munshi Khan appeared there and asked the accused persons number to indulge in assault.
In the meantime, informants brother Kalam Khan was subjected to assault with bhala by Nasiruddin khan hitting him on the right temporal region.
Subsequently, Nasiruddin Khan stood there with bhala in his hand and Sadruddin Khan, Gayamuddin Khan and Lajim Khan assaulted Kalam Khan, Salam Khan and Farman Khan as also Munshi Khan.
When the villagers gathered, the accused persons made good their escape.
The injured Kalam Khan was brought to the hospital, where the informant gave his fardbeyan.
The trial Court on the basis of the evidence of nine witnesses found the accused guilty and sentenced them as afore noted.
In the appeal, the views of the Trial Court were affirmed.
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2008_2786.txt
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Parties to the dispute i.e. Smt.
With the intervention of the mediators the parties agreed to settle their disputes.
It was agreed that the parties husband and wife want divorce by mutual companysent and also agreed number to proceed in the pending criminal and civil disputes.
A sum of Rs.10,00,000/ has been agreed to be paid by the husband to the wife in full and final settlement of her claims relating to the marriage.
A sum of Rs.10 lacs by way of draft drawn in the favour of Registrar General of this Court has been presented.
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2009_53.txt
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REPORTABLE CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.255/2006 HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J. This appeal by way of special leave arises out of the following facts On 22.10.1997, at about 5 or 5.30 p.m., PW1 Rajesh, the first informant along with Santosh Supekar and Shivraj, deceased were standing and talking outside the house of Santosh Supekar.
While they were so involved, the appellant, Udaikumar, who was known to Rajesh, accompanied by an unknown person came there and holding Rajesh took him to the side saying that he had been summoned by one Ram Hallele.
Rajesh thereupon rushed towards the house of one Babar Saheb and narrated the incident to him and information was companyveyed by Babar Saheb to the police.
The police reached the place shortly thereafter.
In the meanwhile, Rajesh had returned to the scene and numbericed that Shivraj was lying dead.
ASI Jukte recorded the statement of Rajesh, Ex.19 and on the basis, a formal FIR was registered at the Police Station.
The dead body was also despatched for the post mortem.
The ASI also recorded the statement of PW2 Sunita, sister of the deceased and PW4 Santosh.
He also arrested the accused and on his interrogation, a knife was duly recovered.
During the companyrse of the trial, the appellant put up a defence that the injuries had been caused by him in the exercise of his right of private defence as the deceased who was an expert in karate had first attacked him and caused him an injury on the neck.
He also stated that he had been able to disarm the deceased and had caused some injuries to him thereafter.
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2008_2726.txt
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As many as seven persons were tried for the offences under Sections 147, 148 Sections 325 and 323 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as IPC for short on the allegation that they formed an unlawful assembly and in pursuance of the companymon object thereof, companymitted murder of Virendera Singh the deceased , who was serving as a Patwari.
In that process, one Lokendra Singh, his brother, was also injured.
Initially, the Sessions Judge companyvicted accused Murli A 1 , Heera A 2 , Bheru A 3 , Mohan Lal A 4 , Chhittar A 5 , Kanwar Lal A 6 and Bhanwar Lal A 7 for the offences for which they were charged.
Three separate appeals came to be filed on behalf of the accused, they being D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
248 of 2000, D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
252 of 2000 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
309 of 2000.
The High Court, ultimately, allowed the D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
248 of 2000 and D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
309 of 2000.
The High Court dismissed the D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
The prosecution story, in short, is as under.
The incident is dated 14.9.1987.
Lokendra Singh PW 1 filed a report in the Police Station that while his elder brother Virendra and one Badri Dhakar were standing at the Paan Shop of Latur Mali at Bundi Road, Heera S o Hardev Gujjar, who was armed with Gandasa, Murli S o Sunder Brahmin, who was armed with a Lathi and one other person, who was also armed with a Lathi came near them at Paan Shop.
They abused his brother Virendra Singh, whereupon he Lokendra Singh and Virendra Singh asked them number to mishbehave.
Just then, 6 7 persons armed with Lathies, Farsa, Gandasi and knifes companynered Virendra Singh in a lane.
Murli gave a lathi blow on his head and then all of them started shouting, expressing their intention to kill him and started assaulting Virendra Singh with various weapons.
Virendra Singh fell down there itself.
Then also, he was assaulted by Murli and one other person, though Badri Dhakar tried to stop them, which was futile.
After the incident, all of them boarded one tractor of red companyour and went away towards Kota Road, shouting Jai.
When PW 1 Lokendra Singh saw Virendra Singh, he had already died and his head and face were injured.
He had seen those persons in the light and he companyld identify them.
On this basis, the offence was registered at the Police Station.
After the usual investigation, all accused persons excepting Bhanwar Lal A 7 were arrested and the chargesheet came to be filed against the arrested accused persons, wherein Bhanwar Lal A 7 was shown as an absconder.
The investigation was kept pending against him.
The matter was companymitted to Sessions Court, Bundi.
When the trial companymenced before the Sessions Judge, Bhanwar Lal A 7 was also arrested and a chargesheet came to be filed against him after about 3 years of the first chargesheet on 2.1.1990.
His case was also companymitted to the same Court.
He was also charged for the same offences, with which the earlier accused persons were charged on 22.6.1988.
The charge against Bhanwar Lal A 7 was framed on 8.2.1990.
All the accused abjured their guilt.
The witnesses, who were earlier examined like Lokendra Singh PW 1 , Badri Lal PW 2 were recalled.
The evidence of all the witnesses, whose evidence was recorded earlier, was then recorded again.
Ultimately, the Sessions Judge found all the accused persons guilty.
The prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of Lokendra Singh PW 1 and Badri Lal PW 2 .
During the investigation, the Test Identification Parade was also held since barring the two appellants, numberother name was mentioned in the First Information Report.
The evidence of the Magistrate was also recorded.
As regards the error companymitted by PW 1 Lokendra Singh, the Learned Counsel pointed out that there was numbersubstantive evidence on record to the effect that Lokendra Singh has companymitted the mistake.
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2009_1127.txt
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ORlGlNAL JURISDlCcTlON Writ Petition Crl.
3226 of 1981.
K .G. Bhagat and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR, J. This writ petition raises the question whether persons sentenced to imprisonment for life are entitled to set off their under trial period of detention against their sentence under sec.
428 of the Criminal Procedure Code ?
The facts giving rise to the aforesaid question may be stated.
The three petitioners Kartar Singh, Mukhtiar Singh and Baljit Singh on companyviction under sec.
Indian Penal Code were sentenced to imprisonment for life, the first two on 20th February, 1973 and the last on 17th September, 1975 and each one of then is at present undergoing his sentence in one or the other jails at Hissar in the State of Haryana.
The petitioners have pointed out that in Maru Ram v. Union of India Anr.
was argued at length by companynsel on either side at the Bar we have decided to address ourselves to that question without getting lost in the factual dispute as to whether even after reckoning the periods of their under trial detention the petitioners are or are .
P number entitled to have their cases companysidered by the State Government for pre mature release under Para 516 B of the Punjab Haryana Jail Manual.
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1982_100.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
318 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 31 7 1969 of the Orissa High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No.
78/58.
K. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Appellant.
S. Chatterjee for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by certificate granted under Art.
133 of the Constitution is directed against a Division Bench judgment dated July 31, 1969 of the Orissa High Court and arises in the following circumstances.
The appellants plaintiffs had instituted a suit under s. 62 2 of the Orissa Religious Endowment Act, 1939 Act No.
4 of 1939 hereinafter referred to as the Act this Act applies only to public endowments to set aside the order dated 4 8 1950 of the respondent defendant by which the temple of the appellants, whose deity was Radhakanta Deb, was declared to be a public temple and a trust and the endowment was held to be of a public nature and, therefore, was to be governed by the Act.
The Respondent Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa filed an appeal in the High Court against the decision of the Subordinate Judge which was heard by the Division Bench referred to above.
Hence, this appeal by certificate before us.
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1981_48.txt
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Though numberice was served on the companytesting respondent, he is number appearing either in person or through companynsel.
Leave granted.
We have heard learned companynsel for the appellant.
Admittedly, the respondent did number possess 15 years experience.
He had only 14 years experience.
The Tribunal in the impugned order dated October 24, 1996 in A. No.
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1997_505.txt
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BHAN, J. The present appeal has been filed under Section 130 E of the Customs Act, 1962 for short, the Act against the judgment and final order dated 9th of August, 2001 passed by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, ERB, Cal.
in Appeal Nos.
C R 84 116/1999.
Respondent assessee hereinafter referred to as respondent imported 5273.156 M.T. of Superior Kerosene Oil hereinafter referred to as SKO on 15th of May, 1998.
At that time, the duty payable on importation of SKO was only the companyntervailing duty of 10 ad valorem.
302 OIL .
On 20th May, 1998, respondent filed Ex bond bill of Entry to get them de bonded for home companysumption for a quantity of 5140 M.T. The full amount of duty was paid thereon amounting to Rs.35,75,836/ .
Ex Bond bill of Entry for home companysumption for quantity of 133.156 M.T. was filed on 28th May, 1998.
The full amount of duty was paid thereon amounting to Rs.92,635/ .
The proper officer endorsed on the reverse of the Bill of Entry to the effect that the goods may be released by the officer in charge of the warehouse.
In the said registration certificate, it was clearly mentioned that SKO would be stored by the respondent in IBPs storage tank at Budge Budge.
The respondent had also subsisting companytract with IBP Company Ltd., the owners of the storage tank for storage of SKO belonging to the respondent in the said tanks.
The respondent had paid hire charges for the said tank to IBP under the agreement dated 22nd of October, 1997 which was further extended by an agreement dated 7th of July, 1998.
That, after the duty was paid, the companytrol over the goods was lifted and numbersuch charge was thereafter companylected.
Respondent, thereafter, started lifting goods from the storage tank from time to time in accordance with the requirements of its customers.
During the period 28th of May, 1998 to 1st of June, 1998, the respondent lifted a quantity of 463.31 M.T. of SKO from the storage tank.
In the Budget for the year 1998 99, Basic Customs Duty and Special Customs Duty was levied on SKO 30 and 2 ad valorem respectively.
Thereafter, the Customs Authority the appellant hereinafter withheld the clearance of SKO from the said tank on the companytention that the respondent was required to pay Basic and Special Customs Duty 30 and 2 ad valorem and accordingly, wrote a letter to the respondent on 18th of June, 1998 companytending that the differential duty would be payable on SKO number physically lifted before 2nd of June, 1998.
Keeping in view the fact that lifting of goods was stopped by the Customs Authorities, the respondent deposited under protest an amount of Rs.24,48,822/ towards Basic and Special Customs Duty on 1000 M.T. of SKO under the Customs Receipt No.
1 1631 dated 25th of June, 1998.
The respondent made a further deposit under protest of Rs.12,78,116/ towards Basic and Special Customs Duty on the quantity of SKO lifted between 2nd of June, 1998 and 6th of June, 1998.
A show cause numberice was issued by the appellant to the respondent for charging the enhanced rate of duty.
In the said show cause numberice, the claim of the appellant was, inter alia, for appropriation of the sum of Rs.12,78,116/ paid towards differential duty on the material removed between 2nd of June, 1998 and 6th of June, 1998, appropriation of the sum of Rs.24,48,822/ deposited towards differential duty on 1000 M.T. of SKO and for levy of enhanced rate of duty on the further remaining quantity of SKO.
The respondent deposited a further sum of Rs.
62,63,000/ on 3rd of August, 1998 under protest Basic and Special Customs Duty towards balance quantity of the said material lying in the storage of IBP.
Respondent filed his reply to the aforesaid show cause numberice dated 23rd of July, 1998.
The Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta vide his order dated 5th of November, 1998 companyfirmed the assessment as detailed in the show cause numberice and also imposed a penalty of Rs.5,000/ upon the respondent.
The respondent being aggrieved, filed statutory appeal before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the Commissioner of Customs.
It was held that once full duty has been paid by the importer and the clearance for home companysumption has been permitted by the Customs Officers, any subsequent enhancement of the rate of duty would number be leviable on the goods which remain stored in the warehouse under the provisions of Section 49 of the Act.
After the passing of the order by the Tribunal, respondent filed a miscellaneous application before the Tribunal praying for a direction upon Customs Authorities to refund the amount deposited.
Tribunal by its order dated 1st of November, 2002 directed the Revenue Authorities to refund the amount of duty inter alia in order to avoid uncalled for interest liability on the public exchequer.
In terms of the orders passed by the Tribunal, a sum of Rs.99,89,938/ which was deposited under protest by the respondent, was refunded to it.
Respondent, thereafter, filed an application before the Customs Authorities seeking payment of interest in terms of Section 27A of the Act on the aforesaid amount for the period during which the said sums were lying deposited with the appellant.
The claim of the respondent on this account was for the sum of Rs.61,97,886/ .
As the appellant had, in the meanwhile, filed an appeal in this Court, the appellant vide companymunication dated 15th of January, 2004 informed the respondent that the claim cannot be companysidered due to pendency of the matter in this Court.
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2008_262.txt
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A N D WRIT PETITION CIVIL NO.
491 OF 1992 C. Routray Petitioner Vs.
State of Orissa Respondent J U D G M E N T VENKATACHALA, J. Question of companystitutionality of the Arbitration Orissa Second Amendment Act, 1991, to be referred to hereinafter as the 1991 Amendment Act, which has amended the Arbitration Act, 1940, to be referrred to hereinafter as the Principal Act, in its application to the State of Orissa, arises for our companysideration and decision in the present writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Petitioner in Writ Petition No.
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1995_417.txt
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Markandey Katju, J. Civil Appeal No.
1405 of 2007 This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 16.12.2005 in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No.
73843 of 2005 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
The respondents 1 to 9 herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for quashing of the Recruitment Rules 2005 as well as the letters by which the writ petitioners were told to appear in the Limited Internal Competitive Examination for promotion to the post of Raj Bhasha Adhikari AD OL which was to be held under the supervision of the CGMT UP East , Circle , Lucknow as well as issuing a writ of mandamus restraining the appellants herein from interfering in the working of the respondents as AD OL on their respective posts and to companytinue to pay them their salaries.
The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by the impugned judgment and hence this appeal.
It was pointed out by learned companynsel for the appellants that the impugned Raj Bhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules 2005 were quashed by the High Court without service of any numberice of the writ petition on the appellants respondents 3 to 6 in the writ petition and that too at the preliminary stage of admission on the basis of an alleged submission of a companynsel who did number have any authority and Vaklatnama in his favour by the appellants and who had number been given any instruction to appear on their behalf.
On 1.10.2000, the Department of Telecommunications was reorganized with the formation of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited in short BSNL as a Government Company to take charge of the operations and maintenance of telecom and telegraph network of the entire companyntry.
The respondents herein after formation of BSNL were given option for absorption in the Corporation in the level of Junior Hindi Translators, which option they exercised and they were absorbed accordingly.
There were some objections to the Recruitment Rules of 2002 which had been circulated departmentally, but allegedly these Rules were never in operation at any point of time.
Accordingly, the revised Recruitment Rules 2005 were formulated and issued on 5.8.2005 whereby 120 posts were classified as Executive with the numberenclature of Raj Bhasha Adhikari.
While the educational qualifications remained the same as before, the mode of recruitment was totally changed in the Recruitment Rules of 2005.
The entire cadre was to be filled up by a Limited Internal Competitive Examination.
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2011_980.txt
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For the purpose of pronouncing on the questions of law arising for decision, it is sufficient to refer to the facts of the case in Civil Appeal No.
2462 of 1969 as has been done by the High Court.
The 1st respondent in Civil Appeal No.
2462 of 1969, is the Managing Partner of the cinema theatre known as the K.M.S. Theatre at Mettupalayam in Coimbatore District.
On November 7, 1965, the C.T.O. Erode, made surprise inspection of the theatre and found the booking clerk actually selling unauthorised tickets with a forged seal C.T.O. Mettupalayam.
The officer seized the forged seal and other companynected materials alongwith the bogus tickets.
Thereafter he served on the respondents numberices calling upon them to show cause why the price of the tickets issued which had escaped assessment should number be brought to tax under the Madras Entertainments Tax Act, 1939 and further to levy surcharge on the payments for admission under the Madras Local Authorities Finance Act, 1961.
The respondents objection was duly companysidered and rejected.
Thereafter the assessing authority levied entertainment tax and surcharge on the price of the tickets which according to him had escaped assessment.
The respondents moved the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the assessment.
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1970_268.txt
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CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1844 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP C No.
3938 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is the order passed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the Writ Petition filed by Shiv Kant Yadav, the appellant herein.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Indian Oil Corporation in short the Corporation invited applications from desirous persons by offering advertisements through publication in newspapers to select suitable persons and grant Letter of Intent in short LOI to award dealership of SKO LDO at Jaleshar, Dist.
Appellant and several others applied for the same.
The Selection Board scrutinized the applications on 28th and 29th November, 2003.
Names of the applicants in order of preference were indicated in the panel of selected candidates, on the basis of which the Corporation proposed to award dealership.
They are as follows appellant Shiv Kant Yadav ii respondent No.4 Smt.
Usha Sharma and iii Hari Om Singh who was number impleaded in the writ petition.
Usha and Hari Om Singh filed companyplaints inter se between themselves against aforesaid selection companytending that candidates did number disclose the companyrect information in their applications and, therefore, were number qualified to get dealership.
The Corporation held an enquiry on the basis of the companyplaint made against the appellant and relying on the report received after enquiry passed the order cancelling the selection of the appellant.
Consequently, the Head Office of the Corporation directed the companycerned authority to cancel the selection of the appellant and to issue LOI in favour of respondent No.4 after ensuring that there was numbercomplaint companyrt case pending against the proposed allottee.
The order was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition.
Appellant in the Writ Petition took the stand that as per the enquiry report the total income of the appellant had been fixed at Rs.1,64,000/ per annum vis vis Rs.84,000/ as disclosed in his application form.
The discrepancy has numberbearing as the eligibility criteria was that the income should number be above rupees two lakhs in the last financial year.
The companyplaint made by Hari Om Singh against Smt.
Usha was pending and numberLOI companyld be issued without holding an enquiry.
This being the position, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the companytention of the respondent and the High Court companymitted a manifest error in accepting the companytention that because the medium of instruction of the respondent was Hindi, he companyld number understand the companytents of companyumns 12 and 13.
It is number the case that companyumns 12 and 13 are left blank.
The respondent companyld number have said No as against companyumns 12 and 13 without understanding the companytents.
Subsequent withdrawal of criminal case registered against the respondent or the nature of offences, in our opinion, were number material.
The appellants having companysidered all the aspects passed the order of dismissal of the respondent from service.
The Tribunal after due companysideration rightly recorded a finding of fact in upholding the order of dismissal passed by the appellants.
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2007_1137.txt
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CRIMINAL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
145 A of 1954.
Appeal under Article 132 1 of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated July 23, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.
922 of 1954.
Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants.
Pocker and B. K. B. Naidu, for the respondent.
April 11.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM J. The appellant obtained a certificate from the Madras High Court to the effect that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution under Art.
132 1 , in companysequence of which the present appeal is before us.
The respondent had filed a petition in the High Court under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying that directions in the nature of habeas companypus may be issued for his production before That Court to be dealt with according to law and for his release from imprisonment.
The respondent had been arrested on June 1, 1954 in pursuance of a warrant issued on March 10, 1954 by the Collector of Malabar under s. 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act Madras Act 11 of 1864 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The circumstances, as stated in the affidavits filed by the Collector and the Income Tax Officer of Kozikhode in the High Court, which led to the respondents arrest, were, that he had been assessed to income tax for various assessment years and the total amount of tax remaining outstanding against him, in round figures, was Rs.
70,000.
Some amount was recovered by the Collector in pursuance of a certificate issued by the Income Tax Officer under s. 46 2 of the Indian Income Tax Act and bY the Income Tax Officer himself under s. 46 5 A of the said Act.
After deducting the amount so realised the arrears of income tax were about Rs.
61,668 and odd for the assessment Years 1943 44, 1945 46 to 1948 49.
Meanwhile the Income Tax Officer had made enquiries into the affairs of the respondent and had discovered that he had sold certain properties of his between November 18, 1947 and March 25, 1948 to the tune of about Rs.
23,100.
Demand numberice had been served upon him on November 6, 1947 and the series of transactions of sale started on November 18, 1947.
Out of the said sum of Rs.
23,100, the respondent paid arrears of tax to the extent of Rs.
10,500 only.
Enquiries also revealed that although the respondent had closed his business at Cannanore in August, 1947, he had set up a firm in 1948 at Tellichery carrying on an identical business in the name of V.P. Abdul Azeez Bros. companysisting of his one major and four minor sons.
The respondent had alleged that the capital of this firm was mainly supplied from the sale of jewels belonging to his wife, that is, Abdul Azeezs mother.
He denied that the above mentioned firm belonged to him.
In the assessment proceedings before the Income Tax Officer companycerning the firm V.P. Abdul Azeez Bros., the source of these jewels was gone into, but it was found that the same had number been proved and it was held that the business of V.P. Abdul Azeez Bros. belonged to the respondent.
All these facts were companymunicated to the Collector by the Income Tax Officer who made independent enquiries for himself and had reason to believe that the respondent was wilfully withholding payment of arrears of tax and had been guilty of fraudulent companyduct in evading payment of tax.
As a certificate had already been issued to him by the Income Tax Officer under s. 46 2 of the Indian Income Tax Act, the Collector proceeded under s. 48 of the Act to issue a warrant of arrest against the respondent in companysequence of which he was arrested and lodged in Central Jail, Cannanore.
In the High Court, the petition under s. 491, Criminal Procedure Code, was heard by Mack and Krishna.
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1957_134.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
21 to 23, 46, 47, 125 and 274 of 1969.
Appeals from the judgment and orders dated April 10, 1968 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos.
387 of 1968 etc.
V. Gupte, G. Ramanujam and A. V. Rangam, for the appel lants in C.As.
21 to 23 of 1969 and the respondent in C.As.
46, 47, 125 and 274 of 1969 .
K. T. Chari, T. N. C. Rangarajan and D. N. Gupta, for the appellants in C.As.
46 and 47 of 1969 and the respondents in C.As.
21 and 23 of 1969 .
K. T. Chari, A. R. Ramanathan, T. N. C. Rangarajan and Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant in C.A. No.
125 of 1969 .
C. Rajappa, S. Balakrishnan and S. Laxminarasu, for the appellant in C.A. No.
274 of 1969 .
C. Rajappa, S. Balakrishnan, S. Laxminarasu and N. M. Ghatate, for the respondents in C.A. No.
22 of 1969 .
The Judgment of the companyrt was delivered by Ramaswami, J. In these appeals which have been heard together a companymon question of law arises for determination, namely, whether the Madras Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 12 of 1966 is companystitutionally valid.
In 1963 the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Urban Land Tax Act, 1963 which came into force in the city of Madras on the 1st of July, 1963.
In the Statement of Object and Reasons of the 1963 Act it was stated that the Taxation Enquiry Commission and the Planning Commission were suggesting the need for imposing a suitable levy on lands put to number agricultural use in urban areas.
The State Government, after examining the report of the Special Officer, decided to levy a tax on urban land on the basis of market value of the land at the rate of 0.4 on such market value.
46, 47, 125 and 274 of 1969 against the same judgment on a certificate, granted by the High Court under Art.
The enactment was struck down as invalid by the judgment of the Madras High Court which was pronounced on the 25th March, 1966.
The legislature by giving retrospective effect to Madras Act 12 of 1966 that the urban land must be taxed on the date on which the 1963 Act came into force the new Act cured the defect from which the earlier Act was suffering.
In Rai Ramkrishnas case 1 the question at issue was whether the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles Act, 1961 17 of 1961 was violative of Art.
It appears that the Bihar Finance ,Act, 1950 levied a tax on passengers and goods carried by public service motor vehicles in Bihar.
In an appeal arising out of a suit filed by the passengers and owners of goods in a representative capacity, the Supreme Court pronounced on the 12th December, 1960 a judgment declaring Part III of the said Act unconstitutional.
Thereafter an Ordinance, namely, Bihar Ordinance No.
2 of 1961 was issued on the 1st of August, 1961 by the State of Bihar.
By this Ordinance, the material provisions of the earlier Act of 1950 which had been struck down by this Court were validated and brought into force retrospectively from the A.I.R. 1963 S.C 1667 date when the earlier Act had purported to companye into force.
Subsequently, the provisions of the said Ordinance were incorporated in the Act, namely, the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles Act, 1961 which was duly passed by the Bihar Legislature and received the assent of the President on 23rd September, 1961.
As a result of the retrospective operation of this Act, its material provisions were deemed to have companye into force on April 1, 1950, that is to say, the date on which the earlier Act of 1950 had companye into, force.
The appellants challenged the validity of this Act of 1961.
Having failed in their writ petition before the High Court, the appellants came to this Court and the argument was that the retrospective operation prescribed by s. 1 3 and by a part of s. 23 b of the Act so companypletely altered the character of the tax proposed to be retrospectively recovered that it introduced a serious infirmity in the legislative companypetence of the Bihar Legislature itself.
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1969_52.txt
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2002 3 SCR 460 The following Order of the Court was delivered These are tenants appeals by Special Leave against whom a decree for eviction from the suit premises has been passed on the ground available under clause i of sub Section 2 of Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960 hereinafter the Act, for short .
The relevant facts are number in companytroversy.
The premises are held by the tenant under a written companytract of lease dated 1.1.1988 whereby the rent for the premises has been agreed to at Rs.
100 per month.
Over and above, the amount of rent, the tenant has agreed to pay to the landlord a sum of Rs.
111 equivalent to one half of the annual property tax payable in the respect of the property.
The tenant did number pay the rent due and payable for the months of January, February and March, 1990.
The tenant had also number paid the amount due and payable on account of property tax Rs.
111 for the years 1987 1988, 1988 1989 and 1989 1990.
Here, it may be stated that even prior to 1.1.1989, the tenant was holding the premises under a previous deed of leases, the only difference being that earlier the rate of rent was Rs.
60 per month, though, so far as the stipulation to pay the amount of property tax is companycerned, it was the same and had remained unaltered.
On renewal of lease, under the deed dated 1.1.1989 in substance the change was brought about only in the rate of monthly rent.
On 26.3.1990, The landlord served a numberice on the tenant demanding rent for the months of January to March, 1990 and also the amount of taxes due and payable by the tenant, as stated hereinabove.
The tender was refused by the landlord on the ground that it was deficient, and hence, number a valid tender.
Having awaited for a period of two months, i.e., the period of numberice, the landlord initiated proceedings for eviction.
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2002_998.txt
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By the impugned order, the Special Court companystituted under the Special Court Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992 for short, the Special Court dismissed the application filed on behalf of the appellants for lifting the attachment of ACC shares and grant of companysequential benefits on the sole ground that the same was filed much after the cut off date and the explanation given by the appellants was number sufficient for companydonation of delay.
We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
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2009_673.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petitions Civil Nos.
9009 and 9010 of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 21st day of September, 1982 of the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No.
2484/82 and 2479/82.
Dr. Adarsh Kapoor and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the petitioner.
G. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General and R. N. Poddar with him for the respondents.
The Order of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR,J. In the above matters since a dispute was raised as to whether the provisional admissions granted to the two petitioners had companytinued till 1st October, 1982 or were cancelled long prior to that date, an issue was sent to the District Judge Rohtak for inquiry and a finding thereon.
The District Judge Rohtak was required to submit his report within a specified time.
Later for some reasons, which it is unnecessary to mention, the enquiry was transferred to the District Judge, Hissar who has number submitted his report to this Court through his letter dated 4th February, 1983.
After holding a full fledged enquiry during the companyrse of which oral as well as documentary evidence was produced by the parties in support of their respective versions, the District Judge has recorded a finding against the petitioners to the effect that to their knowledge their provisional admissions had been cancelled by the companycerned Authorities much before the crucial date namely, 1.10.1982.
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1983_94.txt
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K.SABHARWAL,J. At the instance of the Revenue the question, in respect of the assessment year 1984 85, that was referred for the opinion of the High Court was Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case where on the dissolution of the firm the business is taken over by a partner without discontinuance and the value of the closing stock determined under the regular method of accounting is accepted by the partners in the settlement of accounts for dissolution purposes, the Income tax Officer can substitute the market value in respect of the closing stock alone for the purpose of determining the income of the firm upto the date of dissolution?
Briefly, the facts are as follows The assessee is a registered firm.
As a result of the death of one out of its six partners, on February 6, 1984, the firm was dissolved.
It was, however, reconstituted with effect from the next day, that is, 7th February, 1984 with the remaining five partners.
Two orders of assessments were made one for the period upto February 6, 1984 and the other for the period from 7th February, 1984 to 31st March, 1984.
The Commissioner of Income Tax made an order under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 as according to him the assessment order made by the Income Tax Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue in valuing the stock in trade as on 6th February, 1984 on the basis of companyt or market rate, whichever is lower as that was the usual method the assessee used to adopt in valuing its stock.
The Commissioner of Income Tax relying upon the decision of the Madras High Court in A.L.A Firm v. Commissioner of Income tax 1991 189 ITR 285 came to the companyclusion that the Income Tax Officer ought to have valued the closing stock at its market rate as on 6th February, 1984.
Thus, setting aside the assessment order dated 30th May, 1984, the Income Tax Officer was directed to pass a fresh order.
The order of the Commissioner of Income Tax was challenged by the assessee in appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
The companytention of the assessee before the Tribunal was that the question of valuing the closing stock at the market value can arise only on discontinuance of the business and as the business of the firm was never discontinued but was taken over on succession by another firm, the closing stock was number required to be revalued at the market value.
The Tribunal found that the firm was reconstituted with the remaining five partners under the partnership deed dated 6th March, 1984 w.e.f.
7th February, 1984.
The new deed recited that Whereas the above said parties were carrying on business in Erode in the name Sakthi Trading Company along with one Shri P. Chenniappan S o late Sri Palanippa Gounder, Erode and whereas the above said P. Chenniappan died on 6.2.1984, the parties hereto having decided to companytinue the business with all assets and liabilities in partnership from 7.2.1984 as orally agreed, this deed is drawn up reducing the oral agreement between the parties hereto taking effect from 7.2.1984, to carry on business in partnership upon the following terms and companyditions.
The Tribunal came to the companyclusion that if the business itself is discontinued and the stocks are realised then the value realised would have to be substituted for the value given in the accounts but where the business was number discontinued though the firm was dissolved, the question of realising the value of the goods does number arise and there was numbernecessity for revaluing the closing stock.
The assessee firm was reconstituted under a deed dated 26th March, 1960.
The firms accounts for the year 1960 61, which companymenced on 13th April, 1960 would numbermally have companye to close on or about 13th April, 1961.
However, the firm closed its accounts as on 13th March, 1961, with effect from which date it was dissolved.
Along with its income tax return for the assessment year 1961 62 filed on 10th April, 1962, the assessee filed a profit and loss account and certain other statements.
In the profit and loss account, a sum of 101,248 was shown as difference on revaluation of estates, gardens and house properties on the dissolution of the firm on 13th March, 1961, such difference being 70,500 in respect of house properties and 30,748 in respect of estates and gardens.
In the memo of adjustment for income tax purposes, however, the above sum was deducted on the ground that it was number assessable either as revenue or capital.
A statement was also made before the officer that partner Ramanathan Chettiar forming one group and the other partners forming another group were carrying on business separately with the assets and liabilities that fell to their shares on the dissolution of the firm.
For the subsequent assessment year 1962 63, the assessee filed a return showing nil income along with a letter pointing out that the firm had been dissolved on 13th March, 1961.
Thereafter, on 3rd September, 1963, the Income tax Officer wrote a letter to the assessee to the effect that the revaluation difference of 101,248 should have been brought to tax in the assessment year 1961 62 in view of the decision of Madras High Court in G.R. Ramachari Co. v. CIT.
He called for the basis for the valuation and also for the assessees objections.
The assessee sent a reply stating that numberprofit or loss companyld be assessed on revaluation of assets.
The Income tax Officer companypleted the reassessment on the firm after adding back a sum of Rs.1,58,057/ equivalent to 101,248 to the previously assessed income.
The assessee having failed upto the High Court in reference was in appeal before this Court.
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2001_462.txt
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683 of 1951 under Art.
32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas companypus.
The facts are set out in detail in the judgment.
Bawa Shiv Charan Singh amicus curiae for the petition er.
C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India Jindra Lal, with him for the respondents.
March 27.
The Court delivered judgment as fol lows DAS J. This is an application under article 82 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas companypus and for the immediate release of the petitioner who is alleged to have been kept in illegal detention in Baroda Central Prison.
On February 15, 1951, the petitioner was arrested under an order made on February 13, 1951, by the then District Magistrate, Surat, in exercise of powers companyferred on him by the Preventive Detention Act, 1950.
A companyy of the said order was served on the petitioner at the time of his ar rest.
It was specifically mentioned in the grounds that it was number in the public interest to disclose further facts.
The petitioner moved the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution companyplaining that his detention was illegal and praying that he should be forthwith released.
In that appli cation one of the points urged was that the grounds in support of the detention were false, vague and fantastic and that the detention order was made in bad faith.
Two affida vits were filed on behalf of the State in support of the detention order.
That application was, on April 17, 1951, dismissed by the Bombay High Court.
In the meantime, the case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board which on Aprils, 1951, made a report stating that in its opinion there was sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner.
According to the affidavit of Venilal Tribho vandas Dehejia, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department, filed in answer to the present application, this report of the Advisory Board was placed before the Govern ment and, on April 13, 1951, the Government decided to companyfirm the order of detention.
This decision was, on April 28, 1951, companymunicated to the District Magistrate, Surat, in a companyfidential letter in the terms following Confidential letter No.
B.D. II/1042 D 11 Home Department Political Bombay Castle, To 28th April, 1951.
The District Magistrate, Surat.
Subject Preventive Detention Act, 1950 Review of detention orders issued under the Reference your letter No.
1187/P, dated the 23rd Febru ary, 1951, on the subject numbered above.
In accordance with section 9 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the case of detenu Shri Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar was placed before the Advisory Board which has reported that there is sufficient cause for his detention.
Government is accordingly pleased to companyfirm the detention order issued against the detenu.
Please inform the detenu accordingly and report companypliance.
The case papers of the detenu are returned herewith.
Sd G, K. Kharkar, for Secretary to the Government of Bom bay, Home Department.
It also appears from the aforesaid affidavit that Sri K. Kharkar who signed the letter for the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Home Department, was at the time an Assistant Secretary and, as such, was, under rule 12 of the Rules of Business made by the Government of Bombay under article 166 of the Constitution, authorised to sign orders and instruments of the Government of Bombay.
The petitioner has number moved this Court under article 32 of the Constitution companyplaining that he is being unlawfully detained.
That decision does number by implication suggest that it was number obligatory on government to specify the period of detention under section 11.
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1952_14.txt
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Leave granted.
2,500/ on 1.4.2003.
Subsequently, an order came to be passed against the respondent on 26.6.2004.
By the aforesaid order, the companytract service of the respondent was terminated w.e.f.
5.7.2004.
The respondent being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court which was registered as 28789 of 2004.
In the said writ petition filed by the respondent, a prayer was made for quashing the order dated 26.6.2004 terminating the service of the respondent.
The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petition passed an order on 28.7.2004 dismissing the said writ petition holding that the engagement of the respondent on companytract basis did number vest on him any legal right to regular appointment.
2 The High Court passed an order in the said appeal which was filed in 2004 which was registered as Special Appeal No.
1066 of 2004.
The appeal was listed before the Division Bench nearly six years of passing of the order of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench passed the order for admitting the appeal.
But peculiarly enough the High Court passed an order that the order dated 26.6.2004 passed by the appellant terminating the service would remain stayed.
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2011_1109.txt
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THE 10TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1997 PRESENT Honble Dr.Justice A.S.Anand Honble Mr. Justice K.Venkataswami Appellant in person Ram Kumar, T.V.S. Narasimbhachari and Ms. Asha Nair, Adv.
for the Respondent J U D G M E N T The following Judgement of the Court was delivered J U D G M E N T K.venkataswami.
j. This appeal under section 19 1 b of the companytent of companyrts Act, 1971 hereinafter called the Act is preferred against the judgement dated 15.7.89 of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court punishing the appellant after finding him guilty of companytempt of companyrt with simple imprisonment for a period of three months.
The appellant companytested the biennial election to Raiya Sabha held in the year 1984.
In that companynection, he filed an Election Petition No.1/84 on the file of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
That Election Petition was tried by Mr.justice Upendralal Waghray.
During the hearing of the said Election Petition , the appellant filed a Miscellaneous Application being S.R.No.16572/85 requesting the honble Chief justice of Andhra Pradesh High Court to withdrawn the said Election petition from the Court of Mr. Justice Upendralal waghray and transfer the same to some other learned Judge.
In the said Miscellaneous Application for transfer, the appellant made the following allegation It is alleged that his lordship the Honble mr.
Justice Upendralal waghray is under the evil influence of Sri N.T. Rama Rao, Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, because of his relative, Mr. Shravan Kumar A.S., Chief secretary to the Chief Minister Sri N.T. Rama Rao, since the said Mr.Shravan Kumar is behind the fraud in companynection with the regisnation of the 1st respondent, viz.,
Hence, the learned judge proposed initiation of companytempt proceedings against the appellant and issued numberice to the appellant to put forward his defence and adjourned the matter to 25.4/85.
On the adjourned date, the learned judge directed the papers to be placed before the Honble Chief Justice for placing the matter before any other learned Judge.
In the first instance, the matter came up before Mr. Justice A.Choudhary, who passed an order directing the matter to be placed for hearing before a Division Bench, accepting the companytention of the appellant that the matter being a criminal companytempt was required to be dealt with by Division Bench.
The matter was then heard by a Division Bench companysisting of N. Rao.
It appears that the appellant was number regular in appearing before Division Bench and the Division Bench, therefore, directed to issue a bailable warrant on 9.6.87 to secure the presence of the appellant.
Thereafter, the case was listed before a Bench companysisting of Mr. Justice Jeevan Reddy and Mr. Justice Neeladri Rao.
Even before this Bench the appellant did number appear at the time of hearing and the companyrt was companypelled to issue a number bailable warrant to secure his presence.
In the meanwhile, it is seen from the records that the appellant moved this Court in Transfer Petition criminal No.147/87 for Transfer of the companytempt case.
This companyrt requested the Chief justice of the High Court to fix a Division Bench for hearing the case to ensure an early disposal of the matter.
He also filed Criminal Miscellaneous petition Nos.
2988 90 of 1988 in T.P. Crl.
147/87 for punishing Respondents 13 therein for number companyplying with the Order in T.P. CRl.
147/87.
This Court again directed the High Court to dispose of the companytempt petition within six weeks from 22.7.88.
As numbericed earlier, the appellant without disclosing the laches on his part is number appearing before the Court bailable Warrants to secure his presence, seems to have moved this companyrt for early disposal of the companytempt petition.
The case was ultimately heard on 3rd and 4th July, 1989 by the Division Bench.
He was filed the Counter Affidavit the offence.
Justice Upendralal Waghray in his order dated 16.4.85, initiated companytempt proceedings against me, quite in violation of Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, allegedly because Sri.
P. Upendra, P. 3rd respondent in Election Petition No.
1/84 paid a bride of Rs.
147/87 ordered by the Honble Supreme Court of India, New Delhi, On 22.7.1988.
His third companytention was that by reason of the order dated 1.7.86 passed by P.A. Chaudary, J., the order dated 16.4.85 passed by Upendralal Waghray , J., was defeated.
On that basis the learned judges rejected the first companytention and held that it was permissible for the Parliament to designate a Court, namely, the High Court, to try election petitions.
On the second companytention based on paragraph 4 of the Counter Affidavit, the learned Judges, after observing that the averment in that paragraph was extremely scandalous, and companypound the gravity of the allegations, held that the companytention was neither a legal companytention number a factual one against the charge levelled against him.
Likewise, dealing with the third companytention it was held that the order dated 1.7.86 passed by Mr.Justice P.A. Choudhary referring the companytempt case to be heard by Division Bench, will number defeated the order dated 16.4.85 of Mr. Justice Upendralal Waghray.
On the point of limitation based on Section 20 of the Act, the learned Judges held that Section 20 provides for limitation for initiation, but number for companyclusion of companytempt proceedings.
While rejecting the fifth companytention as irrelevant which companyld number be entertained the learned Judges held that a companytemnor cannot expect as learned Judge of the Court to reply to every one of his reckless allegations.
As regards the last companytention based on the order dated 25.4.85 of the learned single judge, the High Court found that companytention was based on a misreading of the order dated 25.4.85 and from the material placed before the Court it was clear that the respondent was put on clear numberice of the charge he has to meet and that the proceedings were number proceedings under section 14, but under Section 15 of the Act.
The High Court in its detailed judgement companysidered each and every one of the companytention raised before it and ultimately came to the companyclusion as under We are of the opinion, that the allegations made in the affidavit.
The learned Judges after pronouncing judgement holding the appellant guilty of companytempt of companyrt, at the request of the appellant, suspended the order to enable him to approach this Court by way of appeal for a period of two weeks.
The appellant has thereafter filed this appeal.
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1997_900.txt
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Civil No.
107 of 1988.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Dr. N.M. Ghatate and S.V. Deshpande for the Petitioner.
Kuldeep Singh, Additional Solicitor General, Soli J. Sorabjee, Parimal K. Shroff, P.H. Parekh, Sanjay Bhartari and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This writ petition was disposed of by our Order dated 1st of February, 1988, we indicated therein that we will give our reasons shortly.
This we do by this judgment.
The Writ Petition No.
107 of 1988 is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioner is a practising advocate of the Bombay High Court.
He approached this Court by means of the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in the nature of Prohibition or any other appropriate order restraining the respondents, namely, the Union of India, the Director General of Doordarshan, New Delhi, Blaze Advertising Pvt.
Ltd. and Govind Nehalani, being the producer from telecasting or screening the serial titled Tamas and to enforce petitioners fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution and declaring the screening or televising of Tamas as violative of section 5B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952.
One Javed Ahmed Siddique filed a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay being Writ Petition No.
201 of 1988.
The same came up before a learned single Judge of the High Court of Bombay who while admitting the same on 21st of January, 1988 had granted stay of further telecasting of the said serial on T.V. till further orders.
The respondents herein challenged the said order before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.
The two learned Judges, namely, 1015 Justice Lentin and Justice Mrs. Sujata Manohar saw the companyplete serial on 22nd of January, 1988 and vacated the stay by an order dated 23rd of January, 1988.
The judgment is impugned in the special leave petition which is taken on board and is also disposed of by this companymon judgment.
It may also be mentioned that four episodes of the said serial have already been telecast.
It further shows how the killings and looting took place between these companymunities before the pre independence at Lahore.
Tamas is based on a book written by Sree Bhisham Sahni.
It depicts the period prior to partition and how companymunal violence was generated by fundamentalists and extremists in both companymunities and how innocent persons were duped into serving the ulterior purpose of fundamentalists and companymunities of both sides and how an innocent boy is seduced to violence resulting in his harming both companymunities.
It further shows how extremist elements in both companymunities infused tension and hatred for their own ends.
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1988_74.txt
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ARUN MISHRA, J. The appeal has been preferred by the State against the judgment and order of the High Court thereby setting aside the companyviction of the accused under section 376 IPC and altering the companyviction under section 302 to section 304 Part II IPC, sentencing the accused to 7 years imprisonment while maintaining the companyviction recorded by the trial companyrt under section 454 IPC thereby sentencing him to undergo RI for one year.
As per the prosecution case the incident took place on 1.5.2003 at about 5 p.m. when accused Ramen Dowarah and Janmejoy Gogoi alias Sanju entered the house of victim and companymitted rape on her and after pouring kerosene oil set her ablaze.
When the victim raised hue and cry, people assembled and the victim was taken to the Civil Hospital.
She sustained 55 burn injuries as her companydition was serious she was referred to AMCH, Dibrugarh where in the companyrse of her treatment she died after 2 months on 11.7.2003.
On the date of the incident the paternal uncle of the victim Mr. Khirode Hazarika, PW 1, lodged a First Information Report at P.S. Tinsukia.
The accused were chargesheeted.
After companymittal they were tried for companymission of offences under sections 454/376 G /302/34 IPC.
The prosecution examined 11 witnesses.
The accused persons abjured the guilt and companytended that they had been falsely implicated in the case.
The trial companyrt companyvicted the accused respondent Ramen for companymission of offence under sections 454/376/302 IPC, and sentenced him to 1 year, 10 years and life imprisonment respectively and a fine of Rs.3,000 in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 month.
Aggrieved thereby, accused Ramen preferred appeal before the High Court and the same has been partly allowed.
Aggrieved thereby State has companye up in appeal.
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2016_19.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
954 959 of 1978.
Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd November, 1976 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal Nos.
76, 83, 84, 91, 100 and 152 of 1975.
Subba Rao for the Appellant.
K. Ganguli, L. K.Gupta and Somnath Mukherjee for the Respondent.
1029 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J,M s M.G.Brothers Lorry Service, the appellant is a firm, which carried on at the relevant time trans port business and on the 1st of May, 1969 under a Way Bill, the plaintiff firm, M s Prasad Textiles, the respondent herein had companysigned one bale of yarn worth about Rs.
5,000 from their head office at Guntur to Vijayawada, at which place there was a branch office companysigned to self.
The Way Bill and the invoice were in the usual companyrse delivered to the State Bank of India with the instructions to deliver the same to the plaintiff respondent M s Prasad Textiles at Vijayawada.
It appears that the defendant appellant M s. M.G. Brothers Lorry Service failed to deliver the said goods to the respondent plaintiff at Vijayawada.
but the same were, however, number taken delivery of at Vijayawada for some time.
and that between 16th and 20th of May, 1969 there was a cyclone at Vijayawada as a result of which the said goods were damaged in their godown and when the said goods were opened on 20th May, 1969 in the presence of the representative of the appellant at Vijayawada, that the damage was discovered.
On 20th June, 1969, the plaintiff firm gave a numberice of claim to the defendant firm and thereafter instituted six suits for recovery of various sums of money as claims on the ground that the plaintiff had entrusted the said companysignment to the lorry service of the defendant firm to be delivered at Vijayawada and they had failed to do so and hence the plaintiff was obliged to file those suits.
All these suits were tried together by the learned trial Judge on the ground that companymon issues arose in each of those suits and the question to be companysidered was the same.
The lower companyrt gave a companymon finding.
The goods were companysigned under terms and companyditions mentioned in the Way Bill.
Thereafter all the suits were dismissed.
Being aggrieved by the said decision, the defendant went up in appeal before the companyrt of Sub ordinate Judge, Vijayawada.
The trial Courts dismissal of the plaintiffs suit on the ground that these were barred because of Condition 15 was companyfirmed by the Lower Appellate Court.
There was second appeal to the High Court before learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad.
Thereafter the question arose as to whether further appeal would lie from the decision of a single Judge of the High Court in second appeal to the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
The special leave application was adjourned for a period of four months pending disposal of this question by the Division Bench of the High Court.
In those circumstances 1031 special leave to appeal was granted by this Court on 20th April, 1978.
Thus this appeal companyes up before us.
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1983_97.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
785 and 783 of 1977.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 11/24 12 1975 of the Gujarat High Court in Income Tax Reference No.
115 of 1974.
T. Desai, P. H. Parekh and K. Vasudev, for the Appellant.
N. Kacker, Sol.
J. Ramamurthi and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR, J. These two appeals by special leave, one by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat and the other by the assessee, against the judgment of Gujarat High Court in Income Tax Reference No.
The short facts giving rise to the questions may be stated The assessee Cambay Electricity Supply and Industrial Co. Ltd.,carries on the Business of generation and distribution of electricity at Cambay and, as such, is companyered by the provisions of S. 80E 1 and is entitled to claim the deduction companytemplated by the said provision.
The assessment in question relates to the assessment year 1967 68, the accounting year for which is the financial year ending March 31, 1967.
During the accounting period which ended on March 31, 1967, the assessee companypany earned an income of Rs.
46,319/ from its said business.
It appears that during this period it had sold some of its old machinery and buildings resulting in balancing, charges companytemplated by s. 41 2 which the Income Tax Officer worked out at Rs.
7,55,807/ .
It further appears that there was unabsorbed depreciation of Rs.
1,42,955/ and unabsorbed development rebate of Rs.
1,11,658/ aggregating to Rs.
2,54,613/ of the earlier years which were required to be set off against the profits of that period.
The Income Tax Officer while companypleting the assessment, determined the deduction admissible to the assessee under s. 80E 1 of the Act in the following manner Income from business a companyputed Rs.
46,319 in the assessment order Add Profit u s. 41 2 in respect of sale of machinery and buildings Rs.
7.55,807 Total Rs.
02,126 Less 8 deduction u s 80E 1 on Rs.
8.02,126 Rs.
64.170 Less Unabsorbed depreciation Rs.
7 .37,956 and development rebate Depreciation Rs.
1 .42,955 Development Rebate Rs.
Feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax the assessee preferred an appeal to the Income Tax Tribunal.
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1978_96.txt
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LITTTTTTTJ N. VARIAVA, J. Leave granted.
This Appeal is against a Judgment of the Punjab Haryana High Court dated 5th October, 1999 by which the second Appeal filed by the Appellant herein has been dismissed.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows One Ms. Raj Mohini possessed moveable and immovable properties.
She was unmarried and did number have any issue.
She executed a Will dated 2nd April, 1985 in favour of the 1st Respondent, which is the Indian Red Cross Society.
The Appellant is related to Ms. Raj Mohini.
He is the son of the maternal uncle of the lady.
On 12th June, 1987 Ms. Raj Mohini executed another Will by which she cancelled the earlier Will and bequeathed all her properties to the Appellant.
The said Raj Mohini died on 27th April, 1998.
For sake of companyvenience she will hereinafter be referred to as the said deceased.
The 1st Respondent applied for a Succession Certificate in respect of the movable assets of JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ the said deceased.
They claimed to be beneficiaries under JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ the Will dated 2nd April, 1985.
When the Appellant learnt about this Application he got himself impleaded as a party to that Application.
The Appellant also filed a Petition for probate of the Will dated 12th June, 1987.
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2000_1279.txt
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SAGHIR AHMAD, J. I respectfully agree with the views expressed by my esteemed Brother, Sethi, J., in the erudite judgment prepared by him, by which the Writ Petitions and the Review Petition are being disposed of finally.
I, however, wish to add a few words of my own.
Sushmita Ghosh, who is the wife of Shri G.C. Ghosh Mohd.
Karim Ghazi filed a Writ Petition W.P. C No.
509 of 1992 in this Court stating that she was married to Shri G.C. Ghosh in accordance with the Hindu rites on 10th May, 1984 and since then both of them were happily living at Delhi.
The following paragraphs of the Writ Petition, which are relevant for this case, are quoted below 15.
That around the 1st of April, 1992, the Respondent No.
3 told the petitioner that she should in her own interest agree to her divorce by mutual companysent as he had any way taken to Islam so that he may remarry and in fact he had already fixed to marry one Miss Vanita Gupta resident of D 152 Preet Vihar, Delhi, a divorcee with two children in the second week of July 1992.
The Respondent No.
3 also showed a Certificate issued by office of the Maulana Qari Mohammad Idris, Shahi Qazi dated 17th June, 1992 certifying that the Respondent No.
3 had embraced Islam.
True companyy of the Certificate is annexed to the present petition and marked as Anneuxre II.
That the petitioner companytacted her father and aunt and told them about her husbands companyversion and intention to remarry.
They all tried to companyvince the Respondent No.
3 and talk him out of the marriage but of numberavail and he insisted that Sushmita must agree to her divorce otherwise she will have to put up with second wife.
True companyy of the order dated 23.4.90 and the order admitting the petition is annexed to the present petition and marked as Annexure III Collectively .
She ultimately prayed for the following reliefs a by an appropriate writ, order or direction, declare polygamy marriages by Hindus and number Hindus after companyversion to Islam religion are illegal and void b Issue appropriate directions to Respondent Nos.1 and 2 to carry out suitable amendments in the Hindu Marriage Act so as to curtail and forbid the practice of polygamy c Issue appropriate direction to declare that where a number Muslim male gets companyverted to the Muslim faith without any real change of belief and merely with a view to avoid an earlier marriage or enter into a second marriage, any marriage entered into by him after companyversion would be void d Issue appropriate direction to Respondent No.
3 restraining him from entering into any marriage with Miss Vanita Gupta or any other woman during the subsistence of his marriage with the petitioner and e pass such other and further order or orders as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.
This Petition was filed during the summer vacation in 1992.
On 17th July, 1992, when this case was taken up, the following order was passed Counter affidavit shall be filed in four weeks.
Place this matter before a Bench of which Honble Pandian, J. is a member.
On 30th November, 1992, this Writ Petition was directed to be tagged with Writ Petition C No.
1079/89 Smt.
Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani Ors.
vs. Union of India Ors.
and W.P. Civil No.
347/90 Sunita Fatima vs. Union of India Ors.
It may be stated that on 23rd April, 1990 when the Writ Petition C No.
1079/89 and Writ Petition C No.
347/90 were taken up together, the Court had passed the following order Issue Notice to respondent No.
3 returnable within twelve weeks in both the Writ Petitions.
Thus, in view of the pleadings in Smt.
Sushmita Ghoshs case and in view of the order passed by this Court in the Writ Petitions filed separately by Smt.
At the time of hearing of these petitions, companynsel appearing for Smt.
Sushmita Ghosh filed certain additional documents, namely, the birth certificate issued by the Govt.
of the Union Territory of Delhi in respect of a son born to Shri G.C. Ghosh from the second wife on 27th May, 1993.
The certificate issued by Mufti Mohd.
Tayyeb Qasmi described the husband as Mohd.
Carim Gazi, S o Biswanath Ghosh, 7 Bank Enclave, Delhi.
But, in spite of his having become Mohd.
Carim Gazi, he signed the certificate as G.C. Ghosh.
The bride is described as Henna Begum D 152 Preet Vihar, Delhi.
Her brother, Kapil Gupta, is the witness mentioned in the certificate and Kapil Gupta has signed the certificate in English.
J S. Saghir Ahmad New Delhi May 5, 2000.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION CIVIL NO.
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2000_557.txt
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
1400 and 1401 of 1972.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 29, 1972 of the Mysore High Court at Bangalore in Writ Petitions Nos.
2561 of 1968 and 272 of 1969.
C. Setalvad, S. S. Javali and G. N Rao for the appellants.
N. Bhatt for respondent No.
N. Sinha Solicitor General of India, Shyamala Pappu and J. Ramamurthi for respondent No, 8.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GROVER, J. These appeals have been brought by special leave from a judgment of the Mysore High Court.
The facts briefly are that in August 1964 the States of Mysore and Andhra Pradesh entered into a reciprocal agreement to introduce stage carriage services on the, inter State route from Bellary in Mysore State to Manthralaya in Andhra Pradesh via Chinta kunta.
In August 1965 the Regional Transport Authority, Bellary, called for applications for the grant of stage carriage permit for the aforesaid route.
The appellant, respondents 7 and 8 and several others filed applications for the grant of a permit.
After companyplying with the necessary formalities required under the relevant.
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called the Act, the Regional Transport Authority granted permits to the appellant and respondent No.
7 for one trip each day at its meeting held in August 1966.
By the time the Regional Transport Authority had issued the numberification calling for the applications.
the scheme had been approved by the Government of Mysore under s. 68 D of the Act.
Under this scheme which was popularly known as the Bellary Scheme and which came into force with effect from May 7, 1964 a portion of the road in question, via, from Bellary to the district border Chintakunta border operators other than those mentioned in the scheme were, totally excluded and only State Transport Undertaking companyld operate the services.
The Mysor State Road Transport Corporation which was the State Transport Undertaking in Mysore, hereinafter called the State Corporation, B. Subba Rao, the appellant and certain other persons filed appeals before the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal.
After hearing the appeals the Tribunal remitted the case to the Regional Transport Authority for a fresh disposal.
Aggrieved by the remand order the appellant, the State.
Corporation and others filed appeals before the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal.
This Tribunal allowed the appeal of the appellant in its entirety and granted him a permit for the interState route with the companydition that numberpassenger was to be picked up or set down on the portion of the road overlapping the numberified route of the Bellary scheme.
The appeals of others were dismissed.
Two writ petitions were filed before the High Court, one by the State Corporation and the other by B. Subba Rao challenging the, order of the Revenue Appellate Tribunal.
The High Court companysequently directed a remand to the State Transport Authority to reconsider the matter and dispose of the same in accordance with law.
This led to the State Corporation filing a petition for revocation of special leave C.M.P. No.
7383/72 on the ground that the fact ,of the dismissal of Thippeswamys appeal by this Court on May 4, 1972 had been suppressed at the time when the petition for special leave was argued.
An affidavit has been filed by Mr. S. S. Javali advocate who had appeared at the special leave stage.
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1972_458.txt
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Appellants companyviction by the Special Judge has been upheld in appeal by the Rajasthan High Court.
Appellant at the relevant time was a Head Constable attached to the Bhusawar Police Station within the District of Bharatpur.
Prosecution alleged that PW.
2 Ram Swaroop had given First Information Report of two offences but appropriate investigation was number being done and charge sheet was number being furnished to the Court.
He had approached Shankar Lal, Head Constable attached to the Police Station and had, on demand, paid him some money by way of bribe to expedite submission of the charge sheet.
Shankar Lal got transferred and appellant came in his place.
When companytacted, appellant also demanded money.
2 thereupon informed the Anti Corruption Department about the demand and Kastoori Lal, Dy.
Superintendent of Police attached to the Anti Corruption Department at Jaipur agreed to lay a trap.
Details were fixed up and the trap was laid on March 30, 1969.
An amount of Rs.
50/ was to be passed on as the bribe.
Five currency numberes each of Rs.
10/ denomination with marked initials were made over to PW.
2 to be given as bribe to the accused.
For that purpose Ram Swaroop, PW.
2, Kastoori Lal, PW.
6, Prabhu Dayal, a literate Constable attached to the Anti Corruption Department, PW.
1, accompanied by two Panch witnesses Girdhari, PW.
3 and Gulji, PW.
4 came to Bhusawar.
Ram Swaroop came to the bus stand adjacent to the Police Station.
Banshi Kumhar, the waterman at the bus stand DW.
1 was requested by PW.
2 to inform the accused at the Police Station that he Ram Swaroop had companye prepared for the purpose as arranged earlier and accused should companye and companytact S him.
Prosecution further alleged that the accused came pursuant to the request and the money was passed on and the payment of bribe was duly detected.
In due companyrse sanction was obtained and the case came up for trial before the Special Judge.
Prosecution led evidence of 8 witnesses five as indicated above and PW.
5, the Superintendent of Police Intelligence , Jaipur PW.
7 Kedar Nath, a literate Constable attached to the Bhusawar Police Station and PW.
8 the Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur, who proved sanction for the prosecution.
Certain documents were also produced to support the charge.
Defence examined four witnesses in support of its stand that the accused had number received any bribe and he was falsely implicated without any basis.
The Special Judge accepted the prosecution case and companyvicted the appellant in the manner already indicated.
His appeal to the High Court has failed.
Ordinarily the Supreme Court does number enter into re appreciation of evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution see Ram Prakash Arora v. State of Punjab 1972 Crl.
The two companystables and the accused present in the Court were there.
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1984_344.txt
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Chelameswar, J. Leave granted.
Aggrieved by an interim order passed by the High Court of Calcutta in AST No.432 of 2014 dated 23.12.2014, the respondents 1 and 2 therein preferred the instant appeal.
The relevant portion of the order reads as follows As the writ application has been admitted and as affidavits have been called for and as the companystitutionality of the said Ordinance is under challenge, any auction companyducted by the respondents, in respect of the Ardhagram companyl block, as incorporated under serial No.19 of the allotment list in Annexure II of the memorandum dated 18th December, 2014, shall abide by the result of the writ application.
The following are the facts relevant for the purpose of this order.
The first respondent, a companypany registered under the Companies Act, 1956 along with one M s. Jai Balaji Sponge Ltd., secured the allotment of a companyl block known as Ardhagram Coal Block under the memorandum of the appellant dated 6th December, 2007, which was subsequently renewed on 24.2.2014.
Pursuant to the said allotment, the third respondent herein executed a mining lease in respect of the said companyl block in favour of the first respondent.
The legality of the various allotments of the companyl blocks became the subject matter of public interest litigation before this Court.
As a companysequence, an Ordinance came to be promulgated by the President of India known as the Coal Mines Special Provisions Second Ordinance, 2014 No.
7 of 2014 .
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2015_46.txt
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These special leave petitions arise from the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court made on 23.4.1996 in W.P. Nos.8274 and 8715/96.
An order was made by the Government on April 21 1936 in GOMS No.62 granting certain amount to the Director of Medical Education for expansion be the works in the Osmania General Hospital, Hyderabad.
Two generators were to be erected in the hospital.
The petitioner was required to submit the report on the estimates.
In furtherance thereof, the Petitioner submitted of the report to the Superintendent Engineer and tenders were called for.
It would appear that several people had submitted their tenders and the initial estimate was of Rs.15 lakhs and odd for one set of the generator.
Subsequently, it would appear that the estimate was increased to Rs.21 lakhs per set.
After companyducting preliminary investigation, the Lokayukta came to submit his interim order dated March 29, 1996 prohibiting purchase of the two sets and also by interim report dated April 6, 1996 directed the Government either to suspend the petitioner or to transfer him and to take similar action on the Superintendent Engineer as well.
The petitioner came to challenge the two orders in the above writ petitions.
In the writ petitions, the petitioner challenged the companystitutionality of Sections 3, 4, 7 and 12 of the Act as ultra vires Articles 14s 16, 19, 21, 226 and 311 of the Constitution of India.
He also challenged the validity of the interim report.
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1996_735.txt
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Shah, J. This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated February 21, 1997 in Criminal Appeal No.
395 of 1985 passed by the High Court of Gujarat whereby the Court partly allowed the appeal of the State and set aside the judgment and order dated January 31, 1985 rendered in Sessions Case No.85/84 by the Addl.
Sessions Judge, Junagadh acquitting the appellant and companyvicted him for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and imposed sentenced for life.
It is the prosecution story that original accused No.1 approached the father of PW2 Bhana Puna for rendering assistance for companystruction of house at Una district Junagadh.
Father of PW2 gave some amount, which resulted into close relationship between two families.
Thereafter, deceased Naran Puna had gone to Bombay for further studies in the year 1974 and stayed with the family of accused No.1.
It is alleged that accused No.1 was having five to six wives and Narmada was one of them with whom deceased developed some relations Hence deceased was thrashed by the accused and thereafter at the request of PW2 he was permitted to go to Una.
Subsequently, accused No.1 father of the appellant and appellant accused number2 hatched a companyspiracy at Bombay that the deceased Naran Puna, younger brother of PW2 be done to death on account of misconduct or misbehaviour of deceased with the wife of accused No.1.
In the present appeal, we are number required to companysider the evidence relating to the said part of the incident as the incident in question had taken place after ten year, on 17th July, 1984 between 3.00 to 4.00 p.m. on Una Veraval road.
It is the prosecution version that accused No.2 inflicted several knife blows on deceased, Naran Puna on account of enmity and ill will of accused number1 with the deceased.
PW2 Bhana Puna, brother of the deceased on receipt of the information at about 3.30 p.m. that his brother was done to death near the farm of Jaigurudev, rushed to that place where he found several persons among whom PW7 Babu Govind and PW11 Bhagwan Jana were present.
On inquiry, he learnt that Laxman Channa appellant had companymitted murder of deceased Naran.
He thereafter lodged FIR at 5.00 p.m. at Una Police Station.
The learned Addl.
Sessions Judge after recording the evidence of prosecution witnesses and on appraisal and assessment thereof came to the companyclusion that the prosecution case was number established beyond reasonable doubt, hence he acquitted the accused by giving benefit of doubt.
Against that judgment and order the appeal filed by the State Government was partly allowed and appellant was companyvicted as stated above.
That order is challenged in this appeal.
At the time of hearing of this appeal, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that Addl.
On the basis of the aforesaid information P.W. 2 lodged the FIR at 5.00 p.m. Accused number2 appellant was arrested and from his person extensively blood stained bush shirt, banian and other clothes were seized.
Bush shirt and banian companytained human blood A group, which was blood group of the deceased.
The Investigating Officer had prepared the seizure panchnama of the clothes and of the arrest of accused.
The said knife also companytained blood having A group.
For that purpose the High Court has relied upon the panch witness PW20, Bhika Lakhman, who was working as Electric Supervisor in Una sugar factory.
From the aforesaid evidence on record, in our view, it cannot be said that the High Court erred in relying upon some portion of the evidence of P.W. 7 who was cross examined by the prosecution.
It remains admissible in the trial and there is numberlegal bar to base his companyviction upon his testimony if companyroborated by other reliable evidence Re Bhagwan Singh State of Haryana 1976 1 SCC 389 and Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration 1976 1 SCC 727.
In the present case, apart from the evidence of P.W.7, the prosecution version that he saw that appellant was having knife in his hand and was quarreling with the deceased gets companyroboration from the evidence of P.Ws 11 and 12 to whom he disclosed the incident immediately.
On the basis of the said information, within one hour, FIR was lodged disclosing the name of the appellant as the person who has inflicted the knife blow.
Number of incised wounds are found as per the Postmortem report.
The prosecution version gets further companyroboration from discovery of Muddamal knife companytaining human blood Group A. Further the bush shirt and baniyan which were put on by the accused at the time of incident were having extensive blood stains which were also found companytaining human blood group A. Learned companynsel for the appellant, however, companytended that accused is also having blood Group A and that he was having injury on the thigh as per the evidence of the Doctor.
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1999_788.txt
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CIVIL APPEAL NO.684 OF 2003 WITH Civil appeal Nos.
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2007_686.txt
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civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 544 of 1963.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated july 16 1959 of madras high companyrt in second appeal number 513 of 1957.
v. viswanatha sastri s. s. javali and ganapathi iyer for appellants.
k. garg.
s. c. agarwal d. p. singh and m. k. rama murthi for the respondents.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bachawat j. sri sarangadevar peria matam of kumbakowas the inamholder of lands in kannibada zamin dindigul taluk madurai district.
in 1883 the then mathadhipathi granted a perpetual lease of the melwaram and kudiwaram interest in a portion of the inam lands to one chinna gopiya goundar the grandfather of the plaintiff respondent on an annual rent of rs.
the demised lands are the subject matter of the present suit.
since 1883 until january 1950 chinna gopiya goundar and his descendants were in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit lands.
in 1915 the mathadhipathi died without numberinating a successor.
since 1915 the descendants of chinna gopia goundar did number pay any rent to the math.
between 1915 and 1939 there was numbermathadhipathi.
one basavan chetti was in management of the math for a period of 20 years from 1915.
the present mathadhipathi was elected by the disciples of the math in 1939.
in 1928 the collector of madurai passed an order resuming the inam lands and directing full assessment of the lands and payment of the assessment to the math for its upkeep.
after resumption the lands were transferred from the b register of inam lands to the a register of ryotwari lands and a joint patta was issued in the name of the plaintiff and other persons in possession of the lands.
the plaintiff continued to possess the suit lands until january 1950 when the math obtained possession of the lands.
on february 18 1954 the plaintiff instituted a suit against the math represented by its present mathadhipathi and an agent of tile math claiming recovery of possession of the suit lands.
the plaintiff claimed that he acquired title to the lands by adverse possession end by the issue of a ryotwar patta in his favour on the resumption of the inam.
the subordinate judge of dindigul accepted the plaintiffs companytention and decreed the suit.
on appeal the district judge of madurai set aside the decree and dismissed the suit.
on second appeal the high companyrt of madras restored the judgment and decree of the subordinate judge.
the defendants number appeal to this companyrt by special leave.
during the pendency of the appeal the plaintiff respondent died and his legal representatives have been substituted in his place.
the plaintiff claimed title to the suit lands on the follwoing grounds 1 since 1915 he and his predecessors in interest were in adverse possession of the lands and on the expiry of 12 years in 1927 he acquired prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28 read with art.
144 of the indian limitation act 1908 2 by the resumption proceedings and the grant of the ryotwari patta a new tenure was created in his favour and he acquired full ownership in the lands and 3 in any event he was in adverse possession of the lands since 1928 and on the expiry of 12 years in 1940 he acquired prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28 read with art.
134 b of the indian limitation act 1908.
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1965_143.txt
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Bharat Sangal, P. Midha, Advs.
with her for the appellant A. Bobde, Sr.
S.D.Mudaliar, U.U. Lalit, Advs.,
with him for the Respondent J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court wad delivered JAGANNADHA RAO.
J. Leave granted.
These two Civil appeals have been failed by the appellant against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in P. No.
5105 and 5106 of 1994.
The respondent filed L.E. C. Suit No.
86/116 of 1979 for possession against the appellant of one room adjoining the kitchen on the ground floor of the bungalow known as Carmel View situated at 63, Mount carmel Road, Bandra W , Bombay and for arrears of paying quest charges of Rs.
2500/ till 31.12.1978 at Rs.
200/ per month and for mesne profits from 1.1.1979 till vacant possession is granted.
The appellant filed R.A.D Suit number 2041 of 1979, Small Causes Court, Bombay for a declaration that he was tenant in respect of the Bathroom.
According to the owner, the appellant was a paying Guest from February march 1971 of Bed Room No.
2 on an occupation charge of Rs.
120/ per month.
In December 1973, the appellant was married at Allahabad and before his wife joined him, executed a letter dated dated 31.1.1974 admitting that he was a paying guest and seeking permission to bring his wife, He was so permitted to use the dining hall also.
The occupation charges were increased to Rs.
200/ per month.
According to the appellant the respondent forcibly entered in the hall in October 1978.
The respondent gave a numberice dated 2.11.1978 revoking the permission granted to the appellant to occupy as paying guest.
the appellant sent a reply on 19.12.1978 and claimed he was licensee and did number claim that he was a tenant.
The respondent sent a rejoinder on 19.12.1978 and claimed he was licensee and did number claim that he was a tenant.
The respondent sent a rejoinder on 19.12.78.
Th Respondent filed an eviction case on 28.2.1979 as stated above and the appellant filed the other suit on 12.4.1979 for declaration that he was tenant.
The Trial Judge by judgment dated 27/28 6 1989 disposed of both suits by a companymon judgment holding that appellant was number a paying guest but was a tenant from the beginning.
The appellants suit was decreed and the respondents suit was dismissed.
The appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Bandra however allowed both appeals preferred by the respondent, by judgment dated 25.61994.
The appellant filed two writ petitions Nos.
5105 and 51.6 of 1994 and they were dismissed by the High Court on 22.4.1997.
These two appeals are filed by the appellant against the said judgments.
Learned senior companynsel for the appellant companytended that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the bed room No.3 and the dining hall, bathroom and pantry as a tenant, that the letter dated 31.11974 wherein appellant admitted he was a paying guest was obtained by the respondent by pressure, and that the respondent had admitted in his evidence that in 1978 79 he had informed the Bombay Municipal Corporation, in tax assessment proceedings that the appellant was a tenant to whom part of the ground floor was let at Rs.
200 as distinct from one by other in ground floor as paying guest at Rs.
20/ and this admission was number explained.
The appellate Court has found on a companysideration of the letter dated 31.1.1974 and other evidence adduced by parties that the appellant, to start with was a paying guest of bedroom No.3 even after appellants wife joined, that the appellants wife was permitted on companypassionate grounds to companyk in the pantry, that the hall was number given to the appellant when the charges were increased to Rs.
200/ P.M., and that the dining hall was in occupation or companytrol of the respondent for otherwise the respondent would number have been able to enter Bedroom No.2 on the leftside or the kitchen on the numberth, beyond the Bedroom No.3 that was being used by the appellant.
The plan shows that the front close verandah opens into the dining Hall, and on the left, there are Bed Room 1,2 and 3 one after the other and beyond Bedroom 3 is the kitchen etc.
The finding is therefore that the dining hall and kitchen etc.
and other Bed rooms 1,2 which were vacated by other paying guests were in the companytrol of the respondent and that the respondent did number dispossess the appellant from the hall as alleged.
So far as the statement of the appellant that he informed the Corporation that the portion was let to appellant was companycerned, it was observed by the first appellate Court that the appellant was number asked in Cross examination as to why he had so informed the Corporation and that, in any event, the letter dated 31.1.1974 executed by the appellant and other evidence showed that the real relationship of the appellant in respect of the room was as paying guest.
These findings arrived at by the appellate Court are findings of fact and were and liable to be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the companystitution of India.
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1997_1095.txt
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Deepak Gupta, J. Leave granted.
There were a number of other companymercial buildings and residences, including the residence of appellant Shankaranarayanan in this estate.
A companyplaint was sent by the Secretary of the Karnataka Public Service Commission on 14.05.2004 that, in the year 1900, the property had been transferred by the original owner Lancelot Ricketts in favour of the Dewan of Mysore.
Furthermore, numberstamp duty was paid on the sale deed and, therefore, it was companyplained that the sale was either totally illegal or that the sale was in favour of the State of Mysore and Beaulieu estate was number the personal property of the First Princess.
In the same companyplaint, it was also mentioned that, in the year 1956, the Government of Mysore acquired 6 acres of Beaulieu estate and, in those proceedings, Rajkumari Leelavathi Devi was numberified as the owner of the estate.
In the year 1959, some other portions of the estate were acquired and this time K. Basavaraj Urs was shown as the owner.
As a result of this companyplaint, summary proceedings under Section 67 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 for short the KLR Act were initiated against the occupants of the land.
Aggrieved by this action, one of the parties Smt.
Asha Chakko, who is appellant in Civil Appeal No.
4939 of 2017 arising out of SLP C No.
12595 of 2014 filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court, whereas the other parties filed appeals before the Appellate Tribunal.
The State of Karnataka preferred an appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge before the Division Bench of the High Court.
The appellant M. Sankaranarayanan applied for transfer of his appeal, which had been filed before the Appellate Tribunal, to the High Court.
This prayer was rejected by the Karnataka High Court.
Thereafter, the appellant approached this Court in SLP C No.
25034 of 2011 for transfer of his case.
This petition was allowed and the operative portion of the order reads as follows The appellant applied to the High Court for transfer of Appeal No.
690 of 2005, titled as M. Sankaranarayanan vs. Deputy Commissioner and others filed by him before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal KAT to the High Court for hearing the same along with Writ Appeal No.
643 of 2009.
The High Court dismissed the application.
While dismissing the application, the High Court observed that the appeal pending before the KAT has to be heard and decided by the Tribunal itself and it cannot be clubbed with the writ appeal.
643 of 2009, which is pending before the High Court, is broadly identical to the appeal which has been preferred by the appellant before KAT, we are of the view that the High Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by transferring the appeal pending before the KAT to itself to avoid multiplicity of arguments as well as the companyflict of judgments.
We, accordingly, allow the appeal and direct that the Appeal No.
690 of 2005, titled as M. Sankaranarayanan vs. Dy.
Commissioner, Bangalore and others pending before the KAT be transferred to the High Court for its hearing and disposal along with Writ Appeal No.
643 of 2009, titled as State of Karnataka and another vs. Asha Chakko and others.
The Registrar, KAT shall transfer the record and proceedings of Appeal No.
690 of 2005 to the High Court as expeditiously as may be possible and number later than four weeks from the date of receipt of companyy of this order.
No companyts.
The writ appeal filed by the State of Karnataka in the case of Smt.
Asha Chakko was allowed mainly on the ground that the writ petition was number maintainable, since the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy of approaching the Tribunal.
As far as transferred appeal of appellant M. Sankaranarayanan is companycerned, the High Court held that since the appeal had been filed before the Tribunal, it would be proper to remit it back to the Tribunal for decision.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Division Bench, these two appeals have been filed.
We have heard Shri K. K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Shri J. N. Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the State of Karnataka, at length.
On 06.08.1949, 12680 square yards, out of Beaulieu estate were acquired for a sum of Rs.1,95,000/ and the companypensation was paid to the First Princess.
It would be pertinent to mention that the First Princess married one Sri Kantharaje Urs in the year 1918 and they had a daughter Smt.
Another portion of Beaulieu estate was acquired in the year 1959 and companypensation was paid to K. Basavaraj Urs.
As Rajkumari Leelavathi Devi and K. Basavaraj Urs had numberchildren of their own, they had adopted one K.B. Ramachandraraj Urs, who became the owner of the property after the death of his parents.
He executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant M. Sankaranarayanan on 12.12.1973.
The entry in the Revenue Record was also made in 1973.
As far as the case of Smt.
Asha Chakko is companycerned, K.B. Ramachandraraj Urs sold a portion of the property to Smt.
M. Meenakshi Amma vide sale deed dated 15.04.1971.
M. Meenakshi Amma, thereafter, executed a will in favour of Dr. Ammu Nair, who was recorded as owner of that portion of the property.
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2017_164.txt
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2002 Supp 4 SCR 635 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted.
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2002_886.txt
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